

Calamity Cosmologies: Buddhist Ethics and the Creation of a Moral Community

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In this dissertation, I have adopted a style of transliteration for Pāli and Thai terms that is intended to make this work most accessible to students of Buddhism and Thai Studies. There are two different methods of transliteration used in this study. The first one relates to the body of the text. The other method pertains exclusively to my footnotes' citation of Tai Yuan passages from manuscripts.

In respect to this work's body, I have used the Pāli equivalents of Thai or northern Thai words in the case of discussing pan-Theravādin concepts. For proper names and terms in Thai, I have mainly followed the convention for transliteration commonly found in the scholarship on Thai Studies, with the exception of my phonetic transliteration of the word "*m̄yang*."

In the case of footnotes, the rules unique to this portion of the dissertation concern my phonetic transliteration of texts from northern Thai manuscripts. I follow Mary Haas's system found in her *Thai-English Student's Dictionary* (1964). I have made modifications to her system in terms of vowels and final-ending consonants.

One

Introduction

This dissertation is a study in Buddhist Ethics. It explores some Theravāda Buddhist texts that circulated from the nineteenth to early twentieth century in the areas of present-day northern Thailand and argues that they included stories about a community characterized by social oppression but at the same, still a moral community. Northern Thai Buddhist monks used story-telling in these texts as a way for developing an imagination of a new moral community defined by a morality of and for the oppressed. In this descriptive study on the Buddhist moral community envisioned in northern Thai literature, I explore how these compositions, which I refer to as “calamity-cosmology narratives” construct a group defined by a morality of the socially oppressed. In particular, I trace the contours of this moral community along three vectors: shared activities and interests, forms of moral address, and new relations to society’s ideals.

The line of investigation adopted in this dissertation presumes that northern Thai Buddhists found belonging to a religious and moral group to be a significant contour of the moral life. Although students of Buddhism have often tended to regard Buddhist Ethics as privileging the human goods of a better rebirth or *nibbāna*, evidence from northern Thailand suggests that membership in a group of virtuous individuals may be a human good just as important and worthy of pursuit as those other individually oriented ones. Scholarship on Buddhist Ethics, in general, has missed the significance of communal belonging to the moral life. As Frank Reynolds has noted,

“Though the charismatic quality of the community has perhaps been less emphasized in the study of Buddhism than in the study of other founded traditions, it has been present from the very beginning. ... The *Dhamma* which was actualized and experienced through the Founder’s preaching soon became actualized and experienced also in the common life he shared with his disciples” (F. Reynolds 1972: 23).

Scholars may have neglected to study the significance of the moral community in Buddhist Ethics, because they have tended to give primacy to moral reasoning, moral action, and agency, all of which tend to focus our attention on the individual person.¹ Moreover, students of Buddhist Ethics have tended to view moral life as basically a project of self-cultivation belonging to an individual’s life stream.² This interpretive orientation most likely came from the field of Comparative Religious Ethics for this field and that of Buddhist Ethics share a history, including a history of being interested in defining and classifying the general pattern of morality in particular social, cultural, and historical contexts. For example, students of Buddhist Ethics have variously argued for classifying the system of Buddhist Ethics as a example of Aristotelian teleological ethics (Keown 1992: 226-27; Harvey 2000: 50; Jayatilleke 1972: 67-68; Dharmasiri 1989: 27-28); as a Kantian deontological ethics (Harvey 2000: 50-51; Dharmasiri 1989: 27-28); as a consequentialist type of ethics (de Silva 1991: 62);³ as a form of utilitarianism (Kalupahana 1976: 61; Dharmasiri 1989: 24-27); as a type of virtue tradition (Whitehill 1994: 1; Swearer

¹ It should be noted, however, that in the field of Buddhist Ethics, there have been some scholars who have written about Buddhist social ethics and the place of society in this religion’s moral thought (for example, see *Buddhist Ethics Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society: An International Symposium* (1991); *Fundamental of Buddhist Ethics Buddhist Ethics* (1989); and *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A study in Buddhist Social Ethics* (1990). In addition, there have been studies on the concept of “sociokarma” done by Jonathan S. Walters and James P. McDermott (1984). The essays on sociokarma come closer to examining the relevance of a moral community to Buddhist Ethics than studies on Buddhist social ethics. In the latter case, we tend find studies on the Buddhist ethical point of view on certain social issues or social virtues such as filial piety.

² For example, Winston King writes, “Leaving aside momentarily the exact analysis of the Buddhist meaning of “self” we may note that the conception of ethics as consisting essentially of the perfection of the self by the self places the center of interest, the ultimate goal, and the means of development of the self unto perfection, squarely within the individual” (King 1964: 4).

³ In “Karma, Character, and Consequentialism,” Keown has written a review of the characterization of Buddhist Ethics as a consequentialist system (Keown 1996: 330-332).

1998: 71-72); and as including an instance of ethical particularism (Hallisey 1996).⁴

The field of Comparative Religious Ethics took shape prior to the emergence of Buddhist Ethics as a discrete sub-field in Buddhist Studies. The shape that Comparative Religious Ethics assumed developed in the context of a debate that took place in the early years of its formation. In particular, two books published in 1978 *Comparative Religious Ethics* by David Little and Sumner Twiss and *Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief* by Ronald Green were critical to a foundational disagreement that developed between philosophers and historians of religion both of whom engaged in the comparative study of religious ethics. The debate had to do with disciplinary perspectives and with what would count as the “proper context” for the interpretation of ethics cross-culturally.⁵ Although both philosophers and historians of religion investigate the connection of morality to religion as both a cross-cultural and cultural phenomenon, philosophers prefer to begin with a theoretical framework familiar to the type of analysis found in Western moral philosophy with the expectation that this would identify the theoretical context proper to interpretation. This generalizable starting point guides a philosopher’s comparative inquiry. Historians of religion and social scientists, on the other hand, insist upon beginning a comparative analysis from the ground up. This method requires a holistic description of a particular religious system of ethics that is built upon historical and cultural evidence, which by implication locates a religious ethical tradition within its practical context. Despite the philosopher’s preoccupation with a generalizable theory on morality and the

⁴ Schilbrack (1997) has written a critique of this position in “The General and Particular in Theravāda Ethics: A Response to Charles Hallisey.” His article generated a rejoinder from Hallisey (1997) in “A Response to Kevin Schilbrack.” Recently, Keown (2013) has reopened the debate on ethical particularism in “Some Problems with Particularism.”

⁵ Donald Swearer has written several essays on this debate. They include “Caught in the Belly of a Paradox: A Response to Ronald M. Green’s Review of the *Journal of Religious Ethics*,” “History of Religions,” and the introductory chapter to *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics*, which he co-wrote with Russell F. Sizemore. These works provide a detailed illustration of the position of a historian of religion in the debate over how to compare religious ethical traditions.

historian of religion's interest in particular cultural expressions of morality, they often both resort to the same vocabulary of moral agency, action, and reasoning when proceeding to state both a description and interpretation. For example, Donald Swearer, a historian of Buddhism, writes,

“Historians of religions argue that within the scope of religious ethics an account of moral action and moral reason that does not engage the cosmology in which it is set will be restricted; that is the picture justifying a particular course of action will be incomplete; and, of even greater significance, the symbolic web of meaning that informs moral agency will be lost” (Swearer 2005: 141).

Swearer's use of the terms “moral action,” “moral reason,” and “moral agency” illustrates the extent to which students of Buddhist Ethics rely on a theoretical orientation derived from Western moral philosophy. The above quote also suggests that the interaction between the two disciplinary perspectives of philosophers and historians has come to shape the main concerns of many studies on Buddhist Ethics, especially in so far as there is an emphasis on the individual moral agent and on how her action is guided by recourse to moral reasoning or cultural norms. This focus on individual agency, programs of action, and moral reasoning, however, may have contributed to the lack of studies on the idea of the moral community found in Buddhist moral thought. This dissertation seeks to redress some of that scholarly oversight.

Sources: Four Texts

Having presented the general topic and scholarly aim of this study, I now provide a brief description of this dissertation's textual sources. A more detailed discussion of the texts and the genre to which they belong will be found in Chapter Three of this work. For now, I present a background history of the texts that this dissertation explores. First, I will begin with basic information about the texts. Through this description of the textual sources of my study, I elaborate on my decision for focusing on the image of the moral community conveyed in this northern Thai literary genre.

The texts that are grouped together here on the basis of all of them including calamity-cosmology narratives are written in a northern Thai vernacular language known as Tai Yuan. Their authorship is anonymous.⁶ Originally, these texts were written on palm leaves in *Tham* script, a local script used exclusively for writing about religious topics.⁷ The main research materials for this study are copies of these palm leaf books that were made by the Social Research Institute (herein SRI), an archival institute located in Chiang Mai.⁸ For the title of works, I use the titles that are found in the SRI's (2529 B.E./1986 C.E.) catalog of manuscripts. With respect to the texts conveying a calamity-cosmology narrative, there are four texts that will be referred to in this study as *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*.

In terms of their content, the narrative of these four texts have in common a cosmological theme that brings them together them as a distinct literary genre. In particular, I designate these narratives as “calamity cosmologies,” because they provide an account of the 5,000-year period of degeneration in the *dhamma* (the teachings of the Buddha) that begins after the death of Gotama Buddha. Buddhaghosa, an Indian Theravādin commentator, in particular, wrote about this 5,000-year timetable in the fifth century C.E. in Sri Lanka has been associated with the transmission of this religious idea in the history of Theravāda.

Phuttha Tamnan

Phuttha Tamnan is framed as a teaching given by the Lord Buddha, in particular, a

⁶ This lack of authorial identification may be the case since we find in these narratives descriptions of the text as authored by either the Buddha or Indra. Although not having a sacred or divine authorship, the author's name of the folktale *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* is simply not given.

⁷ Given the fact that their authorship is unknown, we have only the name of the scribe, the book's copy date, and the name of the place where the book was copied.

⁸ The SRI is an archival center in Chiang Mai, Thailand, that houses the largest collection of manuscripts whose originals are palm leaf books from various temples located in northern Thailand.

teaching that he preached near the end of his life. Thus, *Phuttha Tamnan* defines itself in association with the Buddha's last sermon given in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* (D II 78-191). Unlike the canonical version, however, the version found in manuscripts from northern Thailand call the Buddha's final teaching an "ovāda" (exhortation). In *Phuttha Tamnan*, we are told that one day, Gotama Buddha peered into the future in order to see what the world will be like after he has departed from it. Looking into the 5,000 years following his death, the Buddha foresees a gradual increase in the number of human beings ruined by random disasters and a steady degeneration in his *sāsana* (religion) that culminates in its disappearance from the earth exactly 5,000 years after his death. The various catastrophes foreseen by the Buddha include starvation due to crop failure, plagues, despotic rule, and periods of incessant warfare. In one instance, the Buddha foresees peasants fleeing and abandoning their homes during wartime, which causes rice cultivation to fall into abeyance.⁹ In some texts, it is Ariya Metteyya who foresees this horrible future fate of humankind and seeks out Gotama Buddha for an explanation of it.

Ariya Metteyya is the name of the next Buddha. In Theravāda Buddhist thought generally, Gotama Buddha's *sāsana* is expected to end 5,000 years after his death. Buddhist mainstream cosmology holds that a future Buddha, Ariya Metteyya, will be born afterwards. This view of a Buddha to come and many Buddhas before complements Buddhism's notion of cyclic cosmic time. According to the mainstream cosmology of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition, the cosmos is subject to a cycle marked by a period of creation and expansion that is then followed by a period of contraction and destruction. Within this cycle of evolution and devolution lasting over eons, there are periods in which a Buddha is born in the world and establishes his own *sāsana*. The fact that Ariya Metteyya appears in the *Phuttha Tamnan*'s

⁹ *Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw 2 Phra Ong*, 1894 C.E./1256 C.S., 79.027.01N.004-004, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phra Caw Haay*, 1969 C.E./1331 C.S., 80.045.01N 053-053, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phra Caw Haay*, n.d., 79.026.01N 081-081, Social Research Institute.

narrative of a 5,000-year decline indicates that the notion of cosmic temporality as well as the notion of many Buddha-s penetrates the worldview expressed in these calamity-cosmology narratives. This framework of a 5,000-year cosmological devolution informs all of the texts considered in this dissertation. In addition, the theme of the importance of the Buddha's last *ovāda*, quite central to the narrative framework of *Phuttha Tamnan*, also appears in *Tamnan Phya In* and *Tamnan Thammikarat*. Therefore, my presentation of these calamity-cosmology texts as distinguished by four separate dominant narratives is not intended to obscure the fact that themes and ideas are shared across these texts such as the literary motif of the Buddha's final *ovāda*, the 5,000-year timetable, a belief in the future Buddha named Ariya Metteyya, and types of disasters prophesized to occur during the 5,000-years of degeneration for the *sāsana* and cosmos.

Tamnan Phya In

Indra rules over the entire assembly of gods found in the Buddhist cosmos. In *Tamnan Phya In*, he descends from the heavens and enters the realm of human beings in order to teach women and men how to save and protect themselves from multiple types of danger. In the course of his teaching, he prophesizes a string of horrible political events that will occur such as wars and the appearance of dishonest rulers who will cheat, rob, and hand down cruel forms of punishments for the northern Thai Buddhist serfs (*phray*).¹⁰ To help women and men, Indra provides in the text a set of magical chants in Pāli, *paritta-s*. Indra states that these *paritta-s* will protect people from the *mahā-yakkha-s* that he predicts will come and torment human beings. Moreover, *Tamnan Phya In* prescribes a path of moral action, appropriate for lay people, that consists of giving *dāna*, keeping the moral precepts (*sīla-s*), and cultivating loving kindness towards others (*mettā-bhavana*). This program for lay Buddhist action, however, is also found

¹⁰ In this dissertation, I translate the northern Thai word “*phray*” as “serf” and “peasant.”

repeated in all calamity-cosmology narratives. Unique to *Tamnan Phya In*'s account of this program of lay action is the promise that showers of gold, gems, rings, and husked and unhusked rice will rain from the sky for those who give *dāna*, keep the five moral precepts (*sīla*), and cultivate loving kindness towards others (*mettā-bhavana*). The moral didactic function of this genre as a whole is the promotion of these three practices. Indra also recommends that Buddhists tell others to copy his teaching and wrap it around the head as another form of protection. Distinctive to *Tamnan Phya In* is this claim that the text itself is a protective talisman. This depiction of a text as a talisman, however, can be found in other calamity-cosmology narratives outside of manuscripts of *Tamnan Phya In*.

Tamnan Thammikarat

The narrative of *Tamnan Thammikarat* revolves around one specific prediction to which other minor predictions are then connected. The main prophecy relates the rise of a *dhammika* king, a righteous monarch, who will usher in a golden age on earth. Under his rule, people's habits, behavior, and customs will return to the ways they had been in the past. Before the advent of this golden age, however, a variety of minor catastrophes are forecast for the world. These calamities arise as the result of the oppressive rule of bad Buddhist kings. These predictions of minor catastrophes fill most of the text. Thus, *Tamnan Thammikarat* mainly entails a portrait of society that gradually becomes evil and oppressive due to the rise of immoral Buddhist leaders after the death of the Buddha. It also includes a contrasting picture of a society that is just and in which all humans can flourish. This society arises as the result of a virtuous individual's ascension to the throne.

Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon

Unlike the other three texts, *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* has a character-driven plot and this

makes us aware of just how prominent chronology is in *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*. The narratives of these three calamity-cosmology texts always include a date according the system of a 5,000-year Buddhist era and a local 12-year cycle calendar system in their accounts of future events. For instance, *Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* states,

“1,700 after the Phra Tathāgata has nibbāna-ed, the kings and local lords of Jambudīpa will become arrogant, greedy, and [filled] with craving (*māna-lobha-taṇhā*). They will plunder small villages, big cities and take crops, rice fields, and territory from the border villages and cities” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* 1917 C.E./1279 C.S.: fol. 6).¹¹

Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon is arranged more like a folktale as it tells the biography of princess who runs away from home, ordains as a Buddhist nun, and then returns home to rescue her kingdom from evil *yakhha-s*.

Copy Dates

For this dissertation, I used manuscripts that were copied from 1811 C.E. to 1934 C.E., or according to the local dating system used in manuscripts and inscriptions, from 1173 C.S. to 1297 C.S. It appears that the peak period of transmission of *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* fell in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The earliest manuscript used is dated 1811 C.E. This date raises the possibility that northern Thai Buddhists began producing these works after the local kingdom, known as “Lanna,” won its independence.¹² Specifically, in the 1780’s the Lanna kingdom regained its

¹¹ *nay māy day khruu tathaagata gotama nibphaan pay day phan plaay 7 rōōy watsaa nan thaaw phya nay chomphuuthip can bang kæt maan lobha tanhaa cak khruup ching aw baan nōōy mýang yay ray naa khaam kheet pratheet mýang kan*

¹² In calamity-cosmology narratives, one finds many passages predicting the fall of Ayutthaya as well as a few references to the taking of war captives, battles with the Burmese (Man), Hō’, and foreigners, and Mangthra’s conquest of Chiang Mai, which began in 1558 C.E. I provide a few examples of such passages. During the year of *maw’s* seventh and eight months, the *Tamnan Phya Thammikarat*, predicts, “Sri Ayutthaya will experience decay during the seventh and eight months. Kings and provincial lords will die or run off. Enemies will come and burn down the principality” (*Tamnan Phya Thammikarat*, 1920 C.E./1283 C.S.: fol.1). *nay pii maw pii sii lamdap nay dýan sip thaaw phya cak taay phladphraak caak kan pay nay dýan 7 nan sri ayodhiya cak salaavat* [read: *salaay*]

sovereignty after having been under Burmese rule for two hundred years. The successful war campaign for independence began in Lampang through a series of locally lead revolts and a military alliance with the central Thai. Daniel Veidlinger has attributed the flurry of writing activity that occurred during Lanna's period of reconstruction to an anxiety that local writers felt over the loss of the writing traditions that had been incurred under Burmese rule. He states,

“I would add to this that the fragility of the oral tradition had been laid bare, which forced people to realize the importance of preserving texts in written form in order to preclude any future complete breaks in tradition. ... There were, then strong reasons for Kawila

tang tae dyan 8 cak klay rōōt dyan 8 thaaw phyā cak taaj phladphraak caak kan kœt sadtruu yōm fay may phaw hyan thuk pratheet phaasaa kœt ubaat

The same text states, “There is a ruling lord with an army of soldiers, elephants, and horses garrisoned in the east. He will come to fight in order to take slaves. He will fight two of our rulings lords who reside in that area” (*Tamnan Phyā Thammikarat*, 1920 C.E./1283 C.S.: fol. 4).

yang mii phyā ton 1 mii seenaa yuttha chaang maa nak phuu praap tang tawan ‘ōōk cak maa rop aw khaa phyā thang 2 ton raw tae nay rawaek yuu wan nan

Tamnan Phyā In, states, “When the *sāsanā* reaches 2209 years, [3][C]S 1209, the month of *ciang*, ‘ōōk *kham*, Hō’ enemies will come in three groups: the first numbering 5,130,000, the second numbering 430,000 and the third numbering 9600 (soldiers). The enemy captain’s name is “Thuvamsa.” Any city he fights, he is not defeated. When he marches, it is not fast. He has 1,000 big canons and 1,000 small canons. Kawila and foreigners come with 100,000 soldiers. Without a doubt, they will fight and strike at one another. Many [men will] die” (*Tamnan Phyā In*, 1920 C.E./1283 C.S.: fols. 3-4).

day 2000 200 phra watsa paay 9 tua dyan ciang ‘ōōk kham s̄yk hō’ kō’ cak maa 3 muu 51 saen 3 m̄j̄jn muu 1 4 saen 3 m̄j̄jn muu 1 300 ruam kan paay 9 m̄j̄jn paay 300 faw hua s̄yk ch̄j̄j waa thuvamsa m̄yang day rop kō’ bō’ phae m̄ya day hae kō’ bō’ fang ‘amok yay khaw mii phan 1 ‘amok nōōy khaw mii 1 phan kō’ maa nae thae kawila kulawaa kō’ maa saen 1 bō’ songsay cak maa rop kan fan kan taay maak nak lae

Tamnan Phyā Tham states, “Lord Mangthra had much fiery splendor. In the year *kat khlay*, he conquered the cities of Ayutthaya and M̄yang [Vieng] Can. He took 183,000 war captive families of Lao ethnic descent to Hongsa that day. In the year *luang say*, Lord Mangthra died. The Lao war captives along with their king and queen living in Hongsa went back home. [Mangthra] had gathered war captives from the outer *m̄yang-s* including Phayao. In the year *pæk set* month ‘ōōk 8 *kham*, when he herded the Phayao people, the monks and twenty families belonging to the Phra Caw Ton Luang fled. When he devastated M̄yang Can, leaving not a single person remaining, the monks took this legend [of the Phra Caw Ton Luang] to M̄yang Canthaburi” (*Tamnan Phyā Tham*, 1927 C.E./1279 C.S.: fol. 13).

caw mangthraa mii teet nak pay aw ‘ayodhiya m̄yang can day nay pii kat khlay wan nan kwaan aw laaw m̄ya way yang hongsa day saen 8 m̄j̄jn 3 phan khrua wan nan lae lun nan maa th̄j̄ng pii luang say caw mangthraa taay maa th̄j̄ng pii pæk seet laaw m̄ya yuu hongsa kh̄j̄jn caw faa kap mia nii maa rōōt phun cha lae kwaan aw m̄yang nōōk thang muan maa rōōt phayaaw pii pæk seet dyan ‘ōōk 8 kham kwaan aw chaaw phayaaw lae chaaw wat phra caw ton luang thang saaw khrua nan nii m̄ya m̄yang can siang bō’ lōō sak khon chaaw wat day phaa maa ph̄j̄jn tamnan pay tok sia m̄yang canthaburii phun nan.

and his descendants to wish to rebuild the Buddhist literary culture of Lan Na alongside its physical infrastructure. Such actions would have helped to strengthened their position as rulers able to uphold the religion and would have been a strong expression of Lan Na's unique cultural identity" (Veidlinger 2006: 146).

In other words, Burmese domination was seen as having disrupted the literary activities of the northern Thai Buddhist *sangha* (monastic order). Once foreign rule had ended, northern Thai monks became profoundly concerned with composing literature in written form, according to Veidlinger. I would add that, somewhat surprisingly, northern Thai monks not only wrote new compositions as part of their efforts to rebuild the region's literary and religious cultures, but they evoked the continuing fragility of northern Thai society's moral community in their repeated depictions of the contrast between a state of society which is immoral and barely habitable and another state of society which is just and desirable. Both of these images of society figure prominently in *Tamnan Thammikarat* and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* especially, but they are found in other works of calamity-cosmology.

Scribe, Patron, and Provenance

As is well known, a manuscript's colophon often contains information about its scribe, patron, provenance and date of being copied. According to the manuscripts used in this dissertation, both monastic and lay scribes copied these texts. Lay Buddhists having no outstanding prestigious social rank sponsored these books.

In terms of provenance, most of the manuscripts appear to have come from temples located in the city of Chiang Mai. A large number also came from Chiang Mai's countryside, in particular the present-day provinces of Sankhampaeng, Sansai, Saraphi, and Chiang Dao. Outside of Chiang Mai, which was the political center of the Lanna kingdom, one finds a few manuscripts from the following northern Thai cities: Lamphun, Lampang, Mae Hong Song, Chiang Rai, and Phayao. Based on their temple-provenance, we can conclude that these books

were shared amongst the Chiang Mai, Yong, Chiang Saen, and perhaps even Shan (Ngiao) monastic lineages (Sommai 2518 B.E./1975 C.E.).

Although these manuscripts do provide us with dates and sites of transmission, there may have been many other manuscripts of texts from this genre that have not survived or were not included in the SRI's archival collection. Therefore, I tentatively state that this literature was the product of a northern Thai Buddhist monastic order and its literary activities during the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries.¹³

Geographical Spread outside of Lanna

Similar versions of these texts are found in neighboring Theravādin kingdoms where they have been written in other local languages. The regional reception of this genre may be attributed to the fact that Buddhaghosa's 5,000-year timetable of devolution was known to the entire Theravādin world of Asia by the time of these texts' emergence and diffusion across the region. Thus, one finds a range of vernacular genres of calamity-cosmology narratives in the Theravādin communities of Laos and Cambodia. In the case of Burma, my research has only uncovered a tradition of prophetic sayings. In this section, I will briefly document the regional spread of this particular type of Theravādin literature.

With respect to Laos, Justin McDaniel (2008) has argued that the premodern manuscript cultures of Lanna and the northwestern Lao principalities share a very similar Buddhist worldview and religious ethos due to having a long history of borrowing texts from one another.¹⁴ For example, the Pāli text *Jinakālamālī* states that the Lanna king Phya Kaew had

¹³ According to Harald Hundius, the Social Research Institute opened in 1981 and today houses more than 4,000 texts with the "the majority belonging to secular fields of knowledge such as traditional law, customs, astrology, history, medicine" (Hundius 1990: 16).

¹⁴ In addition to McDaniel, Iijima (2009) has similarly stated that "the cultural region of *Tham* script manuscripts" was not a stable literary culture but rather a fragmentary one (Iijima 2009: 23-26). *Tham* script was used for the

monks deliver a sixty-volume copy of the *Tipiṭaka* to the king of Lan Sang in 1523. Thus, it is not surprising to find manuscripts bearing a similar title and text in these two local Buddhist cultures. Based on a survey of the digitized Lao manuscripts found at the website www.laomanuscripts, I have found some evidence for Lao versions of *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, and *Tamnan Thammikarat*. In fact, we find the oldest manuscript for texts of this genre at this website, namely the *Tamnan Phanya Intha* copied in 1802 C.E./1194 C.S. With respect to *Tamnan Phya In*, I found five manuscripts in the Lao language copied between 1802 C.E. and 1973 C.E. Although all five manuscripts are currently located in Luang Prabang, one must rely on a colophon to determine the palm leaf manuscript's original provenance. Two of the five Lao manuscripts for *Tamnan Phya In* bear the name “*Katha Tamnan Intha Caw Fa Samang Kham*,” and the other three are called, “*Tamnan Phanya Intha*.”¹⁵ As for examples for a Lao version of *Phuttha Tamnan*, we have manuscripts, titled, “*Tamnan Ho*,” “*Tamnan Pha Mettai*,” “*Tamnan Pha Mettainya*,” “*Tamnan Ho Wong*,” “*Tamnan Nithan Pha Bat That Phra Caw Liap Lok*,” and “*Tamnan Nithan Pha Caw Song Pha Ong*.” In the SRI's collection of Lanna manuscripts, there are found the similarly titled manuscripts of *Tamnan Hō*,¹⁶ *Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw Song Phra Ong*, *Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok*, *Tamnan Phra In lae Ariya Metteyya*, and *Tamnan Phra Caw Ariya Metteyya*. The Lao versions of *Phuttha Tamnan* were copied from 1816 C.E. to 1921 C.E. and today can be found in Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Sainyabuli Province. Finally, this digital Lao manuscript collection has examples of *Tamnan Thammikarat* as evidenced in the few copies of a work, titled, “*Tamnan Phanya Thammikalat*.” Only one manuscript bears a copy date, namely that of 1850 C.E. Most of these manuscripts belong to a collection located in Luang

purposes of religious writing by Theravādins from the present-day areas of Laos, northern Thailand, and the Shan states of Burma as well as Sipsongpanna, which is located in southwestern China.

¹⁵ I have followed this website's spelling of Lao titles.

Prabang.

In addition to this online manuscript collection, Peter Koret has written about this Lao genre, which he refers to as “Buddhist prophetic literature.” According to Koret, these literary works circulated from the nineteenth to early twentieth century in response to the crumbling of the traditional Lao polity that began in the late seventeenth century with the breakup of the Lan Sang kingdom. With respect to the nineteenth century, the central Thais’ sacking of Vientiane in the 1828 caused the Lao kingdoms to further disintegrate. In addition, millennial rebellions occurred in the Mekhong valley during the nineteenth century and continued through the twentieth century. The largest uprisings occurred in 1901 and 1902 and were led by Ong Keo and Ong Man. Their followers believed these two rebel leaders to be a *phuu mii bun* (a person of great merit), a local term used for a holy man. These movements were fueled by prophecies of the arrival of a *dhammika* king. These predictions were transmitted orally and in written form. In other words, Buddhist prophetic literature was instrumental to these peasant political activities.

According to Koret, Buddhist prophetic literature arose in the Lao kingdoms in response to a disruptive period in political history and it also “anticipated modernization and its consequences” (Koret 2007: 143). In other words, Koret finds that Theravādin monastic writers composed works that were structured around the 5,000-year framework of devolution for three purposes. First, these works helped Buddhists make sense of profound political changes that resulted in radical changes to the social life of the period. A second purpose was related to millennial movements of the time and these compositions served to stir up disaffection against state power among peasants. Third, these texts engendered a belief in the coming of a messianic leader (i.e. *dhammika* king) who would deliver peasants from economic and political hardships. Some works of Buddhist prophetic literature also circulated in the mid-twentieth century in Laos.

With respect to the genre as a whole, however, Koret concludes that it served as a form of socio-political commentary (Koret 2007: 156).

In Cambodian Buddhist literature, similar calamity-cosmology narratives are referred to as “*Buddh Daṃṇay*,” which is a Khmer phrase that is equivalent to the central Thai phrase “*phuttha tham nay*” (*phuttha tham nway* in Tai Yuan). In both cases, the phrase translates as “the Buddha prophesizes.” In fact, in parts of northern Thailand today, one can find cheaply-produced pamphlets in which there are predictions made by the Buddha. These books typically bear the title “*Phuttha Tham Nay*.”

Like Koret, Anne Hansen connects the circulation of *Buddh Daṃṇay* in Cambodia to local millennial movements. In the Cambodian territories, periodic rebellions fueled by a Theravādin belief in the imminent arrival of a *dhammika* king arose in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and continued to erupt until the end of the same century. The repeated military incursions of the central Thai and Vietnamese military precipitated the political crises that gave rise to these millennial uprisings. This political instability influenced and shaped the religious ethos of nineteenth century Cambodian Buddhist society. In general, it was a time of disquiet (Hansen 2007: 45-68). Thus, one often finds in *Buddh Daṃṇay* an expression of a moral crisis coupled with “a longing for the restoration of idealized conceptions of meaning and order,” according to Hansen (Hansen 2007: 63).¹⁶

In the case of millennialism in Burma, the messianic king who augurs the coming of Metteyya is known as a “Setkya-Min.” These rebellions entailed prophecies revolving around a future king, as in the case of Laos and Cambodia. Moreover, these prophecies were tied to the belief in the decline of the *dhamma* (Sarkisyanz 1965: 155). Although historians have documented the various rebels that were rumored to be a Setkya Min such as the peasant leader

¹⁶ Bernon (1994; 1998) has written and translated one work from this genre of *Buddh Daṃṇay*.

of an anti-British rebellion named “Saya San” who was active from 1930 to 1932, they have not written much about the actual content of the prophecies (Sarkisyanz 1965; Mendelson 1975; Adas 1979; Aung-Thwin 2011). In the case of Burma, it is not yet possible, given the present state of research, to be sure whether or not this local Buddhist culture produced songs or writings of a calamity-cosmological character similar the ones found in the kingdoms of northern Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.

19th century Millenarianism in mainland Southeast Asia

Across Theravādin mainland Southeast Asia, there were sporadic and short-lived millenarian movements led by holy men during the nineteenth century. In Burma and the ethnically Lao area of northeastern Thailand, uprisings led by a holy man occurred in the twentieth century as well. In the ethnic Lao areas of northeastern Thailand, a pattern to millennial movements emerged. It consisted of prophecies sung by troubadours or written on palm leaf and practices of invulnerability. The prophecies mainly predicted the coming of a messianic leader and its coinciding minor predictions of social upheaval and oppression caused by bad Buddhist kings. According to the Theravādin belief in the 5,000-year timetable, the ascension of a *dhammika* king would usher in the restoration of an idealized social order and be a sign indicating that the future Buddha named Metteyya would soon be take birth in the world of humans.¹⁷

In northern Thai Buddhist culture, a messianic leader was called either a “*ton bun*” (fount of merit) or a “*thammikarat*.” Evidence for millennial thinking in this local Buddhist culture can be adduced from the presence of calamity-cosmology narratives that circulated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like its Theravādin neighbors, rumors of a *dhammika* king’s

¹⁷ On the prominence of Metteyya in northern Thai Buddhist culture, von Hinüber writes that after 1700 C.E. the wish to be born in the time of Metteyya was more frequently expressed in palm leaf writings.

imminent rise to power were widely disseminated. In particular, it appears that some northern Thai Buddhists spread rumors that a local monk named “Khruubaa Sriwichay” (1878-1938) was a *ton bun*, a messianic leader. Khruubaa Sriwichay, however, did not actually inspire a holy man rebellion.

When one takes into account the regional presence of calamity-cosmology narratives in a variety of vernacular languages, it appears that this literature was at least associated with, if not the source for a Theravādin millennial ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During this period, common to the Buddhist cultures of this region was the circulation of texts that included a prediction that a future king would soon rise to power and restore society to its idealized notions of a moral and social order, Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable for the decline of the *dhamma*, and the expectation that Metteyya Buddha would be born shortly after the rise of this prophetic *dhammika* king.¹⁸ These texts also all have an emphasis on the importance of a moral community for the possibility of well-lived human lives.

Calamity cosmology’s narrative image of two societies, one immoral and the other just, allowed Buddhists who read these works to entertain a range of sentiments, including ones that could spark a holy man revolt and others that could lead to a silent and weak protest against northern Thai society’s status quo. Rather than reducing these narratives only to a millennial historical context, I explore how these texts make vociferous claims about the loss of moral order and suggest ways for rethinking and remaking a moral community out of disorder. Through literary representations of a moral community, northern Thai Buddhists were given the possibility of seeing that contemporary northern Thai society did not correlate with the moral community, as it should be, a denial that would be consistent with millennial thinking. With that

¹⁸ Saw Tun has written about the local Burmese tradition of prophetic sayings known as “*tabaun*.” On their role in history, he writes, “At almost every milestone of Burmese history events have been marked by omens and prophetic saying” (Tun 2002: 75). He notes that troubadours transmitted these prophecies.

possibility, Buddhist peasants were given the resources to say that their current rulers were bad Buddhist kings and perhaps rebel under a holy man leader. Another possible reading and the one undertaken in this dissertation considers that while these texts promise that a *dhammika* king will appear and put an end to this currently immoral society, these narratives were more concerned to address the immediate conditions of society's oppressive hierarchical structure. It was simply not enough to fuel millennial dreams of a future just society. Northern Thai Buddhist peasants experienced through literature a distinctly ethical albeit tragic situation engendered by the historical phenomenon of social oppression in a culture where the concept of power itself was defined through Buddhist moral thought and symbolism.

Text and Ethnographic Context

Having described the textual sources for this study, it is now necessary to explain the context against which I read them. First, it is important to note that I do not adopt the same historical millennial context that previous scholars have used to read and interpret Lao Buddhist prophetic literature or *Buddh Damṇay*. Instead, I read these texts against a broad “ethnographic” context. Gananath and Ranjini Obeyesekeres’ concept of intermediate texts recommends that a student of calamity-cosmology narratives consider these didactic pieces of literature along the lines of sermons meant to address “the peasant living in the world of economic want and hardship,” in particular peasants living in northern Thai society during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Obeyesekere and Obeyesekere 1990: 321). On the character of Buddhist Ethics conveyed through intermediate texts, the Obeyesekeres write,

“Buddhist values do enter this world, but they are not the lofty values such as compassion that quenches vengeance but the more practical values of duty, obedience, and merit—all of which have a situational base” (Obeyesekere and Obeyesekere 1990: 321).

Specifically, the approach of the Obeyeskeres to Sinhala intermediate texts suggests the possibility of reading northern Thai calamity-cosmology narratives as containing lessons in how to behave while dealing with the exigencies found in peasant life.

David Morris has stated that in literature suffering “is not a raw datum...but a social status that we extend or withhold” (Morris 1996: 40). Morris’s statement indicates that any study of a literary representation of human suffering ought to pay attention to the image of sufferer. Not only can calamity-cosmology narratives be considered to be literature on human tragedy but they also can be viewed as a Buddhist literature on the life of a peasant. In this northern Thai literature, the face of suffering is that of the Buddhist serf (*phray*). Morris suggests that studying a literary representation of human suffering entails trying to understand the meaning behind the image of the sufferer that a writer has chosen to render and bring to life through literature. In other words, the calamity-cosmology texts themselves suggest the point of the Obeyeskeres, namely, that we should read Buddhist intermediate literature according to its peasant ethnographic context. In the next section, I demonstrate how calamity-cosmology narratives raise the issue of the moral lives of Buddhist serfs and place it at the forefront.

Calamity Cosmology as a Buddhist peasant ideology

In their calamity-cosmology narratives, northern Thai Buddhist monks have selected the peasant (*phray*, in Thai) as the face of human misfortune, as previously stated. Consequently, I choose to read and interpret these texts according to the general social context of Buddhist peasants living in northern Thai society during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The re-imagining and rethinking of the moral community in these texts occurs, in part, through the manner in which these narratives represent a process and disordered cosmology that is in a dissonant counterpoint with an ordered cosmology. In mainstream Theravāda Buddhist

cosmological thought such as that found in the *Three Worlds According to King Ruang* (*Traiphum Phra Ruang*, in Thai) a Thai cosmological work written by Phya Lithai, a Sukhothai king, in 1345 C.E.,¹⁹ the universe consists of three planes of existence: one of formlessness, form, and desire. The creatures living in the cosmos are broken down into six types of destinies (*gati*): the creatures who live in heaven, humans, animals, *preta-s*, *asura-s*, or hell-sufferers. According to the *Dhamma* (Law) and the principle of *kamma*, human beings in the course of their *saṃsāric* cycles of rebirth through good acts move up in the cosmos towards the heavenly realms and through immoral acts move downwards towards the hellish dens of misery and woe. Beings are continually reborn in a cycle of rebirths known as *saṃsāra* and hence, they are constantly journeying through the cosmos. Only through the achievement of *nibbāna* can a person escape from their individual *saṃsāric* cosmos and the cosmos. The *Three Worlds According to King Ruang*'s cosmology represents an ordered cosmology with which calamity cosmology's representation of a process and disordered cosmos is in tension.

Belief in this ordered cosmology was central to thinking about the organization of society in the pre-modern Theravādin cultures of the Thais, Burmese, Lao, and Cambodians. In this study, I refer to this cosmological scheme as "Three Worlds" in recognition that the fourteenth century Sukhothai text represents only one textual version of this cosmology. The *Three Worlds* depicts the workings of the universe and social world as governed by the law of *kamma*. According to *kamma* theory, certain human actions have the capacity to produce *kammic* fruits, that is, consequences of action that will come to bear in an actor's future life. As a consequence

¹⁹ Vickery (1974) argues against this date for the *Three Worlds*'s composition. In Thai Buddhist Studies, there has been little investigation done on cosmological texts, with the exception of the few articles written on the *Three Worlds* in English. They include the works done by Coedès (1957); Vickery (1974); C. Reynolds (1976); Reynolds and Reynolds (1982); Keyes (1989); Ivarsson (1995); Jackson (2002); and Thanet (2008). Although the *Three Worlds According to King Ruang* was originally composed in central Thailand, the Social Research Institute has preserved a number of northern Thai manuscript witnesses of it.

of one's *kammic* past, one is born with a store of *kammic* fruits (*kammavipāka*) that is a mixture of merit (*puñya*) and de-merit (*pāpa*), which has correspondingly accrued as the results of the good and wicked actions performed in previous lives. As a theory of causality, *kamma* explains that an individual's current material circumstances such as wealth, beauty, and social status are the results of one's ledger of *kamma* that has been accrued as the consequential fruits of past *kammic* actions about which one knows nothing.

The Three Worlds' cosmology also entails a vision of a just Buddhist society that is made up of a collection of individuals that are hierarchically stratified into different social statuses. This ranking of individuals is also the result of the law of *kamma*. For example we find that in the premodern period, a Three Worlds cosmology gave symbolic form and a rationale to the Buddhist state. The state consisted of the king and his subjects who existed in a hierarchically ordered social body. The king having the highest rank in society was believed to be the holder of the greatest amount of merit among living human beings. Through this ideology of social hierarchy, Three Worlds' ordered schematization for the cosmos and society served to legitimize royal power in the premodern Buddhist communities of Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. This mainstream Three Worlds cosmology valorized and vindicated Buddhist ethical practices by affirming that those persons who held a high social standing implicitly held a better *kammic* record that had been accomplished during past lives. Attributing one's current social standing to the workings of the law of *kamma*, the Three Worlds's ideology encouraged lay Buddhists to live a morally good life for the sake of improved well-being in future lives. The Three Worlds's portrayal of the cosmos and society sought to convince Buddhists that the performance of morally good actions would be rewarded in the future in some concrete social form. Also, the Three Worlds' ideology compelled Buddhists to view leaders as exemplary individuals in terms

of their morality. Thus, the Buddhist king was regarded as a source for moral authority. After all, according to the Three Worlds's cosmological thinking, an individual was born into the rank of a king due to having the most bountiful store of merit (*puñya*) among contemporary human beings, as previously stated. By implication, Buddhist serfs and slaves were guaranteed to have kings, local lords, and masters who would be righteous, compassionate, and benevolent patrons due to having a greater store of merit.

A critical counterpoint to this vision of an ordered cosmology is the vision of the calamity-cosmology narratives. In this literary representation of peasants suffering, there is a reaction to the Three Worlds' idealized vision of a just hierarchical society. These calamity-cosmology narratives not only speak to an individual's experience of being a Thai Buddhist serf, but these stories also address and problematize the idea that Buddhist society as it is found actually constitutes a moral community. They do so by explicitly being in counterpoint to the ordered cosmology's ideology of legitimate social hierarchy.

Northern Thai calamity cosmologies can be considered to be an adaptation of the Three Worlds's tripartite cosmography and six types of *gati-s*. The main alteration made to the Three Worlds lies in the difference between calamity-cosmology narratives' 5,000-year timetable of decline that is absent from the Three Worlds. The idea of a 5,000-year process cosmology most likely began to circulate in mainland Southeast Asia after the importation of the Sinhala Mahāvihāra monastic lineage to the Burmese kingdom of Pagan in the eleventh century; the Thai principality of Sukhothai in the thirteenth century; and to Lanna, the northern Thai kingdom, in 1371 and again in 1430. Through the implantation of this Sinhala monastic lineage, in other words, Buddhaghosa's timetable for a 5,000-year decline in the *dhamma* would have become known among those Buddhists of Southeast Asian Theravādin societies. It seems that the

northern Thai writers of calamity-cosmology narratives *modified* Buddhaghosa's 5,000-year process cosmology in order to starkly portray the current age as a time when the social order does not harmonize with the moral order of the universe.²⁰ For instance, calamity-cosmology narratives depict kings and local lords oppressing the peasants and judges them to be an evil ominous indication that the law of *kamma* has been compromised. According to the law of *kamma* as found in the Three Worlds' ideology, peasants rank lower than those men in positions of power due to having a lesser amount of merit (*puñya*). These northern Thai texts, however, make it clear that the moral order undergirding society's hierarchical organization of human relationships and statuses has been lost. In particular, the texts often state that the virtuous will suffer, while the wicked will triumph. For example, *Tamnan Maak Nam Chadok* states, "The virtuous carry a pole-shaft. The just wicked go [about]." (*Tamnan Maak Nam Chadok* 1870 C.E./1232 C.S.: fol. 12).²¹ *Tamnan Phya Tham* similarly states, "Those of virtuous hearts (walk around) with only a pole-shaft. Those who are wicked drive around in carts" (*Tamnan Phya Tham* 1901 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 5).²² As for another example, *Tamnan Lokahaani* states, "Listen Ānanda, those having a virtuous heart will carry pole-shafts. In all the kingdoms, those having a

²⁰ According to the calamity-cosmology narratives of northern Thailand, catastrophes will increasingly come to characterize the times during the third millennium of Buddhaghosa's 5,000-year timetable of degeneration (or Buddhist Era). Lagirarde notes that these texts circulated during the Buddhist Era of 1500-2500. He points out that for the original readers of these works, they would view the predictions about the third millennium as events that belonged to the not-so distant past, the contemporary period, or imminent future. In almost all calamity-cosmology narratives except for the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*, most of the occurrences foretold fall in the period of the third millennium of the Buddhist Era. Thus, the picture of a morally bankrupt society that appears in the third millennium speaks of the current state of society that existed for the readers of these texts. Lagirarde also observes that northern Thais filled the third millennium with a history of political instability that is not found in Buddhaghosa's original narrative of 5,000-year decline in the Buddha teachings (*dhamma*) (Lagirarde 2007: 71). He writes, "*Il n'est pas fait allusion ici à une disparition des textes bouddhiques mais plutôt à une instabilité politique génératrice de conflits. ... On voit donc comment le tamnan réajuste la prediction de Buddhaghosa afin d'être conforme aux données historiques alors plausibles ou connues*" (Lagirarde 2007: 71).

²¹ *khon bun cak day thÿy haap khon baap pay bō' daay*

²² *khon cay bun day haap khon cay baap khii yaan wua*

wicked heart will have a high status.” (*Tamnan Lokahaani* 1925 C.E./1245 C.S.: fol. 52).²³ This same text says, “Those who are wicked will be reborn as good people. Those with wealth will become powerful. Those who are [born into the] lineage of serfs will be nobles. Those with a virtuous heart will have little land. Those with wicked hearts will have more than a 100 or 100,000 [ray] in land” (*Tamnan Lokahaani* 1925 C.E./1245 C.S.: fol. 51).²⁴ Both the images of a pole-shaft and landed property portray a difference in wealth and its correlation with an ideology of merit. The pole-shaft, strikingly, has been visualized as an emblem of the grinding poverty and hardships that Buddhist serfs must endure.

In addition to passages about the miserable lot of the virtuous, some calamity-cosmology narratives relate predictions about a righteous king (i.e., *dhammikarāja*) who will be born into a family having a low social status. For instance, *Tamnan Phya Thammikarat* says, “There is a king who knew of merit and de-merit in his previous lives. He [will] be born as a Thai serf. He has a virtuous heart” (*Tamnan Phya Thammikarat* 1920 C.E./1283 C.S.: fol. 4).²⁵ A similar story is given for a *dhammika* king in *Tamnan Khun Thammikarat 5 Phra Ong*. It states, “There is a *phyā* named “Srī Sudhammasokarāja. He will be born in the city of Sāvathi. He will be the son of beggars. He raises cattle for a living” (*Tamnan Khun Thammikarat 5 Phra Ong* 1885 C.E./1248 C.S.: fol. 3).²⁶ The same text continues, “There is a man Hongsaawadi who makes a living by begging. Later on, he will be called “Phanitchaa Thammikarat” (*Tamnan Khun Thammikarat 5*

²³ *duu raa ‘anon khon fuung cay bun than kam haap fuung cay baap ca praakot mii yot thua ‘aanaa*

²⁴ *khon fuung raay cak kæt pen dii khon fuung mii sombat cak day pen yay chya phray phuu phop cak day pen khun fuung cay bun thaw mii khwaen nōy khon fuung caj baap mii khwaen maak kwaa rōy kwaa saen*

²⁵ *phyā phuu ruu bun ruu baap chaat kōn day kæt pen thay nōy phuu l yuu kō’ cay bun nak*

²⁶ *yang cak mii phyā ton l chyy waa sii suthammasogkarat cak kæt maa nay myang saavatti nakhōn pen luuk thugkata khō kin caang thaen liang chiiwit duay an liang ngua thaen thuk myā lae*

Phra Ong 1885 C.E./1242 C.S.: fols. 3-4).²⁷

In calamity-cosmology narratives, one also finds the mainstream view that associates having merit (*puñya*) with a high social status and having de-merit (*pāpā*) with a low social standing. For example, *Tamnan Maak Nam Chadok* says, “[T]hey always committed sins (i.e., de-merit). Due to having lived in such a manner, they will be poor in a next life” (*Tamnan Maak Nam Chadok* 1870 C.E./1232 C.S.: fol. 3).²⁸ Rather than reading and interpreting calamity-cosmology narratives as an inversion of the ideals upheld in the Three Worlds, I consider calamity-cosmology narratives to be in dialogue with the Three Worlds’ ideology of a merit-based social hierarchy. As a consequence of this interplay, one encounters contradictory views in the *Tamnan Maak Nam Chadok* that were just cited. Here, one finds the cosmological conviction that an individual’s low social status comes from one’s bad *kammic* ledger and the opposite view—the cosmological belief that the virtuous in the age of decline will walk about carrying a pole-shaft, as previously mentioned. *Tamnan Maak Nam Chadok*, in particular, and calamity-cosmology narratives, in general, complicates the Three Worlds’ mainstream vision of a moral universe and just society by refracting it from the perspective of serfs (*phray*).

Due to the fact that it was difficult to be sure that one’s invisible store of merit (*puñya*) corresponded with one’s present social standing, Buddhists indeed at times must have been provoked to question and puzzle over the reality of a morally structured society especially during times when the lords did not rule either effectively or justly. Such a state of society would indicate a crisis for the moral community. It seems that historically northern Thai writers produced and transmitted literary images of Buddhists living in a morally questionable world in

²⁷ *yang mii luuk chaaw hamsaavati nakhōn phuu l thian yōm pay kratham kaan kin caang thaam liang chiiwit phaay lun praakot waa phantichaa thammikarat*

²⁸ *thaw yuu kratham baap yuu cay cay maa liang chiiwit haeng ton heet dang an khaw kæt maa nay chaat nii luat day pen khon thuk ray khen phya an lae*

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to speak to “the peasant living in the world of economic want and hardship” (Obeyesekere and Obeyesekere 1990: 321). More than this, these stories appear to forge a sense of a moral community in spite of worldly conditions. By placing Buddhist serfs as the reader “in front of the text,” these literary representations of human suffering gave rise to a moral community for marginalized members of northern Thai society. I borrow the phrase and idea of “in front of the text” from Paul Ricoeur who clarifies “the unique referential dimension the work of fiction and poetry raises” (Ricoeur 2007: 86). On this distinct referential capacity of fiction, Ricoeur writes,

“If we can no longer define hermeneutics in terms of the search for the psychological intentions of another person which are concealed *behind* the text, and if we do not want to reduce interpretation to the dismantling of structures, then what remains to be interpreted? I shall say: to interpret is to explicate the type of being-in the world unfolded *in front of* the text” (Ricoeur 2007: 86).

In my textual analysis, I read narratives against an ethnographic context by which I mean the peasant village context of northern Thai society in the premodern period in which these stories circulated. I do so in order to understand and gain insight into the type of being-in-the world that unfolds through a work a fiction. Thus, I consider calamity-cosmology narratives to be a type of peasant ideology and that means that I pay attention to the manner in which these texts construct meaning for northern Thai peasants as the anticipated reader of the text. Or, in Ricoeur’s terminology, I read and interpret these works according to the type of reader placed in front of the text and hence, addressed by it. The social location of oppressed bonded Buddhists is “the type of being-in the world unfolded *in front of* the text” (Ricoeur 2007: 86). In other words, the fact that these northern Thai writers singled out the Buddhist serf (*phray*) as the face of social suffering cannot be ignored. An investigation into the millennial aspect of these narratives while they demonstrate how Buddhists responded ideologically to historical periods of social turmoil

and political upheaval, it does not take into consideration the ethnographic context of the peasant living in world of economic hardship and social oppression in the same manner. Instead, my analysis using this peasant ethnographic context leads to an exploration of how Buddhists responded to the tragic ethical situations commonly found in the lives of politically-disenfranchised serfs. In particular, calamity-cosmology narratives suggest a reaction to the ideology of social hierarchy as promoted in the Three Worlds. This literary response can be interpreted as a form of a weak protest of social suffering along the lines proposed by James Scott. Looking at the ethnographic context, in other words, forces one to pay attention to the historic realities of the social positions that individuals inhabit as a part of living together in a society conceived along the lines of a moral community. For instance, we are directed to contemplate images such as that of the aforementioned virtuous Buddhist serf who walks around with hardly any possessions except for those few items that can fit in the bag tied to the end of a pole-shaft. In addition to the ethnographic context of the texts, David Morris also directs one to find the image of the suffering *phray* (serf) to be highly meaningful in these literary compositions and to search for an understanding of its significance. Thus, rather than attributing the peasant ideology of calamity cosmology to large-scale socio-historical processes alone, it is also useful to consider the features endemic to northern Thai society in the nineteenth and early twentieth century such as the system of serfdom.

Theoretical Framework: An Ethics from Rethinking the Moral Community

What remains to be introduced in this dissertation's opening chapter is the theory that guides my analysis of the moral community. In other words, how are we to conceptualize and hence investigate the manner in which the authors and readers of the calamity-cosmology narratives undertake and execute the task of constructing a moral community through literature,

as I argue with respect to *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhunī Thon*.

This study's description of the moral community as found in northern Thai Buddhist literature is largely a theoretical one, and thus it will be helpful to name and justify the components of the moral community that this study brings to light and how theory as well as well-reasoned observations made on the basis of the texts guide my selection of those parts of the moral community to be discussed and examined. Part of this task can be answered from the level of the narratives themselves. Through logical deductions made on the basis a few observations about what constitutes a group and how literature can proffer a sense of an imagined community, one can give a theoretical account of how narratives might construct the collective sentiments that are a necessary component to any manifestation of a moral community in reality. Through an inspection of the stories, one can detect one obvious component of a moral community, namely its shared activity and interests. In particular, the Buddha's *ovāda* in *Phuttha Tamnan* signals that religious activity related to living in an age of decline defines this community. *Tamnan Phya In* and *Tamnan Thammikarat* in their promise that one will see the face of a *dhammika* king by engaging in the three-fold lay program of moral action (i.e. give *dāna*, keep the precepts, and cultivate loving kindness) signifies that the lay moral practices promoted in these two narrative strands are also related to the decline narrative of 5,000-years. I examine as the first component of the moral community created through calamity-cosmology narratives the idea of the 5,000-year process cosmos as the locus for a creating a meaningful project that endows a group with an agenda that takes a collective effort to accomplish.

To identify an additional component of the moral community to be examined, it is useful to think about the role of literature in the creation of moral communities. In this case, a

consideration of the place of genre is helpful. A set of discursive practices defines a genre, by which I mean that, each literary genre expresses a patterned form of communication.²⁹ In such a manner, literary theorists have considered a genre as having a voice. Thus another component of a moral community created through literature would come from a genre's voice. In the case of this northern Thai literature, the Buddha's *ovāda* figures prominently in *Phuttha Tamnan* but it also appears in *Tamnan Phya In* and *Tamnan Thammikarat*. In addition, *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* contains an *ovāda* given by the *bhikkhuṇī*, the main character of the story. As the second component of the moral community, I take into consideration genre and its voice by examining *ovāda*, a feature that is found widespread in the works of calamity cosmology. The fact that *ovāda* characterizes a genre of moral didactic literature should come as no surprise. In other words, for a moral community created through literature one would expect a type of moral address to be voiced through the genre. A form of moral address known as *ovāda* (exhortation), in particular is what distinguishes this textual community as group having ethical purpose behind its membership. In other words, a type of moral address is what makes a community into a *moral* community.³⁰

²⁹ In terms of calamity-cosmological literature from northern Thailand, Lagrarde has examined some of these texts and argued that they were mostly likely recited in the ritual context of a sermon (2007: 87). Even though one cannot know for certain whether these texts were recited at temples, one can tell from the three-fold lay program of action repeated throughout them (*hay thaan raksaa siin mettaabhavanaa*) that these narratives served a pedagogical purpose. According to Koret, Lao Buddhist prophetic literature was a type of underground religious literature that was performed outside of the grounds of a temple (Koret 2007: 150-51).

³⁰ Lawrence Stern describes moral dialog as having the aim to correct and transform others as well as to allow "the other person to change us" (Stern 1974: 75). Instead of moral blame, which implies the desire to have an offender suffer, the condemnation of people's behavior can be expressed as a rebuke or chiding (Stern 1974: 74). Lawrence Stern brings to light the possibility that a moral community may be formed at the intersection of a public speech and congregation gathered together through a dialog of moral rebuke. Stern writes, "The lives of men like King and Gandhi seem to furnish evidence to the contrary. They publicly rebuked others for doing wrong. We have every reason to believe that the rebuke was the sincere expression of a sentiment. Therefore, in some important sense they blamed others for wrongdoing. Yet it is not clear that they wished those they blamed to suffer. Nor did they exclude them from the moral community. For their method of action was to appeal to the conscience of their adversaries" (Stern 1974: 78). Stern raises a question as well as provides insight into how speech acts can form a moral community instead of an attachment to agreed-upon transcendental ideals, as Durkheim believes. He even suggests

On the complex level of embedded practices, however, the texts themselves also display what makes a social collectivity into a *moral* community in their underlying pattern of thinking about a socially shared morality. Thus, to understand how humans think about the moral cohesion of a social group a turn to theory is again helpful. Durkheim, in particular, has laid out an important theory on a social group's morality that is still useful and worth drawing upon for our understanding of the expression of the moral community found in *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*.³¹ This turn to theory will allow us to distinguish a final component of the moral community to be discussed in this study.

In particular, there are two useful ideas proposed by Durkheim. The first is Durkheim's theory that ideals are necessary for the construction and constitution of a society's general morality. Durkheim defines society as "a composition of ideas, beliefs, and sentiments of all sorts of which realize themselves through individuals" (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 59). He continues, "Foremost of these ideas is the moral ideal which is its principal *raison d'être*" (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 59). According to Durkheim, society is a collection of moral ideals and facts as well as collective sentiments. Society as an assemblage of ideals, beliefs, and sentiments "constitutes a moral authority" (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 38). Thus, moral ideals may be regarded as a ground for moral authority. According to Durkheim, moral ideals can be a ground for moral authority because such ideals impose themselves on individuals by "willing" an individual's will to be a member of society and to act in accordance with moral obligation. Durkheim's point that

that through overt rebuke a moral community may even be formed against social ideals. Peter Strawson (1974), David Shoemaker (2007), and Lawrence Stern (1974) among others have theorized how moral address can define a moral community by examining who is withheld membership. Shoemaker especially makes it clear that there is division between society and a moral collective and that not everyone can be held under the same moral demand. He states, "[T]he conditions for moral agency are far more nuanced and complex than they have typically been taken to be, and it actually shortchanges the richness of our interpersonal relationships when we ignore the variety of factors that make them what they are" (Shoemaker 2007: 108).

³¹ In particular, Durkheim states, "But we shall maintain that it is impossible to desire a morality other than that endorsed by the condition of society at a given time" (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 38).

there is a necessary connection between ideals and social morality suggests that a third constitutive element of a moral community is its relation to society's moral ideals and the moral authority that issues from those ideals. Following Durkheim, I examine the place of religious ideals in Buddhist calamity-cosmology narratives in order to discuss the third and final element of a moral community imagined and constructed through literature.

In particular, Durkheim's observation that a moral community has a basis in social ideals opens up a line of inquiry into the Buddhist emotion of *saṃvega*, which is a Buddhist concept of a religious emotion that stirs one's faith to a higher level like a breakthrough moment of insight. In the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*, for example, this anxious feeling stirs the main character onto her career as a *bhikkhuṇī* disciple who is ordained by the Buddha. Frequently found in Buddhist texts, *saṃvega* is an emotional response that can be provoked by realities like birth, illness, old-age, and death. Seeing or contemplating such realities generates a fear of the inevitable which lays bare the miseries found in *saṃsāra*, the cycles of rebirth. Again turning to the *Tamnān Bhikkhuṇī Thon*, the main character experiences a moment of *saṃvega* when she contemplates *saṃsāra* by focusing on the objects of marriage, pregnancy, and giving birth to a child. This experience *emotionally* drives her to renounce her life as princess. The concept of *saṃvega* implies that rather than moral ideals, an insightful emotional experience of existential anxiety can shape and inform an individual's morality.³² To examine the connection between a moral community and

³² Tambiah has implied that ethical existential anxiety is a concept found in Buddhist ethics. In a statement about a tension in Theravādin studies, he makes a key observation that reflects an innovative approach to examining Buddhist ethics. It is a method concerned with a pragmatic and everyday lived level of meaning for the religious life. He states, "I think this methodological approach will help to save the anthropologist from imputing to the villager, *a priori*, the ideas contained in the sacred texts, from imputing to all villages the same religious orientation and... from making the villager more 'religious' and more 'philosophical' than he is. I also think if we bear in mind that there is some dialectic between religious ideas and mundane interests, we shall better appreciate the two intriguing aspects of religious conduct—what existential anxieties generate the 'ethical', and why the 'ethical', formulated in a certain way, is viewed by the actors as falling within their human capacity" (Tambiah 1968: 44-45). To avoid seeing Buddhist peasants as religious or moral philosophers, Tambiah proposes to focus on the intersection of "religious ideas and mundane interests." To illustrate this dialectic, Tambiah writes of the manner in which existential

ideals, I study the Buddhist notion of *saṃvega* as it figures in the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*.

The second lesson from Durkheim adopted in this study pertains to his theory of a society's morality. Durkheim says the obvious that ideals are important to a moral community but, significantly, he clarifies for us the relation of society to morality by explaining how a morality arises out of a society and is shared in common by its members. Through rigorous deductions on the objective dimension of morality—what can be observed——Durkheim makes the observation that each culture holds its own set of transcendental values and ideals; and that new ideals arise throughout history. According to Durkheim, “*if a morality exists*” it is “*with the condition that society be always considered as being qualitatively different from the individual beings that compose it*” (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 37). In addition, Durkheim views human moral behavior as dually characterized by obligation and a desire for the Good. Society's ideals reinforce moral obligation through fashioning a desire for the Good. On this connection between human moral behavior and society, Durkheim writes,

“The science of morals allows us to take a position between these two divergent moralities, the one now existing and one in the process of becoming. It teaches us, for example, that the first is related to an order which has disappeared or is disappearing, and the new ideas on the contrary are related to recent changes in the conditions of collective existence and are made necessary by these changes. Our science may help us render these ideas more precise and to direct them, etc.” (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 61).

Central to Durkheim's view of a society's morality is his point that a state of society conditions morality and as a state of society changes a divergent morality will develop. Following his lead, I explore how social oppression may be a state of society that defines a moral community and its development of a divergent morality for the oppressed. To explore this divergent sense of

anxieties can animate and orient the experience of a morally good life. He illuminates an aspect of human behavior in which existential anxieties taken on religious and moral meaning. Furthermore, he suggests that these existential anxieties do not indicate an empty category for fears, but that Buddhists have given them a form, so that they are both real and imaginary.

calamity cosmology's morality, I draw upon *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Phuttha Tamnan*. In particular, Durkheim states that there is a general morality shared by all members of a society. In addition to that, however, Durkheim notes that there is a range of different individual moralities based upon individual personalities. Implied in Durkheim's concepts of a general and individual morality is the expectation that there is a space between a general and individual morality, and that it is in this gap that there is a chance to articulate a new morality that is in the process of becoming distinct from a prevailing social morality. These calamity-cosmology narratives suggest that the reader "in front of the text" was someone who would be receptive to inhabiting that moral space situated between the general morality of society and a personal subjectivity based upon a commonly-experienced social oppression. Thus, the *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhunī Thon* anticipate a reader "in front of the text" who is a Buddhist serf through their recourse to two poles of morality—a general conventional one and a particularly subjective one—in which the latter pole specifically addressed and evoked a person's sense and experience of being unjustly abused and violated

In the above quote from Durkheim, we find his central thesis that the state of society conditions morality. Despite his much critiqued positivist approach, Durkheim's notion of two divergent moralities—the one now existing and the one in the process of becoming—has recently been taken up and developed in the works of scholars. Michael Lambek, for example, observes, "Society is frequently characterized by a tension between an ethics of tradition ('it is right to do as our parents and grandparents did'); and an ethics of reform" (Lambek 2012: 351). On the analytic level, he interprets the ethics of tradition as an urgent attempt to "maintain a firm (metaethical) foundation for ethics," while he interprets an "ethics of reform" as having a

practical basis that “responds to contingency, disquiet, skepticism, contradiction, and new social events or conditions” (Lambek 2012: 351). A Durkheimian distinction between ethics and society tends to presume a homogeneous character to society that makes a shared general morality possible. This assumption exists despite the fact that Durkheim does admit to the existence of multiple individual moralities in a society. The *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* suggest that a moral community of subjugated actors can arise from sentiments that are odds with society’s general morality. There is something in between a general morality and individual morality that exists on the basis of a putatively-shared experience. In the case of northern Thailand, the preoccupation with a calamity cosmology resembles a divergent morality “in the process of becoming,” an idea I adapt from Durkheim. Furthermore, Lambek suggests that calamity cosmologies as an ethics in the process of becoming arose from a state of northern Thai society that was marked by a tension to maintain an “ethics of tradition” (as represented by the static, ordered cosmos of the Three Worlds) and the need to foster an ethics relevant for socially oppressed Buddhists. In light of the possibility of the emergence of a divergent morality in a society, calamity cosmology can be interpreted as an ethics of rethinking tradition. With the transmission of texts conveying a calamity cosmology, it appears that northern Thai society in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was characterized by a tension between an ethics of tradition and an ethics of rethinking that tradition.

Durkheim’s concept of divergent moralities and Lambek’s thesis that a society may be characterized by a dichotomy of ethics suggest an investigation into the manner in which nineteenth century northern Thai society may have been characterized by an ethics of tradition and an ethics of rethinking that tradition. This latter type of ethics may have evolved as a

divergent morality caused by the state of society. At the intersection of a moral community and moral ideals is the current and unfolding state of society. Therefore in addition to the three component of a moral community, namely its activities and shared interests, its form of moral address, its relation to society's ideals, I extend my examination of the relation of society's ideals to this group's morality by taking into consideration how the state of society also defined the moral community imagined and constructed through calamity-cosmology narratives.

Outline of Argument

This Buddhist literary construction of a moral community *in the world* presumes an audience who knew social oppression all-too-well. Based on that reality, the Buddhists writers of the *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* imagined a different kind of moral community, one which they portrayed as more faithful to the Buddha's *dhamma* (the teachings of Buddha). Thus, calamity-cosmology narratives can be considered to be an ethics of rethinking the moral community, rather than an ethics of reforming the current state of society through a return to the past, as a millennial reading might argue. This northern Thai case suggests that a society can be marked by an ethics of rethinking that arises as the result of a new divergent morality in the process of becoming. In fact, the Theravādin Three Worlds cosmology can be taken as a source for an ethics of tradition and calamity-cosmology narratives can be regarded as a carrier for an ethics of rethinking tradition. Rather than exclusively conveying a desire for a return to tradition's idealized vision of society, this ethics of rethinking re-vision a Buddhist moral community actually *separate from* society as it is at the time and becoming constituted by the *phray* who knew of the tragic situation of living in an oppressive society ideologically founded upon Buddhist ideas on morality.

This dissertation's exploration of the *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan*

Thammikarat, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* consists of a theoretical description of the manner in which northern Thai Buddhist writers crafted their vision of a moral community through calamity-cosmology narratives according to the three component identified in the previous section. Given the fact that I derived a moral community's first and second constitutive elements on the basis of observations on the text and the place of genre in literature, I begin my discussion by locating these two elements in the texts. I bring to light the manner in which northern Thai writers of texts conveying a calamity-cosmology narrative created the activities (i.e., the first component) and the voice (i.e., the second component) of the moral community by reinterpreting and reworking the ethical and cosmological concepts that were current in northern Thai Theravādin culture during the nineteenth century. Specifically, in Chapter Two, I lay out the manner in which northern Thai Buddhists used the 5,000-year timetable to construct a sense of shared purpose behind religious activities already known to living Buddhists. The first component of a moral community to be discussed then consists of its shared religious activities, which is also in Chapter Two. Next, in Chapter Three, I examine the use of the Buddha's last *ovāda* (exhortation) as a literary motif and as the speech genre that comes to define this northern Thai literature's voice. This exploration of *ovāda* brings to light the form of moral address, or the voice given to the moral community imagined in and through this literary genre. The second component of the moral community that emerges from this discussion on *ovāda* is that of a moral address held in common and this is also found in Chapter Three

The remainder of this dissertation's approach to texts changes as it proceeds to engage in a close reading of the *Phuttha Tamnan*, *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* to distinguish the manner in which a new moral community came to be imagined and defined against Buddhist ideals (Chapter Four) and against society's general

morality (Chapter Five). Due to the fact that these features of the moral community have been identified through theory, a close reading of texts will allow me to examine the intellectual practices embedded in thinking about social morality that Durkheim and Lambek have theorized. Chapter Four's discussion on the vision of a new morality in relation to rethinking society's currently valorized ideals covers the third component of the moral community to be detailed in this study. In this chapter, I engage in a close reading of *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* in order to uncover the morality exemplified in this text (Chapter Four). As an extension of this third component, I take a close look at the theme of social oppression found in *Tamnan Phya In*, *Tamnan Thammikarat*, and *Phuttha Tamnan* (Chapter Five). Durkheim's concepts of individual and general morality guide my discussion of the relation of morality to society in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. To close this study's examination, I conclude with a chapter on the morality for and of the oppressed implied in this northern Thai literary construction of a moral community for Buddhist serfs (Chapter Six).

Two

A Calamity Cosmology

The belief in a calamitous cosmos found in the Buddhist culture local to Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia had its historical origins in the cosmological thought found in the Theravādin canonical and commentaries writings. Each of the above Southeast Asian communities inherited this textual tradition through their importation of Theravādin monastic lineages from Sri Lanka. This chapter explores the Buddhist idea of a 5,000-year period of cosmic history, in particular its ideological relationship to the Three Worlds' cosmic scheme. To do so, it lays out the various strands of cosmological thinking found in northern Thai Buddhist culture. First, I describe a cosmological tradition that espoused the concept of a *dhammic* cosmos. The Three Worlds exemplifies this strand of cosmological thinking. Second, I give an account of a second cosmological tradition grounded in the idea of the *rūpic* devolutionary cosmos and transmitted through calamity-cosmology narratives. Frank Reynolds has uncovered the prescience of the concepts of the *dhammic* cosmos and the *rūpic* cosmos in Buddhist thought mainly on the basis of his study of early Buddhist texts.

In terms of the dissertation's argument, this second chapter addresses the scholarly interpretation of calamity-cosmology narratives found outside of Thailand in which the millennial context of nineteenth century Theravādin societies is crucial. According to this small body of scholarship, these narratives acted as a discourse meant to shore up the values, ideals, and norms of a tradition perceived to be under threat. This chapter's exploration of the 5,000-year cosmic frame used in calamity-cosmology narratives suggests that this literary tradition put forth the idea of an alternative moral community that is kingless. In doing so, calamity-

cosmology narratives may be interpreted as a form of social critique made against the current state of the Buddhist society of northern Thailand, as previous scholars reading texts against a millennial historical context have indicated. However, I do not read these narratives as fostering a desire for a messianic king who would reform current society by bringing it back in line with Theravāda's idealized vision of society. Instead, one can read these narratives as an attempt to rethink the very paradigm for social and moral membership. Calamity-cosmology narratives sought to rethink the *dhammic* cosmos of the Buddhist state in an effort to transform local thought on the cosmological underpinnings of a just society. When one takes into account the manner in which calamity cosmology paints an alternative vision of the social and moral orders of the cosmos in the form of a *rūpic* cosmos, it becomes clear that a dire need to reinterpret tradition's idea of a *dhammic* cosmos rather than a millennial-induced nostalgia animated this discursive critique of Buddhist society as the normative context for pursuing a morally good life.

This chapter's discussion has three parts. First, I present previous scholars' definition of cosmology as found in the field of religious studies and comparative religious ethics. This theoretical framework guides the manner in which I analyze religious cosmologies. Second, I discuss the notion of the moral community as a *dhammic* cosmos. In particular, I provide an account of the scholarly depiction of the classical Theravādin state as a *dhammic* cosmos. Although I articulate this religious idea of a *dhammic* cosmos by summarizing some important studies on the Theravādin state in South and Southeast Asia, I do provide some historical evidence from central Thailand for which there is a more robust amount of studies and published original sources. Drawing a picture of premodern Theravāda's culture of politics and governance on the basis of scholarship has the advantage of allowing me to focus my research on primary source materials from northern Thailand. It also has the disadvantage of depending upon

other people's interpretation of historical data. Thus, I supplement my literature review of the scholarship with a few pieces of historical evidence that support the scholarly claims that an idea of a *dhammic* cosmos is implicitly found in Theravādin state practices during the premodern period. Third, I investigate the cosmological thought that structures calamity-cosmology narratives. I find that calamity cosmology conceptually developed from the idea of the *rūpic* and devolutionary cosmos, a myth of the cosmos found in Theravādin canonical writings, in addition to Buddhaghosa's exegetical writings on *Dhamma*. My discussion of calamity-cosmology narratives will paint a picture of the intellectual history particular to this local Buddhist culture, while the scholarship on Theravādin kingship will provide a general picture of the cosmological thought that northern Thai Buddhists inherited from outside and shared in common with its Theravādin neighbors. By examining a Theravādin imagination of a cosmic and moral community, this chapter takes up the first component of the moral community, namely its group activities and interests. Religious cosmologies, in other words, do more than express assumptions about reality. They display a home-making process upon which a society or social group is founded.

Cosmology and the Study of Religion

Thomas Tweed states, "Religions, ...*orient* in time and space. ...One of the imperfections the religious confront is that they are always in danger of being disoriented" (Tweed 2006: 74). As Tweed elaborates, "Religions, in other words, involve homemaking" (Tweed 2006: 75).³³ His description of religions in relation to time and space reflects the

³³ Tweed and other scholars are currently engaged in critically assessing the paradigms for Religious Studies by critically reviewing scholarly definitions of religion. A majority of this scholarly critique can be found in the *Cambridge Companion to Religious Studies* (Orsi 2012). Talal Asad has reviewed individual scholars, namely W.C. Smith in his essay "Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith's *The Meaning and End of Religion* (2001) and Geertz in his article "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category" (1993).

prestigious place that cosmogony once held in scholarly conceptions of religion. Tweed's above statements echo Mircea Eliade's observation that cosmogony has the function placing humans in "a certain situation in the cosmos" (Eliade 1954[2005]: 3). Tweed's theory on religion and Eliade's theory on cosmogony both suggest that cosmic symbolism contributes to a religion an idea about "our place in the universe" (Herzfeld 2001:192).³⁴ Moreover, a display of order gives these ontological claims a social power (Herzfeld 2001:194). Through a conception of a sacred order, cosmologies make it possible for individuals to intuit an organizing principle to the universe and tacitly accept it through their manner of inhabiting the world.³⁵

Since the period of the 1950's when Eliade was writing, the normative paradigm for the study of religion has changed. Eliade's works on cosmic symbolism and myths represent an older period in the scholarship when scholars sought a universal definition for religion and viewed cosmic symbolism as tantamount to religion. Clifford Geertz in his 1973 theory of religion not only gives primacy to symbols, especially cosmic symbols, but he also explains why cosmic symbolism is important to any theoretical description of religion.³⁶ He states, "What any particular religion affirms about the fundamental nature of reality may be obscure, shallow, or all

³⁴ In *Buddhism: A study of the Buddhist Norm* (1912), C. Rhys Davids discusses the *Dhamma* in terms of the "philosophical postulates which, uttered or expressed, lies at the back of our [*i.e.*, probably, mankind's] most solemn judgments about life and the whole of things. She speculates that prior to an idea of deities that conceptions like the *Dhamma*, Tao, and, Agathon (Plato's Good)... "represent as many utmost fetches of the early human intellect to conceive an impersonal principle, or order to things prior to, and more constant than, the administrative deity representing it" (quoted from Carter 1978: 8).

³⁵ In *Anthropology: the theoretical practice in culture and society's* ninth chapter, Michael Herzfeld (2001) has written a thorough review of the scholarship on cosmology done by historians of religion and anthropologists in an effort to make cosmology a more robust analytical category in anthropology. His discussion begins with a comparison of scientific and religious cosmologies.

³⁶ To describe religion as a cultural system Geertz (1973: 90) defines religion as "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."

too often perverse; but it must...affirm something” (Geertz 1973: 98-99).³⁷ In the twentieth century, many scholars seeking a universal definition of religion presumed that all religions make statements concerning “the fundamental nature of reality” (Geertz 1973: 98-99).³⁸

Having found cosmology to be important to a religion’s symbolism and a display of order to be essential to cosmic symbolism, students of religion have yet to take into serious consideration a cosmological myth that does not paint a picture of an ordered universe. Jonathan Z. Smith calls attention to this oversight. He states, “[H]istorians of religion have been weakest in interpreting those myths which do not reveal a cosmos in which man finds a place to dwell, but rather suggest the problematic nature of existence and fundamental tension in the cosmos” (J.Z. Smith 1993: 100). According to J.Z. Smith, historians of religions have yet to explore those cosmogonic myths or cosmologies that do not provide an orientation to a religious life according to an idea of order, but rather provoke the religious to confront the direct world of experience as “in danger of being disoriented” (Tweed 2006: 74). J. Z. Smith points out that both ordered and disordered visions of the cosmos are found in the history of religions. Northern Thai calamity cosmologies belong to the second category. This latter type does not entail a picture of a world order, but rather is concerned with illustrating a disharmony between the structures of society and cosmos. Calamity cosmology’s lack of a display of order suggests that students of religion

³⁷ Geertz’s writings in the 1970’s assumed anthropology’s structuralist/symbolic methodology that was in vogue at the time. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, religious studies had a comparable paradigm of religion as a system of meaning-making, which Robert Orsi has recently critiqued (Orsi 2005). According to Talal Asad, the main shortcomings of a concept of religion that emphasizes its private inner or cognitive aspect is that it ignores practice, which Pierre Bourdieu made a prominent anthropological object of study, and the power that underlies and makes discourse possible, which Foucault brought to light (Asad 1993; 2001).

³⁸ According to Anne Taves, although the task of defining “religion” involves a description of what the religious have in mind, first-order terms are “emically loaded” (Taves 2012: 58). One could add that the non-religious aspects of human experience also impinge upon the experience of a religious life, its practices, and ideas (Asad 2012; Lambek 2012). “Emically loaded” categories such as “the sacred” obscure the relation of the non-religious to the religious sphere of experience perhaps because such terms express religion as that which equals everything fundamental about reality.

should not regard cosmology as a system of ideas used to give our place in the world a sacred meaning. Instead, we can consider cosmology to be a tool for cultivating reflexive responses to our experiences of the world. A religious cosmology is in the service of structuring the way in which one experiences the world through ideas, emotions, and the senses. Cosmology provides ideas about how a religious person can sense as well as psychologically and cognitively apprehend the world of direct experience.³⁹ In this manner, religious cosmologies exemplify a method to orient in time and space.

Cosmology and the Study of Religious Ethics

In the study of religious ethics, scholars have stated that the religious idea of cosmic order is analogous to the Western concept of natural law.⁴⁰ Given this homology between cosmic order and natural law, Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds endorsed to a method to comparatively study religious ethics in which one inspected different religions' cosmogonic myths.⁴¹ In this context, they wrote, "Natural order provides the foundation for much of everyday moral thinking, and the origins of natural order can be invoked to justify the choice of one way of acting over another" (Lovin and Reynolds 1985: 2). Lovin and Reynolds make the point that

³⁹ In particular, Asad breaks down the experience of the world into feeling, sensing, and thinking. Experiencing the world involves an interaction between the senses and the intellectual process of interpretation (i.e., belief, thought, interpretation). Belief interacts with the senses but it is not constituted or interpolated by the senses. Asad writes, "[I]t is possible for someone to encounter something unpredictably that transforms her, to be gripped through her senses by a force (whether immanent or transcendent) *without having to interpret anything*" (Asad 2012: 51).

⁴⁰ Max Weber has written on the history of the concept natural law in *The Interpretation of Social Reality* (1971).

⁴¹ Lovin and Reynolds supported this type of inquiry for comparative religious ethics by drawing upon the meta-ethical theory known as "ethical naturalism." Ethical naturalism designates a type of reasoning upon which moral facts can claim validity. In particular, ethical naturalism is a subset of moral realism, a metaethical theory that equates facts about what is moral with what "is." In other words, a strict traditional moral realist would not make a distinction between "is," that is "fact" with "ought to be." Ethical naturalism as a sub-category of moral realism addresses metaethics on a semantic level, namely how truth claims of moral facts are substantiated (Antonaccio 2005). Given that cosmologies provide a source for thinking about the "facts" of reality, Lovin and Reynolds found a suitable ground for asserting that religious claims on moral facts were substantiated by cosmogonic stories. Thus, they proposed a view of religious ethics as a form of ethical naturalism that could be explored comparatively through cosmogonic myths.

commonly found in the history of religions is the idea that cosmic order is inherently related to a system of ethics. In other words, “all religious symbolism aims to join together the two ideas of a cosmic order and ethical order,” as Paul Ricoeur once remarked (Ricoeur 1995: 299).⁴²

In the entry for “cosmology” found in *The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics*, Frank Reynolds and Jonathan Schofer identify three types of ethical orientation people have with the cosmos. In one type found in Indian and European religions, a homology between the individual, society, and cosmos is asserted. The second one is a relation with the cosmos in which an individual seeks harmony and attunement with the cosmos. In the third type, there is a vision of the cosmos as just. It is a cosmos in which the results of good and bad human actions are guaranteed to arise. Of the three types, only the third one holds a conception of the cosmos as being a process rather than a structure. According to Reynolds and Schofer, a process cosmology depicts the world as existing in a state of becoming. This world is continually being formed according to the ethical consequences of human acts. Examples of a process cosmos are a cosmos based on the Hindu and Buddhist concept of *karma* and the cosmos portrayed in the Hebrew Bible through the “images of divine justice” that later became incorporated into Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Reynolds and Schofer 2005: 122-23). Characteristic to this type of cosmic ethical orientation are the concepts of cosmic homology, justice, and harmony. Also, the moral agent believing that the consequences of human action will surely manifest in the world anticipates them (Reynolds and Schofer 2005: 122-23). Theoretically, humans living in a process cosmos have the ability to reverse the structure of it, since it exists in a state of becoming. Also, humans can convert its structure, because it is through human actions that the

⁴² Ricoeur credits Clifford Geertz with this observation. See Paul Ricoeur (1995), “Ethical and Theological Considerations on the Golden Rule.” These ideas of Geertz are found in his theory on religion as a cultural system. In particular, Geertz (1973: 89) notes that “sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order.”

state of the world is formed. Thus, the Three World's *kammic* cosmology and calamity cosmology can be considered to be examples of process cosmology. In the case of calamity cosmology, northern Thai Buddhists reinterpreted Buddhaghosa's 5,000-year timetable. Originally, Buddhaghosa had portrayed stages in the decline in the *dhamma* (the Buddha's teachings) that would eventually lead to the disappearance of Gotama Buddha's *sāsana*. It was simply a narrative about the end of Gotama Buddha's *sāsana*. Building on this narrative of decline, these northern Thai writers altered the meaning of the *sāsana*'s decline and transformed it into a narrative about a disharmonious historical period for the moral community caused by the mechanics of a process *kammic* cosmology. Found in and enacted through religious cosmologies is a human propensity to see orderliness of the world, which is inseparably linked to a puzzling over how to live a morally good life. Rejecting the Three Worlds' cosmological display of an orderliness of time and space, calamity cosmologies provide a manner for apprehending human existence as a stream of inscrutable, obscure, and sometimes perverse stream of events. In particular, calamity cosmology's display of disharmony offered Buddhists a way to assert that the unfolding cosmological processes underlying historical time had become twisted due to the fact that it had a trajectory linked to the Good, justice, and destiny.⁴³

The *Dhammic* Cosmological Belief and the Classical Buddhist State

In Thai, Burmese, Lao, and Cambodian Buddhist cultures, the mainstream belief in a Three Worlds' *kammic* cosmology that valorizes social hierarchy and kingship resembles Reynolds's and Schofer's third type of cosmos in which the universe is pictured as just and as a process, as previously mentioned. The principle of *kamma* that structures Three Worlds's portrait

⁴³ Jean Luc Nancy, on the Greek concept of *dike*, that is, destiny as justice, states that *dike* (read: *kammic retribution* i.e., *kammavipāka*) "apportions a fate, assigns a fate, and provides it with a meaning. But suffering is not a portion in this sense. It is disproportionate, impenetrable hardness" (Nancy 1997: 148).

of the universe seems to follow the logic of a process cosmos in which humans are trained to expect to see the results of good and bad human actions manifest in the world. In this second part of the chapter, I trace the intellectual development of this strand of cosmological thought in Theravādin mainland Southeast Asia by drawing upon early textual sources, scholarship, and historical evidence from central Thailand. I demonstrate that cosmic symbolism was indispensable to the Theravādin picture of the Buddhist state as a just society and hence, a moral community. In particular, Frank Reynolds has shown that in Theravādin history there developed in the Southeast Asian traditions a cosmological belief in an ethical relation between society and cosmos that viewed the two as homologous. I now turn to trace the ideological roots of this manner of seeing the cosmos and society as mirrors of one another.

Concept of a *Dhammic* Cosmos in early Buddhist texts

In the early history of Buddhism, Indian Buddhists like their Hindu and Jain contemporaries held a similar cosmological conviction in a three-tiered universe. Despite the presence of *sutta-s* in which the Buddha disparages metaphysical speculation,⁴⁴ other *sutta-s* do speak of heavenly and purgatory realms, a Jambudīpa cosmo-geography,⁴⁵ and a multiple-worlds system (Kloetzli 1983: 4). We also find evidence for the utility of the belief in a *kammic* cosmos in *sutta-s* that describe of the bodily, mental, and verbal deeds that can lead to a rebirth in the lands of hell (for example, see M III 209-30). On the other hand, there are canonical

⁴⁴ The *Brahmajālasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* relates the Buddha's criticism of the metaphysical claims made by various heretical schools. In *Buddhist Cosmology: From Single World System to Pure Land: Science and Theology in the Images of Motion and Light*, Kloetzli provides numerous references to the scholarship on the questions the Buddha refused to answer (Kloetzli 1983: 1-3). In particular, it was a list of fourteen questions (*caturdaśāvyākṛtavastūni*) (Kloetzli 1983 1-3).

⁴⁵ In a study on the Hindu, Jain, Buddhist post-Vedic cosmologies, Gombrich notes that in Buddhist literature Jambudīpa, the rose-apple continent, refers to India, the continent in the southern quarter of Mt. Meru (Gombrich 1975b: 125). In *tamnan-s*, the Thai kingdoms are located in Jambudīpa, which Charnvit says refers to India (Charnvit 1976: 3)

passages in which the Buddha suggests the insignificance of cosmological axioms to his teachings by declaring that unlike like ordinary folk, *Ariyan* disciples can permanently remove themselves from the realms of heavenly beings, humans, animals, *preta-s*, and hell-sufferers (for example, see A I 245-46; A V 333-35).⁴⁶ In early Buddhist texts, the cosmos is merely that place from which one escapes after one attains *nibbāna*, the ultimate goal of Buddhist practices. On the status of cosmology in early Buddhism, Gombrich observes,

“Where other traditions talk of the world, therefore, in some such cosmological terms as ‘heaven and earth’, early Buddhist texts refer to the five *gati*, ‘destinations’, i.e. kinds of rebirth: gods, men, ghosts, animals, and hell” (Gombrich 1975b: 133).

In the early Buddhist texts, cosmological myth appears to be limited to beliefs having to do with *kammic* rebirth, in other words, the results of good and bad acts committed mentally, verbally, or physically. Or, as Gombrich notes, cosmology was spoken of in terms of a *kammic* rebirth in one of the lower realms of the universe in the abodes of hell, the home of hungry ghosts, or the land of animals, or a *kammic* rebirth in one of the higher realms of the universe in the world of humans or levels of heaven. Despite Gombrich’s above statement that early Buddhists limited conversations on the cosmos to the topic of destinities (*gati*) rather than the world, if one examines the concept of *Dhamma* found in the early Buddhist texts, then one finds that early Buddhists did talk about the world in cosmological terms. On the one hand, *Dhamma*, a religious idea central to Buddhist doctrine does not refer to a cosmography (or “cosmo-geography” as Collins prefers to call it) or to a cosmic temporality. On the other hand, the concept of *Dhamma* has to do with the fundamental nature of reality. In this study, when I refer to this metaphysical idea I use a capitalized spelling of the word “*Dhamma*.” When I speak of the Buddha’s teachings that Buddhists also call “*dhamma*,” I do not capitalize the word.

⁴⁶ In early Buddhist cosmology, there are five *gati-s*. In the *Three Worlds*, there are six *gati-s*.

Both scholastic Buddhist monks and Western academics have spent great time and energy on elucidating the many meanings of *Dhamma*. Western scholars often translate *Dhamma* as “the Norm,” “Truth,” and “Law.”⁴⁷ The scholarly translation of *Dhamma* as “the Norm” indicates its paramount place in Buddhism’s system of morals or ethics. On the meaning of *Dhamma* as “the Norm” as found in early Buddhist texts, Mrs. Rhys Davids notes, “[I]t was with regard to *Dhamma* that values were set and ideals structured” (quoted from Carter 1978: 9). On the *Dhamma*’s meaning as “Truth,” one finds a cosmological rather than ethical connotation. Of particular interest, the Geigers found that *Dhamma* meant “Truth” in those canonical passages “where *dhamma* is mentioned as having been attained unto, realized, by the Buddha, or characterized as being hard to grasp, comprehend” (quoted from Carter 1978: 13). The Geigers also spoke of early Buddhist texts that state, “*dhammo have rakkhati dhammacāriṃ*,” which Carter translates as “*dhamma* indeed protects the one living *dhamma*” (Carter 1978: 13). The Geigers found that *Dhamma* in these instances resembles the metaphysical concept of *brahman* found in “older Vedānta doctrine” (Carter 1978: 13). *Dhamma* as “Truth” alludes to a noetic truth grasped through a mystical experience. Also this construal of *Dhamma* indicates that early Buddhist texts depicted the *Dhamma* as a metaphysical claim. In its meaning as “Law,” *Dhamma* again seems to be a religious idea about reality. On *Dhamma* as “Law,” Eugène Burnouf, writing in 1844, notes that in early Buddhist texts “*la Loi*” captures “the orderliness and authoritativeness in *dhamma*” (Carter 1978: 4). Later in 1916, Beckh nuanced this third meaning of *Dhamma* as “Law” by explaining that the *Dhamma* resembled “Western concepts of natural law and moral law” (Carter 1978: 10). Later in the late twentieth century, Frank Reynolds extended these scholarly insights into the early history of *Dhamma*’s meaning, especially its

⁴⁷ For this discussion, I rely on John Ross Carter’s excellent book *Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations A Study of A Religious Concept*. Carter identifies many of the key interpretations of the concept of *Dhamma* made by some Western interpreters of early Buddhist texts.

cosmic and ethical import in his reading of early Buddhist texts in which he interpreted the Buddha's life-story in a new light. In particular, Reynolds reads the Buddha's sacred biography as a cosmogonic event in which the Buddha gave birth to a "dhammic cosmos."⁴⁸ Like each Buddha before him, Gotama Buddha discovers the *Dhamma* and propagates it by delivering sermons (i.e., the *dhamma*).⁴⁹ In other words, a *dhammic* cosmos is born when the Buddha sets in motion the wheel of *dhamma* (F. Reynolds 1985). The Buddha's *dhamma* (i.e., his teachings) makes it possible for a human community to gather together in an effort to live righteously. This *dhammic* cosmos is "brought into being from within *saṃsāra*, and from within the series of world systems; but it transcends them" (F. Reynolds 1985: 214).⁵⁰ The later Theravādin

⁴⁸ In "Multiple Cosmogonies and Ethics: The Case of Theravada Buddhism" (1985) F. Reynolds names four different cosmogonies found in early Buddhism: a *saṃsāric* cosmogony, a *rūpic* cosmogony, a *dhammic* cosmogony dependent upon ritual enactment, and a *dhammic* cosmogony dependent on the birth of Metteyya Buddha.

⁴⁹ In an exploration of the concept of many Buddha-s, Gombrich (1980) explains that it justified *Dhamma*'s meaning as "Truth." In other words, a Buddha had to discover the *Dhamma* and not author it. Many Buddha-s reflected the universalism conveyed in the *Dhamma*'s meaning as "Truth."

⁵⁰ Reynolds locates expressions of this *dhammic* cosmos in early Buddhist accounts of the life of the Buddha including those belonging to the Jātaka Commentary. Four parts of the Buddha's biography can be read as cosmogonic events: his birth, enlightenment, first sermon, and *parinibbāna*. Reynolds explains, "The Buddha's birth is presented as a cosmic event in which his character as a *mahāpurisa* (a great being destined to become either a Buddha who orders and reigns over a soteriologically oriented cosmos, or a *cakkavatti* king who orders and reigns over a "secular cosmos") is evident to those who have the eyes to see it. His enlightenment is recounted in a narrative that clearly suggests a royally structured but supraroyal enthronement with cosmogonic significance. His first preaching is described as a setting in motion of the wheel of *dhamma*, a clearly cosmogonic act closely associated with a very archaic solar mythology. The account of his *parinibbāna* describes the transition from the primary form in which the *dhammic* cosmos was established during the historical career of Gotama, to the *dhammic* cosmos as it continues after his passing away" (F. Reynolds 1985: 214). On the level of material culture, *stūpa*-s can be read as Buddhists attempting to give material and visual manifestation to a "dhammically ordered cosmos complete with heavenly realms, a Mount Meru cosmography, and an efflorescence of prosperity and affluence" (F. Reynolds 1985: 215).

It is important to note that Reynolds defines "cosmogony" more broadly as accounts or conceptions of the way in which the cosmos or cosmic process is continually being generated and structured rather than a narrow definition of cosmogony as accounts that locate the occurrences they describe "in the beginning" (F. Reynolds 1985: 203).

Mus's work *Barabadur: Esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes* (1935) has contributed to Reynolds's idea of the *stūpa* as a *dhammic* cosmos. Jonathan S. Walters's essay "Stūpa, Story, and Empire: Constructions of the Buddha biography in Early Post-Aśokan India" also carries forth Mus's insight, but in an explicit manner. Walters states, "As Paul Mus has shown us, the *stūpa* is more than a representation of the cosmic Buddha biography: it *is* the cosmic Buddha biography. The *stūpa* of the Buddha is precisely what the Buddha biography has become in the time between the *Parinirvāṇa* and today" (Walters 1997: 174).

traditions of Southeast Asia extended this notion of a *dhammic* cosmos set in motion by the Buddha's preaching career. They added the belief that it was through rituals and moral behavior that a religious community establishes and maintains an orderliness in the world (F. Reynolds 1985: 213-17). I now turn to present the scholarly works that describe this historical evolution of the idea of the *dhammic* cosmos that took place in the Theravādin communities of Southeast Asian.

Royal *Dhammic* Cosmos

An important historical development in the concept of *Dhamma* occurred in the third century B.C.E., when Aśoka, an Indian sovereign, conceived of and made the Buddhist *Dhamma* into an imperial project. King Aśoka erected royal edicts proclaiming the *dhamma*. According to legend, he sent monks on missionary trips to neighboring lands. Having construed the true *Dhamma* as a social ethos, Aśoka constructed for the first time in Buddhist history “a political lay tradition within Buddhism” and “an ethos of *lay* Buddhism” (Sarkisyanz 1965: 36).⁵¹ The legend of Aśoka engendered a picture of the ideal Buddhist state as “a welfare state” composed of a monarchy, *sangha*, and laity that would come to later influence the historic Buddhist kings of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia (Sarkisyanz 1956: 27-31). Thus, historians credit Aśoka with the beginnings of a Buddhist state in the Theravāda tradition of Buddhism.⁵² Tambiah gives a concise description of “state Buddhism,” stating,

“Students of Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia are very familiar with the close association among Buddhism, kingship, national and ethnic identity, and the

⁵¹ F. Reynolds distinguishes Aśoka's *Dhamma* from the early Buddhist textual tradition, because Aśoka's *Dhamma* was not associated with suffering, impermanence, or the ultimate goal of *nibbāna*. He explains, “For Aśoka, in other words, the true *Dhamma* was a goal which could be actualized in the midst of the day to day personal and social life of his subjects” (F. Reynolds 1972: 27).

⁵² In the history of Theravāda, the Buddhist state as a socio-historical and cultural phenomenon developed from Aśoka's construction of a polity based on the true *Dhamma* and the sixth century incorporation of the *Bodhisatta* ideal into Sinhala Buddhist royal expressions (Sarkisyanz 1965).

traditional ideological formulation that each ruler has been entrusted with a historical mission to protect and sustain the religion that is the polity's special treasure" (Tambiah 1982: 5).

In addition to the notion of a welfare state, the concept Buddhist kingship incorporated older Indic notions that associated kingship with agricultural fertility and the rains. For example, we find a passage in the *Anguttara-Nikāya* about a good king who makes the rains fall and crop harvests plentiful. This passage excerpt from AN II 85 states,

"But, monks, when rājahs are righteous, the ministers of rājahs also are righteous. When ministers are righteous, brāhmins and householders also are righteous. Thus townsfolk and villages are righteous. This being so, moon and sun go right in their courses. This being so, constellations and stars do likewise; days and nights, months and fortnights, season and years go on their courses regularly; winds blow regularly and in due season. Thus the devas are not annoyed and the sky-deva bestows sufficient rain. Rains falling seasonably, the crops ripen in due season. Monks, when crops ripen in due season, men who live on crops are long-lived, well-favoured, strong and free from sickness" (Woodward 1952: 85).⁵³

Another decisive factor in the development of Buddhist kingship in Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia were the canonical *sutta-s* about a *Cakkavatti* overlord. Historians placed much significance on the *Cakkavatti*'s emblem of a wheel of *Dhamma*. In particular, the *Lakkhana-sutta* relates the thirty-two marks of a great being (*Mahāpurisa*). A man bearing these thirty-two auspicious marks may become either a Buddha or a *Cakkavatti*. Also, in the *Cakkavattisihānāda-sutta*, a *Cakkavatti* king named Dalhanemi calls forth a wheel of *Dhamma* from the earth and commands it to roll throughout the four corners of the earth. As a result of Dalhanemi's ownership of the wheel of *Dhamma*, all the kings living in the four quarters bow in submission before Dalhanemi, the overlord with the wheel of *Dhamma*. Upon his death the wheel disappears. Afterwards, Dalhanemi's son is able to invoke the wheel, but only after demonstrating that he is morally worthy of it. Tambiah mentions the above *sutta* and cites F.

⁵³ Tambiah (1975: 50) cites this passage and calls this materially effective aspect of the king's power "the multiplier effect."

Reynolds' remarks on this story. He quotes from F. Reynolds:

“The Cakkavatti is depicted as a cosmocrator whose conquest proceeded through the continents at each of the four cardinal points, and whose rule radiated out from a central position either identified or closely associated with the central cosmic mountain of the Indian tradition, Mount Meru. In the later texts this connection between the Cakkavatti and the cosmological pattern of the four directions and Mount Meru comes increasingly to the fore and it plays a dominant role in the architectural symbolism which developed in conjunction with Buddhist kingship” (Tambiah 1976: 46).

In the historical development of Buddhist kingship in Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia, historians have attributed much importance to the myth of a *Cakkavatti* overlord, especially this royal figure's emblem of a wheel of *Dhamma*. Out this myth of the *Cakkavatti*, the Buddhists of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia further extended the meaning of *Dhamma* by incorporating political and social meanings in it, as Aśoka had previously done. It was in the context of the historical origins of a Buddhist state in Sri Lanka after the sixth century and in parts of mainland Southeast Asia after the first millennium of the Common Era that this evolution in *Dhamma*'s meaning occurred alongside the emergence of a Buddhist theory of kingship. On the basis of the Buddhist state's *Cakkavatti* symbolism, Gokhale, F. Reynolds, and Tambiah constructed a major scholarly axiom known as “the two wheels of *Dhamma*.”

The significance of the *Cakkavatti* figure was that it implied that kings, like the Buddha, create a *dhammic* cosmos. Unlike the Buddha's *dhammic* cosmos, which is found only in texts, a historical Buddhist king had the opportunity to make the *dhammic* cosmos manifest in *reality*. In respect to these two wheels of *Dhamma*, Gokhale writes,

“The most important element introduced was the acceptance of a higher morality as the guiding spirit behind the state. ...Secondly, the early Buddhists also put forth the theory of the two “wheels,” two distinct realms of action by positing two separate but equally important ideals of a Cakkavatti, the leader of the temporal realm, and the Bodhisattva, pre-eminent in the spiritual domain” (cited from Tambiah 1976: 42).

Gokhale states that there are two wheels of *Dhamma* and each wheel holds dominance in its own separate realm. Tambiah names these two wheels a “wheel of morality” and a “wheel of domination...which is in a dependent relationship to the former” (Tambiah 1976: 42). Gokhale’s interpretation of two separate realms each of which has its own wheel/wielder of *Dhamma* is repeated in many historical studies on Theravādin kingship in Southeast Asia. For example, we find the following statements about the two domains of *Dhamma* from studies done by both Tambiah and F. Reynolds. Tambiah in particular, states,

“Hence unlike the brahmanical cutting of the cake into the hierarchized domains of dharma, *artha*, *kama*, the Buddhist slicing is in terms of two levels—the dharma, as cosmic law and as truth (the seeker of which is the renouncing *bhikkhu*), encompassing the dharma of the righteous ruler, which attempts to give order to this world” (Tambiah 1976: 40).

Another instance of scholars thinking according to this paradigm of the two wheels of *Dhamma* comes from an article written by Frank Reynolds and Regina T. Clifford. They affiliate the two wheels of *Dhamma* with monastic and lay action. They explain, “The Theravada religio-social ideal” requires “social action to be structured according to the ideal if the social order is to embody it” (Reynolds and Clifford 1980: 57). *Dhammic* order must be perpetuated through the skillful performance of virtuous *kammic* actions that include the ritual giving of *dāna* (gifts) to monastics. They write,

“Every action bears *kammic* fruits that are the just retribution for that action, hence there is a continuity in flux, there is a becoming. Since the law of *kamma* serves both to regulate and generate order based on the nature of the actions constituting it, perfect action bears *kammic* consequences that perpetuate *dhammic* order” (Reynolds and Clifford 1980: 57).

In order to make the ideal social order into a reality, monks and the laity must engage in *dhammic* action, which produces the merit necessary for the establishment and maintenance of social order. Reynolds and Clifford compare the monastic and lay paths of action to “two gears,

both of which are necessary to the soteriological machinery of cosmos and society” (Reynolds and Clifford 1980: 60). Reynolds and Clifford make the striking point that the Buddhist ideal of social order logically entails a view of the *Dhamma* as in flux and in need of perpetuation. Immoral action and the loss of *dāna* ritual practices have real-world consequences, because as they state, “the empirical and ideal merge” (Reynolds and Clifford 1980: 57). In general, this body of scholarship on the Buddhist state paints the following picture: a *Cakkavatti* like a Buddha creates and maintains on earth a *dhammic* cosmos as the moral community in which Buddhist practice the religious life.⁵⁴ Writing on Sinhala kingship, Bardwell Smith nuances the picture of the ideal Buddhist social order by pointing out that in the age of decline ideals can only be approximated by living Buddhists; but that in the age of the future Metteyya Buddha the ideal and real will merge again as it once did in the time of Gotama Buddha (B. Smith 1978a). On the other hand, most scholars adhering to the two wheels paradigm describe the righteous Buddhist king even one living in an age of decline as the one who makes the *Dhamma manifest in world* through the visible forms of rains and bountiful crops. They presume that for living Buddhists there is still found among them the belief that the ideal and real can merge even in an age of decline.

In cosmic agreement with the king are the cadastral spirits of the soil, trees, and mountains as well as Indra, the rainmaker (F. Reynolds 1972b). A righteous sovereign through his “morality”/store of merit (*puñya*) has the power to make manifest political security and economic wealth—in short the social conditions necessary for human flourishing. The righteous

⁵⁴In the premodern period, Siamese kings used epithets of the Buddha (Skilling 2007: 192-93).

In terms of recent contributions to the scholarship on Buddhist kingship, Skilling and Grabowsky (2007) provide insights on the relation of ritual practices to an ideology of power. There have also been a few works on the topic of Buddhist kingship in contemporary Thai politics such as Duncan McCargo’s study “The Changing Politics of Thailand Buddhist Order” (2012); Thongchai Winichakul’s article “Remembering/Silencing the Traumatic Past: The Ambivalent Memories of the October 1976 Massacre in Bangkok” (2002); and Donald Swearer’s essay “Center and Periphery: Buddhism and Politics in Modern Thailand” (1999).

sovereign also has the duty to support the *sangha*, the propagators of the Buddha's *dhamma*. Pivotal to actualizing and maintaining the *Dhamma* in the life of a Buddhist community is an exemplary Buddhist king. Through this interrelationship between the king and *sangha*, a kingdom's capital-state functioned as the "exemplary center" through which a cohesive cultural community came into being in the peripheral towns and villages as well (Jory 2002: 62). According to this development of the idea of a *dhammic* cosmos in South and Southeast Asian Theravādin political ideology, a Buddhist society under the rule of a righteous king represents a *dhammic* cosmos. In such a case, Buddhist society is synonymous with the moral community.

This study is indebted to the scholars who have brought to light the history of this concept of the *dhammic* cosmos that is a type of process cosmos linked to the belief that a virtuous leader is crucial to sustaining the religious life of a Buddhist community. Given my heavy reliance on scholarship, it is necessary to offer some historical evidence for this scholarly thesis on a *dhammic* cosmos. For this task, it makes sense to look at court records for they will give an indication of how kings portrayed themselves to the public. For example, the coronation of Rāma I entailed making the vow (in Pāli): "I shall extend my protection and exercise my royal authority over all those realms to the East and all beings dwelling therein. I shall remain on earth further protecting this kingdom and her Buddhist religion and her people." Post-benediction, the king says, "[A]s your sovereign [I] do hereby provide for your righteous protection, defense, and keeping. Trust me and live at ease" (Wales [1931] 1992: 78-9; 86). By the time of Rāma IV an additional line was added: "I shall provide for the righteous protection, defense, and keeping of the Buddhist Religion. If agreeable, my Lords, may the brotherhood recognize me as the defender of the Buddha faith" (Wales [1931] 1992: 90). These royal vows confirm Reynolds's and other scholars' suggestion that a Buddhist king erected and maintained a moral community,

or as Reynolds calls it the “*dhammic* cosmos.”

Aggañña-sutta’s Rūpic, Devolutionary Cosmos

For Buddhists the *dhammic* cosmos is one of three that exist, according to F. Reynolds. The other two are an individual’s *samsāric* cosmos and the *rūpic* cosmos, the latter which refers to a devolutionary process cosmology such as that found in the *Dīgha-nikāya’s Aggañña-sutta* and which is implied in the doctrine of dependent co-origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) (F. Reynolds 1985: 209). This *rūpic* cosmos “fulfills a fundamental need by formulating an ethically structured conception of the divine, the natural/physical, and the social aspects of reality” (F. Reynolds 1985: 211). In the third part of this chapter, I present this third type of cosmos, because it is also significant to the ideological formulation of Theravādin society in the premodern history of South and Southeast Asian Buddhist kingdoms, and, as it will become clear in the course of the following discussion, it is also important to the development of the idea of a calamity cosmos.

The *Aggañña-sutta* tells us that once while the Buddha was staying in a monastery located outside of Sāvatti, he encountered two Brahmins who were living there while considering monkhood. The Buddha asks them if other Brahmins despise them for living with unshaven charlatan ascetics. The two Brahmins reply, “Yes.” That answer provokes the Buddha to proclaim that the *Arhant* is the primary one. To illustrate his point, the Buddha tells them a story about the origins of kingship and human society, the latter of which is made up of the following four groups: *Khattiya-s* (kings and warriors), *Brahmin-s* (priests), *Vessa-s* (merchants and farmers), *Sudda-s* (servants), ascetics and *arhant-s* (enlightened disciples of the Buddha).

Once upon a time, the cosmos contracted and everything below the *Ābhassara* heavens was destroyed. In the *Ābhassara* heavens, there lived beings made of mind and light. As time

passed, the cosmos began to regenerate. These light-beings from the *Ābhassara* level of heaven descended and lived in the earth's atmosphere, which was an impenetrable darkness. Below the sky was water. One day, a foamy substance formed over the water's surface, covering it. A greedy light-being tasting that earthly substance enjoyed it. Eventually, the others did the same. As a result, these light-beings became the first human beings in cosmic history. They took on physical bodies that were either beautiful or ugly. As a consequence of that, speaking ill of ugly people became known in the world. Next, the primordial humans learned to have sex, to feel shame, to steal, and to lie. They also began to accuse and blame one another. The earth too devolved in tandem with primordial humanity's morality. At first, the earth began as a foamy substance. Then, it took on a grosser material form, first, as a mushroom, then, as a creeper, and finally, as rice. As for the process of the ongoing and increasing moral corruption of the first human beings, the story continues by stating that a lazy primordial human started to hoard rice. Others followed suit. As a result of that, social competition and conflict became known in the world. In response, the primordial human beings decided to choose from among them a ruler to assign punishment and blame. They elected the most handsome and charismatic one among them and made him the very first king known to women and men. The people called him "*Mahāsammata*" (Appointed by the People or Great Elect). As king, he maintained order and governed human society in exchange for a portion of rice.⁵⁵

In their study of the legacy of *Mahāsammata* in later Theravādin history, Steven Collins and Andrew Huxley uncover several instances of *Mahāsammata* in a wide variety of Pāli and

⁵⁵ In the studies on the *Aggañña-sutta*, Gombrich (1992) and Collins (1996) point out that the manner in which later Buddhists interpreted this *sutta* differs radically from the original meaning and authorial intent of the story. Through historical linguistics, Gombrich identifies parallels between the *Aggañña-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* and Brahmanical literature. These findings persuade him to read the story as satirical in authorial intent (Gombrich 1992: 161). Similarly, Collins (1996: 437-38) reads this *sutta* as a parable on suffering and impermanence. According to Collins, the numerical quality of the story's hoary past-ness encouraged the audience of the story to focus on the present-ness of *saṃsāra* and to "diminish all temporal goods past, present, and future."

vernacular texts from Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. With respect to Thai Pāli literature, *Mahāsammata* is mentioned in the *Traibhūmikathā* (*Trai Phum Phra Ruang* in Thai), a fourteenth century text from Sukhothai,⁵⁶ and the *Jinakālamālī*, an early sixteenth century text written in Chiang Mai (Collins and Huxley 1996: 628). In regards to works written in Tai Yuan (i.e., a northern Thai language), *Mahāsammata* appears in the chronicle of *Suvanna K'om Kham* (Rhum 1987: 99; Collins and Huxley 1996: 639) and in the legal text *Kotmaikan Caw Na* in which he is referred to as “*Samuttirāja*”⁵⁷ (Sunsongserm le sugṣā Watanathamlannathai 2523 (1980): 64).⁵⁸

In the premodern pan-Theravādin world of Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia, some historical Buddhist kings traced their lineage back to *Mahāsammata* in order to make allusions to this story’s social contract. They interpreted the *Aggañña-sutta* as a charter myth for the monarchy’s duty towards his subjects, namely the maintenance of the social and moral orders. Without a leader, interpersonal conflicts would arise due to the problem of assigning moral blame and punishment. Collins and Huxley write,

“Buddhist kings sometimes justified their royal function by asserting that they prevent disorder or restore order, and referring to MS as a precedent. This rhetorical association need not imply a claim to have a MS as an ancestor, but the two things are clearly related” (Collins and Huxley 1996: 631).

Although scholars regard the myth of a *Cakkavatti* as crucial to the historical development of Theravādin kingship, Collins and Huxley suggest that the *Aggañña-sutta* was just as important.

⁵⁶ Collins and Huxley note that Vickery has argued for an eighteenth century dating of this work (Collins and Huxley 1996: 626).

⁵⁷ In footnote no. 14, Rhum clarifies for us that “the proper Pali form is *sammuti* (or *sammata*, as in *Mahasammata*)” (Rhum 1987: 105).

⁵⁸ Collins and Huxley locate most of the citations of *Mahāsammata* in Sinhala and Burmese texts. They find that *Mahāsammata*’s place in royal genealogies is “ubiquitous in Sri Lanka, standard in Burma, and somewhat rarer in—but by no means absent from—Thailand, Cambodia and Laos” (Collins and Huxley 1996: 631). Most interestingly, *Mahāsammata* figures prominently in stories from Sinhala ritual texts used for rites of purification and exorcism (Collins and Huxley 1996: 641).

5,000- year Process Cosmos and Divination

F. Reynolds coins the term “*rūpic* cosmogony” in order to describe the type of cosmos found in the *Aggañña-sutta*’s cosmogonic myth. In this study, I consider and refer to this *rūpic* cosmogony identified by Reynolds as a “*rūpic* cosmology,” because it represents a set of assumptions about reality intended to orient time and space. This strand of cosmological thought that is characterized by a dual process of moral and social degeneration can be found in the premodern political culture of the Theravādin kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia, mainly as an interpretation of Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable. The historical evidence for a belief in the *rūpic* cosmos therefore can be found in practices relating to Buddhaghosa’s 5,000 timetable. In particular, I highlight two instances of Buddhists using this 5,000-year timetable: the merit-proving wars of kings and the literary production of calamity-cosmology narratives. I discuss them in that respective order.

According to Lorraine Gesick, the study of Southeast Asian classical states has generally been conducted as an examination on symbolic action (Gesick 1983a: 1). In the case of the Buddhist kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia, historians have found that some kings felt the need to prove that they had acquired the store of merit (*puñya*) that justified their rise to power. One way in which kings sought to offer evidence of their store of merit was to engage in wars. Any defeat in war would severely damage the king’s claim to be legitimate ruler. On the other hand, victories in battle would assure the subjects of a kingdom that their leader was a righteous Buddhist sovereign. This practice of proving one’s right to rule through wars indicates that in addition to a belief in the *dhammic* cosmos, a conviction in the *rūpic* cosmos also informed the ideology of governance found in premodern Southeast Asian Buddhist kingdoms. Gesick explains,

“Since the results of the working of these forces could only be deduced from the visible events of this world, however, the correct identification of the legitimate and royal claimant depended on the correct interpretation of this visible evidence” (Gesick 1983b: 88).

Political history became the proving grounds for a king’s treasure of merit. Paul Mus writing over a decade before Gesick’s 1983 study on kingship made a similar observation. In a study on Theravādin cosmology, Mus notes that later Theravādins interpreted Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable in a manner that encouraged a divinatory attitude towards the world. In particular, Mus pointed out that there is a psychological dimension to the belief in the cosmological scheme of 5,000 years. Fears and hopes were embedded in a practice of reading the cosmos in order to look for symptoms of its degeneration much like the merit-proving wars of kings. He writes,

“[T]his way of thinking comes remarkably close to what we would call the graph of a periodic phenomenon—in this case, the phenomenon of phenomenon, that is the phenomenon of the world or worlds as a whole. ... Thus, the Buddhists, in the pangs of the present Iron Age, were bound to attach ever greater importance, just to be able to see ahead of themselves, to the exact position of our world as shown on its graph. This made sense of royal power, of its social activities, its attempts at a peaceful conquest of the earth, establishing a Welfare State that would take charge of the entire world, an ideal nearly attained by Ashoka. Such a reign was a check and, in case of success, a signal: It meant that the Buddha to come was not indefinitely deferring his coming. There might still be many centuries to wait, but a turning point must already have been reached as things seemed to be improving instead of growing worse. The psychological value of such speculations is not to be slighted” (Mus 1966: 825-26).

Gesick and Mus indicate that later Southeast Asian Buddhists discovered in Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable a line of cosmological thinking along those found in the *Aggañña-sutta*’s notion of the *rūpic* cosmos marked by a process in which humanity’s morality and the social and natural aspects of the universe devolve in conjunction. Moreover, this belief in the *rūpic*-decaying cosmos compelled Buddhists to perceive the apparent and unfolding state of society as a reflection of the current king’s level of morality.

Although my discussion of *rūpic* cosmology has thus far relied on the insights of previous scholars, I now cite some historical evidence to back up this scholarly understanding of

the classical Buddhist state's ideology of power and its relation to cosmological thought. By looking at historical threats to a royal claimant, we find some evidence that catastrophic wars or ominous events like an epidemic did seem to undermine the royal ideology of merit, especially the conviction that a king's duty resided in his maintenance of the Buddhist kingdom's *dhammic* cosmos.⁵⁹ For example, from the Thonburi period in central Thai history there is a work titled, “*Memoirs of Princess Narinthewi*” that contains a passage describing how Taksin surrendered the throne by saying, “My store of merit has run out” (Gesick 1983b: 101). As for another example, we can examine how local Thai historians recorded the fall of the Ayutthayan kingdom. In particular, the *Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya* states,

“Because the life of the Kingdom of the Capital of the Holy Metropolis of Glorious Ayutthaya had reached the appointed time for its [C: destruction] [D: end], abnormalities made themselves manifest in strange ways as omens. Tears flowed all the way down from the holy eyes to the holy navel of the Holy Principle [Statue] of the Monastery of the Lord [C: of the Dam] [D: Holy Lady] Foundation. ... Furthermore, ... the atmosphere was unnatural in various ways to herald the event and publish the portents of the fall of the Capital” (Wyatt 2000: 519).⁶⁰

These two pieces of evidence indicate that royal chroniclers could not fail to document the violent end of a Buddhist king or once glorious Buddhist kingdom without hinting that such a historical event implicated the legitimacy of those fallen kings. The belief in the *rūpic* cosmos

⁵⁹ David Chandler has written the following pioneering studies on the problems of the invisibility of royal merit: “Songs at the Edge of the Forest: Perceptions of Order in Three Cambodian Texts” (1982) and “Going through the Motions: Ritual and Restorative Aspects of the Reign of King Duang of Cambodia (1983). Scholars have continued his investigations on Cambodian cultural perceptions of order and disorder in *At the Edge of the Forest* (2008) and *People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Morality in Cambodia Today* (2008). Michael Aung Thwin (1982; 1983) has also explored this dialectic between the invisibility of royal merit and historical royal claims of legitimacy.

⁶⁰ In addition to Ayutthaya's Royal Chronicle, we have publications of other literary works that arose in the aftermath of a kingdom's destruction; for example, the *Long Song Prophecy for Ayutthaya*, a work attributed to King Narai (r. 1657-1688) about the ominous period preceding the fall Ayutthaya (Cushman 2001); *Klōōng Rjāng Mangtraa Rop Chiang Mai*, an account of the Burmese king Bayinnaung's 1614 seizure of Chiang Mai and the subsequent taking of war captives (Singkha and Prasoet 2522 [1979]); and *Kap Mjāng Phuang*, a story of the Lao war captives enslaved after the Siamese destroyed the kingdom of Vientiane in 1828/9 (Grabowsky and Senmany 2002).

explains why chroniclers would read such disastrous political event as omens. The evidence also suggests that when a kingdom political and economically thrived, Buddhists living in the polity might have evidence that confirmed their cosmological conviction in a *dhammic* cosmos. Periods of political instability, on the other hand, might invite Buddhists to assume that the universe had reverted from the mechanics of the *dhammic* to the *rūpic* cosmological scheme.

Also from the perspective of the court, there is further evidence that a king would naturally fear any period in which his subjects did not fare well due to the logic of *rūpic* cosmology. Such catastrophes might signal that a king had either run out of merit (*puñya*), as Taksin claims he did before he was dethroned, or had assumed power through illegitimate means. One can detect the manner in which calamities might undermine a king's claim to legitimacy in a statement made by Rāma V. Specifically, Rāma V reported that the people believed that the 1820 cholera epidemic had been caused either by evil spirits (*phii*) or the Buddha's anger (Wales [1931] 1992: 310). Reading in between the lines of his statement, it seems that Rāma V *wanted* to say that his subjects attributed this ominous event to the workings of supernatural beings or the Buddha rather than to himself. It is quite possible, however, that some Buddhists may have interpreted this devastating epidemic as a sign that their king, Rāma V, did not fit the paradigm of Buddhist kingship and hence was an unlawful leader. In another comment on people's general attitude towards communal disasters, Rāma V observes that "because people are afraid of calamities like drought, floods, and insect pests, and desire to secure an abundant harvest," they are given to relying on divination in order to seek an appropriate remedy (Wales [1931] 1992: 263). Also, in a Bangkok Times article from 1931, it states,

"The forecast states that the supply of rice, fish, meat, and fruits will be good, while at the beginning and towards the end of the season there will be abundant rainfall and

during the middle it will be good. The supply of water will be sufficiently good” (Wales [1931] 1992: 263).⁶¹

Even though Rāma V’s above comments and the 1931 article from the Bangkok Times indicate a preoccupation with divination, Rāma V’s observations and the newspaper article portray divination as unschooled art of the masses. Moreover, these descriptions of the populace’s preoccupation with divination do not associate it with a belief in the *rūpic* cosmos. Divination, in other words, seems de-politicized in both Rāma V’s and the *Bangkok Time*’s description of it. Rāma V, however, issued a decree to stopping the practice in which monks would begin a sermon by stating the Buddhist Era, that is, the years that had passed since Gotama Buddha’s death.⁶² In contradiction to viewing cosmic divination as a popular apolitical practice, this royal decree demonstrates that Rāma V did consider the idea of the *rūpic* cosmos to be a potential threat to the royal ideology of a merit used to legitimize Buddhist kings. The above examples illustrate that later Theravādin Buddhists read and interpreted contemporary historical events as indications of the state of society, especially its connection to the cosmic and moral orders, as Gesick and Mus have noted in their studies. Holding a belief in a process and degenerative *rūpic* cosmos, Buddhists entered into a relation with the world in which they understood ominous events as the results of good and bad human actions, and, in human society, a monarch represented the most powerful generator of good or bad *kammic* consequences for the kingdom

⁶¹ In Siamese history, much of the court rituals pertain to forecasting the future through Brahmanical rites of prognostication. As Skilling (2007) notes, Buddhist symbols, beliefs, and practices in addition to Brahmanical rituals were foundational to the ideology of power and kingship in Siamese history.

⁶² C. Reynolds, writes, “As the nineteenth century progressed it would seem that the prediction gradually lost its grip on the Siamese imagination. Late in the century, King Chulalongkorn decreed that henceforth monks should not begin their sermons by declaring the exact time in years, months, and days that had passed since the Enlightenment and the time remaining until the year 5,000 (C. Reynolds: 1972: 135).

as whole.⁶³ As in the *Aggañña-sutta*, the *rūpic* cosmos, especially its social and natural world aspects could devolve in tandem with humankind's morality. Although the *dhammic* cosmos, too, involves thinking along the lines of a process type of cosmos, it unlike the *rūpic* cosmos emphasized the king's power to erect a moral community on earth. Through the ritual acts of and the presence of a righteous individual on the throne, the kingdom would constitute the exemplary center of a Buddhist just society. The *rūpic* cosmos, on the other hand, stressed the fragility of the kingdom and tied that vulnerability to king's ability to bring about a peaceful and just society. To make that point, it brought to light a bad king's capacity to bring about chaos, economic hardships, and disharmony in the moral community that Buddhist society represents.

Calamity Cosmology's Alternative Moral Community

The geographical terrain of northern Thailand made its inland northern principalities vulnerable to periods of political and hence social collapse. These kingdoms were located in the hills at points where there was an expansive fertile plateau and a node in the overland trade routes, so that urban state-centers could participate in overland trading. James Scott describes these surrounding uplands as a "relatively stateless" area.⁶⁴ The historical longevity of kingdoms such as Chiang Tung, Nan, and Lanna were "exceptions that prove the rule" (Scott 2009: 19). Scott states, "Those would-be kingdoms that did manage to defy the odds did so only for a relatively brief, crisis strewn period" (Scott 2009: 19). In respect to the tenuous state-making project of Lanna, this northern inland kingdom was independent from the thirteenth to mid-sixteenth century. Then, the Burmese dominated Lanna until the Chiang Mai principality, the

⁶³ For a similar discussion on divination and the fate of a kingdom, one can consult Nerida Cook's (2002) article on the practices of astrology and divining the horoscope of the Thai nation as well as Annette Hamilton's (2002) study on contemporary Thai society's public sphere, media, and public opinion. Hamilton's essay, in particular, paints a portrait of the public sphere as penetrated by a "[c]ontemporary Buddhist ideology" that "stresses an image of degeneration as a fundamental aspect of the current cosmic condition of the world" (Hamilton 2002: 296).

⁶⁴ Scott (2009) uses the term "Zomia" to designate the stateless areas located in the mountainous borderlands of mainland Southeast Asia, China, India, and Bangladesh.

capital of Lanna, regained its independence in the late eighteenth century as a semi-autonomous principality and vassal of the Siamese kingdom. In the late nineteenth century, central Thailand's policies for national integration dissolved the power of the rulers of the northern Thai principalities. Northern Thai chronicles record Lanna's crisis-strewn history especially the period when the kingdom lost its independence to the Burmese. For instance, the

Phongsawadan Yonok states,

“The Burmese controlled all communes [*tambon*] of Lan Na. The oppression of the population caused much suffering all over the country. Some people fled into the jungle. Others flocked together and formed gangs killing each other. The country had no ruler” (Grabowsky 1993:7).

By the late eighteenth century, the Burmese had enacted a policy of direct rule that disrupted the Lanna kingdom's network of local ruling lords and district governors who “ate” (*kin*) the populace living in the countryside *myang-s* and villages by collecting goods and fines as well as by conscripting men for public-works projects or war. According to the *Virakamma Phra Caw Kawila* (which is an undated text)⁶⁵ and the *Chiang Mai Chronicle*, a text written in 1827, Lampang's royal dynasty had been completely wiped out by the late eighteenth century. An abbot worried over the loss of leadership considered defrocking and leading a rebellion. The

Chiang Mai Chronicle states,

At that time, the abbot of Wat Chumphu sympathized with the people, and appealed to the dignitaries—Thao Lin Kan and Chare Nòì—to come, and he advised them, “Now, there is no able person [to lead resistance]: people see anyone die, and they all / abandon their homes. I myself would defrock to save the country if I could mobilize them. All but the women I would lead to go and fight the Lamphun people. If I were unable to win, I would slit my throat and float down the river. I'll defrock today” (Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995: 137)!

The two above passages each of which are from a northern Thai chronicle preserve and transmit a cultural memory of the fragility of a local northern Thai principality. Another instance of a

⁶⁵ For this excerpted passage from *Virakamma Phra Caw Kawila*, see Sanguan 2552 (2009), p. 125.

cultural memory of social fragmentation can be detected in the northern Thai chronicle *Legend of Mahāthera Fa Bot*. In this text, there are descriptions of a ritual to exorcize the city of Chiang Mai, to extend its life, and to celebrate its periodic times of peace and prosperity (Notton 1926: 57-62). Performed in times of war, pestilence, flood, or drought, the ritual exorcism of Chiang Mai consists of making offerings to the city pillar (*Indakhila*), Phya Chaang Phŷak, Phya Raajasii, the elephant monument at Wat Chedi Luang, Phya Indra, the four Catulok (in Thai) gods, and the guardian spirits of the Ping River and Chiang Mai (Notton 1926: 57-61). On the instructions to ritually prolong the life of the *myang*, this text prescribes the king (*caw myang*), chiefs, dignitaries, and inhabitants to gather together to worship while monks chant a list of seven Buddhist texts that must be acquired from specific Chiang Mai temples (Notton 1926: 62). We know from Notton's 1926 translation of the *Legend of Mahāthera Fa Bot* that the northern Thais of Chiang Mai knew of these ritual practices by the first quarter of the twentieth century. It might be noted that during the early twentieth century calamity-cosmology narratives were still being copied.

Calamity-cosmology narratives depict the world of Jambudīpa. The texts typically narrate a host of ominous events destined to befall those living in the Thai kingdoms of Jambudīpa. The cultural logic animating the textual-world of calamity cosmologies resembles the divinatory practice of interpreting history as an index of the king's collection of invisible merit (*puñya*). As stated previously, scholars have identified this divinatory practice in their examinations on historical Buddhist kings, namely the practice of merit-proving (*pāramī*) wars (Jory 2002). Conceptually, F. Reynolds leads us to believe that the *Aggañña-sutta*'s concept of the *rūpic* cosmos anticipated this later Theravādin divinatory attitude found in Southeast Asian Buddhist societies. The idea of the *rūpic* cosmos was indispensable to these divinatory practices in which

Buddhists held a current state of society to be a mirror of that society's and its leader's level of its morality.

A second piece of evidence for this later Theravādin belief in the *rupic* cosmos can be adduced on the basis of the calamity-cosmology narratives from northern Thailand. Calamity-cosmology texts provide a student of Buddhism the chance to inspect narratives that circulated locally in a regional Buddhist moral and political culture. Here, there is a distinct opportunity to inspect in detail the practices of cosmological thought found in northern Thai Buddhist culture. Unlike warring kings who relied on myth of the *Cakkavatti* king's wheel of *Dhamma* as a symbol of just rule, the authors of calamity cosmology, surprisingly, drew upon Buddhist scholasticism, namely Buddhaghosa's 5,000-year narrative of decline in the *dhamma* and four of his definitions for *Dhamma*. I now identify passages that indicate that the writers of calamity-cosmology narratives sought to re-envision the homologous relation of a moral cosmic community and society by taking Buddhaghosa's theories on *Dhamma* and reconstituting them in a cosmological narrative form.⁶⁶ In general, the narrative of a 5,000-year decline in the *dhamma* frames these northern Thai compositions as an interplay between *Dhamma* and *dhamma*. In particular, Buddhaghosa claimed that in a series of stages the *dhamma* would disappear from human society. Once the *dhamma* disappears, Gotama Buddha's *sāsana* will come to end. In calamity-cosmology narratives, there is a suggestion that through the propagation of *dhamma* (the Buddha's teachings) the life of the *Dhamma* in the community could be maintained. Thus, the interplay of *Dhamma/dhamma* entailed supporting the *dhamma* in order to maintain the *Dhamma* in the life of the religious community. In this northern Thai

⁶⁶ Caroline Rhys Davids has identified for us five definitions of *Dhamma* written by Buddhaghosa in her book *Buddhism: A Study of the Buddhist Norm*. The northern Thai writers of calamity-cosmology narratives did not seem to explicitly borrow Buddhaghosa's definition of *Dhamma* as "phenomenon" (*nisatta-nijjivatā*) (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1912: 49).

formulation of the moral community, one finds an allusion made to the manner in which a Buddha creates a *dhammic* cosmos by preaching the *dhamma*. In addition to an interpretation of Buddhaghosa's decline narrative, these northern Thai writers of calamity-cosmology narratives borrowed Buddhaghosa's following definitions of *Dhamma* as 1) "the Buddha's teachings," (*pariyatti*), 2) "an order of causality" (*hetu*),⁶⁷ 3) "right" or "righteousness," and 4) as a set of five *niyāma-s*.⁶⁸ The fourth definition of *Dhamma* relates a view of the universe as a set of five *niyāma-s* (going-on, process) (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1912: 119).⁶⁹ The five processes are "*kamma-niyāma*, order of act-and-result; *utu-niyāma*, physical inorganic order; *bīja-niyāma*, order of germs, or seeds; *citta-niyāma*, order of mind, or conscious life, *dhamma-niyāma*, order of the norm, or the effort of nature to produce a perfect type" (Rhys Davids 1912: 119).⁷⁰ In this last description of *Dhamma*, C. Rhys Davids takes it as an extension of the meaning of *Dhamma* as "moral law" or "right."

Now, I present textual examples that illustrate these five above understandings of *Dhamma*, which can be found in Buddhaghosa's exegetical writings. In other words, the

⁶⁷ In Buddhaghosa's statement "*Dhammo ti hetu*," *Dhamma* refers to "condition" or "cause" (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1912: 78).

⁶⁸ In particular, C. Rhys Davids refers to Buddhaghosa's exegesis of the term "*Dhamma*" found in DhSA. 38 which states, "*Dhammasaddo paṇāyam pariyattihetugūṇanissatta-nijjīvatadāsu dissati*." In her introductory essay to *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, she comments on this passage (see C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1975: xl).

⁶⁹ On this fourth definition of *Dhamma*, C. Rhys Davids locates it in the view of the moral order of the universe found in the Pāli *sutta-s*. She writes, "Now the Pitakas do not assert, but they leave it clear enough, that, in the organic universe, right and wrong, and those consequences of actions which we call justice, retribution, compensation, are as truly and inevitably a part of the eternal natural or cosmic order as the flow of a river, the process of the seasons, the plant from the fertile seed. Going farther than the modern scientific standpoint, they substituted a cosmodicy for a theodicy, a natural moral order for the design of a creative deity" (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1912: 118).

⁷⁰ According to C. Rhys Davids, Buddhaghosa has written on this extension of the *Dhamma*'s meaning in his commentary on the D II 8 line: "This, in such a case, is the norm" (or order of events, *dhammatā*) (C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1912: 119).

Niyāmo ca nām'esa kamma-niyāma utu-niyāmo bīja-niyāmo citta-niyāmo ti pañcavidho (DA II 432).
Imasmim̐ pana ṭhāne pañcavidhaniyāmaṃ nāma gaṇahiṃsu bījaniyāma utuniyāmaṃ kammaniyāmaṃ dhammaniyāmaṃ cittaniyāman ti (DhSA 272).

following textual analysis of calamity-cosmology narratives presumes that these compositions may have been written as a local interpretation and elaboration of Buddhaghosa's theories on *Dhamma*. On *Dhamma*'s meaning as "hetu," *Tamnan Rawaek* has a passage that paints a picture of the cosmos according to an understanding of *Dhamma* as an order of causality (*hetu*). It states,

Once the Lord Buddha, the Omniscient Teacher, gave a sermon on the future saying, "Listen Phra Mahamoggalana, Jambudīpa is a most excellent place where all the *Ariya*-lords such as Lord Buddhas, *paccekabuddhas*, and chief disciples are born. This place is called Jambudīpa because of these *Ariya*-lords. At this time, the ruling lords and people all have faith in the three jewels and give *dāna* as a their refuge. As a result, all the crops and fruits such as rice shoots, beans, sesame, sweet and tart fruits, bananas, sugar cane, honey, dwarf bee honey, lotus flower tips, fiddleheads, and jackfruit—can be eaten. They are not stricken with diseases. Even the rice sprouts, beans, sesame, others seedlings and fruits are so. In the future, when the *Tathāgata*'s *sāsana* reaches three thousand years, all the sweet and tart fruits eaten by people will have poisonous tumors and blemishes. People will cough and vomit. They will have headaches and feel dizzy. These [symptoms] will persist as a disease. Even the [trees] and rice sprouts will not have healthy fruits or clusters. Both cultivated and wet rice will have clusters with one hundred grains. But some will have only thirty or forty grains. So it will be in the future. What is the cause? It is because the ruling lords do not follow the *rajadhamma*-s. They will cause my, the *Tathāgata*'s, *sāsana* to disappear. One factor is: they do not revere or respect the three jewels. They show neglect towards the *Tathāgata*'s *sāsana*. One thing: they do not revere or respect my, the *Tathāgata*'s, students. They think that they are mightier, more glorious, and more powerful than the three jewels (*Tamnan Rawaek* 1900 C.E./1262 C.S.: fols. 1-3).⁷¹

⁷¹ *atha no kaan m̄ya nan satthaa sapranyuu phra phuttha caw kō' theedsanaa pay phaay naa waa dang nii duu raa phra mogkhalan h̄ȳ chomphuudiip pen and prasæt ying nak pen thii kæt haeng ariyacaw thang laay pen ton phra phuttha caw phra pacekka phuttha caw lae 'agkhatsaawok caw kō' mii lae heet dang an ariyacaw thang laay riak waa chomphuthip nii prasæt ph̄ya an lae nay kaan bat nii thaaw phya lae khon thang laay kō' yang fang ch̄ya nay kaew thang 3 prakaan h̄ȳ thaan pen thii ph̄yng dang an an waa phit thang laay pen ton waa khaaw klam thua ngaa thang laay lae luuk som luuk waan kluay 'ōy namph̄yng nammin ngaw bua huabaan maak khanat khamun thang laay fuung nan nay kaanbat nii an khon thang laay kin kō' yang haa phaet roga bō' day daaj maen waa khaaw klam thua ngaa thang muan kō' yang pen ton pen ruang pen luuk maak nak lae nay kaan phaay naa satsanaa tathaagata khaw maa kheet 3 phan m̄ya day an luuk som luuk waan thang laay an khon thang laay aw kin dang an kō' cak pen phit nguansaan kō' ca ay haak 'ōōk cak cep hua muataa klaay pen phaet roga thang laay muan maen waa khaaw klam thang laay kō' bō' pen luuk pen ruang dii thang khaawray khaawnam lang day rōōy khaaw kō' cak day 3 sip 4 sip kō'ca kæt mii phaay naa m̄ȳn cha lae heet day lae waa an chaa thae lae heet day lae waa an chaa thae lae heet waa thaaw phya bō' chōōp bō' prakōōp chōōp thotsaratchatham thang laay khaw cak kratham annaathon tōō satsanaa khruu tathaagata an 1 khaw kō' bō' khrop bō' yam yang kaew 3 prakaan khaw thang laay kō' pramaat tōō satsanaa khruu tathaagata an 1 khaw kho bo khrop yam luuksit khruu tathaagata heet waa khaw mii manoo yay sahaaw khaw thang laay th̄ȳy anya yot sak haeng khaw thang laay nak pen yay kwaa kaew 3 prakaan*

As in the canonical *suttas*, the Buddha speaks of the inhabitants of Jambudīpa rather than a three-tiered universe. At first, Jambudīpa is the land of human flourishing. Afterwards, it will become uninhabitable. The Buddha gives the reason (*hetu*) for this change. Here, the usage of “*hetu*,” which is commonly found in calamity-cosmology narratives, suggests that the author had in mind an understanding of *Dhamma* as a condition that arises as the result of a cause. In addition, the above passage yokes the blossoming forth of plants and vegetation to a thriving religious community. This utopic state of the natural and social aspects of the world and human existence occurs during the time of Gotama Buddha. More importantly, it illustrates that this cosmic period is a time in which all five of the *niyāma-s* are in order. In the future after Gotama Buddha dies, however, it is a period of *adhamma* in which the five *niyāma-s* move perversely. Narrative time demonstrates the movements of the five *niyāma-s* in cosmic time. Moreover, the phrase “one factor” (*prakaan*), which also commonly appears in calamity-cosmology narratives, further implies that the authors of these works had in mind a notion of *Dhamma* as a *niyāma* process. In essence, this passage gives an inverse description of what Tambiah’s calls the king’s multiplier effect, that is, the association of righteous kings with a bountiful harvest and rains. *Dhamma* as “*hetu*” in this passage expresses a notion of the *kammic* results of intentional actions. *Kammic* fruits move in time and become manifest in the world due to time’s movement. As a result of that *kammic* cosmological process, human action becomes implicated in the good and bad things that arise in the world. Thus, one finds in the *Tamnan Rawaek* allusions to the meaning of *Dhamma* as “*niyāma*.” Furthermore, the meaning of *Dhamma* as “*hetu*” is explicitly found in the above excerpted passage’s line: “What is the cause (*hetu*)?” These two meanings of *Dhamma* are also related to *Dhamma*’s third meaning as that which distinguishes right (*dhamma*) from wrong

(*adhamma*), as seen in *Tamnan Rawaek*'s juxtaposition of a time period filled with felicities and another one filled with calamities.

From the same text, *Tamnan Rawaek*, there is a discussion of *Dhamma* as "right." It states,

"The one who is wise and brilliant, that one burns de-merit. ...In the future, things will change. [People] lead others on the wrong path. [People will say,] "This is *Dhamma*." Then they say, "That is not *Dhamma*." [Having said], "That is not *Dhamma*," they say, "It is really is *Dhamma*." Those outside say, "This is the true path." Then they say, "That is not the true path." They say, "I do not like [that]." Then, they say, "I like it." Having said, "I truly like that," they say, "I really do not like it." All of these types of acts (*kamma*) tend to destroy people in the present life and in a future life. The reason (for that) is their perception of the world (*ditthi*) leads them to take the wrong path. Caught in [that view of things], they do not see the path of *Dhamma* or the ways of the world. That causes them to neither have guilt nor feel shame towards acts of de-merit. Ascetics, Brahmins, and householders should contemplate the *Dhamma* known as "the disappearance the *Tathāgata*'s *sāsana*." Thus, (the Blessed One) spoke this sermon on the path of *Dhamma*, so that the people would not become corrupt and sink into the ocean that is *samsāric* existence. So thus, [the Buddha] told the sermon on the future of the *sāsana*'s decline when no one will have the ability to speak a sermon on the *dhamma*. So, it will surely come to pass. "*Yo puggalo*" is any person who knows "*sankhāra-dhamma*." Or it is one who knows how the world is not stable or permanent. Thus, one ought to practice according to the *Dhamma*" (*Tamnan Rawaek* 1900 C.E./1262 C.S.: fols. 10-11).⁷²

In the above excerpt from the *Tamnan Rawaek*, one finds the meaning of *Dhamma* as "what is right." This meaning implicitly pervades this passage, but it is explicitly found in the part that explains that those who do not know the path of *Dhamma* do not have a sense of wrong-doing.

According to this text, *Dhamma* is related to one's capacity to feel shame and guilty in regards to

⁷² *khon panyaa chalaat nak hyy rōn may kae baap nan kō' dii ...phaay naa kō' dii an cak hyy mii prae caak phaawa an nii kō' dii hyy thyy aw khlōng an phit an day chay tham phōy waa bō' chay tham an bō' chay tham phōy waa maen tham lae hon phaay nōk waa an maen khlōng thae phōy waa bō' chay maen khlōng an bō' chōp phōy waa chōp waa an an chōp thae phōy waa bō' chōp thae daay waa an kam thang laay fuung nan kō' thiang yōm hyy khon thang laay chiphaay pay chua nii chua naa heet thidthi hyy khawcay thyy aw khlōng an phit nan maa pok maa hom way bō' hyy ruu bō' hyy han caeng yang khlōng tham lae khlōng lok an nan bō' hyy mii khwamphit la' aay kae baap nan lae sromaphrom krahat thang laay kuan ramphying duu hyy caeng nay tham an chyy waa 'adhara satsanaa khruu tathaagata haak klaaw yang khlōng tham theedsanaa way kae khon thang laay nii thya' phya hyy khon thang laay lom com so nay namsamut khyy phaawa songsaan an cing theedsanaa pay phaay naa waa nay mya satsanaa day thōy nan kō' cak hyy haa bugkhon phuu 1 cak theedsanaa sōn bōk klaaw bō' day cak mii bō' yaa cha lae yo puggalo ryy bugkhon phuu day yang ruu waa sangkhaan tham thang laay ruu duay ruu kaet haeng lok thang laay nii bō' man bō' thiang sak an kō' phying patibat taam tham nii thae lae*

one's performance of acts of de-merit (*pāpa*). In addition, one finds the meaning of *dhamma* as the Buddha's teachings in the second half of the above paragraph in the portion that speaks of "the disappearance of the Tathāgata's *sāsana*." This mention of "the disappearance of *Tathāgata's sāsana*" demonstrates that authors of this passage knew of Buddhaghosa's narrative of 5,000-year decline in the *dhamma*. This passage from a calamity- cosmological narrative also implicitly conveys an idea of a *dhammic* cosmos along the lines articulated by F. Reynolds and Clifford. According to them, a *dhammic* cosmos refers to a cosmic and ethical order that the moral community must establish and maintain through ritual practices and normative behavior. In the case of the above calamity-cosmology narrative, it demonstrates that the vitality and reality of the *dhammic* cosmos depends upon Buddhists knowing what actions are morally right (i.e., *Dhamma's* third meaning) and the prescience of knowers of the Buddha's teachings (the first meaning of *dhamma*). On the actualization of the *Dhamma* in the life of the community, Reynolds and Clifford regard the Buddhist king as pivotal to maintaining the *dhammic* cosmos in the historical context of the premodern Theravādin Buddhist civilizations of mainland Southeast Asia (F. Reynolds and Clifford 1980: 65). The above excerpt from a calamity-cosmology narrative, however, does not relate the existence of the *dhammic* cosmos to a Buddhist king.⁷³ Instead this calamity-cosmological scheme seems to displace the need for a king to erect the *dhammic* cosmos from its vision of the cosmic and moral Buddhist community faithful to the Buddha's teachings. The *Tamnan Rawaek* not only portrays the universe according to Buddhaghosa's definitions of *Dhamma* and his narrative of a 5,000-year age of decline, but it

⁷³ Obeyesekere once remarked, "I suggest that it is in relation to a lay community that ethicization of the moral life occurs (Obeyesekere 2002: 112). He elaborates, "It therefore seems incontrovertible that early Buddhism and Jainism involved preaching to the world and establishing communication with the lay community, not only as a means of finding recruits for the order but also to create congregations. ... Hence a crucial feature of early Buddhism was the public sermon, which has remained to this day a vehicle for the communication of doctrinal tradition to laypeople. These public sermons were open to all, unlike the closed esoteric world of the Upanishadic guru and his pupil" (Obeyesekere 2002: 115).

also portrays the cosmos as a *moral* universe according to the *Aggañña-sutta*'s picture of the *rūpic* cosmos in which humanity's level of morality corresponds with the state of the natural and social worlds. The idea of the *rūpic* cosmos made it possible for northern Thai Buddhists to imagine and formulate a moral valence to historical events, whereas Buddhaghosa's theories on *Dhamma* provided a narrative framework to write a story of the *rūpic* cosmos that extended it beyond being a myth on the origins of humans, kingship, and society.

Conclusion

Through an interpretation of *Dhamma*, this northern Thai *sangha* coopted the royal symbolism of a Buddhist state as a *dhammic* cosmos led by a righteous king who possessed a *Dhammic* wheel of dominion (*āṇācakkā*). In particular, these northern Thai monastics drew on Buddhaghosa's idea of a 5,000-year decline in the *sāsana* caused by the loss of *dhamma* teachings and some of his definitions for *Dhamma*. Using Buddhaghosa's theory that the *dhamma* teachings were needed to support the *sāsana*, these local monks forged a *dhammic* and cosmological foundation for a moral community made up of a lay followers and monks. According to this interplay between *Dhamma/dhamma*, Buddhists did not need an exemplary Buddhist king to bring about and maintain the moral community. Rather than promoting the king as a wielder of the *Dhamma*, these narratives made anyone interested in the *dhamma* (i.e., the teachings of the Buddha) a co-wielder of the *Dhamma*. What this textual community could not dispense with was the teacher/student relationship required to transmit the *dhamma*, and thereby make a moral community come alive and engage in working upon the world in the religious idioms of *Dhamma*. In particular, members of this moral community were encouraged to maintain the *Dhamma* in a communal context through sponsoring monastic order's propagation of the *dhamma*. Through supporting the *dhamma*, ordinary folk were brought together in a

collective effort to maintain the norms, values, and ideals of a moral community.

In terms of ethical orientation, calamity cosmology embodies the idea of a process *kammic* cosmology that too had reached a mainstream status in Theravādin cultures during the premodern period, as indicated by the merit-proving wars conducted by kings. Thus, we can notice the following dialogue occurring between a *dhammic* cosmic and *rūpic* cosmic ideology. First, the belief in a process and devolutionary cosmology along the lines of the *Aggañña-sutta*'s *rūpic* cosmos allowed northern Thai Buddhists to be critical observers of the socio-political world. A “negative” or devolutionary process cosmology gave rise to a divinatory attitude towards the world. It encouraged Buddhists to constantly examine and puzzle over the state of society as it was apparent and as it was becoming. Calamity cosmology used this *rūpic* process cosmological conviction to rethink the *dhammic* cosmos. In other words, the *rūpic* cosmos's assertion of decline and its divinatory practices allowed consumers of calamity-cosmological literature to reject any claims pertaining to a homology between the *dhammic* cosmos and northern Thai society's general morality. To deny that extant Buddhist society's general morality bore any semblance of the idea of individuals living in a *dhammic* cosmos meant that northern Thai Buddhists were free to embrace another idea of the moral community as made up of those who participated in the *Dhamma/dhamma* decline narrative of calamity cosmology's *rūpic* and devolutionary cosmos. Having this new orientation to time and space was essential to constructing an alternative Buddhist fellowship through literature. United by a belief in an age of decline, Buddhist serfs could regard the moral community as made up of those individuals concerned about surviving a time in which Buddhists had to endure life in an oppressive and immoral society ruled by despotic kings.

Three

Ovāda: Calling Forth a Moral Community

Despite these texts being an expression of a cosmological conviction, the monks who wrote/copied these works called them “*tamnan*,” a style of historiography local to northern Thailand.⁷⁴ Therefore, this chapter’s discussion of genre takes into account how the narrative style of these texts warranted a classification as *tamnan*. This chapter brings to light the voice of this literary genre in order to further describe how calamity-cosmology narratives could be used to forge a moral community. As the previous chapter illustrates, calamity-cosmology narratives were written as a discourse in conversation with a prevailing cosmic symbolism and ideology on Buddhist society as a cosmic and moral (i.e. *dhammic*) community, for which Reynolds provided the term “*dhammic* cosmos.” The writers of calamity cosmologies, however, used the idea of the *rūpic* and devolutionary cosmos to re-read contemporary Buddhist society in a divinatory manner and judge it in the same manner that a Buddhist subject could read a king’s loss in battle as a sign that de-legitimizes his right to rule. “Reading and seeing” the status quo’s picture of the *dhammic* cosmos as a *rūpic* and devolutionary cosmos was done through calamity cosmology’s illustration of northern Thai society as one that does not resemble a *dhammic* cosmos. Implied in calamity cosmology’s socio-political critique was the idea of a new moral community created through this calamity-cosmological conviction. Moreover, this Buddhist congregation constituted a new *dhammic* cosmos designed especially for living Buddhists who currently had

⁷⁴ Although cosmological thought pervades calamity-cosmology narratives, these works were not classified as a genre of cosmology. In contemporary Thai society, the genre of cosmology is known as “*lokaśāstra*.” In terms of the premodern period, Craig Reynolds describes the Siamese cosmological tradition as dedicated to the production of a premodern theory of society. He states, “The cosmology articulates the aesthetics of what is morally superior and socially dominant in such a way that its norms and idealizations might be described as a “theory” of premodern Siamese society” (Reynolds 2006: 222).

to endure a cosmic age of decline. This chapter finds that calamity-cosmology narratives, while belonging to the genre of *tamnan*, nonetheless incorporate the speech genre of *ovāda* (exhortation), which is a style of communication commonly found in Pāli *sutta-s*.⁷⁵ Moreover, an *ovāda* expresses rebuke and can easily lend itself to becoming a speech genre that negatively evaluates the socio-political world through an expression of rebuke. Thus, it appears that not only did the writers of calamity-cosmology narratives use the concept of the *rūpic* cosmos to craft a social critique but that they also used the speech genre of *ovāda* to give voice to that critical eye towards the contemporary state of a community's affairs. As laid out in the introductory chapter, three components of the moral community are to be addressed in this study: 1) shared interests and activities, 2) a form of moral address, and 3) a relation to society's ideals. Whereas the second chapter described cosmology's agenda-setting for a group, the first character of a moral community, this third chapter takes up the second foundational block for building a moral community through literature—moral address.

My discussion of genre begins by elaborating the general features of a literary genre that Bakhtin has identified for us. Those features inform my approach to examining genre in terms of discursive acts that can be evidenced in and are commonly shared by texts belonging to the same genre. Then, I investigate the manuscripts upon which this study's research is built. The manuscripts provide me with an empirical basis from which to discern and elaborate the discursive acts that define calamity-cosmology narratives as "*tamnan*." Specifically, these narratives grew out of Buddhist apotropaic practices, the speech genre of *ovāda*, the literary genre of *tamnan*, and the science of astrology, each of which will be discussed separately in this

⁷⁵ A III 144-47 has a section on the method for delivering an *ovāda*.

chapter in that respective order.⁷⁶

A Theory on the Origins of a Genre

Although scholars generally do not use theories from literary criticism to articulate a specific genre of Buddhist literature, this discussion on genre relies on the ideas of literary theorists Mikhail Bakhtin and Tzvetan Todorov. As stated previously, northern Thai tradition places calamity cosmologies in the genre of *tamnan*. Yet the works of *tamnan* most familiar to historians are not narratively framed by cosmological ideas. Therefore, a consideration of these writings begs the question of the origins of this genre. Bakhtin provides a method for that sort of inquiry and Todorov gives a concise definition of genre. I begin with Todorov's explanation of what is a literary genre.

Todorov begins with the statement "genres are classes of texts" (Todorov 1976: 161). Then he proceeds to unpack that comment. "Texts" refer to what is literary, which indicates a discourse made "of spoken sentences." In terms of "classes," they are the result of a scribal institution's codification and dissemination of a discourse having certain properties. These properties in turn constitute the discursive acts that belong to a discrete category of texts.

Todorov concludes that genre consists of "this codification of discursive properties" (Todorov 1976: 162).⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Very little research has been done on the history of calamity-cosmology *tamnan* with the exception of Sawatlabharan Saenpron's (2550 B.E. [2007]) unpublished dissertation "Kaansyikasa Wanakam Tham Nay Khōōng Lānnā." Scholars have not attempted to write a comprehensive study that investigates more than a handful of these works. Even then, there are only a few monographs dedicated to exploring a few works or one work from this strand of cosmological literature. They are François Lagirarde's (2007) "Temps et lieux d'histoires bouddhiques: À propos de quelques «chroniques» inédites du Lanna;" Donald Swearer, Sommai Premchit, and Phaithoon Dokbuakaew's (2004) *Sacred Mountains of Northern Thailand and their legends*; and Phaithoon Dokbuakaew's book (2543 B.E. [2000]) *Daw Caw Rat*. The latter two studies are translations of an individual text. In addition, we have a handful of studies on the *Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* that were done by Thai scholars such as Katanyu Chuchyñ (2525 B.E.) and Prakong Nimmanahaeminda (2544 B.E.).

⁷⁷ Todorov names four possible aspects of a text that can shape its domain of discursive properties. He states, "[T]hese properties arise either from the semantic aspect of the text, or from its syntactic aspect (the relation of the parts among themselves), or from the pragmatic aspect (the relation between the users), or finally from the verbal

In “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin emphasizes the communicative aspect of a literary genre.⁷⁸ Bakhtin, like Todorov, clarifies what is a genre, but Bakhtin reduces a literary genre down to its elementary level of utterance. At a basic level, a literary genre is made up of a generic sphere of communication. On speech genres, Bakhtin states,

“All three of these aspects—thematic content, style, and compositional structure—are equally determined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication. Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types* of these utterances. These we may call *speech genres*” (Bakhtin 1986: 60).

A generic domain of speech is one that exists in the realm of everyday oral communication. Once it is rendered onto the level of a textual speech plane, it undergoes a re-articulation. A literary genre then represents a complex level of discourse. Bakhtin’s theory encourages an analysis of genre on the level of utterances—that is, the dialogical act formed in the space between a speaker’s speech plan and the participants of that communicative act. According to Bakhtin, “the speaker’s speech will is manifested primarily in the choice of a particular speech genre.” He writes,

“This choice is determined by the specific nature of the given sphere of speech communication, semantic (thematic) consideration, the concrete situation of the speech communication, the personal composition of the its participants, and so on. And when the speaker’s speech plan with all its individuality and subjectivity is applied and adapted to a chosen genre, it is shaped and developed within a certain generic form. Such genres exist above all in the great and multifarious sphere of everyday oral communication, including the most familiar and the most intimate” (Bakhtin 1986: 78).

aspect (... which we can use to include everything that involves the materiality of the signs)” (Todorov 1976: 163).

⁷⁸ On the origins of genre, Todorov notes, “A new genre is always the transformation of one or several old genres: by inversions, by displacement, by combination” (Todorov 1976: 161). Like Bakhtin, Todorov holds that genres do consist of speech acts. A society elevates a certain speech genre to the level of a literary one when “a society chooses and codifies the acts that most closely correspond to its ideology” (Todorov 1976: 164). Todorov indicates that scribal institutions create genres through the incorporation of codified discursive acts and through a speech genre related to the social life. He also points out that scribal institutions do and can make new genres in a conscious fashion because under certain socio-historical conditions a certain generic sphere of communication may rise to prominence (Todorov 1976: 164).

The question of genre then, begins with a theoretical description of the speech genre embedded and refracted in the textual plane of communication. In addition, the relationship between a literary and speech genre forces one to recognize the “concrete situation of the speech communication” (Bakhtin 1986: 78). In other words, we must keep in mind the social location from which a speaker’s speech-will arises. Bakhtin clarifies that the concrete location of a speaker’s speech plan shapes the “speaker’s evaluative attitude toward the subject of his speech” as well as “the speaker’s subjective emotional evaluation of the referentially semantic content of his utterance” (Bakhtin 1986: 84).

Todorov suggests that we consider genre in terms of the transformation of extant codified discursive acts. Bakhtin recommends an examination of genre that attends to the oral communicative act from which a genre stems. Both indicate that calamity-cosmology narratives can be analyzed as a genre emerging from within *tamnan*. To discern such a development, a student must attend to what speech genre if any, sets calamity- cosmological narratives apart from *tamnan-s*. Second, one must ask, “What other extant discursive practices may have been codified in these narratives?” I now explore these questions by introducing and examining the texts conveying these narratives and their manuscript witnesses. In the course of describing the texts and their thematic content, I take into consideration the *tamnanic* and other non-*tamnanic* discursive practices that are found in these texts and their manuscript witnesses’ colophon.

A Look at the Paratextual Apparatus

The temple provenance of some manuscripts indicates that its authors emphasized the pragmatic aspect of these writings, which Todorov clarifies as “the relation between users” (Todorov 1976: 163). In particular, the temple named “Wat Dap Phay” (Temple that Averts Danger), which is located within Chiang Mai’s city-walls, possesses two calamity-cosmology

narratives: *Tamnan Phya In* and *Nangsġyġ Kham Sōōn Phraya In*.⁷⁹ The former is a manuscript witness of the *Tamnan Phya In*. The text *Tamnan Phya In*, as previously stated, presents itself as an object to be worshipped and treated as a talisman. In addition, *Tamnan Phya In* contains protective Pāli verses or *paritta-s*. It states that Lord Indra who wrote the text in 1247 C.S. brought it down from the heavens to the people of Jambudġpa in order to teach them to generate and accumulate merit, to keep the precepts, and to cultivate loving-kindness towards others.⁸⁰ This same temple possesses the *Tamnan Phraya Tham*, another calamity-cosmological text.⁸¹ At another temple located in the heart of Chiang Mai city named “Wat Chiang Man” (Temple of the Firmly Established City), which was the first temple erected by Mangrai who founded the Lanna empire, one can find a copy of *Tamnan Hō’ Caak Mġyang Kuy*,⁸² which is the oldest known northern Thai manuscript bearing a calamity-cosmology narrative, and *Tamnan Hō’* (Prasert, Aroonrut, Anand, Srithon 2531 B.E. [1988]). As their names indicate, these two temples are concerned with apotropaic Buddhism, which derives from what Collins has referred to as the

⁷⁹ *Tamnan Phya In*, n.d., 78.020.01N 104-106, Social Research Institute. *Nangsġyġ Kham Sōōn Phya In*, 1938 C.E./1300 C.S., 78.020.01N 104-105, Social Research Institute. I have not inspected the contents of *Nangsġyġ Kham Sōōn Phya In*. At the Lao Digital Manuscript’s website <http://www.laomanuscripts.net>, one can find a work titled “*Nangsġyġ Kham Sōōn Phya In*.” In reading the titles of the *tamnan* manuscripts, some of the oldest manuscript witnesses for calamity cosmology may be found at this website’s digital collection. This evidence tentatively suggests that the Lao tradition may be older than the northern Thai tradition of calamity-cosmology narratives.

⁸⁰ Other witnesses of *Tamnan Phya In* include the following manuscripts: *Tamnan Phya In*, 1869 C.E./1231 C.S., 81.076.01N 043-043, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phya In*, 1878 C.E./1240 C.S., 80.045.01N 032-032, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phya In*, 1921 C.E./1284 C.S., 78.011.01N 039-040, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phya In*, 1920 C.E./1283 C.S., 78.020.01N 110-112, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phya In*, 1921 C.E./ CS 1284, 88.160.01N 037-037, Social Research Institute; *Tamnan Phra In le Ariya Metteyya*, n.d., 78.020.01N 110-112, Social Research Institute.

⁸¹ *Tamnan Phya Tham*, 1917 C.E./1279 C.S., 78.020. 01N 103-103, Social Research Institute.

⁸² *Tamnan Hō’ Caak Mġyang Kuy*, 1811 C.E./1173 C.S., 78.012.05.018.020, Social Research Institute.

“widespread instrumental uses of Pali” (Collins 2003: 681).⁸³ *Paritta-s*—a codified discursive act— cannot be found in the texts scholars generally associate with *tamnan*. The fact that *Tamnan Phya In* bears *paritta-s* and is found in as two manuscript witnesses at Wat Dap Phay, a temple whose name that means “the averting of dangers” suggest that northern Thais considered Indra to be a protector.⁸⁴ In addition to that evidence, the fact that Wat Chiang Man whose name also refers to the aversion of danger has possession of two manuscripts each depicting a calamity-cosmology narrative further demonstrates that apotropaic practices were codified into this genre. Moving from the colophons, I now look at the contents of the texts themselves. By critically attending to the contents, we can discern what other discursive practices were codified in these texts in addition to *paritta-s*.

Discursive Properties of Calamity-Cosmological Texts

⁸³ In particular, Collins (2003: 680) describes the “Pali Buddhism” that began to spread in the second millennium C.E. from Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia as an “international civilizational force.” Moreover, he states, “Pali Buddhism was also claimed to have an intrinsic ontological value and efficacy” (Collins 2003: 681).

⁸⁴ In another example of a talisman-text that is not associated with Indra, it states, “When the omniscient Lord Buddha awakened to the *dhamma-desana* known as the four noble truths, namely the arising of suffering, the truth of its cessation, and the truth of the path (*dukkhasaccasamuddaya saccanirodha saccamagga*), Indra, Brahma, the *devaputta-s*, and *devatā-s* from all over the infinite 100,000 *koṭi* cosmic world-system let out a resounding, “*sadhu*.” That day, Indra, Brahma, a hundred thousand *devaputta-s* and *devatā-s* who had accumulated merit obtained the fruit of stream-winner (*soṭā[panna]*), once-returner (*sakidāgāmin*), or never-returner (*anāgāmin*)—depending on her amount of stored merit—and threw puffed rice and flowers as well as lit candles and incense. Any woman or man who listens attentively to the legend of the five *dhammika* kings, performs skillful acts of merit, and keeps the *sīla-s* will be delivered from all twenty-five types of dangers. Also, she or he will reach the three [types of happiness found]: in the city of heaven, in the city of people, or in the state of *nibbāna*, which is the ultimate goal” (*Tamnan Khun Thammikarat 5 Phra Ong 1885 C.E./1248 C.S.: fols. 27-28*).

nay m̄ya laew tham theedsanaa haeng sapranyuu phra phuttha caw laew kō' kratham samdaeng yang satchatham thang 4 kh̄ȳ waa thuk satchasamudtaya satchanirot satchamagkha satcha nay m̄ya laew satchatham thang 4 in brohm lae theewabut theewadaa day saen koot cagkrawaan bō' 'aat cak khanyanap day h̄ȳ siang saadhukaan maak nak duay khaaw tōōk dōōk may thian thup khandha khōōng hōōm thiip maak nak kō' mii lae in brohm theewabut theewadaa thang laay day saen ton mii sombaan kae klaa kō' day th̄yng sodaa sakidthaakhaa 'arahan taam bun sombaan haeng khaw kō' mii maak nak wan nan bugkhon ying chaay thang laay nay lok nii day satdap rap fang yang tamnan khun thammikarat 5 phra ong nii cam way nay manoodthwaarawithiicin haeng ton kratham kusun bun lae raksa sin pay cay cay kō' cak phon caak phay thang 25 camphuak nii cak day th̄yng suk 3 prakaan mii m̄yang faa lae m̄yang khon mii nibphaan caw pen yōōt bō' yaa cha lae

Although northern Thai writers did not have a tradition of subjugating *tamnan* to written examinations of its etymology or meaning, as was the case with *śāstra* in classical Indian history, they nevertheless categorized writings according to a genre (on *śāstra*, see Pollock 1989). My examination of texts has found that northern Thai writers did not follow clearly defined rules for naming a text's genre. Calamity-cosmology narratives define themselves most often as *tamnan*. Despite that, it is not uncommon to find a text calling itself a *tamnan* and something else. For example, *Tamnan Phra Caw Song Ong*⁸⁵ opens with the following invocation praise-verse in

Pāli:

“I pay homage to the Teacher” (*Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw 2 Ong* 1894 C.E./1256 C.S.: fol. 1).⁸⁶

Then, the text identifies itself multiple times. It states,

“*Sadhu*. Now, I will tell a story (*tamnan*) that has a lesson (*kham sōṇ*). This *sutta* was told to Mahaatheen Caw Phuu Thōṇ. ...Now I will tell a *tham tamnan* about two Buddha- s” (*Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw 2 Ong* 1894 C.E./1256 C.S.: fol. 1).⁸⁷

In the above lines, *tamnan* is compared to: 1) a teaching (*kham sōṇ*), 2) a canonical-style of narrative (*sutta*), and 3) a *dhamma* teaching (*tham tamnan*). The above quote suggests that *tamnan* as a literary genre was not clearly defined. The word “*tamnan*” seems to carry many meanings. The designation of calamity-cosmology narratives as *tamnan* may indicate that they emerged out of the *tamnan* genre, but that this development may have only broadened the meaning of a term (i.e., *tamnan*) that was already diffuse.

⁸⁵ *Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw 2 Ong* 1894 C.E./1256 C.S., 79.027.01N 004-004, Social Research Institute.

⁸⁶ *namo tassatthu*

On the above invocation verse, von Hinüber explains that scribes kept the beginning and ending of a manuscript uniform by adhering to prescribed rules that made these portions formulaic, as in the case of the aforementioned opening line. He writes, “These rules underline the religious significance of manuscripts” (von Hinüber 1996: 43). “*Namo tassatthu*” is a shorten form of the formula “*namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa*.” A canonical or commentary work in Pāli should begin with this invocation verse (von Hinüber 1996: 43).

⁸⁷ *sī svastī thii nii cak klaaw yang tamnan kham sōṇ kōṇ lae suttakā law rjy mahaatheen caw ton chjy phuu thōṇ ...thii nii cak klaaw yang tamnan tham an nii haeng phra phuttha caw thang 2 phra ong haak tham nway thawaay way tae kōṇ mja phra phuttha caw phra gotama raw mja yang thōṛamaan pay khaw suu nibphaan*

Ovāda as an Evaluative Speech Genre

Many texts do give a legendary account of their origins in a form familiar to Theravādin literature in which it is known as a *nidāna*. In the case of northern Thai cosmological *tamnan*, their authors used *nidāna* as a substitute for giving an explicit generic definition for this class of narratives. There are two main *nidāna* stories found in these texts depicting a calamity cosmos. The stability of these two *nidāna-s* reflects a process of setting apart a category of literature through an affiliation of *nidāna-s*. Christian Lammerts in his discussion of *dhammasattha* in the Burmese tradition exploits genesis legends in a similar manner. He regards them as “ideology in narrative form,” a phrase he borrows from Bruce Lincoln (Lammerts 2013: 125). He explains that a myth of genesis “lays the theoretical groundwork and establishes the basis for the effective capacities” of a domain of discursive practices that belong to literary genre (Lammerts 2013: 125).

According to the *nidāna-s* given for these narratives, the text originated either as a Buddha-*ovāda* (a exhortation-sermon) or as a text inscribed on an object that had magically appeared on earth. The latter story resembles the Mon and Burmese legends for the appearance *dhammasattha* (written law) in the world. First, I describe the *nidāna* that authorizes a written source for calamity-cosmology narratives. Then, I elaborate the Buddha’s *ovāda-nidāna*.

In the case of a written source, Indra or another deity makes the book magically appear (*neeromit* in Thai) either on a stone slab, golden plates, a stone cow, or cowhide. Sometimes Indra is the author of this book. Other times, the Blessed One’s *ovāda* is written down and later appears in the world as a written text. For example, there is a *nidāna* story that relates how Indra, Mahākassapa, Mahānuruddha, and Visukamma, a *devaputta*, handed down the Buddha’s prophecies. From them, the Blessed One’s words were passed down and written in *Tham* script

on a stone cow.⁸⁸

With respect to the books authored by Indra, these books usually pop up in an urban-political center located outside of Lanna. For example, we are told that Indra will descend from the worlds of the gods and spread his words all over Ayutthaya.⁸⁹ He will inscribe a book on golden plates and deposit it at the Great Reliquary in Takhong (Shwezigon pagoda).⁹⁰ In another

⁸⁸ “Then Indra, king of kings, ordered Visukamma Devaputta to magically make a statue of cow appear and deposit it in a city. A cow rusi named “Sudandaka Rusi” will make the text magically appear. [That text] gives an explanation of the Lord Buddha’s prophecies. [It will be] given to Lord Indra, the great king. After the Tathāgata has *nibbāna-ed*, the *sāsana* will remain for five thousand years. When the twenty-five types of omens appear a righteous king will come and revive the Tathāgata’s *sāsana* and make it flourish. So it will come to pass in the future. All the *arhant-s* [led] by the chief Mahākassapa and the principle [disciple] Mahānuruddha traveled through the sky to reach that statue of a cow. They worshipped it and had a text written on it. Visukamma Devaputta was the one who wrote the verses of the Lord Buddha on that stone cow in *Tham* script. (That stone cow statue) became a broad and extensive place of worship in the *sāsana* for all humans, gods, *samaṇa-brāhmaṇā-s*, and monastics” (*Tamnan Khun Thammikarat 5 Phra Ong 1885 C.E./1248 C.S.*: fols. 26-27).

m̄ya nan Inthaathirat cing cak caa kap Visukam theewabut h̄ȳy pay neeramit ruup ngua hin tua l way nay m̄yang nakhōōn an caw rusi ton ch̄ȳy waa sudandaka rusi haak neeramit way yang tae agkharathibaay an phra phuttha caw tham nay way h̄ȳy kae phya inda mahaarat nan waa khruu phra tathaagata nibphaan pay laew cak tang satsanaa way 5 phan phra watsaa cha lae khran waa nimit camphuak lae k̄et mii m̄ya day khun thammikarat cak day l̄ek satsanaa khruu phra tathaagata h̄ȳy rung r̄ȳang ngaam m̄ȳy cha lae waa an heet dang arahan caw thang laay mii mahaakatsap theen pen klaaw lae mahaanurudtha theen caw pen prathaan kō’ pay duay luang bon hon aakaat kō’ pay lat m̄ȳy diaw kō’ rōōt ngua hin ngua hin tua nan kō’ kratham sagkara buuchaa laew kō’ taem khit khian aw tua agkhara an visukam theewabut haak taem way nay ruup ngua hin tua nan h̄ȳy siang agkharatham phra phutthacaw chuu bot chuu tua laew aw way h̄ȳy pen thii thaana na kwaang khwaang kae satsanaa h̄ȳy pen thii way lae buuchaa kae khon lae theewadaa thang laay somanabrohm lae chaawcaw thang laay chuu ton chuu khon h̄ȳy han lae

⁸⁹ *Tamnan Phya Thammikarat* states, “Phya Indra, king of kings, came down to tell everyone to spread [his] words everywhere [spanning] from the border regions to the city Sri Ayutthaya, including its northern vassals. Hurry and go make merit by giving *dāna*, by keeping the moral precepts, and by cultivating loving kindness towards others. A person of merit will come. Phya Indra, king of kings, wrote down this book on golden plates, which he brought down from the heavens. Hold the book to one’s forehead and worship of it. Worship it as an offering to the lord of the capital city. Have it written down and distribute it amongst the *samaṇa-s*, ascetics, and the *brāhmaṇā-s*. Phra Sri Ariya Metteyya has descended and taken birth in the capital city. It is said, “(Phra Sri Ariya Metteyya) has descended and taken birth in the capital city of Sri Ayutthaya. He rules over Laan Chaang on the right hand side. He cannot be killed. Everyone ought to hurry and make merit beginning that year until the year *seet*. Hurry and write down this book. On Thursday, in the sixth month, on the 6th *kham*, in the year *mamae*, at the time of the constellation *pharani*, in the afternoon, write down this book. Those who fail to write it down and leave it in the house will cough up blood and die within one day” (*Tamnan Phya Thammikarat 1920 C.E./1283 C.S.*: fols. 6-7). *phya inthaathirat long maa bōōk way h̄ȳy khon thang laay ruu thua pay thuk baan nōōy m̄yang yay nay khōōp hin khandha phae maa m̄yang sii [a]yodhiya cong m̄yang hua daan thuk haeng h̄ȳy reng katham bun h̄ȳy than cam sin meedtaaphaawanaa lae h̄ȳy bōōk kae kan pay maa th̄ya’ phuu mii bun nan cak pay praakot laew nangsȳy nii phya*

manuscript, it states,

“Phitsanukan was the one who wrote it down on cowhide⁹¹ [and deposited it] in the *m̄yang* of Kombacchananakhon, that is M̄yang Lanka” (*Tamnan Phya Tham* 1901 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 17).⁹²

The same text also gives a *nidāna* for the Buddha’s *ovāda*. We are told,

“Now, the Lord Buddha gave this *ovāda* teaching, in which he predicted the end of the *sāsana*, to the *bhikkhu-s* (while staying at) M̄yang Rawaek with Mahānanda, a principle monk, and ten thousand *arhant-s*. He then went to Kusinarat where he sat between two Sala trees. There he gradually entered *parinibbāna* according to four the noble *dhamma-s*: there is *dukkha*, etc. Afterwards, he was without remainder” (*Tamnan Phya Tham* 1901 C.E./1263 C.S: fol. 10).⁹³

Placing the speech genre—*ovāda*—in a textual plane of communication triggers the

Mahāparinibbāna-sutta’s biographical image of Gotama Buddha and its association with a

“Buddha cult and devotion” (Swearer 2540 (1997): 282). In particular, the narrative relates the

ovāda to the absence of the Buddha from the world and the four noble truths. Here, we have

inthaathirat khian say phaen kham aw long maa tae sawanakhaataa lok aw nangsȳy thun kaw thun khranōōm maa thawaay kae phya m̄yang nakhōōn luang nii cing khian ‘ōōk caek kae somana chii phromaa lae khon thang laay h̄ȳy huu thua thuk haeng h̄ȳy ruu waa phra ariya metteyya long maa kæt yuu nay m̄yang nakhōōn luang laew nay 71 [?] long maa kæt nay m̄yang si [a]yodhiya laew cing pay praap laan chaang luk kham khwaa bō’ taay khon thang laay h̄ȳy 1 long katham bun tang tae pii cay pay con th̄ȳng pii seet nan th̄ya’ h̄ȳy 1 long khian way laew nay wan phrahat d̄yan 6 kh̄ȳn 6 kham pii mamae nagkasat pharaa [read: pharaṇi] chaay laew khian nangsȳy nii cing laew chaay phuu day bō’ day khian nangsȳy nii way nay r̄yan cak haak pen l̄yat taay tae nay wan diaw nan

⁹⁰ On the connection between Sakka (Indra) and Schwezigon pagoda, see Spiro’s *Burmese Supernaturalism* (1967: 248).

⁹¹ There is a Mon legend that Manu when he declared the law (*dhammasattha*) it was originally written on a cowhide. Christian Lammerts discusses the mythic origins of law as found in the Burmese writings from the seventeenth century. Specifically, Lammerts writes on the mythic origins of the *dhammasattha* law found in the *Manusāra*, which states that the law appeared on the “boundary wall of the universe” (Lammerts 2013: 124). Either Manu or Mahāsammata discovers the law (Lammerts 2013: 130-36).

⁹² *m̄ya duay thae tamnan nii phitsanukan haak aw long maa taem way thōōng ngua nay m̄yang an ch̄ȳy waa kambotcha nakhōōn kh̄ȳy waa m̄yang langkaa*

⁹³ *m̄ya phra phuttha caw h̄ȳy owaat kham sōōn kae caw bhikkhu thang laay laew kō’ tham nway siang satsanaa way nay m̄yang rawaek thii nan h̄ȳy caeng kae mahaanon then caw pen phra ton lae arahan caw thang laay m̄ȳn ton laew phra kō’ pay su kusinarat maa laew caw kō’ maa pay nang yuu may rua 2 ton laew kō’ khaw pay su parinibphaan tham lamdap sii yang satcha tham thang 4 mii thuk satcha pen ton kō’ bō’ ..l̄ya phrōōm kap duay kan thang muan kō’ mii wan nan*

evidence of Theravādins particularly monks placing more value on the *dhammakāya* rather than the *rūpakāya* of the Lord Buddha in answer to his absence from the universe. If calamity-cosmology narratives represent a distinct type of *tamnan*, then *ovāda* constitutes its elementary speech genre. The fact that the *ovāda*-type of *nidāna* can be found in conjunction with the written type supports the hypothesis that calamity-cosmology narratives at an elementary level constitute an *ovāda*, an evaluative type of utterance that expresses reproof.⁹⁴

Almost all of the calamity-cosmology narratives I have examined are described as an “*ovāda*” somewhere in the text. Following Bakhtin’s theory on the origins of a genre, the following examination focuses on distinguishing *ovāda*’s re-accentuation on the textual plane. It begins with a look at an *ovāda*-speech and then extends that discussion by locating a similar communicative act found in calamity-cosmology narratives.

A Bhikkhuṇī’s Ovāda

In *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī*, which appears in a dozen manuscript witnesses, we find a typical *ovāda* placed within a calamity-cosmology narrative. As the story goes, three *yakkha*-s threaten to undermine the king’s power to protect his kingdom and its people. The three *yakkha*-s seek to cause what is called a “*koolaahon*” (an uproar) in Thai, or *kolāhala* in Pāli. The *bhikkhuṇī* acts as the story’s heroine who saves this kingdom from that potential disaster. Having done so, she delivers an *ovāda*-speech. She states,

“Listen father, my lord. From now on, the king should not engage in philandering. [Nor should the king and his subjects engage] in killing animals, stealing, lying, and drinking spirituous liquors. Maintain the five moral precepts. Cultivate loving kindness towards others. Give *dāna* to the Lord Buddha and the *arhat* disciples with consistency. Be diligent in the path of merit. One thing, do not oppress the freemen of the villages or cities. Even if they should be executed, show them compassion. Be established in the customs of the ten *rājadhamma*-s: *dāna*, *sīla*, *phāvanā*. [Doing so,] the country will

⁹⁴ The prominence of Gotama Buddha’s last *ovāda* endures today as evidenced in an undated pamphlet titled “*Phuttha Owaat Kōḍṇ Parinibphaan*.” I found this pamphlet during my in-country research that was conducted from 2009-2011. This work is a compilation of canonical passages.

prosper. One thing, give as *dāna* the five requisites: robes, rice, water, dishes, to the Lord Buddha and *arhant-s*. Do not be lax. Doing so, you will be released from the *dukkha* of *samsāra* and reach *nibbāna*. In the future, you will surely be reborn in the house of Ariya Mettayya, the precious one” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 45-46).⁹⁵

The above exhortation (*ovāda*) preserves the future-tense sense of this class of statements. It adds a communal orientation through the narrative about a kingdom a crisis. This enhancement of “exhortation” can be found in the above passage’s call for the character- and implied-audience to care for others and to support the *sangha*. In everyday speech, *ovāda* is a type of communication in which the speaker admonishes a person about her habits or current course of action. This speech act revolves around a set of actions that conventionally have ethical consequences. In this narrative about a potential eruption of social upheaval in the kingdom of Hariphun, *ovāda* becomes a site for a moral discourse built upon representations of the potential for human suffering yoked to a need for (or an ideal of) group membership and cooperation.

Exclaiming “*Dukkhāṃ Aniccāṃ*”

The *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*’s narrative opens with a statement about a woman who once foresaw the *sāsana*’s 5,000 years of devolution. Alarmed, she calls out to the boys who are nearby herding buffaloes. She cries out,

⁹⁵ *duu raa phōō phyā pen caw tang tae nii pay mahaarat yaa day kratham baathan kam len chuu suu mia than yaa day khaa sat tat chiwit paanaatibaat athiinaan mutsaawaatha suraa me hyy day raksaa sin 5 sin 8 kratham meettaaphaawanaa hyy than kae phra phuttha caw lae arahant saawok caw yaa khaat yaa pramaat thaang bun thya’ an 1 law yaa bipbian phray baan thay myang maen khuan khaa khōōy karunaa hyy tang yuu nay khlōng thotsa ratchatham 10 prakaan mii than sin phaawana pen ton baan myang kō’ cak camryan maak nak cha lae an 1 cung hyy than yang pracay thang 4 mii phaaphōōn lae khaawnam phoochana’ ‘aahaan khōōng an khuan khiaw khuan kin thang muan kae phra phuttha caw lae arahan yaa hyy khaat lambak duay an day sak an dang an kō’ cak day phon caak thuk nay wadhasongsaan mii nibphaan pen thii laew nay samnak ton kaew chyy ariyametteyya an cak koet maa phaay naa*

“Hey, come over here. I have something to teach you.” The boys did not come, so she said, “Hey, come over here. Let me teach you something. I will give you treats in exchange” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 1).⁹⁶

Then the woman-seer tells them

“Listen here, boys. In the future, in Jambudīpa blood will flow like a river. People will slash and kill each other like they slaughter chickens. No one will travel the roads going in either direction. All four doors having been shut, one still enters. No one accepts the good advice of their parents or teachers. They like the words of those who are wicked. Thus, they understand things accordingly. “Oh Buddha, Buddha, that which is impermanent is suffering” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 1-2).⁹⁷

Seeing that future cataclysm provokes the woman to warn others in the hope that such a catastrophe can be averted and that Fate does not become history. The language is much like that of *ovāda*’s meaning as “warning” and “exhortation.”

At the end of the lesson, she reflexively and emphatically states, “Oh Buddha, Buddha that which is impermanent is suffering” (*phuttho phuttho dukkham aniccam*). “Oh Buddha, Buddha” can be translated into English as “Oh my lord” or “dear God.” The phrase “*dukkham aniccam*” is similarly stated emphatically. “*Dukkham aniccam*,” too, can be considered to be the expression of an evaluative utterance that communicates a judgment of reproof concerning an extant state of the world.

This emphatic declaration sums up the truth of *samsāra*. In the text’s speech plane, *ovāda* when mixed with statements on the truth of *samsāra* relates that truth proposition to an evaluative speech act made against human existence in the universe. With the words: “*dukkham*

⁹⁶ *duu raa dek nōōy suu cung maa fang kham raw badnii thya’ waa an dek nōōy thang laay kō’ bō’ pay cing sam klaaw waa kae dek nōōy thang laay cung maa fang kham raw badnii thya raw cak hyy khanom pen khōōng caang kae suu than thang laay chaa*

⁹⁷ *duu raa dek nōōy thang laay phaay naa chomphuthip lyat cak lay phiang maenam khaw cak khaa fan kan pen dang khaa kay nan hon thang 2 sen khon bō’ thiaw pratu hap thang 4 way laew phōōy luu khaw pay khon thang laay bō’ aw kham haeng phōō mae lae khruubaa ‘aacaan kham dii phōōy bō’ aw khawcay waa san nii laew naang cing klaaw waa phuttho phuttho dukkham aniccam*

aniccam,” the woman expresses reproof of the present inaction of those boys herding buffaloes and of the future calamity cosmos. On the entry for *anicca*, the Pali Text Society’s *Pali-English Dictionary* states,

“The emphatic assertion of impermanence (continuous change of condition) is a prominent axiom of the *Dhamma*, & the realization of the evanescent character of all things mental and material is one of the primary conditions of attaining right knowledge” (T.W. Rhys Davids and Stede 1993[1921-1925]: 355).

T.W. Rhys Davids and Stede indicate that the phrase “*aniccam dukkham*” signifies a metaphysical claim that is important for Buddhists to grasp. The *Tamnan Bhikkhunī Thon* frames that truth with the words, “Buddha, Buddha,” which are also stated emphatically. This narrative reconfigures the metaphysical claim “*aniccam dukkham*” by illustrating it to be a useless proclamation, unless anyone cares about humanity’s situation in the cosmos.

Royal Advice in a Dynastic Chronicle

In calamity-cosmology narratives, a generic type of dialogue—ethical advice—in a textual plane of communication is related to literary portrayals of the potential for human suffering. Through that type of communication an attitude of seriousness and a concern for the world is expressed in this genre of Buddhist tragedy. In the *Chiang Mai Chronicle*, one also finds an instance of this same generic speech genre of exhortation except, in this text, it is called a “teaching” (*kham sōōn*) (Penth 1996: fol. 7.6 R).⁹⁸ The translators of the *Chiang Mai Chronicle* have labeled the passage containing this speech “Fatherly Advice.” It states,

On January 5, 1789, Prince Chai Kaeo, the father of Kawila and his brothers said to them: In s. 1150, a pœk san year, on Friday, the seventh waning of the fourth moon (5 January 1789), Prince Chai Kaeo, the royal father, remembered his children, and feared that they would lose their familial harmony, and so he gave them [the following] royal advice:
“Thenceforth, all my children in Lakhòn and Chiang Mai should heed their

⁹⁸The *Chiang Mai Chronicle* uses the word “*kham sōōn*” to express “advice.” *Kham sōōn* is a Thai word and hence does not carry any of the prestige associated with the Pāli language. It might be worth noting that Indra unlike the Buddha or bhikkhunī gives a “teaching” and not an *ovāda* in the calamity-cosmology texts.

father's advice. Don't listen to your subjects, those who would sow discord, but only those well intentioned. Don't fight amongst yourselves. ...Heed carefully your father's advice and you will avert disaster."

"The past calamities of Lamphun, Chiang Mai, Keng Tung, and M. Yòng, and Nan, all of them occurred because of discord among siblings and from failure to heed their parents' good advice, and because they vied for royal... wealth of the country, and oppressed and harmed each other. Disaster then followed, and they could no longer be countries as in days of yore. Thus you should carefully consider the fate of those domains and understand. Hear this advice: the swan with a single body and seven/heads will know only discord. Though you have the great good fortune to rule in various domains, you must consider them to be a single domain" (Wyatt and Aroonrut 1995: 157).⁹⁹

These words of advice exchanged between members of Chiang Mai's young ruling clan communicate a need to cooperate and heed moral obligation. The above "teaching" (*kham sōōn*) like an *ovāda* constitutes a domain of discourse in which both parties seek to reach an agreement, namely to live up to the moral requirements necessary to sustain the interpersonal activities of a political community. This exhortation spoken by a person of moral authority asks the listener to heed her *ovāda*'s evaluative judgment and warning. This example of a royal exhortation suggests that in the textual world of calamity-cosmology narratives membership in a moral community hinges upon submitting to its *ovāda*.

Northern Thai Literary Genre of Tamnan

Scholarship on northern Thai literature remains at a nascent stage. Many scholars have pointed out the difficulties of writing the history of this local Buddhist culture. For instance, the extant palm leaf books kept at temple libraries and the manuscripts preserved by northern Thai archival institutions do not lend themselves to writing a history of northern Thai Buddhist thought. Instead the manuscript evidence indicates that there might not have been a uniform

⁹⁹ David Wyatt cites this passage from the *Chiang Mai Chronicle*. In particular, it demonstrates that during Lanna's reconstruction period its rulers were preoccupied with consolidating the dependent principalities by "maintaining and fostering a hierarchy in which the ruler of Lan Na lorded it over the northern hills" (Wyatt 1997: 700).

There is a comparable work concerning the collapse of a Thai tribute-taking state. In particular, the destruction of Ayutthaya inspired a royally sponsored work known as "Lost Songs of Ayutthaya." This poem does not contain an *ovāda*. It does, however, have the well-known prophecy of sinking pumpkin gourds from the *Pasendi Jātaka*.

entity that we can call “northern Thai Buddhism” (McDaniel 2002). Adding to this problem, most of the surviving manuscripts bear copy dates ranging from the late eighteenth to early twentieth century (von Hinüber 1996:37; Lagirarde 2007:61). Empirically, we can assert that the works titled *tamnan* tend to be written in a vernacular language¹ or a mixture of Tai Yuan and Pāli, along the lines of a *vohara* text (Swearer 1997: 281). As stated previously, although manuscripts provide several internal self-designations the most common one is that of *tamnan*. *Tamnan* was the most prolific genre of northern Thai literature aside from that of *jātaka*.¹⁰⁰ The prominence of *tamnan* in northern Thai cultural history can be gleaned not only from the published catalogs for northern Thai manuscripts but also from the inscriptional record. In the fourth volume of *Inscriptions in the Chiang Mai Museum*, there is a description of a 1480 C.E inscription from Ku Wat Sao Hin that mentions a *tamnan* given as a gift (Penth, Kruathai, Silao 2000: 60). Even more striking, there is a 1585 C.E. inscription from the reliquary (Wat Phra That) in Chae Haeng, Nan. This inscription relates a *tamnan*. In particular, it relates a legend of the Buddha’s travels to this region (Penth, Kruathai, and Silao 2000: 259).

An early scholarly definition of *tamnan* appears in Charnvit Kasetsiri’s article, “The Nature and Concept of Ancient Thai History,” in which he translates *tamnan* as “story, legend, or myth” (Charnvit 1976: 1). He also names two categories of *tamnan*. A *tamnan* may be either 1) a history of Buddhism (i.e., religion) or 2) a history of dynasties (i.e., kingship) (Charnvit 1976: 1). Writing at the same time as Charnvit, David Wyatt nuances the classification of *tamnan-s* into 1)

¹⁰⁰ Swearer writes, “The Buddha did not confine his travels to northern Thailand. He seems to have been quite ubiquitous throughout Buddhist Asia, but one can speculate—and with more research possibly demonstrate—that northern Thailand produced a larger body of vernacular *Jataka* stories and *Buddha tamnan* than other regions of Buddhist Asia. If this is the case, then the question naturally arises, what was there in the northern Thai religious, historical, and cultural mix that led to such a rich proliferation of *Jataka* and *Buddha tamnan*” (Swearer 2540 (1997): 282)?

tamnan-s of the distant past, 2) “universal histories”, and 3) “monumental *tamnan-s*” about the history of a Buddhist reliquary, Buddha image, or institution (Wyatt 1976). On its etymology, Liew-Herres and Grabowsky write,

“The native term for this genre is called *tamnan*... It is a complex term, borrowed from Pāli through the Khmer, that evokes the concept of “descent” and “origin” and thus can also arouse historical references” (Liew-Herres and Grabowsky 2008: 5).

Like previous scholars they note that *tamnan* refers to types of history. They write,

"In contrast to its Siamese counterpart, the *phongsawadan*... *tamnan* is not limited to chronicles of famous families and dynasties, as it also characterizes texts that are almost exclusively religious in nature, e.g., *Jinakālamāḷīpakaraṇaṃ* by Bhikkhu Ratanapañña written in Pāli” (Liew-Herres and Grabowsky 2008: 5-6)

They too conclude that there are two forms of *tamnan*: 1) a *tamnan satsanaa* (religious chronicles) and 2) *tamnan baan- myang* (dynastic chronicles). Tradition typically designated the latter category as *tamnan myang* or *phyyñ myang*.¹⁰¹ Writing a few years before them, Swearer too makes mention of an etymology for *tamnan*. He writes,

“D. Udom Roongruangsri and Ajan Bampen Rawin of the Department of Thai Language, Chiang Mai University, pointed out to me that the term, *tamnan*, is derived from Pali through Khmer, i.e. tam + nala. Nala refers to an empty stalk and conveys a similar metaphorical association to lineage as does *vamsa*” (Swearer 2540 (1997): 278).

Although their etymology is creative, that does not prevent Liew-Herres and Grabowsky from concluding that there are multiple types of *tamnan*, as Charnvit and Wyatt did. The etymology merely intends to provide suggestive empirical evidence for the historical development of *tamnan* from the Buddhist literary genre of *vamsa*.¹⁰² In the most recent assessment of *tamnan*,

¹⁰¹ Words used to connote “history” in northern Tai are *tamnan*, *phyyñ*, or *cot may heet*. Charnvit (1976) gives a fuller account of all the terms for “history” that are found in some Siamese and northern Thai manuscripts from the premodern period.

¹⁰² *Vamsa* consists of narrative strategies meant to “arouse historical references,” according to Steven Collins. He proposes that Pali *vamsa* texts can be understood as a technique of representation, first, and second, as “strategies of referentiality to the world thus represented” (Collins 2003: 657).

François Lagirarde focuses on the religious histories, which are called *tham tamnan* in Thai. On the notion of history

conveyed in this genre, he writes,

“The *tham tamnan* foremost demand to be read as universal law (that is a historical necessity), moreover every possible story engages it. Because history sits in an envelope of precise cosmology and necessary eschatology—side by side—the envelope remains half closed by multiple symbols or half-opened by the text interpreted and actualized in them” (Lagirarde 2007: 68).¹⁰³

Lagirarde draws from several unpublished manuscripts that are framed according to Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable. Previous scholars have failed to notice the discursive practice of cosmology, because they have tended to focus on political chronicles, according to Lagirarde (Lagirarde 2007:61). Nevertheless, previous scholars have mainly focused on religious chronicles written in Pāli in their evaluations of *tamnan*, whereas Lagirarde’s article and this study are based upon vernacular *tamnan-s* that circulated in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in northern Thailand. The above review of the scholarship on *tamnan* suggests that much more research needs to be done on a manuscript level.

In the nineteenth century, *tamnan*’s style of historiography, which had evolved in part from borrowing motifs from *vamsa* appears to have changed as we find nineteenth century *tamnan-s* that now relate history according to Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year cosmic era.¹⁰⁴ The

F. Reynolds has identified the integration of sacred biography and chronicles that emerged in the later traditions of Theravāda. He finds that the *Mahāvamsa*, a fifth century text, is “the earliest and most famous example of a Theravādin chronicle which possesses some biographical elements (F.E. Reynolds 1976: 51).

¹⁰³ *Ces tham tamnan exigent d’abord de lire la loi universelle (c’est elle l’histoire nécessaire), puis tous les recits possibles qui s’engagent avec elle. Car l’histoire repose dans l’enveloppe d’une cosmologie précise et nécessaire don’t l’eschatologie n’est qu’un côté. Cette enveloppe demeure à moitié « fermée » à par de multiples symbols ou moitié ouverte par ce que le texte interpète et actualize de ceux-ci.*

¹⁰⁴ On *tamnan*, Swearer notes the cosmological symbolism associated with the Buddha stating, “[T]he Buddha is the name-giver and the map maker but in a profound, cosmological sense. The Buddha’s visit to northern Thailand is a cosmogonic event” (Swearer 2540 (1997): 291). Although earlier *tamnan-s* may not have invoked Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable, Swearer emphasizes the cosmological dimension of the Buddha’s travels to this region as a defining motif of Buddha *tamnan* (a term used by Swearer).

features of pre-nineteenth century *tamnan* that were retained in calamity cosmology *tamnan-s* include Buddha prophecy, which Lagirarde has observed, figures prominently in *tamnan* writings (Lagirarde 2007: 63).¹⁰⁵ Most importantly calamity-cosmology *tamnan-s* still exhibit a *tamnan* style of historiography. In general, Swearer observes that *tamnan-s* present the Buddha's presence as a "living reality" and "not as historical memory" (Swearer 2540 (1997): 291). Similarly, Thida writes, "Tamnan-history is a living history, still having meaning [sic] for the local people of today. Its role in linking the past with the present is discernable in the story of the Yon or Yonok people" (Thida 1982: 119). Likewise, Lagirarde defines *tamnan* as an open-ended narration of history written for the *mjang* community. Lagirarde states,

"Between two extremes—the pure telling of dynastic events and marvelous accounts—the *tamnans* have a general concern as stories of destiny that are to be publically read aloud with one edifying goal: a methodological recounting of elements of history and their geographical coordinates—the making of the local—that often seems secondary to the hidden textual and didactic effects of a story's performance that is affected in the elaboration of the fictional parts of the story" (Lagirarde 2007: 60).¹⁰⁶

Lagirarde draws upon manuscripts contemporary with the ones I used. It is possible that by the nineteenth century religious *tamnan* no longer referred exclusively to histories of the religion, Buddhist monuments, Buddha images or relics (i.e, Wyatt's typology). In fact, calamity-cosmology narratives' usage of a 5,000-year calendar suggests that *tamnan* simply referred to

¹⁰⁵ Aung Thwin (1982) argues that prophecy played a paramount role in Burmese chronicles writings. On prophecies (*byadeik*), he states that they were primarily used to make claims of legitimacy for a "family, dynasty, or individual ruler; their capital city, town or village" for whom these legacies made them a "part of the Burmese royal tradition" (Aung Thwin 1982: 87). Thus, there are prophecies of places and individual rulers who through them gain divine sanction. Usurpers attempting to gain recognition as the rightful heir to the throne typically used prophecies. Through the language of prophecy, these reigns "received "divine" sanction" that could dispense with a claim to legitimacy based upon lineal succession (Aung Thwin 1982: 100). Aung Thwin also speaks of the importance of moral dialog found in Burmese chronicles.

¹⁰⁶ *Entre deux extreme — le pur rapport d'événements dynastiques et le conte merveilleux —, les tamnan apparaissent en général comme des récits très images destinés à être lus publiquement dans un but éducatif : le recueil méthodique des éléments historiques et de leurs coordonnées géographiques — « le fait local » — semble souvent secondaire, presque « enfoui », par rapport à l'effet textual et didactique recherché dans l'élaboration de la part fictionnelle du récit.*

history as a stream of events that takes place in the Jambudīpa.

Astrology

Common to political *tamnan-s* is the usage of astrological dating. In calamity-cosmology narratives, astrology can be considered as the handmaiden of Buddha prophecy. Charles Keyes (1975) has called our attention to a northern Thai concept of fate (*chataa* in Thai) that exists alongside the idea of *kammic* destiny in this local Buddhist culture. *Chataa* refers to the sort fate that is related to the cosmic elements. Through rituals such as *sjjyp chataa* (prolonging fate), northern Thais seek to collectively harmonize a person's *chataa* with the cosmic elements.¹⁰⁷ Thus, it may not be surprising to find the discursive practices of astrology codified in calamity cosmology *tamnan-s*, since these narratives relate an account of a disharmonious history.

Evidence for this thesis on astrology can be found in the text *Legend of the Two Buddhas*, in which there appears a list of predicted disasters. Here, they are called *khro'*

(bad fate) (*gaha* in Pāli). In this work, it states

Now, I will tell (you) about the first misfortune.

- 1) Lightning will strike and kill people and animals such as cows and water buffaloes.
- 2) The second misfortune: Everyone will meet with death either by water, fire, stomach, chest pains, or poison.
- 3) The third misfortune: Everyone will have headaches and sore throats that medicine cannot treat.
- 4) The fourth misfortune: Everyone stops eating rice. Instead, they will use it to make and sell liquor. That will result in a lot of *kamma*.
- 5) The fifth misfortune: Everyone's throats will swell up. They will vomit blood and die. So it will be.
- 6) The sixth misfortune: Everyone will have pimples that are both big and small. They will be pus-filled sacks that are painful. They will exude a poisonous pus that causes (the skin) to rot and smell. Not knowing how to excise the poison, [those afflicted] will die.
- 7) The seventh misfortune: Everyone will hurl accusations and argue with one another. Kings, ministers, and councilors will place [offenders] in a pillory as a [type of] severe punishment. These misfortunes along with various dangers will occur in such a manner.
- 8) The eighth misfortune: Everyone will develop large tumors in their belly. The tumors will cause cramping, bloating, and become filled with poisonous pus. [Those afflicted]

¹⁰⁷ Sommai and Doré (1991) give a description of this ritual for a *myang's sjjyp chataa*.

will die.

9) The ninth misfortune: People will be gloomy and unhappy... They experience nothing but suffering (*dukkha*) and difficulties all the time. They will gradually waste away becoming pallid and then die” (*Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw 2 Phra Ong 1894 C.E./1256 C.S.: fols.17-18*).¹⁰⁸

I have found a very similar list of ominous misfortunes in a Siamese Brahmanical astrological text from roughly the same period. This Brahmanical treatise on astrology states,

“*Kāla indriya*, infested with sickness or death;
Itthi panāsa, that is, placed under a constellation the name of which is feminine;
Agni nirodha, of obstruction from fire; noted for the breaking out of conflagrations, the falling of thunderbolts, etc.
Daradika or Dhārādika, terrible, dreadful; in which if one travels by water he will be wrecked and drowned;
Kaladanda, of Death’s punishment; in which one may incur severe penalties from his rulers, or else fall from trees and be killed;
Dakshadina, of bad disposition;
Dinasunya, day of the sun’s transit between two signs, during which one may lose all his wealth;
Mrityu, Yama Khandha, infested with plague and other calamities;
Ayotā Maha Kāla, during which one is exposed to danger from enemies and wild beasts” (cited from G. E. Gerini [1893]1976: 23-4).

These two texts belong to different genres but convey similar materials. In the above astrological text, however, inauspicious events are given an astral conjunction. Although one can find astrologically calculated dates in political *tamnan-s*, these dynastic chronicles use this science to describe past events, whereas these narratives about a calamity cosmos relate a history of the

¹⁰⁸ *thii nii cak klaaw duay khrō’ hua thii nan faa can phaa khon taay lae sat thang laay khyy waa ngua khwaay kō’ cak taay maak nak cha lae khrō’ an thuan 2 nan khon cak taay duay nam duay fay lae cep thōōng cep ‘ōōk taay duay phit maak nak cha lae khrō’ an thuan 3 nan khon cak pen pheethi cep hua cep khōō yaa bō’ than kō’ cak taay mÿn cha lae an thuan 4 khon thang laay cak duu khwaen khaawpæk khaawsaan an pen khōōng liang chiiwit haeng ton phōōy duu khwaen lae aw maa say law kin laew phōōy khaay kin 1 pen klam an lak thae lae khon thang laay maa kratham an day 1 yōm pen baap pen ween say tua yuu khaw dīi līi lae phuu mīi panyaa phÿng ruu thÿa’ khrō’ an thuan 5 nan khon cak pen pheethi khōō khay phōōng laew haak lÿat taay pay kō’ ca mīi mÿn cha lae khrō’ an thuan 6 nan khon thang laay cak pen pheethi tu[m] khÿy waa fīi yay nōōy puat phit ‘ōōk pen naw pen nōōng bō’ ruu khaat phit an nīi laew taay pay mÿn cha lae khrō’ an thuan 7 nan khon thang laay kō’ cak com fōōng phit thiang pay maa lae thaw phya seenaa ‘amaat thang laay kō’ cak aw khon 3 fuung nan pay say khrōōk kan khaa ratchadandakam an yay haeng khaw thang laay fuung nan duay phay laay prakaan taang taang kō’ cak mīi mÿn cha lae khrō’ an thuan 8 nan khon thang laay kō’ cak pen pheethi an tum yay khat khlay thōōng suat buat phit nak lae taay pay siang kō’ cak mīi mÿn cha lae khrō’ an thuan 9 nan khon thang laay kō’ cak mīi cay mon mōōng prakōōp kan pen phaap pen hÿy thaw song kham thuk khryang cay [read: khen caj] yuu cay cay kō’ luat pen chōōp yōōm phōōm lÿang taay pay mÿn cha lae*

future. Astrology adds to calamity cosmology *tamnan-s* a sense of temporality based upon an attitude towards time that is one of chance, risk, opportunity, and danger. Astrologically, there is a host of numbers, for example, the *Cuḷasakkarāja* year, the name of the year according to a 12-year calendar cycle, and the name of months, lunar phases, and watches of the day. The five Buddha-s of the current *Bhadra Kalpa* also mark cosmological and *kammic* time in calamity-cosmology narratives. In this genre, cosmology and astrology organize the temporality of the world-outside-of-the text and the textual world.¹⁰⁹ These numerical markers of time metaphorically wind down the clock on the decline of the *dhammic* cosmos (i.e., *Dhamma/dhamma*) as it devolves into a *rūpic* cosmos and in the common life of the charismatic community (F. Reynolds 1972: 23).

Conclusion

Scholars of *tamnan-s* in general have missed those texts concerned with the history of Buddhism after Gotama's death, such as calamity-cosmology narratives. What this literary account of post-Gotama history tells us about the genre of *tamnan* is that northern Thai writers of

¹⁰⁹ Obeyesekere (1968) explains the distinction between a Buddhist theory of karmic destiny and astrological fate. First, he notes, "From a logical point of view *karma* is a highly deterministic theory of causation, but *karma* must be distinguished from Fate" (Obeyesekere 1968: 21). Then, he explains, "In Buddhism, on the other hand, I cannot know what the future holds in store because I do not know what my past sins and good actions have been. Anything could happen to me: sudden changes or alterations of fortune are to be expected, for my present existence is determined by past karma (regarding which I know nothing). I may be a pauper today, tomorrow a prince. Today I am in perfect health, but tomorrow I may suddenly be struck down by fatal disease. It is my fault that this is so, but my conscious experience cannot tell me what this fault is. This uncertainty which every individual Buddhist must feel about his own state of grace is relevant for our understanding of the role of astrology in Buddhist thought" (Obeyesekere 1968: 21). The relationship between a theory of *karma* and ideas of astrological fate must be more complex and varied among local Theravādin cultures than the above quote from Obeyesekere may give the impression. Nevertheless, few students of Theravāda have investigated astrological thought. An exception to that are those few studies done on the northern and central Thai astrological tradition and beliefs. For example, informative and detailed studies include Charles Keyes's (1975) article "Buddhist Pilgrimage Centers and the 12-year Calendar Cycle: Northern Thai moral orders in space and time;" Richard Davis's (1976) essay "The Northern Thai Calendar and Its Uses;" "Nerida Cook's (2002) "Thai Identity in the Astrological Tradition;" and the historical studies written by Craig Reynolds (1976; 2006). For a religious comparative perspective, one can consult Judy F. Pugh (1983) article "Astrology and Fate: The Hindu and Muslim Experiences" and Lawrence Babbs's (1983) study on popular Hinduism "Destiny and Responsibility: Karma in Popular Hinduism."

calamity-cosmology narratives merely discovered another unit of history with which to write history. This chapter mainly sought to bring to light the voice of calamity-cosmology *tamnan*. Recognizing the Buddha's last *ovāda* as a distinctive marker of calamity-cosmology *tamnan*-s enhances the previous scholarly characterization of religious *tamnan* as a history in which Gotama Buddha is a moving force (Charnvit 1976: 3). The *ovāda* speech genre injects into the *tamnan*'s textual speech plane a sphere of communication rooted in a critical appraisal of world events. In addition, a science of astrology and a cosmological calendar re-accentuate the *ovāda*-speech genre. Aiding *ovāda*'s evaluative form of expression are astrological and cosmological strategies for representing the world as a co-originating chain of events¹¹⁰ that have an emotional and moral valence.¹¹¹ The *ovāda* found in these narratives motivates the members of a moral community towards its objective to actualize the *Dhamma* in the life of the community (as described in the previous chapter) and towards its aim to critically evaluate the historical trajectory of northern Thai society's general morality.

¹¹⁰ Calamity-cosmology narratives can be interpreted as a type of history in which history is understood according to the metaphysical doctrine of dependent co-origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*).

¹¹¹ In the introductory article for the *Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics* (2005), Schweiker names a "fundamental dimension of ethics" as one area of study in the field of religious ethics. This type of investigates accounts of agency in relation to the "the moral context of life." This discursive arena of religious reflection on ethics, he writes, addresses the question: "what does it mean to be a moral agent within the wider compass of reality" (Schweiker: 2005: 8).

Four

The Practice of Listening to the *Dhamma*

This chapter and the next one (i.e., chapters four and five) will engage in a close reading of the texts at the heart of this study. Both of these chapters explore the third constitutive component of a moral community—its relation to society’s ideals—, in particular its *weak* connection to agreed-upon transcendental moral ideals. In respect to the dissertation’s argument, Chapter Two’s discussion of the 5,000-year timetable for the *dhamma*’s decline and Chapter Three’s examination of the speech genre of *ovāda* have shown a weakening of society’s ideals in relation to the moral community constructed through calamity-cosmology narratives from northern Thailand. For instance, Chapter Two demonstrated the manner in which Buddhists believe that in the age of decline there is a gap between ideals and reality. Then, Chapter Three uncovered this moral community’s voice of *ovāda*, which is an evaluative speech genre whose purpose is to pinpoint the shortcomings of an individual’s or a society’s morality. Both the 5,000-year timetable and the speech act of *ovāda* express the calamity-cosmological conviction that northern Thai society’s tradition of ideals, values, and norms is currently under threat. Whereas Chapter Two and Chapter Three suggest the manner in which calamity-cosmology narratives imply that ideals currently exist in an attenuated form, this chapter and the next one will directly examine these narratives in terms of their figuration of ideals. To guide my reading and interpretation of these narratives, I rely on Durkheim’s concept of society’s general morality as well as the ethnographic peasant context of these texts.

In particular, this fourth chapter examines a biography of a *bhikkhuṇī*.¹¹² I refer to this

¹¹² The text calls itself an “*uttaranidāna-tamnan*” (the legend of the necessary conditions [for a moral community]) (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902: fol. 1).

folktale as “*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*.” Due to the fact that northern Thai Buddhists never established a *bhikkhuṇī* order, the *bhikkhuṇī* in this local Buddhist culture represents a religious ideal that has been socially displaced. Thus, this story’s main character lends itself to a study of the weakening of the ideals found in a religious society. Moreover as stated in the introductory chapter, *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* introduces the Buddhist concept of *saṃvega*, which refers to a highly emotional experience of existential anxiety that arouses one’s faith in the Buddha’s teachings. In this *bhikkhuṇī* biography, an apprehension of suffering rather than a desire for the Good inspired by society’s moral ideals informs the individual morality of this *bhikkhuṇī*. Therefore, my examination brings to light the *bhikkhuṇī*’s experience of a *saṃvegic* moment and analyzes it according to Durkheim’s thesis that society’s moral community is constituted by ideals.

Introduction to *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*

The SRI possesses twelve manuscript witnesses for the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*. Their copy dates range from 1811 C.E./1173 C.S. to 1925 C.E. /1287 C.S. Ten of these manuscripts can be found at temples located in the Chiang Mai area. One can found at a temple in Mae Hong Song and another one at temple in Lamphun. For this investigation, I rely on the manuscript *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* that was copied in 1902 C.E./1263 C.S. It can be found at the temple Wat Sao Hin, which is located in the M̄yang district of Chiang Mai. According to its introduction, the text originally came from the Hō’ and was translated into Tai Yuan (i.e., my translation of “our language”) in 1791 C.E. /1153 C.S.¹¹³ Given the meager amount of available information on these manuscripts and their production, there is no obvious way to judge how popular this text may have been. As for a history of the *bhikkhuṇī* as a literary figure, some

¹¹³ Though the manuscripts convey the same text, there are minor elaborations found in them.

chroniclers associated her with Gotamī, the first *bhikkhuṇī* and the Buddha's nurse mother.¹¹⁴ In this

Vinaya story, the Buddha having ordained Gotamī states,

“If, Ānanda, women had not obtained the going forth from home into homelessness in the *dhamma* and the discipline proclaimed by the Truth-finder, the Brahma-faring Ānanda, would have lasted long, true *dhamma* would have endured for a thousand years. But since Ānanda, women have gone forth... in the *dhamma* and the discipline proclaimed by the Truth-finder, *dhamma* will endure only for five hundred years” (Vin. V 356).

According to Jan Nattier, this 500-year timetable of decline is the earliest one found in the history of this religion. It attained an orthodox status among the *Sthavira* sects approximately two hundred years before the first millennium C.E. (Nattier 1991: 62-63). Around the fifth or sixth centuries C.E., Indian Buddhists had to increase the lifespan of the *dhamma* to 1,000 years. What significance then did northern Thai writers find in the story of Gotamī?

In the *Pāḍaeng Chronicle*, a Tai Khÿyn work from Chiang Tung, it states, “The Sakkarāja had progressed to 560 [and] bhikkhunīhood came to an end there” (Sao Sāimong 1981:101).¹¹⁵ In the *Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok*,¹¹⁶ a Tai Yuan chronicle, it reads, “Listen, king. Five hundred years after the Phra Tathāgata has entered into final *nibbāna*, that is when women can still ordain. But afterwards, they cannot” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* Ch. 10 1917

¹¹⁴ There is a *bhikkhuṇī* ordination hall at Wat Phra Singh in Chiang Mai and at Wat Phra Thaat in Lamphun. On the Southeast Asian history of *bhikkhuṇī*, Skilling's (1994) two articles—“A Note on the History of the Bhikkhuṇī-saṅgha (II)” and “The Order of Nun after the Parinirvāṇa”—provide a detailed account that draws on epigraphy and texts from across this region.

¹¹⁵ The *Pāḍaeng Chronicle* (Sao Sāimong 1981) and the *Tamnān Mūlasāsana Wat Pā Daeng* (Swearer and Sommai 1977) relate a similar historical account of the Sinhala monastic lineage that Ñāṇagambhīra brought to Chiang Mai and that was later taken to Chiang Tung during the fifteenth century.

¹¹⁶ In a paper delivered at a recent conference, titled, “Buddhist Narrative in Asia and beyond,” Prakong Nimmanahaeminda (2010) recommends a new 16th/17th century dating for the *Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* based on the historical kings mentioned in it.

C.E./2460 B.E.: fol. 4).¹¹⁷ The same prediction appears in the *Sinhnavati*, a Tai Yuan chronicle. In the French translation of this chronicle, it states, “*En 500, année Kāp Sān, ou 500 du Nibbāna* (— 44), *la religion Bhikkhuṇī fut terminée*” (Notton 1926: 181). Also, in a recent publication of the *Mūlasāsanā*, it describes Buddhaghosa’s two schemes for the 5,000-year retrogression as a commentary to the *Vinaya*’s Gotamī story. This passage appears towards in the end of the book in a section on the five disappearances (Bamphen 1993 C.E./2537 B.E.: 176-253).

From the above evidence we can adduce that in some of the Thai communities in which a Theravādin *bhikkhuṇī* order was never established, Buddhist chroniclers incorporated the Gotamī story’s 500-year prediction into Buddhaghosa’s 5,000-year timetable of losses. Buddhaghosa, a fifth century Indian commentator, lived and wrote at a time before the eleventh and twelfth centuries when the Theravādin *bhikkhuṇī* order in Sri Lanka disintegrated and eventually disappeared. Consequently, Buddhaghosa does not mention the expiration of the *bhikkhuṇī* lineage in his writings on the 5,000-year timetable that are found in the *Manorathapūraṇī* I 87-91 and the *Samantapasādikā* VI 1290-1296.¹¹⁸ What meaning might a community that had no historical memory of a living *bhikkhuṇī* tradition expect to find in a socially absent ideal?

A Reading and Interpretation of *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*

Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon is a composite text made up of three prefatory vignettes and two main stories that converge in the end. Linguistic markers divide each of the five plots. One can categorize the five pieces in the following manner: two apocalyptic visions, one utopic vision of a world restored by a *Cakkavatti*, a *bhikkhuṇī* biography, and a *tamnan m̄yang*. The latter two

¹¹⁷ *duu raa mahaarat nay m̄ya phra tathaagata nibphaan pay day 5 rō̄y pii watsaa wan nan phuuying cak buat pen bhikkhunii kō’ yang day tae nan pay bō’ day*

¹¹⁸ Buddhaghosa proposes two different schemes for the things that will be lost during the 5,000-year period. For a summary of them, one can consult Nattier’s book *Once Upon a Future Time* (Nattier 1991: 56-59). Her monograph on Buddhist perceptions of time and history provides a detailed textual history on this subject. Of interest, she has found in the Tibetan canon Buddhaghosa’s two aforementioned commentaries on the 5,000-year decline (Nattier 1991: 59).

tales make up the main body of the narrative. Having introduced the narrative structure of *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*, I now turn to examine this folktale through a close reading of its contents.

Apocalyptic Vision One

In the previous chapter, I discussed the opening to the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*. In particular, I examined the line “*phuttho phuttho aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ.*” Therefore, in this chapter, I will only summarize the portions of this story that are relevant to this chapter’s discussion on the relation of society’s ideals to the moral community. The opening vignette of *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* sets up the narrative as an urgent teaching of the *dhamma*. It tells the story of a woman who once had a prophetic vision of a world in crisis. Having seen the future, she cries out to some boys who are nearby. She desperately wants to warn them about the catastrophic events that she saw in a vision of the future. Having cried out to them and subsequently been ignored by them, she bribes the boys telling them that she will give them treats if they come and listen to her words. Having described her prophetic vision to the boys, she mutters the above exclamation. Then tears fall from her eyes.

This story opens then with a narrative account of the future of the world as seen by this woman and the initial hesitation the boys have to listen to her. In this first episode, we find a textual world designed according to a calamity-cosmological conviction. Her knowledge of a future apocalypse inspires the lone woman to give the boys nearby a *dhamma* lesson. She expresses a desire to teach the *dhamma* with a tone of urgency. As the lone woman teaches, those who do not know of the *dhamma* they do not make merit, give *dāna*, or respect their parents or teachers. As she states, they people are bad (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E.: 1263 C.S.: fol. 2) (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E.: 1263 C.S.: fol. 2). Buddhists must have a

relationship with the *dhamma*. That association with the *dhamma*, however, is not so desirable as the boys in the story indicate. It is nevertheless, necessary for individuals to engage the *dhamma*. Moreover, the *dhamma* in this case represents a lesson in which others are invited to learn about the potential for human suffering.

Apocalyptic Vision Two

To signal the insertion of a second vignette, the author begins with an opening that reads like the colophon of a manuscript. He gives a date replete with a Buddhist Era-year, day of the week, month, lunar phase, and watch of the day. In that conjunction of time, we are told, a strong wind blew. Next, a lightning bolt struck a boulder, causing it to sheer asunder. On the face of that shorn off piece of rock, there was a text, written by Indra. It carries a much darker apocalyptic vision than the previous one seen by the lone woman. In order to read the inscription, the villagers search for a teacher who is literate. Having read the inscription, the teacher tells them that Indra brought this text down from the heavens to give to the people of Jambudīpa a teaching about the *guṇa-s* (good qualities) and *dosa-s* (bad qualities) of the world (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 3).¹¹⁹ Next, the text states that Indra promises to send four *devaputta-s* down to world of humans in order to inspect and report on the *baap* (*pāpa*, in Pāli) and *bun* (*puñya*, in Pāli) committed by humans living in Jambudīpa (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 3).¹²⁰ Then, the text concludes with a set of predictions about a disastrous future.

This vignette’s vision of the future conveys more of an expression of utter catastrophe that amplifies the previous woman’s revelation about the future loss of customs, religion, and

¹¹⁹ *nangsÿÿ nii phyā inthathirat aw long ma sōñ kae lok hÿÿ ruucak khun lae thot kae chaaw chomphuuthip*

¹²⁰ *day caeng cing chay theewabut 4 ton long maa suu chomphuthip laew liap leng duu khrahat lae chaawcaw somanaprohm lae thaaw phyā seenaa amaat kaewhaan thang laay hÿÿ ruucak baap lae bun*

normative behavior. Lord Indra tells us that human civilization will end in a cataclysmic war. That war, we are told, is fought over twelve *thewada*-like (*devatā* in Pāli) maidens. Following the wake of these wars waged out of lust, an army of *yakkha*-s will manifest alongside bandits both of whom will slaughter people. Next, rice crops, trees, and grass will wither and die. Floods and earthquakes will occur. Finally, a fire like the one that consumes the universe in the End will devastate the cities of Jambudīpa. As for the reasons for these events, the text states,

“It is because the ruling lords, ministers, dignitaries, royal astrologers, teachers, and ascetics do not revere the Lord Buddha’s *dhamma*. The path of destruction is so great that only those who revere the three jewels survive” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 5).¹²¹

This vignette and the previous one express an emotional and moral lesson that is gained from looking at and examining a crisis-strewn period of history. This apocalyptic vision in particular gives one knowledge of Lord Indra’s plans to reap the *kammic* fruits of any wicked deeds committed by human beings. The following third act moves in the opposite direction. It alters the direction of the story from Buddhist calamities towards Buddhist felicities.

A *Cakkavatti* Restores World Order

The story opens with the following line:

“Here, I will tell all the stream-winners and virtuous men about a *bhikkhu* who ordained for three thousand and three hundred years, who had expert knowledge in the three *Veda*-s, and who [practiced] *kammaṭhāna* meditation” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 5).¹²²

We are told that once this wizened *bhikkhu* went to stay at a cave in order to meditate continuously for days. On the seventh night, he heard a baby crying. Finding an infant boy in the

¹²¹ *heet waa phyaa seenaa amaata purohit ‘aacaan somanaprohm thang laay bō’ khrop yam tham phra phuttha caw luat thýng khlōōng an vinaat chiphaay pen an maak thaw yang lya tae bugkhon phuu ruu khrop yam kaew 3 prakaan nan lae*

¹²² *thii nii cak klaaw hýy caeng kae sotuchana sappurisa thang laay kōōn lae yang mii bhikkhu ton 1 mii watsaa day 3300 watssa cop phet ying nak thýy kammathaan yuu cay cay*

cave, the *bhikkhu* suspects that Indra must have sent the baby to him. So the *bhikkhu* decides to adopt the child. Despite having an odd and unattractive appearance, the boy is destined to become an exemplary Buddhist king (*cakkavatti*). Having assumed power, his rules over a populace that is content and peaceful. In his kingdom, one cannot find an enemy or bandit. Also, the rains fall according to the seasons and twelve *Kalapruksa* trees spring up due to this king's wealth of merit (*puñya*). We are told that this sovereign will protect the *sāsana* for a period during its last 1,731 years. With these three opening acts, *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* draws heavily upon the symbolism associated with a calamity cosmology. The three tales presage the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*'s main plot. In particular, a reader is led to expect a story about the fall and restoration of a Buddhist moral community.

Story one: a *bhikkhuṇī* biography

The main body of *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* begins with a *bhikkhuṇī* biography. We are told that a *bhikkhuṇī*, named Sindhun,¹²³ previously took birth in heaven as the daughter of Indra. In her present life, she has taken birth as the youngest of three daughters in the family of King Say Fa, who rules Hariphun. Having reaches puberty, she is told by the king that it is time for marriage. Sindhun begs her father to wait and hold off his plans. She explains that she needs time to consider what marriage entails. To do so, the princess seeks out her two elder sisters and asks them about marriage and pregnancy. She asks,

“Sisters, when you were pregnant, was it painful and difficult? The eldest answered, “My kid-sister, my pregnancy was very difficult. It was incomparable. Whether I was eating, laying down, or walking, it was painful. [Existence] in *samsāra* is truly tiresome and boring.” Having listened to her eldest sister, she dwelt on the matter thinking, “Will my husband be like those of my sisters? One's husband can be either good and bring you joy

¹²³ Some manuscript witnesses for *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* give the name of the *bhikkhuṇī* as “Thon” whereas others give her the name “Sindhun.” Although the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S. has the name of the *bhikkhuṇī* as “Thon” in its title, in the text she is referred to as “Sindhun.”

or he can be bad and cause you misery. [Existence] in *samsāra* is truly tiresome and boring” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 9-10).¹²⁴

Thus, the elder sisters tell her that pregnancy tends to be a grueling (*lambaak*) and painful (*dukkha*) affair. Marriage on the other hand can be happy (*sukkha*) or miserable (*dukkha*) depending on the disposition of one’s husband. Then, we are told that the king ignoring his daughter’s doubts over marriage sent out a proclamation inviting any well-heeled bachelor to come vie for his daughter’s hand in marriage at his palace tomorrow. King Say Fa does so, because, as we are told, Sindhun is “like a lotus in bloom” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 10).¹²⁵ The next morning when Sindhun wakes up, she hears the news of her father’s arrangements. Upon receiving word of her father’s plans, the text states, “She was so shocked, frightened, and scared” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 11).¹²⁶ In response to the news, Sindhun seeks out her nanny, who consoles her by saying,

“My lady-lord, don’t feel slighted. Don’t throw away your life!” [Sindhun] thought, “I can’t stay here. I am not going to make myself miserable. I will run away to some place and die there. As long as I have merit, I will live” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 11).¹²⁷

The line expressing the princess’s profound shock foreshadows her eventual renunciation, because it alludes to the Buddhist concept of *saṃvega*. This Buddhist term refers to the existential anxieties that move one’s faith (*saddhā*). The Pali Text Society’s *Pali-English*

¹²⁴ *Yang mii nay kaan khraap 1 naang cing thaam kap duay phii ying thang 2 nan waa duura phii thang 2 yaam m̄ya song khabpha nay thōṅ yang thuk lambaak pen san day nan chaa naang phuu phii cing klaaw waa duu raa nōṅ yaam m̄ya song khabpha pen an lambaak nak naa haa thii cak priabthiap bō’ day lae yaam m̄ya kin kō’ pen thuk nang kō’ pen thuk nōn kō’ pen thuk thiaw kō’ pen thuk nay songsaan kō’ pun dii naay thae lae naang day yin kham phii laew kō’ ramph̄yng waa tua kuu nii khraan waa mii phua kho m̄yan dang phii haeng kuu nii cha lae maen day phua pen dii kō’ day th̄yng suk khan day phua phuu raay kō’ cak pen thuk cha lae songsaan nii kō’ pun dii naay thae lae*

¹²⁵ *duu raa ‘amaat thang laay luuk ying haeng phra ong raw nan bamphen dang dōṅ bua baan nan lae*

¹²⁶ *Sadung tok cay klua maak nak*

¹²⁷ *duu raa mae pen caw yaa day nōy cay th̄ya’ mae yaa day kratham an la yang chiiwit haeng naang sia th̄ya’ naang kō’ khit waa cak yuu bō’ day cing khraaning cay waa kuu nii yuu bō’ day song thuk th̄ya’ kuu cak nii pay suu thii an cak taay nan th̄ya’ khan bun kuu mii kō’ haak ca mii chiiwit cha lae naang khraaning cay san nii lae*

Dictionary defines *saṃvega* as “agitation, fear, anxiety; thrill, religious emotion (caused by contemplation of the miseries of this world)” (T.W. Rhys Davids and Stede [1921-1925] 1993: 658). This dictionary names six of the eight objects that are said to induce such a state: “birth, old age, illness, death, misery in the *apāya*-s and the misery caused by *saṃsāra* in past, present, and future states” (T.W. Rhys Davids and Stede [1921-1925] 1993: 658). Looking at this list, it seems that Sindhun has experienced a personal and revelatory crisis caused by contemplating *saṃsāra*. The line “[s]he was so shocked, frightened, and scared” describes Sindhun’s experience of *saṃvega*. This episode, however, appears on the surface to be a parody. First, Sindhun’s reflections on *saṃsāra* lead her to view it as being a boring ordeal. Moreover, her thoughts eventually result in her decision to run away and commit suicide. Despite her suicidal ideation, she assures herself that an act of suicide cannot result in death as long as one has merit (*puṇya*). At first glance, the religious emotion of *saṃvega* and the doctrinal definition of *saṃsāra* appear to be at odds in this story. The existential crisis that provokes her experience of *saṃvega* has to do with marriage and childbirth. Such an inciting factor makes little sense, because individuals generally want a spouse and family. The young Sindhun seems childish and naïve in her rejection of womanhood. At the same time, the story precludes such a judgment. In fact, it calls for a suspension of judgment, for the reader knows that Sindhun will ascend to the status of *bhikkhūṇī*. After all, the narrator introduces the *bhikkhūṇī*’s biography by stating, “Now I will tell [a tale] about the *bhikkhūṇī* named Sindhun” (*Tamnan Bhikkhūṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 7). When nighttime arrives, Sindhun sneaks out of the palace. At dawn, she leaves the city. The next morning when the king discovers her missing, he sends out a search party. With the help of a royal astrologer (*mōō purohit aacaan*), the servants quickly locate the direction in which Sindhun fled. Having sighted Sindhun, they begin to chase after her. With the servants fast

upon her heels, Sindhun takes off running. With both her body and mind racing, Sindhun finds herself running down a pier that leads out to the ocean. With nowhere else to go, she convinces herself to jump into the ocean and end her life. In the scene of her suicide, which takes place at the pier leading out to the ocean's edge, her reasoning goes according to the following lines.

“I really think that *samsāra* is a tiresome affair. I will jump, fall into the water, and die”
(*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 13).¹²⁸

Next, the young Sindhun makes a string of last minute requests before killing herself. One of her wishes is religious in intent. The text states,

“Please let me be born in an excellent place so that I may be delivered from *samsāra*”
(*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 13).¹²⁹

In a roundabout fashion, this young princess —because she cannot stand to live in *samsāra* — will kill herself; but in her next life, she hopes to be born somewhere that allows her to escape from *samsāra*. There is an ironic humor found in her words that foreshadows an odd twist in her fate that will soon take place. Just as Sindhun leaps into the ocean, Indra, who has been watching her at the pier, places a lotus on the water's surface. Sindhun lands on the lotus and floats on top of the ocean's waters. Then, she slowly drifts away as the king's servants watch her in astonishment. She eventually reaches an island that Indra has magically created for her. Upon her arrival, the *nāga* king makes an image hall (*mondok*) magically appear for her to live in. Thus, the princess begins her new life on this island where she lives in an image hall and eats only fruits.

One day, Indra disguised as an old Brahmin comes to test the princess. Appearing to be lost and starved, the old Brahmin asks Sindhun to climb up a fruit tree and pick some fruits for

¹²⁸ *Sa dung tok cay klua maak nak tua khaa cak ten tok nam taay laew*

¹²⁹ *khōō hyȳ khaa day pay kæt thii prasært hyȳ phon caak songsaan*

him to eat. Considering that act to be inappropriate for a woman to do, she declines his request. Instead, she kneels and prays for fruits to rain down near him, which they do. Seeing her perform this miracle, Indra, convinced that Sindhun is a person of merit (*phuu mii bun*), offers her ten boons. Soon afterwards, the Buddha appears with 500 *arhant-s*. Not needing any sort of confirmation, the Buddha “sees” Sindhun’s past during which she worshipped at one of the Buddha’s footprints (*buddhapada*). Thus, the Buddha ordains (*abhiseka*) her and then teaches her meditation. Through meditating, Sindhun quickly becomes an *arhant*. Here, her story concludes, for the time being.

In this folktale, actions unfold quite quickly and descriptions are minimal. One does, however, find literary elaborations devoted to those points in the story where the princess has to make a decision. The reader can see her inner world of emotions and judgments. By describing her inner world, the reader knows how Sindhun reflects and feels about a matter before choosing a course of action. In the story, her moral decisions consist of a combination of intentions, reasoning, and quite strikingly, religious emotions. A horizon of emotions animates Sindhun’s thoughts on the Buddhist doctrinal ideas *samsāra* and *dukkha*. At first, *samsara* seems boring to her. Boredom, it is important to note, is a feeling. Then, she feels the weight of *samsāra* at the pier where she makes declarations concerning *samsāra* right before she leaps into the ocean to kill herself. More importantly, the princess’s desire to contemplate the *dukkha* found in marriage and motherhood sets in motion her *saṃvegic* learning experience.

On the surface, her biography appears to be a comedic tale about a princess who chooses to commit suicide rather than marry, because she is shy in the presence of men. In addition, it is a rudimentary conversation with her sisters that endows this princess with a distinct awareness of the *dukkha* found in pregnancy, labor, and marriage. The humorous episodes found in her life-

story create a distance between the reader and Sindhun such that a reader might perceive Sindhun's actions and choices as comedic folly. A reader is invited to dismiss Sindhun as a silly young adult. Yet, the successful ending to her life-story provokes a reader to wonder and marvel at her ironic accession to the state of an *arhant*. After all, her emotional and intellectual understanding of the world and human life seem to be that of young woman afraid of men. Sindhun's irrational fears inform her thoughts on *samsāra*. In light of that, a reader might ask, "How is it possible for Sindhun to be an exemplary model for Buddhists?" In her life's strange twists in fate, the *bhikkhūnī*'s life-story does not invite the reader to comprehend her moral reasoning, despite the fact that it is rooted in doctrinal concepts. Her life's trajectory induces in the reader a sense of an estrangement from this monastic figure. King Say Fa, Indra, and the Buddha set in the motion the Sindhun's life-trajectory. She merely reacts with skill and responds appropriately. The story introduces a gap between the *bhikkhūnī*'s *samvega*-level of understanding Buddhist doctrine and morality and the reader's level of understanding doctrine and morality. The narrative does so by emphasizing the hand of fate that separates the *bhikkhūnī* from ordinary human beings. As a result, Sindhun has the capacity to undo the king's path of action that would have caused her to lose her virginal purity. As it turns out, this princess did have enough merit (*puñya*) to prevent an act of suicide from being successful. The reader's sense of estrangement from the *bhikkhūnī*'s individual morality serves not only to place the *bhikkhūnī* character in an authoritative status, but more importantly it sets up a divide between society's general morality (i.e., the reader's common sense of morality) and the individual morality represented by the *bhikkhūnī*. The *bhikkhūnī* as a socially displaced ideal figure, in other words, metaphorically represents an individual morality that has been decoupled from society's general morality. In the case of the story, this break between an individual's morality and society's

general morality occurs as the result of a conflict between society's traditions, in this case that of marriage, and the Buddhist doctrinal ideas *saṃsāra* and *dukkha*. The *bhikkhuṇī*'s individual morality, rather than stemming from a religious ideal, derives from a profound experience of *dukkha* caused by her father. As with the previous two apocalyptic visions, Sindhun's life story reinforces the idea that one can learn the *dhamma* by contemplating human suffering. In the case of the *bhikkhuṇī*'s biography, it demonstrates how *dukkha* can transform an individual into a superior moral agent through its narrative depiction of *saṃvega* and the objects that induce a profound moral existential anxiety.

Story Two: *Tamnan Mjāng Hariphun*

The story then abruptly switches to a tale about a minister's daughter from Riddhidhon. The narrator introduces this town as "a place where there once lived a lady" who just turned sixteen years of age. The narrator continues,

"Here at this head township a type of disturbance will occur" (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 20).¹³⁰

Just like the princess Sindhun, this girl's father also makes arrangements for her wedding. He consults with an astrologer to choose a date for the ceremony. The astrologer tells him that if his daughter marries this year then she and her husband will become enemies. Therefore, the astrologer advises the minister to delay any wedding plans until next year. Nevertheless, the minister selects a husband for his daughter, but he keeps them from meeting one another.¹³¹ In the meantime, the minister's daughter decides to spend the day at a royal park. There at the playgrounds is large pool named "Brahmadanta." That is where a shrimp as big as a sugar cane

¹³⁰ *pathom baan mjāng thii nan cak bangkæt pen panhaa koalaahon nan*

¹³¹ Due to the obvious duplication of a marriage-plot, we can surmise that *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* is made up of two mimetic stories. Swearer and Sommai (1998) find this story-telling device used in the 15th century Pāli version of the *Legend of Queen Cāmadevī*.

stalk, a fish, and a crab as big as a floor mat reside. Also, we are told that they have been living in that pool together for hundreds of years as friends.¹³² At that pool, the minister's teenage daughter plays a game of fetch with the fish. First, she plucks and tosses flowers into the pool for the fish to fetch. Then, she spits into

the water. Each time she does so, the fish swims towards it and eats it. The young lady remarks,

“*Samsāra* is real, for just look at these animals” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 22)!¹³³

Her wonderment comes from their unexpected friendship. In her mind, the fish was once a human being otherwise the two would not have been able to play a game of fetch together.

On her way home, the minister's daughter happens upon a handsome young lad as he is walking down the path in her direction. Afraid that this man might be her fiancé, the young lady quickly veers off the path to avoid him. In that moment of excitement and fear, she loses one of her hairpins. The young man finds it and brings it home. Next, the story switches to the mischievous spirits (*yakkha-s*) from the pond, especially the fish. The text states,

That night the *saphiankham* fish came to ponder, “In *vatta-samsāra*, there is wrong conduct, etc.” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 22).¹³⁴

In stark contrast to Sindhun's declaration that “*samsāra* is truly tiresome and boring,” the minister's daughter thinks that *samsāra* is about the animal's piteous *kammic* destiny (*gati*), and the fish thinks that *samsāra* is about misconduct (*micchācāra* in Pāli). Whereas Sindhun and her sisters state that *samsāra* is *dukkha*, these latter two characters—the minister's teenage daughter

¹³² The text states that all three of these animals have been sentenced to being these aquatic animals for five hundred lives (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S., fols. 43-44). The name of the pond “Brahmadanta” may be a northern Thai spelling for the word “*brahmadanda*” (heavy punishment), which is found mentioned in Vin V 402.

¹³³ *naang cing rampyng waa songsaan nii maen satdiratchan kō' yang pun dii nōō waa an laew*

¹³⁴ *thyng yaam m̄ya klaangkhj̄yn plaa saphiankham kō' maa ramphyng waa nay watsongsaan nii mitchaacaan pen ton lae*

and the fish—do not relate *samsāra* to *dukkha*. Moreover, Sindhun’s contemplation of *samsāra* inspires a *saṃvegic* emotional response in her, but not in her sisters. These three variant glosses on *samsāra* set up an expectation in the reader, namely that the course of the tale will disclose the true meaning of *samsāra*. The story’s lesson can be imagined to be like an onion in which the many layers of *samsāra*’s meanings will be uncovered.

The fish (i.e., *yakkha*) having taken the form of the minister’s daughter goes to the bachelor’s house under the pretense of retrieving the hairpin. Upon encountering one another, the *yakkha*-girl (i.e., the fish in disguise) expresses her desire for him. When he disapproves of her untoward behavior, the *yakkha*-girl threatens him. She tells him that she will kill herself by pummeling her chest. We read,

“She cried, “I have seen you and fallen in love. My affection for you is overwhelming. My elder brother, if you are not pleased with me and do not give me what I desire, then tonight I will beat my breast until I die. Do not doubt me!” The young man replied, “You would really do that”¹³⁵ (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 24)?

Seeing no easy way out with this teenage girl who is as beautiful as a *thewada*, the young man acquiesces to her demand. The next morning, he awakens feeling shameful, so he persuades the *yakkha*-girl to run away with him. That same morning, the minister’s servants inform him that they found the key to his daughter’s bedroom still inserted in the keyhole of her bedroom’s door. Both the servants and minister take that as sign that the young lady never returned home from her trip to the park. The minister immediately assembles a search party. Having intercepted the couple in the midst of their flight, the servants bring the couple before the minister. Upon receiving the couple, the minister mistakes the *yakkha*-girl for his daughter, for the *yakkha* has

¹³⁵ *naang klaaw waa kha day han yang phua caw kha kho yin dii sineha rak ying nak khon tua phi bo yin dii kap duaj tua khaa lae bō’ h̄ȳy laew kae khwamprarathana haeng khaa dang an khaa kō’ cak tii ‘ōōp taay pay nay kaan kh̄ȳn nii bō’ yaa cha lae chaay phuu nan waa khan naang cak kratham pen san nan cak day waa r̄ȳy chaa*

taken on her appearance. Believing this *yakkha* to be his child, the minister berates his wife. He accuses her of failing to instill a sense of shame in their daughter. The minister says,

“Look, you whore, whatever you taught our child was completely useless, for she doesn’t have the slightest notion of shame in regards to men.” Then, he proceeded to beat the girl’s mother striking her with his fists twice then thrice” (*Tamnan Bhikkhunī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S: fol. 26).¹³⁶

To his astonishment, the mother informs her husband that their daughter is in fact asleep in her bedroom. Then, she promptly fetches their daughter from her bedroom. As a result of that, the minister unexpectedly finds himself standing before two young women who look exactly like his beloved girl. The minister’s wife rebukes her husband for failing to maintain order in his own house. To resolve this dire conflict, he brings both of the girls before the king of Hariphun. The king invites Lord Vissanu to come help, but the shrimp takes on Lord Vissanu’s appearance and enters the palace at the same time the real Lord Vissanu does. When the king asks Lord Vissanu to identify which of the two women is his real daughter, the real Lord Vissanu points out the correct woman and the pretender Lord Vissanu points of the wrong woman. Then, the two Lord Vissanu-s argue over who is right. Next, the king asks Lord Padumma to assist in the matter, but then the crab morphs into a replica of Lord Padumma and arrives at the palace at the same time as the real Lord Padumma does. They too make different claims and dispute one another’s judgment. The king bewildered at the sight of three pairs of doppelgangers, which portents a *kolāhala*, decides to take a break from the case. Before bed, the king gives offerings of worship to the *myāng*’s guardian spirits. As a result of that, he has a portentous dream that causes him to wake up startled (*sa dung*). The king of Hariphun who is the princess Sindhun’s father awakens feeling startled just as his daughter previously had. Given his ominous dream, the king seeks out

¹³⁶ *duu raa ii kaalakiniī sōōn luuk kō’ bō’ pen hyy pht la ‘aay taa kae than waa an laew kō’ tii yang mae naang nan 2 kham 3 kham han lae*

his astrologer who interprets the dream as a sign that the king's long-lost daughter Sindhun at last will return home. To assist her homecoming, Indra disguises himself as a Brahmin and gives the king instructions on the palladium that must be built to receive his girl.

With that emotion of shock (*sa dung*), which both the king and Sindhun experienced, the two stories—the *bhikkhuṇī* biography and the *tamnan m̄yang* Hariphun—begin to converge. The colliding of the two narratives causes the reader to have knowledge about the story that certain characters in the story do not have. The epistemological gap created between the reader and specific characters in the story is part of this folktale's entertainment, however, it also plays a key role in the pedagogical aspect of the text. In particular, the reader knows that each pair of doubles has one *yakkha* who came from the Brahmadata pond. Also, the reader knows that Sindhun has not died but has become an enlightened *bhikkhuṇī*. In short, the reader is aware of who in the story is an innocent bystander and who in the story is the culprit. When King Say Fa, Sindhun's father, sees his girl, he explains how he thought she ran away because she was angry with him. The text states,

“The king said, “Darling, my beloved child, were you mad at me, your father? Was that the reason [you ran away]? When you fled from the kingdom [and left] your parents, you did not tell anyone. Why did you forsake us and your inheritance” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 36-37)¹³⁷

Even though the reader knows the reasons why Sindhun ran away, she is still struck by the *bhikkhuṇī*'s answer. The *bhikkhuṇī* responds,

“Father, my lord, I do not hate you, my mother, or sisters. I feared the many taints caused by craving which leads to *pāpa*. I wanted to strive to eliminate *pāpa*, which belongs to *vaṭṭa-samsāra*. That is the reason why I left. I then came to live on an island in the ocean. There, I ordained as a *bhikkhuṇī* in the house of the Lord Buddha. I cultivated loving

¹³⁷ *phya khō' thaam kap duay naang waa dang nii tāta duu raa caw luuk rak kae phōō caw phōōy mii kroot kh̄yang kliat dauy heetkaan an day chaa yaam m̄ya caw nii caak baanm̄yang phōōmae pay wan nan caw kō' bō' bōōk klaaw cim bugkhon phuu day sak khon caw phōōy la phōōmae lae la ratchasombat way nan chaa*

kindness towards others while living on this island” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 37).¹³⁸

Rather than relating her fear of men or her former conclusion that *samsāra* is “boring and tiresome,” the *bhikkhuṇī* gives what the reader would recognize as a doctrinal response to the question: why did you ordain? In other words, it reads as a boilerplate answer. How does her answer mesh with her biography? Although the reader knows what really caused Sindhun to enter into a life of renunciation that knowledge distinguishes the reader from the *bhikkhuṇī*’s version of her life-story. At the same time, Sindhun’s transformation into an enlightened ascetic and her standard answer places her in the familiar realm of an expert on the *dhamma* in the reader’s mind’s eye. Her explanation of the events surrounding her life suggests that her way of cognizing *samsāra* and her understanding of the Truth derive from the wisdom she achieved upon her enlightenment. Her previous conceptualization of *samsāra* as filled with tedium was in the end correct. In a manner, she exhibits a transcendental understanding of the Truth rather than a conventional one. In Durkheimian terms, she displays an individual morality rooted in the *dhamma* rather than a general morality that reflects the customs and norms of tradition.

To help her father save the kingdom from succumbing to a state of chaos caused by supernatural evil beings, that is, the three *yakkha*-s from Brahmadanta pond, Sindhun resolves the dilemma of the three pairs of twins by distinguishing the *yakkha*-imitators from the genuine humans. The text states,

Then king had the servants bring the minister’s daughter[s], the astrologer[s] [i.e., Lord Vissanu), and Lord Padumma[s]. Having been brought forth, everyone including the king stared at what were once three individuals who now have a twin. All of the people, the king, ministers, and dignitaries were so delighted with lady Sindhun’s return, which [they

¹³⁸ *naang klaaw waa khaa kae phōō pen caw khaa kō’ bō kliat kae phōōmae phiinōōng sak an han lae khaa klua tae kileet tanhaa tua nan cak maa kratham hyy pen baap maak nak khaa mak khray phian caak baap an khōōng yuu watsasongsaan haeng lok nan khaa kō’ cing nii phya an lae khaa nii pay thyyng kaw’ samut thii nan laew khaa kō’ day buat pen bhikkhuṇī nay samnak phra phuttha caw laew kaw’ day bamphen meetaaphaawanaa yuu nay kaw’ thii nan lae*

thought] was amazing. They *wai-ed* the *bhikkhuṇī* and said, “Now, there are the sciences and arts of the *guṇa-s*. Now the minister’s child, astrologer, and Lord Padumma all of a sudden have a double. Your Majesty, how would the sciences and arts explain this event? The *bhikkhuṇī* said, “We do not know those sciences or arts. We have only completed training in cultivating loving kindness towards others (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 38-39).¹³⁹

As proof of her correct assessment of the three pairs of twins, she places the *yakkha-s* in a bucket of water and chants a *dhamma-sutta* in Pāli. The magical potency of her words that are a recitation of Pāli verses uncloaks the three mischievous creatures. The three resume their respective forms as a fish, an abnormally large crab, and a humungous shrimp. All of the countrymen approach the bucket and peer inside. Upon witnessing the metamorphosis of the three humans into three aquatic animals, they exclaimed,

“My lord, these animals are frightening” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 41)!¹⁴⁰

Then, in reaction to the *yakkha-s*’ trickery, they proclaimed,

“These three animals caused a state of chaos to erupt in the kingdom. We ought to kill them” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 42).¹⁴¹

In this instance, the reader and characters in the story have closed the final epistemological gap concerning the knowledge of the true offenders. This closure brings together the reader and the people of Hariphun for they both share a sentiment of anger and vengeance that arises from their awareness of the individuals who are truly guilty of bringing the kingdom to the brink of an

¹³⁹ *yaam nan phya kō’ chay khon pay haa aw luuksaaw ‘amaat lae mōō lae phya pathummaa maa han lae khan khaw thang laay maa th̄yng laew khon thang laay mii phya pen ton kō’ han khaw thang 3 nan mii phuu diaw mii phōō 2 pen dan phaay lang nan yaam nan khon thang laay mii phya lae seenaa ‘amaat thang laay kō’ pun dii ‘adsacan maak nak lae cing way saa kap duay bhikkhunii waa khaa kae caw kuu phōōy mii saat sinlapa khun r̄yang day nan chaa badnii luuk ‘amaat lae mōō lae phya pathummaa bō’ pen 2 khon m̄yan m̄ya kōōn nan chaa khōō caw kuu cung bōōk sinlapa khun r̄yang nan kae khaa thang laay dae th̄ya’ waa an naang bhikkhunii klaaw waa raw bō’ ruu yang saat sinlapa r̄yang nan thaw waa raw kō’ day bamphen meedtaaphaawanaa yuu sing diaw lae*

¹⁴⁰ *khon thang laay cing way saa caw bhikkhunii waa khaa kae caw kuu sat 3 tua nii kō’ pun dii klua maak nak lae*

¹⁴¹ *khaa kae caw kuu nay sat 3 tua nii khaw thang laay mak kratham h̄ȳy baanm̄yang pen unhaakaan khram kh̄ȳak maak nak khuan khaa sia lae*

uproar (*kolāhala*). The reader mostly likely also experiences the collective sentiments of revenge and hate felt by the subjects of Hariphum. Both the characters and reader, in other words, have a common sense notion of the affective aspect of living in a political community fractured by dissension, accusation, and blame. The people's desire for vengeance appears inside the text to be reasonable, for the story tell us that the *bhikkhuṇī* does not condemn such sentiments of revenge. Instead she responds to the people's demand for punishment by stating,

“We have ordained. [Thus] we cannot permit them to be killed. Before, these three were friends. In a past life, they went and listened to the *dhamma* teachings of the Lord Buddha. Now, they exist as animals due to their *kammic* retribution. Let me tell you about their *kammic* retribution. Listen up people” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fols. 42-44).¹⁴²

The *yakkha-s* represent humans who have undergone and continue to experience the *samsāric* consequences of immoral conduct (*micchācāra*). Despite the fact that the *bhikkhuṇī* refuses to punish the *yakkha-s* as a conventional course of justice would recommend, she does not deny the fact that there ought to be moral retribution.¹⁴³ In other words, she does not discount normative practices of justice yet she refrains from punishing any guilty party. On this point, the *bhikkhuṇī*'s behavior again distinguishes her from the other characters in the story, and probably from the reader's sense of a general morality. She exhibits an understanding of morality that embraces moral obligation but refrains from the punishment of others who shirk their moral duty. Instead she discloses the past lives of the three *yakkha-s*, so that the people will see the

¹⁴² *naang bhikkhunii klaaw waa raw pen som bō' anuyaāt hyȳ khaa day lae nay sat 3 tua nii nay kaan myā kōōn wan nan khaw day pen sahaay kap duay kan kō' day pay fang tham theedsana phra phuttha caw kap duay kan nay chaat kōōn kō' mii lae badnii wibaak khaw mii cing day kæt pen sat diratchan lae waa an laew kō' klaaw yang wibaak an nan hyȳ khon thang laay ruu caeng waa*

¹⁴³ Her words on punishment and personal virtue are reminiscent of a passage from *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in which Kant writes, “It is a duty of virtue not only to refrain from repaying another enmity with hatred out of mere revenge but also not even to call upon the judge of the world for vengeance, partly because a man has enough guilt of his own to be greatly in need of pardon and partly, and indeed especially, because no punishment, no matter from whom it comes, may be inflicted out of hatred. It is therefore a duty of men to be *forgiving*” (quoted from Murphy 1999: 154).

human behavior and actions that caused them to be born as *yakkha*-animals. In some versions of the story, the *bhikkhuṇī* takes the three *yakkha*-s to live with her on her island. There, she says a pray to Indra asking him to let the three *yakkha*-s take birth as humans. Having been granted her wish, she teaches them meditation and the *dhamma*. The three eventually obtain enlightenment. Before leaving her kingdom, however, the *bhikkhuṇī* not only preaches a *dhamma* sermon, but she re-names the city as “Riddhinmata.”¹⁴⁴

Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī as a Saṃvega Catalyst

This *tamnan* falls into the category of religious history *and* folktale. As a folktale, readers can vicariously inhabit a fictional character’s experience of making moral decisions. As Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, literature can be a moral laboratory (Ricoeur 1992: 115).¹⁴⁵ Thus far, my discussion has focused on two episodes in which the characters choose a path of moral action. First, the *bhikkhuṇī*’s decision to kill herself; and second, the townspeople call to murder the three *yakkha*-s out of revenge. In both cases, the story references the inner world of emotions that induces those decisions. In the first case, the *bhikkhuṇī* undergoes a religious shock. As for the people of Hariphun, they experience a fear that has been relieved but turned into anger. *Saṃsāra* as *dukkha*, as a beast-*gati*, and as immoral behavior (*micchācāra*) configure the reader’s experience of morality and even of justice away from a conventional sense of morality that defines a society’s general morality. The story decouples a reader’s sense of morality away from society’s idea of a general morality by proffering three narrative images of *saṃsāra* that serve as literary devices meant to induce a *saṃvegic* (i.e., religious affective) and ethical learning experience in the reader. First, the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* displays the concept of *saṃvega*

¹⁴⁴ One can find evidence for the practice of renaming a city in the *Chiang Mai Chronicle*. In particular, Chiang Mai was renamed “Ratanatīṃsa Abhinavapuri” in 1801 (Wyatt and Aroonrut 1998:163).

¹⁴⁵ In terms of Buddhist Ethics, Anne Hansen (2002; 1996) and Charles Hallisey (1996) have applied this thesis of Ricoeur’s to their studies on the intersection of Buddhist narratives and ethical thought.

through the *bhikkhuṇī*'s biography. Then, the story of *tamnan myāng* Hariphun offers examples of *apāya*, which the Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary* defines as "a transient state of loss and woe after death," namely "purgatory (*niraya*), rebirth as an animal, or as a ghost, or as a Titan (*asura*) (T.W. Rhys Davids and Stede [1921-1925] 1993: 54). As mentioned before, the miseries of *apāya* is one of the eight objects that when contemplated can lead to an experience of *saṃvega*. The *saṃsāra* of the three animals represents an object of *apāya* meant to evoke *saṃvega* in the reader. Thus, the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* offers two narrative images of *saṃsāra* that corresponds with objects meant to inspire *saṃvega*. Teaching ethics through narrative representations of *saṃsāra* replaces a method of instruction that utilizes ideals and visions of Buddhist felicities. The moral authority that bids the will of the members of this moral community has little to do with a desire for the Good. Instead, that which bids the will of a moral agent consists of the feelings that arise from seeing the potential for human suffering.

Listening to the *dhamma*

In addition to *saṃvega*'s pedagogical aspect of contemplating human miseries, this story also portrays the life-changing effects that hearing a *dhamma* sermon can have. The text gives us several instances of this transformative aspect of the *dhamma*. For example, hearing the *bhikkhuṇī* chant a *dhamma* verse causes the *yakkha*-s to shed their human masks. Second, the townspeople of Hariphun evolve from being a vengeful mob to a pious group who take refuge in the Buddha, the *dhamma*, and the *sangha*, also known as the three jewels of the religion. This change happens as a consequence of hearing the *bhikkhuṇī* speak a *jātaka* about the three *yakkha*-s' human past and an *ovāda*. At the end of those sermons, the *bhikkhuṇī* tells her audience to aspire to be "released from the *dukkha* of *saṃsāra* and reach *nibbāna*." To close the *bhikkhuṇī*'s sermon, the text states,

“The lady *bhikkhuṇī* has thus preached an *ovāda*. The king, her father, the royal ministers, noble dignitaries, villagers and townspeople having listened to the *dhamma* teaching of the lady *bhikkhuṇī* became delighted and pleased. They worshiped giving many things: silver, gold, and sandalwood that was piled into a heap the height of a palm tree” (*Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* 1902 C.E./1263 C.S.: fol. 46).¹⁴⁶

This depiction of the effects of listening to the *dhamma*, in particular the arising of feelings of joy and satisfaction can be found in the canonical *sutta-s* as a common closing refrain. The *bhikkhuṇī*'s sermon on the *dhamma* inspires the emotions of delight and happiness, unlike the words of the lone lady found in the first vignette or Indra's threatening words found in the second vignette. We find one final example of the power of hearing the *dhamma* that comes from the *bhikkhuṇī*'s final act. Here, the *bhikkhuṇī* renames the kingdom. This gesture signifies that the *dhamma* has restored the kingdom as a moral community. The ending here echoes the *Cakkavatti*'s story, the third act of the three opening vignettes, in which we are told that enemies and bandits cannot be found in the kingdom. The gesture of renaming the city indicates that the *dhamma* can repair a morally fragmented community. Rather than a moral community constituted by a relation to society's ideals, we read about a moral community constituted by a relation to the *dhamma*, in other words, by its relation to the practices of public sermons and congregation. Instead of an attachment to agreed-upon moral ideals, *practices* that are both moral and communal in intent can help engender the collective sentiments of a shared morality.

The *Bhikkhuṇī* as a Historically Displaced Religious Ideal

According to Durkheim, a moral agent is dually characterized by a sense of obligation and a desire for the Good. Society's ideals are crucial in constructing a desire for the Good. To repeat his definition of society, he states that it is “above all a composition of ideas, beliefs, and

¹⁴⁶ *naang bhikkhunī kō' theedsanaa owaat kham sōn san nii kae phya ton pen phō lae seenaa 'amaat lae pratchaachon ratsadon thang muan san ni han lae nay kaan nan phya lae seenaa 'amaat chaawbaan chaawmyang thang muan day fang tham kham sōn haeng bhikkhunī laew kō' mii khwamchomchjyñ yin dii maak nak kō' buuchaa duay khaawkhōng ngænkham phaphōn thōn can maak nak kōngkan khjyñ day chen ton taan 1 kō' mii lae*

sentiments of all sorts of which realize themselves through individuals. Foremost of these ideas is the moral ideal which is its principle *raison d'être*" (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 59). The *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* suggests that northern Thai Buddhists intentionally and consciously defined the moral community according to a Kantian notion of moral obligation *and* ethical existential anxiety (i.e., *saṃvega*). In the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*, the reader encounters three narrative glosses on *saṃsāra* as *dukkha*, as an animal-*gati* and as *micchācāra*. The lesson imparted through these references is the need to fear the impurities (*kilesa*) that result from sinful acts (*pāpa*). As the *bhikkhuṇī* explains it was this very fear that motivated her to ordain as a nun (*bhikkhuṇī*). This moral dread characterizes her morality as a state of being virtuous yet powerless in terms of punishing and blaming others. In this construction of a morality that is bound by a duty to be virtuous but is powerless in terms of seeking moral retribution, the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* shares with the other calamity-cosmology narratives the sentiments of a morality of the oppressed. As stated previously, calamity-cosmology narratives often predict that the virtuous will suffer hardships while the wicked will live in comfort and ease.

Conclusion

This Buddhist folktale—which opens with a vignette in which there appears the line “*Phuttho Phuttho aniccam dukkham*”—implicates *dukkha* in the religious and moral life of individuals and by implication in the life of the moral community. The moral community is made of agents are who actors and sufferers.¹⁴⁷ The effect of placing *dukkha* prominently in this piece

¹⁴⁷ In *Oneself as Another*, Ricoeur (1992) brings to light Bremond's definition of role in narrative. Bremond perceives role as not a passing through the stages of action, but rather role consists in undergoing “both a subject-person and predicate-process.” According to Ricoeur, Bremond noted that in this “great dichotomy is that of *sufferers*” (Ricoeur 1992: 144). Explaining his own similar view, Ricoeur writes, “I never forget to speak of humans as acting and suffering. The moral problem, as we saw in an earlier study, is grafted onto the recognition of this essential dissymmetry between the one who acts and the one who undergoes, culminating in the violence of the powerful agent. Being affected by a course of narrated events is the organizing principle governing an entire series of roles of sufferers, depending on whether the action exerts an influence or whether its effect is to make matters better or worse, to protect or to frustrate. A remarkable enrichment of the notion of role concerns its introduction

of moral story-literature is that one learns about morality through the experience of the emotions of grief, anger, hatred, and most importantly, through a fear of the potential for human suffering. As Martha Nussbaum explains, “Emotions of compassion, grief, fear, and anger are in that sense essential and valuable reminders of our common humanity” (Nussbaum 2004: 7). Nussbaum suggests that the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* can be considered to be a *saṃvega* catalyst that serves as a valuable reminder of our common humanity (Nussbaum 2004: 7). The *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* implicitly demonstrates that while a society’s ideals may generate a desire for the Good, stories that force one to confront the tragic results of unethical actions can also generate the sentiments and motivations that are required of individuals who belong to a moral community. In other words, religious ideals do not lend themselves to being reminders of our common humanity as much as images of human suffering can. A kind of collective sentiment, moral address, and religious practice rooted in the stark realization of human finitude is more important to a moral community, especially one made up of serfs rather than a Durkheimian collective effervescence derived from moral ideals.

into the field of evaluations through the actions which have just been enumerated, then into the field of retributions, where the sufferer appears as the beneficiary of esteem or as the victim of disesteem, depending on whether the agent proves to be someone who distributes rewards or punishments. Bremond rightly observes that it is only on these levels that agents and sufferers are raised to the rank of persons and of initiators of action. In this way, through the roles related to the domain of rewards and punishments, the close connection between the theory of action and ethical theory which we evoked above is witnessed on the plane of narrative” (Ricoeur 1992: 144-45).

Five

The Suffering That Binds and Frees Us

With respect to calamity-cosmology narratives, the relation of a group's morality to ideals can also be investigated in terms of their literary representation of a fallen Buddhist metropolis, especially the moral reactive emotions that arise from living in a broken political community (i.e. a *dhammic* cosmos that has devolved into a *rūpic* cosmos). As a reoccurring theme, the fall of a political moral community (i.e., *dhammic* cosmos) constitutes a leitmotif in these texts. For example, the previous chapter's examination of the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* revealed that narrative representations of "the miseries of this world" can be morally instructive and in terms of collective sentiments can help one contemplate pursuing a morally good life in the context of social and moral fragmentation (T.W. Rhys Davids and Stede [1921-1925] 1993: 658).¹⁴⁸ Calamity-cosmology narratives, in this chapter, will be further explored in terms of how these narratives convey an image of the world turned upside down in order to forge a vision of a moral community not premised on the valorization of social ideals or of kings as the embodiments of a morality infused with power. This fifth chapter extends Chapter Four's investigation of the connection between social ideals and the moral community.

In particular, this chapter takes up a problematic identified by scholars: the inherent limits of an empire's vision of the righteous state (B. Smith 1978a; Ricoeur 2000: 76-93; Lincoln 2007). In the case of Theravādin societies in South and Southeast Asia, scholars have pointed out that the belief that an ideal order is grounded in a king's morality can be easily undermined during periods of social turmoil and upheaval (B. Smith 1978a; Chandler 1982). Such realities

¹⁴⁸ The phrase "miseries of the word" is cited from the entry for "*samvega*" found in the Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary*.

tended to compromise the ability of a ruler to make claims of moral legitimacy. The northern Thai writers of calamity-cosmology narratives latched on this association between a righteous king and ideal social order and embedded it in their portrayal of a world in disarray. They did so in order to provoke the audience of the text to question and rethink the meaning of those moral ideals affiliated with a prevailing vision for a just social order. By betraying the office of kingship as “morally weak” and therefore existentially vulnerable, calamity-cosmology narratives anticipate a reader who is marginalized in society, and hence willing to condemn and challenge society’s general morality. By placing such a reader “in front of” these texts, these northern Thai writers invited that reader to construct a new morality in the space between society’s general morality and their own individual subjective morality. Thus, calamity cosmological-narratives sought to activate in the reader a state of disaffection towards social ideals and the authority figures of state power in order to compel its readers to find meaning in being moral *and* being socially disenfranchised.

Calamity-cosmology narratives display an interest in addressing the moral grievances of the laity that arise from living in socially oppressive conditions. While Durkheim identifies historical change as the impetus for changes in a society’s general morality, he overlooks how a “threat” to social and moral ideals may be born from within a social location rather than large scale historical processes. In the case of the class of serfs living under the strictures of a social hierarchy legitimized through the ethical concept of merit (*puñya*), these serfs’ social experience of suffering may have been a source for questioning and reformulating the meaning and practices of social morality. In this chapter, the discussion begins with a description of the mainstream Buddhist conception of ideal social order and the Thai culture of deference and patronage as described by scholars. This cultural historical background theoretically describes peasant

perspectives on the political and social climate of northern Thailand in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Next, an analysis of the texts will examine the literary unmasking of royal power that is found in these literary representations of a socially and morally fragmented *myang*-polity. In particular, my reading of the texts describes their depiction of the mechanism of royal power and the processes that lead to social disharmony and a sense of injustice. This account shows how power works rather than giving a description of an elite ideology.¹⁴⁹ Afterwards, the discussion turns to address how these works formulate a redress of social oppression, which leads to questions on the relation of moral authority to a community having an ethical orientation. In its overarching framework, this chapter's close examination of the leitmotif of a fallen Buddhist civilization asks, "According to calamity-cosmological texts, what does it mean to be a moral community made up of the marginalized and oppressed members of society?" In my reading and interpretation of these compositions, I investigate, "What was it like to and what does it mean to consume literary images of human suffering at a distance" (cf. Kleinman and Kleinman 1997)? Also, "What are the implications on the Buddhist concept of moral authority found in these portraits of a bad Buddhist king?" Framing my textual analysis with these questions will allow me to further explore the type of moral community announced in this discourse on social structural violence.

Buddhist Ideal Social Order

As stated in the introductory chapter, the ideal Buddhist society mirrors the Three Worlds' placement of beings in the cosmos according to their ledger of *puñya/pāpa*. In a nutshell, social order mimics the cosmological belief that by doing good deeds one ascends towards an abode of happiness, and by committing bad deeds one descends to a place of woe and misery. Through

¹⁴⁹ For my analysis of power, I borrow the line of inquiry proposed by Foucault (1994) for examining the "the *how* of power."

this law of correspondence, the hierarchy of society refracts the universe's moral hierarchy. As previously stated, the king has the most merit amongst living human beings. As if a semi-divine being, he mediates between the sacred and human realms. Through his very moral fiber, the king taps into the sacred ordering powers of the cosmos and aligns the human world with the course of the heavens and with the powers of the cadastral spirits thereby making the rains fall at the proper time, the crops grow in abundance, and the ideal of social order into a reality. According to that image of Buddhist society, the king maintains the conditions for human flourishing that allow monks to pursue *nibbāna* and the laity to give them ritual offerings in order to achieve happiness and a better *kammic* rebirth.¹⁵⁰ Ordered cosmologies, like the Three Worlds, provided the myth of this totalizing ideology of Buddhist society in the Southeast Asian communities of the Thai, Lao, Burmese, and Cambodians (Tambiah 1976). Three Worlds cosmology's display of a cohesive social body made up of the sovereign, *sangha*, and laity constituted a discourse of power in these Theravādin societies (Tambiah 1976; Swearer & Sommai 1978; F. Reynolds and Clifford 1980).¹⁵¹

In this ideology of social hierarchy, the overlapping of the religious and the political domains (i.e., the wheels of *Dhamma*) is highly articulated in the interrelationship between the monarch and *sangha*. Steven Collins has described this interrelationship between the *sangha* and monarchy that obtained in the Buddhist civilizations of Sri Lanka and those in Southeast Asia as being characterized by an agrarian society and a tributary system of taking and giving. He

¹⁵⁰ This ideology of power has been described as one based upon a belief in a cosmo-magical principle (Heine-Geldern 1956; Tambiah 1976; F. Reynolds 1978).

¹⁵¹ In the latter half of the twentieth century, scholars began to produce several studies on the Buddhist state (for example, see Heine-Geldern 1956; Sarkisyanz 1965; Tambiah 1976). In many ways the pursuit of this scholarly interest marked the beginning of the disciplinary paradigm that carved up the study of Buddhism according to national traditions like Burmese Buddhism, Cambodian Buddhism, etc. Thai Buddhism became equated with the Siamese tradition and other forms of Thai Buddhism such as the northern Thai tradition that is the focus of my study became overshadowed.

examines this royal ideological vision of society against the realities of the king's actual system of governance that depended upon warfare and the collection of taxes. In particular, Collins explores what role the *sangha* played in this premodern form of governance. Drawing on a range of Pāli texts, Collins finds that the *sangha* used their symbolic capital and their role as an elite scribal institution to engage in "an ideological one-upmanship" with the king's symbolic capital. To do so, monastic writers composed stories that were not only about glorious Buddhist leaders, but also about bad Buddhist kings. According to Collins, this latter literary theme was possible due the gap between ideals—meant to be socially enacted—and the reality of the gentle violence (a term Collins borrows from Peter Brown) upon which royal power was materially built. As result of this sociological and historical relationship, Collins finds that these two social institutions existed in an antagonistic symbiotic relationship, a phrase he borrows from Gunawardene (Collins 1998). Bardwell Smith was one of the first scholars to point out how this myth of an ideal social order was problematic for some Buddhist communities. The righteous Buddhist king is indispensable to people's happiness *and* faith, because he erects and maintains the ideal social order. As Bardwell Smith notes, the king has real consequences for "what it means to be a Buddhist community" (B. Smith 1978a: 57). In order for the Buddha's teachings to manifest as a successful social reality (i.e. as a *dhammic* cosmos), a king *must* live up to the model of righteous kingship. If and when an evil king rises to power, then an inverse logic kicks in: crops wither, social disharmony reigns, and economic hardships prevail. In other words, the sustainability of the social order and religious life is placed upon the shoulders of a precarious individual who after all is a human being; and like all humans, he has the real potential to be either morally good or evil. As Collins would say, this historical predicament gave rise to a Pāli Buddhist ideology of social order that was never without its discontents.

Lanna's hierarchical society consisted of the king and his royal family (*ratchawong*), a class of nobles (*nay*), the serfs who comprised the masses of the population (*phray*), and a class of debt slaves or *phray* who had entered into slavery voluntarily (*khaa*) (Grabowsky 2005: 15). Among the serfs (*phray*), males aged 18 to 60 years old were conscripted for labor or wars (Grabowsky 2005: 15). According to the territorial organization of the *phray* known as "*nay sip*," each serf (*phray*) lived under a master (*nay*). The *Mangraisat* a 13th century Lanna legal text states,

"For every ten citizens, let there be one Nay Sip (*nai sip*) and one foreman to act as intermediary and make known the tasks assigned. For each five Nai Sip, let there be one Nay Ha-sip (*nai ha sip*), [and two foremen], one for the left side and one for the right side. For two Nay Ha-sip, let there be one Nay Roy (*nai ròì*). For ten Nay Roy, let there be one Cau Ban (*cao phan*). For ten Cau Hmin, let there be one Caw Sen (*cao saen*). Let the country be administered in this way so as not to inconvenience the King" (quoted from Grabowsky 2005: 16).

According to Grabowsky, labor forces, taxes, and tributes were levied according to the *panna* system that tied villages and the levels of lesser *mýang-s* into the administrative system of a capital-city *mýang*. According to this system, the territory was broken down into a *panna* that related to the number of households in a village or lesser *mýang*. This system of governance allowed rulers to take of a census of the population. According to Grabowsky, the *panna* system created what we would call "districts" that were governed by provincial governors (Grabowsky 2005:20). Grabowsky states, "The *panna* served as a decisive connecting link between village and capital in the distribution of economic resources" (Grabowsky 2005: 20). He finds that the *panna* system existed in the core region of Chiang Mai-Lamphun at least by the fifteenth century and in Phayao as early as the twelfth century (Grabowsky 2005: 20-21).

During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, depopulation of the core region of Chiang Mai-Lamphun required the Chiang Mai king, Kawila, to repopulate these areas through

the Southeast Asian practice of engaging in war campaigns to capture serfs and royal family members and forcibly resettle them into an underpopulated territory.¹⁵² For example, Chiang Mai had been deserted for twenty years by the time Kawila rose to power in 1782 in Chiang Mai. From 1789 to 1810, Kawila conducted war resettlement campaigns in the areas of the present-day Burmese Shan States and in the northern hinterlands of Chiang Saen. For example, 23,000 people were captured at Chiang Saen in 1804 (Grabowsky 1999: 56). In 1805, more than 10,000 inhabitants of M̄yang Yong surrendered and agreed to move to Lamphun (Grabowsky 1999: 56). From 1782 to 1839, the resettlement campaigns for the Chiang Mai-Lamphun core region had resulted in the repopulation of somewhere between 50,000 to 70,000 inhabitants from the environs of Sipsongpanna (Grabowsky 1999: 66). Thus, Lanna's nineteenth century population included a prominent number of war captives who were Tai L̄ȳy, Tai Kh̄ȳn, Shan, and Burmese.

Although the *phray* were divided among the nobles according to the *nay-sip* system, the king was regarded as the sole owner of the kingdom's territory and hence all of the *phray-s*. In terms of his relationship to the *phray*, the king was responsible for keeping *phray-s* in the capital-city *m̄yang*, in the lesser *m̄yang -s*, and in the villages. For instance, we are told that the *phray-s* ran away from Lampang during the years of 1848 to 1851 and again from 1854 to 1855 due to the failure of the rice crops. According to Ongsakul, "The Lampang ruler ordered lower-ranking nobles to fetch them back, but the *phray* refused to come" (Ongsakul 2005: 224).

In regards to the system of slavery, Bowie finds that war captives (who were mainly *phray*) and not debt slaves comprised the majority of the population of slaves living in Chiang Mai during the nineteenth century (Bowie 1996: 108-09). Bowie concludes that the "use of state

¹⁵² In the article "Forced Resettlement Campaigns in Northern Thailand During the Early Bangkok Period," Grabowsky provides a list of the number of war captives resettled in the core-region of Chiang Mai-Lamphun and Nan (Grabowsky 1999: 86).

force in northern Thai slavery” was pronounced (Bowie 1996: 109). At the turn of the twentieth century, central Thai administrative reforms in the provincial regions such as northern Thailand had the effect of displacing the *phray* system. In addition, central Thai administrative laws ended the institution of slavery.

Through the *nay-sip* and *panna* systems of administration and rule, the Buddhist ideology of social hierarchy became socially enacted. The northern Thai writers of calamity-cosmology narratives did not reject or refute this mainstream ideology of social order. This idea of a morally justified social hierarchy, however, did animate their writings. As Ricoeur once observed, for people confronted with an experience of injustice their sense of it, “...is not simply more poignant but more perspicacious than the sense of justice, for justice more often is lacking and injustice prevails.” He continues, “And people have a clearer vision of what is missing in human relations than of the right way to organize to them” (Ricoeur 1992:198). In writing about a world in disarray, the writers of calamity-cosmology narratives sought to give a “truthful” account on the nature of the relationship between society, power, and morality. They wrote a cosmological account that did not pay lip service to Buddhist kings. Instead they composed stories about social injustices that attempted to unmask the limits of an ethics of tradition, which I define according to Durkheim’s notion of a morality anchored to moral ideals and membership in a society.

A Culture of Deference and Patronage

I now turn to describe the historical relationship between serfs and ruling lords by quoting an oral history. It states,

“About 60 years ago we were conquered by the Central Thai. We offered them candles and flowers [signs of respect and loyalty]. They became our *caw naj* [“officials” or “rulers”] and we pay them taxes. When the Communists come, they may conquer the Central Thai. Then we will offer them flowers and candles and call them *caw naj*. We will pay them taxes and all will be as before. We are the common people; what happens to officials does not concern us. If there is a war, we must leave for a while in order to avoid

vandals and stray bullets. Whatever side wins, we will return and call them our leaders (1967: 403)” (quoted from Jonsson 1996: 268).

Michael Moerman recorded the above quote during his fieldwork in Chiang Kham on the Tai Lyy. His research was conducted from 1959 to 1961. This oral history discloses how peasants regarded their rulers. It reflects not only a twentieth century but also a premodern peasant perception of the ruling lords. Two aspects are important to note. First, the social position of the *caw nay* (“officials or rulers”) seems to be paramount. The person who fills the role of *caw nay* does not seem to matter much. Second, the practice essential to this patron-client relationship involved paying respect to the *caw nay* through ceremonial gestures and secondarily through the payment of taxes.

The offering of “flowers and candles” is a sign of respect. Through this act the client “performs” a client-patron relationship. The objects of regalia and the pomp of ceremony as well as the strictures of ritualism worked to express a conspicuous and inviolable social distance that existed between nobles and their subjects. Power was evidenced in the nobleman’s clothes, dinnerware, mode of transportation, and house’s building-materials (Conway 2002). It also manifested in terms of certain rights and privileges that included seizing a subject’s daughter, work animals, and property as well as certain trade monopolies (Bowie 1988).

Mechanism of Buddhist Rule Under an Evil King

The king enacted his role through the exertion of political power in ways found throughout the world as well as in forms particular to mainland Southeast Asia. Universally, kings held the exclusive right to punish people (that is known in Buddhist terms as “*daṇḍa*”), to arbitrate legal cases, to wage war for the sake of imperial expansion, and to delegate power to the lesser lords of the *myang-s* and villages located in the peripheries of a capital’s core-region. He also had the right to extract taxes and commission corvée labor. Finally, he had the duty to

maintain the customs known as a set of ten royal virtues (*rājadhama*). To be a model Buddhist king, he had to live up to the norms for kingship captured in these ten royal virtues. To recapitulate the following seven activities that are exclusive to kings and that determine sovereign power, they are as follows: 1) the role of punisher, 2) the role of judge, 3) empire expansion via war, 4) the devolution of power into other hands, 5) extracting taxes, 6) levying corvée labor, and 7) upholding the royal customs (i.e., the ten royal virtues). Given that the king's power over his territory was conceived of as his ownership of the land, its resources, and people, he was given the royal epithet “lord of life” (*caw chiiwit*).

All of the above acts are forms of social control exercised by the king over nobles, provincial governors, serfs (*phray*), and slaves. However, the last activity—the ten royal virtues—is a form of self-control imposed upon the king through the paradigm of Buddhist sovereignty. On the one hand, the king exerts a kind of domination over his subjects. On the other hand, the king submits to a kind of self-imposed domination that is moral in nature. The first type, the king's control over others, can be divided into two modes of actions that rulers executed over the ruled: 1) “giving/handing out,” and 2) “taking/extracting.” In the first category of “giving/handing out” are royal punishment (*danḍa*), presiding over judicial cases, and wars. The second category “taking/extracting” includes taxes, fines, and corvée labor. I also place the delegation of power in the latter category because the king uses nobles and provincial governors (i.e., local lords) to execute actions of “taking.” With respect to arbitrating legal cases there is an overlap in typology depending on whether the punishment entails “giving/handing out” execution, imprisonment, whipping, etc. versus “taking/extracting” fines. Let us now examine how the texts speak of the king's “giving” and “taking” modalities of control. I begin with “giving.”

Royal Giving

As aforementioned, calamity-cosmology narratives relate the history of the slow degeneration of Gotama Buddha's *sāsana*. It is a history of a decaying cosmos that starts from the time of Gotama Buddha's death. In calamity-cosmology narratives, the history of the cosmos is envisioned as a series of catastrophes set to occur in the northern Thai kingdoms of Jambudīpa. Some texts give a list of ten events that characterize this downfall of northern Thai Buddhist civilization. The ten events are variously called “*khro*” (bad fate), “*dukkha*” (suffering) or “*phay*” (danger). In two lists, the king who hands down severe punishment is named as one type of calamity. Here are the two lists from a calamity-cosmological text, titled, “*Tamnan Hō*”:

“Now, here are the teachings of the two Lord Buddha-s who gave them in the form of prophecies, namely they spoke of ten types of suffering that will arise in the future.

1. innumerable [forms of] suffering
2. A great *Kali Yuga* (apocalyptic war) [erupts in the world of] humans and animals
3. Starvation
4. Kings, local lords, ministers, and dignitaries will hand down severe forms of punishment.
5. In the future, roads once traveled upon will be deserted.
6. In the future, fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, and children will become separated from one another.
7. In the future, people will abandon their homes for a long period time.
8. The old and the young will habitually harm one another, over and over again. They will all die from one of ten types of calamities.
9. Men and women having evil hearts will not follow the Buddha's teachings. As a result, they will vomit blood and die.
10. There will be those who are wicked and reject the Buddha's teachings. As a result, they will be incapable of respecting their father, mother, elders, preceptor, or teacher. In such a manner, they are wicked. Upon dying, they will surely go to avici narok (a realm of hell)” (Prasert, Aroonrut, Anand, and Srithon 1988 C.E./2531 B.E.: fol. 6).¹⁵³

¹⁵³ *thuk an pen an pathom hua thii nan bō* ‘aat ca nap day dii lii lae thuk an thuan 2 nan khyy waa ca pen khii yuk syk yay kae sat lae khon thang laay maak nak cha lae thuk an thuan 3 nan khyy waa khon thang laay an cak taay yaak nam kan khaaw maak nak cha lae thuk an thuan 4 nan khyy waa thaaw phya seenaa ‘amaat thang laay ca say dandakam kae khon thang laay maak nak thuk an thuan 5 nan khyy waa hon thang mii way kō’ haa khon ca thaay bō’ day ...phaay naa myjn cha lae thuk an thuan 6 nan khyy waa phōō lae mae phiinōōng phua mia lae luuktaw kō’ ca day phladphraak caak kan phaay naa myjn cha lae thuk an thuan 7 nan ryan mii phōōy haa khon ca yuu bō’ day

“Now I will speak of the bad fates.

1. Lightning will fatally strike dead many cows and water buffaloes.
2. So many people will die from an accident involving water or fire.
3. For so many people, stomach cramps and stabbing chest pains precede death.
4. People will not follow the custom of eating un-husked or husked rice that nourishes the senses. Instead, rice will be grown and sold so that it can be made into liquor, which inclines the senses towards evil. Out of enmity, people will commit sinful deeds.
5. For so many people, convulsions and painful fits of vomiting blood precede death.
6. For so many people, painful boils oozing pus precede death.
7. People will constantly bicker and fight. And kings, local lords, ministers, and dignitaries will severely punish and imprison people.
8. For so many people, an outbreak of large and small pimples and a distended stomach precede death.
9. For so many people, vertigo and disturbing feelings precede death” (Prasert, Aroonrut, Anand, and Srithon 1988 C.E./2531 B.E.: fols. 21-22).¹⁵⁴

According to these two lists, kings can be a danger to people when they abuse royal punishment (*daṇḍa*).¹⁵⁵ The second form of “giving/handing out”—wars—is an event that destabilizes communities. Wars halt the pursuit of everyday activities and one’s livelihood. The format of listing dangers has the effect of equating merciless kings with the other items listed such as

kō’ ca mii phaay naa mÿÿn cha lae thuk an thuan 8 nan fuung thaw kaek dii fuung num baankaang kō’ca mii hua cay an raay sung kan pay maa kō ca taay duay phaay 10 prakaan fuung nii siang cha lae

¹⁵⁴ *thii nii cak caa duay khrō’ yay thang laaj kōñ lae kō’ pathom hua thii nii khÿÿ waa faa ca phaa khon taay maak nak wua khwaay thang laay kō’ ca taay maa knak cha lae khrō’ an thuan 2 khÿÿ waa khon thang laay ca taay duay nam lae fay lae ca cep thōōng taay maak nak khrō’ an thuan 3 nan khon thang laay ca cep puat thōōng taay siap òōk taay kō’ bō’ than yaa taay pay kō’ ca mii phaay naa cha lae khrō’ an thuan 4 nan khon thang laay kō’ ca pramaat duu khwaen khaawpæk khaawsaan lae khōōng an liang intharii chiiwit nan lae aw pay baeng law kin laew phōōy chaay intharii pen baap an nak thae dii lii khon thang laay mak tham rÿang an day kho pen baap ween say ton tua khaw siang thae dii lii lae khrō’ an thuan 5 nan khÿÿ waa khon thang laay ca bangkæt khÿÿ waa khon thang laay ca pen pheethi cep siap thaeng pay chu haeng chu thii nan lae haak lÿat ‘òōk taay pay kō’ ca mii cha lae khrō’ an thuan 6 nan khon thang laay ca bangkæt pen pheethi tum khÿÿ waa can pen fii yay cep puat nak lae taek pen nōōng bō’ ruu khaat kō’ ca taay phay siang cha lae khrō’ an thuan 7 nan khon thang laay ca phit thiang kan pay maa laew thaaw phya seenaa ‘amaat thang laay kō’ ca aw khon thang laay fuung nan say way nay khōōk kan khaa ratchadandakam an yay kae khon thang laay fuung nan duay phay yay kae phon fuung nan duay phay laay prakaan taang taang nan cha lae khrō’ an thuan 8 nan khÿÿ waa khon thang laay ca bang kæd pen pheethi tum yay tum nōōy lae thōōng khat khlaay cep siap thaeng puat phit nak laew taay pay siang cha lae khrō’ an thuan 9 nan khÿÿ waa khon thang laay ca mii hua cay an mun mōōng kō’ bō’ phrōom kan pen kaat pen rii sang thaw yuu song kō’ thuk khÿang cay nan yuu cay luat pen chōōp pen yōōm laew luat taay pay siang cha lae (Cf. Tamnan Phra Phuttha Caw 2 Phra Ong 1894 C.E./1256 C.S.: fols.17-18, see footnote 112).*

¹⁵⁵ S I 42 states that the king is one who commandeers. Also, A II 125 lists the king as one of four fears.

starvation and disease, both of which provide the circumstances for social collapse. Social upheaval is also mentioned as the loss of family members, the disruption of travel, the discontinued consumption of rice as food, and the dissolution of social/familial hierarchical relationships. Like the other calamities itemized, a cruel king can be taken as a type of inexplicable evil unleashed upon the world. This reckoning implies that ominous moments of collective disaster occur under tyrannical rulers. The king and lesser lords who “hand down” severe forms of punishment (*daṇḍa*) and/or engage in warfare are the exact opposite of the model Buddhist king who rules by compassion, as exemplified by Aśoka, who ruled northern India during the third century B.C.E. According to legend, Aśoka after converting to Buddhism transformed from being a cruel vicious king to a righteous and compassionate leader. Like the legend of Aśoka, these texts portray a dichotomy of savage/benevolent leaders in terms of the violence and harm they commit against their subjects.

Royal Extraction

Next, the second modality of social control—“taking/extracting”—has an opposite directional character. In the first one, the ruler’s “giving” is an act that he places upon, hands down, or gives to his subjects. In “taking,” the subjects give up things for the ruler to receive and have. “Taking” is done either by the king or a local representative, that is a provincial governor or noble. These local lords extract taxes, fines, and labor, as well as other things such as women, children, or property in lieu of monetary fines. In the latter case, peasants who do not have the money to pay fines have the option of relinquishing property. Here are a few passages that depict the actions of “taking.” The following excerpts demonstrate how “taking” can blend into the synonymous meanings of “to extort, steal, confiscate, pauperize,” or figuratively, “to bleed.” The text states,

“Kings, local lords, ministers, and dignitaries extract goods [as fines] from villagers and city folk. Each year and month the fines increase. The harmful act of constantly collecting fines is like constantly pouring water into a jar that is already full. That water is emptied as it slowly drips out of the jar. Listen oh king, at that time, in the same city light rain falls on one half. In the other half of the city, it does not fall at all” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* Ch. 10 1917 C.E./2460 B.E.: fols. 22-23).¹⁵⁶

Tamnan Phya In states,

“The local lords are not honest [people]. They will steal and eat the serfs’ cowrie shells, meats, and silver. They will cause them lose cowrie shells and things. [Through] oppressive [forms] of punishment, the serfs will lose their silver. Having lost their gold, [their wealth] does not grow [but instead] it decreases. Also, the local lords will conscript serfs as laborers. That will ruin those who are already poor. Even [worse], when the serfs go to find their money, they won’t be able to give it to [a local lord because] in the blink of an eye he will drag their children into slavery making them his house servants. After [the local lords] conscript the serfs for labor, they will take things that belong to [those serfs who have been called away from home for corvée labor]. If he has acquired little, then he will return to take more. Serfs will be ruined. When [serfs] cannot give enough to satisfy [a local lord], then they will be fined with interest. After [the local lords] have “eaten” the [goods], they will return to take more things according to their worldly power. A local lord having made an arrangement [with a serf] and not being pleased with the outcome of it will punish that serf. Having taken everything away from that [serf], he is pleased and shares his spoils. This [behavior] violates tradition. The rains do not follow the ancient seasonal pattern. In the fifth and sixth months, the rains pour down. In the twelfth month after plowing the fields, the rice clusters will die [due to] the caterpillars that [will] nibble at the rice pods. Many people will die from starvation. It is because the king and local lords do not follow the ten royal virtues (*rājadhama-s*)” (*Tamnan Phya In* C.E./1231 C.S.: fols. 4-5).¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ *prakaan I thaw phya seenaa ‘amaat thang laay kō’ khop aw kep chaawbaan chaawm̄yāng b̄yāk may say thaem pay chu pii chuk d̄yān hi[m]saa thaaw khun cak prap may phray thay yuu cay cay uppamaa pen dang nam hay an mii nam taem laew phō̄y tak aw maa say thaem yuu cay cay hay nam an plaw nam sam pay khō̄ dō̄k sia cay cay law m̄ȳȳn cha lae prakaan I duu raa mahaarat nay kaan yaam nan khr̄ȳng m̄ȳng an diaw kan khr̄ȳng m̄ȳng fon tok sanō̄y khr̄ȳng m̄ȳng fon bō’ tok sak khaap kō’ cak mii m̄ȳȳn cha lae*

¹⁵⁷ *thaaw phya kō’ bō’ s̄ȳȳ kō’ ca maa lak kin nam bia chin ngæn haeng phray thay h̄ȳȳ tok bia sia khō̄ng cha lae an I law kō’ ma uparithoot kae phray thay h̄ȳȳ siang ngæn sia kham lae bō’ wudthaa papatanan law thaaw phya kō’ maa tok kaanbaan m̄ȳng say h̄ȳȳ phray thay phuu ray h̄ȳȳ winaat chip haay bō’ thaw tae nan khran waa phray thay haa ngæn h̄ȳȳ bō’ day kō’ yō taa laew kō’ chak aw luukying luukchaay khaw maa pen khaa yuu nay r̄yan klaang r̄yan ton lae an I khran waa tok kaan h̄ȳȳ kae phray thay baanm̄ȳng laew khran waa cak kratham kaan kō’ maa kep aw khaaw khō̄ng kap duay phray thay lang day nō̄y phō̄y aw nak h̄ȳȳ khaw winaat chip haay khran waa khaw bō’ h̄ȳȳ than cay kō’ dō̄k bia dō̄k ngæn kap duay phray thay khran waa day laew kō’ maa kin sia khran waa siang laew kō’ maa kep aw thaem law aw maa pen khō̄ng anaa lok haeng ton an waa taeng tat kham kō’ bō’ ch̄ȳȳn lang phae phō̄y h̄ȳȳ khaang lang khaang phō̄y h̄ȳȳ phae khran waa day khaaw khō̄ng haeng ton than laew kō’ yin dii aw pay suu pan kap duay kan kin an nii kō’ phit caariitbaan khlō̄ng m̄ȳng fon tok kō’ bō’ thuuk ryduu bō’ thuuk booraan d̄yān 5 d̄yān 6 fon tok nam nō̄ng d̄yān 12 cing ca day raek thay naa waan klam khaaw klam taay khaa maeng bong kat ruang khaaw laew khon thang laay ca taay yaak nam khaaw khō̄ng maak nak cha lae phrō’ waa thaaw phya bō’ chō̄p thotsaratchatham lae*

I selected the two above excerpts from a calamity-cosmology narrative because they both make allusions to water in the context of the king's and local lords' "taking/ extracting" things from the serfs. In the first citation, "taking" is likened to "drawing water." Here, "taking" can be understood figuratively as bleeding to death. By "taking" or "draining" the peasants' resources, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Thus, the jar that runneth over represents the royal "takers." Similarly, the rains that fall in one part of the city stand for the royal "takers" who seize and share the spoils. There is wealth/rain for them, but not for the peasants. As a result, the timing of the rainy season is off. This irregularity in nature causes the rice crops to fail. In other words, as another passage states, "People will die from starvation because the kings and local lords do not abide by the ten royal virtues" (*Tamnan Phya In 1920 C.E./1283 C.S.: fol. 10*).¹⁵⁸ "Taking" excessively from the people depletes them. It metaphorically bleeds them and the kingdom dry. When rulers indulgently engage in "taking" and "giving," serfs will inevitably suffer from hardships.

Although the texts do not employ this dichotomy of "taking/giving," I use it to distinguish two modes of power that belong to the ruling elite. The "giving" modality captures the form of control exercised through the king's monopoly over violence, that is his license to kill. In this sense, "life" (*chiiwit*) in the king's epithet "lord of life" (*caw chiiwit*) refers to human life. "Taking" also articulates a kind of coercion but through the rhetoric of ownership. The king subjects the peasants to his "taking," because he owns them. Here, "life" (*chiiwit*) alludes to "life force" (*rasa*).

In Thai Buddhist cultures, the idioms of "taking/giving" apply to the practice of making merit through the ritual of giving *dāna* to monks. According to Tambiah, northeastern Thai

¹⁵⁸ *khon thang laay ca taay yaak nam yaak khaaw kan maak nak phrō' waa thaaw phya bō' chōōp ratchatham*

Buddhists use the phrases “*tham bun*” (to make merit) and “*aw bun*” (to take merit) to communicate the nature of exchange that occurs in the ritual of giving *dāna*. When a layperson gives a ritual offering of *dāna* to a monk, that monk who receives the *dāna* transfers “some kind of spiritual grace to the giver” (Tambiah 1968: 49). Given that this central religious act involves giving and taking, one would expect to find its idioms of “giving/taking” in an ethical discourse on the nature of the relationship between rulers and their subjects. Northern Thai writers may have focused on the “giving/taking” aspects of royal power in order to make allusions to the superiority of the *dāna* ritual’s face-to-face morality. Or, perhaps these writings simply point out that kings “take” *phray*, slaves, taxes, and labor. In return for “taking” those items, he does reciprocate, but he does so by “handing down” severe forms of punishment and/or by starting wars. In other words, the king should reciprocate by making the rains fall and by generating prosperity for his subjects, yet he does not. Outside of the texts, there is evidence that this ideology of ideal kingship still endured among the rulers (and by implication the inhabitants) of Chiang Mai well into the late nineteenth century. In particular, Sarassawadee Ongsakul cites that King Inthawichayanon launched a complaint against the reform of the tax system instituted by the special commission of the Monthon Administration (1884-1899) for northern Thailand. On King Inthawichayanon’s charge, she writes, “The king claimed that the deities who protected the country were displeased with Phichitprichakon’s changes and had not allowed the rain to fall according to the seasons, so that grain yields were less bountiful than in the past” (Ongsakul 2005: 191). Due to the Monthon Administration’s high tax levy, King Inthawichayong alleges that he cannot bring the rains for the city’s ancestor guardians are displeased. In other words, this Chiang Mai king implicates the Siamese administration in a breakdown of the *Aggañña-sutta*’s myth of a social contract.

The Process of Social Fragmentation

Calamity-cosmology narratives not only give an account of the immoral actions of bad Buddhist kings and lesser lords, but they also outline the process of social disintegration caused by those wicked leaders. In this section, I present passages from calamity-cosmology narratives that depict the crumbling of social hierarchy in order to discern the manner in which these texts portray the consequences of a bad Buddhist king who rises to power. As stated earlier in this chapter, calamity-cosmology narratives picture society according to the *kammic* cosmological principle. Although these writings reduplicate this verticle structure of the moral universe, they mostly depict the structure of society to be evil and oppressive. Such such narrative depictions of social and moral fragmentation bring to light the moral experiences of those members of society who are powerless. In doing so, these texts provide a portrayal of a moral life that is profoundly shaped by a person's social location.

According to calamity-cosmology narratives, the social body implodes under the weight of an evil king. In some texts, we are told that a commoner seizes power. This event destroys the very fabric of social order. In particular, power statuses become inverted. Nobles bow down before a peasant who has seized power. The *Maak Nam Taw Chadok* allegorically describes this situation by stating, “Wolves eat rice off of golden platters and then piss on them” (*Maak Nam Taw Chadok* 1870 C.E./1232 C.S.: fol. 14).¹⁵⁹ The “golden platters” refer to the expensive dinnerware of nobles. Thus, they symbolize the status of royalty and nobility. The same passage continues, “Those kings and local lords who are majestic (literally, “big”) like the *singha* lion become the attendants of wolves” (*Maak Nam Taw Chadok* 1870 C.E./1232 C.S.: fols. 14-

¹⁵⁹ *an nii kō' pen pradut dang maa cing cōōk kin khaaw nja tray kham luat yiaw saj tray kham nan*

15).¹⁶⁰ This text also explains that those wolves have risen to power due to “being bold and aggressive” (*Maak Nam Taw Chadok* 1870 C.E./1232 C.S.: fol. 14).¹⁶¹

The categories of “wild” and “civilized” appear to be used in the above passages to draw the boundaries between order and disorder (Chandler 1982). The image of the cur eating rice off of a golden platter metaphorically states that savage power has replaced civilized Buddhist power that is grounded in moral goodness (Mulder 1979). This evocative imagery also implies that hierarchical roles are rigid and bounded. The allegory “wolves eat rice on golden platters” signifies that a line has been crossed. Status circumscribes each person’s role and identity in life. Each person has a specific hierarchical relationship with respect to everyone else in society. Once social ranking *at the top* disappears, all other social relationships cease to be ordered in respect to one another. The following passage illustrates this situation.

“When the Tathāgata’s *sāsana*’s reaches 1089 years, the kings and local lords of Jambudīpa will harm the serfs either by exacting fines, tying them up, imprisoning them, beating them up, locking them in a pillory, or seizing their property. The children of kings and local lords will compete to “eat” (i.e., rule) the *m̄yang* (kingdom). Thus, great wars will arise. As a result of that, serfs will either die or [their livelihood] will be utterly destroyed. Among the people, wives will try to lord over their husbands. Younger siblings will try to lord over their elder siblings. Guests will try to lord over their hosts. Younger *bhikkhus* (monks) will try to lord over senior *bhikkhu*-s. And students will try to lord over their teachers” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* Ch. 10 1921 C.E./1283 C.S.: fols. 7-8).¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ *an bō’ pen ch̄yā ratchawong thaaw phya phuu yay nan kō’ pen dang ratchasii pay pen booriwaan haeng maa cing cōōk nan lae*

¹⁶¹ *khaw cak bamphen duay an haan nan maak nak an l khaw bō’ khaun yuu khuan nōōn kap duay muu thaaw laan phya an pen ratchawong nan kō’ day duay an khaw pen kaew pen haan haeng khaw luat day nōōn kap duay luuk phya seenaa ‘amaat yay nan*

¹⁶² *nay m̄yā satsanaa khruu tathaagata day phan plaay 89 pii thaaw phya nay chomphuthip thang muan cak kratham himsaaraavi [read: himsādi in Pāli] yia raay prap may phuuk mat say khōōk kan khaa yaat aw khaaw khōōng phray thay haeng ton chu haeng chu thii laew luk thaaw phya thang laay ching kan kin m̄yang laew cak pen sȳk cak day khaa phray thay chip haay taay maak nak cak mii chu haeng chu thii cha lae maen khon thang laay kō’ dii mia cak pōng phae phua nōōng phae phii khon aagkhantuka ca pōng phae caw thii daen ca mii nay kaan nan chaaw caw ton num cak pōng phae ton kae luksit cak pōng phae khruu*

With the loss of social hierarchy, the social classification scheme disappears. Categories such as mother, father, husband, elder/younger sibling, and teacher/student no longer mean anything. Social categories no longer structure human relationships. People exist without any social identity due to the fact that the system of ranking that orders and creates differences has been dissolved. As a result of that lost of social roles, the normative behavior that governs human relationships evaporates as well. One can interpret the above portrait of subalterns vying for power as a representation of power according to an oppressive scheme that works through norms of subjugated behavior and a principle of exclusion. As previously stated, what matters most is the social role. The peasants will give “flowers and candles” to whomever is lord. Any daring individual can attempt to seize power and rule the kingdom. These narratives add to that fact the following observation: serfs will offer “flowers and candles” even to false leaders who have risen to power due to have a savage and deceitful nature. One text states, “Just anybody will say, “I have merit. I have fiery splendor, glory, and a retinue of brave warriors” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* Ch. 10 1921 C.E./1283 C.S.: fol. 26). Practices of submission and not Buddhist moral ideals maintain the oppressive structures of society.

Moral Power

It is important to demonstrate the manner in which calamity-cosmology narratives also uphold the idea of social hierarchy through their portrait of a righteous Buddhist king. We find an example of a valorization of Buddhist kingship in a story about four kings who engaged in a war for dominance over the Lanna principalities. According to the narrative, these four kings’ violent vie for power becomes interminable. Due to the devastation caused to their military forces and seeing no clear victor in sight, the four kings abandon their quest for power. Instead, they decide that whoever is the most righteous one among them will be named the overlord (*Tamnan Phraya*

Tham 1927 C.E./1279 C.S.: fols. 22-27).¹⁶³ As the story indicates, power is not merely a matter of brute force and victory in battle. The story tells us that only a righteous king through moral

¹⁶³ “A king from a city southeast of Lankadīpa will come and wage war in Ayutthaya with an army of 600,000 soldiers. The king from the north will fight him. [Despite not losing], he will retreat and set up camp at Mýang Fang. When the king with an army of six hundred thousand soldiers reaches Mýang Fang, he [i.e., the southeastern king] will retreat to the Mahādhātu Caw Chō Hae in Mýang Phrae. Then, the king with army of six hundred thousand soldiers will arrive and the fighting will ensue again. The warring is incessant as there is no clear victor in sight. Then a king from Laan Chaang will come from the east with an army of eighty thousand soldiers. He too comes to wage a battle with the other two kings. Having arrived he asks them saying, “Can’t you stop fighting?” The two kings ignoring those unkind words of his say, “Your army is puny. What reason do you have [for declaring war] with us?” Then, the eastern king will send his soldiers to fight with them. The skirmishes advance all the way up to the foot of the Dhātu Caw of Lampang in Mýang Lakhon (Lampang). There the three kings stayed. There was a northern king who had a body like a vulture [but] walked like a crow and had the mouth of a duck. His army of 1,700,000 descended from Mýang Gamena Sri Chiang Mai and arrived at the Dhātu Caw of Lampang. Many of the people in that city died. There was a flood of blood the depth of an elephant’s foot. The four kings fought each other until the battle reached all the way up to Naa Saen (one thousand rice fields) [which is at] the foot of the Dhātu Caw of Haripuñjaya. All four kings camped with their armies at Haripuñjaya, and there, they fought one another. Countless soldiers lost their lives. [Their] blood flowed like a river 100 *waa*’s [long]. Each of the four kings, whose armies were decimated, holding the sword of Sri Kañjaya, sat and engaged in talks. Turning to face one another, they began to cry. They said, “Let us not fight anymore. Let us become friends.” Having thus spoken, they laid down their swords and asked one another: “How many remaining soldiers do you have?” The king from south of the river said, “I have only eighty-one men left.” Then the southern king asked the northern king, “Listen, kid brother, how many are left standing in your army?” He replied, “I have only eighty-one men.” The eastern lord asked the western [lord], “Listen lord kid brother, how many men do you have left standing?” The king said, “My army was completely destroyed so there are only sixty- [read: eighty-] one men left.” Having thus interrogated one another, they continued to discuss matters. (One of them) requested to see the *sāstra* treatises. The southern king asked the northern [lord], “Kid brother, do you abide by the *sāstra-sila* and take them as your refuge?” The northern king said, “Listen, elder brother king I hold the eight precepts, which protects me. The southern king then asked the eastern [lord], “Listen, kid brother, what do you keep as the refuge that protects you?” He answered, “I hold onto the tradition of the [three] refugees which protects me.” The eastern king asked the western [lord], “Listen kid brother, what do you hold as a refuge for protection?” He answered, “I hold the five precepts which protect me.” Then the three younger kings *wai-ed* the elder one from the south and asked, “Elder brother, what do you have that protects you?” He answered, “I have the wisdom of the thirty *pāramī-s*. They protect me.” The three kings said to one another, “We ought to live under elder king to the south” (*Tamnan Phya Tham* 1927 C.E./1279 C.S.: fols. 22-27).
Cak mii thaaw ton 1 yuu thit hon tay chuay wan ton ‘ōōk mýang lankhaa thi cak mii ribphon yoodthaa maak luang lay phō 6 saen kō’ rop rew kap duay kan yang mýang sii ayodhiyaa han lae thaaw ton yuu hon nýa rop rew bō’ phae kō’ han thōōy khýyñ maa tang yuu nay mýang fang thii nan kōñ han lae thaaw ton mii ribphon yoodthaa 6 saen nan kō’ cak lay rýay kan khýñ maa rōōt thang yaang mýang fang thii nan laew thaaw ton nan kō’ phaay nii hon thōōy khýyñ maa tang yuu nay tiin mahaathaaw caw chō hae mýang phae thii nan lae thaaw ton mi ribphon 6 saen nan kō’ lay rýay kan khýñ maa chu kan thaem raw kō’ maa rop rew kap duay kan thaem law taang khon kō’ taang bō’ phae phaay kan lae laew cak mii thaaw ton 1 yuu nay mýang laan chaang klam wan ‘ōōk cak mii ribphon yoodthaa 8 mýyñ laew cak khýyñ maa rōōt thaaw thang 2 an rop rew kan nan kō’ khaw pay maa haa thaaw thang 2 han lae thaaw thang 2 nan maa day yin thaaw ton wan ‘ōōk maa thaam waa suu yaa day rop rew kan thýa’ waa an thaaw thang 2 bō’ fang bō’ phýng cay thaaw thang 2 klaaw waa ribphon caw mii nōōy phōōy maa thaam heet san day chaa waa an thaaw ton wan ‘ōōk kō’ luat kliat kō’ luat yok ribphon haeng ton rop rew kap duay kan thii nan

power can end violence and harm in the world.

A Cosmological Explanation for Social Oppression

While the Three Worlds depicts society as composed of individuals hierarchically ranked according to levels of individual morality (i.e., *puñya*), calamity-cosmology narratives portray society as structured according to a hierarchy based on a regime of exclusion and social norms. Yet, the universe remains morally structured in the calamity-cosmological scheme as in the Three Worlds' system. In calamity-cosmology narratives, we find that the cosmos' overarching ethical organization cannot crumble and break apart like society. Heaven cannot turn into hell, etc. The

law lae thaaw thang 3 ton kō' lay yuu thuu kan pay maa kō' khaw pay rōōt tiin thaaw caw lamphaang mýang lakhon thii nan kōōn lae thaaw thang 3 ton kō' tang yuu nay thii nan laew yang mii thaaw 1 yuu thit hon nýa mii ton pen dang raeng yaang pen dang kaa paak pen dang pet cak mii muu ribphon yoodthaa phō laan plaay 7 saen cak long maa tang yuu nay mýang khamane sii Chiang maj thii nan han lae laew thaaw ton nan kō' cak aw ribphon yoodthaa long ma chu kap duay kan yang tiin thaaw caw lamphaang luang rop rew kap duay kan phō 8 wan khon thang lang kō' [wi]naat chip haay taay waay thii nan lýt phō thuam tray tiin chaang lae thaaw thang 3 4 ton nan kō' lay yoodthakam kap duay kan pay maa tōō thaw rōōt naa saen thaang tiin thaaw caw hariphunjaya thii nan han lae thaaw thang 4 kō' tang yuu nay mýang hariphunjaya thii nan kō' sam yoodthakam rop rew kap kan law han lae kō' rop rew kap duay kan phō 8 wan han lae rýy muu ribphon yoodthaa kō' winaat chip haay waay pay siang lae lýt khon thang laay mae [nam] muu phō rōōy waay cha lae thaaw thang 4 ton aw ribphon yoodthaa haeng ton maa winaat chip haay taay sia siang dang an thaaw thang 4 ton nan kō' thýy miit sii kanjaya nang yuu laew kō' paak taam ceenracaa sýng kan pay maa laew kō' bō' mii naa rō kan rōōng haay laew kō' mii han lae thaaw thang 4 ton kō' cing mii kham ceenracaa kap duay kan waa raw thang 4 ton yaa day rop praap kap duay kan thýa' aw kan pen miit rak kap duay kan thýa' waa an laew kō' aw kan wang rok daap say laew kō' thaam yang muu ribphon cim kan an taay laew lae yang thaw day an chaa waa an thaaw ton yuu tay nam kō' klaaw waa ribphon haeng khaa yang khaang 80 nýng lae lam nan taay sia siang laew lae thaaw ton yuu hon tay kō' thaam thaaw ton yuu hon nýa waa duu raa caw ton nōōng ribphon haeng caw yang khaang thaw day chaa thaaw ton nōōng yuu hon nýa klaaw waa ribphon haeng khaa yang khaang 80 nýng lae thaaw ton 'ōōk kō' thaam thaaw ton yuu wan tok nan law lae waa duu raa caw ton nōōng rýy ribphon haeng caw yang khaang thaw day chaa waa an thaaw ton nan klaaw waa ribphon haeng khaa winaat chip haay taay sia siang laew lae yang khaang 6 [read: 8] sip nýng lae waa thaaw thang 4 ton kō' paak taam ceenracaa sýng kan pay maa han lae thaaw thang 4 ton nan kō' thaam duu saat sin aagom kae kan law thaaw ton yuu hon tay kō' thaam thaaw ton yuu hon nýa waa duu raa caw ton nōōng caw yang thýy tray sin an day maa raksa duay rýang day an chaa thaaw ton yuu hon nýa klaaw wa duu raa caw ton phii khaa kō' thýy sin 8 maa raksaa ton haeng khaa lae thaaw ton yuu hon tay kō' thaam thaaw ton yuu hon wan 'ōōk klaw waa duu raa caw ton nōōng yang thýy rýang day maa raksaa ton raw chaa thaaw ton yuu wan 'ōōk kō' klaaw waa phuu khaa kō' thýy saranakhom raksaa ton haeng khaa lae thaaw ton nan kō' thaam thaaw ton phuu yuu wan tok nan law waa duu raa caw ton nōōng yang thýy rýang day maa raksaa ton raw chaa thaaw ton wan tok klaaw waa phuu khaa kō' thýy sin 5 maa raksaa ton haeng khaa lae ton an mýa nan thaaw thang 3 thaam kō' way saa thaaw ton phii yuu hon tay waa caw ton phii yang mii an day maa raksaa caw ton phii nan chaa caw ton nan kō' klaaw waa khaa kō' thýy panyapaarami 30 thot maa raksaa ton haeng khaa lae thaaw thang 3 kō' ceenracaa kan pay maa laew kō' phaay thii yuu haeng ton laew kō' khaw maa chuu yuu kap duay kan thaaw ton phii an yuu hon tay han lae

moral balance of the cosmos, however, can be upset in cases where immoral human beings outnumber those who are moral.¹⁶⁴

When the Tathāgata’s *sāsana* enters the epoch of pronounced degeneration that begins approximately two thousand years after Gotama’s death, the rise of unrighteous leaders impacts other people’s moral agency. The following excerpt from a calamity-cosmology narrative demonstrates that the loss of a righteous king entails the absence of a moral exemplar. As a result of that, humans lose their “moral compass.” Like a malevolent king, they, too, become evil.¹⁶⁵

The passage reads,

“The group of *thewada-s* who guard the whole world will become angry and upset at [the humans who have bad] *kamma* which prohibits their growth and progress. Everyone—women and men—will act immorally following the ways of the kings, local lords, ministers, and dignitaries. At the time when it should rain, the *thewada-s* will make the sun shine. When the sun should shine, they will make it rain. The (decline) in the ground’s life force (*rasa*) will inhibit the sprouting and opening of rice seedlings, soy beans, and sesame pods as well as those things planted and buried. These plants will shrivel up. Mealy bugs will nibble at the buds. As soon as the buds sprout and develop stalks, ants will eat them. From time to time, the crops will die, because the seasons are off” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* Ch.10, 1921 C.E./1283 C.S.: fols. 21-22.).¹⁶⁶

Each layer of the cosmos is linked to and embedded in one another. For instance, when human beings become morally debased, fewer and fewer people are reborn in the heavens. A shortage of *thewada-s* in the heavenly realms occurs. In short, the abodes of hell will become over-populated

¹⁶⁴ For example, see *Tamnan Phya In* 1878 C.E./1240 C.S. fols. 1-3.

¹⁶⁵ A similar domino-like collapse that begins at the top can be found at A II 84-85. The first part of the *sutta* states, “At such time, monks, as rājahs are unrighteous, the ministers of rājahs also are unrighteous. When ministers are unrighteous, brāhmins and housholders also are unrighteous. Thus townsfolk and villagers are unrighteous. This being so, moon and sun go wrong in their courses. This being so, constellations and stars do likewise; days and nights, months and fortnights, seasons and years are out of joint; the winds blow wrong, out of season. Thus the devas are annoyed. This being so, the sky-deva bestows not sufficient rain. Rains not falling seasonably, the crops ripen in wrong season. Monks, when crops ripen in wrong season, men who live on such crops are short-lived, ill-favored, weak and sickly” (*The Book of Gradual Sayings* vol. 2 [1933] 1952: 84-85).

¹⁶⁶ *thewadaa fuung raksa lok thang muan kō’ cak kliat somsiat nay cay tae kam an bō’ wudthi camræn cay maen khon ying ying chaay thang laay cak kratham kam an bō’ chōōp tham taam thaaw phya seenaa ‘amaat thang lay fuung nan cha lae yaam nan theewadaa thang laay kō’ cak taeng hÿÿ kaan khuan fon tok phōōy daet kaan khuan daet phōōy fon mÿa nan rat haeng phaendin kō’ cak long pay phaay taay phÿÿn phaendin phit khaaw klaa thua ngaa khōōng pluuk khōōng fang thang muan luat bō’ ngōōk bō’ baan pen an hiaw haeng siang maeng kō’ cak khop yam yang raak lae kōō haeng phit mii yōōt mii lam mot maeng kin sia laangphrōng kō’ taay sia an ryduu bō’ samæ*

and the heavens under-populated. In this literary representation of royal power as a life-force (*rasa*), it signifies the importance of living within *just* social institutions. These writings emphasize the significance of just rule by pointing to its absence from the social world. Rather than a justification for social oppression, we have an explanation for it, a judgment of it, and hence a demand to overturn and convert that morally anemic situation.

A Redress of Social Oppression

Using a calamity-cosmological framework, northern Thai writers unmistakably express retributive hatred towards the (real world) ruling lords whom they represent as unrepentant wrongdoers. Moreover, these texts present themselves as either the words of the Buddha or Lord Indra. The Buddha's voice in particular lends these compositions a source of ultimate moral authority whereas we find that Indra's words convey moral condemnation along with a threat to "*kammically* curse" any ill-behaved Buddhist especially those individuals in power. These writings' depiction of despotic kings and social fragmentation are a potent reminder of the fact that moral accountability must exist within a moral community by definition; otherwise a language of moral address would not be possible. Unlike the folktale *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon*'s mischievous *yakkha-s*, bad Buddhist kings are not presented as *dukkha*-objects capable of inspiring a *saṃvegic* response. In this case, *dukkha* is not placed beside moral obligation in a felicitous manner.

Among contemporary moral philosophers, there has been a productive discussion on the moral community in terms of assigning moral responsibility. This chapter's discussion selectively draws on a scholarly conversation on moral resentment begun by Peter Strawson. In dialogue with Strawson and others, my examination of moral responsibility and the moral emotion of resentment asks, "What form of moral redress do these texts express in their literary

representations of social suffering?”

So far, this chapter has described the manner in which calamity cosmologies show how an immoral lord “over-eats” the kingdom. He mercilessly “takes” the resources of his subjects and he “hands down” cruel forms of punishments. This portrayal of the king illustrates a type of violence that is characteristic of a reign of terror. This kind of non-dramatic and continuous political violence causes a “slow erosion of the community” (Das and Kleinman 2001: 1). It is also known as a form of “social structural violence” (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997: xi). Unlike people in the twenty-first century, northern Thai serfs could not impose legal sanctions upon individuals in high-level positions of power. Nor did these agrarian peasants have recourse in a truth and reconciliation commission. Yet, like a truth and reconciliation commission, these writings bring to light how far social reality has strayed from any semblance of a moral reality (Das and Kleinman 2001). Thus, these writings can be considered to be the hidden transcript (a term I borrow from Scott) for a weak and passive mode of peasant resistance (Scott 1992; cf. Koret 2007). The literary works about a calamity cosmology allow a peasant to mumble curses behind her lord’s back. Or, this literature can be considered to be the *sangha*’s moral condemnation of the ruling lords that is mainly addressed to peasants.¹⁶⁷ Neither reading excludes the other one. Both readings emphasize a distinctly interpersonal dimension of morality, namely moral injury.

Social order unravels through a piecemeal crumbling of human relationships. Of importance are the practices of showing respect that separate lord/peasant, parent/child,

¹⁶⁷ Kings and local lords were most likely aware of the moral criticism that their socially oppressive measures could awaken in the minds of their subjects. For instance, the spirit medium for the ruling house of Chiang Mai warns the king by telling him that “the spirits were displeased at his oppression of the people and advised him at once to abolish certain vexatious taxes” (Hallett 1890: 105). I found this excerpt from Hallett cited in Bowie’s (1998) article “The Alchemy of Charity: of Class and Buddhism in Northern Thailand.”

teacher/student, etc. The narrative of social collapse begins with the lords who abuse their social position. Specifically, they callously wield their powers of “taking” and “receiving.” To understand the relation between morality and social acts, it is helpful to draw out the implications of the moral responsibility found at the intersection of human interpersonal activity. In particular, Jeffrie G. Murphy (1999) lists the following five “senses of desert”: 1) “desert as legal guilt; 2) desert as involving *mens rea* (e.g., intention, knowledge); 3) desert as involving responsibility (capacity to conform to the rules); 4) desert as a debt owed to annul wrongful gains from unfair free-riding (Herbert Morris’s theory); and 5) desert as involving ultimate character—evil or wickedness in some deep sense” (Murphy 1999: 153). Of the five kinds of retribution, the northern Thai complaint against rulers falls in the fourth category of unfairly abusing the system, as well as the obvious fifth category. In particular, there appears to be an abuse of the patron-client relationship that a peasant has with her master, the local lords, and the warring king who rules a principality. According to Buddhist moral ideals, the peasant’s relationship to these figures of authority has the character of a social contract as found in the *Aggañña-sutta*. In terms of the culture of patronage, some Thai royal inscriptions characterize the client-patron relationship as one that hinges upon a patriarchal and benovolent form of dependency. For instance, King

Rāma I (r. 1782-1809), has written:

“I will devote heart and mind
 To exalt and elevate the holy Buddha *Śāsana*
 I will ensure the safety of the entire realm
 And protect the people and the nobles” (quoted from Skilling 2007: 185).¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ In the article “King Rāma I and Wat Phra Chetuphon: the Buddha-*śāsana* in Early Bangkok, Skilling (2012: 299) mentions this quote. In this article, Skilling critiques the manner in which scholars use the categories “elite” and “peasant” to describe Southeast Asian Buddhism. He writes, “The opposition of “elite” and “peasant,” inescapably fashionable in the study of religion, is not, I feel especially useful in Southeast Asian and Buddhist contexts” (Skilling 2012: 345). Skilling (2012: 345-47) notes that the development of Buddhism in Southeast Asia was “a kind of decentered urbanism” shaped by dynamic exchanges and interactions between Pali and vernacular imaginaries.

King Taksin, his predecessor, also presented himself as a caring protector of the kingdom and patron of the religion. He writes,

I swear I do not desire the kingship for worldly reasons. I desire only to allow all creatures to live in tranquility and harmony, practicing the Dhamma and seeking Enlightenment. If anyone is more fitted than I to assume this royal responsibility, I will give the crown to him and seek the solitary ascetic life” (Gesick 1983b: 97).

Although these two examples come from central Thai kings, northern Thai kings may have also regarded themselves as protectors of the kingdom. Inscriptional records at least indicate that Lanna kings did render the *sangha* patronage through the construction of temple buildings. In contrast to these royal statements, calamity-cosmology narratives paint a negative picture of kings.¹⁶⁹ In my earlier examination of evil lords who “over-eat” the kingdom, I cited a section of *Tamnan Phya In* (1869 C.E./1231 C.S.) that describes how the lords levy trumped up fines (see page 138). I now return to that particular passage because it paints a rather cruel picture of the ruling lords that will illuminate how calamity-cosmology narratives depict moral injury. The *Tamnan Phya In* (1869 C.E./1231 C.S.) states that the lords are terrorizing the peasants by ruthlessly taking things from them. This practice slowly drains away a peasant’s meager store of gold and silver coins. Eventually the lords will fabricate more occasions and reasons to take property and wealth from the peasants. This passage from the *Tamnan Phya In* (1869 C.E./1231 C.S.) also states that before a peasant even has a chance to look for her money, the lord will drag her daughter or son into slavery. When that lord decides to take her child in lieu of money, he affirms that the life of a peasant’s child is not worth more than a few pieces of silver. Although, the type of retribution found in this passage resembles an act that unfairly manipulates social

¹⁶⁹ In *Nirvana and other Buddhist felicities*, Collins (1998) discusses many of the stories of bad Buddhist kings found in Pāli literature.

conventions, Murphy's fourth category of moral deserts, it also falls into the Murphy's fifth category of character retribution. On this type of retribution, Murphy explains that it is the "idea that evil people are to be punished in proper proportion to their inner wickedness" and this idea "had its first and best home in divine punishment" (Murphy 1999: 153).

As the *Tamnan Bhikkhuṇī Thon* teaches, a personal act of vengeance born out hatred is not a virtue. The lords who adjudicate, however, are the ones who commit a moral injury. As one passage states, "The masters in the village and city have no sympathy or compassion for the peasants (*phray*) of the village or the Thai (subjects) of the sovereign. For one thing, they think that the entire kingdom is theirs to eat and [its people] live for their sake" (*Tamnan Rawaek* 1900 C.E./1262 C.S.: fol. 6).¹⁷⁰ In terms of the phenomenon of moral responsibility, this passage appeals to its readers' reactive moral emotions. Moreover, the above passage suggests that social oppression is a form of moral injury. Murphy calls the emotions that arise in response to a moral injury "retributive emotions." Other contemporary moral theorists call them "reactive emotions" (Wallace 1994). Resentment is a reactive emotion that has shades of retributive hatred or even *ressentiment*.¹⁷¹ The textual depictions of local lords harassing peasants elicit in the readers a vicarious analogue of resentment.

Peter Strawson gives a definition of resentment that has had a substantial influence on Anglo-American contemporary discussions on this topic. He defines resentment as "a reaction to injury or indifference" (Strawson 1974: 14).¹⁷² He notes that reactive emotions are essential to

¹⁷⁰ *het khun ban khun m̄yang thaang laay [bō'] mii khwamindu karuna phraj ban phraj m̄yang lae an l khaw kho ramphyng waa ban m̄yang thang muan day yuu day kin kho ph̄ya haw*

¹⁷¹ In his definition of *ressentiment*, J. Murphy states, "[R]essentiment is, by definition, an irrational and base passion. It means, roughly, 'spiteful and malicious envy.' It thus makes no sense to speak of rational or justified or honorable *ressentiment*" (1999: 152). Moral philosophers tend to hold Nietzsche's and Max Scheler's discussion of *ressentiment* as foundational.

¹⁷² In my discussion of Anglo-American philosophies on resentment, I leave aside the notion of forgiveness.

human interpersonal activities. In particular, Strawson observes that behind each and every action the attitudes and intentions of the actor are presumed. In a first-person description of moral injury, he explains that I believe that when someone performs an action there is an intention and attitude exhibited in that action. This impression of mine leads me to believe that that act was done either out of goodwill or contempt/indifference. When I believe that it was done out of goodwill, I will have an emotional response of gratitude. A contemptuous act will cause me to feel resentment. My feelings of resentment have a range of intensity that depends upon the level of contempt/indifference that I perceive. Strawson calls this type of attitude, which is shared in terms of moral reasoning, a “participant attitude.” This participant attitude informs moral disapprobation and indignation. It correlates to a moral demand that is made upon a member of a moral community. In other words, moral indignation would be inhibited in those cases in which someone is incapable of having the same moral reasoning as mine. If a person does not have the capacity to act according to, or is ignorant of, the moral demands shared by my group, I cannot assign moral responsibility to her actions. In this case, I must take an objective attitude towards her. This objective attitude signifies that the two parties do not belong to the same moral community. As a consequence of that, such a case demands one to inhibit one’s reactive emotions (Strawson 1974).

Writing at a time when moral sentiments had fallen out of favor among Anglo-American ethicists, Strawson argues that “in the absence of *any* forms of these attitudes it is doubtful whether we should have anything that *we* could find intelligible as a system of human relationships, as human society” (Strawson 1974: 24). Without reactive emotions, how could we assign moral responsibility in a truthful way? Philosophers such as Nietzsche have argued that

According to Strawson, to forgive is “to forswear the resentment” (1974: 6).

ressentiment cannot lead to a true ascription of moral responsibility for it arises from irrational base passions. In the previously cited passage from the *Tamnan Phya In* (1869 C.E./1231 C.S.) that speaks of a parent who has to pay off a fine by selling her child, that passage seems to convey the idea that “[o]ur emotions are our main heuristic guide to finding out what is morally right,” as Michael Moore has stated (Moore 1987: 189). Thus, this passage challenges Nietzsche’s view of *ressentiment*. Richard Wallace extends Strawson’s thesis that resentment involves the recognition of a community’s moral demands. He states, “[M]oral responsibility might be analyzed in terms of a quasi-evaluative stance of holding people to expectations” (Wallace 1994: 62). To escape from the charge of emotivism, he argues that moral responsibility is a deep form of assessment. Furthermore, he points out that reactive emotions display a cognitive content in their acknowledgement of moral obligations (Wallace 1994: 66-71). Reactive emotions are not the basis for making moral judgments, but they give force to moral judgments (Wallace 1994: 75). The emotional aspect of moral blame helps bind people to the commitments of the moral community. Once again, we are confronted with the problem that it is the ruling lords who offend against the moral community’s expectations. To illustrate how these representatives of state power upset people’s moral expectations, I summarize a passage from *Tamnan Rawaek* that was previously cited in chapter two (see page 69). The Buddha narrates the *Tamnan Rawaek*. It says that while the Buddha was alive, the lords gave gifts to his monks. As a result of that, the trees produced sweet and edible fruits. After his death, the lords will no longer give gifts to his monks. Moreover, they will no longer show deference towards the monks. Instead, the lords will show contempt and indifference towards them. They will even punish monks like they punish commoners. This behavior angers the *thewada-s* who in response to that will poison the fruits so that they become bitter and inedible. This sequence of events will occur

because the lords believe that they are omnipotent and do not answer to anyone (see *Tamnan Rawaek* 1900 C.E./1262 C.S.: fols. 2-3).¹⁷³ The poisoned fruits are a metaphor for moral wrong. They represent what happens when social reality becomes disengaged from moral reality. The fruits have become strange and bitter because the traditional paths for dealing with moral injury have been shut. The lords do not recognize the moral injury they do to others. However, they commit moral injuries without any sense of shame or fear of retribution. An unrepentant wrongdoer of high social status represents a problem for the Buddhist conception of a hierarchical society that is ethically legitimized.

In the *Tamnan Rawaek* passage summarized by me, its words seem to address someone like James's sick-souled person who has lost faith in the spiritual life. This person is someone who has been beaten down and dragged far into the dirt of reality. Or, in the case of *Tamnan Rawaek*, it is someone who had been dragged down into the dust by a person of high social status who is radically untouched by moral responsibility. The representation of moral wrongs committed by unrepentant immoral actors who happen to be ruling lords brings to life a social experience of suffering that belongs only to the *phray*. Due to its socially exclusionary and moral character, that social suffering makes *phray-s* morally superior. Morally horrifying images of the callous actions of ruling lords breathe life into and vivify this subject position's morality.

These narrative representations of structural violence can be read as stories of victimhood. As such, the reactive emotions elicited by the text can be used in the service of moral protest. Through them, a person expresses an ambition for living within the confines of a

¹⁷³ *m̄ȳa day dang an luuk som luuk waan thang laay an khon thang laay aw kin dang an k̄o' cak pen phit nguansaan ...heet waa thaaw phyā b̄o' ch̄ōp b̄o' prak̄ōp ch̄ōp thotsaratchatham khaw k̄o' cak krathan annaathon t̄ō satsanaa khruu tathaagata an 1 khaw k̄o' b̄o' khrop b̄o' yam yang kaew 3 prakaan khaw thang laay k̄o' pramaat t̄ō satsanaa khruu tathaagata an 1 khaw k̄o' b̄o' khrop yam luuksit khruu tathaagata haet waa khaw mii manoo say yay sahaaw*

moral community (Brudholm 2008). Calamity cosmologies evoke the imagination of a morally damaged actor, that is an actor driven by moral injury to uphold and tightly embrace a belief in moral right/wrong as the core of their being, much like a Kantian notion of moral duty. The troubled aspect of this sort of morality, however, stems from that the fact that it arises against other members of society's moral community. The morality of the oppressed not only arises as an experience of moral and social fragmentation, but it also opens up that reality of fragmentation within a society. Margaret Walker states that moral anger demands a response (Walker 2006: 93). In this case, the peasant-reader may take up a subject position of moral anger, but realistically he or she does not have the power to make the local lords answer for their moral crimes. These writings, however, because they do hold the local lords accountable they by implication include the ruling lords in the moral community. Ironically, kings, local lords, ministers, and dignitaries even when ethically condemned form a part of the community. In other words, those Buddhists who are in power would understand the grievances found in calamity-cosmology narratives' redress of social oppression.

Although the texts do not explicitly name the emotion of resentment, it is narratively produced. One could argue that Buddhist moral culture does not have the moral sentiment of resentment. For instance, Buddhist canonical doctrine declares anger and hatred (*dosa*) to be obstacles to the cultivation of virtues. Resentment, however, reveals itself only in the reader's subject position. Peasant resistance takes the form of a vicarious reactive emotion summoned by the textual world of calamity cosmology. This form of resistance affirms an ethics of tradition, that is, all of the conventional convictions in the ideal social order in order to argue that those structures have become oppressive, because the elites currently sitting in power are simply morally unworthy of those positions. As Brudholm suggests, in some cases, through the

“preservation of outrage or resentment,” a moral protest and ambition can be made (Brudholm 2008: 4). Within the confines of the textual community formed through calamity-cosmology narratives, the damaged moral agent expresses the nature of moral obligations and the force of moral judgment through her moral reaction to the textual world described. Resentment emphasizes the moral dimension of human interpersonal activity. The fact that wrongdoers of a high social standing appear impervious to moral responsibility has negative effects on the constitution of moral agency, especially that of the oppressed.

A Moral Economy of Threats

In addition to an interior life of moral protest, Brudholm reminds us that punishment, too, can help people repair a fractured moral community (Brudholm 2008: 36). In this last section, I focus on the images of violence that abound in calamity-cosmology narratives. Although a specter of resentment seems to haunt these texts, the belief that cosmic justice will prevail is explicitly stated. The belief in a moral economy of threat becomes a necessary corollary that allows people to hold onto resentment but restrains them from seeking revenge (Wallace 1994). In the Anglo-American philosophical discussions on resentment and forgiveness what is taken for granted are the oppressive social structures found in some historical societies. The manner in which humans transact in moral injury, revenge, or forgiveness is not as context-free as these philosophers would lead us to believe. The northern Thai case forces a moral philosopher to confront the hypocrisy of Nietzsche’s pithy: “Whoever fights with monsters should take care that in the process he does not become a monster” (cited from Murphy 1999:161). Calamity-cosmology narratives seem to ask, “Though *they* can act like monsters, *we* must suffer in the name of moral humility?”

Tamnan Phya Tham (1901 C.E./ 1263 C.S.) gives detailed information on the Burmese

King Mangthra's *kammic* punishment. According to this text and other northern Thai chronicles, this Burmese king waged colossal wars that utterly devastated many northern Thai communities. According to the *Tamnan Phya Tham* (1901 C.E./ 1263 C.S.), he reaps the following retributive *kamma* (*kamma-vipāka*). First, a giant *yakkha* will hurl a lightning bolt that will land on Mangthra's head and smash it into seven pieces. Next, that giant *yakkha* will tie up Mangthra's legs in chains and drag him down to hell while beating him with an iron club. Once in hell, Mangthra will be punished for incalculable cosmic eons. After the future Buddha is born, Mangthra will not be released from hell until after another million Buddhas have been born (*Tamnan Phya Tham* 1901 C.E./ 1263 C.S.: fols. 19-20). This passage from the *Tamnan Phya Tham* (1901 C.E./ 1263 C.S.) contains an account what Wallace (1994) calls an "economy of threat" that has the function of being a deterrent. It is forward-looking and utilitarian in character. In terms of Buddhist moral sentiments, Maria Heim (2008) describes the concept of *ottappa* (moral dread, shame, conscientiousness, fear of evil) as having a similar character of inhibition. In both cases, fear and a forward-looking gaze help steer the moral agent away from committing evil acts. In this Buddhist case, the moral economy of threat works according to the cosmic principle of *kamma*. According to the law of *kamma*, each intentional ethical action generates either bad or good fruits depending upon the moral character of that action. In Buddhist calamity cosmologies, there appears to be a new type of knowledge put forth: monks can predict the future *kammic* consequences of human actions. In such a case, Kant's following statement does not apply: "The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even of our own conduct, remains entirely hidden from us" (quoted from Murphy 1999: 156). In response to Murphy's question: "Who are we to judge?" a Buddhist monk might answer, "The world (i.e., the *rūpic* process cosmos) judges us. As monks, we can read these judgments according to our interpretation of the

appearances of the world” (Murphy 1999:157). These northern Thai writers see the *kammic* past of the current social chaos. Likewise, they know about King Mangthra’s future *kammic* fate. For example, chapter ten of *Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* explains that 1,918 years after Gotama Buddha’s death, the world will enter a period racked by violent conflict and chaos (*kolāhala*) (*Tamnan Phra Caw Liap Lok* Ch. 10 1917 C.E./ 1279 C.S.: fols. 7-8). By describing a cosmic age of calamities, these writers produced a new form of knowledge meant to help restore the world and heal a traumatic past (Minow 2002). Like a truth and reconciliation commission, these writers reveal the true causes that have led to the manifestation of a morally horrifying world. Revealing the truth paves the way for rebuilding the moral community. Moral sanction fulfills part of this social function. For this local Buddhist community, however, moral sanction is cosmically and not legally granted through an economy of threats. Take for instance, the following passage from the *Tamnan Phra Caw Ariya Metteyya*. It states,

“There is a cosmic time period called “Sathantarakap.” That is when everyone meets with destruction. Beings who meet with such a ruinous end typically are reborn in the abodes of hell. Why [do people strike at one another like that]? Having the evil elements of anger and hatred they are led to strike and kill one another. Ten-year olds will marry. When the Sathantarakap age arises, there will be conflicts and arguing over things even over trees, logs, rocks, and land. So it will be. Armed with weapons in both hands, people will attack and slaughter one another. The wise ones fearing death will flee to the edge of the forest [where they will live in hiding]. The rest will strike down one another. So many people will die. So it will be. Within seven days, blood will flow and cover the entire earth’s surface. So it will be. At the end of the seventh day, the wise ones who fled to the edge of the forest in order to save their lives, they will come out of hiding. They will see corpses piled in heaps all over the place. Feelings of shock (*samvega*) will overwhelm them. Finally, feelings of pity will arise and they will say, “They who did not take flight to save themselves, here they are, dead. Let us not argue anymore.” Having thus spoken, they will embrace one another. Wrapping their hands around each other’s neck, they will cry. Having decided to live together in harmony, they will make merit, give ritual gifts to the monks, keep the moral precepts, and restrain their emotions out of respect for one another (*Tamnan Phra Chao Ariya Metteyya* 1910 C.E./1272 C.S.: fols. 22-23).¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ *nay m̄ya khon thang laay chip haay taay duay an khaa fan kan pay maa nan day ch̄ȳy waa sathantarakap lae sat thang laay chip haay duay sathantara kap ȳm day pay maa k̄et nay narok khwaen maak laay nak heet waa mii kroot thot baap tham cing day khaa fan kan taay nan lae tadā nay kaan m̄ya ‘aayu khon day sip pii pen kh̄eay daen nan sathantarakap ca k̄et mii wiwaat thiang kan kap duay wadthu taang taang k̄et pen khaas̄ȳk sadtru kae kan*

The above passage sparks reflection on the everyday petty squabbles found in village life. What began as bickering over “trees, logs, rocks, and land” has ended up as a field of human carnage. The above passage places mundane conflicts on the same historical stage as human atrocities. In doing so, these writings create the impression that justice need not be the end goal. Deciding who is morally right and who is morally wrong leads to nowhere. Instead, there is a call to publicly witness the human misery caused by a chain reaction set in motion by moral injury. More importantly, there is a call to find a way to resume everyday life after such a dangerous chain of moral reactive emotions has been set off. Das and Kleinman make the insightful point that “stories restructure moral experience” by offering ways to think about experiences and even possibly to offer new ways to experience them (Das and Kleinman 2001: 20). Consuming images of human suffering at a distance may have been a method for northern Thai monks to narratively restructure individuals’ moral experience of structural violence.

The economy of threat, however, overtakes many of the narratives. In particular, Indra is the slayer of immoral human beings. In several of the texts attributed to Indra, a precise date is given for his visit in terms of the month and year, thereby giving Indra’s vengeance a sense of immediacy. In other words, one can count the days until he will descend. In *Tamnan Phya In*, we are told that when he comes, he will seek out those who do not own a copy of a book on calamity cosmology. Indra will search for the book in all the houses in all the villages and cities. Upon not

taang taang kæt leng han kan pen dang han n̄ya khranōng khōōng paa tua laay nan khaw thang laay kō’ th̄ȳ aw wadthu an day duay mii haeng ton pen ton waa may khoon kōōn din kō’ ca mii cha lae pen ‘aawut mii khon thang laay pay maa kō’ cak kuan khaa fan kan maak nak thuk haeng thuk thii cha lae khon fuung mii panyaa klua taay dang an kō’ ca riip kan khaw pay suu paa h̄ȳ yuu na srōōk khōōk huay raaw khaw thii saang sa ‘aat [an] nan thaw cak wen khon thang laay fuung nan way khon thang laay fuung ȳȳn kwaa nan kō cak kuan kaw khaa fan kan taay maak nak kō’ cak mii m̄ȳȳn cha lae siang pramaan 7 wan phō lyat lay phop naa phaendin kō’ ca mii cha lae sattame divase nay wan thuan 7 rung khaam phon pay laew dang an khon thang laay fuung h̄ȳ yuu raksaa tua nay srōōk huay raaw khaw thii saang sa ‘aat nan khaw cing ‘ōōk maa laew han yang khon thang laay an taay kōōng kan yuu thuk haeng thuk thi san nan khaw kō’ bangkæt mii khwamsangweet maak nak lae kō’ luat day yang kham rak kan yin dii s̄ȳng kan pay maa laew kō’ ceenraaa kan waa dang nii khran waa raw la bō’ nii pay yuu raksaa ton nay paa day kō’ thang laay taay siang cha lae raw thang laay yaa day phit thiang kan sak an th̄ya’ waa an laew kō’ kōōt khō m̄ȳȳ kan rōōng haay s̄ȳng kan pay maa mii somakhaa phrōōm phiang kan chuan kan kratham bun mii ton waa h̄ȳ thaan raksaa sin somwon khrop yam yaeng s̄ȳng kan mii cha lae

finding one, the inhabitant of that home will cough up blood and die. This unnatural expulsion of blood will result in death within the span of a single day. Some texts prescribe the cultivation of the Buddhist virtue of shame and moral dread (*hiri-ottappa*) in order to prevent such a horrific death (for example, see *Tamnan Phya In* 1921 C.E./1284 C.S.: fol. 16).¹⁷⁵ While Buddhists are encouraged to leave the business of moral punishment up to the deities who act as *kammic* reapers, they are not enticed to sympathize with those who harm others. In this manner, one can hold onto resentment with the reassurance that a perpetrator of moral crimes will be punished in the cosmic court of law. One can engage in human interactions in a cordial manner for the sake of keeping the peace. In fact, one can afford to show disingenuous respect, because Indra the king of the gods will soon descend from heaven and punish all evildoers. Another dimension of the damaged moral agent comes to light in those texts that convey an economy of threat account and a corresponding implicit desire for almost-instant *kammic* desert. With this form of *kammic* punishment, blood is spilled but no human hands are bloodied. Death by coughing up blood can be read as a metaphor for moral sanctions. Thus, these writers had at their disposal a tool for inhibiting revenge. The hypocrisy of living amongst monsters that hurt others but being morally prohibited from becoming a monster oneself is resolved by Indra's murderous rampage. Indra keeps a ledger of moral culpability. As the ruler of the heavens, he judges humans in the cosmic court of law. In doing so, he obviates personal acts of revenge. As the punishment of the

¹⁷⁵ In respect to the Lao tradition of prophetic literature (which is Koret's terms for what I call "calamity-cosmology narratives"), Peter Koret has discovered this same depiction of Indra threatening those who do not believe in the words of a calamity-cosmology text. He explains that unlike traditional Buddhist literature, these works seem to intimidate their audience through "the threat of karmic punishment" (Koret 2007: 151). In prophetic literature, Koret finds the shift in emphasis from the Buddha to Indra to be a sign of an "increased role of coercive power" (Koret 2007: 152). Koret (2007: 152) writes, "Whereas a composer would hesitate to present a picture of the Buddha as a great destructive force wreaking havoc on mankind, Indra—as a symbol of power in the service of the greater good—is portrayed in works of prophetic literature as committing (or ordering) deadly attacks on thousands or millions of humans who are labeled as sinners."

Burmese King Mangthra demonstrates, cosmic punishment exceeds anything that can be accomplished by the hands of mere mortals.

The *sangha* appears to try to address how peasants live with moral injustices as a fact of life due to the oppressive nature of society. One might ask, “Does the *sangha* go far enough?” I cite Murphy’s description of resentment because it vividly describes the experience of moral injury. Murphy states,

“One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries are also *messages*—symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, “I count but you do not.” “I can use you for my purposes.” Or “I am here up high and you are there down below.” Intentional wrongdoing *insults* us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to *degrade* us. This invokes a kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensible. It is a moral injury and we care about such injuries” (Murphy 1988: 24-25).

To return to our question, these narratives point out the moral injuries committed by ruling lords against peasants. In the moral economy of threat, the writers of these stories recognize the inability of peasants to seek a redress of moral injuries. In that case, how does such a situation compromise Strawson’s and Wallace’s theory that reactive emotions reinforce a community’s commitment to ethically structured human interactions? I do not seek to focus on their thoughts on moral responsibility. Instead I want to suggest that the writers of calamity-cosmology narratives faced a similar dilemma. Personal interactions depend upon certain moral commitments or expectations. Honoring them signifies one’s membership in the moral community. Censuring one for violating them as Strawson points out signifies that that wrongdoer has a place in the moral community. In blaming the ruling lords by putting their actions of “over-taking/-giving” in a bad light, these writings morally censure the lords. At the same time, handing down punishment in the cosmic court of *kammic* law, these writings appear to let the lords off the hook. Is moral protest and complaining enough to repair a damaged sense

of self-worth or the sense that social reality has become divorced from moral order?

Conclusion

Scholars analyzing the Buddhist state have taken for granted the role of the laity. Placed off-stage, the laity's role in history is almost absent, except in the case of short-lived millennial movements or tax rebellions. In effect, scholars have repeated the ruling elitist view of Thai history. What has been missed is the possibility that just as with the *sangha*, the laity perhaps existed alongside the *sangha* (ideologically and sociologically) in an antagonistic symbiosis with the monarch and ruling elites. Part of this shift towards the concerns of the peasants, monastic writers were faced with the task of re-describing the moral world order in a manner that addressed the oppressive structures of society. This chapter reveals that in many ways it was an insurmountable task especially, in light of a political culture that held the king to be "lord of life." I have suggested that these writings took a path of compromise; they portray the ruling lords in a manner that evokes a sense of resentment as well as an idea of character retribution found in the moral economy of threat. Yet, the idea of a Buddhist king as moral exemplar remains part of the worldview of calamity-cosmology narratives. While there is a condemnation of the immoral conditions of northern Thai society, that critical evaluation seems to demand a restructuring and rethinking of how one experiences moral injury and moral reactive emotions. By constructing a literary representation of the political and moral emotions that arise from living in a socially and morally fractured community, these northern Thai writers sought to rethink the *dhammic* cosmos paradigm that equated a religious society with the moral community. One aspect of that rethinking occurred in manner in which calamity-cosmology narratives gave voice to social suffering.

Six

Conclusion

In this final chapter, an evaluation of this dissertation's anthropological and philosophical frameworks will be undertaken in order to assess this study's objective and its results as well as to clarify its findings on a conceptual level. To take into account the consequences and implications of this study's anthropological and philosophical theoretical orientations, I will recapitulate my thesis to bring to light the consequences and then discuss the implications.

Durkheim writes, “[W]e cannot aspire to a morality other than that which is related to the state of our society” (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 61). In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, social oppression was a phenomenon inscribed onto this northern Buddhist moral culture. Consequently, northern Thai monastic writers endeavored to construct a new moral community based off of a morality of and for the oppressed that could address the moral and social problem of structural violence. What Durkheim's sociology of morals fails to consider and what this study has addressed pertains to this fashioning of a morality for a politically disenfranchised social group. Specifically, Durkheim's high regard for society caused him to overlook how a society could bid the will of its subaltern members. My study of calamity-cosmology narratives found that northern Thai monks made an effort to redefine the moral community as a group of serfs (*phray*) that are unique as moral agents due to their experience of social suffering. As these texts commonly relate, the virtuous despite the principle of *kamma* are born to endure hardships unlike the wicked. Calamity-cosmology narratives sought to give voice to a moral community defined by an understanding of social suffering and its corresponding sense of a compromised attachment to moral ideals. In this literary imagination of the moral community, the “truth” of

dukkha bids the individual's will over society's ideals. These literary representations of social suffering constructed a new image of the moral agent according to a definition of humanity as an oppressed humanity (cf., Long 1986). Through these texts, socially disenfranchised peasants entered into a moral community with each other under the auspices of the monastic order. Instead of social ideals, the members of this marginalized group held the badge of victimhood as the collective sentiment that bonded them together. These moral agents were diseased or damaged in concert with the 5,000-year *rūpic* decaying cosmos.

My thesis that calamity-cosmology narratives constructed a moral community for the socially oppressed, however, requires conceptual clarification of the moral agent. In other words, this study has yet to elaborate the new definition of the moral self that a new moral community must have. One cannot posit that suffering alone constitutes a definition of the moral agent. The moral agent is usually conceptualized according to agency in Western moral philosophy. Thus, suffering merely identifies the members of this distinct moral community. Michael Herzfeld writes,

“Between the potential of suffering for the creation of moral selves and communities, and its potential for destruction of any cosmology within which suffering could make sense, we find a space that is especially fertile for the creative exercise and even invention of theodicies calibrated to everyday experience” (Herzfeld 2001: 232).

Herzfeld reminds us that not only can new moral communities be constructed, but also a new moral self must be created in concert with that group's formation. Before evaluating my usage of theories, I want to bring conceptual clarity to my deployment of the category of moral community by recapitulating and elaborating the idea of the moral agent who belongs to the moral community “bodied forth” in calamity-cosmology narratives.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ I borrow the idea that literary representations of human suffering can “body forth” a painful historical past that may have been “silenced” from history from Das (1997). She has theorized that suffering inscribes pain upon its victims' (and perpetrators') bodily comportment, sense of the world, and notion of agency.

This study found that in their rejection of ideals as the font for moral authority and a desire for the Good, these narratives implicitly accept a Kantian notion of duty. Moral obligation, in other words, is based on a sheer commitment to moral reasoning. In addition to moral obligation, calamity-cosmology narratives define the moral self as characterized by an attitude of victimhood. Dually characterized by moral duty and suffering, this new moral self could claim that it belonged to an ethically superior community. This superiority implied that royal persons, local lords, ministers, and dignitaries have a shallow sense of moral duty that is based on ideality. In contrast to that, the *phray* of this marginalized moral community could say, “I know of the unjustifiable character of suffering, yet I am bound to moral maxims. While those in power may have more *puñya*, they do not define morality.” In such a declaration, the *phray* signifies that her moral behavior and demeanor is marked by a transcendent will to act morally despite her subjugated social location. Thus, calamity-cosmology narratives provide a literary account of a new moral self as defined according to a tension between agency and constraint. This profound tension defines the moral agent bodied forth through the consumption of literary representations of human suffering. To describe this tension, we must turn to the definition of the moral community that was elaborated in this dissertation. In particular, the examination of the first component of the moral community—its activities and interests—found that the writers of these texts relied on Buddhaghosa’s multiple definitions for *Dhamma*. Buddhaghosa defined the *Dhamma* as “*hetu*,” as “five going-on processes,” as “right,” and as “the teachings of the Buddha.” Buddhaghosa’s exegesis on *Dhamma* provided a historiographical narrative frame for northern Thai writers to speak of a *dhammic* cosmos in which powerful individuals (or “super-merit beings”) no longer mattered as much as they did in the past. Instead of a *dhammic* cosmos, calamity-cosmology narratives described the degenerative process of the *rūpic* cosmos in order

to communicate the worldly conditions that *constrain* Buddhist actors who are serfs. Both Buddhaghosa's 5,000-year timetable and the *Aggañña-sutta's* *rūpic* cosmic scheme made it possible to posit that there no longer existed a *dhammic* cosmos produced by Buddhist kings. In such a manner, calamity-cosmology narratives constructed an idea of a moral community that placed shared interests and activities under the rubric of the shared problems and difficulties with living a morally good life in a socially oppressive society. In the words of Durkheim, these writings posited that an apparent state of society [read: cosmos] conditions morality. What this meant for the Buddhist serfs—that these narratives anticipated—was that social conditions limit the expectations that the downtrodden have in regards to assigning moral responsibility and expressing moral resentment. These writings state that other (i.e., non-*phray*) Buddhists disregard moral obligation during an age of decline. Ethical laxity is a fact of life in such a morally bankrupt age. That lowering of expectations in others is coupled with a demand to live righteously and be bound to moral maxims as if they are one's transcendental duty. The type of moral address—rebuke (*ovāda*)—found in this Buddhist definition of the moral community highlights a demand for a Kantian notion of moral duty. In addition, these texts' expressions of a moral economy of threats and character retribution—aspects of this community's relation to moral ideals—supports a Kantian-like conception of obligation.

While the characteristics of this moral community support a Kantian type of moral agent, moral resentment also defines this group, especially in terms of its relationship to society's ideals and moral authority. In particular, moral resentment signifies this tension between agency and constraint found in calamity-cosmology narratives. The distinct tension derives from the problem of self-esteem. While these northern Thai writings had to elevate social suffering and moral resentment to the level of a badge for this moral community, that move required them to deal

with the problem of defining a moral community as made up of virtuous and powerless individuals. Strawson and Murphy force us to recognize that a moral injury damages one's self-esteem and sense of self-worth.¹⁷⁷ If the writers of calamity cosmologies had simply taught Buddhists to endorse a moral commitment on the order of a Kantian categorical imperative, then they would have failed to address the feelings of moral resentment, retributive hatred, and anger. In other words, the writers of calamity cosmologies had to deal with the fact that peasants often experienced moral injuries committed by a perpetrator who could not be punished for it. These writers implicitly recognize that moral reactive emotions are important to one's conception of self-worth and hence desire for the Good. While calamity-cosmology narratives define the moral self according to a Kantian idea of moral obligation, they also had to define the moral self according to the desire for revenge and feelings of moral resentment.

My examination of the collective sentiments of moral protest and resentment found in these writings indicate that these northern Thai writers were acutely aware of a peasant's inability to seek a moral redress of social oppression. Calamity-cosmology narratives advise peasants to bind themselves to moral maxims and reasoning, while simultaneously rebuking bad behavior in the moral assemblies convened by the preachers of calamity cosmologies. If we think of Kant as providing a model for agency that knows of no constraints and Durkheim as positing a model for agency that needs society to bid an individual's will, we can see that calamity-cosmology narratives construct a moral self that exists in a space of conflict caused by having an agency based on moral reasoning alone and by cosmic and social constraints. Even though calamity cosmologies made it so that Buddhist serfs could use suffering as a badge of their community and as a critique of the morality of royal persons, ruling lords, ministers, and

¹⁷⁷ In *Oneself as Another*, Ricoeur (1992) addresses this ethical issue of self-esteem. His work provides a philosophical consideration of this concept that can be compared to the Strawson's analysis.

dignitaries, the texts more importantly expressed the difficulties of being moral that arise from everyday circumstances.

Having laid out the concept of moral agency found in calamity cosmologies, the remainder of this chapter describes how philosophy and anthropology have impacted this study's objective to explore the category of moral community. First, I discuss the philosophical orientation to my interpretative practices. I use philosophical theories on moral resentment to bring to light the difficulties of a subject position defined as both virtuous and politically disenfranchised. In particular, Strawson gives a first person account of moral injury that is crucial to understanding why Buddhists in northern Thailand became preoccupied with social and moral fragmentation. As stated before, Strawson and Murphy highlight the fact that without the ability to punish wrongdoers, an individual who is morally wronged incurs a loss of self-worth and self-esteem. They suggest that through the consumption of literary representations of social suffering, peasants could endure moral injuries and not lose a sense of self-worth. These two ethicists in particular help us understand why northern Thai writers produced a community using a calamity cosmology that situates Buddhists in a problematic moral tension with the cosmos. Strawson, Murphy, and other aforementioned ethicists elaborate the emotional quality of the moral life as it is found in the realm of interpersonal activities. Their conversations have allowed this study to examine the moral community in terms of a practical and normative concept of ethics. More importantly, their analysis of moral reactive emotions afforded this study a deeper understanding of the significance of narratives to the moral life.

Martha Nussbaum has taken great pains to elaborate the value of literature to ethics. For example, she points out that tragedies express a richer idea of moral reasoning because these stories speak of a conflict in values (Nussbaum 2002). With respect to Greek tragedy, she finds

“tragic action” to be “sources of ethical learning” (Nussbaum 1986: 18). With respect to Kant’s deontological approach to ethics, she finds that his rejection of the idea that “the contingent demands of reality should ever put the moral agent in the position of being false to a genuine duty” to be “plainly inadequate to the complexities of life” (Nussbaum 2002: 272). Although Nussbaum may find it more practical to conceive of moral agency in terms of its vulnerabilities and fragility, these northern Thai Buddhist writers appear to agree with her on that point while disagreeing with her opinion of Kant. Narratives can offer lessons on the difficulties of being moral in terms of everyday lives. Religious narratives, however, tend to provide a message on how to transcend the human condition. These calamity-cosmology narratives convey an idea of how to aspire for transcendental felicities and desire the Good in the context of a society marked by severely hierarchical social relationships and a coercive state power.

Durkheim and Lambek provided my study with an anthropological theoretical framework, which supplements my own attending to the dynamics of state power found in nineteenth century northern Thai society. For example, this study’s concept of social oppression takes into serious consideration the northern Thai system of slavery and *phray/nay* relations in addition to its culture of deference and patronage. Also, I take into account the *panna* administrative system and galactic polity, the latter of which was a source of incessant warfare and the practice of taking war captives. A second manner in which anthropology informs this study has to do with my analysis of the social power belonging to religious cosmologies. My analysis of a subaltern sector of society led me consider northern Thai society as characterized by a tension between an ethics of tradition and an ethics of rethinking tradition. The status quo of an ethics of tradition represents a society’s general morality whereas an ethics of rethinking and morality for and of the oppressed arise out the intersection between a general morality common

to society and an individual subjective morality that is highly shaped and informed by an individual's social location. The presence of two types of cosmologies—an ordered and disordered one—is evidence for these two traditions of ethics, the latter of which exists in a dialogue with the former. The Three Worlds' cosmology depicts an ordered cosmos paired with a picture of an ideal society. It provides the myth of the righteous Buddhist king who is guaranteed to rise to power in order to bring peace, happiness, and security to the inhabitants of a Buddhist kingdom. Historians of religion have considered cosmology as a vehicle for the valorization and vindication of ideals, moral beliefs, and beliefs about reality (Swearer 2005). Scholars generally consider cosmological displays of order to be device for social control.¹⁷⁸ In fact, contemporary Thai intellectuals have observed that the Three Worlds cosmology helped to socialize Thais (Ivarsson 1995: 65). This study's description of the Three Worlds cosmology has considered it to be an ethics of tradition that valorizes and vindicates Lanna's hierarchical society.

Calamity cosmology insinuates that the Three Worlds' ordered cosmology merely popularized the idea that social status equated with levels of greater or lesser moralities distributed among individuals at birth. Calamity-cosmology narratives consciously engage in a line of thought that critiques the Three World's ordered cosmology. In particular, they “write against” the conviction that correlates a “high” morality with high social standing and hence political power. In the Three Worlds, the moral community is defined according to an idealized system of Buddhist doctrine. With respect to calamity cosmologies, on the other hand, there is a system of ideas in critical conversation with a prevailing system of ideas having an authoritative

¹⁷⁸ After the October 1973 political crisis, Thai intellectuals critical of kingship claimed that the Three Worlds was a device for social control mainly through its glorification of the “linking between status and religious merit” (Ivarsson 1995: 68). Interestingly, calamity cosmologies too focused of this connection between social status and *puñya*.

status based on ideality. Thus, we find the need for the calamity-cosmology narratives to constantly reiterate that a person's invisible store of merit (and hence higher morality) does not explain their social standing through the refrain: the virtuous will be those who are born to suffer.

My dissertation has found northern Thai society to be characterized by a tension between two types of opposing ethical traditions. To clarify the differences between an ethics of tradition and an ethics for the oppressed it will be useful to recite a story that illustrates each tradition, namely one that belongs to an ordered cosmology and its idea of a *dhammic* cosmos and one that belongs to a calamity cosmology and its notion of the *rūpic* cosmos.

The first story is an example of an ethics of tradition that is found in the calamity-cosmological text *Phuttha Tamnan*. As this story evidences, a calamity-cosmological text may express both an ethics of tradition and an ethics rethinking of tradition. In the first story, the Lord Buddha has been traveling around the region of northern Thailand when he encounters a Lua man. At dawn, the Lua man cooks rice and curries and brings it as alms food for the Buddha and his entourage. After partaking of the meal, King Aśoka addresses the Lua man saying,

“Listen, village headman, I see that you have built this watermill to irrigate the rice fields. Life doesn't have to be that hard for you. Take the precepts (*sīla*) from the Lord Buddha. There will be many delectable foods and riches for you to partake of and enjoy. It will be plentiful and inexhaustible” (*Tamnan Phra Caw Tham Nay* 1921 C.E./1283 C.S.: fol.1).¹⁷⁹

After accepting the precepts (*sīla*) from the Lord Buddha, the Lua man returns home and discovers that everything inside and outside of the house has turned into gold. We read,

“Then, he returned home and saw that everything outside and inside of the house had turned into gold. He thought to himself, “Before, I grew rice. And even that was only barely enough to keep me from starving. Today, I took the precepts (*sīla*) from the Lord

¹⁷⁹ *duu raa khun luang than maa baeng luk phat nam khÿn say naa yia hÿy yaak cay thÿa' than cung aw sin phra phuttha caw thÿa' khran waa khaaw khōng cak kin cak bōriphook nan haak cak lÿa lō læk mÿyÿn cha lae*

Buddha. Then I returned home. Everything has turned into gold. The Buddha's precepts (*sīla*) are truly magnificent. I will live by them for the rest of my life" (*Tamnan Phra Caw Tham Nay* 1921 C.E./1283 C.S.: fols. 1-2).¹⁸⁰

The second story is a folktale found in a Tai Khÿn manuscript (Peltier 2005: 185) that has been translated by Anatole-Roger Peltier. Although it does not belong the northern Thai genre of calamity cosmology, it seems to speak of an ethics of rethinking tradition, especially when read in conjunction with the previous excerpt. It is a tale about five family men living in abject poverty. Having just settled into homes in the countryside of Bārāṇasī, the men spend their day looking for work so that they can feed their family. Some days, they are reduced to begging for food, an act that brings them much grief. We are told, "Truly, in this world, no one was as unhappy as they" (Peltier 2005:191). One day, the five men decide to give up, go into the forest, and die. The next morning they pack their things and depart for the forest. They ask each other where would be a suitable place to go and die. They each answer, "No one really knows where. O miserable companions, we have let ourselves be carried away by our anger" (Peltier 2005:192). Thus, they roam the forest. Finding peace in the natural life of the forest, they forget about killing themselves. One day, they encounter a hermit practicing austerities (i.e., the *dhutanga-s*). This hermit teaches them about the moral path to *nibbāna*. The hermit tells them, "In this world, he who does not observe the precepts remains in poverty. On the contrary, he who follows the good precepts and sticks to the Truth will no doubt become rich and opulent (Mahāsetṭhi)" (Peltier 2005:194). The five men decide to take the precepts and return home. Their wives also take the precepts from their husbands who promise, "He who observes it will see his situation get better" (Peltier 2005:198). The husbands and wives having taken the

¹⁸⁰ *laew kō' maa rÿan man han lae man kō' han wadthu an mii nay rÿan lae nōōk rÿan thang muan kō' klaay kœt pen kham thang siang man kō' ramphÿng waa tae kōōn kuu yia naa maa kō' bō' lÿa lōō taay yang bō' phōō kin wan nii kō' day aw sin phra phuttha caw laew phōōk maa rÿan maa leng han an day kō' klaay pen kham siang sin phra phuttha caw nii prasœt thae lae kuu cak raksaa tōō thaw chiiwit cha lae*

precepts live as before except without feelings of resentment or anger. Each morning the men go into the forest, collect firewood, and use it to barter for food. A month later the five friends gather together and remark, “It is really strange! We observe the precepts daily and nothing propitious has happened yet. We still remain poor wretches as before” (Peltier 2005: 198). In these two stories, the same moral act of taking the precepts occurs, however, that same act takes place in two different contexts. The first story is set during the Gotama Buddha’s lifetime and the second tale implicitly takes place after Gotama Buddha’s death. The difference between the first and second story is the loss of the natural order found in the second story. This loss of order fundamentally defines the strand of cosmological thinking unique to a calamity cosmology. For the readers and writers of calamity-cosmology narratives, this loss of natural order allowed them to oppose a Three Worlds cosmology that imagined a moral community based upon a Buddhist tradition of transcendental felicities. That, in turn, allowed them to forge an idea of a moral community made of moral agents who are actors and sufferers, in short, an ethical tradition based on everyday calamities such being a powerless victim of unspeakable moral injuries or just plain poverty.

Although, I have described the oppression found in nineteenth and early twentieth century northern Thai society according to its system of administrative organization, I did not elaborate the historical period during which calamity-cosmology narratives circulated. One could accuse my approach to describing social oppression as historically de-contextualized. These writings circulated in northern Thai society for over a century. Therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint what historical changes in the socio-political milieu would have been relevant to the production and transmission of these texts. As a result of this difficulty, my analysis emphasized the manner in which calamity-cosmology narratives appeal to a person’s sense of injustice and

suffering. Instead, my interpretative framework has allowed this study to heuristically examine the category of moral community according to its basic components. Both Durkheim and Kant are useful in terms of identifying a moral community as a phenomenon having to do with moral obligation (Kant) and the human condition of being a social being (Durkheim). The implication is that my study “encourage[s] a perception of the ethical in culture and history as open-ended and connected, transformative as well as transformable” (Hallisey 2010: 142). Rather than a study of Buddhist ethics framed according to a system of concepts “thrown” into history, this dissertation has shown that one can study Buddhist moral cultures by framing it according to analytical categories found in the study of ethics, religious ethics, or anthropological theories on morality. In such a manner, this dissertation has attempted to broach how Buddhists wrote about communal fragmentation and social injustices. As a result, it was less concerned with exploring in detail the historical circumstances that may have given rise to calamity-cosmological thinking. Instead, I have used Durkheim’s point that a moral community needs authoritative ideals, literary theorists’ observation that a literary genre constitutes a voice, and a basic idea of a group as based upon jointly shared activities and interest.¹⁸¹ These three components of a moral community framed my reading and interpretation of texts. As a result, my study has engaged in a deep conversation with Buddhist perspectives on moral obligation, punishment, rebuke, revenge, and resentment. It is my hope that this study’s objective to bring to light the category of moral community in Buddhist ethics has enriched Western philosophical reflections on the interpersonal dimension of morality. In addition, these writings’ reflection on social oppression

¹⁸¹ At a basic level, the word “community” refers a group having shared interests and activities (Selznick 1992: 358).

has much to teach us about agency and its constraints. This latter phenomenon is not limited to ethics, because it has been central to our way of thinking about human agency since Marx's writings. This study closes with quote from Marx on agency and constraint, in which he states,

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx [1855] 1975: 15).

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