National Humiliation and International Conflict: Origins, Microfoundations, and Effects

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Introduction

The ongoing power transition between the United States and China has lead scholars and observers alike to question whether the two most powerful countries on the planet are "destined for war" (Allison 2017). Recently, US national security strategy has openly labeled China a "strategic competitor" for the first time. The probability China will peacefully achieve its goal of unification with Taiwan has declined dramatically, since China's 2020 imposition of a national security law on Hong Kong has shown Taiwan that Chinese promises of autonomy post-unification lack credibility (Gladstone 2020). Meanwhile, the Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang, dropped the word "peaceful" from his expression of China's desire for unification with Taiwan, and the Chinese government has increased naval and aerial patrols near Taiwan, which the US unofficially protects (Tian and Lee 2020). China's construction of artificial islands and increased military deployments in disputed areas in the East and South China Seas have further increased tensions between the US and China (Shen et al. 2019). A recent border clash between China and India that killed 20 Indian solders and inflicted undisclosed Chinese causalities has aggravated strains in the region and led some to speculate that India, along with Japan and Australia, will increasingly align with the United States in opposition to China (Rachman 2020).

Under these circumstances, it is not farfetched that Chinese and US leaders may face a crisis that requires deciding whether to use military force in the near future. Because the stakes of such a decision are immense, understanding the "latent risk factors" that could increase the probability of conflict is critical (Stein 2019, 57). Scholars have argued that

national humiliation narratives are just such a factor because they increase the probability disputes will escalate (Callahan 2010, 96; Wang 2012). In the early 1990s, the Chinese government launched the Patriotic Education Campaign to spread the narrative that China had a history of greatness but was humiliated by foreign powers. This narrative of national humiliation has since become ubiquitous in China through a multimedia campaign that exploits the power of the state to control the news and education system (Wang 2012).

Moreover, the influence of humiliation on international hostility is not limited to China, which makes understanding it even more important. Otto von Bismark provoked the Franco-Prussia war, which killed nearly 200,000 people, by editing a telegram to give the appearance that the Prussian king had been "snubbed" by the French ambassador (O'Neill 1999, 143). The "humiliation" this loss gave rise to in France led to French territorial conquest in Africa (Barnhart 2020, 113–16). O'Neill (1999) writes that prior to the start of World War I, German and Austrian leaders "talked of 'the outrage,' of 'settling accounts,' and of 'teaching Serbia a lesson' phrases suggestive more of national honor than realpolitik" (144). Schroeder (1972) writes that Britain caused the Crimean War by breaking "the first law of the Concert [of Europe], 'Thou shalt not challenge or seek to humiliate another great power'" (409).

The Vietnam War provides further examples of humiliation's influence on conflict decision making. In a speech justifying the US military campaign in Cambodia, President Nixon said that the bombing let North Vietnam know that "we will not be humiliated" (Steinberg 1996, 203). Nixon used the idea of humiliation to justify continuing to sink costs in an unpopular war, saying, "I know that a peace of humiliation for the United Sates would lead to a bigger war or surrender later" (Steinberg 1996, 204). In a 1965 draft memo outlining the US goals in Vietnam, John McNaughton ascribed a percentage of importance to each goal. The most important goal, with 70% of the importance, was "To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)" (McNaughton 1972).

Researchers have linked humiliation to important foreign policy decisions in both the Soviet Union and modern Russia. Soviet humiliation from US spy plane incursions was an

important factor in the rising tension between the US and the USSR at the beginning of the Cold War, and the humiliation Soviet leaders felt over the Cuban Missile Crisis may have contributed to the decision to seek nuclear parity with the United States (Barnhart 2020, 138–39). Further, scholars point to "humiliation" as a motivation for Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea (Larson and Shevchenko 2014).

Humiliation and International Relations

Consistent with the prominence of humiliation in these examples, scholars of war and peace have historically emphasized the importance of emotions in conflict decision making. For Thomas Hobbes, from whom modern realists often claim lineage, the passions were responsible for war. Abizadeh writes, "What does inevitably cause war, Hobbes assumed, is glory and disagreement: Humans are concerned with relative gains, but not for the structural reasons to which structural realists usually appeal. For Hobbes, relative gains seeking arises from the intrinsic desire for glory, which is not only a rival, positional good, but is also a *passion* that, without being properly socialized, in many circumstances disrupts the instrumentally rational pursuit of one's long-term objectives [my emphasis] (Abizadeh 2011, 313)." Another historical authority on conflict, Carl von Clausewitz (2006), wrote, "Modern wars are seldom fought without hatred between nations; this serves as a more or less substitute for the hatred between individuals" (86). In the 20th century, early realists too relied on emotions to explain conflict. For example, fear rather than uncertainty was the source of the security dilemma (Crawford 2000, 119).

However, in the main perspectives of modern international relations theory, emotions are notably absent. Realism treats states as unitary rational actors that are primarily concerned with relative power (Mearsheimer 2001). Neoliberal internationalism shares this view of states as unitary rational actors but places more emphasis on the ability of institutions to facilitate compromise (Keohane 1984). Bargaining theory treats preferences as fixed and

focuses on the bargaining dynamics created when states attempt to maximize their payoffs given these fixed preferences (Fearon 1995). Although constructivism does not embrace a similarly strict view of rationality, in contrast with the approach taken in this dissertation, much constructivist research tends to draw on psychoanalysis and social theory rather than experimental psychology and neuroscience (Kertzer and Tingley 2018, 9).

The reason for the absence of emotions in modern neorealist, neoliberal, and bargaining theories is that they each make the rationalist assumptions that actors use all available, relevant information, have stable preferences, and share common knowledge of history (Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein 2017; Kydd and Herrera 2018). Emotions often cause individuals to violate these assumptions because emotions can influence decisions by changing the salient aspects of a situation, changing preferences, and influencing what actors remember (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005). If preferences change based on emotional states, then they are not stable. If emotions alter the information that comes to mind, actors no longer use all relevant information. If motivated reasoning leads actors see themselves rather than their counter-parts as victims of past injustice (Herrmann 2017, 67), then they do not share common knowledge of history.

Despite the ways emotions can lead to violations of standard rationalist assumptions, emotions are not contrary to rationality. Modern neuroscience research finds that emotions are necessary for and inseparable from rational decision making (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Damasio 2005). If this is the case, then it should be possible to integrate insights about the effects of emotions on decision making with rationalist theories.

In evaluating whether rationalist assumptions should be relaxed, it is important to understand that rationalist theories do not claim their assumptions represent reality. Instead they argue that these simplifying assumptions make it easier to theorize about international relations and that the complications resulting from relaxing these assumptions do not add enough explanatory power to justify the loss in parsimony. This is not a point that should be lightly dismissed. If preferences are arbitrary and unpredictable, then international relations

theories will no longer make firm, testable predictions.

Fortunately, such a radical departure is not needed. Because emotional states affect variables relevant to rationalist theories, the effect of emotions can be conceptualized in terms of a change in these variables. In this way, the effect of being emotionally aroused can be thought of as increasing or deceasing the propensity of an actor to choose a certain option relative to the baseline rationalist prediction. This does not mean that actors are behaving irrationally in the sense of acting against their preferences (Little and Zeitzoff 2017). Instead, it means that these preferences are influenced by emotional states. Research that theorizes how particular emotional states influence actors and finds empirical evidence for these effects is necessary both to learn about how emotions influence international decision making and to incorporate this information into existing international relations theories.

A growing body of research on individual behavior in international relations has begun demonstrating the explanatory value gained by accounting for individual-level behavioral influences (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017; Little and Zeitzoff 2017). Foreign policy decisions are ultimately made by individuals. These individuals include both the leaders, who make foreign policy directly (Hymans 2006; Saunders 2014; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2014; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon 2018), and outside actors, such as citizens, who exert pressure on leaders' foreign policy decisions (Russett 2013; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Croco 2015; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Quek 2017).[1]

Increasingly, this work has started to explore how emotions affect international decisions. Actors in 'hot' or emotional states do not makes decisions the same way as actors in 'cold' states (Loewenstein 1996; McDermott 2004; Sayette et al. 2008). This emerging field has linked various emotional states and traits to conflict decision making. For example, Renshon, Lee, and Tingley (2017) show that emotional arousal can inhibit strategic thinking, causing actors to make sub-optimal decisions in bargaining. Halperin et al. (2011) find

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[1]For the argument that public pressure has a relatively limited impact, see Snyder and Borghard (2011).

that individuals who are high in hatred of the out-group are less likely to compromise in negotiations when angry. Zeitzoff (2014) finds that anger increases the propensity to punish among Israelis living in areas more exposed to rocket fire. Hatemi et al. (2013) find that individuals high in social fear have more negative opinions about out-groups. Stein (2015) finds that democracies with citizens that value revenge are more conflict prone.

In particular, the emotion of humiliation has been investigated as a potential source of conflict. Scholars have offered various mechanisms through which humiliation might increase an actor's preference for war. Some theorize that humiliation leads to conflict because humiliated actors seek revenge (Lindner 2006; Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Wang 2012). Others argue that humiliation makes people view actors that have humiliated them as enemies (Wang 2012). Still more claim that humiliated actors seek conflict to regain status, dignity, or pride (Saurette 2006; Fattah and Fierke 2009; Barnhart 2017, 2020). However, to be able to integrate humiliation with rationalist bargaining theories, which themselves rest on micro-level assumptions about behavior, and to understand *how* humiliation influences conflict preferences, we must first understand the microfoundations behind humiliation's influence on individual decision makers (Kertzer 2017).

Theoretically, we lack an account of the individual-level psychological mechanism through which the emotion of humiliation affects conflict preferences. As Barnhart (2020) notes, "Much more work remains to be done to establish the underlying microfoundations of humiliation" (182). Empirically, while research has linked international events, such as territory loss (Barnhart 2017), to conflict, it is not clear that these events are always experienced as humiliating. Further, international events like territorial loss could affect conflict though mechanisms other than humiliation. While case study evidence has show decision makers referring to humiliation when making decisions about conflict, it is impossible to know if humiliation was shaping their preferences for conflict or if their invocation of humiliation was an attempt to justify a conflict they already desired (Barnhart 2016, 2020; Wang 2012). The counterfactual of what policies would have been adopted absent humiliation is

unobservable. It is difficult if not impossible to select cases that hold all confounds constant and vary humiliation.[2] In addition to lacking direct, identified evidence of humiliation's effect on preferences, we further lack evidence able to distinguish support among the different mechanisms by which the emotion of humiliation influences conflict preferences.[3]

My theory builds these microfoundations by focusing on humiliation as an emotion, separating the individually experienced emotion of humiliation from international events that could influence foreign policy decisions through other channels. Drawing from neuroscience and experimental psychology, I offer and test two new mechanisms through which humiliation could influence belligerence. The first is that humiliation suppresses individuals' sensitivity to the costs of conflict, increasing their preference for conflict. The second is that humiliation increases the salience of future status loss, which increases how much individuals value the disputed issue today. Conceptualizing these mechanisms in terms of variables highlighted by rationalist bargaining theories, specifically the cost of conflict and the value of the disputed issue, allows insights about individual behavior to be incorporated into systematic theories of rationalist bargaining.

Humiliation and Nationalism

Scholarship on nationalism has long acknowledged the importance of emotions, yet the emotional content of nationalism and where this content comes from is often under-theorized. For example, Hobsbawm wrote of "national sentiments" that can blow back on states that manipulate them, "[. . .] such sentiments were not created but only borrowed and fostered by governments, those who did so became a kind of sorcerer's apprentice. At best they could not entirely control the forces they had released; at worst they became their prisoners"

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[2]Even a recent experiment cannot fully distinguish the effect of humiliation from the effect of international events because treatment groups that received information about international events framed to be humiliating are compared with a control group that does not receive information about these events (Barnhart 2020, 68).

[3]While Barnhart (2020) discusses mechanisms, these mechanisms do no lie on the path between humiliation and decision making, which can be seen in her directed acyclic graphs on pages 72–73.

(Hobsbawm 2012, 92).[4] However, what are these sentiments? What are the circumstances under which political groups attempt to manipulate them? Can any emotional tie to the nation create this effect or does it vary by emotion?

Often emotions are seen as a way for political groups to mobilize nationalist support. In particular, researchers have emphasized emotional nationalism as vital to the Chinese Communist Party's ability to maintain power. For example, Suisheng Zhao writes that "political elites use nationalism as an emotional glue" to hold China together (Zhao 2004, 2). In particular, the emotion of humiliation has come under scrutiny. Nathan and Ross (1998) illustrate this trend with their claim that "Chinese nationalism is powered by feelings of humiliation and pride" (34).

However, questions about where national humiliation comes from and how it spreads to become politically influential remain unclear (Barnhart 2020, 182). The prevalence of national humiliation narratives varies, even within a particular country, both across time and across political groups. If national humiliation narratives are a way to gain legitimacy, as some scholars have argued (Wang 2012, 9), then why do political actors only sometimes use this strategy?

Explaining how individual emotional reactions spread is an important part of bridging the gap between individual-level research on the influence of emotions and nationalism on foreign policy preferences and state-level foreign policy outcomes (Hall and Ross 2015, 848). Emotional narratives that link emotions to group identities play a key role in connecting individual emotional experiences to intergroup conflicts (Matsumoto, Frank, and Hwang 2015, 370). Understanding where these narratives come from would also help explain when these emotions influence foreign policy preferences in particular states and what groups are influenced.

To explain when political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation, I combine insights from political psychology and constructivism. Breaking from the prevailing view

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[4]See also Smith (2010, 72–78).

that narratives of national humiliation are largely driven by traumatic or humiliating events (Jaffrelot 1999; Kaldor 2004; Miller 2013; Badie 2017), I argue that narratives of national humiliation are socially constructed based on the national identities of political groups and their strategic incentives. In order to construct a national humiliation narrative, an actor must be a member of the national identity claimed to be humiliated. Political groups strategically choose to propagate narratives of national humiliation when these groups can avoid responsibility for the event they are framing as humiliating and tie their political opponents to this event. Further, these narratives help promote policies which pose short-term costs to the public but can be framed as necessary to defend the nation.

The Argument in Brief

This dissertation answers the question of how national humiliation affects foreign policy preferences by explaining how humiliation influences decision making at the individual level. It also clarifies when political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation and when these narratives are most likely to appeal to the public. Humiliation is characterized by moral outrage and the perception of a hostile perpetrator. Further, this externally directed hostility extends beyond perceived perpetrators to all of those outside of the reference group. In the context of national humiliation, the reference group is the nation, so humiliation increases hostility towards non-nationals. This increases individuals' preferences for policies that take hostile actions against non-nationals, which I refer to as conflict preferences.

The mechanism through which humiliation increases conflict preferences is by decreasing individuals' sensitivity to the cost of conflict. Humiliation is an intense and cognitively demanding emotion that makes concentrating on other concerns difficult. It is particularly likely to interfere with thoughts that go against its tendency towards hostile actions. This makes humiliated individuals less able and less willing to consider the costs of hostile actions, which decreases the effective cost of war. The reduced cost of war results in a smaller

bargaining range, which increases the probability of bargaining failure and international conflict.

The scope condition for this conflict-promoting effect is that an individual must experience the emotion of humiliation when making a decision about conflict. I argue humiliation affects the decision making of leaders and citizens alike. However, if leaders are unemotional decision makers, then this requires the additional scope condition that leaders must be under pressure from an interest group, for example citizens, that is subject to humiliation for humiliation to affect policy. Narratives of national humiliation increase the probability that both of these conditions are met.

A combination of national identity and strategic considerations determine when political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation. To articulate a narrative of national humiliation, a political group must share a national identity with its audience but not with the humiliator. Because political groups are office seeking, they will disseminate narratives of national humiliation when they can blame their political opponent for the event they construct as humiliating but escape blame themselves. Since, humans involuntarily exhibit both verbal and nonverbal signals of emotions to which others automatically attend, a leader must feel humiliation to persuasively deliver a narrative of national humiliation. For this reason, political groups disseminating narratives of national humiliation select leaders who genuinely experience national humiliation. Further, even instrumentally motivated leaders emotionally rouse themselves when speaking on national humiliation. They may do this intentionally to increase sincerity, or it may be an unintended result of their emotional performance. Consequently, the strategic incentives to propagate narratives of national humiliation are inextricably linked with experience of the emotion.

Propagation of a national humiliation narrative does not guarantee that citizens will embrace it. Three conditions increase the probability national humiliation narratives will resonate with their audience. First, groups propagating narratives of national humiliation must enjoy a relatively open environment. If the state immediately quashes groups promoting

humiliation narratives, then these groups will fail to reach their audience. Second, groups promoting national humiliation narratives require dense networks linking them to their audience. Media networks allow the narrative to spread, and institutional networks increase its durability and reach. Further, narratives of national humiliation appeal more strongly to individuals living above the economic subsistence level. Relief from the concerns of basic survival make citizens more able and willing to mobilize over symbolic issues.

A combination of the leader selection and leader self-rousing effects described previously cause the leadership of political groups promoting national humiliation narratives to become increasingly composed of individuals experiencing national humiliation. This in conjunction with the spread of these sentiments among citizens has important foreign policy implications due to the conflict-fostering properties of the emotion of humiliation.

The Plan of the Dissertation

Before laying out the plan of this dissertation, I want to recognize the difficulties of empirical studies of emotional politics. Emotional states are not directly observable, and even in the context of an experiment, accurate measurement is challenging. Further, emotions often occur in confluence with other emotions, making it difficult to parse the effects of a particular emotion, like humiliation (Myers and Tingley 2016). Some argue that these challenge imply scholars should give up on positivist accounts of the effects of single emotions (Ross 2014, 58–59). While I do not share this perspective, I would be remiss not to acknowledge that the difficulty of precisely measuring the emotional states of actors and the effects of these states on decision making necessarily increases as my research moves further from the lab. At the same time, it is important to show evidence that the effects found in the experiments influence actual international relations decision making.

To balance the goals of clearly establishing the causal link between the emotion of humiliation and decision making while also establishing the foreign policy relevance of these

findings, I have adopted a mixed-methods approach. I use this approach to examine theoretical implications at multiple levels of analysis, starting at the individual level and moving to the macrohistorical level. First, I carefully establish the microfoundations of the effects of the emotion of humiliation on individual decision making with experiments. Then, I examine how national humiliation narratives circulate at the interpersonal level through social media networks and how this influences foreign policy debates using a combination of machine learning and time series analysis. Finally, I examine the conditions under which political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation in China and India over the 20th century.

Chapter 2 contains my theories of both how humiliation influences foreign policy preferences and how it gains political relevance. I began by defining humiliation and distinguishing it from other emotions. Then, drawing on research from neuroscience and experimental psychology, I theorize that humiliation increases individuals' preferences for hostile, costly foreign policies by decreasing their sensitivity to the cost of these policies. I also hypothesize that humiliation could increase preferences for conflict through an additional mechanism, raising the salience of the status implications of disputes. I further lay out some scope conditions under which these preference changes are most likely to influence foreign policy outcomes. Policy influence is most likely when the individuals making policy decisions are either humiliated themselves or under pressure from individuals who are. These conditions are more likely to be met when national humiliation narratives have tied past humiliations to current disputes.

The second part of my theory addresses the circumstances under which political groups are mostly likely to propagate national humiliation narratives and when these narratives will be most appealing to their audience. I theorize that political groups will be more likely to spread national humiliation narratives when they can blame their political opponent for the event they are framing as humiliating while escaping blame themselves. I further argue that political groups who wish to motivate their audience to make sacrifices on behalf of the nation are more likely to promote narratives of national humiliation. National humiliation narratives

are most likely to resonate when they are not repressed, when the groups promoting them have dense links with their audience through media and institutional networks, and when their audience is living above the economic subsistence level.

Chapter 3 examines the microfoundations of humiliation's effect on decision making, testing my hypotheses about the influence of the emotion of humiliation on individual conflict preferences. Before examining foreign policy preferences in practice, it is important to establish that humiliation actually does influence conflict preferences and understand the mechanisms through which it does so. I conduct both a survey experiment and a laboratory experiment where I manipulate both the emotion of humiliation as well as potential mechanisms through which it could influence conflict preferences. The laboratory experiment allows deeper exploration of the cost mechanism in an environment where respondents face real, monetary costs to choosing conflict. Both experiments find that humiliation increases preferences for conflict and that it does so by decreasing sensitivity to the cost of conflict. However, the hypothesis that humiliation increases preferences for conflict by raising the salience of the status implications of disputes is not supported.

After establishing the microfoundations of the theory, Chapter 4 examine whether humiliation's influence on conflict preferences plays out in practice as it did in the experiments. If national humiliation increases an individual's support for costly, hostile policies, then expressions of national humiliation should correlate with advocacy of more aggressive foreign policies. I examine the relationships between national humiliation narratives and support for three costly, hostile foreign policy positions: using military force, maintaining disputed territorial claims, and raising trade barriers. I examine these relationships in Chinese social media using a large, representative data set of more than 1.6 billion Chinese social media posts created from 2009 to 2014 that, to my knowledge, has not previously been used to study politics. I find that posts containing national humiliation narratives are more likely to express support for each hostile foreign policy option. Using time series analysis, I further find that national humiliation posts elevate the number of posts advocating each of the costly,

hostile foreign policy options in subsequent days.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine where national humiliation narratives come from and when they become politically influential. I examine political groups in China and India from the turn of the 20th century to 1999. I also search for conditions that make the political strategy of using narratives of national humiliation more likely to succeed. I find that political groups that can avoid blame for the event they frame as humiliating and blame their opponent are more likely to spread narratives of national humiliation. I further find that political groups wishing to inspire sacrifice on the behalf on the nation are more likely to promote national humiliation narratives. This explanation provides a better account of the behavior of Chinese and Indian political groups than alternate explanations including that narratives of national humiliation are caused by: traumatic events, legitimacy crises, and international bargaining dynamics. I also find that national humiliation narrative propagation is most successful when political groups propagating the narratives are not repressed, when dense networks link these groups to their audience, and when their audience's economic welfare is above subsistence levels.

Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for international relations theory and foreign policy. Theoretically, this dissertation provides an account of the microfoundations of how humiliation influences foreign policy preferences on the individual level, the "mesofoundations" of how this emotion spreads socially through media networks (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017, 546), and the political dynamics that give rise to national humiliation narratives in the first place. This has implications for major theoretical questions, including how knowledge about behavioral influences on decision making can be integrated with rationalist theories and how individual-level influences aggregate up to a level where they become policy relevant.[5]

For foreign policy, the theory indicates that countries that have narratives of national

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[5]On the importance of integrating behavioral insights with rationalist theories, see Kertzer (2017), Renshon, Lee, and Tingley (2017), Hafner-Burton et al. (2017), Little and Zeitzoff (2017). On the importance of understanding how individual-level influences aggregate, see Hall and Ross (2015) and Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).

humiliation tied to disputes, will demand more from dispute settlement offers than would be expected without accounting for national humiliation's effect on their decision making. This means that countries on the other side of these disputes will need to take this into account during bargaining or risk having their settlement offers rejected, leading to bargaining failure and potential military conflict. Countries with national humiliation narratives tied to their disputes may also be more difficult to deter because they are less sensitive to the cost of fighting. This applies to a wide range of international disputes, including the critically important disputes involving China outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

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2

The Origins of National Humiliation and its Effect on Foreign Policy Preferences

In the early 1990s, the Chinese government's Patriotic Education Campaign propagated the narrative that foreign powers humiliated and took advantage of China during the 'Century of National Humiliation' from 1839–1949. Scholars have suggested this narrative of humiliation has had serious political consequences, namely by increasing the Chinese government's tendency to escalate international disputes (Callahan 2010; Wang 2012, 96). Similarly, Hindu nationalist groups including the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have promoted narratives of India's historical "humiliation and subjugation" (Singh 2013, 117). Other scholars point to "humiliation" as a motivation for Russia's annexation of Crimea (Larson and Shevchenko 2014).

Are public statements of humiliation merely bargaining bluster (Weiss 2014), or can humiliation actually increase individuals' willingness for war? The answer matters because if a state's cost of war falls, then the bargaining range shrinks, making conflict more likely (Fearon 1995). Yet, the major theories of international relations largely dismiss this question. Rational choice theories, including bargaining theory, realism, and liberal institutionalism, abstract away from emotions, arguing that one can largely account for important international behavior without resorting to emotional explanations. For these theories, expressions of humiliation can be discounted.

Other scholars have attempted to bring behavioral influences, like emotions, back into international relations theory, yet how to integrate behavioral insights with systematic rational theories remains a challenge (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). Such scholars have offered various mechanisms through which humiliation might increase an actor's preference for war. Some theorize that humiliation leads to conflict because humiliated actors seek revenge (Lindner 2006; Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Wang 2012). Others argue that humiliation makes people view actors that have humiliated them as enemies (Wang 2012). Still more claim that humiliated actors seek conflict to regain status, dignity, or pride (Saurette 2006; Fattah and Fierke 2009; Barnhart 2017). However, to be able to integrate humiliation with rational bargaining theories, which themselves rest on micro-level assumptions about behavior, and to understand *how* humiliation influences conflict preferences, we must first understand the microfoundations behind humiliation's influence on individual decision makers (Kertzer 2017).

A closely connected question is where do national humiliation narratives come from? Understanding when political groups use these narratives matters for three reasons. First, the possibility these narratives could increase the probability of war makes it important to understand what causes them. Second, explaining how individual emotional reactions spread is an important part of bridging the gap between individual-level research on the influence of emotions and nationalism on foreign policy preferences and state-level foreign policy outcomes (Hall and Ross 2015, 848). Emotional narratives that link emotions to group identities play a key role in connecting individual emotional experiences to intergroup conflicts (Matsumoto, Frank, and Hwang 2015, 370). Third, understanding where these narratives come from would also help explain when these emotions influence foreign policy preferences.

In theorizing about the relationship of humiliation and international conflict, I start by defining humiliation and distinguishing it from events that may evoke humiliation as well as other emotions. Second, I discuss the effects of humiliation on conflict decision

making. Third, I specify the scope conditions under which these effects influence foreign policy. Finally, I examine when political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation and when these narratives are most likely to appeal to the public.

1 Defining Humiliation

Before theorizing about humiliation's effects, it is necessary to define humiliation independently from international events and distinguish it from other emotional states. Humiliation is "the deep dysphoric feeling associated with being, or perceiving oneself as being, unjustly degraded, ridiculed, or put down—in particular, one's identity has been demeaned or devalued" (Hartling and Luchetta 1999, 264). While humiliation is an emotion experienced individually, triggers for humiliation target one's identity, and identities may be shared socially. Although individuals are the ones who adopt identities, these identities are created from raw material that is constructed collectively (Hymans 2006, 26–27). This does not imply that aggregate groups or states experience emotions. Because emotions take place within individuals' brains, emotional reactions can only occur at the individual level (McDermott 2014, 562). However, this does not deny that individuals who share an identity can have an increased propensity to have similar emotional responses at times when these identities are activated (Mercer 2014; Sasley 2011).

Not all decreases in self-esteem or losses of face, where face is the expectation among the members of your social group about the deference you will receive (O'Neill 1999, 139), constitute humiliation. The humiliated perceive that the humiliator has committed a grave injustice. This distinguishes humiliation from shame because when ashamed one feels that it is oneself who did something unjust (Leidner, Sheikh, and Ginges 2012). "People believe they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation" (Klein 1991, 117). Experimental evidence supports this distinction (Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin 2015, 5). This distinction contrasts my approach with psychoanalytic accounts of humiliation, which

often treat humiliation and shame as interchangeable (Vogel and Lazare 1990, 140; Steinberg 1996, 8; Fontan 2006, 218). The key is that the humiliating action is perceived as unjust, not whether it truly is. This also distinguishes humiliation from stigma because stigma involves the internalization of values that indicate your identity group has done something wrong, making it more similar to shame (Zarakol 2011, 7). In contrast with shame and stigma, moral outrage is a key component of humiliation (Leidner, Sheikh, and Ginges 2012).

Humiliation is distinct from status because status is a hierarchy that must be recognized by a community while humiliation is an emotional state (Renshon 2016, 519). However, the perception of losing status can trigger the emotion of humiliation (Elison and Harter 2007, 311).

The humiliator need not have intended their act to humiliate, and no audience is necessary.[1] Individuals insulted without the presence of an audience have similar behavioral and physiological responses to individuals insulted with an audience present (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, 49–52). This is consistent with the idea that humiliation is an individual emotional response distinct from a communally determined status hierarchy. Because humiliation involves the gap between the treatment members of an identity group believe they deserve and the treatment they receive, a group's pretension to higher levels of deference and respect than others believe they are owed can increase the likelihood and intensity of humiliation (Miller 1993, 10).[2]

1.1 National Humiliation

For national humiliation, the relevant identity group of the humiliated is their nation. Personal humiliation is much less likely to spread socially. To resonate politically, humiliation must be framed as a matter of public concern and the public, or at least an important segment of it, must accept this framing. While individuals may be humiliated through identities other than national identities, other kinds of humiliation are likely to lead to different outcomes.

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[1] However, research suggests larger audiences intensify the effect of humiliation (Combs et al. 2010).

[2] See also Callahan 2010, 10.

Minority groups might use humiliation narratives to mobilize against social discrimination, but they are unlikely to be able to use this as a political strategy to take control of the state. They are also unlikely to conceive of foreign policy solutions to their humiliation. I focus on national humiliation because I am primarily interested the potential of humiliation to influence foreign policy.

Because national identities are socially constructed, their content may vary both over time and across nationalist groups as well as be contested by individual members of a nation. The construction of an event as humiliating takes place through *humiliation narratives* that specify the humiliating event, the humiliated group, and the humiliator. These narratives are shared socially and are distinct from humiliation itself, which is an emotion that individuals may experience when exposed to these narratives. This is in line with Krebs (2015b)'s conception of narratives as selective presentations of events that tell causal stories that impose order on the world and contain characters (137). Research on emotions indicates that they are particularly suited for use in narrative creation. Further, the core emotional appraisal, or the cognitive meaning given to the emotional events, influences individuals interpretations of each part of the narrative (Frijda 2007, 183).[3] The social sharing of emotions as well as tying emotions to identities and goals can extend their duration (Frijda 2007, 189, 273).

For a potentially humiliating event to become politically salient, domestic political actors must frame that event as humiliating and that framing must resonate with their audience. Sometimes the framing may take place many years after the event, when domestic politics creates an opportunity for humiliation strategies to become successful. Even if an event is not initially framed as humiliating, political actors may later reframe that event. Actors can reimagine past events as humiliating, even if people living at the time of these events did not experience national humiliation. Further, it is possible for actors to restart a national

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[3]Cognitive approaches to emotions are sometimes criticized as ignoring the nonconscious aspects of emotional experience (Ross 2014, 19–20). This criticism does not apply to appraisal theory. As Frijda (2007) writes, "True enough, the term *cognitive* may cause confusion. It suggests declarative as well as conscious representations, neither o which is implied when appraisal theorists use the word" [original emphasis] (102).

humiliation narrative that has gone ignored for many years, as long as they find a receptive audience.

If it is not events but how events are constructed in the context of existing national identities that determines the creation of national humiliation narratives, then researchers must examine the discourse of particular national groups to determine the concerns at the core of those identities. According to Hall and Ross, "Concerns are what we care about—objects, values, and goals that will, when meaningfully implicated in a situation, elicit emotions" (Hall and Ross 2015, 854). Individuals must hold a particular national issue as a concern to be subject to national humiliation over that issue.

Events involving national symbols are more easily framed as national humiliation. National humiliation may occur directly or indirectly through an insult or focal symbol and may or may not involve material harm (O'Neill 1999). Examples of acts that involve material harm and could be perceived as national humiliation include the destruction of a national religious site or the capture of national homeland (Hassner 2009; Shelef 2010; Shelef 2016; Veer 1994; Penrose 2002; Callahan 2004). Other potentially humiliating acts are solely symbolic. Metaphors (for example, the nation as a person represented in the form of a national leader) and prototypes (such as a national flag) can symbolize the nation (O'Neill 1999, 13). Perceived insults or slights to these national symbols may not entail material harm but still be taken seriously by nationalists. For example, the Indian foreign minister recently threatened to deny visas to all Amazon employees, despite the fact that this would pose a significant cost to the Indian economy, unless Amazon apologized for selling a doormat depicting the Indian flag and removed it from its store (Bearak 2017). Because a national symbol like the flag is taken to represent the nation as a whole, insults to these symbols may be considered attacks on the nation. Commemorating past humiliations is a way of activating group identities and connecting them to emotions (Frijda 2007, 287).

2 Humiliation and International Conflict

An emerging field of emotions and international relations research has linked various emotional states and traits to conflict decision making. Renshon, Lee, and Tingley (2017) show that emotional arousal can inhibit strategic thinking, causing actors to make suboptimal decisions in bargaining. Halperin et al. (2011) find that individuals who are high in hatred of the out-group are less likely to compromise in negotiations when angry. Zeitzoff (2014) finds that anger increases the propensity to punish among Israelis living in areas more exposed to rocket fire. Hatemi et al. (2013) find that individuals high in social fear have more negative opinions about out-groups. Stein (2015) finds that democracies that value revenge, measured by whether they allow capital punishment, are more conflict prone.

Some of these theories have linked humiliation to conflict (Wang 2012; Badie 2017; Barnhart 2017; Barnhart 2020). I build on this work by separating humiliation as an emotion from *events* that are experienced as humiliating. Distinguishing humiliation as an emotion from events that may cause it has several advantages. First, if humiliation is just the result of international events, then it cannot have an independent impact on foreign policy. Separating humiliation from events allows theorization of the mechanisms through which humiliation influences conflict preferences. Second, it allows examining whether particular events actually cause humiliation in the first place. Events do not come with emotions attached. The cognitive meaning individuals attribute to events (appraisal) plays an important role in determining what emotion individuals experience (Frijda 2007, 97).

Third, understanding humiliation's emotional aspects provides microfoundations for theories about humiliation and conflict preferences. Theorizing the effect of humiliation on individual preferences avoids the pitfalls of attributing emotions to the state (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, 18). This enables examining individual-level differences in humiliation as well as how humiliation spreads socially through national narratives.

2.1 Humiliation's Effect on Individual Conflict Preferences

Here I derive expectations about humiliation's influence on conflict preferences. Just as is common with rationalist theorizations of bargaining, I abstract away from the specific issue at stake between states (Fearon 1995; Fearon 2018). I do this in order to focus on the way that the emotional state of humiliation affects individual-level conflict preferences, regardless of specific foreign-policy goals. While I use the term 'conflict preferences,' the logic of the theory applies generally to preferences regarding policies that take hostile actions against non-nationals.

To understand the effects of humiliation on decision making, I turn to neuroscience and experimental psychology. From research in these fields, I derive several reasons to expect that humiliation will increase conflict preferences. First, humiliation is an intense emotion. An experiment that recorded electro-encephalograms (EEG) while subjects read stories associated with various emotions found that "humiliation is indeed a particularly demanding emotional experience at the level of neuro-cognitive and emotional processing, more so than other approach-related emotions such as happiness and anger" and that "humiliation is a more intense emotional experience than happiness, shame, or anger" (Otten and Jonas 2014, 29, 32). This is important because more intense emotions are more likely to influence motivations (Smith and Pope 1992; Frijda 2007, 25–26). More cognitively demanding emotions are also more likely to take control precedence, which inhibits processing of information antithetical to the action of tendency of these emotions (Frijda 2007, 41).

Second, while both approach responses, which cause individuals to move towards the object of emotional concern, and withdraw responses, which do the opposite, have been recorded with humiliation (Vogel and Lazare 1990, 141; Atran and Ginges 2008; Torres and Bergner 2010, 200–201; Walker and Knauer 2011, 726), there are several reasons to expect an approach rather than a withdrawal response in an international relations context. Violent, approach responses from humiliation are more likely when an individual identifies as an "outsider who has become an enemy of the community" (Torres and Bergner 2010,

200–01). Approach responses to humiliation are also more likely when it involves intense anger, which alone is not sufficient for violence (Walker and Knauer 2011, 727; Leidner, Sheikh, and Ginges 2012, 4). In international relations, the role of enemy is well defined and readily available, and actors often see other nations as out-groups (Herrmann et al. 1997). An injustice appraisal that increases the emphasis on the moral outrage (anger) component of humiliation is particularly likely in in-group/out-group comparisons because motivated reasoning leads people to see their own group as the victim (Herrmann 2017, 67). This perception that the humiliating action is unjust increases the probability of approach reactions (Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin 2015, 6). In the case of international threat, approach emotions should increase the probability of a fight (intervene) rather than a flight (buck-passing) reaction.

Third, unlike similar emotions, such as shame, humiliation is associated with the perception of a hostile perpetrator (Fernández et al. 2018, 2). Because emotions direct attention to actions that remedy the emotional concern at stake (Mesquita and Frijda 2011, 782), humiliation motivates action against perceived perpetrators. Further, this hostility is *not limited to perceived humiliatiors* but can extend to other actors as well (Elison and Harter 2007; Barnhart 2017, 319; Frijda 2007, 274).

Despite this information, the evidence linking humiliation to conflictual responses is limited. Much of the psychological work on humiliation tends to focus on the causes rather than the effects of humiliation (Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin 2015, 2). In fact, "In the case of humiliation, very little is known about its behavioral consequences [. . .]" (Otten and Jonas 2014, 32). This makes the development of theories of humiliation and conflict with clear microfoundations even more important.

This leads to the hypothesis that:

Hypothesis 1 (H1) *The emotional state of humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict.*

How does humiliation do this? Understanding the mechanism is vital to provide microfoun-

dations to the theory, to understand when the theory is most likely to apply, and to provide research guidance on case selection and which mechanisms to examine.

Broadly speaking there are two ways that emotions can influence preferences about conflict. They can either increase the perceived benefits of conflict or decrease the restraint of the cost of conflict. It is likely that humiliation has some effect on both cost and benefit considerations, but its effect on one may be stronger than the other. This makes it useful to theorize expectations of humiliation's effect on conflict propensity when the benefits vs. the cost component of the effect dominates. I will refer to mechanisms that decrease the restraint of the cost of conflict as cost-side mechanisms and mechanisms that increase the perceived benefits of conflict as benefits-side mechanisms. I restrict this theorization to the interesting case where the benefits of conflict are not already so high that actors in any emotional state would choose conflict. The conceptualization of humiliation's influence in terms of cost and benefit considerations does *not* imply that this is a rationalist account of humiliation, but it does have the advantage of making the integration of this theory with existing rationalist accounts straightforward. The difference is that in this account, preferences are not fixed but changed based on actor's emotional states.

Whether cost-side or benefits-side mechanisms dominate humiliation's effect on conflict preferences has implications for the magnitude of the increase in conflict preferences due to humiliation across different costs of conflict. At low values of cost, the cost component cannot decrease the restraint of the cost of conflict much because it is already low. At higher values of cost, there is more room for cost-side mechanisms to decrease the influence of cost on decision making. In contrast, benefits-side mechanisms increase conflict preferences uniformly across all values of cost because higher benefits make individuals more likely to choose conflict independently of cost.

If the effect of humiliation is mostly cost driven, then humiliation would only have a minor effect at low costs of conflict because only the smaller benefits-side effect is operating, but once the cost of conflict rises beyond a certain point, the effect of humiliation on conflict

propensity would start to increase as non-humiliated individuals choose conflict at lower rates but humiliated individuals are less sensitive to this rising cost. In other words, humiliation would have a small effect on conflict preferences when costs are low but a large effect when costs are high. In contrast, if the effect of humiliation on conflict preferences is mostly benefits driven, humiliation would increase propensity for conflict across all values of the cost of conflict. Any increase in humiliation's effect as the cost of conflict increases would be relatively minor, since most of the effect comes from benefits-side mechanisms. In other words, humiliation would generally increase preferences for conflict and any differences in the magnitude of this increase across the cost of conflict would be slight.

I offer two new mechanisms, one on the cost side and one on the benefits side, through which humiliation may influence conflict preferences. These mechanisms are not exhaustive. However, they have the strongest theoretical case for influencing preferences at the individual level. These mechanisms are neither dependent on each other nor mutually exclusive. It must be determined empirically whether one, either, or both operate.

First, humiliation should increase individuals' preferences for conflict by making them less sensitive to the cost of conflict.[4] Emotions have a corresponding action readiness that prepares the person experiencing them to achieve a particular aim (Frijda 2007, 27). These action tendencies are "reward insensitive", meaning that "Foresight of bad outcomes tends not to deflect from their purpose [...For example,] in urge for revenge, you risk sacrificing your life [...]" (Frijda 2007, 46). This is particularly the case for strong emotions (Elster 2012, 156–58).

Humiliation could also decrease the impact of perceived costs on decision making. Emo-

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[4]There are two reasons why this cost mechanism is distinct from prospect theory's prediction that individuals facing losses will become more risk acceptant (Levy 1992). First, the emotional experience of humiliation is not the same as facing losses with regard to the decision at hand. One could be humiliated for reasons that are not directly tied to the dispute. Humiliated individuals might be confronted either with the prospect of gains or losses, but as long as one is in this state, one is less sensitive to the cost of conflict in general. Second, *cost sensitivity* and *risk preference* are not the same. Given two options with the same expected value, a risk acceptant person will choose the riskier option. In contrast, being less sensitive to cost changes the expected value of the options because cost now has a lower impact on the utility function. If you are less sensitive to cost, then you are more likely to choose a strategy that could result in costly conflict, independently of the likelihood that strategy will lead to conflict (the risk).

tions interfere with the processing of information that is antithetical to their action tendency (Frijda 2007, 41). The especially intense cognitive demands humiliation poses make it particularly likely to interfere (Otten and Jonas 2014, 29, 32). Because humiliation with a strong injustice appraisal leads to a hostile approach action tendency, individuals experiencing humiliation may discount the costs of taking hostile actions or simply be less able to integrate this information into their decision process.

Hypothesis 2a (H2a) *Humiliation increases conflict preferences through decreasing individuals' sensitivity to the costs of conflict.*

The second mechanism is a benefits-side mechanisms involving status. Humiliation can make individuals think they stand to gain status if they prevail in a conflict and lose status if they back down. I will refer to this mechanism of leading individuals to attribute status value to the dispute when they otherwise would not as increasing the salience of status. Humiliated people express heightened fears of future humiliation (Hartling and Luchetta 1999, 263, 270). Because status loss can result in feelings of humiliation (Otten and Jonas 2014), humiliated individuals should particularly be alert for situations where they might lose status. This could cause them to attribute status implications to dispute outcomes when they would not otherwise.

In international relations, status refers to a country's standing in a global hierarchy. It is distinct from reputation, which lacks this relational aspect where one country's status depends on its ranking in comparison with other countries (Renshon 2016, 519–20). Individuals can value their state's status either intrinsically or because they believe that it will make them more likely to be able to achieve other outcomes they desire.

This explanation supposes that humiliation increases the *salience* rather than the *value* of status. This is important because people in general tend to value status. However, many issues are at stake in conflict decision making, and individuals cannot keep them all in mind at once. Instead they assess how a policy will affect one or two salient values and this influences their assessment of the policy's other impacts (Jervis 1976, 137). Emotional

arousal makes some risks more salient than others (Vertzberger 1998, 45). In situations where the status implications of a dispute are not obvious, humiliated individuals are more likely to believe that status is at stake. This can increase their assessment of the stakes and, hence, the perceived benefits of choosing conflict.

However, does increasing the salience of status increase the appeal of conflict, or does it simply displace other motivations for conflict? The way humiliation increases status's salience should, on average, increase the likelihood of conflict. The belief that one stands to lose status if one concedes on the dispute increases the payoff of fighting relative to backing down. Other considerations that status could displace may or may not make conflict more appealing. In the case where status displaces another consideration that equally points toward conflict, it will not increase the probably of conflict, but when it displaces neutral considerations or considerations that point against choosing conflict, it will increase the appeal of conflict. Therefore, on average, increasing the salience of the status value of the dispute raises the appeal of conflict.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b) *Humiliation increases conflict preferences through increasing the salience of future status loss.*

2.2   Cross-cultural Generalizability

Because national identities are socially constructed, the events likely to be constructed as national humiliations vary across cultures. However, the emotional state of humiliation itself as well as its effects on decision making should be similar. There is broad evidence for the universality of emotions and their action tendencies.[5] While some of this evidence has been challenged recently, much of the disagreement stems from whether statistical patterns in emotional brain activity should be interpreted as discrete emotions or more general emotional processes (Barrett 2017). My theory primarily draws on appraisal theory, which analyzes emotions as phenomena that have both cognitive and physiological content. On the subject

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[5]See also Ekman (1992), Ekman and Friesen (1971), and Elfenbein and Ambady (2002).

of the universality of emotions, appraisal theory argues that while "It is still possible that what is universal are not emotional dispositions, but human and animal concerns plus the contingencies in subject-environment interaction that emotions respond to: threat, need and opportunity for bonding, and the like. One may also argue that what is finite and restricted are the limited sets of possible or conceivable relational changes, such as self-protection and forceful opposition" (Frijda 2007, 34–35, 56–57). For my purposes, it does not matter whether emotions are shared because they are innate or because humans globally face broadly similar concerns. As long as an individual can experience an emotional state that we would recognize as humiliation, then my theory about humiliation's effects on decision making should apply.

Still, one might insist that emotional states differ across cultures. There is a psychological theory that corresponds to this way of thinking called the "theory of constructed emotions," which argues that an individual's experience of an emotion depends on their knowledge of socially constructed "emotional concepts"(Barrett 2017, xiii, 92). An implication of this theory is that emotions are not innate and vary by culture (Barrett 2017, xii). However, even proponents of this theory acknowledge that computers are able to find systematic variation in brain scans that corresponds to different emotions and that the existence of this systematic variation provides a foundation for generalizations about how populations experience emotions on average (Barrett 2017, 16, 23–24). In practice, advocates of the theory of constructed emotions tend to also make use of appraisal models because of the value of their parsimony (Fox et al. 2018, 404). Further, the amount of exposure to emotional concepts required according to Barrett, a leading proponent of this theory, are minimal. As little as learning the name of an emotion and its definition can enable one to experience it (Barrett 2017, 54). This implies that cultures exposed to globalization would have been exposed to the emotional concept of humiliation.

3 Implications for International Behavior

In this section, I discuss the implications humiliation's individual-level effect on conflict preferences has for foreign policy decisions. First, I discuss the scope conditions that need to be met for humiliation to influence conflict decisions. These include both who can be influenced and when this influence should occur. Second, I describe the observable implications the theory has for foreign policy behavior. While this dissertation only examines the empirical evidence for the implications discussed in this section regarding expressions of national humiliation and expressions of support for hostile foreign policies, including the other implications has value because they provide empirical implications for future research to test to further evaluate the theory. Further these implications help make clear the substantive importance of the theory by explicating its implications for major foreign policy outcomes, like conflict.

3.1 Scope Conditions

The first scope condition has to do with to *whom* the theory applies. I argue below that both elites and citizens are subject to the influence of humiliation on conflict preferences. However, I also discuss the implications for the theory if elites are insulated from emotional influences. A critic could argue that leaders do not make decisions about conflict on a whim and can delay their decisions to limit the effect of extreme emotions (McDermott 2004). However, elites are not necessarily motivated by the high stakes of their decisions to use better information processing techniques, even when they are not under time pressure (Vertzberger 1998, 390). Leaders may be unable to avoid emotional influences even with conscious effort. Individuals in hot (emotional) states struggle to imagine how they would think in cold states (Loewenstein 1996, 281–284).[6] The emotional motivation for retaliation is enduring, which might make it persist even if the decision is delayed (Löwenheim and

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[6]See also Nordgren, Pligt, and Harreveld (2007), and Van Boven and Loewenstein (2005), and Sayette et al. (2008).

Heimann 2008; Frijda 2007, 272–273).

Rational decision-making cannot be separated from emotions, and leaders, not only citizens, experience emotional influences on their decisions (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Damasio 2005). Even China's top leadership discussing the United States' 1999 bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade—accidental according to U.S. accounts—behind closed doors speculated that it was done intentionally to humiliate China (Zong 2002). The fact that content of this discussion was not intended to be public suggests that the leaders' connection of national humiliation to this incident was not simply to mobilize public support. Their interpretation of this event may have been influenced by narratives of national humiliation the CCP began to promote years earlier.

While one might imagine that emotions affect decision making differently for leaders than for the general public, the experimental evidence is beginning to stack up against the idea that elites are more rational or less biased decision makers than the public (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; Renshon 2015; Sheffer et al. 2018). Experiments conducted on leader and public perceptions about conflict have "obtained nearly identical results" (Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2019, 18). In the context of emotions, the evidence suggests that, if anything, politically sophisticated individuals are more likely to have emotional responses to politics and that these responses have a greater influence on their behavior (Miller 2011). Regarding bargaining, experiments show that elites are even more likely than the general public to reject unfavorable offers that are still better than no deal (LeVeck et al. 2014). This does not imply that leaders act *irrationally* in the sense of acting against their preferences (Little and Zeitzoff 2017, 524). Rather, it means preferences are endogenous to emotional states.

However, even if leaders themselves are somehow isolated from the influences of emotions, public pressure can force them to behave as though they are influenced. This is not limited to democracies. The Japanese premier who signed the Washington System treaties, which limited the build-up of naval forces in the Pacific prior to WWII, was shot and killed by a nationalist (Campbell 2016, 109). Chinese officials are wary of moderating China's South

China Sea claims for fear of being proclaimed a "traitor who suggests backing down" (Lynch 2015, 196). Some contend that nationalism and the emotions it evokes are more influential in authoritarian regimes than in democracies because nationalism is often the only accepted form of public criticism.[7] Further, it is difficult for leaders to change nationalist narratives in the short term, and authoritarian regimes that base their legitimacy on nationalism risk instability when they repress nationalists (Gries 2005, 46, 120). Even if the probability of losing office is lower for autocrats, they are more sensitive to it because they face harsher consequences, such as death and imprisonment, than democratic leaders who lose office (Debs and Goemans 2010).

If despite this we suppose that leaders are insulated from the emotional influence of humiliation on their decisions, this implies an addition scope condition. In this case, national humiliation should only increase the likelihood of conflict when it motivates the public to exert sufficient pressure that leaders feel they risk losing office if they go against citizens' desire for conflict. Evidence for this could be found if leaders acknowledge both the undesirability of conflict and public pressure to engage in conflict in private deliberations that become available to researchers.

The second scope condition has to do with *when* the theory applies. An individual has to be in an emotional state of humiliation while making a decision about whether or not to initiate conflict. Just experiencing the emotion will not necessarily make one seek out a conflict to initiate. Narratives of national humiliation that tie past humiliations to current international disputes make make this scope condition more likely to be met. For example, the way the CCP often explicitly links current foreign policy setbacks to China's humiliating past may increase the probability that humiliation is experienced when critical international decisions are made (Wang 2012). Rumination where individuals "contemplate the injustice of what happened or the perfidy of the perpetrators" decreases the chance that emotions dissipate over time and increases the chance that they motivate future aggression (Barash

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[7]See He (2007, 18) and Shen (2010, 103).

and Lipton 2011, 96).[8] National practices that encourage this kind of thinking may be the "social equivalent of personal rumination" (Barash and Lipton 2011, 96).

The ability of current events to trigger past memories of humiliation is another factor that may increase the probability this scope condition is met. Current humiliation increases thinking about past humiliation through mood-dependent memory (McDermott 2004; Frijda 2007, 273). Past experiences of humiliation are associated with vulnerability to and fear of future humiliation (Hartling and Luchetta 1999, 263, 270). Research on aggression has found that relatively mild triggers can provoke an aggressive response from individuals previously exposed to stronger provocations (Barash and Lipton 2011, 61). These connections may make it difficult for actors to address international crises coolly.

3.2   Foreign Policy Implications

Leaders' beliefs about national humiliation are probably more complicated than a genuine/instrumental dichotomy allows because instrumental expressions will tend to bleed into true feelings (see section 4.2.1). For theoretical tractability, I lay out empirical implications for each end of this dichotomy while acknowledging that in reality it is more of continuum. This also has the advantage of allowing readers who doubt elites are genuinely motivated by their own rhetoric to see how the theory's predictions would change under this condition. For each implication below, if leaders' emotional expressions are strategic rather than genuinely felt, then there should be a divergence between leaders' public justifications and private deliberations. Citizens' expressions and leaders' public discourse would be as predicted by the implication, but leaders' private deliberations would not. Further, the additional scope condition of public pressure, discussed in the previous section, would apply to the below predictions about international behavior.

The hypothesis that humiliation increases preferences for conflict (H1) has several observable implications. First, emotional expressions of national humiliation should correlate

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[8]See also Coleman, Kugler, and Goldman 2007; Anestis et al. 2009.

with advocacy of more conflictual foreign policy. Second, regardless of whether the cost or status mechanism drives preference change, expressions of national humiliation should correlate with the initiation of conflict. This is because both mechanisms shrink the bargaining range, meaning the range of settlements that both sides prefer to war (Fearon 1995). The cost mechanism does so by decreasing the cost of war, and the status mechanism does so by increasing the value of the disputed issue.

The hypothesis that humiliation decreases sensitivity to the cost of conflict (H2a) also provides observable implications for international behavior. Emotional expressions of humiliation should correlate with increased willingness to pay the cost of conflict, which could manifest in several ways. One is increased military spending. Another is greater willingness to accept casualties or economic damage due to conflict. Another way this could manifest is if leaders fail to consider or are unable to correctly calculate the expected costs of conflict due to cognitive interference from the emotion of humiliation.

The hypothesis that humiliation increases the salience of future status loss (H2b) has distinct empirical implications from the cost hypothesis. H2b implies that emotional expressions of national humiliation should correlate with discussions of status. Further, these status concerns should manifest themselves in justifications for conflict. Individuals attributing status value to a dispute where they otherwise would not should increase their value for the dispute, other things equal, and, hence, their willingness to fight.

4 Where Do Humiliation Narratives Come from and When do they Succeed?

Existing theories of national humiliation narratives rarely distinguish between what causes political groups to disseminate national humiliation narratives and what makes this strategy succeed. One might suppose that groups decide to propagate national humiliation narratives because they anticipate this strategy's success. However, groups disseminating na-

tional humiliation narratives do not always take or maintain government control, indicating that foresight of success does not determine when groups propagate these narratives. Below I extract the implications of existing theories for the use and success of national humiliation narratives, explain how they are incomplete, and build on them.

4.1 Existing Explanations of the Origins of National Humiliation Narratives

Explanations for the use of national humiliation narratives can be divided into three categories. The first claims that traumatic events give rise to humiliation narratives. The second theorizes that leaders create narratives of national humiliation for domestic political reasons. The third explains the creation of these narratives as an international bargaining tactic.

4.1.1 Event-based Explanations for the Use of Humiliation Narratives

One explanation is that certain events cause both the use of humiliation narratives and their success when used. "Collective trauma" might create "an emphasis on victimhood and entitlement" (Miller 2013, 2). The presence of a "threatening other" could lead to narratives of national humiliation (Jaffrelot 1999, 11, 21).[9] Other versions of this argument substitute the desire to maintain face or self-esteem in response to the West or modernity for a threatening other (Gries 2005, 27; Badie 2017, 6–9).

The most comprehensive event-based account of humiliation appears in (Barnhart 2020). In this account national humiliation results when states fail to perform, especially in military conflict (18), or are disrespected by being denied rights their leaders expect their state is due (26). Defeats are more likely to lead to national humiliation when the state is defeated rapidly, when it is defeated by a weaker power, when it is defeated in a conflict it initiated, and when it loses territory (21–24). Humiliation from disrespect is more likely the more

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[9]See also Kaldor (2004, 168–69).

important the right the humiliator violates, the more clear the violation is intentional, the longer the violation endures, the more public the violation, and when the violator has equal or greater status (26–28).

I do not deny that events may increase the *probability* of humiliation narratives. However, because humiliation narratives are socially constructed, events are neither necessary nor sufficient for their construction. Event-based explanations are incomplete for three reasons. First, there are always events that could be construed as humiliating. This means that no one event is necessary to make the option of constructing a national humiliation narrative available. Second, not all events that could be conceived of as humiliating according to event-based accounts get constructed as national humiliation, meaning these events are not sufficient explanations for national humiliation narratives. According to the appraisal theory of emotions, given events can lead to different emotional outcomes depending on how they are appraised, that is depending on how individuals give meaning to those events (Frijda 2007, 97). This makes the interpretation of the event more important than the event itself.

Third, not all political groups within a country respond to potentially humiliating events in the same way (Veer 1987, 299; Giuliano 2000, 300). Van der Veer makes this point when describing how Hindu nationalists revived the issue of whether the Mosque of Babur was built on Ram's birthplace in 1984:

> "It seems reasonable to suggest that the very location of a mosque on Ram's birth-site has always been a humiliating affront of Hindu feelings. This line of thought [...] hinders, in my opinion, the correct interpretation [...] First of all there is no 'simple expression of Hindu feelings.' Those who believe in Ram may support the liberation movement or may not support it depending on their interests and interpretation of the situation." (Veer 1987, 299)

As Jaffrelot acknowledges, in his study of Hindu nationalists' perception of Islam, "The reality of a threat was nevertheless of less significance than the Hindus' subjective perception of one" (Jaffrelot 1999, 342).

If a Mosque in a Hindu holy site is sufficient, then why did attempts to mobilize Hindus on this issue fail in 1949 and succeed in the 1980s and early 1990s? Further, why did different Hindus within India have different opinions on whether the Mosque was humiliating? No event is inherently humiliating or threatening to self-esteem. Events alone cannot explain their narration because events are always consistent with multiple possible narratives (Krebs 2015a, 60). This argument is similar to the idea in the ethnic politics literature that there are no issues that automatically produce divides along ethnic lines; instead, the ethnic salience of an issue is determined by the way citizens and politicians construct it (Giuliano 2000, 196).

4.1.2 Domestic Political Explanations for the Use of Humiliation Narratives

Another perspective emphasizes the importance of nationalism as a source of leaders' domestic political support (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). One version of this argument proposes that elites promote narratives of national humiliation when they face a crisis of legitimacy (Wang 2012, 9). Another explanation posits that national humiliation "is largely deployed in specific circumstances as part of a nation-building project (anti-imperialist revolution) or a nation repairing (civil war) project" (Callahan 2004, 207).

These explanations likely contain part of the truth but are incomplete because there is still significant variation in the use of national humiliation narratives by nationalist groups. Essentially every domestic actor competing for political power in China and India during the 20th century, aside from the Qing Empire, was nationalist, yet they did not always use national humiliation narratives. Neither can legitimacy crises alone explain which events get narrated. For example, if the Chinese leadership had framed the sanctions following the Tiananmen Massacre as China's national humiliation rather than framing the events preceding the takeover of the Communist Party in 1949 this way, their efforts likely would have backfired because they would be blamed either for causing the humiliating event or for allowing it to occur. Further, if legitimacy crises lead to national humiliation narratives,

then the Qing Empire on the brink of its collapse and Indira Gandhi during the period of emergency rule in India should have used such narratives but did not.

While nation-building and fostering in-group solidarity may be one strategic motivation for politicians to promote a narrative of national humiliation, the nation-building explanation cannot tell us what kinds of groups are prone to deploy this strategy. Neither can it account for political groups that do not turn to national humiliation narratives.

4.1.3   International Politics Explanations for the Use of Humiliation Narratives

The third explanation of national humiliation narratives finds their source in international politics. Bargaining theory could suggest that humiliation narratives allow states to credibly commit to use force during international disputes. Leaders may stress humiliation to both international and domestic audiences in order to argue that their domestic audience would punish them if they were perceived to humiliatingly back down, allowing them to credibly commit not to back down (Weiss 2014). In this way, humiliation might be cast as an honor commitment mechanism that increases the credibility of commitments and bargaining positions (O'Neill 1999, 127). Alternatively, national humiliation narratives could be an attempt to guilt international counterparts into compiling with policy goals (Finkel 2010, 54). However, national humiliation narratives take time to develop and catch on with a domestic audience. If states can simply conjure up such narratives to improve their bargaining positions, then humiliation narratives should be a ubiquitous feature of international bargaining. While a state may suppress or play up an existing narrative during a bargaining period, the creation of this narrative requires a separate explanation.

Moreover, humiliation does not provide an effective means to signal commitment internationally because humiliation narratives resonate more with domestic than international audiences. Emotions can cause leaders to misjudge the interpretation and importance other leaders will ascribe to their actions (Mercer 2013). If leaders cannot accurately assess the humiliation of individuals in other states or, perhaps, do not even pay attention to it, then

humiliation would not be an effective signal.

Research on empathy suggests that leaders should have difficulty assessing both the emotional state of non-nationals and how this emotional state will influence their decisions. Emotional perspective taking to assess the impact of emotions on the decisions of others involves two judgments that each have challenges. First, one must assess how one's own preferences would differ if one were in the same emotional state as the other person. Second, one must predict how similar one is to the other (Van Boven and Loewenstein 2005, 286). Emotionally unaroused individuals incorrectly imagine how they would feel when aroused, and humans underestimate the impact of others' emotions on their future behavior (Loewenstein 1996, 281–284).[10] Further, even if one is aroused, one is likely to weigh one's own emotions more highly than others' (Loewenstein 1996, 284). In the context of international relations, empathy is particularly difficult because humans find it harder to empathize with out-groups (Gutsell and Inzlicht 2012; Holmes 2013, 836). The attempt to get international partners, particularly those viewed as perpetrators of humiliation, to empathize with national suffering also risks backfiring and provoking anger and escalation (Finkel 2010, 56; Lind 2010), which raises further doubts about its use as a bargaining tactic.

4.2   When Groups Use National Humiliation Narratives

To develop a new explanation for why political groups use narratives of national humiliation, I build on the domestic political explanations. In addition to the problem of variation both within and across nationalist groups, current domestic political explanations face the challenge that recent experimental evidence from China does not find that exposure to humiliation narratives increases support for the government (Mattingly and Yao 2020). If these narratives do not increase support for the groups that promote them, then how do these groups benefit? One possibility is that national humiliation narratives may be more about decreasing support for alternatives than increasing support for the group propagating

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[10]See also Nordgren, Pligt, and Harreveld (2007), and Van Boven and Loewenstein (2005), and Sayette et al. (2008).

them. Research on emotions further provides reason to expect that groups will tar each other with humiliation narratives rather than build themselves up with narratives about more positive emotions. Humans habituate to positive events and not negative events, so negative emotional campaigns will likely produce longer lasting effects (Frijda 2007, 13).

My theory offers a two-part explanation of when political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation. The first is nonstrategic and is a prerequisite to national humiliation narrative construction. The ability of an individual to hold national issues as objects of emotional concern is a prerequisite for an individual to be subject to national humiliation, as discussed in section 1.1. To construct a national humiliation narrative, first, a political group must share a national identity with its audience. Second, the humiliator must not share this identity (otherwise the narrative would be based in shame rather than humiliation). National identity helps narrow down the actors and the possible events for humiliation narratives, but identity is not a sufficient cause for national humiliation narratives.

The second part of my explanation focuses on the strategic incentives of political groups to promote national humiliation narratives. To understand the strategic incentives of political groups we need to know their preferences. I assume members of political groups are office seeking (Riker 1984). Based on my theory of conflict preferences, I further assume groups promoting narratives of national humiliation will be more willing to pay the cost of hostile policies. This implies these groups are more likely to have policy platforms that include such policies.

From these assumptions, two implications about the strategic incentives of political groups to propagate national humiliation narratives follow. The first, and most important, is the ability of the group to distance itself from responsibility for the humiliating event and to instead blame political opponents. One way political groups can avoid blame is if their party was not in power when the event occurred (Croco 2015). Each of the following hypotheses are about the likelihood of political groups to disseminate national humiliation narratives as compared with other political groups in the same country or themselves in time periods

when the political strategy variables take different values.

Because national humiliation is viewed as an extremely negative event, it is unlikely that a leader who was in charge when the humiliation took place would be able to use it as a successful political strategy. This leader would likely be blamed for allowing the humiliating event to occur. Likewise, people closely associated with the leadership when the potentially humiliating event occurred are unlikely to try to use it for political gain. However, competing groups may frame this event as a national humiliation and use it to claim that the ruling group failed to protect the nation. The association between the party receiving blame and the event can be indirect. Even if the opposing group did not exist at the time of the humiliating event, groups that promote ideas associated with the humiliator can be labeled traitors. For example, national humiliation propaganda about events prior to 1949 increases anti-foreign sentiment in China (Mattingly and Yao 2020), which increases the effectiveness of regime claims that advocates of alternative forms of government, such as liberal democracy, are stooges of foreign powers.

Hypothesis 3a (H3a) *A political group is more likely to promote narratives of national humiliation when it can associate its political opponents with the event it constructs as humiliating while itself escaping responsibility.*

Another source of strategic incentives to propagate national humiliation narratives comes from the kinds of policies that feelings of humiliation might drive people to support. Posen (1993) suggested that nationalism, in particular "nationalist feeling," was important in motivating soldiers to sacrifice for the nation and enabled the creation of mass armies (113). My theory about national humiliation and foreign policy preferences, provides microfoundations for further theorizing exactly what kinds of nationalist feelings might motivate this sacrifice. In particular, humiliation should decrease sensitivity to the cost of military policies. This implies that making citizens feel humiliated should make them more accepting of costly policies that can be framed in terms of strengthening or defending the nation.

Further, national humiliation narratives typically include a glorious past when the nation was not humiliated. The appeal to this past can unite citizens and mobilize support for restoring the nation to glory (Greenfeld 2001). Goal formation can turn emotions into enduring passions, including for "revenge," that can extend indefinitely and motivate action (Frijda 2007, 189, 192). National humiliation pits the nation against an other (the humiliator). According to social identity theory, perception of intergroup competition is likely to make members of groups think more in terms of the group than individuals (Tajfel and Turner 2001). Thinking in terms of the group makes individuals more willing to make sacrifices if they believe these sacrifices will benefit the nation as a whole. For these reasons we would expect that leaders using national humiliation narratives strategically would be more likely to do so when they wish to motivate their audience to sacrifice for national defense.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b) *Given that the conditions for H3a are met, political groups that wish to motivate their audience to sacrifice for national defense are more likely to invoke national humiliation narratives.*

The combination of national identity and political incentives accounts for when political groups propagate narratives of national humiliation. However, these factors are not enough to ensure that national humiliation narratives will resonate with their audience. The following section explores when national humiliation narratives are most likely to appeal to citizens.

4.2.1 The Relationship Between Emotion and Strategy

Does the importance of political strategy mean elites are immune to the emotional content of the narratives and are able to dupe citizens who, contrary to my theory of the effect of humiliation on conflict preferences, have different political responses to emotions? It does not. Instead I argue that leaders who promote these narratives tend to have genuine emotional experiences of humiliation. Leaders who genuinely feel the emotion they seek to convey will be able to make more persuasive performances of this emotion in speeches. Even when leaders have strong incentives to deceive, research on empathy and mirror neurons

suggests that they may not be able to successfully do so in face to face communication (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012, 561–62; Holmes 2013, 830–31). Further, as these communications take place among in-group members, the audience does not face the same barriers to uncovering the true feelings of the speaker as an international out-group audience would (Gutsell and Inzlicht 2012; Holmes 2013, 836).

If a leader's performance of humiliation rings false, then it is unlikely to affect the political leanings of its audience, so leaders need to be able to persuasively exhibit humiliation. Hence, the strategic benefits of national humiliation narratives are inextricably tied to leaders' emotional experience. There are three ways leaders can attain an emotional state that allows a convincing performance of humiliation. The first is that a leader may interpret events as national humiliation and experience the attending emotional reaction independently of considerations of political strategy. The second two involve leaders rousing themselves into the emotional state they seek to convey. They may do this consciously in order to appear sincere (Hall 2011, 535), or they could become emotional as an unintended result of their emotional performance (Hall 2017, 11). Some have argued that leader's stronger identification with their group makes them even more likely to experience emotions that reference group identities (Sasley 2011, 460, 468). Regardless of which route leaders take to reach the emotional experience of humiliation, the important point is that they must reach this state regardless of whether their narrative is strategically motivated or not for it to be effective.

Further, the ability to give more persuasive speeches makes individuals who genuinely experience humiliation more likely to get selected as leaders of groups promoting these narratives. The need for effective delivery of the narrative to gain its strategic benefits requires even groups that adopt humiliation narratives for instrumental reasons to select leaders who genuinely experience national humiliation. As a group promotes national humiliation narratives over time, a combination of this selection process with the tendency of leaders to rouse themselves will increasingly populate the group's leadership with individuals who genuinely experience national humiliation. This holds regardless of whether the tendency of political

groups to select narratives that strategically benefit them comes from an evolutionary process through which more successful narratives strategies are retained over time or a rational process of adapting to incentives (Shelef 2010; Moore et al. 2014). In either case, political groups are likely to converge to narratives that benefit them strategically, yet these same pressures to succeed also demand the promotion of leaders who genuinely experience these emotions and can effectively sway their audience.

4.3   When do Narratives of National Humiliation Succeed?

I offer an account of when national humiliation narratives appeal to domestic audiences based on my study of political groups in China and India over the 20th century. I examine two indicators of whether narratives resonate with domestic audiences. First, does the party's propagation of the narrative help it gain or maintain political control? Second, what kinds of individuals are most likely to accept the narrative? I find that three conditions affect narrative resonance. None of these factors alone is sufficient to produce national humiliation narratives success, but together they form the background conditions that determine the likelihood of success. While these three conditions are inspired by the case specific literature on how nationalist narratives spread, I seek to synthesize these theories and my observations from the cases to produce an explanation that is more general, in that it travels cross-nationally, and more specific, in that it focuses particularly on explaining the success of nationalist narratives centered on humiliation.

First, if the government is determined to repress narratives of national humiliation, to the extent that it is willing to ban political groups propagating the narratives, then the ability of these narratives to resonate is limited. There may come a time when repressing these narratives is too costly. However, prior to these narratives becoming politically influential, the political environment must be sufficiently open for their spread. Even if a political group is willing to brave the risk of a government crackdown, the need for secrecy to avoid repression limits its ability to spread its narrative. Further, the government will deny the

message media access. An empirical implication of this condition is that as repression of national humiliation narratives declines, they should become more prominent (Snyder and Ballentine 1996, 5–6; Giuliano 2006, 294).

The second condition is the density of networks that link propagators of national humiliation narratives to their audience (Gorenburg 2003, 16). This condition has two components. The first is the existence of media networks that groups promoting narratives of national humiliation can use and their audience can access (Jaffrelot 2010, 209). One determinate of access to media networks is literacy, which allows nationalist messages to reach broader audiences and spread (Hroch 1996; Anderson 2006; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). Penetration of radio and television further extends the reach of nationalists messages (Rajagopal 2001). Increasingly, the internet and social media are important mediums through which nationalists messages spread (Cairns and Carlson 2016).

The second component is the institutions available to groups propagating narratives of national humiliation. State institutions including the educational system, museums, and state media can promote links that strengthen ties within identity groups (Anderson 2006; Suny 1989; Gorenburg 2000; Gorenburg 2001). They also provide conduits through which information can spread, which constrains the kinds of messages nationalist groups can send to their audience (Gorenburg 2003, 27). Political parties also provide institutions capable of disseminating narratives of national humiliation (DeVotta 2005; Moore et al. 2014). Civil society organizations, which often have official or unofficial links to political parties, provide additional institutional avenues of narrative promotion (Snyder and Ballentine 1996, 8). Besides information distribution, institutions also create social ties among individuals through which narratives of national humiliation can spread (Gorenburg 2003, 3). Moreover, the continued existence of institutional advocates makes narratives more durable by providing a stable source of advocacy (Suny 1989, 510; Gorenburg 2003, 31).

The empirical implications of the network linkage component of national humiliation narrative success are the following. First, as proponents of national humiliation narratives and

their audience become more linked through media networks, national humiliation narratives are more likely to resonate. Second, as proponents of national humiliation gain more control over both state and civil society institutions, national humiliation narratives are more likely to spread.

The third condition that determines whether narratives of national humiliation will spread is economic welfare (Hroch 2000; Hechter 2000). Citizens need enough wealth that they are not forced to spend all of their time engaged in subsistence farming for survival. Gellner notes, "Small peasant communities generally live inward-turned lives, tied to the locality by economic need if not by political prescription" (Gellner 2008, 10). Farmers living in these kinds of communities are less likely to mobilize over concerns that seem distant from their everyday lives, such as national humiliation. As a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) National Executive put it, "Emotional issues can only attract people when the stomach is full" (Jaffrelot 1999, 547). This is not an argument that subsistence farmers can never be mobilized over any issue. Instead, symbolic issues are less likely than bread and butter issues to resonate with subsistence farmers compared to other economic groups. Further, the argument is not that the appeal of national humiliation narratives should increase linearly with economic growth. Instead it is that individuals need to be above some minimal threshold of economic subsistence before national humiliation narratives will appeal to them. The effect of increased welfare beyond this point on the appeal of national humiliation narratives should be minimal.

The empirical implications of these inferences about economic welfare can be broken up into two parts, which distinguish them from other explanations of the spread of humiliation narratives, including those that predict that the rural poor are the most humiliated individuals because they experience the inequality of power and status the most intensely (Badie 2017, 124–25). First, when economic welfare is unevenly spread, narratives of national humiliation are more likely to resonate with literate members of urban professional classes than those living in poverty in the countryside. Second, as a country's economy develops and

citizens are lifted out of poverty, national humiliation narratives are more likely to resonate.

4.3.1 Alternative Explanations for Narrative Success

Once event-based explanations that attribute both the use and success of narratives of national humiliation to a traumatic event are eliminated, there are relatively few explanations for why national humiliation narratives succeed. One might expect the success of national humiliation narratives depends the audience's predispositions or culture (Snyder and Ballentine 1996, 20). Callahan argues that the Chinese Communist Party's patriotic education campaign that emphasizes national humiliation "is so successful because it builds on a structure of feelings that actually precedes this particular propaganda policy, and predates the PRC" (2010, 19). However, this explanation cannot fully account for the case of India where Hindu nationalists drew on themes that existed in India prior to independence but did not experience political success until the late 1980s.

Further, because past events can always be reimagined as humiliating, this theme is always available. Callahan notes he is not making a "culturalist" argument that claims China is "unique," and he claims the civilization/barbarism distinction, which for Callahan is the cultural resource national humiliation narratives require, is always present (Callahan 2010, 24). This suggests factors other than cultural predispositions determine *when* people respond to humiliation narratives.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that national humiliation shifts preferences towards conflict. It may do this both by reducing the constraint of the cost of conflict and by increasing the perceived value of the dispute. Humiliation reduces the constraint of the cost of conflict because its intense cognitive load interferes with the integration of information about the cost of its hostile action tendency into the decision making process. Humiliation increases

the perceived value of disputed issues, and hence willingness to fight for them, by making the status-value of the dispute salient to the decision making process when it would otherwise not be. Both of these mechanisms decrease the bargaining range, making conflict more likely.

I also explore where humiliation comes from and how it comes to be relevant to international decision making. I posit that humiliation gets tied to international politics through national humiliation narratives. Political groups, which share a national identity with their audience, disseminate these narratives when they can tie their political opponent to the potentially humiliating issue and avoid receiving blame themselves. These groups have a further incentive to propagate national humiliation narratives to promote their policies, which impose short-term costs on citizens and can be framed as necessary for national defense. The ability to persuasively deliver a national humiliation narrative in order to receive these political benefits requires leaders to genuinely undergo the emotional experience of humiliation. These narratives rely on a relative absence of repression, and networks that connect narrative propagators to their audience. They are more likely to mobilize individuals living above the economic subsistence level.

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3

The Microfoundations of Humiliation and International Conflict Preferences

Michael Masterson

Unlike theories that attribute emotions to states, my theory of national humiliation's effect on foreign policy preferences starts with humiliation as an individually experienced emotion. This allows analysis of the individual psychological mechanisms through which humiliation influences conflict preferences. Understanding these mechanisms is vital to provide microfoundations to the theory and to understand when the theory is most likely to apply.

Previous empirical studies of humiliation and conflict have either used an international event, such as territory loss (Barnhart 2017), as a proxy to measure humiliation, or examined emotional decision making in case studies (Barnhart 2016; Wang 2012). Both strategies face the challenge that emotions come bundled with international events, such as defeat in conflict, and beliefs about these events that can themselves influence preferences. Further, observational evidence cannot reveal whether humiliation changes or merely reflects preferences. Neither has previous research directly tested the mechanisms through which humiliation influences conflict preferences.

In this chapter I test my theory about whether and how humiliation influences conflict preferences with both survey and lab experiments. Specifically, I test the following hypothe-

ses from Chapter 2.

Hypothesis 1 (H1) *The emotional state of humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict.*

Hypothesis 2a (H2a) *Humiliation increases conflict preferences through decreasing individuals' sensitivity to the costs of conflict.*

Hypothesis 2b (H2b) *Humiliation increases conflict preferences through increasing the salience of future status loss.*

To manipulate humiliation, I administer an autobiographical essay task (Myers and Tingley 2016). This approach takes advantage of the emotional carryover effects of humiliation to isolate its effects from aspects of the international environment that might be associated with humiliation and also influence conflict preferences through other means (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004). I then independently manipulate the mechanisms of cost and status in a hypothetical international crisis to assess how much of humiliation's effect operates through each mechanism (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018). I confirm that the emotion of humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict and find evidence supporting the mechanism of suppressing sensitivity to cost but not the mechanism of increasing the salience of status. I further examine this cost mechanism in a lab experiment that finds additional evidence for the cost mechanism in an environment in which individuals face real, monetary costs.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section describes the design of the survey experiment and analyses its results. The second analyzes the lab experiment testing humiliation's effect on conflict behavior. The third section discusses external validity, and the final section offers concluding comments.

1   Testing Humiliation's Impact on Expressed Conflict Preferences

Observational research faces two big challenges in disentangling humiliation's effect on conflict preferences. First, humiliation in international relations always comes bundled with international events appraised as humiliating as well as beliefs about these events and the actors involved. It is impossible to tell whether it is the emotion of humiliation or these events and/or beliefs that are driving responses (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 570).[1] Second, retrospective accounts of emotional decision making are unreliable. These accounts may be strategic self-justifications. Further, individuals can misunderstand emotional influences on their own decisions (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Frijda 2007, 96). These limitations do not imply observational research is not an important component of our understanding of emotional influences on politics. Instead, they highlight the value of experiments to build on this research and help to triangulate a difficult to observe phenomenon. An experiment can assign emotional states independently of information about the international environment to identify the effect of humiliation on conflict preferences.

Even in a design that can isolate the effect of humiliation from other factors, independent manipulation of the causal mechanisms is critical. This is because humans give accounts "post hoc that serve to explain or justify the emotion" they experienced (Frijda 2007, 96). For example, if asked after the outcome question whether or not they believed that US status was at stake in the dispute or that intervening would be of low cost, individuals whose decision to intervene was emotionally driven might readily seize on these logical justifications, making it impossible to tell if these causal mechanisms actually drove their preferences for conflict.

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[1]The problem of beliefs associated with humiliating events (through pathways other than the emotion they evoke) is distinct from the question of whether emotions influence decision making primarily through changing cognitive beliefs or through affective responses, which is not a challenge I claim to solve here (Holmes 2015, 718).

1.1 Survey Experiment Design

The first of two experiments reported here is a survey experiment on the effect of humiliation on Americans' preference for conflict, specifically military intervention, in a hypothetical scenario. The survey experiment was conducted with 804 adult American respondents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) from April 16th to May 4th 2018.[2] The experiment is a $3 \times 2 \times 2$, (shame, humiliation, control) $\times$ (costly, not costly) $\times$ (status invoked, status not invoked), factorial design.

Following Myers and Tingley (2016), I use autobiographical essay tasks to manipulate emotions and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X) to measure emotions (Watson and Clark 1999). Work showing rumination leads individuals to relive their emotions supports the effectiveness of treatments that require individuals to reflect on negative emotions (Coleman, Kugler, and Goldman 2007; Anestis et al. 2009). Respondents are randomly assigned to write about a time in their life when they were humiliated, a time when they were shamed, or their last trip to the grocery store, which is the control condition (see Appendix section G for the full essay prompts and survey instrument). Respondents had to write at least 140 characters before advancing to the next question.

The shame manipulation is included to rule out the possibility that negative affect rather than humiliation drives the results. Further, shame is considered the emotion most similar to humiliation and is commonly compared with humiliation in the experimental psychology literature (Otten and Jonas 2014; Elison and Harter 2007; Hartling and Luchetta 1999). If humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict but shame does not, this would provide strong evidence that this effect is unique to humiliation. Because the PANAS-X does not have a scale for humiliation, I create a novel scale based on the definition of humiliation in Hartling and Luchetta (1999). The Appendix section G.4 shows these scales, and section K uses principal component analysis to validate the new measure of humiliation.

Experimentally assigning personal emotions has the advantage of separating emotions

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[2]See section 3 for more information on the sample.

from confounding aspects of the international situation. This exploits the way incidental emotions, that is emotions not related to the decision at hand, carry over to influence political judgments to "cleanly estimate the 'pure' effect" of humiliation (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 570).[3] If personal emotions lead to changes in unrelated international conflict preferences, this gives confidence that emotions, rather than information about the international environment, drive these changes.

One might wonder whether measuring emotions through self-reports falls prey to the issue raised earlier about observational research. Indeed, if individuals are dishonest about or unable to recognize their own emotional state, then this measure will fail. However, it does have the advantage of *separating* assessment of respondents emotional states from their accounts of their decision making. This way, it does not matter whether respondents recognize whether their decision for conflict is being driven by humiliation because the design links respondents' reported emotional states to their decisions rather than relying on actors' explanations of why they made their decisions. This also helps address the problem that actors rationalize emotionally-driven decisions in post-hoc explanations.

Figure 1: Survey Experiment Design

Manipulations shaded.

Emotional measurement is conducted immediately after the essay task. I include measures of humiliation, fear, hostility (anger), and guilt (shame). Using these emotional measures is necessary because passive measures of physiological arousal, such as skin-conductance reactivity, measure general arousal and not particular emotions (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley

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[3]See also (Small and Lerner 2008).

2015, 575). Measuring particular emotions is important because conclusions might be confounded by related emotions that are also triggered by the treatment (Myers and Tingley 2016).

Following Myers and Tingley (2016), I use the effect of the essay on the outcome through the targeted emotion, that is the average causal mediation effect (ACME), as the primary quantity of interest.[4] This is because even though autobiographical essay tasks target particular emotions, they will inevitably move subjects on other emotions as well. This makes interpreting the total effect misleading and can result in spurious findings (Myers and Tingley 2016, 498).

After answering the emotional items, respondents receive a vignette similar to vignettes used in other international relations experiments (Kertzer 2016; Tomz 2007). Respondents read that a country has invaded a smaller neighboring state that shares interests with the US but is not a US ally. These details are included to increase the probably that the information equivalence assumption is satisfied (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2017). If respondents are told that US status is at stake in a dispute, they might think that the invaded country is more likely to be a US ally or share US interests. Fixing these conditions prevents the treatments from unintentionally manipulating them.

The vignette varies whether it would be 'very costly' or 'not very costly' for the US to use military force.[5] The scenario also varies whether US status is explicitly at stake. The condition says either, 'US interests as well as US world status' or only 'US interests' is at stake. US interests are mentioned in both conditions to hold them constant, since respondents who hear about US status might be more likely to think other US interests are also at stake. To be clear, the expectation of the status hypothesis is that humiliated respondents will be more likely to support intervention (in comparison with control respondents) when status is *not* mentioned. This is because it expects humiliation to make status salient when

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[4]A consequence of using this approach is that I must assume sequential ignorability (Appendix section N explores the sensitivity of the results to violations of this assumption).

[5]This condition taken from Tomz and Weeks (2016).

it otherwise would not be. The condition that explicitly mentions status makes status salient to all respondents and blocks this mechanism.

The outcome question is whether respondents support using US troops to push back the invader. Respondents then indicate whether they feel strongly about this. These two questions are combined into a four point outcome scale measuring intervention support.[6]

The experiment includes placebo questions about whether respondents believe that the country being invaded is a democracy as well as whether they think that the invader is committing major human rights violations. These are to ensure that respondents are not inferring more than is intended from the manipulations (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2017).

1.2 Survey Experiment Results

1.2.1 Effect of Emotional Essay Tasks on Target Emotions

Figure 2 shows the effect of the shame and humiliation essays on each emotion with the control essay as the comparison category. Each essay treats the emotion it is intended to target more than other emotions. For humiliation, hostility (anger) is a secondary target because humiliation involves moral outrage. As Fernández et al. (2018) explain, "hostility is consubstantial to this emotion, so that people who feel humiliated perceive also that they are the targets of an external attack against their selves" (10). The fact that non-target emotions, such as fear, are also moved by the essays, although to a lesser extent, is expected with emotional essay tasks and is the reason using causal mediation to estimate the effect of the treatment through the targeted emotion is necessary (Myers and Tingley 2016). See Appendix section E for a discussion of potential attrition across treatment groups.

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[6]Taken from Kertzer (2016, 174).

Figure 2: Effect of Essay Treatments on Emotions

The results for each emotion come from separate regression models with the control as the comparison category. The bars show 95% confidence intervals. Emotions are on a 0 to 1 scale.

1.2.2 Effect of Humiliation on Intervention Support

In the models that produce the results shown below, controls are only included for experimentally manipulated conditions.[7] In the causal mediation models used to estimate the effect of the emotional essays through the target emotion, controls for the status and cost manipulations are included in the outcome stage but not in the stage modeling the effect of the essay on the target emotion because this effect is measured before respondents receive either the status or cost manipulation. All variables are rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparability. The placebo tests find neither the cost nor status manipulation inadvertently manipulated respondents' perceptions about the regime type of the country being invaded or whether the invader is committing major human rights violations.[8]

As hypothesized (H1), humiliation increases support for intervention, but shame does not. The difference between the ACMEs of humiliation and shame is also significant.[9] The ACME of humiliation is about half the magnitude of the effect of moving the intervention from 'very costly' to 'not very costly'. According to rational models, the cost of war should play a major role in an individual's intervention support, so the fact that humiliation's

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[7]This includes wave dummies for minor differences in the survey. See Appendix section G.1 for a complete explanation.

[8]The p-values in t-tests are > 0.1.

[9]This is true whether all of the points of the simulation are used or if the simulation of each effect is restricted to the first 235 points for humiliation and 249 for shame to reflect the number of respondents in each condition. This is done to address the concern that the simulation of the ACMEs for shame and humiliation might bias the standard error downward by exaggerating the amount of data points.

effect is about half that of cost means it is a substantively important effect. The status manipulation does not change respondent support for intervention on its own. The section below explores whether the ACME of the humiliation treatment through humiliation changes as the mechanisms are fixed at certain values to assess the support for H2a and H2b.

Figure 3: Effect on Intervention Support

The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

1.2.3   Mechanisms

Figure 4 shows the ACMEs of humiliation and shame as the cost of the intervention varies between 'very costly' and 'not very costly'. Supporting H2a, humiliation significantly increases support for intervention when the intervention is 'very costly' but not when the intervention is 'not very costly'. The results indicate that the effects of humiliation on conflict preferences are mostly cost driven. This does not necessarily imply that humiliation has no benefits-side effects because it could be that those effects exist but are too small to detect with the power available in this experiment. Further, humiliation increases support for intervention in the costly condition almost as much as the costly condition decreases support for intervention in the sample overall (an increase of 0.076 vs. a decrease of 0.079), which suggests that humiliation nearly eliminates the costliness of intervention from respondents' decision making. Figure 5 provides further evidence for this interpretation by showing that the effect of the cost of intervention becomes undetectable as a respondents' humiliation score increases.[10]

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[10]These marginal effects come from a regression that interacts the effect of cost with respondents' humiliation scores while controlling for experimental conditions and waves. Removing the covariates does not affect

The ACME of shame is not significant in either cost condition. Further, the ACMEs of humiliation and shame in the costly condition remain statistically distinguishable from each other. This follows theoretical expectations because even if shame's action tendencies are cost insensitive, shame should not have a conflictual action tendency because it is not an approach emotion. Neither does shame involve the attribution of hostility to an other.

Figure 4: Effect on Intervention Support When Varying Cost

The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 5: Humiliation Attenuates the Effect of Cost

The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 6 shows the effects of humiliation and shame when US status is invoked as opposed to when it is not mentioned. The ACME of humiliation is approximately the same in both status conditions, which suggests that status neither mediates nor moderates the effect. Further, the absence of an effect of the status manipulation by itself calls into question its potential as a mechanism. Overall, H2b is not supported.

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this result.

Figure 6: Effect on Intervention Support Varying Status

The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

2   Testing Humiliation's Effect on Conflict Behavior

If humiliation actually affects conflict preferences through individuals' sensitivity to cost, then this should be visible in behavior when the cost of acting is real rather than hypothetical. A limitation of the survey experiment is that it is relatively costless for respondents to express support for a hypothetical war. If faced with actual cost, respondents might exert more effort to control their emotions and make a less costly decision (Dickson 2011).

To address this, I introduce the humiliation and control essay treatments into a laboratory experiment where respondents play an incentivized game with a monetary cost to war.[11] In addition to the emotional essay conditions (humiliation and control), I assign the cost of war to be either high or low, so it is a 2×2 factorial experiment. The laboratory experiment also adds to the overall confidence in the results because, unlike the survey experiment, there is no post-treatment attrition.

2.1   Lab Experiment Design

I recruited 196 participants from the behavior research lab participant pool at a University in the Midwest. The experiment took place in 26 sessions lasting approximately 40 minutes each. The smallest session had 4 participants, and the largest had 14. Sessions

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[11]The pre-analysis plan is available at `https://egap.org/file/3918/download?token=OcjKbRCe`. Deviations from the pre-analysis plan are indicated in footnotes. This chapter focuses on the hypothesis that humiliated respondents are more likely to attack when the cost of war is high (H2 in the pre-analysis plan).

were conducted in 2019 from May 21 to June 7 and from June 17 to June 21.[12] Participants received \$5 in addition to the money they earned from the incentivized game.[13] Respondents first answer demographic and disposition questions, and then receive instructions on how the experiment will progress as well as how to play the incentivized game (the game is described in detail below and the full instrument appears in the Appendix section H). Respondents input all of their actions into a computer terminal and are instructed not to communicate with each other.[14] First, respondents play 5 practice rounds of the game. The practice rounds are to control both for the effect of learning about the game over time and any emotional effect of playing the game. In each round, players are randomly rematched with an anonymous opponent to avoid reputation effects.

Respondents are instructed that they will be paid based on one randomly selected round of the game (excluding the practice rounds). Respondents' pretreatment emotional states are measured as they are in the survey experiment. Next, respondents play 4 rounds of the game that provide a pretreatment measure of respondent behavior. Afterward, respondents are randomly assigned to write either the control or the humiliation essay, and their emotional state is measured again. Lastly, respondents play 4 more rounds of the game.

The incentivized game is an extended form game where the first player must choose either to attack or not (see the Appendix section I for the game diagram). After the first player moves, the second player observes the first player's move and chooses either to attack or not. If both players choose not to attack, then both players receive their payoff for the status quo s (the game is symmetrical so payoffs have no subscripts). If one player chooses not to attack and the other player chooses to attack, then the player who chose not to attack receives their war payoff for getting struck first w^s and the other player receives their war payoff for striking first w^f. If both players choose to attack, then they both receive their war

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[12]The week of June 17 was not included in the pre-analysis plan, but the lab became available at this time because another experiment was canceled. The total number of participants is within the range specified in the pre-analysis plan.

[13]The pretreatment data for 6 of these participants was lost when the server crashed during a session.

[14]The game is implemented using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).

payoff of w. War payoffs are equal to the player's probability of winning the war p minus their cost of conflict c (see equation 1). The probability of winning is greatest when first striking and next greatest when both strike so that $w^f > w > w_s$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
w &= p - c \\
w^f &= \bar{p} - c \\
w^s &= \underline{p} - c \\
\bar{p} &> p > \underline{p}
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

A key property of this game is that it has two unique subgame perfect Nash equilibria depending on c. When c is high enough that $s > w^f$, then both players choose not to attack. Otherwise, if $w^f > s$, then both players choose to attack. This allows me to manipulate c and assess whether players successfully adapt their behavior to the changing cost of war. H2a predicts that players who are humiliated should be more likely (in comparison with players in the control condition) to choose war in the costly condition because they are less sensitive to the increased cost of war.

The game is presented in game theoretical form here to highlight the link to the theory, but participants only see their payoffs in dollar amounts. The dollar value of the s payoff is always \$6. When the cost of war is high, the war payoffs are: $w = \$3$, $w^f = \$5$, and $w^s = \$2$. When the cost of war is low, the war payoffs are: $w = \$5$, $w^f = \$7$, and $w^s = \$4$.

2.2   Lab Experiment Results

The between-subjects results are tested using the same Myers and Tingley (2016) setup used to analyze the survey experiment, where the main quantity of interest is the ACME of the humiliation essay through the measure of humiliation (see Appendix section C for the effect of the essay on humiliation). I control for whether a respondent is a first mover and include period fixed effects.[15] Figure 7 shows the ACME of the humiliation essay through

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[15]Just as in the survey experiment analysis and in accord with my pre-analysis plan, I do not control for demographic covariates. The between-subjects results are substantively the same with demographic covariates included. Demographic covariates do not vary within-individual, so they cannot be added to the within-subjects results.

the emotion of humiliation on the probability of attacking. The effect is positive and statistically significant only when the cost of war is high, supporting H2a. The within-subjects results also support the conclusion that humiliation increases conflict preferences by decreasing individuals' sensitivity to the cost of conflict (see Appendix section J). This increases confidence that the findings are not driven by some unobserved characteristic of respondents that correlated with treatment assignment.

Figure 7: ACME Across Cost Conditions (Between Subjects)

The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

The null effect of humiliation when conflict is not costly should *not* be interpreted as indicating that humiliation has no benefits-side effects. The experiment is designed only to test the cost mechanism and is explicitly setup so that a rational respondent will always attack in equilibrium when the cost of war is low and not when the cost is high. This means, by design, this experiment cannot find benefits-side effects because both humiliated and control respondents should attack when the cost of war is low.

3   External Validity

When assessing external validity it is important to keep in mind that external validity is not a property of any one study. Instead, external validity applies to a research program as replications examine whether the theorized relationship holds in different contexts (McDermott 2011, 34-35). First confidently establishing that an effect exists is necessary to extrapolate that effect to other cases (Jimenez-Buedo and Miller 2010, 319). In terms of the

research program on humiliation and international conflict, section 1 explains why experiments are valuable for establishing humiliation's influence on conflict preferences. Further, the mechanisms uncovered here can help provide guidance to future observational studies in determining what cases and mechanisms to scrutinize.

One concern could be that humiliation experienced through personal identities differs in effect from humiliation that individuals experience though national identities. According to appraisal theory, it is not the event but the emotional appraisal of that event that determines the emotion experienced (Frijda 2007, 97). The same triggering event can lead to different emotions in different people. The wording of the essay prompt is designed to get respondents to write about an event that they have appraised as humiliating. Further, the aspects of humiliation that I draw on to build my theoretical expectations are trigger independent. Humiliation is an intense emotion associated with hostility that poses an intense cognitive load likely to interfere with assessments of the cost of hostile action, regardless of the identity though which humiliation is triggered.

Another concern could be that treating personal humiliation creates a more intense emotional experience than treating national humiliation, so asking respondents to think about personal humiliation overestimates the effect. However, when politicians promote narratives of national humiliation, these narratives are heavily represented in the media and education system (Wang 2012). An experiment cannot match the saturation and duration of these campaigns, so a stronger treatment is used to mimic this cumulative effect. Additionally, real-life international crises are much more emotional than conditions that can be experimentally induced.

Chapter 2 addresses the issue of whether elites behave differently than the general population when it comes to emotions and politics, but how reflective the samples are of the general population remains to be discussed. The Appendix section B shows the demographic characteristics of the survey sample. MTurk samples tend to be more representative of the US population than most convenience samples used in political science, and the ways that

they differ (respondents skew younger and more liberal) are well documented, making it easy to assess the direction of the bias when generalizing (Huff and Tingley 2015; Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). Examining whether the effect of the humiliation treatment varies across demographic groups finds limited evidence of heterogeneous effects, which suggests that changing the composition of the sample is unlikely to alter the results (see Appendix section D). In general, large-scale replication projects have found that political science experiments on MTurk tend to produce similar treatment effects to experiments on nationally representative samples in the US (Mullinix et al. 2015).

Another concern could be cross-cultural generalizability. Can the results on US subjects be used to make conclusions about the effects of emotions in China and elsewhere? The most direct way to examine this would be to replicate the experiment in China. Unfortunately, my attempts to do this were blocked because questions about hypothetical international crises, which were permitted as recently as 2016 (Quek and Johnston 2018), are now considered too politically sensitive. However, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that the findings would travel. There is broad evidence of the universality of emotions and emotional expression (Ekman 1992; Ekman and Friesen 1971; Elfenbein and Ambady 2002; Frijda 2007). This does not necessarily mean that the same people will experience the same emotions in the same contexts (Sznycer et al. 2012), which suggests the continued value of cross-cultural studies of emotions. However, the lack of heterogeneity of the effect of the humiliation treatment across the demographic variation that does exist in the survey sample lends confidence that the effect is relatively constant across individuals (see Appendix section D).

The value of the laboratory experiment is to probe the generalizability of the survey experiment to conditions where decision makers face real costs rather than to represent a particular target population. While the stakes of an actual war are greater than the monetary incentives in the lab experiment, the empirical work on stakes in experiments suggests that to the extent that stakes change behavior, the difference between the effect of moderate stakes and no stakes is greater than that between moderate stakes and increased stakes (Camerer

and Hogarth 1999; Holt and Laury 2001; Hertwig and Ortmann 2003).

Lastly, does the fact that China has settled many of its disputes peacefully suggest that the findings do not apply to actual conflict decision making? There are certainly factors not examined here that could dampen humiliation's influence on policy outcomes, including institutional structures and the group dynamics of decision making. However, the absence of war in a particular case does not necessarily suggest that the individual-level influence of humiliation is unimportant for policy. The experiment does not find that humiliated individuals *always* choose conflict. Instead, it finds that humiliation makes them more likely to choose conflict. The counterfactual of whether China would have behaved more or less aggressively absent narratives of national humiliation is unobservable. The ability of the experiments to contrast humiliated individuals with individuals in the control condition to directly assess the difference in their conflict preferences allows this study to identify variation that would otherwise be hidden.

4   Conclusion

The way humiliation shapes conflict preferences has implications for international bargaining, how nationalism shapes foreign policy, as well as the role of behavioral influences on individual decision making in international relations. This chapter tests the theory that humiliation increases conflict preferences. Further, it tests two mechanisms through which humiliation might act. The first mechanism is that humiliation decreases sensitivity to the cost of conflict. The second mechanism is that humiliation increases the propensity for individuals to believe that status is at stake when status is not otherwise salient. Both mechanisms would increase preferences for conflict, reducing the bargaining range and increasing the risk of bargaining breakdown.

The results provide the first experimental evidence that humiliation increases individuals' preference for international conflict. Additionally, this chapter provides the first evidence

able to distinguish the support for different mechanisms through which humiliation might foster conflict. The findings indicate that humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict by decreasing their sensitivity to the cost of conflict. This effect continues to hold when individuals face real, monetary costs to initiating conflict. This decreased sensitivity to cost does not make the dispute indivisible, humiliated respondents do not always attack, but it does increase the likelihood that individuals will choose conflict.

Failing to account for humiliation could, therefore, lead to underestimating counterparts' resolve. For example, feelings of humiliation in China regarding territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, could elevate willingness to go to war within China. This is relevant to international bargaining both because an increased willingness to go to war due to a decreased cost of war shrinks the bargaining range and because not accounting for humiliation's effect on China's bargaining range could lead negotiators to make unacceptable offers, increasing the chance of bargaining breakdown and conflict. Understanding the effects of humiliation could also help explain why Russia has been willing to pay the costs of sanctions and lives lost of its annexation of Crimea and role in the conflict in Ukraine.

Understanding the microfoundations of humiliations effect on conflict preferences is particularly valuable because it allows the theory's behavioral insights to be incorporated with rational theories of bargaining, and bridging this gap is a vital challenge for continued progress in international relations theory (Kertzer 2017; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2017; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017; Little and Zeitzoff 2017). Specifically, the variables in rational bargaining models, like cost of war, still determine actors' decisions, but their influence on actors' decision making (in technical terms their impact on the utility function), is affected by actors' emotions. This shows both that while it may be useful to temporarily abstract away from emotions, it is critical to eventually bring emotions back into the picture and that this can be accomplished while building on, rather than sacrificing, the systematic insights rational theories provide. Further, understanding that humiliation acts by decreasing sensitivity to the cost of conflict also helps clarify to which cases the theory is most likely to

apply (cases, like interstate conflict, where conflict is costly rather than less costly cases, like drone strikes against non-state actors).

The experimental evidence presented here provides important empirical contributions. It avoids unreliable individual accounts of emotional decisions, which compose the historical record. Further, assigning humiliation independently of information about the international environment avoids bundling international events and information about these events with humiliation. Future research could examine whether these findings hold up on samples representing different target populations and whether the institutional and/or group decision-making environments that leaders are embedded in can attenuate humiliation's effect.

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4

Expressions of National Humiliation and Foreign Policy Preferences: the Case of Chinese Social Media

In previous chapters, I have laid out a theory of how humiliation influences individual foreign policy preferences and found experimental evidence that humiliation increases preferences for conflict by decreasing sensitivity to the cost of conflict. The question remains whether this influence exists in practice. If humiliation increases support for costly, hostile policies, then individuals who expression national humiliation ought express greater support for such policies. I investigate whether national humiliation narratives are associated with expressions of support for three kinds of costly, hostile policies: using of military force, maintaining disputed territorial claims, and raising barriers to trade. Each of these policies can be conceptualized as a way to harm an adversary and poses costs to the state pursuing them.

Assessing the effect of national humiliation on foreign policy opinion is particularly important because the majority of the Chinese public accepts narratives of national humiliation regarding China's foreign policy disputes, and these narratives are likely to continue to shape Chinese views of foreign policy into the foreseeable future, even if the regime were to cease its national humiliation propaganda (Chubb 2014, 11). While the Chinese government is likely more insulated from public opinion pressure than a democratic government, the regime's reliance on nationalism for legitimacy means that it cannot ignore citizens' passions (Zhao 2004, 264–65).

Social media is a particularly important site to examine the impact of emotional narra-

tives on policy preferences because it is a network in which individuals are embedded that can help account for how these emotions and policies positions diffuse through a population (Hall and Ross 2015, 848; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Further, Chinese leaders pay close attention to social media activity and receive daily briefings on it. While popular pressure is unlikely to shape Chinese foreign policy during normal times, it is most likely to make a difference during a crisis (Weiss 2019).

To examine the relationship between expressed national humiliation narratives and support for costly, hostile foreign policies, I use a data set of over 1.6 billion Weibo (a Twitter-like social media platform) posts created from 2009 to 2014.[1] I use supervised machine learning to label these posts based on whether they contain national humiliation narratives and whether they express support for each of the three costly, hostile foreign policy options. I first examine the relationship between national humiliation and foreign policy preferences at the post level. I then aggregate the data into a daily time series to examine the causal order among the variables.

I find that posts containing narratives of national humiliation are more likely to express support for using military force, maintaining disputed territorial claims, and erecting trade barriers. However, posts containing narratives of national humiliation are not more likely to be associated with discussion of the placebo political issue, income inequality. This reduces the concern that the relationships found are spurious to posts that discuss any political issue being more likely to discuss any other political issue. Further, the time series analysis indicates that posts containing national humiliation narratives elevate the number of posts expressing support for using military force, maintaining disputed territorial claims, and erecting trade barriers in subsequent days. These results suggest that surges of posts about national humiliation push social media users to express support for costly, hostile policies.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 derives hypotheses about expressions of national humiliation and support for hostile, costly foreign polices from the theory laid out in

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[1]Section 5 addresses potential concerns about censorship and regime commentators.

Chapter 2. Section 2 discusses the data analyzed. Section 3 descriptively analyzes the data, and Section 4 formally tests the hypotheses. Section 5 addresses concerns about censorship and regime commentators. The final section offers concluding comments.

1 National Humiliation and Foreign Policy Preferences

Chapter 2 puts forward a theory of how humiliation leads individuals to support hostile foreign policy actions by decreasing their sensitivity to the cost of these actions. This section derives some particular costly, hostile foreign policy actions that individuals might be more likely to support. The most obvious implication of the theory and the one closest to the experimental results presented in Chapter 3 is that humiliated individuals should be more likely to support using military force. Using military force is always a hostile action, and generally, it is considered costly (Fearon 1995). In the Chinese case, using military force might be particularly dangerous because it could escalate to a major conflict involving the United States. Yet, research has found that invoking US deterrence and "cost-imposition threats" actually decreases support among Chinese citizens for backing down during disputes (Quek and Johnston 2018, 10).[2] If humiliation is increasing support for using force by decreasing individuals' sensitivity to the cost of using force, then:

> **H4 Expressions of national humiliation will be more likely advocate using military force.**

Another costly, hostile foreign policy is maintaining territorial disputes. These disputes are costly both because of the risk that they could escalate to war (Vasquez and Henehan 2001), and because they entail substantial economic costs in the form of lost trade and investment (Simmons 2002). In the Chinese case, many of China's remaining territorial disputes are with states that are allied with the United States. Further, Chinese propaganda has

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[2]Although invoking the economic costs of war increased support for backing down, suggesting that citizens may evaluate economic and military costs differently.

linked national humiliation and China's territorial disputes, which could make it particularly likely that Chinese citizens think of these disputes in terms of national humiliation. In particular, the patriotic education campaign, which greatly increased emphasis on national humiliation in the education system and the media, "presented the communist state as the defender of China's national interests, pride, and *territorial integrity* [my emphasis]" (Zhao 2004, 231). Chinese students study maps of China's territorial claims, and the curriculum stresses the necessity of a strong military to regain these territories (Hughes 2017, 64). A best selling nationalist book, *The China That Can Say No* argued that China should "take back Taiwan by force, no matter what the cost, and confront the United States and Japan without consideration of the consequences" (Zhao 2004, 161–62). While this book was later suppressed by the government, it is anecdotal evidence that suggests the power of national humiliation to increase support for territorial aggrandizement in a way that is insensitive to the cost of this policy.

Investigating a potential link between national humiliation and territorial disputes is also interesting because other theories about national humiliation imply a link between national humiliation and territory. Barnhart (2017) argues that national humiliation is particularly likely to drive territorial aggrandizement in great powers because of the link between territory and status.

H5 Expressions of national humiliation will be more likely to support China's disputed territorial claims.

The final foreign policy position that I will investigate is in the economic rather than military realm. While lower on the hostility scale than military force, adopting economic barriers against other countries can certainly be though of as hostile. The current trade war between the US and China exemplifies this. Anti-trade measures are also generally though of as costly to economic welfare (Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan 1992). Anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese citizens connect China's current trade war with the US to China's historic national humiliation (Su 2019). Further, during anti-Japan protests connected to

national humiliation, protesters often call to boycott Japan (N. D. 2012). Could national humiliation lead individuals to be more supportive of trade barriers?

H6 Expressions of national humiliation will be more likely to advocate adopting trade restrictions.

1.1   Does Public Opinion Matter in China?

Popular nationalism has the potential to constrain Chinese foreign policy. Nationalist criticisms of China's policies as being too dovish towards the United States and Japan threaten CCP legitimacy (Zhao 2004, 33). Zhao writes that "nationalism is a double-edged sword" because, while it allows the CCP to claim legitimacy, it could produce "serious backlash and place the government in a tight spot" if citizens demand more hawkish policies than the regime wishes to take (Zhao 2004, 264). He continues, "It is very possible that if the Chinese people should repudiate the communist government of China it could be for nationalist reasons after a conspicuous failure of the government's program of national construction or after the people of China conclude that the government's foreign policies run counter to the national interest (265)." While Zhao points out that the CCP has so far resolved international crises peacefully, despite its nationalist rhetoric, he also notes that with the rise of information exchange over the internet and leader accountability, it is not clear how long this can continue (272).

Even if domestic political opinion is not an absolute constraint on Chinese foreign policy, it may increase leaders' political costs of compromise, making compromise less likely (Weiss 2019, 679).[3] Further, popular pressure may be most likely to be decisive during "major crises and conflicts," when foreign policy decisions are critically important (Weiss 2019, 694). Even if the probability of losing office due to citizen dissatisfaction is lower for autocrats, they are sensitive to it because they face harsher consequences, such as death and imprisonment,

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[3]In contrast, research also shows that while citizens tend to disapprove of backing down, this can be mitigated depending on the explanation the regime gives for its actions (Quek and Johnston 2018, 10).

than democratic leaders who lose office (Debs and Goemans 2010). Krebs (2015) argues that narratives are critical to understanding international conflict because conflicts are costly and cannot be pursued unless legitimized by narratives (2). While observing that the key audience of narrative legitimacy strategies may be narrower than in democracies, Krebs argues the necessity of narrative legitimation applies even in authoritarian contexts (295).

1.2 The Importance of Social Media

The content on social media is both inherently important for politics and important as a means of diffusion of opinion, emotion, and social pressure. As King, Pan, and Roberts (2017) argue, "scholars and policymakers should focus considerably more effort on the Chinese Internet and its information environment, which is a contested virtual space, one that may well be more important than many contested physical spaces. The relationship between the government and the people is defined in this space, and thus the world has a great interest in what goes on there. We believe that considerably more resources and research should be devoted to this area" (497). That China's leaders get a daily briefing on online social media activity emphasizes the importance they ascribe to public opinion in this realm (Weiss 2019, 683).

Johnston (2017) calls for further exploration of Chinese nationalism using time series measures that include "online opinion" because, even if online opinion is "less representative" than survey opinion, it is "more immediately salient for political leaders" (42). Further, those who are more attentive to China's territorial disputes are more likely to get their information about the disputes online (Chubb 2014, 29). This could means that increased attentiveness during a crisis could cause public opinion to converge to online opinion. While cautioning that researchers should not go too far in their conclusions based on hawkish online rhetoric because his surveys find that most Chinese support compromise on China's island disputes, Chubb suggests that online rhetoric may be shaping public opinion within China because those who get their information about China's disputes online are more likely to express

dissatisfaction with China's policy in favor of more hawkish policies (Chubb 2014, 10).

Research on social media can shed light on what Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) refer to as "mesofoundations," the social network context, in which citizens are embedded, which are vital to understanding public opinion and foreign policy because these networks are sources of information to citizens and produce pressure for citizens to conform (546). In a large-scale experiment using Facebook, Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock (2014) show that text alone is enough to create online emotional contagion, causing users within the original poster's network to be more likely to share posts with similar emotional content. Research on emotions suggests that the social sharing of emotions and the connection of emotions to a goal can allow them to propagate indefinitely and motivate action (Frijda 2007, 189, 192). Understanding how individual emotional reactions spread is an important part of bridging the gap between individual level behavioral research on emotions and foreign policy preferences and foreign policy outcomes themselves (Hall and Ross 2015, 848).

It is true that social pressure may mean opinions expressed online do not necessarily reflect actors' true beliefs (censorship and regime commentators are discussed in Section 5). However, if citizens feel pressure to express particular kinds of emotions, this, itself, is a means of emotional diffusion that is interesting (Hall and Ross 2015). It is only expressed beliefs that have the potential to influence politics. If many citizens feel pressure to express national humiliation and/or express support for more aggressive foreign policies, the political effect of this is the same as if they actually held these positions. Expressions due to social pressure can also create a self-reinforcing cycle where, as some citizens believe that social opinion obligates them to express these positions, others observe these expressions and feel pressure to conform.

2 The Data

The Weibo posts analyzed here come from a data set originally collected by a group of Chinese scholars studying natural language processing (NLP) (Zhang et al. 2015).[4] The Fudan NLP Group's website appears to have been taken down, and the data set is no longer publicly available. The data was originally collected by randomly selecting 200 Weibo users and collecting the first 50 pages of posts from these users and their followers. Because the initial selection of users was random, the data should be relatively representative of Chinese online opinion. In total, the data set has 1,679,006,899 posts from 2.07 million users.[5] The earliest post is from August 13, 2009, and the latest post is from March 12, 2014. To my knowledge, this data set has not previously been used to study politics. When the machine-labeled variables I create (described below) are included, the full data set is 559.36 gigabytes, making it computationally challenging to store and analyze.[6]

It is common in political science research, when dealing with data of this size, to select a small subset numbering in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands to ease computational challenges (Pan and Siegel 2020; Cairns and Carlson 2016). This is perfectly acceptable depending on the goals of the research, but I want to make the case that the time and effort needed to analyze the full set of data, when possible, is valuable. In addition to the obvious benefit of adding statistical power, analyzing the full data set has three other advantages in this case. First, since I am machine labeling the full data set based on the content of the posts, it creates a valuable data contribution for others to use. If instead I had only analyzed a subset of posts, then posts of interest to future researchers might not have been labeled. Second, it reduces the problem of the "garden of forking paths" because

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[4]The data set was updated after Zhang et al. (2015) was published. The latest information is based on how the Fudan NLP group's website described the data before it was taken down. Regarding usage data permissions, the website said, "The platform shares the data sets of social media, such as public comments and Weibo posts, for non-commercial non-profit research, and the laboratory reserves the right to interpret" (Fudan NLP Group n.d.).

[5]This is after removing 203,341 posts that had no textual content. Presumably these posts only contained image or emojis content, which was not collected.

[6]I stored the data set as a SQL data base on Google BigQuery.

there are infinite subsets of the data that could be selected for analysis but only one set that contains all of the data (Gelman and Loken 2014). Selecting a subset could raise the concern that my results are sensitive to the subset I selected or even that I intentionally selected a subset that supported my hypotheses. Lastly, using the full data set allows the data to be dense enough to be aggregated to the day level for the time series analysis that I use to assess causal order. This fine-grained day unit of analysis is more in line with social media cycles that happen rapidly. If instead I selected a subset of a few million posts, there would frequently be days where the subset contained no posts representing each variable. This would create a floor effect, and the sparsity of the data would make it difficult to assess the variables' temporal dynamics with each other.

The social media data are also better suited than a set of case studies to examine the theory. The experiments in Chapter 3 show that humiliated people are *more likely* to support costly, hostile foreign policy options, not that they do so in every case. Finding that policy makers came to a costly foreign policy decision in a particular case would not make compelling evidence because the counterfactual of what policy they would have adopted if they were not humiliated is unobservable. In contrast, social media posts offer substantial variation both in national humiliation narratives as well as policy positions. While the counterfactual of the policy a post would support if it had a different value for national humiliation is also unobservable, the presence of many other posts and users makes controlled comparisons more plausibly able to approximate this counterfactual.

Possible concerns about censorship and regime commentators are discussed below, but an even more fundamental concern is whether the data set itself is real or fabricated. This kind of problem often troubles research on politics in authoritarian countries. I follow best practices from King, Pan, and Roberts (2017) who worked with a leaked data set of social media posts from China. Similarly to the data set they used, the massive size of this data set and its complexity suggest that fabrication would be extremely difficult and is therefore unlikely (495). Further, like King, Pan, and Roberts (2017), I verify external references in

select posts as well as checking to see if these posts correspond to real posts that exist online. The facts that this data set was initially collected by computer science researchers who were unlikely to be thinking about the possibility it might be later used to study politics and that they have used it in numerous papers in peer reviewed outlets also increase the likelihood of its veracity. If the regime wanted to produce a set of fake social media posts to mislead political science researchers, it would not make sense for it to first give this data to top computer science researchers to use for years before the data made its way into the study of politics. Further, it would not make sense for the data set be removed from where it was previously posted online.

A different concern could be that belief in national humiliation and/or costly, hawkish foreign policy could be so common in China that citizens see no need to discuss them online (Krebs 2015, 60). In this case, the data set would understate the prevalence of these beliefs. Indeed, survey research indicates that public opinion within China on foreign policy tends to be hawkish (Weiss 2019). However, on the positive side, these survey results indicate that Chinese are not shy about expressing desires for more aggressive military polices, which should alleviate some concerns about self-censorship.

2.1 Coding

The following steps were taken to code the data. First, I assembled two lists of keywords. The first was designed to select posts that could contain narratives of national humiliation. The second was designed to select posts that could contain the dependent variables of supporting the use of military force, China's territorial claims, or the adoption of trade barriers. Keyword selection is used because each variable is relatively rare in the overall data set (see the Appendix section 6 for the full lists of keywords). It is not a good use of human coder time to code thousands of posts, none of which contain the variable being analyzed. Further, machine learning will perform poorly if some categories are too rare.

After constructing the initial lists of keywords, I supplement them with computer sug-

gested keywords (King, Lam, and Roberts 2017). Next, I iteratively eliminate words that select a high proportion of documents that do not contain the sought after variables until the frequency of sought after variables in the selected documents is high enough to be useful for human coding and machine labeling while still being inclusive enough to exclude only a negligible amount of documents that contain these variables.

Out of an original 1,679,006,899 posts, 8,627,945 are selected as potentially containing national humiliation narratives and 26,894,714 are selected as potentially containing at least of one the dependent variables. I then randomly selected 2,499 of the posts selected by keyword for national humiliation to be coded by a hypothesis-blind research assistant for this variable according to my code book. The code book defines `national humiliation` posts as posts representing the nation of China as being humiliated by a foreign humiliator (See the Appendix for the code book that contains the full definition and examples). Of posts selected for hand coding, 151 were labeled as containing national humiliation narratives.

Another set of 3,499 posts was randomly selected from the posts found by keyword to potentially contain one or more of the dependent variables and coded, separately from the humiliation posts, by a research assistant for these variables. Posts were coded as supporting military `force` if they advocated using or threatening to use China's military force against another country (see code book in Appendix for full definitions and examples).[7]

Posts were coded as containing the `territory` variable if they mention one of China's territory disputes, which include but are not limited to Taiwan, the Diaoyu/East China Sea dispute, the South China Sea (including the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands), China's territorial disputes over its border with Indian, and China's territorial disputes over its border with Russia. Simply naming one of these places was not enough. The post had to be about China's claim to the territory.

Posts were coded as containing the `trade barrier` variable if they advocated boycotting

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[7]Initially, there were two military force variables. One for posts that implicitly advocated force and another for posts that explicitly advocated it. These were combined for machine labeling and analysis to decrease rarity and increase accuracy of machine labeling.

goods or raising trade barriers to goods from one or more other countries. Trade barriers include both tariffs and non-tariff barriers, such as increased inspections. Of the posts that were selected for dependent variable hand coding, 77 were coded as advocating military force, 642 were coded as mentioning territory disputes, and 46 were coded as advocating trade barriers.

As a quality control on the human labels, I coded 200 of the posts from both sets of posts selected for hand coding and checked intercoder reliability. For each category, the research assistant's coding agreed with my own at least 97% of the time.[8]

These codings then became the training sets for separately trained and independently tuned Support Vector Machine (SVM) models, which were used to machine label the remaining posts that were selected by keyword as possibly containing each variable.[9] The model that coded the posts for national humiliation was only allowed to train on the text content of the posts (see Appendix for how content was preprocessed). The models that coded the dependent variables used the post content combined with additional features selected using cross-validation on the training set, including the device the post was written on, the year the post was created, the number of likes the post received, and the amount of times the post was reposted (see the Appendix for a detailed breakdown). Taking account of these additional features allows the models to more accurately classify the dependent variables. To account for unbalanced categories, I weight my loss functions in inverse proportion to class frequency (Chang and Masterson 2020).

The posts selected by keyword as possibly containing a particular variable were machine coded for that variable, and the posts that were not selected by keyword as possibly containing a variable were assumed to not contain that variable (meaning they were coded as 0 for that variable). Machine labeling the 35,522,659 posts selected by keywords was a computationally intensive task. To accomplish it, I trained and deployed my SVM models on a

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[8]Krippendorff's α for each category was as follows: 0.922 for national humiliation, 0.784 for military force, 0.889 for territory, and 1 for trade barrier.

[9]These models were created using Python 3 and the machine learning package scikit-learn.

Google AI Platform instance. Labeling the variables with the trained models took about 24 hours of computing time each.

Table 1 shows how each SVM model performed for each variable. To evaluate the models, I use a 0.8/0.2 train/test split. The models are highly accurate, each model classified at least 96% percent of the posts in the withheld test set correctly (approximating the 97% intercoder agreement among the human codings).[10] The models also perform well on the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), which measures how well they are able to distinguish between classes. I also report precision and recall for the minority classes because this captures how often the models are correct when they label a post as being in the minority category and how many of the posts in the minority category are correctly labeled respectively. Labeling minority categories is a challenge for machine learning models, partly because the algorithm has fewer posts of this kind to learn from (Chang and Masterson 2020).

I also include an `income inequality` variable both as a control for political issues in general and as a placebo test, since it is a political issue that national humiliation narratives should not theoretically be related to. Both of these steps are designed to deal with the concern that national humiliation narratives might be more common in political posts generally. I selected income inequality because it is an issue ranked as the second biggest concern among Chinese survey respondents, so it should be salient (Chubb 2014).[11] I use

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[10]While the machine classifications are accurate, they are imperfect, so it is worth considering whether measurement error could bias my causal estimates. Researchers have sometimes argued that measurement error will, at worst, bias against their hypothesis by creating attenuation bias (Grumbach and Sahn 2020, 210). Unfortunately, this is only the case if the machine labels are uncorrelated with the residuals in the downstream regression and the classification errors are uncorrelated with observed covariates (Fong and Tyler, n.d.). While this bias cannot be estimated without knowing the true parameters, it is possible to reason about its severity. The first condition is isomorphic to the assumption made by any OLS regression that all independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term, so it is not uniquely of concern here. The second condition could be violated if, for example, the SVM that classified posts for military force was more or less likely to classify these posts accurately when a post contained a national humiliation narrative. While I cannot rule out this possibility, the facts that the training and evaluation of the models was conducted separately for national humiliation and the other variables means that the models classifying posts for the dependent variables were blind to whether the post also contained national humiliation. This makes it less likely that the classification accuracy for the dependent variables is correlated with the classifications of the national humiliation variable.

[11]I choose this instead of the number 1 issue of corruption because national humiliation posts often attribute

Table 1: Machine Learning Model Performance

Variable	Accuracy	AUC	Minority Class Precision	Minority Class Recall
National Humiliation	0.96	0.7604	0.6818	0.5357
Force	0.9814	0.6319	0.6667	0.2667
Territory	0.9757	0.8812	0.9608	0.7656
Trade Barrier	0.9943	0.6	0.2	0.2

All results are for performance on the withheld test set using a 0.8/0.2 train/test split. The training set for national humiliation posts contains 1,999 posts, and the training set for the dependent variables contains 2,799 posts.

the same phrase to measure income inequality as was used in a previous survey: "rich-poor disparity" (贫富分化) (Chubb 2014, 22).

3   Descriptive Analysis

Because the prevalence of different foreign policy positions on Chinese social media is interesting in itself, this section describes the coded data. The following section formally assess the causal hypothesis. Figure 1 shows the estimated percentage of total posts that fall into each category. This estimate is calculated by taking the proportion of *hand-coded* posts in each category in the posts selected by keywords for that category and multiplying by the proportion of keyword selected posts to total posts. Because the hand-coded posts were randomly selected from the posts selected by keyword to potentially contain content for each category, the proportion of the hand-coded sample should represent an unbiased estimate of the proportion in the keyword selected sample.[12] Assuming that posts that were not selected by keyword do not belong in these categories, multiplying by the portion of

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China's historic vulnerability to humiliation to historic corruption, for example, of the Qing dynasty. I needed a variable that measured a political issue, which there was no theoretical reason to expect would covary with discussions of national humiliation.

[12]I calculated the proportions this way rather than using the machine-labeled posts because while machine learning methods like support vector machines are ideal for labeling individual documents, aggregating these results may give biased estimates of the proportion of documents in a particular category (Hopkins and King 2010). That being said, for much of this section I rely on the machine-coded data to make inferences about the full sample. Describing the machine coded data is useful both for assessing its validity and because even though it is a biased estimator of the proportion of categories in the full sample, this bias shrinks as accuracy approaches 1 (see Table 1). Further, because I weight the loss function of the machine learning models based on the observed proportion of the categories, this bias should be greatly reduced.

keyword selected posts to total posts will give an unbiased estimate of the proportion of total posts from these categories. However, these proportions could underestimate the true proportion of each category if the overall data includes posts that should have been coded as that category but were not selected by keyword.

Figure 1: Post Frequency

The proportions are consistent with what we would expect based on previous work on Chinese public opinion. Previous work has found that only a small minority of Weibo posts contain political content (Chang and Masterson 2020). The fact that only a minority of political posts include discussion of foreign policy is consistent with survey research that finds China's population ranks issues such as corruption and wealth inequality ahead of territorial disputes in terms of problems facing China (Chubb 2014, 24). This being said, the volume of posts in these categories is not trivial. The estimated percentage of 0.0105% of posts falling in the trade barrier category, the smallest category, translates to 176,787 posts in the overall sample, and the estimated percentage of 0.1469% of posts falling in the territory category, the most common category translates to 2,467,334 posts in the overall sample. Further, the approximately 2 million users in the data set are only a small proportion of the nearly 200 million monthly active users on Weibo at the beginning of 2015 (Incitez

China 2015). Multiplying these totals by 100 to account for this amounts to a substantial discussion of foreign policy on Weibo.

Posts that mention China's territorial disputes are by far the most common. A distant second are posts that use national humiliation narratives. This means that most posts about territorial disputes do not explicitly invoke national humiliation. Of course, it could be that people understand these disputes in the context of national humiliation whether or not it is evoked, but that is not directly observable here. Posts that advocate specific policies are the rarest, with explicit and implicit support for using military force both more common than those advocating trade barriers (implicit and explicit military force were coded separately in the hand coding but combined for machine labeling). This is somewhat surprising because trade barriers are a much less escalatory step, so one might expect they would receive wider support than more extreme measures like using force. It could be that if a citizen is emotionally aroused enough to post about foreign policy online, then they are also excited enough that they reach for more forceful positions. That emotionally aroused citizens are more likely to support costly, hostile policies like using force would be consistent with my experimental findings that show humiliation decreases individuals' sensitivity to the cost of hostile foreign policy actions. The subsequent section will examine whether posts that contain national humiliation narratives are also more likely to advocate costly policies.

Figure 2 shows how the proportion of posts in the overall sample that mention territorial disputes, contain national humiliation narratives, or advocate using force vary over time. Here I use the machine-labeled posts to get a data set that is dense enough to show meaningful variation over time. Examining this plot, it does seem that these posts tend to covary. Further, posts about territory have their largest spike during the 2012 Diaoyu Islands Crisis when the Japanese government moved to purchase the islands from their private owners. This set off the largest anti-Japan protests in China since relations between China and Japan were normalized, so it lends some credence that the machine-coded data are picking up real variation.

Figure 2: Posts Over Time
Variables smoothed using a generalized additive model.

Table 2 shows summary statistics for the full machine-labeled data set. Because it is only coded with a single phrase, the income inequality variable is the least prevalent. While this does not reflect the true prevalence of discussion of income inequality on Weibo, which previous research would lead us to expect is much greater than the discussion of international relations, it should still correlate with the the true level, making it suitable as a placebo test and as a proxy variable to control for discussion of political issues in general.

Table 2: Summary Statistics (Post Level)

	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
National Humiliation	0	1	0.00026	0.016
Force	0	1	0.00013	0.01118
Territory	0	1	0.00115	0.03393
Trade Barrier	0	1	0.00002	0.00477
Post Length	1	4651	91.6477	71.18526
Income Inequality	0	1	0.00001	0.00341

N = 1,679,006,899 Weibo posts. Results rounded to fifth decimal place. Post length is measured in characters.

Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the data once it is aggregated to the day level for time series analysis. While there are some days where posts containing each of the variables are not present in the data set, the main variables are mentioned in hundreds of posts on an

average day. Even the income inequality variable, which is measured much more coarsely, receives over 10 mentions on the average day. For each variable that measures the content of the posts, the standard deviation is much greater than the mean, indicating the day to day fluctuation in discussion of these topics is substantial.

Table 3: Summary Statistics (Day Level)

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Posts	$1,003,540.534$	$777,348.954$	8	$2,821,245$
Total Length	$91,970,925.830$	$75,724,084.560$	62	$271,774,287$
National Humiliation	257.108	$1,580.076$	0	$37,672$
Force	125.473	720.985	0	$15,475$
Territory	$1,156.705$	$5,667.186$	0	$99,169$
Trade Barrier	22.830	256.809	0	$6,433$
Income Inequality	11.658	24.255	0	537

N = 1,673 days. Total length is measured in characters.

4   Causal Analysis

The causal analysis assesses support for the hypotheses. It is divided into two parts. The first part examines the data at the post level. This is the most direct way to test whether the same posts that mention national humiliation are also more likely to mention territorial disputes, advocate using military force, or advocate trade barriers. However, since variables are present in the same post, the post-level analysis cannot determine the direction of the causal relationship between national humiliation and the other variables. For this reason, the second part of the causal analysis aggregates the data to the day level and uses time series analysis to examine the causal order among the variables.

4.1 Post-level Analysis

4.1.1 Modeling Strategy

To analyze the post-level data, I use linear probability models.[13] I control for the number of characters in the social media post, which I re-scale to hundreds of characters, to control for the possibility that longer posts are more likely to contain both national humiliation narratives as well as each dependent variable. I also control for the discussion of income inequality as a way to control for whether posts that discuss one political topic are more likely to discuss other political topics, such as those measured by the dependent variables.

4.1.2 Results

Table 4 shows the results for each dependent variable both with and without controls. In each case, the coefficient on national humiliation is positive and statistically significant, supporting H4–6. The coefficients can be interpreted as the increase in probability that a post containing a national humiliation narrative will contain the dependent variable compared with posts that do not contain national humiliation narratives. The substantive effect for humiliation on the territory variable is by far the largest, with national humiliation being associated with a 10.82 percentage point increase in the probability a post mentions a territorial dispute. National humiliation also increases the probability a post advocates using force and trade barriers by between one and two percentage points each. The substantive importance of this effect becomes clear when it is compared to the baseline probabilities of posts advocating military force and trade barriers. The baseline probability of a 100 character post that does not mention income inequality, advocating using force is only 0.01%, so a mention

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[13]Because the post-level data contains 1,679,006,899 observations, the analysis cannot be conducted on a conventional computer. I conduct all of the post-level analysis using Google's BigQuery ML (Machine Learning) platform. For this reason, I have to pay each time I run a model. I also have to conduct additional calculations to compute the standard errors for each variable. To save funds, I only calculate standard errors and evaluate significance for the treatment. This should not detract from the usefulness of the results because control variables do not have causal interpretations anyway (Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert 2020). I cannot use logistic regression because BigQuery logistic regression model objects do not currently return the information necessary to calculate standard errors.

of national humiliation increases this baseline probability by about 142 times. National humiliation increases the baseline probability a post supports trade barriers by approximately 542 times.[14]

Table 4: Post-level Results

	Force	Territory	Trade Barrier	Force	Territory	Trade Barrier
Intercept	0.0001	0.0011	0.0000	−0.0001	0.0002	0.0000
National Humiliation	0.0143**	0.1089**	0.0119**	0.0142**	0.1082**	0.0119**
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
Post Length				0.0002	0.0010	0.0000
Income Inequality				−0.0003	0.0007	0.0000

N = 1,679,006,899 Weibo posts. All results rounded to the fourth decimal place. Post Length is re-scaled to hundreds of characters. Standard errors and significance only shown for treatment. * indicates $p < 0.1$ ** indicates $p < 0.05$.

4.1.3 Placebo Test

A potential concern could be that any political discussion on Weibo would correlate positively with discussion of any other political issue. If this were the case, the relationships between national humiliation and the dependent variables might just exist because posts that discuss any political issue are also more likely to discuss national humiliation. To assess this concern, I run the model with and without controls with a variable measuring income inequality, which is a political issue that should not theoretically be related to national humiliation. Table 5 shows the results.

Table 5: Post-level Placebo Test

	Income Inequality	Income Inequality
Intercept	0.00001	−0.00001
National Humiliation	0.00000	−0.00002**
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Post Length		0.00002

N = 1,679,006,899 Weibo posts. All results rounded to the fifth decimal place. Post Length is measured in hundreds of characters. Standard errors and significance only show for treatment. * indicates $p < 0.1$ ** indicates $p < 0.05$.

The relationship between national humiliation and income inequality is not significant in

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[14]If the baseline probabilities are instead calculated for 100 character posts that do mention income inequality, these effects are not meaningfully changed.

the bi-variate model. In fact, the coefficient rounds to 0 at the fifth decimal place. In the model that accounts for post length, the relationship just barely reaches significance, but it is in the opposite of the direction that would be expected if political discussion confounded the results. Further, the substantive effect is negligible. According to the model, posts that discuss national humiliation are -0.002 percentage points less likely to mention income inequality. Overall, the placebo tests increase confidence that the results in the previous section are not spurious to discussions of politics in general.

4.2   Causal Order

Because the post-level analysis examines narratives of national humiliation and discussions of the dependent variables in the same post, it is unable to establish the temporal relationships among the variables. If national humiliation is causing the other variables, then, at a minimum, it should temporally precede them. This section aggregates the data to the day-level of analysis to examine the temporal relationships among the variables.

4.2.1   Modeling Strategy

To examine the temporal relationship among the variables and establish causal order, I use vector autoregression (VAR). Vector autoregression allows the inclusion of multiple endogenous variables in order to assess how shocks in one variable affect the others (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). The endogenous variables I include are national humiliation, military force, territory, trade barriers, income inequality, total posts, and total length. Each of these variables (aside from total length, which is measured in characters) is measured as a count of posts per day. I select the lag order of the VAR model based on the Hannan–Quinn information criterion, which selects 9 lags as optimal (Hannan and Quinn 1979; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014 Ch. 4)[15]

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[15]Specifically, I iteratively increase the maximum lag order examined until the information criterion selects a model with an order lower than the maximum lag order. Because non-stationary variables can pose problems for VAR (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014 Ch. 4), before selecting the model's lag length, I examine each

I examine two outputs of the models to assess the causal dynamics among the variables. First, I evaluate Granger causality for each endogenous variable on every other endogenous variable. For VAR, an endogenous variable Granger causes another endogenous variable if at least one of the lags of the first variable is significant in the outcome equation for the second variable (Floyd 2005, 31).[16] Second, I examine the orthogonalized impulse response functions (OIRF), which show how each variable responds to a one standard deviation increase in the treatment variable over time to learn about the magnitude and direction of these effects (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989, 847).[17] I also examine how the treatment variable responds to each of the other endogenous variables.

In the results shown below, I do not include exogenous controls.[18] However, in the Appendix I show the Granger causality test results for the model when exogenous dummies are included for days of the week, months, and years.[19] The robustness of the results to the inclusion of these fixed effects should increase confidence that the results are not spurious to unmeasured events that elevate discussion of both national humiliation and the dependent variables although it is impossible to completely eliminate this concern.

4.2.2 Results

The results in Table 6 show whether each variable Granger causes the others. National humiliation both Granger causes and is Granger caused by military force, territory, and trade barrier. However, national humiliation does not Granger cause the placebo variable of income inequality.[20] This indicates that national humiliation is in a dynamic relationship

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variable for stationarity. Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that each variable is non-stationary (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), so I difference each variable once. Both KPSS tests and augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests of the differenced variables indicate they are stationary.

[16]This is distinct from a block exogeneity test, which is a joint test of whether a variable Granger causes any of the other endogenous variables in the VAR. Throughout the paper I will use Granger causality to refer to whether past values of one variable predict future values of another rather than in the block exogeneity sense.

[17]I use bootstrapping to calculate the OIRF, so they are not sensitive to the order of the variables.

[18]I do, however, include an intercept.

[19]Because the impulse response plots only depend on the endogenous variables, they are unaffected by whether exogenous variables are used.

[20]National humiliation is, however, Granger caused by income inequality according to the model.

Figure 3: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses

Orthogonalised impulse response to a 1 standard deviation shock with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Results computed based on a single vector autoregression model with 9 lags. The impulse responses for total posts and post length as well as impulse response pairs not involving national humiliation are not shown.

with military force, territory, and trade barrier, in which past days' counts of posts on each of these variables affect subsequent days' counts of the others. To understand the direction and magnitude of these effects, I turn to the orthogonalized impulse response plots shown in Figure 3.

Table 6: Does The Variable in the Row Granger Cause the Variable in the Column?

	Humiliation	Force	Territory	Trade	Inequality	Total Posts	Total Length
Humiliation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Force	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Territory	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Trade Barrier	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Income Inequality	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total Posts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Total Length	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Yes indicates that the Granger causality test was significant at the 0.05 point level.

The OIRF plots show that for each of the dependent variables, a one standard deviation increase in national humiliation posts results in an increase in posts about the dependent variable the following day. In raw post numbers, a one standard deviation increase in posts about national humiliation results in an increase of approximately 200 posts about military force, 1,500 posts about territory, and 50 posts about trade barriers the following day. On the second day after a shock to humiliation posts, posts about force, territory, and trade barriers decline. Finally, over the next few days, posts about these dependent variables stabilize to their normal levels. Lending confidence that this effect is not a result of general cycles of political discussion, the effect of a shock to humiliation posts on the placebo variable of income inequality is essentially 0 across all 9 days.

Shocks in some of the endogenous variables also appear to have meaningful effects on the number of national humiliation posts in the following 9 days. For each dependent variable, the effect of the dependent variable on national humiliation is less immediate than national humiliation's affect on the dependent variable. A shock to force does not affect the discussion of national humiliation for the first two following days. Then on the third day, national humiliation posts increase by about 350 posts. The elevation in national hu-

miliation posts continues on the forth day before declining and ultimately stabilizing. The confidence interval for the territory variable's affect on national humiliation in the 9 days following a shock to territory always covers 0. This suggests that despite being a Granger cause of national humiliation, the substantive effect of posts about territory on posts about national humiliation is negligible.

The OIRF showing the effect of a shock to trade barrier on national humiliation shows a similar pattern to the OIRF for shocks to force on humiliation. Following the shock, there is initially no response in the humiliation variable, but on the third day after the shock, posts about national humiliation increase by about 500 before declining and then stabilizing. The OIRF showing the effect of shocks to income inequality on national humiliation is puzzling. The response of the humiliation variable is essentially zero for the first seven days. On the eighth day, humiliation increases by 500 posts before declining and then stabilizing. It is tempting to write this change on the eight day off to random change, but I cannot rule out that there could be an effect after an 8 day lag or that income inequality could be proxying for some other variable that has such an effect.

Overall, these results suggest that there is an effect of national humiliation posts on subsequent posts that advocate each kind of costly, hostile foreign policy, even accounting for potential endogenous feedback effects between posts advocating these policies and posts containing national humiliation narratives. Further, the fact that national humiliation narratives and these hawkish policy positions Granger cause each other combined with the fact that (with the exception of the effect of posts about territory disputes on humiliation posts) the OIRF analysis shows these effects to be substantial indicate that there is a feedback effect among these variables. In other words, posts about national humiliation encourage posts advocating hostile foreign policies, which, in turn, encourage more posts about national humiliation.

While the VAR results establish temporal order, which is necessary for causality, it is important to point out what conclusions cannot be made from this analysis. First, the

analysis is limited by the time range of the data, which is from 2009 to 2014. Because of this, the analysis cannot directly show the impact of something like the patriotic education campaign (which began in the early 1990s) on expressed support for different kinds of foreign policies. However, the effects observed here would suggest that the increased emphasis on national humiliation in the education system and media as a part of this campaign ought to have increased support for costly, hostile foreign policies.[21] Second, the ability of the VAR analysis to examine long-term effects is constrained by the lag order of the model. Because the model uses a 9 day lag, it excludes evaluation of possible long-term effects among the endogenous variables that take place over more than 9 days.

5 Censorship and Regime Commentators

When assessing the possible impact of both censorship and regime commentators, it is important to distinguish between conditions that would bias the descriptive estimates of each type of post as a proportion of total Weibo posts and conditions that would bias the causal estimates. If, for example, censors were more likely to remove posts that advocated military force, this would lead to my data underestimating the amount of calls for China to use military force on Weibo, but would not bias my estimate of the relationship between national humiliation and calls for military force unless censors were systematically more/less likely to remove calls to use military force that contained narratives of national humiliation as opposed to other calls to use military force. Similarly, if regime commentators are more likely to post about national humiliation than normal citizens, this would increase the amount of national humiliation posts in my data set as a proportion of total posts, but it would not bias my hypothesis tests unless these posts are also more/less likely to express support for a

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[21]While survey results examining whether youths educated during this period have more hawkish foreign policy positions than their elders are mixed (Chubb 2014; Weiss 2019), it is important to keep in mind a point made in Weiss (2019) that the counter-factual of what these policy positions would have been absent the patriotic education campaign cannot be observed (690). Using age to estimate the campaign's effects could be confounded by any factor that correlates with youth and also affects foreign policy opinions, such as exposure to globalization. Further, estimates of the effect could be contaminated if individuals not in school during this time were also exposed to the campaign, which is likely given its broad reach (Wang 2012).

particular costly foreign policy. I discuss the likelihood and possible direction of biases driven by censorship and regime commentators below with a focus on biases that would confound the relationship between expressions of national humiliation and foreign policy preferences.

The posts were collected the same day they were created. This decreases the chance that the posts that are selected are affected by human censors who remove posts after they are posted. While this does not allow collection of posts that were blocked by automated keyword censorship, this kind of censorship is "not sophisticated or very successful, and therefore much of content filtering is done by hand" (Roberts 2018, 154). Further, if posts about foreign policy crises were keyword filtered during this period, then we would expect no posts about the Diaoyu Islands during the massive 2012 anti-Japan protests over the dispute. Instead, posts about the Diaoyu Islands reach a peak during this period.

Work on censorship has found posts are removed not because they contain inherently political content but because they contain calls to collective action. Censorship is costly to the regime because it risks backlash and decreases the information the regime can gain about public opinion, so political posts are not blanketly censored (Roberts 2018, 13). Online expression about international relations is also relatively exceptional in China because the regime tends to tolerate these discussion with "relatively minimal interference from censors" compared to other political issues (Chubb 2014, 56). This makes it less likely posts containing the variables analyzed here would be specifically targeted.

Self censorship is also a concern. Citizens may be unwilling to express their true feelings because they fear state punishment. While there is no doubt this is a particularly prevalent concern for some groups in China, such as Uyghurs who face mass arbitrary detention and public opinion leaders who face extra scrutiny, for most Chinese the threat of punishment for online comments is not very credible and online criticism of the regime is common (Roberts 2018, 13). When Roberts examined the impact of censorship on Weibo users, contrary to the idea of prevalent self censorship, she found that being censored on social media actually increased the likelihood the user would post about sensitive topics in the future (Roberts

2018, 117). Similarly, Pan and Siegel (2020) find that imprisoning dissidents in Saudi Arabia based on their social media posts tended to increase anti-regime social media content overall.

Another concern is that the data could contain posts written by the regime. In the most comprehensive study on the issue to date, using leaked regime commentator posts as a ground truth, King, Pan, and Roberts (2017) estimate that approximately 1 in every 178 social media posts in China is created by regime commentators. However, these posts rarely contain political content and are instead intended to distract from political issues (King, Pan, and Roberts 2017, 485). Particularly, posts made by regime commentators tend to avoid controversy and avoid taking stances for or against certain policies. For example, after a 2014 earthquake that lead the regime to expect criticism for poor building construction, the regime tried to encourage online commentators to discuss a celebrity scandal rather than trying to defend its policies (Roberts 2018, 190–91).

Perhaps there is an exception to this for national humiliation posts? After all, the regime launched the patriotic education campaign to promote the narrative of national humiliation. Surely, posts from the regime are just a continuation of normal regime propaganda and would also promote this narrative. This is not necessarily true according to the conclusions in King, Pan, and Roberts (2017). They find that the regime's social media strategy "departs from the traditional focus of the Chinese Communist Party propaganda department on guiding the content of media and shaping public opinion" and instead focuses on distracting from controversial issues (496). If regime posts were particularly likely to contain narratives of national humiliation, then we would expect bursts of regime commentator activity around dates like September 18, the anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, which is unofficially referred to as "National Humiliation Day" within China. However, King, Pan, and Roberts (2017) show regime commentators stay flat at near zero during this period and instead spike around periods when the regime fears that the potential for collective action is high (488, 496). This would lead to the expectation that posts made by the regime would simply add noise to the data by increasing the volume of irrelevant posts.

Still, it is worth considering whether the existence of posts by regime commentators in the data set might bias the results and in what direction. It is possible that the "cheerleading" category of posts by regime commentators may contain some national humiliation posts because these posts sometimes reference patriotism and martyrdom (King, Pan, and Roberts 2017, 489–90). However, these cheerleading posts exclude posts about "particular government leaders or specific policies" (King, Pan, and Roberts 2017, 499). If a regime commentator posts about national humiliation, previous research would suggest that this post would be unlikely to take a policy stance. This *biases against* my hypotheses in every case because I am predicting that posts containing national humiliation narratives will be more likely to advocate costly, hostile foreign policies. If instead, the regime took foreign policy positions consistent with those taken in state-run media, such as newspapers and television, then we would expect these posts to take positions that are less hawkish than typical online opinion, which would also bias against my hypotheses (Chubb 2014, 42–43)

Even in the absolute worst case where censorship and/or regime commentators not only bias the results but bias them in favor of my hypotheses, this analysis would still be illuminating. The consequence of this kind of bias would be that the interpretation of the results would change. Instead of concluding that national humiliation drives people to take particular kinds of foreign policy positions, the results would suggest that the Chinese government believes that national humiliation narratives on social media can lead people to support particular foreign policy positions and acts on this belief either by having its commentators create such posts or by censoring alternative views.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined whether the theory that national humiliation increases individuals' preferences for costly, hostile foreign policies is supported outside of an experimental environment. Specifically, I examined whether Weibo posts that contained narratives of na-

tional humiliation were more likely to express support for each of the following costly, hostile policies: using military force, maintaining disputed territorial claims, and raising trade barriers. I find in each case that posts containing national humiliation narratives are more likely to express support for costly, hostile policies. Further, the time series analysis establishes that posts about national humiliation increase the amount of posts advocating each of the three costly, hostile foreign policies on subsequent days. The absence of an increase in the placebo variable of income inequality due to national humiliation in both designs helps allay concerns that the results could be confounded by users' underlying propensities to discuss political topics and/or cycles of political discussion.

This finding has important implications for research on foreign policy preferences and political psychology. It shows how emotional narratives can influence the policy preferences. Further, it establishes that these narratives can spread through social media to influence the policy options citizens consider in the future.

This is particularly important in the case of China where the state promotes narratives of national humiliation with regard to many of its current foreign policy disputes. If these narratives drive individuals towards more costly, hostile policy options, their propagation may increase pressure on the state to adopt more hawkish policies in the future. Further, the evidence suggests a feedback effect between posts containing national humiliation narratives and posts advocating hostile foreign policies. This raises the specter of a vicious cycle that could magnify the effect of state media and nationalist groups pushing national humiliation narratives. The revelation that emotional narratives diffuse through social media networks also increases understanding of how emotions spread to become potentially politically important, which is an under-studied aspect of political behavior (Hall and Ross 2015).

Future research should examine the effect of social media discussions on policy itself. Examining this link is a challenge, partly because foreign policy change is rare, making data on foreign policy coarse and sparse in comparison with social media data. A convincing

study of this kind might need to examine the internal deliberations of policy makers, to more fully capture variation in their positions and whether they mention popular pressure from social media as a policy justification.

A second avenue for future research is examining how other kinds of emotional narratives diffuse though social media to influence policy positions. Lastly, while I have explored the microfoundations of the influence of the emotion of humiliation itself on policy preferences in Chapter 3, the microfoundations through which narratives of national humiliation on social media influence preferences could, themselves, be explored. For example, do national humiliation posts on previous days actually alter individuals' foreign policy preferences or do they simply embolden hawkish individuals to post more on subsequent days? Do individuals experience emotional arousal when exposed to posts about national humiliation, or does some other mechanism account for the effects observed here?

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5

The Origins of National Humiliation Narratives and When They Succeed: the Case of China

The narratives of national humiliation disseminated by the Chinese Communist Party, Hindu nationalists in India, and Russian leaders all share the trope of a once-great nation humiliated and taken advantage of by outsiders as well as the idea that the nation should be restored to its former glory. Given the evidence from Chapters 3 and 4 that national humiliation increases preferences for conflict, understanding how the idea of national humiliation originates and how it becomes politically prominent matters. Understanding the source of these narratives would also help explain when humiliation influences foreign policy preferences.

The next two chapters examine the hypotheses from Chapter 2 about when political groups disseminate narratives of national humiliation. I argue that narratives of national humiliation are socially constructed based on the national identities of political groups and the strategic incentives of key political actors. First, in order to construct a national humiliation narrative, an actor must be a member of the national identity claimed to be humiliated. Second, political groups strategically choose to propagate narratives of national humiliation when they can avoid responsibility for the event they are framing as humiliating and instead pin the blame on their political opponents (H3a). Third, political groups will use national humiliation narratives to promote policies that pose short-term costs to the public but can

be framed as necessary to defend the nation (H3b).

I probe these hypotheses with long-term historical case studies of political groups in China and India over the 20th century. These cases offer substantial variation in the use of national humiliation narratives and the strategic contexts facing the key actors. These case studies should be evaluated more as analytic narratives that seek to probe the extent to which the evidence is consistent with my theory in comparison with alternative explanations than as rigorous hypothesis tests (Bates et al. 1998). This is because it is impossible to find political group-periods that are identical across all confounds but differ on an independent variable.[1] However, the importance of the topic necessitates attempting to understand when political groups use narratives of national humiliation, and the diversity of conditions in China and India where the theory finds support lends some weight to the finding that strategic blame accounts for national humiliation narrative propagation.

I also use these cases to make inductions about the conditions under which the propagation of these narratives pays off. I find three conditions are associated with the political success of national humiliation narratives. First, national humiliation narratives will not lead groups to political success if the government severely represses these narratives and bans parties disseminating them. Second, the success of these narratives requires dense networks connecting the group propagating the narratives to their audience. These networks take two forms. First, media networks allow the narrative to spread and reach a wider audience. Second, institutional networks sustain the narrative over time, build trust, and provide resources for narrative propagation. The third determinate of narrative success is whether the audience is at a sufficient level of economic welfare to provide relief from the immediate concerns of survival, allowing citizens room for concern about more abstract issues like national humiliation. As the cases play a theory generating role for my explanation of humiliation narrative success, I do not attempt to use them to evaluate the evidence for my theory as opposed to competing theories and instead focus on illustrating the aspects of

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[1]This along with the reasons in section 2 of Chapter 4 are why I do not attempt to use the cases to test the hypotheses about the influence of humiliation on foreign policy preferences.

the cases that lead to my conclusions.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss case and period selection. Second, I evaluate my theory against alternative accounts of when national humiliation narratives are disseminated with the case of political groups in China 20th century. Third, I discuss what the Chinese case suggests about the conditions under which national humiliation narratives resonate with their domestic audience. The final section offers concluding comments.

1   Case Selection

In the next two chapters, I conduct case studies of political groups in China and India from the turn of the 20th century to 1999. My unit of analysis is major domestic political groups that either currently control a country or have the prospect of taking control of a national government. I make political groups the unit of analysis because it is political groups that decide whether or not to promote narratives of national humiliation and that either succeed or fail in taking control of a country.

China and India are particularly suited to evaluating my theory. First, they both have variation over time in the promotion of national humiliation narratives, which is important because my theory predicts within-country variation in whether political groups use national humiliation narratives. In both China and India, political factions that did not promote narratives of national humiliation exist during times other political groups do promote such narratives. China and India also both experience periods where national humiliation narratives led to political success as well as when they did not.

Second this variation extends over a long period of time. Being able to follow particular cases over a long period of time is necessary to rule out event-based explanations by showing that humiliation narratives are not always immediately preceded by the potentially humiliating event as well as to include events that could have been constructed as humiliating but were not. The length of time over which these narratives are deployed also helps rule

out international bargaining explanations. If humiliation narratives persist over long periods of time, the politicians initially deploying these narratives could not have anticipated the foreign policy effects this strategy would have many years down the line. This would make it unlikely that those narratives are solely a product of international bargaining.

I search these cases for evidence that would either support or contradict my theory. Specifically, only groups that share a national identity with their audience and can blame their political opponent for the event should propagate narratives of national humiliation. These groups should also promote policies that require short-term sacrifice from citizens, which the groups justify in the name of national defense. Evidence that would falsify my theory includes finding that political groups propagate national humiliation narratives when they could be criticized for the event they construct as humiliating or if none of their political opponents can be associated with this event.

1.1 China Period Selection

I divide my discussion of the Chinese case into three time periods based on changes in the independent variables (Lind 2010, 21). The first period begins when national identity starts forming and ends at independence.[2] I start a new period after independence because the strategic incentives to deploy national humiliation narratives change once a state is formed and colonial powers are ejected. Now domestic politics groups compete primarily against each other instead of the colonizer for political power.

I end the second period with the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, which is commonly described as a turning point (Fewsmith 2001).[3] Importantly for my theory, this marks the beginning of the time period when Communist leaders began to perceive a challenge to their rule from democratic reformers. Whether China ever faced a realistic prospect of democ-

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[2]If instead this period were started earlier, the findings should not change because the use of national humiliation narratives cannot arise prior to national identity formation.

[3]A reasonable alternative cut-point is 1976 (Mao's death and the beginning of Reform and Opening Up). However, 1989 marked a shift in the political strategic situation in China. The Communists' primary perceived opponent changed from reactionaries to liberals.

ratization during this period is less important than Communist leaders' perceptions of this possibility. This is because my theory is about the strategic incentives of political parties to propagate narratives of national humiliation given their beliefs about their primary competitors and their office-seeking imperative. I conclude the case study in 1999 for tractability, but because the Communist Party is still in power today, faces similar incentives about the need to motivate sacrifice to foster national defense, and continues to deploy national humiliation narratives, the findings would hold if this final time period were extended to the present.

Table 1 shows the political groups in China in each time period, whether they promoted narratives of national humiliation, whether they had the opportunity to blame their political opponent for an event constructed as humiliating while themselves escaping blame, who the humiliator was according to this narrative, and what political opponent they sought to blame with it (Target). In contrast, Table 2 shows the variation in the dependent variable alongside variation in independent variables highlighted by alternative explanations.

Wars are important both for events-based explanations that attribute national humiliation narratives to trauma and suffering inflicted by national others during conflict and for bargaining explanations that see narratives of national humiliation as bargaining tactics that seek to convey resolve to opponents in international disputes. One issue with using wars to explain national humiliation narratives is that wars vary at the country-period level and not the political-group-period level. Explanations that rely on wars cannot account for different political group strategies within the same country-period as observed in China from 1885–1949. Legitimacy crisis explanations do a bit better because a group's perceived right to rule does vary among groups. While the tables provide surface level evidence that strategic blame covaries most closely with humiliation narrative use, the analysis of each period below will examine further empirical implications of each explanation to assess their fit.

Of course, there were significant divides within each of these groups, and the time span analyzed is vast. I cannot give a complete account of Chinese politics in the 20th century. Nevertheless, I capture the key points of continuity and change in groups' use of national

Table 1: China Case Summary

Group	Period	Narrative?	Strategic Blame?	Humiliator	Target
Guomindang	1885–1949	Yes	Yes	Imperialists	Warlords
Communists	1885–1949	Yes	Yes	Imperialists	Warlords and Guomindang
Qing Empire	1885–1949	No	No	NA	NA
Communists	1950–1988	No	No	NA	NA
Communists	1989–1999	Yes	Yes	Imperialists	Democrats

Table 2: Alternative Explanations Summary

Group	Period	Narrative?	War?	Legitimacy Crisis?
Guomindang	1885–1949	Yes	Yes	Yes
Communists	1885–1949	Yes	Yes	No
Qing Empire	1885–1949	No	Yes	Yes
Communists	1950–1988	No	Yes	No
Communists	1989–1999	Yes	No	Yes

humiliation narratives as well as in the independent variables.

2 National Humiliation Narratives in China

2.1 Forging National Identity (China 1885–1949)

The events in China from 1885–1949 illustrate the importance of the formation of national identity to allow construction of national humiliation narratives as well as the importance of strategic incentives in their construction. The Qing Empire could not use national humiliation narratives because it would be held responsible for China's defeats. In contrast, its opponents could and did use national humiliation narratives. Strategic incentives can be seen in the timing of narrative construction as well as what they constructed as humiliating. For example, neither the Communists nor the Guomindang framed a 1945 treaty with the Soviets as humiliating, even though many privately felt it made unacceptable concessions on Chinese sovereignty. The Communist could not take this tact because their close ties to the Soviets would make them seem culpable, and the Guomindang could not avoid responsibility because they had signed the treaty. Both parties used national humiliation narratives to convince citizens to sacrifice in support of the war effort either by joining the military

or by donating funds. The absence of national humiliation narratives before the strategic incentives were right, despite many events that would later be constructed as humiliating, suggests that it is not events themselves, which lead to the creation of national humiliation narratives.

Japan's defeat of the Qing Empire in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War marks the beginning of modern Chinese nationalism (Wang 2012, 73-74; Zhao 2004, 16). The term meaning 'national' (国民) was first introduced during this period (Chu and Zarrow 2002, 4-5). The nationalism of Sun Yat-sen's Guomindang (国民党) is shown in that it used this term in its name. Both the Guomindang and the Communist party were strongly nationalist. The desire to save the Chinese nation was largely the motivation of Communist leaders to turn to communism (Meisner 1999, 18).

2.1.1 Strategic Blame

In addition to national identity formation, the correct strategic incentives were necessary for political groups in China to begin propagating national humiliation narratives. The collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 created an opportunity for nationalist entrepreneurs that did not previously exist (Zhao 2004, 18). The ruling Qing were not Han but Manchu. For Sun's revolutionary nationalists, the Manchus were foreigners who were the source of China's weakness (Wright 1959, 3). The Manchu government was criticized as the "running dog" of imperialist powers (Zhao 2004, 64). The Qing themselves could not use narratives of national humiliation both because they were in power during the events constructed as humiliating, preventing them from escaping blame, and because their rule was imperial and not national.

The phrase "never forget national humiliation" (勿忘国耻) was first popularized in China and used by nationalists groups to criticize the government, led by the warlord Yuan Shikai, for accepting Japan's 21 Demands (Wang 2012, 64). That national humiliation was not used politically until 1915 despite the fact that the beginning of the "Century of Humiliation"

was later dated to the first Opium War in 1839 supports the idea that events by themselves are not humiliating but must instead be socially constructed as such. Likewise the Chinese phrase 'unequal treaties' (不平等条约), referring to the treaties China was forced to sign during the Century of Humiliation, was not used until the 1920s (Wang 2008, 1). Further, the portions of the treaties that Chinese later viewed as the most egregious were not the same as the provisions that caused the most consternation at the time the treaties were signed (Wang 2008, 24).

Both the Communists and Guomindang used the concept of unequal treaties and "China's humiliating recent past" as "strategies for bringing down their common enemies—imperialism and warlordism" (Wang 2008, 7). After 1923, China's warlords began to feel intense public pressure as language regarding the unequal treaties became more charged and they were linked with "slavery" and "misery inflicted upon China by imperialism" (Wang 2008, 66). In 1924 a speech, Sun Yat-sen said that the unequal treaties made China's workers "slaves of world powers" (Wang 2008, 65). The Guomindang not only enshrined the abolition of the unequal treaties in its 1924 party platform but made it a "first priority" and "devoted considerable energy to renegotiating" the treaties (Zhao 1998, 83–84). In the 1920s and 1930s, the Guomindang approved textbooks titled "History of National Humiliation" (Callahan 2010, 34).

During the First United Front from 1924–26, the Communists and Guomindang coordinated on propaganda with regards to the treaties and targeted the Beijing Government, which was led by the warlord Duan Qirui until he was deposed a month after being weakened when his government's violent repression of protests against Japanese imperialism sparked mass anger in 1926 (Ji'an 2006, 11). While the Communists and Guomindang referred to members of the Beijing government as "running dogs of imperialism," the Beijing government itself rarely mentioned the unequal treaties (Wang 2008, 67–68). Mao's propaganda reports show that both the Communists and Guomindang believed that the unequal treaties were an effective method of rallying public opinion (Wang 2008, 70).

When the Guomindang began to violently suppress Communists in 1927, the Communists started to accuse the Guomindang of prioritizing protecting foreigners over abolishing the unequal treaties (Wang 2008, 73). To maintain control of the narrative, the Guomindang assumed management of formerly independent groups that commemorated national humiliation (Callahan 2010, 77). After the success of the Northern Expedition in 1928, the power of the warlords was largely broken and the Guomindang now prioritized both political and military competition with the Communists.

As the Guomindang was now their main opponent, the Communists "made every effort to discredit the KMT [Guomindang] for betraying the nationalist cause" and criticized the Guomindang for not doing enough to resist Japan, but this argument was weakened by the Communists' inability to provide meaningful amounts of troops to fight Japan (Zhao 2004, 107). Chiang still believed that the Guomindang could avoid blame and took active steps to do so, including sending forces in 1932 to aid Zhang Xueliang in defending Rehe from Japan. Chiang secretly sent his weakest troops and was able to scapegoat Zhang for the loss (Vogel 2019, 239–40). Further, Chiang formed a political affairs office in Beijing to make unpopular concessions to Japan, including the Tangku Truce, to deflect blame from the Guomindang government in Nanjing.

However, building nationalist pressure eventually resulted in Chiang getting detained by his own forces and being forced to agree to unite with the Communists to fight Japan (Vogel 2019, 245).[4] In 1937 after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident when Japanese and Chinese forces fought near Beijing, Chiang, fearing the Guomingdang would lose support if he failed to respond, rejected advice that China was not ready and ordered a military response (Vogel 2019, 249).

This strategic use of national humiliation narratives by both the Communists and the

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[4]The Grand Chinese Alliance for Stopping the Civil War argued that "external humiliation is related to internal chaos and chaos comes from the civil war" (Zhao 2004, 101). While the Communists did not create this movement they did back the National Salvation movement and New Enlightenment movement, which made similar claims. This resulted in protests against Chiang's policy of defeating the Communists before Japan (Zhao 2004, 101).

Guomindang is consistent with H3a. Both the timing of narrative construction and the events that these parties choose to construct as humiliating are consistent with a strategic explanation rather than an events-based explanation. The failure of the Qing Dynasty and later ruling warlords, who were in power during the events constructed as humiliating, to disseminate national humiliation narratives provides further support for H3a.

2.1.2 Motivating Sacrifice

Both the Guomindang and the Communists wanted to mobilize public support. As the above account shows, political mobilization was costly for protesters who faced violent repression. Further, the parties used narratives of national humiliation to convince citizens to take costly steps to support the war effort. In 1922, Sun sold the planned Northern Expedition as an attack on the government in Beijing, which he claimed was a Japanese tool. He believed that maintaining the loyalty of his troops was even more important than support among the general population, so there is reason to think the justifications he gave to his soldiers were carefully chosen (Fitzgerald 1998, 200).

During the war against Japan, nationalism was seen by both the Guomindang and Communists as a means to mobilize fighters (Zhao 2004, 79). The "National Humiliation Fund" was created to raise money to "buy arms to fight Japan" (Callahan 2010, 69). Likewise, "National Humiliation Day" was officially recognized by the Guomindang during this period and used to raise funds to fight the Japanese and motivate citizens to "produce a strong Chinese nation" (Callahan 2010, 83). The Japanese invasion was also a way for the Guomindang government to convince liberal intellectuals to "painfully sacrifice" their liberalism in the name of "the state's capacity to fight" (Zhao 2004, 126). The use of national humiliation narratives to motivate citizens to sacrifice for national defense during this period corroborates H3b.

2.1.3 Alternative Explanations

The first alternative explanation for this period could be that humiliating or traumatic events drove the Guomindang and Communists parties' use of national humiliation narratives. Indeed, this period includes no shortage of events that could be and were constructed as nationally humiliating, so at first glance the humiliating events explanation appears to fit well. These events include: the First and Second Sino-Japanese wars, the presence of colonial powers in the foreign concessions of treaty ports, the invasion by the Eight-Nation Alliance, and the sacking of the Old Summer Palace on the orders of Lord Elgin, the British High Commissioner to China (Bicker 2012, 5–6). It would stretch credulity to argue that these events have *no* relation to the construction of national humiliation narratives in China during this period.

However, there are several reasons that humiliating events-based explanations fall short. First, there is variation among political groups in the use of national humiliation narratives. If the events listed in the previous paragraph were objectively humiliating to all Chinese, then the Qing dynasty should have constructed national humiliation narratives around these events. The behavior of the Qing dynasty can only be accounted for by understanding that the Qing dynasty was an imperial rather than a nationalist political group (it did not share a national identity with its audience) and that the Qing dynasty was in power during most of these events (it would have been blamed for allowing the events to occur, so constructing a national humiliation narrative was not strategically beneficial).

Second, there is variation in the timing of the construction of events as humiliating. The First and Second Opium wars and the signing of many unequal treaties took place prior to this period, but these events were not constructed as humiliating until this period. If these events themselves were sufficient for the construction of national humiliation narratives, then they should have given rise to such narratives at the time they occurred. The ability of political groups to construct events from the past as humiliating also calls the necessity of any given event into question for the construction of national humiliation narratives,

since there is always some other event from the past that political groups can seize on. Understanding the timing of the construction of national humiliation narratives during this period requires understanding that Chinese national identity did not exist prior to this period and that the political competition among groups that creates the incentives for the construction of national humiliation narratives did not exist until around the time the Qing Dynasty collapsed.

Third, the events constructed as humiliating themselves vary. If treaties that concede sovereignty over Chinese territory to foreign powers are humiliating and give rise to humiliation narratives, then the Guomindang's 1945 treaty with the Soviet Union, which contained secret provisions both Guomindang members and Communists regarded as limiting China's sovereignty, including an independent Outer Mongolia, should have been constructed as humiliating but was not (Wang 2008, 93–94). While members of both the Guomindang and Communist parties had reservations about the treaty, they refrained from criticism, instead praising the treaty in public (Wang 2008, 97–98). Only a theory that accounts for the strategic aspects of national humiliation narrative construction can explain this. It was strategic for neither party to raise the issue. The Guomindang was vulnerable to blame because they signed the treaty and the Communist were vulnerable because of their close links with the Soviets.

Another alternative explanation for the construction of national humiliation narratives is that ruling political groups created these narratives when they faced a legitimacy crisis. Arguably, this could account the behavior of the Guomindang during this period because there were times when they held many of China most important cities but their legitimacy faced serious questions due to corruption and mismanagement (Fairbank 2006, 288). However, this explanation does not account very well for the strategies used by either the Communists or the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty clearly faced a legitimacy crisis during this period and, indeed, ultimately collapsed. However, the Qing Dynasty did not attempt to shore up its legitimacy with national humiliation narratives. The Communists in contrast did not control

China's major population centers until the end of this period. For much of this period, the Communists were confined to relatively isolated rural outposts. Since the Communists were not in power and were not seen as responsible for the welfare and defense of the Chinese people, they did not face a comparable legitimacy crisis during this power. Despite this, the Communists still used national humiliation narratives to blame their political opponents for failure to defend China.

The last alternative explanation is that political groups constructed these narratives to increase their bargaining positions during international conflicts. This explanation fits this period the least well. Often the narratives were constructed after the international conflict had already ended, as was the case with narratives about both Opium wars and the First Sino-Japanese War. In these cases, the need to convey resolve had already passed and, therefore, could not have motivated narrative construction. Further, national humiliation narratives were often constructed in reaction to rather than in the process of negotiating international agreements. This was the case with most of the treaties that later came to be labeled "unequal" (Wang 2008, 24). Further, the length of time over which the Communists and Guomindang constructed national humiliation narratives raises doubt that these narratives were created to engage in a discrete international bargaining process after which they would no longer serve a purpose.

2.2   Statehood to the Tiananmen Massacre (China 1950-1988)

2.2.1   Strategic Blame

The Guomindang's relatively greater contribution to the war against Japan limited the ability of the Communists to use national humiliation narratives during this period (Wang 2012, 88). The Communists would potentially face blame for holding their strength in reserve to fight the Guomindang, fellow Chinese, rather than Japan. Further, the Communists still viewed reactionaries, including the Guomindang, as a threat to their rule. Chiang Kai-shek maintained his hope to retake the mainland until his death (Sui 2009). References

to national humiliation in China from 1940-1990 both in Chinese state media (see Figure 1) and in published books were very rare (Callahan 2010, 26). Instead the party shifted to emphasize Marxism in its propaganda during this period (Callahan 2010, 35). This reticence in deploying national humiliation narratives for fear of facing blame coincides with H3a.

2.2.2 Motivating Sacrifice

This period includes plenty of events that required the Communists to ask citizens to sacrifice, including the Korea War, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. Despite this, the Communists did not disseminate narratives of humiliation during this period. This is consistent with the theory. Political groups will only use narratives of national humiliation to mobilize support for costly policies if the conditions for H3a are met, meaning that they can avoid blame for the events constructed as humiliating. Avoiding blame is a necessary condition to use humiliation narratives to gain support for policies because it does a political group little good to gain support for its policies by fostering opposition to its rule. As the previous section argues, narratives of national humiliation did not provide a good avenue for the Communists to cast blame on their main political opponent, the Guomindang, relative to themselves during this period, which accounts for the absence of humiliation narratives.

2.2.3 Alternative Explanations

As with the previous period, this period is rich with traumatic events that could be constructed as humiliating. The Second Sino-Japanese War had just ended. This war killed millions of Chinese and involved traumatic events, including the Nanjing Massacre, that would later play a central role in Communist narratives of national humiliation (Wang 2012, 208). China also fought a war against United Nations troops in Korea in 1950–51 that posed a major challenge to the People's Republic of China, which was in its infancy, and killed hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops (Meisner 1999, 69–70). Either of these events

could have been constructed as humiliating, yet during the Mao era, the Chinese government framed these events as victories while playing down their humiliating aspects (Gries 2005).

In 1969, China fought a border conflict with its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union (Gerson 2010). While casualties were limited the Sino-Soviet split was a hugely important event for China's security as China, for a time, face a hostile relationship with both of the world's super powers. The Soviet Union's behavior could have been portrayed as a stab in the back and a humiliating betrayal. While some government rhetoric about the Soviet Union could fall in this category, it was short lived and was directed towards international rather than domestic audiences (more on this below). China also fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam. Although the Chinese government could have framed its 1979 war with Vietnam as a humiliation based on Chinese casualties and poor battle performance, it choose to suppress information about causalities (over which it could have faced blame) and frame the conflict as a victory instead (Zhang 2005, 866).

The legitimacy explanation arguably accounts for this period relatively well. While the Chinese government certainly faced challenges that could, in theory, have led to legitimacy crises during this period, Communist rule was never seriously under threat. These crises include mass starvation during the Great Leap Forward as well as political violence during the Cultural Revolution. While the failure of the Great Leap Forward did weaken Mao's position within the Communist Party relative to those who wanted China to more closely follow the Soviet industrial model, no group within China seriously challenged the Communist Party's right to rule, let alone proposed an alternative ruling party (Meisner 1999, 249–250). The Cultural Revolution precipitated mass violence and intimidation against those perceived as deviating from the party line, particularly intellectuals. If anything, the Cultural Revolution reinforced Mao's authority and entrenched his cult of personality (Meisner 1999, 347). A proponent of the legitimacy explanation could argue that the lack of a Communist Party legitimacy crisis during this period accounts for the absence of humiliation narratives during this period.

The evidence for the international bargaining explanation during this period is mixed. The Korean War was portrayed as a victory rather than a humiliation, which does not fit well with the idea the Communist Party used national humiliation to enhance its bargaining position over the issues at stake in the conflict. However, there is evidence from this period consistent with the idea that China sought to convey a sense of humiliation to deter adversaries. In diplomatic communications between the US and China in 1964, China sought to deter US escalation in of the Vietnam War with statements, such as, "650 million Chinese cannot be bullied easily" (Goldstein 2003, 756).

The bargaining explanation also fits the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969. Chinese Communist officials sought to convince the Soviet Union that China could not be "bullied" or "intimate[d]" into territorial concessions (Gerson 2010, 32). The Chinese government went through great effort to convince other nations that it was the victim in the conflict. The most intense effort of China's propaganda campaign was directed across the border into the USSR (Urbansky 2012, 267), which is consistent with the idea that the Chinese government wished to signal resolve to its adversary. The largest protests over the dispute within China took place outside the Soviet embassy (Gerson 2010, 23–24), which suggests that the Chinese government may have allowed protests there to send a message to its adversary. The Soviet side threatened escalating the dispute and even deploying nuclear weapons (Lüthi 2012, 390). The Chinese government wanted to signal that it would use its large population to rapidly the raise the cost of any escalation, to deter further hostilities (Gerson 2010, 43–44).

In contrast with the Soviet border conflict, China's war against Vietnam does not fit well with bargaining explanations. China's military expeditions were portrayed as victorious, and Chinese leaders regarded their casualties, despite the fact that they were much greater than in the Soviet conflict, as relatively unimportant (Zhang 2005, 866-76). The mixed evidence for the bargaining explanation during a period where national humiliation narratives were not used domestically may suggest that, at least in a country that fully controls its citizens' access to information, an international message of humiliation can be cordoned off from

domestic public perceptions. This could indicate that separate explanations are required to explain why messages of national humiliation are sent to international rather than domestic audiences for such cases. The fact that the Chinese government did not always send a message of national humiliation to adversaries during this period suggests that this choice may be endogenous to the bargaining process in ways that have yet to be fully explored.

2.3   After the Tiananmen Massacre (China 1989-1999)

2.3.1   Strategic Blame

Now that the Communists had ruled the mainland for several decades, their rule was recognized by almost every country in the world, and their military power was vastly greater than Taiwan's, they no longer viewed the Guomindang as a major threat to their rule. However, with the global decline of communism and the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, the Chinese government now imagined a new threat: democracy. Liberal movements within China worried the leadership much more than external territorial threats (Zhao 2004, 35). China faced sanctions and human rights pressure from Western countries in response to the massacre (Deng 2008, 76-77). Communist leaders saw national humiliation as a way to shift the public's attention from corruption and the lack of political reform, for which the Communists could be blamed, to external issues (Callahan 2010, 35). Further, the patriotic education campaign, launched in 1991, linked democratic values to foreign humiliators and internal critics of the regime to historical "traitors" who sold out China to foreigners (Callahan 2006, 35, 43).

After the Tiananmen Massacre, the Chinese government launched the patriotic education campaign that emphasized China's pre-1949 humiliation at the hands of Japan and Western powers along with the Communists' role in winning national independence (Wang 2012, 96-97). The Communists could escape responsibility for China's humiliation prior to 1949 because they were not in political power. Further, the information that the Communists held back in the war against Japan to preserve their strength for fighting the Guomindang

Figure 1: *People's Daily* Articles Containing 'National Humiliation'

Data scraped from People's Daily Press (2017), which includes articles from 1946 to the present.

was now suppressed. Chinese history textbooks typically begin with summaries of China's "glorious past" followed by its humiliation by foreign powers. These textbooks omit tragedies that occurred after the Communists took control in 1949 and instead focus on events that can be "blamed on outsiders" (Callahan 2010, 14). Figure 1 shows articles from the Communists' main mouthpiece newspaper, the *People's Daily* mentioning 'national humiliation' (国耻) from 1946 to 2017. State media followed a similar pattern as state approved textbooks, publishing only 2 articles with national humiliation in the title from 1949 to 1989 with surges of articles before and after this period.

2.3.2   Motivating Sacrifice

After the decline of Marxism as a source of legitimacy, the Communists needed an ideology to convince citizens to "bear hardship" (Zhao 2004, 212). Both reformers and conservatives within the Communist Party agreed that after the Tiananmen Massacre, they needed to get citizens "to support and even sacrifice for the regime" (Zhao 2004, 213). Reformers, lead by Deng, argued that paying the costs of reform was necessary because only economic reform could make China strong (Callahan 2010, 44–45). This was part of the motivation for the patriotic education campaign, and textbooks emphasized patriots who "sacrificed themselves" for the nation (Zhao 2004, 224). A 1995 *People's Daily* article summarizes the message of the patriotic education campaign in the national anthem as promoting a spirit of sacrifice, unity, and a sense of danger (Zhao 2004, 241). Patriotic education campaign textbooks are not merely designed to impart information but also emphasize the way students should "feel" (Callahan 2010, 52). This further suggests that the regime may be attempting to make use of the emotion of humiliation's effect, shown in Chapter 3, of decreasing sensitivity costs that come in the name of national defense, which is consistent with H3b.

2.3.3   Alternative Explanations

The events explanation does not account for this period very well. The patriotic education campaign was not triggered by any externally imposed humiliating event and focused almost exclusively on events that took place before the Communist Party took control in 1949. A proponent of the events explanation might argue that these pre-1949 events produced narratives of national humiliation after a time lag. However, many of these events were discussed as humiliating prior to 1949. Such an explanation could not account for why these narratives ceased for a forty year period and then began again. To understand this, it is necessary to examine the strategic incentives of narrative propagation.

Again, the legitimacy crisis explanation arguably accounts well for this period. Many scholars have argued that the Chinese Communist Party faced a legitimacy crisis in China

following the Tianamen Massacre. However, looking beyond this period raises questions for explanations that attribute China's narratives of national humiliation to this legitimacy crisis. In 2020, the Communist Party is arguably more confident than ever. The 2008 and 2009 financial crisis raised questions in China about the relative effectiveness of democratic alternatives (Kurlantzick 2013). Trump's election and the severe mismanagement of the Coronavirus response in the United States have further reinforced confidence in the Chinese system (Rachman 2020). To convincingly account for narratives of national humiliation within China during this period, a legitimacy crisis theory would need to explain why these narratives have long outlasted the initial crisis. The continued presence of national humiliation narratives despite the weakening of the perceived challenge of democratic political competitors is better accounted for by the continued need to justify the sacrifices necessary to modernize China's military and increase China's global influence.

The international bargaining explanation does not well account for the Communist Party's decision to use national humiliation narratives during this period, but it does a better job of accounting the intensity of the narrative's dissemination during periods when the party has decided to use it. While China is involved in ongoing disputes over Taiwan and territory in the South and East China seas, these disputes predate this period, so they cannot explain the initiation of the patriotic education campaign. Further, the integration of national humiliation into the education system suggests a more long term process than a tactic that the Chinese government ramps up when these disputes come to a head. However, the bargaining explanation arguably could account for cycles within the prevalence of national humiliation in public discourse. As seen in Chapter 4, discussion of national humiliation greatly increases during international crises, such as the 2012 Diaoyu Islands crisis. Scholars have noted that modern national humiliation protests within China also follow this pattern (Weiss 2014). It may be that the decision of political groups to use and maintain national humiliation and the cycles in the prevalence of national humiliation *given* this decision require separate explanations and that bargaining theory has an important role to play in the latter.

2.4 Discussion

No single piece of evidence is dispositive, but, taken as a whole, the cases show that the hypotheses can account for variation across a wide variety of circumstances, including different political competitors, regimes, levels of development, degrees of repression, and international environments. In each case, parties use narratives of national humiliation when they are able to escape blame for the event they frame as humiliating and attribute that blame to their political opponents. Strategic blame accounts not only for what groups use the narratives and the timing of their use but also what events political groups construct as humiliating. Neither the Communists nor the Guomindang constructed the Guomindang's 1945 treaty with the USSR as humiliating, despite constructing other similar treaties as humiliating because each group could face blame for the 1945 treaty. The Communists for their close relations with the USSR and the Guomindang because they signed the treaty. In another example, the Communist Party chose to focus on events predating its rule in the patriotic education campaign it launched in the 1990s rather than contemporaneous international sanctions because it was much more clear that the Communists were blameless for events that predated their rule. Further, these events could be tied to the Communists' perceived domestic enemy of democratic reformers because China's humiliation came at the hands of the same Western powers associated with democracy.

Further, the cases provide compelling evidence that alternative explanations cannot fully account for important variation in national humiliation narratives. In particular, traumatic or threatening events such as war defeats do a poor job in predicting national humiliation narratives. Further, these events cannot account for variation in the propagation of national humiliation narratives among political groups within the same country. The ability of political groups to reach far into the past for events to construct as humiliating suggests that no one event provides a necessary or sufficient explanation of national humiliation narratives.

The legitimacy crisis explanation admittedly fits the second two periods relatively well. However, it does a poor job of explaining the first period when the Qing dynasty failed

to disseminate national humiliation narratives despite facing a severe legitimacy crisis that ultimately lead to its collapse, and the Communist Party did propagate national humiliation narratives despite not being a ruling power and not facing a legitimacy crisis. Further, the following chapter that examines the use of national humiliation narratives in India will show that this legitimacy crisis explanation does not travel well outside of China.

The international bargaining explanation provides a poor account for when political groups within China choose to disseminate narratives of national humiliation. However, it does a much better job of accounting for variation in the prominence of national humiliation narratives once a political group has chosen to use this strategy. This is particularly true for the modern period. This suggests that while international disputes do not themselves cause national humiliation narratives, these disputes may create further incentives for a ruling group that has already adopted to such narratives to temporarily increase their circulation.

3   When Do Narratives of National Humiliation Resonate?

Although my theory explains when groups disseminate national humiliation narratives, it does not explain the factors that cause narratives to resonate with domestic audiences once used. For this reason, I draw inductions from the cases about these factors. Correspondingly my use of historical evidence in this section is not intended to test my hypotheses nor to rule out alternative explanations. Instead the purpose of this evidence is to illustrate larger trends in the cases that suggest the importance of each factor of narrative resonance.

I examine two indicators of whether narratives resonate with domestic audiences. First, does the party's propagation of the narrative help it gain or maintain political control? Second, what kinds of individuals are most likely to accept the narrative?

I find that three conditions affect narrative resonance. First, if the government is determined to repress narratives of national humiliation, to the extent that it is willing to ban

political groups propagating the narratives, then the ability of these narratives to resonate is limited. To be clear, this is *not* about repression in general but about repression specifically targeted at groups disseminating narratives of national humiliation. As the case of modern China shows, a regime can be very repressive towards political groups it does not like and still be relatively permissive towards narratives of national humiliation.

The second condition is the density of networks that connect the political group propagating narratives of national humiliation to its audience. Two types of networks are particularly important. First, media networks provide political groups a means of spreading their narrative and reaching audiences that they could not otherwise reach. Second, institutions including political parties, the education system, local governments, and state media outlets help sustain the narratives over time and provide the resources needed to expand the reach of the narratives and foster trust between the political group controlling the institutions and its audience. The final condition is the level of economic welfare of the audience. As more individuals are freed from the immediate concerns of economic survival, they become available for mobilization over symbolic issues.

Below I briefly summarize the evidence for the importance of each of these factors for the resonance of national humiliation narratives within China. If repression limits the success of national humiliation narratives, then we would not expect these narratives to succeed in places and times when they faced strict repression and would expect these narratives to be more likely to resonate when periods of strict repression are lifted. If the evidence supports the importance of networks, then two conditions should hold. First, as media networks linking a political group propagating narratives of national humiliation to its audience expand, national humiliation narratives should be more likely to resonate. Second, the more institutions that the political group controls when propagating a humiliation narrative, the more likely the narrative will persist and the group's audience will embrace that narrative. Likewise, two indicators would support the importance of audience welfare. First, if economic development is unevenly spread, then narratives of national humiliation should be

more likely to resonate with wealthier urban professional classes than those living in poverty in the countryside. Second, as a country's economy develops and citizens are lifted out of poverty, national humiliation narratives should be more likely to resonate.

3.1   Evidence of Narrative Success

The repression of criticism during the Qing empire helps explain why national humiliation narratives did not emerge until after the Qing empire collapsed (Fairbank 2006, 156-159, 261-62). Nationalist critics of the Qing empire were forced to live in foreign concessions or Japan to escape persecution (Spence 1990, 236). However, after the end of the Qing empire in 1912, repression did less to limit the success of national humiliation narratives because it was not the idea of national humiliation that was suppressed. Instead, Communist propaganda was suppressed in areas controlled by the Guomindang, and Guomindang propaganda was suppressed in areas controlled by the Communists (Fairbank 2006, 291, 312).

This initial period, ending 1949, also shows evidence for the importance of networks and economic welfare. The appeal of national humiliation narratives was concentrated among the elites and had little resonance among poor farmers. National humiliation was primarily discussed by intellectuals and business leaders (Wang 2012, 75). National humiliation narratives were first popularized by teachers' organizations and the press (Callahan 2010, 25). The importance of teachers organizations, the press, and political parties in the dissimation of narratives of national humiliation during this period also suggests the significance of networks both in the form of media networks for dissiminating the message and insitutional networks in organizating and supporting its spread. While the Communists attempted to use national humiliation narratives to gain support, in rural areas, they focused more on class issues. The Guomindang prioritized urban centers, devoting relatively less effort to winning rural support (Wang 2012, 82). Since villagers, who were generally less receptive to national humiliation narratives, were the key to the Communists' ability to take over the country, this case suggests that national humiliation narratives are unlikely to determine

political success during periods of low economic development.

The middle period, 1950–88, suggests the power of a determined state to use repression to prevent narratives of national humiliation from resonating. National humiliation narratives were completely muzzled. No books on national humiliation were published from 1947–1990, and the history of the Nanjing Massacre was suppressed (Wang 2012, 82). The utter lack of national humiliation narratives during this period provides strong evidence that determined government repression can prevent national humiliation narratives from spreading.

The extent of repression largely alleviates the need to discuss the influence of networks and economic welfare during this period because humiliation entrepreneurs could not use any media that did exist to reach any class that might have been receptive to their message. However, this period does suggest that the factors of repression and control over networks are closely related in a one-party state. Since the Communist Party controlled the only permissible political party, all meaningful media networks, as well as the educational system during this period, it could easily deny these avenues to potential political opponents who, if they had been permitted to exist, might have attempted to use them to spread narratives of national humiliation blaming the Communist Party for one or more of the events discussed in section 2.2.3. The Communist Party's tight control of these networks also allowed it to reverse its position on national humiliation narratives to great effect in the final period.

The final period, beginning in 1989, continues the theme found in the middle period of the close relationship between repression and control over networks in a one-party state. The Communist Party's control of the media, local governments, and the education system allowed it to suddenly permit national humiliation discourse that had previously been prohibited (Wang 2012, 86). Further, suggesting the importance of media networks, the Communists took advantage of multiple forms of media to spread national humiliation, including films, museums, novels, songs, poems, and online videos (Callahan 2010, 16). The institutional organization of the Communist party allowed it to mobilize these resources in concert.

In a reversal of the role repression played in the previous two periods, censorship of alternative views aided the narrative's spread, allowing it to become more pervasive and unchallenged than it would be in a democratic society (Shen 2010). The Communist Party uses a combination of propaganda and censorship to ensure that there is only one national narrative, the narrative of national humiliation and rejuvenation by the Communists (Callahan 2010, 33). The correspondence of this change in censorship tactics and the reach of national humiliation narratives supports the proposition that state repression is a determinate of narrative success.

Aside from the fact that the Communist Party now sought to use its repression and network power to foster rather than limit national humiliation narratives, one other factor distinguishes this period from the middle period. This is the increased economic development within China that lifted large segments of the population out of poverty. This created a receptive audience for the Communist Party's narrative. The coincidence this development with the strong resonance of national humiliation narratives disseminated in the patriotic education campaign is consistent with the importance of economic welfare to the impact of these narratives. From 1978 to 2009, China's per capita GDP grew an average 8.7% per year (Hu 2011). In addition, development remained uneven, and the more well off groups were disproportionately receptive to national humiliation narratives. Young, educated, urban, and internet-using members of the public are still the most likely to be mobilized by national humiliation narratives (Wang 2012, 232). While it is impossible to know if the Communists would have lost control of the government had they not adopted national humiliation narratives, the common use of nationalism among the world's few surviving communist regimes is suggestive (Dimitrov 2013).

4   Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the conditions that lead political parties to propagate national humiliation narratives. The three periods of Chinese politics examined support the theory that a prior conception of national identity is necessary for the construction of national humiliation narratives. Further, these cases show the importance of strategic incentives in the construction of national humiliation narratives. Political groups use narratives of national humiliation when they can associate their rivals while disassociating themselves from the event constructed as humiliating. Groups further use these narratives to gain support for costly policies that can be framed in terms of national defense. The value of narratives for motivating sacrifice may help explain why the Communist Party continues to use narratives of national humiliation even as its perception of the threat of political competition from democracy proponents wanes. While the cases are not a decisive test of the hypotheses about narrative formation because factors other than the ability to cast blame on political opponents and the desire to motivate sacrifice for national defense inevitably also vary across political groups and time periods, the theory does fit a wide variety of situations and does so better than alternative explanations, including those based on humiliating events, legitimacy crises, and international bargaining.

The cases also provide initial, suggestive evidence about what factors cause narratives of national humiliation to resonate with their audience. When the Chinese state is controlled by a single party that is determined to repress national humiliation narratives it is able to halt their spread, suggesting that for narratives to spread, the state cannot be determined to repress them. In each period, political parties are the key actors that organize either the dissemination or repression of the narratives, which points to the importance of institutional networks. Further, the media plays a key role in disseminating the narrative to its audience. Finally, the significance of economic welfare above a certain minimum threshold for audience receptiveness to the narrative is seen both within period, as wealthier and more urban audience are more receptive than their poorer rural counterparts in both the first and final

period, and between periods, as the period of greatest economic welfare, the final period, was also the time of the narrative's greatest resonance.

While international relations research has found that both nationalism and emotions influence foreign policy, the origins of particular manifestations of emotional nationalism require additional explanation. This is especially pressing because international relations researchers have argued that national humiliation increases the propensity for aggressive foreign policies in important cases, including China and Russia (Wang 2012; Larson and Shevchenko 2014).

Understanding when narratives of national humiliation emerge helps explain how emotions spread socially, enabling them to become a political force that can influence foreign policy. This provides an important link that is often missing in literature that examines the influence of individuals' emotions on foreign policy. It also avoids the pitfalls of attributing emotions directly to states (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, 18), which do not have brains and therefore cannot experience emotions (McDermott 2014, 562). Disaggregating emotions also allows researchers to account for when particular emotions might influence the policies of particular states and why emotional narratives might resonate with some individuals, influencing their foreign policy preferences, and not others.

Knowing more about how narratives of national humiliation originate and spread also has implications for research examining the effects of humiliation on foreign policy, both in terms of potential confounds and how humiliation should be measured. Because narratives of national humiliation are strategies adopted by political parties due to domestic political incentives, rather than stemming directly from international events, such as defeat in war, the risk that international conditions might confound analysis of humiliation's effect by creating both national humiliation narratives and future conflicts is greatest in cases where these international events directly impact the strategic competition among domestic political parties. For example, the Second Sino-Japanese War was important not just as a foreign policy event but also for its role in preventing the Guomindang from focusing their initially

superior might to crush their domestic political opponent, the Communists. Researchers examining the effects of humiliation must take care to control for such events.

Because the use and success of these narratives does not vary along with objective events, measures of events that *might* get framed as humiliating, such as defeat in conflict or territory loss, are poor proxies for national humiliation. Researchers interested in the effect of national humiliation on foreign policy must instead use measures that account for the social construction of events as humiliating (or not). Tools including computational text analysis and discourse analysis could help create more direct measures.

While the case studies in this chapter terminate in 1999, national humiliation narratives still shape politics in China. The Communists under President Xi have continued to use narratives of national humiliation to affirm their rule. This suggests the continued importance of understanding national humiliation narratives to politics today, both in terms of how the Communist Party maintains power and the implications of these narratives for its foreign policy. The continued presence of these narratives raises questions for future research as well. In addition to evaluating explanations for when national humiliation narratives resonate with domestic audiences, future research should examine when successful national humiliation narratives end.

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6

The Origins of National Humiliation Narratives and When They Succeed: the Case of India

This chapter uses evidence from Indian politics during the twentieth century to examine two hypotheses about when political groups disseminate narratives of national humiliation.[1] The first is that political groups strategically propagate narratives of national humiliation when they can avoid responsibility for the event they are framing as humiliating and instead pin the blame on their political opponents (H3a). The second is that political groups will use national humiliation narratives to promote policies that pose short-term costs to the public but can be framed as necessary to defend the nation (H3b). This chapter further assesses how these hypotheses fair against the alternative explanations that humiliating events, legitimacy crises, and/or international bargaining lead political groups to propagate national humiliation narratives. Lastly, this chapter uses observations from this case to help construct an explanation of when narratives of national humiliation resonate with their audience.

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[1]See the previous chapter for a discussion of case selection and how the evidence from the cases should be evaluated. See Chapter 2 for the theory that produces these hypotheses.

1   Period Selection

I divide my discussion the strategies adopted by the main political groups competing for power in India into two time periods based on changes in the independent variables (Lind 2010, 21). The first period begins when conceptions of Indian national identity start forming and ends at independence. I start a new period after independence because the strategic incentives to deploy national humiliation narratives change once domestic political groups compete against each other rather than the British Raj for political power.

Table 1 summarizes the main variables for each political-group-period. It includes information about whether the group promoted narratives of national humiliation, whether the group had the opportunity to strategically blame a political opponent with such a narrative, who the humiliator was according to this narrative, and what political opponent they sought to blame with it (Target). Table 2 likewise summarizes the key variables concerned in alternative explanations along with variation in the dependent variable. It conveys whether a war took place during the period, which is significant for alternative explanations that attribute national humiliation narratives to traumatic events and bargaining during international disputes, as well as whether the political group faced a legitimacy crises during each period.

Just as in the previous chapter, strategic blame covaries the most closely with the use of humiliation narratives. Also in common with the previous chapter, the fact that wars take place at the country level rather than at the political-group level limits their ability to explain variation among political groups in the same country. Further, unlike in the previous chapter, the legitimacy crisis explanation's variation at the political-group level does not help it provide a better fit. In fact, every period witnesses national humiliation narratives from groups that do not face legitimacy crises but not from groups that do. This is the opposite of what the legitimacy crisis explanation predicts.

In common with the previous chapter, this analysis abstracts away from significant divides within each of these groups to examine group political strategy as a whole. Further, this

Table 1: India Case Summary

Group	Period	Narrative?	Strategic Blame?	Humiliator	Target
British Raj	1900–1947	No	No	NA	NA
Hindu Nationalists	1900–1947	Yes	Yes	Muslims and Britain	Muslims and Britain
Congress	1900–1947	Yes	Yes	Britain	Britain
Hindu Nationalists	1948–1999	Yes	Yes	Muslims	Congress
Congress	1948–1999	No	No	NA	NA

Table 2: Alternative Explanations Summary

Group	Period	Narrative?	War?	Legitimacy Crisis?
British Raj	1900–1947	No	Yes	Yes
Hindu Nationalists	1900–1947	Yes	Yes	No
Congress	1900–1947	Yes	Yes	No
Hindu Nationalists	1948–1999	Yes	Yes	No
Congress	1948–1999	No	Yes	Yes

analysis covers a vast time span and does not aspire to provide complete account of Indian politics in the 20th century. Instead, the goal is to capture the key points of continuity and change in groups' use of national humiliation narratives as well as in the independent variables.

2 National Humiliation Narratives in India

2.1 Forging National Identity (India 1900–1947)

This section analyzes political groups in India from 1900–1947. It shows the importance of the formation of national identities to the propagation of national humiliation narratives. National humiliation narratives only arise after national identity formation. Further, whether or not a group's national identity included certain subgroups of the population, particularly Muslims, determined whether or not that group could frame members of those subgroups as humiliators. Both of the groups that promoted national humiliation narratives during this period, the Hindu nationalists and the Indian National Congress, sought to mobilize individuals to resist British Colonial rule, which required personal sacrifice in the name of protecting the nation from colonizers.

Hindu nationalists are the primary promoters of national humiliation narratives in India. The construction of Hindu nationalist ideology took place from the 1870s to the 1920s (Jaffrelot 1999, 5-6). One of the most important figures in its formulation was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, whose book *Hindutva* is a "basic text" for Hindu nationalists (Jaffrelot 1999, 25). Muslims and Christians are not part of the Hindu nation in this view (Savarkar 1923, 80). Savarkar represents Hindus as victimized by foreign invaders and having fallen from the past greatness of the Vedic eras. He writes, "It was nearly all Asia, quickly to be followed by nearly all Europe[...] Heaven and Hell making a common cause—such were the forces, overwhelmingly furious, that took India by surpirse [sic] the day that Mohmad crossed the Indus and invaded her" (Savarkar 1923, 38). However, he argues India can reclaim its past greatness, "If we would we can build on this foundation of Hindutva a future greater than what any other people on earth can yet dream of:—greater even than our own Past" (Savarkar 1923, 124).

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925 by K. B. Hedgewar whom Savarkar heavily influenced (Jaffrelot 1999, 33), and associated Hindu nationalists groups, together called the *Sangh Parivar*, are the key Hindu nationalist political actors in India. This collective also includes groups formed later, like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the World Hindu Congress (VHP). Goyal writes that the RSS' core beliefs are that "Hindus are the nation" and that "the history of India is the history of the struggle of the Hindus for protection and preservation of their religion and culture against the onslaught of these [Muslim and Christian] aliens; the threat continues because the power is in the hands of those who do not believe this nation as a Hindu Nation; those who talk of national unity as the unity of all those who live in this country are motivated by the selfish desire of cornering minority votes and are therefore traitors" (Goyal 2000, 17-18). The bond at the root of both the BJS' and later the BJP's ideology is common ancestry for Hindus and "common suffering at the hands of (mostly Muslim) invaders" (Guha 2008, 743). This is the Hindu nationalist national humiliation narrative in

brief.

In contrast with the Hindu nationalists, Congress' vision of the nation of India included Muslims (Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 136-37).[2] Because Muslims living in India were considered part of the nation, they could not be branded humiliators of the nation. However, during this period, the British Raj ruled India, allowing Congress to construct British rule as humiliating.

2.1.1 Strategic Blame

Those using narratives of national humiliation in India targeted political opponents. Hindu nationalists blamed the Muslim Mughal Empire for weakening India and allowing British conquest. This parallels Chinese nationalist criticism of 'foreign' Manchu rule (discussed in the previous chapter), which was occurring around the same time period. They also blamed India's current British rulers for misrule (Chatterjee 1993, 93). The claim that outsiders living among the nation weakened it and allowed it to be defeated is akin to the "stab-in-the-back legend" propagated by German nationalists in the inter-war period that groups outside their definition of the nation, such as "Jewish left-Liberals," were responsible for Germany's defeat in WWI (Childers 1983, 41). The protection of cows was a strategic issue for Hindu nationalists because it targeted both Muslims and the British who "came to be seen as allied beef-eating barbarians determined to insult the deepest religious sentiments of the Hindus" (Veer 1994, 92).

Congress too used national humiliation during this period. M. Gandhi "declared a 'National Humiliation Day' of mass demonstrations in April 1919 to inspire the Indian nation to fight against British imperialism" (Callahan 2004, 203). Unlike the Hindu nationalists, Congress only labeled Britain and not Muslims as the humiliator. The use of national humil-

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[2]During this period the divide between Hindu nationalists and Congress is less clear than it was after independence. Even though Hindu nationalists had a very different view of the Indian nation than those who ultimately came to dominate Congress, both groups wanted Indian self-governance, and, during this period, Congress was a big tent group that included many who agreed about Indian self-governance but disagreed over other major issues (Jaffrelot 1999, 19). For this reason it is possible to find Hindu nationalists during this period associated with the Congress party.

iation narratives by Congress and Hindu nationalists during this period fit the predictions of H3a because each party can avoid responsibility for the initial colonization of India by Britain, since they were not in power at the time. Further they can blame Britain, which governed India during this period.

2.1.2 Motivating Sacrifice

Both Congress and Hindu nationalists sought to motivate followers to resist British colonization. Resisting British colonization was costly because of the possibility of retaliation from the colonial government. Gandhi's strategy of mobilizing nonviolent resistance required followers to "sacrifice" and accept "the risk of severe consequences" (Mantena 2012, 463). While the RSS fiercely opposed Gandhi's nonviolent approach to independence (Jaffrelot 1999, 46-47), they too demanded sacrifice from their followers. From the Hindu nationalist perspective, Hindus were at war with both the Muslims and the British. To defend the nation in this conflict, the RSS sought to enact "psychosocial reform" in India (Jaffrelot 2010, 206). For the RSS, the "'salvation' of their nation" could only be attained with "renunciation" and "sacrifice" (Jaffrelot 2010). That both parties disseminating national humiliation narratives sought to mobilize followers to sacrifice in the name of defending the nation is consistent with H3b.

2.1.3 Alternative Explanations

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are three possible alternative explanations for when political groups disseminate national humiliation narratives. The first category of alternative explanations are events-based explanations that argue humiliating or traumatic events lead to national humiliation narratives. The second are the legitimacy crisis explanations, which argue political groups use narratives of national humiliation during times when they face legitimacy crises. The third claims that national humiliation narratives are a way to signal resolve to adversaries in international bargaining. This period of Indian politics offers some

evidence for both events-based explanations and the bargaining explanation but not the legitimacy explanation.

For events-based explanations, the evidence is mixed. British colonization of India was a violent and traumatic process. Millions of Indians starved under British rule while wheat was exported to Britain (Osborne 2016). Britain also dragged India into its wars, including World War I, in which over a million Indians served, and World War II (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 163, 204). The Raj extracted Indian wealth for use elsewhere in the British Empire, and India's economy as a percentage of the world's economy shrank from 23% at the beginning of the 1700s to about 3% at the time of independence (Tharoor 2017). Resistance was brutally suppressed, for example, estimates range from hundreds to a thousand peaceful protesters killed by soldiers under British command in the 1919 Amritsar Massacre. Events-based explanations predict that events like these give rise to national humiliation narratives.

Consistent with events based explanations, both Congress and Hindu nationalists pointed to British rule as a source of India's humiliation. Less consistent with events based explanations is the divide between Congress and Hindu nationalists over whether Muslims, both in the form of the Mugal Empire, which ruled India prior to the British Raj, and contemporary Muslims living in India, were humiliators. The Mugal Empire did conquer India by force and used fortified military bases and checkpoints to enforce its rule (Robb 2011, 108). If getting conquered is sufficient to create national humiliation narratives, then these events should speak for themselves, and Indians should generally interpret them as humiliating. That different Indian political groups had different accounts of whether this period constituted a humiliation is evidence that events themselves are not sufficient for humiliation narratives.

As for the legitimacy crisis explanation, neither the Hindu nationalists nor Congress ruled India during this period, so the legitimacy of their rule could not come into crisis. If legitimacy crises were sufficient to create national humiliation narratives, then it should have been the British Raj and not indigenous political groups spinning narratives of national humiliation. India's British rulers could not do so both because they did not share a national

identity with the potential audience for this narrative and because they could hardly separate themselves from their rule of India, which was the event being framed as humiliating.

Proponents of the bargaining explanation could argue that both Congress and Hindu nationalists used national humiliation as a way to increase their bargaining power against the British. National humiliation could have been a way for these groups to increase the credibility of the threat of sustained resistance, nonviolent or otherwise, to British rule. Since it was the British that these parties were competing against for power and this competition was the reason both parties required sacrifice from their supporters, it is impossible to separate evidence from this period for the bargaining explanation from evidence that political groups used national humiliation narratives to strategically blame opponents and motivate their audience to sacrifice for the nation. Judging between these explanations requires examining the evidence from Chinese case in the previous chapter and well as evidence from India in the following period.

2.2   After Independence (India 1948–1999)

The period from 1948–1999 in Indian politics shows the importance of being able to avoid being linked with the humiliating event for groups considering propagating national humiliating narratives. Now that the British were out of India, blaming them was less relevant and Congress' cooperation Britain during the transition period meant they were less able to disassociate themselves from Britain. For these reasons, Congress ceased using national humiliation narratives. In contrast, Hindu nationalists were able to continue to spin their narrative framing Muslims as the humiliator and pin the political blame on Congress for policies they claimed favored Muslims. Both parties choices with regards to using national humiliation narratives are consistent with H3a. Further, Hindu nationalist consistently pushed for more costly, aggressive foreign policy responses than the Congress did and used national humiliation narratives to try to mobilize support for these positions. This is consistent with H3b.

This period also shows the continued importance of national identity to the construction of national humiliation narratives. Though it was certainly a traumatic event, neither the Hindu nationalists nor Congress framed the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 as a national humiliation. This is likely because the assassin was a Sikh, which both groups included in their conception of national identity. In contrast, Hindu nationalists' exclusion of Muslims from their conception of the nation allow them to continue to frame Muslims as humiliators and blame Congress for its perceived pro-Muslim policies.

Specifically, the Birthplace of Ram (*Ram Janmabhoomi*) movement framed Muslims as humiliators for destroying a Hindu temple marking Ram's birthplace and blamed Congress for not allowing Hindus to reclaim this sacred ground. This pattern of casting blame on a political opponent is consistent with H3a. The Birthplace of Ram movement demanded costly participation in illegal activities from Hindu nationalist followers that resulted in some of them being shot. Hindu nationalists' use of humiliation narratives to mobilize sacrifices to defend a site of importance to Hindu nationalist identity is consistent with H3b.

2.2.1 Strategic Blame

After independence, the alliance between Hindu nationalists and Congress broke down as various groups within India began to compete for political power. It was no longer strategic for Congress to use narratives of national humiliation against the British because the British, including the last viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, cooperated with Congress in getting the princes, who controlled various princely states, to join India (Guha 2008, 56). Congress wanted to present itself as the successor to the British Raj, and Nehru encouraged Mountbatten to remain a year in the position of governor general after the partition of India and Pakistan (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 225). Crucially, this cooperation meant that Congress could not escape blame if it used a narrative of national humiliation against the British. Further, Congress' inclusion of Muslims as part of the nation meant that it could not target Muslims as humiliators.

Unlike Congress, it was easy for Hindu nationalists to frame Muslims and Pakistan as humiliators of the nation. Hindu nationalists did not consider Muslims conationals. Instead, they accused their main rivals for power, Congress, of adopting 'pseudo-secularist' policies that favored Muslims (Singh 2013, 98). For them, Congress' construction of a secular state that included Muslims was an attempt to "colonize the nation" (Veer 1994, 144). This divergence in use of national humiliation narratives between Congress and Hindu nationalists on the basis of who could be blamed supports H3a.

The Hindu nationalists needed a political party to make political gains from targeting Congress with this criticism. They founded the BJS in 1951 with the goal of uniting all Hindus into a voting block (Guha 2008, 145). The RSS was heavily involved in the founding of the BJS, and the BJS "adopted an instrumentalist strategy, manipulating identity symbols for political mobilization" (Jaffrelot 2010, 208-209).

One tactic Hindu nationalists used to mobilize support was cow protection. Cow protection was a strategic issue for Hindu nationalists because it united all Hindus in a way that excluded Muslims, which meant parties that sought Muslim support, such as Congress, could not address it (Veer 1994, 66). This allowed Hindu nationalists to blame Congress for allowing outsiders to slaughter the revered animal. In 1952, Golwalkar, who succeeded Hedgewar as head of the RSS, wrote that cow protection was vital to "wipe out all signs that reminded us of our past slavery and humiliation" (Guha 2008, 634).

Another such tactic regarded history textbooks. In 1977, in a move that resonates with later moves in China to condemn textbooks seen as making light of Japan's invasion, the BJS campaigned against textbooks that did not sufficiently condemn what they saw as Muslim invaders during the Medieval period (Jaffrelot 1999, 287-88). While historic Muslims were the humiliator, Hindu nationalists tied this narrative to Congress' current policies, which they labeled "excessively secularist and progressive formulations" (Rudolph and Rudolph 1983, 16). This pattern of blame attribution is consistent with H3a.

The key symbol of national humiliation towards the end of this period stemmed from the

Birthplace of Ram movement. This movement had never previously had national significance but was revived by the VHP in 1984 (Veer 1994, 7, 161). The VHP claimed that a Hindu temple marking the birthplace of Ram previously stood on the sight of the Mosque of Babur (*Babri Masjid*) in Ayodhya (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 275-76). Hindu nationalists said that restoration of the temple was a matter of "national honor" (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 276). The "main objective" of the RSS, operating through the VHP in this campaign "was to accumulate a substantial Hindu vote by the use of Hindu nationalist appeals" (Jaffrelot 1999, 366-67).

The BJP, having won only 2 seats in the 1984 elections, joined the Ram Janmabhoomi movement (Jaffrelot 1999, 374). Hindu nationalists were able to successfully frame the issue as the oppression of majority Hindus and a "continuation of a colonial legacy of suppressing indigenous culture" (Rajagopal 2001, 147). This frame allowed the BJP to attack Congress for leading India down the "wrong path" that was tied to both the British and Muslims who had humiliated India as well as promise a return of "cultural pride" and the "redemption of an unrealized dream, of a strong and prosperous India" (Rajagopal 2001, 233-34). Further, the BJP claimed that building the temple would unite India and "reestablish the greatness of a now-humiliated people" (Rajagopal 2001, 273). Hindu nationalists used the mosque as a symbol of the "humiliating domination" of Hindus to create an "emotional wave" among the public (Jaffrelot 1999, 457).

In October 1990 LK Advani, the President of the BJP, road in a chariot tour to Ayodhya (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 275). This chariot tour reach hundreds of thousands of people and is a clear example of BJP attempts to use Ram Janmabhoomi to promote Hindu solitary and mobilization (Jaffrelot 1999, 416-17). Advani was arrested before arriving, but his supporters made it and faced gunfire from police in clashes that killed at least 20 (Guha 2008, 627). The Sangh Parivar coordinated on the use of symbols, including bricks to be used in the construction of the temple and the ashes of martyrs that were circulated around the country

(Rajagopal 2001, 215-16).[3] Ram Janmabhoomi was "invested with the theme of martyrdom as indicated by its constant reference to the 77 battles fought in Ayodhya throughout history" (Jaffrelot 1999, 423). In a marked similarity with the Chinese Communist Party's slogan 'never forget national humiliation', the VHP adopted the slogan "Do not forget the martyrs of Ayodhya!" (Jaffrelot 1999, 423).

The Birthplace of Ram Movement intensified in 1986 when the Rajiv Gandhi-led government gave in to demands to open the Mosque of Babur (Rajagopal 2001, 160).[4] The Mosque of Babur was in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India's most populous province. Hindu nationalists were able to demonize the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mulayam Yadav, as "Mullah Mulayam" for opposing the movement, despite the fact he was Hindu (Rajagopal 2001, 196). The BJP took control of the UP state government in the 1990 elections and refused to co-operate with requests from the central government to curb the movement (Rajagopal 2001, 200).[5] On December 5, 1992, about 150,000 Hindu nationalist volunteers gathered outside the mosque and, on the 6th, stormed and destroyed it (Jaffrelot 1999, 545-55). Despite BJP and RSS leaders' claims that this was an unplanned event, there is evidence, including the fact that many volunteers brought tools that this was preplanned (Jaffrelot 1999, 455-56).[6] The destruction of the Mosque of Babur set off riots across Northern India that killed about 2,000 people (Guha 2008, 632).

Ram Janmabhoomi succeeded where the cow protection movement in the 1950s and 1960s had failed. Many Hindus began to see the contention over the Mosque of Babur as involving "national honour" and as a reminder of "humiliation" (Guha 2008, 625). Hindu nationalists continued propagating national humiliation narratives in the 1990s. "In every case, a religious minority—Muslim or Christian—was targeted, and accused of having hurt Hindu sentiment or of being in the pay of a foreign power" (Guha 2008, 640). The targeting

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[3]See also Guha 2008, 627 and Jaffrelot 2010, 211.

[4]See also Jaffrelot 1999, 92.

[5]see also Guha 2008, 628.

[6]The Citizens Tribunal on Ayodhya found that the destruction of the Mosque was preplanned in a Dec. 5th meeting attended by LK Advani, M. Joshi (who succeeded Advani as president of the BJP in 1991), and others (Jaffrelot 1999, 456-57).

of religious minorities allowed Hindu nationalists to use narratives of national humiliation to politically attack Congress, which was both the party associated with secularism and tolerance as well as the main political rival of Hindu nationalists. This strategic targeting is consistent with H3a.

2.2.2 Motivating Sacrifice

Consistent with H3b, Hindu nationalists used national humiliation narratives to call for sacrifice to defend the nation during this period. Examples include their positions on the cow protection campaign, the Kashmir dispute, and the Sino-India war. In each foreign policy crisis during this period, Hindu nationalists supported more aggressive responses than Congress, which would have been more costly had they been carried out. In 1952, Golwalkar urged Indians to take part in the cow protection campaign, writing that "There cannot be a higher call of national unity than to be readily prepared to sacrifice our all for the honour and glory of the motherland that is the highest form of patriotism" (Guha 2008, 634).

Hindu nationalists pushed to regain Kashmir at all costs. After a lackluster election in 1952, the President of the BJS, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee in a letter to Nehru about Kashmir, wrote that "It will be nothing short of national disgrace and humiliation if we fail to regain this lost portion of our own territory" (Guha 2008, 258, 796). This letter was later publicly released by the BJS, indicating they believed it would benefit them politically. In 1953, Mukherjee was jailed by the India government for entering Kashmir to protest and died in prison shortly afterwards (Jaffrelot 1999, 129).

In another foreign policy crises that gained attention after a white paper made the Sino-Indian border dispute public in 1959, the president of the BJS pushed for a more aggressive response, saying that it was a matter of the "nation's self-interests and honour" and criticized the government's "helplessness" (Guha 2008, 319). Another BJS leader warned Nehru not to harm the "sentiments" of the Indian nation in his handling of the issue (Guha 2008, 320). The accusation of hurting Hindu sentiment is similar to the way the Chinese Communist

Party often criticizes foreign powers for "hurting the feelings of the Chinese people" (Callahan 2010, x). India's defeat in the war against China was Nehru's biggest failure and the BJS tried to capitalize on Congress' apparent weakness in international affairs by opposing talks with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1962 and 1963 (Guha 2008, 342, 350-55). That the BJS advocated more costly, hostile policies than Congress during each foreign policy juncture and used national humiliation narratives in attempt to mobilize support for these policies is consistent with H3b.

In terms of the sacrifices that Hindu nationalists directly required from supporters, the above analysis shows Ram Janmabhoomi required the mobilization of Hindu nationalists to break laws, commit acts of violence, and face the risk of death. The VHP framed the movement in terms of a long history of Hindu sacrifice, struggle, and suffering and used this frame to mobilize support for costly action, consistent with H3b. VHP leaders said it was a "disgrace" that Hindus did not have access to their places of worship and that "god is in a Muslim jail" (Veer 1987, 293). A 1988 RSS newspaper article illustrates these themes of moral outrage and national redemption, "Yes for too long I have suffered affronts in silence. [..] My number have dwindled as a result, my adored motherland has been torn asunder. I have been deprived of my age-old rights over my own hearths and homes [...] My gods are crying. They are demanding of me for reinstatement in all their original glory" (Jaffrelot 1999, 391). The press coverage exaggerated the Hindu deaths at the hands of police and portrayed the activists as heroes who sacrificed themselves for the cause in the face of an unjust government (Rajagopal 2001, 182). This use of national humiliation narratives to mobilize the costly defense of a national symbol is consistent with H3b.

2.2.3 Alternative Explanations

Events-based explanations do not fit the behavior of either Congress or Hindu nationalists well for this period. Firstly, if events create narratives of national humiliation by themselves, then Indian political groups should not differ in their interpretation of whether an event is

humiliating. Yet, Hindu nationalists spread narratives of national humiliation during this period, and Congress did not. Further, the biggest mobilization over national humiliation during this period was Ram Janmabhoomi. There is debate over whether there really was a temple of Ram destroyed to make way for the Mosque of Babur (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 275–76). If these events did take place, then they would have occurred in the early 1500s. However, Ram Janmabhoomi reached its height in 1992. This appears to indicate that it was not the destruction of the temple itself that triggered the narrative. Explaining the narrative instead requires examining the changing political conditions in India that created the incentives for Hindu nationalists to propagate it.

Neither do legitimacy crisis explanations well account for this period. Congress was the long ruling party that increasingly faced a legitimacy crisis as Indians lost faith in its ability to rule for a variety of reasons including, the loss of trusted leaders like Nehru, the authoritarian interlude under Indira Gandhi, and corruption (Guha 2008, 672–676). Yet, Hindu nationalists rather than Congress disseminated national humiliation narratives, which is the opposite of what the legitimacy crisis theory would predict. This behavior can only be accounted for by considering the importance of political strategy. Congress' reliance on Muslims for support meant it would not be strategic for them to propagate a national humiliation narrative that framed Muslims as the humiliator. Similarly, Congress' cooperation with the British during the handover of control meant that continuing to disseminate national humiliation narratives about the British could risk backfiring. In contrast, Hindu nationalists faced neither of these restraints and had the advantage of being able to link their main political opponent, Congress, to the events they were framing as humiliating.

The evidence for the bargaining explanation from this period is mixed at best. On the one hand, India fought three wars with Pakistan. A bargaining explanation proponent could make the case that Hindu national humiliation narratives about Muslims were intended to signal India's resolve to Pakistan in its ongoing disputes. However, the fact that Hindu nationalist parties were only in power during one of these conflicts, the 1999 Kargil War, sits

less well with this explanation. If national humiliation narratives were a way of communicating resolve, then the Congress Party, which was in power during the 1965 and 1971 wars, should have made use of these narratives.

Another factor that is awkward for bargaining accounts is that the audience for Hindu national humiliation narratives was overwhelmingly domestic rather than international. The Hindu nationalist groups that make up the Sangh Parivar, with the exception of the VHP, are all solely domestic groups that focus on spreading their message within India. While the VHP does organize events outside of India, these are focused on Hindus living abroad rather than India's potential adversaries. Further, the main issues Hindu national humiliation narratives focused on during this period, cow protection, the supposed preferential treatment of Muslims within India, and Ram Janmabhoomi, seem poorly chosen if the goal was to send a message of resolve to Pakistan. While Hindu nationalists did discuss issues that appear more relevant to international resolve, like the dispute over Kashmir, in context of humiliation, this was part of a broader and ongoing narrative of national humiliation that was primarily focused on issues within India. This coincides with the finding in the previous chapter that while bargaining over international disputes does not seem to determine when parties adopt the strategy of national humiliation narratives, parties that have already made the decision to use these narratives apply them to international crises that arise.

2.3 Discussion

The use of humiliation narratives by each political group in each period is consistent with my theory's hypotheses that political groups use these narratives strategically. Specifically, groups use these narratives when they can blame their political opponent for the event they construct as humiliating and when they wish to motivate their audience to engage in sacrifices for the nation. Further, this theory appears to provide a better account of the propagation of national humiliation narratives in India than alternative explanations.

While events-based explanations point to the trauma of the experience of British colonial-

ism to explain national humiliation narratives, these explanations cannot account for why Congress ceased disseminating these narratives after independence but Hindu nationalists did not. Further, events-based explanations cannot account for why different political groups in India had different accounts of whether the same events, the Mughal Empire and the status of contemporary Muslims in India, were humiliating. The ability of Hindu nationalist groups to successfully mobilize supporters with a humiliation narrative surrounding the destruction of a temple of Ram, an event that may not have even taken place and that, if it did take place, took place approximately 500 years ago, raises serious doubts about whether events themselves are the primary drivers of humiliation narratives. If events are the main source of national humiliation narratives, then the construction of narratives should be much more temporally proximate to the humiliating events. If parties can make use of events from far in the past or events that may even be fabricated, then the extent to which events constrain and, therefore, can be used to predict the construction of national humiliation narratives is quite limited.

As for the legitimacy crisis explanation, unlike in the Chinese case where it fairs nearly as well as strategic blame in predicting the propagation of humiliation narratives, this theory incorrectly predicts the behavior of each group in India during both periods. While the ability of each of these explanations to generalize to further cases beyond India and China remains to be explored, based on the evidence accumulated so far, the theory of strategic blame appears to perform the best both cross-nationally and over time.

As with the Chinese case, the Indian case shows some evidence that national humiliation narratives may have been used in international bargaining, but the disputes over which bargaining took place do not appear to be the main drivers of parties' decisions to construct such narratives. While the evidence for this explanation is difficult to separate from evidence for strategic blame in the first period, analysis of the second period shows that strategic blame provides a better account because both the issues and audiences humiliation narratives focused on tended to be domestic rather than international. Further, the

fact that Congress did not use humiliation narratives to bargain with adversaries during the second period despite presiding over two wars with Pakistan shows the importance of looking beyond international bargaining to domestic politics to explain parties' use of such narratives. Still, Hindu nationalist parties did appeal to the idea of national humiliation when discussing disputes, such as Kashmir, which could indicate that once groups decide to propagate national humiliation narratives for domestic political reasons, they may also make use of them in international bargaining.

3 When Do Narratives of National Humiliation Resonate?

The three factors that appeared to affect to the resonance of national humiliation narratives in China, repression, institutional and media networks, and audience economic welfare also seem important in India. When the Hindu nationalists gained power at the end of the second period, the repression of national humiliation narratives was relatively low, the reach of Hindu nationalist groups through both institutions, such as the BJP and the RSS, as well as the media was higher than ever before and so was the economic welfare of the average India. Further, during both periods, more economically successful Indians were more likely to support parties propagating national humiliation narratives. However, the success of the Indian independence movement during the first period raises questions about the extent to which economic development constrains the success of parties disseminating national humiliation narratives. It seems likely that the conditions that determine the success of national independence movements differ from the conditions that determine the success of parties competing among each other domestically. As with the Chinese case, my examination of the factors that promote the resonance of national humiliation narratives with their audience plays a theory generating rather than a theory evaluating, let alone testing, role, so my account of the case in this section is intended to summarize the aspects that lead to my

inductions.

3.1 Evidence of Narrative Success

Repression during the first period under British rule was generally high. British authorities did not want to make martyrs of Indian resistance leaders but at the same time could not accept any political movement that threatened their control. The British adopted a cycle of waiting for popular passions to die down, then swooping in to arrest resistance leaders (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 182-83). However, national humiliation narratives, as opposed to other nationalist or anti-colonial narratives, were not particularly targeted, so repression cannot explain the performance of national humiliation narratives relative to other domestic political ideas in India during the first period. The role of repression in the success of national humiliation narratives becomes more apparent when comparing the success of Hindu nationalist groups in the second period before and after Indira Gandhi's intense crackdown on opposition groups ended.

In terms of network connections during the first period, Hindu nationalists' ability to use media to get their message out was limited. While the RSS had a press agency, it lacked means, and the RSS only had limited radio access (Jaffrelot 2010, 209). Television was not available for use by Hindu nationalists during this period (Rajagopal 2001, 77).They even had difficultly reaching people through print. During India's first election in 1952, most of the electorate was illiterate, and at the time of independence, three-fourths of the workforce was in agriculture (Guha 2008, 158, 209). The combination of Hindu nationalists' limited access to media to spread its message and its struggle to reach groups suggests that these factors may be linked.

Regarding economic welfare in the first period, the appeal of national humiliation narratives was concentrated among the elites and had little resonance among poor farmers. Members of Congress tended to come from the elite (Kaviraj 2010, 324). Likewise, supporters of Hindu nationalism tended to be high-caste and upper middle class (Jaffrelot 1999,

7). However, the role of refugees from Pakistan in providing support to Hindu nationalists following independence is an exception to this trend (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 229). The role of refugees may suggest that economic factors do not provide the entire picture and that individuals who have been personally aggrieved by the humiliator may be more susceptible to humiliation narratives. Despite this, the concentration of Hindu nationalist support among relatively well off urban dwellers suggests that these groups may be more receptive than other groups to national humiliation narratives when development is unevenly distributed (Jaffrelot 1999, 111, 147).

The second period witnessed great change in each of the three variables highlighted in this account. These variables took vastly different values during the first as compared with the second half of this period. In terms of the level of repression during the first part of the second period, 1948–77, it was relatively high. The 1948 assassination of Mahatma Gandhi triggered a precipitous decline in tolerance for narratives of Hindu national humiliation and the groups promoting them. The RSS was banned, and Golwalkar was arrested along with over 20,000 RSS volunteers (*swayamsevaks*) (Jaffrelot 1999, 88; Singh 2013, 88). While the government lifted the ban a year later, the RSS was required to restrict its activity to the "cultural sphere" and not engage in politics (Guha 2008, 111).

Both Nehru and Indira Gandhi conducted anti-RSS campaigns that included banning some of its local branches or *shakhas* (Jaffrelot 2010, 209). The Representation of the People Act banned campaigns from using religious symbols (Jaffrelot 1999, 104). In 1956, Nehru announced a law banning the promotion of communalism through the printed word (Jaffrelot 1999, 156). The Representation of the People Act was extended in 1962 to outlaw dividing the public over religion during elections (Jaffrelot 1999, 168). These actions forced Hindu nationalists to limit their activities for fear of being banned again (Jaffrelot 1999, 168). Repression also limited success of Hindu nationalists campaigns, such as the cow protection campaign in the 1960s (Jaffrelot 1999, 212).

In 1975, Indira Gandhi declared emergency rule and cracked down on all opposition

groups including the RSS. The RSS was banned and over 105,000 members were imprisoned (Jaffrelot 1999, 272-275). The failure of Hindu nationalists to take control of the government until after this repression passed may suggest that repression limits the ability of political groups to capitalize on national humiliation narratives. However, the experience of emergency rule from 1975–77 eroded popular support for and the willingness of future governments to crackdown on opposition groups, setting the stage for later Hindu nationalist successes.

After the end of emergency rule, the political environment was much more open to national humiliation narratives. The Indian central government did little to limit Ram Janmabhoomi until after the mosque's destruction. When the VHP launched a bricklaying movement in 1989, Congress advised against it, but took no action (Guha 2008, 589). The only major repressive action taken before the destruction of the mosque was Advani's 1990 arrest (Guha 2008, 626-27). This arrest was not made by the national government, which feared a popular backlash, but the Chief Minister of Bihar (Guha 2008, 626-27). Advani's arrest was too late to prevent the consolidation of Hindu nationalist networks and contrasts with the preventative arrests in 1949, the last time Hindu nationalists tried to mobilize over the mosque (Jaffrelot 1999, 94-95, 212). These arrests helped prevent successful exploitation of the issue in 1949 (Jaffrelot 1999, 96). This difference in repression and success over two attempts by Hindu nationalists groups to deploy Ram Janmabhoomi suggests repression plays a role in determining narrative success.

The repressive measures taken against Hindu nationalists after the destruction of the mosque were laxly enforced and quickly lifted. In contrast with past crackdowns, the government arrested a "relatively small number of people" (Jaffrelot 1999, 465). While leaders were arrested and the RSS, VHP, and Bajrang Dal were banned, the leaders were released a month later and the ban was lifted in June (Rajagopal 2001, 206).[7] "Narasimha Rao's response to the demolition of the disputed structure therefore, cannot be compared to that

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[7]The exception was the VHP, which remained banned until 1995 (Jaffrelot 1999, 466).

of Nehru's after Gandhi's assassination. Nor does it compare with the steps which Mrs. Gandhi took to ban communal organizations at the onset of the Emergency" (Jaffrelot 1999, 468).

The networks available to Hindu nationalists to promote their message of national humiliation greatly expanded towards the latter half of the second period. Significantly increased literacy and India's newspaper revolution, which began in 1977, added to the reach of networks through which groups could propagate national humiliation narratives (Guha 2008, 693; Jeffrey 2000). Moreover, groups promoting narratives of national humiliation took advantage of new forms of media to further spread their message. For example, Hindu nationalists could now reach the public through television (Rajagopal 2001, 8, 16, 273). This set Hindu nationalists campaigns in the 80s and 90s apart from the previous cow protection campaigns (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Chapter 8). The number of TVs rapidly increased in the 1980s from 2 million to 30 million (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Chapter 6).

The airing of the Hindu epic Ramayana on India state television from 1987-89, which became the most popular television program ever in India, increased the salience of Ram Janmabhoomi (Rajagopal 2001, 30). The Ramayana broadcast "has done more than anything else to make a standard version of the epic known and popular among the Indian middle class" and helped make the issues raised by Ram Janmabhoomi "loaded with affect" (Veer 1994, 9). Viewers increased from 40 to 80 million in the first few months and people planned their schedule so they could crowd around a nearby television for the show's Sunday episodes (Rajagopal 2001, 84). On average, 91% of TV owners watched the weekly broadcast (Jaffrelot 1999, 389).

Further showing the value of media networks, Hindu nationalists took advantage of access to new media technologies beyond just television and distributed audio cassettes with their message in addition to using traditional means like pamphlets and newspapers (Rajagopal 2001, 235).[8] The importance of institutional networks can be seen in the role of Hindu

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[8]See also Jaffrelot 2010, 212-13.

nationalist groups such as the RSS, BJP, and VHP in creating the content propagated through these media networks as well as facilitating its dissemination. Broadcasting cassettes publicly with loud-speakers gave VHP propaganda a new reach (Jaffrelot 1999, 396). The importance of mass media coverage is also seen in fact that people living close to the temple of Ayodhya were often cynical about the Ram Janmabhoomi but people living far away whose only exposure to the movement was through the mass media were often the most passionate (Rajagopal 2001, 220-24).

Economic welfare also changed drastically over the second period, growing from relatively low levels at the beginning to previously unreached highs at the end. During the first part of this the second period (the 1950s and 1960s), famine was a serious problem in India. Even after the Green Revolution alleviated the food crisis, India still had a high rate of poverty with about 223 million out of 530 million Indians in poverty, spending about 80% of their income on food and 10% on fuel (Guha 2008, 442-43, 467). In these conditions, Congress' promises of economic improvements had more appeal to voters than the BJS' Hindu nationalists ideology (Jaffrelot 1999, 156). Hindu nationalists largely failed to expand their support base beyond the urban middle class during these years. This suggests that national humiliation narratives may be unlikely to resonate with those living below economic subsistence.

However, in the latter two decades of the second period (the 1980s and 1990s), economic growth increased the size of India's middle class. This set these decades apart from the past when India was characterized by a small elite with the remainder of the country in poverty (Guha 2008, 689). However, development in India remained uneven, and the poorest remained relatively unreceptive to Hindu nationalist narratives. This can be seen in that Hindu nationalists promoted Ram Janmabhoomi in "suitable areas" while among poor farmers they focused on "a national movement to improve the lot of the peasants" (Jaffrelot 1999, 378). The RSS' system of local branches struggled in villages because of its "relative lack of adaptability in the village world where work completely dominates men's lives" (Jaffrelot 1999, 386). This distribution of support across class is consistent with the

idea that national humiliation narratives are more likely to resonate with those living above the subsistence level.

In the 1989 elections, the BJP gained a resounding 83 seats, bringing its total to 85 (Election Commission of India 1990). Ram Janmabhoomi was a major factor in this success (Jaffrelot 2010, 211). By 1996, the BJP was the largest party in parliament, and, while it failed to put together a majority government, it performed well in the 1998 elections, maintaining its status as the party with the most seats (Guha 2008, 634). This allowed the BJP to put together a coalition government in 1999 that lasted five years (Metcalf and Metcalf 2012, 279). This marked a huge change for the Hindu nationalist movement, which had failed so often that its end as a significant political force had often been proclaimed (Guha 2008, 634-35).

However, not all observers attribute the BJP's political success to Hindu nationalism (Gould 1993, 298; Brass 1993, 266), and I do not mean to suggest that other factors, such as economic policy, played no role. However, it would be wrong to discount the importance of Hindu nationalism in the BJP's success (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Chapter 6), which owed much to its alliance with the VHP and the RSS (Veer 1994, 1). The fact that both Congress and the BJP tended to support market economic reforms while in power and oppose them while out of power in the 1990s and early 2000s suggests that economic policies do not tell the entire story (Guha 2008, 701). Further raising doubts about the ability of economic explanations to fully account for party success, some scholars have even argued that "the divisions within the parties over economic issues tend to be bigger than the divisions between parties" (Mukherji 2005, 59).

4 Conclusion

As with the evidence from the Chinese case in the previous chapter, the case of India supports the theory that a combination of national identity and domestic political incentives

lead groups to construct national humiliation narratives. Specifically, political groups that share a national identity with their audience use narratives of national humiliation when they can associate their rivals while disassociating themselves from the event constructed as humiliating. Groups further use these narratives to gain support for costly policies that can be framed in terms of national defense. The extent to which these findings generalize to cases beyond India and China remains to be examined, but this explanation does seem to fit the behavior of political groups in these countries better than the available alternative explanations.

The evidence from this case also echos the suggestions from the Chinese case about the kinds of factors associated with the resonance of national humiliation narratives with their audience. Namely, I find that these narratives are more likely to help political groups gain or maintain political power when they are not repressed out of existence, when groups promoting them have strong institutional and media network links to their audience, and when their audience is living above the level of economic subsistence. As the theory accounting for political group success mobilizing their audience with national humiliation narratives is generated based on these two cases, it remains for future research to evaluate how this theory fairs against potential alternatives on out-of-sample cases.

While the case studies in this chapter terminate in 1999, national humiliation narratives still shape politics in India. Narendra Modi, the current Prime Minister of India, has placed Muslims in the role of the humiliator to gain support (Guha 2008, 647). This suggests the continued importance of understanding national humiliation narratives to Indian politics today. The following chapter further elaborates on the significance of these findings for both international relations theory and policy responses to the potential security challenges that narratives of national humiliation pose.

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7

Conclusion

This dissertation set out to answer two questions. First, what is the impact of national humiliation on foreign policy preferences? Second, how does the idea of national humiliation become politically important? To answer the first question, I drew from experimental psychology and neuroscience to build a theory of how humiliation influences foreign policy preferences on an individual level. My theory predicts that national humiliation makes individuals more supportive of hostile foreign policies by decreasing their sensitivity to the costs of these policies.

To answer the second question, I draw on work on nationalism, national narratives, and the individual-level behavioral implications of humiliation. Contrary to previous accounts that have tended to emphasize the role of traumatic events in the creation of national humiliation narratives, I argue that these events provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient explanation of narrative construction. Instead, narratives of national humiliation enter political discourse when a political group can blame its political opponents for the event constructed as humiliating while escaping blame itself. Further, political groups propagate these narratives when they desire to inspire sacrifice on behalf of the nation. I also draw from my case studies to conclude that these narratives are most likely to resonate when groups promoting them are not repressed, have dense institutional and media connections to their audience, and have an audience that is living above economic subsistence.

In Chapter 2, I start by building theoretical expectations for humiliation's effect on individual-level preferences. This provides the microfoundations of my theory. I draw from

work in experimental psychology and neuroscience that indicates, firstly, that humiliation is an especially intense emotion, and, therefore, especially likely to influence motivation. Secondly, humiliation is associated with the perception of a hostile perpetrator and motivates individuals to respond with hostility when they believe they were treated unjustly. Thirdly, the in-group/out-group nature of international politics makes it more likely individuals will see other nations as acting unjustly. For these reasons, humiliation motivates a hostile response to non-nationals.

I divide the mechanisms through which humiliation could increase preferences for hostile foreign policies into cost-side mechanisms that reduce the restraint of the cost of hostile policies and benefits-side mechanisms that increase the appeal of the benefits of hostile policies. I theorize that the cost-side mechanism could affect foreign policy decision making under humiliation because emotionally motivated actions tend to be insensitive to consequences and because humiliation's intense cognitive load makes it especially likely to inhibit integrating the cost of hostile actions into the decision making process.

I also theorize that humiliation could influence individual-level conflict preferences through the benefits-side mechanism of increasing the salience of the status implications of disputes. Because humiliated individuals are concerned with avoiding future humiliation and because of the importance of status loss in causing humiliation, humiliated individuals may be particularly attentive to whether they stand to lose status by backing down in a dispute. This raises the value of the disputed issue and, hence, actors' willingness to fight over the issue.

Chapter 3 tests this theory using both a survey and a lab experiment. Both experiments use autobiographical essay tasks to manipulate humiliation and measure humiliation using a novel scale that I create and validate. The survey experiment presents Americans with a foreign policy scenario where they must decide whether to use military force to stop a foreign country from invading its smaller neighbor. Both the cost of the military intervention and whether or not US status is explicitly at stake are randomized. The survey experiment

finds that humiliated respondents are more likely to support using military force against the invader. Further, it finds evidence for the cost mechanism because the marginal effect of cost decreases among humiliated respondents and the marginal effect of humiliation increases among respondents who are told the intervention is costly. The laboratory experiment shows that this finding continues to hold when individuals face real, monetary costs to choosing hostile policy options. The status hypothesis is not supported by the experiments. These experiments provide the first evidence able to distinguish support for different mechanisms by which humiliation could influence conflict preferences.

Chapter 4 examines both whether the preference changes observed in the experiments extend to national humiliation in practice as well as how national humiliation narratives spread through social media networks. This chapter analyzes a large data set of over 1.6 billion Chinese social media posts from the Twitter-like platform Weibo. The results show that posts containing national humiliation narratives are more likely to support three kinds of costly, hostile foreign policies: using military force, maintaining disputed territorial claims, and raising trade barriers. I further find that the causal effect of humiliation on these three policies remains even when accounting for possible feedback effects among the variables and that the effect is not spurious to general cycles of political discussions. Moreover, the results reveal that previous days' posts about national humiliation increase the advocacy of costly, hostile policies in subsequent days. This suggests that national humiliation narratives move through networks of communication to influence the policy preferences of those connected to these networks. This chapter also produces the first evidence of a feedback effect between humiliation narratives and support for costly, hostile policies. I find that national humiliation narratives increase expressions of support for costly, hostile foreign policies on social media and that these expressions, in turn, increase the discussion of national humiliation narratives.

In addition to the effect of national humiliation on foreign policy preferences, I also examine the conditions under which political groups construct narratives of national humiliation. Chapter 2 puts forward a theory of how national humiliation narratives enter political

discourse. Starting with the observation that political groups always have access to events that they could frame as nationally humiliating, this theory departs from previous explanations that emphasize the importance of humiliating or traumatic events for the creation of national humiliation narratives. Drawing on work on national identity, it argues that a shared national identity between the group propagating the national humiliation narrative and their audience is a prerequisite for the propagation of national humiliation narratives. Reasoning based on the incentives of political actors, the theory predicts that political groups will only propagate narratives of national humiliation when they can blame their political opponent for the potentially humiliating event while avoiding blame themselves. Further, the same reasons that humiliation increases preferences for costly, hostile policies suggest that political groups could use narratives of national humiliation to gain support for policies that pose short-term costs to citizens but can be framed as necessary to defend the nation.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine how well this theory accounts for the behavior of political groups in China and India over the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century in comparison with alternative explanations. I find wide variation both within country and within political group in the use of national humiliation narratives over time. However, in each time period, political groups propagating narratives of national humiliation were able to blame their opponent for the humiliating event and escape blame themselves. Further, these groups sought to motivate costly citizen support for policies that they framed as necessary to defend the nation. The case studies are further able to identify times when political groups faced crises of legitimacy that other theories suggest would lead to humiliation narratives (Wang 2012, 9), such as the Qing Dynasty just prior to its collapse and Indira Gandhi's Congress Party during emergency rule, yet did not because these groups would not have been able to blame their political opponents for the humiliating event while escaping blame themselves. The case studies also find incidents that events-based explanations of national humiliation narratives would expect to give rise to humiliation narratives (Jaffrelot 1999; Miller 2013; Badie 2017), such as China's war with Vietnam, but did not. Another challenge posed to events-based explanations from the cases

are the times when there were large temporal gaps between humiliating events and narratives of national humiliation constructed around them, such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement taking place about 500 years after the destruction of the Temple of Ram would have occurred. This suggests that traumatic events alone are not sufficient to give rise to national humiliation narratives. The ability of political groups to construct events that may or may not have taken place hundreds of years ago as humiliating also raises questions about the extent to which events themselves restrict, and are therefore necessary to, the construction of national humiliation narratives.

The case studies also provide insights into when national humiliation narratives are most likely to appeal to their audience. This is when the groups disseminating the narrative are not repressed, have dense connections to their audience through institutions and media networks, and have an audience that is economically above subsistence levels. The importance of media networks found here is consistent with the finding in Chapter 4 that national humiliation narratives are able to spread and influence policy preferences through social media. Evidence from the case studies of India and China suggests that other forms of media, including, newspapers and television are also important vectors of national humiliation narratives.

Implications for International Relations Theory

This dissertation shows that while it can be useful to abstract away from emotions to build initial expectations, emotions must eventually be brought back in to our understanding of international relations. The findings in Chapter 3 show the ability of emotions to change behavior in ways that rationalist theories alone cannot anticipate. Humiliated individuals were more likely to attack than those who received the emotional control condition when the cost of conflict was high in both the lab and survey experiments. This is the case even though a profit maximizing respondent in the lab experiment should not attack in equilibrium when conflict is costly. Existing research on the importance of emotions in shaping preferences gives

no reasons to expect that this effect is limited to the particularities of this study (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005).

Another of this dissertation's contributions is its expansion of our understanding of how individual-level behavioral factors can influence foreign policy preferences. Figuring out how to combine behavioral research with systematic rational theories is an important challenge facing international relations theory (Kertzer 2017; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2017; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017; Little and Zeitzoff 2017). My approach of allowing preferences to vary based on emotions while still constraining actors to act according to their preferences provides one way these frameworks can be integrated. I conceptualize humiliation's individual-level effect on preferences in terms of the variables emphasized by rationalist theories, specifically, the cost of conflict and the value of the disputed issue. This allows the individual-level behavioral insights produced to be integrated with rationalist theories.

While understanding how the emotional state of an actor influences decision making allows existing rationalist theories to make behavioral predictions conditional on an individual's emotional state, a full account of the influence of emotions on foreign policy must also explain when individuals making foreign policy decisions are likely to be in these states. Work examining how narratives tie emotions to foreign policy disputes and how these narratives spread to influence specific kinds of individuals is needed to answer this question (Hall and Ross 2015; Johnston 2017; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). This dissertation provides these answers for national humiliation narratives. This kind of research has the potential to fill in the gap of how individual-level preferences aggregate up to a level where they can influence policy.

My findings that, contrary to events-based explanations of narrative formation, political narratives tied to identity are constructed by political groups who meet identity membership criteria and have a strategic incentive to propagate the narrative likely applies beyond narratives of national humiliation. Conditions are always consistent with multiple possible narratives (Krebs 2015, 60). There is always an other than can be framed as a threat or

an opportunity for cooperation, a piece of territory that can be claimed as homeland, and a group that can be framed as a national or ethnic kin group that needs protection. What varies is whether there is a political group with the identity credentials and political incentive to construct such a narrative. Of course, the specific kinds of identity credentials needed as well as the political incentives likely vary based on the substance of the narrative. Religious narratives would require different kinds of identity credentials than nationalist narratives for example. Further, not all narratives are narratives of blame or evoke emotions that decrease sensitivity to cost. The political incentives for other kinds of narratives might depend on a group's ability to claim credit for past successes or on the supposed benefits of the policy it is advocating.

These factors alone are not enough to assure that the narrative will resonate with a domestic audience. While many of the factors that determine narrative success likely also vary based on the content of the narrative, the need for institutional and media networks linking disseminators to their audience is likely to be shared across narrative types. To the extent a narrative is based on symbols tied to an identity group larger than a village, that is an identity group that is too large for the audience members to have interpersonal ties to every member of the group (Anderson 2006, 49), then individuals are likely to be more receptive to the narrative when their immediate needs are met. Otherwise, these demands of every day survival are likely to crowd-out symbolic concerns and occupy time and energy that could otherwise be used to mobilize politically.

Policy Implications

The findings of this dissertation are disturbing given the prevalence of national humiliation narratives in China, the world's most populous country and most important rising power. Based on the evidence, it appears that these national humiliation narratives promote more hostile foreign policy preferences than we would otherwise expect. This does not make conflict

inevitable, but it does decrease room for compromise.

The findings here are important to take into account for countries, including the US and China's regional neighbors, that find themselves in international disputes with China. China's narratives of national humiliation tied to these disputes likely make it more willing to pay the price of conflict than would otherwise be expected. This means that, should they wish to avoid conflict, countries on the other side of these disputes may need to adjust their assessments of what is required to deter agression and/or their offers for settlement upwards. These findings also apply to other important cases, including the Russian governments willingness to pay the costs of its intervention in Ukraine.

Another implication is that national humiliation narratives should be contested when possible. How to do this effectively is less clear as past attempts have not always succeeded. For example, a government sponsored attempt among Japanese and Chinese historians to compile a joint account of the Second Sino-Japanese War in order to foster mutual understanding ended with the Chinese government refusing to release the report to its citizens (Shin 2010). However, the evidence presented here that these narratives tend to promote more hostile foreign policies may offer one way for domestic political groups to push back on and warn against such ways of viewing the world. It remains to be evaluated empirically what kinds of counter-narratives are most effective at displacing narratives of national humiliation. However, the evidence of feedback loops where national humiliation narratives promote expressions of support for more hostile policies that, in turn, spur further national humiliation narratives makes efforts to understand how to break this cycle even more urgent.

The evidence of feedback cycles between national humiliation narratives and support for hostile policies should also be a caution to political groups contemplating propagating their own national humiliation narratives. While these groups might be able to achieve short-term political gain, they may be unable stop these narratives once initiated. Such a group might find itself in power but beholden to a consistency, mobilized through the national humiliation narrative, demanding more aggressive foreign policies than it would

prefer (Goddard 2010). Further, national humiliation narratives may begin to influence the group's own decision making. There is no reason to expect that elites are immune to the emotional force of national humiliation narratives. Moreover, because national humiliation narratives shape future conversations about foreign policy, it seems likely that beyond a certain point it becomes difficult to conceive of what kinds of foreign policies would seem reasonable in a world where the narrative never took root. The way that narratives define actors and give meaning to issues means that they determine the boundaries of reasonable discussion (Krebs 2015, 14–15).

Avenues for Further Research on Emotions and International Conflict

There remain several issues of importance for future research to explore. The first regards when and to what extent the preference changes driven by national humiliation result in policy change. The contributions of chapters 5 and 6 to our understanding of the circumstances that give rise to these narratives can help improve research designs examining the link between humiliation narratives and foreign policy outcomes. Because narratives of national humiliation are strategies adopted by political parties due to domestic political incentives, rather than stemming directly from international events, such as defeat in war, the risk that international conditions might confound analysis of humiliation's effect by creating both national humiliation narratives and future conflicts is greatest in cases where these international events directly impact the strategic competition among domestic political parties. For example, when Britain withdrew from India, this both changed the nature of domestic political competition in a way that led Congress to relinquish national humiliation narratives as a strategy and created the conditions for the violence surrounding the partition of India. Researchers examining the effects of humiliation must take care to control for such events.

Further, because the use and success of national humiliation narratives does not vary

along with objective events, measures of events that *might* get framed as humiliating, such as war or territory loss, are poor proxies for national humiliation. Researchers interested in national humiliation's effect on foreign policy must instead use measures that account for the social construction of events as humiliating (or not). Tools including computational text analysis and discourse analysis could help create more direct measures.

Examining the impact of narratives of national humiliation on foreign policy outcomes is further complicated because the counterfactual of what policy a country would have adopted absent a national humiliation narrative cannot be observed. Establishing identification through paired comparisons is difficult because it is hard, if not impossible, to find two cases of potential conflict that match on every confound but differ on the emotional state of decision makers or outside pressure groups. The most promising avenue for such research may be to search for within-country, within-conflict variation in the policies advocated by decision makers who were in different emotional states. The findings in Chapter 3 produce the expectation that cost considerations will have less importance to humiliated decision makers.

A further aspect of understanding how emotionally-driven preference changes affect policy outcomes is how the group and institution-based nature of foreign policy decision making influences the effect of individual-level emotions on foreign policy choices. It could be that some types of institutions dampen the effect of emotionally aroused individuals on policy making, either by separating them from the decision making process or subjecting their decisions to the veto of less emotionally aroused individuals. Also, relatively unknown is how emotions diffuse through decision making bodies to influence decisions. Does deliberation with others cause emotionally aroused individuals to moderate their positions, or does their emotional excitement spread to other decision makers? Perhaps both outcomes are possible under different conditions. Maybe certain institutional procedures delay decisions and give time for emotional arousal to cool before policy is made?

Studying these questions is a challenge because it requires knowing not only the emotional

states of individuals decision makers, but also finding a controlled comparison that involves a similar decision and a similar distribution of emotions among decision makers but a different institutional or group context. However, addressing these challenges is important because understanding the way that group interactions and institutional characteristics moderate the effect of individual-level emotions is crucial to fully address the aggregation problem. That is, do individual-level changes influence decisions made at the group level and, if so, how?

Another important avenue for future research has to do with decision makers' assessments of the emotional states of their counter-parts. Are decision makers able to accurately assess whether the humiliation of leaders and citizens in other countries is feigned or genuine? This matters because if decision makers decide the humiliation is feigned when it is really genuine, then they may make a dispute settlement offer that will be rejected, leading to bargaining failure and potential conflict. If leaders believe humiliation is genuine when it is really feigned, then actors who are skilled at simulating humiliation may be able to extract more from bargaining than they would otherwise be able to get. In particular, it will be important for international relations theorists to draw from research on empathy in tackling this question.

Empathy is also important for understanding how decision makers react to pressure from outside groups, such as emotionally aroused citizens. Do decision makers tend to overestimate, underestimate, or accurately estimate the emotional arousal and preferences of these groups. If they overestimate the emotional pressure they face from outside groups, they might overreact and choose policies more hostile than either they or the group pressuring them desire. If they underreact, then we would expect decision makers to face a backlash from these groups and to potentially lose office.

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