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


1944

Volume III

THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH
EUROPE

Department of State
Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States

Diplomatic Papers
1944

Volume III

The British Commonwealth
and Europe



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PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the direct supervision of E. Ralph Perkins, formerly Chief of the Foreign Relations Division now headed by S. Everett Gleason. The compilers of the volume were N. O. Sappington, John G. Reid, John P. Glennon, William Slany, Velma Hastings Cassidy, and Warren H. Reynolds; and former members of the Division, Douglas W. Houston, John Rison Jones, and William K. Medlin.

The Publishing and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of this volume and the preparation of the index. These functions were performed in the Historical Editing Section under the direct supervision of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs*

MARCH 2, 1965

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below :

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS
UNITED KINGDOM

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY UNDER SECRETARY
STETTINIUS ON HIS MISSION TO LONDON, APRIL 7-29, 1944

740.0011 E. W. Stettinius Mission/112½

The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It gives me pleasure to transmit to you herewith a report on the conversations carried on in London on your behalf from April 7th to April 29th, 1944.

As directed by you and the President, the objective of our Mission was to exchange views with members of the British Government on any subjects of current mutual interest which the British desired to discuss with us. We sought also to establish with British officials relationships of frankness and mutual confidence, having in mind the vital importance of such relationships in the solution of our common problems both during the war and in the post-war era. In the carrying out of these objectives I was given most loyal and capable support by all the members of the Mission and by Ambassador Winant and other American officials in Britain.

We were accorded a most warm and hospitable reception by the British. They displayed throughout our talks the same spirit of frankness and cooperation which motivated our approach to them.

In the course of the conversations, the British raised with us a large number of topics of both immediate and long-range importance. I explored a large number of these topics with senior British officials discussing in particular detail a number of currently pressing matters such as the European Advisory Commission, the French directive, shipment of war supplies to the Axis from the neutral countries, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and the forthcoming economic talks. I met also on several occasions with the Soviet Ambassador and with the Chinese Ambassador in order to keep them informed of the course of our discussions. In addition, I met with representatives of all the Governments-in-Exile at their request and with numerous American diplomatic, military and civilian officials.

Dr. Isaiah Bowman gave the greatest part of his attention in London to post-war matters, particularly the world security organization,

the world court, and colonial problems. Mr. John L. Pratt concentrated on problems of war supply and British planning for post-war reconstruction and reconversion. Mr. Wallace Murray discussed with members of the Foreign Office a large number of current Near Eastern and African topics. Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, who accompanied me on many of my talks with senior members of the British Government, carried on conversations also with members of the Foreign Office on European matters. Mr. Robert Lynch discussed administrative affairs, both at the Foreign Office and at our two Embassies in London.

As the result of our conversations in London, we are more deeply convinced than ever that the United States must play an aggressive role in the creation of the international machinery necessary to ensure world security and economic stability. It is clear that the British attach great importance to the active participation of the United States in the world problems of the post-war era. We feel that in order to ensure our participation they will go far toward meeting our wishes on the form and character of the machinery for international cooperation. In the field of international security, British thinking is already very similar to our own, and we are convinced that when formal negotiations begin, we and the British will find ourselves in substantial agreement.

In the meanwhile, we urge that the most careful attention be given to the workings of the inter-allied bodies already functioning and to the preparation for those which it may be necessary to create in the near future. Much of our attention in London was devoted to the European Advisory Commission, to the civil affairs planning of SHAEF¹ and to European control machinery which it may be necessary to set up as surrender becomes imminent, to the President's proposal for a United Nations economic "steering committee", to the proposed interim shipping commission, and to other United Nations bodies. It is vital that these United Nations groups work as efficiently and as fruitfully as possible, for it is there that the spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence is being formed which will be indispensable to successful international cooperation in the post-war era.

In conclusion, may I take this means of expressing again the deep appreciation of myself and the other members for the privilege of having been able to undertake this Mission for you and for the splendid support and cooperation which you and the other officials of the State Department gave us at all times.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

¹ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

[Enclosure]

Report on Conversations in London, April 7 to April 29, 1944

THE MISSION TO LONDON

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State

Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Vice Chairman, Advisory Council on Post-War Foreign Policy, Department of State

John L. Pratt, Consultant on Commercial Affairs, Department of State

Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State

H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs

Robert J. Lynch, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary and Executive Secretary to the Mission

Louis J. Hector, Assistant to the Under Secretary

The members of the Mission left the United States on March 30th, 1944 and arrived in London on April 7th. Conversations were carried on until April 29th with members of the British Government, with officials of other Allied Governments, and with United States diplomatic, military and civilian officials. The members of the Mission left London on April 29th and reached Washington on May 4th, spending two days en route in conferences with Ambassador Averell Harriman² and Ambassador Robert Murphy³ at Marrakech, French Morocco.

[Here follows table of contents.]

I. CURRENT POLITICAL TOPICS

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

British officials and Mr. Eden⁴ in particular, were most eager to raise with the Mission various questions concerning the European Advisory Commission.⁵

Scope of Reference of the E.A.C.

As the Department is aware, the British, since the Commission's inception, have ascribed to it a much broader field of endeavor than we have. They stated to us that under its terms of reference the E.A.C. should concern itself with the whole short-term clearing up of Europe after cessation of hostilities, i.e., as distinguished from

² Ambassador in the Soviet Union.³ Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.⁵ For correspondence pertaining to the European Advisory Commission, see vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.

long-term peace and security arrangements which should be left to the world security organization.

The British admitted that under their conception the E.A.C. might grow into the instrument for governing the control machinery of Europe. They envisage it, indeed, as becoming the focus for Tri-Partite forward planning in both the pre-surrender and post-hostilities periods, particularly the latter.

The British laid great store on their interpretation of the Moscow Conference⁶ decision to refer to the E.A.C. the British paper on policy toward liberated areas. Mr. Eden insisted it was not merely this specific document—which the British no longer wish to present—that was referred to the E.A.C., but rather that all questions affecting liberated areas were to come before the E.A.C. We stated that this interpretation differed materially from ours, and further, that our military authorities are definitely opposed to having matters come before the Commission which concern military planning and operations because of the possible delays involved. We said that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement,⁷ covering primarily the pre-surrender period, fell in this category.

As one of the principal British arguments in support of their conception of the E.A.C., the British dwelt on the importance of obtaining Russia's wholehearted support of cooperative action in the solution of European problems. They insisted that the only existing machinery for consulting Russia is the E.A.C. and, in support of this, cited Russian requests to the British that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement and the French Civil Affairs directive should be considered by the E.A.C. We pointed out to the British that the Russians had declined so far to consider any other questions until agreement is reached on the proposed surrender terms for Germany. The British seemed to feel that since the Russians themselves had now proposed several other questions for clearance through the E.A.C., they would probably not insist upon this position.

While we were still in London, the Russians presented their Civil Affairs Agreement with Czechoslovakia⁸ to the British Foreign Office and to the Department for comment without suggesting reference to the E.A.C. This had a moderating effect upon the British position and they dropped their insistence that such documents should be cleared through the E.A.C.

We endeavored in all conversations to correct the British feeling that there is a desire on the Department's part to belittle the Commis-

⁶ For correspondence regarding the Moscow Conference of October 1943, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

⁷ Concluded May 16, 1944, in identical terms with the agreement concluded on the same day between the United States and Norway; for text of the latter, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1514*, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1581.

⁸ For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, p. 744.

sion or to underestimate the value of its functions. We emphasized the complexity, size and importance of the problems affecting the future treatment of Germany and the satellite countries and said that we doubted whether the Commission could, as a practical matter, handle other problems at the present time. Sir William Strang⁹ in private conversation admitted that the E.A.C. would have its hands full for some time to come with the problems affecting enemy countries already scheduled for consideration.

*Progress on Surrender Terms*¹⁰

We and the British were equally insistent that time did not permit of further delays in reaching agreement on surrender terms for Germany and beginning consideration of the other questions concerning the subsequent treatment and control of Germany.

As to the lack of progress thus far in disposing of the surrender terms, various causes emerged. The original delay was caused by the failure for some weeks of the Russian Ambassador to receive instructions on surrender terms. The subsequent delay resulted from confusion in Ambassador Winant's¹¹ mind as to the degree of latitude he had to negotiate agreements not strictly in accord with the letter of the documents furnished him. As a result of our visit and that of General Wickersham, his Military Advisor, to Washington, we believe that Mr. Winant now realizes the importance attached to expediting the Commission's work and understands that we expect him to negotiate, on the general basis of the documents furnished, the best agreements possible for submission to the three governments.

During our stay Mr. Winant informally submitted a new draft of the surrender terms to his British and Russian colleagues. In substance it is apparently acceptable to the British, and it goes a long way to meet the Russian point of view. When we left, Ambassador Gousev was daily expecting Moscow's comment on this draft and all seemed hopeful that agreement could soon be reached.

As the E.A.C. passes from surrender terms to directives and proclamations for the Allied commanders and then to control machinery for Germany, Ambassador Winant will need an increase in his Commission staff. This is particularly true in the economic field. Sir William Strang can and does call upon the whole British Government for technical assistance. If Mr. Winant is to have the technical assistance he will require in presenting the American view, he must have on his staff persons capable of advising him on the economic problems which will come before the Commission.

⁹ British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰ For further correspondence regarding surrender terms for Germany, see vol. I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission," part V.

¹¹ John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

Recommendations

1) We recommend that careful attention be given Mr. Winant's personnel requirements. The Department should begin at once to consider personnel choices for the expanded staff Mr. Winant will need as soon as the detailed control machinery and occupation arrangements come under discussion.

2) In order that Mr. Winant may have the full benefit of this Government's current views on problems under consideration by the E.A.C., it would seem desirable that officers in the Department who have participated in the formulation of these views make brief visits to London from time to time in order to assist the American representative on E.A.C. in understanding our Government's approach and the factors behind it.

3) The Department should give careful consideration to the possible scope of the work of the E.A.C. during the interim period between the surrender of Germany and the final settlements, and to the relations between the E.A.C. and the military during that period. If the E.A.C. does, in fact, become the control machinery for Europe during this interim period, we must be prepared with the necessary personnel and machinery for American participation. If it is decided by the State Department that the E.A.C. should not assume these post-surrender control functions, immediate consideration should be given to alternative machinery since this may have to be set up with considerable speed.

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY—LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

General Eisenhower¹² and General Bedell Smith¹³ stated to members of the Mission their conviction that there should be a single Anglo-American zone of occupation in Germany instead of two separate zones. The issue had been raised by them through military channels but no reply had been received. They ask that the matter be discussed with the President and with the Secretary.

It is General Eisenhower's belief that it would be a very difficult task to separate the combined Anglo-American invasion force so as to create two distinct occupation forces. Moreover, he pointed out that the supply for the combined force is based on an intricate system of Combined Boards and pooled supplies which would be very difficult to disentangle in order to create two different supply systems for two separate zones of occupation.

The character of the zones of occupation in Germany must be considered, however, from the long-range political viewpoint as well as the immediate military viewpoint. Great Britain, because of her

¹² Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

¹³ Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Force.

geographical position, will inevitably desire to play a more active role than will the United States in continental affairs, particularly French affairs. If the American occupation forces are integrated with the British forces in a single Anglo-American zone, we may be put in the position of seeming to back up all of Britain's post-war European policies. On the other hand, the creation of two separate zones will give the Germans wider scope for playing off one occupying power against another. These are only two examples of the various long-range aspects of the problem which must be given careful consideration.

Recommendation

We suggest that this is a problem of great urgency, since the military planning for the zones of occupation must get under way immediately. We recommend that the Secretary call a meeting in the very near future, to include the Under Secretary, Dr. Bowman, Mr. Dunn,¹⁴ Mr. Matthews and such other officers of the Department as may seem appropriate, and that the views of the Department be promptly embodied in a memorandum to the President.

FOOD RELIEF FOR OCCUPIED EUROPE

The Prime Minister¹⁵ stated that he objected strongly to any relief shipments of food to the occupied countries of Europe because of the danger of security leaks concerning the coming operations. He said that he is interested in the providing of relief, but that he feels we must take no chances whatsoever of jeopardizing the success of our military operations.

Mr. Eden stated that it was hopeless to raise the food relief question again with the War Cabinet. He said that they had taken a firm position that the best thing for the people in the occupied areas is to turn those areas into liberated areas as soon as possible and that any food relief plans must be turned down for operational and security reasons. This whole question is tied up, of course, with Britain's historical dependence on blockade as a principal weapon of war.

The Under-Secretary told Mr. Eden that it is very important from the American political point of view to open negotiations promptly with Germany, through Switzerland or Sweden, on the subject of food relief. Mr. Eden felt that his Government would never agree to such action.

FRANCE

Status of Directive to General Eisenhower

Upon arrival in England we found that the President's proposed directive of March 3rd, 1944 to General Eisenhower on the administra-

¹⁴ James Clement Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

¹⁵ Winston S. Churchill.

tion of civil affairs in France was still on the Prime Minister's desk. The Prime Minister took the position that he did not want to "bother the President" at this time, and he was apparently unwilling to authorize acceptance of the directive or even its discussion in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

Following our arrival, we made every effort with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan¹⁶ and other Foreign Office officials to have action on the directive expedited. We explained at length that in practice General Eisenhower would deal with the French Committee in all his pre-invasion planning and to the extent that it proved possible after landing in France.¹⁷ We made it clear that neither the Department nor General Eisenhower has any intention of encouraging any rival group which may emerge in France, but that we did feel General Eisenhower's hands should not be tied to the extent of forcing him to maintain the Committee with American bayonets should it prove unacceptable to the French people.

The British were delighted with the Secretary's speech of April 9th¹⁸ and particularly his references to France. They felt, however, that there were elements in the speech incompatible with the President's directive. We consistently explained that there was no divergence and pointed out that the Secretary's speech had received the President's prior approval.

Mr. Eden insisted that his statement in Parliament on September 22nd¹⁹ last made it "embarrassing" for him to accept the President's directive unless it were amended so as to make General Eisenhower's dealings with the Committee mandatory, i.e. "may" changed to "should" in Article II, paragraph 3 of the directive. Subsequent reading of Mr. Eden's statement, however, does not reveal to us any real basis for such embarrassment.

During our stay in England, it developed that as action on the President's directive was not to be immediately forthcoming, the time element compelled General Eisenhower to initiate informal discussions with the French Military Mission in London under General Koenig,²⁰ with a view to reaching working agreements. General Eisenhower at the same time requested approval of this procedure

¹⁶ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁷ For correspondence regarding concern of the United States over civil administration of France following liberation from the Germans, see pp. 634 ff.

¹⁸ Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

¹⁹ Mr. Eden stated he welcomed the development of the Soviet Union informing the French Committee of National Liberation on August 26, 1943, that it had decided to recognize the Committee and to exchange plenipotentiary representatives with it. (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 392, col. 174.)

²⁰ Gen. Joseph P. Koenig, appointed by French Committee of National Liberation as Military Delegate for the French zone of theater of operations to be established after D-Day.

from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He feels, however, that, while this arrangement is a satisfactory stop-gap, he must eventually have some formal directive.

Mr. Churchill stated in his last visit with the Under-Secretary that he had devised a "formula" on the French directive. He would say in the House of Commons that the British Government's position was identical with that outlined in the Secretary's speech and that General Eisenhower and his staff were already in informal conversations with "a French general". If asked about the directive, Mr. Churchill would say that it was a private matter between the two Governments concerning the prosecution of the war and not the concern of Parliament or the Press. He thought this formula would meet the situation in England, and he did not propose to communicate further with the President on the directive. (This is apparently the basis of Mr. Eden's statement of May 2 [3?].²¹)

The Under-Secretary made it clear to the Prime Minister that while the present informal conversations provided a satisfactory "tentative" basis for working agreements with the French Committee, but that General Eisenhower must have some definite directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on which to base his policies.

Basis of British Policy Toward French Directive

We believe that the British reluctance to accept the President's proposed directive stems from three causes:

1) The policy of the British Government has always been to give the French Committee the fullest possible support, and we believe that it is prepared to continue this support to the utmost once the invasion starts. It does not therefore wish to place on record with its stamp of approval any document which might, some time in the future, be taken to imply that the British contemplated dealing under any circumstances with some group or element other than the Committee.

2) It is contrary to the conception of the British system of government to permit important political decisions to be taken by a military commander. Such decisions are the functions of the Foreign Office with the prior approval, in important cases, of the War Cabinet. The British consider that relations with the French authorities of a non-operational character are primarily political in nature, particularly the decision as to the authority with whom to deal. They would be unwilling to grant discretion to a British supreme commander in such a matter, and they are naturally far less willing to grant this authority to an American supreme commander, however much confidence they may have in him.

3) There is much suspicion on the part of the British that after we get into France a "deal" may be made similar to the arrangements

²¹ On May 3, 1944, Mr. Eden stated in the House of Commons: "I am happy to take this opportunity to emphasize that His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with the statement made by United States Secretary of State on 9th of April in regard to the administration of liberated France." (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 399, col. 1296.)

which were entered into with Admiral Darlan²² at the time of our landing in North Africa, the memory of which is still vivid in England. The British have never more than grudgingly admitted that however unfortunate the Darlan arrangements may have been from the political point of view, they nonetheless saved many lives and helped materially to shorten the African campaign. They fear that for strictly military reasons General Eisenhower may again take some action under the President's flexible directive which might run counter to their determination to give full and undivided support to the French Committee of National Liberation.

The difference in British and American thinking with regard to the immediate situation we will find in France was brought out clearly during our stay. Whereas we consider that as France is liberated a period of some confusion, disorders and even a limited blood bath are possible, the British attitude is one of convinced optimism. They not only hope, but believe, that the entire country will rally to the support of General de Gaulle²³ and the Committee, and will accept their dictates without question. They state that they do not plan to recognize de Gaulle and the Committee as a provisional government until they are reestablished in Metropolitan France. It is clear, however, that the British will do everything possible to encourage support of the Committee and discourage opposition to it and that full recognition will probably not be long delayed once the Committee or certain members thereof have arrived on the mainland of France.

RUSSIA

British and American Policy Toward Russia

The British are determined to work in all ways for continued Russian cooperation with the Western Allies after the conclusion of hostilities. This is one of the cornerstones of present British policy. Given the background of Russian isolation and suspicion over the past quarter century—not to mention traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry—the British believe that the road will be long, slow and painful. But they feel—with occasional doubts—that the chances of ultimate success are favorable. They believe that the maximum of patience will be called for in the face of the inevitable setbacks and sudden incomprehensible Russian moves.

The British seemed curiously unaware of the fact that American relations with Russia are at present enjoying less friction than their own. They even seem to fear that we will exercise less patience with Russia than they. We assured the British that the Secretary is well

²² Adm. Jean François Darlan, French High Commissioner in North Africa. For correspondence pertaining to the landing of Allied forces in North Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 379 ff.

²³ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Committee of National Liberation.

aware of all the pitfalls that may confront us and of the patience which will be required if the habit of Russian consultation and cooperation with the Western world is to be gradually evolved. We emphasized that the outlook for a post-war world without such prospect of Russian partnership would indeed be grim.

On this fundamental objective of Russian cooperation there seems to be no difference in British or American viewpoint; on the means of bringing the policy to fruition there may, of course, be differences in approach. We explained to the British the greater difficulties which we face with public opinion in this country and mentioned the disillusionment on the part of some Americans which followed the Polish affair,²⁴ the *Pravda* peace feeler story,²⁵ and the Badoglio recognition incident.²⁶ We pointed out that the Secretary has taken every opportunity both in Washington and through our Ambassador at Moscow to emphasize how American public opinion fails to understand any unilateral course of action on Russia's part and the need for working through mutual consultation and agreement. The British expressed full agreement with the wisdom of this policy and felt that it is already having results, notably in the "moderate" Russian Terms to Finland²⁷ and more recently in the Russian consultation with the British and ourselves on surrender terms for Rumania²⁸ and the Czech civil affairs agreement.²⁹

Russian Treatment of Germany

The British are convinced that the Russians will be decidedly "tough" with Germany after the termination of hostilities. They believe that the cornerstone of future Russian policy is to prevent Germany ever being again in a position to threaten the peace. They feel that any argument that a stable peaceful Europe requires a prosperous stable Germany will fall on decidedly deaf Russian ears. In fact, the British Foreign Office thought that one element in Russia's offer of German territory up to the Oder to a friendly Poland is the belief that in thus giving the Poles a sizeable German minority problem, any possibility of a German-Polish alliance will be prevented. The British believe that Russia will maintain its determination to keep Germany weak long after the British and ourselves have fallen into forgiveness and forgetfulness.

²⁴ For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in Poland and its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 1216 ff.

²⁵ See vol. iv, section under the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Reports on developments of significance concerning Soviet relations . . .".

²⁶ For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States over the maintenance of responsible government in Italy, see pp. 996 ff.

²⁷ For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in Finland and its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 608 ff.

²⁸ See vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania at Moscow . . .".

²⁹ See pp. 515 ff.

Russian-Polish Relations

The British feel that there is nothing that can usefully be done at the moment with regard to Russian-Polish relations. They were encouraged in varying degrees by Polish reports—which they appeared to accept at face value—that the Polish underground has working arrangements with Russian military commanders on the spot. The British believe that the Russians have discovered that the Polish underground has some real military value, that it is loyal to the Polish Government in London and that failure to obtain its cooperation might hamper Russian military operations. The British seem to feel that if cooperation on the spot between the Polish underground and the Russian armies works well, a Polish Government with substantial popular support may gradually arise in Poland.

In spite of reiterated Russian hostility to the Polish Government-in-Exile, the British have not abandoned hope that perhaps Mikolajczyk³⁰ and one or two others might be brought into an administration set up locally in Poland. They admitted that this for the moment is pure speculation, but they are not inclined to accept Russian denials of cooperation with the Polish underground at face value.

Post-War Relations with Russia

We endeavored to learn whether there is any substantial body of opinion in England which believes that at some future time a stronger Germany may be necessary as a bulwark against the East and whether thinking in this direction has affected British policy. It was admitted that there exists and always has existed a minority fringe of people on the extreme Right who believe that Bolshevism is the real menace to Europe and that such people might argue for a strong Germany after the war. The vast majority of the British, however, so far as we could ascertain, are not thinking along these lines but are hoping and expecting—with occasional qualms—that Russian cooperation with the Western Allies will extend into the post-war future.

British officials do not believe that there are any tangible signs, in spite of the Polish question, that Russian policy as decided upon at Moscow³¹ and Tehran³² has undergone any fundamental change in the direction of isolation. They believe that Russian needs for reconstruction and rehabilitation and her natural desire to raise the standard of living of her war-stricken people will prevent Russian nationalism from going to extremes for some time after the war. They say, however, that this factor should not be exaggerated. They

³⁰ Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of Poland.

³¹ For correspondence regarding the Tripartite Conference at Moscow October 18–November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

³² For correspondence regarding the Conference at Tehran, November 27–December 2, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 459 ff.

likewise believe with us that the fatigue factor is important and works in favor of cooperation with the West. It would be dangerous for the Soviet Government to strain the Russian people further by depicting another period of struggle against Western capitalist powers. This reluctance to confront his people with another period of tightened belts and preparation for another threat of war will constitute an important element, the British feel, making for Stalin's³³ cooperation in a world security organization.

PORTUGUESE WOLFRAM³⁴

Mr. Eden gave his assurances that the British would take a position on Portuguese wolfram comparable to that which is finally worked out with regard to Spanish wolfram. They feel themselves in a difficult position, however, to impose severe blockade sanctions before July 1, 1944, because of the supply commitments in their agreement with Portugal concerning the use of the Azores bases. The British implied, however, that the United States is under no such disability and that they would support such action on our part should it become necessary. As to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance,³⁵ the British are apparently not prepared to consider denouncing it if Portugal does not meet our wishes.

ARGENTINA

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden gave their firm assurances that Britain would support any position which the United States finds it necessary to take with regard to Argentina,³⁶ provided only that the problem of meat and other critical imports from Argentina can be solved. The British are quite aware of the danger of a South American bloc hostile to Britain and the United States being formed around an intransigent Argentina, and they realize the necessity for firm joint action to prevent this.

BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Prime Minister Churchill stated on April 15th with great directness that he felt it would be a serious error to permit more than a token force or "a brigade" to be sent overseas from Brazil at this time, and that this force should be assigned to the Mediterranean theater because of similar climatic conditions there.

³³ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

³⁴ For correspondence on negotiations leading to embargo by Portugal on export of wolfram in order to cut off source of supply to Germany, see vol. iv, second section under Portugal.

³⁵ Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. i, p. 462.

³⁶ For correspondence pertaining to United States policy of non-recognition of the Argentine Government, see vol. vii, section under Argentina entitled "Withholding of recognition from the regime of Edelmiro Farrell by the United States."

After receipt of Esdel³⁷ 22 on April 16th, the Under Secretary impressed upon the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden the political importance both within Brazil and from the standpoint of her prestige as an ally of avoiding any further delay in the embarkation of the B.E.F.³⁸ Mr. Eden promised the Under Secretary on April 24th that he would review the matter with the War Cabinet. He himself was favorably inclined and seemed hopeful that the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet would grant the necessary approval. We understand that the necessary British approval has now been forthcoming.

THE GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE

American Diplomatic Representation

Many of the representatives of the Governments-in-Exile in London expressed genuine concern over the fact that an American diplomatic representative with the rank of Ambassador has not been appointed to them. This was particularly true of the Norwegians who explained that this was resented in Norway and that it had served to create doubts about the friendship of the United States for Norway. Mr. Trygve Lie, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the change in Mr. Biddle's status from an Ambassador to a Lieutenant Colonel has created fears that the United States intends to deal with Norway through some military organization such as AMGOT³⁹ rather than through diplomatic channels.

Participation in Work of E.A.C.

Representatives of the Exiled Governments were also much concerned over the fact that they have not been consulted about the surrender terms for Germany. Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, for instance, that there are certain questions involved in the German surrender terms with which the Netherlands Government is vitally concerned, but, that as things stand now it has had no opportunity to make its views known or to find out what decisions are being reached by the European Advisory Commission.

Refund of Currency made Available for Pay of United States Troops

The Belgian and Dutch Finance Ministers⁴⁰ stated to the Under Secretary their great concern over the position taken by the United States Treasury that currency made available by Western European countries for pay of United States troops might not be reimbursed

³⁷ Designation for series of telegrams from the Department of State to Under Secretary of State Stettinius in connection with his mission to London in April 1944. Telegram Esdel 22, not printed.

³⁸ Brazilian Expeditionary Force.

³⁹ Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory.

⁴⁰ Camille Gutt and J. van den Broek, respectively.

by the United States. They feel that the Reciprocal Aid Agreements settled this point in clear unmistakable language, and they cannot understand why we are now proposing a different arrangement, particularly in the light of the fact that we pay dollars for the sterling used to pay our troops in Britain. The Belgian Finance Minister pointed out also that the British had agreed to pay in sterling for the Belgian currency made available to the British Army.

Recommendations

1) We recommend that a single Ambassador be appointed for all the Governments-in-Exile in London to fill the post left vacant by Mr. Biddle. Although Governments such as the Norwegian Government obviously feel entitled to a full-time Ambassador appointed to their country alone, they seem to appreciate the embarrassment which might result from appointment of ambassadors to each of the Exiled Governments in the event that the authority of some of these governments is challenged after the liberation of their homelands. The possibility of such embarrassment is greatly reduced, of course, by the device of having one ambassador for all the Governments-in-Exile.

2) We recommend that the question of the refunding of currency made available for payment of American troops be reopened with the Treasury. Whatever the merits or demerits of the original determination to exclude payment of troops from Reverse Lend-Lease, this policy was definitely embodied in the Reciprocal Aid Agreements and we feel from our conversations in London that what they regard as our sudden decision to abandon this policy has left a very unfortunate impression with the Governments-in-Exile.

II. POST-WAR TOPICS

WORLD ORGANIZATION

There were frank and detailed comments by British officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden, Under-Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan and others, on the world security organization. In general, British thinking on this subject seems very similar to our own.

The following points from the discussions on world security seem to us the most important from the point of view of future preparatory study and discussion within the Department.

The Executive Council

In order to provide larger representation for small states, the composition of the Executive Council is more broadly conceived by the British than by our Government. They feel that the experience of the League Council demonstrates that the small states do not com-

bine against the large states at critical times or on critical issues. Only by increasing representation of small states, they believe, can we avoid two dangers: 1) The small states will claim that the Great Powers, possessing overwhelming military power, are ruling the world arbitrarily and by force; 2) The small representation of small states in the Council may tend to force the discussion of questions of security into the general assembly and to this the Prime Minister has expressed most emphatic opposition since he believes that futile debates would be the result.

The chief functions of the Executive Council as conceived by the British are:

1) The prompt exercise of force, if necessary, in the interest of security.

2) To harmonize policies and conciliate powers and regions.

3) To refer to regional councils certain questions for recommendation and report, if not for action. The example was given of the Flemish question as a type of question which could be referred to a possible European council for study and report instead of being taken up in either the assembly or the executive council of the world organization.

In order further to avoid the charge of arbitrary action by the Great Powers, some British officials have been considering the possibility of a "Defense Committee" of the Executive Council to assist the Council in dealing directly and swiftly with security issues. Such a Defense Committee would be advisory only. It would be in effect a subcommittee of the Executive Council, to receive the reports of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and make a preliminary study of them.

Regional Councils

With respect to the need for a World Organization, there is no difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and his Government. The form of it, however, is very much in question. The Prime Minister's view stems from his belief in the need for the decisive exercise of power in order to keep the post-war world on an even keel. He doubts the wisdom of reestablishing a World Organization on vague general lines, preferring to make more precise the several fields of responsibility.

Regional councils for security are to the Prime Minister a primary objective. He would have three principal ones in the world: a Western Hemisphere council, a European council, and an Asiatic council. His Foreign Office and his experts generally would put the weight of world security upon the World Organization rather than upon regional councils. In conversation it was clear that Mr. Churchill has not thought out the operations and complexities of regional councils. For example, he would resolve interregional disputes by

appointing a commission under the Executive Council. This seems to us a weak setup for a highly important dispute that might shake world security.

International Military Bases

Military bases under international authority seem necessary to the British, but they feel that they cannot be distributed throughout the world in great numbers. In our conversations, reference was made repeatedly to Pantelleria, the Marquesas Islands, New Caledonia, Truk, Singapore, the Caribbean Islands, Dakar and Madagascar, and one or two of the Japanese Mandated Islands to be selected for this purpose. From these examples, we have the impression that the British stand somewhat midway between the position of our military advisers at Washington, who incline toward few bases, and the position of those who desire many widely distributed bases.

Mr. Churchill repeatedly emphasized the need for international funds to support international bases, even under a trusteeship arrangement. He believes that in this way the United Nations will learn how expensive it is to maintain a security system such as the British have maintained in the past through national bases under Empire organization.

International Military Force

The use of military contingents with a distinctive insignia for international security is much in the Prime Minister's mind. He seems somewhat theoretical and imaginative in his treatment of this aspect of the matter rather than soundly convinced himself of its feasibility. His officials in the Foreign Office and the study group associated with it do not share his enthusiasm, although they are willing to examine the question impartially.

Regulation of Armaments

The regulation of armaments is believed possible by the British only through positive action. Negative prohibitions will get us nowhere, they feel, in view of the probably Russian position that inspection, or indeed any implication of outside control, is unacceptable.

Positive action offers a fairly wide field for consideration, the British feel. The standardization of arms with uniform calibre might be discussed, for instance, although the wartime problems arising from this question as between just the British and Americans warn of difficulties in this regard. The large states, of course, will have the problem of preventing excess armaments by small states. The airplane introduces an element of special difficulty. We cannot stop aeronautical experimentation and it will be difficult to agree on standards of construction and operation, since the needs of various

countries differ as to the type of plane and the type of services required.

Mandated Territories

The disposal of the Mandated Territories of 1919 was discussed apart from the colonial question. The legal position of the Mandates is a troublesome question which may or may not need to be resolved before the World Organization is set up with a section in it to deal with dependent peoples.

Since France as a nation is not in being at the moment, we cannot ask her to subscribe to a decision respecting the Mandated Territories. Only preliminary work on the legal aspects would seem to be useful now. Afterward the Mandated Territories can be treated in one of several ways: they can become parts of the general problem of dependent peoples, or they can form a part of a general system with a special status, or, theoretically at least, they can be treated separately and in an individual manner, depending upon the nature of the problems in each. Whatever solution is worked out, account must be taken of improvements, invested capital, etc., which form a part of the between-wars period of British and French administration. The legal questions involved are complicated and novel. Presumably the title of these territories reverts to the Allied and Associated Powers. *A* mandates have been largely settled or are in process of settlement. Iraq has become independent; Syria and Lebanon have been promised independence after the war; and Palestine must under any circumstances have special treatment. *B* mandates are not yet ready for self-government. *C* mandates are largely under the sovereignty of the Dominions who would have to be consulted about them.

WORLD COURT

Discussion of a World Court, from the British point of view, begins with consideration of the "Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice" of February 10, 1944.⁴¹ It is the work of a committee of experts formed early in 1943, whose members were chosen from eleven different countries. The Chairman was Sir William Malkin.

It is our understanding that this report is now under consideration in the Office of the Legal Adviser⁴² of the Department of State. Sir William Malkin expressed the hope that comment from the Department upon the above report would be received by him at an early date.

So far as Sir William Malkin represents his Government, it is important to realize that he is apparently ready to accept within

⁴¹ British Cmd. 6531, Misc. No. 2 (1944).

⁴² Green H. Hackworth.

reason whatever plan of a World Court the Government of the United States finds "politically feasible". He considers representation by the United States on the Court and in the preliminaries of organization as vital to its success.

Sir William stated that in his view the value of the Court's work lies in enlarging the cooperating machinery and habits of the world. He recognizes that the cases brought before the Court in the twenty years between world wars do not represent the real causes of wars, which lie in the political and economic fields. Yet there is a great need for a Court in order to fasten the attention of the world upon the possibilities of international law. Conciliation and arbitration have their due place, but they do not represent consistent views on international behavior except in so far as they enlarge the hope of using machinery other than war for the settlement of disputes.

Sir William Malkin considers it desirable to limit the work of the World Court to justiciable disputes and advisory opinions. It cannot take up political disputes. On the question of universal jurisdiction there is considerable doubt. I gather that this is considered a more remote object in the development of world political thinking than the actual constitution and operation of the Court in the near future.

Sir William said that he realized the desirability of employing new terms in setting up the new World Organization, since League memories are not altogether happy ones. Moreover, some of the powers that withdrew from the League, in order to save face, desire to have the Court's name changed and its functions redefined. For these reasons, the Report of the Inter-Allied Committee states that the existing connection between the Court and the League of Nations should be discontinued and should not be replaced by an organic connection with any new international organization in the sense of being established by an article of such organization.

A novel element introduced into the Report is presented in Chapter XI, "Regional Chambers". It is especially designed to attract non-European countries to a system of international law and a World Court to interpret it. It is recognized that there is a danger in decentralization in that doubt may be cast on the legal merits or finality of the decisions given. To meet this doubt ingenious plans are proposed for securing prior assent to the selection of judges for the Regional Court by agreement between the parties or by nomination of the Court. This would secure "uniformity of jurisprudence and a coherent and self-consistent Court".

Judges of different types of mind and methods of legal thought will almost inevitably be represented by the principal countries adhering to the Court. No specific attempt should be made to represent particular legal systems. Sir William emphasized the fact that the

decisions of the Court at The Hague over twenty years showed that no fundamental difficulty arose because participants in an action came from different legal systems.

Sir William thought that the Court should continue to sit at The Hague.

Both Sir William and Professor Webster⁴³ remarked that they did not want to emphasize the World Court at the present time if it diverted attention from an over-all World Organization whose primary object was security.

Recommendation

Since it appears that the British are willing at the present time to follow our lead in the organization of the World Court, it is vital that our views be formulated and made known to them as quickly as may be possible. We recommend that this subject be considered by the Committee on Post-War Programs in the near future.

COLONIAL POLICY

We were able to discuss the colonial question with practically the whole of the upper Foreign Office staff. There was also the opportunity of discussing it with Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, and a study group attached to the Foreign Office.

British Attitude Toward United States Statements on Colonial Policy

In exchanges between our Government and the British Government during the past year and a half, we have presented for British consideration a set of principles for the guidance of the United Nations in the administration of dependent peoples. These principles are cast in the most general form, and emphasis was at first upon "independence", later changed to "self-government". It is the British view that these statements are vague and impractical. They claim that the diversities of life and environment among dependent peoples are so great that it is not possible to make any real improvement in the relations of such peoples to the metropole by setting up what they feel is a vague set of general ideals.

In one of the replies of the British Government, an *Aide-Mémoire* dated May 26, 1943,⁴⁴ the point is made that a definite time table to be followed in giving an independent status to colonial peoples is an impossible goal. One cannot say in advance when the processes of education will enable a given people to exercise self-government. This point was expanded in our conversations. Self-governing people, the British feel, are developed as a result of trial and error. To put all dependent peoples under a general set of principles is to pre-

⁴³ Charles K. Webster, Research Department, British Foreign Office.

⁴⁴ Not found in Department files.

tend that all may be treated alike. Moreover, an enduring security system is not achieved by multiplying completely independent and small political entities all over the world.

United Nations Supervision of Dependent Areas

The line of approach used in our conversations with the British was the need for settling specific difficult questions, such as Italian Somaliland, Libya, the Japanese Mandated Islands, and the possible location of military bases on French possessions such as New Caledonia, Marquesas Islands, Madagascar, or French Indo-China.

At the beginning the general attitude of the British officials was cool toward any form of international control, which we presume reflected their disappointment with the previous documents from this Government. We pointed out that we are actually dealing in an international way with dependent peoples, including colonies, when we undertake to form a general security system under which both military bases and economic matters may be agreed upon. In the economic field, we have the standard of living of native peoples being affected by forms of international control of excess production of commercial agriculture in the tropics. This became so clear in the Caribbean region, when war interrupted normal commercial relations, that a Caribbean Advisory Commission had to be set up. We asked if similar commissions could not operate in other regions.

Colonel Stanley's⁴⁵ first reaction to this question was not favorable but Dr. Bowman pressed the matter and requested further consideration of various possibilities. At their second meeting, Colonel Stanley thought that Southeastern Asia might well have a regional council for the benefit of dependent peoples there. He thought that a regional council might also operate in the case of the Japanese Mandated Islands, though like all other officials he expressed the hope that the flag of the United States will fly in that region after the war. He also saw valuable results from a regional council in East Africa where Italian Somaliland and Eritrea come into the picture. In the case of West Africa, he thought that a regional council was not desirable, or if one were formed that the United States should not be represented upon it because, speaking frankly, he thought we were not popular there.

We and the British found ourselves much closer in our thinking at the end of our several talks than we could have hoped. The need for entering the French colonial field was obvious to our British colleagues and the argument seems to have been accepted that this hope could be realized and the position of the United States in an international scheme clarified with respect to the Pacific islands, only if

⁴⁵ Oliver Stanley, British Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Great Britain were willing to have the question of dependent peoples brought into the area of international discussion.

Once we had reached this point the remaining question was: Should we continue to seek agreement on the text of a declaration by Great Britain and the United States with respect to dependent peoples? On this point Colonel Stanley said that the time had passed when such a joint declaration would have any political value either in Great Britain or, he thought, in the world. But he was willing to take up the suggestion that a section on dependent peoples should appear in the World Organization.

At the end of the conversations, Colonel Stanley summarized under four heads the general situation as he saw it, as follows:

1) Any statement of colonial policy should become part of a section on dependent peoples in the structure of world organization and should not be a joint declaration.

2) The principle of regional commissions is acceptable to the British if they are not executive in character but are set up to study, recommend, and advise. On them should be represented not only parent nations but nations that have major economic and strategic interests in such areas.

3) Local branches of functional world organizations should be linked up to the regional commissions in the fields of health, nutrition, labor, etc. The functional organization would consult on the recommendations of the regional commissions.

4) A definite obligation to publish annual reports on each area should be assumed. This should be an obligation on all the colonial powers. Such reports would be sent to a control body where they would be available and interchangeable.

Colonel Stanley was so hopeful of future agreement along the above lines that he said he was willing to place these four points before his associates in the Cabinet. Dr. Bowman told him that he thought consideration on the ministerial level was inappropriate at the present time, if Colonel Stanley were going to refer in such presentation to the position of the Government of the United States. The exchanges in our conversations had been informal and exploratory. On our side it was necessary to put the four points he had mentioned into the stream of discussion in the Department of State, after which Secretary Hull would in due course convey our decision or proposal. Colonel Stanley said that he understood this but that he thought it desirable to consult his associates in the Cabinet in an informal way and try out these four points as the beginning of another chapter in our discussion of dependent peoples.

ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC

Dr. Bowman inquired if the British Government desired to include Arctic and Antarctic questions in the general settlement following

the war. He stated that there were no questions in either region that could not be settled fairly without argument, but that before the situation got tangled by further explorations, such as the Japanese had made in the Antarctic some years ago, we ought to make a final territorial settlement of the conflicting or overlapping claims of the Norwegians, British and Americans.

Instructions were given to a representative of the study group attached to the Foreign Office to look into the Arctic and Antarctic question and advise the Foreign Office on the desirability of undertaking a broad examination of this group of problems with a view to its consideration in the final settlement.

III. ECONOMIC TOPICS

ECONOMIC ADVISERS TO SHAEF

Mr. Philip Reed⁴⁶ expressed the opinion to the Under Secretary that on the basis of our experience in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the responsibility for the integration of American and British economic policies with military planning in the coming European operations should be centralized in SHAEF under the authority of the Supreme Commander. This responsibility should be vested, he feels, in representatives of the respective governments attached to SHAEF as economic advisers to the Supreme Commander.

This proposal was discussed with Ambassador Robert Murphy in Marrakech and he concurs in it. He pointed out that in North Africa it was necessary to set up the North African Economic Board as a staff section of the Allied High Command in order to centralize economic matters and integrate them with military planning, and that the Board constituted a convenient bridge between the economic activities of the operational period and the post-military period. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the problems which will be faced by SHAEF are far more complex than those faced in North Africa. It would be wise, he feels, to develop civilian economic coordination with the military as soon as may be convenient in order to deal both with the short-range and long-range economic problems more effectively.

Recommendation

We do not believe, of course, that economic advisers should be urged on General Eisenhower if he does not feel the need for them. We think it highly desirable, however, that the problem be put before him in the near future. We recommend that an informal letter be addressed to General Eisenhower asking him whether he believes that American and British economic advisers, occupying the same status as

⁴⁶ Chief of the U.S. Mission for Economic Affairs in London.

the American and British political advisers now attached to SHAEF, would be of value to him in the coming operations.

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS

Resumption of Anglo-American Economic Talks

The early resumption of the economic talks was urged on the British in numerous conversations. The officials of the Foreign Office seem willing to proceed promptly with the talks. The Prime Minister, however, feels that he must proceed with great caution in this field. He stated that thorough discussions with the Dominions and further discussions in Parliament are necessary before the British can resume the economic talks. He did state, however, that he recognized that the political situation in the United States may make it necessary to proceed at a faster pace, and he gave his assurances that he would bear this fact in mind.

Once the agreement of the Prime Minister has been obtained, there should be little delay on the British side, since the Foreign Office seems now to feel technically prepared to resume discussions. In fact, Mr. Richard Law⁴⁷ stated that he was very anxious that they get under way in May of this year.

United Nations Economic Steering Committee

The failure of the Prime Minister to answer the President's two telegrams of February 23rd,⁴⁸ concerning a United Nations steering committee for international economic discussion and the future of the Anglo-American Combined Boards, was pointed out repeatedly in our conversations.

Although this was not stated by the British, it is our belief that they are reluctant to set up a United Nations steering committee for economic discussions until there is already a considerable measure of agreement between Britain and the United States as to the topics to be raised and the countries which are to participate in the discussions. Mr. Eden, however, agreed to take the matter up with the War Cabinet and to secure an answer as quickly as possible. On the last day of our visit, Mr. Eden apologized for the fact that an answer had not yet been formulated and stated that he would communicate with the State Department within the next two weeks.

CARTELS

Cartels had apparently never been recognized as a problem by the British Foreign Office until the economic talks at Washington in October, 1943.⁴⁹ British thinking is still far behind ours on the

⁴⁷ British Minister of State.

⁴⁸ Vol. II, section entitled "Informal and exploratory discussions regarding post-war economic policy."

⁴⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, pp. 1099 ff.

subject. The Foreign Office is concerned with it now, in fact, only because we have taken a position and wish to continue discussions.

Some British officials were willing to admit the evils of cartelization, but they emphasized that the unscrambling process as far as Britain is concerned will be very long and difficult. Their feeling is that we should start on a case by case basis, taking the most flagrant examples first and gradually working toward the abolition of all forms of cartels that can definitely be shown to interfere with international trade.

Other British officials, however, believe that cartels are necessary to protect invested capital and commitments to labor such as stabilized wages and pensions. They feel that we in the United States will have to accept cartels after our economy ceases to expand at such a swift rate.

It is unquestionable that there are both powerful industrial and labor groups in Britain which will support the maintenance of cartels.

Recommendation

1) We recommend that the discussion of cartels with the British be conducted to a greater extent on a case by case basis and that the American representatives be thoroughly briefed on particularly flagrant cartel abuses which the British will not be able to defend.

2) Since the argument is frequently raised that cartels are a necessary machinery for the interchange of technical information, we recommend that studies be made of alternative methods for exchanging technical information which will not involve the restrictive aspects of cartelization.

SHIPPING

Officials of the British Government, almost without exception, are acutely concerned over Britain's place in post-war shipping and the threat of competition from subsidized American shipping. The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Lord Leathers⁵⁰ and Sir Walter Layton⁵¹ discussed this subject at considerable length in various conversations. The British feel that a large merchant fleet is of great importance to them not only as a direct source of revenue but also as the foundation of their export trade.

Lord Leathers stated that it is expected that he will have a conversation with the President on shipping before any final decisions are reached. It is clear that this subject must be discussed at the highest levels. It will be one of the most difficult of our mutual problems.

⁵⁰ Minister of War Transport.

⁵¹ Chairman of *News Chronicle*.

Recommendation

We recommend that studies be commenced immediately to determine the advantages of an enlarged merchant fleet to the economy of the United States and disadvantages of such a fleet to the British economy. While strategic considerations must play an important role in any final decision, it is our feeling that the purely commercial aspects should be more thoroughly explored before any position is crystallized.

BRITISH POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

Priorities in Post-War Planning

British post-war domestic planning authorities stated to Mr. Pratt that housing has been given first priority of manpower and materials in post-war domestic reconstruction plans. The housing shortage is already a serious problem, and it will become acute, the British feel, when the demobilization of the armed forces begins. Second in the post-war priority scale is the production of civilian goods for domestic use, e.g., clothing, hardware, china, and similar items, which are now almost impossible to obtain.

The British post-war planning authorities stated that they do not see how any substantial volume of goods can be manufactured in Britain for export until these urgent domestic needs have been met.

Notwithstanding that the present British planning gives exports a lower priority than housing and civilian goods, however, we believe that it would be unwise to expect that when final decisions are made, manufacturing for export will not have at least an equal priority with housing and civilian goods.

The Interim Period after European Hostilities Cease

British officials state that it is unlikely that even the urgent housing and civilian goods production jobs can be gotten under way on a large scale in Britain between the end of hostilities in Europe and total demobilization after the Pacific war. The greatest limiting factor in British reconstruction during this interim period will be manpower.

The British General Staff has estimated that after the end of the war in Europe, personnel in the armed forces and munition plants can be reduced by 25 percent. The civilian authorities have asked for a re-examination of this figure, but there is little possibility of more than a 30 percent reduction. Taking into account the retirement of over-age workers and the return of married women to their homes, this reduction will produce only about half a million workers for reconstruction purposes. It is estimated that the housing job alone will take 1,250,000 to 1,500,000 workers. Thus, there will probably be little increase in the production of civilian supplies until the end of the Pacific war.

Termination of Lend-Lease

The British are very concerned over the possibility of a diminution of the volume of Lend-Lease during the period between the end of the European war and the end of the Pacific war. Their import requirements will not decline, since they will need continued food imports and imports of raw materials for a substantial volume of continued war production. The British stated that they see no possibility of increasing their exports to any extent, however, in order to pay for these imports until after the Japanese war is over. They feel that financial assistance of some sort from this country during that period will be necessary.

It was pointed out to the British that whatever the financing arrangements for the period between the end of hostilities in Europe and in the Pacific might be, it is clear that Lend-Lease must draw to a close when general hostilities cease. It is therefore vital that our two Governments begin to plan now for financing arrangements, perhaps in the form of long-term credits, to ensure the continued flow of food and other necessary supplies from this country to Britain without a prolonged transition period of doubt and confusion which would work great hardships on the economies of both countries.

Recommendation

We recommend that studies be commenced on the volume and character of exports from the United States which will probably be necessary to the maintenance of the British economy, 1) in the interim period between the close of hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, and 2) in the immediate post-war period. The relationship of these exports to the Lend-Lease program and the possibility of long-term credit arrangements should also be studied.

BRITISH RECONVERSION AND DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS WAR MATERIALS

It became apparent in discussions by Mr. Pratt on the disposition of war plants and surplus war materials, that these problems have had very little attention at the Ministerial level in Britain and that in general we in the United States are a good deal further ahead in our planning in this regard.

The disposition of Government-financed war plants is a highly controversial political subject in Britain, and the present coalition of government does not wish to raise it at the present time. Mr. Oliver Franks of the Ministry of Supply stated that a policy of short-term leasing of such plants would probably be adopted in order to provide an opportunity for a thorough national discussion of the long-term disposition of them.

The British feel that the only surplus war materials which will be a problem for them will be copper and wool. Mr. Franks estimates that

the British Government will have in its possession at the end of the war a four years' supply of each of these commodities. He is also concerned over the world surplus of cotton which may result from the great increase in Brazilian cotton production. It is his feeling that these three products should be controlled by commodity agreements in order to protect the British and American producers by preventing a serious decline in prices.

Sir David Waley of the Treasury⁵² stated that he believes Great Britain will not make again the mistake which was made at the end of the last war of attempting to dispose of surplus war materials too speedily. He stated that there would be no pressure from the Treasury at the end of this war for a hurried disposition of surplus materials and war plants in order to reimburse the Treasury.

IV. MIDDLE EAST TOPICS

PALESTINE⁵³

The British Government has undertaken to move to Palestine any Jewish refugees coming from Europe via Turkey and is prepared to cooperate actively in any efforts to rescue refugees which will not rebound to the benefit of the Axis.

The British intend, however, to stand firmly on the White Paper⁵⁴ policy as regards Jewish immigration into Palestine until the end of the war. There are 27,500 remaining quota numbers, of which only 8,000 are presently earmarked, and the British regard this as ample provision for any foreseeable refugee traffic. Should the number of refugees unexpectedly exceed this provision, they are confident of their ability to provide places of refuge in the Near East, although not necessarily in Palestine itself.

The British do not expect any trouble from either Jews or Arabs in Palestine which they will be unable to handle, unless the local populations should be aroused by a revival of Zionist activity and agitation in the United States. They accordingly hope that we will do anything possible to prevent such development. At the moment the British regard this situation as satisfactory, following the initiative of General Marshall⁵⁵ in forestalling the passage of the recent Zionist resolutions in Congress. They therefore regard the present issuance of a joint Anglo-American statement on Palestine as more likely to stir than calm the American Zionists, but desire to consider the matter again should developments necessitate.

⁵² Under-Secretary.

⁵³ See vol. v, pp. 560 ff.

⁵⁴ The White Paper was dated May 17, 1939; British Cmd. 6019: *Palestine, Statement of Policy*.

⁵⁵ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

AMERICAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATION IN BAHREIN ⁵⁶

The British maintained their long-standing refusal to allow an American consul to reside in Bahrein on the basis of their unwillingness to create a precedent which would require similar authorization for Persian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian consular officers there and result in endless intrigue and administrative difficulties.

The British, however, in discussions with Mr. Murray made satisfactory concessions to us by agreeing:

1) To allow the American Consul at Dhahran to include Bahrein in his consular district and pay frequent visits thereto.

2) To appoint American constables to act under the authority of the British political agent in matters involving American citizens.

3) To appoint American assessors—a type of juryman who advises the judge under the Indian Code applying to aliens in Bahrein—to sit with the British Political Agent, in his judicial capacity, in cases involving American citizens.

IRAN

The British affirmed their whole-hearted support of the American advisers to the Iranian Government and agreed to join with us in suggesting to the Soviet Government that conversations should be held in Tehran with a view to implementing more fully the provisions of the Tehran declaration ⁵⁷ regarding Allied economic assistance for Iran. This suggestion was made to the Soviet Ambassador by Mr. Eden and The Under Secretary on April 25, 1944 and was favorably received.

The British are naturally and understandably concerned with the maintenance of order throughout the Middle East. They therefore proposed that an agreed Anglo-American program of arms supply for Iran be worked out, and that efforts subsequently be made to bring the Soviets into the agreed program. This proposal is being studied in close consultation with the War Department.

SAUDI ARABIA ⁵⁸

Paramount British political and strategic interests and paramount United States oil interests in Saudi Arabia were explained and mutually recognized in discussions between Mr. Murray and officials of the Foreign Office. It was agreed that these special interests should not conflict. The British categorically disclaimed any intention to undermine or to prejudice American oil rights in that country and agreed that the larger financial and supply problems of Saudi Arabia should be dealt with as far as possible on the joint basis in consulta-

⁵⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 111 ff.

⁵⁷ *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646.

⁵⁸ See vol. v, pp. 658 ff.

tion between the two Governments. It was felt by representatives of both Governments that:

- 1) Anglo-American discussions in Washington regarding the establishment of a currency and banking system in Iran should be expedited.
- 2) An agreed joint program for the supply of goods to Saudi Arabia should be worked out in Cairo.
- 3) Prompt consideration should be given to the organization of a joint Anglo-American military mission to assist King Ibn Saud in training and establishing a modern Saudi Arabian Army.

MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTER

The British expressed appreciation of the work of Mr. Landis as Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East. They fully agreed that his efforts to settle controversial matters as soon as they come up will in the long run contribute more to the effective maintenance of good Anglo-American relations than a policy of nursing grudges which might well be publicly and harmfully ventilated later. It was agreed that Mr. Landis, Lord Moyne,⁵⁹ and all other British and American representatives in the Middle East should be instructed to arrange local machinery whereby rumors, criticisms and complaints will be raised frankly, jointly examined and disposed of as soon as they arise.

The British were sincerely anxious that American participation in the MESC⁶⁰ should be strengthened by the addition of further American personnel.

As regards the future of the Center, it was agreed that the Middle Eastern Governments should if possible be drawn gradually into closer association with the Center so that they may be aided to co-operate with each other and provided with general and technical guidance for dealing with their common social and economic problems and for raising the standard of living and health throughout the Middle East. While it was recognized that the nature of British and American participation must be left for subsequent consideration, it was agreed that the ultimate objective should be the development of an autonomous economic institution serving the peoples of the Middle East and operated and supported by them.

LIST OF CONVERSATIONS

[Here follows list of conversations.]

⁵⁹ British Resident Minister in Egypt.

⁶⁰ Middle East Supply Center.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE MUTUAL AID PROGRAM; CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER BRITISH GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES; DISCUSSIONS REGARDING PHASE II OF LEND LEASE⁶¹

841.24/2181

The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1943.

DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: It is my information that the British Government has, during the course of the war, invested substantial sums in the construction of war plants and other capital facilities within the United States. It is also my information that the British Government has already disposed of the bulk of these plants and facilities by selling them or leasing them to the United States Government.

The original decision of the United States Government to purchase and lease these plants and facilities from the British Government was made at a time when the British acutely needed additional dollar exchange for the effective prosecution of the war. The purchase of these plants and facilities was at that time an excellent means of supplying the British Treasury with the necessary dollar exchange and aiding in the prosecution of the war. Since that time, however, the British dollar position has steadily improved and the British Treasury is no longer in urgent need of dollar relief. Accordingly, the emergency situation which justified the United States' purchase of these British war plants, in my opinion, no longer exists.

In view of the foregoing, I feel it would be wise to reconsider whether it would not be more in keeping with the principle of a maximum pooling of resources—which principle, in the last analysis, must be the guide in the lend-lease relations between Great Britain and the United States—to place the transfer of the British war plants in this country on a reverse Lend-Lease basis. As you know, the White House recently approved a proposal that the War Department should negotiate with the British to get the remainder of the war

⁶¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 48 ff.; for related correspondence, see *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 1054 ff. and pp. 1099 ff.

The Department of State was only one of the Government agencies concerned with the mutual aid program. Any comprehensive treatment of the subject would involve extensive publication of records from the Foreign Economic Administration, the Department of the Treasury, the War Department, and the Department of the Navy. Aside from some supplementary papers, the editors have selected only those papers from the files of the Department of State needed to document the part played by that Department in connection with its responsibilities in the making of policy decisions in this field.

plants in this country on a reverse-lend-lease basis.⁶² It seems to me that the facilities which have already been paid for or listed should be brought within the scope of such arrangements.

The United States Government has furnished to the United Kingdom as Lend-Lease aid numerous capital facilities constructed in the United Kingdom with Lend-Lease funds, such as yards, docks and other permanent installations. A mutual pooling of resources would, therefore, seem to call for a reverse lend-leasing of comparable capital facilities in this country whenever such facilities are turned over to us by the United Kingdom.

I would appreciate your views on this matter.

If you wish to discuss with me more fully both the facts and the policy considerations involved, I should be very happy to do so at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

841.5151/2009a

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*⁶³

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1943.

Secretary Morgenthau has shown me his Memorandum to you of December 31, 1943, on the subject of the United Kingdom's gold and dollar balances.⁶⁴ I share his desire to bring the matter to your attention and generally agree that the facts are as stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Memorandum. I believe that it would be entirely possible in view of the improved British financial position to eliminate from lend-lease transfers goods of the character stated in paragraph 7 of Secretary Morgenthau's Memorandum.

If, in your judgment, it is still practicable and wise to attempt to hold British balances to a fixed amount, I respectfully suggest that this policy should be made clear to the British, in order to avoid possible friction and feeling of a serious nature between the two governments by reason of the great importance which they seem to attach to the need for fullest discussion of their liabilities in connection with any possible policy of limitation of their assets to a fixed amount.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁶² This subject had been brought to the attention of President Roosevelt in a memorandum from Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson on November 6, 1943. The President referred it to Mr. James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization, who authorized Mr. Patterson on November 18, 1943, to proceed with negotiations to secure the munitions facilities as reciprocal aid. Mr. Patterson was to consult and inform the Foreign Economic Administration and the Department of State. (841.24/2182)

⁶³ Notation on the original reads: "Orig sent to Sec. Morgenthau, who will attach it to his memorandum & forward to White House."

⁶⁴ The memorandum here referred to was presumably a draft of the one sent to President Roosevelt on January 4, 1944, *infra*.

*Memorandum to President Roosevelt*⁶⁵

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1944.

1. In January 1943, you approved the following recommendation of a committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury and War, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare:

“It is recommended in the light of present circumstances, that the United Kingdom’s gold and dollar balances should not be permitted to be less than about \$600 million nor above about \$1 billion.”⁶⁶

2. Notwithstanding the directive, the British Government’s liquid dollar exchange assets have continued to rise and are now over \$1.7 billion, or \$1,350 million more than at the time the Lend-Lease Bill was presented to Congress in January 1941.⁶⁷

In addition to the gold and dollar holdings of the British Government, residents of the United Kingdom hold \$320 million of private dollar balances and about \$1,150 million of long-term investments in the United States. Of the latter assets, \$500 million are pledged with the R.F.C.⁶⁸ against the \$350 million loan.

3. When it became clear that the British balances were rising substantially above the ceiling set in your directive, the Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare pressed for a reduction in civilian lend-lease as a means of implementing your directive, but the State Department and Lend-Lease Administration were reluctant to recommend such a step in the absence of an exhaustive reexamination of our policy of financial assistance to the British and of Britain’s overall international financial position. It was finally agreed to request the British for strategic and other materials as reciprocal aid, estimated likely to amount to \$200–\$300 million during the ensuing year. This proposal was immediately placed before the British. Several months elapsed before the latter agreed to the proposal in principle and even then only after considerable prodding. Several more months have been spent in an endeavor to arrive at methods

⁶⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Although indicated as coming from the Secretary of State as well as the Secretary of the Treasury and the Foreign Economic Administrator, this document was signed only by Messrs. Morgenthau and Crowley. For Secretary Hull’s separate memorandum, see *supra*.

⁶⁶ Memorandum to President Roosevelt, January 1, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 48.

⁶⁷ The Lend-Lease Bill was introduced into both Houses of Congress on January 10, 1941. For the text of the Bill as introduced and amended, see S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (eds.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, July 1940–June 1941 (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941), vol. III, pp. 712–723. For text of the Lend-Lease Act as approved March 11, 1941, see 55 Stat. 31.

⁶⁸ Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

of implementing the proposal. We are disappointed with the progress made to date and we think there is little reason at present to be hopeful that this device will in effect yield anything like the amount needed to carry out your directive.

4. The British Government has strongly objected to a policy which prohibits an increase in their gold and dollar assets. They emphasize that the rise in their holdings of these assets—which may be expected to continue at an annual rate of at least a half billion dollars unless steps are taken to interrupt this trend—is only a fraction of the increase in their short-term indebtedness to overseas countries other than the United States.

They assert first that \$365 million of these liabilities represent a specific claim against an equivalent amount of dollars and that that sum must be subtracted from their total holdings in order to obtain the correct figure of their available gold and dollar reserve.

Secondly, they claim that their short-term sterling liabilities to overseas countries are five times the amount of their gold and dollar holdings and that these liabilities are increasing at a rate of \$2.5 billion a year.

The British claim that they should be permitted to accumulate gold and dollars as a necessary reserve against these growing liabilities. They assert that the continued accumulation of gold and dollars is a prerequisite to the continuation of the policy by which they have managed to finance their war expenditures in India, the Near East and other overseas areas.

Finally, the British fear that their mounting liabilities to overseas countries will place them in a very vulnerable position after the war and jeopardize their chances of a speedy post-war recovery.

5. There is merit, of course, in the British position but we feel that neither Britain's international financial position outside the United States nor its post-war needs were among the considerations which prompted Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act. In our opinion, Congress might well feel now that Lend-Lease aid to Britain was instituted in order to enable her to obtain those goods and services essential to the prosecution of the war for the purchase of which she lacked the necessary dollars, and that therefore to administer the Act in such a way as to help underwrite Britain's short-term indebtedness to other countries or to improve her post-war financial position might be contrary to the wishes of Congress. The British concede that this narrower purpose may have been the original objective, but they believe that our entry into the war alters the situation.

6. What the view in Congress may be is indicated by the report of the Truman Committee entitled "Outlines of Problems of Conversion

from War Production" and submitted to Congress on November 5, 1943.⁶⁹ To quote from page 13 of this document:

"In the latter connection, we should never forget that lend-lease was originally authorized by the Congress, solely because the English and others whom we desired to assist did not have sufficient American exchange to purchase materials needed by them. Lend-Lease was never intended as a device to shift a portion of their war costs to us, but only as a realistic recognition that they did not have the means with which to pay for materials they needed.

"Before authorizing lend-lease, the Congress expressly requested and received assurances that lend-lease assistance would be extended only where the recipient was fully utilizing all of its own resources."

7. In view of the considerations mentioned above we believe that various questionable items which were initially included because of the earlier shortage of dollars should be eliminated from lend-lease. Therefore, unless you indicate to the contrary, we propose to discontinue certain types of transactions such as the following:

- (a) machinery and capital installations;
- (b) off-shore purchases such as Iceland fish, Caribbean sugar, and oil from outside the U.S.;
- (c) civilian goods to the Middle East, Jamaica, Southern Rhodesia, etc.;
- (d) pulp and paper;
- (e) tobacco for the Armed forces;
- (f) certain other controversial civilian items.

The policy of discussing with the British each category of items that it is proposed to cease sending under Lend-Lease credit prior to any action being taken with respect to that category will, of course, be continued.

HENRY MORGENTHAU
LEO T. CROWLEY

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt*⁷⁰

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1944.

I agree with the report of the Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Crowley, and I understand that the Secretary of State approves the

⁶⁹ Senator Harry S. Truman was Chairman of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, usually referred to as the War Investigating Committee. For text of this report, see *Additional Report of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program Pursuant to S. Res. 71* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), Report No. 10, pt. 12.

⁷⁰ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Foreign Economic Administrator.

report but wishes to take the matter up first with the British. Also, I understand that the Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Crowley feel that they have been doing this for a year and have got nowhere.

Therefore, I suggest that the matter be taken up once more with the British, but on the distinct understanding that I will be given a final report within thirty days, i.e., February 7, 1944, and will act finally thereon.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

841.24/2176

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1944.

Participants: Secretary of State;
Secretary of the Treasury;
Mr. Leo Crowley, Administrator of Foreign Economic
Administration;
Mr. Oscar Cox, General Counsel, Foreign Economic
Administration;
Mr. Harry White, Treasury Department;
Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson;
The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax,
Sir David Waley⁷¹ and
Mr. Ben Smith.⁷²

At Secretary Morgenthau's request a meeting was held at 9:30 in the office of the Secretary of State attended by the gentlemen mentioned above. This meeting was preliminary to the same group meeting at 10:00 with Lord Halifax, Sir David Waley and Mr. Ben Smith.

The Secretary of the Treasury opened the discussion by recalling the memorandum of January 1, 1943 regarding the recommended upper and lower limits of British dollar balances, the fact that their dollar balances had during 1943 exceeded the one billion dollars referred to in the memorandum, the various discussions which had occurred in the Interdepartmental Committee, and the recent memorandum⁷³ of the Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Crowley to the President, together with the President's instruction in regard thereto. The Secretary of the Treasury stated that it was the purpose of the meeting with the British representatives to take up with them the proposals that the items listed upon the attached sheets should be

⁷¹ United Kingdom Treasury representative, British Supply Council, Washington.

⁷² United Kingdom Minister Resident in Washington for Supply.

⁷³ Memorandum dated January 4, p. 33.

eliminated from Lend Lease transactions. He recommended that the approach to the British should be that the proposal to eliminate the items was based upon the fact that they were of such a character as might raise political criticism of Lend Lease and render more difficult the extension of the Act under the Lend Lease program when these matters came before Congress. He recommended that the approach should not be from the point of view of dollar balances and that it should be stated that for the present our concern in the matter was directed toward these items. Mr. Acheson expressed the view that the British would relate the two matters and that we should be prepared to state whether or not this proposal was for the purpose of reducing dollar balances. After some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Crowley should present the proposal to the British representatives and that any questions which they might ask regarding the dollar balance position should be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury.

The Secretary of State suggested that our attitude should be that during the present meeting, or at any subsequent discussions between British and American representatives, either side would of course be free to raise any matter which it regarded as relevant, which would be referred to the appropriate department of the Government for discussion.

At this point Lord Halifax, Sir David Waley and Mr. Ben Smith entered the meeting.

The Secretary of State said that the meeting had been called to discuss certain matters relating to Lend Lease and requested Mr. Crowley to present the subject for discussion. Mr. Crowley stated that he wished to take up with the British representatives certain items which he believed were embarrassing to the Lend Lease program and to its future legislative continuance. These related to certain items shown on the attached list, which at an earlier date had been included in items furnished under Lend Lease. Under the present circumstances he believed that this was no longer necessary and that, weighing all the considerations, the continued inclusion of these items would on net balance do more harm than good to the continuation of Lend Lease and to the furtherance of the war effort. He stated that he was solely interested in these considerations and stated the untruth of reports which had been circulated in the press and elsewhere regarding his alleged lack of sympathy with Lend Lease to the British. He discussed the political problem raised by these items and expressed his hope that the British representatives would cooperate with us in eliminating these items and with them the difficulties of which they were the cause.

Lord Halifax assured Mr. Crowley that neither he nor any of his associates took any stock whatever in the reports referred to by Mr. Crowley. He stated that he regarded it of importance that the

matters presented by Mr. Crowley should not be considered as isolated items but should be thought of as part of a larger whole. He recalled that prior to his death, Sir Kingsley Wood⁷⁴ had presented to the Treasury a statement⁷⁵ of the British financial position, pointing out the difficulties of that position and the reasons why the British Government believed that a limit should not be placed upon British foreign exchange assets. He was under the impression that this statement of the British case had not been answered. While he was entirely willing to accept the views of this Government as to its political difficulties and the steps which were necessary to meet them, he hoped that, in order to help the British Government with its political difficulties, the discussion might take place against the background of an acceptance of the view expressed in Sir Kingsley Wood's memorandum. If this were done, he felt that the matters could be considered upon their merits without raising fears in Great Britain that the British position was not accepted and that the proposals were steps based upon the contrary point of view.

Mr. Ben Smith briefly reiterated and supported what Lord Halifax had said, stressing the difficulty of considering the items in isolation and without knowledge as to the American attitude on the broader problem of the British financial position.

Sir David Waley stated that this was the last day of his service in Washington and that he was leaving saddened by the direction in which he believed that certain aspects of the relations between our two countries were tending. He added he believed earlier in the year, at the time when he discussed reverse Lend Lease of raw materials with Mr. Stettinius,⁷⁶ that we were moving toward a true pooling of our resources in the common task of the war. He believed that the decision to include raw materials to the United States in reverse Lend Lease from the British was an important step in this direction and had greatly strengthened the principle.⁷⁷ He felt that the present proposal was a step in the opposite direction by this Government at a time when his Government was moving forward along the pooling principle. He stressed and acknowledged the great generosity with which this Government had acted toward his Government and stated his apprehension that this basic and important fact might be obscured by raising proposals to eliminate matters from Lend Lease without clarifying the general position of this Government toward the British

⁷⁴ British Chancellor of the Exchequer until his death on September 20, 1943.

⁷⁵ See memorandum by the British Treasury, September 14, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 82.

⁷⁶ Mr. Stettinius had been Lend-Lease Administrator prior to becoming Under Secretary of State on October 4, 1943.

⁷⁷ For information concerning the exchange of notes effecting agreement on the transmission of raw materials as reciprocal aid, December 17 and 27, 1943, see bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 107.

Government's statement of its financial position. He asked whether it would not be possible for the Secretary of the Treasury to communicate with the Chancellor of the Exchequer ⁷⁸ stating in general his agreement with the position taken by the Chancellor in his memorandum, and that it was our intention to permit the dollar balance situation to run along.

The Secretary of the Treasury replied that he and his associates had given a great deal of consideration to the matter referred to, that he was anxious to eliminate the source of friction between the two Governments, and that therefore his approach to the present matter was not from the point of view of the dollar balances but from the point of view of eliminating the items referred to because of the considerations referred to by Mr. Crowley.

Sir David Waley said that this statement would be important for the Chancellor to know. After some discussion it was agreed that the Secretary of the Treasury would give Sir David Waley a letter to the Chancellor stating that the matter had been the subject of discussion at the meeting this morning, and that Sir David Waley was apprised of the Secretary's views and would communicate them to the Chancellor.

Mr. White stated that a reply had been sent to the Chancellor regarding his memorandum stating in general that the United States Treasury would be at all times willing to discuss the matter with representatives of the British Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury asked Mr. White to send to the Ambassador a complete dossier of the correspondence.

Mr. Ben Smith stated that after obtaining instructions from London, he would be glad to discuss the items referred to with Mr. Crowley and stressed the importance of reaching agreement in regard to them and of preventing so far as possible statements appearing in the press that agreement had been reached prior to the actual reaching of an agreement. Such statements, he said, had appeared in the past and had caused him and his ministers considerable embarrassment.

The meeting was concluded at 11:15.

[Annex]

We believe that certain questionable items such as the following should be discontinued from Lend-Lease :

A. Shipments of capital goods such as machinery, installations, etc., effective as soon as possible.

⁷⁸ Sir John Anderson.

B. Off-shore purchases such as Iceland fish, Caribbean sugar, oil from outside the United States, etc.

C. Civilian goods for Jamaica, Southern Rhodesia, the Middle East, etc.

D. Pulp and paper.

E. Tobacco for the armed forces.

F. Certain other controversial items.

Certain other Controversial Items:

Under this category are included such items as those parts of the rental or charter of vessels which are open to question, agricultural machinery and other types of equipment which have a relatively long life, certain raw, semi-fabricated and fabricated materials whose end use is subject to question, items procured from one part of the British Commonwealth for lend-leasing to another part in the same or similar form, and items lend-leased to the British Empire for which the United States has to make substantial imports from third countries, etc.

841.24/2181

*The Secretary of State to the Foreign Economic Administrator
(Crowley)*

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. CROWLEY: I have received your letter of December 7, 1943, on the subject of certain United States Government plants and facilities formerly owned by the British Government. As I understand it, the letter supports the proposal that we request the British to return to us as reciprocal aid sums of money, in dollars, which we have already paid them for these facilities under completed contracts, entered into upon our offers. The plants in question are among the munitions factories built in the United States pursuant to contracts made by the British Government before March 11, 1941, and were originally paid for by them.

Upon consideration, I regard such a proposal as unwise and unwarranted, for these reasons:

First, the repudiation of completed contracts seems to me most undesirable practice, both as a matter of ordinary business usage, and especially in the conduct of international relations. We purchased the plants in question after extended negotiation, under contracts fully authorized and solemnly entered into. The effect of the proposal would be to request the return of sums of money which we have already paid over according to our bargain. Other things being equal, I should regard such a request as putting our Government in an altogether unfortunate light in its dealings with the British Government.

Secondly, the plan of repaying us for these plants would call for a small dollar credit on the lend-lease records. It is thus in fact a proposal for piecemeal cash payment for lend-lease assistance we have given Great Britain. This is something quite different from reciprocal aid. In this sense, too, the proposal seems to me unsound. The policy of this Government on the question of ultimate lend-lease settlement was clearly stated in the Master Lend-Lease agreement of February 22 [23], 1942.⁸⁰ In that agreement, we covenanted with the British Government to defer ultimate lend-lease settlement "until the extent of defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States and Great Britain, and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace". This policy has received the strong approval of the only Committees of Congress which have considered the matter. The extent to which cash payments may figure in the ultimate resolution of the lend-lease accounts is by no means clear. Until further instructions are received, I should regard the Master Agreements, and particularly Article VII thereof, as the basic statement of our policy on the subject. I find the proposal that the British repay us for the plants in question inconsistent with the intent of the Agreements.

Finally, it is my view that under the President's recent memorandum on the relationship between lend-lease policy and British dollar balances, we are to take up specific lend-lease transactions regarded as doubtful on their merits, and without special reference to the British financial position. Yet I understand that the chief justification for the present proposal is that the British can afford it. In view of all the circumstances, I do not think that fact is sufficient basis for a request on our part that the British return to us as reverse lend-lease the sums we have paid them under completed contracts for the purchase of munitions factories. The usual situations calling for reverse lend-lease financing, as stated in the Reciprocal Aid Agreement of September 3, 1942,⁸¹ are those requiring payments in pounds, not in dollars. It was decided that we should acquire the factories in question primarily because it was regarded as preferable, in the light of our military policy, for our Government to own such facilities. Most of the factories have been purchased. An exception was made for the factories not yet purchased, as to which we are requesting reverse

⁸⁰ Preliminary Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, signed at Washington, February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241 or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433. For correspondence on negotiation of the Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 525 ff.

⁸¹ Agreement with the United Kingdom regarding principles applying to the provision of aid to the armed forces of the United States; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 270 or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1605.

lend-lease. The reasons which govern the exception do not seem to me to apply in the case of factories already purchased.

I am sure that further discussion of the facts between members of your staff and officers of this Department will clear up what seems to me to be a regrettable misunderstanding.⁸²

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

841.24/2186a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), and the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1944.

In accordance with the suggestion in your memorandum of January 5, 1944, the Foreign Economic Administration has now discussed with the British representatives the larger part of the list of controversial items heretofore supplied to the British on lend-lease aid. The following comments and the attached list⁸³ indicate the present status of the various items:

The British have signified acceptance of the elimination from lend-lease aid of the items shown in Group I, which would total approximately \$145 million in 1944.

Discussions with the British are under way or pending with respect to the items shown in Group II. These items would total approximately \$143 million in 1944. The Foreign Economic Administration wishes, subject to further checking, to eliminate these items from lend-lease aid.

The total of the items in Groups I and II which will or may be removed from lend-lease aid would be approximately \$288 million in 1944.

Convincing reasons against the elimination of the items shown in Group III were developed by further investigation. The Foreign Economic Administration, therefore, proposes to continue them on lend-lease aid for the present. The dollar volume of lend-lease aid for such items in 1944 will be approximately \$245 million.

The Foreign Economic Administration proposes to continue examining the items supplied under lend-lease aid, such as offshore purchases other than those listed, supplies for South Africa, and certain other controversial groups, with a view to making any further

⁸² Further discussions on this subject resulted in the War Department's agreeing to a British request not to pursue the question of transfer of the munitions factories at this time. This decision was communicated to the Secretary of State in a letter of February 23, 1944, from Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. (841.24/2200)

⁸³ Not printed.

adjustments that may be required. The Foreign Economic Administration is also exploring the possibility of avoiding friction with respect to commercial exports through the transfer to a cash basis of the quantities of certain types of raw materials and products now supplied under lend-lease aid which are used by the United Kingdom in commercial exports.

It is believed that the actual and contemplated revisions will greatly strengthen the lend-lease program.

CORDELL HULL
H. MORGENTHAU, JR.
LEO CROWLEY

841.5151/2015

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State*⁸⁴

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1944.

Following some general comments by Mr. Crowley at yesterday's Cabinet meeting relative to the operations of FEA,⁸⁵ the President talked about the importance of reducing British dollar balances in this country. He expressed the opinion that it was important politically that these balances be kept at around a billion dollars. Mr. Crowley replied that the State Department and FEA were making headway with the British on this but that negotiations were going rather slowly. The President then asked me to prepare a letter which he could send to Mr. Churchill,⁸⁶ with a copy to Mr. Eden,⁸⁷ stating that it was important for the British to arrange their affairs so that their dollar and gold balances would be reduced from the present level of around \$1,600,000,000 to around a billion dollars. I should appreciate it if you would have such a letter prepared which I can forward to the President.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

841.24/2197a

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1944.

1. In connection with the attached,⁸⁸ I am certainly mindful of the political dangers inherent in the accumulation by the British Govern-

⁸⁴ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn).

⁸⁵ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁸⁶ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

⁸⁷ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁸ See telegram 474 from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, *infra*.

ment of very large dollar balances as a result of the lend-lease program. However, may I recall certain facts which may make a proposal such as this one equivocal at this time?

2. Negotiations have been conducted with the British on the termination of certain lend-lease transfers which we regard as embarrassing, and no longer necessary. The British were assured by the Secretary of the Treasury and by Mr. Crowley that the changes submitted on January 7 were all we were going to undertake for the present, and that our proposals were being made in the light of domestic political considerations, not British assets. The British have not delayed these negotiations. Research on certain items being submitted was not completed by the Foreign Economic Administration until the middle of January, and some important items were not submitted to the British until about February 1. It is expected that the lists will be wound up by March 1. At a meeting in my office on February 15,⁸⁹ Mr. Crowley told Lord Halifax it was his thought that at the conclusion of the present series of negotiations, the British lend-lease program could be stabilized in all major aspects until mid-Summer at least.

3. The question is more than one of embarrassment. The present British dollar balances must be considered as the only reserve for their growing financial commitments, especially in the Middle East and Far East. An ordering of their affairs which will reduce those holdings may gravely weaken their machinery of war finance. Against that background, the balances do not seem too high. Furthermore, they have risen largely because of our troop expenditures, a source of dollars which may well decline after the next few months. If the British are to be able to cooperate with us in multilateral solutions of trade and financial problems, they must finish the war with enough assets to carry through such a program.⁹⁰ Even as things stand now, it would be difficult for the British to consider unfreezing sterling at or near the end of the war, or giving up many of their other economic controls. If the financial side of the war is run in such a way as to keep British balances at or about \$1 billion, we thereby reduce our chance to achieve the basic economic policy we want and need.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Memorandum of meeting not printed.

⁹⁰ See vol. II, sections entitled "Informal and exploratory discussions regarding postwar economic policy," and "United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference . . ."

⁹¹ On February 23, 1944, the Acting Secretary of State sent the following memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson: "This is to confirm that the President approved the cable which you drafted under his instructions to the Prime Minister on this subject. The President read the covering memorandum and I explained orally that we felt this action might create considerable difficulty but he felt the domestic political aspect of the situation was great enough to be controlling." (841.5151/2016)

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁹²

[WASHINGTON,] 22 February, 1944.

Number 474. Personal. From the President for the Former Naval Person,⁹³ copy to the Foreign Secretary. May I ask your help in solving a troublesome problem which is of deep political concern both for you and for us? Officers of our Government have lately discussed with Lord Halifax, Mr. Ben Smith and Sir David Waley the possible termination of certain lend-lease transactions which we have found to be embarrassing, and no longer necessary. Your people have, as I understand it, promptly agreed to take over the purchase of goods which cost about \$400 million in 1943. Final agreement on the whole list of articles is expected soon, and the negotiations, in view of their complexity, have gone very well.

Quite apart from these lend-lease negotiations, I have been wondering whether it would be feasible for you to consider so ordering your financial affairs as to reduce your gold and dollar holdings available in this country to the neighborhood of about \$1 billion.

What do you think should and can be done?

ROOSEVELT

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁴

LONDON, 9 March, 1944.

Number 613. Your 474.

1. You will remember that we discussed the dollar balances in Cairo on December 8th and that I gave a memorandum to Harry.⁹⁵ I certainly understood that you felt we ought not to be treated worse than France or Russia in these matters. France has at least two billions and no overseas liabilities against them. So has Russia. These dollar balances are not, as your telegram might suggest, a particular part of our assets which is available in the United States, but our total reserves. Against these reserves we have incurred for the common cause liabilities of at least ten billions on the other side of the account.

2. Since our talk, Lord Halifax met Mr. Hull and Mr. Morgenthau as recently as January 8th [7th], when the matters mentioned

⁹² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹³ Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

⁹⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹⁵ Reference is to Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt. For text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 822.

in the first paragraph of your telegram under reply were discussed. Lord Halifax reported to us that Mr. Morgenthau stated to him that it was not at present intended to reduce our dollar balances in any other way, and in reliance on this personal assurance to Lord Halifax, we agreed to the exclusion of the politically difficult item[s] from Lend-Lease.

3. Will you allow me to say that the suggestion of reducing our dollar balances, which constitute our sole liquid reserve, to one billion dollars would really not be consistent either with equal treatment of Allies or with any conception of equal sacrifice or pooling of resources. We have not shirked our duty or indulged in an easy way of living. We have already spent practically all our convertible foreign investments in the struggle. We alone of the Allies will emerge from the war with great overseas war debts. I do not know what would happen if we were now asked to disperse our last liquid reserves required to meet pressing needs, or how I could put my case to Parliament without it affecting public sentiment in the most painful manner and that at a time when British and American blood will be flowing in broad and equal streams and when the shortening of the war even by a month would far exceed the sums under consideration.

4. I venture to put these arguments before you in order that you may be fully armed with our case, for my confidence in your sense of justice and, I may add, in that of the American people is unshakable.

5. But see also my immediately following.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁶

LONDON, 9 March, 1944.

614. 1. Further to my number 613. I have laid before you our case about dollar balances in its full strength, but from the informal way in which you refer to it in your number 474, I have wondered whether you might be meaning only that we should search for some arrangement to enable us to put a portion of our balance less conspicuously in the limelight. If this is so, and if you desire it, we will go into this very carefully with Stettinius when he visits us.⁹⁷

2. Since we received your telegram, we now learn that Mr. Crowley on March 8th promised to give Congress the amount of our dollar balances now and at the outbreak of war. This raises serious dangers. I am confident in the justice of our case if it could be stated as a whole, and of course if the matter becomes public property, we shall have to justify ourselves in public. The disclosure of the vast debit balance

⁹⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹⁷ See bracketed note, p. 47.

which is growing up against us outside the United States would certainly have most injurious effects upon our Sterling position, and consequently upon the whole strength of the Allies at this period. We therefore ask that there shall be no disclosure. If this is not possible, that the disclosure shall be in strict confidence, and also that the substance of our case should be stated to the body to whom the disclosure is made.

[On March 18, 1944, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Economic Administrator, Leo T. Crowley, issued a joint statement dealing with United States discussions with the United Kingdom in an effort to reach agreement on "an agreed set of principles on a bilateral basis governing the re-export of lend-lease and mutual aid goods and similar goods." For the complete text of this statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 18, 1944, page 256. These talks came to no final agreement and ultimately were merged into the discussions on Phase II of Lend-Lease later in the year.]

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] 24 March, 1944.

509. 1. Thank you for your reply contained in your cables 613 and 614 of March 9. The points you raised have already been brought to my attention several times by Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Hull.

I am sorry if my message caused you anxiety. There is no dispute as to the understanding on the handling of questionable items under Lend-Lease which was reached between Mr. Crowley, Secretary Hull, Secretary Morgenthau and Lord Halifax, and to which I had given my prior approval. As Secretary Morgenthau stated at the meeting, this understanding did not deal with the dollar position question and did not preclude the possibility of our reopening that question in the future should the situation seem to call for it.

I raised this dollar position question since it is a troublesome one of continuing concern with us here and doubtless with you. I hope that we may be able together to find some reasonable solution to this problem before it becomes more troublesome.

2. In any further discussion of these matters the Treasury would be the normal center of such conversations. The agenda which

⁹⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The copy of this telegram retained in the White House files was signed on the lower margin by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Foreign Economic Administrator.

Stettinius has of topics to be discussed in London does not include the question of British dollar balances.

3. The question to which you refer in paragraph 2 of 614 may be withdrawn, although the Congressman concerned⁹⁹ and the entire Foreign Affairs Committee are now alerted to the issue. We will let you know as soon as a definite decision is reached, and will consult fully before any information is proffered.

ROOSEVELT

841.5151/2029

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Stettinius)*

[LONDON,] April 19, 1944.

1) Sir John Anderson stated that in spite of the enormous volume of Lend-Lease assistance, the British overseas financial position has continued to deteriorate throughout the war. He gave me the following annual figures on the loss of British overseas assets and increase of overseas liabilities:

1940	\$3,024,000,000
1941	3,188,000,000
1942	2,540,000,000
1943	2,620,000,000

He stated that the estimate for 1944 is \$2,800,000,000.

Sir John Anderson stated that from 1939 to the end of 1944 the aggregate British loss of overseas assets and increase in overseas liabilities will exceed 15 billion dollars. Part of this, of course, has been met by the outright sale of assets. It is probable, however, that the external liabilities of the United Kingdom at the end of 1944 will be in the neighborhood of 12 billion dollars. (The British have parted outright with more than 3 billion dollars since the beginning of the war, Anderson explained, but they entered the war with certain external liabilities against which their reserves at that time were held.)

2) From the middle of 1941, when British gold and dollar balances were almost exhausted, they had built up balances in the amount of 1.3 billion dollars by the end of 1943. Sir John Anderson estimates that by the end of 1944 these balances will have risen to 1.6 billion dollars, or about one-seventh of the probable British liabilities at that date.

⁹⁹ Representative Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Sir John Anderson emphasized that these gold and dollar balances represent the United Kingdom's only quick assets against their external liabilities and that they are in fact the central reserves of the whole sterling area. He pointed out that the British are under certain obligations to furnish dollars from these balances when they are needed by the other members of the sterling area.

3) Sir John Anderson stated that the improvement in Britain's dollar balance during 1944 would be almost entirely due to the large expenditures of United States troops within the Empire. In 1944, the British expect to receive \$585,000,000 from this source in the United Kingdom and \$475,000,000 in the rest of the sterling area, making a total of over a billion dollars. As a result of the recent reductions in Lend-Lease and the increases in Reverse Lend-Lease, however, it is estimated that the net increase in the British gold and dollar balances will be only \$300,000,000.

4) The element in this situation which is most disturbing, Sir John Anderson stated, is the fact that the receipts from United States troops, particularly those in the British Isles, constitute only a temporary source of income. The British fear that after the end of hostilities in Europe their balances will fall throughout the period of the Pacific war, even if Lend-Lease is maintained at its present level. A further diminution in the volume of Lend-Lease after the end of the war in Europe, Anderson stated, would mean that British balances would fall rapidly during the Japanese war while their external liabilities continue to grow.

5) Sir John Anderson estimates that by the end of 1945 or shortly thereafter, British gold and dollar reserves will be down to about one billion dollars and their overseas liabilities will have risen to about 15 billion, which will mean that the ratio of quick assets to external liabilities will have fallen from one-seventh at the end of 1944 to one-fifteenth at the end of 1945.

6) Sir John Anderson asked me about American opinion on this problem. I explained that when the "farmer from Kansas" learns that the British had 3 billion dollars in 1939, that they have received 10 billion or more of goods under Lend-Lease, and that they are beginning to accumulate gold and dollars again, he is going to think that the British must now be very rich. Anderson pointed out that, of course, assets without reference to liabilities are meaningless. "As I have told you," he stated, "we will probably come out of this war with debts of fifteen billion dollars and assets of only one billion."

[On May 12, 1944, Under Secretary of State Stettinius presented to the Secretary the report of his Mission to London, April 7-29, 1944;

see pages 1 ff. For his discussion of Great Britain's fiscal position and the termination of Lend-Lease, see page 27.]

841.50/7-1944

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1944.

Yesterday afternoon I had a private talk with Mr. Richard Law¹ during which he expressed the hope that we would not press for a final decision on the Eden White Paper² until Sir John Anderson, who may be in Washington later this summer, had a chance to talk with the President, Secretary Morgenthau, and Mr. Hull. I said I thought the matter could be postponed until then.

Mr. Law also referred to the attitude of FEA toward the British, which he felt to be unfortunate. In particular he mentioned the administration of the White Paper and thought it would be helpful if FEA would let Harry Whitney³ go to England in order to review this with the British.

I am asking Charley Taft⁴ to mention this to FEA.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

841.24/7-1444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1944.

Mr. Richard Law, British Minister of State, called at his request. He said that the British had an unusually difficult political situation in relation to the general question of commercial policy after the war. He stated that certain cross sections of British businessmen were in a state of fear.

He then brought up the economic discussions relating particularly to Article 7 of Lend Lease⁵ and of Lend Lease generally in connection with the settlements between our two countries. He dwelt at some length on the extreme difficulties with which Great Britain and the

¹ British Minister of State.

² For the text of the British White Paper relating to distribution of lend-lease material, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 13, 1941, p. 204; for correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 16-36.

³ Harry Whitney, Director, White Paper Policy Staff, Foreign Economic Administration.

⁴ Charles P. Taft, Director of the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs.

⁵ Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement of February 23, 1942, is quoted in the memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, September 30, p. 61.

British Commonwealth were confronted and said that they needed a more elaborate discussion of any Lend Lease settlement that might be undertaken and that they would like most earnestly to request such an opportunity without being under too severe pressure as to time. He said that at the present our governmental agencies such as FEA were bearing down too severely in their restrictions of exports and urged me to get FEA to be more liberal during the coming months.

He then made a special request that discussions of Lend Lease, as carried into commercial policy mainly by Article 7, be postponed until next fall on account of British difficulties and their preoccupation with the war. I said that I could appreciate more or less what he said about the situation of his Government and country. I then proceeded to review the indispensable necessity for a broader and more liberal commercial policy in the whole international situation if we were to increase and broaden production and consumption generally after the war; that this course would require Herculean efforts, especially on the part of the United States and Great Britain, efforts such as Great Britain put forth during the years following the British-French commercial treaty in 1860.⁶ I said that unless the businessmen in our two countries recognized that we had to turn over a new page in economic affairs and go out as resolutely as the British did to support and carry forward a suitable policy, there would simply be no foundation for any stable peace structure in the future. On the contrary, there would be the inevitable seeds of future wars in the form of vast unemployment and hunger throughout the world. I elaborated on these phases. I then said that if we postponed such a tremendous undertaking, many of its supporters would take entirely too much for granted and would become quiescent and inactive, which would be fatal. I stated that I would have his Government consider this phase very carefully and see if in any event it could now start a real revival and awakening in support of the long-view program of commercial policy in the world situation, such as I described. I said that this was all-important.

I then spoke generally about the British situation in relation to that of the world and answered his statement about how desperate the British situation toward all economic matters was by referring, with apologies, to the long fight of myself and associates for our trade agreements policy, which commenced in 1916,⁷ and favorable action was had by Congress in 1934⁸ when the country was overwhelmingly low tariff in its views. I said we proceeded resolutely to continue to go forward with our fight by making practical appli-

⁶ Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and France, signed at Paris, January 23, 1860, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. L, p. 13.

⁷ See *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948), vol. I, pp. 81-85.

⁸ Trade Agreements Act, June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943.

cation of the policy under the act of Congress step by step over a period of nine years, at the end of which this policy was generally recognized by public opinion in this country. I added that I might be pardoned for suggesting that the British Government and British majorities would be submerged by high pressure selfish or prejudiced minorities unless it organized and fought as we had fought to make the first serious inroads in international economic isolation. I said that there was no other course except failure. I then remarked that, in no spirit of criticism but illustrative of the drifting policy in Great Britain, for some time we had seen the two opposite extremes of thought bantering and badgering each other about the question of dependent peoples; that the leftists would go their own distance and take charge of colonies and supervise the treatment of their populations by the parent governments. On the other hand the British Prime Minister merely stood on the policy that Great Britain would not be dismembered while he was in office. This included the Indian situation among others. I said that if all nations having special relations with backward peoples would proceed simultaneously with an awakening and a general forward movement relating to more opportunities, more facilities, more encouragement and any other feasible material cooperation to the end that all dependent peoples would make greatly increased efforts to improve their levels of existence, such as the course and policy of the United States toward the Philippines, this would be a grand thing in the end for all; that it would increase production and employment and purchasing power for surplus-producing countries, et cetera, et cetera. Mr. Law did not take serious issue with me on any of these matters.

I summed up by saying that it would be very hazardous to wait until the war was over when political chaos set in and emotional psychology got out of control for us to undertake these great tasks then, both political and economic.

The conversation was very agreeable and Mr. Law seemed in a much troubled state of mind about the problems in his country.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.00112 EW/7-1944

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs (Taft) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1944.

In connection with your memorandum of July 19th to me ^{8a} on your conversation with Mr. Richard Law, Mr. Currie ⁹ himself has told

^{8a} See the memorandum of July 19 to Mr. Acheson, and footnote 4, p. 50.

⁹ Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt and Deputy Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration.

me that he is entirely willing to postpone the final decision on the White Paper until cold weather—meaning after the 6th [7th?] of November!¹⁰

On the second paragraph, Mr. Law and his assistant met with the FEA people, including Whitney, and they discussed this quite frankly. Whitney pointed out that he was not really pushing any large matters at all, but was only picking occasional samples out of the most unimportant cases which were referred to the FEA by the British. He asked Law whether he was proposing that we should stop all enforcement, or simply that we should not increase our pressure. He tells me that Law clearly indicated that he hoped we would stop all pressure. Whitney is not willing to do that, but it is clear that he will not increase it, and the British should be satisfied with that.

Whitney does not wish to go to England now. He claims that the invitation, which he knew about already, is issued either on the theory that they can soften him up (which he says they will not do), or they want him out of Washington, which he does not wish to go along on.

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*¹¹

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1944.

LEND-LEASE AND GENERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN "PHASE 2"¹²

1. The most important international economic problem of the transition and post-war periods will be the situation of the United Kingdom: the sterling-dollar relationship, the change in Britain's creditor position, the prospects for British export trade, and the commercial and financial policies which she will adopt in the light of the situation. This problem has its long run aspect—associated with the loss of overseas investment; the probable reduction in shipping, international banking, and insurance earnings; and the difficulty of reestablishing and expanding British export markets in the post-war world. The main outlines of this problem have been developing for several decades, although war has accentuated the difficulties. It is the Department's view that it is in the best interests both directly of the British and of the world in general if this long run problem is attacked by the adoption by the British of a liberal

¹⁰ Presumably reference here is to election day in the United States, November 7, 1944.

¹¹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹² Phase 2 designated the period of the war between the surrender of Germany and the surrender of Japan.

commercial policy with foreign exchange and investment operations handled in accordance with the principles of Bretton Woods.¹³

2. Nevertheless, strong economic and political pressures will be brought to bear upon the British Government to adopt restrictive policies of commerce and finance, and these pressures will be in considerable measure induced by pressing, critical, short run problems of British economic adjustment at the close of the war. The United States can contribute greatly to the possibility of Anglo-American collaboration in sound post-war economic policies and relationships and to the attainment of high levels of economic activity and international commerce in and between the two nations and the rest of the world, by doing everything in its power to permit and assist Britain to enter "Phase 3"¹⁴ on as sound an economic foundation as possible.

3. The potentialities of Anglo-American and general international economic collaboration in the reconstruction and development of the world economy in "Phase 3" are large. They include the establishment of the Fund and Bank blueprinted at Bretton Woods,¹⁵ and the setting up of machinery for collaboration in the commercial policy field. Direct assistance, largely of a financial character, will in all probability be essentially on a loan and repayment basis. The institutions for carrying out these programs have yet in the main to be created.

4. In "Phase 2" there is more which we can do quickly and directly to set the stage for a favorable but slower development in the post-war period.

5. Turning first to the military situation, I must of course defer to the armed forces in matters of strategic policy and decision. Nevertheless it is clear that one of the most important objectives of United States policy must be to bring the British into the war operations in the Far East to the greatest possible extent. The advantages of such a course are obvious in producing an early end of the war, with the resultant saving in human and material costs. The disadvantages of the failure of the British to participate to the full in the war in the Far East deserve special emphasis:

a. Political—any indication that British participation in the Far Eastern struggle is at a rate below their utmost capabilities will produce immediate and hostile public reaction in the United States.

¹³ See vol. II, section entitled "United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944"; also, *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, N. H., July 1-22, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vols. I and II.

¹⁴ Reference is to the period following the surrender of Japan, during which the war economies of the Allies would be fully reconverted to the purposes of peace.

¹⁵ Reference is to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

b. Economic—a great expansion of British exports with relatively weak British participation in the Far Eastern war will stir up the resentment of our export manufacturers and traders.

c. Lend-Lease—a failure to obtain full British participation in the Far Eastern military operations will be regarded as at least a partial failure of lend-lease policies and will create unfortunate circumstances in which to arrange for lend-lease settlement.

d. General Post-War—all of these factors will combine to produce the most difficult of circumstances in which to attempt to build Anglo-American and general political and economic collaboration to face the problems of the post-war world.

6. The economic problem then in “Phase 2” will be to permit a reasonable degree of reconversion in the United Kingdom, to be divided among reconstruction, the satisfaction of domestic needs, and the reestablishment of exports to pay for the imports which are essential to the economic life of Great Britain. This must be done in such a way as to:

a. Meet the immediate British problem of avoiding economic disaster.

b. Avoid the creation of obligations that will later plague Anglo-American relations.

c. Reduce to a minimum tendencies towards the adoption of discriminatory trade policies by the British.

d. Be politically acceptable to the American public.

7. It has been indicated that in “Phase 2” American production for war may be reduced by as much as 40 percent with a resultant reconversion to meet domestic civilian demands as well as to permit some increase in commercial exports. It is essential that there be a synchronized British reconversion program. The strain of five years of war, with bombing, severe rationing, and the dislocation of life produced by national service, will require, from the point of view of any government in the United Kingdom, substantial improvement in the conditions of civilian life. The necessities of British physical reconstruction and balances of payments will almost certainly mean that British civilian standards will remain far below those in the United States. This should be recognized here as a laudable determination of the British to restrict consumption in accordance with the realities of their economic position.

8. If British reconversion is coordinated with our own, it will be right and proper, and it should be possible to justify to the Congress and the American people, to continue lend-lease aid on a reasonable scale to the British during the continuance of the Pacific war. It is my understanding that the British as yet have made no definite proposals for their overall lend-lease needs in “Phase 2”, as they feel that the nature of these proposals must depend to a large degree on the strategic plans for the Far Eastern war. In view of the speed

of military developments in Europe it is most important that we come to an early understanding with the British on this matter, so that a program of lend-lease can be worked out that will be fair to all concerned.

9. I therefore recommend the adoption of the following key economic policies with respect to the British in "Phase 2":

a. Synchronization of the American and British reconversion programs, recognizing that a greater proportion of the British productive capacity released from war production will be devoted to exports.

b. Maintenance of lend-lease deliveries to the United Kingdom in "Phase 2" reduced by about one-third overall. Lend-lease deliveries upon such a scale would recognize the continued British production for war, would not hamper reconversion in this country, and through the continuance of civilian items such as food (many items of which are likely to be in surplus in this country) would assist British reconversion without assuming responsibility for it.

10. These efforts to assist the British to enter "Phase 3" on as sound an economic foundation as possible must be accompanied by vigorous British efforts to join with us in pressing a world-wide program of multilateral reduction in barriers to international trade. The Bretton Woods agreements with respect to exchange manipulations, restrictions, and discriminations constitute a very important part of our commercial policy program. The British must be urged to implement these arrangements, and to join with us—through the Article VII conversations and otherwise—in thorough consideration of the remaining elements of our international economic program. It is of fundamental importance to the interests of the United States and to the establishment of the kind of economic conditions which we hope to see prevail in the post-war world that in formulating a lend-lease policy for "Phase 2" which will further these objectives we have assurances from the British that they will actively cooperate with us in achieving them. You are aware of the political situation in the British government which has impeded this, and I know you will agree that it is time that some forward steps be taken to resolve it.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President, to President Roosevelt*¹⁶

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think it is important, in Quebec,¹⁷ that you tell the Prime Minister how strongly you feel about knocking down

¹⁶ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁷ President Roosevelt was about to depart for the Second Quebec Conference, held September 11–16, 1944, with British Prime Minister Churchill. Correspondence on this Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

some of the trade barriers to get somewhere in terms of world trade.

I have a feeling that the Prime Minister thinks that that is a pet hobby of Secretary Hull's and that you may not think it of great importance.

I think it is essential to our future bargaining with Great Britain that you disabuse the Prime Minister's mind of this.

I rather think that he thinks that the genius of this program in America lies with Secretary Hull, while the truth of the matter is that it is a program that, from the beginning, has been pushed by you.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*¹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There has been a good deal of discussion within the several Government Departments relative to our Lend Lease policy after the collapse of Germany.

It is my wish that no Department of the Government take unilateral action in regard to any matters that concern Lease Lend, because the implications of any such action are bound to affect other Departments of the Government and, indeed, our whole national policy. I am particularly anxious that any instructions which may have been issued, or are about to be issued regarding Lease Lend material or supplies to our allies after the collapse of Germany, be immediately cancelled and withdrawn.

I intend to give instructions to all Departments relative to the Lease Lend policy of this government at an early date.

Will you be sure, therefore, that your several bureaus and divisions are advised of my position at once?

I am sending identical letters to the Chief of Staff,¹⁹ the Chief of Naval Operations,²⁰ the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration.²¹

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁹ General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

²⁰ Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.

²¹ Vice Admiral Emory S. Land.

841.24/9-1644: Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1944—12:40 p. m.

A-1843. At the President's request I am repeating to you herein a memorandum to me from the President dated September 15, 1944: ²²

"We have discussed the question of the scope and scale of mutual Lend-Lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan. We have agreed that a temporary joint Committee shall be set up to consider this question. Among American membership would be Stettinius, Morgenthau and Crowley. British members not yet chosen.

"The Committee will agree and recommend to the Heads of their respective Governments the amount of mutual aid in Munitions, non-munitions and services which is to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war. The Committee is instructed to obtain from the various branches of the Governments whatever pertinent information is necessary for the preparation of their recommendation.

"Pending the recommendations of the Committee to the Heads of the respective governments, the appropriate departments of each government shall be instructed not to make any major decision with respect to the programmes of Lend-Lease aid for the period referred to above without the approval of the Committee.

"In reaching its conclusions the Committee will be guided by the conversation between the President and Prime Minister on September 14, 1944.

"Would you be good enough to let the Secretary of War and Ambassador Winant know about this?" ²³

The following is the record of a conversation between the President and the Prime Minister on September 14:

"The Prime Minister said that when Germany was overcome there would be a measure of redistribution of effort in both countries. He hoped that the President would agree that during the war with Japan we should continue to get food, shipping, etc. from the United States to cover our reasonable needs. The President indicated assent.

"He hoped also that the President would agree that it would be proper for Lend-Lease munitions to continue on a proportional basis even though this would enable the United Kingdom to set free labour for re-building, exports, etc., e.g. if British munitions production were cut to three-fifths, U.S. assistance should also fall to three-fifths. The President indicated assent. Mr. Morgenthau however, suggested that it would be better to have definite figures. He understood that munitions assistance required had been calculated by the British at

²² This memorandum was sent by President Roosevelt from the Second Quebec Conference. It is based on a memorandum initialled by British Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at Quebec, September 14, 1944.

²³ Documents concerning the arrangements made at the Second Quebec Conference on lend-lease were transmitted to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on September 20, 1944 (*Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 137).

about 3.5 billion dollars in the first year on the basis of the strategy envisaged before the OCTAGON Conference.²⁴ The exact needs would have to be recalculated in the light of decisions on military matters reached at the conference. The non-munitions requirements had been put at 3 billion dollars gross against which a considerable amount would be set off for reverse Lend-Lease. The President agreed that it would be better to work on figures like these than on a proportional basis.

"The Prime Minister emphasized that all these supplies would be on Lease-Lend. The President said this would naturally be so.

"The Prime Minister pointed out that if the United Kingdom was once more to pay its way it was essential that the export trade, which had shrunk to a very small fraction, should be re-established. Naturally no articles obtained on Lend-Lease or identical thereto would be exported or sold for profit;²⁵ but it was essential that the United States should not attach any conditions to supplies delivered to Britain on Lend-Lease which would jeopardize the recovery of her export trade. The President thought this would be proper.

"To implement these decisions the Prime Minister suggested there should be a joint committee. It was held that it would be better to appoint an *ad hoc* committee for this purpose on an informal basis in the first instance which could be formalized in due course. Pending its report the United States Departments should be instructed not to take action which would prejudice the Committee's conclusions, e.g., production should not be closed down without reference to Lend-Lease supplies which it might be held should be supplied to Britain."

I have sent the following memorandum to the President under date of September 17:

"I note from your record of conversation with the Prime Minister on September 14, 1944 that lend-lease aid during the war with Japan will exceed, in food, shipping, et cetera, the strategic needs of Great Britain in carrying on that war and will, to that extent, be devoted to maintaining British economy. Would it not be well to make clear to the Prime Minister at this time that one of the primary considerations of the Committee, in determining the extent to which lend-lease might exceed direct strategic needs, would be the soundness of the course adopted by the British Government with a view to restoring its own economy, particularly with regard to measures taken to restore the flow of international trade? My thought on this, which applies to financial assistance through lend-lease or in other forms, is de-

²⁴ Code name for the Second Quebec Conference.

²⁵ The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) in a letter of September 30 to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), enclosed a memorandum which referred to the British White Paper of September 10, 1941 (printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 13, 1941, pp. 204-206), and pointed out that the White Paper did not provide that all commodities received under lend-lease should be distributed through government channels but that private channels would be used only when necessary and that, when used, the British Government would prevent private individuals from obtaining an unreasonable or spectacular profit. The memorandum stated that the words "sold for profit" should be interpreted in this sense. Mr. Crowley's letter and the enclosed memorandum are contained in the official *History of Lend Lease*, Part II, Chapter II, Box 64, Document 62, Section I, No. 03, located in the Security Classified Records Area of the Central Services Division in the National Archives.

veloped in the last enclosure, of which a copy is attached, to my memorandum to you of September 8, 1944."

The pertinent enclosure to my memorandum to the President of September 8 read as follows:

"There are growing indications that the British Government contemplates approaching us concerning the seriousness of their financial situation. At one time they contemplated sending Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Washington for this purpose. It is understood, however, that they have decided to defer Anderson's visit for several months. The Prime Minister may possibly raise this question with you at your forthcoming meeting.

"It seems to me that it is in the interests of the people of the United States that we extend such credits and other financial assistance to the United Kingdom as may be necessary to reconstitute and restore what has traditionally been the largest market for American goods.

"At the same time it is of fundamental importance to the interests of the United States and to the establishment of the kind of economic conditions which we hope to see prevail in the post-war world that we not blindly grant credits to the United Kingdom without taking into consideration the kind of commercial policy and trade practices which it may adopt.

"The British may seek to take the position that unless wholly satisfactory financial arrangements are made for assisting them in meeting their admittedly serious balance-of-payments problems, they cannot pursue the liberal, multilateral trade policies we have advocated. That position would not be sound and we should not accept it.

"Our position should be that whatever the British balance-of-payments problems may be and to whatever extent they may receive our help in meeting them, those problems will in our view be less difficult in a world in which the United States and Britain take the leadership in bringing about the greatest possible expansion of international trade on a multilateral nondiscriminatory basis; that balance-of-payments problems will be more difficult to meet if bilateralistic practices on the German pattern, high tariffs, quotas and discriminations result in a scramble among nations for a diminishing volume of world trade.

"In brief, in dealing with the British in regard to financial and other economic problems, I believe our basic position should be that the trade policies we advocate are not something the British should do for us in return for our financial help, but that, irrespective of such help, liberal trade policies designed to bring about an expanding world trade are in Britain's own interest.

"Obviously, therefore, we should not offer to extend generous credits to Great Britain at a low rate of interest in return for commitments regarding commercial policy and imperial preference (which we already have, in preliminary form, in the Basic Lend-Lease Agreement). The field for bargaining about these matters should be the narrow one of respective tariff concessions. It seems to me, however, that we may properly bear in mind that the United Kingdom will not be a good credit risk unless she embarks on a sound commercial policy.

"The discussion of trade policies which may take place with the

British in the near future will be more fruitful from our standpoint, if there can be complete understanding on the above point before those discussions are undertaken."

HULL

[For correspondence during the period September 20-29, 1944, relating to Phase II of Lend-Lease discussions and concern over the financial condition and policies of the United Kingdom, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pages 134-141, 155.]

840.50/9-3044

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²⁶

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1944.

You will recall my memorandum of September 2, 1944,²⁷ suggesting that you urge upon Mr. Churchill the early resumption of conversations on economic policy, and my memorandum of September 8th²⁸ stressing the fundamental importance of predicating the extension of financial assistance, whether through lend-lease or otherwise to Great Britain during phase two, upon the adoption by the British Government of sound economic policies designed to revive the flow of international trade.

Your memorandum of September 15th²⁸ indicated that you had substantially agreed to Mr. Churchill's request for some six-and-a-half billion dollars of lend-lease aid during the first year of phase two but it did not mention any discussion of economic policy or any policy commitments on the part of the British Government.

On September 17th I accordingly urged you to make clear to Mr. Churchill that one of the primary factors in connection with phase two of lend-lease, in excess of the strategic needs of the Pacific war, would be the soundness of the economic policy adopted by Great Britain.

I have just learned that Lord Keynes²⁹ is now en route to this country to be available to discuss the financial situation of the United Kingdom Government.

As the Committee specified in your memorandum of September 15th has already begun discussions with the British and in view of Lord Keynes' impending arrival in this country, it is important that we know what you said to Mr. Churchill, either at Quebec or Hyde

²⁶ Handed to the President by the Secretary of State, October 1, 1944.

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ Memorandum quoted in airgram A-1843, September 19, 12:40 p. m., to London, p. 58.

²⁹ Baron John Maynard Keynes, financial adviser to the British Government.

Park,³⁰ along the lines I suggested. It is also important to know whether you consider your agreement with the Prime Minister to cover the extension of lend-lease aid to the specific figure of \$6,500,000,000 or whether you intended that lend-lease aid should be based upon specific gross needs rather than upon the proportion, as Mr. Churchill had suggested of British industry which might be converted to peace-time production.

Perhaps it would be useful if I summarized briefly at this point the lend-lease problem as I see it and what my associates and I in the Department of State have been trying to do. Soon after we began to furnish lend-lease assistance to Great Britain under the Act of March 11, 1941,³¹ it became apparent that the volume of such assistance would have to be on such a large scale that there could be no question of the British Government's repaying us in full either in money or in goods. We had fresh in our minds the world war debts problem. We knew that even if the British could produce the goods to repay us it would not be possible for the United States to accept them. On February 23, 1942 we therefore concluded an agreement with the British Government on the principles applying to mutual aid. That agreement was necessarily a preliminary one since as was recognized the final determination of the terms and conditions under which the United Kingdom received such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States in return therefor "should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests" of the two countries and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace.

The heart of the agreement was of course Article VII which I quote in full for ready reference :

"In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the re-

³⁰ Reference is to discussions held at Hyde Park, N.Y., following the close of the Second Quebec Conference.

³¹ 55 Stat. 31.

duction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941,³² by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

“At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.”

By the time we undertook the negotiation of this agreement it was clear to me that the principal benefits which we might expect to obtain lay in the field described in Article VII. The United States does not need nor desire any cession of territory from the United Kingdom. The program set forth in Article VII impressed me as being one indispensable to conditions in which world peace could survive. I felt then and I feel now that no collective system of security can be expected to work unless adequate measures are taken in the field of world economics to hold out hope of a tolerable standard of living to all peoples.

You will recall the difficulties which we had in getting the British Government to agree to Article VII. It was your intercession with Mr. Churchill at the last moment which finally persuaded him to take the British Cabinet along with him in assuming this commitment.³³ Unfortunately the commitment was necessarily indefinite. It would perhaps be better to describe it as a statement of an agreement on objective without a binding commitment as to the ways and means by which the objective would be realized.

I attached very real importance to this whole question because of a number of disturbing trends which were visible throughout the world under war-time conditions. One of these was an emotional tendency, which I fear may be capable of being translated into governmental action toward the extension, rather than the curtailment, of Imperial preference.³⁴ This was doubtless due to an appreciation in the United Kingdom of the extent and degree to which the Dominions and the Colonial Possessions supported the home country in the war effort. Another thing which disturbed me was the frank advocacy in Great Britain, even on the part of some British officials that Britain's post-war commercial policy should be based on discrimina-

³² Statement released to the press on August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. 1, p. 367.

³³ See telegram 418, February 4, 1942, 5 p. m., and telegram of February 11, 1942, to London, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 529 and 535, respectively.

³⁴ Reference is to the system of bilateral treaties inaugurated at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932 whereby Commonwealth members extended preferential treatment on tariffs to one another.

tory bilateral agreements. This was the method of Hitler and the totalitarians. It didn't work for Germany and we know that it won't work for Britain or any other country.

You will recall that in September and October of last year we had confidential conversations at the expert level with representatives of the British Government on the objective set forth in Article VII.³⁵ We made considerable progress in our discussion with the British experts. It was hoped that we would be able to resume these conversations in February 1944. This was not possible, however, because the British experts ran into difficulties at the Cabinet level. In other words the British Cabinet as recently as April of this year was reluctant to go forward even with expert discussions on the program set forth in Article VII since they were not able to reach agreement among themselves as to whether they wanted to proceed in the direction laid down in Article VII.

Naturally we don't know at this time the extent to which public opinion and Congress will support a program for the reduction of trade barriers, which in my opinion is indispensable to world peace. What is important, however, is that the British Government agree *now* that they will not be the obstacle if we are prepared to move along in that direction. In other words they should be prepared to go along with us to the extent that we find it possible to proceed, and they should make it easier, not harder, for us politically.

My associates and I have endeavored at all times to keep before the British Government not only their obligation under Article VII to proceed with us in the formulation of a program but to impress upon them the desirability from the standpoint of the British Commonwealth itself and general world conditions in doing so. Richard Law informed me about six weeks ago that his Government would be prepared to resume the Article VII discussions in London "in the autumn". In the meantime our experts have been hard at work on the formulation of definitive proposals. In a few weeks I hope that it will be possible for me to lay these proposals before you and to discuss them with you. My suggestion would be that we not proceed too rapidly with the implementation of plans for lend-lease aid in phase two beyond the direct strategic needs of the Pacific war until we are able to ascertain a little more clearly the attitude of the British on these commercial policy questions above referred to. As I pointed out in my memorandum to you of September 8th it seems to me that it is in the interests of the people of the United States that we extend such credits and other financial assistance to the United Kingdom that may be necessary to reconstitute and restore what has been traditionally the largest market for American goods. We

³⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 1099 ff.

must, however, bear in mind that the United Kingdom cannot again become either a good credit risk or the largest market for American goods unless she follows a sound commercial policy designed to increase the flow of international trade.

Another advantage of proceeding cautiously with the implementation of the plans for the non-military part of phase two of lend-lease is the Argentine situation where, as you know, we are not receiving that measure of British cooperation which is essential.³⁶

840.50/9-3044

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1944.

I refer to our conversation yesterday and to the memorandum which I handed you in which I put on paper some thoughts in connection with the recent discussions with Mr. Churchill and other British officials in regard to lend-lease assistance to be extended to Great Britain after the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan. For reference purposes I enclose a copy of that memorandum.³⁷

Our guiding thought has been that the problem of provision of financial assistance to Great Britain beyond direct military requirements is an integral part of our most basic foreign policy. Hence I believe that the negotiations now under way on this subject should not be divorced from the discussion of other extremely important matters, some of which are set forth in the accompanying memorandum, and that no final decisions should be reached in connection with this aspect of lend-lease assistance independently of an adequate clarification of these other matters.

I am afraid, therefore, that we are courting disaster unless the whole subject is handled as a matter of foreign policy rather than solely or predominantly a matter of finance.

The operations agency in lend-lease matters is the Foreign Economic Administration. Naturally there are important financial considerations on which the Treasury Department should be consulted and concerning which their advice and assistance is of great importance. Since this question is of fundamental importance in our foreign policy it seems to me, as I pointed out to you yesterday, that it should be actually handled by the Department of State, with the advice and assistance of Foreign Economic Administration, the Treasury Depart-

³⁶ For correspondence on this matter, see vol. VII, section under Argentina entitled "Efforts of the United States to enlist the American Republics and the United Kingdom in a common policy toward Argentina."

³⁷ *Supra*.

ment and other agencies of the Government that are concerned, in accordance with our customary procedure in dealing with such questions. I should be glad if you would let me know whether this meets with your approval.

CORDELL HULL

841.24/10-444

The Secretary of War (Stimson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Congress of the United States has shown a very marked interest in the total value of Reciprocal Aid, or Reverse Lend Lease, which has been received by the United States from foreign governments and has frequently requested that the armed forces of this country show the total amount of such aid, including the full dollar value, which has been received.

Accordingly, both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy have issued directives requiring their officers responsible for receiving Reciprocal Aid to obtain money values for all such aid received and to make full reports of Reciprocal Aid received to the Army's International Division and to the International Aid Division of the Navy's Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, respectively.

The Government of the United Kingdom, from whom the major part of Reciprocal Aid has been received, has issued instructions through the British Treasury, however, that prices or pricing information concerning Reciprocal Aid shall not be given to the United States or its representatives receiving such aid.

It is obviously very difficult for the U.S. armed forces to comply with the request of the Congress for information on the value of Reciprocal Aid received, if accurate information on the value of goods and services received cannot be ascertained. Efforts have been made by both the Army and the Navy to have their officers in the field estimate dollar values of Reciprocal Aid received, but such a system is unsatisfactory and is, at best, subject to considerable inaccuracies.

It has been stated by British authorities that manpower is lacking to do the work of pricing Reciprocal Aid items. However, in many instances British officials have given copies of priced invoices for Reciprocal Aid items to officers of the U.S. armed forces on which the price columns have been physically cut out; in other instances special unpriced invoices have been made out separately by the British for the U.S. officers. It is therefore obvious that some kind of record is being kept by British authorities, and that this record involves, in such cases as those above, a greater expenditure of manpower than if

the British were simply to give identical copies of their own priced invoices directly to the officials of the U.S. armed forces.

The Government of the United Kingdom is now furnishing the Government of the United States with quarterly over-all estimates of the value of Reciprocal Aid furnished: this fact is an additional clear indication that British authorities are assigning values to Reciprocal Aid transactions, but for U.S. purposes these quarterly estimates have many deficiencies, chief among which are the following:

(a) The figures presented to the United States are summary totals only, with no indication of the method by which they were reached, nor what quantities they cover, and therefore offer no real indication of what prices are being assigned Reciprocal Aid items.

(b) There is no way in which these figures can be checked against any figures kept by the U.S. armed forces on Reciprocal Aid receipts.

(c) The British reports of Reciprocal Aid include items which had previously been transferred to the British by the United States as Lend Lease and subsequently retransferred to the United States. Consequently, British figures are padded by those amounts and do not represent an entirely accurate record of Reciprocal Aid.

(d) The British reports do not show what part of the totals were delivered to the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and to other U.S. agencies, thus leaving the various branches of the armed services without a basis for replying to the inquiries of the Congress concerning the extent of Reciprocal Aid received by each.

It is strongly felt by the U.S. War Department and the U.S. Navy Department that the Army, the Navy, and other U.S. agencies which receive Reciprocal Aid from the United Kingdom are entitled to full information, including prices, relating to such aid received and it is noted in this connection that the U.S. Government furnishes the Government of the United Kingdom with the most complete information, including prices, on all items transferred to the United Kingdom as direct Lend Lease.

It is further believed that the Government of the United States will be placed in a highly disadvantageous position in the post-war discussions concerning eventual settlement of the master Lend-Lease accounts if the British are in possession of all figures showing the value of both U.S. Lend Lease aid to Britain and British Reciprocal Aid to the United States, while this country is in possession of detailed figures on direct Lend Lease only.

The present situation, where directives issued by the U.S. armed forces conflict with those issued by the Government of the United Kingdom, is a most undesirable one and tends to lead to friction between representatives of the two Governments on lower operating levels. Efforts on the part of the armed forces to obtain individual prices from the British agencies have been made without success, and the British services concerned state that in view of the order of the British Treasury, they are unable to furnish itemized prices.

In view of the facts above set forth, it will be greatly appreciated if the Honorable the Secretary of State will take up the matter of Reciprocal Aid pricing with the Government of the United Kingdom, and request that the British Treasury's current directive be modified, and that British agencies furnishing Reciprocal Aid to the U.S. armed forces or other agencies of the U.S. Government give the receiving agency full information, including prices, on all Reciprocal Aid which has been or will be furnished by the British Government.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
FORRESTAL

841.24/10-444

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy
(Forrestal)*³⁹

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received the letter of October 4, signed by you and the Secretary of War, in regard to the pricing of reciprocal aid furnished by the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Department is familiar with this problem, which has a long history, and it was the Department's request to the British Ambassador in Washington in June 1943,⁴⁰ that led to the British furnishing to us quarterly over-all estimates on reciprocal aid. I realize the limitations of this information and the desirability of receiving more detail, particularly in view of the interest of Congressional committees in this aspect of our lend-lease relations with the United Kingdom. As you suggest, the British would undoubtedly be in a position without additional use of manpower to furnish this information in many instances, but in some cases the furnishing of the information would probably present serious difficulties.

I understand that Mr. Charles Denby, the head of the General Areas Branch in FEA, and Major General Edgerton⁴¹ of the International Division of the War Department are leaving for London shortly and will take up these questions with American Army and Naval officers and with British officials. We are instructing Ambassador Winant to associate himself with them in presenting the problem to the British and in urging upon the British the importance of working out a satisfactory solution that will not impose excessive manpower demands, but at the same time will furnish a sufficient

³⁹ The same letter, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent on the same date to the Secretary of War. Marginal note on the original reads: "Mr. Denby of FEA has seen this letter and concurs."

⁴⁰ See memorandum to the British Embassy, June 29, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 57.

⁴¹ Maj. Gen. Glen E. Edgerton, Director of Material, Army Service Forces.

detail of information to answer the questions that Congress is asking in regard to the handling of reciprocal aid.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS

841.24/10-2344 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1944—3 p. m.

8972. With reference to the pricing of individual items of reciprocal aid by the British (refer to Department's telegrams 8661 of October 19, 1944, and 8798 of October 23, 1944) ⁴² after full discussions with Denby, Edgerton, Stark,⁴³ and Reed ⁴⁴ you are requested to discuss the matter urgently with the Foreign Office and the Treasury, requesting a lifting of the ban on disclosure to our armed forces and FEA of pricing data on reciprocal aid known to be available in British records. We are not asking for the compilation of extensive new data, but rather the disclosure of existing types of data which we legitimately require to present the reciprocal aid case properly at home.

It is suggested that if you are successful in having the general ban lifted, working parties headed by the individuals mentioned above discuss the details of the matter with the British Treasury, Army, and Admiralty.

STETTINIUS

841.24/10-3144 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 31, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

9392. Accompanied by Denby we discussed the pricing of individual items of reciprocal aid with Cadogan ⁴⁵ yesterday and today Reed, Edgerton, Maxwell,⁴⁶ Denby, and Hawkins⁴⁷ discussed the subject further with Sir John Anderson (re Department's 8872 [8972?], October 27, 3 p. m.). The British officials referred to showed appreciation of our position and an inclination to cooperate. Anderson

⁴² Neither printed.

⁴³ Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

⁴⁴ Philip D. Reed, Chief of the U.S. Mission for Economic Affairs in London.

⁴⁵ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁶ James A. Maxwell, Office of Wartime Economic Affairs.

⁴⁷ Harry C. Hawkins, Economic Counselor of the American Embassy.

brought in Sir Wilfred Eady⁴⁸ who will have direct charge of the matter and the question was further briefly discussed with him. Eady indicated that over a large part of the field price data are available and would be furnished. As for the rest the question of what could be done would be explored in detail. Arrangements were made for a meeting tomorrow with Eady and members of his staff at which detailed work will begin and an effort will be made to complete it as soon as possible.

GALLMAN

841.24/11-244

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: In a meeting in your office last week you suggested that I give you a private memorandum commenting on certain aspects of the negotiations with the British Government in regard to lend-lease in phase 2.

I am deeply troubled over this matter. I am afraid that it is going to cause an explosion in public opinion when it becomes known that will adversely affect our relations with the United Kingdom for a long time. Let me make it clear at the outset that I recognize that it is in the interests of the United States, short term and long term, to have a post-war Britain that is as strong as she can be made. The United Kingdom is the best friend of the United States and no one in his right mind can visualize our two countries lining up on opposite sides in armed conflict. Of no other great power can this be said. In these parlous times that means a lot.

It is equally clear that it is in the best interests of the United States to extend the assistance necessary to bring about the restoration of what has been traditionally the best market for American goods.

The arrangement proposed for phase 2 would extend for the calendar year 1945 lend-lease assistance to the United Kingdom for military supplies to the extent of about 3 billion dollars and civilian supplies up to about 2.7 billion dollars. The negotiations have made it clear that the major part of this total amount is for economic reconstruction and expansion of British exports. It is not necessary to go into the question of whether this is a proper interpretation of the Lend-Lease Act. This question has been discussed for a long time and there are arguments on both sides. The President has apparently accepted the advice of those who feel that the Act can appropriately be used for such purchases.

⁴⁸ Joint Second Secretary, British Treasury.

I am deeply concerned over the question of whether an arrangement along the lines proposed with the United Kingdom for phase 2 can be made to stand up before Congress and public opinion in this country. If it does not meet with the approval of the people and the Congress it will have serious effects on relations between our two countries, even though the terms of the agreement could be carried out under existing appropriations.

When phase 2 begins as events unfold the public of this country may well regard the level of British military participation in the Pacific as small and minor and contrast this with the amount of lend-lease assistance extended to the United Kingdom. Let me say at once that the level of Britain's military participation if regarded as small will not be the fault of the British Government or the British people but due to circumstances over which they have no control. They simply don't have the land forces available to send any appreciable number into the Pacific. Their navy is already in existence and the amount of lend-lease assistance to help them on that score would probably not be large. I understand that our Chiefs of Staff feel that we have more naval vessels and planes now in the Pacific than we can service. None of this is the fault of the British Government but these are factors which may tend to cause the public to regard the amount of assistance proposed under phase 2 as out of all proportion to the British military effort in the Pacific.

Another factor in this situation which will make trouble for us is the unfunded sterling debt of about 12 billion dollars which Britain owes to various countries for goods and services obtained during the war. This overhanging debt is the most serious single handicap which the British Government faces in phase 2 or phase 3. In essence this money is owed to countries which have sold goods to Great Britain rather than furnish them under lend-lease or mutual aid as the United States and Canada have done. Over three-fourths of these sterling balances or more than 9 billion dollars is owed to countries of the British Commonwealth and Egypt. The British Government is proposing to repay these sums in goods and services. Meanwhile they are paying interest on the balances at the rate of 1%. In my opinion we will never be able to explain to the taxpayers of the United States why the American people should treat the United Kingdom more generously than the people of other parts of the Commonwealth and Egypt should treat the United Kingdom. That part of the proposed phase 2 lend-lease assistance other than the amounts actually needed for military supplies will be particularly vulnerable to attack on this score and invidious contrasts will be made between the way Britain is treating us and the way she is paying the Commonwealth.

Critics of this proposed arrangement will bring forward the figures on public debt increase in the two countries and will parade them

and distort them perhaps to show we've carried more than our share in the war. They will point out that in the five year period ending March 31, 1944 the British public debt increased by 136% to 19,593,000,000 while the United States federal debt increased 315% to 187 billion dollars. Since that time the gap has widened further.

The combination of all of these things may bring about an uproar which will result in a situation that will make U.S.-U.K. relations after World War I (and God knows they were bad then) look like a love feast by comparison.

What can we ask the British to do for us? Frankly there isn't much which we can accept from Great Britain. In the following paragraphs are a few things which we might endeavor to get them to do for us over the next few months in a series of separate agreements independent of the phase 2 agreement but making some reference in the preamble of the separate agreements to lend-lease assistance extended by the United States to the United Kingdom :

1. Strategic bases. For security reasons I am dealing with this in a separate memorandum.⁴⁹ There is very little we want from the British. It isn't of great importance and would be a very small offset to phase 2. It has the advantage, however, that things of this sort cannot have a monetary value placed on them and it is capable of being dressed up somewhat.

2. Article VII commitments were obtained in the provisional agreement of February 23, 1942. It would be an appropriate occasion to ask the British to renew this commitment in somewhat more definite terms. The British might be asked to give us a sort of blank check to insure that Britain will not be the obstacle to carrying out of the program set forth in Article VII. In other words the British should agree now that if we find it possible to move toward that objective they will go along with us step by step and that they will make it easier for us politically and not more difficult to move in that direction.

3. We have certain objectives in the telecommunications field which might now be taken up with Great Britain; they are:

(a) The lowest possible rates, including those on press messages, consistent with efficient operation and reasonable profits, between the United States and all parts of the British Commonwealth, such rates to be no higher than those on comparable messages between points within the Commonwealth;

(b) The right to establish direct circuits, both radio-telephone and radio-telegraph, between the United States and points in the British Commonwealth wherever more efficient service would be provided by such circuits;

(c) Agreement by the British not to obstruct our efforts to establish direct circuits with other countries (as they are now doing with Saudi Arabia).⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Not found in Department files.

⁵⁰ For correspondence on representations by the United States to Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom regarding proposed establishment of a direct radio-telegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia, see vol. v, pp. 760 ff.

Suitable commitments in this field might well be sought at this time.

4. We should by all means at this time ask the British Government for an assurance that they will cooperate more effectively with the United States Government in relations with third countries. The phrasing of such a commitment presents certain difficulties but not insuperable ones. In Argentina for instance, if our policy is right it should not be necessary for us to have to go to the British with our hat in our hand and ask them not to renew the meat contract with the Argentine fascist government. To give the United Kingdom \$2,700,000,000 worth of non-military lend-lease assistance for 1945 without regard to the way they have frustrated our policy in regard to Argentina is unthinkable. To be specific I recommend that we inform the British Government in these negotiations that we will expect them to consult with us in regard to policy in respect to Argentina and not to sign any purchase or commercial agreements with Argentina during the period covered by the arrangement (that is 1945) without consultation with us and our agreement.

What does this all add up to? Not enough in my opinion to carry the load which is required. What is the alternative? The only one which I can see is this: give the British under phase 2 every dollar's worth of military equipment and supplies which our Chiefs of Staff think is necessary to enable them to carry the maximum load which the military situation in the Pacific will permit with due regard to efficient military operations. Everything else they need for civilian supply and reconstruction should be furnished under a long-term credit with an interest rate as low as we could possibly make it, say what we ourselves pay. The obligation to repay this should be spread out over a long period of time, as much as 50 years or even more. This obligation naturally could be repaid in the final analysis only in goods and services but I am convinced that it could be carried by British and United States economy without adverse effect. If, however, we should find that it could not be so carried after a reasonable period of effort we could then reconsider the situation in the light of the circumstances then obtaining.

The comments of Lord Keynes and other British representatives have indicated that an arrangement like the one set forth in the preceding paragraph would be unpalatable to the British Government. I believe that every effort should be made to convince them that in their own interests they are wrong. If the British cannot be brought around to our way of thinking on this and the United States Government decides on an arrangement of the sort now under consideration for phase 2 (that is, large-scale lend-lease grants for reconstruction as well as for military purposes) then it seems to me that the President should ask Congress to share the responsibility for this action. At least the President should call in leaders in Congress and tell them of the terrible plight in which the British Gov-

ernment finds itself and of the proposed solution and line up Congressional support in advance of a fixed commitment. It seems to me that it would be desirable for the British negotiators to be told that this will have to be done. As the Lend-Lease Act will come up for renewal in the spring, it would seem the height of folly to make a firm commitment to the British at this time to supply any fixed amount of non-military lend-lease during phase 2 without ascertaining the feeling of Congress even if sufficient funds are available from past appropriations.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

*The Financial Adviser to the British Government (Keynes) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*⁵¹

WASHINGTON, 16 November, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am sorry that I have been so slow in letting you have the further break-up of British war expenses abroad, which I promised you some little time ago. The reason is, of course, as you are only too well aware, that your people and ours have been kept busy up to almost the limit of possibility. I have thought that the most convenient way might be to arrange my reply in a series of short annexes, each dealing with a particular matter.⁵²

You will see that I have partly devoted myself to giving you some further figures for your own information, not suitable for general use, and that here and there I have suggested very briefly one or two lines of argument which might be useful, if later on you have to go up to The Hill on our behalf.

Perhaps I might sum up here a few of the salient points:—

1. As you will see below, our indebtedness is largely due to our military expenditure in the Middle East and India. For five years we, and we alone, have been responsible for practically the whole cash outgoings for the war over the vast territories from North Africa to Burma. Without these expenditures we should never have held Rommel⁵³ at the critical moment of the war.

2. Quite early in the war the Treasury control over war expenditure overseas was virtually abandoned. If Treasury control over expenditure had continued, unquestionably many economies could have been

⁵¹ Copied from the *History of Lend Lease*, Part II, Chapter II, Box 64, Document 61, pp. 104–105.

⁵² None printed; the three enclosed annexes dealt with the following subjects: British war expenditures overseas; financial relations between United Kingdom, United States, and the Dominions; unfavorable trade balances with other countries.

⁵³ German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commanding General of the Afrika Korps, December 1941–May 1943.

made. But these economies would not have been possible without setting up a machine of control which would have impeded the prosecution of the war. One has to choose. The principles of good housekeeping do not apply when you are fighting for your lives over three continents far from home. We threw good housekeeping to the winds. But we saved ourselves, and helped to save the world. Too much financial precaution might easily have made just the difference when, as at one time, the forces were so evenly balanced. It is easy to argue that a method set up in an emergency has been continued too long. Very probably that is the case. But the obstacles in the way of re-imposing detailed control when it has been long absent are very great.

3. We ourselves receive no reverse Lend-Lease whatever from the British Commonwealth, apart from Canada. As is shown below, we have made far less favourable financial arrangements with our own Dominions than has the United States. We pay Australia, for example, for the same goods and services which the United States receive without payment. Even when Lend-Lease is brought into the account, the United States has with these countries more favourable arrangements than we have.

4. We have not thought it right to ask for any contribution to the war from the Crown Colonies, where we are in a position of Trustee. We have paid them for everything we have obtained, and consequently owe them vast sums. We even pay them for the goods which they send as reverse Lend-Lease to the United States, so that this contribution also falls on our shoulders.

5. We abandoned our export business in order to devote to the war the whole of the manpower which could by any means be made available.

6. We paid over nearly the whole of the gold reserves with which we started the war to the United States, and spent the money to build up the American munitions industries from small beginnings, with the result that when America came into the war, the time-lag in the expansion of production was very greatly reduced.

No doubt the above makes up collectively a story of financial imprudence which has no parallel in history. Nevertheless, that financial imprudence may have been a facet of that single-minded devotion without which the war would have been lost. So we beg leave to think that it was worth while—for us, and also for you.

If there is anything further I can do whilst I am here, I am, of course, always at your service.

Sincerely yours,

KEYNES

[For information concerning the role of Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, in advising President Roosevelt on Lend-Lease matters in the period November 18 to November 27, 1944, see William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1950), pages 279–280.]

841.24/11-2244

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) and the Secretary of the Navy
(Forrestal) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 22 November, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In a joint letter dated 4 October 1944, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War informed the Secretary of State of the unsatisfactory situation regarding the valuation of reciprocal aid received from the United Kingdom, and requested that the Government of the United Kingdom be approached so that itemized prices and supporting data on all reciprocal aid which has been or will be furnished by the British Government will be supplied by the U.K. to the U.S. as soon as possible.

In reply Mr. Stettinius indicated that Ambassador Winant would associate himself with Mr. Charles Denby of the Foreign Economic Administration and the delegations of the Navy and War Departments sent to London for the purpose of presenting the problem to the British and of negotiating a satisfactory solution. The State Department cable #367, dated 7 November,⁵⁴ from Mr. Denby to Mr. Acheson, clearly indicated the status of the negotiations in London. The British proposals, as reported by Mr. Denby, do not satisfy the minimum requirements of the Navy and War Departments, as itemized prices and supporting data for the Reciprocal Aid account from the beginning are not promised by the British. It should be emphasized that in our opinion no accurate picture can be obtained of the overall contribution of reciprocal aid to the war effort without obtaining itemized prices not only from June 1943 to the conclusion of reciprocal aid, but for the prior period of time. Furthermore, the British do not agree for the future to furnish itemized prices and supporting data on all items furnished by the U.K. at the time of issue throughout the U.K., the British Colonial Empire, and the Commonwealth, and in other parts of the world.

The War and Navy Departments again request that the Secretary of State consider all phases of this problem and that the State Department representatives in these negotiations be instructed to continue negotiations to accomplish the objectives deemed essential by the War and Navy Departments.

We recognize, however, that there may be reasons of policy which will restrain you from pressing for acceptance on the part of the British of the responsibility for providing the pricing data in the detail we have recommended. Under such circumstances it should be recognized that our reports of reciprocal aid received will lack the

⁵⁴ Not found in Department files.

completeness and accuracy which we believe a proper and reasonable accounting to require and which we have endeavored to obtain.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
FORRESTAL

[President Roosevelt's Seventeenth Quarterly Report on Lend-Lease was entirely devoted to reverse Lend-Lease received from the British Commonwealth of Nations. For the text, see *Seventeenth Report to Congress on Lend Lease Operations*, November 24, 1944 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1944).]

841.24/11-2544

*Memorandum to President Roosevelt*⁵⁵

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1944.

In accordance with your instructions following your conversations in Quebec with Mr. Churchill last September, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Stettinius and I, together with the appropriate officials of Army, Navy, FEA, State, Treasury and other agencies, have been meeting with the British representatives to examine their requests for lend-lease assistance for the first year following the defeat of Germany (and prior to the defeat of Japan).

1. The lend-lease requirements presented by the British for the U.K. and the Empire consisted of approximately \$3.2 billion for munitions, \$3 billion for non-munitions and some \$800 million of special military and non-military items or an aggregate of \$7 billion. After screening these requests on the basis of anticipated war strategy, availability of supplies and other needs the agencies concluded that they could recommend to you as part of the program for budgetary and production planning the following: Approximately \$2.7 billion for munitions; \$2.8 billion for non-munitions or a total of \$5½ billion. This represents roughly a 50 percent cut from the 1944 level of lend-lease aid to the British Empire.

This program which we recommend for your consideration would not constitute any commitment. All schedules, both munitions and non-munitions, are subject to the changing demands of strategy as well as to supply considerations and the usual considerations of procurement and allocation.

2. This lend-lease program consists of articles and services which either cannot be produced at all in the United Kingdom in time for war needs or which, as a result of past decisions about specialization,

⁵⁵ Prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Foreign Economic Administrator.

can be more effectively produced in the United States. However, this program, coupled with decreased munitions and manpower requirements in Stage II, will make it possible for Britain and the United States, to release some manpower and resources for reconversion, easement of living standards and a partial revival of exports.

3. We have considered the British proposal to modify their export policy, and we are prepared to recommend that:

a. No change in the present export policy be made until V-E Day, and thereafter:

1. The Eden White Paper of 1941 continue to prohibit the re-export of goods delivered under Lend-Lease;
2. The British be allowed to re-export goods purchased for cash in the United States, and manufactures of them;
3. The British reserve exclusively for war purposes any stocks built up by Lend-Lease shipments.

b. Mr. Crowley should advise the appropriate Committee of Congress about the foregoing principles which will apply after V-E Day.

Mr. Crowley has stated that he will go as far as practicably possible to make such administrative arrangements, under the terms of the White Paper, as will not hinder unduly certain minor British exports prior to V-E Day.

The British also wished to be able after V-E Day to sell munitions of British manufacture for cash to the Allies. The American group could not see its way clear to recommending such action to you and the matter has been dropped for the time being.

4. Assurances have been received from the British and the Dominions that the flow of supplies and services to the United States and its military forces as mutual aid will be continued as in the past. Detailed arrangements are still under consideration.

5. Though discussions are still going forward with the British at the operating level which may slightly modify the estimates given in 1 above, the American members of this committee consider that the task assigned to it at Quebec is completed with the presentation to you of this memorandum of recommendations. Unless we hear from you to the contrary we will consider the committee dissolved.

HENRY MORGENTHAU
E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
LEO T. CROWLEY

800.24/11-2644

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1944.

Lord Keynes called upon me at 6:45 this afternoon after spending an hour with the President. He said the President had been most

helpful and that he had discussed with him principally the future of lend-lease and the treatment of Germany.

On the future of lend-lease the President stated that he had received a preliminary report from Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Crowley and myself and seemed well pleased. Lord Keynes then showed me the draft of a statement⁵⁶ he had prepared for Sir John Anderson to make in Parliament on November 29. He said Secretary Morgenthau and Messrs. Hopkins, Acheson and Cox had been over the statement and thought it was appropriate. I read it hurriedly and told him that I could not, of course, make a final judgment without studying it carefully but that it appeared to be in order.

Lord Keynes stated that he had received a private message from the Chancellor of the Exchequer today⁵⁷ relative to lend-lease in Stage 2 and at the end of the message it was reported that the Prime Minister had sent the President a statement on Argentine meat within the last twenty-four hours which would be both satisfactory and gratifying to the President. Lord Keynes stated that the President did not mention this at tea this afternoon and apparently had not yet received it.

Lord Keynes mentioned that the President had discussed with him the economic treatment of Germany at length. He said that as he listened to the President it seemed to confirm what Lord Cherwell⁵⁸ had told him had transpired at the conference at Quebec. I inquired as to whether this meant a complete agrarian economy and he stated not quite but that it went pretty far in de-industrializing the Ruhr and eliminating many of Germany's basic industries. He stated that the President had emphasized that he did not feel there was any great hurry in reaching a final decision regarding the economic treatment of Germany; that he wanted to see what damage our bombs had done and what the general conditions were, and that he would like to go there himself and take a look before any final definite position was taken.

Lord Keynes expressed the hope that it would be possible for me to come to England soon for he thought there would be many things we could accomplish.

He said the Ministers in London were quite satisfied with the results of the lend-lease discussions although they were disappointed in not commencing exports until V-E Day. All in all, Lord Keynes seemed very cheerful and he seemed to feel that his mission here had been a success, and that London was relatively happy. He was particularly

⁵⁶ Not found in Department files.

⁵⁷ Not printed; for content of this message, see telegram 10178, December 5, to London, vol. VII, section under Argentina entitled "Efforts of the United States to enlist the American Republics and the United Kingdom in a common policy toward Argentina."

⁵⁸ Baron Frederick A. L. Cherwell, Personal Assistant to Prime Minister Churchill and also Paymaster General.

complimentary in the way in which the State Department had participated in the matter.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

800.24/11-3044

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) ⁵⁹

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: Apropos of your conversation with Lord Keynes of November 26, memorandum of which is attached,⁶⁰ you may be interested to know that his statement to you, that Messrs. Morgenthau, Hopkins, Acheson and Cox had been over his draft of statement prepared for Sir John Anderson and thought it appropriate, was a triumph of hope over reality.

At the meeting the following afternoon Secretary Morgenthau mentioned a similar statement which Lord Keynes had made to him. Mr. Morgenthau pointed out that he had not seen the statement; Mr. Hopkins added that he had seen the statement and told Lord Keynes that he did not approve. I stated that I had seen the statement and told Lord Keynes that Oscar Cox was handling the matter and that in its then form I was sure the statement would not be approved by Oscar; and Oscar concluded by saying that he was at that time engaged in revising the statement with Lord Keynes.

This is merely to keep the record straight. In fact, after the meeting with Mr. Morgenthau, we all engaged in the business of revising the statement and finally got one which was issued today and was agreed on by everyone.⁶¹

DEAN ACHESON

*Press Release Issued by the Foreign Economic Administration,
November 30, 1944* ⁶²

Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, and Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,

⁵⁹ Although this memorandum was addressed to him as Under Secretary, Edward R. Stettinius became Secretary of State on this date.

⁶⁰ *Supra*.

⁶¹ See statement by Assistant Secretary Acheson before the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade and Shipping of the Special Committee of the House of Representatives on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, November 30, 1944, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 3, 1944, p. 656; see also speech by Prime Minister Churchill to the House of Commons on the future of Lend-Lease, November 30, 1944, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 406, col. 69.

⁶² Copied from the *History of Lend Lease*, Part II, Chapter II, Box 64, Document 62, Section III, No. 63.

Acting Secretary of State, acting as a special committee of the Government on Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease discussions with the British following up the Quebec Conference, today made the following statement:—

Throughout the war the Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease requirements of the United Nations have been reviewed from time to time in the light of the military strategy for the war against Germany and Japan.

Such a review has been carried out in discussions now concluded between the appropriate military, naval, air and civilian representatives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments. These discussions concerned the Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease aid required to enable the carrying out of the strategic decisions made at Quebec for winning victory over both Germany and Japan at the earliest possible moment.

The programmes of Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease aid should be continued in accordance with the fundamental principle laid down by the President that: "Until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, we should continue the Lend-Lease programme on whatever scale is necessary to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it."⁶³

The amounts and types of supplies required continue to be subject, as always, to adjustment from time to time in accordance with the changing conditions of the war. When finished munitions are produced and available for delivery, they are assigned by the Munitions Assignments Board under directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the light of the strategic considerations prevailing at the time of the assignment. Similar procedures are and will continue to be in effect for other war supplies that each country may make available to the other.

From the beginning of the Lend-Lease programme in March 1941, Lend-Lease aid has been extended for one purpose—and for one purpose only—the defence of the United States and to enable our Allies to bring the full weight of their men and resources to bear against our common enemies. That policy will be continued without change.

Since Lend-Lease aid is made available to our Allies only when it contributes directly to the winning of the war, Lend-Lease articles have from the beginning not been available for re-export commercially. That policy will also be continued without change. There will be no change in the principle as laid down by the Government of

⁶³ Quotation is from a letter from President Roosevelt to Congress, August 23, 1944, transmitting the 16th Quarterly Report on Lend-Lease; for complete text of the letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 27, 1944, p. 205.

the United Kingdom in its White Paper of September 1941, that no articles received under Lend-Lease from the United States shall be exported commercially.

After the defeat of Germany, there will be no impediment to the United Kingdom's exporting articles, so far as war conditions permit, which are no longer supplied under Lend-Lease and are obtained out of their own production or purchased from this country for cash.

To some degree Lend-Lease aid for the United Kingdom will be reduced even before the defeat of Germany. It is now expected that some raw and semi-fabricated materials, such as iron and steel, will no longer be provided by the United States to the United Kingdom under Lend-Lease after the 1st January, 1945. This will have the effect, under the terms of the White Paper itself, of removing products made from such materials from limitations that will continue to apply to articles received under Lend-Lease. Such materials no longer obtained under Lend-Lease will, of course, be available to the United Kingdom in commercial exports only after the overriding considerations of war supply and war shipping are met.

The Committee understands that, as in the past, the United States and the United Kingdom will both endeavour to insure, to the extent practicable, that neither United States nor United Kingdom exporters receive undue competitive advantage over the other as a result of the war situation.

It appeared in the discussions that, in the period immediately following the defeat of Germany, the British need for Lend-Lease assistance would be not much more than one-half of that currently furnished in 1944.

After the defeat of Germany the United Kingdom and the United States will both use all the fighting power that is required for the earliest possible defeat of Japan. It is likely, however, that both the United Kingdom and the United States will be able to reconvert part of their resources on an equitable basis to meet essential civilian needs in the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. As a result of such a partial and equitable reconversion there will be some improvement in the conditions of life of the British people. For six years, first standing alone against the enemy and later fighting alongside our own forces on battlefields, on seas and in the sky all over the world, they have endured privation in diet, had their houses destroyed about them and have been sent to distant parts of the country to work wherever the needs of war called them. After the defeat of Germany, it is necessary that their inadequate diet be improved, temporary emergency housing be provided, and such other measures adopted as may relieve in some degree their present extremely difficult circumstances.

This committee believes that a programme which will help in achieving this objective is a matter of necessity for the most effective prosecution of the war against Japan, and that it expresses in some measure the common bond which has carried our countries through the hard days of the war to approaching victory.

Since Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease are concerned solely with war supply, problems of post-war foreign trade throughout the world did not enter into the review of these programmes. Economic and financial co-operation by all the United Nations in many different forms will be required to meet these separate post-war problems. Effective measures in this field will require both international and national action by the respective governments, including in many cases, legislative action.

NOVEMBER 30, 1944.

841.24/11-2244

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)*⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the joint letter of November 22, from you and the Secretary of War, in regard to the pricing of reciprocal aid received from the United Kingdom. As you indicate in your letter, the State Department instructed Ambassador Winant to associate himself with Mr. Denby of FEA and the representatives of the Navy and War Departments in negotiating with the British for the furnishing of more detailed information than had hitherto been made available.

As a result of these discussions the British have agreed to make available for past transactions substantially more details than have been furnished heretofore, and also to make an *ad hoc* investigation on any particular items when requested by the United States. For the future, most of the Ministries involved are prepared to give practically complete information, although in some cases the pricing will not be on the voucher when issued but will be done centrally at a later date. Furthermore, all of the Ministries are prepared to give representatives of the United States access to their record of reciprocal aid for any individual items on which more detailed information is desired.

I understand your desire to have as complete financial records as possible. The State Department, however, in view of the manpower and accounting problems that the U.K. feels would be involved if the wishes of the Navy and War Departments were met in every detail, is not in a position to press for more information than the British Gov-

⁶⁴ The same letter, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent on the same date to the Secretary of War. Marginal note on the original reads: "This letter was read to Mr. Denby of FEA and approved 12/5/44."

ernment indicated, in the recent London discussions, that it would be in a position to furnish.

Representatives of FEA and the Clearing Office for Foreign Transactions and Reports are still in London, and are obtaining full information as to exactly what details will be made available by the various British Ministries under the general agreement that was reached with the British. I also understand that discussions recently took place between Mr. Denby and the International Division of the War Department, pursuant to which Major Overby,⁶⁵ who has been in Paris, is to stop off in London to consider exactly what details are to be available as a result of the earlier discussions.

When the results of these current discussions in London are known, we would then be in a position to review the situation with representatives of the Navy and War Departments and of FEA, and see whether the details that the British will furnish conform with the understanding that they gave to the American representatives at the earlier discussions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

800.24/12-2344

Memorandum by Mr. Frank W. Fetter of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs⁶⁶ to the Chief of the Division (Collado)

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1944.

BRITISH EXPORTS OF ITEMS MANUFACTURED FROM CASH PURCHASE MATERIALS IN SHORT SUPPLY IN THE UNITED STATES

The Top Secret memorandum of November 25, 1944 on lend-lease to the British presented to the President by Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Morgenthau, and Mr. Crowley, the public statement of these three men on November 30, and Mr. Churchill's statement of the same date in the House of Commons raise the question as to whether previous to V-E Day the British are to be permitted to export products embodying materials in short supply in the U.S. that have been purchased for cash.

The memorandum to the President states in 3-a, "No change in the present export policy to be made until V-E Day". This language is clear and unequivocal, but the subsequent statement "Mr. Crowley has stated that he will go as far as practicably possible to make such administrative arrangements, under the terms of the White Paper, as

⁶⁵ Presumably, Maj. Andrew N. Overbury.

⁶⁶ Mr. Fetter was adviser on British Commonwealth financial affairs in the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs.

will not hinder unduly certain minor British exports prior to V-E day" leaves some doubt as to what the net result is.

The press release of November 30 given by Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Morgenthau, and Mr. Crowley had the following statement in regard to the shift of some items from lend-lease to cash purchase:

"It is now expected that some raw and semi-fabricated materials, such as iron and steel, will no longer be provided by the United States to the United Kingdom under lend-lease after January 1, 1945. This will have the effect, under the terms of the White Paper itself, of removing products made from such materials from limitations that will continue to apply to articles received under lend-lease. Such materials no longer obtained under lend-lease will of course, be available to the United Kingdom in commercial exports only after the overriding considerations of war supply and war shipping are met."

In the light of the memorandum to the President the exact meaning of this public statement is not clear. The sentence starting, "This will have the effect" appears to say that the White Paper restrictions no longer apply to cash purchase items, but this is directly contrary to the recommendations made by the same persons to the President. An alternative explanation is that iron and steel and the other items obtained under cash purchase are no longer in short supply, although this does not square with the facts on some types of steel products. The last sentence does not apply to the U.K.'s right to export, but to the U.S. policy on cash sales to the U.K. Strictly interpreted the passage says that the White Paper restrictions will not apply to any cash purchases from the United States, (either because the White Paper provision on this point has been repealed *sub silentio*, or because no items purchased for cash will be considered in short supply) but that the U.S. will make available materials to the U.K. on a cash basis "only after the overriding considerations of war supply and war shipping are met". In other words the White Paper restrictions are lifted on cash purchase items, providing the U.K. can get them, but the U.S. will not furnish such items on a cash basis if they are in short supply. The question as to how the WPB⁶⁷ in making allocations is to interpret "short supply" is the crux of the problem. An extreme view would be that an item was in "short supply" as long as demands by American exporters were not fully met, and that hence nothing would be available to U.K. for export purposes. A more reasonable view would be that "short supply" related to military and essential civilian needs, and that when those had been met some reasonable division would be made between the U.S. and the U.K. to take care of export needs.

Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons on the same date read as follows:

⁶⁷ War Production Board.

"Thus, from that date, [January 1, 1945]⁶⁸ we shall no longer receive shipments to this country under Lend-Lease, of any manufactured articles for civilian use which enter into our export trade nor of many raw and semi-fabricated materials such as iron, steel and some non-ferrous metals. Consequently, in accordance with the White Paper of September 1941, we shall then be free to export a wide range of goods made from these materials. Naturally, we have not used in exports and do not propose to use any critically scarce materials except where export is essential for the effective prosecution of the war."

This statement implies that as far as the U.K. is concerned no restrictions are in effect after January 1, 1945 on the export of items purchased for cash or made from items purchased for cash, but that the U.K. will not use "critically scarce materials" in exports. What difference, if any, there is between "critically scarce materials" and "materials of a type the use of which is being restricted in the United States on the grounds of short supply" is not clear.

In summary, the memorandum to the President says that the cash purchase restrictions of the White Paper stand unchanged, but that the administration of the White Paper waivers will be changed. The statement to the press implies either that the White Paper restrictions on cash purchase items have been lifted, or that no cash purchase items are in short supply. The Prime Minister's statement says that as far as a commitment to the United States is concerned there are now no restrictions on the use of cash purchase items in exports, but that the U.K. will not make exports that use material needed for war purposes.

The results in practice of the policy expressed by these somewhat conflicting statements will be determined largely by the action of FEA in the granting of White Paper waivers, and by the position of WPB on "short supply".

**CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER TRANSFER OF MUNITIONS
BY THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE COMMON POOL TO THIRD
COUNTRIES**

841.24/3-2244

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) and the Secretary of the Navy
(Knox) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, the agencies of the War and Navy Departments dealing with lend-lease matters have recently

⁶⁸ Brackets appear in the original memorandum.

reached an understanding with the representatives of the United Kingdom regarding the supply of certain rifles to Saudi Arabia.⁶⁹

During the course of discussions on this matter, the United Kingdom representatives took the position, in meetings of the Munitions Assignments Board⁷⁰ and in conferences with the State Department, that their Government was free, without obtaining the concurrence of the United States, to dispose of any weapons having a United Kingdom origin, even though the availability of such weapons for disposition resulted directly from the transfer on lend-lease of substantial amounts of identical, or similar, articles. This view—which makes the sole criterion the country of origin of the particular article in question—was emphatically rejected by the War and Navy Departments. It was, and is, the considered view of both Departments that the United Kingdom's obligation to obtain United States concurrence to transfers of military and naval items, as provided in MBW⁷¹ 67/8, should be applied equally to articles of United States origin and articles similar thereto, up to the amounts transferred on lend-lease.

Such a position is regarded by the War Department and the Navy Department as the only one consistent with the underlying principles of the Lend-Lease Act,⁷² the Master Lend-Lease Agreement⁷³ and the White Paper published by the British Government on 10 September 1941.⁷⁴

There is enclosed herewith a memorandum which states briefly the premises upon which this conclusion is grounded.

It seems of some importance, to us, moreover, to suggest that this would also be the Congressional and the public view in this country. We fear that both Congress and the public would react most adversely to the suggestion that the United Kingdom is free to retransfer without obtaining the concurrence of the United States, any weapons or other items which have become available for such disposition as a direct result of similar lend-lease shipments from the United States. We cannot believe that the determining factor should be the question of whether the particular items were actually of United States origin.

⁶⁹ For correspondence relating to aid extended to Saudi Arabia, see vol. v, pp. 670 ff.

⁷⁰ Established in January 1942 as a result of the First Washington Conference, December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942. Correspondence on this Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁷¹ Munitions Assignments Board (Washington).

⁷² Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁷³ Preliminary Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom signed at Washington, February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433. For correspondence on negotiation of the Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 525 ff.

⁷⁴ British Cmd. 6311, United States No. 2 (1941): *Correspondence respecting the Policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Connexion With the Use of Materials Received Under the Lend-Lease Act*.

It is, therefore, the earnest desire of the War Department and the Navy Department that the State Department adopt the position expressed herein as the declared policy of the United States Government and that appropriate notice thereof be given to the Government of the United Kingdom.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
FRANK KNOX

[Enclosure]

APPLICATION OF RETRANSFER PRINCIPLE OF MBW 67/8 TO MILITARY AND NAVAL ITEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE SUPPLIED ON LEND-LEASE

The Munitions Assignments Board in MBW 67/8, after recommending that the President be requested to delegate appropriate authority to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, clearly announced it to be:

“. . . a matter of fundamental policy that no lend-lease government shall be permitted to retransfer military or naval lend-lease items without the consent of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy.”

This policy rests upon the firm foundation of Section 4 of the Lend-Lease Act which provides that:

“All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article . . . shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article . . . by gift, sale or otherwise . . . ”

In the Master Lend-Lease Agreements, the several lend-lease nations have agreed in specific terms, in accordance with Section 4, that they will not retransfer defense articles without the consent of the President. This is the substance of Article III of the Master Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. dated 23 February 1942.

It is therefore clear beyond any question that military or naval equipment of any kind which originated in the U.S. and was thereafter assigned to the U.K. cannot be retransferred except with the express consent of the U.S.

In the British White Paper of 10 September 1941, the principle is announced that the obligations which the U.K. may have with respect to the use and export of material of U.S. origin applies equally to “materials similar to those supplied under lend-lease”.

The White Paper was adopted by the U.K. in order to forestall certain criticisms and to allay certain fears which had arisen in the

U.S. as a result of the increasing amounts of lend-lease goods being sent to England. Hence, it must have seemed clear to the British that, as a matter of fair dealing and equity, "materials similar to those being transferred under lend-lease" and "materials of a type the use of which is being restricted within the U.S. on the grounds of short supply, and of which we (the U.K.) obtain supplies from the U.S." should be governed by the same restrictions as materials of U.S. origin.

The principle of the paper is simply that whether particular materials were actually of U.S. origin should not, and could not equitably, be the determining factor as to whether the U.K. would be free to dispose of such materials without the concurrence of the U.S. The only fair criterion is whether the materials have become available for distribution as a result of lend-lease transfers. No distinction in this respect ought to be made between military or naval equipment and materials of other types.

It is submitted that the two principles outlined above—the retransfer principle and the "similar materials" principle announced in the White Paper—lead inevitably to the conclusion that military or naval equipment of a type (and within the quantities) which has been transferred to the U.K. under lend-lease, should not be transferred by the British to other governments except with the consent of the U.S.

800.24/1714a

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: The Secretaries of War and Navy have called to my attention certain problems with regard to the assignment of munitions by the Washington and London Munitions Assignments Boards and the transfer thereof to third countries. I have discussed these problems with the President.⁷⁵

As you recall, the Munitions Assignments Boards were set up by the Prime Minister⁷⁶ and the President in the following terms:⁷⁷

"1. The entire munitions resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool, about which the fullest information will be interchanged.

⁷⁵ Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt and reply, June 17, 1944, not printed.

⁷⁶ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

⁷⁷ For complete text of the statement on the Munitions Assignments Boards, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 31, 1942, p. 87.

"2. Committees will be formed in Washington and London under the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a manner similar to the South-West Pacific Agreement.⁷⁸ These Committees will advise on all assignments both in quantity and priority whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations in accordance with strategic needs."

In the assignment of munitions the objective as seen by the President and the Prime Minister was clearly to utilize all available resources, regardless of origin, for the most effective prosecution of the war. To do this they established the Munitions Assignments Boards. It is my understanding, however, that United Kingdom representatives on the Munitions Assignments Board have taken the position that their Government is free, without obtaining the concurrence of the United States, to dispose of any weapons having United Kingdom origin, even though the availability of such weapons for disposition resulted directly from the transfer on Lend-Lease of substantial amounts of identical or similar articles.

In order to settle the questions of interpretation and procedure which have arisen, it is the policy of the American Government that:

1. The two governments shall consult and concert their actions before making transfers of munitions to other countries.
2. Transfers to third countries of munitions of a kind which either government has received from the other shall be by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two governments.

The Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington would appear to be the appropriate machinery for carrying out the foregoing.

I should appreciate being informed that the policy of this Government as stated above is concurred in by the Government of Great Britain.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

⁷⁸ Reference here is to the Agreement at the First Washington Conference to form a unified command in the South-East Asia Theater; correspondence on this subject is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*. See also Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The War Department*, issued by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 123-126.

800.24/7-144

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*⁷⁹

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1944.

I transmit a copy of the note⁸⁰ on the above subject⁸¹ which was recently sent the British Ambassador with your approval. The essence of that note is in the following sentence:

"It is the policy of the American Government that transfers to third countries of munitions of a kind which either Government has received from the other shall be by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments."

The note represents the considered views of the State, War and Navy Departments. The policy set forth is designed not to meet a *theoretical* situation but to prevent actual abuses.

I am informed that Dr. Isador Lubin⁸² communicated with Mr. Stettinius on June 23⁸³ and expressed the view that "the British would probably object to the proposed arrangement", and in that event he felt the question should be reopened. Dr. Lubin called later to say that he had meanwhile discussed the matter with you; that you had misunderstood the significance of the note to Lord Halifax; and that if the British make a counter-proposal you would be willing to adjust the position we have taken in the note in question.

I think it would be a serious mistake to retreat from the position which we have taken. The policy set forth in the note to Lord Halifax is designed to put an end to specific abuses and for the protection of vital American interests. I do not believe that we could justify, from a domestic political point of view, a procedure whereby the British, without our agreement, transfer to third powers, often for political purposes, military items similar to those which they have received from us under Lend-Lease. Moreover, I feel that there is no sound reason why our point of view should not be accepted by the British particularly since the procedure suggested is reciprocal.

I think, therefore, that we should stand firm on the policy set forth in that note and make every effort to induce the British Government to accept it.

⁷⁹ File copy of this memorandum contains the marginal note: "OK FDR". According to a memorandum from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to Under Secretary of State Stettinius, July 6, 1944, President Roosevelt's endorsement was given on July 3 (841.24/2253).

⁸⁰ *Supra.*

⁸¹ Disposition by United Kingdom of military materials similar to those received under Lend-Lease.

⁸² Chairman of the Statistical Analysis Branch of the Munitions Assignments Board.

⁸³ Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1944; not printed (841.24/2253).

800.24/7-2244

The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State

No. 448

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1944.

SIR: In considering Your Excellency's note of June 20th, His Majesty's Government have assumed that it applies only to the assignment of those resources which fall within the scope of the Munitions Assignments Board.

His Majesty's Government entirely concur in the policy of the United States Government as set out in paragraph 4 of Your Excellency's note in regard to the assignment of munitions by the Washington and London Munitions Assignments Board and their transfer to third countries. Apart from those items which have been in full supply or in which the United States have expressed no interest, the United Kingdom representatives on the Board have, in fact, followed this policy in almost every case during the past two years and they do not consider themselves free, as suggested in the third paragraph of Your Excellency's note, to dispose of weapons of United Kingdom origin without obtaining the concurrence of their United States colleagues on the Board. In relatively few cases in which an assignment of United Kingdom munitions to a third country has been made without consultation with United States members of the London Board, this has been due to faulty procedure rather than to an intentional departure from the agreed policy.

At the same time, His Majesty's Government are concerned that in a number of instances the transfer to a third country of munitions of United Kingdom origin has been opposed by United States authorities purely on the ground that similar material has been, or is being, received by the United Kingdom on lend lease from the United States. His Majesty's Government cannot reconcile this attitude with the principle laid down by the President and the Prime Minister, quoted in your note, that the entire munitions resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool regardless of origin. In the view of His Majesty's Government, each case should be considered jointly by United Kingdom and United States members of the Washington or London Board as appropriate, whose recommendations should be framed solely in accordance with strategic needs.

I have [etc.]

RONALD I. CAMPBELL

800.24/7-2244

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I refer to Sir Ronald Campbell's note of July 22, 1944, concerning the transfer of military supplies to third countries.

I am pleased to learn that your Government concurs entirely in the policy of the United States Government as set out in paragraph four of my note of June 20, 1944, which provides that the two Governments shall consult and concert their actions before making transfers of munitions to other countries, and that transfers to third countries of munitions of a kind which either Government has received from the other shall be by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments.

I am concerned, however, about the apparent assumption of your Government, as indicated in the last paragraph of Sir Ronald's note, that the President and the Prime Minister, in declaring that the munitions of Great Britain and the United States should be deemed to be in a common pool, intended that the origin of the munitions should be disregarded. It is true that the munition resources of the United States and Great Britain have been pooled in the sense that their munitions are made available to each other for the wisest and most efficient conduct of the war. But, in the absence of such completed settlements as are contemplated by the Lend-Lease Act, neither the Master Agreement nor the Lend-Lease Act itself permits the United States to disregard, after the transfer of supplies to Great Britain, the origin of the supplies so transferred. The specific reservation by the United States of the right to reclaim such supplies is proof of this. The decisions as to whether certain defense supplies are transferred to Great Britain is determined, of course, by the British need for such supplies, and bearing upon that need is the use which Great Britain seeks to make of these or similar supplies of British origin.

As regards the grounds on which American consent to transfers is given, it is legitimate for the United States to consider the fact that American munitions are being or have been transferred for British use on Lend-Lease as a datum pertinent to consenting to the transfer of similar munitions by Great Britain to some third country. This is not to imply that strategic needs are not to be considered in consenting to such a transfer. Indeed, such needs are primary, but obviously other considerations pertinent to the very widest concept of strategy are also relevant.

I renew my appreciation of your assurances that Great Britain concurs in the policy of the United States as expressed in my earlier

note. I must, however, point out the limitations upon the common pool conception of our munition resources which must, as a matter of law and policy, be borne in mind.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

ANGLO-AMERICAN PETROLEUM DISCUSSIONS⁸⁹ AND UNPERFECTED AGREEMENT SIGNED AUGUST 8, 1944

800.6363/1482½

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to the Department's notes of December 2nd⁹⁰ and January 11th,⁹¹ has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government welcome the suggestion of the United States Government for an informal discussion of matters concerning petroleum.

As the United States Government will already be aware, His Majesty's Government would wish these discussions to be world-wide in scope and not limited to any particular area. His Majesty's Government, however, readily accept the suggestion contained in the Department's note of January 11th that at the outset these conversations should deal with the Middle Eastern aspect of petroleum and should thereafter be extended to cover the subject in its general aspects. His Majesty's Government fully share the United States Government's desire to reach conclusions on the basis of close cooperation.

In order to avoid unnecessary delay and to ensure that the conversations take place under the most favourable possible circumstances, His Majesty's Government would welcome some indication of those aspects of the question which the United States Government particularly wish to discuss, and also of the precise level at which the United States Government consider the discussions should be held.

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1944.

800.6363/1482

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the British Ambassador and refers to the Ambassador's note of February 7, 1944

⁸⁹ For correspondence concerning the origins of these discussions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 943-952.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 947.

⁹¹ Not printed, but see *ibid.*, footnote 45.

stating that the British Government welcomes the suggestion of the United States Government that informal exploratory discussions concerning petroleum be initiated.

It is noted that while the British Government agrees that these conversations at the outset should deal with problems of mutual interest regarding Middle Eastern petroleum, they should at a later period be extended to cover the general subject of petroleum. This Government believes that it may be found desirable to extend the scope of the conversations beyond a discussion of the problems concerning Middle Eastern oil but that a determination of whether that should be done and to what extent can be made best in the light of the progress of the discussions on Middle Eastern oil.

In compliance with the British Government's desire for some indication of the aspects of the question which this Government believes should be discussed, there follows a tentative list of general topics which it is believed could be profitably covered in the conversations.

1. Interests of the producing and consuming countries in Middle Eastern petroleum.
2. The quantity of Middle Eastern oil that should flow into post war world markets.
3. Existing impediments to orderly production.
4. Transportation problems.
5. Concession rights.
6. Price and marketing policies.

It is contemplated that a group of not more than five staff members at the export level will conduct the conversations for this Government. The group will be headed by the Petroleum Adviser of the Department of State⁹² as Chairman and will include the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and African Affairs of the Department.⁹³

It is believed to be auspicious for the outcome of the conversations that both Governments desire to reach conclusions on the basis of close cooperation. This Government strongly hopes that, in this atmosphere, the conversations can be initiated without delay.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1944.

800.6363/1482

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer further to the Ambassador's note of February 7, 1944, in regard to the forth-

⁹² Charles B. Rayner.

⁹³ Paul H. Alling.

coming informal exploratory discussions on petroleum, and to the Department's note of February 10, 1944, in reply. Reference is also made to the telephone conversation of February 15 between the Acting Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning this subject.

In confirmation of the above-mentioned conversation, it is desired to inform the Ambassador that, in view of the importance which the Government of the United States attaches to the forthcoming discussions, further consideration has been given to the composition of the group which will conduct the conversations for this Government. It has been decided that the Secretary of State will be the chairman of the group. The Secretary of the Interior will be vice-chairman of the group and the other members will be the Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Petroleum Adviser of the Department of State and the Vice Chairman of the War Production Board.

It is strongly hoped that it will be agreeable to the British Government for the conversations to be initiated the latter part of this month at Washington. Early advice as to whether this is agreeable to the British Government will be appreciated.

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1944.

800.6363/1506c: Circular airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics*⁹⁴

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1944—7 p. m.

For your strictly confidential information, we are actively engaged in developing a firm post war foreign oil policy. Exploratory conversations will soon be initiated between this Government and the British Government on problems of mutual interest concerning Middle Eastern oil. It is quite possible that these conversations will lead to international oil discussions of a broader scope.

On February 2, the Secretary met with the heads of the American companies operating abroad and with the President of the American Petroleum Institute and advised them of the forthcoming conversations with the British and indicated the Department's interest in foreign petroleum matters. American oil companies with foreign interests are being encouraged to present their views and problems to the Department, and are discussing with the Department their interest in and endeavors to obtain foreign concessions. The Department is informing them that this Government, because of the wartime and long-range importance of oil, favors the development of foreign oil

⁹⁴ Sent to Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

resources and welcomes the participation of American companies in that development.

This Government takes the clear position that, if any country grants to foreigners rights concerning the exploration for or development of petroleum resources, the nationals of the United States should be accorded equal opportunity with the nationals of any other country to obtain such rights. With this end in view, if the occasion arises, you should render all appropriate assistance to representatives of American oil companies who may be seeking petroleum concessions or rights in the country to which you are accredited. This assistance should include such introductions by you as may facilitate proper contacts between the companies' representatives and government officials and other persons where desirable. To the maximum extent appropriate, in the light of the foregoing policy, you should indicate an interest in the matter to government officials.

The Department desires you to maintain such contact with any oil company representatives, who may be engaged in the above-indicated endeavors, as will encourage them to keep you advised of their activities.

The Department wishes to be kept fully and currently informed of any action taken by the Embassy in line with the foregoing.

STETTINIUS

800.6363/2-1844

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 95

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were about to reply to the State Department's note of February 11th [10th] setting forth the views of the United States Government regarding the scope of proposed discussions on oil when they were informed by His Majesty's Ambassador on February 16th that the United States Government proposed to announce forthwith their intention to convene a conference at Ministerial level in the near future.

2. It had previously been understood that exploratory conversations at official and technical level were contemplated, and this impression was confirmed by the State Department's note under reply. It was on this understanding that His Majesty's Government agreed to issue joint statement communicated to the State Department on January 25th.⁹⁵ In the view of His Majesty's Government a conference of Ministers should not take place until the ground has been cleared with preliminary discussions which have hitherto been contemplated.

⁹⁵ Not found in Department files.

3. Provided preliminary conversations are at official and technical level and are of an exploratory nature His Majesty's Government will be glad to meet the wishes of the United States Government by concentrating in the opening stages of the discussions on the Middle East subject to the understanding that conversations will be world-wide in their general scope and will not be specifically confined to any particular oil-bearing region.

4. As regards the topics indicated in the State Department's note of February 11th [10th], His Majesty's Government are preparing their comments.

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1944.

800.6363/2-1844

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner)

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1944.

Participants: The Acting Secretary ⁹⁶
Lord Halifax
Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary ⁹⁷
Mr. Charles Rayner

Lord Halifax presented his note no. 95, dated February 18,⁹⁸ in regard to the proposed conversations with the British on petroleum matters of mutual interest. Lord Halifax stated that the British Government was agreeable to issuing a press release in accordance with the text previously agreed upon but subject to two conditions; (1) that the names and positions of the American group not be disclosed, although he was agreeable to naming the Departments which would be represented in the American group; and (2) that it was clearly understood that the reference in the Department's note of February 11 [10] to "concession rights" referred to future concessions and not to the readjustment of present existing concessions.

Elaborating upon the first point, Lord Halifax stated that it would be impossible for the British Government to send representatives of Ministerial rank to Washington at this time in view of the coming invasion months. He stated that he had been proceeding on the basis that the conversations would be conducted on a technical level and that the naming of an American group of Ministerial rank presented serious difficulties from the British standpoint. The Acting Secretary suggested the possibility of sending one member of the Cabinet and representatives technically qualified who could act under the

⁹⁶ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

⁹⁷ Of the British Embassy.

⁹⁸ *Supra.*

direction of Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax did not know whether or not such an arrangement would be satisfactory to London.

In regard to the elimination of "concession rights" from the conversations, the Acting Secretary telephoned Secretary Ickes⁹⁹ and discussed this matter with him. Secretary Ickes stated that he could not commit the President in this connection and suggested that they discuss the matter with the President after the Cabinet meeting that afternoon. The Acting Secretary so informed Lord Halifax and agreed to communicate with him after the Cabinet meeting.

Lord Halifax stated that London had not officially agreed to conduct the conversations in Washington. Mr. Wright confirmed this statement. Mr. Rayner stated that although official approval had not been given to Washington as the meeting place, he had understood from Mr. Wright that informal agreement had been reached on that point. The meeting then adjourned, to be resumed after the Cabinet meeting.

CHARLES RAYNER

800.6363/2-1844

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner)

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1944.

Participants: The Acting Secretary
 Lord Halifax
 Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary
 Mr. James Dunn, SPA¹
 Mr. Wallace Murray, OEA²
 Mr. Charles Rayner, ECA³

The Acting Secretary advised Lord Halifax that he had discussed with the President

- (1) the matter of a press release covering the conversations with the British,
- (2) the British objection to discussing concession rights, and
- (3) the Cabinet level of the American group.

He informed Lord Halifax on the first point that the President had been subject to a great deal of pressure from the press, with some intimation that a failure to issue a press release had given rise to rumors that difficulties had arisen between the British and us regard-

⁹⁹ Secretary of the Interior; also Petroleum Administrator for War.

¹ James Clement Dunn, Director, Office of European Affairs; also Acting Director, Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA), January 15-May 7, 1944.

² Wallace Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

³ Mr. Rayner, the Petroleum Adviser, was at this time attached to the Office of Economic Affairs (ECA).

ing these conversations and that he felt it extremely desirable that a press release should be issued immediately.

On the second point, the President was strong in his opinion that there should be no restrictions on the conversations; that the approach should be one of a frank and open discussion of all matters of mutual interest conducted between equal partners in a spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence. He therefore did not approve of the British request to eliminate a discussion of concession rights.

With reference to the third point, the President felt that the whole matter of mutual agreement on petroleum problems was of such extreme importance to both the British Government and to this Government and to the problems of international security that high ranking representatives of both Governments should constitute the groups that were to carry on the discussions.

A proposed press release to be issued at noon tomorrow was discussed. Mr. Wright felt very definitely that such a release would have an unfavorable reaction in London and might even result in a decision on their part to postpone conversations indefinitely. Several changes were made and final agreement was eventually reached on changes Lord Halifax felt would assist him in clearing the matter with London. It was also felt that a cable to Ambassador Winant requesting him to get in touch with Mr. Eden⁴ to elaborate on the point of view of this Government would be of assistance. The Acting Secretary instructed Messrs. Dunn, Murray and Rayner to prepare such a cable.⁵

CHARLES RAYNER

800.6363/1536 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

[LONDON,] February 20, 1944.

I have been watching lately with increasing misgivings official telegrams about the oil business. I am very glad you have consented to delay for a few days the publication of a purely American statement. You may be sure I should only wish to arrive at what is fair and just between our two countries. Surely this can be patiently considered between us before it is flung into public discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. A wrangle about oil would be a poor prelude for the tremendous joint enterprise and sacrifice to which we have bound ourselves.

2. Halifax has explained to me the difficulties of the situation on your side. We too have our difficulties which may become very formidable in Parliament.

⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Cable drafted but not sent.

There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which among other things, the whole supply of our Navy depends. This sensitiveness has, of course, been greatly aggravated by the five Senators.⁶ I am sure these suspicions are entirely unfounded so far as the Government of the United States is concerned. When, however, it is announced that you are to open a Conference upon oil in Persia and the Middle East and that the Secretary of State is to lead the American delegation, the whole question will become one of the first magnitude in Parliament. It will be felt that we are being hustled and may be subjected to pressure. I am sure to be asked for an assurance that the question of no transfer of property will arise and I shall be unable to give such an assurance. Moreover, great expectations will certainly be aroused in the United States by a conference on oil opened under your auspices. Will there not be increasing pressure upon you from those elements in the United States which are least friendly to us to gratify those expectations at our expense?

3. International Conference at highest level should surely be carefully prepared beforehand and I would beg you to consider whether it would not be more advisable to proceed as a first step for official and technical talks on the lines which had, I understand, already been agreed to between the State Department and ourselves.

800.6363/1509a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1944—midnight.

1332. Please deliver this message personally to the Prime Minister from the President.

“I have given most careful consideration to your telegram of February 20. I have noted particularly your concern that a wrangle between the two Governments on oil must be avoided. You point to the apprehension on your side that the United States desires to deprive you of oil assets in the Middle East. On the other hand, I am disturbed about the rumor that the British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves. Problems and questions which give rise to rumors and apprehensions of this sort also clearly indicate the strong need for arriving at a basic understanding between the two Governments regarding Middle Eastern oil, which understanding should lead to oil agreements of a broader scope.

I agree that the actual working technical discussions should be at

⁶ Reference is apparently to the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Petroleum Resources, known also as the Maloney Committee.

the expert staff level. However, in view of the great long range importance of oil to the post-war international security and economic arrangements, it is my firm conviction that these technical discussions should take place under the guidance of a group at Cabinet level and I cannot, therefore, change my position in this regard. While the American group will be under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, I desire to preside at the first meeting of the joint group to be held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

It is my view that all of the discussions should take place in Washington and that, in order that the broadest possible understandings may be reached, there should be no limitations on the petroleum problems to be discussed.

I assure you that it is the firm intention of this Government to approach these conversations in a frank and fully cooperative manner and with a clear desire to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement which will strengthen our collaboration in the tremendous joint enterprise to which you have alluded. Roosevelt."

STETTINIUS

800.6363/2-2544 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷

[LONDON,] 24 February, 1944.

591. Your telegram of February 22nd⁸ was brought to me by Winant and I told him that I was much concerned at the way things were developing. Our Cabinet are quite willing to have a technical enquiry into the oil position throughout the world. We should then know how we both stood.

The Cabinet however has definitely expressed the following view, namely:

First, that the enquiry should be on the official level in the first instance in order to ascertain the facts.

Secondly, they would prefer that it should take place here in London, and

Thirdly, that we should be authorized to state to Parliament that no proposal will be made to change the existing ownership of oil interests in the Middle East on which, as you know, our Navy depends or elsewhere.

Your telegram dismisses all these points and if you will allow me to say so seemed to convey your decision on these matters.

When I read the telegrams to the Cabinet this evening I found them also very much disturbed at the apparent possibility of a wide difference opening between the British and United States Governments

⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House in a memorandum dated February 25, 1944.

⁸ See *supra*.

on such a subject and at such a time. I have called for reports from the Ministers particularly concerned and will bring the matter before the Cabinet again in a few days. Meanwhile I trust you will not commit yourself to any public announcement because I am by no means sure that we could endorse it. Should the matter become public, otherwise than by agreement, debates will take place in Parliament at which all kinds of things would be said which would darken counsel and be resented on your side of the ocean.

I am deeply grieved that all these troubles should arise at a time when you have so many worries to contend with, and you may be sure that I will on every occasion do my best to be helpful. But I feel sure that to open up these matters with the maximum publicity without knowing where they will lead us might do real harm to Anglo-American relations.

800.6363/1699

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹

[LONDON,] March 4, 1944.

Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheep's eyes at our oilfields in Iran and Iraq.¹⁰ Let me reciprocate by giving you fullest assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia. My position in this as in all matters is that Great Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or otherwise, as result of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause—at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of her affairs. I will bring the matter before the Cabinet Monday and hope to telegraph you immediately thereafter.

800.636/1514c: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1944—1 p. m.

1680. Personal for the Ambassador. The press is beginning to speculate unfavorably on a breakdown of proposed oil talks. It is

⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on March 6, 1944. This is apparently an extract from the Prime Minister's telegram No. 601, of the same date, covering a number of subjects, transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on March 7, 1944 (740.0011 European War 1939/33702).

¹⁰ President Roosevelt in his message No. 485, dated March 3, to Prime Minister Churchill stated that he was having the oil question studied by the Department of State, but asked Mr. Churchill to accept his assurances that "we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran." (Copy of message obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.)

vital to make some announcement tomorrow. Please do all you can to get an immediate decision.

STETTINIUS

800.6363/1515 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 6, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received March 6—12:35 p. m.]

1822. Personal for the Acting Secretary of State. Your 1680, March 5. Please postpone statement until tomorrow. Cabinet meeting for decision this evening.

WINANT

800.6363/3-744

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to President Roosevelt*¹¹

LONDON, 6 March, 1944.

Following up your message number 485 to the Prime Minister of March 3rd¹² and State Department message number 1680 to me of March 5th (received this morning) I asked that the Cabinet take up the question of our oil conference in Washington at their evening session today.

It was my intention to forward their decision to Stettinius, but the Prime Minister asked that I transmit it directly to you.

"The War Cabinet welcome your assurance that there is no desire on the part of the United States Government to propose the transfer of our property and interests in Iraq and Iran, which we presume includes our properties elsewhere. In consequence of this, we waive our objection to talks not being in London and will send a delegation to the United States. We still feel, however, that this delegation should be official and expert, and once the ground is clear and facts established, that higher authorities should then intervene.

"As the fact that we are sending a delegation will now become public property, I suggest that a communiqué on the following lines be issued:

"The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are undertaking preliminary and exploratory discussions on petroleum questions. These discussions will be, in the first instance, at the official and expert level, and will take place in Washington."¹³

¹¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House on March 7, 1944.

¹² Not printed, but see footnote 10, p. 103.

¹³ Released to the press by the Department of State on March 7, 1944, together with a list of the American group appointed for further discussions on a higher level; Department of State *Bulletin*, March 11, 1944, p. 238.

“As I am likely to be questioned in Parliament on the subject, I must reserve the right to make it clear that no question arises of any transfer of existing rights or properties in oil. Signed Churchill.”

Eden told me that the Technical Committee might be called to meet at once and that the conference on a ministerial level could be called immediately thereafter to meet in Washington.

Would you be good enough to inform Stettinius, as I promised him on the telephone today, that I would cable him of the results of the Cabinet meeting this evening?

800.6363/1519b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1944—9 p. m.

1725. For your information we are quoting below the press release which was issued the afternoon of March 7:

“The Acting Secretary of State today made the following announcement, which is being issued simultaneously in Washington and London: ‘The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are undertaking preliminary and exploratory discussions on petroleum questions. These discussions will be, in the first instance, on an expert technical level, and will take place in Washington.’ The Acting Secretary of State stated that it is contemplated that these informal conversations with the British Government on problems of mutual interest relating to oil would lead at an early date to further conversations between the two Governments at a higher level. For this purpose the President has appointed a group under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State consisting of Secretary Ickes as Vice Chairman, Under Secretary of War Patterson, Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Charles Rayner, Petroleum Adviser of the Department of State, and Charles E. Wilson, Vice Chairman of the War Production Board.

In making the above announcement, the Acting Secretary of State stated that should these conversations lead to conclusions, no decision affecting producing areas would be taken without consultation with the governments of the countries concerned. He also pointed out that this Government is at all times ready to discuss economic problems with other governments and accordingly will welcome discussions with the government of any other friendly country concerning petroleum questions of mutual interest.”

STETTINIUS

800.6363/1523 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 9, 1944.

[Received March 10—12:15 p. m.]

784. Moscow papers for March 9th publish a Tass despatch from London concerning the forthcoming conversations between Britain and the United States concerning oil and listing the American representatives. The item includes statement at a press conference that other United Nations may participate in the conference.

HARRIMAN

800.6363/1526b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1944—11 p. m.

1836. From the President. As you know, the State Department's press release on the oil conversations which was issued on March 7 (State Department's telegram number 1725, March 7) named the group which will conduct the conversations at the high level and indicated that the technical exploratory discussions will lead to the high level conversations at an early date. I believe this is in line with Eden's view as given in your telegram of March 6 conveying the Prime Minister's message relative to the release.

Please inform the Prime Minister that I consider it most desirable that the British group at the ministerial level be also named promptly. I assume that the British technical experts will leave for the United States at an early date and will be prepared to carry on rapid preparatory discussions with a view to carrying the conversations to the higher level without delay. Accordingly, please tell the Prime Minister that I hope that the ministerial group will arrange to arrive in Washington very shortly, perhaps within a week or ten days, after the technical discussions have begun. [Roosevelt.]

HULL

800.6363/1523 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944—10 p. m.

600. Reference is made to the Department's press release of March 7 containing the Acting Secretary's announcement regarding the forth-

coming conversations with the British on oil. You will have received this announcement by Radio Bulletin. Relative to the last sentence of your telegram 784 of March 9, it is contemplated that these conversations will be entirely between the British and ourselves. There will first be preparatory technical discussions between American and British experts on oil problems of mutual interest to the two Governments. These discussions will lead as rapidly as possible to conversations between high level groups representing the two Governments. The Secretary of State is chairman of the American group at the high level.

Your attention is called to the following statements contained in the announcement: 1. Should these conversations lead to conclusions, no decision affecting producing areas will be taken without consultation with the governments of the countries concerned, and 2. This Government is at all times ready to discuss economic problems with any other friendly country concerning petroleum questions of mutual interest.

If you consider it advisable, you should bring these statements to the attention of the appropriate Soviet authorities.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/966 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to President Roosevelt*¹⁴

[Extract]

[LONDON,] 19 March, 1944.

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I again brought up, when I was with the Prime Minister today, the need for immediate action with reference to the conversations on oil. I have pressed this with Eden and others. The Prime Minister said he would have an answer for me on Monday,¹⁵ after studying over the week end a memorandum which had been prepared for him. A Cabinet Committee has already been appointed, but the names of the Cabinet Committee have not, in accordance with British custom and procedure, been made public. I am trying to get the technical experts appointed as soon as possible and the Cabinet Committee announced.

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¹⁴ Paraphrase transmitted to the Department by the White House on March 20, 1944.

¹⁵ March 20.

800.6363/1563c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1944—5 p. m.

2420. The British Embassy here informed the Department on March 23¹⁶ of a telegram it had received from London on that day stating that Sir William Brown¹⁷ has been appointed to head the official British delegation for the oil discussions here and that the remainder of the delegation will be named shortly. The Embassy stated that you were advised of the foregoing.

It is understood that it is the British intention that the delegation referred to will conduct for them the technical preliminary discussions which will precede the conversations at the higher level. In this connection, the telegram received by the British Embassy stated that the names of the Ministerial Committee will not be made public.

While this appears to be an indirect and partial answer to the message to the Prime Minister from the President, contained in Department's no. 1836 of March 10, it is believed desirable, if you have not already done so, that you ascertain directly the Prime Minister's reaction to that message and secure his reply without further delay.

HULL

800.6363/1565 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, March 30, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received March 30—1:58 p. m.]

2564. Your 2420, March 29, was just handed to me. This morning I received the following letter from Richard Law:¹⁸

"I am now able to let you know that the official delegation for discussions with the United States on the subject of oil will consist of Sir William Brown, Mr. F. C. Starling from the Petroleum Department, Mr. J. H. Le Rougetel from the Foreign Office, at least one representative from the service departments, and Sir W. Fraser and Sir F. Godber from the Petroleum Board.

The delegation will travel by sea and should arrive in Washington about April 15th."

It is contrary to all British custom and procedure to publish Cab-

¹⁶ British note, dated March 23, not printed.

¹⁷ Permanent Secretary of the British Ministry of Home Security; formerly Secretary of the Petroleum Division of the British Ministry of Fuel and Power and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Petroleum Control Board.

¹⁸ British Minister of State.

inet committees. I have been trying to persuade them to make an exception in this case but so far have not succeeded.

There is another difficulty that concerns the British in attempting to deal with this problem on a Ministerial level. In order to send a delegation to the United States that would rank equally with the men appointed by the President on the American Committee it would be necessary that members of the War Cabinet go to the United States. That the meeting be held in Washington has been conceded. I am certain that the British want both Eden and Lord Leathers¹⁹ included. The latter is far and away the best informed man in this field. Both these men are seriously involved in the day to day operational preparation for the invasion from the West. I have talked this matter over with the Prime Minister, Eden, Leathers and Law on several occasions. They are not trying to evade the issue. They want to work with us. It is my judgment that after the technical groups have measured the field for discussion we will be able to get definite action from this side even if the men the British want to send are not then available.

I could not press harder than I have to get this job done.

WINANT

S00.6363/4-144

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Blake-Tyler) to the
Petroleum Adviser (Rayner)*

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1944.

MY DEAR RAYNER: The following is the text of an announcement which is being issued in London for publication on the morning of April 4th.

Begins. An official delegation is about to leave for Washington to conduct preliminary and exploratory discussions on petroleum questions at an expert and technical level. Delegation will be led by Sir William Brown, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.B.E. The other members will be Commodore A. W. Clarke, D.S.O., R.N., Sir William Fraser, C.B.E., Sir Frederick Godber, F. Harner, J.H. Le Rougetel, C.M.G., M.C., F. C. Starling, C.B.E.

Secretary will be Mr. V. Butler. *Ends.*

You will of course appreciate that it will be necessary for the delegation to return to England and to present their report, and for this report to be considered fully by Ministers before discussions are embarked on at Ministerial level. In any publicity which you care to give to the question at this stage, therefore, the Foreign Office would be grateful if no statement is made which would imply that Ministers

¹⁹ British Minister of War Transport.

would arrive in Washington immediately at the conclusion of the official discussions.

Yours very truly,

H. BLAKE TYLER

[On April 11, 1944, the Department of State announced to the press the composition of the American group of experts, and on April 13, 1944, a list of ten representatives of the American petroleum industry invited to meet with the group of experts; see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, pages 346-347.]

800.6363/1601 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic Representatives*²⁰

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1944—7 p. m.

As you know exploratory discussions on petroleum with the Government of the United Kingdom are being initiated here at the expert technical level. The object of the discussions, which will begin about April 15, is to arrive at an understanding on principles and on the procedure and mechanism for implementing such principles, preliminary to definitive conversations between the two Governments at the cabinet and ministerial level.

Discussions on oil are being held first with the United Kingdom Government because of the extensive joint interest of nationals of the two countries in foreign oil and because of the necessity for the two countries to reach an understanding thereon particularly in view of pressing problems of purely mutual interest.

In no event however will any decisions be made or action taken as a result of these discussions which might affect any third country unless the Government of such country is consulted. Moreover, it is this Government's intention to work as rapidly as possible with other

²⁰ Sent to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

Sent to the Soviet Union with the following substituted for the last paragraph: "You should convey the above information to the appropriate authorities of the Government to which you are accredited as soon as possible. Please report any reaction of those authorities to this matter."

Sent to Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria and Lebanon with the following substituted for the last paragraph: "You should convey the above information to the appropriate authorities of the Government to which you are accredited as soon as possible. In your conversations with those officials you should stress the fact that this Government shall strive in every way possible to see, in so far as oil concessions held abroad by its nationals are concerned, that adequate benefits are received from the development of such oil by the countries owning the resources in order that the economic advancement of such countries may be furthered. Please report any official reaction to the foregoing."

Sent to China and to the United Kingdom for the Netherlands with the following substituted for the last paragraph: "The above information is for your use in answering any inquiries that may be made by officials of the Government to which you are accredited regarding the Anglo-American oil discussions."

Governments toward a multilateral oil agreement and with that in view this Government contemplates planning with other Governments for a multilateral oil conference as soon as possible. In the meantime, as the Department stated when announcing the conversations with the British, this Government is prepared at any time to discuss with any Government problems of mutual interest concerning oil.

The above information is being conveyed orally at Washington to the diplomatic representatives of the Government to which you are accredited. It is being sent to you for your information and use where advisable in conversations with officials.

HULL

[The Anglo-American exploratory discussions were held at Washington April 18–May 3, 1944. The minutes of the meetings of the groups of experts are not printed. The draft memorandum of understanding agreed to by the American and British experts is printed as enclosure to the document *infra*.]

800.6363/1643c

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1944.

The enclosed draft Memorandum of Understanding on petroleum was agreed to, on an *ad referendum* basis, by the United States and United Kingdom expert groups as a result of the exploratory discussions on oil, and was considered on May 2 by the Committee you appointed and of which I am Chairman. This Committee unanimously approved the Memorandum.

In the exploratory discussions, the United Kingdom Delegation urged that the Memorandum of Understanding be re-enforced on two counts:

1. The British group felt that there should be explicit recognition of the United Kingdom's dependence upon imported petroleum supplies and that therefore there should be special assurances of ample supplies to the United Kingdom for its national security and industrial and commercial well-being. The American expert group felt that the prime purpose of the Memorandum is to assure ample oil supplies to all countries and that any specific further assurance for the United Kingdom would be in conflict with our established commercial policy.

2. The United Kingdom group urged that the two Governments should agree not merely to respect but also to support all valid concession contracts. This further commitment would have obligated the United States Government to take joint action with the British vis-à-vis third governments regarding the validity of contracts, and the

American group was not authorized to consider so broad a commitment.

We understand that when the British Delegation presents the draft Memorandum to the Cabinet Committee, they will urge that the second of these points be pressed again at a higher level. It is thought unlikely that there will be further pressure for special assurances of supplies for the United Kingdom.

[Enclosure]

Draft Memorandum of Understanding With the United Kingdom on Petroleum, April 29, 1944

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, whose nationals hold, to a substantial extent jointly, rights to explore and develop petroleum resources in other countries, recognize:

1. That ample supplies of petroleum,* available in international trade to meet increasing market demands, are essential for both the security and economic well-being of nations;

2. That for the foreseeable future the petroleum resources of the world are adequate to assure the availability of such supplies;

3. That such supplies should be derived from the various producing areas of the world with due consideration of such factors as available reserves, sound engineering practices, relevant economic factors, and the interests of producing and consuming countries, and with a view to the full satisfaction of expanding demand;

4. That such supplies should be available in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.²³

I

The two Governments agree that the development of petroleum resources should be expanded in an orderly manner on a world-wide basis with due consideration of the factors set forth in paragraph 3 of the Preamble and within the framework of applicable laws or concession contracts. To this end they will concert their efforts to ensure, with respect to petroleum resources in which rights are held or may be acquired by the nationals of either country,

1. That petroleum shall be available in international trade to the nationals of all peace-loving countries in adequate volume, at fair prices and on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis;

2. That the development of petroleum resources and the benefits received therefrom by the producing countries shall be such as to encourage the sound economic advancement of those countries;

* "Petroleum" throughout this document is used to signify crude petroleum and its derivatives. [Footnote in the original.]

²³ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

3. That the development of these resources shall be conducted with a view to the availability of adequate supplies of petroleum to both countries as well as to all other peace-loving countries, subject to the provisions of such collective security arrangements as may be established;

4. That, with respect to the acquisition of exploration and development rights in areas not now under concession, the principle of equal opportunity shall be respected by both Governments;

5. That the Government of each country and the nationals thereof shall respect all valid concession contracts and lawfully acquired rights, and shall make no effort unilaterally to interfere directly or indirectly with such contracts or rights;

6. That the exploration for and development of petroleum resources, the construction and operation of refineries and other facilities, and the distribution of petroleum shall not be hampered by restrictions imposed by either Government or its nationals, inconsistent with the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding.

II

The two Governments recognize that the principles declared in Article I hereof are of general applicability and merit adherence on the part of all nations interested in the international petroleum trade of the world.

Therefore, with a view to the wider adoption and effectuation of the principles embodied in this Memorandum of Understanding they agree that as soon as practicable they will propose to the governments of other interested producing and consuming countries an International Petroleum Agreement which, *inter alia*, would establish a permanent International Petroleum Council composed of representatives of all signatory countries.

To this end the two Governments hereby pledge themselves to formulate plans for an international conference to consider the negotiation of such a multilateral Petroleum Agreement. They also pledge themselves to consult with other interested governments with a view to taking whatever action is necessary to prepare for the proposed conference.

III

There are, however, numerous problems of joint immediate interest to the two Governments, with respect to petroleum resources in which rights are held or may be acquired by their nationals, which must be discussed and resolved on a cooperative interim basis if the general petroleum supply situation is not to deteriorate.

With this end in view the two Governments hereby agree to establish a Joint Petroleum Commission to be composed of ten members, five members to be appointed immediately by each Government. This Commission, in furtherance of and in accordance with the principles

stated in Article I hereof, shall consider problems of mutual interest to both Governments and their nationals, and, with a view to the equitable disposition of such problems, shall be charged with the following duties and responsibilities:

1. To prepare long-term estimates of world demand for petroleum, having due regard for the interests of consuming countries and expanding consumption requirements,

2. To suggest the manner in which, over the long term, this estimated demand may best be satisfied by production equitably distributed among the various producing countries in accordance with the criteria enumerated in paragraph 3 of the Preamble,

3. To recommend to both Governments broad policies for adoption by operating companies with a view to effectuating programs suggested under the provisions of paragraph 2 above,

4. To analyze such short-term problems of joint interest as may arise in connection with production, processing, transportation and distribution of petroleum on a world-wide basis, wherever the nationals of either country have a significant interest, and to recommend to both Governments such action as may appear appropriate;

5. To make regular reports to the two Governments concerning its activities;

6. To make, from time to time, such additional reports and recommendations to the respective Governments as may be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding.

The Commission shall establish such organization as is necessary to carry out its functions under this Memorandum of Understanding. The expenses of the Commission shall be shared equally by the two Governments.

IV

To effectuate this Memorandum of Understanding the two Governments hereby grant reciprocal assurances:

1. That they will adhere to the principles set forth in Article I, paragraphs 1 to 6 inclusive,

2. That they will endeavor to obtain the collaboration of the governments of other producing and consuming countries in the implementation of the principles set forth in Article I, and will consult, as appropriate, with such governments in connection with activities undertaken under Article III,

3. That upon approval of the recommendations of the Commission they will endeavor, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, to give effect to such approved recommendations and, wherever necessary and advisable, to ensure that the activities of their nationals will conform thereto,

4. That each Government will undertake to keep itself adequately informed of the current and prospective activities of its nationals with respect to the development, processing, transportation and distribution of petroleum,

5. That each Government will make available to the Commission such information regarding the activities of its nationals as is neces-

sary to the realization of the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding.

V

This Memorandum of Understanding shall continue in force until six months after notice of termination by either Government or until superseded by the International Petroleum Agreement contemplated in Article II.

800.6363/1653a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic
Representatives*²⁴

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1944—10 p. m.

The following regarding the preliminary exploratory petroleum discussions with the United Kingdom which were completed in Washington on Wednesday, May 3 is for your confidential background information and for such use as in your discretion may be appropriate in conversations with government officials.

Since it had been previously agreed that definitive understandings between the two Governments would be effected at Cabinet level, all conclusions reached in the preliminary discussions were on an *ad referendum* basis. The measure of agreement however was very large and it is anticipated that the tentative understandings reached in these technical discussions will be ratified by the respective senior committees.

The two Delegations agreed on certain broad principles under which Anglo-American foreign oil operations should be conducted. These principles are summarily as follows:

1. That ample supplies of petroleum shall be available in international trade to all peace-loving countries at fair prices and on a non-discriminatory basis, and that petroleum resources, in which their nationals hold rights, shall be developed to this end;
2. That petroleum development operations shall be conducted with a view to the sound economic advancement of producing countries;
3. That the principle of equal opportunity to acquire new exploration and development rights shall be respected by both Governments;
4. That both Governments and their nationals shall respect all valid concession contracts and rights lawfully acquired thereunder;
5. That no restrictions inconsistent with the broad purpose of developing ample supplies shall be imposed by either Government or its nationals.

²⁴ Sent to Canada, China, and Egypt for repetition to Jerusalem, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. On May 10, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom was instructed to repeat the circular telegram to the representative near the Netherlands Government in Exile. On May 12 the same circular telegram was sent to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

During the discussions these principles were discussed thoroughly and in great detail. Pending specific problems were fully canvassed and there was a genuine meeting of minds with respect to applicability of the principles to such problems.

It was agreed that as soon as practicable both Governments would take action looking toward the negotiation of a multilateral agreement among interested producing and consuming countries. To this end, the two Governments, in consultation with other governments, would formulate plans for a petroleum conference to consider such an agreement.

Meanwhile, to implement the agreed principles, the two Governments would create a Joint Petroleum Commission which would be charged with the responsibility of estimating long range world demand for petroleum and suggesting the manner in which this demand may best be satisfied by production equitably distributed among producing countries. The Joint Commission would also recommend policies the adoption of which by operating companies would effectuate the suggested production programs. Finally, it would consider short term problems of production, transportation, refining and distribution wherever the nationals of either country have a significant interest and would make appropriate recommendations. The proposed Commission would not have executive power or functions. Its operations would be confined to recommending to the two Governments broad production and distribution policies.

The Department believes that the discussions have had a satisfactory outcome and that, if the draft Memorandum of Understanding which incorporates the foregoing is adopted, a most constructive step will have been taken in the direction of post-war economic cooperation.

HULL

800.6363/1706a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1944—11 p. m.

4493. As you know, the exploratory oil discussions held in Washington in the latter part of April resulted in a substantial measure of agreement on an *ad referendum* basis. It was our understanding and hope that the British Government would expedite definitive action on this agreement.

The British Embassy here informs us that the matter is still under consideration by the British Government which indicates that there will be further delay before the departure of any group from London for final conversations. We are also informed that the Ambassador here is urging his Government to take prompt action.

For your confidential information the Maloney Committee, which is a special Senate committee on petroleum, is suspending public hearings on all matters connected with foreign oil until the Anglo-American discussions are consummated. Moreover, prolonged delay may cause press and other comment which it would be preferable to avoid. It is therefore desirable that final agreement be reached with the British without further delay and it is requested that you urge upon the British authorities that they take prompt action to that end.

STETTINIUS

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²⁵

[WASHINGTON,] 7 June, 1944.

554. I am sorry to learn that Sir William Brown and staff departure has been delayed. I personally hope much that they can come as quickly as possible, as the situation is becoming embarrassing.

ROOSEVELT

800.6363/1707: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 9, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received June 9—4:35 p. m.]

4641. To the Acting Secretary. In reply to your 4493 of June 6, I wanted you to know that conversations on the oil situation have been progressing within the Government here and I am in contact with the Ministers who are considering it. I hope to give you a definite and favorable reply some time next week.

WINANT

800.6363/6-1644

*Memorandum by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner)*²⁶

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1944.

I am informed by the British Embassy that the following telegram was sent by the Prime Minister to the President yesterday.

"Many thanks for your telegram of June 7 number 554. Points of principle have arisen in connection with Brown's report which it has been necessary to take up in the Cabinet, and oil being so vital to our security and other reasons we have referred them to a ministerial

²⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁶ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary.

committee, but I hope that this will not mean any great delay and that I will be able to let you know how the matter stands in the very near future."

The Brown referred to above is Sir William Brown who was Chairman of the British Delegation which conducted the preliminary discussions with our American Expert Group.

CHARLES RAYNER

800.6363/1724a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1944—11 p. m.

5007. The following is a United Press report of this morning:

"High American oil officials charged the British with using the invasion as an excuse for delaying action on plans for an Anglo-American agreement on postwar petroleum activities. The United States has already named its delegation, headed by Secretary Hull, to participate in the final talks. The British, however, have not yet appointed representatives for this 'full dress' parley. Some quarters reported that the British Delegation would arrive here within ten days. American officials, however, have become extremely annoyed over what they termed the British 'procrastination'. They said the British have 'used' the invasion 'to drag this whole thing out indefinitely'. They gave as a possible explanation the belief that Britain wants to show this country it has no enthusiasm for our participation in Middle Eastern oil affairs."

We have been concerned lest this type of publicity would occur with resultant adverse atmosphere relative to future petroleum conversations.

We understand the British Embassy here has transmitted the foregoing in full to London, at the same time urging prompt action. Please urge strongly upon the British the advisability of their naming their Delegation to complete the conversations and of fixing the date of its departure without further delay.

HULL

800.6363/7-344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, July 3, 1944—midnight.

[Received July 3—8:09 p. m.]

5265. After receiving your 5007 of June 24, I urged prompt action in the appointment of delegates by the British Government and also

called attention to the United Press report which you included in your message. The Foreign Office was able to forward a prospective list of delegates to the British Embassy in Washington which I was told Lord Halifax had transmitted to the Department.²⁷ I do not anticipate changes in the personnel but as soon as the list has had Cabinet confirmation, I shall cable it to you.²⁸

WINANT

800.6363/7-2544

*Minutes of Plenary Session No. I, Anglo-American Conversations on Petroleum, July 25, 1944, 4 p. m.*²⁹

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION :

The Right Honorable Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal, Head of Delegation

The Right Honorable Richard Law, Minister of State

The Right Honorable Ben Smith, Minister Resident in Washington

The Right Honorable Ralph Assheton, Financial Secretary to the Treasury

The Right Honorable Geoffrey Lloyd, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Fuel and Power

UNITED STATES DELEGATION :

The Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Chairman

The Honorable Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Administrator for War, Vice Chairman

The Honorable James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War

The Honorable Leo Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator

Mr. Ralph K. Davies, Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War

Mr. Charles Rayner, Petroleum Adviser, Department of State

ADVISERS AND STAFF :

Sir William Brown, Chief Adviser, U.K. Delegation

Mr. Harry C. Hawkins, Director, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State, Adviser, U.S. Delegation

Mr. Victor Butler, Secretary, U.K. Delegation

Mr. James C. Sappington, Assistant Chief, Petroleum Division, Department of State, Executive Secretary, U.S. Delegation

²⁷ British note of June 30, not printed.

²⁸ Ambassador's later cable of July 13 not printed. A list of the American and British delegates was announced simultaneously in Washington and London on July 12; see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 16, 1944, p. 62. For announcement of the arrival of the British delegation on July 21 and the initiation of the conversations on July 25, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1944, p. 93.

²⁹ Minutes of the remaining four plenary sessions not printed.

Mr. John A. Loftus, Petroleum Division, Department of State,
Recording Secretary

1. Secretary Hull opened the meeting by welcoming the U.K. Delegation. He observed how encouraging a portent for the future it was that these two delegations were assembled to talk constructively on one phase of international cooperation. He adverted to the importance of petroleum as a commodity, both domestically and in international trade. He said that he conceived it to be the object of these conferences to discuss all of the implications and problems of international trade in oil in the future. The hope shared by both delegations was that out of these conversations there would emerge a better understanding in matters connected with the international petroleum trade. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that the principles which would constitute the basis of agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom would soon receive a wider adoption and would become the corner stone of a broad world-wide agreement on international petroleum problems.

2. Secretary Hull stated that it was his understanding that these conversations would be based upon the Memorandum of Understanding dated April 29, 1944 which had been agreed to on an *ad referendum* basis by the technical delegations at an earlier date. He stated that the U.S. Delegation had considered and approved certain minor changes which he would table for consideration by the U.K. Delegation. Copies of the agreed draft of April 29 and of a memorandum indicating the changes proposed by the U.S. Delegation were distributed. He suggested that subcommittees be appointed by each delegation to consider these proposed changes and any amendments that the U.K. Delegation might care to suggest.

3. Lord Beaverbrook thanked Secretary Hull most warmly for the welcome extended to his colleagues and himself.

The Government of the United States had already made immense efforts for the furtherance of international cooperation and the British were in full accord with the broad principles which had been laid down.

The discussions upon which we were about to enter would be a pattern for the many problems of international organization which would be coming up for consideration by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain.

He referred to the proposed Memorandum of Understanding. The British Government wished to make certain amendments but these were solely concerned with subjects which had been specifically reserved at the earlier discussions at an official level.

He welcomed the proposal of submitting the amendments suggested by the United States and British Governments to a special subcom-

mittee and nominated the Financial Secretary to the Treasury as the Chairman of the British group.

He hoped that it would be possible for the subcommittee to clear the various points at a single session, in which case a further meeting might be held on Thursday with a view to the signature of an agreed document.

4. Copies were distributed of a memorandum setting forth in parallel columns the agreed draft of April 29, 1944 and a draft as proposed to be amended by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

5. Secretary Hull nominated to the United States subcommittee, Mr. Rayner, Mr. Davies and Mr. Hawkins.

6. It was moved to adjourn until Thursday, July 27, at 3:30 p. m. Meeting adjourned 4:35 p. m.

800.6363/8-2144

*The Petroleum Administrator for War (Ickes) to President Roosevelt*³⁰

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS Acting Chairman, in the absence of Secretary Hull, of the Committee appointed by you to conduct on behalf of this Government the petroleum conversations with the Government of the United Kingdom, I have the honor to make the following report.

The conversations were initiated on July 25, 1944 between a United States Delegation headed by Secretary Hull and a United Kingdom Delegation led by Lord Beaverbrook, and were successfully concluded at a plenary session on August 3 of the two Delegations under my chairmanship. As a result of these conversations, a mutually satisfactory agreement on petroleum was reached. The United States Delegation approves this agreement and has recommended that the State Department conclude the agreement between this Government and the Government of the United Kingdom.³¹

Respectfully,

HAROLD L. ICKES

Approved:

Ralph A. Bard

Acting Secretary of the Navy

Robert P. Patterson

Under Secretary of War

by Robert A. Lovett A.S.W.A.

³⁰ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Petroleum Administration for War on August 21, 1944.

³¹ The agreement was signed at Washington August 8, 1944; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 13, 1944, p. 153, or British Cmd. 6555.

Leo Crowley
Foreign Economic Administrator
Charles E. Wilson
Vice Chairman, War Production Board
Ralph K. Davies
Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War
Charles Rayner
Petroleum Adviser, Department of State

800.6363/8-844

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner)

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1944.

I called on Mr. Richard Law ²² this morning in connection with a suggestion that the agreed minutes covering the British exchange position be released to the press at the same time the terms of the oil agreement are made public. I called to his attention that it was the feeling of our Delegation that to do so would be inadvisable as it would exaggerate that factor out of all proportion to the broad principles and purposes of the agreement and by implication make it an addendum to the agreement itself. It was our intention to file with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Maloney Committee a full set of the minutes of the Plenary Sessions together with the agreement itself. Accordingly, they would be advised concerning all matters discussed between the Delegations and there would be no question, therefore, of our not disclosing any points concerning which discussion took place. Mr. Law said that he was satisfied with this explanation and would withdraw his suggestion.

I called to his attention our agreement that if they found it necessary to file with the Parliament the minutes covering the subject of the British exchange position and such minutes became public, then we would be free to issue whatever press release we felt was necessary. He said that they might be forced to make these minutes public before the Parliament convened the end of September. If either course were taken, he agreed that they would give us prior notice of their intention so that we could give the matter whatever publicity we considered desirable.

For your information, I called Ralph Davies in regard to the above matter and he said that both he and Secretary Ickes felt very strongly that there should be no publicity at this time of the agreed minutes and that we should follow the course of action which I have outlined

²² British Minister of State.

above. I also tried to reach Mr. McDermott³³ to get his opinion from the publicity angle. I was unable to reach him.

CHARLES B. RAYNER

800.6363/8-1044

The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 10 August, 1944.

DEAR ED: You will remember that on August 3rd you asked me to send a special personal message from you to Mr. Eden to say that, though at a Plenary Session of the United States and the United Kingdom Delegations on Petroleum the previous day you had found it necessary to take a firm stand in respect of one of our proposals, you wished him to know that you remained as hitherto the friend of Great Britain and the standard-bearer of cooperation between our two countries. With all the great problems which our two countries had to surmount together, you had felt that we should keep on the hill-top, but that we had dropped below it.

I duly sent a message on these lines and I have now received from Mr. Eden a message, the text of which I attach.

Yours ever

RONALD I. CAMPBELL

[Enclosure]

*Telegram From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(Eden)*

"Please thank Stettinius and tell him that my ears are always very open to anything he has to say to me. I want to help him and his country as he has often helped us and mine.

2. We are greatly relieved to have reached an agreement over oil, and I am very hopeful that the Commission we have set up will eliminate quietly a great many troubles connected with oil in the past.

3. The team I have now sent him for talks on future world organization is led by a seasoned mountaineer who, while he cuts steps will have the summit in mind."³⁴

³³ Michael J. McDermott, special assistant to the Secretary of State as Press Relations Officer.

³⁴ Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was the head of the British delegation for the First Phase of the Washington Conversations on International Organization at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21-September 28, 1944; see vol. I, section entitled "Preliminaries to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security," part II.

800.6363/8-1544

Memorandum by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: Secretary Ickes advised me today that he had written the President requesting that he take no action in regard to appointments on the Petroleum Commission until he (Secretary Ickes) had had an opportunity of discussing the matter with him on his return to Washington the latter part of this month. I told Secretary Ickes that it would be desirable if he and Secretary Hull would see the President together in connection with these appointments. Secretary Ickes was in full accord with this suggestion.

CHARLES RAYNER

800.6363/8-2444

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate to receive the advice and consent of that body to ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, an agreement on petroleum between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed in Washington August 8, 1944.

The agreement expresses the mutual understanding of the two Governments with respect to certain principles governing international trade in petroleum. These principles have relation to (1) the making available of adequate petroleum supplies to the nationals of all peaceable countries at fair prices and on a nondiscriminatory basis, subject to such collective security arrangements as may be established; (2) the development of petroleum resources with a view to encouraging the sound economic advancement of producing countries; (3) equal opportunity in the acquisition of exploration and development rights in areas not now under concession; (4) respect for valid concession contracts and lawfully acquired rights; and (5) safeguarding the production and distribution of petroleum from restrictions inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the agreement.

The agreement is of an interim character, intended to be preliminary to the negotiation of an international agreement to which the governments of all producing and consuming countries interested in the

international petroleum trade would become parties and which would establish a permanent International Petroleum Council. The agreement provides that the two Governments will formulate plans for an international conference to consider the negotiation of a multilateral petroleum agreement and that they will consult with other interested governments with a view to taking any necessary action to prepare for the proposed conference.

Meanwhile, for the discussing and resolving, on a cooperative interim basis, of certain problems of joint immediate interest to the two Governments, the agreement provides for the establishment of an International Petroleum Commission to be composed of eight members, four to be appointed by each Government. The Commission is charged with the responsibility of considering problems of mutual interest to the two Governments and their respective nationals. With a view to the equitable disposition of such problems the Commission is charged with (1) preparing long-term estimates of world demand for petroleum and suggesting the manner in which this estimated demand may best be satisfied by production equitably distributed among the various producing countries in accordance with the general principles of the agreement; (2) recommending broad policies for adoption by operating companies; (3) analyzing short-term problems of joint interest, wherever the nationals of either country have a significant interest, in connection with production, processing, transportation, and distribution of petroleum on a world-wide basis; and (4) making appropriate reports and recommendations to the two Governments.

It is provided in the agreement that the two Governments will seek the collaboration of the governments of other producing and consuming countries in the implementation of the principles underlying the agreement and will consult, as appropriate, with such governments in connection with activities undertaken on the basis of recommendations of the Commission established by the agreement.

The agreement consists of an Introductory Article and six numbered Articles. Article VI provides that the agreement shall enter into force upon a date to be agreed upon after each Government shall have notified the other of its readiness to bring the agreement into force and that the agreement shall continue in force until three months after notice of termination has been given by either Government or until it is superseded by a multilateral petroleum agreement of the character mentioned hereinbefore.

Respectfully submitted,

CORDELL HULL

800.6363/9-1544

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner)

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1944.

Michael Wright³⁵ inquired regarding the present status of the oil agreement between this Government and the U.K., particularly as to when the hearings on the agreement would begin. I told him that, as he undoubtedly knew, the President had referred the agreement to the Senate for ratification and that the Senate had referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations; that Senator Connally, Chairman of that Committee, had stated that hearings on the oil agreement would not take place until after the elections. I told Mr. Wright that I was hopeful that hearings would begin early in November.

Mr. Wright referred to an article which he had read in the *New York Journal of Commerce* which stated that discussions in connection with a multilateral agreement on oil had already begun with Venezuela, Russia and the Netherlands, and asked me if there was any truth in this report. I replied that there was not. He said that it was their feeling that consultation between the two Governments should precede any formal approach to representatives of other Governments leading to the formulation of a multilateral agreement. I stated that it was also my feeling that such consultation should precede any formal discussions.

He asked me as to when the members of the American half of the International Petroleum Commission would be appointed. I told him that that had not been decided, but I assumed that Secretary Hull would discuss the matter with the President in the near future. He requested that the British Government be advised as to the American membership of the International Petroleum Commission prior to the actual announcement of such membership. I told him that I would pass this request on to Secretary Hull. Mr. Wright stated that they would advise this Government of the British membership in advance of any public announcement.

CHARLES RAYNER

800.6363/12-2744

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1944.

Misunderstandings have arisen concerning the purposes and scope of the Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement which, as you know, was submitted on August 24, 1944, to the Senate for its advice and

³⁵ Counselor of the British Embassy.

consent to ratification. Senator Connally has publicly stated his belief that the Agreement would not be ratified in its present form. Opposition has been expressed by certain sections of the American petroleum industry indicating concern lest implementation of the Agreement might lead to the mandatory regulation of its operations.

Therefore it is the intention of the State Department to recommend that you request the Senate to return the Agreement in order that consideration may be given to a revision of the Agreement in order to remove grounds for misunderstanding.³⁶

We have discussed this with Senator Connally and will send you a definite recommendation in the next few days.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR SETTLING CERTAIN CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF ACTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EITHER STATIONED IN TERRITORY OF THE OTHER

811.203/2-2743

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1943.

The British Ambassador³⁷ called at his request and brought up very specially the subject matter of a recent cable from Mr. Winant,³⁸ in which he set forth the British complaint about the lack of British jurisdiction to punish Americans for crimes committed in that country apart from those pertaining to the duties and functions of seamen. I thanked him and said that this was primarily a matter for the War Department, but that his arguments seemed plausible at first blush to the extent that it might call for further examination or review by my Government and that in any event I would be glad to encourage by suitable means the hastening of consideration of this matter by the War Department coupled with any legitimate cooperation on the part of the State Department.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

³⁶ On January 10, 1945, President Roosevelt requested the Senate to return the Agreement to the State Department. There followed conversations between representatives of industry and government in which the misunderstandings were removed and changes agreed upon. Then on September 17 a new Anglo-American Conference was opened in London, out of which came a new agreement signed on September 24. This agreement, too, was submitted to the United States Senate for ratification but it met with no more success than the first and on July 5, 1952, by a Joint Resolution it was returned to the State Department.

³⁷ Lord Halifax.

³⁸ Presumably reference is to telegram No. 7845, November 11, 1943 (not printed), from John G. Winant, American Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

811.203/356 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1944.

181. Foreign Office letter dated November 20 quoted in your 8206, November 24,³⁹ requested amplification of statement in Department's 6748, October 28,³⁹ that military and naval authorities would make every effort consistent with law and policy to secure compliance by members of armed forces of United States with judgments of United Kingdom courts in civil case to extent permissible under United States military or naval law.

Department is advised as follows by War and Navy Departments: ⁴⁰

By the phrase "every effort consistent with law and policy to secure compliance to the extent permissible in United States military and naval law", the following meaning is intended:

The Army and Navy will give to judgments of British courts the same effect as that given to judgments of American courts except as to judgments based on subject matter within the purview of the Foreign Claims Act.⁴¹

The policy of the Army and Navy in regard to invoking disciplinary action to effect payment of the judgments of American courts is as follows:

Refusal or failure to satisfy judgments found by courts to be due to a plaintiff will be proper ground for disciplinary action when in so refusing or failing to pay such judgment such personnel have violated Army or Navy standards of honor by fraud, deceit, evasion, or other dishonorable conduct or neglect justifying disciplinary action. Mere inability to pay such a judgment would not justify such disciplinary action. There must be a willful refusal or failure to make such payment under circumstances constituting dishonorable indifference, accompanied by ability to pay.

Refusal or failure to pay a judgment based on a claim within the purview of the Foreign Claims Act of January 2, 1942, as amended, would not be a proper basis for such disciplinary action. Claims within the purview of the Foreign Claims Act are subject to the jurisdiction of United States foreign claims commissions whose disposition thereof will be final and no assistance will be rendered by United States Authorities to require personnel to pay judgments of British courts to which claimant has resorted in such cases either originally or as a means of evasion or appeal from United States Claim Commissions.

HULL

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ The following statements except the last sentence of the telegram were conveyed in a letter of January 19 (not printed), from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom to Sir Nevile Butler, Counselor in the British Foreign Office.

⁴¹ Act approved January 2, 1942; 55 Stat. 880.

811.203/348 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1944.

182. The Department refers to your telegram 7808, November 10⁴² repeating a communication dated November 5 from British Foreign Office concerning civil claims against members of the United States forces in the United Kingdom.

At the outset it should be stated that while as indicated in the Department's No. 5657 of September 16,⁴² this Government pending further experience will not object to exercise by British courts of jurisdiction in civil proceeding involving members of its armed forces, subject to the conditions therein stated, in no circumstances does it recognize any liability of the United States or its foreign claims commissions to pay judgments of British courts or tribunals against personnel of its armed forces.

Department's No. 6748 of October 28⁴² indicated that subject to the conditions in its No. 5657 the War and Navy Departments would make every effort consistent with law and policy to obtain compliance by their personnel with judgments of British courts. Further detail in explanation of this position is contained in the Department's No. 181 of January 7, 1944. These arrangements are particularly applicable to personal judgments in affiliation proceedings and on private contractual and domestic obligations, which are beyond the scope of the Foreign Claims Acts.

The Foreign Office note of November 5 alleges that certain commitments involving the responsibility of this government for judgments of British courts against members of the armed forces of the United States with respect to torts committed by service personnel of the United States in the course of duty have been made by officers of this Government in London. Not only is there some disagreement as to what commitments were made, but the Department is advised that the War and Navy Departments have not authorized the payment of any such civil judgments. The War Department has however recently authorized the theater commander to pay from contingent funds specified outstanding and unpaid claims which had been processed under knock for knock and halving agreements prior to the time that operation under these collision agreements was terminated.

This Government desires that the British Government pay under reverse lend-lease all noncombat claims of third parties, now pending or hereafter arising out of acts of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in line of duty or out of operations of United States armed forces and their equipment, which the British Government

⁴² Not printed.

considers not politically objectionable. It is believed that such claims are a part of the normal expenses of the United States forces and are properly chargeable to reverse lend-lease. It is contemplated that under this arrangement property losses of the respective Governments arising out of accidents in which only personnel and equipment of the two Governments are involved shall be borne where they fall. In all collision cases the United States will repair its own vehicles without charge. The United States will moreover transfer to the British authorities all property damage claims against third parties to be used by the British Government under collision agreements or otherwise in processing claims against the United States or as offset receipts to be credited against reciprocal aid.

In carrying out these arrangements the following procedure is suggested: After the usual investigation by the United States forces, each claim will be presented to the British authorities for settlement and when necessary for payment under reverse lend-lease. In the processing of such claims as are accepted the British authorities would be free to use British courts, commissions, collision agreements with insurance companies or other such available means as they consider feasible and the United States authorities would cooperate by assisting in the production of evidence and, so long as available within the United Kingdom, of parties and witnesses whenever military duties are not paramount. The disposition of such cases by the British authorities will be final. Claims presented to the British authorities and not accepted for payment under reciprocal aid and which are within the provisions of the Foreign Claims Acts may be presented to the Foreign Claims Commissions of the United States. Military or naval authorities of the United States may not be expected to render assistance to obtain satisfaction from service personnel of any personal judgment obtained by a claimant who has resorted to a civil action either in avoidance of or as in effect an appeal from the jurisdiction of United States Foreign Claims Commission.

You are requested to address an appropriate communication in the sense of the foregoing to the Foreign Office in reply to its communication of November 5.

HULL

811.203/380 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 12, 1944.

[Received January 12—2:55 p. m.]

270. A note has been drafted in the sense of Department's telegram 182, January 7 and approved by appropriate Army officer and La Rue

Brown.⁴⁴ No reference is made in draft to the statements and information contained in fourth paragraph of Department's telegram as all here concerned believe that any use particularly of first two sentences of that paragraph would only serve to put obstacles in the way of a possible solution of problem under reverse Lend-Lease. Both Army officer and Mr. Brown feel that certain definite commitments were implicit in the previously existing *modus operandi* for defense of certain suits by Treasury Solicitor and now that operation under collision agreements has been terminated and the *modus operandi* ended only harm can be done by specific mention of so-called alleged commitments and of disagreement with respect thereto. Embassy fully concurs in this view. Consequently, the Department is earnestly requested to authorize by urgent telegram the sending of Embassy's note with omission mentioned above.

Furthermore informal discussions reveal that if reverse Lend-Lease principle is adopted British authorities will expect that United States authorities will on a reciprocal basis dispose of all non-combat claims of third parties arising out of acts in United States of personnel of armed forces of the United Kingdom in line of duty or out of operations of United Kingdom armed forces and their equipment. It is believed that it would strengthen the British authorities' position with their public and promote a disposition to adopt Department's suggestion if Embassy were authorized to state in its note that in the event of the adoption of reverse Lend-Lease principle such arrangements would be on a reciprocal basis. Department's early instructions are urgently requested.

WINANT

811.203/380 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1944.

447. Your 270, January 12. Fourth paragraph of Department's 182, January 7, may be omitted from note to Foreign Office.

Department has no funds from which to pay noncombat claims of third parties arising out of acts in United States of personnel of armed forces of United Kingdom or out of operations of United Kingdom armed forces and their equipment. War and Navy Departments informally advise that they have no funds for such purpose. It would therefore probably require authorization of Congress for payment of such claims. You will appreciate that it would not be desirable to request such legislation at this time. Unless you perceive some

⁴⁴ Herman La Rue Brown, special representative of the Attorney General of the United States and Legal Attaché, American Embassy in the United Kingdom.

serious reason to the contrary, Department suggests that your note omitting paragraph 4, referred to above, be sent to the Foreign Office and that it be explained informally that for the reasons indicated it seems unlikely that this Government will be able to pay claims arising out of acts of service personnel of the United Kingdom in the United States.

HULL

811.203/391

The American Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) ⁴⁵

No. 3295

LONDON, January 19, 1944.

SIR: With reference to Mr. Churchill's note of November 5, 1943 (No. W 15227/5/64),⁴⁶ concerning the question of civil claims arising in tort against personnel of the United States armed forces in the United Kingdom, I have been instructed to state that for reasons set forth below it is the earnest desire of my Government that your Government may find it possible to pay under reverse Lend-Lease all noncombat claims of third parties now pending, or hereafter arising out of acts of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in line of duty, or out of operations of the United States armed forces and their equipment which the British Government considers not politically objectionable. The United States Government believes that such claims are a part of the normal expenses of the United States forces and consequently are properly chargeable to reverse Lend-Lease. It is contemplated that under the suggested arrangements property losses of the respective Governments, arising out of acts in which only personnel and equipment of the two Governments are involved, should be borne where they fall. The United States Government proposes that in all collision cases it will repair its own vehicles without charge. The United States Government will, moreover, transfer to the British authorities all property damage claims against third parties to be used by the British Government under collision agreements or otherwise in processing claims against the United States, or as offset receipts to be credited against reciprocal aid.

In carrying out these proposed arrangements, should they be acceptable to the British Government, the following procedure is suggested after the usual investigation by the United States forces:

Each claim will be presented to the British authorities for disposition, and, when necessary, for payment under reverse Lend-Lease.

⁴⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch 13411, January 20; received January 27.

⁴⁶ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. The note was quoted in telegram 7808, November 10, 1943, from London, not printed.

In the processing of such claims as are accepted, the British authorities would be free to use British courts, commissions, collision agreements with insurance companies, or other such available means as they consider feasible, and the United States authorities would cooperate by assisting in the production of evidence, and, so long as available within the United Kingdom, of parties and witnesses whenever military duties are not paramount. The disposition of such cases by the British authorities would be final. Claims presented to the British authorities and not accepted for payment under reciprocal aid, and which are within the provisions of the Foreign Claims Acts, may be presented to the Foreign Claims Commissions of the United States. In view of the terms of the legislation from which such Claims Commissions derive their authority, I venture to point out that the military or naval authorities of the United States may not be expected to render assistance to obtain satisfaction from American service personnel of any personal judgment obtained by a claimant who has resorted to a civil action either in avoidance of or as in effect an appeal from the jurisdiction of a United States Foreign Claims Commission.

In making the foregoing suggestion I have been instructed to state that while, as indicated in the Embassy's communication of September 25, 1943 to Mr. Patrick Dean of the Foreign Office, the United States Government, pending further experience, will not object to the exercise by British courts of jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving members of its armed forces subject to the conditions therein stated, in no circumstances does the United States Government recognize any liability of the United States or of its Foreign Claims Commissions to pay judgments of British courts or tribunals against personnel of its armed forces. The Embassy's communication of January 19, 1944 ⁴⁷ to Mr. Nevile Butler of the Foreign Office confirms and amplifies the point that the War and Navy Departments will make every effort consistent with law and policy to obtain compliance by their personnel with judgments of British courts arising from claims beyond the scope of the Foreign Claims Acts, particularly in affiliation proceedings and on private contractual and domestic obligations.

In view of the considerations stated in Mr. Churchill's note under reference as to the desirability of affording to British claimants recourse to British courts, I venture to express the hope that the British Government will find it possible to accede to the foregoing suggestion that it take over under reverse Lend-Lease the disposition of all non-combat claims of third parties now pending or hereafter arising out of acts of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in line of duty, or out of operations of United States armed forces and their equipment. By so doing not only could the desired recourse to British

⁴⁷ Not printed, but see *infra*.

courts be given, but the arrangements with insurance companies which are now in abeyance could be reinstated.

Accept [etc.]

JOHN G. WINANT

811.203/412

Sir Nevile Butler of the British Foreign Office to the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Warner)

No. W 2375/150/64

[LONDON,] 21 February, 1944.

DEAR MR. WARNER: Many thanks for your letter of the 19th January⁴⁸ explaining in greater detail the policy which the United States Army and Navy Authorities will follow in dealing with such civil claims against members of the United States Forces in this country as do not fall within the scope of the Foreign Claims Act of the 2nd January, 1942.

We have noted your assurance that in such cases the same effect will be given to the judgments of United Kingdom Courts as is given to judgments of American Courts and your explanation of the circumstances in which disciplinary action will be taken by the United States Military Authorities. I am glad to say that the competent Departments of His Majesty's Government find this explanation entirely satisfactory and have no doubt that this arrangement will solve the problem with which we have been faced.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE BUTLER

811.203/411: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 4, 1944.

[Received March 5—5:44 p. m.]

1808. I am gratified to report that I have received under cover of a personal letter from Mr. Eden a lengthy footnote dated February 29 with an annex⁴⁹ which accepted the suggestion made in my note of January 19, 1944 (Embassy despatch 13491 [13411], January 20;⁵⁰ Department's 182, January 7 and 447, January 18) to Eden stating that the British Government will pay under reverse Lend-Lease claims of British nationals for injuries arising out of acts of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in line of duty. The claims as to which the British Government are willing to accept responsibility are

⁴⁸ Not printed, but see telegram 181, January 7, to London, and footnote 40, p. 128.

⁴⁹ For text of letter and annex, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1602.

⁵⁰ Despatch not printed.

defined in the footnote but in conformity with the general scope of request presented to it. The British Government is "prepared to undertake certain responsibilities the settlement of these claims on behalf of the United States Government as a reciprocal aid service".

It is, however, stated in the footnote that the British Government assumes that "the United States will be willing to make similar arrangements for the settlement of civil claims of like nature arising against members of His Majesty's forces in the United States in the course of their duties."

While I do not overlook the content of Department's 447 regarding the availability of funds at the present disposal of the Department or of the War and Navy Departments for purpose just referred to I earnestly hope that every possible means of granting this reciprocity will be explored including the President's contingency fund. The Lend-Lease mechanism would seem available to provide the small sums which will be required. Resort to this agency is clearly justified by fact that we are asking the British Government to deal with this whole matter as one of reverse Lend-Lease upon grounds set out in Department's 182. Moreover, a precedent exists in the reciprocal handling of maritime claims under agreement of December 4, 1942.⁵¹

It is of first importance that this solution which is our suggestion and which has, after hesitation and reluctance, been accepted by the British Government shall not be defeated by refusing the reciprocal undertaking which the British Government feels to be required not only as matter of fairness but as necessary to its justification. Despite the prolonged study of the matter no other way of putting an end to this difficult and dangerous problem now appears to have any chance of mutual acceptance. It is of first importance to bring into force the arrangement to which the British Government has consented subject to foregoing assumption.

I have informed General Eisenhower and Admiral Stark of the favorable reply of the British Government to our proposal.

Copies of Mr. Eden's letter, of Foreign Office note of acceptance and of annex which deals primarily with administration details of setting in motion and continued operation of proposed arrangement are being forwarded by air mail.⁵² La Rue Brown representative here of Attorney General is leaving for Washington and will take with him a copy. Brown has been thoroughly familiar with this problem from its inception and has participated in various discussions in London which have brought matter to its present state. I am instructing him to examine situation with the Department.

⁵¹ Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning problems of marine transportation and litigation, signed at London; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 282, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1780.

⁵² Despatch 14273, March 6, 1944, and enclosures not printed.

I request as matter of urgency Department's authorization to put proposed arrangement with British Government into immediate effect upon the reciprocal basis requested. This matter has caused more difficulty in friendly relationship with the British Government and has done more injury with the public at large than any issue that I have had to deal with since coming to London. In my judgment the immediate solution of this matter is so essential as to merit the personal attention of the President if necessary.

WINANT

811.203/419 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 13, 1944.

[Received March 13—5:35 p. m.]

2021. Following informal communication dated March 13 has been received from the Foreign Office:

"I understand that in recent discussions between the British and United States Claims Commissions, a number of points have been raised in connection with paragraph 7 of Mr. Eden's note of the 29th February to your Ambassador,⁵³ about the question of civil claims against members of the United States forces. We are most anxious that there should be no misunderstanding of our intentions in this matter and I think it would be useful to explain our position in detail.

You will remember that a great many of the complaints which have been caused by the present position, both in Parliament and outside it, have arisen from cases in which the United States Claims Commission, having refused to admit any liability, has equally refused to afford the claimants any effective right of recourse to the courts of this country. Unless, therefore, we can reopen cases in which no payment has been made we shall not remove either the cause of the complaint or the criticisms which are being directed both against the British and the United States authorities. A number of Members of Parliament have urged that any settlement which is reached should be retroactive, and consequently paragraph 7 is from our point of view of fundamental importance. Indeed, we are convinced that if we were to refuse to reopen these claims, and we shall certainly be pressed to do so in Parliament, we should very seriously prejudice the success of the entire arrangements which we are now attempting to conclude.

We certainly do not wish to review all the decisions of the United States Claims Commission, and we are fully satisfied that in the great majority of cases the United States Commission has dealt generously with claimants. It is, however, inevitable that the principles adopted by the United States Commission should differ in some respect from those adopted by the British Commission, and I think it

⁵³ In paragraph 7 Mr. Eden stated that it might be "necessary for His Majesty's Government to reopen those claims which have not been admitted by the United States Claims Commission and in which no payment has been made".

is generally accepted that the rules of contributory negligence are much more rigorously applied under United States law than under British. The principle underlying the proposals made in Mr. Eden's note is that there should be equality of treatment for all persons who have a claim against members of either the British or United States forces, and we shall therefore find it necessary to apply British principles in all such cases. It is our present intention to reopen a case only if a claimant has received nothing from the United States Commission, and we, on examination, feel that some payment would have been made if British principles had been applied. In addition, if a claimant presses his claim, he will be afforded facilities for proceeding in the courts, and we shall honour any judgment he may obtain. It seems most unlikely that there will be many such cases, but as I have said it is our considered view that unless we adopt this procedure we shall fail entirely to remove one of the most important sources of complaint which now exist.

I understand that the point has also been made that this paragraph 7 does not appear in the annex to Mr. Eden's note. This is, of course, the case but we hope that it has not given the impression that the paragraph is any the less important. For the reasons I have given above it is, in fact, fundamental.

I understand the United States Commission also expressed the hope that we would not advertise the fact that past cases would be reopened. I can assure you on this point that the interested departments of His Majesty's Government are less anxious than anyone to be faced with large numbers of requests for the reopening of cases, and that we shall give as little publicity as possible to the matter. But it seems inevitable that this aspect of the matter will be raised in Parliament and indeed Mr. Eden was specifically questioned on the point on Wednesday.⁵⁴ I am sure you will realise that it will not be possible for him to avoid stating what course we propose to adopt.

I hope that this explanation will show exactly where we stand upon the various points which have been raised.⁵⁵

WINANT

811.203/419 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—midnight.

2073. Your 1808, March 4, and 2021, March 13. You may advise Mr. Eden that since the British Government has agreed to pay under reverse lend-lease noncombat claims of third parties now pending or hereafter arising out of acts of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in line of duty which the British Government considers not politically objectionable, the United States is willing under the same conditions to make similar arrangements for the settlement of civil claims of like nature arising out of acts of members of the armed forces of Great Britain in the United States in the line of duty.

⁵⁴ March 8.

For your information and not for transmission to the British at this time, Lend-Lease has decided that the reciprocal claims can be paid by it.

This is an agreement in principle only and full instructions will be sent when the Department and other interested agencies have had an opportunity to consider the documents enclosed with your despatch no. 14273, March 6,⁵⁵ which has only recently been received. This consideration will be completed as quickly as possible. In other words, this is not an agreement to the conditions and limitations in the enclosures to despatch no. 14273.

HULL

811.203/422: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1944—10 p. m.

2353. Your despatch no. 14273, March 6.⁵⁵ You are requested to reply to the Foreign Office note of February 29, 1944⁵⁶ that this Government accepts the limitations and conditions contained in the note and in the Annex thereto as applicable to the claims arising out of acts of personnel of the armed forces of the United States in line of duty which the British Government has agreed to accept for settlement and payment, such payment to be credited to reciprocal aid. For its part this Government agrees to settle and pay under Lend-Lease, on a reciprocal basis, claims arising out of acts of members of the armed forces of Great Britain in the United States in line of duty.

With respect to paragraph 7 of the Foreign Office note⁵⁷ concerning the reopening of claims in which payment has been denied by the United States Claims Commission, the War Department has been informed by La Rue Brown that the number of such claims which the British authorities desire to reopen is very small. In as much as the War Department has agreed to this provision with reluctance, it is hoped that every effort will be made not to extend the number of such cases.

Paragraph 6 of the Annex suggests that the United States authorities will supply "a retainer to the Treasury Solicitor." It is assumed that "retainer" is here used in the sense of power of attorney. This clarification is suggested since "retainer" is commonly used in the United States to describe the fee paid to an attorney for retention of his services.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ For text of note and Ambassador Winant's reply of March 28, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1602.

⁵⁷ See footnote 53, p. 136.

Paragraph 11 of the Annex is to be understood as a waiver by this Government only of claims in its own behalf, but not as a waiver of claims of its nationals in their own right on account of property losses, personal injuries, or death.

Paragraph 16 of the Annex is agreed to in principle, but decisions as to the carrying out of the undertaking will have to be made by United States Army and Navy authorities in London.

You will be advised when the procedure for processing claims against members of the armed forces of Great Britain in the United States has been worked out.

HULL

811.203/452 : Airgram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 3, 1944.

[Received May 10—8 a. m.]

A-550. With reference to Department's telegram 2353 March 27, 10 p. m., and supplementing my 2666, April 1, 6 p. m.,⁵⁸ there is quoted below Mr. Eden's official reply to my note No. 3493 of March 28, 1944,⁵⁹ concerning the agreement for settling certain claims arising against personnel of the United States Forces in the United Kingdom and for settling certain claims arising out of the acts of members of the armed forces of Great Britain in the United States in the line of duty (Embassy's despatch No. 14,737 of March 29⁶⁰):

"I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's note No. 3493 of the 29th [28th] March, concerning the question of civil claims arising in tort against members of the United States Forces in the United Kingdom.

"2. I was most gratified to learn that the United States Government are able to accept the conditions and limitations which I attached, in my note No. W 3151/150/64 of the 29th February and in the annex thereto, to the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of responsibility for a settlement as a matter of reciprocal aid of a number of classes of such claims. I am further most grateful for your assurance that the United States Government for their part will make similar arrangements for the settlement under Lend-Lease of such claims arising out of the acts of His Majesty's Forces in the United States in the course of their Military duties.

"3. I am able to confirm the interpretation placed by the United States Government upon paragraphs 6 and 11 of the annex to my

⁵⁸ Latter not printed.

⁵⁹ For text of note, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1602.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

note of the 29th February. In stipulating in the former paragraph that the United States authorities should supply a retainer to the Treasury Solicitor I have used the word 'retainer' in the sense of an authority to act on behalf of the defendant. The intention of the latter paragraph is, as the United States Government assumes, that claims should not be brought by one government against the other. It is not suggested that the claims of United States nationals in their own right on account of personal injury, death, or property losses should be waived.

"4. Your Excellency is no doubt aware that on receiving your note under reference, I announced in Parliament on the 30th March⁶¹ that a satisfactory solution to this problem had been reached. At the same time I circulated a written statement of the details of this solution in the official report of Parliamentary debates, and I enclose ten copies of this statement for your information.

"5. I shall be grateful if you will inform the United States Government of the pleasure with which I have received their acceptance of the proposals made to them and of my satisfaction that it has been possible to reach a settlement of this matter."

Copies of Mr. Eden's statement referred to in paragraph 4 of his note were forwarded to the Department with the Embassy's despatch No. 14, 817 of April 1, 1944.⁶²

Agreement has now been reached on all the points raised in the Department's telegram under reference.

The Department's instructions as to the procedure for processing claims arising out of acts of members of the armed forces of Great Britain in the United States in line of duty are awaited.

WINANT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING THE USE AND DISPOSITION OF RECAPTURED VESSELS

740.00112 European War 1939/9754

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On October 22nd, 1943, with the approval of the United States Government,⁶³ His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom transmitted to the Allied Governments concerned their proposals for the treatment of recaptured vessels formerly belonging to the Allied Governments or their nationals. A copy of the memorandum which was sent to the Allied Governments is enclosed for convenience of reference.

⁶¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 398, cols. 1558-1559.

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ For explanation of approval, see second paragraph of memorandum to the British Embassy, *infra*.

2. Consideration has been given to the parallel question of the way in which cargoes on recaptured vessels should be treated, and it is clearly necessary that His Majesty's Government should in the very near future be in a position to explain to the Allied Governments concerned their proposals in regard to cargoes.

3. A second memorandum is enclosed⁶⁴ which has been drawn up, with the idea of forming an addendum to the memorandum on ships, setting out the procedure for dealing with cargoes, and His Majesty's Government would be glad to know as soon as possible whether the United States Government concur in its terms. It is proposed to communicate to the Allied Governments suitable sections of the memorandum comparable with those sections of the original memorandum on ships.

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1943.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum on Use and Disposal of Vessels Captured or Found by Allied Forces in the Course of Operations for the Liberation of Europe

Note: Throughout this memorandum the term "vessels" has been used in the widest sense to include all categories, e.g. ocean-going, coastal and inland craft; but the appropriateness of applying the procedure proposed to inland craft may require consideration in the light of the circumstances at the time.

It is suggested that the problem should be considered under two main headings:—

(A) The immediate action to be taken as regards any vessels captured or found in the area of operations; and

(B) Arrangements to be made for their ultimate disposal.

It seems clear that these two matters should be kept entirely distinct both in practice and in any agreements which may be made between the Governments concerned, and that any steps which may be taken or contemplated under (A) above would be without prejudice to steps taken or contemplated under (B).

(A) *Immediate action to be taken as regards any vessels captured or found in the area of operations.*

1. The objects to be attained are (i) not to impede the Commander-in-Chief or operations in any way; (ii) to put the vessels into useful service as soon as possible; and (iii) to avoid all local disagreement between the various Allied forces who may be concerned in their capture and also between persons or organizations who may be found

⁶⁴ Not printed.

to be in local control of the vessels. It is suggested that general agreement should be sought for the proposition that the Commander-in-Chief* acting on the advice of his competent advisers should in the first instance be solely responsible for all clearance and emergency measures in the ports within the area of his control and for immediate operational purposes should have absolute discretion over all vessels whatsoever captured by the forces under his command or found within the area for which he is responsible. This discretion should cover such matters as power to order the destruction of vessels in accordance with military necessity, to order the loading or unloading of vessels, their movements and any other steps necessary to preserve them or put them into use in his own name in so far as he may consider necessary for the immediate operations in progress. The Commander-in-Chief for these purposes would use any powers of military requisition etc., which might be necessary, and neither he nor his Government nor the forces operating under his command would be held responsible in any way for any action or the results of any action taken by him or on his authority apart of course from any question of ultimate liability for payments for the use or for the loss of vessels taken up for his service. Any vessel not immediately required by the Commander-in-Chief in the operational area should be ordered away so that it can be dealt with under (B) below. The Commander-in-Chief should not, however, have power to enter into any *general* agreements even of a temporary character dealing with the chartering of groups of vessels with any authorities he may find in the liberated territories. Any such matters would have to be dealt with by the shipping authorities. The question as to the time at which it may be appropriate to transfer the primary responsibility for dealing with vessels from the Commander-in-Chief to the shipping authorities of the United Nations in [*is*] one which will have to be dealt with according to the course of the operations.

(B) *Arrangements to be made for the disposal of vessels captured or found in the area of operations.*

1. The general principle as regards these would be to ensure that the Government of the country in whose territory they were registered at the time when they fell into the hands of the enemy are recognised as being ultimately entitled to take over and dispose of them, as they think fit. This principle would apply irrespective of the place of capture, or of the constitution, or nationality of the Allied force effecting the actual capture. Thus, if in a Norwegian

*If for any operation or series of operations there is a Supreme Commander-in-Chief then he is the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of this memorandum. If, however, the Naval Command is separate from the Land Command, then for the purposes of this memorandum the Naval Commander-in-Chief is the Commander-in-Chief as regards ocean-going and coastal vessels and the Land Commander-in-Chief as regards all other vessels. [Footnote in the original.]

harbour were captured a formerly British vessel, a formerly Norwegian vessel and a formerly Netherlands vessel, subject to (A) above, the first would ultimately be handed over to the United Kingdom Government, the second to the Norwegian Government and the third to the Netherlands Government, even though the forces actually capturing them were not British, Norwegian or Dutch, but belonging to some other Allied nationality. (There may have to be exceptions to this general principle in cases where the real ownership is in some United Nations' country other than the country of registration).

2. In connexion with this class of vessels, the following would apply:—

(a) In some cases, ex-Allied vessels will have been placed by the enemy in a Prize Court in which case some form of Prize proceedings will be required to divest the enemy of their title and to re-vest it in the Allied Government concerned. The necessary proceedings should be brought in a Prize Court of the state to which the ship is to be returned, and failing that in a Prize Court of the state of which the Commander-in-Chief is a national, but action in the latter Prize Court would be without prejudice to the operation of the general principle as to return stated in paragraph 1. In other cases no Prize Court proceedings will be necessary and the machinery of transfer to the Allied Government concerned may be comparatively simple, but Prize Court proceedings as proposed would be taken in any case where immediate action was necessary to bring a vessel into service.

(b) The vessels concerned would be handed back to the Allied *Government* concerned, and not to the individual nationals or their original owners. It would be for the Allied Government concerned to make the necessary arrangements with their own nationals as regards the ultimate ownership of the vessel (subject to the reservation made at the end of paragraph 1.) This would be the most convenient procedure and in any case may be necessary because of the existence of Allied Governmental decrees conferring some form of title to these ships upon the Allied Government.

(c) Each Allied Government should, in respect of any vessel handed over to it under the foregoing machinery:—

(i) agree to make the vessels available for the war effort of the United Nations in accordance with the arrangements then existing,

(ii) undertake to accept responsibility for all liabilities in respect of the vessel, and

(iii) agree to indemnify the other Allied Governments against any claims made against them or any one or more of them arising out of the handing over thereof.

(d) In the case of vessels in respect of which total losses have been paid by underwriters, so that the underwriters have become the owners or are entitled to claim ownership, the return to a Government under the arrangements contemplated in this memorandum can only be made after satisfaction of the claims of the underwriters.

This would apply whether the underwriters be an Allied Government or private underwriters.

The foregoing proposals deal exclusively with ships formerly belonging to the Allied Governments or their nationals.

The treatment to be accorded to enemy and neutral owned ships recaptured in similar circumstances will require further consideration at some future date.

It is not, however, considered that this need stand in the way of immediate agreement in regard to recaptured Allied ships.

LONDON, 22 October, 1943.

740.00112 European War 1939/9754

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of November 15, 1943, with which was transmitted a copy of a memorandum dated October 22, 1943, on the use and disposal of vessels captured or found by Allied forces in the course of operations for the liberation of Europe, confined to vessels which formerly belonged to the Allied Governments or their nationals, and a copy of a second memorandum drawn up as an addendum⁶⁵ to the former memorandum and setting out the procedure proposed for dealing with cargoes found on such vessels at the time they are captured or found by Allied forces. The Embassy states that on October 22, 1943, "with the approval of the United States Government", the British Government transmitted to the Allied Governments the proposals contained in the memorandum of that date for the treatment of recaptured vessels. The Embassy inquires whether the Government of the United States concurs in the terms of the addendum dealing with cargoes, and states that it is proposed to communicate to the Allied Governments suitable sections of the addendum comparable with those of the original memorandum of October 22, 1943.

Informal communications between the Embassy and the Department of State develop the fact that the text of the proposals of October 22, 1943 relating to recaptured vessels was not submitted for approval to the Government of the United States, and that the Embassy intends that the first sentence of the British *Aide-Mémoire* should be read as meaning only that the Government of the United States had approved the informing of the Allied Governments of the policy agreed upon in principle.

The Department of State finds itself in general accord with the

⁶⁵ Addendum not printed.

position taken in the British memorandum of October 22, 1943 relating to recaptured vessels, with the exception of paragraph (d) on the last page under (B) 2, where the statement is made that "the return to a Government under the arrangements contemplated in this memorandum can only be made after satisfaction of the claims of the underwriters", whether the underwriters be an Allied Government or private underwriters. The Government of the United States is of the opinion that when a vessel has been captured by the enemy and condemned as prize by an enemy prize court, all prior title, rights and interest are *ipso facto* cut off, and that in case of recapture by the country whose flag it originally flew or by an Allied Power it becomes good prize for the captor. The Allied Powers may agree, if they so desire, to return such vessels to the country whose flag they carried prior to capture by the enemy, and may do so under such terms and conditions as they see fit, but it is hardly seen why there should be an implication that the underwriters must be treated on the basis that they "have become the owners or are entitled to claim ownership". It is recognized that under the municipal law of various states, including the United States and Great Britain, an underwriter by payment of the loss becomes subrogated by operation of law to such rights, if any, as the insured may have in regard to that loss. This may be a basis for favoring the underwriter over the original owner if the vessel is to be restored to either of them, or for requiring the original owner to repay the underwriter if the vessel is to be restored to the original owner who has already been paid by the underwriter for the loss. But when the vessel is to be turned back to a government, it would appear that since the rights of the former owner and of the underwriters alike were cut off by the capture and condemnation of the vessel by the enemy, there may be presented a question whether any remuneration for the return of the vessel to the state of which the former owner was a national might more appropriately be made to the governments obtaining the right to the vessel by recapture, or disposed of in some other way among the United Nations as their interests may be made to appear.

As for the cargoes, it would seem desirable that all cargoes on such vessels should be submitted to adjudication in prize courts in order that it may be determined whether they constitute good prize or whether in the case of neutral or Allied owners compensation would be in order. Generally speaking, requisition presupposes a duty to make compensation, hence the desirability of determining by judicial methods the right to condemn without compensation. Requisition similar to that under the Defense Regulations in British ports may not be practicable in some of the Allied States, and in such cases prize court proceedings may be necessary for this reason as well.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1944.

740.00112 European War 1939/10128

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The following are the preliminary views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as a summary of the considerations set forth in the Department's memorandum No. 740.00112 European War 1939/9754 of January 20th, 1944, commenting on the proposals of His Majesty's Government for the disposal of vessels and their cargoes which formerly belonged to the Allied Governments or their nationals and are captured or found by Allied forces in the course of operations. Such ships will be referred to hereinafter as "recaptured ships".

2. His Majesty's Government welcome the Department's general agreement with the United Kingdom memorandum on ships, a copy of which was attached to Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of November 15th, 1943, the main object of which is to secure the orderly and prompt disposal of recaptured ships with a view to their return to the common pool. The financial provisions of the memorandum were designed to secure their general acceptance by all concerned as fair, even if such a solution should not coincide in every detail with too nice a regard for what may be the strict legal position. Moreover, any solution other than restoration to the Government of the original flag would not have been acceptable to the European Allies.

3. The justification for providing for the satisfaction of the claims of certain underwriters is that it seems to be inequitable that in the case of a ship where the total loss had been paid, the country receiving the ship back should either by its Government or its nationals, have received both the ship and the insurance monies. Further, where underwriters have paid for a total loss they can reasonably claim to have their loss repaid if it has been ademed by the restoration of the ship.

4. The Department's view that the Governments which have effected recapture might expect a reward for recovery appears to His Majesty's Government to be inconsistent with the general principles of the United Nations war effort that pecuniary claims of this nature should not be made between Governments; and under modern conditions of joint operations, it is in general unreal to attribute the recapture of ships to any particular ship, aircraft or force. Moreover, His Majesty's Government are convinced that the European Allies would have the strongest objections to being asked for payment by His Majesty's Government or the United States Government.

5. In any event, prize salvage is a right of individual officers and men of the recapturing ships and not of the belligerent governments

concerned, and in this connection it has become clear from preliminary discussions with some of the Allies that agreement will not be possible so long as the existing rights of individual officers and men of the Armed Forces (or any other persons) to claim a reward for their services in capturing Allied ships can be enforced. The Allied Governments would not agree to prize salvage being included in claims against which they would be called on under Article 2(c)⁶⁶ to indemnify His Majesty's Government. Nor would they be prepared to hand back to His Majesty's Government ex-British ships without raising difficulties and causing delay so long as prize salvage claims can be brought against their ships in British courts.

6. It has accordingly been decided that His Majesty's Government should take powers to enable them to control the bringing of prize salvage claims and necessary legislation was introduced on January 25th. The effect of the measure will be that the prior consent of His Majesty's Government will be required before a claim for prize salvage can be made in any British court. (This would not apply in the Dominions who are, however, being invited to consider taking similar powers). Consent will not be given for any claim against an Allied ship recaptured in the course of joint operations, provided that His Majesty's Government are satisfied that no similar claims against British ships or property can or will be brought in the courts of the Allied Government concerned.

7. Copies of the draft bill and of an explanatory memorandum are on their way to Washington and will be furnished to the Department as soon as possible.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government would be glad to know whether the United States Government are prepared to take powers similar to those being taken by His Majesty's Government if such a step is necessary to ensure that claims for prize salvage will not be brought against British ships in American courts, since the bringing of such claims would create an exceedingly awkward situation.

8. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will also agree to take parallel action to that already taken by His Majesty's Government in regard to recaptured ships. The memorandum referred to in paragraph 2 above was addressed in an abbreviated form on October 22nd, 1943 to the Norwegian, Netherlands, Belgian, Yugoslav and Greek Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation. No reply has been received from the last three, but the Norwegian, Netherlands and Belgian Governments have accepted the proposals in principle. The prospects for general

⁶⁶ See British memorandum of October 22, 1943, p. 141.

⁶⁷ See British note of April 18, p. 149.

agreement may therefore be considered good. As United States forces will be taking part in forthcoming operations, and particularly as the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief⁶⁸ is American, it seems to His Majesty's Government most important that the United States Government should take steps to reach parallel agreement with the Allied Governments concerned. Moreover, for the same reason, it is necessary that His Majesty's Government should know where they stand in regard to ex-British ships recaptured by United States forces. It has always been the intention of His Majesty's Government that any ex-United States ships recaptured by British forces should be handed to the United States Government in accordance with the terms of the memorandum. His Majesty's Government would, however, require a reciprocal undertaking from the United States Government in regard to ex-British ships recaptured by their forces. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn the views of the United States Government on the form which such an agreement might take.

9. As regards cargoes, His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the possibility of seizing cargoes in prize but are convinced, particularly in view of their experiences in handling refugee cargoes in the United Kingdom during the summer of 1940, that their European Allies would object most strongly to the general adoption of such a procedure for cargoes which may partly consist of cargoes owned in enemy occupied territory and will therefore be only technically "enemy". His Majesty's Government are further satisfied that the Allied Governments would not agree to the seizure of these technically enemy cargoes without compensation, particularly where the Allied Government concerned itself has requisitioning powers under its own law. They appreciate that requisitioning as opposed to Prize court procedure can involve liability to pay compensation in respect of some real enemy cargoes, but in such cases any compensation payable would be paid to the Custodian of Enemy Property and thus be dealt with in the ultimate settlement with the enemy. Lastly, His Majesty's Government are convinced that the impossibility of discriminating rapidly during the period of active operations between technical enemy cargoes and real enemy ownership leaves requisition as the only practicable procedure.

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1944.

⁶⁸ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

103.9164 London : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1944—2 p. m.

2808. From Land⁶⁹ and Morse⁷⁰ for Reed,⁷¹ WSA.⁷² SD 3665. Re Embassy 2777⁷³ and related cables. 1. With the reservation that (A) there will be reserved for later determination questions of title and right to possession and third party claims and (B) Allied Governments shall acquire possession of recaptured vessels assigned temporarily for operation by Governments of registration subject to obligation to release vessels and make adjustments in accordance with (A) above, you are authorized to join with the British in presentation of memorandum to Allied Ministers. The State Department has permitted us to give this authorization pending settlement of differences between British Foreign Office and that Department stated in memorandum of October 22.

2. The understanding is that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will have to approve the arrangements for transmission to Supreme C in C⁷⁴ as stated in Leathers' letter of February 9th,⁷⁵ penultimate paragraph.

3. Referring paragraph 2 of your Embassy's 2777 we agree to the principle of joint action stated therein.

4. In regard to MWT draft instructions,⁷⁶ particularly part IV, we are anxious to have your views. [Land and Morse.]

HULL

740.00112 European War/10593

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Ref: 1101/19/44

No. 224

His Majesty's Ambassador⁷⁷ presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of February 7th, 1944, regarding the disposal of vessels and their cargoes which formerly belonged to the Allied Governments or their nationals

⁶⁹ Vice Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator.

⁷⁰ H. T. Morse, Assistant to Administrator, War Shipping Administration.

⁷¹ Philip D. Reed, Chief of United States Mission for Economic Affairs in London.

⁷² War Shipping Administration.

⁷³ Telegram No. 2777, April 5, not printed.

⁷⁴ Commander in Chief.

⁷⁵ Lord Frederick James Leathers, British Minister of War Transport. Letter of February 9 not found in Department files.

⁷⁶ Ministry of War Transport; draft instructions not found in Department files.

⁷⁷ Viscount Halifax.

and are captured or found by Allied forces in the course of operations, has the honour to inform him that the legislation referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the *Aide-Mémoire* has now been enacted. A copy of the Act, which is entitled the Prize Salvage Act, 1944, is transmitted herewith, together with the records of the speech by the Lord Chancellor ⁷⁸ on the occasion of the introduction of the Bill in the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor's remarks were based on the explanatory memorandum referred to in paragraph 7 of the Embassy's *Aide Mémoire*.

Lord Halifax would be grateful for an early expression of the Department's views on the points raised in the *Aide Mémoire*.

WASHINGTON, 18 April, 1944.

103.9164/3432 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 24, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

3373. To Admiral Land and Morse from Reed. Refer your 2808, April 10.

1. I have informed Lord Leathers that I am now authorized to approach the Allies with him subject to the reservations in your cable. On the basis of preliminary discussions with his staff, it appears that MWT will probably be unwilling to approach the Allies at this late stage with the proposal that the questions reserved by you should be left for later determination.

2. As you know, the British Foreign Office, with the approval, in principle, of the State Department, submitted the memorandum of October 22 to the Allies sometime ago. The Norwegians, Belgians, Dutch and the French Committee have now agreed to the proposals contained therein. MWT state that arrangements similar to those contained in this memorandum have already been put into effect on a joint basis by AFHQ ⁷⁹ in the Mediterranean and it would be awkward to go back on this precedent. The MWT considers itself committed to the proposals already agreed to with the Allies and would be extremely loath and much embarrassed to propose such a substantial modification of these arrangements as you suggest.

3. It appeared from your cable 2185 of March 23 ⁸⁰ that the principal questions at issue between the Foreign Office and the State De-

⁷⁸ For text of speech, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 130, col. 571.

⁷⁹ Allied Force Headquarters.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

partment related to the questions of reimbursement of British Underwriters and Prize Court proceedings. The reservations in your 2808 cover a much broader field and appear to us and to MWT to nullify many of the basic provisions of the October 22 memorandum. In an effort to determine whether the issues between us could not be narrowed we have obtained from MWT copies of the October 22 memorandum as submitted by the British Embassy in Washington to the State Department, the Department's reply dated January 20 and the Embassy's counter reply dated February 7. It appears from these documents that the only difference between us relates to the exceptional case where total losses have been paid by Underwriters on an Allied ship which the Germans have taken in prize and is reprized by the Allies. If this is the case it should at least be possible to proceed in our discussions with the Allies with a much more limited reservation than that contained in your 2808.

4. The position of the MWT on this narrow issue is as follows :

They admit that prize or reprize proceedings would probably have the effect of cutting off all legal rights of underwriters. They believe, however, that in the great majority of cases the British Government will be the underwriters and that in almost every instance where payments have been made against total loss the payments have been made to the Allied Governments rather than to their nationals. Since it is agreed as a matter of equity rather than law to return to the government of former registration vessels recaptured from the Germans, the British feel it is eminently proper that the receiving government shall, as a matter of equity should, make an appropriate adjustment in regard to the total loss claims paid by the British Government as underwriters. In any case the four Allies in question have agreed to satisfy the claims of the underwriters. If necessary in order to permit an immediate joint approach to the Allies, MWT might be willing to hold any payments made by the Allies in trust pending later determination of the issue between the State Department and the Foreign Office.

5. I am not clear that I have properly interpreted the State Department's position, therefore hesitate to make any recommendation. I do not feel, however, that it is reasonable to press Lord Leathers to proceed jointly on the basis of the reservations contained in your 2808, at least until further clarification and instructions from you. I am doubtful whether the Allies would agree to the reservations, and even if they did agree, I see little advantage to be gained by reaching an agreement on such a limited basis. Leathers and I are in complete agreement that it is urgent for us to make a joint approach to the Allies at the earliest possible moment. It seems to me not only undesirable but quite impracticable for our two governments to take different positions with regard to recaptured ships, due to the difficulty in deter-

mining for whom the supreme commander is acting in a particular case of recapture. We must reach an agreement between ourselves on the whole issue and present a joint view to the Allies. I strongly recommend that you take the matter up with the State Department immediately and that every effort be made to reach an immediate agreement with the British so that we can proceed. [Reed.]

WINANT

103.9164/3453 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 10, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received 10:45 p. m.]

3802. To Land WSA from Reed.

(1) Lord Leathers and I met Friday⁸² with the Allied Shipping Ministers to discuss the joint memorandum⁸³ in regard to recaptured ships which was submitted to them several days ago. I have forwarded by air pouch two copies of the memorandum which we submitted. There was general agreement in regard to the proposals put forward in the memo with minor qualifications. We propose to prepare an agreed note of the meeting which I will send you promptly.

(2) Several points were raised by Leathers which were not covered by the agreed note.

(3) In particular Lord Leathers raised the question whether we should not work out with our Allies, and they among themselves, a series of knock for knock agreements to cover ships taking part in operations including all recaptured ships. I took no position on this question. The Allied Ministers appeared to favor the proposal in principle and it was left that [apparent omission] further discussions with MWT indicated that they have arranged with the Belgians and Dutch for special charters for all ships taking part in operations under which any damages or losses arising out of collisions between such ships fall on government of registry. MWT would like to see the same principle extended by agreement to cover all recaptured ships during the period they are required by the Supreme Commander or until they reach UK ports, as well as all Norwegian, French and U.S. ships taking part in operations during the period of operations. The proposal is that in regard to ships covered by this agreement each government would relieve each other Allied Government of liability for claims arising out of collisions made by each government or its nationals against other Allied Gov-

⁸² May 5.

⁸³ Not found in Department files.

ernments or their nationals. Could you advise me whether WSA would be interested in principle in working out such an agreement and if so give me appropriate instructions? [Reed.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/10864

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

No. 286

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1944.

Ref: 1101/23/44

SIR: With reference to my note No. 224 of April 18th, 1944, and to previous correspondence about the proposals of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for dealing with vessels formerly belonging to one of the United Nations or to nationals thereof and recaptured from the enemy by United Nations forces, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government now desire to enter into formal agreement with the Allied Governments concerned on the basis of the memorandum dated October 22nd, 1943 attached to the *Aide-Mémoire*, dated November 15th, 1943, which was handed to an official of the Department by a member of this Embassy on November 16th. A draft of a letter which it is proposed to address to the representatives of the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom and of the memorandum in its final form are transmitted herewith.⁸⁴

2. His Majesty's Government consider it important to have an agreement on this subject with the United States Government as well as with the other maritime Allies, and discussion with the United States Mission for Economic Affairs in London has confirmed their view. I am therefore instructed to enquire whether the United States Government are prepared to enter into an exchange of notes with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the lines of the enclosed drafts. I am to add that His Majesty's Government regard the matter as one of urgency and attach importance to the conclusion of an agreement at the earliest possible date.

I have [etc.]

HALIFAX

740.00112 E.W. 1939/10864

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Campbell)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1944.

SIR: I refer to Lord Halifax's note no. 286, dated May 23, 1944, and the enclosures thereto, regarding the disposition to be made of

⁸⁴ Not printed.

vessels recaptured from the enemy, which formerly belonged to one of the United Nations or to its nationals.

The matter has received the attention not only of this Department but also of other interested agencies of this Government, and I am glad now to be able to acquaint you with the conclusions that have been reached.

(1) As stated in this Department's memorandum of January 20, 1944, this Government in general raises no objection to the proposal that recaptured vessels not needed in the combined war effort be turned over to the governments of the allied countries to which they formerly belonged.

(2) The question whether the vessels are needed by a particular theater commander, as suggested by your Government, is not believed to be a sufficient test of whether they may be needed in the general war effort, i.e., in another theater or in connection with general war transportation problems.

(3) This Government perceives no pressing necessity for entering into a general agreement with respect to a situation which at this time is extremely obscure. It does not now have available information as to the number, nationality, type or condition of the vessels that may be involved. Consequently, a general agreement on the subject, except in principle, appears to this Government to be ill-advised. Instead of a general agreement at the present time, as suggested by the British Government, this Government believes that special agreements in line with the principle stated in paragraph one could be made as vessels are available to be turned over to the Allied Governments and in the light of the special circumstances then obtaining.

(4) This Government agrees with your Government with respect to the requisition of cargoes.

(5) This Government is still troubled regarding the desire of the British Government to make the turning over to the Allied Governments of such vessels subject to an undertaking to reimburse underwriters, particularly in view of the fact that under our law and the law of most of the United Nations the rights of former owners and underwriters are cut off by a judgment of an enemy prize court, and the further fact that such an undertaking might require the Government receiving a vessel to reimburse its own underwriters, a matter in respect to which the recapturing country should have no concern.

(6) Underwriters fix their premiums on the basis of the war risks assumed, and it is not perceived why their interests merit special consideration different from all other interests in the vessels.

(7) In those cases where recaptured vessels had not previously been condemned by enemy prize courts and the former owners may have a right to have the vessels restored to them upon the payment of prize salvage where required, reimbursement of the underwriters may

be appropriate under the doctrine of subrogation, but even in this situation it is scarcely perceived why underwriters should be placed in a more favorable position than those having prize salvage rights.

(8) This Government recognizes that where the former owner of a vessel—whether an Allied Government or a national of an Allied Government—has been indemnified by underwriters, the turning over of the ship to that government without compensation by it would be in the nature of a gift, and hence some adjustment as a matter of equity might be desirable, but it is doubted whether it can be determined in advance of an actual situation arising what such adjustments should be or in whose favor they should be made.

(9) It is not clear whether your Government's proposal that the Government receiving the vessel shall accept responsibility for "all liabilities in respect of the vessel" would cover such items as expenses incurred by the recapturing governments in making repairs or reconditioning recaptured vessels, a factor to be taken into consideration.

(10) Finally this Government is inclined to feel that the time at which and the conditions under which a particular vessel, or a particular group or category of vessels, no longer needed by a theater commander, may be turned over to an Allied Government without prejudice to the general war effort, should be considered in the first instance by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. Final decision with respect to transfers could then be made in the light of the Boards' recommendations.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.00112 E.W./10-3044

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

No. 668

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1944.

Ref: 1101/40/44

SIR: I have the honour to refer to your note No. 740.0012 European War 1939/10864 of July 29th, 1944, about the disposal of vessels recaptured from the enemy and to inform you that the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the points therein raised are as follows:

2. His Majesty's Government regret that the statement in paragraph 3 of your note questions for the first time the whole principle of a general arrangement. His Majesty's Government remain firmly of the conviction that, in the absence of an agreement on general principles on the lines suggested in the memorandum⁸⁵ enclosed in my note No. 286 of May 23rd, 1944, (hereinafter referred to as the memorandum), the disposal of every recaptured ship would be sub-

⁸⁵ Not printed.

ject to interminable negotiations with consequent detriment to the war effort of the United Nations.

3. With reference to paragraphs 1, 2 and 10 of your note, the proposal of His Majesty's Government was that the Commander-in-Chief as defined in paragraph 4, of Part III of the memorandum should keep the ship for his own immediate use if he so requires. As soon as he releases the ship it comes under the control of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, a joint agency created by the two Governments to deal with Merchant Ships, for use in the general war effort, that is, in connection with the prosecution and completion of the war in Europe and the Far East. In no circumstances would recaptured ships escape use in the war effort. The jurisdiction of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board in this regard is recognized by those Allied Governments to whom copies of the memorandum were handed, and any ships turned over to such Allied Governments would remain under the control of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board by virtue of special agreements already made with these Allies.

4. With regard to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of your note, His Majesty's Government appreciate the helpful comments of the United States Government and suggest in the interest of clarity that the words "after satisfaction of the reasonable claims of underwriters" at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2(*d*) of Part II of the memorandum should read "subject to the safeguarding of any rights which the underwriters may have". This would make it clear that no new rights would be conferred on underwriters but that their rights if any would merely be preserved. Consequent upon this amendment it is suggested that paragraph 2(*d*) of Part II could be shortened to read as follows:

"(*d*) In the case of vessels in respect of which total losses have been paid by underwriters, the return to a government under the arrangements contemplated in this Memorandum will be made subject to the safeguarding of any rights which the underwriters may have."

5. With reference to paragraph 8 of your note, as was pointed out in the memorandum, there may be cases in which it is subsequently proved that the true owner of a particular vessel is a State or national of a State other than that in which the vessel is registered or that parties who are not nationals of the State of registration hold equities in the vessel or the right to possession thereof. In such cases it is understood that the Allied Government to whom the vessel has been transferred for operation by virtue of registration has, by such transfer, acquired custody only and will release the vessel or make such other adjustments as may be necessary in the circumstances. His Majesty's Government therefore agree that the final determina-

tion of title must depend on the facts in each case. In order to clarify this position it is suggested that paragraph 2 of Part II of the memorandum should be amended to read as follows:

“(e) There may be cases in which it is subsequently proved that the true owner of a particular vessel is a State or national of a State other than that in which the vessel is registered or that parties who are not nationals of the State of registration hold equities in the vessel or the right to possession thereof. In such cases it is understood that the Allied Government to whom the vessel has been transferred in accordance with paragraph 1, Part II, of this memorandum has, by such transfer, acquired custody only and will release the vessel or make such other adjustments as may be necessary in the circumstances.”

“(f) In cases where the owner of a vessel—whether a United Nations Government or a national of a United Nations Government—has been indemnified by underwriters, the turning over of a vessel to that Government without taking into account such indemnification would be in the nature of a gift and, in such instances, it is agreed that appropriate equitable adjustments will be made between the governments concerned.”

6. With regard to paragraph 4 of your note, His Majesty's Government welcome the United States Government's agreement with their views in regard to the disposal of cargoes found on recaptured ships.

7. With reference to paragraph 9 of your note, His Majesty's Government confirm that the expression “all liabilities, including costs of repairing and reconditioning, in respect of the vessel”, as it appears in paragraph 2(e) (ii) of Part II of the memorandum, is intended to cover the cost of repairing or reconditioning recaptured vessels whether already settled or not, and propose that the memorandum be amended accordingly.

8. His Majesty's Government hope that the above explanations will enable the United States Government to proceed with a formal agreement on the lines suggested in paragraph 2 of my note No. 286 of May 23, 1944. At the same time, they would be grateful for an early reply⁸⁶ to the question raised in paragraph 7 of this Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of February 7, 1944, as to whether the United States Government are prepared to take powers similar to those which have been taken by His Majesty's Government in order to ensure that claims for prize salvage will not be brought against British ships in American courts.

I have [etc.]

HALIFAX

⁸⁶ The Department did not reply until March 2, 1945, when it declared its willingness to proceed to the conclusion of a formal agreement along lines suggested by the British in their notes of May 23 and October 30, 1944. For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington May 7 and June 15, 1945, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1556, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1909.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ON MAKING A DÉMARCHE TO THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REGARDING DISPOSITION OF GERMAN VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT SEEKING REFUGE IN THOSE COUNTRIES

740.00119 European War/9-2344

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are considering the possibility that as the situation in Germany grows more critical, enemy warships and merchant vessels and military and civil aircraft may endeavour to evade capture and seek refuge in neutral territory.

2. In order to safeguard the position, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are anxious to instruct His Majesty's representatives in neutral countries, viz., Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to remind the Governments to which they are accredited, at a suitable opportunity, that the United Nations will be entitled to decide upon the ultimate disposal of all enemy vessels and aircraft that may reach neutral territory. Those Governments must be held responsible not only for interning warships and military aircraft but also for preserving intact all vessels and aircraft including merchant ships and civil aircraft pending their ultimate disposal.

3. His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to invite the United States Government to associate themselves with the proposed *démarche*.

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1944.

740.00119 European War/10-2344

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Consideration has been given to the suggestion made in the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 23, 1944 that the Government of the United States associate itself with the Government of the United Kingdom in informing the Governments of Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela that the United Nations will be entitled to decide upon the ultimate disposal of all enemy vessels and aircraft that may reach neutral territory and that they will be held responsible not only for interning warships and military aircraft but also for preserving intact all vessels and aircraft including merchant ships and civil aircraft pending their ultimate disposal.

The Government of the United States will be pleased to take action

parallel to that contemplated by the Government of the United Kingdom. It is suggested, however, that the Governments of Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela should not be characterized as Governments of neutral countries, as all of these countries have broken diplomatic relations with Germany and have otherwise indicated their sympathy with the cause of the United Nations. It is suggested instead that all of the recipients of the proposed *démarche* be characterized as the Governments of those countries that have not declared war on Germany.

With reference to Argentina, this Government would not be in a position to communicate directly with the Argentine Foreign Office, since the government of General Farrell is not recognized by the United States.⁸⁷ At the same time, the Department of State agrees that it would be desirable that this matter be brought to the attention of the authorities in Buenos Aires, and in this connection suggests that the good offices of the Paraguayan Government be utilized. It is observed that Paraguay is not included among the countries to which it is proposed to make this *démarche*, and for this reason, as well as the fact that it still maintains its Ambassador in Buenos Aires, it would seem the best channel for an informal approach to the Argentine Foreign Office. It is hoped that the British Government will agree that it would be inadvisable to approach the Farrell government directly, regardless of the form in which the approach might be made, in order to avoid any suggestion of departure from the policy of non-recognition.

The Department of State would appreciate being advised whether the above suggestions meet with the concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom and receiving further information as to the time when the proposed *démarche* will be made by His Britannic Majesty's representatives in the countries listed above, so as to facilitate the taking of parallel action by this Government.

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1944.

740.00119 European War/11-2144

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

Ref: 3132/11/44

No. 694

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to the Department's memorandum of October 23, 1944 about German ships and aircraft seeking refuge in neutral territory, has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's

⁸⁷ Gen. Edelmiro J. Farrell, President of Argentina. For correspondence regarding the United States non-recognition of his government, see vol. VII, section under Argentina entitled, "Withholding of recognition from the regime of Edelmiro Farrell by the United States."

representatives in Ankara, Berne, Lisbon, Madrid, Stockholm, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, Quito and Santiago have been instructed to approach the Governments to which they are accredited, on the lines proposed in the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 23, as soon as their United States colleagues have received parallel instructions. In accordance with the suggestion made in the second paragraph of the Department's memorandum, their communications will refer to "countries that have not declared war on the Axis nations," rather than to "neutral countries".

2. As regards Argentina, His Majesty's representative at Asunción has been instructed to ask the Paraguayan Government to approach the Argentine Government, in accordance with the suggestion made in the third paragraph of the Department's memorandum.

3. His Majesty's Embassy have the honour to enquire whether the United States Government would be willing to send instructions to the United States representatives in the countries named, including Switzerland, to concert with their British colleagues with a view to a simultaneous approach to the governments concerned.

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1944.

740.00119 European War/12-2944

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Ref. 3132/18/44

On December 18th, Mr. Gore-Booth⁸⁸ of the British Embassy discussed with the legal adviser to the Department⁸⁹ the instructions which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposed to send to His Majesty's Representatives in certain countries on the subject of German ships and aircraft seeking refuge in neutral territory.⁹⁰ (See the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of September 23, 1944).

2. Mr. Hackworth suggested that the wording of the proposed instructions was open to objection on the ground that there is at present no legal obligation on the governments concerned to intern German ships and aircraft pending their disposal by the United Nations, and said that the Department preferred to phrase its instructions to United States representatives as follows: "you are requested to bring the matter to the attention of the government to which you are accredited and to say that the Government of the United States has no doubt

⁸⁸ Paul H. Gore-Booth, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁸⁹ Green H. Hackworth.

⁹⁰ Memorandum of conversation, dated December 23, not printed.

that that government will recognize its special responsibility not only to intern such ships and aircraft but also to preserve them intact pending their ultimate disposition”.

3. His Majesty's Government accept this amendment and their instructions to British representatives will be amended accordingly.

4. His Majesty's Government also agree with the suggestion made by Mr. Hackworth that the Soviet Government should be given advance warning of the proposed action. They suggest January 20th as the date for the proposed *démarche* and would be glad to know as soon as possible whether this date is agreeable to the Department, in order that the necessary instructions may be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow.

5. With reference to further suggestions made by Mr. Hackworth, His Majesty's Government are considering whether a communication should be made to the Government of Eire but do not think that the *démarche* to the other governments need be delayed pending a decision on this point. Finally, His Majesty's Government agree that the Saudi Arabian Government should be included in the *démarche*.

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1944.

740.00119 European War/12-2944

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy (reference 3132/18/44) dated December 29, 1944 on the subject of the proposed *démarche* to be made to the governments of neutral countries by the representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States accredited to such governments, with regard to the internment and safeguarding of German vessels and aircraft that may seek refuge in the countries in question.

The Department of State sees no objection to the making of the proposed *démarche* on January 20, 1945 and is instructing its representatives accordingly.⁹¹ It is also instructing its representative at Asunción to join with the British representative in Asunción in requesting the Government of Paraguay to bring the matter to the at-

⁹¹ A circular instruction was sent on January 13, 1945, to diplomatic representatives in Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, Chile, Switzerland, Sweden, and Saudi Arabia for the *démarche* to be made. These Governments were requested to recognize their responsibility to intern and preserve intact pending ultimate disposition all vessels and aircraft of Germany seeking refuge within their boundaries. Early responses were received from most of the nations acknowledging their responsibility.

tention of the Government of Argentina.⁹² In that instruction it is pointed out that because of the landlocked character of Paraguayan territory, it is unlikely that any German vessel or aircraft would seek refuge in such territory and that for that reason the making of formal representations to that Government would not seem to be necessary. However, the representative of the United States has been informed that, if agreeable to the British representative in Asunción, there would be no objection to bringing informally to the attention of the Government of Paraguay its own obligations in the matter in the unlikely event that German vessels or aircraft should seek refuge in Paraguay.

The Department has noted that the Government of the United Kingdom will advise the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the proposed action. It has also noted that the Government of the United Kingdom does not desire to make a similar *démarche* to the Government of Eire. It is understood, however, on the basis of oral information furnished by the British Embassy that the Government of the United Kingdom has already unofficially advised the Government of Eire of its position in the matter and that it has no objections to the Government of the United States making a unilateral representation in the same sense to the Government of Eire.⁹³

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945.

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM DESIGNED TO PREVENT NEGOTIATION OF EXCLUSIVE OR DISCRIMINATORY AIR AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

800.796/8-3144

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1944.

Mr. Gore-Booth⁹⁴ came in to see me at his request and said that they had been working on a proposed exchange of notes which would amplify and make more concrete the so-called "Halifax Agreement"⁹⁵ by which the United States and Britain agreed that neither would attempt to negotiate air agreements discriminatory against or exclusive of the other. He presented the attached draft of note to see

⁹² Argentina in reply expressed willingness to take the action suggested by the Department.

⁹³ A favorable attitude was manifested by the Government of Eire but no written reply was made to representations made by the American Minister.

⁹⁴ Paul H. Gore-Booth, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁹⁵ Exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding air services in the Near and Middle East; see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. iv, pp. 18 ff.

whether it fitted our ideas. I said we would comment as soon as possible.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

[Annex]

Draft Note From the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

YOUR EXCELLENCY: During his visit to London in April last, Mr. Berle⁹⁶ drew attention to the understanding between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government regarding exclusive arrangements for United Kingdom-United States air transport lines, contained in the last paragraph of the State Department's *aide-mémoire* to His Majesty's Embassy of the 27th May, 1942 and the latter's reply of the 28th July, 1942.⁹⁷ Mr. Berle pointed out that the wording of this understanding might suggest that it ceased to have effect after the general consultation on civil aviation matters which was then in progress between our two governments. He proposed that an agreement to the same effect be put on record which would remain in force at least until the time of the international civil aviation conference contemplated during the talks in London.

2. As stated at the time of Mr. Berle's visit, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome this suggestion and are ready on a basis of reciprocity to agree as follows:—

(a) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom undertake that, except after consultation with the Government of the United States, they will not conclude agreements with the government of a foreign country which would preclude the Government of that country from granting flying rights to, in, and over its territory, to United States air transport undertakings.

(b) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom undertake that they will also prevent United Kingdom air transport undertakings from concluding such agreements with the Government of a foreign country except after consultation between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States.

(c) For the purposes of this Agreement, the expression "United Kingdom air transport undertaking" means any company engaged wholly or partly in air transport, which is incorporated in the United Kingdom or in any British colony, overseas territory, Protectorate, protected state or Mandated territory in respect of which the Mandate is exercised by the Government of the United Kingdom.

(d) This undertaking will remain in force until such time as an international civil aviation conference is held with the object of reaching agreement regarding the future regulation of international air transport.

⁹⁶ For correspondence relating to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle's visit, see vol. II, section entitled "Preliminary and exploratory discussions regarding international civil aviation; Conference held at Chicago, November 1-December 7, 1944."

⁹⁷ This exchange of notes constituted the so-called "Halifax Agreement".

3. If, as I understand, the United States Government are for their part willing to give a reciprocal undertaking, I have the honour to suggest that the present note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force immediately and continue in force until an international conference on civil aviation has been held.

WASHINGTON,

800.796/8-3144

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The British proposal for an understanding between the United States and British Governments relating to the acquisition of air transport rights on a non-exclusive basis, received in the Department of State on August 31, 1944, is acceptable subject to certain proposed amendments.

With reference to paragraph 2(b) the Government of the United States feels that it could not enter into a commitment to prevent United States air transport undertakings from concluding any agreements with foreign governments. However, it is fully disposed to adopt all practical means to prevent United States air transport companies from concluding operating agreements with foreign governments which would preclude such governments from granting rights to the United Kingdom.

As to paragraph 2(c) it is thought that the definition of an air transport undertaking should include not only a company already engaged in air transport, but one which may be seeking to engage in such transport.

With regard to paragraph 2(d) it is the view of the United States Government that there should be a more definite provision for possible termination of the understanding, and it is thought that the understanding should remain in force until the Government of the United States and the British Government become bound by a future international agreement relating to the operation of international air transport services, or until the understanding is terminated on reasonable notice given by either Government to the other Government.

In line with the foregoing suggestions there is attached a draft of a suggested form of exchange of notes for giving effect to the proposed understanding.

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1944.

[Enclosure 1]

Proposed Note From the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to negotiations which have taken place between the Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the reaching of a reciprocal agreement concerning the acquisition of air transport operating rights on a non-exclusive basis.

It is understood that it has been agreed in the course of these negotiations, now concluded, that so far as concerns the obligations to be assumed by the Government of the United States of America this agreement shall be as follows:

Article 1

(a) The Government of the United States of America undertakes that, except after consultation with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it will not conclude any agreement with the government of any foreign country which would preclude the government of that country from granting flying rights to, in, and over its territory, to United Kingdom air transport undertakings.

(b) The Government of the United States of America undertakes that it will also by all practical means prevent United States air transport undertakings from concluding any such agreement with the government of any foreign country, except after consultation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article 2

For the purposes of this understanding the expression "United States air transport undertaking" means any company engaged wholly or partly in air transport, or seeking to engage in such transport, which is incorporated in the United States of America or in any territory or possession within its jurisdiction.

Article 3

The present understanding will remain in force until the Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom become bound by a future international agreement relating to the operation of international air transport services, or until the present understanding is terminated on sixty days' notice given by either Government to the other Government.

I shall be glad to have you inform me whether it is understood by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the terms of the reciprocal agreement so far as they constitute the obligations to be assumed by the Government of the United States of America are as above set forth. If so, it is suggested that your reply setting forth the corresponding obligations to be assumed by His Majesty's Government constitute the reciprocal agreement to become effective

on the date of your reply. If His Majesty's Government concurs in this suggestion the Government of the United States of America will regard the reciprocal agreement as becoming effective on that date.

Accept [etc.]

[Enclosure 2]

Proposed Note From the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of in regard to the reaching of a reciprocal agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America, concerning the acquisition of air transport operating rights on a non-exclusive basis.

In your note of you have set forth your understanding of the obligations to be assumed by the Government of the United States of America in the carrying out of the terms of the reciprocal agreement which has been the subject of negotiations between the two Governments, now concluded.

I am instructed by my Government to state that the corresponding obligations to be assumed by His Majesty's Government under the reciprocal agreement are as set forth below :

Article 1

(a) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom undertake that, except after consultation with the Government of the United States of America, they will not conclude any agreement with the government of any foreign country which would preclude the government of that country from granting flying rights to, in, and over its territory, to United States air transport undertakings.

(b) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom undertake that they will also by all practical means prevent United Kingdom air transport undertakings from concluding any such agreement with the government of any foreign country except after consultation between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America.

Article 2

For the purposes of this understanding, the expression "United Kingdom air transport undertaking" means any company engaged wholly or partly in air transport, or seeking to engage in such transport, which is incorporated in the United Kingdom or in any British colony, overseas territory, protectorate, protected state or mandated territory in respect of which the mandate is exercised by the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article 3

The present understanding will remain in force until His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the

United States of America become bound by a future international agreement relating to the operation of international air transport services, or until the present understanding is terminated on sixty days' notice given by either Government to the other Government.

I am further instructed to inform you that my Government concur in your suggestion that the reciprocal agreement become effective on the date of this reply, and will accordingly regard it as becoming effective on this date.

I have [etc.]

[Subsequent correspondence on this subject dealt specifically with individual Near Eastern countries. See section entitled "Representations to the United Kingdom and Iran regarding American post-war civil air rights in Iran, especially at Abadan Island," volume V, pages 486 ff.; also, section entitled "Representations to Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding American post-war civil air rights in Egypt," *ibid.*, pages 56 ff.]

AUSTRALIA

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND AGREEMENT OF 1944 WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY OF SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC REGIONS

747.47H/3 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, December 28, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received December 28—8:35 a. m.]

232. On December 27 Evatt¹ announced that conversations would be held at Canberra in January between Australia and New Zealand to discuss common interests and problems and their future policies in relation to both Southwest and South Pacific regions.

In making this announcement Evatt expressed the hope that after the conference it would be possible to hold a wider conference in Australia consisting of accredited representatives of all powers with territorial interests in the Southwest Pacific. He has in mind specifically the Dutch, Portuguese, United Kingdom and French Governments. In this connection please see my despatch No. 628, December 1,² pages 9 through 14 commenting on a statement by Evatt in the House of Representatives on international affairs.

JOHNSON

747.47H/3 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1944—10 p. m.

4. Your 232 December 28. We have noted with interest Dr. Evatt's proposal, after discussions with New Zealand in January, to hold a conference of all powers with territorial interests in the Southwest Pacific. We have very considerable doubts that the time is yet ripe, or that it is likely to be ripe for some time to come, for a conference on this subject. You may use a suitable occasion to indicate our doubts to Dr. Evatt and inquire whether he does not believe that plans for a conference at this time are premature. The war in the Pacific is yet to be won and, in our opinion, it has not yet reached the stage which

¹ H. V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.

² Not printed.

would warrant the kind of discussions contemplated by Evatt or would make such discussions of greatest usefulness.

HULL

747.47H/7: Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, January 22, 1944.

[Received January 22—1:32 p.m.]

12. Department's 9, January 20.³ Following is text minus preamble of agreement signed noon yesterday and subject to early ratification:

1. The Two Governments agree that, as a preliminary, provision shall be made for fuller exchange of information regarding both the views of each Government and the facts in the possession of either bearing on matters of common interest.

2. The Two Governments give mutual assurances that, on matters which appear to be of common concern, each Government will, so far as possible, be made acquainted with the mind of the other before views are expressed elsewhere by either.

3. In furtherance of the above provisions with respect to exchange of views and information, the Two Governments agree that there shall be the maximum degree of unity in the presentation, elsewhere, of the views of the two Countries.

4. The Two Governments agree to adopt an expeditious and continuous means of consultation by which each party will obtain directly the opinions of the other.

5. The Two Governments agree to act together in matters of common concern in the Southwest and South Pacific areas.

6. So far as compatible with the existence of separate military commands, the Two Governments agree to coordinate their efforts for the purpose of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.

7. The Two Governments declare that they have vital interests in all preparations for any armistice ending the present hostilities or any part thereof and also in arrangements subsequent to any such armistice, and agree that their interests should be protected by representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies.

8. The Two Governments are in agreement that the final peace settlement should be made in respect of all our enemies after hostilities with all of them are concluded.

9. Subject to the last two preceding clauses, the Two Governments will seek agreement with each other on the terms of any armistice to be concluded.

10. The Two Governments declare that they should actively participate in any armistice commission to be set up.

11. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia shall set up in Australia, and his Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand shall set up in New Zealand, armistice and post hostilities planning committees, and shall arrange for the work of

³ Not printed.

those committees to be coordinated in order to give effect to the views of the respective Governments.

12. The Two Governments will collaborate generally with regard to the location of machinery set up under international organizations, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and, in particular, with regard to the location of the Far Eastern Committee of that Administration.

13. The Two Governments agree that, within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defense comprising the Southwest and South Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands north and northeast of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.

14. The Two Governments regard it as a matter of cardinal importance that they should both be associated, not only in the membership, but also in the planning and establishment of the General International Organization referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943⁴ which Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states and open to membership by all such states, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

15. Pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, the Two Governments hereby declare their vital interests in the action on behalf of the Community of Nations contemplated in Article V of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943. For that purpose it is agreed that it would be proper for Australia and New Zealand to assume full responsibility for policing or sharing policing such areas in the Southwest and South Pacific as may from time to time be agreed upon.

16. The Two Governments accept as a recognized principle of international practice that the construction and use, in time of war, by any power, of naval, military or air installations, in any territory under the sovereignty or control of another power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or right of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities.

17. The Two Governments agree that the regulation of all air transport services should be subject to the terms of a convention which will supersede the Convention relating to the regulation of aerial navigation.

18. The Two Governments declare that the air services using the international air trunk routes should be operated by an International Air Transport Authority.

19. The Two Governments support the principles that (a) full control of the international air trunk routes and the ownership of all aircraft and ancillary equipment should be vested in the International Air Transport Authority; and (b) the international air trunk routes should themselves be specified in the International Agreement referred to in the next succeeding clause.

20. The Two Governments agree that the creation of the International Air Transport Authority should be effected by an international agreement.

⁴The Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed October 30, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 755.

21. Within the framework of the system set up under any such international agreement, the two Governments support (a) the right of each country to conduct all air transport services within its own national jurisdiction, including its own contiguous territories, subject only to agreed international requirements regarding safety, facilities, landing and transit rights for international services and exchange of mails; (b) the right of Australia and New Zealand to utilize to the fullest extent their productive capacity in respect of aircraft and raw materials for the production of aircraft; and (c) the right of Australia and New Zealand to use a fair proportion of their own personnel, agencies and materials in operating and maintaining international air trunk routes.

22. In the event of failure to obtain a satisfactory international agreement to establish and govern the use of international air trunk routes, the Two Governments will support a system of air trunk routes controlled and operated by Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations under government ownership.

23. The Two Governments will act jointly in support of the above-mentioned principles with respect to civil aviation, and each will inform the other of its existing interests and commitments, as a basis of advancing the policy herein agreed upon.

24. Following the procedure adopted at the Conference which has just concluded, the Two Governments will regularly exchange information and views in regard to all developments in or affecting the islands of the Pacific.

25. The Two Governments take note of the intention of the Australian Government to resume administration at the earliest possible moment of those parts of its territories which have not yet been reoccupied.

26. The Two Governments declare that the interim administration and ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia and New Zealand, and that any such disposal should be effected only with their agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement.

27. The Two Governments declare that no change in the sovereignty or system of control of any of the Islands of the Pacific should be effected except as a result of an agreement to which they are parties or in the terms of which they have both concurred.

28. The Two Governments declare that, in applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter⁵ to the Pacific, the doctrine of "Trusteeship" (already applicable in the case of the mandated territories of which the Two Governments are mandatory powers) is applicable in broad principle to all colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, and that the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and political development.

29. The Two Governments agree that the future of the various territories of the Pacific and the welfare of their inhabitants cannot be successfully promoted without a greater measure of collaboration between the numerous authorities concerned in their control, and that such collaboration is particularly desirable in regard to health services and communications, matters of native education, anthro-

⁵ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

pological investigation, assistance in native production and material development generally.

30. The Two Governments agree to promote the establishment, at the earliest possible date, of a regional organization with advisory powers, which could be called the South Seas Regional Commission and, on which, in addition to representatives of Australia and New Zealand, there might be accredited representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and of the French Committee of National Liberation.

31. The Two Governments agree that it shall be the function of such South Seas Regional Commission as may be established to secure a common policy on social, economic and political development directed towards the advancement and well being of the native peoples themselves, and that, in particular, the commission should (a) recommend arrangements for the participation of natives in administration in increasing measure with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment of self-government in the form most suited to the circumstances of the native peoples concerned; (b) recommend arrangements for material development, including production, finance, communications and marketing; (c) recommend arrangements for coordination of health and medical services and education; (d) recommend arrangements for maintenance and improvement of standards of native welfare in regard to labor conditions and participation of natives in administration and social services; (e) recommend arrangements for collaboration in economic, social, medical and anthropological research; and (f) make and publish periodical reviews of progress towards the development of self-governing institutions in the islands of the Pacific and in the improvement of standards of living, conditions of work, education, health and general welfare.

32. In the peace settlement or other negotiations, the Two Governments will accord one another full support in maintaining the accepted principle that every government has the right to control immigration and emigration in regard to all territories within its jurisdiction.

33. The Two Governments will collaborate, exchange full information and render full assistance to one another in all matters concerning migration to their respective territories.

34. The Two Governments agree that, as soon as practicable, there should be a frank exchange of views on the problems of security, post-war development and native welfare between properly accredited representatives of the Governments with existing territorial interests in the Southwest Pacific Area or in the South Pacific Area, or in both, namely, in addition to the Two Governments His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Netherlands, the French Committee of National Liberation and the Government of Portugal, and His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia should take the necessary steps to call a conference of the Governments concerned.

35. The Two Governments agree that (a) Their cooperation for defense should be developed by (1) continuous consultation in all defense matters of mutual interest; (2) the organization, equipment, training and exercising of the armed forces under a common doctrine; (3) joint planning; (4) interchange of staff; (5) the coordination of policy for the production of munitions, aircraft and supply items and for shipping to ensure the greatest possible degree of mutual aid

consistent with the maintenance of the policy of self-sufficiency in local production; (*b*) collaboration in external policy on all matters affecting the peace, welfare and good government of the Pacific should be secured through the exchange of information and frequent ministerial consultation; (*c*) the development of commerce between Australia and New Zealand and their industrial development should be pursued by consultation and, in agreed cases, by joint planning; (*d*) there should be cooperation in achieving full employment in Australia and New Zealand and the highest standards of social security both within their borders and throughout the Islands of the Pacific and other territories for which they may jointly or severally be wholly or partly responsible; (*e*) there should be cooperation in encouraging missionary work and all other activities directed towards the improvement of the welfare of the native peoples in the Islands and territories of the Pacific.

36. The Two Governments declare their desire to have the adherence to the objectives set out in the last preceding clause of any other government having or controlling territories in the Pacific.

37. The Two Governments agree that the methods to be used for carrying out the provisions of Clause 35 of this agreement and of other provisions of this agreement shall be consultation, exchange of information and, where applicable, joint planning. They further agree that such methods shall include (*a*) conferences of Ministers of State to be held alternately in Canberra and Wellington, it being the aim of the Two Governments that these conferences be held at least twice a year; (*b*) conferences of departmental officers and technical experts; (*c*) meetings of standing Intergovernmental Committees on such subjects as are agreed to by the Two Governments; (*d*) the fullest use of the status and functions of the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Australia in [New] Zealand and of the High Commissioner of the Dominion of New Zealand in Australia; (*e*) regular exchange of information; (*f*) exchange of officers; and (*g*) the development of institutions in either country serving the common purposes of both.

38. In order to ensure continuous collaboration on the lines set out in this Agreement and to facilitate the carrying out of the duties and functions involved, the Two Governments agree that a permanent Secretariat shall be established in Australia and in New Zealand.

39. The Secretariat shall be known as the Australian-New Zealand Affairs Secretariat and shall consist of a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in Australia and a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in New Zealand, each under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs in the country concerned.

40. The functions of the Secretariat shall be (*a*) to take the initiative in ensuring that effect is given to the provisions of this Agreement; (*b*) to make arrangements as the occasion arises for the holding of conferences or meetings; (*c*) to carry out the directions of those conferences in regard to further consultation, exchange of information or the examination of particular questions; (*d*) to coordinate all forms of collaboration between the Two Governments; (*e*) to raise for joint discussion and action such other matters as may seem from day to day to require attentions by the Two Governments; and (*f*) generally to provide for more frequent and regular exchanges of in-

formation and views, those exchanges between the Two Governments to take place normally through the respective High Commissioners.

41. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand each shall nominate an officer or officers from the staff of their respective High Commissioners to act in closest collaboration with the Secretariat in which they shall be accorded full access to all relevant sources of information.

42. In each Country, the Minister of State for External Affairs and the Resident High Commissioner shall have joint responsibility for the effective functioning of the Secretariat.

43. This agreement is subject to ratification by the respective Governments and shall come into force as soon as both Governments have ratified the agreement and have notified each other accordingly. It is intended that such notification will take place as soon as possible after the signing of this agreement.

44. This agreement shall be known as the Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944.

Supplementary telegrams follow.

JOHNSON

747.47H/6: Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, January 22, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received January 22—7:36 a. m.]

13. Taking advantage of Dr. Evatt's presence in Canberra to attend conference between Australia and New Zealand I communicated to him yesterday substance of Department's telegram No. 4, January 2 [8], 10 p. m.

Evatt was quite evidently annoyed and somewhat nervous over the communication which, at one point in the conversation that followed, he referred to as "officious", a word which he subsequently withdrew. His first words were "of course, the complete answer to that would be '*tu quoque*'".

By way of explanation he made it abundantly clear that Commonwealth Government had been extremely irritated because it had neither been consulted nor invited to attend Cairo Conference.⁶ To my remark that this Conference had dealt with military matters he immediately countered by statement that Conference had dealt with Pacific matters, that China was represented, and that he felt decisions such as the one dealing with the disposition of Formosa after the war should have been left to a conference of all the powers. To my remark that China looked upon Formosa as Chinese territory occupied by Japan, Evatt replied that, nevertheless, he felt Australia should

⁶ For correspondence pertaining to the Cairo Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

have been invited to participate in a conference which discussed such matter.

Evatt then entered upon a long series of complaints regarding the treatment of Australia. He referred to his disappointment that Australia had been put off in regard to its desire to negotiate a trade agreement with the United States,⁷ going over the arguments set forth in his note on that subject dated December 17.⁸ He stated that Australia and New Zealand had been forced by self-interest to confer in regard to their position and that it might be expected that neither Australia nor New Zealand acting separately or together would consent to any disposition of Japanese possessions in the Pacific except as part of a general Pacific agreement. He seemed to think that our argument that the time is not yet ripe for a conference of all powers with territorial interests in the Southwest Pacific was specious, intimating that similar objection might have been made to conferences which the United States has called concerning food and relief, and stating that only when Australia sought to call a conference to consider matters of interest to Australia was such an argument advanced.

I saw Evatt immediately after the signing of the Agreement, which was made public only last night, and it was evident that he felt somewhat shamefaced and yet truculently pleased over the whole proceeding. All the publicity had been concentrated upon the negotiations as an effort to set up machinery for mutual consultation on problems of mutual interest, and it was not until he mentioned that Australia and New Zealand would not consent to any disposition of Japanese possessions in the Pacific except as part of a general Pacific agreement that I understood the reason for his attitude. When I left him I carried away the impression that he might shortly communicate further with me on this whole subject.

JOHNSON

747.47H/4 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, January 22, 1944—12 a. m.
[Received 8:18 a. m.]

14. My 12, January 22. Conference opened 17th in utmost secrecy and at no time were we officially informed of agenda or intentions although we had easy access to superficial knowledge of some of the general subjects. I was informed by the Netherlands Minister, who showed his resentment of the whole procedure by refusing to attend

⁷ For discussions regarding trade relations between the United States and Australia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 115 ff.

⁸ For text of note, see telegram 230, December 27, 1943, 10 a. m., from Canberra, *ibid.*, p. 117.

the public signing ceremony, that he had not been informed or consulted on any point although he knew or felt that they were discussing territory and peoples over which the Netherlands claimed complete sovereignty. British representative apparently also not consulted.

The agreement can be described as the Anzac Monroe Doctrine. In his final speech Curtin⁹ said "in substance the two nations have declared a Pacific charter of permanent collaboration and cooperation" to which like-minded powers might adhere when Australia (not the Anzac consortium) calls together "representatives of the other governments in the Pacific and the territories north of Australia with a view to extending the scope of regional collaboration". The South Seas Regional Commission mentioned in Department's telegram 9, January 20,¹⁰ has to do only with welfare of natives (clauses 28 to 31). The implications of this section of the agreement cover also the natives in territories outside Anzac jurisdiction and we have been told that the reason for concern of welfare of natives outside their jurisdiction is that the improvement of welfare of natives everywhere in the Pacific would render them "fitter components" in the outer defense bastions.

Both Prime Ministers in their final speeches averred emphatically that the agreement was not aimed at any other power and various officials have tried to reassure members of my staff of this. However, articles 26 and 27 serve notice on powers not now sovereign in certain territories that cession to them, even of former enemy territory, would be subject to Anzac concurrence.

By the wording of the agreement itself and by explanatory public statements of official spokesmen the two governments virtually served notice that no non-British aviation line shall operate to and through the two countries except international trunk routes managed by an international air transport authority whose construction is agreeable to them. Failing the establishment and use of international trunk routes they will support a system of air trunk routes controlled and operated by the Government of the British Commonwealth under Government ownership. The agreement did not overlook the much mooted aircraft manufacturing industry.

We are told that clause 16 is a direct result of statements published in the United States including those of members of Congress and such people as McCormick.¹¹ In an official statement issued last night Curtin stated:

"Absurd claims have sometimes been advanced in connection with war time construction of naval, military and air installations. Both Governments accept the undoubted principle of international practice that such construction does not in itself afford any basis whatever for

⁹ John Curtin, Australian Prime Minister.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ Presumably Robert R. McCormick, editor and publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*.

territorial claims after hostilities have been concluded. Obvious illustrations of such general practice occur in the cases of Iceland and the Azores.”

JOHNSON

747.47H/15a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)*¹²

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1944—6 p. m.

10. Please request an appointment with Prime Minister Curtin and hand him the text of the following message from the Secretary of State:

“I have read the text of the Australian–New Zealand agreement of January 21 expressing the views of the two governments on certain matters of common interest relating particularly to the South and Southwest Pacific region. I am, of course, aware that this agreement, in so far as it undertakes to deal with matters affecting territories other than those of the two governments, is wholly without prejudice to the interests of other countries. I am certain that both the Australian and New Zealand Governments are likewise aware of this and that they have no desire to affect the interests of other countries prejudicially.

“It is understandable that the Australian and New Zealand Governments should wish to reach agreement between themselves on matters of common concern and that they should wish to make their views known to other governments. I am frankly disturbed, however, at the proposal of the two governments to call an early conference of Powers with territorial interests in the South and Southwest Pacific to consider the problem of regional security and related matters. I have discussed this with the President and, while we agree that these matters must be given utmost attention, we have considerable doubts that it is yet time for discussing them at a formal conference of interested Powers. Our doubts have, I believe, already been communicated informally to the Australian Government. Despite all the progress we have made, the war in the Pacific has still to be won and, in our opinion, it has not yet reached the stage which would warrant the type of formalized discussions which appear to be contemplated.

“There is also the question of approach which should be carefully considered. In our opinion, it is necessary to agree upon arrangements for a general international security system before attempting to deal with problems of regional security. Any attempt to deal with regional security in the Southwest Pacific in advance of agreement on a general security system might well give rise to efforts on the part of other regional groups to make their own exclusive arrangements for security. Thus, such a conference as is proposed might in the end result in a number of independent regional systems and seriously interfere with efforts to achieve a general system of world security.

¹² The same, *mutatis mutandis*, as No. 63 on the same date to the Chargé in New Zealand.

"We have also to consider the effect of such a conference upon our immediate war effort. The President and I have some fears that a formal conference of the interested Powers for the purpose contemplated would possibly do more harm than good to our united war effort. Such a conference might well arouse suspicions and possibly bring into focus conflicting opinions on matters which do not require decision at this time. We are sure you share our strong feeling that nothing should be done at this time to impair existing harmony among all the United Nations fighting together against our common enemies.

"We hope, therefore, that you will not take any steps toward calling such a conference until we have had an opportunity to discuss these matters fully together. I understand that you may be coming to Washington within the next month or two. The President and I look forward with pleasure to seeing you at that time and believe that your visit will give us an excellent opportunity for a full and frank exchange of views on all these problems.

"I am also communicating with Prime Minister Fraser¹³ in this sense."

HULL

747.47H/15

Memorandum by Mr. R. B. Stewart of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1944.

This Division does *not* believe that we should consult the British Government before sending the proposed message from the Secretary to the Prime Minister of Australia and New Zealand on the subject of a Southwest Pacific conference. It seems all too likely that the British may heartily support the Australian and New Zealand proposals contained in their agreement. Although we have no information regarding the attitude of the British Government, the agreement has been commented on favorably in the British press.

For some time it has been evident that the British Government is apprehensive lest Australia and New Zealand come too closely under American influence. This apprehension has found outward expression in a number of ways including the despatch of a recent mission headed by Sir Walter Layton. Although Sir Walter has come back with the report that "the feeling Australia has toward the Empire is in no way changed by what has happened in the Pacific", the apprehension still remains. It is very likely indeed therefore that the British Government warmly welcomes this Australia-New Zealand agreement indicating as it does that these two members of the Commonwealth do not intend to be subservient to the United States.

¹³ Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Thus it is believed that we should not consult the British in advance of expressing our views to Australia and New Zealand. If, despite the views put forward by this Government, Australia and New Zealand still insist on going ahead with the conference idea, we may then wish to consider what further means, including consultation with the British, should be used to stop or postpone the holding of a conference.

747.47H/9 : Telegram

The Chargé Near the Netherlands Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 1, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received February 1—8:25 p. m.]

3. Netherlands Series. Your 2, January 29, 6 p. m.¹⁴ Netherlands officials have not yet formulated their ideas on the specific provisions of recently concluded Australian–New Zealand Agreement regarding the Southwestern Pacific.

Foreign Minister Van Kleffens tells me Netherlands Government was not approached in any way by the signatories prior to or since the conclusion of the agreement. He referred to the assertiveness of Australia in matters of foreign policy toward Britain particularly, and said Australia had of course taken the initiative in this matter. The agreement was a sort of “declaration of independence” in foreign affairs by Australia and New Zealand and he was not sure it was not *ultra vires*.

He had now seen the text of the agreement but was not prepared to discuss its substance at this time. He considered its provisions to be very far ahead of the military situation in the Far East but imagined the agreement would be discussed at the forthcoming Conference of British Empire Ministers.

Baron Pallandt, a senior diplomatic official of the Netherlands Foreign Office, states Netherlands Government had been aware of the negotiations but had not expected so far-reaching a document. It was his impression that there was a great deal in it which would be acceptable to the Dutch.

Dr. Pelt, Chief of the Netherlands Press Office, states no comment on the agreement has been carried by any Dutch publications here. They have confined themselves to straight reporting.

Pelt adds in confidence that the Government here has wired Van Mook, Minister of Colonies now in Washington, asking for his comment but he has not yet replied.

¹⁴ Not printed.

I believe the Department, if it has not already done so, would get a better preliminary picture of the Dutch attitude from him than from any personality in the Government here.

[SCHOENFELD]

747.47H/12 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, February 3, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received February 3—5:17 a. m.]

25. Reference Department's 10, February 1, 6 p. m. I presented text of message to Prime Minister Curtin at noon today. Apparently Minister External Affairs had not informed Prime Minister of my conversation with him on January 21 communicating our ideas.

Curtin authorized me to assure you that there is no immediacy involved in plan for calling conference and stated that he would give me a considered reply shortly.

JOHNSON

747.47H/16 : Telegram

The Chargé in New Zealand (Childs) to the Secretary of State

WELLINGTON, February 4, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received February 4—6:10 a. m.]

74. The Prime Minister has asked me to hasten to assure Secretary Hull and the President in connection with the Department's telegram No. 63 of February 1, 6 p. m.,¹⁵ that he is in entire accord with that message and was very glad to receive it; that there is no intention to call this regional conference until after their return from the Prime Ministers' conference in London which will probably be held early in May; that he and Dr. Evatt [*sic*] plan previously have full and frank discussions in Washington before and after the London Conference; that a more formal reply will be forthcoming soon.

In connection with Mr. Fraser's trip to London mentioned in this Legation's airgram No. A-4 dated January 13, 10 a. m.,¹⁶ he again mentioned that it was essential for Mrs. Fraser to accompany him and that he would like to leave here immediately after Easter to stop over in Washington en route. On his return from London he will be glad to remain in the United States as long as desirable. If a plane of ours could not pick them up in New Zealand he said they could arrange to make connections with it in Noumea or Suva.

CHILDS

¹⁵ See footnote 12, p. 177.

¹⁶ Not printed.

747.47H/12: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1944—7 p. m.

12. Reference your No. 25, February 3. Prime Minister Fraser has replied that he is in entire accord with my message of February 1. We infer from Fraser's reply, however, that he may believe we are agreeable to the calling of a conference after discussions in Washington and that it is still the plan of Curtin and Fraser to call the conference after their return from London and Washington. This leads us to believe that our message was not as explicit as we had thought. We are, therefore, instructing Wellington to inform Fraser that in our opinion no attempt should be made during the present year to call a conference of the type contemplated. Please inform Curtin of our view to this effect. We shall of course hope to discuss all aspects of the matter with Prime Ministers Curtin and Fraser when they are in Washington.

HULL

747.47H/22: Telegram

The Chargé in New Zealand (Childs) to the Secretary of State

WELLINGTON, February 8, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received February 8—10:30 a. m.]

80. With further reference to my telegram No. 74, February 4, 3 p. m.; and Department's 67, February 5, 7 p. m.¹⁷ Prime Minister Fraser's interim written reply states:

"I agree that this question of the conference could be the subject of personal discussion when Mr. Curtin and I pass through Washington later on in the year. The other views expressed in the message from the Secretary of State (telegram 63, February 1, 6 p. m.)¹⁸ are as you will appreciate matters for consideration affecting both the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments and as I stated in the course of our discussion I will in due course be glad to let you have formal reply thereon."

I understand that Evatt was anxious to hold an international conference in Australia immediately or soon after the London Prime Ministers conference; that New Zealand's stand was that this was too soon, because preliminary arrangements preceding calling of such a formal conference would take at least until November; that New Zealand is not particularly interested in pushing such a conference but Evatt is the prime mover therein and under the Canberra arrange-

¹⁷ Latter not printed.¹⁸ See footnote 12, p. 177.

ment the calling of such a regional conference is Australia's responsibility.

As already reported by Johnson from Canberra especially in third paragraph of his telegram No. 13, January 22, 10 a. m., it is said here that Evatt's action in calling the Canberra conference and in advocating a regional one before long is due to chagrin at not being at Cairo. Also said here that Australia is having growing pains and Evatt is actively cultivating her interest in international affairs.

I believe that both Australia and New Zealand feel Canberra agreement was good thing in expressing their stand early and perhaps in bringing themselves more forcefully to the attention of the great powers. They undoubtedly feel their position and interest in the Pacific is greater than formerly. They want to have a part in the final settlements following this war and not have everything pre-arranged by others for them. Australia apparently is the aggressive partner but smaller and more distant New Zealand does not want to be forgotten either.

Repeated to Canberra.

CHILDS

747.47H/34

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. B. Stewart of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1944.

Participants: Mr. Tswen-ling Tsui, First Secretary, Chinese Embassy
 Mr. Troy Perkins, FE¹⁹
 Mr. Kenneth Landon, FE
 Mr. Robert B. Stewart, BC

Mr. Tsui called at the Department this afternoon to request information on the attitude of the American Government toward the Australian–New Zealand Agreement. He stated that the Chinese Government had not yet formulated its attitude toward the agreement and that the Chinese Foreign Minister wished first to know the views of the American Government.

Officers of the Department present informed Mr. Tsui of the attitude of this Government substantially as outlined in the Secretary's message to Prime Ministers Curtin and Fraser—omitting, however, any reference to the possibility, mentioned in the Secretary's message, that a Southwest Pacific Conference at this time "might well arouse suspicions and possibly bring into focus conflicting opinions on matters which do not require decision at this time." Mr. Tsui was also in-

¹⁹ Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

formed that the views of this Government have been formally communicated to the Australian and New Zealand Governments.

Mr. Tsui was informed that frankly we do not take the Australian-New Zealand Agreement too seriously, that we regard it as without effect upon our interests, that it probably reflects in a large measure the desire of Australia and New Zealand as small countries to participate in all major international decisions on a plane of equality with the Great Powers. It was added that the Agreement is also in part a public statement of policies which Australia and New Zealand expect to follow. For example, one of the subjects dealt with is international aviation. We have not expressed any views to Australia and New Zealand regarding this portion of the agreement. We might not agree with the attitude which they take and might believe it not to be in their own best interests, but we recognize it merely as a statement of views which these Governments say that they will press when this matter becomes the subject of international discussion.

Mr. Tsui said that in general his Government felt that problems of the kind covered by the agreement should be left for settlement at the Peace Conference. He cited the recent agreement between Czechoslovakia and Russia,²⁰ and said this seemed to them to be going in the wrong direction and that, from what he could gather from the American press, this Government was not too pleased with attempts to settle matters before winning the war. Mr. Tsui was informed that with regard to the proposal of Australia and New Zealand to call a conference, this Government does take the attitude that this matter should be postponed until the war in the Pacific has reached a later stage.

Mr. Tsui stated that they wondered what territories were intended to be covered by the Australia-New Zealand agreement. It was stated in reply that while we have no information on this point and could only guess, it seemed that insofar as the idea of establishing a security zone is concerned, the Australians and New Zealanders are probably thinking in terms of islands south of the equator.

Mr. Tsui mentioned the particular interest of his government in the Japanese Mandated territories and the provision of the Australian and New Zealand governments stating that the disposal of these islands should be effected only with Australian and New Zealand agreement. He also referred to the reference in the agreement to the location of international machinery dealing with the Far Eastern area. (Article 12 reads as follows: "The two Governments will collaborate generally with regard to the location of machinery set up under

²⁰ Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-war Collaboration, with Protocol, signed at Moscow December 12, 1943, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 238.

international organization such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and in particular with regard to the location of the Far Eastern Committee of that Administration".) Mr. Tsui said that his Government was of course interested in this, that the Australian–New Zealand Agreement apparently is in conflict with the provisions of the UNRRA agreement,²¹ and that their view is that the agreement of 44 nations would naturally override the agreement of two nations. The specific manner in which the Australian–New Zealand Agreement is believed to conflict with the UNRRA Agreement was not made clear. It was evident, however, that Chinese Government is interested in having UNRRA machinery set up in China rather than in Australia and New Zealand.

It was observed by officers of the Department that China is not listed among the Powers which Australia and New Zealand propose to invite to a conference on the South and Southwest Pacific and that it was presumed that this was owing to the fact that Australia and New Zealand proposed to confine the conference to Powers with territorial interests in that area. Mr. Tsui commented that while his Government did not have any territory in this Southwest Pacific area, it would not like to be excluded from a conference of this kind. He pointed out that China has literally millions of "overseas nationals" scattered through these areas—in Dutch East Indies and even in New Georgia and the Solomons. He felt that his Government does have interests in the area and would wish to be represented.

747.47H/27a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia
(Johnson)*²²

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1944—11 a. m.

15. On February 4 the Department repeated to London²³ the text of the Secretary's message to Prime Ministers Curtin and Fraser in regard to the Australian–New Zealand Agreement. The Embassy was instructed to make known to the British authorities our attitude on this subject. The Embassy now reports a conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan²⁴ as follows:

"Sir Alexander said that the British Government's attitude toward the agreement was that in general they welcomed many of the provi-

²¹ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Agreement between the United States and Other Governments or Authorities, signed at Washington November 9, 1943; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 352, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1164.

²² Repeated to the Minister in New Zealand on the same date as No. 83.

²³ Telegram No. 876, not printed.

²⁴ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

sions of the agreement itself as they supposed was the case with the American Government. Their attitude with regard to the convening of an early conference, however, was that such a conference was premature and that considerable preparation and groundwork should be accomplished before such a meeting should be called. He did not know whether this view had been communicated as yet to the Governments of New Zealand and Australia but in any case this was the attitude of the British Government."

Repeated to Wellington.

STETTINIUS

747.47H/31: Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, February 25, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received February 25—8:33 a. m.]

30. Below is quoted text of note signed by Minister for External Affairs and dated today which constitutes the Commonwealth Government's reply to the message from the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Curtin (Department's telegram No. 10, February 1, 6 p. m.)

"Sir: I have the honor to inform you that careful consideration has been given to the recent message of the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister dated February 3 and relating in the main to the time of calling the conference contemplated in Clause 34 of the Australian-New Zealand agreement 1944.

I note the important suggestion of the Secretary of State that the Australian Prime Minister should discuss the matter at Washington while en route to the forthcoming talks in London between Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

It was agreed between Australia and New Zealand during the recent Canberra conference that the proposed international conference should not take place before the London talks and we readily accept the suggestion of an informal discussion at Washington.

While this answers the main suggestions of the Secretary of State, there are other observations in his message which require comment, so that there shall be no misunderstanding of Australia's general policy.

The general tenor of the message is that the holding of a 'formalized' or 'formal' conference may not be desirable at the present time. However, the degree of form or formality which might attach to the proposed conference is a matter on which prior agreement should easily be obtained. Of course we are more interested in the substance than in the form of the 'frank exchange of views' envisaged in Article 34 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement.

It is the opinion of the Australian Government that the prosecution of the war especially in the Pacific would be aided by such a frank and friendly exchange of views.

If it appeared that the powers with territorial interests in the South Pacific were determined to safeguard the future welfare and

good Government of all the native peoples, it is certain that the joint war effort against Japan would be aided; something of positive value could be presented to the world as an answer to the Japanese political and economic propaganda within the great areas not yet liberated.

The message under reply rather assumes that Australia and New Zealand wished problems of regional defense to be dealt with prior to and irrespective of arrangements for a general international security system. This is not so. The agreement between Australia and New Zealand makes the position very clear. Article 13 speaks of a regional zone of defense 'within the framework of a general world plan of security'. Further, the obvious intention both of Australia and New Zealand was that any discussions of regional defense should be related at all times to plans for the General International Organization referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943. With that organization Australia and New Zealand desire to be associated at the planning stages and before any definite proposals are formulated, *vide* Article 14.

The Australian Government finds it difficult to appreciate the suggestion that a conference in Australia of representatives of every Allied power without exception interested in the South Pacific area, whether held formally or informally, could create any reasonable ground whatsoever for objection or suspicion. On the contrary, such a conference should, in our view, be a helpful contribution to the maintenance of harmonious action among the United Nations. All the matters covered by the Australian-New Zealand Agreement have post-war relevance and some of the matters will form the main content of the postwar settlement in this part of the world. The purpose of the Conference is to ensure that the discussion of these great matters is set on foot in good time so as to avert the grave risk of insufficiently considered decisions which, through the great pressure of events at or towards the close of hostilities, may prejudice the final peace settlement.

Even in the midst of war every principal government of the United Nations has found it necessary to concern itself with these vital post-war problems, and nearly all have established agencies for the purpose of making suitable plans and arrangements. In this connection it is appropriate to emphasize that no country has more frequently taken the initiative than has the United States of America, and that in all such matters the United States has received the fullest possible support both from Australia and New Zealand.

We feel strongly that Australia and New Zealand are entitled to the fullest degree of preliminary consultation, especially in relation to Pacific matters. At the recent Cairo conference decisions affecting the future of certain portions of the Pacific and vitally affecting both Australia and New Zealand were not only made but publicly announced without any prior reference either to the Australian or the New Zealand Government. Actually the first news the Australian Government received of the Cairo decisions was through the medium of the press.

Further, it is gradually becoming clear that certain Governments, including the United States Government, are tending to indicate their policy, though not publicly, on important phases of the Pacific settlement.

For instance at the Pacific Council ²⁵ on March 31, 1943 the President said he had discussed with Mr. Eden different island territories in the Pacific.²⁶ The President expressed opinions not only as to sovereignty, but as to proposed economic coordination. The President added that he had also discussed with Mr. Eden the question of Japanese mandated islands and of Timor.

Subsequently, on 29 September 1943, also at the Pacific Council, the President referred to the Marshall and Caroline Islands and other islands east of the Philippines. He indicated the existence of plans to determine what postwar policy should be adopted for the maintenance of peace in that part of the Pacific.

Very recently, at the meeting of the Pacific council on January 12 last, the President communicated his views regarding the future of the Pacific Islands both north and south of the equator. With reference to the latter, he spoke of the possibility of 'some arrangement' for their future allocation.

In the course of the meeting of January 12 the President referred specially to the question of what should be done with the French islands. The President stated that he had told Mr. Churchill ²⁷ that the French should not have New Caledonia back under any conditions and that he believed that the people of Australia and New Zealand would back him up.

It is realized that the President may not have been speaking definitively on these matters but they are cited as illustrations of the fact that, in matters of tremendous consequence to Australia and New Zealand postwar arrangements are under consideration by the United States Government. We fear that they may be dealt with in a way which can prejudice harmonious Pacific settlement.

For instance, I should mention that Australia is under a deep obligation to Fighting France. It is publicly pledged to do its utmost to maintain the sovereignty of France in its present South Pacific possessions. Similar pledges have been given by other of the United Nations.

We trust that the United States Government will appreciate that our reference to France is intended merely to indicate, in our view, the danger of postponing the frank exchange of views which is the purpose of the conference referred to in article 34 of the Australian-New Zealand agreement.

It is pointed out that Australia's proposal to call the International Conference was announced in a speech delivered by myself as long ago as October 12 of last year.

It is the hope of the Australian Government that the proposed conference should be held about July of the present year. Therefore we request that when the time comes for decision the United States Government will give the conference such active and vigorous support as will help to secure its success.

²⁵ Pacific War Council, meeting for the first time on April 1, 1942, was created for the purpose of considering matters of policy relating to joint war efforts in the Pacific. The Department of State was not represented on the Council.

²⁶ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: see memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, March 27, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 36.

²⁷ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

As I have already mentioned the United States has during the present war frequently taken the initiative in matters designed to secure closer collaboration among groups of the United Nations in matters of common interest. Groups initiative has extended to matters of regional cooperation, e.g. the Caribbean Commission. Now, when Australia and New Zealand have taken the initiative in relation to an important aspect of future international collaboration in their part of the world, we confidently ask the United States for understanding and sympathy commensurate with that which has always been extended by both Australia and New Zealand.”

I understand a note along similar lines has been communicated by Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand.²⁸

JOHNSON

747.47H/42

*The New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Fraser) to the Chargé in New Zealand (Childs)*²⁹

WELLINGTON, February 25, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication dated 4th February, in which you conveyed to me a message from your Government similar in terms, I understand, to that delivered to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia³⁰ regarding certain matters arising out of the Australia–New Zealand Agreement of 21st January.

Very careful consideration has been given to the views of the Secretary of State and I would be grateful if you would convey to him my comments on his note in the sense following:

1. It was the intention and the understanding of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, as the Secretary of State himself observes, that the Agreement “in so far as it undertakes to deal with matters affecting territories other than those of the two Governments is wholly without prejudice to the interests of other countries.” I can assure the Secretary of State that neither Government had or have any desire to affect the interests of other countries prejudicially. They did, however, desire to make known in the Agreement their attitude towards other countries as a means of ensuring that future international undertakings might not prejudicially affect their own interests. In this connection the two Governments should, I feel, draw attention to the fact that they have twice within a generation been drawn into war by a chain of circumstances which originated

²⁸ See *infra*.

²⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in New Zealand in his despatch 168, February 25; received March 25.

³⁰ See telegram 10, February 1, 6 p.m., to Canberra, p. 177.

on the other side of the world, and Australia and New Zealand would wish, in any discussions or proposals for the reordering of world affairs, that their own external interests should be given due weight and consideration.

2. I note that the United States "have considerable doubts that it is yet time for discussing" the problems of regional security and related matters at an early conference of Powers with territorial interests in the South and South West Pacific. In case there should be any grounds of misunderstanding between the two Governments and the United States it would seem desirable to comment on—

- (a) the attitude of the two Governments towards regional security;
- (b) the aims of the proposed Conference; and
- (c) the appropriate time for the holding of this Conference.

On the question of approach, there is I feel no fundamental difference between the United States point of view and our own. It was never contemplated that regional security should be dealt with in advance of an agreement on a general security system, both for the reason put forward by the United States Government and for the added reason that New Zealand and Australia do not consider that systems of regional security are capable of preserving peace. In view of the New Zealand Government, which is shared by the Commonwealth, the preservation of peace can only be maintained effectively under a world system of security and not under a number of systems of regional security. While the New Zealand Government make a clear distinction between an international security organization for the preservation of peace and systems of regional defence, at the same time they recognize the practical worth of a zone of regional—in the sense of local—defence as distinct from a zone of regional security for the preservation of peace. This conception is dealt with in clauses 13 to 15 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, and is linked up with the question of "policing" contemplated in Article V of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943.

The term "regional security" is nowhere used in the Agreement, and at any conference of interested powers in the South and South West Pacific, as suggested in Clause 34, the Government would wish to make their viewpoint clear regarding the limitations of regional security.

While the future security of both Australia and New Zealand is, subject to a general system of world security, dependent on the arrangements to be made for the control and defence of the South West and South Pacific areas, these will inevitably be affected by the interim arrangements immediately following the reconquest of the Netherlands East Indies and contiguous territories.

Australia and New Zealand feel, therefore, that they must be closely associated with all decisions and measures taken in this important formative stage, and they desire, subject always to consultation and agreement with the other Governments concerned, that Australia and New Zealand should have responsibility either in full or in part for policing of vital areas in the chain of territories stretching through the islands of the Netherlands East Indies north west of Australia, Portuguese Timor, Dutch New Guinea, the Solomon Islands Protectorate and the New Hebrides, and the area eastwards across to Cook Islands and Western Samoa. The two countries regard it as essential that arrangements for policing in this area and elsewhere in the Pacific should be part of a general scheme and not be made piecemeal. They believe, moreover, that a zone of regional defence could be established by agreement among the Governments concerned, and for that reason suggested the holding of a regional conference for the purpose of discussing this question in addition to post-war development and native welfare.

On the question of the appropriate time for calling such a conference there is, I agree, room for difference of opinion. The force of the arguments put forward by the Secretary of State are appreciated. On the other hand, Australia and New Zealand, like others of the smaller nations, are apprehensive lest they should be excluded from any direct and immediate share in the planning and establishment of the general international organization contemplated in the Moscow Declaration.

For their part, the two Governments regard it as a matter of cardinal importance that they both should be associated in the initial stages with the elaboration of any such general international system. It was for this purpose that they declared in the Agreement that Australia and New Zealand had a vital interest in the "joint action on behalf of the community of nations" contemplated in Article V of the Moscow Declaration, and both were therefore ready, in the interval before the general organization contemplated in Article IV can be established, to assume responsibility as an interim measure for policing, or sharing in the policing, of such areas in the South West and South Pacific as might from time to time be agreed upon.

As I have already stated, they would be vitally affected by the interim arrangements following the reconquest of the Netherlands East Indies and contiguous territories and would therefore wish to discuss such arrangements as soon as possible.

Australia and New Zealand, in common no doubt with other powers, feel the necessity for clear declarations of policy at an early stage in regard to the post-war settlement, and the two Governments were of opinion that the time had come when they at least should state

the principles which they regarded as essential for the protection of their own vital interests. They are naturally anxious that those vital interests should not be overlooked by the major powers in the establishment of any new world order. In this connection they would cite the action taken without their prior knowledge at the Cairo Conference in issuing a declaration regarding the Pacific and disposing of territories in that area.

I can assure the Secretary of State that I would welcome the opportunity of discussing with him and the President the question of the proposed Pacific Conference and that in the meantime I would have no objection to invitations to the conference contemplated in Article 34 of the Australian–New Zealand Agreement being postponed until after the forthcoming meeting of Prime Ministers in London. By that time full opportunity will have been given for discussions not only with the President but with Mr. Churchill and others.

I have [etc.]

P. FRASER

747.47H/54

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1944.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull, the New Zealand Minister, Mr. Walter Nash, and the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Fraser

The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Fraser, accompanied by the New Zealand Minister in Washington, Mr. Nash, called at their request.

The Prime Minister proceeded to refer to the Australian–New Zealand Agreement of last January in which these two countries declared that the disposal of any enemy territories in the Pacific should be made only with their agreement and that “no change in the sovereignty or the system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific” should be made except with their agreement.

The Prime Minister said that his Government was not really open to the criticism which the circumstances of the agreement might ordinarily imply. I said I understood that this was primarily a movement initiated and led by Mr. Evatt, Australian Minister of External Affairs; that Mr. Evatt seemed to adopt methods similar to those adopted by the Russians a short time ago when the Russian Government was not satisfied with the way Great Britain was functioning in respect to Poland and also in regard to the second front—the Russians proceeded to put out a world-wide statement charging the British with the intention of negotiating a separate peace with Germany.

I said that this surprising agreement between Australia and New Zealand, which almost shocked some of us, seemed to be on all fours, so far as the tone and method are concerned, with the Russian action toward Great Britain. The Prime Minister and Minister both promptly replied that this was exactly the situation.

I then referred to the proposal to call a conference of the nations with territorial interests in the Southwest Pacific and spoke about the unfortunate nature of this sort of step while the war must still be won in the Pacific. I said that world peace plans must be worked out in advance of any regional peace or related plan. I said that I could not believe that New Zealand would participate in the spirit of this sort of thing in the circumstances and that I was glad to have the assurances from the Prime Minister that they did not desire to be considered either as active or leading participants, but that instead the Prime Minister is entirely willing that the proposed meeting be postponed.

The Prime Minister then inquired about when a meeting might be held to deal with military forces of the Southwest Pacific area from the point of view of security and defense. I replied that our military authorities should be consulted before any expression of views on my part. The Prime Minister said he fully understood this.

All the way through the conversation the Prime Minister made a general plea for understanding, friendliness and wholehearted cooperation in every important respect. He seemed to be embarrassed no little about this occurrence.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

033.4711/160

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1944.

Participants: The Secretary of State
 The Right Honorable John Curtin, Prime Minister of
 Australia
 Sir Owen Dixon, Australian Minister

The Prime Minister of Australia, accompanied by Sir Owen Dixon, called today after arriving in Washington yesterday.

Mr. Curtin promptly commenced the conversation by saying that so far as our two countries are concerned the American Government entered the war against Germany to defend certain basic principles and that our countries should be able to cooperate in a mutually satisfactory manner. Mr. Curtin said that Australia had a special interest in the islands adjacent to Australia, including the Dutch East Indies and New Caledonia. He had nothing very concrete to suggest.

The Prime Minister was a little slow in picking up the subject of the Australian–New Zealand Agreement, except in the most general way.

I replied to the Prime Minister's remark about our entrance into the war in support of certain basic principles by saying that the outstanding principle involved was that of self-defense and self-preservation against the German war movement, as well as that of Japan.

I then recounted the history of our attitude towards Germany as Germany spread her conquest over the continent of Europe and steadily pursued the purpose of capturing the British Isles and, with it, the British fleet, which would have given Germany control of the seven seas and other continents. This, I said, would have left the United States in a critical state of danger in the Atlantic, to say nothing of the danger from the Japanese in the Pacific to ourselves and to Australia as well.

I added further that, as regards the Pacific, this Government had stood for principles of world-wide application against Japan's often-announced plans and efforts to dominate the Pacific area, economically, politically and militarily, and that all countries in the Pacific area were in danger equally with the United States. I said that this Government for long years has stood for the broad principles of world order under law, justice, morality and economic well-being and that these principles include the equality of nations before law, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, et cetera.

After describing the policies of the American Government in the Pacific during the past years, I came directly to the Australian–New Zealand Agreement of January 21, 1944 and said that this Government has had no discussions with other governments in Europe or in the Pacific in regard to the allotment of territory, much less the settlement of such questions during the war.

I said that any casual or any informal remarks on this subject by officials of this Government naturally related to the post-war period and were not intended to bring up such question for consideration or for final decisions during the fighting period. I said that this Government has not been a party to any proposed local or regional plans or movements relating to the Pacific area, especially in the area of Australia and New Zealand. I said that, in connection with the problem of dependent areas, we in the Department have been considering the possible desirability of establishing regional commissions in the Pacific as well as in other areas for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the native peoples involved, but that such consideration has not reached the stage of discussions with other countries.

I said that naturally we were almost flabbergasted at certain provisions of the Australian–New Zealand Agreement, especially the declarations that nothing must be done about territory anywhere in

the Pacific except by agreement with Australia and New Zealand. I said that this agreement would seem to show that Australia and New Zealand have their minds on the whole question of territorial settlement in the Pacific, with special reference to New Caledonia and other areas, while this Government has been deliberately refusing to take up with other nations territorial questions in Europe or elsewhere until the end of the war.

Mr. Curtin tried to make it appear that the Australian–New Zealand Agreement does not contain anything unusual, that it is not aimed at other countries and that Australia and New Zealand in concluding this agreement did not have territorial designs in mind, but rather the formation of a regional organization for the promotion of native welfare in the islands of the Pacific. I said that I must disagree with his statement, as the Australian–New Zealand Agreement seemed clearly to contemplate territorial dispositions. Mr. Curtin no longer denied that the Australian–New Zealand Agreement related to the question of territorial settlements.

I told Mr. Curtin that we have had the impression that Dr. Evatt, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, was peeved because he was not consulted by those who are directly and almost solely concerned with the direction of the war and that Dr. Evatt had brought forward this Australian–New Zealand Agreement apparently with no concern that the war in the Pacific must yet be won.

I emphasized that, as already recited in my personal message, we do not desire a conference of the kind contemplated by Australia while the war is on and hope that this proposed meeting may be postponed until a later date. I told Mr. Curtin that Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand had expressed to me his entire willingness that the meeting be postponed. Prime Minister Curtin at first indicated that this would be agreeable to him also, but in the same sentence added that there should be a meeting of some kind in the Southwest Pacific to deal with the question of social, economic and political development in this area.

I replied that, of course, our democratic nations must find ways of cooperating together, that we must be patient with one another and must talk out matters to a friendly understanding—otherwise there was little hope for general international understanding.

I once more said that we frankly do not appreciate the attitude of Dr. Evatt on this and other matters and I referred particularly to Dr. Evatt's action in recording in a formal document a private conversation with the President. The Prime Minister then referred to persons with ambitions in a vague sort of way.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

747.47H/53a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1944—midnight.

3500. During the visits of Prime Ministers Fraser and Curtin to Washington I have discussed with them, among other things, certain aspects of the Australian–New Zealand agreement. I told them that frankly this Government was considerably shocked at the tone and method of the agreement, certain parts of which were clearly directed against the United States. The agreement, for example, declares that the construction or use of military bases in the Pacific Islands does not provide any basis for “territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control.” The agreement also declares that “no change in the sovereignty or the system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific” should be made except by agreement of Australia and New Zealand.

All of our information in regard to the agreement indicates that it is primarily the work of Dr. Evatt, Australian Minister of External Affairs. I have made it clear to Prime Minister Curtin that we do not appreciate Evatt’s attitude in connection with this agreement and also in connection with several other matters. Evatt has apparently been annoyed at not being invited to participate in the Cairo Conference and other important deliberations on the conduct of the war.

As regards the proposal contained in the agreement that Australia call a conference of powers with territorial interests in the Southwest Pacific I have again emphasized to Prime Ministers Fraser and Curtin our strong feeling that it would be inadvisable to hold such a conference at this time. The grounds on which we oppose such a conference are (a) that the war in the Pacific is still to be won, (b) that an attempt to deal with regional security might prejudice efforts to achieve a general system of world security and (c) that a conference now might interfere with our united war effort.

Prime Minister Fraser has expressed his willingness that the conference be postponed. Prime Minister Curtin was more non-committal. Undoubtedly, this is one of the subjects which will be discussed with Prime Minister Churchill, and Australia’s further action may depend considerably on the amount of encouragement which is received in London.

I hope, therefore, that you will make known to Mr. Churchill and perhaps also to Eden and Cranborne³¹ our views on this subject. We should appreciate receiving any further information regarding the British Government’s views. We are especially interested in knowing about any views which the British may have already com-

³¹ Viscount Cranborne, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

municated to the Australian and New Zealand Governments or which may be communicated to the Prime Ministers during their visit in London.

I am aware that the British consider the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers very much in the nature of a family gathering. I hope very much, however, that it will be possible for you to be kept informed regarding the discussions between the Prime Ministers.

HULL

747.47H/10-2544 : Telegram

The Minister in New Zealand (Patton) ³² to the Secretary of State

WELLINGTON, October 25, 1944—noon.

[Received October 25—7:42 a. m.]

429. As provided in the Canberra agreement Evatt and Ford ³³ are arriving here this week-end for discussions with New Zealand Prime Minister early next week. Am definitely informed by Secretary for External Affairs that although this may be played up as a formal conference such would be only "window dressing" as it actually will be only talks for a day or two, that is informal exchange of views only with no definite formal agreements anticipated.

There are no formal agenda, but it is understood that discussions will concern chiefly, (1) Pacific welfare, health, et cetera (2) Dumbarton Oaks proposals,³⁴ (3) the Australians wish discuss joint schemes of industrial development under article 35 (c) of the Canberra agreement, but I am confidentially and frankly informed New Zealand has no such plans or schemes to discuss so wishes to minimize this.

Civil aviation was discussed with Minister Drakeford ³⁵ who was here earlier this month and mutual agreement thereon was reaffirmed as outlined in the Canberra agreement. Repeated to Canberra.

PATTON

747.47H/11-844 : Telegram

The Minister in New Zealand (Patton) to the Secretary of State

WELLINGTON, November 8, 1944—noon.

[Received November 8—6:58 a. m.]

441. Following is résumé of Prime Minister Fraser's remarks at concluding session November 6: (with reference to my telegram num-

³² Kenneth S. Patton, assigned as Minister to New Zealand March 21, 1944.

³³ Presumably reference is to F. M. Fordé, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Army.

³⁴ For the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, see vol. I, section entitled "Preliminaries to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security," part II.

³⁵ A. S. Drakeford, Australian Minister for Air and Civil Aviation.

ber 429, dated October 25, Australia-New Zealand talks opened at Wellington on Wednesday November 1.)

Consultations were due to special position as neighbor British Dominions in South Pacific as well as those issues which are the common concern of the United Nations; we desire others to take account of our own particular needs and circumstances, as we must take account of theirs.

General international organization of supreme importance which will depend upon the people's support, and therefore on their understanding; promotion of human welfare which with security should be central objective of this organization; collective security by force if need be with territorial integrity and political independence; peace will depend upon the support and the leadership of the greater powers, but essential that all members should be enabled actively to participate in control and direction of its [apparent omission]; powers of the assembly should extend to the whole sphere of action, but the Security Council should have special powers in regard to the settlement of disputes and the prevention of aggression.

Trusteeship for dependent people, both colonies and mandated territories, welfare and advancement of the native people; regional commission so that governments and administrations of the South Seas area may pool their experiences and collaborate in joint schemes with which representatives of dependent peoples should be [apparent omission]; system of international supervision of colonial administration; consultation with other governments concerned to exchange views on South Seas Regional Commission to include the United Kingdom, the United States and France also.

Domestic policies of full employment for both national and international welfare; standard of living depends more upon the level of employment throughout the world and less upon international trading agreements; encouragement of trade in a world not afflicted by unemployment; full employment is the first need; improved labor standards economic advancement and social security under Atlantic Charter.

Consultations held not in an exclusive spirit or to serve narrow interests, but as due contribution to world peace and welfare.

Australian Deputy Prime Minister reiterated some of these statements and said Australian Government was interested in insuring effective participation by Australia in international affairs and particularly in the Pacific questions as member of British Commonwealth and as a nation of the Pacific; further consultations and further actions would develop from this conference on their common interests.

Security and welfare under Atlantic Charter with security guaranteed, poverty reduced, employment maintained and standards of living raised in all countries, including welfare of the native peoples.

Cannot live to ourselves alone; will take our place in the Councils of the United Nations.

Editorial comment referred to expression of many admirable sentiments, but no decisions. Considerable interest in proposed general

international organization to which colonial powers should report on administration of their colonies.

PATTON

747.47H/11-1444

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 942

CANBERRA, November 14, 1944.

[Received November 25.]

Subject: Australia-New Zealand Conference in Wellington, November 1-6, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to Wellington's confidential despatches no. 189 of November 8, 1944, and no. 194 of November 9, 1944,³⁶ and telegram no. 441 of November 8, 1944, all in regard to the above subject.

Dr. Evatt, Commonwealth Minister for External Affairs, came, on his own initiative, to see me in my office on Saturday, November 11. He said that he had two things that he wanted to talk to me about.

The first was the health of the Prime Minister. He stated that the Prime Minister, John Curtin, had been ordered into hospital by his physicians as he was suffering from exhaustion, which had slightly affected his heart, and that Mr. Curtin would have to be away from active duty at least until the beginning of the new year.

The other matter that he wanted to tell me about was the conference which he had just had in New Zealand with the New Zealand authorities. He said that this conference had been called under the Anzac Agreement of last January; that it was merely for the purpose of exchanging views under that Agreement. He outlined to me the work of the conference pretty much as it had been covered by public statements which have been completely covered by Wellington's despatch no. 194 of November 9, 1944. The important thing that he told me was that it was their intention to make no documents public, and that it was his intention to furnish the United States Government with the minutes³⁷ of the conference at an early date.

It was obvious that Dr. Evatt is very anxious to dissipate any feeling on the part of the United States Government that either Australia or New Zealand desired to act behind the back of the United States. Dr. Evatt referred several times in the course of his conversation to the feeling that existed in the mind, not only of his own Government but also in that of the New Zealand Government, that

³⁶ Neither printed.

³⁷ A copy of the minutes of the Conference (not printed), was received by the Department as an enclosure to despatch No. 943, November 17, not printed.

in this time of their dire distress they had, to use Dr. Evatt's own phrase, "been constantly brushed off", both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, whenever they had attempted to set forth their considered views in regard to the Pacific, its future, or to their current necessities.

I pointed out to Dr. Evatt that in this present world emergency the United States was cooperating with the British Empire, and, naturally, dealt directly with London in regard to matters of global strategy and policy in connection with that cooperation; I reminded him that very early in the war I had told him that he would find Washington rather inclined to lean over backwards in its relations with the responsible members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, lest any action which we might take lend color to a belief, either within the Empire or in London, or a belief which might be used to advantage by our enemies, that we were encouraging any separatist tendencies on the part of members of the Commonwealth.

Dr. Evatt said that he realized that this was so, and that of course the Commonwealth Government did not want to do anything that would lend color to the belief that it was trying to part company with the Empire. He said that Australia was always on the horns of a dilemma: they were bound to the Empire by ties of blood, and by economic ties, but that more and more they were coming to the realization that their political future as a people was cast in the Pacific; they found little sympathy for their point of view in London, which was mostly concerned with India, or in Canada, which was preoccupied with its relations with the United States, or in South Africa. Australia felt very much alone, and they realized that they had a part to play in the Pacific; Dr. Evatt hoped that the United States Government would recognize Australia's position, and he is very anxious that this recognition be given some concrete and public evidence; and to this end he looks to the United States and hopes that there can be something in the nature of the conference proposed under the Anzac Pact which would help them to feel that their position in the Pacific was recognized and accepted, and give them some confidence in regard to the future.

Except for a general statement which ran very much along the lines of the public statements included in Wellington's despatch no. 194 of November 9, 1944, Dr. Evatt gave me no clue as to conclusions reached in their discussions with the New Zealand Government. He gave me to understand that he would shortly communicate the documents agreed upon which he termed "minutes", for the confidential information of Washington; whether through me or through the Australian Legation in Washington he did not say.

Respectfully yours,

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON

747.47H/11-2044

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

No. 4783

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1944.

The Secretary of State has received the text of the statement made on November 7, 1944 by the Prime Minister of New Zealand upon the conclusion of the second Anzac Conference held at Wellington. Mr. Fraser's statement includes the following reference to postwar colonial policy which was considered by the conference:

"The Conference also gave consideration to the means of achieving the objective of Colonial Welfare set out in Clauses 28 and 31 of the Australian and New Zealand Agreement in which it is declared that 'In applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific the doctrine of trusteeship (already applicable in the case of the mandated territories of which the two Governments are Mandatory Powers) is applicable in broad principle to all colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere and the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the native peoples and their social economic and political development.'

"We feel that there should be set up as part of the general International Organization an international body analogous to the permanent mandates commission to which Colonial Powers should undertake to make reports on the administration of their Colonial Territories. This body should be empowered to visit dependent territories and to publish reports of its deliberations. We believe that this is a natural implication of the spirit of—'trusteeship' for dependent peoples and for our part we are willing to subscribe to a general undertaking to that effect. As regards both Colonies and Mandated Territories in accepting the principle of 'trusteeship' we wish to make it quite clear that we regard the purpose of the trust as the welfare and advancement of the native peoples. Quite apart from this system of international supervision of colonial administration which we believe should be binding on trustee states whatever arrangements they might make for regional collaboration with other trustee states we are anxious to promote a regional commission as a means by which the governments and administrations of the South Seas area may pool their experience and collaborate in joint schemes with a view to furthering the welfare of the dependent peoples and their social economic and political development.

"It is part of our proposal that representatives of the dependent peoples should be associated wherever possible with the regional body, its secretariat and with any of the welfare and research agencies which might be brought within its framework. The establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission is one of the specific objectives of the Australian-New Zealand agreement which we have endeavoured to further by our discussions.

"In the Australian-New Zealand Agreement we proposed that in addition to representatives of Australia and New Zealand there might be on the commission, representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of France. We are ready for our part to enter into early consultation with the

other Governments concerned and to exchange views upon the form of the Commission.”

The Embassy is requested to keep the Department advised of any reactions in the United Kingdom to this declaration, which seems rather advanced in comparison to British colonial policy. The reactions of the Colonial Office would be of particular interest.

**ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE RAW MATERIALS AS
RECIPROCAL AID FROM AUSTRALIA**

847.24/763c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1943—9 p. m.

387. In an *aide-mémoire* addressed to the Australian Minister on October 6 this Government proposed that the Government of Australia extend the reciprocal aid program to include raw materials and foodstuffs imported into the United States from Australia.³⁸ The Australian Legation on November 5 replied in part as follows:

“The provision of reciprocal aid under the present arrangements, in conjunction with the requirements of the Australian forces and other essential commitments, is imposing such a heavy strain on Australia’s very limited resources that Australia is already faced with a serious manpower shortage which will be intensified as the Allied forces based on Australia grow and the demands under the present reciprocal lend lease agreement increase.

“After a full examination of present and prospective commitments, the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia feels that these commitments are so great and its manpower position so acute that Australia has reached the practical limits of the contribution it can make by way of reciprocal aid. The Commonwealth Government is therefore unable to agree to an extension of reciprocal lend lease along the lines proposed by the United States Government, which would commit the Commonwealth Government in principle to the provision of reciprocal aid in a new field involving an unspecified number of commodities.

“It is however recognised that circumstances may arise in which the United States Government would desire to submit a special request for a particular commodity and in such circumstances the Commonwealth Government will be prepared to consider at the time and in the light of then existing conditions the question of the supply of such commodity by way of reciprocal lend lease.”

Since the receipt of the Australian reply certain informal discussions have been held between the Australian Minister and Lauchlin

³⁸ The *aide-mémoire* handed to Sir Owen Dixon, Australian Minister, on October 6 indicated the deep appreciation of the United States Government for the aid thus far granted to U.S. forces in the Southwest Pacific by Australia.

Currie, Deputy Administrator of FEA.³⁹ In response to a request from Sir Owen Dixon for additional information with respect to the scope of the proposed program and the contemplated procedure, Currie prepared a memorandum with Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which was handed to Sir Owen Dixon by Assistant Secretary Acheson on December 13.⁴⁰ It was agreed between ourselves and Sir Owen that these documents would be merely for his own information and that we would instruct our Legation at Canberra to take the matter up further with the Australian authorities. There is quoted below the text of the memorandum in question on the basis of which please ask the Australian authorities to reconsider their reply.

For your strictly confidential information we believe that it might be most desirable for you to discuss this matter with the Prime Minister⁴¹ and with Treasurer Chifley.

Following is the text of the memorandum:

"In answer to the suggestion of the United States Government that the Australian Government extend the reciprocal aid program to include the furnishing, without payment by the United States, of those materials which are now being purchased in Australia or from Australian sources by agencies of the United States Government, the Australian *aide-mémoire* of November 5 indicates that the Australian Government feels that it is impossible to accede to this suggestion because existing commitments impose 'such a heavy strain on Australia's very limited resources that Australia is already faced with a serious manpower shortage which will be intensified as the Allied Forces based in Australia grow and the demands under the present reciprocal lend-lease agreement increase.'

"The fact that the Australian position is rested so largely on the manpower shortage suggests that the United States proposal may not have been fully understood by the Australian Government. The raw materials which would fall within the scope of the proposal are already being produced in Australia and are already being delivered to the United States pursuant to existing purchase contracts. Accordingly, the proposal involves no additional drain on Australian manpower, and in fact requires no modification whatever of existing production schedules. The only effect of the proposal would be that the Australian Government would defray the costs which are now being met through dollar expenditures made by the United States. It is clear, moreover, that acceptance of the United States proposal would not involve an unlimited commitment by the Australian Government to furnish an indefinite list of commodities or indefinite amounts. Not only does the proposal relate only to materials which form part of the United States Government purchase program, but separate requests would be presented by the United States with respect to each commodity desired; and as to each the Australian Government

³⁹ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁴⁰ The text of the memorandum and the substance of Exhibit A are contained in this telegram; Exhibits B, C, and D not printed (847.24/767).

⁴¹ John Curtin.

would have full discretion to grant or to decline to grant it as reciprocal aid.

"A provisional list of Australian contracts which it is hoped may be transferred to a reciprocal aid basis is attached as Exhibit A.

"A procedure is now being worked out with the British Raw Materials and Food Missions with respect to materials to be furnished by the United Kingdom, the British Colonies, and Southern Rhodesia.⁴² This procedure is being established in conformity with a memorandum submitted by Mr. Archer of the British Raw Materials Mission on November 5, as modified in a letter from Mr. Currie to Colonel Llewellyn⁴³ dated November 9, and Mr. Brand's⁴⁴ reply thereto of November 12. Copies of these papers are attached as Exhibits B, C, and D.⁴⁵ I understand that copies of these documents have already been furnished either to the Legation or to Australia War Supplies Procurement by the United Kingdom representatives. I believe these documents will contain answers to most of the questions that you have raised.

"It will be noted that the memorandum of November 5 refers to Australia and to the other Dominions. Admittedly, the United Kingdom representatives have no authority to deal on behalf of Australia. It is hoped, however, that the procedure now being worked out with respect to the United Kingdom and the Colonies might prove acceptable to the Dominions so that a uniform policy might be applicable to all British Commonwealth areas. I suggest that it would be very advisable if the Australian representatives were to discuss the procedures which are now under negotiation with Mr. Archer, Mr. Field, and others in the British Raw Materials Mission.

"If the Australian Government should come to the conclusion that it may wish to furnish commodities on a reciprocal aid basis, it is hoped Australia will follow the course which we hope to adopt with respect to current contracts for materials from the United Kingdom areas. This contemplates an arrangement for disturbing these contracts as little as possible, and for the supplying government's making such payments under the contract as it may be willing to assume.

"It will be noted that the British agreement contemplates that with respect to government-to-government purchases (which account for the greater part of the United States procurement programs in these areas) the arrangements go into effect as of July 1, 1943, although payment made with respect to goods delivered since that date will not be refunded. It is hoped that agreement will soon be reached to the effect that acceptable contracts for procurement by United States Government agencies from private sources will be taken over as of November 11, 1943. It is hoped that the effective date for the programs in Australia would conform to the arrangements made with the United Kingdom.

"It is suggested that the Australian Government may wish to reconsider the view expressed in its memorandum of November 5 in

⁴² For correspondence relating to acquisition of raw materials as reciprocal aid from the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, and British Colonies, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 48 ff.

⁴³ Col. John J. Llewellyn, Chairman, British Supply Council, Washington.

⁴⁴ Robert H. Brand, British Supply Council, Washington.

⁴⁵ None printed.

the light of the facts above set forth, and that it may come to the conclusion that it may be in a position to furnish some or all of the foregoing commodities on a reciprocal aid basis.”

Exhibit A lists our tentative public procurement program from Australia for 1944 as follows:

Beryl	250 ST.	\$25,000
Lead ore, concentrates & dross	20,000 ST.	1,500,000
Scrap metals	20,000 LT.	400,000
Tantalite	50 ST.	135,000
Zinc	59,000 ST.	5,547,000
Tallow & Fatty Acids	7,000 LT.	700,000
Cadmium	120,000 lbs.	50,000
Osmiridium	100 troy oz.	9,800
Benzol		1,170,000
Hides		

Remaining documents are being forwarded by air mail.

For your confidential information Lord Halifax⁴⁶ in a recent conversation with officers of the Department and of FEA has confirmed our previous understanding that in cases where Dominions find it financially impossible to meet total programs requested by the United States, the British Government would consider providing assistance to them.⁴⁷

HULL

847.24/766 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, January 14, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received January 14—5:36 a. m.]

6. I saw Chifley at first opportunity which was December 24 and left an explanatory memorandum⁴⁸ similar to that which the Department handed Dixon on December 13 (Department's 387, December 16, 9 p. m.).

The matter is to be decided at War Cabinet on January 17 and I learn from various sources that members are inclined again to reject our proposal. I expect to see Chifley and Evatt⁴⁹ once more before that meeting and I believe it would help if I could say to them that Exhibit A was a reasonably definitive rather than just a tentative public procurement program. This would definitely dispel fears

⁴⁶ British Ambassador.

⁴⁷ See memorandum by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, September 16, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 84.

⁴⁸ Dated December 23, not printed.

⁴⁹ Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.

entertained in some quarters that we might later come upon them with a demand for wool under reverse Lend-Lease.

JOHNSON

847.24/768b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944—8 p. m.

6. FEA is agreeable to your assuring the Australian authorities that no commodities other than those listed in Exhibit A⁵⁰ will be requested during the present calendar year and that the dollar amounts listed are substantially accurate. It has not yet been possible to determine the dollar amount of requirements of hides but this is not believed to be an important item.

HULL

847.24/775

*The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to the American Minister in Australia (Johnson)*⁵¹

The Minister of State for External Affairs presents his compliments to the Honourable the American Minister, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his communication of December 23rd last and subsequent memorandum⁵² regarding the proposal of the Government of the United States of America, first communicated to the Australian Government on 6th October, 1943,⁵³ in relation to bringing under the reverse lend-lease system those materials which are imported from Australia or from Australian sources by agencies of the United States Government.

The proposal of the United States Government has been again fully considered by the Australian Government in the light of the further circumstances adduced in the communications above referred to, for which the Australian Government is grateful.

However, all the resources of this country have been and still are strained to the utmost limit, and the Australian Government is therefore compelled to adhere to the decision previously reached and communicated to the State Department on 5th November last.⁵³

CANBERRA, 28 January, 1944.

⁵⁰ See footnote 40, p. 202.

⁵¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in his despatch No. 684, *infra*.

⁵² The second memorandum was dated January 15, 1944; neither printed.

⁵³ See telegram 387, December 16, 1943, 9 p.m., to Canberra, p. 201.

847.24/775

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 684

CANBERRA, February 1, 1944.

[Received February 16—9:45 a. m.]

SIR:

To sum up the reasons for the Commonwealth Government's present decision as elucidated in my despatch no. 668⁵⁴ and in this despatch:

- (1) pressure by the Army for and final agreement of the Commonwealth Government to the feeding of American troops in the South Pacific as well as the Southwest Pacific;
- (2) firm belief by the Australians that they have given more proportionately, if not actually, than they have been getting under direct Lend Lease;
- (3) confirmation of the foregoing by the demobilization of Lend Lease while at the same time asking for additional items under Reverse Lend Lease, namely the present public procurement program;
- (4) deep-seated resentment at forcing them to get all of their oil supplies from Persia;
- (5) discriminatory treatment of the machine tool question;
- (6) belief that we have asked for more than we need; reluctance of United States officials to be as conscientious in giving reasons for our requests as we require them to be in connection with their requests;
- (7) the removal of tobacco which they claim is an essential product for civilian, munitions worker and soldier morale.

I do not say that any of the foregoing reasons are valid. My staff and I have tried to refute them and to influence a more reasonable view. I do not know that there is anything I can recommend which would cause a change of attitude, since I cannot conscientiously suggest a change of general policy to meet this particular situation. I do hope, however, that this present refusal will not be taken as a cue by officials at Washington to treat Australian requests rather more harshly. I am certain that such would be the beginning of a vicious circle of at first hidden and then open reprisals which could only end in bitterness.

I do have one recommendation to make but not in connection with appeasement. I wish to suggest that the Department instruct me to address a communication to the Commonwealth Government having reference to its note of January 28, 1944—a communication which, after expressing regret that the Commonwealth Government does not see fit to take over the contracts for the public procurement program

⁵⁴ Dated January 19, 1944; not printed.

for 1944, could then ask for the assurances of the Commonwealth Government that it will not tolerate any obstruction in the carrying out of that program. I think that such a communication, under instructions from the Department, might influence the Cabinet to direct all supply officials to operate in the fulfillment of contracts, not to mention that such communication might serve to keep the present question open.

Respectfully yours,

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON

800.24/1667

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1944.

MY DEAR ED: I am now in a position to give an answer to the questions regarding Reciprocal Aid from Australia and India⁵⁵ raised in the discussions that were held in the State Department on February 15th.⁵⁶ After your conversation with Opie on February 29th,⁵⁷ I think you are probably aware of the general answer my Government were proposing to give.

The position taken by my Government regarding these questions is as follows:—

After the fullest consideration, the United Kingdom Government regret that they find themselves unable to agree to the suggestions made to them that they should purchase certain raw materials in Australia, and turn them over to the United States Government as Reciprocal Aid.

The United Kingdom Government's position in this matter was made clear at the meeting on September 16th⁵⁸ at which Sir David Waley,⁵⁹ Mr. Opie and Mr. R. L. Hall⁶⁰ met Mr. Acheson, Mr. White,⁶¹ Mr. Achilles and Mr. Knollenberg.⁶² The matter was then discussed in terms of financial considerations, and it was suggested

⁵⁵ For correspondence on this subject relative to India, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 246 ff., and pp. 283 ff.

⁵⁶ These discussions involved British and U.S. representatives and concerned lend-lease and reverse lend-lease problems relating to British Commonwealth countries; memorandum of conversation not printed.

⁵⁷ No record of this conversation with Redvers Opie, Counselor of the British Embassy, has been found in Department files.

⁵⁸ For a record of this meeting, see memorandum by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, September 16, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 84.

⁵⁹ United Kingdom Treasury Representative, British Supply Council, Washington.

⁶⁰ Robert Lowe Hall, Member of the British Raw Materials Mission, Washington.

⁶¹ Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

⁶² Bernhard Knollenberg, Senior Deputy Lend-Lease Administrator.

that the United Kingdom Government might be prepared to consider giving financial assistance to the Dominions or India, insofar as the bar to those countries giving supplies on reciprocal aid was financial in character. As I understand it, at no time in the discussions that have taken place did the United Kingdom Government give any more general undertaking to make supplies available where such supplies were required by the United States Government, but fell outside the limits within which the producing countries were prepared to provide reciprocal aid themselves. Thus, apart from using their good offices in bringing about an agreement between the Dominion and Indian Governments on the one hand, and the United States Government on the other, the United Kingdom Government was prepared to consider further assistance only insofar as the major obstacle was at any time financial in character.

If, then, the effect of the Australian Government's supplying raw materials under Reciprocal Aid would have been to deplete unduly the sterling balances of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom Government would, in accordance with the above understanding, have readily agreed to safeguard the Commonwealth Government in this respect, and from the outset the United Kingdom Government gave the Commonwealth Government the fullest assurances on this point. In fact, however, the sterling liabilities of the United Kingdom to Australia are rising, and military developments render it probable that they will increase still further. The United Kingdom Government do not consider that it is justifiable to ask them to contribute Australian raw materials as Reciprocal Aid from the United Kingdom, for the United Kingdom could only obtain such Australian raw materials by incurring indebtedness to Australia. In any case, the United States Government will no doubt take into account the fact that the volume of Reciprocal Aid provided in Australia to United States forces is on a very considerable scale having regard to the limits of the economic resources available to Australia.

As regards India, while the United Kingdom Government will be glad to use its good offices in so far as this may be practicable, it does not feel able to provide raw materials on Reciprocal Aid to supplement such raw materials as the Government of India may itself feel able to provide. The reasons which apply in this case of Australia apply even more strongly in the case of India, whose holdings of sterling are increasing even more rapidly.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly trust that when the United States Government realise that His Majesty's Government could not comply with its request without adding

to the problem of their external liabilities, the United States Government will agree not to press them further in the matter.⁶³

Yours ever,

HALIFAX

847.24/775 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1944—7 p. m.

23. You are authorized with reference to the last paragraph of your airmail dispatch No. 684 of February 1, 1944, to express our regret at the Commonwealth Government's position on the matter, and to request its assistance in facilitating the completion of procurement contracts. This view may be presented orally or by note, in your discretion.

HULL

**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
REGARDING JURISDICTION OVER NAVAL PRIZES**

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Canberra November 10, 1942, and May 10, 1944, and President Roosevelt's proclamation of August 12, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 417, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1390; for proclamation, see 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1146.]

⁶³ In a letter of May 13, 1944, from the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Deputy Foreign Economic Administrator (Currie), which transmitted a copy of this letter from Lord Halifax, Mr. Acheson made the following statement: "It is the view of the Department that no further action on this matter is called for at this time." (800.24/1667)

CANADA

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE ACQUISITION OF LAND IN CANADA REQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR WAR PROJECTS

842.20 Defense/12-3044

*The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mackenzie King) to the American Ambassador in Canada (Atherton)*¹

No. 141

OTTAWA, December 28, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence concerning the acquisition by the Canadian Government of land required by the United States for the purpose of carrying out their defence projects in this country.

Opportunity was taken of the presence in Ottawa of Brigadier-General F. S. Strong, Jr., and Captain C. B. Schmeltzer of the Northwest Service Command and Major Robert H. Fabian of the Engineers R. E. Division, United States War Department to discuss this matter. Accordingly a meeting took place in October in which participated the above-mentioned persons, together with members of this Department and of other governmental departments concerned.

The conclusions reached at this meeting have been embodied in a memorandum, six copies of which are enclosed herewith together with six copies of the enclosure referred to therein.

The proposals set forth in the memorandum for the purpose of solving the problem of acquisition of land for United States defence projects are acceptable to the Canadian Government and it would be appreciated if you would inform me whether they meet with the same approval on the part of the United States Government.

Accept [etc.]

J. E. READ²

For Secretary of State for External Affairs

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

Setting forth the Conclusions reached at a Meeting between Representatives of the United States and Canadian Governments held at Ottawa, October 20, 1944, to deal with Procedures Relating to Acquisition by the Canadian Government of Land Required for United States War Projects in Canada.

¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Canada in his letter, December 30, 1944, not printed.

² Deputy Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

1. The conclusion was reached that the acquisition by the Canadian Government of land required for United States war projects in Canada should be in accordance with the following procedure:

In all cases where land is needed by the United States for a major war project, a request concerning it should be forwarded through the State Department to the Department of External Affairs. In the case of minor projects involving the use of land, the United States authorities should communicate their requirements, in the case of land in Northwest Canada, to the Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in Northwest Canada, Edmonton, Alberta. (For the purpose of this memorandum, Northwest Canada is deemed to include all lands situated in Canada west of the fourth meridian in the system of Dominion land surveys). In the case of minor projects situated in other parts of Canada, the appropriate channel would be through the Department of External Affairs. In all cases, in the event that the request is approved, the appropriate authorities of the Canadian Government will take the necessary steps to have the land placed at the disposal of the United States authorities. In cases in which the land needed is Crown land in the right of a province, or private property, the Canadian Government will take immediate steps to secure title to or a lease of the land and will then make it available to the United States authorities in precisely the same way as in the case of land originally held by the Canadian Government. It is also understood that this procedure will apply in all cases where land is required but that it will not be applicable in cases where all that is needed is existing office space or housing, or leases of parts of existing buildings or of entire existing buildings.

This procedure and the other arrangements made hereunder are not intended to interfere with, or limit in any way, the procedure adopted for the handling of recommendations made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

2. The conclusion was reached that the assignment of existing leaseholds in Canada, held for war purposes, should be carried out in accordance with the following procedures and understandings:

(a) The transactions should extend to leaseholds in all parts of Canada. In Northwest Canada the transactions should be dealt with through the office of the Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in Northwest Canada, Edmonton, Alberta. In the case of lands in other parts of Canada, the transactions should be dealt with by direct communication through the United States Military Attaché at Ottawa and the Department of Transport.

(b) The assignments should be made in accordance with the attached form,³ which has been approved by the Canadian Government,

³ Not printed.

subject to any modifications which may be approved either by the United States Army representative and the Special Commissioner, or by the United States Military Attaché and the Department of Transport, as the case may be.

(c) All of the transactions hereunder are to be subject to the following provisions and conditions:

(i) That the United States may retain occupancy of the demised premises without charge therefor for so long as may be desired but in no event beyond the duration of the war and six (6) months thereafter.

(ii) That the Canadian Government will reimburse the United States Government for any and all rentals paid under the terms of the leases covering occupancy from and after the 7th day of September, 1943, and will assume the obligation for the payment of all rentals due or to become due from the effective date of the assignment, together with any and all other obligations of the United States Government under the leases, express or implied, including obligations to restore, if any. As to those leases entered into by the United States Government, or assigned to the Government by its cost-plus fixed fee contractors subsequent to the 7th day of September, 1943, the Canadian Government will reimburse the United States Government from the date of acquisition or from the date of assignment, as the case may be.

(iii) That title to any and all improvements erected on the demised premises by the United States Government will be retained by the Government until such improvements have been appraised and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 33rd Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, United States-Canada or such other agreement between the two countries as may supplement or supersede this Recommendation.

(d) It is understood that the procedure, as set out herein, relating to assignment of leases, will apply in all cases where land has been leased by the United States Government, but that leases, held by the United States Government, of office space or housing, or of parts of existing buildings or of entire existing buildings, will not be subject to these procedures and understandings.

842.20 Defense/12-3044

*The American Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mackenzie King)*⁴

No. 262

OTTAWA, December 30, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 141 of December 28, 1944, concerning the acquisition by the Canadian

⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Canada in his letter of December 30, 1944, not printed. The acceptance by the Embassy of the Canadian proposals was made on basis of telephone instructions from the Department of State.

Government of land required by the United States for the purpose of carrying out defence projects in Canada.

In reply I am pleased to be able to inform you that the proposals for the purpose of solving the problem of acquisition of land for United States defence projects, which are set forth in the memorandum enclosed with your note, are acceptable to my Government.

Accept [etc.]

RAY ATHERTON

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA AMENDING AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 27, 1943, REGARDING POST-WAR DISPOSITION OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington November 22 and December 20, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 444, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1565. For text of original agreement, see Executive Agreement Series No. 391, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1429.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING PAYMENT BY CANADA FOR CERTAIN DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN CANADA AND AT GOOSE BAY

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington June 23 and 27, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 405, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1290.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS INVOLVING VEHICLES OF UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa March 1 and 23, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1581, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1948.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA RESPECTING USE OF LOWER COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa February 25 and March 3, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 399, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1236.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA CONTINUING IN EFFECT THE AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 10, 1941, REGARDING TEMPORARY RAISING OF LEVEL OF LAKE ST. FRANCIS DURING LOW-WATER PERIODS

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington August 31 and September 7, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 424, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1437. For text of 1941 Agreement, see Executive Agreement Series No. 291, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1832, 1833.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA APPROVING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES COMMISSION REGARDING THE SOCKEYE SALMON FISHERIES

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington July 21 and August 5, 1944. For text of notes and appendices, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 479, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1614.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA TO CHANGES IN PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS PERTAINING TO DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF OIL RESOURCES IN NORTHWEST CANADA

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa June 7, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 416, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1384.]

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING DOUBLE TAXATION, ESTATE TAXES AND SUCCESSION DUTIES, SIGNED AT OTTAWA JUNE 8, 1944

[For text of Convention, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 989, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 915.]

INDIA

(See Volume V, pages 232-302.)

IRELAND

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, ASKING THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO TAKE STEPS FOR THE RECALL OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES IN IRELAND

841D.01/235 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 27, 1944—1 a. m.
[Received January 26—9:54 p. m.]

715. In answer to your 429, January 17, 8 p. m., I sent you my message 599 January 21, 9 p. m.¹ I had a long talk with Lord Cranborne² this noon. He tells me that he approves our approach to Eire on the subject of Axis representatives in Eire. He also believes the War Cabinet will support his recommendation on this subject.

It is his understanding that we would base our request to De Valera³ on our concern for the lives of our soldiers. He feels that the British should support us in a separate note sent simultaneously explaining that the United States has informed them of our action and that the British Government is in agreement with the position taken by us. It would be helpful to the British to see the wording of our message in order to formulate their supporting statement.

Since there are certain secret security arrangements between Eire and the British Government the timing of any publicity given to an interchange of this character is of concern to the British Government and might affect the safety of our forces in the British Isles because De Valera's reaction to such an approach is uncertain and existing arrangements have been made with his approval and support. The British Government would want to be informed in advance in order to prepare for exigencies that might arise in consequence of our issuing a statement in regard to De Valera's possible refusal to cooperate in protecting the movements of our troops.

WINANT

¹ Neither printed; the Department requested the views of Ambassador Winant and those of the British Government regarding the presence of Axis diplomatic representatives in Ireland (841D.01/224, 841D.01/234).

² British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

³ Eamon de Valera, Irish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

841D.01/235a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)* ⁴

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944—10 a. m.

831. We are pleased to know that Cranborne believes the War Cabinet will approve our proposed approach to the Irish Government. We hope that we may receive official notice of such approval as soon as possible.

We have made certain minor changes in Mr. Gray's ⁵ draft note to de Valera and the revised draft is quoted below. Please show this draft to the British authorities and obtain their views on the proposed wording. We agree entirely that the British Government should support us in a note to be delivered simultaneously.

We are, of course, willing to arrange timing of any publicity to meet requirements of security. We do feel strongly, however, that the approach should be made at the earliest possible date.

The text of the draft note as it now stands follows:

Your Excellency will recall that in your speech at Cork delivered on the fourteenth of December, 1941 ⁶ you expressed sentiments of special friendship for the American people on the occasion of their entry into the present war and closed by saying, "The policy of the state remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral." As you will also recall, extracts of this speech were transmitted to the President by your Minister in Washington. The President, while conveying his appreciation for this expression of friendship, stated his confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, whose freedom is at stake no less than ours, would know how to meet their responsibilities in this situation. ⁷

It has become increasingly apparent that despite the declared desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate in favor of either of the belligerents, it has in fact operated and continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend. One of the gravest and most inequitable results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized espionage which the geographical position of Ireland affords the Axis and denies the United Nations. Situated as you are in close proximity to Britain, divided only by an intangible boundary from Northern Ireland, where are situated important American bases, with continuous traffic to and from both countries, Axis agents enjoy almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from Great Britain and Northern Ireland into Ireland and from there transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany. No

⁴ Text of this telegram was quoted in telegram 13 of the same date to Dublin.

⁵ David Gray, Minister in Ireland.

⁶ For summary of speech, see the *New York Times*, December 15, 1941, p. 3.

⁷ For text of the President's message sent to the Irish Minister on December 22, 1941, to be transmitted to de Valera, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, p. 251.

opportunity corresponding to this is open to the United Nations, for the Axis has no military dispositions which may be observed from Ireland.

We do not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Whether or to what extent it has succeeded in preventing acts of espionage against American shipping and American forces in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty. Nevertheless, it is a fact that German and Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives still continue to reside in Dublin and enjoy the special privileges and immunities customarily accorded to such officials. That Axis representatives in neutral countries use these special privileges and immunities as a cloak for espionage activities against the United Nations has been demonstrated over and over again. It would be naive to assume that Axis agencies have not exploited conditions to the full in Ireland as they have in other countries. It is our understanding that the German Legation in Dublin, until recently at least, has had in its possession a radio sending set which obviously could be used to radio information to Germany. It is also not without point that German planes recently dropped two parachutists in Ireland.

As you know from common report, United Nations military operations are in preparation in both Britain and Northern Ireland. It is vital that information from which may be deduced their nature and direction should not reach the enemy. Not only the success of the operations but the lives of thousands of United Nations' soldiers are at stake.

We request therefore, that the Irish Government take appropriate steps for the recall of German and Japanese representatives in Ireland. We should be lacking in candor if we did not state our hope that this action will take the form of severance of all diplomatic relations between Ireland and these two countries. You will, of course, readily understand the compelling reasons why we ask as an absolute minimum the removal of these Axis representatives whose presence in Ireland must inevitably be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of Allied military operations.

It is hardly necessary to point out that time is of extreme importance and that we trust Your Excellency will favor us with your reply at your early convenience.

HULL

841D.01/236: Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, February 5, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:13 p. m.]

17. Reference your 13, February 3.⁸ Unreservedly approve your changes in draft. I studied text yesterday with Maffey⁹ who will recommend it to his Government. We agree in view that because of

⁸ See footnote 4, p. 217.

⁹ John Maffey, British Representative in Ireland.

American High Command and predominance of American troops in Ulster the note should be American but that English Government should at time of delivery inform Eire Government that they have been consulted and desire to associate themselves with the note. In order to forestall opportunity for De Valera to spread on record his sequestering of the German Legation radio sending set suggest that reference to radio sets be phrased explicitly to show the intention of the German Government to use this means of communication. I would therefore suggest a full stop after the words "sending set" and finish the paragraph as follows: "This is evidence of the intention of the German Government to use this means of communication. Supporting evidence is furnished by the two parachutists equipped with radio sending sets recently dropped on your territory by German planes."

I note that the strictly confidential introduction to your number 13 came in brown as well as text of note.

Appreciate your efforts to minimize delay in this matter.

Repeated to London.

GRAY

841D.01/236 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944—10 a. m.

14. We fully approve the changes suggested in your No. 17, February 5 and are so informing London.

HULL

841D.01/239 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 10, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received February 10—12:30 p. m.]

1140. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.¹⁰ Following on my 1052 of February 7,¹¹ I have received today the letter quoted below from the Foreign Minister¹² dated February 9, 1944.

"My Dear Ambassador: The Cabinet have now considered the proposal which you put to Lord Cranborne orally the other day with regard to a suggested American approach to Eire. Lord Cranborne has since received from you in the form of a draft note an indication

¹⁰ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

of the line which the United States Government think should be taken with the Eire Government.

You asked Lord Cranborne what was likely to be the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to this proposal, and outlined three alternative methods of approach on which your Government would be glad of our views. There were (1) a note from the United States Government alone; (2) a joint Anglo-American note; and (3) separate simultaneous notes from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government.

I am now able to let you know the views of the United Kingdom Government in the matter. They are as follows:

We are in agreement in principle with the proposed approach by the United States Government to Eire on the lines indicated above and concur in the terms of the draft which you have furnished including a certain amendment which, you explained to Lord Cranborne, it was proposed to make in it. (Department's 949, February 8).¹³

As regards the question of United Kingdom participation in the approach, we feel that the best course would be that we should, a day or two after the United States note is delivered, send a separate note to the Eire Government to the effect that we had been consulted by the United States Government before their approach was made, and that we warmly welcome their initiative and support their request. We assume that there would be no question of publishing the approach when it was made, and consider, subject to any views which the United States Government may wish to express, that the question of publication at a later stage should be a matter for further consultation between the United States Government and ourselves. We should, in any case, hope that the United States Government would consult with us again with regard to any further steps when the Eire Government's reply is received.

On the assumption that the above is satisfactory to the United States Government, I should be grateful if you would give me a few days' notice of the date on which the United States note will be delivered, so that we may time our note accordingly.

Yours sincerely (signed) Anthony Eden."

WINANT

841D.01/241 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1944—10 p. m.

19. Some days ago we received the British reply in the sense indicated in your 25, February 16.¹⁴ The matter was then submitted to the President for his final approval, which has now been given.

¹³ Not printed; for suggested amendment, see telegram 17, February 5, from Dublin, p. 218.

¹⁴ Not printed, but see telegram 1140, February 10, 2 p. m., from London, *supra*.

Please address a note to Mr. de Valera with the text of the message as telegraphed in the Department's No. 13, February 3¹⁵ and amended by your No. 17, February 5. Request an appointment with Mr. de Valera to hand this note to him personally.

You will also wish to keep in touch with Sir John Maffey so that the British note may be delivered within a day or two after our own. We are informing London that we regard as important the delivery of the British note immediately after our own in order to make clear our common attitude on this matter.

We are also informing London that no publicity is contemplated at present, that we shall be glad to consult with the British regarding any further action after receipt of the Irish Government's reply, and that similarly we assume that the British Government will consult with us regarding any further action on their part.

STETTINIUS

841D.01/244 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, February 21, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received February 22—6:50 a. m.]

28. At 3:30 p. m. today I called upon Mr. de Valera and pursuant to your instructions delivered note no. 410 dated February 21, 1944. It seemed to me desirable to obtain his reaction to the note and not merely to hand it to him and take my leave. I therefore opened the conversation by observing that in my opinion the Cardinal's pastoral printed in the morning papers and expressing the view that the United Nations should be grateful that Eire was not now fighting on the side of the Axis in view of the wrong of partition was not helpful nor conducive to that conciliation between Northern and Southern Ireland which Americans of good will hoped might prevail. Mr. de Valera said that he could understand my viewpoint but that I must also try to understand the Cardinal's and those of 80% of the Irish Nationalists who suffered under this injustice. I said that I tried to understand that point of view but from a practical viewpoint could not see that it was helpful. I then said "It is certainly not going to make it easier for you to make the response which I hope you can make to this note." I thereupon handed him the note in question and watched him closely while he read it. I am under the impression that Brown Code in which the note was transmitted to us had not been broken for he read and reread certain passages

¹⁵ See footnote 4, p. 217.

slowly, obviously seeing them for the first time. He betrayed no anger as he often had done when confronted with an unacceptable proposal, but looked very sour and grim. When he reached the next to the last page the purport of the note became clear, he paused and said "Of course our answer will be no; as long as I am here it will be no." He read a few lines further and paused again asking me "Is this an ultimatum?" I replied "I have no reason to believe that it is more than a request to a friendly state; as far as I can see there is no 'or else' implication in this communication." He then finished the note and repeated "As long as I am here Eire will not grant this request; we have done everything to prevent Axis espionage, going beyond what we might reasonably be expected to do and I am satisfied that there are no leaks from this country; for a year and a half you have been advertising the invasion of Europe and what has got out about it has not been from Eire; the German Minister, I am satisfied, has behaved very correctly and decently and as a neutral we will not send him away." I said that I had consistently reported to my Government my belief in the good faith of the Irish Government as far as preventing espionage was concerned but that naturally I had no means of ascertaining whether espionage did exist; I could only assume that it did exist in view of what had taken place in other neutral countries where Axis representatives were present. I said that in view of the known facts my Government could not take the responsibility of not making the request in question.

I then asked him if he intended to make a formal reply through me or through his Minister in Washington. He said he would have to consider that but would make his formal reply shortly. I then took my leave.

Immediately went to the office of the British representative and advised him of the conversation which I have above reported. He asked me whether I thought he should see Mr. de Valera as soon as possible or should allow an interval to occur. I told him that in my judgment it would be advisable to wait on Mr. de Valera as soon as possible; that I saw nothing to be gained from delay. He told me that this was his view also in the light of what I recounted to him. He said he intended at once to telegraph his Government and ask for instructions to see Mr. de Valera at his earliest convenience. We agreed that the question of publicizing this matter should be very carefully considered by our Governments with reference to de Valera's formal reply.

Repeated to London.

841D.01/245 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, February 23, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

29. Reference my No. 28 dated February 21, 10 p. m. On the afternoon of February 22 the United Kingdom representative to Eire Sir John Maffey presented to the Irish Government the note given at end of this message in Brown code.

Maffey informed me this morning that De Valera, in contrast to the controlled attitude in which he received our note the day before, showed intense emotion. He deprecated the presentation of a note by Maffey with whom he said he had got on very well during the course of the war. He charged a conspiracy on the part of Britain and the United States to exert pressure upon weak neutrals. He repeated what he had said to me the day before that his Government had done everything possible to prevent espionage and neither could nor would do more. He spoke again of our expressed hope that as "minimum" there would be a complete break with the Axis as an "ultimatum".

Maffey told him that he was at a loss to understand De Valera's agitated indignation. That he regarded the note as wholly reasonable and as conveying a request that our Government was bound to make in the interest of American lives and American military effort. He asked De Valera what he would have done had he been in General Eisenhower's¹⁶ place. This question was evaded. Maffey said that the Eire Government had done everything to restrict espionage short of pulling up the roots that are the Axis Missions. He said that it was idle to believe that the German Minister was betraying his country by not fostering espionage.

Continue on in summing up De Valera's attitude Maffey said that De Valera appeared to regard the retention of the Axis Missions as the symbol not only of neutrality but of sovereignty. He either could not or would not recognize that the war in any way concerned Ireland or that Eire's future was bound up in the success of the United Nations. This bleak unconcern as to the war and its issues was characteristic also of his attitude when I gave him our note on Monday. The Irish Cabinet was in session all forenoon today presumably discussing a reply. Maffey received the same impression I did that the answer would be no.

¹⁶ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe.

As soon as the Dominion office apprises the Dominion Governments of the presentation of the two notes and indicates some forecast of their action I am arranging with Maffey to call on the Canadian High Commissioner to acquaint him with our action and explain that I had not wished to embarrass him with previous knowledge of our note in the absence of instructions from you to me to confer with him.

Maffey and I agree that in view of political conditions here, in the event of the answer being no, great care should be taken to avoid the appearance of retaliatory action on our part. De Valera will want to represent himself as a martyr. I shall shortly recommend to you a token release of strategic materials for the Irish Sugar Company to be accompanied with notable publicity. I believe it would be advisable to take special pains to forestall any possible denunciation of Eire by the British Prime Minister at this time. We might lose more than we have gained by such action.

"The Government of the United States of America recently consulted His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on their proposal to address to the Government of Eire a request for the removal of Axis diplomatic and consular representatives in Eire. It was with the full concurrence of His Majesty's Government that the United States Government made this approach to the Government of Eire in their note of 21st February 1944. The United Kingdom Government desire to make it clear to the Government of Eire that for their part they warmly welcome the initiative which has been taken by the United States Government and that they fully support the request for the removal from Eire of German and Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives.

The United Kingdom Government wish to emphasize the importance which they attach to this request.["]

GRAY

841D.01/247 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, February 24, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received February 25—1:37 a. m.]

30. Last evening February 23 the Canadian High Commissioner John Kearney and Sir John Maffey called on me. It appears that De Valera yesterday morning had sent for Kearney and informed him of the receipt of the American and British notes. Kearney, though he had not been advised by us, suggested that he knew of the matter in a general way and that he expected instructions from his Government. De Valera in a very exaggerated mood asserting [*asserted?*] that they interpreted our note as a conspiracy to coerce weak neutrals and as a prelude to invasion. Kearney says he told De Valera that the request to dismiss the Axis representatives was a reasonable one which govern-

ments responsible for the safety of their soldiers could not shirk. De Valera said that the effect of these notes was bound to make United Nations relations with Ireland deteriorate and he asked Kearney as the representative of a friendly power to act as intermediary and communicate to Maffey and me the request that the notes be withdrawn. If they were withdrawn he would undertake to do everything in his power to prevent Axis espionage short of dismissing the Axis Missions. Note that he told me Monday ¹⁷ that he had done everything possible and neither could nor would do more. Kearney pointed out that the sending of parachutists by Germany in defiance of international convention gave De Valera an excellent reason for action but he steadily refused to consider it, the real reason apparently being his pride in taking decisions contrary to our interests.

Maffey has telegraphed his Government recounting this *démarche* by De Valera advising them to notify Mackenzie King ¹⁸ with a minimum of delay and to request him to instruct his Minister in Eire to reply to De Valera in the following sense:

(1) That Mr. King had considered the notes in question and was satisfied that they contained nothing in the nature either of menace or of ultimatum but only such a reasonable request as it was the duty of the Governments in question in the circumstances to make.

(2) Would recommend that unless reasons of which I have no knowledge make such a course undesirable you approve this line with the Canadian Government.

Maffey and I feel that thus far no mistake has been made, that appeal to the Canadian Minister gives time for cooling off and consideration and that our best course is to do nothing for the time being. If Canada supports us De Valera will have to accept the situation or begin on some new line.

De Valera had represented to Kearney that his Cabinet was in agreement with him in interpreting our note as an ultimatum and prelude to invasion. Maffey says he dined at the same party with the Vice Premier O'Kelly Tuesday night after delivery of the British note and that O'Kelly apparently took it very calmly and showed neither resentment nor apprehension. Maffey feels certain that the Irish Cabinet does not share De Valera's view whatever he may say.

Reference your No. 23 of February 23,¹⁹ the British note went to you yesterday. I will of course keep you advised of all developments. Would appreciate information regarding the Canadian angle. Assuming Canadian cooperation with United States I am considering procedure in the case that De Valera persists in interpreting our note as an ultimatum and should make a public appeal to the electorate although I think this course unlikely. You will be interested to learn

¹⁷ February 21.

¹⁸ Canadian Prime Minister.

¹⁹ Not printed.

that he had his Defense Council in session all Monday night making plans to resist invasion with the arms we have supplied him. This is characteristic De Valera political dramatics.

Please advise me if you hear of effort through the Irish Minister in Washington to interest American political leaders.

Repeated to London.

GRAY

841D.01/248 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, February 25, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

31. The Canadian High Commissioner lunched with me today and told me that his suggestion to his Government regarding De Valera's request that Canada act as intermediary in requesting a withdrawal of the recent notes presented by America and Britain was that the Canadian Government should propose that the notes be marked secret. I told him that I could give De Valera assurances that there was no intention to inaugurate a propaganda campaign against Eire nor in any predetermined future to publish our note but that I could not recommend to you any restriction upon our freedom of action. I said that we had made a reasonable request without sinister implications and that if De Valera chose to read into that request a meaning not there, responsibility was his. I said that if De Valera should send for me I would be willing as a friend of Ireland to assure him again in this sense and warn him that if he started to dramatize the incident with public announcement of wholly unwarranted implications that American opinion would doubtless interpret his action as it did his publicized protest against our use of Northern Ireland bases.

Repeated to London.

GRAY

841D.01/249a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1944—4 p. m.

26. Following is the text of a memorandum of conversation today with the Irish Minister:

"The Irish Minister, Mr. Brennan (on his own initiative and without making an appointment) called today on Mr. Hickerson²⁰ and stated that he personally interpreted our approach to the Irish Government on the removal of Axis representatives in Ireland as an ultimatum and that he felt that if the Irish Government should refuse our request, Ireland would be invaded by American forces. He added

²⁰ John D. Hickerson, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.

that he knew for a fact also that the authorities in Dublin were deeply disturbed.

"Mr. Hickerson assured Mr. Brennan that this request was not in the nature of an ultimatum and that he was certain that no use of military force against Ireland was contemplated; the principal sanction which we had in mind, in the event of a refusal, was the wrath of American mothers whose sons' lives would be placed in jeopardy. Mr. Hickerson added that the assurances which the President gave to Prime Minister de Valera in early 1942 still stand. The President's message to Prime Minister de Valera, transmitted through a note to the Irish Minister in Washington on February 26, 1942²¹ included the following statement with reference to the landing of American forces in Northern Ireland: 'There was not, and is not now, the slightest thought or intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security.'

"It was agreed that Mr. Brennan might inform his government to this effect. Mr. Brennan stated that he felt greatly relieved to hear this and would telegraph his government today."

Please inform the Irish authorities orally at once that you have been in touch with your government and are authorized to give them assurances in the sense of the foregoing.

STETTINIUS

S41D.01/259

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1944.

On Saturday, February 27, I called Ambassador Atherton in Ottawa on the telephone and told him the background of our note to the Irish Government on February 21 requesting that the Irish Government on security grounds take steps to remove the Axis representatives in Ireland. I then told Mr. Atherton that we had received word from our Minister in Dublin to the effect that Mr. de Valera was appealing to the Irish [*Canadian*] High Commissioner to act as intermediary in persuading the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw their notes in return for Mr. de Valera's pledge of redoubled vigilance. I told Mr. Atherton that I assumed that the Canadian Government would not be agreeable to the Irish proposal but that I wished to tell him the background in order that he might be in a position to discuss this matter with officials of the Canadian Government in the event they raised the question. I said that if he felt it desirable to raise the question himself he should feel free to do so. Mr. Atherton said that he would be seeing Mr. Norman Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sunday afternoon and that he would probably take occasion to discuss this matter.

²¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 758.

This morning, February 28, Ambassador Atherton called me on the telephone and said that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Robertson informally at a social gathering yesterday. He said that Mr. Robertson informed him that the Irish Government's appeal had been made to Canada and that Canada had turned it down explaining that Canada had not been consulted about this matter and was not familiar with the background and was not therefore in a position to comply with the Irish request.

Mr. Atherton said that he was glad to have our comments on the background since Mr. Robertson seemed a little puzzled and confused as to why we took this attitude. Mr. Atherton said that he explained to Mr. Robertson that if military operations are started on the Continent within the next few months and if large casualty lists result perhaps it would then be clear why the United States Government was especially concerned and taking every precaution to plug every possible leak of military information which might get through to Germany.

Mr. Atherton said that Mr. Robertson stated that it would in his opinion have been preferable if we had not asked the British to send a note supporting our request. I replied that we had not requested the British to send such a note; that we had as a matter of course informed the British Government that we were taking such action unless they disapproved; and that the British Government of its own volition had informed us that it wished to send a supporting note. I added that we did not object to their taking this action.

I told Mr. Atherton of the Irish Minister's call on me Saturday and of the statement which I had made to him that our note was not an ultimatum which would be followed by the use of force if the Irish declined to carry out our request. I told Mr. Atherton that I had informed Mr. Brennan that the principal sanction which may be expected if the Irish Government refuses our request will be the undying hatred on the part of mothers if they feel that military information was sent by the Axis representatives from Dublin that contributed to the German preparations to repel an allied attack.

JOHN HICKERSON

841D.01/249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:42 p. m.]

1625. For the Acting Secretary. Today Lord Cranborne came in to see me to bring me up to date on recent developments in connection with the presentation of the American and British notes to the Govern-

ment of Eire. He gave me the memorandum quoted below which I am forwarding simply for information. It was his opinion that de Valera's answer would be "no" and that the matter would probably end there.

He understood that there was to be no publicity of this incident at this time but that at a later time if we were to make it public the British would be given advance notice and an opportunity to see any statement before it was released. He asked that this same procedure be followed if de Valera should give any publicity to the matter, or in the event that the information should leak out, and we cared to issue a statement. Cranborne felt that de Valera would not want any publicity about the notes now.

The text of the memorandum is as follows :

"Sir John Maffey reported on February 24 that after the presentation of the United Kingdom note supporting the earlier United States note, Mr. de Valera sent for the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin and formally asked him as the representative of a friendly power not involved in the *démarche* to ask the Canadian Government to intervene with the suggestion that the note should be withheld. Mr. Kearney discussed the matter with Sir John Maffey and the United States Minister in Dublin and it is understood from Sir John Maffey that as a result the United States Minister has reported to the United States Government on the position.

It has now been learned from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada that the Canadian Prime Minister on February 26 authorized the despatch of instructions to the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin in the following sense :

The Canadian Government had learned of the matter only on February 23 after the notes had been presented and had had no opportunity of commenting in advance of the event. They might have suggested the adoption of less direct and formal methods if they had been consulted in advance.

The Canadian Government had, as Mr. de Valera knows, for a long time earnestly hoped that the Eire Government would come to share their conviction that the permanent interests of the Irish people were identified with the victory of the United Nations. The Canadian Government had welcomed each indication of Irish sympathy and support and still hoped that Eire would feel able to make some more direct contribution to winning the war. They would be very glad to see the Axis Missions removed from Dublin and are thus in full sympathy with the object of the approach which the United States and the United Kingdom Governments had made.

The Canadian Government could not intervene in the question which Mr. de Valera had raised. In their view Mr. de Valera would be well advised to comply with the request of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments.

It is understood that the telegram from the Canadian Government to the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin went on to say, presumably for his own guidance, that the Canadian Government would be glad to intervene if there were any assurance that the withdrawal of the notes would make it easier for Eire to expel the Axis Missions and range herself definitely on the side of the United Nations. As, however, Mr. de Valera had informed the Canadian High Commissioner that he was not prepared to do this, the Canadian Government did not feel justified in making an issue of the manner in which the views of the United States and United Kingdom Governments had been brought to the notice of Mr. de Valera.

The United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa learns that a further message is being sent by the Canadian Government to their High Commissioner in Dublin stating that they see no advantage from any point of view in giving publicity to the question and expressing the hope that each of the parties directly concerned will take the same view."

WINANT

841D.01/250 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, March 1, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received March 3—1:47 a. m.]

36. Pursuant to your No. 26, February 26 I obtained an interview with Mr. De Valera yesterday afternoon. I informed him that I was instructed to give him oral assurances in the sense set forth in the telegram which transmitted my instructions. It seemed desirable to bring to his attention the suggestion made by Hickerson to Brennan so I therefore told him that in order that there might be no question of the exact terms of the assurances I would read him what I had received. I therefore read him your telegram down to the last paragraph.

He said that this relieved his apprehension as to invasion and was duly appreciated but that the intention to apply the sanctions of publicity on the score of American mothers which was now part of the record was sinister and that he regarded it with gravity. I then said with emphasis that this was not an intention nor in any sense a part of the record but merely information transmitted orally to him of the friendly warning given Brennan by a State Department Officer as to what would probably happen if, as a result of his refusal to send away the Axis Legations, it later developed that information had reached the enemy which resulted in loss of American lives.

He said he had done all he could and would continue to do so but that he could not guarantee. This gave me the opening which I had been leading up to. I said this is just the point of our note. It is impossible to guarantee our security and we feel therefore that it is reasonable to ask you to do everything possible not everything short of removing the Germans. If you do not you assume a grave moral responsibility for possible consequences. If it should develop later that information sent out of Ireland should be the cause of some terrible disaster then the consequences suggested by Mr. Hickerson would undoubtedly be visited on you. We hope nothing like that will happen; we hope that you will be successful in suppressing espionage but if you should fail the responsibility is on you.

He attempted to dispute this by repeating that he had done and would do everything possible.

As a result of his calling his Cabinet and Defense Council together immediately after I delivered the note and telling them he had received an ultimatum, arms were issued to the local defense forces and they stood to all night all over Ireland. Rumors of every kind were circulated. The American fleet was to seize the ports, the British fleet was off Dublin. Fighting had broken out at the border. The public were perplexed as Maffey appeared publicly at the army football game in the box with the Irish Minister of War and I took pains to let a Cabinet member know that I was going fishing over the weekend. At one point in the talk he said I shall have to do something now to put a stop to the rumors that are circulating. I had said, you will remember, that on the day I delivered the note at a certain point in reading it you asked if this was an ultimatum and I told you that to the best of my knowledge and belief it was not nor did the text contain an or else course, implying that he was responsible for the rumors. I then asked him if it was reasonable to assume a conspiracy to exert pressure on him in the light of what we have done for him since the war began. I then cited some of the various benefits that we had done him. Finally I told him that a substantially correct version of the three notes which he received had leaked out and had been related to Mr. Brown²² from some person that he had confided in and that if the story broke it would not have come from our Legation and I believed not from British sources either. He said he did not want publicity. I said "that is entirely in your hands. We have no desire to have you crucified by a press campaign and will not give the story out in any immediate future but if you give it out and a storm breaks that is your affair. It is a matter of indifference to us".

I am preparing a detailed memorandum of the conversation for the record which I shall forward as soon as completed. De Valera told me that he was preparing a written answer refusing our request.

I saw the Canadian Minister this morning. He told me that he delivered orally the note of his Government to De Valera on the evening of February 26. De Valera had asked him to see Maffey and me and request that we give the matter no publicity. I told Kearney that I had already told De Valera that we had no wish to conduct a publicity campaign against him. Kearney promised me a copy of the Canadian note. I think it would be helpful if you communicated to the Canadian Government our appreciation of their note and the helpful role of their representative in Dublin. For reasons which I will communicate I hope you will be able to do this so that it may reach Kearney.

GRAY

²² Aaron S. Brown, Third Secretary of Embassy in Ireland.

841D.01/251a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1944—6 p. m.

30. The Irish Minister on March 7 left the following reply from Mr. de Valera to the note you handed him February 21:

"The note of the American Government was handed to me by the American Minister on February 21st. I informed him at once that the request it contained was one with which it was impossible for the Irish Government to comply. The Irish Government have since given the matter careful consideration and I now confirm the reply which I then gave verbally.

"The Irish Government have also received the assurance of the American Government conveyed to the Irish Minister at Washington and later confirmed by the American Minister here in an interview with me on February 29th,²³ to the effect that the American Government did not contemplate proceeding to military or other measures because of the reply which had been given. The American Minister quoted in particular the President's personal message to me of February 26, 1942, that 'there is not now nor was there then the slightest thought or intention of invading the territory of Ireland or of threatening the security of the Irish' and added that this attitude was unchanged.

"The Irish Government wish to express their appreciation of this assurance. They were indeed surprised that so grave a note as that of February 21st should have been addressed to them. The terms of the note seemed to them altogether out of harmony with the facts and with the traditional relations of friendship between the Irish and American peoples. They doubted that such a note could have been presented had the American Government been fully aware of the uniform friendly character of Irish neutrality in relation to the United States and of the measures which had been taken by the Irish Government, within the limits of their power, to safeguard American interests. They felt moreover that the American Government should have realized that the removal of representatives of a foreign state on the demand of the Government to which they are accredited is universally recognized as the first step towards war, and that the Irish Government could not entertain the American proposal without a complete betrayal of their democratic trust. Irish neutrality represents the united will of the people and parliament. It is the logical consequence of Irish history and of the forced partition of national territory.

"Already before America's entry into the war, the policy of the Irish Government toward Britain, America's ally, had been directed toward carrying out the intentions indicated in a statement of policy made by me in Dail Eireann on May 29th 1935, namely that 'our territory would never be permitted to be used as a base for attack upon Britain.' That policy has during the war been faithfully pursued. From the beginning, by the establishment of strong observation and defence forces, by a wide and rigorous censorship of press and

²³ See telegram No. 36, *supra*.

of communications, by an extensive antiespionage organization and by every other means within our power, we have endeavoured to prevent the leakage through Ireland of any information which might in any way endanger British lives or the safety of Great Britain. Since the United States entered the war, the same spirit of scrupulous regard for American interests has been shown. American officials have had an opportunity of seeing the measures which have been taken—they have indeed made favourable comments on their effectiveness—and it is satisfactory to observe that in the note itself not a single instance of neglect is alleged and no proof of injury to American interests is adduced. Should American lives be lost it will not be through any indifference or neglect of its duty on the part of this State.

“As was known to the American officials, it is true that the German Minister had a wireless transmitter, but he had been for a long time debarred from using it and it has been in the custody of the Irish Government for some months. As regards the two parachutists dropped in Ireland last December, they were apprehended within a few hours. Two other agents dropped here since the war began met with a similar fate. The fifth, who arrived during the first year of the war, remained at large until December 3rd 1941, but the police were aware of his presence here almost from the first moment of landing, and successful activities on his part were rendered impossible. The total number of persons, inclusive of these parachutists, suspected of intentions to engage in espionage, and now held in Irish prisons, is 10 foreign and 2 Irish nationals. These are the facts, and it is doubtful if any other country can show such a record of care and successful vigilance.

“The British Government have informed the Irish Government that they welcome the initiative of the American Government in sending the note and that they attached the utmost importance to it. The Irish Government do not wish to comment on this, except to remark that it is perhaps not known to the American Government that the feelings of the Irish people towards Britain have during the war undergone a considerable change precisely because Britain has not attempted to violate our neutrality. The Irish Government feel sure that the American Government would agree that it would be regrettable if any incidents now should alter that happy result.

“The Irish Government are therefore safeguarding, and will continue to safeguard, the interests of the United States, but they must in all the circumstances protect the neutrality of the Irish State and the democratic way of life of the Irish people. Their attitude will continue to be determined not by fear of any measures which could be employed against them but by good will and the fundamental friendship existing between the two peoples.”

Fragmentary and speculative reports have been appearing in the American press as they have in the British press. We are receiving inquiries but for the present are giving out no information pending further consideration of the whole matter and possible additional steps in the light of de Valera's reply.

Please repeat to London.

STETTINIUS

841D.01/267 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, March 10, 1944.

[Received March 10—8 p. m.]

48. Have received no confirmation from you of announcement made by British Broadcasting Company that the story of the American note requesting the withdrawal of Axis representations had broken. Irish Government much concerned. I called Winant at 8 this evening. At that time he only knew that he had no confirmation of story. At 9 he telephoned me saying that the Department had telephoned him that the story had broken in London and that the Secretary was confirming the story and issuing the American note²⁴ with the comment that a negative reply had been received. We are much embarrassed at not having been able to give Irish Government advance notice of this course especially as I had given them reason to believe that we had no desire or intention to publish the notes at this time. I have just told the Permanent Secretary for External Affairs of the decision of the Secretary and he is much disturbed at the prospect of publishing the American note and not the text of the reply at the same time. I have told him that I would telegraph you in clear to this effect. I have made clear to him our belief that the story broke in Dublin as a result of divulgence here. At time of filing have received no communication from you.

GRAY

841D.01/262b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1944.

33. Reference your 48, March 10. The story of our request to Ireland for removal of Axis representatives broke in London yesterday and was immediately headlined in Washington papers. We decided therefore that the text of our note should be given to the press at once. We telephoned Winant to inform the British and, in order to save an extra call, asked him to telephone you. As soon as it was decided to publish the note we also informed the Irish Legation. Brennan decided to release the Irish note and we arranged an hour agreeable to the Legation for the release of both notes.

HULL

²⁴ Released to the press on March 10, 1944; text printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 11, 1944, p. 235.

841D.01/278

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1944.

At 10:20 this morning I telephoned to the Irish Minister and in his absence talked to Mr. Sean Nunan, Counselor of the Legation, about one aspect of a press statement of Mr. Brennan in this morning's papers carried by the Associated Press. I read the paragraph in question to Mr. Nunan from the *Washington Post* as follows:

"He said President Roosevelt's 1942 'no invasion' of Ireland promise was reaffirmed when the Irish Minister called at the State Department shortly after David Gray, American Minister to Dublin, delivered the United States note. At that time Brennan said he was told neither military nor 'other measures' would be taken to put pressure on Ireland."

I recalled to Mr. Nunan that I was the person with whom Mr. Brennan had talked on February 26 and that I had informed Mr. Brennan that our note was not in the nature of an ultimatum and that no use of military force against Ireland was contemplated. I continued that I had also stated that the assurances which the President gave Prime Minister de Valera early in 1942 still stand. I added, however, that I had said nothing whatsoever about "other measures". I went on to say that I was calling this to the Legation's attention in the interests of accuracy. I added that in so doing I was not stating that "other measures" would be taken; nor had I any suggestions as to whether Mr. Brennan should take any action in regard to this inaccuracy.

I recalled further to Mr. Nunan that following my conversations with Mr. Brennan on February 26 Mr. Stewart²⁵ and I had dictated a memorandum of this conversation immediately, which Mr. Stewart had read to Mr. Brennan over the telephone. Mr. Brennan agreed that this represented an accurate description of the conversation. I informed Mr. Nunan that I had this memorandum in front of me and that the memorandum was as recited above and said nothing about "other measures" which might be taken to put pressure on Ireland. I added again that my calling this inaccuracy to his attention had nothing whatever to do with whether or not "other measures" would be taken.

JOHN HICKERSON

²⁵ Robert B. Stewart of the Division of European Affairs.

841D.01/256 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

OTTAWA, March 13, 1944.

[Received March 13—9:37 p. m.]

14. Replying to an inquiry of the leader of the opposition Prime Minister King made a statement in the House of Commons today on our efforts to obtain expulsion of German and Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives from Ireland, he said: "The Canadian Government has not in any way endeavored to mediate between the Irish Government and the United States Government" and "such representations as were received were in the nature of informal confidential conversations" saying that the matter has been presented orally by De Valera to Canadian High Commissioner in Ireland and by Irish Commissioner in Ottawa to him personally. Mr. King said "In my reply it was made clear that as the Canadian Government was in full sympathy with the object of the approach made by the United States Government it would not wish to intervene in the matter; I believe that the informal discussions which took place through Mr. Kearney in Dublin and with Mr. Hearn²⁶ here were of some help at the time in steadying a difficult situation". Full text follows.²⁷

ATHERTON

841D.01/277d : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1944—6 p. m.

1918. We should appreciate information regarding any further measures contemplated by the British Government in relation to Ireland.

We believe that for our part we should endeavor to keep the matter open, without revealing to the Irish Government whether further action may be contemplated by the American Government. We are now considering sending a further message to de Valera reaffirming the position taken in our original approach and stating that the Irish Government will inevitably be held responsible by the American Government and the American people for actions of Axis representatives in Ireland against American forces and American military operations.

Mr. Gray has just reported that "all classes of Irish opinion fear economic or military sanctions by the United States and Britain."

²⁶ John J. Hearn, Irish High Commissioner in Canada.

²⁷ Despatch No. 820, March 14, 1944, and enclosed text not printed.

Mr. Gray believes it to be of utmost importance to allay these fears which result in resentment against the American people. He suggests that he be authorized to announce in Dublin that the American Government had no desire or intention to institute economic or military reprisals and that the American Government is releasing certain supplies of steel, copper and aluminum to the Irish Sugar Company, the export of which has previously been refused. Mr. Gray states that the British Representative in Dublin joins in this recommendation.

I have previously informed Mr. Gray that the supply situation on some of the items needed by the Irish Sugar Company might not be so difficult as two years ago when their export was denied and that if Mr. Gray is convinced that these supplies are necessary for the manufacture of the 1944 sugar crop and ought to be released by us, I am willing to make a favorable recommendation to the Foreign Economic Administration. However, I am inclined to believe that for the time being at least, we should not make any statement to the press or commit ourselves to the Irish Government that we have no intention of instituting economic sanctions. While we do not believe that economic sanctions against Ireland are advisable, this question would rest primarily with the British Government since Britain is the primary supplier of Irish requirements.

Please telegraph us the British Government's views on this whole matter as it now stands.

Repeated to Dublin.

HULL

841D.01/268 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 14, 1944.

[Received March 14—11 p. m.]

2064. Answering question in House of Commons today on Ireland, Prime Minister ²⁸ said that initiative in recent step had been taken by United States because of danger to American armed forces from presence of Axis missions in Dublin, and that His Majesty's Government had been consulted throughout by American Government and had given American approach full support. He said that British Government for some time past had taken a number of measures to

²⁸ Winston S. Churchill; for text of statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 398, cols. 36-38.

minimize danger to Allied cause involved in retention by Mr. de Valera's Government of the German Minister and Japanese Consul with their staffs in Dublin. He continued :

"The time has now come when these measures must be strengthened, and the restrictions on travel to Ireland announced in the press yesterday are the first step in the policy designed to isolate Great Britain from Southern Ireland, and also to isolate Southern Ireland from the outer world during the critical period which is now approaching. I need scarcely say how painful it is to us to take such measures in view of the large numbers of Irishmen who are fighting so bravely in our armed forces and the many deeds of personal heroism by which they have kept alive the martial honor of the Irish race. No one, I think, can reproach us for precipitancy. No nation in the world would have been so patient. In view however of the fact that both British and British Dominion lives and the lives of the soldiers of our Allies are imperilled we are bound to do our utmost to obtain effective security for the forthcoming operations. There is the future to consider. If a catastrophe were to occur to the Allied armies which could be traced to the retention of the German and Japanese representatives in Dublin, a gulf would be opened between Great Britain on the one hand and Southern Ireland on the other which even generations would not bridge. The British Government would also be held accountable to the people of the United States if it could be shown that we had in any way failed to do everything in our power to safeguard their troops".

Prime Minister's statement was received with evident approval by House. He refused to be drawn into discussion of what measures might be taken to safeguard border between Ulster and Eire or other future steps.

Local press comment indicates belief that there is no probability of economic measures against Eire. Diplomatic correspondent of *Times* wrote this morning :

"There are no signs that the Government intend to interrupt the mutually valuable trade between Britain and Eire, and very many people would speak against such a proposal. When they supported the American Government's request to Mr. de Valera, and on Sunday night when they put almost a complete stop to travel, the Government had only one purpose in mind. That is to safeguard military information. The ban on travel is in no way a reprisal—as sanctions would be—for Mr. de Valera's refusal of the American request. It is simply an elementary safeguard. The channel for the possible information is closed at this end as it is not being closed at the other. The ban hampers Ulster people and business men on this side of the channel just as much as the Southern Irish. In Ulster it has been accepted loyally. Indeed, there the chief complaint is that it does not go far enough. Severe restrictions, it is said, should be imposed on the easy comings and goings across the land boundary between Ulster and Eire. Hundreds of people cross the boundary each day, and Ulster members

of Parliament have asked for restrictions several times in the past. London officials do not doubt that Mr. de Valera has sought to prevent the enemy diplomatists and their agents from passing on information to their countries. He closed down the German wireless transmitting station as soon as he knew of it. But information has been reaching Eire in a flood. Often it has been little more than gossip. But its value and its price increase as great military enterprises are being prepared, and the Germans must be considered to be ready to use extraordinary measures to get even a hint out of Eire about forthcoming plans. Such measures might easily evade Dublin's watch. Furthermore Mr. de Valera himself has said (in January 1942) that the I.R.A.,²⁹ having 'declared war' on Britain, is presumably willing to help Germany. I.R.A. agents have been caught in Ulster and in England. In March 1942 a man was caught in Ulster bearing instructions from the I.R.A. headquarters for the discovery of the exact number of American troops in Ulster and other military secrets. The risk to be countered is not only careless talk but planned espionage. Against that background the American request appeared moderate. Against the suggestion that Irish neutrality would be wrecked by closing the enemy missions there stands the example of Portugal.³⁰ Portugal went much further than the Azores bases to help in safeguarding shipping, but her main policy in Europe remains unaffectedly neutral."

All papers carry statements by Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Curtin³¹ concerning their refusal of Mr. de Valera's request that they intervene to secure withdrawal of American note, and their expression of solidarity with Anglo-American position. Mr. Churchill said in House of Commons this afternoon that Commonwealth was united in its attitude on this matter.

Papers also carry Secretary's press conference remarks concerning dangers of espionage in Ireland.

Editorials in today's *Daily Herald*, *Daily Mirror* and *Daily Worker* and last night's *Evening Standard* give renewed support to Anglo-American measures. *Herald* states that British and American publics however "should not allow themselves to be goaded into a revengeful mood", and holds that the two governments "would blunder badly if they should take any measure against Eire which was not strictly confined to security purposes". It asserts that any attempts to "punish" Ireland would not increase security but revive all the old hatreds in full strength, and add both to difficulties of wartime task and problems of peace settlement.

WINANT

²⁹ Irish Republican Army.

³⁰ See vol. iv, section under Portugal, entitled "Efforts of the United States to obtain from Portugal certain military privileges . . ."

³¹ John Curtin, Australian Prime Minister.

841D.01/265 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 14, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 9:52 p. m.]

2082. Dulanty, High Commissioner of Eire, asked Bruce³² if the Australian Government would intervene in opposing the United States and British request to Eire to remove Axis representatives. I understand this followed the Canadians' refusal to intervene. Bruce with the permission of his Government conveyed to me the following verbal statement today:

"The Australian Government did not see its way to intervene so as to secure the withdrawal of the American note and the attitude of the Australian Government was that they were in accord with the American request that the German and Japanese representatives be expelled and hoped that the Eire Government would agree to take the action asked for in the American note."

WINANT

841D.01/271 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, March 15, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received March 16—1:50 a. m.]

56. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Extremely apprehensive as to effect of Churchill's statement yesterday on situation here. De Valera's newspaper has seized upon it as evidence of conspiracy to isolate Eire in spirit of reprisal rather than from military necessity. It would have been better, we think, to have had no statement but the bare announcement of the necessary defensive measures. . . . Thus far our hand has been well played and we can justly claim to be aggrieved party. We must not lose this position. The President's farsighted view that the approach and conduct of this negotiation should be from military standpoint has proved very sound. Whatever has to be done in future should be out of military necessity which is understood here and not resented. It would be most helpful if he would explain to the Prime Minister the desirability from the American viewpoint of maintaining the position of the aggrieved party. The British representative concurring this view. He is very anxious. We strongly urge against any further note warning

³² S. M. Bruce, Australian High Commissioner in London.

De Valera of his responsibility in case of leakage of military information from Eire at present. He was bluntly warned of this responsibility by me in my conversation with him on February 29 as reported in my telegram No. 36 dated March 1st. This warning was reduced to writing and became part of the [apparent omission] recording the memorandum of that conversation which I furnished him at his request dated March 2. This is part of despatch No. 819 of March 6⁸⁸ now in transit and can be utilized and amplified by you when desirable.

We heartily support your view that there should be neither reprisal spirit nor bullying of one from the Government. The general condemnation of De Valera by our press will have its effect without our taking further official measures.

What we need now are more assurances in a spirit of sorrow rather than anger, and time to cool out. That is why I think it most important to be authorized to announce here the release of the materials for the sugar company.

We must defend ourselves against De Valera's political strategy by playing to the man in the street and giving this Legation a popular standing as a friend of the Irish people. Otherwise we may find ourselves confronted by a serious situation in which all classes of political opinion will be united by a lunatic fanaticism and resolved to die rather than give an inch. You know better than I the consequences of such a situation on the Irish-American front.

The Government has today placed a guard on the Legation and assigned me an escort car of armed detectives. I believe the primary purpose of this is political. They wish to make us believe that our action has aroused public indignation to danger point. I have written a personal letter to the Minister of Justice pointing out that in fact there is no danger at all; that I went about unguarded without any change in kindly public attitude at the time when troops were standing to all night and everybody was waiting for American forces to invade on the strength of the rumors emanating from De Valera. I also pointed out that it was unthinkable that an American Minister should need an armed guard in Ireland and that when the story broke in America as it certainly would it would be exaggerated and most damaging to Eire. I offered to call on him and discuss the matter. He is the best man in the Cabinet. I will report outcome.

Repeated to London.

GRAY

⁸⁸ Not printed.

841D.01/286: Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, March 18, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:42 p. m.]

58. De Valera continues to take the line that our request was an affront to Irish sovereignty and an effort to intimidate the Irish people. He also asserts that acceding to our request would inevitably place Eire in the war. This is universally believed by the people. It is not clear to what extent they accept the view that our request was unjustifiable.

Reference my No. 57 March 18.⁸⁴

Our impression is that both government and people believed that they were getting by with a free ride and were shocked to be asked for a ticket. Moreover everybody is anxious about the supply position. For the first time they are obliged to face the truth as to their much vaunted self-sufficiency. While they indulge in coat trailing for political effect as in inviting German[s] and Japs to a Gaelic ball at the castle last night at which De Valera and most of the cabinet members were present they seem not to want to break friendly personal relations with us. On Thursday⁸⁵ the Lord Mayor and wife, Papal Nuncio, the Maffey and Walshe of External Affairs came to lunch. It is noteworthy that the Mayor came. Walshe told me that they wanted more assurances, that statements from Maffey and me would be very helpful. Maffey would like to give further assurances. I am not as convinced of the importance of it as I was a few days ago. We are too near for a perspective view. Irish are disturbed deeply by such American press comment as has been released here as they never believed they would lose American sympathy. They are playing up such published opinion from Irish American nationalist sources as available in the effort to show that the American people are not behind their government.

Our Vice Consul Calder at Foynes reports general calmness and a degree of understanding of our position in his area. He says Irish officials have continued to be friendly.

Minister for Justice has acquiesced in my request not to be assigned an escort car, reference my 56; I told him I assumed full responsibility.

GRAY

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ March 16.

841D.01/318 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

[LONDON,] 19 March, 1944.

628. Refer to message of 14 March from State Department through Winant.³⁶

1. Gray's lead in Ireland has been followed by us and it is too soon to begin reassuring De Valera. A doctor telling his patient that medicine prescribed for his nerve trouble is only colored water is senseless. To keep them guessing for a while would be much better in my opinion.

2. My proposal is not to prevent anything going into Ireland or to stop the necessary trade between Britain and Ireland. Until OVERLORD³⁷ is launched I do propose to stop ships from going to Spain, Portugal and other foreign ports from Ireland. It must be remembered that a ship can start in one direction and turn in another. We have no trouble stopping ships. Outward bound airplanes are also included in the above which we shall do our utmost to stop. Spite against the Irish is not the intention of these measures but rather provision against our plans being betrayed by emissaries sent by sea or air from the German Minister in Dublin and preservation of British and American soldiers' lives. The evil is not very great. Since the beginning of 1943 only 19 Irish ships, some several times, have left Irish ports. Also we are stopping the Anglo-Irish Air Line from running, cutting off telephones and restricting all communications to the utmost. I reiterate that motives of self-preservation and not spite dictate our actions.

3. I would feel free to stop their cross channel trade if the Irish should retaliate by doing something which would not help them but only annoy us, such as stopping the Foynes Airport facilities. Economic measures of retaliation would be considered since they would have opened a new chapter. Before we did any of this I would inform you.

4. I think that we should let fear work its healthy process rather than to allay alarm in De Valera's circles. In that way we shall get a continued stiffening up of the Irish measures behind the scenes. At the moment these are not so bad to prevent a leakage.

5. I don't think the State Department will disagree with the above since Mr. Hull says in part in the message mentioned above:

"I am inclined to believe however that for the time being at least we should not make any statement to press or commit ourselves to the

³⁶ Telegram No. 1918, p. 236.

³⁷ Code name for Allied invasion of the Continent of Europe.

Irish Government that we have no intention of instituting economic sanctions."

It is my hope that this is your view also.

841D.01/343

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1944.

Participants: Mr. Robert B. Stewart
Mr. John D. Hickerson
Mr. Robert Brennan, Irish Minister

Mr. Brennan called this afternoon on his own initiative to discuss developments in connection with the American request for the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland.

Mr. Brennan stated that he is at a loss to understand how the American request could have been made since our security people have been aware of the situation in Ireland and have expressed their satisfaction with the precautionary measures taken by the Irish Government. He read from a statement which he had apparently received from Dublin, to the following effect: Some time in 1943, a Colonel Bruce, stated to be our security officer in London, came to Dublin with a Mr. "X" who was put in touch with the Irish security people. After a time Mr. "X" returned to London, stating his satisfaction that the Irish Government was taking adequate security measures. Mr. Brennan said he could only conclude that the State Department is not informed of American security activities.

Recently, Mr. Brennan added, the Irish officials have expressed their willingness to cooperate with American security officials and to have an American security official stationed permanently in Dublin. Mr. Brennan thought that the American Government should accept this offer.

Mr. Brennan stated that he understood that we were preparing a documented reply to the Irish note and that he or his Government thought it would be very bad if we should use, as a basis for our charges, information which has been given to American security officers by Irish officials. Mr. Hickerson told Mr. Brennan that we would not use such information in this way.

Mr. Brennan asked whether we thought that the Secretary or the President would be willing to issue a statement to the effect that Ireland was now cooperating with us in all essential matters.

Mr. Brennan was told in reply that we believed that so long as the Axis representatives remained in Ireland, the Secretary or the

President would find it impossible to issue such a statement. As regards the cooperation on security matters, while our service authorities might accept this offer of cooperation on the part of the Irish Government, it was seriously doubted that they would regard this as going far enough. In other words, the removal of the Axis diplomats was the only thing which would satisfy this Government that the Irish Government was cooperating fully.

Mr. Brennan said that he felt in view of this that he would be forced to issue here or the Irish Government should issue in Dublin a statement to the effect that Ireland had offered to cooperate on security, that American security officers had expressed their satisfaction with the measures being taken by Ireland and that the Irish Government could only conclude that the State Department is not informed of the true state of affairs. Mr. Hickerson told Mr. Brennan that should such a statement be issued, we would then be forced to say that the original request for the removal of Axis diplomats had been cleared all the way to the top with our military authorities including the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves and that they are surely informed about the danger in Ireland.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

841D.01/306 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1944—midnight.

2591. Please deliver the following message to Prime Minister Churchill from the President:

"I have discussed with Secretary Hull your message of March 19 on the further steps which you contemplate in relation to Ireland. We believe that you are pursuing the right line in taking the security measures mentioned without, however, adopting measures of coercion designed only to harm Ireland.

"We wonder, however, if measures forbidding Irish ships to go to all foreign ports from Ireland might not be interpreted as economic sanctions. Would not your purpose be accomplished by limiting the prohibition to Irish shipping going to any part of the continent? I realize that, as you say, a ship can start in one direction and turn in another, but any ship violating the prohibition could be dealt with in an appropriate manner. This would leave Ireland free to send its ships to North America to carry wheat and other essential supplies. The fact that no ban was made on Irish shipping to Canada and the

United States would in itself constitute proof that the measures against shipping were not in the nature of economic sanctions.

“For our part we are considering a further message to Mr. de Valera once more making plain that the continued presence of Axis representatives in Ireland constitutes a danger to our forces and their operations for which the Irish Government cannot escape responsibility. We shall let you see it in advance.”

HULL

841D.01/292 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1944—8 p. m.

56. Below is the text of a further note which we propose to send to Prime Minister de Valera. Although the draft had been prepared before the receipt of your telegram no. 59, March 21,³⁸ we have added to it certain suggestions from your telegram. Please telegraph any comments you have on this note. This draft is being telegraphed to Winant today for clearance with the British. As soon as the British approval is received we shall telegraph you. We believe it would be better for you to send the note rather than to deliver it in person. We plan to give this note to the press as soon as you telegraph that it has been delivered. The text of the note follows as Department No. 57.³⁹

HULL

841D.01/325b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*⁴⁰

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1944—9 p. m.

2623. “On February 21, 1944 the American Government through its Minister in Dublin presented a request to the Irish Government for the removal of Axis consular and diplomatic representatives whose presence in Ireland must be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of the Allied military operations. The Irish Minister in Washington on March 7, 1944 handed to the Acting Secretary of State your reply⁴¹ stating that it is impossible for the Irish Government to comply with this request.

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ See footnote 40, *infra*.

⁴⁰ Repeated to the Minister in Ireland on the same date as Department's No. 57. This telegram contains text of note referred to in telegram 56, *supra*.

⁴¹ See telegram 30, March 8, 6 p. m., to Dublin, p. 232.

“Since the compelling circumstances giving rise to the American Government’s request were clearly set forth in its note of February 21, they need not be repeated here.

“Your reply states that the Irish Government was ‘indeed surprised that so grave a note as that of February 21st should have been addressed to them. The terms of the note seemed to them altogether out of harmony with the facts and with the traditional relations of friendship between the Irish and the American peoples.’ It seems hardly necessary to say that any situation in which the lives of thousands of American men are at stake is to the American Government a grave situation and one which requires its utmost endeavors to remedy.

“The Irish Government has not denied that the German Legation in Dublin until recently had in its possession a radio-sending set. Nor has the Irish Government denied that Axis agents, equipped with radio-sending sets, have been dropped on Irish territory by German planes. The fact that five parachutists are known to have landed in Ireland does not preclude the possibility, indeed it adds to the likelihood, that others have landed and have not been discovered by the Irish authorities. The American Government understands that one of the five parachutists mentioned in your note remained at large for 18 months and that twenty thousand dollars in American bills were found in the room which he occupied in the house of his German confederate in Dublin. The American Government understands that another of the German parachute spies who was apprehended shortly after landing and sentenced to imprisonment later mysteriously escaped from prison and remained at large for 6 weeks. It is evident that Axis spies could not remain at large in Ireland for such long periods without assistance from some quarter. The German Government apparently considers it possible for German agents in Ireland to operate radio-sending sets without detection; otherwise, they would not have equipped their spies as well as their Legation with radio-sending apparatus.

“The American Government’s request, far from being out of harmony with the traditional relations of friendship between the Irish and American peoples, would seem entirely in accord with such friendly relations and one to which the Irish Government might be expected to make a favorable response. As you stated in your speech of December 14, 1941, there is scarcely a family in Ireland that does not have a member or a near relative in the United States. These Americans of Irish blood and background are loyal American citizens and are making their full contribution to the war in every way. At home they are supporting the war effort as loyally as any section of the American population. They are contributing their full share of fighting men for duty in the armed forces overseas. Fighting with

these American soldiers of Irish blood are many tens of thousands of other Irishmen from Great Britain and other countries of the British Commonwealth and including Ireland itself. Any steps to help safeguard the lives of these men and of all those fighting with them must surely strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of the people of Ireland and indeed of all Irishmen everywhere. In making this request, however, the American Government is not asking a special favor of Ireland on the basis of Irish-American friendship. It is merely asking that steps be taken to insure that Irish neutrality shall not be used by the Axis powers to harm the United States and the United Nations.

"Your note states that the American Government 'should have realized that the removal of representatives of a foreign state on the demand of the government to which they are accredited is universally recognized as the first step toward war, and that the Irish Government could not entertain the American proposal without a complete betrayal of their democratic trust.' In this connection it may be noted that a number of other friendly nations have found it in their own interest to break diplomatic relations with the Axis nations, a step going beyond that requested of the Irish Government, without participating in the war or assuming the status of belligerents.

"The removal of Axis representatives, moreover, could scarcely be regarded as the 'first step toward war' in the same sense as the hostile acts already committed against Ireland by Germany. German planes have bombed Irish cities and destroyed Irish lives and property with impunity. A German plane has sunk a ship carrying a cargo of American wheat to Ireland, and Axis submarines have sunk still other ships carrying supplies to Ireland. The German Government by the very act of dropping parachutists with radio equipment on Irish soil surely shows little respect for Ireland's neutrality or Ireland's desire that the United Nations be given no ground for complaint against Ireland.

"The American Government finds it difficult to understand how the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland could possibly be considered a 'betrayal' of Ireland's 'democratic trust.' Surely the people of Ireland are not unaware that their country and their democratic way of life have been spared only because powerful armed resistance has stood in the Nazi conqueror's path. As the President emphasized in his message of December 22, 1941 to you,⁴² Ireland's freedom is at stake no less than our own. Although Irish neutrality may, as you say, represent the united will of the Irish people and Parliament, the American Government cannot believe that the Irish people or their

⁴² Quoted in note to the Irish Minister, December 22, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, p. 251.

elected representatives desire that Irish soil be used by the Axis powers in ways which endanger United States forces and their operations.

"Irish neutrality is not the issue. The American Government has at no time questioned Ireland's right to remain neutral—although it has doubted the wisdom of such a policy from the viewpoint of Ireland's own best interests. Nor is it a question of Ireland's maintaining diplomatic relations with the Axis countries, although the American Government would naturally like to see such relations severed completely. If the Irish Government considers its relations with Germany and Japan of such importance that diplomatic relations with these countries must be continued, maintenance of such relations through Irish representatives stationed in those countries would at least not constitute a direct danger to the lives of members of the American Armed Forces.

"Your reply, after reciting the various measures taken by the Irish Government to suppress Axis espionage, concludes: 'Should American lives be lost, it will not be through any indifference or neglect of its duty on the part of this State.' The American Government has already stated that it does not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Unhappily, friendly intentions alone are not enough when so much is at stake. Despite all the precautions on the part of the Irish Government, the continued presence of Axis diplomatic and consular representatives in Ireland, operating under their special privileges and immunities, must be regarded as a danger to American lives and military operations for which the Irish Government cannot escape responsibility. The United States Government therefore hopes that further consideration of this matter will convince the Government of Ireland that its own interests as well as those of the United Nations require the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland at the earliest possible date."

HULL

841D.01/322 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 5, 1944—midnight.

[Received April 6—3:00 a. m.]

2790. To the Secretary and for the President. Your 2591, April 3, midnight, received this morning. I personally delivered to the Prime Minister the President's message at noon today.

I felt he was in complete accord with it.

Last night I spent 2 hours with Lord Cranborne going over Walshe's visit to England in connection with supplies and security. I have also received three messages from Gray.

The confidential memorandum I am attaching to this message was given me by the Dominions Office on Walshe's arrival in England.

After contacting the British Walshe called the O.S.S. office by telephone and Russell Forgan, who was acting for David Bruce, and Hugh Wilson⁴³ at once informed me. I in turn made contact for them with the British security authorities dealing with this problem, and all considerations in relation to military security have been reviewed jointly.

Walshe suggested to Forgan and Wilson that we have a tri-partite meeting with British and Irish authorities to determine what additional measures should be taken by the Irish to prevent possibility of leakage, and that we send an officer to Dublin to sit with the Irish on security work.

After consultation with the British we all agreed that the invitation should not be ignored and therefore we recommend the tripartite conference. We believe the Eire Government will not want to make this public because of their neutrality position but if they do it can be credited to our exchange of notes.

We feel that the stationing of officers in Dublin might imply a possible sharing of responsibility and that refusal on the other hand might excuse failures in Irish counter-espionage. My suggestion is that we tell them that in any particular emergency or incident we would send an officer to Dublin for consultation but we question the advisability of stationing an officer there on a permanent assignment.

Gray is very insistent that we get to the Irish the necessary material for the Irish Sugar Company. He also thinks that the reduction in coal shipments which has been explained to the Irish by the British as a necessary adjunct to the second front operations and has been amicably accepted by them on this basis should be further underlined by publicized statements from here emphasizing coal shortages due to the strike situation. I understand that some of the American reporters are pointing up the coal shortage apart from Irish needs.

The Prime Minister told me this noon that he was willing to have the shipments to North America continued because if necessary we could delay turn-around shipments from American ports as D-day⁴⁴ approached.

Walshe himself agreed to the discontinuance of trade with the Iberian Peninsula.

⁴³ Both of the Office of Strategic Services.

⁴⁴ Day for Allied landing on the Continent.

In the conversations that have already taken place we have limited the area of operations for fishing boats and got agreement of freeing airmen who come down in Eire on forced landings.

Your message 2622, April 4, 7 [8] p. m.,⁴⁵ suggesting your sending a new note to Prime Minister de Valera has been received but the text of the accompanying note has not yet reached us. I think you might wish to reconsider the advisability of sending this note on receipt of this cable. If the above program is accepted we are in a position at a later date to make public the fact that our previous exchange of notes prompted the Eire Government to extend to us these additional facilities to ensure security, and if Mr. Gray's recommendation is followed to carry through our agreement to supply the Eire Government with the necessary material for the Irish Sugar Company we cannot be charged with applying economic sanctions.

Following is text of confidential memorandum mentioned above given me by the Dominions Office on Walshe's arrival in England:

"Informal memorandum.

1. A complete survey has been undertaken of all possible means of strengthening the existing arrangements to ensure that information about military activities does not reach the enemy. A number of measures with this object in view have been approved, and some, e.g., the restrictions on travel between Great Britain and Ireland, have already been put into effect. Others, such as the ban on travel to coastal districts in England and the suspension of certain air mail services, which have been announced, and a stricter general censorship control over mails, telegrams (including press telegrams) and the export of newspapers, do not specially concern Eire. The following sets out all the measures at present in contemplation which directly affect Eire.

(a) Telephone services. The public telephone service between Great Britain and Ireland to be suspended subject only to exception for authorized calls. (This means, in the case of Eire, Governmental and diplomatic calls and calls for operation civil air lines and in the case of Northern Ireland to certain firms engaged on urgent war contracts which necessitate close liaison with associated firms in Great Britain).

(b) Air services. The civil air services operated between Eire and Great Britain by Aer Lingus Teoranta to be suspended as from a given date. It is desired to discuss with the Eire authorities what steps can be taken to ensure that Eire aircraft cannot be used for journeys outside Ireland during the period of suspension.

(c) Shipping services. It is desired to discontinue direct sailings to the Iberian Peninsula. This has been put into effect so far as sailings from the United Kingdom are concerned. It is desired to arrange with the Eire authorities the suspension of the sailing of Eire ships to the Iberian Peninsula and West Africa, and to discuss with them the possible employment of such ships during the period of

⁴⁵ Not printed.

suspension and the means for providing Eire with any essential cargoes from that area which would otherwise have been carried by these ships. (It is not suggested that any change should be made as regards sailings between Eire and North America.)

(d) Diversion of shipping. Only a very limited number of ports on the west coast of England and Scotland will be available for traffic between Great Britain and Ireland. Notification of the necessary changes will be made separately.

(e) Diplomatic communications. The representatives of Allied and neutral governments in London will shortly be requested to take every precaution to prevent the leakage of information, and in regard to the use of the telephone service between Great Britain and Ireland they will shortly be informed that calls in English only will be permitted. It is requested that the Eire authorities should themselves observe these precautions in regard to communications with their representatives outside Eire.

2. Apart from the above measures, which derive from security requirements, it has been found necessary to take up for military purposes a considerable quantity of coastal shipping. One result of this and of the increasing strain on railway facilities will be that the amount of coal which can be made available weekly for delivery to Eire will be seriously reduced. It is desired to discuss the resulting position with the Eire authorities.

3. The foregoing measures are based on military grounds of a temporary character and not on any other grounds.

4. It is suggested that a representative be sent to London this week to discuss on the official level the best means of giving effect to the various arrangements and their timing."

WINANT

841D.01/339a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1944—midnight.

2759. We believe that the Irish Government's offer of cooperation in tightening security measures should by all means be accepted and that our security people should enter into any desired discussions or arrangements for this purpose, perhaps even stationing a security officer in Dublin. Should such an officer be stationed in Dublin we should make it clear that this does not relieve Ireland of complete responsibility for any untoward events resulting from Axis espionage in Ireland but that it would merely be intended to provide a means of continuous consultation.

In the final drafting of the proposed note transmitted to you as Department's No. 2623, April 4, we were aware of the Irish offer of improved cooperation in security measures. It was our thought that

we should express our appreciation for this offer and state our desire to take advantage of it. We believe that at the same time we should make it clear that any measures short of getting rid of the Axis representatives would not be regarded as going far enough to satisfy our security requirements. On March 30 [29?] the Irish Minister called at the Department and inquired whether, in view of the Irish offer of cooperation on security matters, it might not be possible for the Secretary or the President to issue a statement to the effect that Ireland is now cooperating with us in all essential matters. He was told in reply that it was believed that so long as the Axis representatives remained in Ireland, the Secretary or the President would find it impossible to issue such a statement. In other words, it was believed that only the removal of Axis representatives, in addition to adequate cooperation on security, would satisfy this Government that the Irish Government is cooperating fully.

Our draft note transmitted in telegram 2623 was approved by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. In transmitting the draft to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval, we recounted the conversation with the Irish Minister and stated that we are not informed whether or to what degree American security officials are satisfied with the measures now in force in Ireland. We added that we believed that the draft note, in addition to meeting certain points in the Irish reply which should not be left unanswered, might help to increase still further Irish cooperation on security measures. You will have noted Mr. Churchill's statement on this point in his message to the President on March 19.

We are still disposed to send the draft message with the last paragraph changed to read as follows:

"Your reply, after reciting the various measures taken by the Irish Government to suppress Axis espionage, concludes: 'Should American lives be lost, it will not be through any indifference or neglect of its duty on the part of this State.' The American Government has already stated that it does not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Nor is the American Government unmindful of the measures which the Irish Government has already adopted for the prevention of espionage or of the Irish Government's willingness to adopt still further measures of cooperation—short of removing Axis representatives. All of these measures are appreciated. Unhappily, such measures short of removing Axis representatives in Ireland do not go far enough, since this leaves intact the permanent instrument and core of Axis espionage. The United States Government therefore hopes that further consideration of this matter will convince the Government of Ireland that its own interests as well as those of the United Nations require the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland at the earliest possible date."

We should, however, be glad to consider any further views you wish to express on the advisability of sending this message. Also, we shall be glad to receive and consider the views of the British and of David Gray.

Please repeat the substance of this telegram and of your 2790⁴⁶ to David Gray.

HULL

841D.01/326 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, April 8, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received April 9—1:08 a. m.]

74. Acknowledging your number 56, April 4 and accompanying draft for proposed note to Eire. The situation following recent exchange of notes appears to be substantially as follows. There is a growing realization that our note was not a hostile ultimatum [*ultimatum*] to be followed by reprisals but a request which responsibility for American lives and our military effort compelled us to make. It came as a shock to Irish complacency and angered and alarmed those who counted on a free and prosperous ride without prejudice to the riders. This shock brought immediate and general support to De Valera for his refusal. It is now realized that his intimations of impending invasion were unfounded and probably disingenuous and thoughtful people are beginning to worry over the position in which he has placed Eire on the record. There are signs that the opposition parties while upholding neutrality are preparing to attack the Government for the manner in which it has shown needless unfriendliness to us and made political capital by willfully misinterpreting our request.

The imponderables are working for us and gradually weakening belief in De Valera's thesis that acquiescence in our request meant violation of Irish sovereignty, betrayal of neutrality and immediate and inevitable entry into war. Letting the truth work itself out within the Irish mind is the only practical course for us to take. Although we failed in our efforts to increase the security factor for our military effort we are in a stronger position than we were, even in this respect. Eire is now on formal notice as to the responsibility which she has elected to assume.

Churchill's speech in the Commons made that clear and it is in our written record through the memorandum of my conversation with

⁴⁶ Dated April 5, p. 249.

De Valera on the occasion of giving him assurances pursuant to your instructions and prepared and sent to him at his request.

We have also the record of his formal refusal to cooperate even in a small way in this world emergency as protection against future demands of his which we may deem unreasonable. From a practical point of view our note has not diminished cooperation in security measures or in releasing aircraft. It is also operating to make Eire accept the serious reduction of coal supplies necessitated by the British shortage without politically-inspired resentment. It is probable that it will have a similar effect on other reductions if and when they occur. This is of great value in minimizing the danger that would attend a martyred Ireland propaganda.

The proposed new note is excellently conceived and drafted but we see little or nothing that its delivery and publication here would gain for us. We cannot put Eire more on record than she now is and it is a certainty that De Valera will not reconsider his reply. The disadvantages that we should experience are several. First we give De Valera important help for his political campaign by giving him the opportunity for rousing the country with more emotional and disingenuous appeals. Second we enhance his prestige by dignifying his answer to us with a reply that will not further our interest there. No argument or citation of fact will change the lunatic group. Truth seeking people do not need our assistance. Of the situation in America you of course are a far better judge than we.

As well as we can reconstruct it would seem desirable to point out the falsity of De Valera's premises to the American public. Cannot this be done by issuing the substance of the draft note in the form of a statement which you could father, though from our point of view it would be preferable to have it issued by an Assistant Secretary. That touch would not escape Irish scrutiny. In other words treat this disingenuous reply as it deserves to be treated.

On April 6 I had a long conference with British representative. He strongly holds views similar to the above as regards situation in Eire but withholds comment as to best policy in America. He feels that from the British viewpoint the note though excellent would gain us nothing of practical value and would probably cause deterioration of Anglo-Irish working relations at a time when reduction of coal may produce serious dislocation of Irish economy. For the present at least he feels the least said here the better.

Whether the note is delivered or used as a statement I would suggest cutting out reference to bombing Eire territory. Our unfortunate mishap in Switzerland⁴⁷ was prominently publicized by Government newspaper. I would suggest also in presenting case of

⁴⁷ See vol. iv, section under Switzerland entitled "Accidental bombing of the Swiss city of Schaffhausen by American planes."

parachutists that "the published record shows et cetera." be the reading instead of "the American Government is informed".

Repeated to Winant.

GRAY

841D.01/344a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1944—midnight.

3060. We are still awaiting the views of the British Government before reaching a definite decision in regard to the proposed further note to Ireland. It is of course desirable that we have these views as soon as possible if the note is to be sent.

HULL

841D.01/344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 20, 1944—midnight.

[Received April 20—9 :10 p. m.]

3271. Your 3060 of April 17 received. I had thought that my 2992 of April 13⁴⁸ covered the question of a further note to Ireland. However, I talked today both with Lord Cranborne and the Prime Minister who is acting as Foreign Secretary during Eden's absence. Cranborne is against sending a second note to De Valera. He is supported by security officials here.

This evening I talked with the Prime Minister. He told me he thought that our first note had done great good, that it had prompted the Irish to pull their socks up and that it had resulted in a strengthening security measures but he felt that it would be best to leave well enough alone and that a second note was unnecessary.

WINANT

841D.01/361a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1944.

In my memorandum of March 24, I transmitted for your approval a copy of a further note⁴⁹ which I proposed to send to Prime Minister

⁴⁸ Not printed; in it Ambassador Winant stated that in his opinion the question of whether or not to send a second note to De Valera should be determined by the judgment of Secretary Hull as to the necessity of answering the points raised by De Valera and the effect on public opinion in the United States (841 D. 01/329).

⁴⁹ Memorandum of March 24 not printed, but for text of proposed note, see telegram 2623, April 4, 9 p. m., to London, p. 246.

de Valera in regard to the continued presence of Axis representatives in Ireland. Following your approval, we submitted the text of this proposed note to Mr. David Gray for his opinion and to Ambassador Winant for his opinion and for the views of the British Government.

Both Mr. Gray and Mr. Winant have recommended that a further note should not be sent. Mr. Winant has also reported that he has discussed this matter with Prime Minister Churchill and with Lord Cranborne, who was acting as Foreign Secretary during Eden's absence. Cranborne opposed sending a second note and is supported in this view by British security officials. Prime Minister Churchill has told Mr. Winant that he thinks our first note has done great good and has prompted the Irish authorities to strengthen security measures, but he felt that a second note was not necessary and that it would be best to leave well enough alone.

In view of the attitude of the British Government and of the recommendations of Mr. Gray and Mr. Winant, the Department has decided that it would not be advisable to proceed with the further note. You will also have noted the recent announcement of Mr. de Valera's decision to call a general election on May 30. This development, even aside from other considerations, would appear to make the sending of a further note definitely undesirable. I propose, therefore, to let this matter rest, at least for the time being. Meanwhile, however, we are following all aspects of the Irish situation, particularly as it relates to the security of our military operations.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CASH-ONLY BASIS FOR MILITARY SUP- PLIES; RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT OF GOLD MIN- ING MACHINERY TO THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA ¹

848A.24/445

The Department of State to the South African Legation

MEMORANDUM

Negotiations have been pending for a considerable period of time between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Government of the United States with reference to the conclusion of an Agreement on the Provision of Mutual Aid. The progress of events, and particularly the evolution of the financial situation of the Government of the Union of South Africa, has led the Government of the United States to the conclusion that all forms of mutual aid provided by one Government to the other in the course of the war should be financed at this time by cash payments in both directions.

It is intended that this decision be prospective in effect from February 15, 1944, and that the terms and conditions on which war aid was received by the two Governments from each other before that date be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in the Preliminary Mutual Aid Agreement between the United States and Great Britain, dated February 23, 1942,² through an exchange of notes in the form of the draft accompanying this Memorandum.

The supply agencies of the United States Government will continue to be available to the Government of the Union of South Africa for assistance in the handling or facilitating the procurement of necessary supplies in every practicable way.

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1944.

[Enclosure]

PROPOSED DRAFT OF NOTE FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

With reference to the aid received before February 15, 1944, by the Government of the Union of South Africa from the Government of

¹ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 173 ff.

² Signed at Washington; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433. For correspondence on negotiation of the Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 525 ff.

the United States of America, under the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941,³ and the mutual aid extended on like terms to the United States by the Government of the Union of South Africa, I refer to the agreement signed at Washington on February 23, 1942, between the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom on principles applying to mutual aid in the present war authorized and provided for by the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, and have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Union of South Africa accepts the principles therein contained as governing the provision of mutual aid between itself and the Government of the United States of America.

If the Government of the United States of America concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

848A.24/5-2744

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Achilles)

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1944.

Mr. Jordaan⁴ called at his request. He stated that his Government accepted the proposal made in our *aide-mémoire* of May 8, 1944 that all Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease transactions between this Government and the South African Government be transferred to a cash basis as of February 15, 1944. The Legation had requested certain clarifications of its instructions and would give us an *aide-mémoire* as soon as these were received. He said that he was instructed to raise three minor questions:

1. What was to be done about combat material furnished through the British to South African troops under British operational command? He understood that the British Supply Mission was already discussing this with FEA.⁵

2. What would be done about articles for which requisitions had been accepted prior to February 15, 1944, but delivered after that date? His Government assumed that these would be filled on Lend-Lease terms.⁶

3. Did the statement in our *aide-mémoire* that Lend-Lease machinery would still be available to facilitate procurement by the South African Government mean that it could continue filing requisitions?

³ Lend Lease Act, 55 Stat. 31.

⁴ J. R. Jordaan, Secretary, South African Legation.

⁵ Foreign Economic Administration. Notation in margin beside this paragraph reads: "Charge to British L[end] L[ease]".

⁶ Notation in margin beside this paragraph reads: "Feb 15 ought to be the cut off date for all purposes".

tions on a cash reimbursable basis? His Government assumed that it did.⁷

4. His Government wished to alter the preamble of the proposed South African note to express appreciation for the Lend-Lease assistance already rendered by this Government and appreciation of our willingness to continue facilitating procurement through cash reimbursement Lend-Lease.⁸

I expressed gratification at the South African Government's decision and the belief that it would redound greatly to the long-range advantage of that Government in its relations with ours, as had been the case with Canada. I said that we would endeavor to let them know the answers to the questions raised as quickly as possible.

848A.24/8-144

The Minister in South Africa (Holcomb) to the Secretary of State

No. 41

PRETORIA, August 1, 1944.

[Received August 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum⁹ prepared for me by Mr. S. H. Day, my Commercial Attaché, on the subject of a possible modification of the United States Government's policy regarding the furnishing of supplies for the South African gold mines.

I have discussed this problem at length with Mr. Day and also with Mr. Bitting, head of the Johannesburg Office of the Foreign Economic Administration and am in complete accord with Mr. Day's recommendations, particularly because I feel that unless some modification of the American policy is made shortly, American manufacturers producing mining equipment needed in the Union, will find themselves greatly handicapped after the war in endeavoring to re-establish themselves in this market.

I can think of no more effective method of paving the way for the re-entry into this market of American mining equipment than the release (so far as justified by military requirements) of a substantial amount of the machinery and other material long since ordered by and manufactured for Union mining companies, which, because of American export prohibitions have remained in storage there, while British manufacturers have been able to consider and fill orders in relatively substantial fashion.

In the foregoing connection I should also like to suggest that the Department may wish to discuss with the appropriate agencies, the possibility of reviewing the present American policy with respect to the

⁷ Notation in margin beside this paragraph reads: "Yes".

⁸ Notation in margin beside this paragraph reads: "OK".

⁹ Not printed.

export to South Africa of mining equipment and of supplies in general, which, in light of the improved military position, might now possibly be released.

Respectfully yours,

T. HOLCOMB

848A.24/7-644

The Acting Secretary of State to the South African Minister (Gie)

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I refer to Mr. Jordaan's letter of July 6, 1944, to Mr. Achilles,¹⁰ concerning the problem of Lend-Lease equipment furnished through the United Kingdom to South African forces under British operational control. As you know, this matter was discussed by Dr. Holloway,¹¹ Mr. Jordaan and Mr. Andrews¹² with representatives of the Foreign Economic Administration and this Department on July 29.¹³ We have given careful and sympathetic consideration to the position of your Government as set forth in that letter and as explained by Dr. Holloway, and I wish to outline in this letter the position as we see it.

Agreement has been reached in principle that the Union Government should go on a strictly cash basis in its relations with my Government. The question of Lend-Lease equipment furnished through the United Kingdom to South African troops is only one practical detail to be settled within this principle.

We understand that the present arrangement between your Government and the Government of the United Kingdom whereby your Government pays the United Kingdom the arbitrary figure of £1,000,000 a month for the equipment and maintenance of South African forces in the Mediterranean-European Theater is not intended to cover Lend-Lease equipment furnished to those forces. It therefore seems to us that it would be equitable if a similar payment, the amount to be subject to agreement, were to be made to this Government in respect of Lend-Lease equipment furnished to such forces.

In view of South Africa's exceptionally strong financial position, one of the strongest of the United Nations, we have difficulty in believing that such a payment would exceed the financial capacity of the Union.

I hope that it may be possible to reach agreement on this matter in the near future and would suggest that, in any event, arrangements

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ John E. Holloway, South African Secretary for Finance.

¹² Harry T. Andrews, Head of the South African Supply Mission in Washington.

¹³ Memorandum of conversation not printed.

be completed for the transfer to a cash basis of all other Lend-Lease equipment currently being furnished to the Union or to Union forces in South Africa without awaiting agreement on this one point, and I am making a suggestion to this effect to the Secretary of War.¹⁴

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

848A.24/8-744

The South African Minister (Gie) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1944.

DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: In the third paragraph of your letter of August 3rd concerning Lend-Lease equipment furnished from United Kingdom stocks to South African Forces under British Operational Control you say that the State Department's understanding of the financial arrangements between the Union Government and the Government of the United Kingdom is that the sum of £1,000,000 per month which the Union Government pays to the United Kingdom Government for the equipment and maintenance of South African Forces in the Mediterranean-European Theatre is not intended to cover Lend-Lease equipment furnished those forces, and for this reason it seems equitable that a similar payment should be made to the United States Government in respect of Lend-Lease equipment furnished to such forces.

I regret to say that this understanding does not reflect the factual position as explained at the meeting on August [July] 29th to officers of the State Department and of F.E.A. by Dr. Holloway and at several previous meetings by South African officials and officials of the British Treasury.

I am writing therefore again to explain that under the financial agreement with the U.K. Government, the Union Government supplies, as part of its contribution to the common war effort, such manpower as it is able to put in the field and in addition pays the global sum of £1,000,000 per month, as well as the salaries and allowances of such forces.

For its part the U.K. Government undertook to maintain and equip the South African forces under its operational control.

Whether or not the U.K. Government utilizes Lend-Lease equipment for these purposes is, of course, no concern of the Union Government.

It was assumed, at the time the agreement was made, that the U.S. Government would have no objection to the U.K. Government utilizing Lend-Lease supplies from stocks in its possession to equip and maintain in part the South African forces in the field in as much

¹⁴ Letter dated August 3, 1944, not printed.

as these forces do not function as a self contained army but are in fact integrated and for all intents and purposes function as part of the British Armies, under their operational command.

For so far as the British Command makes Lend-Lease supplies available for use by the South African forces in the field these supplies were not and are not being transferred to the Union Government. They remain in the possession of the U.K. Government and remain available for use of any part of the forces under British Operational Control, wherever and whenever strategic needs demand.

I would add that in addition to the above, the South African Government makes a considerable contribution to the common effort in maintaining the air umbrella along the whole length of its coast, including the coast of the Mandated Area of South West Africa. This is primarily for the defence of the shipping of its Allies since, as you are no doubt aware, the ocean-going ships on the South African register are limited to a few units. The defence of purely South African interests in this matter would not justify the maintenance of this service. My Government, in accepting this service in the interest of its Allies and in assistance of the common effort, was primarily influenced by the fact that Lend-Lease supplies were available in respect of equipment beyond its ability to supply. The withdrawal of such Lend-Lease assistance at this stage would in fact mean that the commitments which my Government agreed to undertake would become much more burdensome than they were, when this commitment was so undertaken.

I trust that the foregoing will remove the misunderstanding, as to the factual position, which appeared to exist in the minds of the United States authorities.

With expressions [etc.]

S. F. N. GIE

848A.24/9-144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in South Africa (Holcomb)

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1944—11 a. m.

142. As you know, some months ago agreement was reached in principle with the South Africans that all mutual aid transactions between our two governments should be placed on a cash basis effective as of February 15, 1944.

Discussions have been held recently between the State Department and FEA representatives on the one hand and the South African Legation, the South African Supply Mission and Dr. Holloway on the other with a view to putting this agreement into effect.

We were under the impression that the only practical detail to be settled within this principle was the question of lend-lease equipment

furnished from the United States through United Kingdom to South African troops. We urged upon the South Africans that the Union Government, in view of its exceptionally strong financial position, should make a payment to us for lend-lease material provided South African troops through the British. We mentioned our understanding that the Union Government pays to the United Kingdom an arbitrary figure of £1,000,000 per month for equipment and maintenance of South African forces under British operational control. We stated that we believed it would be appropriate if a similar sum were paid to us for the equipment provided by us through the British. The South Africans replied that the Union Government has an agreement with the British Government under which the latter assumed responsibility for the equipment and maintenance of South African Forces under British operational command. The Union Government states that such equipment never comes into its possession and disclaims any liability for it.

After considerable discussion the South Africans still refuse to admit responsibility for material provided by us for the South African troops under British operational command. They likewise disclaim responsibility for materials going to the Union itself for United Kingdom account. They propose that the Union Government accept liability only for goods supplied direct by the United States to the Union Government on orders placed by the Union Government after February 15, 1944.

Thus the responsibility for goods supplied by us for various purposes would be as follows:

1. South African troops in the European-Mediterranean theater under British operational command—United Kingdom responsibility.
2. The RAF flying boat squadron based on Durban—United Kingdom responsibility in so far as aircraft, spares and equipment are concerned.
3. Air training scheme—United Kingdom responsibility in so far as planes and personnel are concerned and South African responsibility in so far as ground facilities, lubricants, and possibly fuel are concerned.
4. Material and equipment for maintenance of Air Patrol to protect shipping routes around the Cape—South African responsibility.
5. South African forces in the Union—South African responsibility.

The South Africans have emphasized that General Smuts¹⁵ has outlined to Parliament the arrangements with Britain and that South Africa's contribution to the war, both in money and materials, has been on the basis of this agreement and on the understanding that no

¹⁵ Gen. Jan Christian Smuts, South African Prime Minister.

change would be made in lend-lease arrangements. They state that General Smuts could not now go before Parliament and ask for a new arrangement.

We are convinced that in view of South Africa's strong financial position it is well able to make full payment for lend-lease materials provided from this country.

On the other hand, there is merit in the South African position that they should not be required to pay for equipment ordered by the United Kingdom for use in carrying out United Kingdom commitments and over which the Union Government does not have control. A third possibility would be to charge the United Kingdom for equipment used by South African forces, but this would create a distinction both in principle and in practice from the treatment of equipment furnished the United Kingdom for use by other Commonwealth forces. Furthermore, we feel that the United Kingdom's contribution to the war effort is far greater in proportion than the Union's contribution. In all circumstances we are inclined to accept the proposal outlined above without making any change in treatment of equipment furnished the United Kingdom for use of South African forces.

We should appreciate receiving your views at your early convenience.

HULL

848A.24/9-1244 : Telegram

The Minister in South Africa (Holcomb) to the Secretary of State.

PRETORIA, September 12, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10:36 p. m.]

177. I consider the South African proposals as set forth in the Department's 142 of September 1, 11 a. m., inequitable, especially in view of the Union's ability to pay but in the circumstances the only practical arrangement and feel that the Department's decision to accept those proposals the best present solution of this problem.

HOLCOMB.

848A.24/11-344

*Revised Draft Note From the South African Minister to the Secretary of State*¹⁶

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to the memorandum dated May 8th from the State Department and recent discussions between

¹⁶ Received in the Department from the South African Legation on October 8, 1944.

representatives of the Union of South Africa and those of the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration concerning the proposal that all forms of mutual aid provided by either of the governments of the Union of South Africa and the United States to the other should be financed by cash payments as from February 15, 1944, I am directed to inform you that the Union Government agrees in principle to the application of such a cash basis in its relations with the United States Government.

(2) The Union Government is accordingly prepared to accept liability for all combat material, aircraft and other goods shipped on and after 15th February, 1944, and supplied direct by the Government of the United States, or by means of retransfer from other Governments, on orders placed by the Union Government. This would include equipment for coastal defence undertaken by the Union Government in agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom, but would not include the provision of aircraft and equipment for the Flying Boat Squadron No. 262 at present based on Durban, which is, by agreement with the United Kingdom Government, a liability of the latter government, in so far as the procurement of aircraft, spares and related equipment is concerned.

(3) The basis of the foregoing proposal is that liability for goods supplied should follow the authority responsible for the issue of the order of procurement. The Union Government would, therefore, be liable solely for goods ordered by it for supply to the Union, but would not be liable for any goods which the United Kingdom Government may supply for the temporary or intermittent use of the Union Forces under United Kingdom operational control outside the boundaries of the Union of South Africa in compliance with the terms of the financial arrangements in existence between the two governments.

(4) The Union Government would be grateful to learn whether the application of the proposed cash basis along the lines indicated above is acceptable to the Government of the United States.

Accept etc.

848A.24/10-2544

The Secretary of State to the Minister in South Africa (Holcomb)

No. 196

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1944.

The Secretary of State refers to the Legation's despatch number 41, dated August 1, 1944, entitled "Transmitting Memorandum on Modification of American Policy with respect to the furnishing of Supplies

for South African Gold Mines”¹⁷ and to the Legation’s telegram number 181 dated September 20,¹⁸ in reference to the same subject.

The Department desires to inform the Legation that a meeting was held with the other interested agencies of the Government to discuss the question of relaxing export controls over gold mining supplies. For general information, the following is an extract from the minutes of this meeting :

“It is the consensus of this meeting that it is desirable to adopt a policy on the part of the United States to relax requirements for the export of gold mining machinery for both MRO¹⁹ and new equipment, taking into consideration the existing supply position at the time the application is made. In the event applications are made for articles in critically short supply, the Foreign Economic Administration and the War Production Board will use their best offices in recommending substitutions to take the place of the short supply items, in order to permit the carrying out of a rehabilitation program for operating properties.”

The Department is further informed that all pending requests for gold mining supplies have been processed within the last month.

It is imperative that the Department emphasize that in no case is it intended that gold mining supplies be recommended for importation into a foreign country if the result in the use of such supplies would be to divert necessary labor from other employment that would more beneficially affect the prosecution of the war effort. It is recognized that mining companies necessarily must carry an inventory of supplies for operations. There appear to be no present objections by United States Government agencies to mining companies acquiring such an inventory, provided it does not interfere with the prosecution of the war effort. The present supply position in the United States indicates that all mining supplies will not be readily available, but each application will be processed and considered in the light of existing supply conditions when the application is made.

It is pointed out that the gold mining companies referred to in the despatch under reference will be given the opportunity to acquire those supplies that are available for export from the United States if they desire them, so that they may anticipate their needs and be in a position to expand their operations to assist in the stabilization of the

¹⁷ Memorandum not printed.

¹⁸ Not printed; the concluding paragraph of this telegram read as follows: “Relaxation of restrictions proposed in my despatch 41 of August 1, 1944, would permit certain desirable replacement of worn out equipment and possibly some additional mechanization to offset labor shortage. It is unlikely that this would result in any increase in gold output or that it would have any effect on recruiting of labor for corundum and coal mining. FEA Johannesburg concurs.” (848A.24/9-2044)

¹⁹ Maintenance, Repair and Operating Supplies.

economy of the country and prevent unemployment among workers who are released from other war activities.

848A.24/11-344

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the South African Minister (Gie)

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I refer to the State Department's memorandum of May 8, 1944, regarding the placing of Lend-Lease operations between the United States and the Union of South Africa on a cash basis, to the revised draft note which was received from your Legation on October 8, 1944, and to the subsequent discussions which have been held by Mr. Andrews of the Union of South Africa Government Supply Mission and representatives of the Foreign Economic Administration.

In the light of these discussions the United States Government is prepared to accept the proposal of the Government of the Union of South Africa for cash basis settlements as outlined in the revised draft note referred to above with certain clarifications. These are as follows:

(1) Omit the words "in principle" in the eighth line of the first paragraph of the draft note.

(2) Alter the second sentence of the third paragraph of the draft note to read, "The Union Government would, therefore, be liable solely for goods received in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, and it would not be liable for any goods which the United Kingdom Government . . ."

It is my understanding that the word "shipped" in the first sentence of the second paragraph is intended to denote the time at which the United States Government transfers the goods to the recipient government and further, in the case of South Africa, that this transfer takes place when the goods are actually placed on board ship. In further reference to that sentence, it is my understanding that any goods retransferred by any government and accepted by the Union Government are considered to be "on orders placed by the Union Government".

I hope that these suggestions will meet with the approval of your Government.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

848A.24/11-2344

*The South African Minister (Gie) to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, 23 November, 1944.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I have received your letter of 21st November in regard to the proposal that the Lend Lease operations between the Union of South Africa and the United States of America be placed on a cash basis, and wish to inform you that I am immediately telegraphing the Union Government on the matter.

I shall not fail to communicate with you when I receive further instructions.

Yours sincerely,

S. F. N. GIE

EUROPE

ALBANIA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIA, AND DESIRE TO FORESTALL INTERNAL STRIFE AMONG POLITICAL FACTIONS

875.01/563a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1944.

In a conversation at the White House yesterday the President asked Mr. Acheson¹ for the reasons for the omission of Albania in invitations for last year's Food Conference² and the forthcoming Monetary Conference.³

Since the occupation of Albania by Italian troops in April 1939⁴ there has been no Albanian authority abroad able to muster sufficient strength to lay any substantial claim to representing either resistance forces within the country or unified Albanian groups abroad.

After the Italian occupation the Government of King Zog disintegrated, Zog eventually receiving admission to England in the quality of a distinguished private person. The American Government never formally terminated its relations with King Zog, but our Minister at Tirana⁵ was instructed to depart from Albania, and the Albanian Legation at Washington was closed in the late spring of 1939.⁶ The former government must therefore be considered as at least in suspense, and factional strife has prevented other exiles from

¹ Dean G. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

² The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18-June 3, 1943. For correspondence on this meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 820 ff.

³ For correspondence on this meeting, see vol. II, section entitled "The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944".

⁴ For correspondence on the absorption of Albania by Italy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 365 ff.

⁵ Hugh G. Grant.

⁶ The United States subsequently refused to recognize the puppet government established in Albania by Italy. As recently as April 1944 it had approved a decision by the Turkish Government to continue to withhold recognition. In telegram 249, April 12, 1944, 3 p. m., the Secretary of State informed the Consul General at Istanbul (Berry): "We can not see that any good purpose would be served by having in Turkey or elsewhere a representative of a puppet Albanian Government which is subservient to and collaborates with the Germans." (875.01/562)

forming any group of a representative character. Unfortunately there is a similar lack of unity among the patriots at home. Consequently there is at present no one to whom an invitation to any international conference might be sent without prejudging the future political institutions of the country.

This Government has nevertheless repeatedly demonstrated its interest in Albanian independence, and has sought to encourage Albanian unity and resistance. As recently as April 6 the Department issued a public statement, a copy of which is attached.⁷ There have also been recurrent conversations with the British and with the several Albanian leaders here who, together with similar groups in London and elsewhere, have made various attempts to form a provisional representative body, without, it must be said, much prospect of achieving any real unity.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

875.00/583: Telegram

The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 17, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:25 p. m.]

2060. From Murphy.⁸ General Wilson⁹ has commented to British Chiefs of Staff on Foreign Office proposal mentioned in my 1947 June 11, 2 p. m.¹⁰ that AFHQ¹¹ considers reconciliation between Zogists¹² and Partisans¹³ to be an essential prerequisite to the extension of any military aid to Zogists since without such a reconciliation the suggested support would merely encourage development of civil strife.

He adds that despite the obvious desirability of unifying elements within Albania it is considered doubtful that the Zogists and Partisans will agree to shelve political issues and join in resisting the enemy.

He describes main characteristics of Zogists as loyalist Albanian patriotism and antagonism to Communist Partisans whose strength

⁷ See Department of State *Bulletin*, April 8, 1944, p. 315.

⁸ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

⁹ Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

¹⁰ Not printed; it informed the Department of British proposals for stimulating the Zogist Party in Albania to undertake active resistance against the Germans (875.00/582).

¹¹ Allied Force Headquarters.

¹² Basi Canit, the group currently supporting King Zog, who was in Great Britain.

¹³ The Communist-led National Liberation Movement in Albania, the FNC (Fronti Nacional Clirimtare), or as it was commonly known outside Albania, the LNC (Levizia Nacional Clirimtare).

and organization is increasing rapidly and who already constitute an effective instrument for action against the enemy in the South where the enemy's main commitments are to be found.

Repeated as 88, to Cairo for MacVeagh.¹⁴ [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

875.01/6-2844 : Telegram

The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 28, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

2155. From Murphy. According to Broad¹⁵ at Bari the LNC Congress¹⁶ held at end of May in Albania, elected a provisional government on a pattern similar to Tito's administration.¹⁷ He reports that the new "provisional government" desires military recognition from the Allies, the exchange of military representatives and increase of military support. It also requests additional military missions from the United States and the Soviet Union and urges that the Allied missions now working with what it regards as discredited political parties should be withdrawn. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

875.01/7-1044 : Telegram

The Secretary of Mission at Algiers (Lawton) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 10, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received July 11—9:58 a. m.]

2346. From Murphy. Balkan Air Force¹⁸ reports that Albanian situation has deteriorated during past 24 [hours?]. Situation is résuméed as follows:

Kupi¹⁹ is willing to meet LNC representatives under Allied auspices and provided British Liaison Officers conduct negotiations. Kupi insists that he should be recognized by LNC as representative of

¹⁴ Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador to the Governments of Greece and Yugoslavia, established in Cairo.

¹⁵ Phillip Broad, British Vice Consul at Bari, and representative of the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

¹⁶ The Congress of the Albanian National Liberation Movement was held at Permeti, May 26-28, 1944.

¹⁷ The administration of Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), President of the National Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia, and military leader of the Partisan guerrilla forces in that country.

¹⁸ Allied headquarters under British command located in Bari, Italy, responsible for the planning and execution of all air, sea, land, and special operations on and across the Dalmatian coast.

¹⁹ Abas Kupa, leader of the Movement of Legality, the Albanian political movement pledged to the restoration of King Zog.

Movement of Legality. Liaison Officer reports that Kupa is showing sincere desire to compromise and avert civil war, but it is thought *force majeure* probably contributes to this belated repentance.

LNC commander first division reported as maintaining intransigent attitude determined to fight Kupa as a traitor. President of LNC²⁰ indicates that the first division cannot be stopped. He is consulting with his council and will probably take the line that LNC have waited too long for Kupa to fight and that the latter is now an obstacle to the progress of LNC to the north. Balkan Air Command states that Major Smith²¹ has been prevented by weather from taking letters to Kupa and LNC and from using such influence as he may have been able to exercise in bringing the parties together.²² Chances of reconciliation now appear slight.

British Liaison Officers on both sides are instructed to continue their efforts to bring about an understanding and prevent civil war from spreading. If Kupa and his forces are defeated by LNC, which seems possible, British Liaison Forces are instructed to endeavor to obtain best possible terms for future action against Germans. Embargo on supplies to LNC continues and this weapon will be used in an effort to persuade LNC to behave.²³

A late telegram received states that the Partisans have advanced further north with only slight fighting and no resistance elsewhere.

Repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh as AmEmBalk number 22. [Murphy.]

LAWTON

875.01/7-1544: Telegram

The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 15, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 6:37 p. m.]

2410. From Murphy. General Wilson has asked Balkan Air Force to pass to Hoxha a message of appreciation for his message men-

²⁰ Presumably, the reference here is to Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha, Commander of the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) and President of the Anti-Fascist Committee of National Liberation, the executive organ of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation with the attributes of a provisional government. Both the Council and the Committee were created by the convention of Albanian national liberation forces held at Permët (Permeti) in May 1944.

²¹ Presumably a British Liaison Officer in Albania.

²² Details of this *démarche* have not been found in the Department files. However, the Secretary of Mission at Algiers reported in telegram 2277, July 5, 7 p. m., that the Commander in Chief of the Balkan Air Forces was about to make an effort to arrange for representatives of the National Liberation Movement and Kupa to come to Bari for conversations (875.01/7-544).

²³ In telegram 2277, July 5, 7 p. m., Mr. Lawton reported that the British Liaison Officer at National Liberation Movement Headquarters had been instructed to warn the Partisans that if arms were used for civil war all supplies would be cancelled (875.01/7-544).

tioned my 2368 July 12.²⁴ SAC's²⁵ message states flatly, however, that Allied supplies sent Hoxha are for sole purpose [of] assisting his forces fight enemy and that supplies will cease if they are used against Hoxha's countrymen for political purpose. It also states SAC must hold Hoxha responsible personally for making efforts for agreement with KUPI enabling joint action against Germans. Hoxha is invited to send three representatives to Bari for discussions with Balkan Air Force (BAF) commander.

Meantime BAF relays report from British Liaison Officer with Hoxha that latter still unwilling compromise with KUPI whose present whereabouts unknown. Major Smith (my 2346, July 10) reports still en route to first Partisan division. Mati area north of Tirana entered by LNC Partisans but only isolated incidents of fighting between Zogists and LNC reported.

SAC also has cabled British Chiefs of Staff that Zogists will be supported with comparatively small scale supplies if reconciliation with LNC should establish common aim of resisting enemy, in view of political and unifying benefits even though worthwhile military results hardly could be expected.

Sent Department as no. 2410, repeated to AmEmBalk Cairo for MacVeagh as No. 24. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

875.01/7-1344 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1944—6 p. m.

391. For Murphy. The Department desires that the American representative should have constantly in mind the principle that at this stage military considerations are paramount.²⁶

We do not underrate either the political importance of decisions under which military aid would be apportioned to rival factions in Albania, or the use which could be made of such military support to influence the country's political future. We fully realize the aspirations of the LNC to obtain political recognition abroad, and we

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Supreme Allied Commander (Mediterranean Theater).

²⁶ This telegram is in reply to telegram 397, July 13, 9 p.m., from the U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, which informed the Department that Allied Force Headquarters had requested American support for British attempts to avert civil war in Albania. Specifically it requested that an American representative attend meetings with KUPI and representatives of the National Liberation Movement, if and when such representatives were brought to Bari. Mr. Murphy asked for Departmental guidance on this matter.

desire both the British and the Albanian representatives to understand our position as favoring a non-political agreement between Kupa and the LNC for common action against the Germans. We consider that Albania's cause in the eyes of the Allies will be helped by a union of all resistance groups for the liberation of their country.

Albanians generally have high regard for the United States and particular confidence in us because of our disinterested position. We want them to know that we favor the eventual formation of a provisional government in liberated Albania representing the desires of the people, without raising at this time the question of King Zog's status, and without indicating any special interest in the political ideas of any of the groups now active. We probably would agree in general with the line now proposed by the British, but should not give the support of American prestige in Albania to the British lead if it would appear to prejudice our position as set forth above.

In general we should show an active interest in meetings of this kind. If we expect to influence policy decisions which are being made in the field and thus give some implementation to our ideas on Balkan affairs we should be willing to do more than act as observers when important arrangements are being made.

HULL

875.01/8-1244: Telegram

*Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 12, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received 9:33 p. m.]

114. AFHQ has instructed Balkan Air Force that a polite but definite refusal is to be made to request of LNC for recognition as the *de facto* government of Albania (see my 68, August 3²⁷). The small LNC mission at Bari, purely military in character, is approved on understanding that there is no question setting up an LNC base in Italy.

MURPHY

²⁷ Not printed; in this telegram Mr. Murphy reported on the progress of discussions then taking place between three representatives of the Albanian National Liberation Committee and the Political Committee of the Balkan Air Force at Bari. The Albanian delegates had requested recognition of the National Liberation Committee as the *de facto* government of Albania until fighting had stopped and a plebiscite could be held. They also asked permission to establish a permanent military mission of two or three members in Italy. (875.01/8-344)

875.01/9-1644 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk,*²⁸ *Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 16, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 17—12:59 a.m.]

415. KUPI's forces have commenced minor actions against Germans but British contend they come too late, can never be militarily important and that giving KUPI supplies would only increase possibilities of civil war. The American representatives on BAF policy committee could only agree to denying support to KUPI on grounds that there was as yet no evidence of sincere resistance by KUPI.

It is British opinion that as we are entering a new phase, the prevention of civil war overrides policy of aiding anyone who will fight Germans. They do not believe that KUPI and LNC can ever get together and it is now doubtful if supplies will be sent to KUPI even if he really fights. Moreover the withdrawal of all BLOs²⁹ from KUPI is under consideration while support to LNC is thought necessary until Germans surrender.

In this transition phase it appears quite probable that policy of supporting only one faction in Albania will greatly influence the country's political future. Can we maintain our disinterested position as outlined in Department's 391, July 20 and still be a party to Allied decisions, based on preventing civil war by aiding only one side? The Department's views will be appreciated.

KIRK

875.01/9-1444 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944—9 p. m.

151. Representatives of the various Albanian groups and elements in the United States have expressed to the Department their very grave fears that withdrawal of German forces from Albania will be the signal for civil war between the LNC and the KUPI or nationalist forces in that country. The Department also has felt some anxiety in this regard, but has supposed that, in as much as the establishment and maintenance of order in that area is undoubtedly a matter of major preoccupation for the Allied Command in that theater, this

²⁸ Mr. Kirk succeeded Robert D. Murphy on September 5, 1944.

²⁹ British Liaison Officers.

contingency has been long foreseen and plans laid down to prevent extensive hostilities among the Albanians.

We should be interested in having, however, any information you or your representatives in Bari may be able to obtain with regard to the disposition of the Albanian forces to attack each other once the Germans are out of the war or the prospects of a truce or other *modus vivendi* being arrived at promptly upon German departure in order to avoid internal warfare. It has been suggested, for example, that this purpose might be served if at the time of German evacuation the American and British Governments were, through the Allied Commander or by other means, to call upon the rival factions to observe a "freezing" of territorial authority, each faction undertaking not to seek to extend its area of control by force of arms.

From your 391 September 14³⁰ we suppose the whole subject will be thoroughly reviewed by the BAF policy committee after the arrival of the BLOs from the Kupi camp. Please ask Norden³¹ for full reports on whatever political plans for Albania may then be discussed.

Sent to AmPolAd (Caserta); repeated to London and Cairo (AmEmBalk).

HULL

875.01/9-1944: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 19, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

7733. A Foreign Office official today made the following remarks about Albania:

Local conflicts already have taken place between LNC and Kupi, the former having infiltrated into the territory where Kupi has his forces. The latter has repeatedly asked the Allies for armaments to be used, as he said, against the Germans. However, it is not believed in Allied circles that these armaments would be used for this purpose, and that they would be turned on the LNC. Kupi, who has never been positively accused of collaboration with the Germans, now has attracted to his following certain other Albanian nationalist elements, including some of the German puppets.

The LNC is, of course, very Left in its tendencies and bears certain resemblances to the Greek EAM.³² There are a number of moderate

³⁰ Not printed; this telegram informed the Department that the Balkan Air Force had ordered two of the British Liaison Officers with Kupi to report to Bari for discussions (875.01/9-1444).

³¹ Carl F. Norden, Foreign Service Officer in the office of the U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

³² National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon), Communist-controlled resistance organization in Greece.

Socialists included in the LNC, but they do not guide its policies. The leader, Colonel General Hoxha, is pretty far to the Left. Kupa has only about 2000 armed followers, whereas the LNC has many times that number and in an actual fight the latter would undoubtedly eliminate Kupa.

Insofar as King Zog is concerned, Kupa represents his interests. The only other Zogist elements are apparently certain tribal groups in the north. Strangely enough, according to the Foreign Office official, while Zog's prestige has been on the decline in Albania, it has increased considerably in Albanian circles outside the country.

The possible future, said the Foreign Office official, for a liberated Albania is that the LNC will take over the country. However should it not modify its extreme Leftist tendencies, it probably would not be able to maintain itself in power for very long, as it is believed that there is scarcely any Communist feeling in Albania. If the LNC should remain far to the Left there will probably be some sort of civil war and Zog might be able to stage a comeback. Whatever one may say or feel about Zog, said the Foreign Office, he probably is the only man with the necessary qualities of leadership who has emerged from the tangled political scene in Albania and at the same time he is the leader of a powerful tribe and a man of the people.

WINANT

875.01/9-2844 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 28, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 4:07 p. m.]

575. Reference my 451, September 19.³³ BAF Policy Committee is being asked to consider desirability of extending aid to LNC beyond time of German withdrawal from Albania on grounds its political opponents will inherit surplus German arms. This is frankly recognized as direct intervention in Albania's internal affairs and seems unnecessary since most Allied sources in Bari now believe that civil war can be avoided except possibly in a few areas in north-east and Kossovo. As reported in our No. 572, September 28,³⁴ the recent disunity and distintegration among Nationalist elements and desertions to LNC make it unlikely that German arms could be used effectively even if left behind in anti-LNC hands. Moreover, it is assumed some Allied occupational troops will arrive in time.

³³ Telegram not printed.

³⁴ Not printed.

In addition, LNC has lately given indication of a softening attitude towards its political opponents, KUPI excluded.

The Department's comments would be appreciated as soon as possible.

KIRK

875.01/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1944—10 p. m.

213. Reurtel 575 September 28. It is the Department's view that Allied aid in the form of military supplies should not be extended to FNC beyond the time of German withdrawal from Albania. Since any arms so supplied would presumably be used for fighting among Albanians themselves, their provision not only would constitute intervention in Albanian affairs but might very well result in increased bloodshed in that country. American policy, based on the primacy of military considerations, looks with favor upon the supplying of arms to elements or groups actively engaged in fighting the Germans, but we can discover no justification for supplying arms to be used in internal war between political factions.

We cannot accept without some reservation the assumption that FNC will "sweep the country" nor are we wholly convinced that FNC will be found acceptable to the Albanian people as a whole. We believe, therefore, that a policy of assisting that group to impose its authority over the country could only be construed as contravening the principle that the Albanian people have the right to choose their own form of government.

The Department has received no information which would warrant revision of the view that KUPI and the nationalists, apart from the question of the charges made against them of collaboration with the Germans, have thus far failed to qualify for Allied military assistance because of their inactivity vis-à-vis the common enemy (Reurtel 415, September 16).

Once the Germans have been eliminated as an active factor in Albanian affairs, we hope that civil war can be prevented and that order can be restored under conditions which will make possible the early formation of a broadly representative provisional government conforming to the will of the Albanian people.

Sent to AmPolAd (Caserta), repeated to London.

HULL

875.01/10-844 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, October 8, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 4:12 p. m.]

674. British representatives Bari have just received from Foreign Office restatement of policy towards Albania. New directive is based on belief that LNC will now be able to impose its authority in Albania and to throw obstacles in its path would further push it into Soviet orbit. Development of block of states to include Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania with governments sympathetic only to Russia was considered contrary to British interests.

Foreign Office therefore proposed first, to withdraw support including all BLOs from [A]bas Kupa and those Nationalists who have recently joined him and second, to invite Hoxha to confer with General Wilson in Italy. Attempt will then be made to persuade Hoxha to mollify his attitude towards other elements in Albania and to broaden base of his organization as alternative to coalition. It was recognized that this would mean closing door to Zog who is utterly unacceptable to LNC. In offering LNC chance to establish itself with British sympathy, possibility was not overlooked that LNC might alienate large sections of population by its amateurish and direct action methods and so fail to form acceptable government. For this contingency Zog was to be kept in reserve.

However, concurrent with this decision number of unfortunate incidents have occurred between British and Partisans: (1) Hoxha was furious at not being informed in advance of recent British landings in southern Albania;³⁵ (2) British have fallen far behind supply commitment made at Bari conferences in August and are now being accused of using every means of avoiding this commitment; (3) Fifth Partisan Brigade in north arrested and maltreated BLO with Gani Kryeziu³⁶ and Hoxha was forced into apology; (4) Greek Minister of Press has recently claimed northern Epirus over Cairo radio and Zervas forces³⁷ have crossed border in raids. Hoxha has threatened retaliation and will have to be restrained. OSS³⁸ representative with Hoxha reports that anti-British sentiment is becoming more intensive every day.

KIRK

³⁵ British Land Forces, Adriatic, made landings on the Albanian coast on October 5, 1944.

³⁶ Gani Kreysiu, Albanian Nationalist leader opposed to Hoxha.

³⁷ The E.D.E.S. (Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos) or Greek Democratic National League, a rightist guerrilla force led by Gen. Napoleon Zervas.

³⁸ Office of Strategic Services.

768.7515/10-2344 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, October 23, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received October 24—8:23 a. m.]

921. OSS reports that Hoxha has expressed himself as favoring southern Albanian boundary set at Conference of London in 1913.³⁹ He takes position that Greeks in Albania should return to Greece and sees no justification for and would oppose a plebiscite in southern Albania which he contends is definitely Albanian. Hoxha further states that Albanians will fight for this territory if necessary. On other hand, Hoxha considers Kossovo⁴⁰ problem can be settled only by plebiscite.

KIRK

875.01/11-344

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As the Department of State will be aware, Enver Hoxha made a declaration on October 20th in Berat that the first "Albanian Democratic Government" had now been formed, and that the Governments of the U.S.S.R., United States and Great Britain, "and all those in the anti-Fascist League", would be asked to give full recognition.⁴¹ In the present confused situation in Albania His Majesty's Government do not propose to recognise the Provisional Government which has been set up by the F.N.C., and in informing the Department of State of His Majesty's Government's view, the British Embassy has been instructed to express the hope that the United States Government will concur.

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1944.

³⁹ The Conference of London, by the treaty of May 30, 1913, left the boundaries of Albania for settlement by the European powers. These were actually described by decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors in London on May 22 and August 11, 1913. The delimitation of the southern Albanian boundary was completed on the scene in December 1913. For text of the Treaty of London, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cvii, p. 656.

⁴⁰ Area in southwest Yugoslavia, the present-day autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohija.

⁴¹ On October 26, the pro-Axis government of Ibrahim Bicaku resigned, its members fleeing to the hills. The National Liberation Council was at the time meeting in Berat and on October 22 formed a provisional government for Albania with Colonel General Hoxha as Prime Minister. (875.01/11-1344)

800.48/11-644 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 6, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received November 7—3:58 a. m.]

1174. SACMED^{41a} has recently decided that Allied operations in Albania be confined to introduction of relief and no occupational troops are contemplated. The situation now resembles that described in Department's document H 112⁴² section 2 B except it is probable there will exist no effective armed resistance from rival organizations. The question of some form of recognition of FNC as the provisional government is sure to arise if present plans to invite Hoxha to send delegates to Italy to discuss future relief matters materialize. The British are already considering this locally without reference to what may have been decided recently in Moscow regarding future of Albania.⁴³

The problem of how to distribute relief supplies in the absence of any Allied occupational troops has two alternative solutions: 1. Recognition of FNC as the provisional government and negotiation of a relief understanding with Hoxha along lines of proposed Yugoslav agreement.⁴⁴ This might mean a substantial delay in the actual delivery of relief supplies which are now urgently needed; 2. Postponement of recognition question as well as of an overall relief agreement with Hoxha while introducing immediate relief on an *ad hoc* basis under very simple agreements with local groups on lines similar to the CCS⁴⁵ directive Fan⁴⁶ 428 outlined in Department's 202 of October 2, 6 p. m.,⁴⁷ and my airmail despatch No. 823 of October 14.⁴⁸ In view of the complications inherent in 1, which the British now apparently favor, I believe we should proceed in accordance with original directive. General Sadler⁴⁹ concurs.

^{41a} Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ Reference is probably to the meetings of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden with Premier Stalin in Moscow during October 1944. See vol. iv, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Discussions relating to policies and problems . . ."

⁴⁴ Discussions were currently taking place at Bari between British military authorities and representatives of the Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation over the question of civilian relief for Yugoslavia. The draft agreement was drawn up on November 23.

⁴⁵ Combined Chiefs of Staff.

⁴⁶ Military communications indicator.

⁴⁷ Not printed; this telegram explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had informed the Supreme Allied Commander that since no group was recognized by the Allies as a government of Albania, he was authorized to deal with such local groups as he found in control. Though authorized to carry on discussions with these groups, he was cautioned to make no firm commitments on relief. (800.48/9-2344)

⁴⁸ Not found in Department files.

⁴⁹ Brig. Gen. Percy L. Sadler, Deputy Commander for Combined Operations with the British for Relief and Rehabilitation in the Balkan countries.

I would appreciate having the Department's comments as soon as possible.

KIRK

875.01/11-644 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, November 6, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received November 7—3:45 a. m.]

1175. Lieutenant Colonel McLean,⁵⁰ Senior BLO with Kupi, has arrived in Bari under SACMED's orders and has strongly recommended to Eden⁵¹ that Kupi be evacuated to Italy on grounds that British prestige, particularly among pro-British elements in FNC, would suffer should they abandon to his sworn enemies a man who has served the Allied cause since 1940 and with whom they have maintained a British mission for the last 14 months.⁵² Kupi's sole alternative is to retire into the mountains where he might become a core of resistance to FNC thereby prolonging internal strife. Meanwhile British have evacuated Said Kryesiu who was also in danger and may have to save his brother Gani at some future date. According to McLean these men, unlike other Nationalist leaders, are relatively untainted by collaboration, are feared by FNC as potential rivals, and are therefore prime objectives for elimination. Their evacuation to Italy will in effect leave virtually all Albania to the FNC after the German withdrawal as Nationalist forces are rapidly disintegrating and leaders are more concerned over their own safety.

KIRK

875.01/11-144 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1944—4 p. m.

346. The Department hopes that you will continue to keep it informed regarding developments in Albania. We should like particularly to have any details that may come to your attention regarding the circumstances surrounding the resignation of the Tirana Government and the extent to which FNC has established its authority over the country.

STETTINIUS

⁵⁰ Lieutenant Colonel MacLean, senior British Liaison Officer in Albania and commander of the British military mission to Abas Kupi.

⁵¹ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵² Before the British could arrange for his evacuation, Kupi escaped unaided to Italy.

875.01/11-644 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1944—9 p. m.

365. The Department would be interested in receiving any information that you or members of your staff in Bari may have or be able to obtain regarding the prospects for the maintenance of stability on the Greek-Albanian frontier as the Germans leave and full control passes into the hands of the native authorities. As you may be aware, the Greek Government not only has brought forward claims to extensive territories in Southern Albania (Northern Epirus), but has sought to have Albania declared an "enemy state" and indicated its desire to send Greek troops of occupation into the disputed area.

The United States Government has on several occasions made public in clear terms its view that boundary disputes should not be decided until the general settlement. The British Government has stated that it regards Albania's boundaries as a matter that should be left for settlement by the peace conference. While we believe that the Greek claim to Southern Albania should be given a hearing at that time, it is our view that the pre-war frontier must be considered as being the legal boundary in the meantime. Meanwhile, the disputant states and their nationals should be restrained from taking measures which violate that boundary or which would tend to prejudice a settlement of the frontier dispute on its merits at a later date. For these reasons, we feel it important that both the Greek and Albanian armed forces should be prevented from crossing the frontier and that attempts on either side to drive out or to exterminate the minority belonging to the other language or nationality group should not be permitted. We are sure that the military authorities have this problem very much in mind, but would be grateful for any information which you may be able to provide on this subject. Your recent telegrams on Albania, such as your 1175 November 6, have been very helpful.

STETTINIUS

875.01/11-1344 : Airgram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, November 13, 1944.

[Received November 20—6 p. m.]

A-50. Reference is made to the Department's telegram 346 of November 8 [6], 4 p. m., 1944. Mr. Frederick T. Merrill, representative of this office at Bari, Italy, has reported under date of November

10, 1944 a conversation with Abas Kupa and details of the collapse of opposition to the FNC in Albania, as follows:

Last spring the British foresaw that the rise of the FNC might well upset the political balance in Albania and bring to power a group more friendly to Russia than to England. British liaison officers had been active ever since the German occupation last fall in all parts of the country, but aid in the form of gold or promises of support were mostly given to the so-called nationalist leaders, who in the past had been the tribal chiefs, politicians and rulers of the country. The policy of aiding any groups who fought Germans was gradually applied (perhaps unwillingly at first) to FNC's Army of National Liberation, culminating in an agreement for coordinating action against the Germans and delivering military supplies, which was signed in Bari, Italy, in August, 1944.*

However, in order to counteract the growing political strength of the FNC movement, the Foreign Office evidently decided last April to try to create a Nationalist bloc around Major Abas Kupa, with whom they had been dealing since 1940 and who, at that time, was free of any taint of collaboration with the Germans. Such a bloc would, after successfully fighting the enemy and enjoying British support, draw off the moderates from the FNC and emerge as the future government of Albania.

Unfortunately for British policy, they underestimated the appeal and effectiveness of the FNC organization and overestimated Kupa's strength. Those they hoped would rally around Kupa or join his Movement of Legality could not resist German gold and promises of arms, nor could any of the nationalists either evolve a constructive program to attract the peasant or submerge their individual ambitions. There was nothing to hold them together but British support—and there was very little real evidence of that.

The tendencies of the nationalist groups to collaborate with the Germans, their lack of cohesion, their unwillingness to fight with only promises of British support, destroyed whatever small hope there was in forming a bloc, and the attack of the LNC First Division on Kupa just as he was about to attack the Germans on his own, pointed up the danger of a civil war if Kupa should then be given military supplies.

After several months of vacillation, during which time the British kept their officers with Kupa, thereby infuriating the FNC, who were by now accusing him of open collaboration with the Germans, directives were issued from London to withdraw all support from Kupa.

*In fact not until September did Radio Bari begin to give a hand to the Partisans and only after the head of the Albanian section of P[er]s[onal] W[arfare] B[oard] and a sinister character named Gyokova, who seems to have Fascist connections in the past, were removed. [Footnote in the original.]

Subsequently, the entire mission was withdrawn, as well as the officers with Gani Kreysiu, an Albanian chief in the north, who even the FNC admits has been fighting against the Germans. This has brought about the collapse of all opposition or potential opposition to the FNC, since any such opposition depended on either German (now withdrawing) or British support. Kupa and Said Kreysiu are now political refugees in Italy. Attempts are also being made to evacuate Gani. The Ballists,⁵⁴ who have as a group been collaborating, are fleeing with the Germans and will be killed if caught. Several have been able to go over to the FNC. The only resistance remaining is in the Catholic district in northwestern Albania around Scutari, but it is not thought that they will fight it out with the FNC once it has dominated the rest of Albania.

In a conversation I had with Abas Kupa yesterday, he freely admitted that there is now no possibility of forming any opposition to the FNC as a political power unless there is intervention by the Allies to disarm the ANLA⁵⁵ and to control the *gendarmerie*. He firmly believes that the FNC is completely dominated by Communists and is taking orders from Moscow while getting inspiration from Tito. He recognizes the validity of the argument that arms be given to those who will kill Germans, but he believes that the Partisans have assiduously avoided the Germans when there was any real risk and that their contribution has been minor. He therefore feels it was shortsighted to put arms in the hands of those who will now use them to liquidate all those in Albania who look West not East. He would prefer to see a sphere of influence set up in the Balkans since he feels that then only would the British be able to set him and his kind back in power. He believes his former followers and the peasants in the section of Albania he controlled will not accept the authority of the FNC—or, as he put it, “Anybody who has guns”.

The important conclusion to be drawn from talking to Kupa and to those BLOs who have attempted to create the nationalist bloc and failed is merely that it is now an inescapable fact that:

1. The FNC are now dominant in over half of Albania and soon will dominate it all.

2. This will be accomplished by ruthless force or threat of force and the elimination of its political opponents. And mostly because the majority of people now know that the organization has the backing of both the Soviets and lately the British.

3. That the government will be controlled by Communists and will follow the Tito line for the south Balkans.

⁵⁴ Members of the Balli Kombetar, Albanian Nationalist organization with a Western orientation.

⁵⁵ Albanian National Liberation Army.

4. That there is nothing left for the British to do but recognize this government and pretend to like it.

KIRK

875.01/11-344

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the memorandum of November 3, 1944, in which the British Embassy referred to the declaration made on October 20 by Mr. Enver Hoxha to the effect that Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States would be requested to recognize the "Albanian Democratic Government" recently formed at Berat and stated that the British Government does not propose, in the present confused situation in Albania, to grant such a request for recognition.

The Department of State concurs in the view of the British Government that any request for recognition of the provisional government formed at Berat which may be received at this time should not be granted. The Department feels, however, that there may be a stage in the not distant future in which it may be found expedient to consider the desirability on practical grounds of establishing with such governing authority as may be in *de facto* control of the country such relations as would enable this Government to open an office in Tirana for the purpose of protecting American interests there and coordinating the activities of the representatives of other American agencies who may be sent to Albania. The Department will be disposed to give sympathetic consideration to a request for *de jure* recognition by an Albanian Government only at such time as it may be able to demonstrate that it is non-Fascist in character, that it has established its authority over the country, that it represents the will of the people and is prepared to fulfil its international obligations.

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1944.

875.01/11-2444 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 24, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 10:07 p. m.]

1488. We are informed that following liberation of Tirana by Partisans, FNC controls about four-fifths of the country and it is probable

that active partisan resistance will decrease against Nazis. In southern Albania ANLA brigades are being formed into units for work of reconstruction. We understand also that as soon as Partisan resistance groups have become organized into military formations their functions tend to become political rather than military and they are no longer primarily concerned with fighting the Nazis. Real strength of FNC still lies in Army of National Liberation. From recent reports, it would appear that FNC has been adopting obstructive attitude towards Allied Missions in Albania. Restrictions are being placed on the movements of members of these missions and they are not permitted to contact civilian or any source of information other than Partisan headquarters.

Conditions in Valona area are reported to be very satisfactory. In Korçë area difficulties are arising between Partisans and Albanian civilians as latter do not seem willing to perform reconstruction work without pay and Partisans as yet are not sufficiently well organized to enforce orders. Many rumors are current in Albania regarding Soviet deliveries of relief to Yugoslavia and the possibilities of early similar deliveries to Albania.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as 138.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Albania)/11-2544

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1944.

The Department is assembling at Bari a few subordinate officers for handling Albanian affairs, with the intention of constituting a small mission to Albania upon the liberation of that country. The trend of military and political events in Southeastern Europe indicates that the organization of this mission should be completed at an early date.

We should like to appoint, as the head of this mission, Mr. Joseph E. Jacobs, a Foreign Service Officer of Class I, who has been Counselor of Legation at Cairo for some four years.

Since this group will be in effect the equivalent of a combined diplomatic and consular establishment, pending the resumption of regular diplomatic relations, we suggest that Mr. Jacobs have the personal rank of Minister.

If you approve,⁵⁶ the Department will proceed with the necessary

⁵⁶ The President subsequently approved of this suggestion and Mr. Jacobs was detailed to the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, effective on January 1, 1945. In a memorandum of December 19, 1944, the Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs, Cavendish W. Cannon, explained that this procedure was adopted "in order that the Department may avoid giving grounds at this time for conjecture by interested parties regarding the intentions of this Government in organizing such missions". (740.00119 Control (Albania)/12-1944)

arrangements for Mr. Jacobs' appointment, in order that he may proceed promptly to Bari, where Albanian questions of some importance are already requiring attention.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

875.48/12-544 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, December 5, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 10:58 p. m.]

1607. Uncooperative attitude of FNC in Albania to Allied missions and their unwillingness to solicit Allied relief is due in opinion of JIC⁵⁷ AFHQ to (1) desire to obtain recognition from Allies as sole governmental authority in Albania; (2) fear of economic exploitation by foreigners as formerly by Italians; (3) national pride causing reluctance to admit shortages and weakness to Allies and (4) inherent suspicion of Allied intentions in Balkans especially in support of Greek Irredentism.

KIRK

875.01/12-644

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1944.

Participants: Mr. Cimon P. Diamantopoulos, Greek Ambassador
Mr. Alling⁵⁸
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to discuss current matters. He read a telegram from his Government expressing its vigorous opposition to the formation of a Government in Albania by Hoxha (the Ambassador said this name was really Hodja, i.e. "teacher", and referred to him as a Moslem Turk). The telegram continued with allegations that the Hoxha forces in Albania were terrorizing and oppressing the Greek minority in southern Albania.

The Ambassador did not seem certain as to the intention of his Government, particularly as to whether it was instructing him to ask us to prevent the formation of a Hoxha Government or not to recog-

⁵⁷ Joint Intelligence Committee.

⁵⁸ Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

nize any such Government which might be formed. He is seeking clarification on this point.

In reply to his request for our views as to the second part of the message, it was suggested that if the Greek Government sought practical results it might well ask the British military authorities who were responsible for the Albanian theater to investigate these charges of terrorization and oppression.

FOY D. KOHLER

875.01/12-2044 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, December 20, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 20—9:37 p. m.]

1848. The FNC last October requested permission through the OSS representative to send a representative of the Albanian National Liberation Army to the United States. This was referred to Washington by OSS for action, but no reply has been given to Hoxha. The Minister of Finance⁵⁹ in the new Government has also requested permission to send a representative to the United States to discuss possibilities of having money printed. Since the FNC is pressing the OSS representative for an answer, would the Department suggest the nature of the reply which OSS may make to Hoxha in the premises.

KIRK

875.01/12-2444 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, December 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 7:08 p. m.]

1897. Lt. Col. Palmer,⁶⁰ who returned to Albania some days ago, was given following directive by commander of force 399,⁶¹ text of which according to BAF message to this HQS had been approved by British Resident Minister's representative here. Palmer was ordered to return to Hoxha's HQS and in his talk with latter to indi-

⁵⁹ Lt. Col. Ramadan Citaku.

⁶⁰ Lt. Col. C. A. Palmer, British Liaison Officer in Albania and Chief of the British Military Mission to the Army of National Liberation.

⁶¹ The support unit and planning staff for the various British military missions in the Balkans. Based in Bari, Italy, it acted as a rear link between these units and Balkan Air Force which was responsible for all British operations in the Balkans.

cate to him informally that question of granting recognition to Hoxha's administration would depend to great extent on his ability to prove he was in effective control of country and that he intended to administer country in just and fair manner. Hoxha was further to be told that importance would be attached to it being made plain to world opinion that Hoxha in fact had support of Albanian people as whole. Palmer was told to stress that events such as unsatisfactory treatment of Allied liaison officers, lack of cooperation in certain military operations and mistreatments of German prisoners would be borne in mind by British in giving consideration to recognition. Palmer was also instructed to say that widening of political basis of FNC, representative of country as whole, would be well viewed and he was told to indicate that inclusion of such a man as Gani Kryseiu and others who have taken active steps to drive out Germans would go far towards convincing Allies that FNC is truly representative of Albanian people. Palmer was to inform Hoxha that with liberation in Albania it would be necessary for British to stop sending in military supplies as of December 31 and he was to make clear that once Germans had withdrawn from country the various British operational missions would be withdrawn. In case Hoxha requested support for FNC formations in Yugoslavia supporting Partisans against Germans, Palmer was to inform him that this was a question which had to be decided between Tito and himself and that he, Palmer, was not authorized to provide any supplies outside 1939 Albanian boundaries.

SAM [*Same?*] message from BAF quoted directive to Palmer on relief for Albania and stated he was authorized to inform Hoxha that relief would be introduced to Albania by HQS ML⁶² Albania but that Hoxha's agreement would have to be obtained for introduction of supplies so he might instruct his representative in Durazzo accordingly. While Palmer was not to negotiate in this matter he was to tell Hoxha of this proposal and ask him to instruct local authority to make necessary arrangements and draw up any agreement which might be necessary. Palmer was, however, authorized to explain extent of proposed relief and basic conditions attached thereto while avoiding definite promises. Immediately on receipt of foregoing December 16 we took this up with Deputy Chief of Staff⁶³ and Office of British Resident Minister pointing out that we did not think it desirable to tie political and relief negotiations together and that it would be unfortunate to have Palmer carry out such discussions simultaneously. After protracted discussion of matter, Deputy Chief of Staff directed that immediate telegram be sent Palmer telling him

⁶² Military Liaison (Albania), British military relief organization for Albania.

⁶³ Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, U.S. Army.

under no circumstances to discuss political and relief matters with Hoxha simultaneously and further message was sent Balkan Air Force stating it should not involve itself in any way with relief negotiations in Albania.

We are now informed that on December 20 Palmer spoke with Hoxha and outlined relief plan stressing that ML could not make approach to him as a governing organization for whole of Albania and could only deal with him insofar as he is found to be in control of various localities. Hoxha remained noncommittal during Palmer's entire representation taking copious notes. Later Hoxha remarked that it would be far more satisfactory to deal with him direct than sign agreements with his underlings who look to him for guidance. He agreed entirely with principle of equitable distribution but felt that he and his organization could be best judges as to which areas needed relief most and as to priority of same. He could not see need for observers and felt that a few men attached to his HQS would accomplish same purpose. He pounced on statement that ML Albania was anxious to help Albanians to help themselves and stated that if ML put supplies into Durazzo he and his organization were quite capable of handling from there with just a few people from ML at this HQS. He stressed that this would release about 1200 people to fight war somewhere else. He does not object to financial conditions of agreement and seemed impressed with proposed amount of 8 to 10 thousand tons of supplies per month.

Palmer observes that Hoxha is afraid of another [apparent garble] and that landing of large force as envisaged by ML plan would be disastrous and invitation to attack. He feels that if he could go back with some concession in form of cutting down number of troops, at least in initial stage, he would be able to convince Hoxha to accept. He feels it is essential to have relief supplies on first ship to convince Hoxha of our sincerity. Palmer believes Hoxha to be in rigid control of whole country.

From Broad we hear that Palmer reports that Hoxha seemed greatly interested in securing early recognition.

KIRK

868.00/12-2944 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 29, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 30—2:25 p. m.]

1968. We are reliably informed that Lieutenant Colonel Palmer was instructed recently that British would regard despatch of Al-

banian forces to Greece as a hostile duty and that it would remove any chance of recognition by H.M. Government. To OSS Hoxha has categorically denied that his troops are in Chameria or across the southern border in any place and said he would not get mixed up in Greek business. December 26 issue of *Bashmimi* FNC newspaper made a front page denial of BBC reports of such movements signed by Major General Shehu.⁶⁴ Hoxha did not react too badly over plans for a British military mission which calls for a brigadier, Colonel Palmer as second and political head, an additional political adviser, an economist, a financial adviser, two intelligence officers and three roving liaison officers. Foreign Office approval is still pending. Hoxha is still stalling on OSS mission apparently awaiting a reply to his request to send military and financial representatives to Washington. OSS Bari is recommending that the mission in any case proceed January 5.

KIRK

875.01/12-2044 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1945.

41. Reurtel 1848 December 20. Officials of OSS have discussed with the Department the desire of FNC to send military and financial representatives to the United States. They indicated that OSS operations in Albania would be facilitated if FNC were given a reply, even though unfavorable, to their request to send such representatives to this country. The Department is informing OSS that its position in this matter is as follows:

Although we have constantly maintained a friendly attitude toward Albania, which we have looked upon as victim of aggression whose independence is to be restored, the absence of official relations with that country makes it difficult for us to receive or to consider favorably a request for the sending of Albanian military and financial representatives to the United States.

We see no need for an Albanian military representative to come to the United States. It is assumed that, in any case, the reasons for the FNC's desire to send such a representative have now been removed by the elimination of German forces from Albania. We will accordingly take no action in this regard unless the matter is raised by our military authorities. Likewise in the case of a financial representative, we are not in a position to look favorably on the Albanian request at the present time. Even if we were convinced of the economic feasibility of the FNC currency program, political

⁶⁴ Maj. Gen. Mehmet Shehu, Chief of Staff of the Albanian National Liberation Army.

considerations would not permit us to proceed with such a project until the status of governmental authority in Albania has been clarified and agreement has been reached among the major Allied powers regarding procedures to be observed in dealing with Albanian matters.

While it is not intended that you or members of your staff at Bari should seek formally to convey the foregoing to Albanian representatives, it is transmitted for your information and such use as may be deemed appropriate.

GREW

BELGIUM

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BELGIUM RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION IN BELGIAN TERRITORY LIBERATED BY AN ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

*Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and Belgium,
Signed May 16, 1944*¹

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BELGIUM RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION IN BELGIAN TERRITORY LIBERATED BY AN ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The discussions which have taken place between the representatives of the United States of America and Belgium concerning the arrangements to be made for civil administration and jurisdiction in Belgian territory liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force under an Allied Commander in Chief have led to agreement upon the following broad conclusions.

The agreed arrangements set out below are intended to be essentially temporary and practical and are designed to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Commander in Chief and to further our common purpose, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Belgium and the final victory of the Allies over Germany.

1. In areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a first or military phase during which the Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Force on land must *de facto* exercise supreme responsibility and authority to the full extent necessitated by the military situation.

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief the military situation permits the resumption by the Belgian Government of responsibility for the civil administration, he will notify the appropriate representative of the Belgian Government accordingly. The Belgian Government will thereupon, and to that extent, resume such exercise of responsibility, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied forces, such as ports, lines of communication and airfields, and without prejudice to the enjoyment by the Allied forces of such other

¹ Original in the Treaty Division, Office of the Legal Adviser.

facilities as may be necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

3. *a.* During the first phase the Commander in Chief will make the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance which will be tendered to him through Belgian liaison officers, attached to his staff for civil affairs and included in the personnel of a Belgian Military Mission to be appointed by the Belgian Government. He will also make the fullest possible use of loyal Belgian local authorities.

b. The Belgian liaison officers referred to in subparagraph *a* above will, so far as possible, be employed as intermediaries between the Allied Military authorities and the Belgian local authorities.

4. During the first phase the Belgian Government will promulgate or pass such legislation as in their opinion may be required after consultation with the Commander in Chief.

5. *a.* In order to facilitate the administration of the territory during the first phase the Belgian Government will reorganize or reestablish the Belgian administrative and judicial services, through whose cooperation the Commander in Chief can discharge his supreme responsibility. For this purpose the instructions of the Belgian Government will be communicated through the appropriate members of the Belgian Military Mission referred to in subparagraph 3 *a* above or the Auditeur Général, Haut Commissaire a la Sécurité de l'État, as the case may be. However, the appropriate members of the Belgian Military Mission are authorized to act on the spot in the event the normal procedure, as prescribed in the preceding sentence, is impracticable or impossible.

b. The appointment of the Belgian administrative and judicial services will be effected by the competent Belgian authorities in accordance with Belgian law. If during the first phase conditions should necessitate appointments in the Belgian administrative or judicial services, such appointments will be made after consultation with the Commander in Chief, who may request the Belgian authorities to make appointments when he considers it necessary.

6. *a.* Members of the Belgian armed forces serving in Belgian units with the Allied Expeditionary Force in Belgian territory will come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Belgian courts. Other Belgians who, at the time of entering Belgium as members of the Allied Expeditionary Force, are serving in conditions which render them subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, will not be regarded as members of the Belgian armed forces for this purpose.

b. Persons who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Belgian authorities in the absence of Belgian authorities may be arrested by the Allied Military Police and detained by them until they can be handed over to competent Belgian authorities.

7. In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Belgian Government will make the necessary arrangements for insuring the speedy trial in the vicinity by Belgian courts of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offenses against the persons, property, or security of the Allied forces or against such proclamations of the Commander in Chief as fall within the limits of the jurisdiction which, during the "État de Siège" can be exercised by Belgian military authorities, without prejudice however to the power of the Commander in Chief, if military necessity requires, to bring to trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offense of this nature.

8. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 15, Allied service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied forces respectively and over all persons of non-Belgian nationality not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces and are subject to Allied naval, military, or air force law. The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen of non-Belgian nationality as are not subject to Allied service law will require special consideration and should form the subject of a separate agreement.

9. Persons thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied service courts and authorities may, however, be arrested by the Belgian police for offenses against Belgian law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied service authority. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent, that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in paragraph 8, shall be conclusive. The procedure for handing over such persons is a matter for local arrangement.

10. The Allied Commander in Chief and the Belgian authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or Belgian jurisdiction.

11. There shall be established by the respective Allies claims commissions to examine and dispose of claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred by Belgian civilians against the Allied forces exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.

12. Members of the Allied forces and organizations and persons employed by or accompanying those forces, and all property belonging to them or to the Allied Governments, shall be exempt from all Belgian taxation (including customs) except as may be subsequently agreed between the Allied and Belgian Governments. The Allied authorities will take the necessary steps to insure that such property

is not sold to the public in Belgium except in agreement with the Belgian Government.

13. The Commander in Chief shall have power to requisition civilian labor, billets and supplies and make use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of his command. Requisitions will be effected where possible through Belgian authorities and in accordance with Belgian law. For this purpose the fullest use will be made of Belgian liaison officers attached to the Staff of the Commander in Chief.

14. The immunity from Belgian jurisdiction and taxation resulting from paragraphs 8 and 12 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments present in Belgium on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Expeditionary Force as may from time to time be notified by the Commander in Chief to the competent Belgian authority.

15. Should circumstances in future be such as to require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-Belgian members of the Allied forces present in Belgium, the Allied Governments concerned and the Belgian Government will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.

16. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of Belgian territory by an Allied Expeditionary Force (in particular questions relating to finance, currency, the ultimate disposition of booty, the custody of enemy property, and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first phase) which are not dealt with in this agreement shall be regarded as remaining open and shall be dealt with by further agreement as may be required.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed in duplicate as of this 16th day of May, 1944, on behalf of the parties hereto under the respective authorizations hereinafter set forth.

Pursuant to the decision of the Belgian Council of Ministers of May 9th, 1944, I hereby execute this instrument on behalf of the Kingdom of Belgium.

HUBERT PIERLOT
*Prime Minister and Minister for
National Defence*

Pursuant to instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I hereby execute this instrument on behalf of the United States of America.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army

BULGARIA

NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO SIGNING OF ARMISTICE WITH BULGARIA AT MOSCOW, OCTOBER 28, 1944

740.00119 European War 1939/2125 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1944—8 p. m.

274. Personal for the Ambassador. The following information has just been received by the Department from another agency of the Government:¹

The Bulgarian Minister to Turkey,² following a conference which he had with the Bulgarian regents,³ Prime Minister,⁴ and chief leaders of the opposition, has requested through an American agent⁵ that talks be initiated with the United States Government with a view to Bulgaria joining the United Nations. It was suggested for this purpose that a Bulgarian mission be sent to Istanbul to outline the conditions under which the Bulgarian Army would join the Allies as a combatant force. The competent authorities of the United States Government are at present examining this information and as yet have formed no view of the matter.

You are authorized to communicate the foregoing information to the Soviet Government in accordance with the understandings reached at the Moscow Conference.⁶ The British Government is also being informed.

The Department leaves to your discretion whether the following additional details should be communicated to the Soviet Government:

In the conversations with the American agent the Bulgarian representative expressed the hope that the United States would be prepared to give some form of guarantee that it did not intend to end the national existence of Bulgaria and also requested that air raids be stopped for 10 days in order to permit the Bulgarian mission to reach Istanbul.

¹ Office of Strategic Services, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director.

² Nikola Balabanov.

³ Prince Regent Cyril, brother of the late King Boris III; Lt. Gen. Nikola Mihov, former Minister of War; and Professor Bogdan Filov, former Premier.

⁴ Dobri Bozhilov (Bojilov), former Minister of Finance.

⁵ Angel Kouyoumdjisky, with rank of U.S. Army colonel, on a mission for the United States to Turkey relating to financial questions.

⁶ For joint Four Nation Declaration on General Security, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 755; for documentation concerning the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, see *ibid.*, pp. 513 ff.

The foregoing was just received by the Department and since it presumably refers to the same subject constitutes an answer to your 436 of February 9.⁷

STETTINIUS

740.0011 European War 1939/33304 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 21, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

301. The Russian Ambassador⁸ informed me last night that the Bulgarian Minister had called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs⁹ to request that the Turkish Government intervene with the American and British Governments to bring about the discontinuance of the bombing of Sofia and other Bulgarian cities and that Numan had declined to accede to his request but instead had instructed the Turkish Minister in Sofia¹⁰ to ascertain authoritatively what steps the Bulgarian Government was prepared to take to dissociate itself from the Axis, whether it was considering going over to the Allied side. Vinogradov expressed the opinion that Numan was making a serious effort to persuade the Bulgarian Government to follow this course as it would not only result in the collapse of the Axis Balkan front but would at the same time permit Turkey's immediate entry into the war without serious risk.

Repeated to Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 European War 1939/2182 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, February 24, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received February 25—8:45 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 44. In a talk which I had with the Soviet Ambassador¹¹ this morning he told me confidentially that an emissary or emissaries from Bulgaria might be arriving here shortly for conversation in which he and I and our British colleague¹² might be

⁷ Not printed; it reported that General Donovan was forwarding information on the Bulgarian situation to Government agencies in Washington and requested instructions as to action to be taken by the Embassy in Moscow.

⁸ Sergei Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

⁹ Numan R. Menemencioglu.

¹⁰ Vasfi Mentès.

¹¹ Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov.

¹² R. C. Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile in Egypt.

expected to join. This is independent of a similar Rumanian project¹³ which has been the subject of messages between Department and this Embassy (the last of these being the Department's No. 21 [1] to the Legation Cairo of January 5, 9 p. m.¹⁴). I have not heard of it from any other source and if the Department has information which can be given me I would appreciate instructions.

MACVEAGH

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*¹⁵

[WASHINGTON,] 25 February 1944.

482. For the Former Naval Person.¹⁶ I have received the following message dated 21 February from Harriman in regard to our report of an attempt at peace conversations by Bulgaria:

"First—The Soviet Government agrees that Bulgaria should be asked to send a fully qualified mission to confer with representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. Cairo is preferred by the Soviet Government as the place for such a conference because a responsible Soviet Representative is now there. Second—the Soviet Government considers that it is for the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to reach a decision in connection with the request of the Bulgarian Government that Allied air raids and bombing of Bulgaria be stopped for a few days."

I would be pleased to have your reaction to this message and, if you approve of the Soviet attitude, a suggested line of approach to the Bulgarians.

ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/2182: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, February 29, 1944—8 p. m.

6 Yugos. Your 44, February 24. The Department received early this month information to the effect that the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey had indicated the desire of the Bulgarian Regents, Prime Minister and opposition leaders to initiate discussions with the United States Government with a view to arranging for Bulgaria to join

¹³ For Rumanian overtures, see telegram 84, January 11, 10 a. m., from Moscow, vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁶ Code name for Winston S. Churchill.

the United Nations. It was proposed that a Bulgarian mission proceed to Istanbul to discuss the conditions under which the Bulgarian army would collaborate with the Allies as a combatant force. Competent American and British quarters are in agreement that the Bulgarians should be advised to send a fully qualified mission to meet American, Soviet and British representatives not at Istanbul but at some other point to be indicated, possibly Cairo or Cyprus. The Soviet Government has been asked for its agreement to this plan.

Should it develop that conversations with the Bulgarians are to be held in Cairo you will be authorized to join your British and Soviet colleagues in the discussions and to designate in your discretion a member of your staff to participate on your behalf and under your instructions in any meetings not attended by both your British and your Soviet colleagues. While you may now consider yourself as having such authorization in hand for use should events be precipitated unexpectedly, the Department anticipates that it will be able to provide you with more detailed instructions should this tentative proposal take definite form.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 European War/2348: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹⁷

[LONDON,] 29 February 1944.

596. Reference is made to your latest message about the Bulgarian peace feelers.

We have had already the same reply through Clark Kerr¹⁸ and agree that probably Cairo is the best rendezvous.

The only thing to do now I think is for the Jadwin Mission¹⁹ to inform the Minister of Bulgaria that the representatives of the Three Allies are prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission in Cairo. If a Mission is sent by the Bulgarians, we then can listen to what it has to say.

It has already been suggested by the Foreign Office that the Department of State should send the Jadwin Mission the necessary instructions.

[CHURCHILL]

¹⁷ Copy of telegram transmitted to the Department by the White House with covering memorandum of March 1 signed by Col. Lemuel Mathewson of the General Staff.

¹⁸ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ Col. C. L. Jadwin, U.S. Army, former Military Attaché in Bulgaria, was in Turkey to treat with Bulgarian representatives; he had worked with Angel Kouyoumdjisky.

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum by the Division of Southern European Affairs*²¹

[WASHINGTON, March 1944.]

The special position of Bulgaria among the Axis satellites derives from the fact that, whereas that country followed the Axis in declaring war on the United States in December 1941, it has not, like Hungary and Rumania, participated in the war against Russia and has in fact, mainly because of the racial tie, rather special sentiments for and relations with "Mother Russia". Bulgaria and Russia have continued normal and friendly relations throughout the war, maintaining their diplomatic establishments in the respective capitals. While refusing to send soldiers against Russia, Bulgaria has taken part in the war by permitting German troops to pass through the country, as well as to establish garrisons there, and by occupying extensive territories in Macedonia and Thrace formerly belonging to Yugoslavia and Greece.

Our immediate problem with respect to Bulgaria is to find means of expediting its withdrawal from the war. This country may well be the first of the satellites to fall, partly because of its geographical position but largely because of Russian influence and the fact that the Bulgarians do not have the same fear of the Russians as do the Hungarians and the Rumanians. The chief obstacle to withdrawal is, of course, Bulgarian reluctance to accede to the almost inevitable Allied requirement that Bulgarian forces be withdrawn from United Nations territory in Yugoslavia and Greece.

The Slavic tie between Russia and Bulgaria and Russia's traditional ambition to have a dependable access to the Mediterranean combine to create interesting possibilities as regards the Soviet role in determining the disposition to be made of Bulgaria. Will the Soviet Government, for example, insist on an enlarged and strengthened Bulgaria, reviving Bulgarian claims to Northern Dobruja and championing Bulgaria's longstanding insistence upon an outlet on the Aegean? With Bessarabia in Soviet possession, this would give Russia and Bulgaria a common frontier at the lower reaches and mouths of the Danube, at the same time giving the Soviet Union, in effect, a practical highway which would by-pass the Straits and carry right on down to the Aegean and the Mediterranean.

It would be useful for us to learn what information the British may have with respect to Russian designs in this direction and to know

²¹ Prepared for Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in connection with his departure for London for discussions with members of the British Government, held April 7-29, 1944. For report on Mr. Stettinius' mission to London, see pp. 1 ff.

what the British attitude may be. Our view is that Bulgaria must evacuate all United Nations territory at present occupied by Bulgarian forces and that all boundary questions should be left for post-war settlement. Whereas the Macedonian question will almost inevitably arise at some stage of the peace discussions and the Bulgarian desire for an Aegean outlet will have sufficiently numerous and strong champions to require attention, we believe that the agreement reached between Rumania and Bulgaria at Craiova in the summer of 1940²² drew a pretty good line and that the Rumanians and Bulgarians will be content to let it stand. Although this agreement evolved out of conversations undertaken at the instance of the Axis, its provisions were worked out in a reasonably frank and conciliatory manner and may be considered as having been freely negotiated between the two countries. It gave the predominantly Bulgarian area called the *quadrilateral* (Southern Dobruja) to Bulgaria and left the predominantly Rumanian area to Rumania, at the same time carrying provisions for an exchange of populations which has since taken place. We now see no good reason why this question should be reopened.

740.00119 European War 1939/2231 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 3, 1944—11 a. m.
[Received March 5—8:02 p. m.]

Yugos 55. The Department's No. 6 Yugos of February 29, 8 p. m. My British colleague advises me that the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean²³ is informed of this matter and desires to be present or represented in the conversations and the Department may therefore wish to instruct me whether his quality as an Allied commander would be deemed sufficient to cover American military interest or whether as instructed in the Department's No. 21 [1] January 5, 9 p. m. to the Legation in Cairo²⁴ regarding similar contemplated discussions I should in addition ask the American theater commander²⁵ to designate military advisory.

MACVEAGH

²² For the signing of the accord at Craiova on September 7, 1940, see telegram 511, September 8, 1940, 2 p. m., from Bucharest, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 506.

²³ Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED).

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, commanding general of North African Theater of Operations and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

740.00119 European War 1939/2182 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1944—7 p. m.

7 Yugos. Department's 6, February 29. In accordance with an agreement reached by the President and the British Prime Minister, after consultation with Moscow, word is being conveyed to the Bulgarians that representatives of the three principal Allies are prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo.

Should the proposed Bulgarian mission eventually arrive in Cairo with a view to getting into touch with the Allied representatives you are authorized to join your British and Soviet colleagues for the purpose of hearing what the Bulgarians have to say. Their proposal would then be submitted to the three Governments for further consideration.

For your guidance in connection with conversations which you may meanwhile be having with your British and Soviet colleagues it may be noted that question may at some stage arise as to the extent to which the Soviet[s] may desire to participate by reason of the fact that the Soviet Union is not at war with Bulgaria. It is in any case the intention that the Soviet Government should be kept fully informed and have every opportunity to express its views.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 European War 1939/2222 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, March 3, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received March 4—4:18 a. m.]

145. Yesterday and today there have been rumors in the Istanbul press that Bulgaria is considering armistice negotiations with the United Nations. This was touched off by the discovery by the press of the presence in Turkey of a former adviser of King Boris, the architect Sevov. But neither the progress of the Kouyoumjisky Mission nor the situation in Bulgaria seems to justify these rumors.

Kouyoumjisky Mission arrived in Istanbul from America in the early winter for the announced purpose of making a financial survey of the Balkans.

In due course of time it became generally known that the mission was interested more specifically in attempting to detach Bulgaria from the Axis. For this purpose a member of the mission met Balabanov, the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, on December 18 and let him know that persons were available in Turkey to transmit to

the American Government any proposals that the Bulgarian Government might desire to make.

Nothing came from this suggestion and on February 1st a member of the mission again spoke with Minister Balabanov just before his departure for Sofia. On February 5th after his return the Minister informed the mission that while in Sofia he had spoken privately with members of the regency, the leader of the Government and the chiefs of the opposition all of whom agreed that Bulgaria should change their foreign policy with a view towards withdrawing from the Axis.

Balabanov was unable to speak for the loyalty of the army if such a change in policy occurred but he agreed to send a request by courier to his Government to send to Istanbul two emissaries who would be in a position to vouch for the attitude of the army.

His courier returned without bringing a message and on February 28 Balabanov inquired of the mission whether if for any reason his Government found it inadvisable to send two qualified persons to Istanbul, he and Sevov would be acceptable to the American Mission as representatives of the Bulgarian Government.

Thus the mission has been successful in opening a contact with high Bulgarian authorities but there has been no further indication that these authorities desire or are able to bring about a radical change in the policy of the Bulgarian Government. Bulgarian Government leaders are of course committed to the Germans to follow an Axis policy. Government and opposition leaders are committed before the Bulgarian people to a policy of unification. German propaganda has not let the Bulgarians lose sight of the price the Italian leaders have paid for their defection. The Bulgarian people at this time would be likely to turn against their leaders if they abandoned the still holy cause of unification. It seems therefore that for the present there can be no turning from the path which Bulgarians have so clearly marked for themselves.

Consequently, although the Bulgarian people [are] deeply discouraged and foresee no favorable end of the war for Bulgaria, the rigidity of the United Nations terms of unconditional surrender, the presence throughout Bulgaria of German military and Gestapo units, the distance that separates the Anglo-American forces from the Bulgarian frontier, the neutrality of Turkey and the example of Italy, perhaps even the hesitation of Finland, all contribute towards making a movement against the Government unlikely for the time being. Thus the Government is still strong and the army in the main still loyal. Under these conditions now does not seem the time to expect the Bulgarians to seek an armistice.

740.00119 European War 1939/2125 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1944—8 p. m.

486. Personal for the Ambassador. Since the project mentioned in the Department's telegram No. 274 of February 10 may presently require detailed examination, the Department is supplying its representative on the European Advisory Commission with certain documents for study in connection with the formulation of terms of surrender for Bulgaria.²⁶

The British Embassy at the request of the Foreign Office has asked that you be authorized to make a joint approach with the British Ambassador in requesting the Soviet Government to despatch the "necessary instructions" to its representative on the Commission, for the consideration of this matter.

You are authorized merely to inform the Soviet Government that this subject may shortly be brought before the Commission, and request it to send appropriate instructions to its representative on the Commission.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EAC/109a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1944—midnight.

1666. Eacom²⁷ 10. 1. The following two documents have been approved for transmission to you by the Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Provisions for Imposition upon Bulgaria at Time of Surrender—WS-58b"²⁸ and "Aspects of Bulgarian Surrender Requiring Consultation between the British, Soviet, and American Governments—WS-59b"

2. The text of both these documents is being forwarded by air pouch tonight.

WS-58b is substantially identical with the Rumanian document WS-16a²⁹ with the following exceptions:

A. In as much as the Soviet Union is not at war with Bulgaria, references to the Governments imposing the terms mention only the

²⁶ See telegram 1666, March 4, midnight, to London, *infra*.

²⁷ Designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the Department to the European Advisory Commission.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ See vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

United Kingdom and the United States with the addition, in the introductory paragraph, of the words

“Acting after consultation with the Government of the Soviet Union”

B. In numbered paragraphs 1, 4, and 6 references to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces is omitted.

C. In numbered paragraph 5 the date given is January 1, 1940.³⁰

D. Penultimate sentence in numbered paragraph 8³¹ is omitted.

The text of WS-59b follows:

“The following factors should be taken into account in considering the terms recommended in the accompanying document, WS-58b, for imposition upon Bulgaria at the time of her surrender.

“Comment on Nature of Surrender Document”

“It is believed that the capitulation of Bulgaria should be recorded in a single document of unconditional surrender. The statement of principles embodied in WS-58b would, it is felt, provide an adequate legal basis for the principal security, political and economic controls which the United Nations will need to impose on Bulgaria at the time of surrender and thereafter. The principles listed therein should not, however, be considered as exclusive of such additional conditions which it may be found advisable or necessary to impose. Nor should it be considered that all such terms must necessarily be included in the instrument of surrender so long as the instrument includes the complete and unconditional surrender of Bulgaria and such other broad and general terms as the two Governments may agree, after consultation with the Soviet Government, should be included therein in order to safeguard their rights and powers. In general, it is believed that the document of unconditional surrender should be a relatively brief instrument, with full power reserved to implement it by such proclamations, orders and ordinances as the occupation authorities and the Governments which they represent may deem advisable or necessary.

“United Nations Concerned with the Terms of Bulgarian Surrender”

“The following United Nations are at war with Bulgaria: The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Haiti, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. The imposition of surrender terms upon Bulgaria should rest with the American and British Governments, acting after consultation with the Soviet Government, and in the interest of the United Nations, without prejudice to the participation by other United Nations which are at war with Bulgaria in subsequent peace negotiations with Bulgaria.

“Signatory or Signatories to the Surrender Instrument (Article 1)”

“The American and British Governments may appoint their several plenipotentiaries, civilian or military or both, to examine jointly the credentials of the Bulgarian plenipotentiary or plenipotentiaries and to present for his or their signature, without discussion or negotiation, the instrument of surrender. On the other hand, having agreed to-

³⁰ Date for Rumania given as June 21, 1941.

³¹ The sentence is as follows: “For political purposes Bucharest and other principal cities to be designated should be occupied, at least temporarily.”

gether on the provisions of that instrument, the two Governments may appoint a single plenipotentiary to act in the name of both. If the offer of surrender should be made in the field, the presentation of terms, in the interest of the United Nations, might be made by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in that theater. If the offer should be made elsewhere, for example, in a neutral country, the presentation of terms might be made by representatives of the two Governments.

“Provisional Status of Certain Disputed Territories (Articles 5 and 8)

“The two Governments should agree, after consultation with the Soviet Government and in accordance with the circumstances existing at the time of surrender and occupation, whether the territory acquired by Bulgaria from Rumania since the outbreak of the war should be placed, in whole or in part, under the military government for Bulgaria or under that for Rumania. This decision should be without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of the territory concerned. The territories taken by Bulgaria from Yugoslavia and from Greece since the outbreak of the war also should be placed under Allied occupation authorities and should not be assimilated into the national administrative systems of Yugoslavia and Greece respectively, until the final boundaries have been determined as part of the general peace settlement.

“From What Bulgarian Regime Should Surrender Be Accepted?”

“Assuming a Bulgarian offer of surrender prior to the capitulation of Germany, the answer to this question would depend in part on the degree to which a Bulgarian Government desirous of capitulating might be able to escape from German domination. Of particular importance would be the question whether any Bulgarian Government would be in a position to offer more than a token surrender, leaving the territory itself still to be conquered, as in the case of Italy. If there is agreement among the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom that the Bulgarians are in a position to offer unconditional surrender, then these governments should agree without delay as to the Bulgarian regime from which they are willing to accept such surrender. If they desire to saddle the present Filov-Bozhilov³² regime with responsibility for Bulgarian participation in the war, it would be important to secure the submission of the present Bulgarian leaders, and thus to forestall the danger that later generations of Bulgarian nationalists would blame the defeat and the surrender on the moderate and pro-Ally groups.”

In their letter of Clearance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the additional instrument of surrender for Bulgaria should be similar in form to that recommended by them for Germany WS-65 Annex B.³³

STETTINIUS

³² Bogdan Filov, Third Bulgar Regent for minority of King Simeon II, and Dobri Bozhilov, Bulgar Prime Minister until May, 1944.

³³ See letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, February 5, vol. I, section entitled “Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission,” part V.

740.00119 European War 1939/2240 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 7, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received March 8—12:22 p. m.]

57. See the Department's Yugos 7 of March 3, 7 p. m. My Soviet colleague today informed me that he is instructed in the event of the Bulgarian Mission arriving in Cairo simply to join with me and my British colleague in hearing what it may have to say and to report to his Government accordingly. He is similarly instructed as regards to the Rumanian emissary (see my Yugos 54 of March 3, 10 a. m.³⁴) whose arrival here the British Ambassador expects may take place the end of this week. He definitely denied that he had any instructions in either case to present any views. Regarding the Department's observation in its telegram above referred to that since a state of war does not exist between the Soviet Government and Bulgaria the question might arise of the former's desiring to take part in conversations of the type proposed he remarked that "we wish to be informed as to what takes place and the best way to ensure this is to be present ourselves."

MACVEAGH

740.00119 EAC/112 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, March 9, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received 10 p. m.]

1942. Comea ³⁵ 36. I have received the Department's 1666, March 4, midnight, Eacom 10, containing information about WS-58b and WS-59b regarding Bulgaria, which I understand are enroute to me by air pouch. In addition to this, my military advisor has received a JCS document 722 containing texts of WS-56a and WS-57b,³⁶ relating to Hungary.

Neither of my colleagues on the Commission has yet mentioned the question of terms for Hungary or Bulgaria.

I note from the wording of the comments made in respect to each of these countries as well as Rumania that it is left to the three Gov-

³⁴ Vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

³⁵ Designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the European Advisory Commission to the Department.

³⁶ Neither printed.

ernments to decide—presumably outside the Commission—when each country is in a position to offer unconditional surrender.

I also note that our 27 principles, which we are asked to apply indiscriminately in the case of all three countries, make no allowance for the problems created by the presence in those countries of German troops. There are very few of those provisions which would not be directly affected by this practical consideration.

I take it from this that our Government does not wish me to envisage in my discussions with respect to the satellite countries any situation other than that which will prevail after the events of the war have led to the withdrawal of German forces from at least certain portions of these areas, and after the three Governments have accordingly agreed that the respective country is in a position to offer unconditional surrender.³⁷

WINANT

740.00119 European War/2258A : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1944—7 p. m.

9 Yugos. Department's 7 March 3. The Prime Minister has now informed the President that Macmillan³⁸ will represent the British in any discussions that may be held with the proposed Bulgarian mission. You should accordingly keep in touch with him in connection with the project.

It has also been agreed that General Wilson, who will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs in matters pertaining to the activities of the Bulgarian Mission, is to be kept currently informed of developments and that he will have a military representative present.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 European War/2252 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, March 10, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received March 10—2:34 p. m.]

162R20. The Bulgarian Prime Minister, speaking at Varna on March 5, devoted primary attention to internal problems and policies. At the same meeting Minister Vasilev³⁹ restated the Bulgarian posi-

³⁷ For correspondence pertaining to possible modification of the principle of unconditional surrender as applied to satellite countries, see vol. I, section entitled "Application of the principle of unconditional surrender . . ."

³⁸ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

³⁹ Dimitar Vasilev, Bulgarian Minister of Public Works.

tion on territorial questions reaffirming the Government's position, namely, that Bulgaria regards the territorial problem as justly and finally settled. He said that the efforts of the Government are directed toward maintaining the frontiers as now established and toward strengthening the internal front by just reform measures on one hand and by strict police control on the other.

The tenor of all speeches of recent date indicate and people recently arrived from Bulgaria state that decided action by the Government in the direction of peace cannot be expected until military events of more decisive importance occur directly affecting Bulgaria. Pending such events, however, responsible people in Bulgaria are inclined to support the Government policy through fear (1) of a repetition on Bulgarian soil of the Italian experience and (2) of the development of an internal state of affairs through the growth of partisan bands and Communist agitation similar to that that now exists in Yugoslavia.

BERRY

740.00119 EAC/118 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

2023. Comea 41. I understand that the British Ambassador to Moscow was informed last night by Molotov^{39a} that the Soviet Government does not wish the question of terms of surrender for Bulgaria to be treated in the European Advisory Commission. Please see in this connection my Comea 36 and 37.⁴⁰

I hope that the Department will let me have any information it may receive or any views it may hold in this connection.

WINANT

740.00119 European War/2280b

The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1944.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: At Wednesday's meeting of the Department's Policy Committee it was decided that the direct interest of Greece in the surrender of Bulgaria would suggest that the Greek Government be given an opportunity to participate in eventual peace talks with the Bulgarians.

^{39a} Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴⁰ Latter not printed.

The situation at the present moment is that if, as a result of the contact established by the Jadwin mission, the Bulgarian Government should decide to send a delegation to Cairo, the arrangements thus far made for hearing their proposals contemplate the participation only of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, with a military representative of General Wilson also taking part. The Department understands that this is the plan as agreed to by the President and the Prime Minister, after consultation with Moscow. Mr. Churchill has also informed the President that he considers it most important that he and the President, in conjunction with Mr. Stalin,⁴² should watch this matter from day to day, for decision on the highest level.

Concurrently the American representative on the European Advisory Commission has been supplied with the documents which were recently cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for study in connection with the formulation of terms of surrender for Bulgaria. The British Foreign Office is anxious to have this matter brought before the European Advisory Commission and the Soviet Government has been so informed. The Department has not yet learned whether the Soviet Government is agreeable to this procedure.

Paragraph 4 of the terms of reference of the European Advisory Commission reads as follows:

"4. Representatives of the Governments of other United Nations will, at the discretion of the Commission, be invited to take part in meetings of the Commission when matters particularly affecting their interests are under discussion."

The "other United Nations" which may be expected to express a direct interest in the Bulgarian surrender would be Greece, as mentioned above, and Yugoslavia. Although the agreement reached by the President and the Prime Minister did not contemplate Greek and Yugoslav representation in the initial meeting proposed for Cairo, which would be arranged only to hear what the Bulgarians have to say, the Department believes that attention should be given to the problem of establishing a procedure whereby the Greek and Yugoslav Governments might be represented in the discussions.

In making this suggestion the Department must, however, observe that the inclusion of Yugoslav representation in the peace talks may create certain complications by reason of the hostility which exists between the Yugoslav Government-in-exile, as now constituted, and that group of resistance forces within Yugoslavia (the "Tito" organi-

⁴² Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

zation ⁴³) to which both the British and the Soviet Governments have given strong official encouragement in the political as well as the military sense. The broader question as to which authorities should be recognized as speaking for Yugoslavia might thus be injected into these Bulgarian discussions.

I should be grateful if you could let me know what action the President or the Joint Chiefs may wish to have taken, and at what stage, in order that the matter may be cleared with the British and Soviet Governments and the Greek and Yugoslav Governments so informed.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

740.00119 EAC/118 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944, 10 p. m.

2035. The first information which the Department had received respecting Russian reluctance to discuss eventually surrender terms for Bulgaria in the Commission was that set forth in your no. 2023 of March 13, Comea 41. In as much as the terms of reference of the European Advisory Commission provide that the Commission is charged specifically with the duty of making detailed recommendations for the "terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European states with which any of the three Powers are at war, and upon the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms", it appears that the question of surrender terms for Bulgaria is clearly a proper subject for discussion in the Commission.

However, as U.S.S.R. is not at war with Bulgaria, we can well understand that the Russian delegate might not desire to participate actively in any discussion on the proposed surrender terms, and for this reason the terms would, in effect, be drafted by the British and American members. This procedure would not, of course, exclude any observations which the Soviet representative might desire to make. The Department, therefore, suggests that at your discretion you recommend this method of procedure to the Commission with the intent of taking up the discussion of the terms for Bulgaria, as well as those for Hungary and Rumania, as soon as the question of the terms for Germany has been disposed of by the Commission.

We are instructing Harriman to lay this before the Soviet Government and ask to have the above suggested procedure adopted.⁴⁴

HULL

⁴³ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz) was military leader of the Partisan guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia and President of the National Liberation Movement in that country; for documentation concerning United States interest in Yugoslavia, see vol IV, section under Yugoslavia entitled "Concern of the United States with internal conditions . . ."

⁴⁴ See telegram 619, *infra*.

740.00119 European War/2125 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944—midnight.

619. Department's 486 March 4. A telegram from Winant⁴⁵ indicates that the British Ambassador to Moscow has been informed by Molotov that the Soviet Government does not wish the question of terms of surrender for Bulgaria to be treated in the European Advisory Commission.

In as much as the Soviet Government has instructed its Ambassador in Cairo to join the American and British representatives in listening to what the Bulgarians have to say in case a proposal to send a Bulgarian mission out should eventuate, the Department assumes that Winant's report should not be taken as signifying a lack of Soviet interest in the Bulgarian matter but rather as an indication that the Soviet Government is not disposed formally to prepare or discuss surrender terms for a country with which it is not at war. Since, however, discussion of the Bulgarian surrender terms clearly falls within the terms of reference of the European Advisory Commission the Soviet Government would presumably have no reason to object to the presentation and discussion of such terms by the American and British members provided the Soviet member, while having every opportunity to make any observations representing the Soviet view, were not expected to participate actively in the discussions.

With the foregoing in mind please endeavor to ascertain the extent to which the Soviet Government desires to take part in the development of the Bulgarian terms and whether it would have any objection to the procedure outlined above for handling this matter in the Commission.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/2305 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, March 19, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received March 20—8:43 a. m.]

924. Your 619, March 17, midnight. I asked Molotov tonight orally why the Soviet Government was reluctant to have the question

⁴⁵ Telegram 2023, March 13, 7 p. m., from London, p. 313.

of the surrender terms for Bulgaria submitted for consideration by the European Advisory Commission at this time.

Molotov explained that his Government considered it was too early to discuss Bulgarian surrender terms as the Allied forces were not approaching Bulgaria, Turkey had not agreed to come into the war, and there were no hopeful internal developments that had come to his knowledge. When I explained that you considered it would be useful to exchange views on the subject and be ready for any contingency, he agreed but said at the present time there were more active questions. He asked me whether I had any new information about Bulgaria to which I replied in the negative.

He stated that they were planning to ask their Minister in Bulgaria⁴⁶ to come to Moscow for consultation and that he would give me any information that developed from his trip. He gave me no indication that the Soviet Government was reluctant to join discussions with the British and ourselves on Bulgarian surrender terms though [*through*] the medium of the Advisory Commission except on the question of timing.

He asked me specifically to inquire from you what information you had on the developments within Bulgaria. I believe it would be helpful if you would advise me what information you have on this subject for transmission to Molotov.

Is there any further action you wish me to take at this time? I got the impression from my talk this evening that Molotov wanted to watch developments and obtain more information before he started discussion with us on surrender terms.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 European War 1939/2408 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, March 25, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received March 27—2 p. m.]

201R34. Bulgarian⁴⁷ referred telegram 413, October 22⁴⁸ arrived Istanbul March 24 having left Sofia preceding day. He is here officially for trade talks with Turkish officials, while not authorized delegate Government to talk peace here presents himself working with approval Filov with whom in direct communication. Before leaving Sofia he had conversations with Bozhilov and Shishmanov.⁴⁹ Personally he is anti-German, anti-Soviet, well disposed to America

⁴⁶ Alexander Andreyevich Lavrishchev.

⁴⁷ George P. Kisseloff, vice president of Bulgarian Union of Industrialists, and cotton manufacturer.

⁴⁸ Not printed.

⁴⁹ Dimitar Shishmanov, Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

but primarily Bulgarian patriot who wants save his country from destruction.

In meeting at his request today he made following statements about results bombing Bulgarian cities: "Bombing works advantage Germany and Soviets and against Anglo-American interests for (1) compelling evacuation city populations, the pro-ally elements who are strong only in the cities are scattered, thus making impossible effective opposition to pro-German element in the Government. [Garbled group] to Anglo-Americans has been altogether disorganized and rendered powerless; (2) nearly all Bulgarians have regretted and opposed war with America, believing that America was basically friendly to Bulgaria and would work for a reasonable peace. Germany is taking advantage bombing to say Germany is Bulgaria's one friend and hope, and that it is better for Bulgaria to risk all fighting to the end with Germany; (3) public opinion has moved more and more to Soviets. The majority have come to believe that Bulgaria's place is with Soviets. Former pro-ally leaders like Burov⁵¹ have turned to Soviets. Burov confers frequently with Soviet Minister; (4) if bombing continues it will further weaken Bulgarian administration, then opening way for German occupation on the ground that Bulgarian Government cannot control country and maintain Axis interests. Bulgaria is not in position to oppose occupation effectively."

Informant believes Germans unlikely occupy Bulgaria now, Bulgarian Army will not join in fighting Soviets, he said moderate elements including Filov and Prince Cyril hope Bulgarians can maintain present position of military inactivity. If bombings continue this position cannot be maintained.

Russia is taking advantage of situation to draw Bulgaria into Soviet orbit. Soviet Minister in Sofia has recently been very active seeing Bulgarian opposition leaders and extending Soviet influence. Bulgarians are told that Moscow is building up a powerful Slavic bloc which will be the dominant world force; Bulgarians are urged to join this bloc. The Minister is now en route to Moscow to report Bulgarian and Balkan situation. Bulgarians expect decided Soviet move regarding Bulgaria following his arrival in Moscow.

Hence informant earnestly begs that bombings of Bulgarian cities, that is non-military objectives, be stopped because its continuation is driving Bulgaria directly into subjection both to Germans and to Soviets, both of which all moderate men in Bulgaria desire to avoid. Bulgaria cannot get out of the war while Germans dominate the

⁵¹ Atanas Burov, former Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs and leader of the People's Party.

Balkans, if Anglo-American forces invade Balkans Bulgaria will take immediate steps for peace.

Informant said further that bombing has hardened rather than softened morale, it has also broken up the recognized opposition group in Parliament numbering about 60. The opposition has been reduced to two men, Mushanov⁵² and Stainov.⁵³

BERRY

740.00119 European War/2305 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1944—8 p. m.

775. Your 924 March 19. In consideration of a proposal of the Bulgarian Minister in Ankara word was sent on March 2 that representatives of the three principal Allies were prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo. Although the Bulgarians have so far not indicated whether they intend to send out such a mission, the Department, believing that discussion of the Bulgarian surrender terms should be in as advanced a stage as possible should this project develop, has directed its representative on the European Advisory Commission to be prepared to take the subject up after the Commission has disposed of the German terms and at such time as his British and Soviet colleagues have received authorization for its discussion.

Information available here tends to indicate that Prince Cyril has been very active recently and that Bulgarian leaders have been devoting considerable attention to popularizing and strengthening the dynasty apparently with a view to ensuring its future. It is reported that the present Government is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign to combat defeatist tendencies and continues despite widespread opposition to base its policy on (a) the retention of conquered territory and (b) continued collaboration with the Germans. The strain between the Regency and the Germans is said to have been intensified by reports that Kiosseivanov⁵⁴ might be asked to head a pro-Allied government, whereas the Nazis are expected to insist on a Quisling regime headed by Tsankov⁵⁵ or Gabrovski.⁵⁶ It would be interesting to learn whether information in possession of the Soviet Minister to Sofia bears out these reports.

⁵² Nikola Mushanov, leader in Bulgarian Democratic Party, former Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵³ Petko Stainov, leader in Democratic Entente, Bulgarian political party, former Minister of Railways.

⁵⁴ George Kiosseivanov, Bulgarian Premier, 1935-40; Minister in Switzerland since 1940.

⁵⁵ Alexander Tsankov, former Bulgarian Premier.

⁵⁶ Peter Gabrovski, former Bulgarian Minister of Interior.

The Department has no reliable information regarding the effect current military and political events may be having on the Bulgarian situation, although it is understood the occupation of Hungary has stimulated the growth of the Bulgarian "underground".

HULL

740.00119 European War/2426 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Istanbul (Berry)

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1944—8 p. m.

245. Your telegrams on the situation in Bulgaria have been very helpful. With particular reference to your 224R42 of April 4⁵⁷ it may be useful to emphasize that a month has passed since word was sent to the Bulgarians that representatives of the three principal Allies were prepared to meet a Bulgarian mission in Cairo. The rapid march of events must surely have shown to the Bulgarians the danger of further delay if they hope to escape the full consequences of their share in the Nazi war.

The Department and your office have long been familiar with the Bulgarian argumentation of their predicament. They should be made to see that their ultimate interests would be served if they hasten to take advantage of the opportunity still open.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/2459 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, April 10, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received 10:19 p. m.]

236R46. The substance of the Department's 245, April 7, 8 p. m. has been conveyed to the Bulgarian referred to in my communication. He will pass it on at once to the Bulgarian Government.

In his opinion the prospects of a successful Bulgarian peace move are not bright. The desire exists but not the will. He expects the Government still to hesitate because (1) it believes its action in sending delegates to Cairo would become known to the Germans who would use it as a pretext for occupying the country and (2) public opinion is not yet ready to accept and cannot hastily be prepared to accept a break with Germany entailing the loss of Macedonia and Thrace.

Thus reason seems unavailing and Anglo-American bombings apparently unsuccessful in exerting the pressure desired. In view of this it is suggested that the Bulgarian Government might be brought

⁵⁷ Not printed.

to move in the desired direction if the Soviet authorities would advise the Bulgarian Government through diplomatic channels to find a direct way to end the state of war existing between Bulgaria and the United States and England.

BERRY

740.00119 EAC/118 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1944—midnight.

3147. Embassy reported in its Comea 41 (no. 2023, March 13) Soviet unwillingness to discuss surrender terms for Bulgaria in the European Advisory Commission, and Department in its no. 2035, March 17 expressed its attitude on this and suggested a method of procedure. Please cable any developments in this matter, and particularly whether the Soviet representative is willing for the Commission to enter upon a discussion of surrender terms for Bulgaria. If the Soviet representative is not authorized to discuss Bulgarian terms in the Commission, the Department will have to take this matter up directly with Moscow.

For your information Harriman reported on March 19⁵⁸ that when he discussed this matter with Molotov, the latter replied that the Soviet Government considered it was too early to discuss Bulgarian surrender terms as the Allied forces were not approaching Bulgaria. Harriman insisted that it would be useful to exchange views on the subject and be ready for any contingency to which Molotov agreed but said that at present there were more active questions. Molotov gave no indication that the Soviet Government was reluctant to participate in discussions with us and the British on Bulgarian surrender terms in the European Advisory Commission except on the question of timing.

HULL

740.00119 European War/2510 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, April 21, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received 8:56 p. m.]

256R55. On April 20 the Bulgarian referred to in my telegram No. 236[R46] of April 10, 6 p. m., asked to talk again with a member

⁵⁸ Telegram 924, March 19, 11 p. m. from Moscow, p. 316.

of this office. A meeting was arranged. He reported considerable progress with regard to the possibility of his Government sending delegates to meet representatives of the United Nations. A messenger is now on point of departure for Sofia and on his return the line of conduct of present Bulgarian Government in this connection should be clear.

To keep the Department informed of the progress of Bulgarian thinking, I summarize his statements. He said that Petrov-Chemakov, recently appointed Bulgarian Minister to Japan who is now in Istanbul, brought no new political information from Sofia. It is believed that George Kyuseivanov, now in Sofia, is attempting to form a new cabinet but there is yet no indication of prospective success. Bulgarians are aware that decisive events for their country are at hand. **One conviction is that if the moderate and governing classes can now take immediate steps to get Bulgaria out of the war there will be a Communist and pro-Soviet rising in some form as soon as Soviet Armies approach Bulgaria's frontiers. Efforts to get Bulgaria out of the war are opposed and kept in check by German controlled elements in the Government and Army.**

Bulgarian attention and fear center especially on the question of saving the national frontiers as of March 1, 1941, and of maintaining a free and independent Government within these frontiers. They are seriously concerned about the preservation of the dynasty. The upper classes desire to keep the monarchical form of Government.

Thus it is apparent that there is a sharp conflict between the moderate upper classes desirous of getting the country out of war without too great change in the form of Government and social system and the Leftist elements who desire a radical change in both Government and social system. If the moderate elements cannot take definitive action soon the Leftist elements will. The tempo of this internal conflict and development is the same as that of advance of Soviet Armies.

Bulgarians are raising the question of the advisability of asking Moscow to intercede for their country instead of attempting to carry on any direct negotiations with Allied representatives in Cairo or elsewhere. While Bulgarians are willing to treat with Americans they are loath to treat with British. Actually the Bulgarian leaders appear to be in the midst of a process of clarifying their own thought and of developing a policy corresponding to the realism of current events.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers as my No. 7.

BERRY

740.00119 European War 1939/2527 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 25, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 26—7:06 a. m.]

1436. I asked Molotov today whether the Soviet Minister to Sofia had had anything of interest to report. He replied that from the Minister's reports the Soviet Government considered that the proposed tripartite statement to the satellites of Germany⁵⁹ applied in full to Bulgaria since the Bulgarian Government had sold its country to Germany and was actively assisting the Nazis. He said that the Soviet Government had addressed a statement to the Bulgarian Government to this effect.⁶⁰ I asked him whether a copy of the statement had been transmitted to the United States Government. He said he did not know whether this had yet been done through Gromyko,⁶¹ but that in any event the statement was in the spirit of the above-mentioned tripartite statement.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 European War 1939/2545 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 27, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received April 28—11:48 a. m.]

1468. See my 1436, April 25, 10 p. m. The Embassy has received a note dated April 25 from Molotov enclosing a copy of an exchange of communications between the Soviet and Bulgarian Governments. The notes read in summary translation as follows:

1. Soviet note of April 17. The Soviet Government has made repeated representations to the Bulgarian Government in connection with the use by Germany of Bulgarian territory and the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas for conducting hostilities against the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian Government has always limited its replies to denying these facts. "This cannot be regarded as anything else than an attempt to cover up the action of the Bulgarian authorities which is hostile to the Soviet Union." Now that the military situation of Germany has further deteriorated the Germans have started to make especially wide use of Bulgarian territory and of the ports of Varna and Burgas which have been transformed into German bases and at which are concentrated the principal German naval forces in the Black Sea. Likewise the Germans are using airfields in Bul-

⁵⁹ For statement as issued, May 12, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1944, p. 425.

⁶⁰ See telegram 1468, April 27, 7 p. m., from Moscow, *infra*.

⁶¹ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

garia from which they are raiding Soviet troops (recently the Germans have enjoyed the especially wide cooperation of the Bulgarian authorities in their hostilities against the Soviet Union. "This situation is incompatible with the normal relations between the USSR and Bulgaria and cannot be tolerated any further." The Soviet Government urgently proposes that an immediate end be put to the use of Bulgarian territory and ports by Germany.

2. Bulgarian note of April 24. The Bulgarian Government wishes to emphasize that it has never failed to deny as without foundation the circumstances protested by the Soviet Government. The assertions in the Soviet note under reference do not correspond to the facts. The Bulgarian Government is ready to study all the real facts which the Soviet Government may consider it has at its disposition if these facts are communicated to the Bulgarian Government. "The Bulgarian Government considers it necessary to state once more that it has in no way changed its relations with the Soviet Union in comparison with its relations at the time of the adherence of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact⁶² at which time the Soviet Union and Germany were also allied by another pact."⁶³ The Bulgarian Government wishes to maintain the most correct, loyal and friendly relations with the Soviet Government.

The Foreign Office telephoned the Embassy today that the Bulgarian reply had been submitted to it in the Russian language and that if it were unintelligible the Foreign Office was not to blame.

Complete texts by airmail.⁶⁴

HAMILTON

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/67 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 27—8:54 p. m.]

3475. Deles⁶⁵ 39. From the Under Secretary: The Foreign Office has not yet received an intimation of a forthcoming Greek approach

⁶² Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940, by Germany, Italy, and Japan; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cctv, p. 386, or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. xi (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 204. For correspondence, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. i, pp. 633 ff.

⁶³ Treaty of Non-Aggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. vii, p. 245.

⁶⁴ Not printed.

⁶⁵ Designation assigned to a series of telegrams from Under Secretary of State Stettinius in London to the Department. For report on Mr. Stettinius' mission to London, see pp. 1 ff.

of the nature referred to in Esdel⁶⁶ number 17,⁶⁷ though they are aware of the Greek Government's concern regarding the Russian attitude toward the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia and Thrace. However, the Foreign Office has recently instructed the British Ambassador at Moscow to take advantage of the earliest suitable opportunity to make clear to the Russians the British position that Greek and Yugoslav prewar frontiers must be restored and that there can be no question of buying off the Bulgars with either Greek or Yugoslav territory.⁶⁸ [Stettinius.]

WINANT

740.00119 European War 1939/2573a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1944—noon.

65 Greek. Though knowing of Greek concern as to Russian attitude regarding Bulgarian occupation of Thrace and of Macedonia, the British Foreign Office as yet has had no suggestion that the matter may be raised by Greece. The British Ambassador in Moscow has been advised to state as soon as practicable the British position that the pre-war frontiers of both Greece and Yugoslavia must be restored and that the territory of neither country is subject to dismemberment in order to influence the Bulgars.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/2570 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Istanbul (Squires) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, May 3, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received May 4—2:35 p. m.]

274R59. Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, Balabanov, left Istanbul for Sofia May 2. Among other things he will represent to his Government extreme danger in which Bulgaria now stands, attitude of Allied nations toward Bulgaria, hopelessness of Bulgaria's present position and necessity of establishing contact with Allies with view to getting out of war.

⁶⁶ Designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the Department to the Under Secretary of State in London.

⁶⁷ Telegram 2939, April 13, midnight, to London, not printed; it reported the Greek representation in regard to Bulgarian troops evacuating Greek Macedonia (740.0011 Stettinius Mission/22b).

⁶⁸ The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) made the following notation: "Very good. Why do not we reinforce this?"

Balabanov belongs to moderate group political leaders who realize folly of pro-German policy of Government and who desire to save country from complete political collapse as well as becoming a Communist state. They believe only hope of maintaining present state and form of government is to break away from Germany at right moment, come to terms with Allies and consolidate the Government before Communists and other extreme elements can seize power and establish their own regime. This is thought to be only way to avert complete national catastrophe. Little hope now entertained any such plan would succeed as difficulties seem insurmountable.

Hope, formerly strong in some circles that Bulgaria might save herself by eventual alignment with Soviets, is waning as result of apparent close collaboration between Soviets and Anglo-Americans. Fear of internal Communist uprising supported from Moscow has not diminished. The root problem of the moderate elements is to save third Bulgarian kingdom from dissolution and upper classes from ruin. Such is believed [apparent omission] of Balabanov thought as he returns to Sofia to report.

Repeated Algiers as my No. 11, also MacVeagh, Cairo.

SQUIRES

740.00119 European War 1939/2575 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Istanbul (Squires) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, May 6, 1944—noon.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

277R60. Reference my No. 274R59 of May 3, 6 p. m. It is reported on good authority that the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, Balabanov, will remain in Sofia for the present. Two reasons for this are advanced by persons familiar with the situation in Bulgaria:

First, to remove German suspicion that Balabanov may be forming connections with Allies looking toward peace terms.

Second, to keep Balabanov in Sofia in case it should be desirable for the Government to use him either in a new Cabinet of more liberal tone or for quick negotiations with Anglo-Americans if opportunity should occur.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers for Murphy⁶⁹ as my No. 12; also to MacVeagh, Cairo.

SQUIRES

⁶⁹ Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

740.00119 EAC/175 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 8, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 3:21 p. m.]

3726. Comea 57. On April 21 I wrote Gousev⁷⁰ regarding surrender terms for Bulgaria on the basis of the Department's 3147, April 19, midnight and the Department's 2035, March 17, 10 p. m. I have just received a letter from Gousev in which he states:

"I am now in a position to say that there is no objection on my part to discussing terms of surrender for Bulgaria in the European Advisory Commission."

Strang⁷¹ has several times indicated his readiness to initiate discussions on Bulgaria with our delegation and I shall take the subject up with him at an early date and at the same time keep in touch with Gousev. I shall be guided by the Department's 3469, April 29, 10 p. m.⁷² and the views to which it refers but in the meantime request urgently that the Department furnish me with such special studies and background material on Bulgaria as it feels it would be helpful for me to have in addition to material already furnished to my military adviser by the War Department.⁷³

WINANT

740.00119 European War 1939/2605 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

MOSCOW, May 15, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received May 16—12:30 a. m.]

1727. Embassy's 1468, April 27, 7 p. m. The British Ambassador has informed me that the Soviet Government has replied to the Bulgarian note of April 24 substantially as follows:

The Bulgarian proposal to provide more detailed particulars for verification is unacceptable since a unilateral verification by the Bulgarian authorities could not produce positive results or win the confidence of the Soviet Government. It is sufficient to recall that the Soviet Consulate at Varna was closed in the autumn of 1942 on the demand of the Bulgarian Government, although consulates of states friendly to Germany continued to exist there and in other Bulgarian

⁷⁰ Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev, Soviet representative on the European Advisory Commission; also Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁷¹ Sir William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office and representative on the European Advisory Commission.

⁷² Not printed.

⁷³ Background material for the Ambassador's information was transmitted in instruction 4057, May 11, 1944, not printed.

ports. It should also be recalled that for over 2 years the Bulgarian Government has forbidden Soviet representatives in Sofia any access to Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea or on the Danube.

If the Bulgarian Government is anxious to establish the facts and to verify the actual situation on the spot, this should not be done by representatives of the Bulgarian Government alone but also by Soviet representatives. For this purpose the Soviet Government considers it necessary to reestablish a Soviet Consulate at Varna and also to establish consulates in Burgas and Ruschuk since, according to information of the Soviet Government, the Bulgarian Black Sea and Danube ports are bases for the German Armed Forces operating against the Soviet Union. The presence of Soviet Consulates in these ports would enable representatives, together with Bulgarian representatives, to verify the facts on the spot and, if it should be required, to do so in the future.

HAMILTON

740.00119 European War 1939/2612 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Istanbul (Squires) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, May 16, 1944—noon.

[Received 7:56 p. m.]

289R64. Reference No. 277R60 of May 6, noon.⁷⁴ Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, Balabanov, returned from Sofia May 14. He reports Bulgarian Government fully realizes necessity of making immediate contact with Allies for purpose of getting out of war at earliest possible moment. He believes his Government can do nothing in that direction at present because of German watchfulness.

Balabanov states Germany is now bringing in greatest pressure on Government to force participation of Bulgarian Army in war under German High Command.

He insists that in no case will Bulgarian Army fight Russia. He reports there is fear in Sofia causing great anxiety that Russians will break relations with Bulgaria.

Balabanov also reports that despite bombings, sentiment is not altogether unfavorable to the United States. Each bombing raid, however, increases hostility.

Attitude of Balabanov indicates he is convinced Bulgarian Government is so completely under control of Germans as to make unsuccessful any attempt to get out of war until Germans are further softened by military defeats.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as my No. 15, also to Cairo for MacVeagh.

SQUIRES

⁷⁴Not printed.

874.01/82 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 16, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

879. I have learned from a thoroughly reliable source that the Bulgarian Minister, who reported yesterday from Sofia, is very depressed. He declared to my informant that his Government was fumbling and undecided and afraid of what happened to Hungary. He stated that the members of the Government lacked qualities of leadership and rather than take action are hoping for a miracle. The Government represented so small section of the country that any action it would take would not enjoy nationwide political support. Balabanoff had recommended that it was better for Bulgaria to register herself on the anti-German side even at the price of temporary German occupation. He had a violent altercation with Filoff the Regent who appears to be entirely on the German side as is Prince Kyril. Balabanoff stated that Kossievannoff had been called back from Bern and had been offered the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had declined saying that it was both too early and too late to do anything and had returned to Bern.

The Minister said that discussions are now taking place in Sofia regarding changes in the Government and that Bogranioff is mentioned as a possible Prime Minister. The present Prime Minister, Bojiloff, is very worried and more than any other Minister is prepared to make such changes as may ultimately allow a definite stand to be taken against Germany.

Balabanoff stated that the Bulgarians are much worried over the prolonged absence of the Russian Minister from Sofia. The Bulgarian Government asked the Soviet Government more than a month ago for their *agrément* to Radev as Bulgarian Minister at Moscow and have not received an answer. Balabanoff does not expect that the Russian *agrément* will be forthcoming since Radev is strongly pro-German. The Minister stated that it was true that the Russians had asked for Bulgaria's permission to reopen consulates in Varna and Burgas.

STEINHARDT

761.74/81 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 24, 1944.

[Received May 25—3:44 a. m.]

943. In conversation with Soviet Ambassador he indicated recent resignation of Bulgarian Cabinet had been precipitated by action of

his Government in protesting to Bulgarian Government at the use of the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas by the Germans as bases of operations against Soviet Union. Vinogradov said Bulgarian Government had replied to protest by denying truth of Soviet contention, stating an investigation had failed to disclose any basis for protest. Soviet Government had replied Bulgarian investigation could hardly be regarded as unbiased and had proposed Soviet Consulates in Varna and Burgas be immediately reopened so the Soviet Consuls could ascertain the facts. To this Bulgarian Government had replied there was insufficient consular work to justify reopening of the Consulate. Soviet answer that a continuation of German activities in Varna and Burgas would oblige Soviets to take appropriate measures, implying such measures would be of a drastic nature, appears to have resulted in resignation of Bulgarian Cabinet.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 EW (39)/2645½

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*⁷⁵

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

To the American Ambassador in Moscow in April were transmitted copies of notes of the Soviet Government, handed to Mr. Stamenov, Bulgarian Minister at Moscow, on April 17⁷⁶ and of the reply note of the Bulgarian Government, transmitted by Mr. Stamenov to Mr. V. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on April 24.⁷⁶ In reply to the above-mentioned note of the Bulgarian Government, on April 26 Mr. Molotov handed to Mr. Stamenov a note,⁷⁷ in which there was pointed out, that in spite of the statement of the Soviet Government to the effect that it has in its possession authentic facts regarding Germany's use of Bulgarian ports and aerodromes in the war against the Soviet Union, and that the Bulgarian Government in its reply note of April 24 has restrained itself to bare denials of these facts. There was pointed out further, that the proposal of the Bulgarian Government to submit it, for the purpose of checking, more detailed information, was not acceptable to the Soviet Government, since onesided checking of facts by the Bulgarian authorities cannot be regarded trustworthy by the Soviet Government. In this note, the Soviet Government pointed out the fact, that the Soviet Consulate at Varna was closed in fall of 1942 on request of the Bulgarian

⁷⁵ The Department reported receipt of this *aide-mémoire* in telegram 1403, June 2, midnight, to Moscow and summarized the document in telegrams 1481-1482, June 12, 8-9 p. m. (740.00119 E.W. 1939/2664a, 2653, 2671a).

⁷⁶ See telegram 1468, April 27, 7 p. m., from Moscow, p. 323.

⁷⁷ See telegram 1727, May 15, 2 p. m., from Moscow, p. 327.

authorities while the Consulates of countries, friendly to Germany continue to exist at Varna and other ports.

The Soviet Government has also pointed out the fact that for more than two years the Bulgarian authorities have denied the Soviet representatives at Sofia entrance to Black Sea and Danube ports. It was stated further, that, if the Bulgarian Government is striving to ascertain the facts and check them, this should be done not only by the representatives of the Bulgarian Government but by the representatives of the Soviet Government as well. In view of this, as it was said in the note, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to reestablish the Soviet Consulate at Varna, and also to set up Soviet Consulates at Burgas and Ruscuk on the Danube, and that the presence in these cities of Soviet Consulates could make it possible for the Soviet representatives together with the representatives of Bulgaria to carry out the necessary checking of facts on the spot and carry out such checking in the future if there will be a necessity for it.

In reply to the above-mentioned note of the Soviet Government of April 26, Mr. Stamenov handed to Mr. Molotov a note on May 6, in which the Bulgarian Government made an attempt to justify the closing down of the Soviet Consulate at Varna by the interruption of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria referring to the "juridical nature of trade consulates" and put the question of setting up Soviet consulates in Burgas and Ruscuk in subordination to the resumption of Bulgaro-Soviet economic relations. The Bulgarian Government promised to consider in the most favorable manner the wishes of the Soviet Government regarding the establishment of Soviet Consulates at Varna, Burgas and Ruscuk after the resumption of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria. It was pointed out in the note that Bulgaria desired to maintain "correct, loyal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union."

In reply to the above-mentioned note the Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. in Sofia on May 9 handed a note to D. Bashiloff.

It was said in the note that the Soviet Government did not interrupt trade relations with Bulgaria and that the economic ties with the latter had been interrupted due to the military operations on the Black Sea, and that the reference of the Bulgarian Government to the juridical nature of trade consulates was groundless, since trade consulates as such do not exist and Consulates do not deal with commercial matters. It was confirmed that the wish of the Soviet Government in regard to setting up Soviet Consulates at Varna, Ruscuk and Burgas was based on the necessity to make it possible for the Soviet representatives to check together with the Bulgarian representatives the facts relating to the utilization of Bulgarian ports and aerodromes by the Germans in military operations against the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government pointed out that the statement of the Bulgarian Government about its readiness to consider the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the setting up Soviet Consulates at Varna, Burgas and Ruscuk not before the economic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union are resumed, as a refusal to meet the wishes of the Soviet Government, and as the intention of the Bulgarian Government to render aid to Germany in the future as well by letting her utilize Bulgarian aerodromes and ports against the Soviet Union. It was pointed out further that the Soviet Government insists on the meeting its wishes to reestablish the Consulate at Varna and setting up Consulates at Burgas and Ruscuk.

On May 15 Mr. Bashiloff handed a reply of the Bulgarian Government to the above-mentioned note, to the Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. in Sofia.

In this note the Bulgarian Government stated that it noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Government admits that it has not interrupted trade relations with Bulgaria and that the economic relations with whom were interrupted because of military operations on the Black Sea. The Bulgarian Government stated that it considered it possible to develop economic relations with the Soviet Union through Turkey and asked the Soviet Government to consider again the arguments expressed in the note of the Bulgarian Government of May 6. The Bulgarian Government stressed again that it desired to maintain friendly relations between Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R.

In reply to the above note of the Bulgarian Government, the Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. handed on May 17 to Mr. Bashiloff, a reply note of the Soviet Government, in which the Soviet Government drew the attention of the Bulgarian Government to the incompatibility of facts of converting ports Varna and Burgas into German bases, utilized by Germany against the U.S.S.R., with normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria. The Soviet Government proposed to the Bulgarian Government to stop immediately the utilization of Bulgarian territory and Bulgarian ports by Fascist Germany against the Soviet Union.

It was pointed out in the note that in view of wholesale denials of these facts by the Bulgarian Government, the Soviet Government expressed a wish to reestablish the closed[,] on request of the Bulgarian Government, Soviet Consulate at Varna and set up Soviet Consulates at Burgas and Ruscuk with the purpose of making it possible for the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria to check the facts on the spot and carry out such checking in the future, in case of such a necessity and that the Bulgarian Government has restrained itself from a direct reply to this wish of the Soviet Government and has subordinated the question of setting up Soviet Consulates to the resumption of trade relations between Bulgaria and the

U.S.S.R., although there is no connection between the resumption of trade relations with the establishment of Soviet Consulates in Bulgaria. In view of this, the Soviet Government pointed out that the suggestion of the Bulgarian Government did not have any practical meaning due to military actions on the Black Sea and that the Soviet Government's statement regarding placing at the disposal of Hitlerite Germany Bulgarian ports and aerodromes cannot be denied and that the Bulgarian Government is seeking out pretexts to evade from a direct reply to the proposals of the Soviet Government regarding setting up Soviet Consulates in Bulgaria, and that, in view of the aforesaid, the Soviet Government insists that the Bulgarian Government meet the proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the reestablishment of the Soviet Consulate in Varna and setting up Soviet Consulates in Burgas and Ruseuk without further delay. The Soviet Government has warned the Government of Bulgaria that without meeting the wishes of the Soviet Government, the latter will consider it impossible to maintain relations with Bulgaria as a country which gives assistance and intends to give it in the future to Hitlerite Germany in its war against the Soviet Union.

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1944.

874.002/175 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, June 3, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 8:38 p. m.]

330R71. The new Bulgarian Cabinet comprises the following: Prime Minister and temporarily Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Bagryanov, scientific farmer friend of the dynasty; for Minister of Interior, Professor Alexander Stanishev, MD., a Macedonian; Education, Professor Mihail Arnaudov, Slavist, former tutor of Tsar Boris, guardian of King Simeon; Finance, Dimiter Savov, industrialist and financier, former President of the Sofia Chamber of Commerce and Bulgaro-Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce; Justice, Rusi Rusev, a new man, lawyer of moderate reputation; War, General Rusi Rusev, retained from Bozhilov Cabinet, regarded as mildly pro-German and an honest army administrator; Commerce, Hristo Vasilev, industrialist, former member of Parliament, politics and reputation unknown; Agriculture, Doncho Kostov, Professor in Agricultural College, studied in Germany and 3 years in America, held positions in Soviet Russia for 7 years until 1939; Communications, Boris Kolchev, Colonel in Army Engineers. Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Works are yet to be filled.

While this Cabinet contains strong pro-German elements it appears to be a cabinet which will not commit Bulgaria any further to the German cause. Bulgarian diplomatic representatives in Turkey regard the new Cabinet with satisfaction believing that its fundamental characteristic is the determination to maintain the present *status quo* in Bulgaria. Its composition indicates that this is its primary aim. It is believed that the new Government will endeavor to maintain present relations with Germany, at the same time avoiding any direct offense to the Soviets. It also aims to hold the support of the Macedonians both in Bulgaria and in Macedonia including the IMRO⁷⁸ to satisfy the agrarians and keep the loyalty and confidence of the army. This conclusion as to the policy is based on the following observations: Bagryanov, while neutral politically, is trusted by the dynasty, is only moderately pro-German and at the same time has the confidence of the peasants and of the agrarians generally; Savov and Kostov have Soviet connections, the first having served on the Bozhilov Trade Mission to Moscow in January 1940 and the second having spent 7 years in scientific agricultural works in Russia returning to Bulgaria in 1939. Stanishev, close friend of former King Boris, is a leading and trusted figure in Macedonian affairs, being also head of the Macedonian-German Association, pro-German in personal sympathies; Kostov, in addition to having Russian connection is one of the most prominent leaders in Bulgarian agricultural development, known and highly regarded everywhere in Bulgaria. Arnaudov, besides being trusted by the dynasty and generally pro-German, is a renowned Slavic scholar and strong exponent of Bulgarian national and literary traditions and folklore. Minister of War while a pro-German is not an extremist. Bagryanov and Kolchev have good military records, the latter being a specialist in military transport. Savov and Vasilev represent finance, trade and industry.

The Cabinet unites in the interest of the dynasty, the Macedonians, the Army, the farmers and industrialists. Labor interests thus far left out may yet be represented by the Minister of Public Works when appointed.

Thus the new Cabinet while ostensibly pro-German in its composition appears to be primarily a cabinet of Bulgarian national unity skillfully organized to represent the main trends in Bulgarian public life today and to avoid commitments to the extremists in any direction. The attitude of the man eventually appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs will give further indication of Government policy.

Repeated to Amrep, Algiers, for Murphy as No. 21 and true reading to MacVeagh, Cairo.

BERRY

⁷⁸ Internal Macedonian organization.

874.00/838 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, June 8, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

339. Bulgarian officials in Turkey believe Bagryanov's speech represents a complete change in Bulgarian policy. This conviction is based mainly on the following facts: The speech does not mention Hitler, Germany, an Axis victory, the New Order or Tsar Boris and his testament. It is also the first official statement of Bulgarian policy broadcast in Russian translation as well as in French and German.

Policies of preceding Governments are sharply criticised in the speech as having seriously affected the public welfare. The war is declared to have gone beyond the possibilities of the Bul[garian Government to c]ope with its problems and demands.

Instead of using the term "New Order" as all his recent predecessors have done, Bagryanov employs the term "New World" in which he says Bulgaria must find her place. He indicates also that Bulgaria must find a way to live without being compelled to make further heavy sacrifices for she has made sacrifices enough in the past.

The most important statement in the speech is "Our fate must be in our own hands". Evidently this means that the new Government does not expect the country to be saved by a German victory.

Thus the speech, as a declaration of policy, is interpreted to mean that henceforth Bulgaria will steer her own course according to her own interests.

If, as thus interpreted, the speech is evidence that the Bulgarian Government is now publicly taking the first sincere step to break away from the German alliance and its consequences, it would seem to be in the interest of the United Nations to give the new Government time to prove this intention.

Further weakening of Governmental authority in Bulgaria may result in internal confusion and anarchy on a dangerous scale.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers for Murphy as my No. 22 and true reading sent to MacVeagh in Cairo.

BERRY

874.002/179 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, June 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 6:09 p. m.]

347R75. The completed Bulgarian Cabinet: Ivan Bagryanov, Prime Minister; Purvan Draganov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor

Alexander Stanishev, MD, Minister of the Interior; Professor Mihail Arnaudov, Minister of Public Instruction; Dimiter Savov, Minister of Finance; Lieutenant General Rusi Rusev, Minister of National Defense; Hristo Vasilev, Minister of Commerce and Labor; lawyer Rusi Rusev, Minister of Agriculture, army engineer Boris Kolchev, Minister of Railways; lawyer Alexander Staliiski, Minister of Justice, Reserve Colonel Slaveiko Vasilev, Minister of Public Works.

Doncho Kostov, Minister of Agriculture in Bagryanov's first Cabinet, resigned. He was regarded as friendly to Soviet Russia. Hence his resignation seems to indicate a concession to the anti-Soviet element.

Three new Ministers have been added to the Cabinet in this latest reorganization namely Draganov, Staliiski and Vasilev. Draganov was Bulgarian Minister in Berlin until 1942 when he was transferred by King Boris to Madrid. The primary reason for his transfer is said to have been German complaint that he was lukewarm with regard to the Bulgarian alliance with the Axis. He was sent to Madrid for the purpose of keeping King Boris informed of affairs outside Axis dominated Europe.

Staliiski in the past has shown strong support of the Fascist concept of the state, having written a book entitled *The State and the Fascist Philosophy*.

Vasilev is President of the powerful union of reserve officers including reserve commissioned and non-commissioned officers said to number about 200,000 members.

While many members of the new Cabinet have been in the past associated with the Alliance with Germany and have expressed pro-German sentiment, they are believed to be primarily Bulgarian nationalists interested in the preservation of the independence of the Bulgarian state and nation. The only statement of policy of this Cabinet to date was that made on June 3 by Prime Minister Bagryanov which declared that the fate of Bulgaria rested entirely in Bulgarian hands and that Bulgaria must find her place in the new world which is coming into being as a result of this war. Please see my telegram No. 339R72 of June 8, 5 p. m. Thus the Cabinet has as its task to maintain the unity of the Bulgarian people and to preserve Bulgaria as an independent nation under the circumstances of a German defeat which will leave Bulgaria to find her own way out of the war.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as my No. 25 and true reading sent to MacVeagh in Cairo.

BERRY

740.0011 European War, 1939/34724 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, June 15, 1944—noon.

[Received 7:36 p. m.]

351R77. The composition of the Bagryanov Cabinet indicates that the Bulgarian Army is likely to play an increasingly important role in the political life of the country. In addition to the Minister of War, General Rusev, Bagryanov, Vasilev and Kolchev are all ex-Army officers. They represent the point of view of the army. The army is the strongest and generally the most reliable force in Bulgarian public life. As the army is universally conscripted and the highest army posts are open to able officers regardless of their social origin, the army is truly national and has the confidence of the great mass of the people, including townsmen and peasantry. During the first year of the present war when the outcome of the struggle was uncertain the strong determination of the Army was that Bulgaria must not again fall into a catastrophe like that of 1918. The army turned to the Axis side only when an Axis victory appeared certain, but even then the army was unwilling to take an active part in the war. It is believed that the present position of the army can be summed up in the phrases: The maintenance of the dynasty, the preservation of the state, the defense of the nation.

In view of the growing realization of a certain German defeat we may expect the Bulgarian Army to resume the position it held at the beginning of the war, namely, that a national catastrophe such as that of 1918 must be avoided at all cost.

With the army thought so developing and the army position so strongly entrenched in the Cabinet that it is likely to be decisive in the formation of Bulgarian policy, the United Nations now have the opportunity, by skillfully exploiting this circumstance, to lay the foundation for the eventual withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war on terms acceptable to the United Nations.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers for Murphy as my 27. True reading sent to MacVeagh in Cairo.

BERRY

740.00119 European War, 1939/2678 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, June 16, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

354R78. Several recent telegrams in this office's Bulgarian series contained suggestions that the time may be ripe for the United Na-

tions to capitalize upon the Bagryanov Cabinet's shift to a new direction of national policy. This telegram contains suggestions based upon information from Bulgaria that offer a means toward that end.

First, it is recommended that the United Nations change the directive of their propaganda directed to Bulgaria. It is commonly agreed by persons familiar with Bulgarian public opinion that Anglo-American propaganda generally misses its mark because it is destructive rather than constructive, attacking Bulgarian policies and threatening without showing a practicable way by which Bulgaria could change her policies or alter her course to the advantage of the country as Bulgarians themselves understand it. This approach may have been useful during the period when the Filov and Boshilov Governments were in power but seems a mistake at present.

Secondly, it is suggested that a statement be made by the Secretary or some other highly regarded American official, indicating Anglo-American postwar policy concerning Bulgaria. If a statement is made it is important that it be made by an American as deep rooted suspicion of British political intentions would indicate the effect in Bulgaria of a statement from a British personality. If such a statement could say that Anglo-American policy does not envisage any change in Bulgaria's frontiers as of March 1941, or any interference in the structure of the Bulgarian Government or social system and that the independence of Bulgaria will be fully recognized provided of course that Bulgaria gives up the occupied Yugoslav and Greek territory which Bulgarians know as Macedonia and Belomoriye it would do much to convince the great majority of Bulgarians who live within the confines of the old Kingdom that it would be to the advantage of the nation to surrender claims to Macedonia and Belomoriye in order to preserve national independence and to avoid the military and social disaster which would result from an attempt to hold these lands.

The present moment is propitious for such a statement, for the new Cabinet, [it] is generally assumed, has at least changed the direction of national policy and is trying to develop a policy in conformity with demands of the new world, as Bagryanov intimated in his speech of June 3rd and at the same time Allied military successes in Italy and Normandy have eliminated any belief among Bulgarians that Germany can wage a successful defensive war.

Repeated to American representative Algiers for Murphy as my No. 28 and true reading to MacVeagh, Cairo.

BERRY

874.002/182 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, June 22, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

367R83. The attitude of Bulgarian officials in Turkey toward the Bagryanov Cabinet and the official explanation of the general situation in Bulgaria at the present moment are presented in the following statements made by a prominent Bulgarian now in Istanbul on an official mission.

The Cabinet is both led and dominated by Bagryanov whose policy of national preservation was expressed in general terms in his statement of June 3rd. This statement remains fundamental to an understanding of present policies.

Bagryanov is exercising close control over foreign affairs. Foreign Minister Draganov is responsible primarily for the general administration of the office rather than for policy making. Draganov is valuable in this capacity particularly because his wide diplomatic experience during the last 6 years has made him something of an authority on Axis policy and views as understood and interpreted both within and outside of Germany and Axis-dominated countries.

The internal situation is regarded as reasonably satisfactory and considerably improved over a month or two ago. This improvement is shown by the recent order of Bagryanov revoking the special powers exercised hitherto by the military authorities in areas in which Partisans [and] other opposition elements have been active. According to Bagryanov's new order, all Partisans and other disturbers of the peace when apprehended will be tried in the regular courts in accordance with customary judicial procedure instead of being turned over to military authorities for summary punishment under martial law. This is regarded as an indication that the Government does not now fear any kind of uprising or any movement within Bulgaria comparable to the Tito movement in Yugoslavia. Measures to remove local discontent and to gain internal support for the Government include a proposal for general amnesty of political offenders, the recent announcement of an increase of 30% to 50% in the prices of principal farm products and an increase of 30% to 50% in salaries of Government employees. These measures are regarded as realistic and effective as contrasted with ineffective propaganda scheme of the Bozhilov government known as "obshtestvenasila" or social strength.

Bulgarian policy is now being directed toward improving relations with Soviets. Progress in this direction is believed to have been made since Bagryanov came into office. A straw showing the direction of the current in this respect is seen in the fact that Russian

music is now frequently broadcast by the Sofia radio. The strong Anglo-American influence in Greece and Yugoslavia and the popular sentiment in both countries toward Anglo-Americans is regarded by Bulgarians as a sufficient guarantee of some Soviet favor toward Bulgaria and as indicating the policy which Bulgaria in her own interest must pursue toward Russia. Regarding Macedonia and Thrace, it is believed Bagryanov will follow a course of political expediency, the army continues to exercise the strongest single influence on the Government and the Government can take no important decision without the tacit consent of the army. However, the degree of unity among military leaders and in army sentiment is not great enough to permit an open break with Germany at the present moment through a *coup d'état* or an attempt to deprive the Germans of all control within the country. Bulgarians believe that some weeks will still elapse before it is necessary for their Government to take irrevocable decisions in one direction or another. They think the crisis for Bulgaria will come if and when the Red Army invades Rumania and Anglo-American forces land east of the Adriatic. They think this combination of events will not occur before Anglo-American forces have occupied northern Italy. Meanwhile they believe the Bagryanov Cabinet will continue to build up the internal unity of the country, further cultivate Moscow but not break altogether with Germany until the day of final decision arrives.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers for Murphy as my No. 32 and true reading sent to MacVeagh in Cairo.

BERRY

740.00119 EAC/194

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

No. 4268

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1944.

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's telegram No. 4597 (Eacom 21) of June 9, 1944⁷⁹ and encloses herewith a copy of a document entitled "Proposed Terms of Surrender for Bulgaria" (WS-162b). This paper has been cleared by the Working Security Committee and has also been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Department. It presents, therefore, for the information and guidance of the Embassy, the policy to be followed with regard to the terms of surrender for Bulgaria and supersedes the other documents submitted with the Department's instruction No. 4057 of May 11, 1944.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Not printed.

[Enclosure]

WS-162b
(CAC-229b)

JUNE 17, 1944.

PROPOSED TERMS OF SURRENDER FOR BULGARIA

I. THE PROBLEM

In view of the recent statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the desirability of the withdrawal of the Axis satellites from the war, and of the advantageous position which will be created for the United Nations by the continued progress of the military campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front, serious consideration should be given to the means available for hastening Bulgarian surrender. Furthermore, the declaration issued by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on May 12, 1944,⁸⁰ implied that an early capitulation of the Axis satellites would be rewarded by less severe terms than those which would be imposed if they refused to surrender before the defeat of Germany.

The chief problem is to determine the degree to which this could be accomplished without compromising the war aims of the United Nations. Over-generous terms would not only tend to alienate members of the United Nations which have suffered from Bulgaria's participation in the war on the side of the Axis, principally Greece and Yugoslavia, but might also appear to justify within Bulgaria the policies of the pro-Axis groups which have guided Bulgaria's policy since 1940. Unduly stringent terms, on the other hand, would probably fail to win the support of any important section of Bulgarian opinion and might even strengthen the determination of the Bulgarian government to continue resistance.

II. TERMS OF SURRENDER

A. *Obligations to be Imposed on Bulgaria*

1. *The Signatories.*—The instrument providing for the termination of hostilities should be signed by the Allied Theater Commander, by the Chief of the High Command of the Bulgarian Armed Forces or his representative and, if possible, by an authorized civilian official representing the Bulgarian Government.

2. *Evacuation of Occupied Territories.*—Without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Bulgarian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than territory held by Bulgaria on January 1, 1940, their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the occupation authorities. Bulgarian officials in such areas, except those whose continued presence

⁸⁰ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1944, p. 425.

is desired by the occupation authorities, should likewise be withdrawn. Individuals or units in such areas may be designated to be held as prisoners of war.

3. *Right-of-Occupation*.—The Allied Governments signatory to the instrument of surrender should have the right to occupy with any forces they may designate and in any way they deem necessary, and to utilize in any way they deem appropriate, any or all parts of Bulgarian territory heretofore acknowledged to be under Bulgarian sovereignty or in dispute as to such sovereignty, and to exercise throughout the country the legal rights of an occupying power.

4. *Terms of Occupation*.—In case the occupation of all or a part of Bulgaria should be found necessary to the prosecution of the war, Bulgaria should place at the disposal of the occupation authorities such troops, materials of war, public and private archives, and communication, information transportation and power facilities as the occupation authorities may demand. This assistance will be used by the Allied forces in their military operations against Germany. Bulgaria will not, however, be given the status of co-belligerency. The occupation authorities may determine, according to the circumstances, the degree of Bulgarian disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.

5. *Maintenance of Order*.—In case Bulgaria should not be occupied, or in such parts of Bulgaria as may not be occupied, the maintenance of order will be the responsibility of such Bulgarian Government as may be established with the approval of the Allied signatory Governments. In addition to its ordinary responsibilities, the Bulgarian Government will be required to hold and to deliver as directed by the Allied signatory Governments all Axis nationals and persons designated as war criminals who may be found on Bulgarian soil.

6. *Prisoners of War*.—Bulgaria should be obligated to release, as directed by the occupation authorities and to protect in their persons and property, pending release, all prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, all other nationals of those countries, who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be similarly confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of Bulgarian or Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, creed, color or political belief.

7. *Reparation and Restitution*.—Bulgaria should be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the United Nations may require. Bulgaria should also be required to take all necessary measures to safeguard all property removed from territory which has been under Bulgarian occupation or control, and all property in Bulgaria belonging to the governments or nationals of the United Nations.

8. *Economic Reconstruction.*—Bulgaria should be required to assist and cooperate with the United Nations in such measures for relief, rehabilitation, and economic reconstruction as the United Nations may decide to undertake.

B. Eventual Advantages for Bulgaria

In case the military and political situation obtaining at the time of the negotiations for surrender should warrant it, the United Nations should be prepared to offer positive inducements to Bulgaria in return for its withdrawal from the Axis. The full terms suggested below should be regarded as the maximum concessions to be made in case Bulgaria should disarm the German armed forces within its frontiers and deliver them with their equipment to the Allied forces. If, on the other hand, Bulgaria should delay surrender until the defeat of Germany is imminent, the United Nations should make no concessions to Bulgaria except with respect to the ultimate restoration of its independence.

1. *Independence.*—Independence of Bulgaria after the war and its territorial integrity within its 1939 frontiers could be assured. One of the main fears of the Bulgarian people is a partition of the country and the destruction of its independence. The assurance that this is not the intention of the United Nations would facilitate the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the Axis.

2. *Occupation.*—Bulgaria might be assured that neither Greek nor Yugoslav troops will participate in the occupation. In view of the deep traditional antagonism which exists between the Bulgarian, Greek and Yugoslav peoples, an attempt to use the troops of the latter on Bulgarian soil would in all likelihood result in widespread disorders and lasting resentments.

3. *Territorial Settlement.*—Bulgaria could be assured that at the final settlement it will be permitted to retain Southern Dobruja. This territory, of which two-thirds of the population is Bulgarian and one-third Turkish, was ceded to Bulgaria by Rumania as a result of friendly negotiations in September 1940. While the actual cession was made under Axis auspices, negotiations to that end had been in progress for some time previously. It received the public approval of the British and Soviet Governments.

Bulgaria also has extensive claims in Yugoslav Macedonia and in Greek Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. In these territories, however, the Bulgarian case is by no means convincing. The Bulgarian record has also been marred by its illegal seizure and harsh administration of these territories during the present war. Any attempt on the part of the United Nations to satisfy these Bulgarian claims would therefore be likely to promote disunity among the

United Nations and to prejudice an equitable territorial settlement after the war.

4. *Economic Settlement*.—In assessing Bulgaria's reparations obligations, it will not be the intention of the United Nations to impose such an economic burden on the country as to reduce disastrously its standard of living or to endanger permanently its economic independence.

740.00119 EW/7-644 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, July 6, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received July 7—6:55 p. m.]

400R88. The Bulgarian⁸³ who provided the information for my telegrams 413 of October 22, 2 p. m.,⁸⁴ 201, March 25, 11 p. m. and 256 of April 21, 2 p. m. asked on July 4 to see a member of the staff of this office.

He told him that he had been certain when the Bagryanov government came into office that it would direct its primary efforts to save Bulgaria from its present dangerous situation and would seek a way to withdraw from the war at the earliest opportunity. He said that he has consistently represented to Filov the seriousness of Bulgaria's present position and warned of the danger of delay in taking the initiative in coming to terms with the Allies.

Now he continued on the basis of his last report to Filov made about June 25 Balabanov, the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, has received instructions from Foreign Minister Draganov to return to Sofia immediately to discuss further the statements made by our informant and to deliver other despatches from him on the same subject. The informant said that Balabanov will leave Istanbul July 8 for Sofia. He regards Balabanov's return to Sofia under these conditions as indicative of the present attitude of the Bulgarian Government and believes that he will return shortly with some communication from his Government to the American Government relative to withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war. In reply the informant was told (reference Department's 233 of October 30, 8 p. m.⁸⁴) that this office would forward by the most secret means any communication he might be authorized to make on the instruction of his Government.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers for Murphy as my No. 37 and true reading sent to MacVeagh in Cairo.

BERRY

⁸³ George P. Kisseloff.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

740.00119 EW/7-1344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 13, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received July 13—3 p. m.]

5533. Comea 69. Thank you for your instruction No. 4268 of July 5 transmitting WS-162b with regard to surrender terms for Bulgaria.

The British delegation is about to circulate in the Commission a paper⁸⁵ on the same subject, an advance copy of which I am tomorrow sending you by air courier. The British paper lays down a set of basic principles which they feel will be applicable regardless of the time Bulgaria surrenders. While this approach is somewhat broader than ours, I have reason to believe the British will go along with our proposals which cover the possibility of Bulgaria's early withdrawal from the war.

If you approve,⁸⁶ I should like to circulate in the Commission an American paper based on WS-162b. In fact I think that document might be used almost verbatim although I have a few alterations to suggest. When the British and American papers have been circulated, we will be in a position to invite the Russian delegate to express his views and then presumably we should be able to work out a single document representing the recommendations of the Commission.

It would be appreciated if you would let me know by telegraph whether you approve the suggested procedure and the following amendments to WS-162b which would make that paper more suitable for presentation to the Commission.

In the introductory first paragraph, omit "of the recent statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the desirability of the withdrawal of the Axis satellites from the war and".

On page 4, section 3, substitute the following for the first paragraph: "The principal Allied governments will be prepared at the final peace settlement to use their influence in favor of the retention of southern Dobruja by Bulgaria. Pending this settlement Bulgarian officials would be permitted to administer southern Dobruja and, if circumstances made such action necessary, units of the Bulgarian Armed Forces might be stationed there at a strength to be determined by the Allied Theater Commander."

WINANT

⁸⁵ *Infra.*

⁸⁶ The Department's approval was given in telegram 5563, July 15, to London (740.00119EAC/7-1344). Accordingly, the American document (E.A.C. (44) 21, July 26) was circulated in the European Advisory Commission on July 26, and copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 17135, July 27 (740.00119EAC/7-2744).

740.00119 EAC/7-1344

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 16837

LONDON, July 13, 1944.

[Received July 18—4:24 p. m.]

SIR: With reference to Comea 69 of July 13, in connection with terms of surrender for Bulgaria, I have the honor to transmit a draft memorandum on the same subject which the British Representative on the European Advisory Commission intends to circulate in the Commission within a few days.

The United States Representative plans shortly thereafter to circulate a memorandum embodying the substance of WS-162b, "Proposed Terms of Surrender for Bulgaria", subject to the Department's approval of the changes suggested in the telegram under reference. When both papers have been circulated the Soviet Representative will be invited to express his views. Presumably the next step would be to work out a single document representing the recommendations of the Commission.

It is believed that the United States proposals will tie in with the British "conditions", which are phrased in such broad language as to be applicable to almost any situation regardless of the time of the surrender of Bulgaria. It is understood that the British will be willing to approach the subject from the point of view of the United States paper, that is, to consider now the terms to be applied in the event Bulgaria withdraws from the war before the defeat of Germany is imminent.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
E. ALLAN LIGHTNER, JR.
*Secretary, U. S. Delegation
European Advisory Commission*

[Enclosure]

SURRENDER TERMS FOR BULGARIA: MEMORANDUM BY U.K.
REPRESENTATIVE ⁸⁷

The E.A.C. has been instructed to submit its recommendations on the subject of surrender terms for Bulgaria.

2. Whilst the detailed requirements of the Allies will depend on the circumstances in which the surrender of Bulgaria takes place, there are certain basic conditions which Bulgaria must in any case fulfil. It should thus be possible to agree now on an Instrument of Surrender

⁸⁷ Circulated within the European Advisory Commission as E.A.C. (44) 22, July 26, 1944.

which sets out these conditions and provides in addition for the necessary powers to ensure the execution of those terms and such further requirements as the Allies may wish to impose.

2 [3]. I accordingly suggest that the Instrument of Surrender for Bulgaria should provide for:—

(a) Withdrawal of Bulgarian troops, officials and intruded persons from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

(b) Release of Allied prisoners-of-war and internees.

(c) Restoration of Allied property and reparation for war damage.

(d) Apprehension and surrender of war criminals.

(e) Rupture of relations with Germany and other enemy powers, internment of their troops and nationals, and control of their property.

(f) Allied use or occupation of Bulgarian territory, (including occupation costs).

(g) Bulgarian compliance with Allied instructions relating to disarmament and demobilisation and the surrender, disposal, use or control of war material, property, resources and facilities in or belonging to Bulgaria.

(h) Supply of information.

(i) Appointment of an Allied Control Commission or Allied representatives in Bulgaria.

4. If the surrender of Bulgaria takes place at a moment when action by Bulgaria could contribute materially towards hastening Germany's defeat it would be necessary to specify what form such action should take: for instance sabotage of German communications, interference with supplies for Germany, assistance to partisan activities; or an undertaking that the Bulgarian army would defend Bulgarian territory against German attack. As an inducement to the Bulgarian Government to take such action, the Allied Governments might, without according Bulgaria the status of co-belligerency, give her certain assurances: for instance that they recognise that Bulgaria would henceforward be in a position to work her passage home and that account would be taken in determining the peace terms to be ultimately imposed on Bulgaria of her contribution towards hastening Germany's defeat.

740.00119 EW/7-1944: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Istanbul (Berry)

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1944—noon.

331. British Foreign Office, as reported in London's 5526 July 13,⁸⁸ believes that the Bulgarian Government desires to desert Germany but has not yet determined on a course of action, and that it is now attempting to obtain German withdrawal from the Varna region to appease the Russians.

⁸⁸ Not printed.

In this connection please keep the Department currently informed of anything you are able to learn concerning Balabanoff's talks in Sofia. If the Bulgarians intend to send out an emissary (Department's 245 of April 7, 8 p. m.), they must realize that their time is running out.

For your confidential information the Department has sent to the American representative on the European Advisory Commission a revision of the original paper on terms of surrender for Bulgaria,⁸⁹ taking into account modifications of the unconditional surrender formula.

HULL

740.00119 EW/7-2144 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, July 21, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 3:49 p. m.]

429R91. The following is a paraphrased translation of a document brought back from Sofia yesterday by Balabanov, Bulgarian Minister to Turkey. It was given by him to our confidential informant (reference my telegram No. 400 of July 6, 5 p. m.) for transmission to the American Government as foreseen in the above telegram. The translation was made by Dr. Black formerly on the staff of this office, from the original which is unsigned and is retained by the informant.

Begin paraphrase: The Bulgarian Government's policy in its main lines was set forth in the speech of the Prime Minister (see my telegram No. 339 of June 8, 5 p. m.). From this speech it is evident that the fate of Bulgaria rests entirely in Bulgarian hands. The policy of the Government will be directed exclusively to the interests of Bulgaria. The ultimate purpose of this policy will be to get Bulgaria out of the war as conditions make this purpose possible having in view a situation favorable to future peace.

Toward the end of solving national problems by practical peaceful means the Government is moving with all possible speed. Among its decisive achievements within the short time since it came into office the following are enumerated:

1. German transit trains across Bulgarian territory to Rumania have been reduced from eight a week to one a week and within a short time the one remaining train will be discontinued. Hence Bulgaria has ceased to be a transit area for German military transport.

2. At the demand of the Government the Germans have withdrawn all their offensive military forces from the Black Sea coast and from Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government has made it possible for the Soviet diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria to verify this fact.

3. Within the short period of its existence the Government has brought about the rapid internal pacification and social unification of the country as is indicated by the fact that a number of Communist groups have now taken a regular place in the national economy.

⁸⁹ See telegram 5533, July 13, 6 p. m., from London, and footnote 86, p. 345.

4. The Government now has under consideration the withdrawal of the Bulgarian forces in Serbia, leaving in that country only the minimum units required for the military and political defense of Bulgaria's frontiers as at present delineated, the Government will endeavor to act in such a way as not to make worse the military and political situation in Bulgaria. It has in view shortly to issue a general amnesty for political offenders. This amnesty is made it [*sic*] possible by the confidence of the nation in the Government, which will continue to carry on its policy of internal conciliation. In this connection the conditions of the Jews have been very much alleviated. In pursuance of the policy of conciliation toward the Jews, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has already summoned the governing committee of the Jewish community in Bulgaria and given assurance that all Jews will be treated in accordance with the laws of Bulgaria. This assurance was received by the members of the Jewish Committee with lively appreciation.

The Government is doing everything possible to get Bulgaria out of the war, at the same time presenting [*preserving?*] the vigor and unity of the nation. In pursuance of this purpose it now has under consideration the whole question of the exit of Bulgaria from the war and the development of a policy independent of the Axis, having in view purely Balkan interest. In order to take a definitive decision in this direction it would be most useful to the Government and it would facilitate its decision if it could know the attitude of Washington on Balkan problems and particularly in regard to the position of Bulgaria in the future political arrangement in the Balkans. *End paraphrase.*

In view of the extreme secrecy which source attaches to this statement, any hint of which might cause the downfall of the Bagryanov government and the advent of a more pro-German regime, I am not repeating it to any other office. Source especially asked that it not be shown to the Russians but no assurance was given of that. Statement on the Jewish situation indicates reaction of Bulgarian Government to strong advices sent to Sofia by source following my informing him of the gist of the Department's attitude concerning rescue and relief of Jewish Axis Europe. Other views brought back by Balabanov are being forwarded in separate telegram.⁹⁰

BERRY

740.00119 E.W./7-2144: Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, July 21, 1944—noon.

[Received 10:56 p. m.]

430R92. Source close to Bulgarian Government reports following political and military information brought back to Turkey by Balabanov.

⁹⁰ *Infra.*

1. The Government's policy of internal pacification is succeeding. Partisans in Bulgaria now number not more than 2,000. Russia is worried by this since population is not rising against government as desired by unofficial Soviet propaganda.

2. Regarding official relations with Russia, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has had two meetings with Bagryanov and two with Draganov within last few days, indicating that Russia will soon satisfy certain Bulgarian demands but not specifying what.

3. Draganov has openly received leaders of Jewish community in Bulgaria, promising them that Jews will be treated in accordance with Bulgarian law. This indicates a changed attitude in their behalf. Sofia has announced that all facilities will be given Jews to leave Bulgaria without hindrance.

4. Bulgarian Government has given orders to anti-aircraft artillery not to fire on American planes in transit over Bulgarian territory unless Bulgarian territory is directly attacked. This follows devastating Allied attack on Karlovo believed to have been provoked when planes heading for Rumania were imprudently fired upon inducing them to turn to attack the Bulgarians also.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers for Murphy as my No. 40 and true reading to MacVeagh, Cairo.

BERRY

740.00119 E.W./7-2144 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, July 21, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

431R93. Source of information from Bulgarian Government just transmitted to Department has been ordered to Sofia to discuss the situation. He would like and is willing to wait for some statement to the American attitude on a Balkan settlement. It would be helpful to Bulgaria in her present dilemma, source says, to know whether American Government desires settlement in Balkans most likely to promote Balkan peace and prosperous peaceful Bulgarian state within frontiers to be established at peace conference.

With reference to paragraph 4 of telegram No. 430R92 of July 21, noon, source would like take back with him to Sofia a statement that Washington notes with satisfaction Bulgaria will not fire on American planes passing over but not attacking Bulgarian territory and that attention of American commanders has been drawn to this fact.

Please advise me urgently whether anything in nature of these two replies can be transmitted to source.

No distribution made from Istanbul of this telegram.

BERRY

874.00/7-2144

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

No. 3264 (R-2998)

ISTANBUL, July 21, 1944.

[Received August 1—10:09 a. m.]

SIR: I have the honor to present below some views on the present situation of Bulgaria, especially with regard to Russia and the Western Democracies, expressed by a person close to the Bulgarian Government who has been the source for some of my recent secret telegrams. Two questions seem to be the primary concern of the Bulgarian Government nowadays, that of internal order and unity and that of relations with Russia. This despatch deals primarily with the latter and its bearing on Bulgaria's relations with the Western Democracies.

Internal Affairs:

Contrary to notices in the newspapers the Bulgarian Parliament did not meet in emergency session on July 15th. However, it probably will meet soon. At that time, Bagryanov, who has not yet met Parliament, must ask for a vote of confidence—perhaps on the question of his economic decrees.

The source thinks the Jewish question is too touchy for the Government to place before Parliament now. Therefore, no immediate change in Jewish laws is now likely for the Council of Ministers has not the power to change laws by decree. Changes must be made by Parliament. The Government's power of decree is used only to initiate new laws.

No member of the Bagryanov Government is anti-Jewish in background. The nearest to this is Staliisky who has been a strong advocate of Fascism, but of the Italian rather than the German brand.

Relations with Russia:

Perhaps the most interesting and at the same time the most delicate information from our source is that there is a current belief among Bulgarians of high rank that a clear divergence of views on Balkan affairs exists today between Moscow on the one hand and London and Washington on the other. Russia resents any effort of the Anglo-Americans to gain favor in the Balkans and especially among the Slavic Balkan peoples. Russia does not recognize spheres of influence in the Balkans.

Bulgaria, seeing this divergence, hopes to reach a bargain between the two divisions. Bulgaria wants to walk arm in arm both with the West and with the East, much as Czechoslovakia is doing in Central Europe. The Bulgarian connections with Russia are so strong that the Anglo-Americans probably won't do anything to offend Russia. Inevitably, therefore, Bulgaria will go a certain distance with Russia,

but how far depends on Anglo-American diplomacy. The present Allied policy of saying nothing tends to push Bulgaria towards Russia. This policy of the great western Allies may be compared with their efforts to win favor in Yugoslavia, a policy which Russia does not approve.

In the informant's opinion, Russia is not going to see her hegemony in the Balkans disturbed after this war. Russia has directed her policy towards this hegemony for 200 years, especially in the Nineteenth Century when she was thwarted by such events as the Treaty of Berlin.⁹¹ Russia will want a Bulgarian Government favorable to Moscow and unable to make major decisions, especially in foreign policy, without consent from Moscow. In other words, Russia will want to put a collar on Bulgaria; and, if the Anglo-Americans press too hard for favor in the Balkans, Russia might even annex Bulgaria.

The amount of territory allowed Bulgaria after the War, the informant thinks, will depend on the divergence of attitude between London and Moscow. If this divergence is great, Russia will demand a strong Bulgaria with some of Macedonia and some outlet on the Aegean. This, in a way, will be a repetition of San Stefano,⁹² but this time other powers will not be able to force a revision as was done in the Treaty of Berlin. Anglo-American and Russian agreement on Balkan questions may have been reached in part at Tehran,⁹³ but as the situation develops it will take on form regardless of preliminary agreements.

Thus, here is one more confirmation that the key to the situation in Bulgaria is Russia, as has often been pointed out by this office, and that no settlement is possible there without her. This fundamental conception is becoming much more important now that restoration of order in the Balkans is approaching the point of realization. Recent statements by persons who claim to be informed, that the Bulgarian Parliament was about to meet to break relations with Russia, are ridiculous. No Bulgarian would take this step today at a time when the Red Army is enjoying its greatest successes on the Eastern Front, unless he were drunk or insane. Therefore, the informant is convinced now more than ever that his interpretation of the present Bulgarian Government (reference recent telegrams on this subject) is the correct one.

Respectfully yours,

BURTON Y. BERRY

⁹¹ Signed July 13, 1878; *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXIX, p. 749.

⁹² Treaty of peace signed on March 3, 1878, between Russia and Turkey; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 866, or *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXIX, p. 732.

⁹³ President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin met at Tehran from November 27 to December 1, 1943; for documentation concerning this meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

740.00119 EW/7-2144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Istanbul (Berry)

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1944—6 p. m.

340. The Department is transmitting the substance of your three telegrams of July 21 (430R91 [*429R91*] to 430R93 [*431R93*]) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as to our Embassies at London and Moscow.

Pending an expression of their views, and for your own information, the Department finds that the concessions indicated by the Bulgarians appear to be of no great value. No action short of an actual severance of relations with Germany is regarded as satisfactory at this stage. The degree of consideration to be accorded Bulgaria's claims following the cessation of hostilities would, of course, be largely influenced by the aid and cooperation afforded Allied forces in support of an early defeat of Germany.

Your informant may be advised that the Department is awaiting the views of the American military authorities, but that its present opinion is that negotiations cannot be satisfactorily conducted unless an emissary empowered to speak for the Bulgarian Government is sent to a convenient location, preferably Cairo, to meet with representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union; the latter, though not at war with Bulgaria, having indicated a desire to participate in any eventual conversations. You should stress the urgency of any action Bulgarians may intend to take (see Department's 331, July 19, noon).⁹⁴

Further instructions will be sent to you as soon as the views of the Joint Chiefs and the two other Governments can be ascertained.

HULL

740.00119 EW/7-2944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 29, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received July 30—3:35 a. m.]

2806. I left with Vyshinski ⁹⁵ today and [*an*] *aide-mémoire* containing the substance of the Department's 1733, July 27, 2 p. m.⁹⁶ In reply

⁹⁴ In telegram 454, August 3, 6 p. m., the Consul General at Istanbul reported that his source left for Sofia on August 1 with the information given him (740.00119 EW/8-344).

⁹⁵ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁶ Not printed; it summarized Bulgarian reports in telegrams from Istanbul (740.00119 E.W./7-2744).

to my inquiries Vyshinski stated that the Soviet Government had received no recent information on the situation in Bulgaria and that, although he wished to study carefully the *aide-mémoire*, it was difficult for him to say at this time how seriously the Bulgarian statements should be taken.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/7-2744 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1944—midnight.

1858. Department's 1783 July 27.⁹⁷ In the matter of the prospective peace talks with the Bulgarians, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now replied⁹⁸ that notwithstanding the favorable progress of the war in Europe, the detachment of Bulgaria from the Axis is of considerable military importance and that if the Bulgarians should decide definitely to ask for peace terms along these lines it would be most useful to follow up this project vigorously.

Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that this Government proposes that the Bulgarians be told that they may still take advantage of the procedure which was agreed to last March by the Soviet, British and American Governments, for talks to be held at Cairo.

Since from the Allied point of view it is important that there should be no delay, the Department hopes that our three Governments can reach prompt agreement in this sense. The Department will then authorize the American Consul General at Istanbul to remind his contact with the Bulgarians that as long ago as last March the three principal Allies agreed to receive at Cairo a Bulgarian mission and hear what they have to say, and to state that if the Bulgarian Government is genuinely ready immediately to conclude an armistice, a fully empowered emissary or mission should be despatched in order that the talks can now begin.

A similar telegram is being sent to London.⁹⁹

Your 2806 July 29 has been received.

STETTINIUS

⁹⁷ See footnote 96, p. 353.

⁹⁸ Letter of August 2, not printed.

⁹⁹ Telegram 6167, August 4, midnight; repeated as 58, August 5, to Cairo; paraphrase sent in telegram 348, August 4, 8 p. m., to Istanbul.

740.00119 E.W./8-1244 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1944—3 p. m.

6385. Department's 6167.¹ The British Embassy has given us the substance of a telegram from the Foreign Office dated August 4, stating that it had referred the Bulgarian proposals to the British Chief of Staff and was meanwhile giving you an interim reply indicating that it considered the approach in its present form valueless and suggesting that the Bulgarians be told that if they really wished to sue for terms they should send a qualified emissary to meet Allied representatives at Cairo. If you have received nothing from the Foreign Office in this connection, please inquire as to the present status of the matter.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/8-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 12, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received August 13—3:15 p. m.]

2971. Reference my 2806, July 29, 8 p. m. Last night I asked Molotov what the Soviet Government's attitude was regarding the recent peace feelers by Bulgarians. He said that the matter was still being studied and that the Soviet Government had not come to a conclusion. Although there was no doubt that the situation had changed and that at some time Bulgaria would move, he did not know whether the situation had developed sufficiently favorably to take the matter seriously at this time. The Turkish move in breaking relations with Germany² had undoubtedly had an influence in Bulgaria and other factors especially the military were at work. He said that he would let me know as soon as they had made up their minds.

In reply to his question as to how seriously we took the feeler, I told him that we had not sufficient information to make up our minds and were counting on his advice as his sources of information were so much more intimate. We felt however that the door should always be kept open and any serious move on the part of Bulgaria encouraged.

HARRIMAN

¹ See footnote 99, p. 354.

² See press release issued by the Department of State, August 2, vol. v, p. 897.

740.00119 EW/8-1444: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 14, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10:10 p. m.]

6533. Department's 6385, August 12, 3 p. m. In accordance with your telegram 5878, July 27, 2 p. m.³ received July 28 the Embassy addressed a letter on that date to the Foreign Office paraphrasing the substance of the telegram and inviting comment. The comment referred to in your telegram 6385 was received by us in a letter from the Foreign Office dated August 5 and delivered August 8. In it the Foreign Office, pending receipt of views of British Chiefs of Staff, stated its belief that the Bulgarian approach in its present form is of no great value. It also stated that the Bulgarian emissary should be informed that if his Government desires to leave the war it should send to Cairo a fully accredited envoy to learn from the Allied representatives the terms of surrender. The Foreign Office reply added that the Bulgarian Government would be well advised to undertake promptly steps to break diplomatic relations with Germany and also to withdraw its forces from both Serbia and Greece. The reply placed stress on making the Bulgarians aware that they will be required to evacuate Greece. In conclusion the reply expressed a desire to learn any comments of the Soviets on this peace feeler although the latter are not concerned directly, being not at war with Bulgaria.

Your telegram 6167, August 4, midnight⁴ was received on August 5. On the same day I addressed a letter to Strang⁵ informing him of the substance of that telegram. Since EAC document (44) 21 of July 26 (see despatch No. 17135 of July 27)⁶ is before the Commission, I sent Gousev⁷ a similar letter also on August 5 to inform him of our views, stating my understanding that a similar approach was being made to his Government through the American Ambassador in Moscow. On August 7, Gousev acknowledged my letter without comment.

The British have not replied to my letter of August 5. In an informal conversation with Strang on August 9, it was pointed out to him that the Foreign Office letter of August 5 crossed with my letter of the same date. Strang indicated his belief that a reply to my letter would be forthcoming shortly. He also expressed a belief that the

³ Not printed; it summarized Bulgarian reports sent in telegrams from Istanbul (740.00119 E.W./7-2744).

⁴ See footnote 99, p. 354.

⁵ Sir William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, and representative on the European Advisory Commission.

⁶ See footnote 86, p. 345.

⁷ Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and representative on the European Advisory Commission.

Foreign Office would wish to inform the Soviet Ambassador of its future reply to us, parallel with my letter to Gousev of August 5. Further informal inquiry made today at the Foreign Office indicates that the British Chiefs of Staff have not replied to Foreign Office query but that the Foreign Office expects shortly to be in a position to reply to our inquiry of August 5. I shall continue to press for an early reply and should also appreciate any information you may have regarding Soviet views in the matter.

WINANT

874.002/8-1844 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, August 18, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received August 18—5:31 p. m.]

483R99. Yesterday's speech by Prime Minister Ivan Bagryanov at opening of seventh extraordinary session of 25th Bulgarian Parliament is an important exposé of the present Bulgarian situation. Recommendations to Parliament in line with his speech are expected to follow immediately. Parliament meets for business this afternoon.

The speech confirms the view taken by this office of the Bagryanov government from the beginning (see my telegram No. 330 of June 3, 4 p. m.), namely, that this Government will not commit Bulgaria further to the German cause but on the contrary will look out for the independence and best interests of Bulgaria. Thus, the Bagryanov government has now publicly verified the fact that it has turned a political corner and has started in an entirely new direction. The Prime Minister's speech yesterday was a further development of what he said in his first speech as Premier (see my telegram No. 339 of June 8, 5 p. m.). He mentions this himself, saying that anyone who heard his first speech could have seen what he meant. Yesterday the Prime Minister suggested action by the Government on several points mentioned in the statement brought back from Sofia by Balabanov and reported in my telegram 429, July 21, 10 a. m. These are a political amnesty, a change in the treatment of the Jews and an effort to get Bulgaria out of the war without further bloodshed—all of which he will probably now recommend to Parliament for action.

Bagryanov said nothing specific on the territorial question, leaving that field entirely open. It is difficult to see how he could have said as much as he did in his speech yesterday if he had not been sure that the Germans cannot exercise final pressure on Bulgaria. This raises the question of to what extent Bulgaria has explored her present situation with Russia.

A summary of the main features of the speech is contained in an immediately following telegram in clear.⁸ Further discussion of the speech as well as other indications of the present Bulgarian position with respect to the Allies is being forwarded by airmail despatch tomorrow.⁹

Repeated to AmEmBalk as my No. 9. Please repeat to Murphy.

BERRY

740.00119 E.W./8-2044

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy in Ankara was approached in the train from Istanbul on August 14th by M. Stoicho Moshanoff former president of the Sobranje and said that though out of office, he had been charged with a mission to see Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen.¹⁰ The Counsellor remarked that His Majesty's Government's attitude towards Bulgarian approaches had been defined; M. Moshanoff said he knew this but that this was an entirely new and official approach and that he was charged to present an official memorandum defining it direct to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen. The Counsellor replied that he must seek instructions.

2. The British Ambassador in Ankara was authorised by the Foreign Office to receive M. Moshanoff but was instructed not to go further than listening to what he had to say and promising to report it to the Foreign Office. At the same time he was instructed to make it clear that any communication which M. Moshanoff might make would be communicated as a matter of course by His Majesty's Government to the United States and Soviet Governments.

3. Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen received M. Moshanoff on August 16th and began the interview by speaking in the sense of the Foreign Office instructions as given in the preceding paragraph. M. Moshanoff of course agreed.

4. As regards informing the Soviet Government he stated that he would prefer it if the Bulgarian Government could be the first to do so. The position as regards Russia, he said, was different as the Russians were not at war with Bulgaria. Later he expressed considerable satisfaction that all three Allied Governments would be dealing jointly with the matter.

5. He brought an official message from the Bulgarian Government that they desired to get out of the war and asked to be informed what conditions would be satisfactory to the Allies.

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Despatch not printed.

¹⁰ British Ambassador in Turkey.

6. He mentioned two points which might affect the timing: (1) it was necessary to get in as much of the harvest as possible. The harvest, though very good, is late this year. (2) the need of securing unity in Bulgaria. He said that this could be achieved by the end of the month. Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen understood that these points related to the fear of German reaction. The reservists are not with the colours but are working at the harvest. M. Moshanoff said that Bulgaria could not cope with German reprisals.

7. Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen deprecated delay. M. Moshanoff entirely agreed and said that since his arrival in Turkey he realized that things were going much faster than he had previously supposed. As regards the harvest, M. Moshanoff thought it could not be in till after September 14th but in view of the need for haste he finally said that enough could be brought in during the early days of September.

8. M. Moshanoff will remain in Istanbul until a reply is received. He has authority, if necessary, to proceed to Cairo.

9. As the State Department will have learned through the United States Embassy in London in connexion with the latter's communication to the Foreign Office on July 28th, 1944 regarding Bulgarian peace feelers through the intermediary of the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, the British Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with American views that the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war would be of distinct military value to the Allies and that the Bulgarian Government should be invited to send a fully empowered representative to Cairo. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the sincerity of Bulgarian intentions should be tested and unnecessary delays avoided by improving the preliminary conditions. It is considered, however, that it would be impracticable to ask that Bulgaria should break off relations with Germany and withdraw troops from Serbia and Greece at this stage, and the proposed conditions are therefore:

(a) that the Bulgarian Government should release Allied prisoners now in Bulgaria before their emissary is received in Cairo and (b) that a date not later than the end of August should be fixed by which the Bulgarian emissary should arrive in Cairo and condition (a) should have been fulfilled.

10. Although there are some obviously unsatisfactory points about M. Moshanoff's approach his statements reported in paragraphs 5 and 8 above seem hopeful and His Majesty's Government consider that provided Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen is satisfied with M. Moshanoff's credentials he might go to Cairo as Bulgarian emissary.

11. In informing the United States Government of M. Moshanoff's approach His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to ask them urgently to agree that the conditions proposed in paragraph 9 above should be communicated as soon as possible to M. Moshanoff for im-

mediate transmission to the Bulgarian Government. The next move would then be with the latter.

12. If the United States Government agree His Majesty's Government would propose to go ahead on this basis and inform the Soviet Government of what is being done. The latter could be invited to join in discussions in Cairo if so desired but as the U.S.S.R. is not at war with Bulgaria the Soviet Government could hardly sign armistice terms.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1944.

740.0011 E.W./8-2044

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have been giving urgent consideration to the next step in their policy towards Turkey. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government agree that the rupture of Turco-German relations was only a preliminary to Turkey's actual entry into war. As a definition of policy this is however unsatisfactory unless there is some concrete proposal that can be put to the Turks. At the present time there seems to be no way of fitting Turkey into active Central European Military operations and in default of this the only way the Turks could get at the Germans is by action against Bulgaria. This however immediately raises the question of Turco-Soviet relations. Turkey cannot be expected and would probably refuse to declare war on Bulgaria unless the Russians did so too. Any action must therefore be taken jointly by both the Turkish and the Soviet Governments. His Majesty's Government's view is that both Governments should be asked to sign an ultimatum to the Bulgarian Government informing them that unless they expel the Germans from Bulgaria forthwith, sever relations with Germany and withdraw their troops from Allied territory they have occupied, Turkey and the Soviet Union will declare war on Bulgaria.

There are of course certain objections to this plan. In the first place it is far from certain that the Soviet Government would agree to take the action proposed. Their policy towards Bulgaria is obscure. However to make this approach to them may help to clarify their attitude. Secondly, if asked to declare war on Bulgaria the Turks would probably make large demands for equipment and military assistance which it would be necessary to confess that we could not provide. However, this is not so important now that the Turks have been induced to take the first step of breaking off relations with

Germany. Thirdly, if it came to an actual clash between Turkey and Bulgaria there is no certainty that the result would be all in Turkey's favour if the Russians were not in a position to give much assistance. His Majesty's Government are, however, inclined to believe that a combined Turco-Russian ultimatum would probably be sufficient to bring Bulgaria out of the war without any fighting.

The British Chiefs of Staff have been consulted and have commented that if, as may be hoped, a combined Turco-Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria resulted in bringing the latter out of the war it would be militarily most valuable. If it came to a clash, the measure of assistance which Turkey would require would not be greater than that which the Combined Chiefs of Staff have already authorised in the event of Turkey becoming involved in hostilities and the Chiefs of Staff would not be prepared to recommend any further assistance even if asked by the Turks.

His Majesty's Government consider this scheme as complementary to, and not as conflicting with, the plan described in the British Embassy's memorandum of to-day's date¹¹ regarding the approach made to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen by M. Stoicho Moshanoff. It may in any case be possible to execute the latter plan before the plan described in the preceding paragraphs.

In communicating the above views of His Majesty's Government His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to express the hope that the United States Government will be able to give their very early concurrence.¹² When this has been obtained the two Governments can arrange together the best method of approaching the Turkish and Soviet Governments.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1944.

740.00119 EW/8-2344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 23, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 3:30 p. m.]

3115. ReDeptel 1858, August 4, noon [*midnight*]. In a letter dated August 22 in reply to my letters of July 29 and August 6, Molotov states:

"On behalf of the Soviet Government I desire to inform you that it has no objection to the United States Government's proposal to

¹¹ *Supra*.

¹² In acknowledging the British *aide-mémoire* on August 31, the Department said it would like to defer consideration of it pending developments in direct conversations with the Bulgarians (740.0011 EW/8-2044).

bring to the attention of the Bulgarian Government that the procedure in relation to conversations with the representatives of the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain which was agreed upon by us in February 1944 may still be used. In the belief, however, that at the present time it would be more appropriate if these conversations should take place not in Cairo but in Ankara, the Soviet Government hopes that this proposal will not meet objections on the part of the United States Government."¹³

Repeated to Cairo and Ankara.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./8-2044

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has examined the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 20 setting forth conversations which have taken place between a Bulgarian spokesman, Mr. Stoicho Moshanoff, and the British Ambassador to Turkey, and suggesting conditions which should now be made known to the Bulgarian spokesman, looking toward negotiations for effecting the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war. It is noted that these conditions provide that the Bulgarian Government should be invited to send a fully empowered representative to Cairo, where he should arrive on a fixed date not later than the end of August, but that the Bulgarian Government should release Allied prisoners now in Bulgaria before their emissary is received at Cairo.

The Department agrees that these conditions should be communicated to Mr. Moshanoff for transmission to the Bulgarian Government.

The methods of release and the means of delivery of Allied prisoners in Bulgarian hands may, however, require attention to other considerations. The Department makes reference to this matter since it interprets "return of Allied prisoners" to include the nationals of other Allied states, as well as British or American prisoners. The release of British or American prisoners would probably not require a complicated procedure, but there may be large numbers of Greek, Yugoslav or other Allied nationals who might claim the status of prisoners of war, and for whom the procedure of release and delivery might present a rather more complex problem. Supposing that it is desired to reach a decision concerning Bulgaria at the earliest possible date, the Department therefore would not be disposed to insist upon the release of Allied prisoners as a condition precedent to the com-

¹³ The substance of this note was reported by circular telegram, August 24, midnight, to posts at Algiers, Caserta, Lisbon, London, Madrid, and Stockholm (740.00119EW/8-2444).

mencement of negotiations and would be agreeable, without further consultation, to the omission of this condition in the reply to be communicated to Mr. Moshanoff.

The Department also agrees that the British Government should inform the Soviet Government of this matter, as indicated in paragraph 12 of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*.

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1944.

740.00119 E.W./8-2344 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, August 23, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 24—3:50 a. m.]

489R101. Reference my telegram No. 454, August 3, 6 p. m.¹⁴ This office's confidential Bulgarian informant arrived in Istanbul from Sofia this morning. He requested an immediate interview. This afternoon in presence of Dr. Black¹⁵ and Fraleigh¹⁶ he declared to me: (1) that in response to advice given him through this office on August 3rd he, George P. Kisseloff, and Stoycho Moshanov have been nominated by the Bulgarian Government as delegates *ad referendum* to establish contact and begin talks at once in Istanbul with representatives of United States and Great Britain and observers of the Soviet Union for the purpose of withdrawing Bulgaria from the war and establishing a status of neutrality towards both the Allies and the Axis.

(2) That their authorization which he displayed is in form of a memorandum initialed by Draganov and addressed to Balabanov informing the latter of the nominations and instructing him to confirm them if necessary to the Allies.

(3) That in order not to prejudice Bulgaria's position adversely Bagryanov and Draganov handed a note to Kirsanov, Soviet Chargé in Sofia, on August 19 informing of Bulgaria's decision to send delegates to meet American and British representatives, adding that Bulgaria would welcome Soviet observers at conference.

(4) Also that as Bulgarian Government's only contact has been through this office Moshanov was instructed to inform the British Ambassador at Ankara which he did at two meetings, the last on August 16, that Bulgaria desires to get out of the war. At that time Moshanov was not informed that he would be a delegate.

Biographical and other details follow in my next telegram.¹⁷

BERRY

¹⁴ See footnote 94, p. 353.

¹⁵ Dr. Floyd H. Black, president of American College at Sofia since 1926.

¹⁶ William N. Fraleigh, Vice Consul at Istanbul.

¹⁷ No. 491, *infra*.

740.00119 E.W./8-2444 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, August 24, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 3:15 p. m.]

491. Reference my telegram No. 489R101 of August 23, 8 p. m. Kisseloff, vice president of Bulgarian Union of Industrialists, is a prominent cotton manufacturer. He has represented his Government on commercial missions to Russia in 1940 as well as to Germany and Italy. He speaks Bulgarian, French and Italian.

Moshanov is a politician, formerly President of the Sobranje. He visited London in 1939, was received by British King and President of Parliament, knows British Ambassador in Ankara personally. He is reported to speak Bulgarian and French.

Kisseloff emphasizes necessity for speedy action, danger of German reaction to direction now openly taken by Bulgarian Government following speeches of Bagryanov on August 17 (see my telegram No. 484R100, August 18¹⁸) and Draganov on August 22 (see my next following telegram¹⁹). Saying "complications in Balkans are not excluded", Kisseloff asserts Bagryanov has exposed himself and Bulgaria to great political and physical danger; German forces in Bulgaria are still not inconsiderable though main offensive forces have been withdrawn.

Bulgaria might expect its best offer from Russia but prefers at some sacrifice to assure her future status as free democratic state in coming to agreement with three principal Allies. Success of this will depend largely on Allied terms as harsh terms may cause Bulgarians to go over en masse to Russia, carrying Government with them.

Finally he said that in making the first moves in accordance with advice tendered them to get out of the war Bulgarian Government is counting on American disinterestedness in Balkan politics and great national idealism for fairest possible understanding of Bulgarian position.

BERRY

740.00119 EW/8-2044

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

With reference to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 20, 1944, and the reply of the Department of State, dated August 22 [23],

¹⁸ Not printed.¹⁹ Telegram 492R103, not printed.

1944, regarding Bulgarian proposals for discussions looking to the conclusion of an armistice, there is now enclosed the text, in paraphrase, of (a) a telegram from the American Embassy in Moscow²⁰ quoting a letter from Mr. Molotov in which he expresses the hope that conversations with the Bulgarians may be conducted in Ankara rather than Cairo and (b) a telegram from the American Consul General in Istanbul²¹ indicating that two Bulgarian delegates now in Turkey have been authorized by the Bulgarian Government to initiate conversations with the Allied representatives.

Since Mr. Molotov's letter expresses the Soviet desire that the conversations should take place in Ankara rather than in Cairo, and in view of the fact that the Bulgarian delegates are now in Turkey, the Department sees no reasons why arrangements should not be made for the discussions to begin at once in Ankara, particularly in the absence of Lord Moyne²² and Ambassador MacVeagh from Cairo. If the British Government has already communicated to Mr. Moshanoff the conditions proposed in the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* and agreed to in the Department's reply, it seems likely that it is not too late to inform him that he and his fellow delegates are expected to proceed to Ankara rather than Cairo. It is also felt that, if the British Government is in agreement with the Department's view expressed in its memorandum already cited that we need not insist upon the release of Allied prisoners as a condition precedent to the commencement of negotiations, the talks might well be initiated without incurring the risk of indefinite delay such as might be entailed by a complicated operation designed to test the sincerity of Bulgarian intentions.

It is, therefore, proposed that the Bulgarian delegates now in Istanbul be told that: if they are fully authorized and prepared to proceed to Ankara to conclude an armistice with the Allies, the British and American Ambassadors in Ankara will be authorized to receive them for pertinent discussions; the Soviet Government is being fully informed of this proposal and invited also to have a representative present; and, in the meantime, any actions by the Bulgarian Government favorable to the Allies, such as the release of Allied prisoners, the severance of relations with Germany, the ejection of Nazi forces from Bulgaria or the announcement of the termination of Bulgarian hostilities against the United Nations, will be taken into account as a gauge of the sincerity of Bulgaria's intentions.

Should the British Government indicate its agreement to the foregoing, the Department will immediately instruct its Consul General

²⁰ Telegram 3115, August 23, 3 p. m., p. 361.

²¹ Telegram 489R101, August 23, 8 p. m., p. 363.

²² Walter E. Guinness, 1st Baron Moyne, British Deputy Minister of State, Minister Resident in the Middle East.

in Istanbul in that sense and direct its Ambassador to associate himself with the British Ambassador, together with the Soviet representative if the latter so desires, in receiving the Bulgarian delegates.

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1944.

740.00119 EW/8-2544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 25, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

1562. Insofar as concerns Bulgaria's desire to withdraw from the war the British Ambassador this morning informed me of the proposed terms which he said had already been communicated to the Department by London for which reason I am not telegraphing them. He said terms had not as yet been communicated to Moshanoff who he stated is at present in Ankara with full authority to negotiate on behalf of Bulgarian Government pending receipt by Hugessen of instructions containing final terms and information as to whether negotiations are to be conducted in Ankara or Cairo.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 EW/8-2544 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, August 25, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 9:14 p. m.]

495R104. Reference my telegram No. 489, August 23, 8 p. m.

1. Moshanov returned last night to Sofia for new instructions following Rumania's surrender.²³

2. Kisseloff says most emphatically that if present opportunity for Bulgaria to get out of the war is not to be lost action must begin immediately for following reasons: (a) Russian Army may at any moment appear on Danube; (b) this might produce overturning of Government and establishment of Communist regime; (c) military events in Bulgaria of unforeseen nature may happen suddenly through German attempt at this moment of uncertainty to defeat Bulgaria's effort to get out of the war.

BERRY

²³ For radio broadcast by the new Rumanian Government on August 23, see vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

740.00119 EW/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1944—9 p. m.

2038. The Consulate General at Istanbul has reported that two Bulgarians now in that city, George P. Kisseloff and Stoycho Moshanov, have displayed authorization in the form of a memorandum from the Sofia Foreign Office for them to serve as delegates of the Bulgarian Government in initiating at once conversations with the American and British representatives and Soviet observers looking to Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war and establishment of a status of neutrality.

The Department is informing the British Government through its Embassy in Washington of Mr. Molotov's letter to you and indicating that it knows of no reason why these discussions should not be held in Ankara, particularly since both Ambassador MacVeagh and Lord Moyne are absent from Cairo. The Department is also proposing that the Bulgarian delegates who are now in Turkey be told that the American and British Ambassadors in Ankara will receive them to discuss the terms of Bulgarian surrender, that the Soviet Government is being invited to have a representative present at any such conversations and that any actions favorable to the Allies taken by the Bulgarian Government in the meantime, for example, the release of Allied prisoners, the termination of Bulgarian hostilities against the United Nations, the severance of relations with Germany or the ejection of German forces from Bulgarian territory, will receive consideration in judging the sincerity of Bulgaria's intentions.

Please immediately inform the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the foregoing and state that notification will be communicated to the Soviet Government at once in case the British indicate their approval of the foregoing proposals.

HULL

740.00119 EW/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, August 25, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 26—3:55 a.m.]

6928. Department's No. 6717, August 23, 4 p. m.²⁴ Your helpful telegram received August 24, concerning Mushanov approach at

²⁴ Not printed; it summarized the exchange with the British Embassy respecting Bulgaria (740.00119 European War/8-2344).

Ankara. On the same day Eden²⁵ expressed his keen interest in taking advantage of this approach (which by them seemed much more serious than was at first assumed), to hasten Bulgaria's exit from the war. An emergency meeting of the EAC was arranged for that evening. Prior to the meeting my staff met with Foreign Office experts to draw up a list of topics for inclusion in a Bulgarian armistice, taking our EAC-21 and the British EAC-22 as the basis. At the meeting the three delegates found themselves in close agreement except for three questions, which were held over for further discussion, and it was agreed to draft armistice terms on the basis of the list of topics approved at that meeting.

Today my staff drafted an armistice instrument, stating the basic requirements in rather full and exact language, and based on the materials furnished by the Department. This draft was circulated to the British and Soviet delegations at noon. A briefer British draft covering exactly the same points was likewise circulated. Then my staff and the British experts worked through the two drafts, bringing the British draft closer to American thinking but keeping the briefer form of the British statement. This third draft was discussed tonight in detail in the EAC. The new draft was explained thoroughly to Gousev and a number of clarifications were made in the wording. In its present form the armistice terms would seem to satisfy all our essential requirements and provide a firm basis for dealing with Bulgaria.

The text of the draft armistice follows:

"ARMISTICE TERMS FOR BULGARIA

The following conditions have been accepted by the Bulgarian Government:

1. Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and the United Nations at

2. Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.

3. Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw forthwith from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

4. The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice.

5. Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.

6. Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.

7. Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

²⁵ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

8. Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.

9. Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

10. Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage.

11. Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.

12. Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security."

At the close of the meeting Strang informed us that he approved the draft document on behalf of his Government. Eden is telegraphing the draft terms to Moyne in Cairo for his information. He has been selected by the Prime Minister to negotiate for the British. Moyne will be instructed not to act on these terms pending instructions from Washington to our representative. Gousev seems personally satisfied with the terms and hopes to inform us tomorrow of his Government's attitude. I recommend this instrument for approval by our authorities in Washington. If it is approved I hope that suitable instructions can be sent to Cairo so that the opportunity for speedy action will be seized.

In view of our Government's emphasis on assuring Bulgaria of its future independence as a means of easing its exit from the war, I suggested to my colleagues that some such statement be made orally or in writing to the Bulgarian delegate at the time of signing the armistice. Accordingly, it was recommended in the EAC that the representatives of the Allied Governments in Cairo be given authority at their discretion "to reaffirm the recognition by their Governments of the independence of Bulgaria". It was our feeling that such a statement might hasten the acceptance of the armistice and encourage more willing execution of its terms.

At Thursday's meeting Strang expressed a desire to have Greece and Yugoslavia associated as signatories of the armistice. The Foreign Office suggested that the British Dominions also join in signing if the other two Governments were included. After tonight's meeting Strang explained that his people were hesitating between inviting the Greeks and Yugoslavs to sign and inviting them to assent to the terms without signing, with a slight preference for the second course. In accordance with the tenor of the papers furnished me by the Department, I urged that the Greeks and Yugoslavs be allowed to assent to the terms without participating as signatories. I believe the British will agree to this. Meanwhile the British are trying to hasten the arrival of the Bulgarian emissary in Cairo. Nothing has been said

here about making release of Allied prisoners a prior condition for receiving the emissary. I heartily agree with the Department's view in this matter.

WINANT

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 26, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received August 26—8:31 a. m.]

Greek 263. Telegram from Eden to Lord Moyne dated August 25 asks that Moyne present armistice terms to Bulgarian delegate now at Istanbul who is being sent to Cairo for this purpose. This disagrees with Department's 71, August 25.²⁶ Because of better communication with Bulgaria, Steel²⁷ strongly favors negotiation at Ankara and is advising London to this effect.

Repeated to Murphy as 21, to Ankara and to London as 8.

SHANTZ

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 26, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received 5:30 p. m.]

1573. For the President, Secretary, and Under Secretary. The Prime Minister²⁸ asked me to call to see him this morning and said that he had just received a telegram from the Turkish Minister in Sofia²⁹ to the effect that during the night the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent for him and made the following statement:

"The Russians are approaching the mouth of the Danube. The approach of the Russians to the Danube is not in the interest of either Bulgaria or Turkey. The British and Americans are acting much too slowly. To arrive at an understanding, speed is now essential. We Bulgars count on the support and diplomatic intervention of Turkey."

The Prime Minister stated that Moshanoff has full authority to act for the Bulgarian Government and is in Istanbul awaiting a reply.

STEINHARDT

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Christopher E. Steel, Acting Counselor of the British Embassy in Egypt.

²⁸ Şükrü Saraçoğlu.

²⁹ Vasfi Mentés.

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 26, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received August 26—2:05 p. m.]

Greek 264. In a release today obviously inspired by apprehension lest Bulgaria's present overtures toward the Allies nullify her enemies and permit her to the detriment of Greece to escape consequences of her past, the Hellenic News Service here, after detailing grounds for condemnation of course Bulgaria has followed, lists five seemingly not unreasonable Greek demands in regard to Bulgaria which the Department may find of interest as an expression of views by an official Greek Government agency.

These five demands are quoted in my immediately following telegram.³⁰ The full text of the release is being transmitted by despatch.³¹

Repeated to Murphy as 22.

SHANTZ

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 26, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received August 26—2:05 p. m.]

Greek 265. Greece demands from Bulgaria: (a) A strategical guarantee of her northern frontier, so that the keys of her house be not held in foreign hands, and especially Bulgarian hands. (b) The punishment of the Bulgarian rulers and military chiefs, and also of all those who have committed crimes against the populations of Macedonia and Thrace, according to the principles on the punishment of war criminals, proclaimed by the United Nations.³² (c) The payment of indemnities to the families of the victims, who died executed, or from hunger, privations, and hardships; also to the persons who were forced to leave their homes and their possessions on the territories occupied by the Bulgarians, and to those who were forcibly driven to labour camps. (d) That all measures to be taken against Germany for her "reeducation," by the United Nations be equally applied to Bulgaria. (e) Occupation of Bulgaria by the

³⁰ *Infra*.

³¹ Despatch 203, August 28, not printed.

³² For Declaration of German Atrocities signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 768.

crimes [*armies*] of the United Nations, as a guarantee for the execution of the sanctions which will be applied on her, so that the Bulgarian people should be convinced that violence and crime do not pay for nations as well as for individuals.

Repeated to Murphy as No. 23.

SHANTZ

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 26, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received August 26—9:15 p. m.]

3180. For the President and the Secretary. Molotov in his conversation with the British Ambassador and myself this evening told us that the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed the Soviet Chargé in Sofia that the Bulgarian Government had decided to adopt a policy of "complete neutrality". Under this new status the German Government had been asked on August 25 to withdraw its troops from Bulgaria and if it failed to do so they would be disarmed. Also any German troops attempting to enter Bulgaria from Rumania would be disarmed and interned in accordance with international practice. He said that the Soviet Government was releasing a statement to this effect on the radio tonight and in the press tomorrow.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./8-2544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944—midnight.

6866. Department has tentatively approved the draft terms for a Bulgarian armistice as communicated in your 6928 August 25 midnight, pending their clearance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In view of the widespread civil strife which might result from the immediate withdrawal of Bulgarian forces from occupied Allied territory, however, it suggests that as negotiations proceed consideration be given to the desirability of adding to Article III the clause "their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the Allied occupation authorities". The draft terms are being communicated in some detail to Ankara, Cairo and Moscow. Your attention is called to the Department's 6820, August 25, 8 p. m.,³³ indicating the

³³ Not printed.

possibility that the negotiations may be held in Ankara rather than Cairo.

Department approves your position that, at the discretion of the Allied negotiators, the Bulgarian delegates may be given assurances of recognition by our Governments of the independence of Bulgaria. Department likewise agrees that the Greek and Yugoslav Governments should be invited to assent to the armistice terms, preferring that they should not participate as signatories. Accordingly all other Governments at war with Bulgaria should be informed of the terms at the time of their acceptance.

HULL

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 26, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 27—1 a. m.]

6969. Reference my 6928. Today Strang discussed further the question of participation by certain smaller United Nations in the conclusion of a Bulgarian armistice. He noted that Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, and Nicaragua are also at war with Bulgaria. He wired Washington proposing that the British and we act together in securing in Cairo Greek approval of the proposed armistice terms, and in London to secure Yugoslav and Czechoslovak approval, and inviting the Department to indicate to what degree and in what form Haiti and Nicaragua should be either informed of the terms or invited to authorize signature of them by the British and US in the names of their Governments. I expressed my personal view that we would probably be willing to have the Greek and Yugoslav Governments informed of the terms and invited to assent to them in advance, but that Czechoslovakia's position was different, first, in that Czechoslovakia had not declared war on Bulgaria by name but only in a blanket declaration of war against any state which is at war with any of the United Nations, and, second, in that Czechoslovakia had not been involved in hostilities with Bulgaria. With regard to Haiti and Nicaragua, I merely commented that the Department would be in the best position to judge how far it is necessary or desirable to consult these two Governments with regard to the Bulgarian armistice. Strang has not pursued the question of including the British Dominions among the signatories; the British attitude in this respect is probably made clear in his communication to the Embassy in Washington.

WINANT

740.00119 EW/8-2744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 27, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received August 27—3:54 p. m.]

6972. Department's 6866, August 26, midnight. Your helpful message is much appreciated. The concept of a gradual withdrawal of Bulgarian forces is a sound one in principle but the British, Greeks and Yugoslavs may feel that the psychological effect of a speedy Bulgarian withdrawal is more valuable than the avoidance of local disorders. However, I much prefer your formula and will advance it as a recommendation following review by our Government of the draft terms recommended by the European Advisory Commission.

The British Government has also reviewed the draft terms and has suggested certain additions, as a result of which I had a 2-hour discussion today with Strang and his experts. The British Treasury feels that the economic and financial provisions of the draft armistice are not adequate to safeguard our position and might result in placing Bulgaria in a more favorable position than some of our Allies. The draft which Strang presented at Friday's EAC meeting contained in article IV an additional sentence as follows: "The United Nations also to have the right to utilize Bulgarian territory, facilities and resources". This provision was interpreted by Gousev as conveying to the Allies absolute control over the Bulgarian economy without any limitation as to purpose and Strang agreed rather readily to delete it, assuming that articles VII, X, XI, and XII would give the Allies adequate powers.

After review the British now suggest the insertion of a new provision, to follow present article XI and to read as follows: "Bulgaria to furnish such supplies, services and facilities as the Allies may require for the use of their forces, missions or agencies, and such local currency as they may require for expenditure within Bulgaria." This provision would, as they explain it, allow Allied agencies to buy within Bulgaria, with currency provided by the Bulgarian Government, any commodities they may desire for their use within or outside Bulgaria. In view of Gousev's repeated objections to the transfer of such sweeping powers without limitation as to purpose, I feel sure that this provision would meet with strong Russian resistance. I am inclined to suggest a somewhat more limited but, I believe, adequate formula, as follows: "Bulgaria to furnish such supplies, services and facilities, and such amounts of local currency, as the Allies may require for the use of their forces or missions within Bulgaria or for the prosecution of the war". I have so informed the British.

This latter formula would, I believe, meet the valid contention that the armistice should specifically empower the Allies to cover the expenses of their missions or forces in Bulgaria with currency provided by the local government and to acquire in Bulgaria those commodities such as mica which we require for the prosecution of the war in Europe and the Far East. The formula which I am putting forward for consideration by the Department in reviewing the British proposals would give us access to Bulgarian resources for purposes of prosecuting the war, controlling transport, securing restitution and reparation, and providing relief and rehabilitation. Above and beyond that, any remaining exportable surplus could presumably be controlled through economic warfare controls and shipping channels, as well as by Bulgaria's need for outside supplies. At the same time I believe my formula may satisfy the Russians as Gousev has continually laid stress on testing each article of the Armistice in the light of its usefulness in furthering the prosecution of the war, with the special emphasis on getting Bulgaria out of the war as quickly as possible.

The Treasury expert also proposed that Bulgaria be obligated "to redeem and hand over to the Allies any currency which they may issue in Bulgaria". He agreed to drop this when I pointed out that the proposed new economic clause if adopted would provide us with adequate supplies of local currency, while present article XII provides sanctions in case Bulgaria fails to provide such supplies.

The British also propose to add at the end of article X the following words "and not to dispose of any of her assets without the consent of the Allies". This seems a reasonable provision for safeguarding assets required for reparation and other purposes.

In order to give greater dignity and authority to Allied missions in Bulgaria, the British propose to insert in present article XII, following the words "to the Armistice"; the following: "to give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send;" This addition may not be strictly necessary in view of the first part of article XII, but it seems unobjectionable.

If the Department approves any or all of these proposed additions to the armistice instrument, I should like very much to present them in the Commission as coming from our Government, as a result of examination of the draft instrument in Washington. I have suggested to Strang that it would be awkward for him to advance them on his own behalf; his draft of last Friday, which he stated had the support of his Government, was naturally assumed to be based on consultation with all interested British agencies. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear to Gousev that I gave only tentative approval to the draft terms and that the Department may well have amendments to

offer. Since the Russians yesterday circulated their draft on control machinery for Germany³⁴ (an English translation will be ready for cabling tomorrow³⁵) I am anxious to move as smoothly as possible into this vital phase of our EAC negotiations on Germany. The Russians have given real demonstration of goodwill in that they have receded from their earlier position and are now willing to discuss German control machinery and to advance other documents.

WINANT

740.00119 EW/8-2844 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 28, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received August 28—8:55 a. m.]

Greek 267. My Greek 263, August 26. Steel has shown me telegraphic instructions to Moyné regarding Bulgarian armistice negotiations to be held here. We agree that clause III of armistice terms should have a time limit placed on withdrawal of Bulgarians from Allied territory and that 2 weeks would be advisable. It should expedite agreement if Department will authorize American representative to negotiate and agree to time limit without further reference to Washington on basis of advice as to military aspects by General Giles³⁶ or his delegate.

Bulgarian delegate is expected here this week.

Repeated to Caserta as 26, to London as 11, and to Moscow and Ankara.

SHANTZ

740.00119 EW/8-2844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 28, 1944.

[Received August 28—4:20 p. m.]

3189. Situation in Bulgaria was subject to [of?] communiqué released by Foreign Office Information Bureau to press for August 27th and reading in translation as follows:

“On August 26 the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Draganov, made a statement to the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires, in Bul-

³⁴ See document E.A.C.(44) 25, dated August 26, vol. 1, section entitled “Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission,” part V.

³⁵ Telegram 6992, August 28, 7 p. m., not printed.

³⁶ Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East.

garia, Comrade Kirsanov, in the name of the Bulgarian Government to the effect that the Bulgarian Government had taken its decision regarding the complete neutrality of Bulgaria. The Minister of Foreign [Affairs] of Bulgaria, Mr. Draganov, stated that in the event that the German troops who are in Rumania should retreat into Bulgarian territory they would be disarmed and the Hague Convention³⁷ would be applied to them. With regard to the German troops which are on Bulgarian territory here, as Mr. Draganov stated, the Bulgarian Government on August 25 took up with the German Government and Military Command the question of withdrawing these troops from Bulgaria. Mr. Draganov stated also that in the event of refusal by the Germans to withdraw their troops from Bulgaria they would be disarmed."

HARRIMAN

740.00119 European War/8-2844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 28, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received August 30—12:32 a. m.]

1585. ReDeptel 743, August 25.³⁸ The British Ambassador informed me today that he has received instructions dated April [August?] 27 to send Kisseloff to Cairo immediately and to make every effort to expedite the return to Istanbul of Moshanoff (who has returned to Sofia from Istanbul) with a view to his prompt departure for Cairo. The Ambassador is at present endeavoring to persuade Kisseloff to leave immediately for Cairo although the latter prefers to await Moshanoff's return to Istanbul.

Hugessen assumes from his most recent instructions that Washington and Moscow have now accepted London's view that the negotiations should be conducted in Cairo.

Repeated to Moscow and Cairo.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 E.W./8-2944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 29, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received August 29—12:05 p. m.]

7028. This noon Gousev came to see me and delivered a note from his Government thanking the American and British Governments for in-

³⁷ See convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, signed October 18, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1216.

³⁸ Not printed; it reported Bulgarian developments (740.00119 E.W./8-2544).

forming it about the conditions of Bulgarian surrender as worked out between our two Governments and informing us that his Government had decided not to take part in the discussion of the terms of Bulgarian surrender and was leaving it to the two Governments to decide this question. The note pointed out that this procedure corresponded exactly to that followed by the United States Government in declining to take part in discussing terms of Finnish armistice.³⁹ Mr. Gousev told me that if our Government were to make changes in the draft armistice terms as they were forwarded from the EAC on August 25 he would appreciate my informing him informally of changes adopted.

WINANT

740.00119 EW/8-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1944—7 p. m.

6930. Your 6972, August 27. The Department approves your recommendations with regard to the proposed British modifications of the Bulgarian terms and is accordingly agreeable to the following adjustments of the text:

1. Article X is made to read "Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage and not to dispose of any of her assets without the consent of the Allies".

2. Article XII should read "Bulgaria to furnish such supplies, services and facilities as the Allies may require, for the use of their forces or missions in Bulgaria or for the prosecution of the war".

The Department would have no objection to the text proposed by the British for this article, but agrees with you that the Soviet Government might be reluctant to approve it and that it might be a deterrent to Bulgarian acceptance of the terms.

3. The article already numbered XII should be made article XIII reading "Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; to give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security".

You may as requested present the foregoing modifications as proposed modifications coming from this Government.

With regard to the first paragraph of your telegram already cited, the Department will not insist on its recommendation but you may wish to point out that this formula need not preclude immediate withdrawal of Bulgarian forces from Greek and Yugoslav territory in case United Nations authorities and forces can be moved in immediately to replace them and ensure the maintenance of order.

HULL

³⁹ For correspondence concerning United States interest in the Allied armistice with Finland, see pp. 608 ff.

740.00119 EW/8-2944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 29, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 29—6:13 p. m.]

7040. Department's 6866, August 26, midnight. Cairo's Greek 267, August 28, 10 a. m. Today I discussed further with the British alternative wordings of clause 3 of armistice terms for Bulgaria stressing considerations advanced in Department's 6866. British Chiefs of Staff feel strong preference for word "forthwith". The British reasoning is as follows:

(1) Supreme Allied Command may have a very small control body in Bulgaria, perhaps inadequate to lay down a detailed schedule or to gather all the necessary facts, especially as they relate to civil officials and nationals in the territory to be affected.

(2) Awaiting instructions from the SAC would in effect establish a standstill until those instructions were issued.

(3) The wording adopted should place basic responsibility on the Bulgarians for evacuation, not on the Allies.

(4) It is in the Allied interest to get the Bulgars out of the occupied territory as quickly as possible.

The British Chiefs of Staff do not favor the time limit of 14 days, as suggested in Cairo's Greek 267.

WINANT

740.00119 EW/8-2944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 29, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received August 30—6:36 p. m.]

1591. The British Ambassador informed me last night that under instructions from London he has made the following arrangements for the continuance of the negotiations looking to Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war. Moshanoff is to return immediately to Istanbul with two other Bulgarian delegates who will proceed to Cairo probably on August 30 together with Kisseloff who is now in Istanbul. The necessary travel arrangements for the trip to Cairo are now being made by Hugessen.

Repeated to Moscow and Cairo.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 EW/8-3044

The Greek Embassy to the Department of State

The Greek Embassy in Moscow has drawn the attention of the Greek Government on the possibility that German forces could be

withdrawn to Greece from Bulgaria, owing to the impending surrender of the latter. The Greek Government strongly feels the necessity that a special clause be included in the armistice with Bulgaria, preventing such an eventuality.

Information from official Turkish sources indicates that German forces have already evacuated the northern section of the Evros district and that the region in question is under the control of the underground.

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944.

740.00119 European War/8-3044: Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, August 30, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 3:42 p. m.]

506R109. Reference my telegram No. 495 of August 25, 6 p. m. Moshanov returned to Istanbul late yesterday. Upon insistence of British Ambassador he is flying to Cairo today by special plane to make initial contacts with British emissaries. He is accompanied by Colonel Zheleskov, former Bulgarian Military Attaché in Istanbul, as military aide. Kisseloff despite British pressure decided to stay here to keep communications open between Sofia and Washington.

This morning before leaving Moshanov came with Kisseloff for a meeting with Dr. Black, Fraleigh and me. He intends to stress two points on his arrival there: (1) He is not authorized to begin talks except in the presence of both England and United States (Russia may be present but only as observer). (2) Talks should be moved at once to Turkey for sake of communications in telephonic and telegraphic cipher between delegates and Bulgarian Government. But British Ambassador insisted they accept portable radio set to be sent to Sofia to enable communications with Cairo.

Meanwhile preparations are nearing completion Sofia for composition of remainder of delegation. For instance, Lyuben Boshkov, described as pro-American former director general of Bulgarian railways, who visited United States in 1940, is being sought as technical advisor on communications and geography. Ivan Stanchev, career diplomat with American wife (see my despatch No. 3411 of August 19⁴⁰), has been sent for at Bucharest by special car and is expected to be made secretary of delegation. He speaks English fluently.

Bulgarian Government has taken drastic steps to give evidence of sincere intentions (reDeptel 360 of August 26, 9 p.m.⁴⁰). Release

⁴⁰ Not printed.

of Allied prisoners principally American flyers was mentioned to delegates this morning and will be suggested to Sofia today. Relations with Germany have not been severed owing to declaration of neutrality but all, some 4800, German military refugees from Rumania have been disarmed; other German troops heretofore in Bulgaria by official consent are being sent out of the country (without being disarmed) deadline of tomorrow night; German Gestapo left Sofia on August 27. Hostilities against United Nations are being terminated by withdrawal of Bulgarian Army Corps from Serbia [which] began August 26, 8 a. m. In addition all anti-Jewish laws were abrogated by regency decree of August 21. Citizenship of Jews has been restored and machinery set up for return of their property. Present Parliament will be dissolved in about 10 days in order as Moshanov said "that these criminals should be allowed to correct own mistakes". Following that, there will be a general amnesty for political offenders.

Other information given by Moshanov follows in my next telegram. Repeated AmEmBalk as my No. 10, please repeat to Murphy.

BERRY

740.00119 European War/8-3044 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, August 30, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received August 30—3:30 p. m.]

508R110. Reference my telegram 506, August 30, 10 a. m. Following is additional information given by Moshanov:

1. German Minister to Sofia, Nazi Gauleiter Beckerle, returned from Berlin August 27. He had left Bulgaria in great huff, but returned more calm. He said merely that Bulgarians had taken a misstep of which they would repent.

2. German troops withdrawing from Bulgaria are moving into Macedonia. This is causing disquiet in Sofia, but before Bulgarians can fight Germany over Macedonia they must have guarantee that they will be awarded their "Transylvania". German movements indicate they mean to defend Salonica and Vardar and Morava valleys.

3. Greatest panic yet in Sofia occurred on day of Rumanian surrender. Air raid alarm was taken as indication that Allies and Rumanians were already invading Bulgaria. Raid, however, was on Rumania and destroyed Ruse Giurgiu ferry at Giurgiu.

4. Germans fleeing in panic from Rumania have arrived at Vran. They destroyed their transport and surrendered arms willingly. Bulgarians have only two companies in the area.

5. Signs are increasing that Russia is playing double game in Bulgaria. Moscow announcement of acceptance by Russia of Bulgarian declaration of neutrality was received by Bulgarian radio and

published. Thereupon, Soviet Legation informed Communists that story was all lies. Kirsanov, Soviet Chargé in Sofia, has left for Moscow, leaving only Second Secretary who claims to know nothing of Russia's intentions of which Bulgarian Government is frantic for information. Government might withstand Russian appearance on Bulgaria's frontiers, but Russian crossing of frontiers would likely produce Communist Government. Russians have asked why Bulgarians did not ask for peace through Moscow "for better terms." Bulgarians replied that they were not at war with Russia and acted accordingly.

6. Kisseloff pleads for some word from Washington to give his Government. He asserts delegates have been here since August 23 in response to American suggestion, but nothing official has yet been communicated to them, not even the place of the conference. Time, he says, is of the essence.

Repeated to AmEmBalk as my 11. Please repeat to Murphy.

BERRY

740.00119 E.W./8-3044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944—11 p. m.

77. You are authorized to concert with Lord Moyne in notifying the Greek Government of the Bulgarian armistice terms, the text of which is being sent separately.⁴² See in this connection the Department's telegram to London,⁴³ repeated to you, concerning the procedure for notification of all other Governments at war with Bulgaria.

HULL

740.00119 E.W./8-2644 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944—midnight.

6998. Reurtel 6969, August 26. The Department's views on the participation of the smaller United Nations in the Bulgarian armistice negotiations are as follows:

The British and American Governments being in agreement on the Armistice terms to be presented to the Bulgarians should apprise the other Governments at war with Bulgaria of these terms.

As regards Haiti and Nicaragua, the Department thinks that this procedure would be sufficient, but would be willing to apply the three-

⁴² Telegram 76, August 30, 10 p. m., not printed.

⁴³ *Infra*.

point formula suggested by the British if the British feel that for the sake of uniformity it is advisable that all the Governments in question authorize signature on their behalf.

As regards Czechoslovakia and the British Dominions the Department is agreeable, either to informing them of the terms, or applying the three-point formula.

As regards Greece and Yugoslavia the Department thinks that they should be urgently invited (1) to give their concurrence to the terms, (2) to consider them as applicable to themselves and (3) to authorize the representatives of the United Kingdom and United States Governments to sign on their behalf.

In acknowledgement of the particular position of Greece and Yugoslavia as immediate neighbors and victims of Bulgarian actions, this Government would be disposed to notify them also of any important modifications which may be agreed to in the course of the negotiations, it being clearly understood that such procedure would be allowed in no way to delay the signature of the instrument by the British and American representatives.

The machinery for notification as proposed by the British is satisfactory, and appropriate instructions are being sent to Amembalk.

Sent to London, repeated to Moscow and AmEmbalk Cairo.

HULL

740.00119 EW/8-3044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944—midnight.

The Soviet Government has now indicated that it does not desire to participate in the negotiation of the Bulgarian armistice terms, and the British and American Governments have agreed that the negotiations should be held in Cairo.

Ambassador MacVeagh will leave Washington tomorrow August 31 and expects to reach Cairo by Sunday afternoon September 3 unless unforeseen delays occur. Department authorizes you to represent this Government in any discussions or arrangements regarding the Bulgarian armistice, deputizing for the Ambassador who on his arrival will take over for whatever may remain to be done.

Additional instructions, including the full text of the Bulgarian terms as they now stand, will follow in a separate telegram.⁴⁴ Please repeat to Moscow and London all your messages in this matter.

Sent to Cairo, repeated to Ankara, Moscow and London.

HULL

⁴⁴ Telegram 76, August 30, 10 p. m., not printed.

740.00119 EW/8-3144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 31, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received August 31—8 p. m.]

7103. In accordance with suggestion contained in last paragraph of Department's 6866 August 26, midnight, and since British had instructed their Ambassador to Yugoslav Government in London⁴⁵ to invite that Government to assent to the Bulgarian armistice terms, I requested Mr. Schoenfeld⁴⁶ to act jointly with Stevenson in taking up the question with Dr. Subasić.⁴⁷ Schoenfeld and Stevenson called on Subasić at noon yesterday, presenting identic drafts of the terms as amended in Department's 6930, August 29. Schoenfeld has given me the following report of that interview :

"Stevenson said British and United States Governments desired to make these terms known to Yugoslav Government before signature and to request its assent to them. He added that it was hoped Yugoslav Government would feel terms were wide enough to meet its wishes and he pointed out any change would involve delays which it was desirable to avoid in view of the urgency of the matter.

Subasić said he would submit the terms to Yugoslav Cabinet and would reply today. He advanced the suggestion that as a matter of prestige a Yugoslav representative might be present at the signing. Stevenson did not commit himself on this point but expressed hope that Yugoslav Government would advance the idea merely as a suggestion and not as a condition."

Yesterday evening Schoenfeld received from Subasić a memorandum explaining in considerable detail the Yugoslav point of view. Subasić suggests including provisions for cancellation of Bulgarian laws annexing Yugoslav territory, supplemented by a formal declaration renouncing all aspiration to possess Yugoslav territory, abolition of Bulgarian ecclesiastic jurisdiction over Yugoslav territory and withdrawal of Bulgarian ecclesiastical personnel. The memorandum also stated that the Yugoslav Government considers it of great importance that a Yugoslav representative should take part in the signing of the armistice with Bulgaria and that the Yugoslav Government had designated as their representative Dr. Milan Gavrilović,⁴⁸ Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, now in Cairo, who had been instructed to contact the competent Allied authorities.

⁴⁵ R. C. Skrine Stevenson.

⁴⁶ Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of Embassy to the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland in Exile at London.

⁴⁷ Ivan Subasić, Yugoslav Prime Minister.

⁴⁸ Dr. Stoyan Gavrilović was Yugoslav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Cairo, while Dr. Milan Gavrilović was a former Minister of Justice in the Yugoslav Government in Exile.

Yugoslav Government also requests that "representatives of the kingdom of Yugoslavia should be admitted to the armistice commission and all other commissions which will be organized to control or deal with the execution of the armistice terms concerning Bulgaria".

Rybar⁴⁹ of Yugoslav Foreign Office delivered foregoing memorandum at Schoenfeld's office during latter's absence at Polish Foreign Office late yesterday. He left word that points raised were "desiderata" and "not conditions". Stevenson told Schoenfeld that when Rybar delivered similar memorandum to him, Rybar stated that points raised "were not conditions of acceptance but expressions of earnest desire" and the most important thing was that the Yugoslav representative should actually sign. It would otherwise be very embarrassing for the Government. Rybar added that the Yugoslav Government was very upset about the omission of the religious point.

I feel, and Mr. Schoenfeld agrees with me, that most of these requests are unsuitable for inclusion in the armistice. As explained in last part of my 7086, August 31,⁵⁰ the question of the signatures might be settled most conveniently through empowering Allied military representatives to sign.

WINANT

861.9111/9-144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

Moscow, September 1, 1944.

[Received September 1—10:30 a. m.]

3257. Moscow papers for August 31 publish prominently an article by the Tass observer N. Bodrov entitled "The False Maneuvers of the Bulgarian Government". The article contends that the neutrality policy proclaimed by the Bulgarian Government was adopted merely to mislead public opinion. It charges that the Bulgarians have failed to intern German vessels in Bulgarian ports and are taking over German equipment in Bulgaria to be applied against German trade obligations and predicts that these maneuvers of the Bulgarian Government are doomed to failure.

HARRIMAN

⁴⁹ Vladimir Rybar, Yugoslav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at London.

⁵⁰ Not printed.

740.00119 EW/9-144

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

The Yugoslav Chargé⁵¹ came in to present the attached note.⁵² It sets out certain terms which the Government of Yugoslavia would like to have included in the armistice about to be negotiated between the Allies and Bulgaria in Cairo. He further added that his Government would like to be a signatory to the armistice.

I said that, as he knew, our Government recognized the very solid and deep interest which the Government of Yugoslavia had in armistice arrangement with Bulgaria. His representations would, therefore, be considered with especial care. I permitted myself to inject one consideration. This was an armistice, not a peace treaty; the armistice terms would not go into the same detail as would a treaty; and my understanding was that in any event the Allied Governments have under consideration the inclusion of a clause which would permit them to add, virtually at will, other requirements as might be necessary. In consequence, I believed that in one form or another most of the points made by the Yugoslav Government were taken care of.

I said that this Government would take note of the Yugoslav Government's desire to be a signatory to the armistice. The matter of form was indeed under consideration; and one possibility was that the terms might be signed by the Commander in the field, in which case, of course, the signature of the Field Commander would be sufficient.

The Chargé said that this was true, and added that this might be the easiest solution in that regard.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.00119 EW/9-144

The Yugoslav Chargé (Frangješ) to the Secretary of State

Pov. No. 527

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1944.

The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and, acting under the instructions of his Government, has the honor to submit the following statement:

The Royal Yugoslav Government has examined the situation created by the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war. The Government considers it urgent to submit to the Allied Governments the following demands which should be included, in the name of the

⁵¹ Ivan Frangješ.

⁵² *Infra*.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in the terms of armistice to be presented to the Bulgarian Government:

1) That all Yugoslav territory occupied by Bulgaria be immediately and completely evacuated. That all military, civilian and other Bulgarian authorities withdraw immediately and entirely; likewise, that church authorities as well as any other Bulgarian personnel withdraw from the mentioned Yugoslav territory or any other part of Yugoslavia;

2) That all parliamentary resolutions or decisions from other Bulgarian authorities, including laws, rules and regulations of the Bulgarian Government, on the basis of which certain parts of Yugoslav territory have been annexed or in any other way appropriated by Bulgaria be immediately and formally revoked and annulled, and the same be followed by a solemn declaration of the Bulgarian Government that it renounce once and forever all aspirations in regard to Yugoslav territories which have been occupied by Bulgaria during the present war;

3) That all decisions, laws, regulations and measures enacted by the Bulgarian Government, regarding the unlawfully created situation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as the consequences of hostilities and war be invalidated;

4) That all public and private property and estates requisitioned, taken or acquired in any other way at the detriment of Yugoslav citizens, institutions, endowments and public foundations or Yugoslav authorities after the Bulgarian attack on Yugoslavia be restored as soon as possible in their entirety or damages paid;

5) That war criminals be turned over to the Yugoslav authorities;

6) To enact regulations which are usually applied in the conditions of armistice concerning disarmament, prisoners of war, civilian internees, war material, economic and financial clauses, financial agreements, bank balances, issuing of bank-notes, rolling stock and other transport material, and to return works of art etc.;

7) That the Kingdom of Yugoslavia be represented in the Commission of Armistice and in all other official bodies which will be established with the aim of controlling and putting into effect the execution of the conditions of armistice regarding Bulgaria.

740.00119 EW/9-144: Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, September 1, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:27 p. m.]

514R113. Kisseloff was informed by telephone from Sofia this afternoon that Red Army arriving on Bulgaria's Dobruja frontier demanded early this morning to enter the country. Request was forwarded to Sofia for decision; whereupon Bagrianov Cabinet tendered its resignation to Regents, offering to serve until new Cabinet is formed.

BERRY

740.00119 EW/9-144 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, September 1, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received September 1—4:20 p. m.]

Greek Series 278. Lord Moyne and I met Bulgarian emissaries this afternoon but, as Moushanov is without full powers to treat, the armistice terms were not presented to him.

He explained the assurances given British Ambassador in Ankara by Bulgarian Minister there to the effect that he had such powers by stating that when that assurance was given he was on an unofficial mission to sound out the Allied viewpoint concerning Bulgarian withdrawal from the war. Since that time (the middle of August) he had returned to Sofia and had agreed with Bagrianov to undertake an official mission to receive and sign armistice terms on condition that latter reshuffle his Cabinet. At urgent request that he return to Turkey to receive reply to his original approach, he had left Sofia before Bagrianov carried out that condition and consequently was without full powers. Upon arrival in Turkey he had been expedited to Cairo.

Moushanov also said that he would now accept a mandate to conclude armistice on behalf of Bagrianov without waiting for change of government.

Immediately after the meeting news was received of resignation of Bagrianov government and Moyne is now informing Ankara that Balabanov should obtain credentials for Moushanov from new government or that other envoys should be sent at once.

Repeated to Caserta as No. 39, to London as 19, to Ankara and to Moscow.

SHANTZ

740.00119 E.W./9-244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, September 2, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received September 2—3:51 p. m.]

7189. In accordance with instructions contained in the Department's 6998, August 30, midnight, I have requested Mr. Schoenfeld to inform the Czechoslovak Government in London of the terms of the Bulgarian armistice and to invite them (1) to give their concurrence in the terms, (2) to consider them as applicable to themselves and (3) to authorize the representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments to sign on their

behalf.⁵³ This alternative procedure was adopted because the British have already taken this step in relation to the Czechoslovak Government.

I have also requested Schoenfeld to intimate to the Yugoslav Government that our Government invites it to consider the terms of the Bulgarian armistice as applicable to itself and to authorize the representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments to sign on its behalf. As you will have noted from my 7103 of August 31, 9 p. m., we had previously confined our action in this regard to requesting Yugoslavia's assent to the terms in accordance with Department's 6866, August 26, midnight. In this connection we had been acting under the assumption that any Allied Government which authorizes the U.S. and U.K. representatives to sign on its behalf presumably enjoys all the rights of an original signatory under the terms of the armistice. Here we had interpreted your telegram 6866, August 26 to mean that such rights under the armistice should be exercised only by the U.S. and U.K. Governments. In the absence of any agreement among the Allies signatory to the Bulgarian armistice as to the joint exercise of the rights acquired under that armistice, a legal basis will now be provided for unilateral Greek or Yugoslav action in real or alleged fulfillment of the terms of the armistice. It should also be pointed out that the British will probably be eager to make the multiple signature of the Bulgarian armistice a precedent for broadening the signature of the German surrender instrument.

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./9-244 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 2, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received September 3—6:15 p. m.]

Greek 283. My 276, September 1, 1 p. m. [*a. m.*].⁵⁴ In reply received last night Prime Minister, after reviewing Bulgaria's special relationship to Greece and latter's demands against them (see my Greek 264, August 26, 4 p. m.) and stating that "announcement of armistice with Bulgaria which does not merely include the unconditional surrender has aroused amongst the Greek people the deepest alarm and dismay," advises that, while Greece does not wish to obstruct the policy of the great Allies to shorten the war Greece be-

⁵³ Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave oral and written assurance to this effect on September 4 and 6.

⁵⁴ Not printed; it reported presentation of draft terms of Bulgarian armistice to Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou (740.00119EW/9-144).

lieves following amendments should be made to draft terms more fully to protect rights of Greece:

(1) Article IV, insert after "territory" the phrase "and to occupy parts of it".

(2) Article V, add phrase "and to surrender in due time to the Allies her war material".

(3) Article VI, add a second sentence "the cost of subsistence, repatriation and reestablishment in their former homes of the Allied populations which have been in whatever manner moved away from them as a result of Bulgarian occupation to be charged up on Bulgaria."

(4) Article X, insert after "damage" the phrase "caused either by the regular army, by irregular or by private individuals."

(5) Article XII add "or for the needs of the population of the Allied districts occupied by Bulgaria".

(6) Article XIII, insert "territorial or others" after word "requirements".

(7) Add as article XIV, "Bulgaria to replace Bulgarian currency in the hands of Allied citizens established in districts occupied by her, with its corresponding value in gold or sound foreign currency, the parity of Bulgaria specie being calculated on the basis of its value at the time of the Bulgarian invasion."

The Prime Minister also attached a list of "elucidations" concerning the various armistice terms as follows (in broken order for security purposes):

(4) Greece considers indispensable to state that in order to secure full safety of her territories from any future Bulgarian covetousness she must obtain, in due time, the extension of her frontiers as far as the line Rila-Moussalaa-Evros.

(2) According to the amended formula of article IV, it is understood that in due time and as soon as military conditions will allow it, the Allies will proceed to the complete occupation of Bulgarian territory.

In view of her particular position with regards to Bulgaria, Greece wishes that the temporary occupation of the regions south of the Balkans should devolve upon her, in due time.

(3) According to the provisions of article IV concerning the disarmament of Bulgaria, Greece, who was totally disarmed by her enemies, demands that half the total Bulgarian armaments should be conceded to her in good condition.

(1) It is understood in article III that the Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals, who will depart from the Allied territories at present under occupation, will carry away with them solely their personal belongings and that Bulgaria will be held responsible for indemnities for any other asset that would be abducted from Allied territories.

At noon today Ambassador Leeper⁵⁵ addressed a note for delivery to Papandreou at Alexandria giving "explanations which, he hopes,

⁵⁵ Reginald W. A. Leeper, British Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile, at Cairo.

will satisfy the Prime Minister" that the points he raises are either "in fact covered by the existing terms or are not appropriate for inclusion in the armistice but in the peace treaty". After explaining that unconditional surrender merely means Allies can impose conditions while enemy is precluded from putting conditions on its side, Leeper states that draft terms contain necessary stipulations for giving effect to armistice and article XIII provides for imposition of any further requirements deemed necessary including occupation of Bulgarian territory if desired, surrender of war materials, cost of subsistence, repatriation et cetera of displaced Allied populations, reparations for war damage of all kinds, the needs of the population of the Allied districts occupied by Bulgaria, territorial requirements ("details regarding which are of course a matter for the peace treaty and not the armistice terms") and currency requirements. Leeper concludes that in circumstances he earnestly hopes Greek Government will not press for any modification of armistice terms as this would inevitably involve delay in conclusion of the armistice and the consequent withdrawal of Bulgarian forces from Greek territory.

The "elucidations" communicated by Prime Minister have, Leeper adds, been duly noted by British representative charged to conduct discussions with Bulgarian delegates.

Full texts of these communications will be transmitted by despatch.⁵⁶

I have not replied to Prime Minister pending latter's further response to Leeper.

Repeated to Caserta as No. 42: to London as 21, to Moscow.

SHANTZ

740.00119 E.W./8-3144: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944—midnight.

7123. Reurtel 7103 August 31. The Department agrees with you that most of the provisions which the Yugoslav Government desires included in the Bulgarian surrender terms are unsuitable for inclusion in the armistice document.

The British Embassy here has communicated the Yugoslav requests to the Department in detail and proposes that the British and American representatives to the Yugoslav Government should inform the latter that: (a) we are grateful to the Yugoslav Government for having given its agreement to the surrender terms for Bulgaria; (b) with respect to the supplementary points which the Yugoslav Government wishes to have included in the armistice document, we desire

⁵⁶ Despatch 214, September 7, not printed.

to keep the terms as brief and simple as possible and not overload the instrument with detail; (c) insofar as these points are suitable for an armistice rather than a peace treaty, Article 13 of the terms provides powers for the issuance of further instructions to the Bulgarians to perform such additional acts as are appropriate to an armistice of this character; and (d) the question of issuing further instructions covering Yugoslav desiderata once the main instrument has been signed will receive the most careful and earnest attention of the British and American Governments. The British communication indicates that the British Chiefs of Staff are, with Foreign Office assent, suggesting to the American Chiefs of Staff that the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean or his representative sign the armistice on behalf of all the United Nations at war with Bulgaria, in which case the question of signature by Yugoslav and Greek representatives would not arise.

The Department is agreeable to the British suggestions. It feels, however, that it would be well not to over-emphasize the comprehensiveness of Article 13 as a catch-all clause which might come to be looked upon by the Greek and Yugoslav Governments as an invitation to present a series of demands which are not of such immediate necessity or military character as to require their consideration as a part of the armistice. We should accordingly prefer some scrutiny of proposals advanced for consideration under Article 13, and suggest their incorporation, wherever appropriate, in the peace treaty.

Sent to London, repeated to AmEmBalk.

HULL

740.00119 European War/9-244: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 2, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 3—10:40 p. m.]

1635. In Turk official circles there is considerable criticism of the course pursued by the British in connection with the Bulgarian armistice negotiations. The Turks who have always feared a Russian entry into Bulgaria point out that prior to the conclusion of a satisfactory arrangement between Russia and Rumania the Russians were in no position from a military point of view to exercise serious pressure on Bulgaria and were therefore obliged to contemplate an armistice between the British and Americans on the one hand and the Bulgarians on the other with themselves as mere observers. They argue that by reason of the British delay in conducting Bulgarian armistice negotiations the Russians have been able to secure Constanza and

Ploesti and reach the Rumanian-Bulgarian frontier and stress that now that Rumanian forces are operating in conjunction with Russian forces to occupy Transylvania it is most unlikely that the Russians will fail to seize the opportunity to take whatever measures may be necessary to place themselves on an equal footing with the British and Americans in the Bulgarian armistice negotiations. Turk officials appear to be annoyed at what they regard as the studied manner with which the British have ignored the interests of Turkey in Bulgaria and seem to feel that in carrying on the negotiations in Cairo the British had in mind an ulterior motive resulting in injury to Turk prestige vis-à-vis Bulgaria. In short the Turks are disposed to blame the British for the fall of the Bagrianoff Cabinet which they believe was prepared to surrender unconditionally and to anticipate that from now on the Russians will play a more important role than heretofore in negotiations relating to the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war.

Repeated to London as No. 41, Moscow and to Cairo for AmEmBalk.

STEINHARDT

874.002/9-344 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, September 3, 1944—noon.
[Received September 4—9:30 a. m.]

519R115. Following is new Bulgarian Cabinet announced last night: Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Muraviev, nephew of Stambulisky,⁵⁷ Agrarian, Minister of War in Stambulisky government 1923; Minister of Education in 1932.

Without portfolio, Nikola Mushanov, chief of Democratic Party, ex-Prime Minister; Atanas Burov, Russophile chief of Conservative Narodna Party, ex-Foreign Minister under Liyapchev;⁵⁸ Dimitri Gichev, chief of Agrarian Party, ex-Minister of Commerce and Agriculture; Interior and temporarily Communications, Vergil Dimov, brother-in-law of Gichev, Agrarian ex-Minister of Public Works, leftist tendencies; Finance and temporarily Commerce, Dr. Alexandre Girginov, Democrat of Mushanov Party, ex-Minister of Interior in Mushanov Cabinet; Justice and temporarily Education, Boris Pavlov, prominent Democrat lawyer; War, General Ivan Marinov, ex-Military Attaché at London and Paris, able officer until lately at Skoplje; Public Works, Stevan Daskalov, Agrarian; Agriculture, Hristo Popov, Agrarian.

⁵⁷ Alexander Stambulisky, leader of the Peasant Party, was Bulgarian Prime Minister from 1919 to 1923; he was assassinated in June 1923.

⁵⁸ Andrew Liapchev, Bulgarian Prime Minister from 1926 to 1931.

New government is concentration of former opposition parties excepting Leftist, Agrarians, Socialists and Communists. Innovation of Ministries without Portfolio designed to give special status to three prominent political leaders serving under comparatively little known Prime Minister.

BERRY

740.00119 E.W./9-444 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 4, 1944—10 a. m.
[Received September 4—9:30 a. m.]

Greek 286. Moushanov now declines to act for new Bulgarian Government and British propose unless United States objects to send him back to Turkey Wednesday.

Stating that new Government does not include certain elements of the Left who are apparently hanging back so that Muraviev can bear odium of accepting possibly severe terms after which the Left will oust his government, Moushanov reiterates his statement at meeting Friday that he is a politician and not a Government functionary and declines to become involved in such an unpopular move which has not Soviet support.

British believe cold reception accorded him here has impressed Moushanov and disillusioned him as to Bulgaria's getting away with easy terms, a development which Lord Moyne considers good and likely to hasten matters in the end if he convinces his people of it. The British add that Allies should ensure that next delegate is plenipotentiary ready to receive and sign armistice in name of Bulgarian Government even if latter should change during delegate's stay here and Moyne hopes it will be possible for British Ambassador in Ankara to convince Balabanov of this, remarking that Balabanov himself would appear suitable for the job.

Moushanov yesterday sent message to Balabanov in which he says that the formation of a Government of most eminent Bulgarians will not change armistice terms which will probably be severe and will be a hard blow to friends of Allies in Bulgaria, that he will not accept new mandate, that there is no point in sending numerous delegation as there will be no opportunity to deliberate on the terms and that he advises that a minister plenipotentiary or high ranking officer be sent to receive and sign the armistice in the name of the Government "if the possible entry of Russian troops into Bulgaria does not create a new situation.["]

Repeated to London as 24, to Caserta as 45 and to Moscow and Ankara.

SHANTZ

740.00119 E.W./9-444

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As soon as the armistice with Bulgaria has been signed His Majesty's Government consider that it will be necessary to hand to the Bulgarian delegates on the strength of Article 13, a set of instructions for implementing certain of the articles. His Majesty's Government consider that the following should be included:—

Article 3.

(a) Bulgarian forces and officials to cease at once all communications with any Germans in Greek and Yugoslav territories and, pending withdrawal from these territories, to cooperate with any Allied forces and Partisans operating against the Germans.

(b) All Bulgarian transport authorities to be withdrawn along with other Bulgarian officials.

(c) Immediate and formal cancellation of all legislative and administrative enactments which provided for annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Yugoslav or Greek territories (the purpose of (b) and (c) is to meet the desires of the Yugoslav Government but should be made to apply equally to Greece).

Article 6.

The Bulgarian authorities to provide at their own expense adequate food, clothing, and medical services for, and to ensure the welfare of, all Allied prisoners of war and internees pending other arrangements.

Article 10.

The Bulgarian authorities to take immediate steps to safeguard the property of the United Nations and their nationals pending return to the owners.

Article 12.

The Bulgarian authorities to send to a specified place sufficient local currency for the use of the British and American missions for their entry into Bulgaria.

The British Embassy has been instructed to inform the Department of State of the foregoing views of His Majesty's Government and to enquire whether they are in agreement with them and have any further suggestions.

WASHINGTON, 4 September, 1944.

740.0011 EW/9-544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 5, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received September 5—2:05 p. m.]

3321. Molotov has just given Clark Kerr and myself copy of a note which he is handing the Bulgarian Minister⁵⁹ at 7 p. m. Moscow time in which the Soviet Government breaks all relations and declares herself from now on in a state of war with Bulgaria. Moscow radio will announce at 9 p. m. Details follow.⁶⁰

HARRIMAN

874.01/9-544 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, September 5, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received September 6—9:55 p. m.]

524R116. Bulgarian Prime Minister Konstantin Muraviev made a statement last night on the policy of his newly-formed Government; it may be summarized as follows:

1. Coming into office at a difficult moment, government has brought together principal political leaders who have opposed pro-Axis policy.
2. Toleration of all races and religions, constitutional liberties of Bulgarian citizens will be restored.
3. Full amnesty will be accorded those imprisoned for opposing the dictators.
4. All Fascistic institutions imposed by influences from abroad will be dissolved.
5. Twenty-fifth Parliament will be finally dissolved in view of its responsibility for dragging the country into a war which the people never desired.
6. Government will give full attention to stabilizing the currency, arranging supply of food, fuel and clothing, other initial affairs.
7. German [*Armistice?*] negotiations with England and America approved and will be continued.
8. Bulgarian troops continue to withdraw from Serbia.
9. [Apparent omission] actions of previous Government in beginning peace [efforts with?] Russia seeking to improve their relations to point that is natural between a liberator and the liberated.

⁵⁹ Ivan Stamenov.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

10. Efforts will be made to restore friendly diplomatic relations with popular governments of Bulgaria's neighbors (presumably including Tito and Papandreou governments⁶¹).

11. As a prime consideration Government will continue sincere and friendly relations with [apparent omission] troops will soon complete their retreat from country. Thenceforth, neutral attitude to all nations will be Government's policy unless Germans by their actions force a break in diplomatic relations.

12. Prime Minister called for full support of nation for this program.

BERRY

740.0011 EW/9-544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 5, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received September 5—3:12 p. m.]

3325. ReEmbs 3321, September 5, 7 p. m. After Molotov had informed the British Ambassador and myself of the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria, I inquired whether Russian troops would enter Bulgaria. Molotov replied that this was a military question which had not been discussed and which would depend on developments. I asked whether the Soviet Government would prefer the Bulgars to cave in. He replied that it was difficult to say and that it was quite possible that the Bulgarians had foreseen this development as the Soviets had publicly made plain their dissatisfaction with Bulgaria's continued aid to Germany and unwillingness to join the democratic camp.

I would not be surprised if the Soviet Government's desire to be party to Bulgarian armistice and control of its execution did not play an important part in the Soviet Government's declaration of war.

Sent to the Department. Repeated for the secret information of the Ambassadors to AmEmbassy London as 161, AmEmbassy Ankara, AmEmBalk Cairo for MacVeagh.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-644

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 6 September 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the views of the Department of State with respect to the terms to be pre-

⁶¹ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), military leader of the Partisan guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia and President of the National Liberation Movement in that country, and George Papandreou, Greek Prime Minister.

sented to Bulgaria as set forth in your memoranda dated 26 and 30 August 1944.⁶² From the military viewpoint, the armistice terms transmitted in your memoranda under reference are acceptable.

Your comments in regard to "assurances" to be given Bulgaria with respect to the future independence of that country have been particularly noted. It is believed desirable that any such assurances should under no circumstances include any commitment, explicit or implied, regarding future military support of Bulgaria's independence.

Your suggestion of the addition to paragraph 3 of the clause: "their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the Allied occupation authorities," and the alterations agreed to with the British Government, are not considered objectionable from the military viewpoint.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

740.00119 E.W./9-544: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 5 [6], 1944—6 p. m.

[Received September 7—11:25 a. m.]

1663. Kisseloff called to see me this morning and informed me that while he was talking to the Bulgarian Foreign Office on the telephone last night he was told that the Bulgarian Government had just learned by a radio announcement from Moscow that Russia had declared war on Bulgaria. Kisseloff was instructed to request Balabanoff to inquire of Vinogradov⁶³ as to whether the radio announcement was correct. Balabanoff immediately called on Vinogradov who confirmed the report. After talking to Sofia on the telephone, Balabanoff returned to the Russian Embassy 30 minutes later and requested an armistice on behalf of the Bulgarian Government. Vinogradov informed Balabanoff that before transmitting the Bulgarian Government's request for an armistice to Moscow Bulgaria must break off relations with Germany. Balabanoff again telephoned Sofia and half an hour later visited Vinogradov and informed him that as a result of a decision of the Bulgarian Cabinet all relations between

⁶² Neither printed; they transmitted views and terms of the proposed armistice as given in telegrams 6928, August 25, midnight, from London, p. 367, and 6930, August 29, 7 p.m., to London, p. 378.

⁶³ Sergei Alexandrovich Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador in Turkey.

Bulgaria and Germany had been broken off and that Bulgaria considered itself in a state of war with Germany. Vinogradov thereupon transmitted Balabanoff's statement together with the request for an armistice to Moscow. Up to noon today no reply had been received by Balabanoff.

Kisseloff also informed me that the Bulgarian Government had not [*sic*] sent Saravoef,⁶⁴ Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Altinoef⁶⁵ last night to call on the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia to communicate to him the same message that Balabanoff communicated to Vinogradov.

Balabanoff has received instructions to inform Hugessen and myself of the foregoing which he will presumably do later in the day.

Repeated to Moscow, London and American Embassy Balk.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 E.W./9-644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 6, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received September 6—8:45 p. m.]

7287. In discussing the Russian declaration of war against Bulgaria with Sir Orme Sargent,⁶⁶ we were told that last night as soon as word of the declaration had been received, instructions were sent to Clark Kerr to press the Soviet Government for information on the steps it intends to take with reference to Bulgaria. As Sir Orme pointed out, this information is urgently needed to clear up, among other things, what is to be done now about the proposed armistice negotiations with Bulgaria.

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./9-644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 6, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

Yugos 16. From Schoenfeld. Ambassador Stevenson and I yesterday conveyed to Dr. Subasić points (a) to (d) listed in your 7123, September 2 and we added that in the circumstances, our Govern-

⁶⁴ Konstantin Sarafov, Secretary General of the Bulgarian Foreign Office.

⁶⁵ Ivan Altunov, Chief of the Political Department, Bulgarian Foreign Office.

⁶⁶ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ments requested that (1) the Yugoslav Government would confirm its concurrence in the armistice terms for Bulgaria and that it regarded them as applicable to itself and (2) that it would give its authorization to the representatives of the United Kingdom and United States Governments to sign on its behalf. We left with Subasić a joint confirmatory memorandum. Stevenson added orally that he felt confident means would be found to associate a Yugoslav representative with the ceremony of signature.

Subasić has now sent a memorandum stating that the Yugoslav Government has recognized with satisfaction the explanation given in our memorandum "i.e. that the propositions of the Royal Yugoslav Government as exposed in their notes of August 28 and 30 will be taken into consideration when the armistice terms will be enforced, as it has been provided by article XIII of the draft armistice terms." The memorandum adds: However, in view of the importance the Yugoslav Government attaches to the integrity of Yugoslav territory, it is anxious to see an additional clause added to article III reading as follows: "And to abrogate all acts and laws concerning annexation or incorporation of Yugoslav territory to Bulgaria".

The memorandum concludes: Thus the Yugoslav Government will be prepared to give its adherence and authorize the signing of the armistice terms on its behalf by the representative of the Allied Governments but if the instrument is signed by more than one Allied power, the Yugoslav Government would consider it essential that its representative also be a signatory.

In a covering letter, Dr. Subasić states, in view of the new situation created by Russia's declaration of war on Bulgaria and with respect to the previous intention of signature by a single representative for all the Allied Governments, the Yugoslav Government would like further clarification concerning the signing of the armistice [Schoenfeld.]

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./9-644 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 6, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received September 7—10:02 a. m.]

Greek Series 292. Embassy's Greek 284, September 3, 1 p. m.⁶⁷ In communication received today Prime Minister refers to Leeper's note summarized in Embassy's 283, September 2 and encloses a copy thereof together with a copy of his reply both of which he requests be communicated to United States Government. In that reply Papandreou, after quoting substance of Leeper's communication,

⁶⁷ Not printed.

states that Greek Government agrees not to insist on inclusion in armistice terms of additions previously proposed but again draws attention to urgent necessity of obliging Bulgaria at earliest moment to (1) reinstate Greeks displaced from Greek territory and to "provide means for their restitution" and (2) "redress financial damage brought upon Greece by compulsory circulation of Bulgarian currency" in Bulgarian occupied Greek territory.

Full text follows by despatch.^{67a} Repeated to Moscow, Ankara, Caserta as 49 and to London as 27.

SHANTZ

740.00119 E.W./9-644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 6, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received September 7—6:10 p. m.]

1671. See my 1663, September 6. In the course of my talk with Kisseloff, I inquired of him as to what steps were being taken by the Bulgarian Government to release American prisoners of war, particularly airmen. I suggested that they be evacuated immediately by air or that they be sent by rail to Turkey where the Embassy would assume responsibility for them. Kisseloff said that he would take the matter up at once with Sofia by telephone and endeavor to make the necessary arrangements for their evacuation as quickly as possible.⁶⁸

Repeated to Cairo for AmEmBalk.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 E.W./9-744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 7, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

3361. At the close of the discussion on Rumania yesterday, Clark Kerr said he was instructed to express the astonishment of his Government that the Soviet Government had declared war on Bulgaria without previous consultation and at a time when Bulgaria appeared to be anxious to make peace with the Allies. The Soviet Government having declared war, he was instructed to inquire what the

^{67a} Not printed.

⁶⁸ On September 11 there arrived at Istanbul by train from Bulgaria 306 American and 36 Allied prisoners of war en route home; most of the Americans were airmen, 35 requiring hospitalization.

Soviet Government proposed to do. Did it intend to invade Bulgaria or make specific demands of the Bulgarian Government? Was it the intention of the Soviet Government that Great Britain and the United States should not conclude an armistice with Bulgaria because this would violate our undertaking not to conclude a separate peace with our common enemies, or does the Soviet Government intend to join in the armistice which we were about to negotiate?

Molotov first pressed Clark Kerr to admit that the rupture of relations would help rather than hinder the Allies in the struggle against Germany. He then said that Clark Kerr's questions related to two matters, motive and timing. The reasons for declaring war were set forth in the Soviet note. Molotov explained the timing of the step by giving a review of Soviet *démarches* to the Bulgarian Government beginning last April and said that as far back as last May the Soviet Government had threatened to break off relations with Bulgaria. The Soviet Government had at first pressed for re-establishment of their consulates but on August 12 the Bulgarian Government was informed that the question was not one of consulates but of the rupture of relations with Germany. The last stage was the declaration of the Muraviev Government which showed that the Bulgarian Government did not dare break relations with Germany but had decided only to declare its neutrality. The rupture of relations and declaration of war by the Soviet Union then became an urgent step. He added that the Soviet Union was anxious to show the Bulgarians that the three Allies were in agreement.

Molotov said the question of invasion and that of armistice negotiations would depend upon the Bulgarians. Perhaps the Bulgarians would come to their senses. The Soviet Government had received unconfirmed reports that on the night of September 5 Bulgaria had broken relations with Germany. He pointed out that only one day had elapsed since the Soviet rupture of relations and declaration of war and said that it would take a little time to make certain that Bulgaria was ready to adopt a new policy. During the conversation Molotov observed several times that there was no need to hurry and that it would be well if Bulgaria "thought over the situation for a bit." He concluded by saying that the Soviet Union had for 3 years been urging Bulgaria to break relations with Germany, and it was now necessary to make sure that Bulgaria had abandoned its old policy of making false promises.

It seems clear that the internal political situation in Bulgaria taken together with the arrival of Soviet forces on the Bulgarian border is an important, if not the most important, factor in present Soviet

policy, and Molotov appeared to feel that Soviet interests in this respect would best be served by allowing Bulgaria to "stew in its own juice" for the time being. Although Molotov begged the question about Soviet military plans respecting Bulgaria, saying that these matters would be governed by military decisions, political considerations may well impel the Russians in the direction of an entry of Russia's troops onto Bulgarian soil. The Turkish angle will also play a prominent part in Russian thought on this question.

Sent to Department as No. 3361 and repeated to AmLegation [*Embassy*] Cairo for MacVeagh.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 E.W./9-744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 7, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received September 8—10:45 p. m.]

1676. The Bulgarian Minister has informed me that in the course of a telephone conversation with Sofia yesterday he was told that approximately 5000 Germans had thus far been disarmed in Bulgaria and that 230 vessels of different sizes operating on the Danube for German account had been disarmed and the crews interned. As of September 6, according to the Bulgarian Government in Sofia, no Soviet troops had as yet entered Bulgaria.

Repeated to Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 E.W./9-744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 7, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received September 7—3:24 p. m.]

7314. ReDept 7026, August 31, 8 p. m.⁶⁹ Foreign Office says it had come to regard proposal outlined in British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 20⁷⁰ as out of date and that Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria now completely kills it and that the proposal has been dropped in its entirety.

Sent Department; repeated to Moscow and Ankara.

WINANT

⁶⁹ Not printed.

⁷⁰ *Ante*, p. 358.

740.0011 European War/9-744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 7, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received September 8—10:32 p. m.]

1677. British Ambassador informed me today he had seen the Prime Minister this morning. Saraçoğlu was very much disturbed by recent developments in Bulgaria, particularly the Soviet declaration of war against that country. He expressed his mistrust of Soviet intentions and inquired as to whether the Soviet declaration of war against Bulgaria had been made with approval of the British and American Governments. Hugessen replied he could see no reason for alarm on the part of Turkey as Soviet, British and American long range objectives were the same and particularly as the British and American Governments had been informed of the Soviet intention to declare war on Bulgaria. Hugessen said he had based this latter statement on this morning's BBC broadcast to the effect that Molotov had informed British and American Ambassadors in Moscow prior to the declaration of war.

He then remarked to Saraçoğlu that if he were in his place he would keep a careful eye on the situation just as should "a person who had a spot on his chest to see if it might develop into measles or something more serious".

I referred to the rumor now current in Ankara and Istanbul that Turkey would declare war on Germany before September 15 and asked Hugessen whether he considered such action by the Turks to be within the realm of possibility. Hugessen replied that it was inconceivable to him without full prior discussion with the British and American Governments.

Repeated to Moscow and London as No. 47.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 European War/9-844 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 8, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received 8:25 p. m.]

Greek 297. Ankara telegram 1635, September 2 to Department. The course of events in Cairo does not seem to justify the Turkish criticism of British delay in conducting armistice negotiations.

The British brought the Bulgarian delegate to Cairo by special plane the day after his arrival at Istanbul (Istanbul telegram to Department August 30, 10 a.m.).

Conversations with Moushanov began September 1, the same day that Shantz received authority to act.

Subsequent delay was caused by Moushanov's reluctance to proceed with the negotiations for reasons given in Embassy's telegram Greek 278, 286 and 290 ⁷¹ of September 1, 4 and 5 respectively.

Repeated to London as 28, to Moscow and Ankara.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 E.W./9-1144

*The Soviet Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Gousev) to the American Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant)*⁷²

[Translation]

LONDON, September 9, 1944.

DEAR MR. WINANT: As you will recall, I informed you on August 29th that the Soviet Government had decided not to take part in the discussion by the European Advisory Commission of the armistice terms for Bulgaria, which was explained by the fact that the U.S.S.R. was then not at war with Bulgaria.

On September 5th the Soviet Government broke off relations with Bulgaria and declared that the Soviet Union was henceforth at war with Bulgaria. This decision was adopted by the Soviet Government in virtue of the fact that Bulgaria, despite the fact that the worsening military situation of Germany enabled her to break off relations with the German Government without risk, was refusing to break off her relations with Germany and was continuing to harbor Germans on Bulgarian territory, thus giving them every possibility of creating there a new center of resistance to the forces of the anti-German coalition.

It was only on September 7th that the Bulgarian Government declared officially that it had broken off relations with Germany, and appealed to the Soviet Government with a request for an armistice. Thus, the aim set by the Soviet Government in its note of September 5th was attained.

In view of the above mentioned circumstances, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to discuss armistice terms for Bulgaria in the European Advisory Commission. At the same time the Soviet Government would consider it convenient for the actual negotiations

⁷¹ Telegram Greek 290, September 5, 8 p. m., not printed.

⁷² Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 17973, September 11, from London, not printed. A summary of this letter was sent to the Department in telegram 7428, September 9, 9 p.m., from London, not printed.

with the Bulgarian Government to be conducted in Moscow or, if for any reason that is not appropriate, in Ankara.⁷³

Sincerely,

F[EDOR] GOUSEV

740.0011 E.W./9-944: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1944.

[Received September 9—6:35 p. m.]

3388. Following Foreign Office Information Bureau communiqué regarding Bulgaria appeared in press for September 9:

"On September 5 the Soviet Union severed relations with Bulgaria and declared a state of war between the USSR and Bulgaria. This decision was taken by the Soviet Government in consequence of the fact that Bulgaria despite the deterioration of Germany's military situation, giving her every possibility of breaking her relations with Germany and thus ending her pro-German policy, continued to maintain relations with Germany, sheltering Germans on Bulgarian territory and affording them the possibility of creating there a new base for resistance to the forces of the Allies.

After publication of the Soviet note, representatives of the Bulgarian Government, namely, the General Secretary of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mister Sarafov, and the Director of the Political Department of this Ministry, Mister Altynov, visited the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia, D. G. Yakovlev, on the night of September 6 and requested him on behalf of the Bulgarian Government to inform the Soviet Government that Bulgaria had broken its relations with Germany and that the Bulgarian Government requested an armistice of the Soviet Government.

Despite these official declarations, the Bulgarian Government on September 6 merely announced that it had approached the Soviet Government with a request for an armistice but it made no declaration regarding a breach with Germany. Thus a contradiction was revealed between the statement of the Bulgarian Government made to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia and the statement made by the Bulgarian Government publicly. Such a contradictory situation cannot but arouse in the Soviet Government mistrust of the position of the Bulgarian Government. In view of this the Soviet Government was unable to consider the request of the Bulgarian Government for an armistice.

Only on September 7 did the Bulgarian Government announce that it had severed relations with Germany.

⁷³ In telegram 7404, September 12, 10 p.m., to London, the Department indicated that it was agreeable to have the Bulgarian surrender terms reviewed by the European Advisory Commission. Furthermore, the Department believed that Ankara would be a more suitable place than Moscow for the Bulgarian armistice discussions in case it was decided that Cairo was no longer feasible. (740.00119-E. W./9-944)

On September 8 the Bulgarian Government declared war on Germany.

At the present time the Soviet Government has found it possible to undertake consideration of the request of the Bulgarian Government regarding negotiations for an armistice".⁷⁴

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-944

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 9 September, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the letter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 6 September 1944 regarding Armistice Terms for Bulgaria, as set forth in your memoranda dated 26 and 30 August 1944.⁷⁵

Subsequent to the forwarding of this letter, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered this matter and recommend that the following sentence be added to Article 13 of the Armistice Terms:

"These instructions and requirements will be communicated to the Bulgarian Government by an Allied control commission which will be appointed in Bulgaria for that purpose."

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

740.0011 E.W./9-744 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944—10 p. m.

783. Your 1677, September 7, 6 p. m. For your information hardly more than one hour's prior notice was given to British and American Ambassadors in Moscow of the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria September 5. According to Harriman's 3361 September 7, 3 p. m., British Ambassador, Moscow, on September 6 informed Molotov that he was under instructions to express the astonishment of his Government that Soviets had declared war on Bulgaria without previous consultation and at a time when Bulgaria appeared to be anxious to make peace with Allies.

[Here follows report on Ambassador Harriman's telegram.]

⁷⁴ For information regarding the Bulgarian armistice terms, see bracketed note in vol. I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission," part II.

⁷⁵ Memoranda not printed.

Foregoing will be of interest in connection with the concern expressed by Saraçoğlu.

Please keep Department informed of developments which may come to your attention in Turkish reaction, attitude, and intentions. Should the Turks, as rumored, contemplate a declaration of war on Germany in the near future, presumably with a view to recording Turkey's position beyond equivocation and possibly paving the way for adherence to the United Nations Declaration, Department would appreciate your views and comment.

The Department is not aware of London's current thinking regarding the course it might now be desirable for Turkey to follow. Has the British Embassy, Ankara received any information in this connection?

Sent to Ankara as Department's 783, repeated to London as Department's no. 7334.

HULL

740.0011 E.W./9-944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 16—9:35 a. m.]

3410. V. P. Kolarov, former Bulgarian delegate to the Comintern, delivered a public lecture last night in Moscow before a moderate sized audience which shed light on the motivation behind the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria. The outstanding feature of the lecture was a sharp denunciation of the Muraviev government for its refusal to include representatives of the Communist-sponsored Fatherland Front.

Kolarov made no mention of the break in relations with Germany and subsequent declaration of war by the Muraviev government although these events had already occurred and were announced in an official communiqué published in today's papers.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-1044 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, September 10, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received September 11—11:48 a. m.]

348 Papandreou and Svolos, Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Greek Government who have just arrived in Italy, expressed

to General Wilson today great concern over information that they had received as to probable armistice terms with Bulgaria by which Bulgarian forces will be co-belligerent and as result would presumably be in position to fight against Germans on Greek soil. They informed SAC that this was an insult to Greek sovereignty which would be intolerable. They urged General Wilson to act on their protest and to request that armistice terms for Bulgaria include evacuation of Bulgarian forces from Greece and a prohibition against their return to Greek soil under any pretext.

SAC was sympathetic with this latter request and stated that he thought there was great deal to be said for Greek case.

In expressing orally his appreciation for Department's message 104, September 5,⁷⁷ SAC commented, "this Bulgarian affair is a mess. Our Russian friends have nosed us out again. They will certainly insist on handling the negotiations in Moscow". General Wilson then added that he understood Yugoslavs were making trouble about Bulgarian armistice also and stated that he felt worse headaches in Balkan affairs are still before us.

KIRK

874.002/9-1044 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, September 10, 1944.

[Received September 11—4 p. m.]

535. The Bulgarian Cabinet announced on September 9th: Prime Minister, Minister Without Portfolio Kimon Gheorgiev, Minister Without Portfolio Dobri Partichev, Minister Without Portfolio Nicolas D. Petkov, Minister Foreign Affairs Professor Petko Stainov, Minister the Interior Anton Stanev [Yugov], Minister Public Instruction Professor Stancho Cholakov, Minister Justice Doctor Mincho Neychev, Minister Finance Professor Petko Stoyanov, Minister War Colonel Damian Velchev, Minister Commerce Dimiter Neykov, Minister Public Lands Boris Pumpalov [*Bumbarov*], Minister Agriculture Assen Pavlov, Minister Transportation Angel Derjanski. Three new ministries are formed: Ministry Public Health Doctor Racho Angelov, Ministry Social Welfare Grigor Chesmedjiev, Ministry Propaganda Dimo Kazasov.

BERRY

⁷⁷ Not printed.

740.00119 E.W./9-1144: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 11, 1944.

[Received September 11—6:30 a. m.]

3420. Moscow papers for September 10th publish following communiqué of Foreign Office Informburo headed "Soviet troops have terminated hostilities in Bulgaria".

"Inasmuch as the Bulgarian Government has broken off relations with Germany, declared war on Germany and approached the Soviet Government with request for an armistice, Soviet troops ceased hostilities in Bulgaria at 10 p. m. September 9.

At the present time the terms for an armistice with Bulgaria are being worked out by the Soviet Government in conjunction with the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America.["]

HARRIMAN

740.00119 European War/9-1144: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 11, 1944—noon.

[Received September 13—2:08 a. m.]

1702. The Bulgarian Minister informed me today that the new Bulgarian Cabinet is composed of four Communists, four Agrarians and four members of the former "Zveno group". He expressed concern at what he described as the "extreme leftist tendencies" of all 12 members of the new Cabinet.

Balabanoff said that he had received no recent information concerning the armistice negotiations or where they were to be held. He expressed the hope that the United States and Britain would resist any Russian pressure to transfer the negotiations to Moscow. He said that Mushanoff had been instructed to return to Ankara but that these orders had been countermanded at the last moment and he had been told to keep in touch with the American and British representatives in Cairo in order to avoid the appearance of any breakdown in the negotiations.

Repeated to Moscow and to Cairo for AmEmBalk for MacVeagh.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 E.W./9-1144: Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, September 11, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:34 p. m.]

534R117. Reestablishment late yesterday of telephone connections between Istanbul and Sofia permitted my Bulgarian source to confirm from Sofia the following developments:

On September 5 amid efforts to maintain strict neutrality and preserve internal order Bulgarian Council of Ministers met at 3 p. m. faced with problem of taking measures against outbreak of various German reprisals within the country, brushes between German and Bulgarian troops, including German torture and imprisonment of the staff of a Bulgarian division occupying Serbia and disarming of various detachments.

While thus in session the Council of Ministers received the note from USSR announcing Russian declaration of war against Bulgaria. Without adjourning the meeting the Council sent three Ministers to the Soviet Legation in Sofia to request an armistice. The Council of Ministers had already decided to break off diplomatic relations with Reich and so informed diplomatic representative of USSR. Also diplomatic relations were broken off with Social Fascist Italian Republic and independent Croatia and Slovakia. Council on September 6 dissolved all Fascist organizations of National Socialist ideology which are influenced from abroad.

Commander of Fifth Army, Major General Constantin Stoyanov, and Chief of Staff of Bulgarian Armies, Major General Trifon Trifonov, were dismissed. Major General Cyril Yanchulev was named Chief of Bulgarian Forces. Regent Filoff resigned.

An amnesty was declared for those accused of plotting against Fascist ideology. By ministerial decree all military ranks of Allied countries were liberated. State *gendarmerie* was dissolved and its formations returned whence derived, the police or the army.

On September 6 the Russian Army entered Bulgaria and on the 8th the Bulgarian Government replied to the proclamation of General Tolbukhin, commanding Russian troops in Bulgaria, that no obstacle exists to ending state of war. The Government was ready to begin armistice immediately.

Late in the 8th Moscow Radio announced that the Government of Muraviev was unable to give the necessary guarantees for the execution of the armistice and the Government immediately resigned. On

the 9th a new leftist Government under Kimon Gheorgiev was announced. This Government attested the intention of national front to consolidate all its forces to assist USSR, Allies to rid Balkans of Germans. It proclaimed that every effort will be made to establish solid relations with USSR and the new Yugoslavia and sincere friendship with western democratic powers. It then relieved of their functions Prince Cyril and General Michoff, the two remaining Regents, and published the declaration of war against Germany.

BERRY

874.01/9-1144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 11, 1944.

[Received September 12—8:35 a. m.]

3425. Press for September 10 published Tass despatch from Sofia dated September 9 listing personnel of new Bulgarian Government as announced by Bulgarian radio.

Another despatch of same date and place quotes radio speech by propaganda Minister of new Government, Dimo Kazasov. Kazasov quotedly described steps taken by new Bulgarian Government in liquidating everything which had led to country's present grievous situation. Steps included decree dismissing regents. Council of Ministers also ordered arrest of all those guilty of bringing country to catastrophe, namely, all Ministers of Governments since January 1, 1941, and all Deputies of National Assembly of 25th convocation who approved policy carried out against national interests. Property of all those persons is being confiscated.

Council of Ministers appointed delegation consisting of Professor Dimiter Mihailchev, Colonel of General Staff [Kiril] Slavchev [*Stanchev?*] and Dimiter Ganev to contact Army General Tolbukhin, commanding third Ukrainian front, with aim of learning armistice terms for terminating war between Soviet Union and Bulgaria and of reestablishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Union and working out plans for concerting operations of Bulgarian and Soviet troops to expel Germans from Bulgaria.

From this day on, continued Kazasov's statement, all political liberties and rights are reestablished, and laws against the people's interests are annulled. All present organs which helped bring Bulgaria to verge of ruin are suppressed. All other organs of press have

full freedom. Censorship is abolished. Also abolished are restrictions on freedom of circulation.

HARRIMAN

874.01/9-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 12, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

3436. ReEmbtel 3425, September 11. While Embassy has no information concerning identity of leaders of Bulgarian Fatherland Front, it is assumed that new Bulgarian Government reported in Soviet Press for September 10 contains representatives of Fatherland Front (reEmbtel 3410, September 9, midnight). Soviet approval of the new Government may be inferred from publication of the proclamation of the Minister of Propaganda of the new Government. Department will note that while proclaiming restoration of all political rights and freedoms, new Government has ordered arrest of all Ministers serving in Governments since January 1, 1941 and all members of 25th session of National Assembly who approved anti-national policy. Similarly while freedom of press is guaranteed all papers which assisted in "bringing Bulgaria to the verge of catastrophe" are closed down.

Press for past week reveals Soviet interest in internal Bulgarian political situation which Soviet Government is apparently seeking to influence with a view to achieving basic aims of its foreign policy in the Balkans.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 12, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 11:43 p. m.]

1708. In conversation with the Russian Ambassador last night he remarked that he had received a telegram from Moscow to the effect that the Russian Government intended to express to the EAC its desire that the Bulgarian armistice negotiations be conducted in Moscow but that if this was not agreeable to the British and American Governments it was willing that the negotiations be conducted in Ankara. Vinogradov indicated that his Government was at a loss to under-

stand the British insistence on conducting Bulgarian negotiations in Cairo.

Repeated to London as No. 49, Moscow and AmEmBalk.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 E.W./9-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 12, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received September 12—3:30 p. m.]

Greek Series 305. My Greek series 290, September 5.⁷³ Today I received Moushanov at his own request with Mr. Steel, representing Lord Moyné, also present.

Moushanov said the new Bulgarian Government had instructed him to remain in contact with the Allies at Cairo and had also enquired as to place where armistice negotiations were to be continued. To his request for advice on the matter, we replied that this question would be decided by the three Allied Governments.

He then said that since the new Bulgarian Government was of an entirely different character from the one which first asked him to negotiate, he felt it essential, if he were to represent it properly, for him to have closer contact with it. He asked to go temporarily to Ankara where he could communicate with Sofia by telephone.

Steel informed him that he was agreeable to this provided his Government had no objection and that he would make enquiry of the Foreign Office by telegraph.

If the Department has objection to Moushanov's departure for Ankara, please reply urgently.

Repeated to London as 30, to Moscow, Ankara and Caserta as No. 59.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War/9-1244 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1944—8 p. m.

92. Reurtel 305, September 12. Department has no objection to Moshanov's departure for Ankara.

For your information the Soviet Government has proposed that the Bulgarian terms be presented either at Moscow or at Ankara. We are indicating a preference for Ankara, but are not yet informed

⁷³ Not printed.

of the British views. We are also agreeing to having the EAC review the terms and examine certain as yet undisclosed "amendments and additions" which the Russians wish to propose.

HULL

740.00119 EAC/9-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 12, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

7503. Comea 84. At today's meeting of the EAC, Russian delegation presented amendments and additions to Bulgarian armistice terms. The British asked for a discussion of them, the Russians agreeing. I explained that I was without instructions as yet from my Government in reply to Ambassador Gousev's letter of September 9⁷⁹ (my 7428, September 9, 9 p. m.⁸⁰), but that I was willing, in order to save time, to sit in during the presentation of the Soviet proposals, but would not enter into the discussion. Discussion was prefaced by British statement that Mushanov was awaiting Allied terms in Cairo, according to report of Bulgarian Foreign Minister's interview of September 10. Gousev reported that Bulgaria had asked the Soviet authorities for armistice terms and pointed out that since Bulgaria had declared war on Germany the original terms no longer reflected the present situation and required modification. We had before us the slightly revised British draft (see my 7474, September 11, 11 p. m.⁸¹) for comparison.

A new preamble was proposed by Soviet delegation as follows: "The Bulgarian Government accepts the armistice terms presented by the Governments of Great Britain, Soviet Union and USA acting in the interests of all the United Nations. Accordingly, the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, duly empowered by the Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA acting in the interests of all the United Nations, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Bulgarian Government, being furnished with the necessary full powers, on the other hand, have signed the following conditions." Strang questioned whether the three Governments could act in the interests of United Nations not at war with Bulgaria, and noted that the assent of those United Nations at war with Bulgaria had already been received. Strang also noted that it was now

⁷⁹ *Ante*, p. 405.

⁸⁰ See footnote 72, p. 405.

⁸¹ Not printed; the British draft was a revision of terms as set forth in telegrams 6928, August 25, midnight, from London, p. 367, and 6930, August 29, 7 p. m., to London, p. 378.

proposed to substitute a Soviet general for SACMED as signatory and recalled that Gousev's letter of September 9 (my 7428, September 9, 9 p. m.) proposed that negotiations with the Bulgarians be conducted in Moscow or Ankara. He reported that British Ambassador had been instructed today to tell Soviet Government that United Kingdom prefers Cairo since British, United States and Bulgarian Plenipotentiaries are already there and that it considers Ankara, as neutral territory, unsuited to such negotiations. United Kingdom Government prefers signature of Bulgarian terms by SACMED acting for Allied Governments, including Soviet, as Soviet commander is signing Rumanian terms on behalf of United Kingdom Government.⁸² Gousev pointed out that Moscow was the headquarters of the Allied troops which are now in Bulgaria.

In place of articles I and II Soviet delegation proposed one new article as follows: "Bulgaria has ceased hostilities completely as of (blank) date 1944 and has withdrawn from the war against the United Nations, has severed relations with Germany and her satellites, has gone to war and will wage war on the side of the Allied Powers against Germany and her satellites for the purpose of restoring her independence and sovereignty, for which purpose she puts in the field not fewer than (blank) number divisions together with necessary reinforcements. The military action of the Bulgarian Armed Forces including the fleet and air forces against Germany will be carried on under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command." British pointed out they did not know whether Bulgaria had stopped fighting the United Kingdom and had severed relations with the satellites.

Article III approved by Soviet delegation. It proposed a new article IV: "The Bulgarian Government will assure to the Soviet and other Allied Forces free movement across Bulgarian territory in every direction, if required by the military situation, the Bulgarian Government to furnish every assistance to such movement by its means of communications and at its expense, on land and water and in the air." British noted similarity of this provision to one article of the Rumanian draft. Soviet delegation proposed omission of article V as inappropriate in view of Bulgarian participation in the war. Article VI was approved by the Soviet delegation. It proposed omission of article VII since its content is covered in Soviet's new draft of article IV. British delegate pointed out that new article IV would cover only military movements, while article X of Rumanian armi-

⁸² For text of the armistice agreement with Rumania, signed at Moscow September 13, 1944, at 5 a. m., see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712. For correspondence regarding negotiations, see vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

stice also covers nonmilitary movements. Gousev proposed new article VIII: "The Bulgarian Government will liberate immediately all persons, regardless of citizenship and nationality, who are under confinement in connection with their activity in favor of the United Nations or for their sympathies for the cause of the United Nations or because of their racial origin, and will likewise repeal all discriminatory legislation and all restrictions derived therefrom." Strang noted that this provision was identical with a provision of the Rumanian terms.

Article IX was accepted by Soviet delegation. In article X it proposed omission of rest of sentence following "war damage". British commented that omitted words were important (1) to prevent disposal of Bulgarian external assets (2) to prevent sale to other nationals of Bulgarian domestic assets. Gousev felt this point was covered by an additional paragraph on property, but I do not find this in any of his proposed terms. Soviet delegate proposed omission of article XI as ineffective now that we want Bulgaria to wage war on our side. For article XII he proposed new version: "Bulgaria shall regularly pay such monetary sums in Bulgarian currency and furnish such commodities (fuel, foodstuffs, et cetera), facilities and services as may be required by the Allied (Soviet) High Command for the performance of its functions". British noted resemblance of this draft article to article XIV of Rumanian terms. For article XIII Gousev proposed a new version, "there will be established an Allied Control Commission which shall undertake to regulate and control the execution of the present conditions under the general direction and according to the instructions of the Allied (Soviet) High Command". Strang noted similarity of this draft to Rumanian article XII, but pointed out that a proposal to place the Control Commission for Bulgaria under the Soviet Supreme Command raises a question of principle; also new draft omitted provision of article XIII which enabled Allies to issue additional instructions.

Soviet delegation then presented six additional articles, apparently based on articles XVI, XVII, XII, VIII, IX and X of the Rumanian draft armistice.

(1) "The Bulgarian Government undertakes to dissolve immediately all pro-Hitlerite (Fascist in type) organizations located on Bulgarian territory, political, military, militarized, and likewise any other organizations carrying on propaganda hostile to the United Nations and, in particular, to the Soviet Union, and henceforth not to permit the existence of such organizations."

(2) "The publication, importation and distribution in Bulgaria of periodical and nonperiodical literature, the presentation of theatrical performances and cinema films, the operation of radio stations, posts, telegraph and telephone, will take place by agreement with the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

(3) "The Government of Bulgaria undertakes to return to the Soviet Union, in time-limits to be set by the Allied (Soviet) High Command, and in good condition, all valuables and materials removed by Germany from Soviet territory during the war and belonging to state, public and cooperative organizations, enterprises and institutions or to individual citizens, such as: equipment of factories and plants, locomotives, railway cars, tractors, automobiles and trucks, historical monuments, museum pieces and every other kind of property." Strang inquired whether such rights should not be extended to Greece and Yugoslavia.

(4) "The Government of Bulgaria undertakes not to permit the exportation or expropriation of any kind of property (including valuables and currency) belonging to Germany, Hungary or Rumania or to their citizens or to persons residing on their territories or on territories occupied by them, without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. It will safeguard this property in accordance with arrangements to be laid down by the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

(5) "The Government of Bulgaria undertakes to deliver to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all ships belonging to the United Nations and located in the ports of Bulgaria, regardless of whose disposition these ships are found in, for use by the Allied (Soviet) High Command during the war against Germany and Hungary in the common interests of the Allies, these ships to be returned later to their owners. The Bulgarian Government will bear full material responsibility for any damage or destruction done to the above-enumerated property prior to its delivery to the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

(6) "The Bulgarian Government will, in case of need, assure the use, on the territory of Bulgaria, of industrial and transport enterprises, and also of means of communication, power stations, public service enterprises and facilities, stores of fuel and other materials, in accordance with instructions issued during the armistice period by the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

The Commission will meet to discuss Bulgarian armistice terms as soon as the delegations have been able to communicate with their Governments.

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./9-1344 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

Greek 309. Department's Greek 92, of September 12. With reference to the Soviet proposal that the Bulgarian terms be presented at Moscow or at Ankara, Steel, who is in charge of Balkan affairs for Lord Moyne, personally expresses a strong preference for Moscow on the grounds that there is no British Ambassador at Ankara and that in any event negotiations would proceed more rapidly at Moscow

On the basis of our experience here in connection with the Rumanian negotiations, I agree with the above, if the terms, when presented to the Bulgarian delegate, are still to be open to discussion. However, if they are to be presented simply for signature, after being completely elaborated and agreed on previously by the victorious powers, I can see no valid reason against the apparently continuing, British official preference for Cairo which may not be unconnected with natural pique over Russia's last minute entrance into the affair.

Repeated to Moscow and Ankara, to London as 31 and to Caserta as 60.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 E.A.C./9-1244: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1944—midnight.

7492. Reurtel 7503 September 12. Pending clearance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department has the following tentative comments on the proposals presented to the EAC by the Russian representative with regard to the Bulgarian armistice terms.

While the Department agrees that the signature of the armistice terms by a Soviet general is not illogical, in view of the development of military operations, it wishes to give this important matter further consideration particularly in the light of such views as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may formulate. These same considerations apply to the proposal that the Control Commission be placed under the general direction of the Soviet High Command.

The Department also wishes to give further consideration to the proposal in articles I, V and XI of the Russian terms that Bulgaria be granted a status of cobelligerency. It is noted that under the new article I Bulgarian forces are to be used only against Germany and her satellites. Nevertheless, in view of the apprehension which this provision is likely to arouse among neighboring United Nations, and in particular Greece, it may be advisable, on political grounds, to insert a clause restricting the number of Bulgarian divisions to be used, delimiting the area of their operations, and providing for the demobilization and disarmament of the remaining troops.

The Department believes that Ankara would be the most suitable place for the armistice discussions.

The Department finds no objection to the Soviet versions of articles III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, XII, XIII and the six additional articles.

With regard to the discussion which arose in the EAC over articles VII and X, the Department understands that there was no disagreement as to substance, and supposes that the necessary adjustments can best be made in the EAC.

The following changes in phraseology are recommended:

A. In the preamble, the words "at war with Bulgaria" should be inserted after the words "all the United Nations," as it is supposed that it was not intended to include those members of the United Nations which are not at war with Bulgaria.

B. Even more in the case of the Bulgarian terms than in that of the Rumanian terms the Department believes that the words "and, in particular, to the Soviet Union," should be omitted, since it is believed the term "United Nations" should adequately meet the Soviet requirements in this regard.

You will receive final instructions upon receipt of the views of the Joint Chiefs.

HULL

740.00119 EAC/9-1544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 15, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 15—10:36 p. m.]

7630. Comea 87. Department's 7492, September 14, midnight. Today the EAC renewed its discussion of armistice terms for Bulgaria. The British reported they had received no reply to their inquiry in Moscow about signature of the armistice by SACMED in Cairo (my 7503, September 12, 11 p. m., Comea 84). The Soviet delegate stressed the desirability of concentrating the discussions in the EAC. Both American and British delegations reserved their positions with respect to signature of the armistice and cobelligerency.

In discussing Soviet article I, my delegation also stressed the desirability of restricting the number of divisions allowed to Bulgaria, of disarming the rest of the Bulgarian Army, and delimiting the area of Bulgarian operations. For article III the United Kingdom delegation presented a new version: "Bulgarian forces, officials (including Bulgarian church authorities) and nationals will withdraw forthwith from Greek and Yugoslav territory at present occupied by Bulgaria. The Bulgarian authorities will take immediate steps to cancel all legislative and administrative enactments which provided for the annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Greek or Yugoslav territory". In Soviet article IV the British proposed the addition of the words "in the opinion of the Allies" following "if" and preceding "required". British delegate proposed an expanded article VI, simi-

lar to article V of Rumanian armistice. In Soviet article VIII, "disabilities" was substituted for "restrictions".

A new reading of article X was proposed by the British delegation, "the Bulgarian Government will restore all rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals in Bulgaria and will return their property in complete good order. The Bulgarian Government will comply with such provisions regarding deliveries, services or payments by way of reparation for war loss and damage as may be prescribed. There shall be no disposal of Bulgarian assets without Allied consent". My delegation proposed omission of words "loss and" in second sentence of new article X. Soviet delegate again objected to last sentence of new article X as too inclusive in scope.

As substitute for articles XI and XII, British delegation proposed new article XII, "the Bulgarian Government will make such regular money payments in Bulgarian currency and supply such goods (fuel, food products, et cetera), facilities and services as the Allies may require". Both United States and United Kingdom delegations reserved their positions with respect to the Control Commission, in article XIII. The United Kingdom delegation emphasized the desirability of retaining in article XIII provisions for issuing additional instructions to Bulgaria and for Bulgarian compliance with requirements for peace and security.

In first added Soviet article, my delegation proposed omission of words "and in particular to the Soviet Union". Gousev stressed Soviet desire to retain these words because Bulgaria was nearer to Russia geographically and because it had been a center of anti-Soviet and white-Guard agitation after the revolution. In place of third added Soviet article, the British delegation proposed a new version, "the Government of Bulgaria will return in conformity with Allied instructions and in a good state of preservation all valuables, material and property removed from Allied territory during the war and now located in Bulgaria". Gousev felt Russian public would appreciate inclusion of detailed Soviet article. My delegation proposed enlarging new United Kingdom article X to cover more specifically the restitution of Allied property other than Soviet. In fifth added Soviet article, United Kingdom delegation proposed omission of words "for use by the Allied (Soviet) High Command during the war against Germany and Hungary in the common interests of the Allies, these ships to be returned later to their owners" on the ground that these matters do not concern Bulgaria.

For sixth added Soviet article, the United Kingdom delegation proposed a new wording, "the Bulgarian Government will comply with instructions issued during the armistice by the Allies regarding the utilization in Bulgarian territory of industrial and transport enterprises, including Danubian transport and navigation facilities,

and of means of communication, power stations, public service enterprises and facilities, and stocks of fuel and other materials. Bulgarian merchant vessels, whether in Bulgarian or foreign waters, shall be subject to the operational control of the Allies for use in the general interest of the Allies". The British felt the inclusion of a reference to Danubian transport would facilitate omission of original article VII. The Soviet delegate objected that such enumeration was unnecessary. One new article was proposed by the British delegation, "The Bulgarian Government will hand over to the Allies as booty all war material of Germany and her satellites located on Bulgarian territory, including vessels in the fleets of Germany and her satellites located in Bulgarian waters", based on an article of the Rumanian armistice. The Soviet and United States delegations agreed to consider this addition. The next discussion of Bulgarian terms is to be held as soon as any one of the three delegations is ready to take up any of the points raised.

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/9-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 16, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received September 16—1:55 p. m.]

7654. Comea 88. My 7630, September 15, midnight, Comea 87. A divergence has emerged from yesterday's EAC discussion of Bulgarian armistice terms in the question of consultation with the smaller United Nations prior to presenting the terms for Bulgarian signature. The British-American draft provides for signature "on behalf of all the United Nations Governments at war with Bulgaria." This phrase if accepted would mean that the three principal Governments would consult the Yugoslav, Greek, Czechoslovak, Haitian and Nicaraguan Governments, would ask their approval of the terms and would receive authority to sign on their behalf. The Soviet draft, on the other hand, states that the terms are presented by the three Governments "acting in the interests of all the United Nations." This phrase, which is similar to the one used in the German surrender instrument,⁸³ implies clearly that the three Governments will not consult the smaller Allies, ask their approval of the terms or request authority to sign on their behalf. In view of this divergence between the British and Soviet positions, I refrained yesterday from taking an explicit position and should appreciate learning the further views of the Department.

WINANT

⁸³ Approved by the European Advisory Commission on July 25; for text, see vol. I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission," part V.

740.00119 E.W./9-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 16, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 18—9:05 a. m.]

Greek Series 319. The Department's Greece 12 [92], September 12, 8 p. m. Moushanov has been informed by Balabanov that Minister Stainov agrees to the proposal that Moushanov go temporarily to Ankara to establish contact with his Government, but only provided the representatives of the British and American Governments consent and that the journey does not in any way signify that the Bulgarian delegation is finally leaving Cairo.

The British Foreign Office has so far not agreed to Moushanov's going and he is therefore still here.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, by telegram dated September 11 and received in Ankara September 13, Stainov has informed Moushanov that the Bulgarian delegation sent to General Tolbukhin was received cordially but notified that the armistice conditions would be jointly elaborated by the three powers. In addition Balabanov advises that, upon the request of his delegation, the Russians have returned their arms to disarmed Bulgarian troops.

Repeated to Moscow, Ankara, London as 33 and to Caserta as 66.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 EAC/9-1744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 17, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 17—8:43 p. m.]

7680. Comea 90. My 7630, September 15, midnight. Subsequent to Friday's EAC discussion of Bulgarian armistice terms, Foreign Office has today raised formally with me and Soviet Ambassador the question of making prior Bulgarian evacuation of Allied territories a prerequisite for the armistice. The British believe that the Bulgars should be required to give an undertaking to evacuate their officials and forces but not nationals from Greek and Yugoslav territory within 15 days, and that only when that undertaking had been given would armistice negotiations with the Bulgars begin. Likewise fulfillment of this undertaking, to be verified by a tripartite commission sent to Sofia, should be a prerequisite for actual signature of the armistice. Such a requirement would, Strang felt, be similar to that imposed on

⁸⁴ Mr. Mushanov departed for Ankara on September 20.

the Finns. According to Strang's information, Molotov had told Clark Kerr on September 14 that he fully shared the British view that Bulgaria must evacuate Greek and Yugoslav territory. Above was communicated today by Strang to Gousev.

Certain points raised in Friday's discussion were also reviewed informally by Strang with me, who stressed that views expressed below were not yet policy.

1. British are now inclined to accept Ankara as the place of negotiation with the Bulgarians.

2. They contemplate proposing a double signature, by a representative of the Soviet High Command, and a representative of SACMED.

3. They would like to avoid a formal recognition of Bulgarian co-belligerency, perhaps by including in the armistice terms a requirement that Bulgaria furnish a definite number of divisions, that the rest of the Bulgarian forces be demobilized, and that Bulgarian forces would not be employed on the territory of an Ally except with the consent of that Ally.

4. With respect to the Control Commission, they are inclined to give the Russians the major role but would want a larger share than in the Rumania-Finnish cases; their experts were working on the formulation of this problem.

I have informed Strang of the Hungarian approach (Department's 7524, September 15, 9 [8] p. m.⁸⁵) in the sense of your telegram.

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/9-1944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 19, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 20—12:01 a. m.]

7775. Comea 91. Most of today's meeting of the European Advisory Commission was devoted to further consideration of Bulgarian armistice terms. In the absence of the further instructions referred to in Department's 7492, (September 14, midnight) and of comment on my telegrams 7630 (September 15, midnight), 7654 (September 16, 6 p. m.) and 7680 (September 17, midnight), I reserved my position on the proposals presented. The Soviet delegate was likewise not prepared to comment on the British proposal (my 7680, September 17, midnight) for making Bulgarian evacuation of Allied territory a precondition for signing an armistice.

The United Kingdom delegation presented a new draft of article I, to replace articles I, II and V of the United States-United Kingdom

⁸⁵ Not printed, but see telegram 2278, September 24, 9 p. m., to Moscow, p. 889.

draft and article I of the Soviet draft (my 7503, September 12, 11 p. m.) as follows:

“Part 1. Bulgaria having ceased hostilities with the USSR on blank date and severed relations with Germany on blank date will cease hostilities against all the other United Nations and will sever relations with Germany’s satellites.

Part 2. Bulgaria will disarm the German Armed Forces in Bulgaria and hand them over as prisoners of war. The Bulgarian Government will also intern nationals of Germany and her satellites.

Part 3. The Bulgarian Government will maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. In no circumstances will any such forces be used on Allied territory without the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.

Part 4. The Bulgarian Government will carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization as may be prescribed by the Allies, and will hold Bulgarian war material at the disposal of the Allies.”

With regard to part 1 of this article, United Kingdom delegate felt strongly that Bulgaria should be obligated specifically to cease hostilities against United Nations other than Russia and to sever relations with the satellites; his Government had no knowledge whether Bulgaria had in fact taken these steps. Part 4, he continued, was needed to provide a basis for disarming whatever Bulgarian forces were not used under Soviet direction.

Discussion centered around part 3 of new United Kingdom draft of article I. Strang stressed the disquiet of the British public, and even more of Greece and Yugoslavia, if Bulgaria were recognized formally as co-belligerent as provided under Soviet article I. New British draft was designed to provide for use of Bulgarian forces under Soviet command without granting formal co-belligerency and under restriction that such forces could not be used on territory of an Ally without prior consent of that Ally. If the Bulgarians were enabled to present themselves as liberators of Greek or Yugoslav territory, the effect on the public would be deplorable and it might be difficult to get the Bulgarian forces out of those areas. I questioned whether a defeated country could be compelled to provide forces against the common enemy without granting it co-belligerent status, and informally approved the idea that Bulgarian forces should be used on the territory of an Ally only with consent of that Ally. The Soviet delegate insisted on the interest of all the Allies to secure Bulgaria’s maximum effort against Germany both for the material advantages involved and for the political effect of discrediting the Nazi puppet leaders in the satellites. He pointed out that since Bulgaria has already entered the war against Germany, the Bulgarian people must be told that the aim of their struggle is to restore their independence and sovereignty. The formula of co-belligerency, he

felt, placed no obligations on the victors in either the Bulgarian or the Rumanian case. I reminded the Commission that from the beginning my Government had proposed a declaration on Bulgarian independence to accompany the armistice, and stated that it was reasonable to accept Bulgarian aid in destroying the common enemy because we were all interested in saving lives of Allied soldiers, and that it was our desire to find a formula which would provide for this without hurting the pride and interests of Allies who had long supported our cause. Strang suggested including in part 3 of his new article I a statement of the number of Bulgarian divisions to be used as well as the Soviet reference to "for the purpose of restoring her independence and sovereignty".

In the Soviet article I the United Kingdom delegate objected specifically to the words "has gone to war and will wage war on the side of the Allied Powers against Germany and her satellites" as a formal recognition of co-belligerency. He felt the Rumanian and Bulgarian cases were not comparable since two Allied peoples had suffered under Bulgarian oppression; Bulgaria, which had had a series of tricky governments, ought not to be allowed through these maneuvers to achieve formal co-belligerent status. This part of the discussion closed with the Soviet delegate insisting on his draft of article I, and the British unwilling to accept it.

A new draft of article XIII was proposed by the British, as follows:

"Part 1. The Bulgarian Government will carry out the instructions of the Allies for giving effect to the armistice, the interpretation of which will be laid down by the Allies. The Bulgarian Government will give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send to Bulgaria and will meet any further Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security.

Part 2. An Allied Control Commission, of which the Soviet member will be chairman, will be set up to regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms and to communicate to the Bulgarian Government the instructions and further requirements of the Allies mentioned in part 1 above."

British pointed out similarity of part 1 to part 17 of Rumanian Armistice; they attached importance to the provision for further instructions relating to fulfillment of the armistice terms and of Allied requirements for peace and security. Strang explained that part 2 provided for a tripartite commission, with each Power having an equal share and the Soviet member serving as permanent chairman, but not under the direction of the Soviet High Command. Gousev felt that the new British draft might apply under normal armistice conditions followed by general cessation of hostilities. Since, however, Bulgaria must wage war on Germany, the Control Commission

must, he stated, be subject to the Commander in Chief in charge of operations in that area. The British delegate expressed doubt that active hostilities against Germany would take place on any considerable scale on Bulgarian territory. Throughout the discussion Gousev laid repeated stress on subordinating all other aims to that of using every possible force, including Bulgarian, for the earliest possible defeat of Germany.

With regard to signature, Strang stated United Kingdom Government was considering possibility of double signature by the Soviet Commander and SACMED, if signature by latter on behalf of United Kingdom and United States was agreeable to the United States Government. Strang expressed willingness to consider Ankara as the place of negotiation, while Gousev continued to prefer Moscow.

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/9-1644

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 19, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: A divergence between the British and the Russians has arisen in London on the matter of consulting the other and lesser governments at war with Bulgaria, concerning the Bulgarian armistice.

The formula adopted by the British and ourselves before Russia's eleventh-hour declaration of war against Bulgaria provided for signature of the armistice "on behalf of all the United Nations Governments at war with Bulgaria". Accordingly the other Governments were shown the terms and invited to authorize signature of the armistice on their behalf. The Russians now propose the phrase "acting in the interests of all the United Nations", which implies that the three Governments negotiating the armistice will not consult the smaller Allies.

It is true that the Russian formula is similar to the phrase used in the German surrender instrument, but we are nevertheless inclined to continue to support the British position, for the reason that Greece and Yugoslavia, the two smaller Allies directly concerned, are the only United Nations which were directly affected by Bulgarian participation in the war, and it is they that have the primary interest in the Bulgarian situation following surrender. While Soviet armies are in Bulgaria, their occupation was effected without a shot, and only after Bulgaria's declaration of capitulation.

Having already consulted with the Greek and Yugoslav Governments at the time we were conducting armistice negotiations without Russian participation, we feel that to refuse to do so now would amount to an admission that we are unwilling to object to anything the Soviets may propose, particularly since there is as yet no indication that the Soviet Government desires even to make a strong point of the matter, unless it might actually be seeking an opportunity to make the smaller nations more distrustful of the British and ourselves.

Accordingly we have drafted the underlying telegram⁸⁶ expressing our preference for the procedure as agreed to in the earlier negotiations.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

740.00119 EAC/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1944—8 p. m.

7671. Reurtel 7654, September 16. It is the Department's opinion that we ought to continue the policy of consulting the smaller countries at war with Bulgaria concerning the armistice terms, in view of the action already taken in this regard. To change the procedure already agreed upon, and in fact already acted on, would probably be interpreted by them as demonstrating a lack of consideration for their rights on our part and an unwillingness to maintain, in the face of Soviet objections, the position already taken. The United States and Great Britain have already recognized the special interest of Greece and Yugoslavia in the Bulgarian armistice terms and, while we understand the attitude of the Soviet Union with regard to Bulgaria, we would find it difficult now to alter our policy on a matter in which the two adjacent Balkan states feel so strongly.

Accordingly we are inclined to have you say that you support the original version to the preamble as agreed which provides that the signatories act "on behalf of all United Nations Governments at war with Bulgaria", although we would not be prepared to insist upon the original version and have no direct interest in the particular point under discussion. If the Russians hold to their point of view they would presumably be agreeable to informing the other nations at war with Bulgaria, especially Greece and Yugoslavia, of the change.

HULL

⁸⁶ *Infra.*

740.00119 EAC/9-2044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 20, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 21—3 :25 a. m.]

7816. Comea 92. At today's meeting of the European Advisory Commission the Soviet delegates presented a revised draft of Bulgarian armistice terms. Text follows:

"The Bulgarian Government accept the armistice conditions presented by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, acting in the interests of all the United Nations. Accordingly, the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, General duly authorized thereto by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, acting in the interests of all the United Nations, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Bulgarian Government, furnished with due powers, on the other hand, have signed the following terms:

1. As from blank date 1944 Bulgaria has completely ceased hostilities and withdrawn from the war against the United Nations, severed relations with Germany and her satellites, entered the war on the side of the Allied Powers against Germany and her satellites for the purpose of restoring her independence and sovereignty, for which purpose she provides not less than 10 divisions with corps troops. Military operations against Germany by the Bulgarian Armed Forces, including the Navy and Air Force, will be conducted under the general orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

2. Bulgarian Armed Forces, officials and nationals will withdraw forthwith from the territory of Greece and Yugoslavia occupied at present by Bulgaria. The Bulgarian authorities will immediately take steps to repeal all legislative and administrative provisions relating to the annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Greek and Yugoslav territory.

3. The Bulgarian Government will arrange to furnish the Soviet and other Allied troops with free traffic facilities over Bulgarian territory in any direction, if in the opinion of the Allied (Soviet) High Command the military situation so requires, the Bulgarian Government giving such traffic every possible assistance with their own means of communication and at their own expense by land, water and in the air.

4. The Bulgarian Government will immediately release all Allied prisoners of war and internees. Pending further instructions, the Bulgarian Government will provide at their own expense all Allied prisoners of war and internees and displaced persons and refugees, including nationals of Greece and Yugoslavia, with adequate food, clothing, medical services and hygienic requirements as well as with means of transport for the return of any such persons to their own country.

5. The Bulgarian Government will immediately release, irrespective of citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement in connection with their activities in favor of the United Nations or because

of their sympathies with the United Nations cause or for racial reasons, and will repeal all discriminatory legislation and disabilities imposed thereunder.

6. The Bulgarian Government undertake to place all German and Hungarian prisoners of war and Government employees immediately at the disposal of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

7. Bulgaria will cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

8. The Bulgarian Government undertake to dissolve immediately all pro-Hitler (of a Fascist type) political, military and militarized and other organizations on Bulgarian territory conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations and not to tolerate the existence of such organizations in future.

9. The publication, introduction and distribution in Bulgaria of periodical or non-periodical literature, presentation of theatrical performances or exhibition of cinema films, the operation of wireless stations, post offices, telegraph and telephones will take place in agreement with the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

10. The Bulgarian Government will restore all property of the United Nations, including Greek and Yugoslav property, and make restitution for the damages caused by the war to the United Nations, including Greece and Yugoslavia.

11. The Bulgarian Government will restore all the rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals in Bulgaria.

12. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to return to the Soviet Union and to Greece and Yugoslavia by the dates specified by the Allied (Soviet) High Command and in a good state of preservation all valuables and materials belonging to state, public or cooperative organizations, enterprises, institutions or individual citizens removed by Germany and Bulgaria from their territories during the war, such as: factory and works equipment, locomotives, railway wagons, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum treasures and any other property.

13. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to place at the disposal of the Allied (Soviet) High Command as booty all war material of Germany and her satellites located on Bulgarian territory, including vessels in the fleets of Germany and her satellites located in Bulgarian waters.

14. The Government of Bulgaria undertake not to permit the removal or expropriation of any property (including valuables and currency), belonging to Germany and Hungary or their nationals or to persons resident on their territory or on territory occupied by them, without the authorization of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. They will safeguard such property in the manner specified by the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

15. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all vessels belonging to the United Nations which are in Bulgarian ports, [no?] matter at whose disposal they are held, for the use of the Allied (Soviet) High Command during the war against Germany and Hungary in the common interest of the Allies, the vessels to be restored subsequently to their owners. The Bulgarian Government will bear full material responsibility for any damage to or destruction of the aforesaid property up to the moment of its transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

16. Bulgaria shall make regular money payments in Bulgarian currency and supply goods (fuel, food products, et cetera), facilities and services such as the Allied (Soviet) High Command may require for the discharge of its functions.

17. In case of need the Bulgarian Government will arrange for the utilization in Bulgarian territory of industrial and transport enterprises and facilities and of means of communication, power stations, public utility enterprises and facilities, stocks of fuel and other materials in accordance with instructions issued during the armistice by the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

18. An Allied Control Commission will be set up which will undertake the regulation of and supervision over the execution of the present terms under the general direction and the orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

19. The present terms will come into force on their signature.

Done at Moscow in quadruplicate, in Russian, English and Bulgarian, the Russian and English texts being authentic. Date blank 1944. By authority of the Governments of the United Kingdom, USSR, USA, Greece and Yugoslavia blank. By authority of the Bulgarian Government blank."

A cursory examination suggests that the revised draft takes account of the relatively minor suggestions presented by the British and ourselves on September 15 (my 7630, September 15, midnight), but not of the more basic points presented by the United Kingdom delegation yesterday (my 7775, September 19, midnight) and so far reserved by us. The new draft was not discussed today. At the close of the meeting Gousev announced that the United Kingdom precondition for signature of an armistice, namely the verified withdrawal of Bulgarian forces and officials from Allied territories, (my 7680, September 17, midnight) had been accepted by his Government.

WINANT

740.00119 E.A.C./9-2144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 21, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received September 21—8:28 p. m.]

7854. Comea 95. I am glad to have the Department's 7671 (September 20, 8 p. m.) with regard to consultation with Allied Governments about the Bulgarian armistice terms. Since receiving Department's 7492, September 14, midnight, stating that further consideration was being given in Washington to the question of (1) single or multiple signature of the armistice, (2) cobelligerency, (3) organization and functions of the Control Commission in Bulgaria, I have reserved my position on these points as reported in my 7630, September 15, midnight, and 7680, September 17, midnight. No further instructions having been received here, our part in the delib-

erations has been correspondingly reduced and the Russians may be gaining the impression that we are indifferent in a matter to which they attach great military and political importance. I have been holding up the discussions in the EAC on the Bulgarian armistice terms for more than a week because I am without instructions from the Department.

WINANT

740.00119 E.A.C./9-2144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 21, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received September 21—9 :28 p. m.]

7855. Comea 94. Subsequent to British proposal (my 7680, September 17, midnight) that Bulgarian evacuation of occupied Greek and Yugoslav territory be made a precondition for signature of an armistice with Bulgaria, and to Soviet acceptance of this view (my 7816, September 20, midnight), Foreign Office has tonight handed to Soviet Ambassador and myself a draft communication to be presented to the Bulgarian Minister at Ankara by representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and USSR:

“The Governments of the United Kingdom, USA and USSR, having considered the request of the Bulgarian Government for an armistice, have decided that it is an indispensable prerequisite to the opening of armistice negotiations that the Bulgarian Government should give an undertaking to withdraw all Bulgarian troops and officials from Greek and Yugoslav territory. Such withdrawal must take place within 15 days from the date of this communication and will be verified and controlled by a Joint Military Mission of the three Allied Governments to be received in Bulgaria and to be afforded by the Bulgarian Government all the facilities which the three Allied Governments deem necessary for the fulfillment of its task.”

If this precondition and this draft communication are acceptable to the Department, it will doubtless wish to provide appropriate instructions to the United States representative in Ankara.

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./9-1944 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1944—7 p. m.

816. Reurtels 1760 September 16 and 1770 September 19.⁸⁷ The British Foreign Office has proposed the following draft of a commu-

⁸⁷ Neither printed.

nication to be presented to the Bulgarian Minister at Ankara jointly by you and your British and Soviet colleagues.

[Here follows text of communication quoted in telegram 7855, September 21, 11 p. m., from London, printed *supra*.]

While the Department is in full agreement that the Bulgarian Government should be required immediately to evacuate its forces and officials from Yugoslav and Greek territory, it is not convinced of the necessity or advantage of making such a withdrawal a prerequisite to the opening of armistice discussions, particularly since such a procedure might delay the signing of the armistice. Since the British and Soviet Governments have agreed on this procedure, however, the Department has no reason to oppose it so long as every effort is made to insure that the observance of the stipulation is not allowed to delay the actual conclusion of the armistice.

You are accordingly authorized to associate yourself with your British and Soviet colleagues in addressing to the Bulgarian Minister a communication in the sense of the foregoing draft. Since, however, we believe that such a communication should obligate only the Bulgarians and not the three Allied Governments, and in view of the fact that actual arrangements for the "Joint Military Mission" have not yet been made, you should indicate the Department's desire that the last sentence in the above-quoted draft be replaced by the following: "Such withdrawal must begin at once and should be completed within 15 days from the date of this communication. The Bulgarian Government must undertake to receive in Bulgaria and afford all requisite facilities to such military representatives or missions as the three Allied Governments may send for the purpose of verifying and controlling the withdrawal."

Repeated to Moscow and London,⁸⁸ sent to Ankara.

HULL

740.00119 E.A.C./9-2044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1944—8 p. m.

7750. Reurtels 7775, September 19, and 7816, September 20. Lack of any comment from the Joint Chiefs of Staff has prevented the Department from formulating its final instructions with regard to the Bulgarian armistice terms, but it suggests that you present the follow-

⁸⁸ Repeated as telegrams 2267 and 7749, respectively.

ing provisional views to the EAC, the numbering of the articles referring in every case to the revised Soviet draft of September 20:⁸⁹

In view of the Soviet acceptance of the British proposal to make the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces and officials from Allied territories, with prior verification by Allied authorities, a prerequisite for the signature of the armistice, the Department will not object to this procedure. It had felt, however, that, although it is undoubtedly desirable to call upon the Bulgarians to evacuate Allied territory at once, the adoption of the British proposal would provide very little advantage and might possibly delay the actual conclusion of the armistice. Upon signature of the armistice, without this condition, the Allies would be in any event in a position to enforce immediate withdrawal if it had not by that time already been accomplished.

In view of the apparent willingness of the British and Soviet representatives to accept Ankara as the venue for the signing of the armistice, the Department believes that a definitive agreement on this point should now be reached.

Preamble. The Department sees no objection to the British suggestion that the armistice terms be signed jointly by the Soviet High Command and by a representative of SACMED, but cannot give a definitive reply regarding signature solely by an authorized Soviet general pending receipt of the views of the Joint Chiefs.

Article I. The Department favors in principle the Soviet Article 1, but believes that the co-belligerent status which this implies should be limited to the following conditions to be formulated by the EAC for safeguarding the interests of the countries, such as Greece and Yugoslavia, which have suffered from Bulgarian aggression: (1) the number of Bulgarian divisions should be restricted and the remaining divisions disarmed, and (2) Bulgarian troops should not be used on Allied territory without the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.

Article II to XVII, inclusive. The Department finds these articles acceptable, and suggests that any further objections which may be raised by the United Kingdom delegation are a matter for adjustment in the EAC between it and the Soviet delegation.

Article XVIII. The Department hopes that an early instruction can be sent to you on the points connected with the matter of the Control Commission. The views of the military on this general question have not yet been formulated.

HULL

⁸⁹ Quoted in telegram 7816, September 20, midnight, from London, p. 429.

740.00119 EAC/9-2344: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 23, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 23—9:50 a. m.]

7902. Comea 98. I am glad to have the helpful comments and suggestions contained in Department's 7750 (September 22, 8 p. m.) and I have discussed with the Foreign Office the points raised in Department's 7749 (September 22, 7 p. m.)⁹⁰ With respect to article XVIII of the Soviet draft, I feel that it might be possible to satisfy the Soviet demand for predominant control in Bulgaria during the period of hostilities without accepting similarly one-sided control in case the armistice period should be considerably prolonged beyond the surrender of Germany. I should appreciate your comments on the following draft to replace article XVIII of the Soviet draft of September 20: "During the period of hostilities in Europe an Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the present terms under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe and until the conclusion of peace with Bulgaria an Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice according to the instructions of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Soviet Union and United States of America." If such a compromise formula meets with the approval of the Department, I should like to present it at the next meeting of the Commission,⁹¹ probably on Monday.

WINANT

740.0011 E.W./9-2544: Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, September 25, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 4:29 p. m.]

561R123. A reliable person in Sofia informed me yesterday:

1. Situation is completely quiet. Order has been entirely restored and a normal state of affairs has been resumed.

2. Russians are maintaining a hands-off policy. Sound trucks manned by Russians go through the town and proclaim that (a) the Russians have no intention of enforcing their type of government on

⁹⁰ See footnote 88, p. 433.

⁹¹ Presentation of the draft was authorized in telegram 7797, September 25, 3 p. m., to London (740.0011 E.W./9-2344).

Bulgaria; (b) the Russian Army is in Bulgaria as liberator not occupier; (c) the Russians want to cooperate with Bulgarians and permit Bulgarians to develop whatever type and form of democratic government they wish to have; (d) private property will be respected and the Russians have no intention of enforcing any form of communistic ownership of land and property.

3. All Germans in Bulgaria have been disarmed. There is no German force in the area of pre-war Bulgaria. Germans have been arming themselves for a final stand in Salonica region where 116 divisions have been massed.

4. General mobilization in Bulgaria has been ordered and the nation is in an active state of war against Germany. Main line of movement is toward Salonica concentration of Germans.

5. Yesterday my informant had had long conversation with the Prime Minister. Principal worry of present Government is delay on part of Allies in revealing armistice terms. Prime Minister believes that the terms will be arranged Ankara despite objections of British and that they will be signed within next 8 to 10 days. He indicated his hope that the American Government could in some way expedite granting of final armistice terms in order that the final step may be quickly taken in restoring order in Bulgaria.

BERRY

740.00119 EAC/9-2544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 25, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 25—10:55 p. m.]

7992. Comea 100. Armistice terms for Bulgaria were discussed at great length in today's meeting of the European Advisory Commission. In accordance with Department's 7749, September 22, 7 p. m.,⁹² I proposed a redraft of the last two sentences of the United Kingdom precondition; it was accepted by the United Kingdom delegation with the change of one word. The Soviet delegate then stated that his Government's acceptance of the pre-condition providing for evacuation of Allied territory (my 7816, September 20, midnight) was conditional upon the three Powers agreeing to signature of the armistice by Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin as representative of all three. The United Kingdom delegation continued to urge signature by both a Soviet representative and a representative of SACMED. I believe the Russians mean to stand firm on a single signature. Much as the British dislike giving way on this issue, I think they would do so if

⁹² See footnote 88, p. 433.

they felt they could get recognition of more equal rights on the Control Commission. They realize as I do that with every day that passes the Russians are increasing their control of Bulgaria and consequently taking a firmer position in their insistence on Soviet provisions in the armistice terms. I would therefore urge immediate clearance from the Department of the pre-condition terms with the inclusion of the Russian condition of single Soviet signature of the armistice. It would also seem to me only just to support the British in a fairer representation of United States and United Kingdom on the Control Commission. The Russians fought a bloodless 5-hour war with the Bulgarians. We lost considerable life in bombing Bulgarian objectives and our crews that were forced to land there were badly mauled. The British suffered great loss of life in defending Greece and were largely responsible for Yugoslavia's initial support of the Allied cause. These actions delayed German invasion of Russia and put winter on the side of the Red Army in 1941. Failure to give the British support on the Control Commission issue will be very deeply resented by them.

In discussing the preamble I presented my Government's view (Department's 7671, September 20, 8 p. m.) in strong support of the wording "on behalf of the United Nations at war with Bulgaria". After a long and detailed discussion the Soviet delegate still insisted on the Soviet draft preamble. In an equally long consideration of Soviet article I, the Soviet delegate offered to accept parts 1, 2 and 3 of United Kingdom article I (my 7775, September 19, midnight). This would include provision for using Bulgarian forces on territory of an Ally only with prior consent of that Ally but would exclude any provision for disarmament and demobilization. The United Kingdom delegation offered to omit specific reference to disarmament provided such power could be acquired under a general clause binding Bulgaria to comply with further requirements; it was impossible, however, to arrive at an agreement for the insertion of a general powers clause because of Russian opposition.

In a discussion of articles II through XVII, several slight changes were made. In article XV the United Kingdom delegation urged strongly the inclusion of a protocol patterned on that attached to the corresponding article of the Finnish Armistice,⁹³ concerning the ultimate disposition of United Nations ships transferred to Soviet control by the armistice. In respect to article XVI the United Kingdom delegation felt strongly that some expansion of the article was needed in order that Bulgarian goods and services might be used for the general prosecution of the war and not only for the discharge of its

⁹³ Article XVIII of the Finnish Armistice signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV. p. 513.

functions by the Soviet High Command. In article XVII, the British representative proposed that the addition of a sentence copied from the last part of Rumanian article X placing Bulgarian merchant shipping under Allied control. There was no discussion of article XVIII since I had to state that I was without instructions regarding it (my 7902, September 23, 1 p. m.). In general today's discussion clarified a number of minor points but in the absence of further instructions to me it necessarily left unsettled the two most awkward questions, that of single or double signature, and the character of the Control Commission. Since so many days of discussion have passed without my being able to present my Government's views on these two questions, positions of other delegations have naturally hardened and the American view may be much less effective in shaping the final agreement on armistice terms unless I can get an immediate answer. The Commission meets tomorrow at 4 o'clock London time to continue its discussions.

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/9-2544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1944—midnight.

7852. Reurtel 7992, September 25. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Bulgarian armistice terms having now been received, the Department authorizes you to present the following views to the EAC:

Preamble. It is the view of this Government that, in consideration of the British and American share in the war with Bulgaria and Anglo-American conduct of the earlier negotiations with the Bulgarians, the armistice terms should be signed jointly by representatives of the Soviet High Command and of SACMED. In case the Soviet delegate should still make the single signature a condition to his acceptance of the precondition providing for Bulgarian evacuation of Allied territory, you should press for joint signature even if this should necessitate the sacrifice of the British plan to require Bulgarian forces and officials to withdraw from Greek and Yugoslav territory before the opening of armistice discussions, as immediate withdrawal is in any case specifically provided for by the armistice terms.

As regards the wording "on behalf of the United Nations at war with Bulgaria," the Department has no further instructions (Department's 7671 September 20).

Article I. This Government accepts the view that Bulgarian troops should be employed against Germany and its satellites. The Department accordingly believes that, since the Soviet Government is prepared to accept parts 1 to 3 of the British Article I, the provision for disarmament and demobilization may be omitted from this Article provided some "general powers" clause such as the British have proposed is agreed upon.

Articles II to XVII, inclusive. Reference is made to the several instances in which the proposed terms mention the Allied (Soviet) High Command as the agency to control the enforcement of the armistice terms rather than the Allied Control Commission. Since the latter agency should have the responsibility for determining enforcement policies, it is recommended that consideration be given to the desirability of substituting in the appropriate places the words "Allied Control Commission" for "Allied (Soviet) High Command". The Department has no further alterations to propose in these Articles and suggests that such minor changes as are or may be proposed are a matter for adjustment in the EAC.

Article XVIII. This Government agrees that for purposes of military operations the Allied Control Commission should be placed under the general direction of the Soviet High Command. In view of the necessity, however, for securing the essential interests of the United States and Great Britain in this regard, the Department authorizes you to press for the compromise draft proposed in your 7902 September 23 and approved in the Department's 7797 September 25.⁹⁴ The Department believes that it is highly important that a general powers clause be included in Article XVIII and would be willing to accept for this purpose the text given in part 1 of the British version of that Article as quoted in your 7775 September 19.

Sent to London; repeated to Moscow.

HULL

740.00119 E.A.C./9-2744: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 27, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received September 27—3:59 p. m.]

8056. Comea 101. Department's 7852, September 26, midnight. Thank you for your helpful telegram.

At today's meeting of the EAC, I presented fully the American viewpoint regarding (1) double signature of the Bulgarian armistice,

⁹⁴ With regard to the latter, see footnote 91, p. 435.

(2) Control Commission and (3) a general powers clause covering disarmament. The Soviet delegate is consulting his Government on these questions.

WINANT

740.00119 European War/9-2844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

1853. The Russian Ambassador informed me this morning that he had received a telegram from Moscow last night to the effect that the Russian Government had informed the British Foreign Office that the text of the proposed communication to be presented to the Bulgarian Minister jointly by the British, American and Russian diplomatic representatives in Ankara was acceptable subject to the condition that the British and American Governments agree that the armistice is to be signed on behalf of the Allied Governments by Marshal Tolbukhin. Vinogradov added that the Russian reply to the proposal of the British Foreign Office had been made within 24 hours after the proposal had been received.

With reference to the change in the last sentence of the proposed draft suggested by the Department, the British Chargé⁹⁵ has told me informally that he would not feel himself authorized to make the desired change without instructions from London.

Pending the receipt of further instructions by the Soviet Ambassador and the British Chargé, it will not be possible for them to address the proposed communication to the Bulgarian Minister.

Repeated to London as No. 56 and Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 E.W./9-3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 30, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 11:13 p. m.]

1870. The memorandum referred to in my 1869⁹⁶ is dated Ankara, September 29, and reads as follows:

The British Chargé d'Affaires is instructed by his Government to inform the Bulgarian Minister that the following parliamentary question was addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on September 29 "to ask whether Bulgarian troops are still in oc-

⁹⁵ Alexander K. Helm.

⁹⁶ Dated October 1, 2 p. m., not printed.

cupation of Greek and Yugoslav territory and what action is being taken to secure their early withdrawal?."

The Secretary of State replied as follows:

"Bulgarian forces still remain both on Greek and Yugoslav territory. His Majesty's Government consider it an essential prerequisite before any armistice is concluded with Bulgaria [that Bulgarian forces be withdrawn?] from Greek and Yugoslav territory. His Majesty's Government in consultation with the Greek Government are carefully watching the position in Greek Thrace where the situation is particularly confused."

The Bulgarian Minister is requested to regard Eden's answer quoted above quoted [*sic*] as serving as the reply of His Majesty's Government to the inquiry which Monsieur Balabanoff made in the communication which he left with Mr. Helm on September 16.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 E.W./9-3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 30, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:08 p. m.]

1876. The Bulgarian Minister called to see me this morning to inform me of the memorandum which he had received last night from the British Chargé d'Affaires (see my 1869, September 30 [*October 1*], 2 p. m.⁹⁷). He expressed concern at the delay in the armistice negotiations. I replied that while I was not in a position to inform him as to the reasons for the delay, it seems to me that the apparent reluctance of the Bulgarian Government to withdraw its troops from Greek and Yugoslav territory might well be an important factor. I also remarked that the observation of the Bulgarian Government that it hesitated to withdraw its troops from Thrace lest civil war break out after their withdrawal failed to recognize Bulgaria's defeat and that I doubted the victorious powers would desire Bulgarian troops to do policing in the Balkans.

Repeated to London as No. 57 and Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 EW/10-244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 2, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 11:39 p. m.]

1886. The following is a translation of a memorandum which the Bulgarian Minister sent me after his visit with me on September 30.

⁹⁷ Not printed, but see telegram 1870, *supra*.

"Under instructions from his Government, the Minister of Bulgaria at Ankara has recently informed the representatives of the three great Allied Powers in Turkey of the situation in Thrace resulting from the bitter struggles between the various Greek organizations in that region and had requested at the same time the suggestions of their Governments relative to the transfer by the Bulgarian authorities of the local administration in Thrace. The Bulgarian Government is genuinely desirous of transferring the administration and to this end it has even proceeded, in certain places, to such a transfer. There has resulted from this transfer, however, an atmosphere favorable to misunderstanding and struggles among the Greek population themselves. The Bulgarian Government would like to have at the earliest possible moment the clearly expressed views of the three Governments on this question, in order to prevent anarchy and complications.

The Bulgarian Government denies in the most categorical manner the truth of the articles in certain Turkish newspapers relative to the atrocities which it is claimed have been committed by the Bulgarian troops in Thrace. In view of these struggles among the members of the Greek population in the most [*past?*], the Bulgarian troops are, and remain at the present time the only guardians of order in this region. The new Bulgarian Government is making the most sincere efforts to arrive at an understanding with the Greek population until the time when a definite suggestion shall be made by the three Powers."

STEINHARDT

740.0011 E.W./10-344: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 3, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

1894. The Bulgarian Minister called to see me this morning and left with me an *aide-mémoire* which in translation reads as follows:

"The Bulgarian authorities have completely evacuated Thrace, Macedonia and Serbia and have turned over the administration to the local population. Certain detachments of the army which are, as is the case with the entire Bulgarian Army, under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin have remained in these territories not to maintain order there which is menaced by bitter fighting by the armed Greek partisans but solely and exclusively in connection with the military operations against Germany. Bulgaria has undertaken an engagement to enter into war against Germany. To carry out this engagement it must pursue certain purely military considerations with respect to the location of troops. Otherwise the Bulgarian troops would in reality withdraw behind the frontiers of Bulgaria thereby facilitating the retreat of the German troops. Up to this time, no common demand for such action has been presented on the part of the three Allied Powers. On the contrary [the Soviet?] command which it is considered in Bulgaria acts in the name of the Allies insists on offensive operations against the German troops in the direction of Bela Palanka-Nish, a condition which calls for a movement of Bul-

garian troops in Yugoslav territory. The maintenance in Thrace of certain detachments of Bulgarian troops is the result of purely military considerations. Thus a hasty retreat of all the Bulgarian troops in Thrace would expose to danger the rear of the Bulgarian Army operating in the west as well as the Russian troops moving across Bulgarian territory in view of the fact that in the absence for the time being of any other regular troops in Thrace there would be created the possibility for the German troops coming from the islands and Salonika to invade this region.

"The Bulgarian Government has never refused and will not refuse to carry out a common demand clearly expressed by the three Allied Powers relative to the withdrawal of all Bulgarian troops from Thrace and Yugoslavia. The presence of certain Bulgarian military detachments in Thrace and Yugoslavia is justified as has been pointed out above exclusively by the military operations undertaken against Germany and will not give any other advantage to Bulgaria. Dated Ankara, October 2, 1944."

Repeated to London and Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 EW/10-1044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 10, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received October 11—2:20 a. m.]

8547. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. The Prime Minister and Eden plan to do what they can to expedite business of the EAC. Gousev went to Moscow for the same purpose. Among other things Eden planned to take up with Molotov the differences with respect to the Bulgarian armistice terms.

It was my understanding with Eden that the negotiations would continue through the European Advisory Commission.

I thought you might like to have the latest United States draft of Bulgarian armistice terms which we discussed with Strang and Gousev. We have kept you informed regarding the individual items but I thought it would be convenient if you had a full draft.

The British and United States delegations attach great importance to the substance of article XVIII which was to do with the Allied Control Commission but that article has not yet been accepted by the Soviet delegation. The British, I believe, would concede substituting "in the interests of" for "on behalf of", accept the signature of a Russian general, and agree that the armistice be signed in Moscow but they do not want to make these concessions unless forced to by the refusal of the Russians to reach agreement. Time is on the side of

the Russians. They are occupying more and more of Bulgaria every day.

The text of the latest United States draft follows:

"The Bulgarian Government accept the armistice conditions presented by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, acting on behalf of all the United Nations at war with Bulgaria.

Accordingly, the representative of the Soviet High Command, General, and the representative of the Supreme Allied Command in the Mediterranean, General, duly authorized thereto by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States of America, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Bulgarian Government,, furnished with due powers, on the other hand, have signed the following terms:

1. (a) Bulgaria having ceased hostilities with the USSR on and severed relations with Germany on, will cease hostilities against all the other United Nations and will sever relations with the satellites of Germany.

(b) Bulgaria will disarm the German and Hungarian Armed Forces in Bulgaria and hand them over as prisoners of war. The Bulgarian Government will also intern nationals of Germany and her satellites.

(c) The Bulgarian Government will maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Such forces will not be used on Allied territory except with the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.

2. Bulgarian Armed Forces and officials having withdrawn from the territory of Greece and Yugoslavia in accordance with the precondition accepted by the Bulgarian Government on, the Bulgarian authorities will immediately take steps to withdraw from Greek and Yugoslav territory Bulgarian nationals who were citizens of Bulgaria on January 1, 1941, and to repeal all legislative and administrative provisions relating to the annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Greek or Yugoslav territory.

3. The Bulgarian Government will arrange to furnish the Soviet and other Allied Forces with free traffic facilities over Bulgarian territory in any direction, if in the opinion of the Allied (Soviet) High Command the military situation so requires, the Bulgarian Government giving such traffic every possible assistance with their own means of communication and at their own expense by land, water and in the air.

4. The Bulgarian Government will immediately release all Allied prisoners of war and internees. Pending further instructions, the Bulgarian Government will provide at their own expense all Allied prisoners of war and internees and displaced persons and refugees, including nationals of Greece and Yugoslavia, with adequate food, clothing, medical service and hygienic requirements as well as with means of transport for the return of any such persons to their own country.

5. The Bulgarian Government will immediately release, irrespective of citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement in con-

nection with their activities in favor of the United Nations or because of their sympathies with the United Nations cause or for racial or religious reasons, and will repeal all discriminatory legislation and disabilities arising therefrom.

6. Bulgaria will cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

7. The Bulgarian Government undertake to dissolve immediately all pro-Hitler or other Fascist political, military, para military and other organizations on Bulgarian territory conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations and not to tolerate the existence of such organizations in future.

8. The publication, introduction and distribution in Bulgaria of periodical or non-periodical literature, the presentation of theatrical performances or exhibition of cinema films, the operation of wireless stations, post offices, telegraph and telephones will take place in agreement with the Allied Control Commission.

9. The Bulgarian Government will restore all property of the United Nations and their nationals, including Greek and Yugoslav property, and will make such reparation for loss and damage caused by the war to the United Nations, including Greece and Yugoslavia, as may be prescribed. The Bulgarian Government will not permit the disposal of external Bulgarian assets, or the disposal of internal Bulgarian assets to foreign governments or foreign nationals except by authorization of the Allies.

10. The Bulgarian Government will restore all the rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals in Bulgaria.

11. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to return to the Soviet Union and to Greece and Yugoslavia and other United Nations, by the dates specified by the Allied Control Commission and in a good state of preservation, all valuables and materials belonging to state, public or cooperative organizations, enterprises, institutions or individual citizens removed by Germany and Bulgaria from United Nations territories during the war and located now in Bulgaria, such as: factory and works equipment, locomotives, railway wagons, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum treasures and any other property.

12. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to place at the disposal of the Allied (Soviet) High Command as booty all war material of Germany and her satellites located on Bulgarian territory, including vessels in the fleets of Germany and her satellites located in Bulgarian waters.

13. The Government of Bulgaria undertake not to permit the removal or expropriation of any property (including valuables and currency), belonging to Germany and Hungary or their nationals or to persons residing in their territory or on territory occupied by them without the authorization of the Allied Control Commission. The Government of Bulgaria will safeguard such property in the manner specified by the Allied Control Commission.

14. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all vessels belonging to the United Nations which are in Bulgarian ports, no matter at whose disposal they are held, for the use of the Allied (Soviet) High Command during the war against Germany and Hungary in the common interest of the Allies, the vessels to be restored subsequently to their owners.

The Bulgarian Government will bear full material responsibility for and will make good any damage to or destruction of all the aforesaid property up to the moment of its transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

15. Bulgaria shall make regular money payments in Bulgarian currency and supply goods (fuel, foodstuffs, et cetera), facilities and services such as the Allies may require for the prosecution of the war.

16. Bulgarian merchant vessels, whether in Bulgarian or foreign waters, shall be subject to the operational control of the Allied (Soviet) High Command for use in the general interest of the Allies.

17. In case of need the Bulgarian Government will arrange for the utilization in Bulgarian territory of industrial and transport enterprises and of means of communications, power stations, public utility enterprises and facilities, stocks of fuel and other materials in accordance with instructions issued during the Armistice by the Allied Control Commission.

18. During the period of hostilities in Europe an Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the present terms under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe and until the conclusion of peace with Bulgaria, an Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice according to the instructions of the Governments of the United States of America, Soviet Union and United Kingdom; the Bulgarian Government will carry out the instructions of the Allies for giving effect to the armistice and will meet any further Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security.

19. The present terms will come into force on their signature.

Done at Ankara in quadruplicate, in Russian, English and Bulgarian, the Russian and English texts being authentic.

Date 1944.

By authority of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the USSR: _____

Representative of the Soviet High Command.

By authority of the Bulgarian Government: _____

WINANT

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/10-1144

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1944.

The Department has designated Mr. Maynard B. Barnes, a Foreign Service Officer of Class I, now in the Department, as the American representative to proceed to Bulgaria upon the signature of the armistice, which is now in discussion with the British and Soviet Governments.

In view of the functions he will perform, either as head of the American delegation on the Control Commission to be set up under the terms of the armistice, or as American political representative

with a separate establishment, or as acting concurrently in both capacities, we think he should be appointed with the personal rank of Minister.

If you approve, the Department will proceed with the appointment, in order that he should be ready to enter upon these duties as soon as an American mission can be despatched to Bulgaria.⁹⁸

868.01/10-1144

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1944.

The Greek Ambassador⁹⁹ came in to see me to say that he hoped to see the President tomorrow. He wished to express the very great concern of his Government at the delay in signing the proposed Bulgarian armistice. They were aware that this armistice called for the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces from Thrace and Macedonia.

During the delay, a series of confused reports were coming out of Sofia. A Bulgarian general had reviewed a "Macedonian" brigade, presented it with a flag, and encouraged it to plant that flag in Salonika. Reports of agreement with the Soviet general in Sofia for establishment of a Macedonian state had come out of the Bulgarian radio, though they were later denied. The fact was that the Bulgarian forces were running Thrace. Tito appeared to be getting into it.

He said that Greece, of course, recognized the nearness of Russia and the power of Russian influence, but they did not know what Soviet ideas were about non-interference with the Greek state. Bulgarian encouragement of Macedonian or Thracian ambitions was of course nothing more than a Bulgarian plan to dismember Greece, and all this went on under the eyes of a Soviet field marshal. He said that he imagined this would be one of the subjects discussed between Churchill and Eden on the one hand, and Stalin on the other, in Moscow. He asked what we thought the Russian views really were.

I said that I could not comment on that. The views of the United States Government had been made known; we had advocated putting the withdrawal clause in the armistice terms, and Secretary Hull had backed this up by public reference in the press. I had no reason to believe that our views were changing. I was not informed as to the Soviet view. I said that the representations and the telegrams from his Government (copies of which are attached)¹ would receive prompt consideration.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

⁹⁸ Notation by President Roosevelt: "CH OK FDR".

⁹⁹ Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.

¹ Neither printed.

740.00119 E.W./10-1144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 11, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received October 12—8:25 a. m.]

3901. After our talk about Hungary referred to in my 3900, October 11, 8 p. m.,² Molotov discussed with Eden³ the proposed communication to the Bulgarian Government regarding withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greece and Yugoslavia. He agreed to it in principle but suggested that the phraseology of the last sentence regarding the Allied military representatives to be sent to verify the withdrawal follow the language agreed to in connection with the preliminary Hungarian conditions since unity of Allied action was more implicit. Eden agreed with Molotov to the change and stated he preferred the new wording. Molotov inquired whether I approved the changes. I explained that I had no authority to deal with Bulgarian matters. Eden then said that he would take responsibility for the change as he felt sure we would agree. I expressed the personal opinion that I saw no reason why we should not approve the change as the language had been agreed to in connection with Hungary. Eden told me that the communication would be passed through the EAC for immediate publication, tomorrow if possible.

Sent to Department as 3901 October 11, 10 p. m. Repeated to Embassy London as 207.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 12, 1944.

[Received October 12—5 p. m.]

3906. Press for October 12 published following announcement regarding Bulgarian acceptance of preliminary armistice terms.

"In connection with the approach of the Bulgarian Government to the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America with a request for an armistice, the three above mentioned Allied Governments on October 11 informed the Government of Bulgaria as follows:

"The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, having considered the request of the Bulgarian Government for an armistice, have decided, that the indispensable

² *Post*, p. 899.

³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was on a visit to Moscow.

basis of the beginning of negotiations regarding an armistice is the giving by the Bulgarian Government of an undertaking to evacuate all Bulgarian troops and all Bulgarian officials from Greece and Yugoslav territory. Such evacuation must begin without delay and must be completed within 15 days from the date of this communication. With a view to verifying and controlling the carrying out of this evacuation, the three Allied Governments will despatch representatives to Bulgaria, who will act in the capacity of a United Allied Mission under the chairmanship of the Soviet representative.⁷

The Bulgarian Government has accepted the preliminary condition of the Allied Governments.”

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 12, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11:10 p. m.]

3911. A meeting was held this afternoon at the Foreign Office attended by Vyshinski, Gusev, Clark Kerr and myself at which armistice terms for Bulgaria were discussed. The purpose of the meeting was to take advantage of the presence in Moscow of Mr. Eden and other Foreign Office officials to reach agreement as far as possible between the British and Russians here on these terms with the understanding that the results of the discussions would be wired to their respective representatives on the EAC and that final agreement between the three countries would be arrived at there. I made it plain that I had no instructions to discuss these terms here and that I could therefore participate only as an observer.

The Russians submitted a revised draft of their proposals which was used as the basis for discussion. This draft together with the details of the discussions will be wired to London by the British Embassy here as soon as one or two questions have been cleared with Eden and the British have agreed to request Strang to make all this material available to Winant. I have therefore not undertaken to report it myself. The Department may wish however to know at once the outcome of the discussions with respect to the article pertaining to the Control Commission. The final wording of this article to which both Russians and British agreed provides that an Allied Control Commission shall be established in Bulgaria for the whole period of the armistice under the chairmanship of the Soviet representative with the participation of representatives of the United States and United Kingdom. It is further stipulated that the Commission is to regulate and supervise the execution of the terms under the general direction of the Soviet command. This final wording is the reflection of discussions yesterday between Eden and Molotov and I understand from

Eden that in practice it will be so interpreted as long as hostilities with Germany continue [and that] the Control Commission will function more or less as in Rumania but that after that time each of the three countries will have an equal voice in its affairs.

The British wish to add to this article an additional phrase binding the Bulgarians to carry out any and all instructions of the Control Commission. The Russians oppose the inclusion of such a phrase. No agreement has been reached on this point which together with other unsettled points will presumably have to be thrashed out.

Repeated to London and Caserta for Kirk.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EAC/10-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 12, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received October 12—8:33 p. m.]

8651. Comea 110. This afternoon Strang called at his request to report on the discussions in Moscow concerning the Bulgarian armistice terms. Since Harriman was present at some of the conversations and has presumably informed you fully I shall not repeat in detail the substance of Eden's telegrams. Eden and Molotov agreed on a new draft for the preliminary condition of evacuation to be fulfilled by Bulgaria and to be verified by Allied Commission under a Soviet chairman. Eden agreed to make Moscow the place of venue and Molotov agreed to participation by SACMED or his representative in the negotiations with the Bulgarians and in the signature of the armistice.

The principal change is a new text of article XVIII, agreed upon between Eden and Molotov as follows:

"XVIII. For whole period of the armistice there will be established an Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria under chairmanship of Soviet representative and with participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and United States of America. Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise execution of armistice terms under general direction of Allied (Soviet) High Command."

Strang also gave me the following paraphrase of Eden's comment on this new draft of article XVIII:

"New text as finally agreed represents a distinct improvement on United States draft of article XVIII. In order to avoid future misunderstandings, I made it clear to Molotov that in our interpretation of this article it was understood that in the first period there would be no direct British or United States participation in Control Com-

mission but that Allied missions would be in the same position as in Roumania, but that in second period after cessation of hostilities there would be tripartite participation under Soviet chairmanship. Molotov agreed."

I stated to Strang, as my personal opinion, that my Government would probably accept the precondition as drafted, especially since it has already apparently been broadcast on the Moscow radio. I also said that I felt we would be agreeable to Moscow as place of venue and to signature by SACMED or his representative. I stated that I could not see in what way the new draft of article XVIII represented an improvement on the US draft of that article; that I could not see that the draft article made any distinction between a first and second period of control in Bulgaria as outlined in Eden's "interpretation"; and that I could not see any difference between the new article XVIII and the original Soviet draft (my 7816, September 20, midnight; Comea 92). Strang admitted that he could not see any difference between the original Soviet draft of article XVIII and the new draft. He is also wiring Eden to inquire whether the omission of the last sentence of the U.S. article XVIII (my 8547, October 10, 8 p. m.) is intentional; he said that the Foreign Office attaches much importance to that final sentence of the U.S. draft since it replaces an earlier UK draft article covering disarmament and demobilization.

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/10-1244: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 12, 1944—11 p. m.
[Received October 12—10:16 p. m.]

8680. Personal to the Secretary only. Please see my 8651 (Comea 110, October 12, 8 [9] p. m.) and read it in connection with my personal message to you.

When I was talking with Strang with regard to Eden's conversations in Moscow, I further pointed out that the second sentence of Eden's "interpretation", which Strang suggested might be agreed upon in a separate protocol, contained what I thought was a limitation upon the Rumanian Armistice Control Commission⁴ as I understood it. I had thought we were to participate in the Control Commission for Rumania from the start, but from the texts of Eden's messages to the Foreign Office it appears that the Russians were to operate the Control Commission and we and the British were merely to have liai-

⁴For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Post-armistice problems of occupation and control . . ."

son missions. Eden's suggestion that the new Russian draft was an improvement is probably based on the inclusion of the word "participation".

These messages also referred to various percentages of control, the exact meaning of which was not clear, and the Foreign Office has asked for further clarification. The percentages spoke of 75 to 25 for Hungary, and 75 to 25 for Rumania, and Eden insisted on a joint United Kingdom-Soviet policy for Yugoslavia, although the Russians referred to the 60 to 40 percent for the country, with Eden insisting on a 50 to 50 percent.

I have always been of the opinion that the British would be wiser if they sat in with us in working out policy and arrangements with the Russians, rather than attempting bilateral conversations. In this instance they have chosen to do otherwise. I was very grateful that the President intervened with the Prime Minister and asked that the discussion of any differences at Dumbarton Oaks⁵ be postponed until the three countries were represented. This request, I understand, has been strictly adhered to.

I realize that the arrangements regarding southeastern Europe are limited to what might be considered the military period, but they may well influence the final peace terms.

A casual evaluation of the conversations in regard to Bulgarian armistice terms, on the evidence I have seen, might suggest that our friend Eden was having his pants traded off. But when you stop to realize the advance of Russian troops into Yugoslavia, it is clear that the primary British purpose was to continue their relationship with Greece and to maintain a sufficient degree of control in Yugoslavia to protect British Mediterranean interests.

I remember when we were at the White House with Eden and others discussing the possibility of French Indo-China going back to the Chinese. The British seemed more willing to accept this proposal than other changes affecting the Far East. I never realized until I was in Cairo that if you eliminated the French from Indo-China they would have no justified interest in maintaining their position in the Levant. A French withdrawal would have increased British interests in that area. The prosecution of the war in the Middle East also evidenced the importance to the British of that area and of the Mediterranean as a life line of the British Empire.

I realize that so far as the Bulgarian armistice matter is concerned Eden in fact has been closing out the European Advisory Commission

⁵ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. I, section entitled "Preliminaries to the establishment of an International Organization . . ." part II, and *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 44 ff. For President Roosevelt's telegram 626, October 4, to Prime Minister Churchill, see *ibid.*, p. 7.

in attempting to reach agreement with Molotov on a bipartite basis, in spite of his insistence on having final recommendations arrived at in the EAC for submission to the three Governments. I am not sure whether we should accept this situation and have EAC simply register the results of Eden's Moscow conversations or whether time would permit us to accept the collateral agreements and hold out for article XVIII as introduced by the United States delegation. If the object was to protect the European Advisory Commission, I would suggest that the armistice terms be concluded in Moscow, but I am afraid that that might react politically at home as an acceptance of areas of influence and as compliance with Russian demands.

I want very much to get your advice. I thought you might also want to talk this problem over with the President, as I understand the Prime Minister cabled him that he might bring up the Bulgarian armistice question in Moscow.

WINANT

868.00/10-1344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 13, 1944—noon.

[Received 7:47 p. m.]

1958. The Bulgarian Minister called to see me this morning and left with me an *aide-mémoire* which in translation reads as follows:

"After the turning over of all local administration in Thrace to the local Greek population was completed and after all of the administrative services of the State were turned over to the respective representatives of the local Greek population, the withdrawal has also commenced during the past few days of the Bulgarian troops from Thrace. This withdrawal will be entirely completed in the very near future.

"The landing of British troops in the Peloponnesus, the evacuation of the islands by the Germans and the fact that the line of retreat of the Germans has been cut by the approach of Soviet troops to Belgrade, have radically changed the military situation and have eliminated all serious danger of the appearance of German troops in Thrace.

"In view of this situation which has thus developed, the Bulgarian Government has hastened to give effect to its decision formerly taken to evacuate southern Thrace and to comply in this manner with the condition precedent demanded by the Allied Powers for the conclusion of an armistice. Dated Ankara, October 12."

Repeated to London as No. 61 and Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.0011 E.W./10-1444 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 14, 1944—noon.

[Received 12:45 p. m.]

Greek Series 365. The Greek Minister to Egypt⁶ has notified me verbally that last Wednesday afternoon his colleague in Moscow was summoned by Mr. Molotoff and informed that Bulgarian troops have been ordered to evacuate Greek territory completely, the movement to be completed in 15 days. Pappas added with evident relief and satisfaction that the whole tone of Mr. Molotoff's conversation with the Greek representative was "more friendly and easy" than has been the case previously.

Repeated to Caserta as No. 96 and to Moscow.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 E.W./10-1144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—2 p. m.

2431. The Department approves the agreement reported in your 3901 October 11 regarding the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greek and Yugoslav territory as a precondition for the opening of armistice discussions.

With a view to making the appropriate arrangements for the American representation on the joint military mission, the Department will appreciate receiving any information that you may be able to obtain with respect to the Soviet and British plans regarding the size of their contingents on such mission, the respective ranks of the various members and the time and manner of their entry into Bulgaria.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London.

HULL

740.00119 E.A.C./10-1444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 14, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received October 14—2:50 p. m.]

8744. Comea 112. I have received from the Soviet delegation on the European Advisory Commission copy of a letter from the Greek

⁶ Dimitrios Pappas.

Ambassador in London ⁷ under date of October 12, addressed to the chairman of the EAC. Letter states that the Greek Government wishes to be represented on the Inter Allied Commission for the enforcement of the armistice terms upon Bulgaria, in view of its immediate interest, as a neighbor of Bulgaria, in the strict enforcement of the terms of armistice. I propose at the next meeting of the EAC to present to my colleagues a draft reply to the Greek Ambassador, acknowledging receipt of his letter, informing him that the question of representation on the Armistice Commission is outside the competency of the EAC, and stating that these delegates will inform their Governments of the request of the Greek Government.

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/10-1244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—midnight.

8526. Your 8651, October 12. Ambassador Harriman has reported that British and Soviet representatives have discussed in Moscow the revised draft of Soviet proposals for Bulgarian armistice terms, Harriman participating only as an observer in the absence of instructions. It was agreed that the results of the discussions should be transmitted to their respective representatives on the EAC for final consideration, with the understanding that Strang would be requested to make available to you the text of the Russian draft and a detailed account of the Moscow discussions.

The Department has given its concurrence in the agreement reached at Moscow regarding the communication to the Bulgarian Government regarding evacuation of Allied territory, namely, that the last sentence be rephrased to follow the language adopted in connection with the preliminary Hungarian conditions. We accept Moscow as the venue and are glad to know that the Soviet Government has agreed that SACMED or his representative should participate in the negotiations with the Bulgarians and in the signature of the armistice.

The Department does not, however, feel that the new text of Article XVIII as quoted in your 8651 would be satisfactory. We agree with you that it is difficult to see how this new draft represents any improvement on previous language, including the original Soviet draft, and that it affords no distinction whatever between the two periods of control, and completely overlooks the general obligations to be assumed by the Bulgarian Government to carry out the Control Commission's

⁷ Thanassis Agnides.

instructions. The fact that Mr. Eden's interpretive comment, to which Mr. Molotov is reported to have agreed, was in any way necessary seems to us to demonstrate the inadequacy of the language of this article. If the word "participation" means what Mr. Eden hopes it does, we think the text should be made to say so, while the drafting is still in process. Even this interpretation gives us less than we feel justified in expecting. We therefore strongly prefer your compromise draft as included in the text quoted in your 8547 October 10. If it should be necessary to make further modifications in order to harmonize the several views, we would be willing, for example, to accept a provision for Soviet chairmanship during the second period following the cessation of hostilities.

Sent to London; repeated to Moscow and AmPolAd^s (Caserta).

HULL

740.00119 E.A.C./10-1244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—midnight.

8527. I am most grateful for your observations as set forth in your 8680 of October 12. In a separate telegram we are outlining our views on the various points still in discussion in the matter of the Bulgarian armistice terms. As you will observe, we have supported the position that the EAC should have the final consideration of the Bulgarian terms, rather than simply register the results of Eden's conversations at Moscow. The particular urgency of the military situation in Hungary is advanced as requiring action at Moscow on the Hungarian terms.

Your mention of the various percentages of control indicates that the whole question of spheres of influence is again in discussion. I shall be grateful for whatever additional information you may obtain. Meanwhile, it is interesting that the British Ambassador at Ankara has told Steinhardt of the percentage agreement, using the term "Anglo-American" to describe the non-Soviet share. We do not understand how percentages of responsibility can be distributed and we have no knowledge of any American participation in such a plan.

HULL

^s American Political Adviser.

740.00119 E.W./10-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received October 16—10 a. m.]

3943. ReEmbs 3911, October 12, 7 p. m. I understand that the British and Russians met over the weekend for further discussion of the Bulgarian armistice terms. We were not invited to attend, and inasmuch as I have no adequate instructions which would enable me to participate in such discussions, I did not press the matter, other than to remind the British that our Government would still wish to have its say in the Advisory Commission and to urge that they keep you and Mr. Winant fully informed of the results of their conferences with the Russians. This they have promised to do.

The morning press announces the arrival in Moscow of the Bulgarian delegation for the conduct of negotiations for an armistice. The delegation is under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Stainov. Its full composition and the details of arrival will go forward in a press telegram.⁹

Repeated to London as 214, to Rome as No. 3.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/10-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 16, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:42 p. m.]

8782. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Thank you for Department's helpful telegram 8526, October 14, midnight, regarding Bulgarian armistice. Today Strang gave Mosely¹⁰ a copy of a telegram from Eden of October 15.

Summary follows: Eden considered new Russian draft of article XVIII an improvement over the United States draft because of its specific reference to the participation of British and American representatives in the Control Commission. After a prolonged tussle, Molotov agreed to drop the reference to the Soviet High Command supervising the Control Commission after cessation of hostilities, in return for a provision that the chairmanship of the Commission should be held by a representative of the Soviet High Command. Molotov

⁹ Telegram 3956, October 16, from Moscow, not printed.

¹⁰ Philip E. Mosely, Chief, Division of Territorial Studies, on detail to the European Advisory Commission.

still insists upon the Soviet High Command retaining in practice the general direction of the work of the Control Commission by virtue of the continued presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria for the whole period during which the Control Commission would operate and by virtue of the predominant Russian interests which the United Kingdom had admitted to be theirs in that country.

The Russians have refused to accept a general clause as in the last sentence of the United States draft of article XVIII. They have agreed on insertion of a provision for demobilization of the Bulgarian Army to a peace footing under the direction of the Control Commission. They agree to provide in a protocol to article IX for Bulgarian foodstuffs to be made available for relief in the Greek and Yugoslav territories devastated by the Bulgarians. The Russians also agree to make provision for currency and other needs of Allied representatives in Bulgaria, in a protocol to article VI.

The Soviet Government agrees that the Control Commission should take action to safeguard Bulgarian assets but are unwilling to put this in writing. Molotov refused any provision about procurement of Bulgarian products for United States and United Kingdom war purposes but promised personal support for any demands we might wish to make provided United Kingdom would support Soviet requirements.

Eden feels that after long hours of discussion, he has got as much as is humanly possible. The Russians insisted interminably that Bulgarians must not be treated worse than Rumanians and Hungarians. Mr. Eden feels that in London and in Washington the strong and special interest of the Russians in Bulgaria as a Slav country is not sufficiently realized. Mr. Eden sent me his personal assurance that he has done all he can to secure as much as possible of the American draft. In conclusion he promises to send the texts as soon as possible. (*End of summary.*)

When we receive the new texts, especially article XVIII, we shall be in a better position to determine how far the new texts meet the views of our Government which are so well set forth in Department's 8526. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Government plans to continue the occupation of Bulgaria after the cessation of hostilities with Germany. In the early stages of negotiation for Bulgarian armistice terms, the Soviet representative objected vigorously to including in the United States-United Kingdom terms any provision for occupation of Bulgaria despite the fact that we made it clear that we hoped we would not have to use this right on any considerable scale but were mainly concerned to have this right included in the armistice as a means of assuring Bulgarian compliance. It is also my understanding of the Moscow declaration that after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, Soviet and other Allied Forces will not be used outside the territories of their own countries except after consultation.

The European Advisory Commission will not consider Bulgarian armistice until we have the full material promised from Moscow and have had a chance to consider it.

740.00119 E.W./10-1644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

3947. I have received a letter from Vyshinski dated October 15 stating that the Soviet Government has appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union F. I. Tolbukhin to be Chairman of the Joint Allied Military Mission which will control the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greece and Yugoslavia. Colonel General S. S. Biryuzov will be his deputy. Lieutenant General Cherepanov and Colonel Pleshkov has [*have*] been named assistants to the Chairman.

This answers in part the questions raised in the Department's 2431, October 14, 2 p. m., concerning the composition of the Soviet and British delegations.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1744: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 17, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 5 p. m.]

3965. ReDepts 2437 and 2439 [2438], October 14, midnight.¹¹ We are assured by the British that the details of their negotiations with the Russians over the past weekend with respect to the Bulgarian armistice have been communicated to the British Embassy in Washington in order that they may be made available to the Department and that the Foreign Office has been asked to communicate them to Winant. The Department is therefore presumably aware that in the case of Bulgaria, the Russians steadfastly refused to consider the inclusion in the armistice terms of any specific reference to an equal voice in the Control Commission for the three Powers after the termination of hostilities with Germany. The clause finally agreed upon merely specified that for the entire period of the armistice, there should be established an Allied Control Commission which would regulate and supervise the execution of the terms under the chairmanship of a representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and United States and that until termination of hostilities against Germany, the Commission would be under the general direction of the Allied

¹¹ *Post*, pp. 906 and 908, respectively.

(Soviet) High Command. Nothing was said about the remaining period; and Molotov has now made it plain in a letter to Eden that the Soviet Government expects and intends that even during this remaining period, the Soviet representative would continue to exercise leadership in the work of the Commission. (I believe that the Department will also be informed by the British Embassy of the tenor of this letter.)

The British do not consider the working [*wording*] of the article as far as it goes unsatisfactory. As far as Molotov's letter is concerned, they are merely acknowledging it without commenting on the content; but they clearly realize that it is not going to be easy to get anything like an equal voice in the Control Commission and I do not have the impression that they intend to oppose strongly the stand Molotov has taken.

The Russians further refuse to include a general clause requiring Bulgaria to carry out any demands of the Allies with regard to the restoration of peace and security. This, too, the British have reluctantly accepted but have managed to get in a clause about demobilization and a provision in the proposed tripartite protocol which would assure Russian support in inducing Bulgaria to provide food for Greece and Yugoslavia.

It must be anticipated that in negotiations for the Hungarian agreement, the Russians will probably refuse to go farther than they have gone in the Bulgarian agreement with respect to the participation of the United States and United Kingdom in the work of the Control Commission. This means that they may refuse to agree to the inclusion of any provision for equal participation after the termination of hostilities with Germany and that they may not in fact be willing even to contemplate such equal participation in practice. It is probable that they will likewise refuse to consider the inclusion of a general powers clause. They have reiterated to the British interminably their contention that all these armistices should be on the same model.

Before we go into the Hungarian negotiations, it would be very useful to know just to what extent our Government is willing to insist on these points. Given the general inelasticity of Soviet negotiation procedure, it is not to be anticipated that anything can be accomplished by argument or persuasion with the Soviet negotiators. In the Rumanian negotiations when the Russians were prepared to insist on something, Molotov had no hesitation in saying "Without this clause there will be no agreement". What I would like to know is whether, if worst comes to worst, we would be authorized to say the same thing with respect to any of the points at issue. If we are prepared to take this stand, it would be much better if we here know of this in advance and can take a firm and consistent line through

the entire negotiations without having to wire Washington for new instructions. If we are not prepared to insist on these points, there is little to be gained by explanation and argument directed to men who lack authority to consider arguments on their merits.

The same applies to the clause about reparations concerning which the Department has made its position clear in a separate cable.¹² Mr. Eden will discuss this question with Molotov today and I expect to send another cable on this subject as soon as I am informed of the results of their conversation.

My own recommendations with respect to the above are as follows:

1. I do not think it advisable that we should press for the general powers clause. Regardless of the provisions we are able to agree on with respect to the Control Commission, the Soviets whose forces will presumably be in effective occupation of the country will undoubtedly play the leading part in the Commission in practice. To insist on far-reaching powers for the Commission would thus operate in practice simply to increase the powers of the Soviet Commander in that area who will presumably be the Soviet representative on the Commission.

2. With respect to the direction of the Control Commission, I feel that we should with the cooperation of the British press as strongly as possible for recognition of a tripartite division of authority for the period following termination of hostilities against Germany; I do not think that we should make a decisive issue of this point.

3. With respect to reparations, I believe that we should adhere firmly to our position and refuse to yield even at the risk of a breakdown of the negotiations.

While I realize that events in Hungary¹³ may delay the conclusion of an armistice with Hungary, we have had no indication that the preliminary discussions are not to be continued.

Sent to Department as 3965, October 17, 2 p. m.; repeated to London as 221 and Rome as 7.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EAC/10-1744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 17, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received October 17—4:20 p. m.]

8839. My 8651, October 12, 8 [9] p. m. On receipt of Eden's message concerning Bulgarian armistice terms, I took the liberty of asking

¹² Telegram 2438, October 14, midnight, to Moscow, p. 908.

¹³ The Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, on October 15 took steps to terminate war; German intervention followed.

the Foreign Office to cable him that the redraft of article XVIII in the form in which he had reported it would not be acceptable to the U.S. delegation. The new draft of the armistice terms and protocol has just reached us. We understand the Foreign Office is cabling full text to Embassy in Washington, but I repeat article XVIII for confirmation :

“For the whole period of the armistice there will be established an Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria which will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of a representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the UK and U.S. During the period between the entry into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.”

We believe this new draft covers the main issue involved and is acceptable, in accordance with Department's 8526, October 14, midnight.

The general powers clause included in U.S. article XVIII has been omitted, but a new article I (*d*) has been inserted to provide for later demobilization of Bulgarian forces: “conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Bulgarian Armed Forces must be demobilized and put on a peace footing under supervision of the Allied Control Commission.”

The wording of the preamble refers to the three Governments “acting on behalf of all the United Nations at war with Bulgaria.” Previously we have assumed that the words “on behalf of” could be used only if the armistice were shown to and approved by those other United Nations at war with Bulgaria. Strang has informed Mosely that he has no word from Eden as to whether Greece and Yugoslavia are to be consulted prior to signature of the armistice. I believe this question can best be settled by the three Governments through diplomatic channels. Gousev is still in Moscow and his substitute on the EAC has limited authority. The U.S. and UK Governments will also wish to handle the question of Bulgaria's breaking relations with Japan by direct negotiation with the Bulgarian delegation in Moscow.

As soon as the Soviet delegate receives his instructions on Bulgaria, I plan to call a meeting of the European Advisory Commission, of which I am now serving as Chairman, to clear the Bulgarian armistice terms for submission to the three Governments, since time has now become an important factor.

WINANT

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/10-1844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 18, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received October 18—6:13 p. m.]

8904. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. I have read with interest the comment of our Embassy in Moscow (Moscow's 3965 to Department, October 17, 2 p. m.) on the letter dated October 15 addressed to Eden by Molotov regarding Soviet predominance in the Bulgarian Control Commission in the second period of the armistice. This afternoon just before going into the meeting of the EAC, I received a paraphrase of Molotov's letter forwarded by Eden to the Foreign Office.

Summary follows: Molotov recalls that in conversation with Eden on October 14, he agreed to accept latest United Kingdom draft of article XVIII subject to provision that Chairman of Control Commission should be a representative of Soviet High Command in order to meet desire of Eden and Winant to differentiate between first and second period of Control Commission work. Letter emphasizes that direction of Control Commission would belong to Soviet High Command during both first and second period. It adds that "leading role" of Soviet Command in second period would "to some extent be restricted in favor of British and American representatives". Molotov repudiates suggestion that the three Governments must have equal participation in second period in practical work and responsibility of the Commission. Molotov insists that in practice this would mean the elimination of the Soviet Command from the direction of the Control Commission which "in view of the present circumstances in Bulgaria" would only lead to the absence of all direction of the work of the Commission in enforcing the armistice terms and would thus not be in the interests of the Allies. *End of summary.*

In an accompanying telegram, Eden states his views regarding Molotov's letter.

Summary follows: In my opinion it will get us nowhere to oppose Molotov's interpretation and I propose simply to acknowledge his letter as being confirmation of his remarks to me on October 14. It now appears that the Soviet Government intends to maintain forces in Bulgaria so long as the Control Commission operates and neither we nor Americans are in position to send troops to that country. Hence, I fear we must simply accept the really embarrassing situation, however disagreeable that may be. Whether we like it or not, we must accept the fact that, for the time being, the Soviet Government hold most of the cards with respect to Bulgaria. *End of summary.*

The Foreign Office is unwilling to make further protest to Eden and I believe will accept the Soviet interpretation as an accomplished fact.

Today Rosh¹⁴ who is substituting for Gousev had the Russian texts of the armistice and protocol. Instead of accepting the texts with a recommendation for their acceptance by the three Governments as I had planned (my 8839, October 17, 5 p. m.), we limited the action of the Commission to a comparison of the Russian and English texts which was carried out by a subcommittee. I explained to my colleagues that I would have to forward the agreed text to my Government. I am not certain in my own mind as to whether the Molotov letter is binding on our Government since, in the discussions in Moscow, our Embassy there was probably put on formal notice by the Russians with respect to their position. The British appear to me to be largely committed by the exchange of letters despite Eden's statement that he will do no more than acknowledge the correctness of Molotov's written expression of his previous oral remarks.

The language of article XVIII is capable by reasonable interpretation of giving us a position of sharing in effective control in the second period. But if there is a prearranged understanding defined in an exchange of letters regarding the second period, we shall have curtailed our rights under the armistice and will not be able at a later date to assert the rights which have been formally assured to us under article XVIII of the armistice as now written.

In the immediately following telegram (my 8905, October 18, 9 p. m.) I am forwarding the full texts of the armistice and accompanying protocol which have been checked against the Russian text received from Moscow.

I would very much like to have your judgment as to the action to be taken next in the EAC. Could the Commission recommend the text as it stands without relating it in any way to the Eden-Molotov exchange of letters in Moscow? The formal position is that the formulation of armistice terms for Bulgaria is properly before the Commission. I should think that a recommendation of agreed armistice terms by the Commission if accepted and agreed to by the three Governments without specific reservations would ultimately permit the language of the agreed armistice document to prevail.

WINANT

¹⁴ Alexey A. Rosh, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom.

740.00119 E.W./10-1844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 18, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

8905. Following is the text of Bulgarian armistice and protocol as agreed between the experts of the three delegations today for concordance with Russian text received today from Moscow. For textual changes refer to my 8547, October 10, 1 [8] p. m. Text follows:

“Title: Agreement Between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, on the One Hand, and the Government of Bulgaria, on the Other Hand, Concerning an Armistice.

Preamble. The Government of Bulgaria accept the armistice terms presented by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States of America, acting on behalf of all the United Nations at war with Bulgaria. Accordingly, the representative of the Soviet High Command, General, and the representative of the Supreme Allied Command in the Mediterranean, General, duly authorized thereto by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States of America, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Government of Bulgaria, furnished with due powers, on the other hand have signed the following terms:

1. (a) Bulgaria having ceased hostilities with the USSR on (date) and severed relations with Germany on (date) and with her satellites on (date), will cease hostilities against all the other United Nations.

1. (b) Bulgaria undertakes to disarm the German Armed Forces in Bulgaria and hand them over as prisoners of war. The Government of Bulgaria also undertake to intern nationals of Germany and her satellites.

1. (c) The Government of Bulgaria undertake to maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Such forces must not be used on Allied territory except with the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.

1. (d) On the conclusion of hostilities against Germany the Bulgarian Armed Forces must be demobilized and put on peace footing under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission.

2. Bulgarian Armed Forces and officials have been withdrawn within the specified time limit from the territory of Greece and Yugoslavia in accordance with the precondition accepted by the Government of Bulgaria on (date); the Bulgarian authorities must immediately take steps to withdraw from Greek and Yugoslav territory Bulgarians who were citizens of Bulgaria on January 1, 1941 and to repeal all legislative and administrative provisions relating to the

annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Greek and Yugoslav territory.

3. The Government of Bulgaria will afford to Soviet and other Allied forces freedom of movement over Bulgarian territory in any direction, if, in the opinion of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, the military situation so requires, the Government of Bulgaria giving to such movements every assistance with their own means of communication, and at their own expense, by land, water and in the air."

In articles IV, V, VII and X of text given in my 8547, October 10, 1 [8] p. m., change "Bulgarian Government" to "Government of Bulgaria". In article IV, change "transport" to "transportation". In article V, change "irrespective" to "regardless". Otherwise articles IV, V, VI, VII, X, XVI and XIX remain the same. Conclusion remains the same except substitution of Moscow for Ankara. Continuation of text.

"8. The publication, introduction and distribution of [*in*] Bulgaria of periodical or nonperiodical literature, the presentation of theatrical performances of films, the operation of wireless stations, post, telegraph and telephone services will take place in agreement with the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

9. The Government of Bulgaria will restore all property of the United Nations and their nationals, including Greek and Yugoslav property, and will make such reparation for loss and damage caused by the war to the United Nations, including Greece and Yugoslavia, as may be determined later.

11. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to return to the Soviet Union, and to Greece and Yugoslavia and to other United Nations, by the dates specified by the Allied Control Commission and in a good state of preservation, all valuables and materials removed during the war by Germany or Bulgaria from United Nations territory and belonging to state, public or cooperative organizations, enterprises, institutions or individual citizens, such as factory and work equipment, locomotives, rolling-stock, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum treasures and any other property.

12. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to hand over as booty to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all war material of Germany and her satellites located on Bulgarian territory, including vessels in the fleets of Germany and her satellites located in Bulgarian waters.

13. The Government of Bulgaria undertake not to permit the removal or expropriation of any form of property (including valuables and currency belonging to Germany or Hungary or to their nationals or to persons resident in their territories or in territories occupied by them, without the permission of the Allied Control Commission. The Government of Bulgaria will safeguard such property in the manner specified by the ACC.

14. The Government of Bulgaria undertake to hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all vessels belonging to the United Nations which are in Bulgarian ports no matter at whose disposal these vessels may be, for the use of the Allied (Soviet) High Command during the war against Germany or Hungary in the common interest

of the Allies, the vessels to be returned subsequently to their owners. The Government of Bulgaria will bear full material responsibility for any damage to or destruction of the aforesaid property up to the moment of its transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

15. Bulgaria must make regular payments in Bulgarian currency and must supply goods (fuel, foodstuffs, et cetera), quantities and services as may be required by the Allied (Soviet) High Command for the discharge of its functions.

17. The Government of Bulgaria will arrange, in case of need, for the utilization in Bulgarian territory of industrial and transport enterprises and means of communication, power stations, public utility enterprises and facilities, stocks of fuel and other materials in accordance with instructions issued during the armistice by the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

18. For the whole period of the armistice there will be established in Bulgaria an Allied Control Commission which will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. During the period between the coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

"Protocol to the agreement concerning an armistice with Bulgaria.

At the time of signing the armistice with the Government of Bulgaria, the Allied Governments signatory thereto have agreed to the following:

1. In connection with article IX it is understood that the Bulgarian Government will immediately make available certain foodstuffs for the relief of the population of Greek and Yugoslav territories which have suffered as a result of Bulgarian aggression. The quantity of each product to be delivered will be determined by agreement between the three Governments, and will be considered as part of the reparation by Bulgaria for the loss and damage sustained by Greece and Yugoslavia.

2. The term 'war material' used in article XII shall be deemed to include all material or equipment belonging to, used by, or intended for use by enemy military or paramilitary formations or members thereof.

3. The use by the Allied (Soviet) High Command of Allied vessels handed over by the Government of Bulgaria in accordance with article XIV of the armistice and the date of their return to their owners will be the subject of discussion and settlement between the Allied Government concerned and the Government of the Soviet Union.

4. It is understood that in the application of article XV the Allied (Soviet) High Command will also arrange for the provision of Bulgarian currency, supplies, services et cetera, to meet the needs of the representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in Bulgaria.

Done at Moscow in triplicate, in the Russian and English languages, both Russian and English texts being authentic."

740.00119 E.W./10-1844: Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, October 18, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

824. General Wilson has designated his Chief of Staff Lieutenant General J. A. H. Gammell as his representative to sign Bulgarian armistice terms at Moscow. It is expected that General Gammell will proceed in very near future for this purpose. Major General I. H. Edwards of General Gammell's staff will accompany General Gammell to the Soviet Union with understanding that Edwards is serving on staff of SACMED and not as the United States representative in connection with signing of Bulgarian armistice terms.

Repeated Moscow 56, sent Department.

KIRK

740.00119 E.W./10-1944

*The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 262/GS

CAIRO, October 19, 1944.

[Received October 27.]

SIR: AS of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to enclose a memorandum prepared by Special Assistant Henry A. Hill, relating to material losses of the Greek people arising from the occupation by the Bulgarians of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, together with a list of livestock in Bulgar occupied Greece, 1937, and comments.¹⁵

The Greek Government has been very insistent that their losses be made good. Unfortunately, however, very little exact data exists in Cairo. No doubt the Greek Government will immediately after liberation prepare a full study, properly supported, of the losses sustained.

Mr. Allard, former Swedish Chargé d'Affaires for Greece and Bulgaria, in talking to me, specifically referred to the brutality of Bulgarian officials. He says that there can be no question that every effort was made by the Bulgarians to force the Greek population to leave the occupied area and under pretext that villages were Communist, thousands of people were massacred. In addition, he himself saw Bulgarian police and customs officials robbing the refugees at the border.

Mr. Lambrianides, Under Secretary of State, advised this Embassy that by starving and ill-treating the population, the Bulgarians forced

¹⁵ None printed.

them to ask for permits to leave the area. These permits were only granted when the refugees were prepared to cede to the Bulgarian State their entire property.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

740.00119 EW/9-1544

The Department of State to the Greek Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the memorandum of the Royal Greek Embassy dated September 15, 1944,¹⁶ requesting that the American representatives charged with presenting the armistice terms to Bulgaria be instructed to maintain close contact with the diplomatic representatives of the Greek Government at the place chosen for the armistice discussions.

The Department of State will have in mind the Embassy's request when, following the determination of the place and time for the presentation of the armistice terms for Bulgaria, instructions are sent to its representative regarding his participation in the presentation.

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1944.

740.00119 E.W./10-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1944—3 p. m.

8735. With reference to the proposed text of the Bulgarian armistice and protocol as contained in your 8905 October 18, the Department desires to make the following observations:

1. It is noted that the second sentence of article IX as given in previous drafts regarding the disposal of Bulgarian assets is omitted in the new version. Although the Department had regarded this provision as being suitable for inclusion in the armistice, it is not disposed to press for its inclusion in case there are good reasons for its omission.

2. In article XI there should of course be inserted after the words "United Nations territory" the words "and now located in Bulgaria." Otherwise this article is open to absurd interpretations.

3. As stated in its 8526 October 14, the Department does not feel that the new text of article XVIII would be satisfactory. We do not believe that the inadequacy of the present language, which is apparent from its failure to deal with the second period, can be suitably corrected by separate "interpretations" or "understandings" be-

¹⁶ Not printed.

tween the British and Soviet Governments, but that the terms as they are to be made public should be complete and clear in this regard.

4. The Department is agreeable to the remaining provisions of the present draft of the armistice and the attached protocol.

5. With respect to article IV of the protocol, the Department does not, of course, intend that the expenses of its representation should be paid otherwise than by this Government. If this provision is designed to ensure suitable facilities for concluding necessary arrangements for services and supplies, more explicit language to this effect should be used.

Please present the foregoing comment of the Department in the EAC, expressing in particular the Department's dissatisfaction with the new version of article XVIII. For your own information, we will not insist on a revision of this article to the point of refusing to agree to the armistice, but if you should not succeed in obtaining agreement to a more satisfactory version we want it to be clear to all concerned that we may find it necessary at some later date to reopen the question of interpretation of this article.

You are accordingly authorized, without further reference to the Department, to agree in the Commission on a final text, without reference to the Eden-Molotov letters, for recommendation to the respective Governments.

The text as received here contained a number of apparent errors probably due to faulty typing or transmission which the Department assumes will be eliminated in the final proofreading.

Sent to London, repeated to Moscow.^{16a}

HULL

740.00119 E.W./10-2144 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 21, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received October 22—8:55 a. m.]

4029. [To Caserta:] Reurtel 59, October 19.¹⁷ For your information with respect to the mission of General Hall¹⁸ in Bulgaria, Ambassador Harriman wrote to Molotov on September 26, at the request of General Deane,¹⁹ setting forth the purpose and composition of this mission and stating that General Deane had requested the Soviet military authorities to assist General Hall's party in order that they might complete their work promptly and return to their proper station. On

^{16a} Repeated as telegram 2490.

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ Brig. Gen. William E. Hall, commanding 15th Air Force, Mediterranean Theater, since September. General Hall's mission was to investigate atrocity cases involving Bulgarians.

¹⁹ Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

September 30, the Ambassador received a reply from Vyshinski stating that instructions had been issued to the Soviet Command in Sofia to assist General Hall's group in fulfilling its mission.²⁰ On October 15, when it was learned that no steps had been taken to assist General Hall in carrying out his work, the Ambassador again wrote to Vyshinski calling attention to this and reminding him that our military authorities were most anxious that this investigation be conducted as soon as possible.

No reply having been received to this last communication, I called on Vyshinski this evening at General Deane's request, in order to find out what the trouble was. Vyshinski was unable to make any statement on the subject other than that he had communicated to the Soviet military authorities the substance of the Ambassador's last letter. He undertook to let me know as soon as he could obtain further information.

Incidentally, Vyshinski called me back this evening to complain of a delay in the consideration of the Bulgarian armistice terms in EAC and to ask me to do what I could to expedite action there. (An account of this interview is going forward in my next following message.) It is not impossible, in the light of general Soviet practice, that these two matters are connected and that he wished to intimate that they preferred not to grant us utilities such as those sought by General Hall's mission until they could be sure that we would approve the proposed terms, which would in effect recognize Soviet primacy in Bulgaria in the armistice period.

General Deane also addressed another letter to the Soviet General Staff today asking for compliance with the instructions which Vyshinski said in his letter of September 30 had been issued.

Sent to AmPolAd, Caserta, repeated to Department as No. 4029.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./10-2144 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 21, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received October 22—6:50 a. m.]

4030. Vyshinski invited me to the Foreign Office this evening to tell me that the Soviet Government was anxious that the Bulgarian terms should be cleared as soon as possible through EAC and were disturbed at the delay which they understood was occurring in this respect. They understood that a meeting had first been planned for the 19th to consider this question, and that it had then been postponed to the 20th and then again to the 21st at Mr. Winant's request.

²⁰ The mission reached Bulgaria on October 4.

Vyshinski asked me to do what I could to expedite clearance there. I undertook to report the matter, and reminded him that the terms agreed upon in Moscow were still open to discussion, and not merely clearance, in EAC.

Sent to Department as 4030; repeated to London as No. 231 and to AmPolAd Caserta.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./10-2244: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 22, 1944—midnight.

[Received October 22—11 p. m.]

9077. Many thanks for Department's 8735 (October 21, 3 p. m.), with its helpful comments and authorization to settle the text of the Bulgarian draft armistice. At this evening's meeting of the European Advisory Commission the three delegations reviewed the texts of the draft armistice and protocol carefully, and approved the drafts for submission to the three Governments in a signed minute of the EAC.

With respect to article XI, I strongly advocated insertion of the words "and now located in Bulgaria". The Russian delegate objected that such property might be concealed in the territory outside of Bulgaria, for example, in a bank in a neutral country, and that power should be reserved to oblige Bulgaria to take all steps in its power to restore it to its rightful owners. The British delegation felt that the fact that this power is to be administered by the Allied Control Commission (not by the Soviet Command) was sufficient assurance that no unreasonable interpretation of this article would be insisted on. In the end, after maintaining our position, I felt it would be better not to insist on this point, especially since the Russian delegate would otherwise have had to wire his Government for fresh instructions on this one point which would have caused considerable delay before we could approve the document for submission to the three Governments.

With regard to the former provision in article IX for safeguarding Bulgarian assets, I felt it would be fruitless to press for its reinclusion now. I had had several long and exhaustive discussions with Gousev concerning it in the EAC. In addition this particular point was put up by Eden direct to Molotov in Moscow, without any success. Obviously, Gousev's substitute was unable to reopen a decision made in the Kremlin, however reasonable our own view even from the angle of safeguarding Russia's own interests. Eden and Molotov

agreed that this question should be taken up direct in the Allied Control Commission in case it became clear that Bulgaria was trying to hide her foreign assets.

The provision of article IV of the protocol is so drafted as to prevent Bulgaria from refusing to rent buildings, provide access to food and fuel, or to change dollars into leva, for the use of our missions. Its range is satisfactorily restricted in that it applies only for the benefit of United States and United Kingdom missions. Since the British delegation had set great store on some such precaution and Eden had gone to considerable trouble to obtain its insertion in Moscow, I did not feel that I should delay the negotiation over this point.

With respect to article XVIII, I handed to Strang and Rosh, Gousev's substitute, the following identic letters, before I consented to approve the draft armistice for transmission.

"In view of the presence of the Bulgarian delegation in Moscow, where it is awaiting presentation of armistice terms by the representatives of the three Allied Governments, in view also of the approaching expiration of the time limit set for the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces and officials from the territories of Greece and Yugoslavia, and in view of my Government's desire to make every contribution in its power towards expediting the completion of the armistice terms in the EAC, I am empowered to join with you and our Soviet (British) colleague in approving the present draft armistice terms for submission to the three Governments. In so doing I am also directed to inform my colleagues that my Government continues to feel that article XVIII of the armistice should properly contain an additional provision to the effect that 'upon the conclusion of hostilities against Germany and until the conclusion of peace with Bulgaria, the Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice according to the instructions of the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom'. I wish, therefore, at this time to inform you and our Soviet (British) colleague that my Government may find it necessary at a later date to discuss with the two Allied Governments the detailed manner in which article XVIII should be implemented during the period subsequent to the conclusion of hostilities against Germany. I am writing similarly to Mr. Rosh (Sir William Strang)."

I believe that this communication safeguards fully our position in the matter and goes as far as we can now without reopening the whole negotiation. It maintains our preference for the third sentence of our original draft, and without referring to the Molotov-Eden exchange of letters, it rejects all part and parcel of the idea which lies behind Molotov's letter. In this respect it puts us in a clear position. I felt that, in view of the fact that we have approved in writing of the draft armistice, our reservation concerning article XVIII should

also be in writing, and yet in a form which would not uselessly prolong the controversy at this time. I believe our efforts have resulted in several improvements in the armistice arrangements and may have slowed down somewhat the tendency to harden Europe into spheres of exclusive influence. Full texts of draft armistice and protocol follows in my 9078 (October 22, midnight).²¹

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./10-2344 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 23, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received October 29—3:35 p. m.]

4046. ReEmbtel 4030, October 21, 6 p. m. Molotov's secretary phoned me this afternoon to say that word had just been received from London that the Bulgarian terms have been agreed in EAC and to inquire whether I would be willing to be present at 7 o'clock to present them to the Bulgarian delegation. I explained that I did not have instructions which would permit me to do this.

The British have received what purports to be a text of the terms as agreed in EAC. They understood Mr. Winant had made it clear that the draft would still require approval by our Government.

The British Ambassador yesterday wrote to Molotov stating that his Government attached importance to the terms, as agreed in EAC, being shown to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments for their concurrence. He suggested that those Governments be given an opportunity to express their views on the draft before it is handed to the Bulgarians, but left open as an alternative the possibility that the draft might be simply communicated to those Governments before negotiations with the Bulgarian delegation were begun. It was proposed that communication be sent either to the Greek Government in Athens and to the Yugoslav Government in London, or, as an alternative, to the Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors either in Moscow or in London. No reply has been received to this inquiry.

Thus the British are also not yet in a position to agree to the presentation of the terms to the Bulgarians.

The British Embassy here does not know the present whereabouts of General Gammell who, it is understood, is to sign the agreement with the Bulgarians. They have wired to various of their posts in the Mediterranean and Near East urging that he proceed to Moscow as soon as possible.

²¹ Not printed.

The Russians are pushing most energetically for the early clearance and signature of this agreement. I do not know the reasons for their impatience.

I hope that the Department, in drawing up my instructions with relation to the signing of this agreement, will bear in mind that the protocol is designed for signature by diplomatic representatives of the three Powers and not by General Gammell. I also hope that the Department will let me have its views as soon as possible on the question of clearing the agreement with the Greek and Yugoslav Governments.

Repeated to London as 233, to AmPolAd Caserta and to Cairo for MacVeagh as No. 7.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/10-2444 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 24, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received October 24—12:10 p. m.]

4058. ReEmbtel 4046, October 23, 6 p. m. I have received a call again today from Molotov's office asking whether I would not be prepared to join in presenting the Bulgarian armistice terms to the Bulgarian delegation this afternoon or this evening. I replied that I still have no instructions.

The British have now received word that their Government has approved the terms as agreed in EAC and they have indicated to the Russians that they would be willing to join in presentation of the terms to the Bulgarians at any time provided the Soviet Government are agreeable to the prior notification of the Greek and Yugoslav Governments. They expect the Russian reply on this point this afternoon.

Sent to Department, repeated to London as 234, to Rome as 16 and to Cairo for MacVeagh as number 8.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/10-2144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1944—midnight.

2521. Reurtel 4030, October 21. The Bulgarian armistice terms and accompanying protocol have now been cleared by the EAC and referred back to the three Allied Governments. The Department, after consultation with our military authorities, accepts the text agreed

upon in the EAC and is willing that this Government should be a signatory thereto. This text is given in the Department's next numbered telegram,²³ the different articles being arranged out of order for purposes of security.

You should accordingly inform, preferably by *aides-mémoire*, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador that this Government accepts the text of the Bulgarian terms as reported out of EAC, subject to the reservations contained in identical letters regarding article XVIII addressed to his Soviet and British colleagues by the American representative on the EAC. These communications stressed our preference for the original compromise draft, giving the three Allied Governments an equal position on the Allied Control Commission during the period following the cessation of hostilities with Germany. It also reserved our right to raise at a later date the question of the implementation of this article during the second period, and made no reference to the Eden-Molotov exchange of letters.

The present telegram may be considered as constituting your authorization to empower the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean and of the Soviet High Command to sign the terms of armistice and protocol for Bulgaria on behalf of the United States Government.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/10-2544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 25, 1944.

[Received October 26—12:15 a. m.]

9200. In the House of Commons today a number of questions were asked regarding the position in Hungary and Bulgaria. Mr. Law, Minister of State replying for the Foreign Minister, said that he was not in a position to make a statement on Hungary. With reference to Bulgaria he said that no armistice had been concluded with Bulgaria and that the terms of the armistice are under consideration by the governments concerned and it is hoped there will be no long delay. In answer to another question concerning the present status of the Bulgarian Government in relation to the Allied Governments, he said that although Bulgaria had declared war on Germany she was not recognized by any of the Allied Governments as a co-belligerent. Bulgarian units under the Soviet High Command were, however, taking part in battles against the Germans.

WINANT

²³ Not printed.

740.00119 E.W./10-2544 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944—3 p. m.

2523. (1) Reurtel 4088 October 25.²⁴ You are authorized to join the British and Soviet representatives in presenting to the Bulgarian delegates the Bulgarian armistice terms as agreed upon by the three Allied Governments.

(2) Reurtel 4093 October 26.²⁴ You are also authorized to sign the protocol to the Bulgarian armistice terms on behalf of this Government.

(3) Although the British Government had previously indicated that it desired to secure the concurrence of the Greek and Yugoslav Governments themselves to these terms prior to their presentation to the Bulgarian delegates, we are willing to consider the transmission of the terms by the Soviet Government to the Yugoslav and Greek missions in Moscow as sufficient notification to those Governments provided, as indicated in the first paragraph of your 4088, it is satisfactory to the British.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/10-2244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944—6 p. m.

8940. Reurtel 9077, October 22. The Department agrees with you that we have obtained as full recognition of our views on the Bulgarian armistice terms as is possible under existing conditions, and it fully approves your written communication to Strang and Gousev safeguarding our position with regard to Article XVIII.

With regard to Article XI, we rather deplore the maladroit language used, and the consequent necessity of reverting to "interpretations" of a text which holds Bulgaria responsible for "all valuables and materials removed during the war by Germany or Bulgaria from United Nations territory". In this connection, the distinction made by the British delegation between the Allied Control Commission and the Soviet High Command does not appear to be particularly relevant, in view of the final version of Article XVIII, under which the Control Commission will have little substantial authority as distinct from the Soviet Command.

²⁴ Not printed.

In Article VIII it is noted that your latest text (Reurtel 9078, October 22²⁵) reads "the presentation of theatrical performances of films" instead of "the presentation of theatrical performances or exhibition of cinema films" as in the text given in your 8547, October 10. We are assuming that the latter is the correct and intended version.

The full text of the terms has been sent to Moscow, together with the proper authorizations for signature.

You may notify the British and Soviet delegates in the EAC that this Government approves the text of the Bulgarian armistice and protocol.²⁶ (Reurtel 9213, October 26²⁵).

The Department wishes to express its deep appreciation to you and your assistants for the extremely able and painstaking conduct of these negotiations.

HULL

740.00119 EW/10-2644 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 26, 1944—midnight.

[Received October 27—1:54 a. m.]

4107. ReDept's 2521, October 25, midnight. Molotov, Clark Kerr and myself met this evening with the members of the Bulgarian Armistice delegation. Stainov, the head of the Bulgarian delegation, first read a lengthy and highly rhetorical declaration expressing abject contrition for the policies of former Bulgarian Governments, maintaining that these policies had never corresponded to the wishes of the people and claiming that the Bulgarian people had spontaneously gotten rid of the pro-German regime and had contributed to the Allied war effort. The declaration ended with protestations of readiness to wipe out past guilt with the shedding of blood in the struggle against the Nazis and to abide by the verdict of the Allies. The pronouncement contained a number of ingratiating references to the Soviet Union, Marshal Stalin and to Marshal Tito. I hope to obtain and transmit the full text tomorrow.²⁵

Molotov then handed to Stainov the armistice terms. It was agreed that the Bulgarian delegation should have 24 hours for consideration and that we should meet again tomorrow at 10 p. m. to hear their reply.

General Gammell has not yet arrived in Moscow. I understand he is now in Tehran but has not proceeded from there because the Russians, on the ground they had not been notified that his accompanying staff officers would be Americans, have thus far refused to issue visas to them. The British Embassy which has been handling all arrange-

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ This was done October 27, as reported in telegram 9313, October 27, 9 p.m., from London (740.00119 E.W./10-2744).

ments for General Gammell's arrival is now in correspondence with the Soviet Foreign Office about this delay and I have taken no steps in the matter.

It is my feeling that having consented to admit General Gammell with his accompanying staff and representatives of a joint command the Russians should be held to that agreement and I cannot see that any special request should be required from our Government on behalf of those officers who happen to be Americans.

Sent to Department as 4107, October 26, midnight, repeated to London and AmPolAd Caserta.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./10-2744 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 27, 1944—midnight.

[Received October 27—11:55 p. m.]

4124. ReEmbs 4107, October 26, midnight. We met again this evening with the Bulgarian delegation. General Gammell who arrived this afternoon was present. The Bulgarians accepted all the terms of the armistice without change and the document is to be signed tomorrow afternoon at 3 p. m. The Bulgarians raised the question of the broad language of article XI. I stated that it was the understanding of our Government that this would apply only to property located on the territory of Bulgaria.

Sent Department, repeated AmPolAd Caserta and London.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./10-2844 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 28, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 1:10 p. m.]

4130. [To Caserta:] ReEmbs October 21, 5 p. m. which was repeated as 4029 to Department. Having heard nothing further from Vyshinski on General Hall's mission, I wrote to him once more on October 25, stating that I was perturbed over the uncertainty concerning the status of this group, stressing the importance of its work and warning him that I could not delay longer in giving my Government a full report of the results of the exchanges we had had with the Soviet Government on this matter. I said that my Government would expect me to explain why the mission had not been able to proceed with its work and that in view of the assurances we had received from him on September 30 I should be at a loss to know how to do this.

Late last night upon completion of the armistice discussions with the Bulgarians I took occasion to mention this matter to Molotov. He said that these matters would all be straightened out as soon as an Allied Control Commission was established in Bulgaria. I pointed out that this had no connection with the Control Commission, that General Hall's group had been there nearly a month already and that it was most desirable that action be taken at once to enable them to complete their tasks.

At 8 o'clock this morning I received a note from Vyshinski saying that in connection with my letter of October 25 a check had been made on the instructions issued to the Soviet military authorities in Bulgaria as well as of the reports of the latter. It had thereby been determined that the Soviet Command in Sofia had indeed received instructions as stated in his letter of September 29 and the instructions had been reconfirmed in the middle of October. General Hall had applied only twice to the Soviet Command for specific assistance and each time his request had been granted. Thus according to the information at the disposal of the Foreign Office the successful completion of the work of General Hall's mission was not hampered by any impediments the removal of which would depend on the Soviet Command.

I also took occasion in the course of the meeting with the Bulgarian delegation yesterday evening to mention this matter to the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stainov, who is Chairman of the Bulgarian delegation. He stated that General Hall's mission had never applied to him for assistance. He gave me most fulsome and enthusiastic assurances of collaboration in the arrest and trial of any Bulgarians we might name as suspected of ill treatment of our prisoners of war. He repeatedly described that ill treatment as a shame on Bulgaria's honor and insisted that his Government would not be satisfied until they had set things to rights.

In view of the above I am hopeful that if General Hall will now press his wishes energetically both with the Soviet Command and with the Bulgarian Government he will receive better cooperation.

Sent to AmPolAd, Caserta as No. 4; repeated to Department as 4130.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/10-2844 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 28, 1944—noon.

[Received October 29—12:46 a. m.]

4131. ReEmbtel 4124, October 27, midnight. At last night's meeting with the Bulgarians the question arose as to the completion by

Bulgaria of the preliminary condition for the presentation of armistice terms. Before the meeting began, Molotov handed to me a letter enclosing for the information of the United States Government a copy of a communication which Marshal Tolbukhin had received on October 26 from the Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgiev, stating that on October 25 at 7 p. m. all Bulgarian forces in Belomore, which was described as comprising western Thrace and eastern Macedonia, had been withdrawn to the old Bulgarian-Greek frontier.

It was agreed at the meeting that the circumstances of completion of the preliminary condition required no alteration of the accepted wording of the armistice terms. The Soviet view, namely, that all Bulgarian forces of occupation have been withdrawn from both Greek and Yugoslav territory and that Bulgarian forces now in Yugoslavia are not occupying forces but are operating there under the orders of Marshal Tolbukhin, seemed to meet with general understanding. In view of the presence of General Gammell as military adviser, there was no need for me to comment on this phase of the discussions.

Sent to Department as No. 4131, repeated to AmPolAd Caserta as No. 5.

KENNAN

[The armistice agreement with Bulgaria was signed at Moscow, October 28, at 3 p. m., and the accompanying protocol was signed in the evening of the same day. Texts were released the next day and printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1944, pages 492-494; printed also as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, and 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1498.]

POST-ARMISTICE PROBLEMS OF OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF BULGARIA²⁸

740.00119 EW/10-3044: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 30, 1944—11 a. m.
[Received October 30—10:05 a. m.]

4146. On October 28, immediately after the signing of the Bulgarian armistice agreement (4138, October 28, 6 p. m.²⁹), I took the liberty of handing to Mr. Stainov³⁰ a letter, addressed to the Bulgarian armistice delegation, stating that the United States Govern-

²⁸ For correspondence regarding negotiations leading to the signing of the armistice with Bulgaria, see pp. 300 ff. For text of armistice agreement signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1498.

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ Petko Stainov, Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ment expected the Bulgarian Government to break immediately all relations with Japan. The wording of the letter was the same as that of the letter addressed to the Rumanian armistice delegation on the same subject (Embassy's 3492, September 14, 7 p. m.³¹). The British Ambassador,³² acting on instructions, was handing Mr. Stainov a similar letter at that time, and I feared that any delay on our part in doing likewise might invite interpretation.³³

Sent to the Department as 4146; repeated to AmPolAd,³⁴ Caserta, as No. 7.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./10-3044 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 30, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received October 31—11:58 p. m.]

9370. The Embassy received today a letter of October 28 addressed by the Soviet Chargé³⁵ to Mr. Winant³⁶ in reply to Mr. Winant's letter of October 22 (Embassy's 9077, October 22, midnight³⁷) concerning article XVIII of the Bulgarian armistice. Full translation follows by air mail.³⁸

In substance Soviet reply points out that article XVIII "was agreed between the Soviet and British Governments after repeated discussions of this question with Mr. Eden in Moscow". It points out that the provision for the chairmanship of "the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command" instead of "the Soviet representative" signifies that the direction of the Control Commission will belong to the Soviet Command during both periods although in the second period "the leading role of the Soviet High Command" will "be limited to a certain degree in favor of the American and British representatives".

The reply further states that "it is impossible to agree to your proposal for supplementing article XVIII" as set forth in the Amb's letter of October 22. This addition "might be interpreted as meaning that the three Governments should have the same share in the prac-

³¹ Vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Post-armistice problems of occupation and control of Rumania . . ."

³² Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.

³³ Bulgaria severed relations with Japan as of November 6.

³⁴ American Political Adviser; Alexander C. Kirk was Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED), Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

³⁵ Konstantin Mikhailovich Kukin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom.

³⁶ The Ambassador, John G. Winant (at this time on home leave), was also Chairman of the European Advisory Commission, London (EAC).

³⁷ *Ante*, p. 472.

³⁸ Not printed.

tical activity and responsibility of the Commission, although only troops of the Soviet Union are on the territory of Bulgaria and Bulgaria is not divided into zones of occupation between the Allied Governments.["] It states that "such an interpretation would in fact lead to the elimination of the Soviet Command from the direction of the Control Commission which under circumstances as they have developed in Bulgaria cannot but lead to the elimination of any sort of direction in the work of the Allied Control Commission".

The reply states that in accepting the present version of article XVIII the Soviet Government based its attitude on "the necessity for preserving the leading role of the Soviet High Command although in a somewhat different form likewise during the second period" of the Control Commission. In conclusion the reply states that "in view of the above I assume that the American delegation will not insist on the further discussion proposed by it or the manner in which article XVIII should be applied during the period subsequent to the conclusion of hostilities against Germany".

Receipt of this letter has been acknowledged. Please show to Mr. Winant.

GALLMAN

740.00119 EW/11-244 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*³⁹

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1944—2 p. m.

With reference to relations with Bulgarian diplomatic representatives, you should be guided by the directives set forth in Department's circular telegram of October 4, 9 p. m.,⁴⁰ regarding relations with Rumanian representatives.

In addition to American representation on Allied Control Commissions which are being established in Bulgaria and Rumania pursuant to Armistice terms,⁴¹ American Missions are proceeding to Sofia and Bucharest headed by Foreign Service Officers Maynard Barnes and Burton Berry, respectively, who have the personal rank of Minister.

Although the establishment of these Missions does not signify the resumption of formal diplomatic relations with the countries in question, it is expected that the Missions will have informal relations with

³⁹ The diplomatic and consular officers in Ankara (for repetition to Istanbul), Bern, Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, and Stockholm.

⁴⁰ Vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Post-armistice problems of occupation . . ."

⁴¹ For text of the armistice agreement with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 13, 1944, at 5 a. m., see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712. For correspondence regarding negotiations, see vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania . . ."

the local authorities and such facilities and freedom of movement as may be necessary to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities for the protection of American interests.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./11-844

*The Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hill-
dring) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, 8 November 1944.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: The Bulgarian Armistice terms, published in JCS 921/11, contain a protocol which provides:

"In connection with Article IX it is understood that the Bulgarian Government will immediately make available certain foodstuffs for the relief of the population of Greek and Yugoslav territories which have suffered as a result of Bulgarian aggression. The quantity of each product to be delivered will be determined by agreement between the three governments, and will be considered as part of the reparation by Bulgaria for the loss and damage sustained by Greece and Yugoslavia."⁴²

You are aware that normally Bulgaria is a net exporter of considerable quantities of foodstuffs. It would obviously be of considerable advantage from an Allied shipping and supply standpoint, if Bulgarian food surpluses were made available as soon as possible for civilian relief in Greece and Yugoslavia in accordance with the intention of the protocol to the Armistice Terms.

I therefore urge upon the State Department the desirability of effectuating the protocol provision. I should appreciate advice from the State Department concerning the steps being taken in this direction as well as information as to items and quantities of foodstuffs which may be supplied by Bulgaria for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

J. H. HILLDRING
Major General

868.48/11-944 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 9, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received November 10—4 a. m.]

4291. On November 7 the British Ambassador wrote to Vyshinski⁴² to say that his Government now felt that the question of the procedure to be followed in dealing with the Greek Government's request for

⁴² Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

immediate deliveries from Bulgaria should not be referred to the European Advisory Commission since this would involve loss of time. In the British view the legal basis for action by the Allied Control Commission already exists, as the protocol to the armistice agreement provides for immediate deliveries of foodstuffs; under article IX of the agreement, the Greeks are entitled to other goods by way of reparation; under article XI the Bulgarians must return all loot within a time limit fixed by the Control Commission. Clark Kerr has therefore asked that the Soviet Military authorities be instructed at once (1) to arrange for the immediate beginning of deliveries of foodstuffs to Greece (2) to begin at once the examination of the list of other requirements submitted by the Greek Government and (3) to ensure that loot is restored in full and that early action is initiated in this respect.

His letter added that the British representative on the Control Commission ^{42a} had been instructed to cooperate to these ends, and that the British Ambassador in Athens ⁴³ had been directed to telegraph to Sofia a list giving the order of priority in which goods should be delivered, after consultation with the British military authorities in Athens.

Sent to Department, repeated to AmPolAd as No. 22 for his information and for transmission to Athens.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./11-1044

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 273

ATHENS, November 10, 1944.

[Received November 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith ⁴⁴ a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Themistocles Sophoulis, leader of the Greek Liberal Party and old associate of the late Mr. Venizelos,⁴⁵ on the terms of the armistice recently signed with Bulgaria, together with a copy of a letter which he has addressed to the Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, on the same subject.

In acknowledging receipt of these documents to Mr. Sophoulis and advising him that I would forward them to my Government for its information, I have expressed no personal views regarding their contents, as the Department will observe from my reply, a copy of which I also enclose. Nevertheless, I believe the Department may care to accord them its considered perusal, not only because the opinions and

^{42a} Maj. Gen. Walter H. Oxley.

⁴³ Reginald W. A. Leeper.

⁴⁴ Enclosures mentioned in this despatch not printed.

⁴⁵ Eleutherios Venizelos, leader of Greek Liberal Party and former Prime Minister.

sentiments they express appear to be widely shared by persons of all parties in this country, but because they present a well reasoned case in a competent manner and in a tone notably free of the hysteria so often connected with discussions of the subject in hand.

The Department will note that while recognizing that "the armistice is not the peace treaty," Mr. Sophoulis expresses surprise that whereas "in the recent armistice agreements between the USSR and Finland,⁴⁶ and the USSR and Rumania, provision was made both of a territorial nature and also substantial war indemnities were imposed", Greece should have been so little taken into account in the terms of the armistice with Bulgaria, with which no country is more vitally concerned than herself.

In his letter to me Mr. Sophoulis, on behalf of his party, accordingly makes "the fullest reservations on the terms of the armistice with Bulgaria". In his letter to Mr. Papandreou, however, he not only does this but comments on the terms individually. In particular, along with views which the Department may find familiar, he gives interesting reasons for believing that a Greek representative on the Control Commission would be desirable, and for finding certain clauses in the armistice too vague to be likely to prove operative.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

740.00119 EAC/11-1344 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 13, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 5:22 p. m.]

9885. Comea ⁴⁷ 128. By memoranda of August 24 and September 22 the Greek Ambassador ⁴⁸ submitted to the European Advisory Commission the desiderata of his Government concerning the Bulgarian armistice, including requests for deliveries in kind. By letter of October 12 he requested Greek representation on the Armistice Commission for Bulgaria. The Acting Chairman of the EAC,⁴⁹ by instruction of the EAC, addressed a letter today to the Greek Ambassador, informing him that the three EAC representatives have referred to their Governments the Greek request for representation on the Control Commission and that they have recommended to their Governments that the Greek requests for deliveries be referred

⁴⁶ For correspondence on the Finnish armistice, see pp. 608 ff.

⁴⁷ Designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the European Advisory Commission to the Department.

⁴⁸ Thanassis Aghnides.

⁴⁹ Philip E. Mosely, Chief of the Division of Territorial Studies, was acting for Mr. Winant.

to their representatives on the Control Commission. In conclusion the letter of reply refers to article IX of the Bulgarian armistice and article I of the inter-Allied protocol. Full texts are forwarded under cover of despatch No. 19187 of November 13.⁵⁰

GALLMAN

868.48/11-944

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As the Department of State are aware, the Greek Government have submitted to His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens a list of foodstuffs, live stock and other items which they wish the Bulgarian Government to hand over immediately as supplies to meet Greece's urgent needs for relief and rehabilitation. A similar list containing most of the items shown in the list handed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens had already been presented to the European Advisory Commission by the Greek Ambassador in London.

Since the Greek claim against the Bulgarian Government for reparation is indisputable and in view of the serious economic and supply position in Greece, it is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, desirable that deliveries from Bulgaria should start with a minimum of delay. The Protocol attached to the Bulgarian Armistice provides for immediate deliveries of foodstuffs from Bulgaria to Greece, and the Greek claim to other goods by way of reparation is fully covered by Article 9 of the Armistice.

The Greek demands were taken up by His Majesty's representative on the European Advisory Commission on October 28th. Sir William Strang proposed to his American and Russian colleagues that the Commission should recommend that the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria be instructed to examine the Greek claims and report on the possibility of making the deliveries desired by the Greek Government, the value of which would be taken into account in the final settlement of enemy states' liability for damage caused in Greece.

However, in view of the urgent need of getting supplies to Greece and in order to avoid the possibility that reference back to the European Advisory Commission might cause delay, the Foreign Office sent instructions on November 6th to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to see M. Molotov⁵¹ and to invite the Soviet Government to send instructions immediately to the Soviet head of the Control Commission in

⁵⁰ Not printed.

⁵¹ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria⁵³ to arrange the immediate delivery of foodstuffs in accordance with the protocol to the Armistice, and also to examine the list of items submitted by the Greek Government. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was to say that the British representative on the Control Commission would be instructed to cooperate fully in this task and that His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens was being requested, after consultation with the military authorities, to telegraph to Sofia a list giving the order of priority in which the goods required by the Greek Government should be delivered.

In informing the Department of State of the foregoing, the British Embassy have been instructed to express the hope of His Majesty's Government that the United States Government will feel able to instruct the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow to associate himself with Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's representations to the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1944.

740.00119 EAC/11-1344 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1944—9 p. m.

9642. Your 9885, November 13, 3 p. m. British Embassy here has also approached us regarding Greek request for deliveries in kind from Bulgaria. We agree that the Greek request should be referred to the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria.

The Department is considering the Greek request for representation on the Commission.

STETTINIUS

868.48/11-944 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1944—11 p. m.

The British Embassy here has approached the Department with reference to the subject of your 4291, November 9, 7 p. m. You are requested to apprise the Soviet Government of this Government's interest in arranging for immediate deliveries of Bulgarian foodstuffs to Greece pursuant to the Armistice protocol and in the early consideration of the Greek claims by the ACC⁵⁴ for Bulgaria.

⁵³ Marshal of the Soviet Union Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin.

⁵⁴ Allied Control Commission.

The Department, in conjunction with FEA,⁵⁵ the War Department and the Department of Agriculture, is examining the list of Greek demands in the light of the probable Bulgarian capacity to deliver within the first 6 months following the signature of the Armistice. The findings will be made available to the American delegation on the ACC for Bulgaria and will be forwarded to you for your information by air mail.⁵⁶

Sent to Moscow as —; repeated to Athens as —, to London as — and to Caserta (for Maynard Barnes) as —.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/11-2244: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, November 22, 1944—10 a. m.
[Received November 23—11:50 a. m.]

1442. General Koenig⁵⁷ reports that three of his officers, accompanied by Soviet officers, left Sofia November 20th to visit Macedonia and Thrace to verify withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greek territory. They are expected to return about November 23rd at which time General Koenig proposes to sign a codicil to the protocol already signed by Soviet and British representatives attesting Bulgarian compliance with pre-armistice conditions. Koenig expects to have accomplished his mission within a week. He reports Barnes' arrival on November 19th and states that his mission is now being guided by Barnes' advice.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as No. 132.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/11-1744: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1944—6 p. m.

419. Your 1356, November 17, 9 p. m.⁵⁸ Department is informed by Joint Chiefs that Major General John A. Crane was designated on November 17 as Chief of United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. He has been ordered to proceed to Sofia from Caserta as soon as possible. Two additional

⁵⁵ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁵⁶ Not printed; the instructions were sent on December 7.

⁵⁷ Brig. Gen. Egmont F. Koenig, Chief, American delegation, Allied Joint Military Mission for Bulgaria.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

Army members and a Navy member will shortly be designated and ordered to Sofia. Please inform Barnes.

Sent to Caserta, repeated to London and Moscow.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./11-2444

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 293

ATHENS, November 24, 1944.

[Received December 5.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, in translation from the French, a letter from the Greek Prime Minister enclosing a copy of his letter to the British Ambassador, dated November 10, 1944, setting forth the views of the Greek Government on the Bulgarian armistice terms.⁵⁹

Mr. Papandreou expresses himself forcefully concerning Bulgarian treachery and states that the Greek Government is "firmly resolved to obtain territorial guarantees which will assure absolute security to Greece", and encloses the statement of ten points which the Greek Government "considers itself obliged to insist be taken into consideration by an amendment of the armistice terms".

The ten points, for which the Greek Government believes the armistice should make specific provision, may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. Prompt demobilization of the Bulgarian Army.
2. Disarmament of Bulgaria.
3. Payment of repatriation expenses of Greeks transported to Bulgaria and refugees who fled from the Bulgarians to other parts of Greece. (Addition to Article 4.)
4. Restoration of losses and repair of damages caused apart from acts of war. (Addition to Article 9.)
5. Indemnity for damages caused by Bulgarian irregulars, Comitadjis and civilians.
6. Exchange of Bulgarian money held by inhabitants of former occupied areas for its pre-occupation equivalent.
7. Greek representation on Allied Control Commission.
8. Immediate delivery, in addition to foodstuffs (par. 1 of protocol to armistice terms) of farm machines, tools, fuel, grain and other products needed for farming, and means of transport.
9. Penalties for non-fulfillment of armistice terms.
10. Acceptance in advance by Bulgaria of all Allied decisions concerning territorial changes or other clauses necessary to establish peace and security in the Balkans.

However much the Greeks may be divided politically there is little question of the unanimity of their feeling of bitterness against their

⁵⁹ Enclosures not printed.

hereditary enemies, the Bulgars. The views of the Liberal party as expressed by its leader, Themistocles Sophoulis in his letter to me (see my Despatch No. 273 of November 10, 1944) are in close agreement with those of Mr. Papandreou submitted herewith.

In acknowledging receipt of the Prime Minister's communication I made no comment on the contents and assured him that I would transmit the text to my Government, as requested.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/11-1644

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State refers to the British Embassy's memorandum no. 692 of November 16, 1944,⁶⁰ requesting the views of the United States Government with reference to the advisability of constituting an Advisory Commission for Bulgaria, which would include political representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, Greece and possibly Yugoslavia.

The Department is strongly of the opinion that the Greek Government should have some channel of communication for putting forward its demands and claims against Bulgaria, preferably in the form of Greek representatives resident in Sofia, with regularized status establishing their relations with the Allied Control Commission.

The Department entertains some doubts, however, as to the advisability of creating an Advisory Commission for Bulgaria on the model of the Italian Advisory Commission. There is some question whether more membership on such a commission would constitute an effective means of achieving the results desired by the Greek Government, principally because (1) it would not afford the Greek member direct access to the Control Commission, and (2) it would diminish the power and delay the consideration of representations made by him, since such representations would have first to be submitted to a discussion group, and in some cases be subsequently referred back to the respective Governments for instructions.

It is the understanding of the Department that a Greek delegation arrived in Sofia on November 13, being the second of its kind, for the purpose of arranging deliveries to Greece from Bulgaria pursuant

⁶⁰ Not printed.

to the Armistice terms. It is further understood that the Soviet acting head of the Control Commission ⁶¹ has advised the Greek delegation to obtain due powers from the Greek Prime Minister personally and has indicated that Greek requests for immediate deliveries from Bulgaria will receive consideration as soon as a delegation is formally accredited.

Since time is of the essence in arranging for Bulgarian deliveries to Greece, the Department suggests that the Greek delegation described above, or a similar delegation duly accredited by the Greek Government, would constitute an effective channel of communicating the demands and claims of the Greek Government against Bulgaria. If the British Government agrees to this suggestion, the Department will send appropriate instructions to its representative at Sofia to recommend that further discussions in the matter be undertaken in the Control Commission.

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1944.

740.00119 E.W./11-1544

The Department of State to the Greek Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the memorandum of the Royal Greek Embassy dated November 15, 1944,^{61a} requesting the support of the United States Government in securing an early application of the provisions of Article 9 of the Bulgarian Armistice terms and of Article 1 of the Protocol to the Armistice.

The Department is pleased to inform the Embassy that appropriate steps have already been taken in furtherance of the Embassy's request under reference. The United States Government has requested that the claim of the Greek Government for deliveries in kind, as set forth in the memoranda of August 24 and September 22 submitted to the European Advisory Commission by the Greek Ambassador at London, be referred to the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, and has urged the immediate delivery of foodstuffs from Bulgaria to Greece as provided in the Bulgarian Armistice Protocol and the early consideration by the Allied Control Commission of the Greek Government's request for deliveries in kind.

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1944.

⁶¹ Col. Gen. Sergey Semenovich Biryuzov, Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria and of the Joint Allied Military Mission to control Bulgarian evacuation of occupied territory. Biryuzov was also commander of the 37th Army occupying Bulgaria.

^{61a} Memorandum not printed.

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/11-2844 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 28, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

1523. Re my 1410 of November 20, 11 a. m.⁶² General Koenig has reported that his inspection party has returned from Greece and stated that outstanding receptions occurred in all Greek villages and towns, with population considering this group first concrete evidence of American interest in their fate and carrying the delegation on its shoulders in triumph. Popular excitement described as "frenzy" by one member.

In Greek Thrace and Macedonia, according to Koenig, there remain no Bulgarian troops or civil officials except possibly for a few deserters hiding in the hills. Delegation is satisfied that as far as withdrawal from Greece is concerned, Bulgarians have complied with pre-armistice conditions before October 18.

Protocol has been drawn up which includes Koenig's signature as head of United States delegation and has been submitted for comment to both Russians and British. Both Tcherepanov⁶³ (in absence of Beresov⁶⁴ now in Moscow) and Oxley have indicated they are willing to sign.

Documents are in order and when signed by all concerned at the formal and plenary meeting of the armistice commission then Koenig will consider his mission accomplished.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/11-2844 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 28, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

1524. Re my 1523 of November 28, 2 p. m. General Koenig has reported that at 10:45 a. m. on November 25 the United States through its plenipotentiaries appended its signature to the Allied protocol of November 23 [3] declaring that Bulgaria had complied with all pre-armistice requirements. The ceremony took place in

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ Lt. Gen. Alexander Ivanovich Cherepanov, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Allied Military Mission.

⁶⁴ Col. Gen. Biryuzov, Deputy Chairman of the Joint Allied Military Mission.

Sofia in the presence of British and Soviet representatives. Koenig has now returned to his command at Oran.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/11-2844 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 28, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received November 29—10:55 a. m.]

4553. 1. The British Ambassador has written Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs Dekanosov a letter dated November 26 with regard to an announcement reported to have been made in Belgrade by the Bulgarian Minister of Justice Terpeshev,⁶⁵ to the effect that the Bulgarian Government would supply Yugoslavia with some 3,000 tons each of flour, corn, beans, salt and sugar as well as clothing and other articles, and also would care for 10,000 Yugoslav orphan children until the end of the war.

Clark Kerr pointed out that under the terms of the Bulgarian armistice, both Greece and Yugoslavia were entitled to deliveries from Bulgaria, and that although the needs of the Greek population were desperate, Greece had as yet received nothing from Bulgaria. The British Government understood that the Allied Control Commission had not yet begun consideration of Greek claims, and in a conversation with Houston-Boswell⁶⁶ the Bulgarian Foreign Minister had stated that the Bulgarian Government would find it difficult to comply with deliveries to Greece, in view of other calls on Bulgaria's limited resources. Clark Kerr said that if any proof of the inaccuracy of this statement were needed, it was provided by Terpeshev's announcement in Belgrade.

The British Government did not know whether the Bulgarian plan to make these deliveries to Yugoslavia had Soviet approval. If it did, the British hoped that the Soviet Government would instruct the Soviet military authorities in Bulgaria to have the Bulgarians make identical deliveries to Greece. If the plan did not have Soviet approval, the British hoped the Soviet authorities in Bulgaria would be directed to hold up the proposed deliveries in order that Greek needs, which had equal priority with those of Yugoslavia, should not be prejudiced. It was clearly inadmissible that the Bulgarian Government should, while under an armistice regime, export goods without the consent of the Control Commission. Immediate action by the Soviet Government was requested.

⁶⁵ Lt. Gen. Dobri Terpeshev, a Communist Party member, was Bulgarian Minister without Portfolio; Mincho Neychev (Hristo Neichev), also a Communist, was Minister of Justice.

⁶⁶ William E. Houston-Boswell, British Political Representative in Bulgaria.

Clark-Kerr's letter added that the British Government hoped the Soviet Government [would] take early steps to set up the Control Commission so that the Bulgarian Government might be kept under proper supervision and prevented from attempting to play one Allied government off against another.

2. As instructed in the Department's circular of November 18, 11 p. m., I have informed the Soviet Government of the U.S. Government's interest in arranging for immediate deliveries of Bulgarian foodstuffs to Greece and in the early consideration of Greek claims by the Control Commission.

Sent to Department, repeated to Athens and to Caserta for Barnes.

KENNAN

871.01/12-144 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 1, 1944—midnight.
[Received December 3—10:55 p. m.]

2. During the past 10 days I have had conversations with the Bulgarian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and War,⁸⁷ the Russian political representative⁸⁸ and General Cherepanov, with most of the foreign diplomats here and with numerous prominent Bulgarians. From these conversations I have derived the following first impressions.

1. The Government of the Fatherland Front continues a prisoner of the Bulgarian Communists, the only well organized political group in the country. Ten years of Palace government have wiped out the organizations of the former legal parties. During this period the Communists continued underground to perfect their organization. And now they possess an armed "militia" of some 10,000 while all other elements of the population have been disarmed. In the towns and villages perquisitions and terroristic acts, even executions by the militia, are not unusual. Yet, the Government is divided within on the issue of disarming the militia (the Communist Ministers can hardly be expected to emasculate their own people) and are fearful of any action that might precipitate the issue of the Communists versus the army.

2. The revolution of September, the about face of Bulgarian policy and occupation of the country by the Russians have demoralized the army. Discipline has suffered considerably. No one seems clear in his own mind as to where the army really stands, except that it does

⁸⁷ Col. Damian Velchev, Bulgarian Minister of War.

⁸⁸ Alexander Andreyevich Lavrishchev, formerly Minister of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria.

not understand the need for the "blood bath" inevitable in fighting the German Army in Yugoslavia and beyond. Certainly there is no enthusiasm either in the army or on the part of the populace for the decision of the Government, taken no doubt at the instance of the Russians, to send a new expeditionary force of five divisions to pursue the Germans "beyond the Danube and even to Berlin". It is thought by the Government that such an expeditionary force may improve Bulgaria's position with respect to final peace terms, facilitate Bulgarian efforts to obtain the status of co-belligerent, and have a stabilizing effect on morale, but no one (except a doleful and weak Government) is prepared for heavy sacrifices.

3. The Agrarian Party, which all agree represents the bulk of the electorate, is bitter against the Communists, and therefore against the Government that has failed thus far to show sufficient courage to place the interests of the country as a whole above the need for compromise if the Communists are to be restrained from going into top position. The Agrarians, and such bourgeois elements as are able to give expression to an opinion, entertain a very natural doubt as to Russia's ultimate aims in this country and the relationship of the occupying authorities to the Communists. The Russians appear to be exercising a restraining influence on the Communists, but many believe that this is primarily because Bulgarian communism, ideologically and with respect to methods, is still of the 1917 vintage. I have yet to hear of anyone who believes that if the Bulgarian Communists can relate their ideas and their methods to those of the 1944 variety of Russian communism there will not ultimately be a marriage of convenience between the occupying authorities and the Bulgarian Communists. All agree that the Bulgarian Communists are on the make and have every intention of gaining full control of the Government, if this can be accomplished in the period of Russian occupation.

4. Russian popularity is said to have decreased rapidly since the initial stages of the occupation. Russia has always been to the Bulgarians "the liberator". The Bulgarians are a simple people with a great desire for advancement. They yearn for education and admire polish and culture. They recall their liberators of the 19th century as a fine and cultured people. The Russian Army of today is rough and vigorous. Excesses have been committed by the Russian soldier—nothing astonishing, perhaps nothing beyond theft and the violation of person and property. The effect has been disillusioning. At the same time it is clear that the Russian High Command is here to protect Bulgaria from the "rapacity" of Britain's friends, such as Greece. This has been said to us in so many words by high Russians.

5. The economic and financial situation is equally depressing. The two east-west railway lines are engaged largely in transporting Rus-

sian troops. The railways also have suffered from the problem of upkeep in war time, degradations by the Germans and our bombing, and road transport has of course been greatly affected by military requirements and the deterioration of time and inadequate means of repair and upkeep. While crops have been good the movement thereof has been handicapped. Also, Bulgaria today has no foreign markets, even if transportation were not a problem. And she possesses no foreign exchange and virtually no gold cover. At the same time the currency circulation is about 20 times greater than it was in 1938, and the rate of issue is on the increase. The inner city of Sofia is a shambles from bombing. Perhaps 70% of it has been destroyed. As one observes the somewhat frantic effort now being made to remove these millions of tons of rubble with small horse drawn carts, one can only wonder at the faith that keeps the effort alive.

In summary it must be said in all honesty that all Bulgaria is in a hell of a state. What may result from these circumstances is almost anyone's guess, but that the immediate future will be one of stresses and strains no one who has the vaguest knowledge of the country's make-up and of existing circumstances can doubt for a moment.

Repeated to Moscow, Caserta, Athens.

BARNES

874.01/12-544 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFLA, December 5, 1944—5 p. m.
 [Received December 6—2:34 p. m.]

10. The divergence of views inherent in the present government of the Zveno, the Agrarians, the Socialists and the Communists is beginning to break through the obscurity of the Fatherland Front that has somewhat shrouded it from general view thus far.

Yesterday's press announced a decision by the Government to re-integrate into the army officers and men who since the September revolution have been charged with aiding and abetting past governments in "Fascist" acts.

Last night the Communists announced over the radio that no member of their party had participated in a council of ministers that had decided to open the army door to suspected officers and men, that while such officers and men might now join the colors to establish their future good faith, it should not fall to the province of any minister to determine the effect of such service with respect to crimes committed in support of previous Fascist governments, a matter to be resolved only by the People's Court in connection with arrests

effected under the authority of the Minister of Interior. This statement carried the endorsement of Yugov, Minister of Interior and a leader of the Communist Party. Yesterday's version of the "decision" stated that the Minister of War, the Zveno leader Veltchev, should determine who might be reintegrated and thereby afforded the opportunity to escape the consequences of their Fascist crimes. This morning it was announced in the Zvet's press that the decision envisaged only junior officers and men and no one charged with grave crimes against the interests of Bulgaria, and that only those wounded in future engagements with the enemy or decorated in action would escape the consequences of their pasts, while those who merely acquit themselves honorably in battle would gain no more than the right to a minimum penalty under the law. Who will give way, or is Bulgaria about to be launched on the road that Greece is bouncing along? These are questions that are in the minds of many people here today. All recognize that the decision probably lies with Russia. Will the Russians point out to the Communists that even the Soviets back in the early days of their history reintegrated many imperialist officers or will they support the Communists in this first open disagreement with the Government in which they take part? The answer is not self-evident. The Russians still play their cards close to the chest. Soviet inclinations seem usually to be revealed by action, not by straws in the wind. It does, however, seem logical to assume that at the present moment when Bulgaria is being used by Russia for important troop movements to the west the Soviet High Command would abhor disorder in the country.

BARNES

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria) /12-744 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 7, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received December 8—6:10 p. m.]

11. It has been officially announced on the radio that the so-called decision to reintegrate "Fascist-tinged" officers and soldiers into the army will not be carried out. Prior to this announcement the Minister of Justice,⁶⁹ a Communist, let it be known that he had instructed the Peoples Courts to disregard the decision. Thus the Communists have scored and it would be a pretty good bet they have done so because of Russian support. In fact the story is told, and it comes from an excellent source, that General Biryusov notified the Government that the decision must be revoked as it contravened article VI of the arm-

⁶⁹ Mincho Neychev.

stice convention which binds the Government to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of all persons accused of war crimes. There is nothing surprising in the suggestion that General Biryusov may have enacted [*so acted*] without any reference of the matter to the British and American delegates on the ACC as he has already made it very clear to General Crane and General Oxley that he, Biryusov, and his Russian assistants are in fact the Allied Control Commission.

It is almost an hourly occurrence for Bulgarians who continue[d] to believe in the Western democracies during the days of Germany's utilization of Bulgaria, the [*to*] appeal for evidence refuting the contention of previous regimes that the inevitable result of a policy opposed to Germany would be the Bolshevization of Bulgaria. Each day these advocates of democracy become more confident that the Russian army in Bulgaria will support the Bulgarian Communists in their determination to grasp control of the country. Each day they wait in vain for some sign of American and British resistance to this fear of Russian interference in the domestic political affairs of the country. These people are Bulgarians and it is difficult if not impossible for them to understand that American-British-Soviet "co-operation" is not to be made or broken over Bulgaria. Nevertheless, I myself believe that the time may come and perhaps very soon, when efforts to maintain with [*in*] this country the symbols of such cooperation may permanently or at least for a long time to come harm our position and that of the British with sane and sober opinion in the country.

Certainly to date the Accion [*ACC in*] Bulgaria, insofar as it may be said to have any reality, is in no way a cooperative body—it is nothing more than a section of the headquarters of Marshal Tolbukhin's Sofia Chief of Staff, who at the same time is the Commanding Officer of Russia's 37th Army, the Army that is apparently being created for the occupation of this country while the Bulgarian Army is "pursuing the Germans to Berlin".

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

BARNES

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/12-844 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 8, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received December 10—12:29 p. m.]

12. See my telegram No. 11, December 7, 9 a. m. It has now been verified that General Biryuzov did convoke members of the Fatherland Front Government and tell them in the name of the ACC that

the decision to reintegrate officers and men into the army must be rescinded. The outstanding point of interest in connection with this fact, aside from its disregard of the ACC as an Allied organization, is the implication that with the aid of the Russians the Bulgarian Communists are seeking to gain control of the army.

Yesterday afternoon a huge mass meeting, variously estimated at from 35 to 150,000, was organized in the cathedral square to emphasize the unity and strength of the FF. It celebrated the rescinding of the order and emphasized the necessity for a complete purge of the army and Government of all "Fascist" elements, thereby giving the lie to the very thing that the meeting was to prove, namely, unity of the FF. It appears at the present moment that so long as the non-Communists [apparent omission], this Government will be maintained in office until such time as the army is a "people's army". The Communists now control the Ministry of the Interior and with it the country's entire police force—the militia. If the army, or that portion of it that is left in Bulgaria, can be brought into line with the "will of the people", no serious obstacle to the completion of the September revolution should exist.

Communist control of the army is being sought from the top down. General Kozovski, who has been made the right hand of the Bulgarian Chief of Staff, General Marinov (with or without his consent is not yet clear), arrived in the country with the Russian Army and as a Russian General although of Bulgarian origin and not a Bulgarian General. Also Dobri Terpeshev, the Communist Minister without Portfolio, who negotiated the military agreement with Tito,⁷⁰ now appears in public from time to time in the uniform of a Bulgarian Lieutenant General and is thought to be the chief Political Commissar of the Bulgarian Army.

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

BARNES

740.00116 EW/12-844 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 8, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received December 10—11 :20 a. m.]

14. Considerable preparatory propaganda is being carried on with regard to the forthcoming trials of the members of pro-Nazi governments. The following information on these trials was provided by Naiden Nikolov, lawyer and veteran Communist leader, now Presi-

⁷⁰ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), military leader of Partisan guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia, and President of the National Liberation Movement in that country.

dent of the Court of Cassation. The people's courts, of which there will be several, will each be composed of 13 members. Of these, four will be career judges appointed by the Minister of Justice, and the remaining nine will represent the four parties comprising the Fatherland Front. The two main groups to be tried will be the 30 Cabinet members who have served since 1941 and some 140 national representatives who held office during the same period. The trials of the two groups will probably proceed simultaneously. Numerous other persons suspected of being collaborators will be tried separately. Nikolov pointed out that the defendants will be tried for complicity in one or more of three acts now regarded as treasonable: The adherence of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact,⁷¹ the declaration of war on the United States and Great Britain and anti-Soviet propaganda and activity in violation of Bulgarian neutrality. Nikolov added that capital punishment will probably be employed only in a few instances and that the majority of sentences would be for life imprisonment or shorter prison terms. The trials will be held in public and will commence before the end of the month.

As regards the members of the shortlived Muraviev⁷² Cabinet, most of whom are under house arrest, Nikolov indicated that all but Virgil Dimov would probably be found innocent. Dimov, who is now in prison, may well receive a prison sentence since he sanctioned the execution of a number of anti-Nazis during his brief tenure as Minister of Interior.

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

BARNES

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/12-844: Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force
Headquarters,⁷³ to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 8, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 10—10:20 p. m.]

1653. General Crane has reported from Sofia that his personal relations with Beresov, President of ACC, have been very friendly but latter's interpretations of armistice terms and protocol is that all decisions will be made by himself or his deputy. Beresov seems to think he has authority to restrict movement of members of missions

⁷¹ Pact of alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 386, or Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D. vol. xi, p. 204. For correspondence regarding this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. i, pp. 651-672, *passim*.

⁷² Konstantin Muraviev, Bulgarian Prime Minister, September 2-9, 1944.

⁷³ Mr. Kirk was appointed Ambassador to Italy on December 8.

to Sofia and environs except if accompanied by Soviet officer with express permission from him and to determine size of British missions.

Crane has impression that Beresov confuses his dual position, for example he issued orders as President ACC prohibiting entry of British and American military and civilian personnel without prior authority. Other steps, it is believed, have also been taken in name of ACC which have not been laid before the Commission formally. No organization of ACC has been set up yet except for the meeting reported in my No. 1612 of December 5.⁷⁴ Crane has requested an early meeting in order to establish formal procedure.

According to Crane, several unpleasing incidents have occurred between Russians and British, which have resulted in strained relations, but none have occurred between Russians and Americans. General Oxley is believed to be leaving for London soon to report personally on the situation which he considers unsatisfactory.

Russians were responsible for delay in releasing the 11 American air corps men, 6 British and 1 Chetnik who crashed near Salonika, who made their way nearer Sofia and were held 5 days by the Bulgarians before being released to Crane. Reason for delay seems to have been presence of the one Chetnik.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/12-1344 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 13, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received December 14—7:05 a. m.]

24. General Crane and I are aware of the views expressed by Mr. Eden⁷⁵ with respect to the ACC in Bulgaria and to the treatment by the Russian of the British delegation thereon, which were contained in an instruction to Mr. Balfour⁷⁶ for communication to Mr. Molotov. It is our understanding that the Department has been informed of the contents of this instruction and requested by the British Ambassador in Washington⁷⁷ to make similar representations in Moscow.

It would be most helpful to the General and to me if we were kept informed of the development of the Department's views with respect to the Russian handling of the ACC in Bulgaria and the justifiable

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁶ John Balfour, British Chargé in the Soviet Union.

⁷⁷ Lord Halifax.

discontent of the British to date. While it is clear that the Russians are apparently more anxious to please us than the British in small things and therefore are more agreeable in applying to us such restrictions as have annoyed General Oxley, the fact remains that to date the ACC exists largely in name only, and is in fact, part and parcel of the Russian military command here and not a separate and distinct Allied (Soviet) body.

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

BARNES

740.00119 Control Bulgaria/12-1544 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOPIA, December 15, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received December 16—8:55 a. m.]

25. The Council of Ministers has issued a statement apparently calculated to present in the most favorable light possible the setback to the efforts of the non-Communist elements in the Government to save the army from a radical purge. The pertinent portions of the declaration are contained in my immediately following telegram (No. 26).⁷⁸

The truth is that an extensive purge of the army is now underway, with General Kozovski, mentioned in my telegram No. 12 of December 8, passing on the records of the officers while at the same time "assistant commanders" (political commissars) are being selected and attached to all commanding officers.

Lieutenant General Marinov, now supreme commander of the Bulgarian armies (the new Chief of Staff is General Slavkov), is understood to have come to terms with the Communist Party if he has not actually accepted membership in the party, and the appointment of Terpeshev, the Communist Minister without Portfolio, as Lieutenant General in the Bulgarian Army has been officially announced. From a reliable source we have heard that there are now 16 general officers in the Bulgarian Army who have come from Russia since the arrival of Soviet forces in Bulgaria. Also units of the militia (former *shumtsies* or partisans) are being detailed to all groups of the army.

In view of above, it would seem foolhardy to believe that democratic elements in Bulgaria may hope for support from army in whatever resistance these elements may plan against efforts of Communists to gain political mastery in this country.

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

BARNES

⁷⁸ Not printed.

740.00116 European War/12-544

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of December 5, 1944⁷⁹ in which you ask for this Government's opinion regarding the suggestion of the Bulgarian Government that certain persons arrested by the Soviet authorities in Bulgaria⁸⁰ be turned over to it for trial.

This Government agrees with the Soviet Government in perceiving no objection to the suggestion.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.00116 E.W./12-1944

The British Embassy to the Department of State

The British Embassy have the honour to inform the Department of State, on instructions from the Foreign Office, that the Soviet Ambassador,⁸¹ in a note dated December 5th, informed Mr. Eden that after the entry of Soviet forces into Bulgaria the Soviet authorities arrested a number of persons guilty of bringing Bulgaria into the war against the United Nations, amongst them Prince Cyril, M. Filov⁸² and General Michov⁸³ (members of the Regency Council); M. Bozhilov⁸⁴ (the former Prime Minister), M. Vasiliev⁸⁵ (a former Minister) and others. M. Gusev said that in connection with the opening of the trials of war criminals in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Government had asked the Soviet Government to hand over these persons to them for three months. The Soviet Government had no objection to this proposal but wished to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government. M. Gusev added that the Soviet Government were addressing a similar enquiry to the United States Government.

Mr. Eden has informed the Soviet Ambassador that His Majesty's Government likewise see no objection to the course proposed by the Bulgarian Government.⁸⁶

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1944.

⁷⁹ Not printed.⁸⁰ For names of those arrested, see note from the British Embassy, December 19, *infra*.⁸¹ Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev.⁸² Bogdan Filov, Prime Minister, 1942.⁸³ Lt. Gen. Nikola Mihov, Minister of War, 1942.⁸⁴ Dobri Bozhilov, Minister of Finance, 1942; Prime Minister until May 1944.⁸⁵ Dimiter Vasilev, Minister of Public Works until May 1944.⁸⁶ Marginal notation: "British Embassy orally advised of similar U.S. action."

740.00116 E.W./12-2144: Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, [December 21, 1944.]

[Received December 21—9:02 a. m.]

34. Please see my No. 30 of December 18, 1 p. m.⁸⁷ The trials of the King's Counsellors and Ministers and of the members of Parliament opened on schedule this morning before the People's Courts at Sofia. At the initial hearing of the first group, the Counsellors and Ministers, it was announced that those of the accused who are "absent" would be represented by counsel. The lawyers chosen to contest this defense observed that it was not only customary but important for attorney to consult his client especially to determine what plea to enter—guilty or not guilty; that perforce the plea in these cases must be not guilty. The public prosecutor observed that, as the facts in the respective cases were so notorious, it was hardly a matter of importance for the defending lawyers to consult their clients.

This afternoon the Partisan Army division of General Slavacho Trunski, which has just returned from the Yugoslav front, is being blessed in the Cathedral Square. The political character of this ceremony and its connection with the opening of the trials today are indicated by the unmartial-like banners being carried by these armed troops, bearing such legends as "Long live the Red Army"; "Merciless death for the assassins of the Bulgarian people"; "Death to Fascism"; "Down with the Fascist officers"; "Long live the union between the people and the army". Indeed the advocates of a people's army are in the saddle today hoping to spur the People's Court to "justice". Bulgaria has indeed fallen upon difficult times and perhaps into the hands of questionable associates.

Of further interest in this general picture is the fact that Chief of Staff General Slavkov has been replaced by the Soviet-trained Bulgarian General Kinov. Similarly the important post of Chief of Military Intelligence (Bulgaria Gestapo) held until recently by Togzceno leader, Colonel Lekarski,⁸⁸ has now been filled by Colonel Vrzigov,⁸⁹ likewise trained in the USSR. At the same time numerous military personnel are being arrested every day from all branches of the army by the militia. While all this is greatly resented and feared by the bulk of the officer class, the paralysis of their leadership and the presence of Russian troops prevent them from taking action.

Repeated to Caserta as 26 and to Moscow as 19.

BARNES

⁸⁷ Not printed.

⁸⁸ Col. Asen Lekarski; Togzceno was a political movement related to Macedonia.

⁸⁹ Presumably Col. Petur Zranchev.

740.00119 EW/11-2944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1944—6 p. m.

For Barnes, Sofia, 14.

For Berry, Bucharest, 32.

Reurtel 1533, November 29.⁹⁰ Department now giving consideration to British proposal for establishment of restitution commission details of which have just been received.

However, it is not desired that negotiations for establishment of restitution commission should delay recovery of identifiable looted Greek property by Greece from Bulgaria.

ACC should nevertheless make it clear to Greek authorities that it can accept no liability for deciding true ownership in handing over property for which prima facie claims have been made.

Repeated to Athens 139, Moscow 2867, and London 10634.

STETTINIUS

740.00116 EW/12-2144 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*⁹¹

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1944—midnight.

Barnes understands that all members of Muraviev Cabinet except Muraviev himself and Dimov have been released but have signed pledges to appear before the Peoples courts when called. This move is generally considered to mean that only Dimov is in danger. It is generally believed that the Russians had been persuaded not to take action against the other ministers since such action would undermine the declaration of war against Germany which constituted the final action of the Cabinet in question. War criminal trials will begin on December 21 and there is some fear that the penalties will be heavy and justice may not be dispensed impartially. Those persons bearing the greatest responsibility for Bulgarian participation in the war such as Filov, Gabrovsky⁹² and Prince Cyril are now imprisoned in Russia where they will be held for trial by an international court.

STETTINIUS

⁹⁰ Not printed.

⁹¹ The diplomatic representatives at London, Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, Bern, Cairo, Ankara, and Stockholm.

⁹² Peter Gabrovski, Bulgarian Minister of Interior, February 1940—August 1943.

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria) /12-2144

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

According to information received from the British representative in Sofia, the Soviet representatives in Bulgaria have made suggestions that if a properly accredited Greek Mission were to be sent to Bulgaria the Soviet authorities would be prepared to consider the claims they put forward.

Since there appears to be no question of securing Greek representation on the Allied Control Commission, His Majesty's Government feel that some kind of recognised Greek mission, through which the Greek Government could state their case to the Allied Control Commission, would seem to be the most practicable means of ensuring that the Greek case is fully explained to, and considered by, the Commission.

His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens has therefore been instructed to ascertain as soon as practicable from the Greek Government whether they would be ready to send a mission to Sofia to act as a channel of communication between the Greek Government and the Allied Control Commission. The Greek mission could either be attached to the Allied Control Commission, which would be the more satisfactory solution, or it could be an independent body.

Mr. Leeper is to inform the Greek Government that, if they agree on the desirability of sending some such mission to Bulgaria, His Majesty's Government would endeavor to secure the consent of the Soviet authorities.

His Majesty's Government hope that in the event of the Greek Government agreeing to send a mission to Bulgaria, the United States Government will join His Majesty's Government in making representations to the Soviet authorities with a view to securing their consent.

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1944.

740.00119 Control Bulgaria /12-2344 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 23, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received December 24—7 a. m.]

42. I have sent the following self-explanatory letter this afternoon to the Deputy President of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission:

"My Dear General Cherepanov: I want to tell you how sorry I was this morning that a previous luncheon engagement with General

Marinov made it impossible for me to accept your kind invitation for this noon. But now I must add a statement of my regret that General Crane and I were not permitted to assist at General Marinov's luncheon because the Russian military control post stationed a short distance before arriving at General Marinov's residence turned us back on the grounds that we had no authority from the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission to proceed to our destination.

It was most kind of you to change your invitation from luncheon this noon to dinner this evening and I was most happy to accept. Now, however, as it is clearly established that for the time being I do not enjoy the privilege of free circulation, I think it best to restrict my movements to Sofia proper and to the route that leads to my residence until the question has been decided, once and for all, whether or not the US representative in Bulgaria is, in fact, confined to the area within the military posts established by the Russian Command, except when accompanied by a Russian officer. Therefore, please accept my sincere regret at not being able to accept your invitation for this evening.

Sincerely yours."

General Crane is addressing a letter of protest against the restrictions placed upon his movements to Colonel General Biryuzov which will be dated tomorrow and text will be telegraphed.

Repeated to Moscow as 24 and to Caserta as 32.

BARNES

740.00119 Control Bulgaria/12-1344 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Bulgaria
(Barnes)

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1944—7 p. m.

16. Reurtel 24, December 13, 3 p. m. The Department is prepared to make appropriate representations to Moscow but the reports as yet received from the field do not warrant an approach along the lines of Mr. Eden's note. Thus far our information on points which would justify such representations has for the most part been received from British sources or relates to treatment accorded British representatives.

In particular, information is desired on the following points:

1) Issuance by Soviet authorities of orders purporting to come from ACC, on which there was in fact no advance consultation with American and British representatives. Thus far we have received information, for example, on Beresov's order to Fatherland Front to rescind decision to reintegrate personnel into army (Reurtel 12, December 8, 3 p. m.) and his order prohibiting the entry of British and American military and civilian personnel without prior Soviet authority (reported by Caserta December 8). We feel that this practice is unwarranted, but wish to be informed of other incidents, if any.

2) Suggested limitation in number of personnel on ACC. On this we have only Crane's report of the first ACC meeting, which merely refers to a discussion of the matter. We are not prepared to take action unless we expect to be denied the right to bring in needed personnel.

3) Limitations on Bulgarian funds for the expenses of American representatives. Again the only report is contained in Crane's account of the first meeting and mentions merely a discussion of the question.

4) Requirement of clearance from Moscow for each Allied aircraft landing in Bulgaria. We are prepared to protest this ruling, but first wish to have some tangible evidence of serious delay or inconvenience suffered by our personnel as a consequence thereof.

5) Restrictions on movements of Allied representatives. It does not appear that our representatives have been restricted in their movements in Sofia and environs. Please advise whether it would be satisfactory if an arrangement were made to submit in advance to the Soviet military authorities itineraries for our provincial travel, with the stipulation that our people should not normally be accompanied by Soviet liaison officers. We assume that the restrictions apply to Crane's staff, rather than to your mission.

We realize that these are vexing problems which require serious attention, bearing in mind that any representations must have a convincing factual basis and must come within the meaning and intent of the Armistice terms. The precedents established in the Italian theater must also be kept in mind, though they are not entirely parallel.

Sent to Sofia, repeated to Bucharest and Moscow.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria) /12-2644 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOPIA, December 26, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received December 27—11:55 a. m.]

45. Please see my telegram No. 42, December 23, 3 p. m. I spent Christmas Eve in company with General Cherepanov who was greatly upset that I had eluded his search party on the previous evening, which had been sent all over Sofia to find me to apologize for the incident complained of in my letter of December 23 and to insist that I forgive and dine with him even so. I told him that he had been pardoned before I had written the letter but that it was just as well his search party had not found me as the officer in charge apparently had not been authorized to state that the order restricting my movements had been rescinded. The upshot of the conversation was that General Biryusov and Cherepanov are to dine with me tomorrow.

Today General Crane communicated the following letter to General Biryusov.

"My dear General Beresov: Yesterday afternoon, while en route to lunch at General Marinov's, I was prevented from arriving at his house, as it was situated outside the limits of circulation that you have seen fit to set for me. I find this setting of a limit to my free movements in Bulgaria incomprehensible. I believe that you must appreciate my humiliation at seeing cars carrying Bulgar officers pass without any question where I am stopped. The idea of having a Russian officer to accompany me wherever I want to go is unsatisfactory. They are never available at the time required. I am sure that under such circumstances you will understand my view that the restriction of myself to the limits of your control posts is contrary to spirit of the relations that obtains between our two countries and that you will take prompt measures to put an end to this situation. Sincerely yours."

BARNES

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/12-2744 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 27, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received December 29—1:20 a. m.]

46. Reurtel 16, December 23, 7 p. m. I am sorry if any of my telegrams on our relations with the Russians here have conveyed an impression of vexation on our part, or surprised annoyance with the situation that we have found. Both General Crane and I have sought to cultivate an attitude of *détente*, and even of some detachment. It has not seemed to us in view of what transpired in Moscow during the armistice negotiations that accounts of petty annoyances generally merit inclusion in our reports. As I suggested in my telegram 11 of December 7, 9 a. m., we are aware that American-British-Soviet collaboration is not to be made or unmade over Bulgaria.

The situation about which the Department specifies a desire for further information may be summarized as follows: We are all of us, mission and delegation on the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, restricted to Sofia and certain limited areas of its environs unless accompanied by a Russian officer. The airport for example is out of bounds, yet officers to accompany us are only infrequently readily available. The inconvenience thus caused in meeting planes after days of waiting for permission to bring in a plane can well be imagined. An instance of serious delay and inconvenience resulting from the requirement to obtain from Moscow clearance of planes is the fact that on Christmas day we received our first pouch from the Department since my arrival here November 17th. For three weeks General Crane has been awaiting permission for the rear echelon of his staff to enter

Bulgaria. Most of his personnel has now been cleared, presumably by action of General Deane,⁹³ but the local Russian authorities have not yet seen fit to reply to General Crane's original and subsequent requests for clearance of this personnel and for members of his delegation [who?] are still held up in Istanbul because no clearance has been received for them. Also the OSS⁹⁴ team has been sent away again as the result of the insistence of General Biryusov. There can be no doubt that General Biryusov persists in the view that it is for Moscow to determine the extent of our personnel here, not ourselves. The matter of Bulgarian funds has been settled satisfactorily so far as we are concerned.

It is my view that the situation outlined above is important only as it provides evidences of the "Soviet" as distinct from "Allied" character of the Control Commission. The really disturbing fact is that the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission operates as part and parcel of the Russian Command and is not a separate body on which Generals Crane and Oxley has [apparent omission]; and the very presence here of American and British generals and their staffs confirms in the minds of the Bulgarian population that decisions taken with respect to their affairs by the Russians are "Allied", not "Russian", decisions. In fact we institute [*constitute?*] something of a screen behind which the Russians today may take any decision that pleases them with respect to any and all aspects of Bulgarian political, economic and social life.

Let us take an example that is of direct interest to us. A few days ago the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed regret to me that the "Allied Control Commission" had decided that postal relations should not be restored at this time with the U.S. When questioned he manifested surprise that we had not known that he had received a letter to that effect, signed by the Russians in the name of the "Allied Control Commission". This letter was in reply to one he had sent to the President of the Commission. From what he told me, I gathered that this was merely one of numerous letters addressed by him to the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission and one of numerous replies. Neither Crane nor Oxley has ever been consulted with regard to action on matters submitted to the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission by the Bulgarian Government. Therein lies the proof of our false position here with respect to the Bulgarian public and Bulgarian authorities.

Restrictions on our movements and the arrival and departure of our planes and limitation on our personnel may be annoying and destructive of prestige locally but they do not involve our responsibilities as a signatory of the armistice convention. It is this latter con-

⁹³ Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

⁹⁴ Office of Strategic Services.

sideration that is really important, especially as there is no matter settled or left unsettled in this country today without positive, negative or tacit decision by the Russian authorities. How much of this is in the name of the "Allied Control Commission" we have no way of knowing. Only when rumors reach us from the street are we in a position to make a check. Except when inquiry can be based on a specific case, the Russians say they take no action in the name of the Commission and we can hardly expect a Bulgarian Government, that must and ideologically wishes to get along with the Soviet authorities, to come running to us with complaints. On the other hand, I do not believe we can afford to ignore the view of many leading Bulgarians, that it is "shameful" for the Anglo-Saxon Powers to have signed an armistice and exercise no power in the execution of that armistice.

General Crane and I are fully aware that we are here as investments of American policy but we also know that in the minds of the Bulgarian population America and Britain represent one set of political, economic and racial ideas and Soviet Russia another set. We realize too that whereas the British are naturally anxious for our sympathetic interest in their local difficulties with the Russians, so too are the Russians pleased when we do not manifest that sympathy. This is the reason why the Russians apply to us their restrictive measures with less brusqueness than they do in the case of the British. These are considerations that will naturally affect the Department's final decision with respect to the nature of the representations that may be made in Moscow.

Also I would suggest that in connection with such representations no generalizations be made on the basis of our experience to date in the two countries, Bulgaria and Rumania. It is justifiable to suppose that, in the case of Rumania, Russia anticipates no serious interference in her management there. Here Russia fears that she may not count on such a free hand. Bulgaria is too close to Greece for Britain to be as detached with respect to what may happen here as to what may happen in Rumania and the Russians know it. Bulgaria is one of those limitrophe areas where the tide of political conflict between British and Soviet international interests is bound to ebb and flow perhaps for a long time to come. Also, as General Donovan⁹⁵ pointed out to King Boris, "Bulgaria is the key to the Balkans". It will be recalled that the King replied that all depends upon who holds the key. As matters go here, certainly will they go in Yugoslavia and probably also in Hungary.

Repeated to Caserta as 35 and Moscow as 26.

BARNES

⁹⁵ Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services.

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/12-2944 : Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, December 29, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received December 30—4:30 a. m.]

47. Please see my No. 45, December 26, 5 p. m. The meeting with Generals Biryusov and Cherepanov at my house for dinner proved the most interesting (and I think useful) that General Crane and I have yet had with these key officials.

In the course of three hours of conversation it was possible to convey in one way or another to General Biryusov virtually all that I had said in my telegram No. 46, of December 27, 4 p. m. to the Department. The spirit of the talk was at all times friendly and cooperative. While I do not assume that I talked General Biryusov into a new point of view, I am sure he left the dinner with ideas to ponder that had not occurred to him before. In fact he said in so many words that he had obviously made a serious mistake thus far in not making clear distinction between his role as commanding Russian general and his second role as President of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission. He avowed an intention to remedy this at once by giving definite form to the Commission and by restricting decisions in the name of the Commission to matters clearly within the purview of the armistice convention.

Several hours later Generals Oxley and Crane were notified of a formal meeting of the Commission to be held the following day (yesterday afternoon at 4:30). At yesterday's meeting an opportunity was afforded for general discussion of questions that Generals Oxley and Crane have for some weeks wished to bring before the Commission. It was announced that henceforth regular weekly meetings will be held, that special meetings may be called in case of need and that agendas will be prepared and distributed in advance of all meetings.

On the subject of Russian-British relations, General Biryusov at my house confirmed in specific word, the distinction I had made in the last paragraph of my telegram 46 between the situation obtaining here and in Rumania. He said quite frankly that the restrictive measures imposed by him in the matter of Allied (Soviet) Control Commission personnel, their movements and the arrival and departure of planes, were dictated by his distrust in British objectives. He expressed regret that the Americans must be hampered by measures designed to check British enterprise but hoped that these measures were applied to us in as agreeable a manner as possible under the circumstances. General Biryusov disclaimed any designs on the part of Russia with respect to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, except to assure

that in the future no Balkan block may exist that might be used to the disadvantage of Russian security. He did not, however, mention the point that doubtless the most effective way to carry out this policy is to place the Communists and other pro-Russian elements in power.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 27 and Caserta as No. 36.

BARNES

740.00116 E.W./12-3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 30, 1944.

[Received December 30—11:34 p. m.]

5061. *Pravda* December 30 publishes following Bulgarian items:

1. It is announced that on December 29 Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov received representative of Bulgarian Government in USSR, D. Mikhalchev.⁹⁶

2. Announcement of transfer of principal Bulgarian war criminals to Bulgarian Government for trial. It is stated that in connection with beginning of trial of war criminals the Bulgarian Government requested Soviet Government to turn over for trial principal Bulgarian war criminals who had been taken into custody by command of Soviet Armies in Bulgaria. In agreement with U.S. and British Governments, Soviet Government agreed to this request and has transferred former regents of Bulgaria (1) Prince Kiril Preslavski Saxe Coburg Gotha, (2) Professor Bogdan Filov, (3) General Nikola Mikhov. Also former Bulgarian Ministers (1) Dobra Bozhilov, (2) Petr Gabrovski, (3) Dimitr Vasilev, (4) Dimitr Shishmanov, (5) Parvan Draganstv, (6) Konstantin Muraviev, (7) General Nikola Khadchi Petkov, (8) General Konstantin Lukash.

3. Brief item on progress of trials of war criminals in Bulgaria. Sent to Department, repeated to Sofia as 18.

HARRIMAN

⁹⁶ Dimiter Mihailchev, former Bulgarian Minister in the Soviet Union.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DESIRE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE TO ENTER INTO A CIVIL AFFAIRS ARRANGEMENT WITH AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS; DECISION BY THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THIS PROPOSAL

860F.01/524: Telegram

The Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 17, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

3 Zecho. Acting Foreign Minister Ripka states the Czechoslovak Government would like to enter into a civil affairs arrangement with the American, British and Soviet Governments. He explains that when in Moscow last year President Beneš discussed the general question with the Soviet authorities and that they were in agreement on certain principles, namely, that when Czechoslovak territory was liberated the Czechoslovak units in Russia should enter liberated territory, together with Soviet forces, as a symbol of their participation in their country's liberation and that a Czechoslovak Government delegate should be appointed to set up a Czechoslovak administration and to ensure effective cooperation between it and the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Ripka adds that because of political and practical considerations the Czechoslovak Government desires to make arrangements not only with the Soviet Government but with the American and British Governments. He cites as an example of such considerations the desire to secure permission for the return to Czechoslovakia of Czechoslovak aviators serving with the forces in England when Czechoslovak territory is liberated.

Ripka requests me to forward the following draft embodying his Government's suggestions for such an arrangement and states it will be appreciated if the American authorities may give an indication of their views on the general question and on the specific suggestions. Similar request has been made of the British and Soviet Governments.

“Scheme of arrangement to operate when the Allied Forces enter Czechoslovak territory.

1. As soon as Allied Forces, as the result of war operations, enter Czechoslovak territory, the Allied Commander-in-Chief will possess the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters essential to

the conduct of the war in the zone of war operations for the period necessary to carry out those operations.

2. A Czechoslovak Government delegate for the liberated territories will be appointed, whose task it will be:

(a) To set up and direct, in accordance with Czechoslovak law, the administration of the territory which has been cleared of the enemy.

(b) To reconstitute the Czechoslovak Armed Forces there.

(c) To ensure effective cooperation between the Czechoslovak administration and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and in particular, to give the local authorities appropriate instructions on the basis of the needs and wishes of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. The Czechoslovak troops comprised in the Allied armies when they enter Czechoslovak territory will immediately be utilized there.

4. To facilitate contact between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Czechoslovak Government delegate a Czechoslovak military mission will be set up at the headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

5. As regards the zones under the supreme authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the Czechoslovak Government authorities and representatives in the liberated territory will be in touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief through the Czechoslovak Government delegate.

6. As soon as any part of the liberated territory ceases to be a zone of actual war operations, the Czechoslovak Government will take over the full exercise of public authority there, with the commitment that the Czechoslovak civil and military administration will afford the Allied Commander-in-Chief all necessary assistance and support.

7. Members of the Allied Forces on Czechoslovak territory will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. Civilians on Czechoslovak territory will likewise be subject to this latter jurisdiction, even in cases of penal offences committed against the Allied Armed Forces, unless such offences were committed in the zone of war operations. In the latter case they will come under the jurisdiction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Any doubts about jurisdiction which may arise will be settled by agreement between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Czechoslovak Government delegate.

8. A special agreement will be reached on the subject of financial, and notably currency matters, connected with the entry of Allied Forces into Czechoslovak territory."

[SCHOENFELD]

860F.01/524 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1944—midnight.

2128. With reference to your 3, March 17, 5 p. m. Czecho, you may inform Ripka that the desire of the Czechoslovak Government

to enter into a civil affairs arrangement with this Government is being taken under advisement, and we shall communicate with him at a later time when it will be found appropriate to discuss the matter.

Please so inform Phillips.¹

HULL

860F.01/535

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador² has the honour to inform Mr. Hull that the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs³ has given His Majesty's Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Republic⁴ a copy of a draft entitled "Scheme of Arrangements to Operate when the Allied Armies enter Czechoslovakian Territory". This is in the form of a short agreement on civil affairs following broadly the model agreements which the British and United States Governments have negotiated with the Western European Allied Governments. It contemplates an operational area within which the Commander of the Allied army of liberation would have supreme authority, handing over the administration to the legitimate Czechoslovak Government (who will be represented by a special delegate) as soon as military considerations permit. The text of this document is contained in Annex A.⁵

M. Masaryk has explained that the Czech draft is based upon discussions which took place between President Beneš and Marshal Stalin,⁶ M. Molotov⁷ and other Russians during President Beneš' recent visit to Russia. It has, however, been drafted for political reasons in such a way that it would apply to all Allied forces and not to the Russians alone. The draft had been given to the Soviet Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Republic⁸ on March 14th, and it is understood that it was also being given to the United States Government.

It appears that the Czechoslovak Government hope that the British and United States Governments, as well as the Soviet Government, will make agreements with them on the lines of this draft. They attach much importance to concerting arrangements for the administration of their liberated territory with their Western Allies also,

¹ Presumably William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt.

² Lord Halifax.

³ Jan Masaryk.

⁴ Philip Bowyer Nichols.

⁵ Not printed; it was substantially the same as draft arrangement quoted in telegram 3 Zecho, March 17, 5 p. m., from London, p. 515.

⁶ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

⁷ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁸ Viktor Zakharovich Lebedyev.

and not treating the matter as one of sole concern to the Soviet Union. Without consulting His Majesty's Government, the Czechoslovak Government issued an official communiqué on March 18th to the effect that they had communicated proposals to the Soviet, British and American Governments regarding the Administration of their country upon liberation.

Instructions are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Republic to tell the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government quite understand the reasons for which his Government wish to make an agreement on civil affairs with the Soviet Government, that His Majesty's Government have no criticism to offer on their draft (apart from a doubt about the meaning of paragraph 3) and that His Majesty's Government hope the Czechoslovak Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed about the progress of their negotiations. At the same time Mr. Nichols is to explain that for geographic and practical reasons His Majesty's Government do not think any parallel Anglo-Czechoslovak agreement is called for at present.

The Czechoslovak Government have also asked through Mr. Nichols for assistance in transporting their representatives by British aircraft to liberated Czechoslovakian territory. His Majesty's Government are instructing Mr. Nichols to reply that while they will sympathetically consider, in conjunction with the Soviet authorities, the possibility of making the necessary arrangements for the return of the Czechoslovak representatives when the time comes, they cannot commit themselves now in hypothetical circumstances to routes or other particulars.

Lord Halifax has been instructed to inform the State Department and explain that as the Czechoslovak Government were anxious for an early answer and as Czechoslovakia is not within any combined command His Majesty's Government felt able to give this temporizing reply without prior consultation in Washington. His Majesty's Government hope the State Department will be taking a similar line in their reply to the Czechoslovak approach and suggest that the two Governments should concert together as regards future developments.

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1944.

760F.61/132

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*⁹

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Soviet Government has instructed me to bring to your attention the following:

⁹ File copy is an unsigned carbon copy.

The Czechoslovak Government has approached the Government of the U.S.S.R. with a proposal to conclude an agreement relating to the situation in case of entrance of Allied troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Having considered the submitted by the Czechoslovak Government draft, the Soviet Government has informed the Government of Czechoslovakia about its accord with the draft, having suggested an amendment: wherever in the draft the Allied troops and the Allied Supreme Commander are mentioned the word "Soviet" should precede the word "Allied", and the word "Allied" put into parenthesis. Simultaneously the Government of the U.S.S.R. has notified the Government of Czechoslovakia about its intention to inquire the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain regarding this draft agreement.

In connection with the stated, and transmitting to you herewith the draft agreement between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.,¹⁰ I will appreciate it if you inform me whether the Government of the United States has any remarks on this draft.

In view of the urgent character of this question, I should highly appreciate the earliest possible information regarding the opinion of your Government on the said draft.

Sincerely yours,

[A. GROMYKO]

760F.61/132

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of April 15 communicating to me, on behalf of your Government, for the information and comment of this Government the text of a suggested agreement in the event of the entry of Allied forces into the territory of Czechoslovakia, which has been submitted to the Soviet Government by the Czechoslovak Government. I note that the Soviet Government desires to amend the draft so that wherever the word "Allied" appears the word "Soviet" followed by the word "Allied" in parentheses should be substituted.

After consideration of the proposed draft and consultation with the appropriate officials of this Government I am happy to inform you for communication to your Government that the Government of the United States has no objection to the draft as proposed nor to the suggested amendment of the Soviet Government.

¹⁰ Substantially the same as draft arrangement quoted in 3 Zecho, March 17, 5 p. m., from London, p. 515.

I shall of course not fail to communicate to your Government any arrangements which this Government may subsequently make with the Czechoslovak Government concerning United States representatives in areas liberated from the enemy which have reverted to the control of the Czechoslovak Government.

I hope you will assure your Government that its courtesy in making available the text of the proposed agreement to my Government for its information and comment is sincerely appreciated.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

860F.01/524: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1944—11 p. m.

3524. Refer your telegram no. 3 of March 17 and Department's 2128 of March 21. Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in Department's view that there is no present need for a United States-Czechoslovak agreement concerning civil affairs administration in Czechoslovakia. Accordingly, please advise the Czechoslovak Government that, after consideration of the draft and consultation with the appropriate U.S. officials, it is our opinion that, in the light of the practical considerations involved, including geographic factors, no such agreement need be negotiated at the present time between the Governments of the United States and Czechoslovakia.

With respect to the agreement made or to be made between the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments (which we understand from the Russian Embassy is along the lines of the draft set forth in your no. 3 of March 17 except that wherever the word "Allied" appears in the draft, the word "Soviet" followed by the word "Allied" in parentheses is to be substituted), please advise the Czechoslovak Government that we have no criticism to offer concerning the agreement or its terms.

Please also express our sincere appreciation of its action in submitting the draft agreement for our comment.

We are advising the Czechoslovak Embassy in the above sense.

For your information, the British Embassy has advised the Department that British have informed the Czechoslovak Government along above lines in reply to a suggestion that an Anglo-Czechoslovak agreement be negotiated.

Repeated to Moscow.

HULL

860F.01/535

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has noted with interest the British Embassy's memorandum of April 15, 1944 relative to the draft received from the Czechoslovak Government entitled "Scheme of Arrangements to Operate When the Allied Armies Enter Czechoslovakian Territory."

The Czechoslovak Government is being advised that, in the light of geographic factors and in view of other practical considerations, it is the opinion of the United States Government that no civil affairs agreement need be negotiated at the present time between the Governments of the United States and Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government is being further advised that the United States Government has no criticism to offer concerning the agreement made or to be made between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments.

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1944.

**REQUEST BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE FOR
UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR THE SLOVAK UPRISING**

860F.20/8-3144 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 31, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received August 31—9:53 a. m.]

Zecho 13. Foreign Minister Masaryk¹¹ called on me at 11 this morning. He spoke of yesterday's announcement of the rising of Czechoslovak forces in Slovakia and said his Government desired him to appeal to the United States Government for support for the rising.

Masaryk mentioned as possible means of assistance: (a) Allied bombing of German objectives in Czechoslovakia; and (b) eventual issuance by the principal Allies of a statement recognizing the Czechoslovak home forces as having combatant rights.

With regard to (a) he said that approaches would be made through proper military channels. With regard to (b) he said the Czechoslovak Government had yesterday proclaimed all military and

¹¹ Jan Masaryk, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile.

guerilla elements fighting against Germans in Czechoslovakia to be members of the regular Czechoslovak Army.

Masaryk said a similar approach had been made to the Soviet Government and to the British Government. Ambassador Hurban¹² had also been informed and requested to approach the proper American authorities.

With regard to the timing of the rising, Masaryk said the decision had been left to the military leaders in the country. Moscow had in general been informed of the possibility of such a rising but the exact date had not been fixed with the Soviet authorities.

[SCHOENFELD]

[In a declaration concerning the Czechoslovak Army, released to the press by the Department of State on September 7, 1944, the United States Government recognized the Czechoslovak home forces as having combatant rights. For text of the declaration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 10, 1944, page 263.]

860F.24/10-2444 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 24, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received October 24—7:11 p. m.]

Zecho 19. Foreign Minister Masaryk states Czechoslovak Government is concerned by recent news from Slovakia. He says the rising there is going badly and it is not excluded that it may be "liquidated". He has accordingly been directed by his Government to appeal to the United States Government for help in the form of supplementary supplies for the Slovak forces in Slovakia.¹³

He states that if the following supplies could be provided, the situation would be materially improved:

Fifty to 100 mortars 80 mm with 200 rounds ammunition each;
One hundred medium machine guns with 3000 rounds ammunition each;

Five hundred Bren guns¹⁴ with 3 rounds ammunition each;
One thousand tommy guns with 1000 rounds ammunition each;
Two hundred bazooka with 50 rounds ammunition each;
One hundred flame throwers with reserve of fuel;
Three thousand anti-tank mines;
Five hundred anti-personnel mines;

¹² Vladimír Hurban, Czechoslovak Ambassador in the United States.

¹³ For a brief description of Allied military assistance to the Slovak uprising, see Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia* (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1955), p. 213.

¹⁴ Type of small, automatic rifle.

Ten thousand hand grenades;
One thousand explosives with the necessary fuses and other accessories;
Twenty thousand field dressings;
Five thousand doses of anti-tetanus serum.

Masaryk adds a similar appeal is being addressed to the Soviet and British Governments.

[SCHOENFELD]

[In a letter to President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia, dated October 28, 1944, President Roosevelt marked the anniversary of Czechoslovak independence by saluting the uprising inside Czechoslovakia. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1944, page 497.]

860F.24/10-2444 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1944—midnight.

Zecho 9. The Department put up to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff the Czechoslovak request for military supplies to Slovakia conveyed by your telegram 19, of October 24, 1944.

A reply has now been received stating that it had already been considered and decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on a similar request received September 7, 1944 that this would not be a reasonably feasible operation for American or British aircraft. It was considered that geography left only the Soviet forces in position to do it. United States Chiefs of Staff were informed September 7 by British Chiefs of Staff that Foreign Office would ascertain Soviet intentions regarding it. Pending Soviet reply United States Chiefs of Staff September 22 recommended withholding action.

In the absence of further information the United States Chiefs of Staff have now asked the British Chiefs of Staff for prompt notification when the Foreign Office learns Soviet intentions.¹⁵

STETTINIUS

¹⁵ A letter of November 17, 1944 (received November 18), from the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted information that the British Foreign Office had received no reply from the Soviet Government as to its intentions with respect to the uprising in Slovakia and had accepted the military argument against assistance and so informed the Czechoslovak Government (860F.24/11-1744). The rising had collapsed.

DENMARK

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING A PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE SOVIET UNION AS TO SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE DANISH PEOPLE

850.01/139

*The Counselor of the British Foreign Office (Warner) to the Chief
of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)*

LONDON, 17 January, 1944.

MY DEAR CUMMING: Gallop,¹ who brings this letter to you, was at our Legation in Copenhagen and we still avail ourselves of his knowledge of Denmark and Danish and of his advice on Danish affairs, with which he keeps in close touch. I have for some time past felt that I should much like a talk about Denmark with you, so I am taking the opportunity of Gallop's visit to Washington on another matter to ask him to discuss this letter with you.

As you may have heard from Gallman,² we have received numerous reports—and also messages from the Danish Committee of Liberation—to the effect that the Danes in Denmark, and particularly the active resistance movement, are much disappointed that the changed situation since the 29th August last³ has not led the Allies to regard Denmark as one of themselves. The Danish Minister in London⁴ and the Danish Council also press the same view upon us.

We have explained to Count Reventlow and the representative of the Council that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government do not think it possible to recognise Denmark as an Ally or a member of the United Nations. But we have for some time considered whether we should not put to you a suggestion that a declaration might be issued that we regard Denmark as "associated with the United Nations" or some formula of this kind. It has seemed to me, however, that there are three possible objections. The first is that we should no doubt wish to be assured that responsible authorities in Denmark really desire this and that we do not risk, by issuing such a declaration some public repudiation being issued in Denmark under German pressure.

¹ Rodney A. Gallop, British Foreign Office.

² Waldemar J. Gallman, Counselor of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom.

³ On August 29, 1943, the Germans declared a state of military emergency in Denmark, and the Danish Government handed in its resignation.

⁴ Count Eduard Reventlow.

Secondly, there is the difficulty that the Danes still maintain a Legation in Berlin. When I pointed this out in a recent discussion with Reventlow, he appreciated the difficulty, but said that to withdraw the Legation might cause the Germans to close down the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs altogether, and that he had the impression that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather gave the lead to the other Departments in Copenhagen. Further, he said, the Germans would almost certainly insist on the withdrawal of the Swedish Minister from Copenhagen, and this would mean the loss of a valuable channel of communication with the outside world, which he thought the King particularly would feel deeply.

The third possible difficulty in declaring Denmark "associated with the United Nations" or some such formula, is that some of the Allies might be opposed to it. I think we should have to consult the Soviet Government before anything of the kind was done and I am not sure what their reaction would be. The Danish Minister here is in contact with the Soviet Ambassador^{4a} and has been sending him information about Denmark, and the Soviet Ambassador has expressed appreciation and says he has forwarded it to the Soviet Government. As regards the other Allies, I have been waiting to see the result of a resolution proposing Danish admission, which has been before the Allied Information Bureau, recently established in London. Not quite all the replies are yet in, but it does not look as if there would be opposition from any of the European Allies. This is, of course, not a conclusive indication of the views of the Allies on the "association" of Denmark with the Allies, having regard to the admission of Denmark long ago to the corresponding body in Washington. Further, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁵ who has discussed the matter with some of his Allied colleagues has expressed the view that the question of the representation of Denmark on inter-Allied bodies, either by an observer or as a full member, should be considered on its merits in each case. But my feeling is that if the United States Government, the Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government agree to regard the Danes as "associated" or something of the kind we need not bother about possible objections from minor Allies . . .

As regards the other two difficulties, it has occurred to me that it might be a good plan to send a message to the King of Denmark explaining the situation. It would be for him then to consult whoever he thought fit in Denmark (I am assured that he is able to do so) and to let us know whether Denmark liked our proposal and would be prepared to withdraw the Danish Legation in Berlin. Even if the Danes felt they could not remove their Legation in Berlin, our message would have the advantage of explaining the position to the King

^{4a} Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev.

⁵ Trygve Lie.

and to other important Danes, and should help to remove any sense of grievance, and consequent discouragement in the resistance movement.

You will, no doubt, wish to discuss this suggestion with Kauffmann.⁶ It emerged in a personal conversation between myself and Count Reventlow. I have told the latter that I would let him know when I write to you in order that he could simultaneously write to Kauffmann.

I hope you will not think that the failure of the previous discussions between us on the subject of the issue of a declaration about Denmark need affect this matter. I personally feel that it was rather a pity that owing to their origin in Kauffmann's proposal they were, from the start, involved with the question of who should be recognised as leaders or representatives of the Free Danes. I think you appreciate the difficulty for us of ignoring the Danish Council and I need not go over that ground again. Our feeling here is that there need be no real difficulty about leaving matters as they are. There is general agreement, I think, in deprecating the setting-up of any quasi-governmental body outside Denmark. I was able to arrange here that communication between the Free Danes and Kauffman should all be through Reventlow. Reventlow and Christmas Moeller⁷ are co-operating well together and Reventlow is only too anxious to keep in step with Kauffmann. I am glad to hear from Gallman that Kauffmann gave you copies of his correspondence with me. I should have liked to have sent you copies but did not feel that I could, since Kauffmann's letter to me was of a personal character. I hope you will agree with me that I was right in indicating in reply that I thought it important to keep to the proper channels and that I should deal only with the Danes here and with you and not direct with Kauffmann.

Will you let me have your views through Gallop on the above proposal for sending a message to King Christian? If the State Department approve of it, I think we should then consult the Russians. They may feel it a difficulty that Denmark broke off relations with them, but we can leave them to raise that point. Perhaps you would let me have your views as to how we should consult the Russians. We have sent our Embassy in Moscow a long background despatch, which should be reaching them soon, so if it should be thought desirable to raise the matter in Moscow we could do it.

This letter has the approval of my seniors and you can treat the proposals in it as official. I am giving a copy to Gallman.

I hope you are very well and prosper in every way. I wish we could meet again soon.

Very sincerely,

C. F. A. WARNER

⁶ Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Minister in the United States.

⁷ Christmas Moeller, representative of Fighting Denmark in England.

859.01/136a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—10 a. m.

2048. We have carefully considered the proposals regarding Denmark contained in Warner's letter to Cumming of January 17, a copy of which is understood to have been given to Gallman. The matter has been briefly discussed with Kauffmann, while Gallop when here also talked with him in respect thereto. In general, the Department favors the British suggestions and desires that you so orally inform the Foreign Office. At your discretion you may offer to collaborate in the drafting of the declaration on Denmark and the accompanying message to the King. In any case, you should furnish the Foreign Office with our observations as expressed hereunder:

1. We do not feel that the declaration should confer on Denmark the status of a Nation associated with the United Nations, which is a category now including countries (except Argentina) which have broken relations with the Axis but have not declared war. Kauffmann has expressed the same view. In the absence of a Danish Government, it is impossible for Denmark to adhere to the United Nations Declaration.⁸ Accordingly, it is thought that recognition of this fact should be made in the declaration, followed by a statement to the effect that the Danes are inspired by the same ideas as the peoples of the United Nations and we, therefore, consider them as allies in all but name. Such a formula, it is felt, would achieve the same objective as that set forth in Warner's letter.

2. Every effort should be made to avoid in drafting the declaration the use of terminology which might be interpreted as empowering Danish representatives abroad to become full members of United Nations sponsored organizations such as UNRRA.⁹

3. It is assumed that the British, like we, continue to be opposed to the formation of any Danish Government in exile. It is, therefore, suggested that the declaration should be so worded as to convey clearly to the Danes that this action is not to be interpreted as a preliminary step toward the establishment of a Free Danish Committee.

4. We are opposed to the inclusion in the declaration of any mention of the Danish London Council or other Free Danish organizations abroad. As you will recall divergence of views on this point led to a breakdown in the conversations which we held with the British last September on the proposed Roosevelt-Churchill statement on Denmark.¹⁰ In lieu thereof, a general statement along the following lines might prove satisfactory:

"The contributions which the Danish people both at home and abroad are making toward the cause of the United Nations are well known and deserve the highest commendation."

⁸ Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

⁹ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

¹⁰ See memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 4, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 12.

5. Although naturally desirable, we consider the closing of the Danish Legation at Berlin to be of secondary importance. Furthermore we not only feel that neither the King in his present position as a German prisoner nor Svenningsen¹¹ possesses the power to take such action, but also that any step in that direction would enhance Denmark's difficulties vis-à-vis the Germans without compensating advantages. Thus to make the issuance of the declaration conditional upon the closing of the Legation would, in effect, nullify in advance the whole proposal.

6. As a point of departure, we feel that the text of the proposed declaration on Denmark of September 1943 might be utilized in the preparation of the new declaration.

So far as procedure is concerned, the Department desires that the following be observed:

1. The proposed texts of the declaration and message should be submitted to the Department for its consideration.

2. Once the texts have been approved by the Department and the Foreign Office, they should be submitted to the Russians for their consideration. Thereafter the Norwegians should be informed of the course of action which we will take.

You are requested to keep the Department fully informed in respect to your conversations on this subject with the Foreign Office and obtain its views regarding the manner in which it is proposed that the declaration be issued. It is possible that the Foreign Office views may be affected by conversations with de Kauffmann after he arrives in London. We are informing Moscow.

HULL

859.01/139b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1944—midnight.

2131. In communicating to the Embassy at Moscow a summary of our 2048, March 18, 10 a. m. to you, we have included a paragraph which reads in paraphrase as follows:

“In your discretion, you may following consultation with the British Ambassador,^{11a} who, the Department understands, is acquainted with the matter, impart the foregoing to the appropriate officials of the Soviet Government and advise them that we would be glad to have their participation in the proposed declaration and, in any event, their views thereon.”

HULL

¹¹ Nils T. Svenningsen, Director of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

^{11a} Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

859.01/137 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1944—10 p. m.

665. Department's 650, March 21, midnight to you.¹² London's 2278, March 21, 5 p. m. to the Department, reads paraphrased as follows:

"We have orally advised the Foreign Office that the suggestions regarding Denmark contained in Warner's letter to Cumming are, in general, favored by the Department. We have also transmitted to the Foreign Office the observations appearing in the Department's 2048, March 18, 10 a. m. The Foreign Office informs us that the Department's observations coincide with its views and that the suggested procedure meets with its approval.

"Drafting of the statement and the accompanying message to the Danish King are now to be undertaken in collaboration with us. Once the drafts have been approved at the highest level in the Foreign Office, we will forward them to the Department for its consideration.

"We will keep you currently advised."

HULL

859.01/140a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1944—5 p. m.

486. For your background information, the Embassy at London and the British Foreign Office are now collaborating in the drafting of a joint declaration on Denmark to be issued on April 9. The declaration, which is primarily designed to give encouragement to the people of Denmark and secondarily to meet the wishes of Danish groups in this country and the United Kingdom, would allude to the Danish people as "allies in all but name" but would not confer on Denmark the status of either a United Nation or a nation associated with the United Nations. It would in no way signify any desire whatsoever that a Free Danish Committee be established abroad. We have informed the Foreign Office through the Embassy that we do not wish to have any mention made in the declaration of the London Danish Council or any other semi-official or private Danish organizations abroad. In order not to give offense to the King of Denmark, the declaration together with a message describing its purpose would be communicated to him secretly for his consideration.

¹² Not printed.

The Soviet Government is being invited to comment on the proposed declaration and, should it so desire, to participate with us and the British in its issuance.

The foregoing is transmitted for your information only as no action by you would seem necessary at this stage. We would however welcome your suggestions.

HULL

859.01/141 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 27, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received March 27—2:31 p. m.]

1031. There seems no doubt that great majority of Danish people will be pleased and heartened by joint British-American declaration along lines indicated Department's 486, March 23, 5 p. m. This is a subject often mentioned by visiting Danes and Legation has heard practically no adverse comment. Formula outlined telegram under reference not only presumably meets various practical objections from American viewpoint, such as avoiding question of recognizing any particular Danish group abroad, but also appears hardly likely to offend even the most timid members anti-Nazi national front in Denmark, such as certain non-activist Social Democrats who perhaps fear that such a declaration might compromise their future Nordic independence.

King Christian's probable reaction (mentioned Department's 457, January 18, 10 p. m., to London¹³) has occasionally come up in discussions with visiting Danes, and though their views have differed, consensus of opinion seemed to be that King would be definitely pleased, though if asked in advance might answer that this was rather question for political parties to express judgment on. Suggested secret Allied message to King appears wise step in this connection.

Regarding maintenance Danish Legation Berlin (mentioned London's 589, January 21, 7 p. m. to Department¹³) following may be observed. Germans obviously wish this to continue as part their propaganda regarding present Danish administrative regime (compare page 2 to memorandum enclosed despatch 2574, December 11¹⁴) and would therefore regard its closing as Danish provocation, even though Legation seems to be performing no actual functions. Some observers fear Germans might reply by closing down foreign legations still functioning Copenhagen including the Swedish which latter would be a great blow to the Danes.

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ Despatch not printed.

Finally, it is suggested that in order to achieve maximum effect proposed declaration should emphasize idea "Allies in all but name" and reasons why Danish people are so regarded, only incidentally referring to anniversary of April 9th. For on this day Danish thoughts will be so dominated by memories German occupation 4 years ago and what has since been experienced that otherwise declaration's significance might be lost on many Danes particularly in view of false rumors¹⁵ circulated some weeks ago (compare airgram A-97 January 26, 3:30 p. m.¹⁶).

JOHNSON

859.01/141b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1944—3 p. m.

2449. Moscow reports that British Ambassador there has not been instructed by the Foreign Office on the proposed declaration on Denmark (Department's 2131, March 21, midnight). Mr. Harri-man prefers not to inform the Soviet Government regarding the proposal until we are in a position to furnish it with the proposed draft. Department approves of his suggestion and is so informing him. Please notify Foreign Office.

HULL

859.01/145c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944—midnight.

2787. Your 2668, April 1, 6 p. m.¹⁷ With the exception of certain minor drafting changes which are being communicated to the British Embassy here for transmission to the Foreign Office, the Department approves of the texts of the Declaration on Denmark and the accompanying message to the King.

Provided the Foreign Office concurs in these suggested changes, we understand that it will forward both texts by telegram to the

¹⁵ Rumors were based on a press report to the effect that Denmark had been "recognized" by the United Nations.

¹⁶ Airgram not printed.

¹⁷ Not printed; it reported that draft texts of Declaration and accompanying message to King Christian were being cabled by the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington with instructions to submit them to the Department for consideration (859.01/143).

British Ambassador at Moscow who will furnish copies of them to Mr. Harriman and will associate himself with the latter in extending an invitation to the Soviet authorities to participate in the statement. We are informing Moscow to this effect and should appreciate it if the Foreign Office could issue similar instructions to Clark Kerr.

HULL

859.01/146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 19, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:10 p. m.]

3190. Minor changes in proposed text of declaration of Denmark mentioned in Department's 2787 of April 8, are acceptable to Foreign Office.

After careful consideration Foreign Office and we feel that [it] is preferable to approach King Christian regarding the declaration before approaching the Soviets. Foreign Office and we fear that unfavorable repercussions might arise if Soviet concurrence in the issuance of the declaration is obtained first and thereafter it develops that King Christian does not approve of its issuance.

Please telegraph whether approach to King Christian before approaching the Soviets is approved.

If Department approves, message to the King would have to be changed somewhat. Draft text would, of course, be submitted to the Department for its consideration before being dispatched.

WINANT

859.01/146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1944—midnight.

3171. Your 3190, April 19, 5 p. m. The Department is agreeable to the suggestion of the Foreign Office that an approach be made to the King before communicating to the Soviet Government the proposed action regarding Denmark. It is assumed that the Foreign Office will inform Clark Kerr regarding this change in procedure, and that he, in turn, will notify Mr. Harriman.

HULL

859.01/158 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 6, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received May 6—3:30 p. m.]

3714. Warner of the Foreign Office informed us this afternoon that the consent of King Christian of Denmark had been obtained to the issuance of the declaration on Denmark (referred to in Embassy's 3315, April 22¹⁹ and Department's 3171, April 20 and previous). The draft text of the Foreign Office instructions to the British Embassy at Moscow were shown the Embassy. A final copy will be furnished us at the same time as it is sent forward to Moscow, which will be within the next day or two. The substance of the instructions to the British Embassy at Moscow are as follows:

1. The British Ambassador is instructed to concert with his United States colleague with regard to approaching the Soviet Government.

2. The final text of the declaration, as given the Department by the British Embassy at Washington, is being forwarded.

3. The question of whether or not the Soviet Government should be informed of the prior approach to the King of Denmark is left up to the judgment of the British and United States Missions in Moscow. Warner feels that if the Soviets are informed of this approach to the King, they may feel that they have been left out of the preliminary negotiations and only brought in at the last moment, and that, therefore, it might be better to state only that the British and American Governments have received information from Denmark that the proposed declaration would be appreciated and acceptable. However, it is felt that the Missions in Moscow will be in a better position to judge this matter.

4. The Soviet Government is to be told that it is desired to issue the declaration within the first fortnight of May, but, should the Soviet agreement not be received in time, the declaration should be made as soon as possible thereafter.

5. The proposed declaration will be signed by the three Foreign Ministers, providing the Soviet Government agrees.

6. The British hope that when the declaration is issued, it can be done at 1600 GMT²⁰ as this time is said to be the best for radio transmission to Denmark. The Foreign Office hopes the State Department agrees to this and desires to be informed urgently on this point.

7. It is hoped that information of the Soviet agreement to the declaration may be received at least 24 hours prior to its issuance in order that the Danish underground can be informed.

Warner feels that King Christian's statement regarding the decision of Iceland to establish a republic²¹ (see my immediately following

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ Greenwich mean time.

²¹ For correspondence regarding the establishment of the Icelandic Republic, see pp. 984 ff.

telegram ²²) should have no effect on the proposed declaration inasmuch as it is believed that the Danish-Icelandic matter is purely a domestic issue.

WINANT

859.01/181

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1944.

I am attaching for your consideration the draft text of the Declaration on Denmark which it is proposed should be issued simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow under my signature and those of Mr. Eden ²³ and Mr. Molotov.²⁴ The Declaration is primarily designed to give encouragement to the Danish people in their opposition to the Germans and, secondarily, to meet the wishes of Danish groups in this country and the United Kingdom. It does not confer on Denmark the status of either a United Nation or a nation associated with the United Nations and is not intended to lead to the establishment of any type of Danish Government in exile.

Should you approve of the issuance of the proposed Declaration and its text, the American Chargé d'Affaires ²⁵ and the British Ambassador in Moscow will be instructed to invite the Soviet authorities to participate in it. The Declaration would be issued immediately following notification of its acceptability to the Soviet Government.

The King of Norway and the King of Denmark, to whom the Declaration was secretly transmitted by the British, both approve of the proposed action.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

TEXT OF PROPOSED DECLARATION ON DENMARK

For over four years Denmark has been subjected to the Nazi yoke. Her King is virtually a prisoner, her Government has ceased to operate and her people are unable to express their feelings openly. But the whole Danish people were united behind their King in determination to refuse new and humiliating German demands provoked in August last, by their stubbornly growing resistance. Inspired by the same beliefs as Danes abroad who sail and fly and fight in the ranks of the United Nations, the Danes at home with their comrades

²² No. 3715, May 6, 7 p. m., not printed.

²³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²⁴ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

²⁵ Maxwell M. Hamilton, Counselor of Embassy in Moscow.

in other occupied lands contribute by active and passive opposition to weaken the Nazi hold.

There is no Danish Government which can give expression to the feelings of Denmark by adhering to the United Nations declaration. The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognize however that the Danish nation has placed itself side by side with the United Nations and like them is determined to contribute to the common struggle for victory over Hitlerism and for the attainment of the aims of the Atlantic Charter.²⁶

859.01/158 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1944—4 p. m.

3772. Your 3714, May 6, 7 p. m. The Department approves of all of the desiderata contained in the Foreign Office instructions to the British Ambassador at Moscow except paragraph no. 3. We consider that no advantage can be gained by not informing the Soviets of our prior action, while certain embarrassment might be caused should they subsequently learn of it from other source. We have already cabled the Moscow Embassy to this effect²⁷ and desire that you similarly inform the Foreign Office.

The proposed hour for the release of the Declaration is agreeable to us. We would like to have 24 hours notice of the release day.

HULL

859.01/162 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 12, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

1672. Embassy 1651, May 11, 3 p. m.²⁸ The British Ambassador did not inform the Soviets of the approach to the King of Denmark and I also did not. I assume, reference Department's 1168, May 11, 3 p. m.,²⁸ that if the British Foreign Office agrees that the Soviets should now be informed of the approach to the King of Denmark, I shall receive further instructions, in the event that the Department desires that both the British and ourselves communicate this information to the Soviet Foreign Office.

Sent to the Department, repeated to London as 108.

HAMILTON

²⁶ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

²⁷ Telegram 1168, May 11, 3 p. m., not printed.

²⁸ Not printed.

859.01/164 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1944—3 p. m.

1211. Your 1672, May 12, 2 p. m. Following is a paraphrase of London's 3900, May 13, 5 p. m. to the Department:

"A short article written by its diplomatic correspondent and published in today's *Daily Telegraph* states that it is planned to treat Denmark as an Ally when liberated by the United Nations forces, and that she will thus be on the same footing with other countries in Europe which have been occupied by the enemy. The newspaper quotes Christmas Møller as having asserted last night that recognition of Denmark as an Ally would be welcomed with a great deal of satisfaction in that country and would be accompanied by a feeling that justice has been done.

A Foreign Office official told us this morning that he understood that the article was the result of inquiries made during an interview which was given by the Civil Affairs Division SHAEF,²⁹ which was published in yesterday's local press.

We have discussed the matter with one of the army officers present at the meeting and ascertained that when Denmark was included in the list of nations for which detailed plans had been made, a newspaper man inquired as to the reasons for such inclusion. He was informed that in view of the underground movement and sabotage activities in Denmark it was considered that the people of Denmark have justified their treatment as Allies. This statement was seemingly employed as the basis for today's *Daily Telegraph* article."

Foregoing for your information only.

HULL

859.01/167 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 20, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 8:35 p. m.]

4079. Reference Embassy's 3892, May 13, 2 p. m.³⁰ A communication has been received from the Foreign Office stating that a telegram has now been received from Moscow to the effect that the British Ambassador sent the draft declaration on Denmark to M. Vyshinski³¹ on May 9. In accordance with an arrangement with the American Chargé, who wrote Vyshinski May 10, the British Ambassador's letter

²⁹ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

made no mention of the prior clearance of the declaration with the King of Denmark.

As a result of further telegrams from the F.O. regarding proposed arrangements for publication, the British Ambassador has again written to M. Vyshinski stressing the urgency of the matter and he proposes to remind the Soviets again.

Repeated to Moscow.

BUCKNELL

800.00 Summaries/31t : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1944—3 p. m.

4079. CBS ³² News Round-Up this morning carried a broadcast direct from London to the effect that a statement on Denmark prepared by the British and American Governments had recently been transmitted, through secret channels, to the King of Denmark who had not only approved its text but also had evinced gratification that its issuance was contemplated. The broadcast from London added that the declaration is now before the Soviet Foreign Office for consideration by the Soviet Government and that its issuance by the British, American and Soviet Governments might be expected momentarily. While it is possible that the story may have emanated from SHAEF (see your 3900, May 13 ³³) it is difficult nevertheless to escape the conclusion that the story is the result of a leak from British or Danish circles in London. Not only is there a possibility that the position and even the safety of the King of Denmark may be compromised through public revelation at this time of the fact that he is in communication with the outside world through secret channels but the possibility of embarrassment arises out of the fact that the Soviet Government has now stated that it could not adhere to or sign a declaration which appeals to the Danish people to rally around the King of Denmark.

Please first check with SHAEF and then get in touch with the Foreign Office in regard to this matter and report by telegraph.

Sent to London, repeated to Moscow for information only as Department's 1273.

HULL

³² Columbia Broadcasting System.

³³ See telegram 1211, May 16, 3 p. m., to Moscow, p. 536.

859.01/166 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1944—midnight.

4100. Your 3794, May 9, 5 p. m.³⁴ Following is a paraphrase of Moscow's 1810, May 21, 1 p. m., to the Department.

"A note from the Foreign Office, dated May 21 and signed by Vyshinski states, with respect to the proposed joint declaration on Denmark by the three Governments as suggested by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that it should be recalled that immediately following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June 1941, the Royal Danish Government considered it necessary to sever relations with the U.S.S.R.; that since that time the Soviet Government has had no grounds to believe that the Danish Government had modified its hostile attitude toward the U.S.S.R.; and that in view of this the Government of the U.S.S.R. would neither adhere to nor sign a declaration which calls upon the Danish people to rally round their King."

In view of the position taken by the Soviet Government I have strong doubts as to the advisability of now proceeding with the issuance of the Declaration by the British and American Governments. There is also the further consideration to be taken into account, namely, that issuance of the Declaration would tend to confirm in the minds of the Germans the radio story which came out of London on the morning of May 23 to the effect that the Danish King had been consulted through secret channels by the British Government. Such confirmation might result in harmful consequences to the King at the hands of the Germans.

Please present the foregoing views to the Foreign Office and report the British reaction by telegraph.

HULL

859.01/170 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, May 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:07 p. m.]

4179. Reference Department's 4079, May 23, 3 p. m. Investigation through Public Relations and Civil Affairs Officers of SHAEF indicates they had no knowledge of details of statement on Denmark and that leak did not originate from that source.

³⁴ Not printed.

Warner of the Foreign Office was both surprised and shocked when informed of the broadcast, particularly in view of the Russian reply which he stated had come in on May 22. This reply, as Department presumably is aware, was to the effect that (1) Denmark had broken off diplomatic relations with Russia shortly after the German invasion of Russia in 1941 and the Russian Government had no reason to think that the Danish attitude toward it had changed: (2) Therefore the Russian Government did not wish to be associated with a statement which would appear to give special status to the Danish people and nation. Warner was inclined to believe that the leak had come from Danish circles, although he was more concerned with the possible effect on the Russians of the broadcast than the tracing of the origin of the story. He promised to do what he could to trace the leak through Danish and other circles and said he would keep the Embassy informed.

After consulting his superiors, Warner informed us that the British intend to make no comment on the broadcast and if the matter is brought up by the press, which so far has not happened, they will neither confirm nor deny the story. Short telegram is being sent to British Embassy in Moscow regarding the broadcast and instructing the Embassy to inform the Soviets, if the question is raised, that it had been possible to approach the King with regard to the declaration and tracts as had been done, leaving up to the Embassy in Moscow the exact method of giving this information.

Foreign Office is telegraphing British Embassy in Washington to consult with Department on British further proposals with regard to the issuing of a declaration. According to Warner the British propose, if State Department approves, a full consultation with British Embassy in Washington; 1, to approach Russians again and ask if their objections would be met if assurances could be received from Danish King to effect that the breaking off of relations with Moscow in 1941 had been due to force and that it was the desire of Danish Government to renew relations as soon as possible; 2, to inform Russians that for an urgent special purpose (Warner says Department is aware of what this purpose is) the British Government desire strongly to issue a declaration at this time.

Warner believes it a good sign that there have been no inquiries from the press up to this time regarding the broadcast and he hopes the subject will not attract much attention.

The broadcast was made by a former member of the London office of OWI³⁵ who refused to give his source.

BUCKNELL

³⁵ Office of War Information.

859.01/171 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 25, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received May 25—12:30 p. m.]

4202. Reference Department's 4100, May 23, midnight. Warner of the Foreign Office told us this morning that an urgent telegram had been sent last night to the British Embassy in Moscow instructing it to approach the Soviets again along the lines outlined in our 4179, May 24, 7 p. m. The Foreign Office's telegram was repeated to the British Embassy in Washington and Moscow was instructed to hold up any action for 24 hours while the State Department was being consulted. The British Embassy in Washington was instructed to cable Moscow direct, should the State Department interpose any objection to the British proposals, repeating the message to London. Warner is sending off a second urgent telegram to the British Embassy in Washington (for transmission to the Department) giving more in detail his reasons for believing that the declaration should be made and that the Soviets should be urged to participate.

Warner said that while he understood the Department's reluctance to issue the declaration now as given in Department's 4100, May 23, he nevertheless felt that there was good reason for going ahead and that in fact the leakage made it more desirable to do so rather than otherwise. Up to 11 o'clock this morning there had been no press inquiries at the Foreign Office based on the CBS broadcast. The Foreign Office is, therefore, hopeful that no undue publicity will be given it.

BUCKNELL

859.01/166 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1944—8 p. m.

1302. Your 1810, May 21.³⁶ British Embassy informs us that Foreign Office is instructing Clark Kerr to approach Molotov again to say that the British estimate as to the attitude of the Danish people towards the Soviet Union differs from the opinion apparently held by the Soviet Government and to stress that for an urgent special purpose the British Government attaches great importance to the issuance of the declaration by the British, American and Soviet Governments

³⁶ For paraphrase, see telegram 4100, May 23, midnight, to London, p. 538.

within the very near future. Clark Kerr is also instructed to ask Molotov if the Soviet objections would be met if the British Government could obtain through secret channels an assurance from the Danish King to the effect that the breaking off of Danish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1941 had been due to German pressure and that it was the desire of the King to renew relations as soon as possible.

The Department is informing the British Embassy that no objection is perceived to Clark Kerr reopening the question with the Soviet Government and that if the Soviet Government agrees we have no objection to proceeding with the issuance of the declaration by the three Governments as originally planned.

The foregoing is for your information only and, although you should keep in touch with Clark Kerr, the Department does not desire you to join with Clark Kerr in his representations to Mr. Molotov.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London as Department's no. 4158 referring to London's 4179, May 24.

HULL

859.01/199

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William C. Trimble of the Division of Northern European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1944.

Mr. Pares³⁷ called on me this morning at his request and read me a telegram which had just been received from the British Embassy at Moscow via the Foreign Office to the effect that the Soviet authorities have again refused to participate in the proposed declaration on Denmark, giving the same reasons as originally conveyed to the British Ambassador and the American Chargé d'Affaires.

Mr. Pares also read me a copy of a telegram transmitted by the Foreign Office to the British Embassy at Moscow and repeated to the British Embassy here for its information. It was to the effect that the Foreign Office desires for important reasons again to approach the Russians with a modified statement on Denmark (copy attached³⁸). The modified statement resembles the original except that all references to the King are omitted. The telegram added that Clark Kerr was instructed to consult with Mr. Harriman before making any approach to the Soviet authorities and to request Mr. Harriman to furnish the Department with the results of his conversation. Should the Soviet authorities again refuse to participate in the modified declaration, the Foreign Office desires to know whether or not a

³⁷ P. Pares, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

³⁸ Not printed.

statement should be issued over the signatures of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden alone and, if so, whether the Soviet authorities should be informed of the proposed action. Mr. Pares said that he would furnish me later in the day with a paraphrase of the Foreign Office cable.

I told Mr. Pares that I was naturally unable to furnish him with the Department's views with respect to this latest proposal since the matter would have to be considered at a higher level. I added that it would be preferable to await Mr. Harriman's telegram before reaching any decision on the matter and, hence, I doubted whether the Department's opinion would be forthcoming today.

Mr. Pares expressed his appreciation of these circumstances and said that in the event the Department approved of the third approach to the Soviet Foreign Office would it be possible to instruct Mr. Harriman to participate in this approach. (I believe this suggestion was not contained in the Foreign Office telegram but represented Mr. Pares' own views.) I told Mr. Pares that this matter would also have to be decided higher up.

859.01/180 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 5, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received June 5—11:46 a. m.]

4497. Reference Department's 4158, May 25, 8 p. m.³⁹ Embassy has just received a communication from Foreign Office regarding proposed declaration on Denmark. According to Foreign Office a telegram was received from the British Embassy in Moscow on May 30 to the effect that while the Russians appreciate British efforts to remove Soviet objections, compliance with British request would not be understood by public opinion at home or abroad in view of fact that Danish Government and King broke off relations with USSR in 1941. A secret statement by the Danish King would not remove these difficulties. The Soviet Government therefore regrets that it cannot accede to British request with regard to declaration.

Foreign Office has therefore sent further instructions to British Ambassador in Moscow requesting him to consult urgently with his American colleague and telegraph their joint views with regard to the following questions to Foreign Office and repeat to British Ambassador in Washington in order that he may consult the State Department. The Foreign Office expresses reluctance to abandon altogether

³⁹ See last paragraph of telegram 1302. May 25, 8 p. m., to Moscow, p. 540.

the idea of the statement on Denmark, in view of the strategic reasons mentioned previously and of the useful response which such a declaration would arouse in Denmark. It therefore proposes a modified declaration, omitting reference to the King in first paragraph of present text.

The Embassy's immediately following telegram ⁴⁰ contains text of modified declaration.

British Embassy in Moscow was asked whether it considers it worthwhile inquiring whether Soviet authorities would be inclined to join in declaration so modified, with or without minor changes, or alternatively whether the Soviet Government would be seriously indisposed if the British and American Governments should issue the declaration in modified form without Soviet participation. The opinion of the British Ambassador is also requested with regard to whether it would be essential to consult the Soviet Government before issuing the declaration. Foreign Office points out that while on the one hand it might not be considered unnatural in view of continued recognition in London and Washington of Danish Ministers, and more direct Anglo-American concern with Danish assistance in the war effort, on the other hand the Soviet Government might consider that it was not for the British and American Governments to bring Denmark, as it were, halfway into the United Nations without Soviet participation.

WINANT

859.01/183 : Airgram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 6, 1944.

[Received June 12—1 p. m.]

A-697. There is quoted below a letter (N 3397/23/G) dated June 5, 1944 just received from the Foreign Office with regard to the declaration on Denmark. In view of the fact that, as the letter states, the British Embassy in Washington has been fully informed and instructed to consult the Department, this has not been telegraphed but is merely forwarded for the Department's information.

"We have now received from Moscow a reply to our telegram about the Danish declaration a copy of which I enclosed in my letter of the 3rd June.

"Sir A. Clark Kerr states that he has discussed the matter with the U. S. Ambassador. The latter was unwilling to express any opinion

⁴⁰ Not printed.

whether it would be worth while to ask the Soviet Government if they would join the declaration as modified but Sir A. Clark Kerr, for his part, thinks it might well be. Mr. Harriman shares his view that the Soviet Government would probably take it amiss if we and the Americans made a declaration in this form without their participation and that if we did so there would be wide spread suggestions in the press that we had again failed to secure solidarity with the Russians. Both Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr feel strongly that it would be essential to consult the Soviet Government whatever we decide to do.

"Sir A. Clark Kerr's telegram has been repeated to our Embassy in Washington and we have followed it up with a telegram in which we say that we think it would be well worth while that Sir A. Clark Kerr should put the modified declaration to the Soviet Government and press them either to join in it or to agree to its issue by the U. S. Government and H. M. G. without Soviet participation. He could add that we should be prepared to consider further modifications of the text provided that the general tenor remained the same. It is suggested that, in doing so, he should emphasize the Anglo-American interest involved in increasing Danish resistance and assistance to the Allied Cause at this juncture and should imply that we should consider the Soviet Government pretty unhelpful if they did not agree to one of these alternatives. We have instructed our Ambassador in Washington to put this to the State Department urgently and, if they agree, to inform our Ambassador in Moscow direct by telegram in order that he may at once proceed accordingly. We have suggested that if the State Department agree they should instruct the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow to support Sir A. Clark Kerr."

WINANT

859.01/180 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1944—midnight.

4494. Your 4497, June 5, 1 p. m. In the light of the two Soviet refusals to adhere to the original declaration and the radio broadcast disclosure mentioned in our 4079, May 23, 3 p. m. we do not feel that any American purpose would be served by instructing Mr. Harriman to associate himself with his British colleague in making a third approach to the Soviet authorities with the modified declaration. We are so informing Harriman and have already conveyed our views to the British Embassy here. The British have also been advised that the Department has no objection to the British Ambassador making an independent approach to the Soviet Foreign Office, provided it is clearly understood that the U. S. Government is not associated with such a British approach.

STETTINIUS

859.01/185 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

4725. The Embassy has just received a communication from the Foreign Office with regard to the proposed declaration on Denmark. Reference Department's 4494, June 6, midnight.

After stating that the Foreign Office had been informed of the Department's attitude as presented in the Department's telegram under reference, the letter goes on to say that the British Ambassador in Moscow has now been authorized to put the modified declaration to the Soviet Government and instructed to express the hope that this modification will enable the Russians to participate in the issuance of the declaration. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr has been told to stress the fact that the issue of such a declaration would be of value for strategic purposes and to add that anything which is likely to increase Danish resistance in the coming period will be of considerable value for operational purposes. If the Soviets should agree, he will attempt to arrange with them the date and time of issue on the basis of 48 hours notice being given the Foreign Office and the State Department. The British Ambassador in Moscow has also been instructed in the event of a negative reply to inquire, as a purely personal suggestion, whether the Soviets would agree to the issuance of a joint declaration by the American and British Governments.

Foreign Office states it will keep the Embassy informed of the result of this approach.

WINANT

859.01/186 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1944—9 p. m.

4850. Our A-838, May 11, 3:50 p. m. to you.⁴¹ The following is a summary of Stockholm's 2134, June 14, 2 p. m., to the Department.

Doessing⁴² and Foss (a leader of the Danish Freedom Council) have been presented to the Soviet Legation at Stockholm and the latter has communicated with the Soviet Foreign Office with respect to the formal acceptance of Doessing as unofficial Danish observer at Moscow. He plans to travel to Moscow via London where he will consult with Reventlow and Christmas Møller. Foss and Doessing are collaborating with the Russian Legation in drafting a declaration announcing the latter's acceptance by the USSR. They hope that

⁴¹ Not printed.⁴² Thomas M. Doessing, leader of Social Democratic Party of Denmark.

the statement will emphasize his position as a representative of Fighting Denmark collaborating with the Danish leaders in the United Kingdom and the United States. They propose to include in it a brief review of the facts surrounding the severance of diplomatic relations between Denmark and the USSR and the subsequent signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact,⁴³ pointing out that these acts were taken under strong German pressure and against the wishes of the people. The proposed declaration will conclude with a statement to the effect that since August 29 the Freedom Council has been the only remaining vehicle for the free expression of the will of the Danish people, the King having been a virtual prisoner of the Germans since that time. Once the Soviet authorities have agreed to a statement along these lines, Foss and Doessing suggest that it be issued simultaneously by the Soviet authorities in Moscow, the Danish leaders in Washington and London and through the illegal press in Denmark (end summary).

Although the Department recognizes the assistance given to the Allied cause by the Freedom Council, it feels that the proposed phraseology concerning the Council is too strong and would create the impression that it is primarily sponsored by the Soviet Government.

You are requested to discuss this matter with the Foreign Office with a view to the issuance of similar instructions to the British and American Legations at Stockholm directing them to inform the Freedom Council representatives that it would be advisable to "tone down" the reference to the Freedom Council.

HULL

859.01/191 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1944—2 p. m.

4940. Kauffmann has just sent a message to Doessing and Foss suggesting that statement regarding Doessing's appointment as Danish Observer to Moscow be reworded so as to prevent German propaganda from claiming that the Freedom Council is primarily sponsored by the Soviets. In view of this circumstance and the fact that the original text has already been transmitted to Moscow, we no longer consider it necessary to instruct our Legation at Stockholm along the lines suggested in our 4850, June 19, 9 p. m. Please inform the Foreign Office.

HULL

⁴³ The original pact was between Germany and Japan, signed at Berlin on November 25, 1936. For text of treaty and supplementary protocol, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Teil II, January 15, 1937, pp. 28-30. An unofficial English translation is in *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 153-155. The secret additional agreement appears in English translation in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D. vol. I (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 734, footnote 2a.

859.01/196 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 23, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:52 p. m.]

4996. In the absence of Warner, substance of Department's 4850, June 19, 9 p. m. and 4899 June 21, midnight,⁴⁴ was communicated to Haigh of Foreign Office Northern Department. He states that full text of proposed declaration announcing acceptance of Doessing as unofficial Danish observer at Moscow has been sent to the British Embassy at Washington for transmission to Department.

Haigh stated informally that the official policy of the British Government toward this declaration was now being considered at highest level in Foreign Office but that he believed it would be substantially in agreement with that expressed in Department's 4850. Haigh felt that the Soviet Government had been encouraging the Freedom Council in its present action and that it was important that Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia should adopt a common policy toward Denmark which would not appear to back any one particular group but rather give encouragement to all anti-Axis elements in Denmark, including the King. He expressed the opinion that it might be better for action of British and United States representatives to be concerted in Moscow rather than Stockholm.

Haigh promised to keep Embassy promptly informed of any Foreign Office action in the matter and expressed appreciation of receipt of the State Department's views, which he said he would promptly convey to higher officials in the Foreign Office.

WINANT

859.01/200 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 26, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received June 26—3:10 p. m.]

5056. Reference Department's 4940, June 23, 2 p. m., and Embassy's 4996, June 23, 5 p. m. Foreign Office has furnished Embassy with copies of the full text of the projected statement regarding the appointment of Doessing as unofficial Danish observer in Moscow, as well as copies of Kauffmann's message to Doessing and a message sent to him by Count Reventlow. According to the Foreign Office, Count Reventlow's message merely requests postponement of publication

⁴⁴ Latter not printed.

of the statement until Doessing's arrival in Moscow and it has been forwarded to the British Embassy in Washington for Kauffmann's information and Department's. Embassy understands full text of statement regarding Doessing has been given Department by British Embassy.

Haigh of the Foreign Office has stated that Count Reventlow and Christmas Moeller are afraid that the matter may already be a *fait accompli* and that the statement may be issued as drafted. The Foreign Office is considering what steps to take should this be so and whether or not to request the British Legation in Stockholm to take action. Should the statement not be issued at the present time, Haigh is of opinion that it may not be necessary for the British Government to take any action other than informal discussion with Doessing when he travels through London.

WINANT

859.01/6-2744 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, June 27, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:19 p. m.]

2333. Reference Department's 1247 June 23, 2 p. m.⁴⁵ In view Kauffmann's obvious interest in full text proposed joint Soviet-Danish declaration, Legation believes it advisable transmit following paraphrase. Foss and Doessing do not believe local Soviet Legation has yet received Moscow's approval of this text though local Russians indicated few days ago they hope this will come soon and that declaration can be published promptly "on account of its effect on resistance movement in Denmark". Following is broadly paraphrased substance:

Soviet Government has received suggestion from Freedom Council, Denmark, that relations be established between Fighting Denmark and Russia. In this connection Council has asked Soviets to receive representative of Fighting Denmark in Moscow, as for example Christmas Moeller represents Denmark in London. This request is also supported by London and Washington Free Danish representatives.

Freedom Council's suggestion emphasizes that Denmark's breaking of diplomatic relations with Russia in 1941 was against wishes of Danish population and the result of strong pressure from Germany and that signing of Anti-Comintern Pact, also due German pressure, caused great popular resentment and first public demonstrations since German occupation had begun.

As Government and Parliament have not functioned since end last August, and King has become a prisoner, Freedom Council is now

⁴⁵ Not printed.

only organ in Denmark which can express people's wishes, independently and freely, to resume friendly relations with Russia.

Soviet Government has accepted above suggestion and agreed to establish at once relations with Freedom Council and receive fighting Denmark representative in Moscow.

Well known Danish personality Thomas Doessing has been named by Council for this post of authorized delegate Fighting Denmark with ministerial privileges in Russia and he is now en route to Moscow from Denmark. End of paraphrase of proposed declaration.

Legation understands British have already drawn attention to fact that Reventlow rather than Christmas Moeller is Danish representative London, which will necessitate slight alteration first paragraph this declaration. True text of English translation of above has been forwarded despatch 3590, June 26.⁴⁶

JOHNSON

859.01/6-2844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received June 28—6:30 p. m.]

5109. The Embassy has just received from Foreign Office text of a telegram it has sent today to the British Legation at Stockholm, regarding Doessing's appointment to Moscow.

The Foreign Office's message states that its view is that the statement regarding Doessing should be reworded so that it places less emphasis on the Freedom Council and says it is therefore desirable that publication of the statement should be postponed until Doessing has been able to consult Reventlow and Christmas Moeller and exchange views with Kauffmann. Suggestions are made for the correction of the description of Christmas Moeller as Danish representative in London but the British Minister is informed that he does not need to put these suggestions forward if Doessing and Foss agree to postpone publication of the statement until Doessing has had time to discuss it in London. However, should publication of the statement be insisted upon, the British Minister is to endeavor to obtain such modifications as may be possible.

Foreign Office states the full text of this telegram has been repeated to the British Embassy in Washington which is being instructed to communicate it to the Department and to invite the Department's views.

WINANT

⁴⁶ Not printed.

859.01/6-2944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 29, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

5140. Reference Embassy's 4497 June 5, 1 p. m. and Department's 4494, June 6, midnight. In a conversation with Warner of Foreign Office this afternoon, he stated in strict confidence that they were seriously considering what action could be taken in view of the Soviet Government's refusal to join in even the modified declaration on Denmark. According to Warner, consideration is being given to the possibility of a statement being made in Parliament along the lines of the originally proposed tri-partite declaration. This would merely be a statement setting forth the feeling of the British Government. Warner made it clear that it had not yet been decided to adopt this course, and he stated that the Embassy would immediately be informed when any decision finally is taken. He wondered whether or not there was any possibility of the United States Government taking any similar action and suggested very informally that it might be possible for the Secretary to make some such statement at a press conference.

In view of the fact that top officials of the Foreign Office have not yet decided on whether or not to take this action, it is suggested that it might not be advisable for the Department to take the matter up with the British Embassy at this time.

WINANT

859.01/7-1044 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 10, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received July 10—12:30 p. m.]

2540. Please inform Danish Minister Kauffmann that weekend discussions between local Soviet Legation and Freedom Council representatives have concluded with decision to publish declaration regarding Doessing's mission this afternoon. Text will be practically same as already reported except that Christmas Moeller's name is not mentioned at all and that Doessing is named in fourth paragraph as representative instead of delegate of Fighting Denmark.

This quick decision to announce Doessing's mission at once seems to be primarily due pressure from both Freedom Council and Russian Dides [*aides?*]. Foss reports this connection that following Council's decision few days ago to press for immediate publicity, local Soviet Legation suggested joint declaration on July 14, but

then changed this late Saturday ⁴⁷ and urged July 10 instead. Legation has reason to believe that one reason for this step was considerable irritation caused by last minute request from Reventlow and Christmas Moeller for certain changes in text, particularly deletion of reference in second paragraph to Freedom Council being the only organ capable of expressing freely people's wishes as regards relations with Russia.

In transmitting message to Danish leaders London late yesterday regarding today's announcement, Foss also requested Reventlow to notify Kauffmann. Latter will presumably wish communicate with his London colleagues regarding manner in which they may wish, if at all, to support this announcement publicly. Foss states declaration itself will be made simultaneously by Soviet authorities Moscow and Freedom Council Denmark, latter in practice meaning immediate publicity through Stockholm Free Danish publicity organs and via BBC ⁴⁸ Danish program from London and subsequent announcements as soon as possible by illegal press Denmark. Declaration itself will be accompanied by short commentary referring to facts that Doessing will represent Fighting Denmark in Moscow in same way that Christmas Moeller does in England and that Doessing will cooperate closely with Free Danish diplomats mentioning particularly Reventlow and Kauffmann.

JOHNSON

859.01/7-1044

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

In view of the Soviet Government's objections, His Majesty's Government feel that it necessary to abandon the idea of a joint declaration on Denmark.

2. As however, the King of Denmark has been led by an earlier secret exchange of communications with him to expect some such declaration, His Majesty's Government propose, subject to the State Department's concurrence,⁴⁹ to send him through the same secret channel a message of which the text will be found in Annex A.

3. It will be seen that the final sentence of that message refers to a further public statement. This Mr. Eden proposes to make in the form of a reply to an inspired Parliamentary question. Text of proposed question and the answer are given in Annex B.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ July 8.

⁴⁸ British Broadcasting Company.

⁴⁹ The British Embassy was informed orally on July 11 that the Department had no objections to the British sending the message, and that the Secretary of State would also make a statement on July 12 (*post*, p. 553.)

⁵⁰ Statement printed as Annex B was made in House of Commons on July 12; see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 401, col. 1717.

4. His Majesty's Government have been instructed in informing the State Department to ask for their early views on the proposed message to the King of Denmark. The Danish Minister in London will not be informed until the message has been sent.

5. His Majesty's Government would also be grateful if they could be informed in the event that the United States Government decide to issue a statement on Denmark similar to that which is proposed by Mr. Eden.

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1944.

ANNEX "A"

On receipt of Your Majesty's reply welcoming message from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarding proposed declaration on Denmark, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and United States Government submitted text to Soviet Government and invited their participation as proposed.

Soviet Government have however declined to subscribe to it on the grounds that the Danish Government broke off relations with Soviet Union in 1941.

As it has proved impossible to reach agreement with the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government and United States Government have been compelled to abandon suggested tripartite declaration. His Majesty's Government, however, still wish to acknowledge Denmark's contribution to the cause of the United Nations.

Your Majesty will already have been informed of the friendly reference to Denmark contained in the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on May 24⁵¹ in which Mr. Churchill alluded to close ties between our two countries. His Majesty's Government will find an early opportunity of making a further public statement giving clear expression to their friendly disposition towards Denmark.

ANNEX "B"

QUESTION

To ask Secretary of State whether his attention has been drawn to appointment of a Free Danish Representative at Moscow and whether he can enlighten this House on the international position of Denmark.

ANSWER

Yes, Sir, I am glad to note that Free Denmark is now represented in Soviet Union as well as in this country and in the United States.

⁵¹ For text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 400, cols. 771-781.

It is the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to support all those who help in the fight against the enemy—Denmark is an enemy-occupied country. Her King regards himself a prisoner of the Germans and his Government ceased to function last August. It is not therefore possible at present for Denmark to become formally belligerent and join the United Nations. But it is clear that the people of Denmark as a whole are inspired by the ideals of the United Nations, many Danes are actively engaged in the ranks of the United Nations for the liberation of their country, and inside Denmark ever increasing active resistance is contributing to the common struggle against the Axis.

Last autumn the representatives of various resistance bodies in Denmark formed a Committee with the name of Council of Freedom, which, pending the restoration of liberty and constitutional government to Denmark, played a conspicuous part in the life of occupied Denmark as a focus of resistance to the Germans. The valuable contribution which is being made to defeat Germany by the work of Danish Council of Freedom and by all who contribute to resistance in Denmark is, like that of Free Danes abroad, acknowledged with admiration by His Majesty's Government.

859.01/7-1144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 11, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received July 11—4:20 p. m.]

5450. Warner of the Foreign Office told us today that Mr. Eden's statement in Parliament on Doessing, referred to in our 5428, July 10, 6 p. m.,⁵² is to be given tomorrow.

We also were given the text of a telegram received by the Foreign Office from M. Foss at Stockholm for delivery to Count Reventlow, Christmas Moeller and Mr. Doessing. This message contained the text of a communiqué, broadcast from Moscow the afternoon of July 10, concerning the appointment of Doessing as the representative of "Fighting Denmark" in the USSR. Warner said this message has been telegraphed very urgently to Washington for communication to the State Department and to M. Kauffmann. While he expressed regret that the statement was being issued by Moscow in the form given, he felt that no great harm would be done. There has so far

⁵² Not printed.

been but slight publicity here concerning the Moscow statement and Warner expressed the opinion that the Foreign Minister's statement in Parliament tomorrow should show that Moscow was not alone in expressing friendship for the Danish people. See Embassy's 5449, 11th.⁵³

Warner said that Doessing had called on him, in company with Count Reventlow and Christmas Moeller, and that he had made a favorable impression. According to Warner, Doessing is an elderly-appearing man, a member of the Social Democrat party, but not, as Warner expressed it, "a wild-eyed revolutionary". Doessing apparently is taking the position, after consultation with Reventlow and Christmas Moeller, that he is to represent in Moscow the whole Danish people and not merely one group. Apparently it is not yet decided whether Doessing will go to Washington prior to his proceeding to Moscow, but Warner stated that during his talk with the three men, Christmas Moeller had expressed opposition to Doessing making the Washington trip on the ground that too much time would be consumed there [apparent omission] Warner emphasized that he had taken no part in the discussion as to whether or not Doessing should go to Washington. He stated that he was to see Doessing again at the Danish Legation on Friday, July 14th, so apparently no move will be made before that time.

Mr. Kauffmann's message to Doessing, transmitted in Department's 1338, July 5, 10 p. m.,⁵³ to Stockholm and forwarded to this Embassy for delivery, was conveyed to Doessing the morning of July 8. Mr. Doessing has made no effort to get in touch with Embassy in order to send a reply or for any other purpose.

WINANT

*Statement Issued to the Press, July 12, 1944, by the Secretary of State on the Opposition in Denmark to Nazi Rule*⁵⁴

Recent events in Denmark have again proven that the spirit of freedom cannot be crushed in a people determined to uphold their liberties. The Danes have steadfastly opposed the attempts by the Germans to establish a "model protectorate" in what once was and will again be a free and sovereign country. Their stand, inspired by leaders within and without Denmark, associates them with the people of the other countries who firmly resist the German oppressors and whose conduct sets an example to the people of other lands whose craven leaders succumbed to the false promises of the Nazis.

⁵³ Telegram not printed.

⁵⁴ Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, July 16, 1944, p. 60.

There is no Danish government which can give expression to the feelings of Denmark by adhering to the United Nations Declaration. We recognize, however, that the Danish people have placed themselves side by side with the people of the United Nations and like them are determined to contribute to the common struggle for victory over Nazism and for the attainment of the aims of the Atlantic Charter.

AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND DENMARK

[For text of agreement, effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington, December 16, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 430, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1458.]

FINLAND

FAILURE OF FINLAND TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE RUPTURE OF AMERICAN-FINNISH RELATIONS¹

740.0011 European War 1939/32782 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 20, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received January 21—9 :52 a. m.]

49. I was received by President Ryti this afternoon in farewell audience² and spent 2 hours with him during which, as usual, he covered practically entire range of human history and all the map of Europe. I was struck by basic fact there had been practically no change in President's estimate of Finland's situation in year between my interview of January 21, 1943 (see my 116 that day³) and today. The President still insisted that Finland was fighting a separate war and its only enemy was Russia, that his policy had been right all the time and that Finland would continue to "wait and see".

Mr. Ryti confirmed entirely, report in my 31, January 14,⁴ that Ribbentrop had again requested a statement of joint solidarity between Germany and Finland and that Finnish Government had declined this demand. President said Germans had on "two or three occasions" asked Finland to participate in active military operations to take Soroka⁵ and to participate in a German drive against Tikhvin but that his Government had turned down these requests. This contrasts with his statement to me last year that "only once" had Germans requested active Finnish participation in new offensives.

¹ For previous correspondence on United States efforts to facilitate the withdrawal of Finland from the war against the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 213 ff.

² On January 25, Second Secretary and Chargé Robert M. McClintock relinquished charge of the American Legation in Finland to Edmund A. Gullion, designated Third Secretary of Legation and Chargé. Mr. McClintock was transferred to the American Legation in Stockholm as Second Secretary.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 222.

⁴ Not printed; it reported that, according to a statement made by an official of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, in late November of 1943, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop twice pressed the Finnish Minister to Germany, Toivo M. Kivimäki, with a demand that Finland sign an agreement to continue the war "to the end" with Germany (740.00119 European War 1939/2073).

⁵ An important Soviet town on the Murmansk-Leningrad railroad and White Sea-Baltic Canal, now called Belomorsk.

President is following military events with keen personal interest and said in fact it was "his duty" these days to do so. In a large hall adjoining his study he had maps of every active front in Europe. As for recent military events he thought Russian offensive from Oranienbaum was purely local in character designed to pinch off German salient between there and Tsarskoe Selo. Russians in this offensive had lost half their tanks but their infantry was "very strong". Mr. Ryti confided that German forces in this sector had been considerably reduced as Germans were concentrating their strength to prevent a Russian thrust westward from Nevel area. Novgorod, said President, had already been taken by Russians.

He refused to be drawn into speculation of [*as*] to whether Germany could, or would, hold Baltic States but did say definitely General Dietl's⁶ forces in far north had been reduced in number. President declined to rise to my bait when I said I had heard number of German divisions now in Finland was 6.

President at no time referred to recent American policy toward Finland. He seemed completely convinced his own policy had been right and that Finland had no other course but to fight its second war with Russia. When I recalled Hitler's Proclamation of June 22, 1941,⁷ suggested Finland had had prior notice of impending outbreak of hostilities, President professed his Government had been in dark as to when war would break out, or if indeed it would commence at all. He said Foreign Minister Gunther⁸ had been "very angry" at Finnish Foreign Minister Witting⁹ following his visit here in May, 1941, because Witting had not told him Russo-German war would soon begin. However, according to President Ryti, Witting had day before Gunther's visit, been informed by a member of "Ribbentrop's private cabinet" that there would be no Russo-German war and that Witting had informed Gunther accordingly. I think this was eyewash.

President said with great emphasis "the papers are perfectly clear. We have no reason to start [*sic*] the verdict of history".

I said that might seem true to a Finn but that in American eyes, Finland had made a disastrous decision in choosing to cooperate with the Nazis. I asked why the Finnish people seemed universally to

⁶ Col. Gen. Eduard Dietl, Commander of the German Army in North Finland.

⁷ Proclamation of the Führer to the German People on June 22, 1941, in which he referred to "Finnish comrades", with whom German soldiers were "united" in defense of the Arctic shores; for text, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik* (Berlin), July 1941, pp. 545-551.

⁸ Christian Günther, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁹ Rolf J. Witting, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 1941 to March 1943.

fear "unconditional surrender" if they were not a satellite state of Germany and not a Nazi power. President said, as had Foreign Minister¹⁰ (see my 1347, December 15¹¹) that [according to?] British newspapers and BBC¹² Finnish language broadcasts, unconditional surrender would be demanded of Finland and that Russian broadcasts were to same effect. However, he did not seem at all concerned at prospect of unconditional surrender.

President said at close of an exceedingly long interview that he did not think Finland would seek a separate peace because risks were too great of Finland standing alone versus Russia. He said flatly that terms of treaty of Moscow¹³ were not acceptable. His policy was accordingly to wait for termination of hostilities in Europe on assumption that Finland, despite fact it was fighting a "separate war", would gain the benefits of a collective peace. President Ryti as usual reaffirmed his abiding distrust of "the Bolsheviks" and was filled with foreboding for future of world after war unless America could act as a restraining influence on USSR. He said within 20 years Russians would be stronger than ever and seemed to feel that with Germany reduced in strength and both Italy and France negligible nations there was nothing to prevent sweep of Russian revolutionary influence throughout Europe unless we could somehow stem the tide.

President whom I have known for more than 4 years in recalling events of two wars said many great powers had sought to help Finland: British, French, and "whether we (the Finns) wish it or not", the Germans. At this point he added that German help had been very welcome and that without it "Finland would not today exist as a nation". He then said only great power which had not yet been called upon to help Finland was America and that he hoped day would come when U. S. might intercede in Finland's behalf. I said that as President well knew from record there was nothing in history of 2½ years of our diplomacy with Finland which could lead him to expect such intercession.

McCLINTOCK

¹⁰ C. Henrik Ramsay.

¹¹ Not printed; see telegrams 1332 of December 7, 1943, to Stockholm, and 1419, December 17, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 310 and 311, respectively.

¹² British Broadcasting Corporation.

¹³ The Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, between the Soviet Union and Finland. For texts of the treaty and protocol, see Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Finnish Blue Book* (Philadelphia-New York, 1940), p. 115, and Department of State *Bulletin*, April 27, 1940, p. 453; or U.S.S.R., *Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykh s inostrannymi gosudarstvami* (Moscow, 1955), vol. x, p. 11. For terms and conditions for Finland, see telegrams 281 and 283 from Moscow, dated March 13, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 314.

740.00119 European War 1939/2179

*The American Legation in Finland to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*¹⁴

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Secretary of State has requested the American Chargé d'Affaires a.i. in Helsinki to call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland with reference to interviews granted by Mr. McClintock, former American Chargé d'Affaires in Helsinki, to the Helsinki press before his departure for Stockholm and to refer also to an interview between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. McClintock on January 24.¹⁵ The American Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed by his Government to state that it wishes it made clear to the Finnish Government that the interviews granted by Mr. McClintock were not authorized by the United States Government and were on Mr. McClintock's own initiative. The conclusion should not be drawn from these interviews that the Government of the United States has in any way altered the views which it has often repeated as to the existing collaboration between Germany and Finland and the state of war which continues between Finland on one hand and, on the other, the U.S.S.R.,¹⁶ Great Britain¹⁷ and the nations in the British Commonwealth, who have all pledged themselves to continue to wage this war until victory is won. It should not be forgotten, furthermore, that each one of the United Nations has given a pledge to make no separate peace.

The American Chargé d'Affaires is instructed also to refer to Dr. Ramsay's inquiry during his interview with Mr. McClintock of January 24, 1944 as to whether, in the event of the Germans leaving Finland, American policy would continue to be critical of Finland because it continued to make war against the U.S.S.R. Mr. McClintock in-

¹⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2694, February 4, from Helsinki. The Chargé in Finland delivered this *Aide-Mémoire* to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed in the Department's telegram 15, January 29, 1944, not printed.

¹⁵ In telegrams 58 and 60, January 24, 1944, the Chargé reported that he had, that day, made statements to the press in Helsinki and to Finnish Foreign Minister Ramsay. These statements were substantially as follows: That Finland's cooperation with the principal enemy of the United States in Europe was the reason why in the "relations between United States and Finland there must be problems for which solution can be found only with difficulty" (711.60d/283); that as long as enemy troops remained in Finland friendly relations between Finland and the United States would be impossible; and (statement made to Ramsay only), that it was a "hypothetical question" whether or not American policy would be "critical of Finland" if she continued the war against the Soviet Union after German forces left Finland. (740.00119 European War 1939/2099)

¹⁶ War between Finland and the Soviet Union began on June 25, 1941; see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 40-43.

¹⁷ Great Britain declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941, effective the following day. See telegram 256, December 5, 1941, to Helsinki, *ibid.*, p. 114.

licated that this was a hypothetical question; his Government's answer to the Foreign Minister's question is most emphatically affirmative; the United States Government's attitude toward Finland, a fact of which the Finnish Government should be well aware, is influenced not only by the overt cooperation between Germany and Finland, which among other ways is evidenced by the acceptance by Finland on Finnish soil of the armed forces of Germany, but, additionally, by the existence of a state of war between Finland and Allies of the United States of America, among whom are the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Soviet Union, who are bound together in solemn agreements for the aims for which this war is being waged.

Nowhere can there still be a vestige of doubt, even in Germany, of the inevitability of Germany's total military defeat; nor that, when Germany's military power is destroyed, there must follow, inexorably, disastrous consequences to those nations which have based their policy on confidence in the military might of Germany. Nor can there remain hardly any doubt that the longer the hopeless struggle is continued by Germany and its associates, the more rigorous will be the terms of peace imposed.

Therefore, it would appear that the Finnish Government might wish to consider whether the conclusion is not to be drawn that the longer Finland continues at war, the more unfavorable the terms of peace open to it will become. The Government of the United States desires to reiterate that it is the Finnish Government and solely that Government which must bear responsibility for the results to Finland of its failure to end Finland's participation in the war and its collaboration with the Axis.¹⁸

HELSINKI, January 31, 1944.

701.6260D/18 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 1, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received February 1—2:27 p. m.]

78. I am informed by a reliable diplomatic source that Blücher, German Minister, has been called to confer with Hitler at his head-

¹⁸ The Chargé reported in telegram 72, January 31, 1944, that after Foreign Minister Ramsay had read the *Aide-Mémoire*, the latter stated he had only two comments to make: "(a) With reference to first paragraph of statement he stated he had not deduced change in U. S. policy from interviews given by McClintock (statements attributed to McClintock do not appear to have caused much comment in Helsinki to my knowledge, nor has undue emphasis been placed upon them); (b) Dr. Ramsay took especial note of that part of Department's communication which emphatically affirmed that the attitude of our Government would continue to be critical of any continuation of the war by Finland after Germans had left country." The Chargé felt that Dr. Ramsay "will take Department's communication under close advisement; its force did not appear to be lost upon him." (740.00119 European War 1939/2107)

quarters. Blücher left here yesterday or the day before accompanied by Metzger, German Press Attaché. I have not yet heard any explanation of this visit.

GULLION

740.00119 European War 1939/2111 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 2, 1944—midnight.

[Received February 3—3:05 p. m.]

345. Madame Kollontay¹⁹ having expressed a desire to meet McClintock, he called on her yesterday on my instruction.

Madame Kollontay opened conversation by inquiring if Finns were ready to make peace with USSR. When asked what terms of peace her Government had in mind she at first said Finns would receive unconditional surrender along lines of Four Power Declaration at Moscow²⁰ but later expressed hope that despite their many stupidities they would have perspicacity to conclude a separate peace with Russia before this disastrous event.

She asked specifically "why don't the Finns send a man to Moscow now[?]"

McClintock recalled that principal stumbling block from Finnish point of view on receiving our tender of good offices of March 20, 1943,²¹ was an alleged ignorance of agenda for any proposed peace negotiation. He felt accordingly that prior to sending a delegate to Moscow, Finnish Government would wish to know what terms Russian Government had in mind.

Madame Kollontay said that she thought Finnish "gesture of good will" in sending a representative to Moscow would of itself be sufficient to insure reasonable Russian terms; although at no time did she seem to feel that conditions more favorable than those of treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, would even be considered by her Government, with exception of Hango. On question of Hango she said "It is better to say nothing at all". McClintock had definite impression that Madame Kollontay's view of possible peace terms would be Karelian frontier of 1940 but with Hango remaining in Finnish hands.

Madame Kollontay said that she had in past discussed this general question with British and American Ministers as well as with Foreign Minister Gunther (Legation's 3977, December 8, 7 p. m.²²). She

¹⁹ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden.

²⁰ Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, released November 1, 1943, upon the conclusion of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 755.

²¹ See telegram 43, of March 19, 1943, 6 p. m., to Helsinki, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, p. 250.

²² Not printed, but see telegram 1332, December 7, 1943, 8 p. m., to Stockholm, *ibid.*, p. 310.

said in response to inquiry that she was not speaking under instructions from her Government but that she was anxious to wind up Finnish question because it was of utmost importance to Allied cause and to Sweden that Finnish war be ended as otherwise Russian High Command would most certainly apply terms of unconditional surrender to Finland with consequent unpleasant results so far as Sweden and Scandinavian opinion were concerned. She deprecated Swedish Foreign Minister's cautious policy and refusal to be of assistance in getting Finland out of its war.

Madame Kollontay expressed hope that, if there was any possibility of Finns being willing to send a negotiator to Moscow at this time, it might be possible to make use of informal services of American Government in approaching them. She said, however, at a later point in conversation that she had certain sources of her own seeking to establish contact in Finland.

(See Helsinki's 70, January 9 [29] 6 p. m. and Legation's 312, January 31, 4 p. m.²³)

She stressed throughout conversation that venue of talks must be Moscow.

Soviet Minister questioned McClintock closely as to attitude of various Finnish leaders and he replied briefly citing Ryti's policy as stated to him January 2 [20] that it was best for Finland to wait until end of general hostilities before seeking peace, as contrasted with Ramsey's statement to him on January 24,²⁴ that Finland would probably have to accept terms not better than those of Winter War. McClintock told Madame Kollontay he thought Marshal Mannerheim²⁵ was convinced of disastrous military position but that professional officers corps in Finland would probably resist a peace move at this time.

McClintock had impression that Madame Kollontay was genuinely serious in exploring possibilities of a separate peace on basis of a direct Finnish approach to Moscow and in Moscow and that, despite her disavowal of instructions, she had probably been given *carte blanche* to explore this problem and would shortly formulate recommendations to her Government.

JOHNSON

²³ These telegrams reported rumors and hopes about a possible Finnish peace move in the near future (740.00119EW39/2104, 2106).

²⁴ This statement was reported in telegram 58, January 24, 1944, from Helsinki, not printed.

²⁵ Karl Gustav, Baron Mannerheim, Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces.

740.00119 European War 1939/2126 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 9, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 4:41 p. m.]

114. Foreign Minister asked me to call this morning. He made the following statement:

1. He had given all consideration to the American statement of January 31 (Department's 15, January 29²⁶) and had read Secretary Hull's declaration²⁷ to press. He wished Secretary Hull to know that he has been endeavoring to find a solution to the Finnish problem which would safeguard Finnish interests and yet meet Russian ideas. So far he has been unable to get sufficient information to elucidate the Russian point of view but is continuing his efforts.

He wished this to be for the private and personal information of Secretary Hull since he feared if this statement became more widely known, there would be misgivings by the Russians about Finnish good faith and fears lest the Finns were intriguing against them.

[2. ?] I asked the Foreign Minister whether his phrase "continuing efforts" meant that he was actually in contact with the Russians. With some reluctance he said that this was the case but that the contact was not a direct one. I did not press him further. In my meeting with him on January 31 (my 75 February 1²⁸) he had sheered away from this topic and gave me to understand by indirection that there had been no contact.

3. After interview Dr. Ramsay left immediately for meeting of Diet Foreign Affairs Committee.

4. If Department agrees I shall find an occasion to bring to the attention of the Foreign Office without undue emphasis, Madame Kollontay's interview of January 29 with Minister Johnson.²⁹ Her remarks seem to have been made with the intention that we should bring them to the notice of the Finns.

GULLION

²⁶ Not printed, but see *aide-mémoire* of January 31, and footnote 14, p. 559.

²⁷ On February 8 Secretary of State Hull had issued a statement summarizing the American Government's attitude toward Finland as it was expressed in the *aide-mémoire* of January 31. For Secretary Hull's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 12, 1944, p. 179.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ The Minister in Sweden, in his telegram 312 of January 31, reported this conversation with the Soviet Minister during which the latter mentioned that if Finland did not soon react favorably to Soviet peace terms, the U.S.S.R. would take "action which would be disastrous for Finland" (740.00119 European War 1939/2106). The Department advised, in its telegram 23 of February 9 to Helsinki, that it was inadvisable for Chargé Gullion to inform the Finns of the Kollontay statement (740.00119 EW/2126).

740.00119 European War/2332

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 21, 1944.

THE SECRETARY: On Saturday³⁰ afternoon the Soviet Ambassador³¹ called and left with me an *aide-mémoire*³² stating that in Stockholm Madame Kollontai had talked with the Finnish emissary Paasikivi³³ and had been told that the Finns were ready to accept the 1940 border although they had certain wishes in connection with this question. The Finnish representative asked if the Russians would demand that the Finns join in the war against Germany. Madame Kollontai simply listened, but because Paasikivi stated he was an official representative of the Finnish Government the Soviet Government is presenting its own conditions of peace.

Saturday at midnight the Soviet Ambassador called again and left with me an additional *aide-mémoire*³⁴ outlining the Soviet conditions. They are as follows:

1. Severance of relations with Germany and interning of German troops by Finnish forces, if necessary with the aid of Soviet troops.
2. Reestablishment of the treaty of 1940 and withdrawal of Finnish troops to the 1940 border.
3. The return of Soviet prisoners of war and interned citizens.
4. To leave open for negotiations in Moscow the question of demobilization of the Finnish army, compensation for military damages and "certain other questions"³⁵ the nature of which the Ambassador did not know.

This information was promptly passed along to the President with a suggested cable outlining these conditions to Mr. Harriman.³⁶ The Soviet *aide-mémoire* added that the Soviet Government hopes there will be no objection on the part of this Government regarding these

³⁰ February 19.

³¹ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

³² Not printed.

³³ On February 12, 1944, Dr. Juho K. Paasikivi arrived in Stockholm with instructions from his Government to contact the Soviet Minister there in order to explore the possibilities for peace. Madame Kollontay received Paasikivi on February 16 and 19. In telegram 570, February 19, 1944, the Minister in Sweden reported that, according to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Paasikivi was assured that the Soviet Government "would not refuse to deal with the Finnish Government as now constituted and that it did not desire to destroy Finnish independence." (740.00119 European War 1939/2166)

³⁴ Not found in Department files.

³⁵ Another probable condition for Finland was disclosed by the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in its communiqué of March 1, sent to the Department that day in telegram 683, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman. That condition concerned negotiation of "The question of the Petsamo district," which was the sixth item in the communiqué's list of peace terms. (760D.61/1703)

³⁶ Instructions were sent to Moscow in telegram 368, February 21, 1944 (not printed).

terms. In transmitting the information to Mr. Harriman, the President instructed him as follows:

1. To seek an immediate interview with Molotov and convey to him the following:

a. An expression of our appreciation for conveying this information to us.

b. As we are not at war with Finland, we have no comment to make with respect to the terms outlined in the *aide-mémoire*.

c. In view of the important effect thereof in the prosecution of the war against our common enemy, this Government would appreciate being kept informed of the progress of negotiations which may take place.

We made a like reply to the Soviet Ambassador here.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

740.00119 European War/2309

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1944.

A recent (February 21) JIS³⁷ survey of the Finnish situation makes the following points, *inter alia*:

1. Germany obtains from Finland 60 percent of the nickel available to Germany, 10 percent of the copper, 23–32 percent of the molybdenum, 28 percent of the cobalt and asbestos; and any Finnish decision to withdraw from the war would probably be met with emphatic objections from the Germans and might be followed by German military action.

2. It is within Germany's capabilities to retain the resources now in its possession adjusting its southern flank in Finland to extend generally east from the north end of the Gulf of Bothnia to the present front line. This can be accomplished by the seven divisions already in Finland and the five in northern Norway.

Assuming the Germans will remain in northern Norway, the Soviets are confronted with problems of either attacking the Germans or standing fast. They would stand fast only if economic benefits being derived by the Germans from northern Finland were being successfully interfered with and if the terms of the peace treaty precluded unlimited military occupation of Finland and if the Finns refused to cooperate militarily. The Russian lines of communication to the area rule out substantial reinforcement of the troops there. Regardless of whether Finns cooperate militarily, "a coordinated attack from the east and south is probable if the Germans continue to exploit the nickel mines at Petsamo."

3. If Finland elects to remain in the war and the Soviet Union decides to attack it, only an over-whelming Soviet ground force with

³⁷ Presumably Joint Intelligence Staff.

considerable armor supported by a much greater amount of strategic bombing of military objectives than the Soviets have exhibited in the past could defeat organized Finnish resistance. Morale in the Finnish Armed Forces is excellent and basic supplies available to the Finns are adequate for a stout resistance. Finland's defensive position against the Soviets is advantageous in that it is favored by internal lines of communication. Also its necessary land defenses are more or less limited to three land sectors, namely, the Karelian, the Aunus,³⁸ and the Masselka³⁹ isthmuses.

4. Neither Germany nor Russia is likely to initiate action against Finnish forces in view of more pressing commitments elsewhere. German retaliation other than defensive operations in the North would be limited principally to air and naval attacks.

5. Presumably with Finland breaking away from Germany the U. S. S. R. and Sweden will assume important roles in Finnish trade. Swedish exports to Finland might conceivably be increased including some food products, and some iron and steel machinery. The strategic metal production of Finland would be a most acceptable increment to U. S. S. R. supplies. It might in fact displace the present Lend-Lease⁴⁰ supplies to that country. Finnish wood products could presumably also be absorbed by the U. S. S. R. as their importation at least as long as the war continues would free Russian manpower for other uses.

The foregoing survey gives point to the reported recent statement of Finnish Finance Minister Tanner⁴¹ that Finland's position is not "hopeless"; and that if the terms of peace which may be offered Finland are unacceptable, Finland will continue to fight.

H[UGH] S. C[UMMING, JR.]

740.00119 European War 1939/2201: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 29, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 8:34 p. m.]

685. Madame Kollontay asked me to see her last evening. She had nothing particular to take up but seemed very desirous of talking about Finnish situation. (See my 659, February 26, 11 p. m.⁴²) Her remarks were evidently based on assumption that I was informed as to Russian terms. She stated that Moscow had advised her Wash-

³⁸ The Aunus, or Olonets (Russian) Isthmus lies between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.

³⁹ The Maaselkä, or Maselgskaya (Russian) Isthmus extends from Lake Onega to the Segozero and Vygozero, and thence to the Gulf of Onega on the White Sea littoral.

⁴⁰ For correspondence relating to aid to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease program, see vol. iv, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Continuance of wartime assistance . . ."

⁴¹ Väinö A. Tanner, who was also head of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party, stated in an interview with the Helsinki correspondent of the *Stockholms-Tidningen* that Finland's position "is not desperate." See the issue of that newspaper for February 23, 1944.

⁴² Not printed.

ington and London were being kept currently informed. She has heard nothing from Paasikivi or any Finnish source since Paasikivi left Stockholm⁴³ but expects early developments. Secret session of Finnish Parliament scheduled for today she connects with Government's consideration of Russian conditions. She said she understood difficulty of Hango from Finnish point of view but that she is confident that Moscow will find some way to settle this question which Finland will accept. She thinks less public discussion about Hango the better. Madame Kollontay expressed herself as being optimistic that a favorable reply will come from Finland. She pointed out obvious practical difficulty of implementing a Russian-Finnish armistice presented by presence of German troops in Finland. Russia does not expect Finns to go to war with Germans but if Russia recognizes Finland as having a neutral status for remainder of war Finland must take some action or agree to some action to intern Germans. Madame Kollontay indicated, however, that extreme practical difficulties of this situation from Finnish point of view are understood by Moscow. She had no suggestions to make as to how problem might be met. Ease of its solution will largely depend on attitude of Germans. She seemed hopeful that it might be possible to isolate Germans in north Finland and cut them off from supply sources as well as isolating them in groups. She did not say how this could be done if Germans put up resistance but remarked that her Government could hardly acquiesce in Germans leaving Finland via Norway to be thrown against them on some other front. She said it made no difference whether Paasikivi were the individual chosen by Finnish Government to go to Moscow or not; important thing was that some one go there with full powers to deal with Russian Government. A Finnish representative could be got across the lines and to Moscow in a very few hours directly from Finland. She spoke in highest terms of Paasikivi whom she has known personally for years and said that he was trusted and liked by Stalin who had once told her that Paasikivi was "all right. He is an honest man." She remarked on publication in London of accurate details of Russian conditions,⁴⁴ that this publicity was so foolish from viewpoint of Russians and British that she could only believe that Finns had themselves arranged in some way for the terms to be given out in London as a help in preparing Finnish public opinion to accept them. She disclaimed, however, any knowledge of facts about this leakage.

Madame Kollontay expressed herself as being very conscious of value of Finland's getting out of the war as an example to other

⁴³ Paasikivi departed for Finland on February 23.

⁴⁴ A Moscow radio broadcast on February 29, giving the official Soviet announcement of the six conditions to Finland, was received in London and cabled to New York by the *New York Times* correspondent in London; see the *New York Times*, March 1, 1944, p. 1.

satellites of Germany. She also expressed personal satisfaction at moderation of Russian terms, which she thinks is only wise way to approach peace settlement.

JOHNSON

740.00119 European War/2343

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: It is probable that one of the most difficult obstacles to a Soviet-Finnish peace will be the question of Hango, and a recent telegram from Stockholm,⁴⁶ which you no doubt saw, made specific mention of this question.

The Soviet terms as given to us and as broadcast by the Moscow radio yesterday, by referring to the restoration of the Treaty of 1940 would appear to indicate a determination on the part of the Soviets to retain the leased base at Hango. I thought you might be interested to know, for your personal and secret information, that at Tehran, Stalin definitely stated to the President and Mr. Churchill that the Soviet Government would be prepared to relinquish its claim to a base at Hango in return for the cession of Petsamo in the north.⁴⁷

The Soviet conditions as published leave the question of Petsamo for consideration during the negotiations without, however, any reference to the abandonment of a claim to Hango. It is not clear whether the Soviet Government now intends to have both or will in negotiation agree to relinquish this claim to Hango in accordance with Stalin's statement to the President and the Prime Minister.⁴⁸

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

740.00119 European War 1939/2208 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 2, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 7:56 p. m.]

186. 1. Reference my 181, yesterday.⁴⁹ I called on Foreign Minister Ramsay at his request this morning. He began by saying that

⁴⁶ *Supra.*

⁴⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 592.

⁴⁸ British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill.

⁴⁹ Not printed; it reported that by a vote of 105 to 80 the Finnish Diet "voted to open negotiations with Moscow on basis of Russian terms" (740.00119 European War 1939/2210).

although American and British newspapers seemed to regard Soviet peace conditions as moderate, Finns found them very difficult indeed. People of Finland wanted peace and were willing to make considerable sacrifices to get it. However, first condition imposed by Soviet [Government,] the internment of German troops, was physically impossible, regardless of other considerations.

2. Its enforcement meant presence of Russian troops in country and although Foreign Minister did not dwell on this point, he clearly appeared to share general Finnish fear of Russian occupation. Condition number two, the restoration of 1940 peace terms, would be extremely difficult and meant vital damage to economy of country. Dr. Ramsay at this point presented me with a set of maps and statistics showing water power, railways, waterways and woodworking industries [lost?] through 1940 Moscow peace treaty (Dept. may already have seen them but they will be summarized in a subsequent telegram⁵⁰ and airtailed to Dept.) He said it would be difficult to maintain "good neighbor condition" given frontiers of 1940.

3. Third point upon which Dr. Ramsay volunteered comment appears in section 2 of the negotiable part of peace conditions as reported by DNB.⁵¹ This referred to partial or total mobilization [*demobilization?*] of Finnish Army. He found that this would create great problems for Finland's security and ability to maintain status of a neutral. It would also be difficult for Finnish economy to absorb quickly the demobilized manpower.

4. I asked Dr. Ramsay if Diet had authorized Government to negotiate on terms of peace conditions as announced. He replied that it would be incorrect to say that negotiations had been authorized but that Diet had approved Government's action and given it a "relatively free hand". He was not prepared to say that Government was getting ready to make counter-proposals.

5. In reply to a question about Hango (my telegram in reference) he said that Soviet Union had indicated it would be prepared to discuss Hango provided it received satisfaction on other points but there seemed to be a doubt in his mind as to whether this meant all the points of Russian terms or merely those in category 1. There was no reference to Hango in official communiqué.⁵²

6. In going over peace terms point by point it appeared that Foreign Minister was not prepared to state Finnish peace aims in terms of

⁵⁰ Telegram 217, March 11, 1944, not printed; see despatch 2708, March 7, from Helsinki, p. 572.

⁵¹ Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German news agency.

⁵² On March 1 the Soviet Government newspaper *Izvestiya* published the press release issued by the Information Bureau of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, giving the Soviet Union's six terms to Finland.

maximum concessions. It was quite clear, however, that greatest difficulty at present is stipulation concerning internment of German troops while there is more hope for concessions by Finnish side on other points. It was either in this connection or elsewhere in interview that Dr. Ramsay referred to the great obstacle to agreement presented by Russian insistence that all points in category 1 be accepted before negotiations could begin.

7. As to release of Soviet prisoners of war (condition 3) Ramsay pointed out that there was no mention of reciprocal action on Soviet part.

8. As to indemnities (point 5) and Petsamo (point 6) Foreign Minister gave no additional information. He said he did not know exactly what territory was intended by term "Petsamo District".

9. As to German reaction Dr. Ramsay indicated that Berlin had kept comparatively quiet but he made no reference to representations by Germans here nor did I question him about this. He said that although he might be too naïve he did not believe that German military reprisals were to be feared (German action in Italy was not parallel since Finland had no treaty with Germany). He did indicate Germans could apply commercial sanctions by cutting off supplies. Correction in this paragraph: After "to be feared" add: "although one could never tell".

10. I asked him if Finland had been informed in advance that Tass⁵³ agency was going to publish Russian peace terms. He said that on contrary he had been astounded and that he considered this a bad sign since Russians had done same thing in '39 and that it seemed to mean that Russians were not prepared to accept any modification of their demands.

11. He concluded interview by saying that he took a pessimistic view of situation.

12. Although present mood of Finns may be merely one on [of] rejection [*dejection*] after numbing effect of seeing conditions in black and white for first time, morning press and private persons with whom I have talked are also pessimistic. In view of Government's narrow Diet majority (telegram in reference) there seems to be danger that negotiation is headed toward impasse where unforeseen concessions or perhaps some U. S. initiative would be required to extricate it. It should be recalled that Dr. Ramsay has been a peace activist while powerful political figures like Tanner (telegram in reference) are said to be opposed to peace on terms reported.

GULLION

⁵³ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official news agency of the Soviet Government.

740.00119 European War/2229: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (Gullion)

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1944—8 p. m.

52. Minister Johnson, in his telegram to the Department 768, March 6,⁵⁴ referring to your telegram to him 28, March 4,⁵⁵ reports that the Swedish Government considers the proposed Finnish reply to the Soviet terms to be so unrealistic that the Swedes refused to transmit it. According to the Swedish Foreign Office the Finnish document expressed the Finns' desire for peace but continued by saying that the Soviet conditions were not acceptable "as such" and therefore the Finnish Government proposed that negotiations take place to enable the Finns to have an opportunity to make clear their views. The Swedish Government feels that transmission of the Finnish reply might well end in completely closing the door and therefore are strongly urging the Finns to accept the Russian terms. With the authorization of the King⁵⁶ the Swedish Foreign Minister has delivered to Gripenberg⁵⁷ a Royal message to the Finnish Government expressing the King's personal views along these lines.

For the past week the Swedish Foreign Minister has been pressing with the Finns his view that under no circumstances can they possibly hope for any better terms than the Soviet conditions and that refusal would simply mean that the ultimate terms of capitulation will be harder.

The Department finds it difficult to disagree with the point of view and conclusions of the Swedish Government as reported by Mr. Johnson. Accordingly, should an early opportunity present itself in conversation with Dr. Ramsay or any other responsible Finnish officials you may say that you have knowledge of the Swedish Government's expression to the Finnish Government of the Swedish views and invite attention to the close similarity between those views and the observations contained in the *aide-mémoire* which you handed Dr. Ramsay on January 31.

Sent to Helsinki, repeated to Moscow as Department's No. 509 and to London as Department's No. 1724: For the secret information of the Ambassador only.

STETTINIUS

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ This telegram was sent to the Department as 193, March 4, 1944, not printed.

⁵⁶ King Gustav V.

⁵⁷ Georg A. Gripenberg, Finnish Minister to Sweden.

860D.014/41

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

No. 2708

HELSINKI, March 7, 1944.

[Received March 24.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 186 of March 2, describing an interview with the Finnish Foreign Minister, Dr. Ramsay, in which he declared the Russian peace terms released here on March 2 very difficult for Finland to accept. He referred to the vital damage to the economy of the country which restoration of the frontiers of the Moscow Peace of 1940 would impose, and to illustrate his argument gave me a series of maps and statistics which are enclosed.⁵⁸

In explaining the maps, Dr. Ramsay dwelt particularly on the importance of the Saima Canal, which connects south and central Finland with the port of Viipuri and is the outlet for a large part of Finland's timber exports which is floated down the lake system through the Canal to Viborg.⁵⁹

Some of the more salient statistics given in the tables accompanying the maps follow.

In forest resources Finland would see its forest area reduced from 1939 total of 19,580,000 hectares to 17,480,000 hectares. Finland loses 20% of its sawn timber woodworking industry, 23% of plywood industry, 25% of woodpulpboard, 25% of chemical woodpulp.

By the loss of the Saima Canal the country loses transport facilities for 13% of total exports of sawn timber and 13.5% of pitprops and pulpwood. The importance of the loss of the ports of Viipuri, Uuras, Koivisto and Makslahti is illustrated by fact that through these ports in 1938 passed 28% of sawn timber exports, 24% of mechanical and chemical woodpulp, 6.5% of paper, 31% of woodpulp board, 27.5% of plywood and 20% of other timber.

Seventeen per cent of Finnish railway trackage, or 1,000 kilometers, is in area to be ceded.

Chiefly through loss of sections of the Vuoksi River, Finland would lose 17.8% of total water power or 1,600 kilowatt hours output, while 25.8% of total capacity would be lost and 44.6% of total capacity of water power stations under construction.

These losses to the Finnish economy affect chiefly the timber industry, the country's principal industry and source of income.

Respectfully yours,

EDMUND A. GULLION

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ i.e., Viipuri.

740.00119 European War 1939/2242 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 8, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:39 p. m.]

802. My 768, March 6, 8 p. m.⁶⁰ This afternoon Boheman⁶¹ informed me that a revised Finnish reply⁶² has been received and delivered to Madame Kollontay. This reply in substance is that Finns understand and accept Russian position that if Finland is to have a status of neutrality until end of war, German troops cannot operate or remain in Finland without internment. It points out, however, extreme practical difficulties and complications which this situation presents for Finland and expresses hope that earliest possible opportunity may be given by Russia for discussion of matter. Finns hope if such an opportunity is given to them to make certain observations on the other armistice terms. Boheman says that he views this reply as an implicit acceptance of other armistice terms and an acceptance in principle of Russian demand regarding internment of German troops although this acceptance in principle is not expressly stated. He said that reply was very favorably received by Madame Kollontay but there has not yet been time for any reaction from Moscow. He says that he has urged Madame Kollontay to keep nature of this Finnish reply secret as there is possibility for many a slip before Finland is definitely out of hostilities. I told him substance of Department's 371, March 7, 8 p. m.,⁶³ which had just arrived. He expressed appreciation for Department's attitude but said that in view of present favorable developments and extreme sensitivity of Finns at moment, he would prefer that no reference be made by Gullion to our having knowledge of Swedish official views as expressed to Finnish Government. He said that Finns are already in some quarters accusing him of being too closely connected with Allied point of view and that he thinks it wiser for them not to know that he has told me as much as he has. In view of this observation I have taken liberty of telegraphing Gullion the suggestion that he not act on Department's instruction until he has heard from you further.

Boheman remarked that German troops in Finland are indeed a very serious impediment to realization of present hopes. What German action may be if armistice is made by Finns with Russians is unknown but events could possibly take a turn which would result in fighting in Finland and there would be a sufficient body of Finnish

⁶⁰ Not printed.

⁶¹ Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁶² See *infra*.

⁶³ Not printed; it informed the Minister in Sweden of the Department's telegram 52, March 7, to Helsinki, p. 571.

support for the Germans to result in a civil war. He feels that such a development would not be even in Allied interest and the one thing which is worrying him most is an apprehension that Germans may still be in a position to do Finland very serious injury. This point is the one on which all previous endeavors to get Finland out of the war have broken. He expressed opinion that it had not previously been possible for Finland to get out of the war without facing serious German counter-action. He is not absolutely sure that Finland can escape this now.

JOHNSON

760D.61/3-1144

The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The following are the texts of the answer of the Finnish Government⁶⁴ to the Soviet peace terms and the consequent reply of the Soviet Government.

"The Finnish Government which is earnestly desiring to establish in the shortest possible time peaceful relations between Finland and the U.S.S.R., has thoroughly studied the peace terms of the Soviet Union to Finland.

"The Finnish Government realizes, that in order that Finland may remain neutral after the conclusion of peace it is necessary that no foreign troops belonging to a belligerent power should remain on her territory. However, this question is so complicated that it demands a more thorough consideration. The Finnish Government therefore desires to suggest to start negotiations so that Finland could have the possibility to explain its point of view on that question and also regarding other questions in connection with the peace terms proposed by the Soviet Government."

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to give the following answer⁶⁵ to the statement of the Finnish Government of March 8th.

"The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the reply of the Finnish Government, transmitted in Stockholm to Madame Kolontai by Mr. Boheman and considers it entirely unsatisfactory. In regard to that reply the Soviet Government states: The Soviet peace terms to Finland, in the form of six points, transmitted to Mr. Paasikivi on February 19, are minimal and elementary and only upon acceptance of these terms by the Finnish Government Soviet-Finnish negotiations regarding the cessation of hostilities and regarding the establishment of peace between the U.S.S.R. and Finland are possible.

"Should these terms be accepted by Finland and should the Finnish Government agree in principle to the internment of the German

⁶⁴This reply from the Finnish Government was a revised one. A substantially identical translation of this text from the Swedish Government was sent to the Department in telegram 219, March 11, 1944, from Helsinki; not printed.

⁶⁵Delivered to the Swedish Government on March 10 for transmittal to the Finnish Government.

troops, the Soviet Government is ready to discuss the latter question during the negotiations in Moscow.

“The Soviet Government deems it necessary to inform the Finnish Government hereby, that the Soviet Government will await a positive reply within a week, i.e. until March 18, after that the Soviet Government will consider that the Finns are deliberately delaying the negotiations for certain not clear for us purposes and are rejecting the Soviet terms.

“The Soviet Government taking into account the interests of the Finnish Government agrees to keep secret the correspondence as well as the negotiations.”

MARCH 11, 1944.

740.00119 European War/2284b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (Gullion)

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1944—3 p. m.

60. You are requested to seek an appointment with the Foreign Minister as soon as possible to leave with him an *aide-mémoire*⁶⁶ in the following sense:

The British and Soviet Governments have kept my Government fully informed of the recent exchange of communications between the Finnish and Soviet Governments, and I am instructed to inform you that nothing in those communications gives my Government occasion to modify in any particular the observations communicated to the Finnish Government in my *aide-mémoire* of January 31.

Sent to Helsinki, repeated to Moscow as Department's No. 560 for the secret information of the Ambassador.

HULL

740.00119 European War/2294a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (Gullion)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944.

66. President issued following statement today:⁶⁷

“It has always seemed odd to me and to the people of the United States to find Finland a partner of Nazi Germany, fighting side by side with the sworn enemies of our civilization.

The Finnish people now have a chance to withdraw from this hateful partnership. The longer they stay at Germany's side the more sorrow and suffering is bound to come to them. I think I can speak for all Americans when I say that we sincerely hope Finland will now take the opportunity to disassociate herself from Germany.”

HULL

⁶⁶ The *aide-mémoire* was delivered to Foreign Minister Ramsay on March 13.

⁶⁷ President Roosevelt's statement was given to Foreign Minister Ramsay, who had requested an exact text of it, by the Chargé in Finland on March 17 in an *aide-mémoire* (not printed).

740.00119 European War/2333a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (Gullion)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944—4 p. m.

67. An officer of the Department⁶⁸ on whom Procopé⁶⁹ called yesterday afternoon at his request, speaking personally, said that the very gravest view was taken in the Department of the press reports just received from Stockholm regarding the Finnish negative attitude towards the Soviet terms and that serious consideration was being given to the various courses of action which the United States Government might be compelled to take to meet the situation; and that among these possible courses of action should not be excluded delivery to Procopé of his passport and severance of diplomatic relations. He was told that although the officer spoke personally he was at liberty to report this to Helsinki.

You may disseminate the foregoing as your own estimate of possible action by your Government.

You should immediately make all necessary preparations for the prompt implementation of Department's mail instruction 333, October 28, 1941,⁷⁰ as amended.

Sent to Helsinki, repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 436; to Moscow as Department's no. 595; and to London as Department's no. 1981.

HULL

740.00119 European War/2287: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 16, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:58 p. m.]

235. 1. I called on Foreign Minister, Dr. Ramsay, by request this afternoon.

2. He inquired if I had been informed of decision of Diet. I replied that I had heard unofficial reports about action taken and hoped that it did not mean closing of door on negotiations. He said that door was not closed and that it was definitely intention of Finns not to close it, and that if any country could be said to have done so it would be the country which had set a time limit to further negotiations and which was in position of refusing further discussion. He said he could not understand failure of Western world to appreciate this.

3. He explained that Government had reported latest Russian terms with recommendation that they be not accepted unless further

⁶⁸ Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs.

⁶⁹ Hjalmar J. Procopé, Finnish Minister in the United States.

⁷⁰ Not printed; it informed the Chargé on the appropriate procedures for closing the Mission should that necessity arise (124.60D/43a).

discussion were permitted by Russians. Diet had unanimously agreed ⁷¹ (exact form of unanimous approval seems to have been in shape of unrecorded vote rather than actual count of members). Dr. Ramsay asked if I and my Government understood that Finland's decision was being reached solely through democratic procedures without pressure of any kind. I answered that I believed and thought our Government believed Finnish Government was faithful to democratic procedures.

4. In this connection he stated that Germans had not applied any pressure here and that they had been calm throughout. I replied that obviously Finland's association with Germany gave us great concern and in this connection I informed him of our Government's views as expressed in Department's 63 March 14,⁷² and presented him with an *aide-mémoire* ⁷³ in sense of that message. I then pointed out that although telegram transmitting this message was despatched from Washington urgently on March 14, it had not been received here until morning of March 16. I expressed my concern about this delay in communications and pointed out that if any further message was to be sent by my Government, I should have it at earliest possible moment. He asked that I should call him as soon as possible tomorrow morning to ascertain situation. I asked if Finnish note following Diet session had been transmitted to Russians. He said that he could not say that it had been delivered but that it had been forwarded to Stockholm.

Repeated to Stockholm as my 43.

GULLION

740.00119 European War/2329

The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Stated below is the answer of the Finnish Government ⁷⁴ to the notification of the Soviet Government of March 10 and the consequent reply of the Soviet Government.

"The Government of Finland has acquainted itself with the notification of the Soviet Government which was transmitted on March 10 ⁷⁵ by its Ambassador to Stockholm, Madame A. M. Kollontai, to Mr. Boheman.

⁷¹ The Diet had voted on March 15.

⁷² Not printed; it expressed the hope of the United States Government that the conversations taking place between the Soviet and Finnish Governments would lead to Finland's withdrawal from the war (740.0019 European War/2284a).

⁷³ Not printed.

⁷⁴ This reply was given to the Soviet representatives at 4 p. m., March 17, in Stockholm. On March 18, the Chargé in Finland received from the Finnish Foreign Minister an unofficial text in English and cabled it to the Department in his telegram 244, that day (740.00119 EW/2298).

⁷⁵ See *aide-mémoire* dated March 11 from the Soviet Embassy, and footnote 64, p. 574.

"As the Government of Finland has informed on March 8, it was ready to state its opinion regarding various questions, touched in the peace terms put forward by the Soviet Government. Besides it wanted also to receive explanation regarding the formal interpretation as well as regarding the real contents of those points, in which the terms were formulated. Such an explanation would be necessary in order that the Diet of Finland could determine its attitude towards the terms which touch a number of complicated questions. The Government of Finland regrets that the Soviet Government had not found it possible to give it the opportunity to state its point of view on these special questions and that the negotiations were announced possible only after the peace terms put forward by the Soviet Government are accepted by the Finnish Government. The Government of Finland which, as before, is seriously striving to establish peaceful relations and desires to start negotiations cannot, however, declare beforehand acceptance of the terms in question, which touch the existence of the whole nation, not having even a firm sureness regarding the interpretation of these terms and their meaning (*totag [toute] leur portée*)."

On March 18 the Soviet Government has instructed Madame Kollontai to transmit to Mr. Boheman the following reply of the Soviet Government to the Finnish Government.

"The Soviet Government has received the reply of the Finnish Government transmitted on March 17 by Mr. Boheman to Madame A. M. Kollontai, where it expresses the desire to get the interpretation of the Soviet peace terms before it makes a decision to the point regarding these terms.

"First. The Soviet Government does not object against the sending by the Finnish Government one or several of its representatives to receive from the Soviet Government the interpretation of the Soviet peace terms.

"Second. The Soviet Government considers that Moscow would be the most suitable place where the representatives of the Finnish Government could receive the most complete interpretation."

MARCH 19, 1944.

740.00119 European War/2327

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming) ⁷⁶

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1944.

The decision "in principle" of the Finnish Government reported in Helsinki's 260, March 21,⁷⁷ to send two representatives to Moscow probably at the end of this week for the purpose of obtaining from

⁷⁶ Addressed to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn), the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), and the Secretary of State.

⁷⁷ Not printed; in this telegram the Chargé informed the Department that on the morning of March 21, Finnish Foreign Minister Ramsay told him that the Soviet Government had been informed of Finland's acceptance in principle of the sending of two representatives to Moscow.

the Soviet Government "interpretations" of the Soviet peace terms seems circumstantially to have been communicated to the Soviet Government prior to the issuance of the Finnish and Soviet communiqués on March 21.⁷⁸ The Finnish communiqué in effect expressed a desire to continue negotiations; and it is considered significant that the Soviet communiqué aside from recounting previous developments stated only with respect to the Finnish reply of March 17 that "by this action the Finnish Government has taken upon itself full responsibility for what will follow" and did not launch into a tirade against Finnish leaders, etc. It is also interesting that German propaganda regarding Finnish developments continues cautious and had made no claims as yet of a great diplomatic defeat for "the Anglo-Saxon countries".

These circumstances strongly suggest that the Finnish and Soviet Governments may have reached tacit agreement that the conversations are to be continued in Moscow (in this connection, however, it is to be noted that the Finnish Foreign Minister emphasized that the Finnish representatives would not have plenary power and would not make decisions in Moscow). It would seem that both the Finnish and Soviet Governments are desirous of keeping the further conversations as secret as possible. The generally negative tone of the two communiqués was probably intended as a "smoke screen" for the further conversations.

It will also have been noted from Helsinki's telegram under reference that Dr. Ramsay went into considerable detail as to the validity of the Finnish Government's mandate from the Finnish Diet to continue the conversations. It has been suggested by a number of competent observers that if the Finnish Government makes peace on the basis of the Soviet terms there is a possibility that with German resistance to ejection of German troops from Finland, Finland faces the distinct possibility of civil war. We have received previous indications that President Ryti and other Finnish leaders held the opinion that when it came time to make peace with the U.S.S.R. it might be preferable to confront Finnish public opinion with a *fait accompli*. The parliamentary maneuvers described by Dr. Ramsay to Mr. Gullion taken together with Dr. Ramsay's statement that very few "Finnish personalities" were aware of the decision to send representatives to Moscow point toward a development of that character.

Regarding the possibility of civil war in Finland, it is to be recalled that the mandate of the Diet to the Government to explore the pos-

⁷⁸ The Finnish and Soviet Governments each released on this date a communiqué, summarizing for the press the official exchanges between them during the previous month and stating the position of each Government with respect to the armistice terms. See *Izvestiya*, March 22, 1944, p. 1.

sibilities of making peace on the basis of the Soviet terms passed by a vote of 105 to 80. The minority consisted of the Conservative, the Agrarian and the IKL⁷⁹ (quasi Fascist) Parties. The minority was later described as determined in its objections whereas the majority were lukewarm in their approval. The majority of the Karelians who will be dispossessed of their land if the terms are accepted belong to the Agrarian Party and these Karelians are reportedly unequivocally opposed to any terms which involve the return of Finnish Karelia to the Soviet Union. It is also interesting to recall that the White Guard Movement⁸⁰ in 1918 originated with and was principally supported by the farming population of Finland; and that the so-called Lappo Movement⁸¹ in 1930 which aimed at the suppression of Communism and the power of the Social Democrats also had the same origin. Reports indicate that Finnish censorship has nowhere been more effective than among the rural population where the belief even now is held that the Soviet Union is being rapidly defeated by German forces. The Conservatives were the principal backers in 1918 of the plan to make a German prince King of Finland and they subsequently have numbered among their ranks some of the most pro-German people in Finland. The IKL Party is completely pro-Nazi and could without doubt be depended upon to support any movement to overthrow a Finnish Government which would make peace with the U.S.S.R. at this time. It has frequently been stated that the full power and prestige of Marshal Mannerheim would have to be behind a peace of the character now under consideration if Finnish unity were to be maintained in the face thereof.

The question naturally arises as to what course of action this Government should take in such a situation. Pending further developments, it is assumed we would wish to respect the stated desire of the Finnish Government for secrecy concerning the proposed further conversations. This in turn suggests that we would wish to refrain from further comment to the press with respect to our own intentions toward Finland and to information regarding developments in the Finnish situation. Such a course of action would not, however, exclude the continuation of our firm attitude toward the Finnish Government.

HUGH S. CUMMING, JR.

⁷⁹ *Isänmaallinen Kansanliike*, the "Patriotic National Movement".

⁸⁰ On the activities of the White (civil) Guards against the Red Guards and Bolshevik participation in the struggle over the independence of Finland, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 746 ff., and *ibid.*, 1919, Russia, index under Finland, p. 796.

⁸¹ During 1929-1930 the Lapua Movement, first organized in the region of the town Lapua, spread in Finland as a vigorous anti-Communist political organization which demanded that severe legal controls be placed on the Communist (Labor) Party and its adherents in Finland.

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)*⁸²

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1944.

In September 1940 the Soviet Government demanded and received permission from Finland for the transit of Soviet troops over Finnish railroads between the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-leased area of Hango, Finland, and a few days later similar privileges were granted Germany by Finland for the transit of German troops between Finnish ports and Northern Norway.⁸³ In the spring of 1941 there were indications that these German troops were tending to remain unduly long at transfer points in Finland. In view of these and other indications of the coming conflict between Germany and the U.S.S.R. this Government even before the German attack on the U.S.S.R. began its efforts, in anticipation thereof, to persuade the Finnish Government not to become involved in such an attack.⁸⁴

After Finland became associated militarily with Germany the Department used all available diplomatic means (*a*) to limit Finland's military contribution to the German war effort and (*b*) to effect Finland's withdrawal from the war at the earliest possible moment. We made the strongest possible representations to the Finns in the autumn of 1941 both in Helsinki and in Washington to this end and, though Finland's withdrawal from the war did not result, it can be fairly claimed we were successful in limiting to a material extent Finland's military assistance to Germany.

In 1942 we continued our efforts to impress on the Finnish Government the direction in which its policies were leading the country, and especially that American sympathy could not be counted on.⁸⁵ We seized the opportunities to sever consular relations between the two countries,⁸⁶ to place restrictions upon the movement of Finnish diplomatic personnel in the United States,⁸⁷ and to stop Finnish Government publicity activities in the United States provided by prior similar actions of the Finnish Government.⁸⁸

⁸² Prepared for Under Secretary of State Stettinius, in connection with his departure for London for discussions with members of the British Government, held April 7-29, 1944.

⁸³ For correspondence relating to these transit agreements with the Soviet Union and Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 343-345 and 346-348, respectively.

⁸⁴ See *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 31 ff.

⁸⁵ For correspondence on this subject, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 21 ff.

⁸⁶ United States Consular Offices in Finland were closed on July 15, 1942, and Finnish Consulates in the United States on August 1, 1942. See telegrams 142 of July 15, 1942, to Helsinki, and 596 of July 21, 1942, from Helsinki, *ibid.*, pp. 68 and 73, respectively.

⁸⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

⁸⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 115; and *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, p. 213.

In the spring of 1943 we again undertook concrete measures to bring about Finnish-Soviet peace negotiations.⁸⁹ The Soviet Government indicated its willingness to begin such negotiations but expressed the opinion that the Finnish Government was not similarly disposed and this view proved to be accurate after German intervention with the Finnish Government as a result of which we reached the decision to break relations with Finland. This latter action was, however, held up at the last minute for the reason that it would have taken place concurrently with the Soviet action in breaking relations with the Polish Government.⁹⁰

No further major moves were undertaken by us until January 29, 1944 when we instructed the Chargé d'Affaires in Helsinki⁹¹ to emphasize to the Finnish Government the determination among the United Nations to effect the total military defeat of Germany with which there must inexorably result disastrous consequences to those nations which founded their policies on confidence in German military might; to point out that it would seem that the Finnish Government would wish to consider whether the conclusion might not be drawn that the peace terms open to Finland would become more unfavorable to Finland the longer Finland continued at war; and to reiterate that the Finnish Government alone must bear the consequences to Finland of its failure to terminate Finland's collaboration with the Axis and its participation in the war.

Shortly after this *démarche* the Finnish Government sent Mr. Paasikivi to Stockholm to ascertain from the Soviet Ambassador there the nature of the peace terms which the Soviet Government might be prepared to offer Finland. He was given on February 19 the Soviet terms in the form of six points. The Finnish Government referred these terms to the Finnish Diet and obtained a mandate to procure from the Soviet Government further information regarding the terms. On March 8 the Soviet Government replied giving the Finnish Government until March 18 to accept the Soviet terms. The Finnish reply rejecting the terms "as such" but expressing the desire to discuss them further was given the Soviet representative on March 17.

Throughout this period this Government through public statements by the President and the Secretary and through diplomatic channels urged the Finnish Government to continue negotiations until an agreement with the Soviet Government was reached.

The present position is that we have been informed by the Finnish Foreign Minister, in strictest confidence, that the Finnish Govern-

⁸⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 247-262, *passim*.

⁹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 384 ff.

⁹¹ See *aide-mémoire* of January 31, from the American Legation in Finland to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and footnote 14, p. 559.

ment has decided "in principle" to send two representatives to Moscow to discuss further with the Soviet Government the Soviet terms. There are no present indications that the Soviet Government opposes this development.

While there is no certainty as to the future course of events it seems that the Finnish Government may prefer to confront the Finnish Diet and people with a *fait accompli* if it proves possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet Government on peace terms, for the reason that it fears that in view of the substantial opposition in Finland to the terms civil war might occur if the Government, prior to reaching agreement, publicly indicated its intention to do so.

HUGH S. CUMMING, JR.

740.00119 European War 1939/2371 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

STOCKHOLM, March 25, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11:18 p. m.]

1018. This morning Boheman informed me that arrangements have now been completed for sending two Finnish representatives to Moscow and they are ready to leave (Helsinki's 260, March 21, 1 p. m. to Department, 49 to Stockholm, and Department's 459 March 20, 1 p. m.⁹²). Procedure is being handled in great secrecy in hope it will not become public and particularly that Germans can be kept in ignorance. Representatives are Paasikivi and Enckell.⁹³ Latter was at one time Foreign Minister but is not now conspicuous in Finnish public life and is not tied up with Ryti-Tanner-Linkomies⁹⁴ group. It is hoped that his absence from Helsinki may even pass unnoticed. . . .

Boheman is urging his own Government here to decree mobilization, not a complete general mobilization but a full mobilization of military forces, so that Sweden might not be caught off guard. He thinks the country should be ready for any eventuality and believes that if they are fully prepared Germans would not dare to make any move against this country. Generals are in agreement with him and ready for immediate action but he is having difficulty with Government itself which does not desire to disturb the mass of people too much with discomforts and difficulties of mobilization in face of elections later

⁹² Neither printed.

⁹³ Carl J. Enckell. The two representatives arrived in Moscow on March 26.

⁹⁴ Edwin J. Linkomies, Finnish Prime Minister.

in year. He said that difficulties of putting over his view are those which all democracies have experienced and that it is hard to shake some people out of their fool's paradise. Germans he said are fully aware that Swedish intervention in Russo-Finnish matter is determining factor; that without Swedish action there would have been no negotiation between Finland and Russia. If negotiations succeed Germans might attempt desperate measures and only thing that will deter them will be consciousness of complete Swedish preparedness.

Boheman expressed his satisfaction at patience of Russians but said he was convinced that Moscow desires peace with Finland not simply to fold up that section of front but as a step toward general peace which Russians intensely desire to reach as soon as possible. He remarked that Russians are pushing forward rapidly to the west and will soon have reached lines and occupied all the territory they want. He does not think Russians would ever make separate peace with Hitler but on reaching certain frontiers they might decide to do nothing for a while and Western Allies might find that they had Germany on their hands alone. Speaking as an onlooker he said that he felt it of utmost importance that Anglo-Saxon Allies do something very soon.

JOHNSON

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁵

Moscow, March 29, 1944—5:45 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

Personal for the President. Molotov has given me the following information in writing marked exceptionally secret.

The Finnish Delegation composed of Paasikivi, King [*Carl J.*] Enckell and Secretary George Enckell arrived in Moscow March 26. The first meeting took place March 27. The Finns declared they had no powers except to receive from the Soviet Government an interpretation of the Soviet armistice terms. The Finns inquired whether the Soviet Government was prepared to conclude a treaty of peace or only an agreement on an armistice. The Soviets explained that they had transmitted the Soviet armistice terms and not a treaty of peace but that if the Finnish Government desired at the present time to make a proposal for the conclusion of a treaty of peace it could do so. The Soviet Government was prepared to carry on negotiations either for an armistice or a treaty of peace with Finland. In reply to the

⁹⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Finnish delegation's attempts to ascertain the Soviet position regarding the possibility of making [making] various changes in the six Soviet conditions the Soviet side confirmed as unalterable the position of the Soviet Government on these points.

The Soviet Government agreed that if the Finnish Government so desired the second meeting would take place on the 28 or 29. Molotov states that the Government of the United States will be informed of subsequent developments.

May I ask that Mr. Hull be informed.⁹⁶

711.00/1788 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 30, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 9:01 p. m.]

292. Department of State memorandum on foreign policy of March 21⁹⁷ seems not to have been reported except in few lines by FNB⁹⁸ from United States of America and was hardly noted in press.

Procopé has referred to memorandum in his cables and there is tendency here to be encouraged by references to rights of small nations.

GULLION

740.00119 European War/2442

The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As it is known to the Government of the United States, the first meeting with the Finnish delegation was held on March 27 in Moscow about which information was already given in the memorandum handed on March 28 to United States Ambassador, Mr. Harriman.⁹⁹

The second meeting was held on March 29th. At the first meeting, as well as at the second one, the Finnish delegation, which was interested in receiving the Soviet interpretation of the known six terms, on its part did not suggest any formulated terms.

⁹⁶ A notation at the top of the telegram reads: "Paraphrased copy to State [March] 29/1915Q by direction of President."

⁹⁷ The Department released to the press on March 21, 1944, a memorandum entitled, "Bases of the Foreign Policy of the United States"; see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 25, 1944, p. 275.

⁹⁸ Finska Nyhets Byrån, Finnish News Bureau.

⁹⁹ See Ambassador Harriman's telegram of March 29 to President Roosevelt, p. 584.

In the course of the conversations, the Finnish delegates especially stressed the difficulties for Finland to carry out the internment of German troops stationed in Finland. Besides, the Finnish delegates particularly stressed the Finnish Government's concern that the Soviet Union waive its rights, provided by the treaty of 1940, to the lease of Hango.

As a result of exchange of opinions the Soviet Government decided to introduce certain changes into the initial terms in respect to the demands to the Finnish Government regarding its measures concerning the German troops as well as in regard to Hango and has formulated its proposals for handing them to the Finnish Government, through the arrived Finnish delegates, in the following final edition:

"SOVIET PROPOSALS OF PEACE WITH FINLAND

1. Severance of relations with Germany and internment of German troops and vessels in Finland, or severance of relations with Germany and expulsion of German troops and vessels from the limits of Finland not later than by the end of April.

In both cases the Soviet Government can assist Finland with its own armed forces.

2. Reestablishment of the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1940 and withdrawal of Finnish troops to the border of 1940 to be carried out in successive phases during April.

3. Immediate return of Soviet and Allied prisoners of war as well as Soviet and Allied persons from among the civilian population being kept in concentration camps or used by the Finns for labor, and, if there will be signed between the U.S.S.R. and Finland not a treaty of armistice but a peace treaty the return of prisoners of war should be mutual.

4. Demobilization of 50 percent of the Finnish Army to be carried out during May, and putting the whole Finnish Army on a peace-time basis to be carried out during June and July. (This point should be included in the treaty or should be agreed upon in the form of a separate Soviet-Finnish agreement, subject to signing simultaneously with the peace treaty or the treaty of armistice.)

5. Compensation of damages caused by Finland to the Soviet Union by military actions and occupation of Soviet territory, in the amount of 600,000,000 American dollars, to be paid up during a five years' period in goods (paper, cellulose, sea-going and river-going vessels, various machinery.)

6. Return to the Soviet Union of Petsamo and the Petsamo region, ceded voluntar[il]y by the Soviet Union to Finland in accordance with the peace treaties of 1920¹ and 1940.

¹ Article IV of the Treaty of Dorpat (Tartu) of October 14, 1920, between Finland and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, gave "for perpetuity" the territory of Petsamo (Pechenga) to Finland. For text of treaty, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. III, p. 6. Also, see telegram 70, October 15, 1920, from Helsingfors, and note 206, March 11, 1921, from the Finnish Minister in the United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. II, pp. 256 and 257, respectively.

7. On condition of acceptance by the Finnish side of the stated above six terms, the Soviet Government considers it possible to waive its rights to the lease of Hango and its region in favor of Finland without any compensation."

APRIL 1, 1944.

740.00119 European War/2419 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 3, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:43 p. m.]

304. (1) I called today on Foreign Minister Ramsay at his request.

(2) He told me that Finnish representatives Dr. Paasikivi and Mr. Carl Enckell, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, had returned from Moscow on Saturday, April 1, with modified peace terms presented by Soviet Union. These terms were "technically impractical" and still quite difficult. They would be presented to caucus of various party groups in Diet tonight and these meetings would appear on a time [appropriate?] for a plenary session of Diet to consider the terms. I asked when this meeting might take place and if Ramsay thought it probably would not occur until after Easter.²

(3) I told him I would not inquire further about the peace terms since I assumed my Government was informed. He said he had some hesitancy in giving them himself since he was afraid to have them telegraphed (as Department is aware Finnish Government suspects our ciphers are compromised) but that he thought he would have more to say to me tomorrow and asked me to call in the morning about an appointment. He did mention that Russians asked for an indemnity of \$600,000,000. This he confirmed was a figure cited in American dollars but to be payable in goods. I asked what proportion this represented of national income and he gave me off-hand a figure for national income of 25 billion marks, which is so improbably low that I shall confirm it tomorrow. In 1943 one estimate of national income was 31 billion; this was at prewar standards of money; presumably today's figure is much higher. (He said the indemnity represented the whole value of Finnish exports in a good year.) This again seems inaccurate; according to Bank of Finland, in 1942, the best year between 1937 and 1942, exports were placed at 11,723,000,000; at legal rate of about 50 marks to dollar. This far below indemnity figure given by Dr. Ramsay.

(4) In reply to a question he said the Government at least did not contemplate making a recommendation to Diet about terms. He did not care to commit himself about them.

² Easter Sunday was on April 9.

(5) I took the opportunity to say that my Government's view as to the necessity of negotiation remained same and that we hoped Finland would seize opportunity of the new contact to get rid of its association with Germany. I left with Foreign Minister an *aide-mémoire* in sense of Department's 89.³

(6) I asked if Germans remained quiescent and repeated warning hint in Stockholm's 1012, March 24,⁴ without mentioning sources. Dr. Ramsay appeared unconcerned and said Germans had done nothing so far. America would agree, he thought, that Finland had taken great risks in cause of peace and done all it could do even to extent of sending delegates to Moscow.

(7) I remarked that secret of Moscow visit had been well kept and Dr. Ramsay expressed his pleasure that it had. He asked me when I heard public rumors about it and I told him on Saturday morning, day negotiators returned. In spite of negative attitude taken at outset of interview as in paragraph 2 above, Dr. Ramsay seemed more cheerful than I had yet seen him. Whether this was "because he had done all he could do" or because he had more tangible grounds for hope I do not know. (65 repeats this to Stockholm.)

GULLION

760D.61/1708

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)*⁵

[WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1944.

The British Embassy has made available to us the following information regarding the Soviet-Finnish negotiations:

1. The Swedish Government considers that the Soviet terms regarding treatment of German troops and the indemnity to be paid by Finland to be impossible of fulfillment and therefore the Swedish Government cannot recommend Finnish acceptance of the Soviet offer.

2. The British Government has expressed to the Soviet Government the view that it would be regrettable if the indemnity provision were to cause a breakdown of the present negotiations and has inquired whether in order to bring about a settlement the Soviet Government would if necessary be prepared to reduce the indemnity figure which

³ Dated April 2, 1944, not printed; it instructed the Chargé to inform the Finnish Government that the United States Government "reiterates the hope that the Finnish Government will lose no opportunity to bring these new exchanges of views [between the Finnish and Soviet Governments] to a successful conclusion for the purpose of terminating Finland's association with Germany and participation in the war." (740.00119 European War/2413)

⁴ Not printed; it reported that German forces, supported by a Finnish Army group, were prepared to overthrow the Finnish Government (860d.01/180).

⁵ Addressed to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) and to the Secretary of State.

now stands at \$600,000,000 worth of goods spread over five years (this amount will cover at least 75 percent and possibly 100 percent of the total value of Finnish exports during the five-year period).

3. The British Government has given the Soviet Government an intimation of its concern lest the Soviet demand for goods from Finland interfere with the supply to Britain of timber, wood pulp and paper which Britain will badly need both during the war and the reconstruction period.

4. The British Government has reserved certain points with respect to British interests in Finland particularly its expectation that compensation will be paid to the British owners of the nickel mine in the Petsamo region should the territory in which this mine is located be ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union.

HUGH S. CUMMING, JR.

740.00119 European War 1939/2449: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 9, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:48 p. m.]

314. 1. John Scott, Stockholm correspondent of *Time* and *Life* yesterday had 4-hour interview with Dr. Paasikivi. We had consulted beforehand and he had agreed to give me report of interview which is summarized below. Scott has agreed with Paasikivi not to publish anything before showing it to him.

2. Although talks were "not pleasant", Paasikivi and Enckell were well received by Molotov⁶ and Dekanosov.⁷ Molotov was personally charming and was confident of Russian victory. The three talks lasted altogether 5½ hours.

3. In last talk Molotov presented as "absolutely final terms" concessions which allowed Finns to retain Hango in exchange for Petsamo; and changed formula about Germans from internment to expulsion. These terms were described by Molotov as basis of final peace, not mere armistice. He claimed furthermore that terms were unanimous since 1939 talks⁸ had broken down over Hango. Paasikivi believed Molotov sincerely thought terms were liberal.

4. Paasikivi told Molotov that Finland would never have gotten into 1941 war except possibly on Russian side had Russia not attacked Finland in '39. Molotov reported to have replied why then did Finns not accept terms in November, a reply which according to Paasikivi indicated abandonment of Russian thesis that Finland attacked Soviet.

⁶ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanosov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁸ For correspondence relating to the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in the fall of 1939, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 952 ff.

5. Paasikivi twice mentioned Atlantic Charter⁹ and Molotov declared that Charter was signed in summer of '41 while Soviet Finnish frontiers were fixed in '40. Atlantic Charter not meant to be retroactive.

6. Limits set by Russia for evacuation of Karelia and expulsion of Germans were reasonable but were already being approached. Paasikivi felt, however, that Russians would be reasonable on this point and would date time limit from time of final Finnish-Russian agreement if one is reached. He was not optimistic but if Diet on Wednesday¹⁰ decided to accept terms as basis of continued negotiations agreement would be reached in a week. Paasikivi would not, however, return to Moscow unless agreement in principle were reached.

7. Indemnity of 600 million dollars was outrageous but Paasikivi thought that there again Russians would negotiate. They knew it would take 50 to 60 divisions to conquer Finland and that bitter Partisan fighting would continue. He told Molotov so but latter was already aware of it. Paasikivi thinks Russians will bargain on points where prestige not involved.

[8.] Russian terms presented to Finnish party groups in fairly unbiased manner. Tanner gave terms to Social Democratic Party but he is of course opposed to peace on any terms except Russian unconditional surrender (jest by Dr.).¹¹ Linkomies and Ramsay also want peace but better terms. Also Mannerheim whom Paasikivi has seen often since return, but he may have trouble with Army.

9. Feared by Paasikivi is that indemnity issue may bring about negative reaction by Diet on all points and Russia will lose patience. In that case Finns could expect some months before offensive starts but no more negotiation.

10. If terms impressed Finns favorably Germans could be got out without difficulty. But if terms insufficiently favorable pro-German minority here might engineer coup. This Paasikivi explained to Molotov. He also dwelt on contribution to world peace and goodwill toward Russians would be made if Russia was not too firm with little Finland and fact that she did not risk prestige by magnanimity to small state. Molotov only shook his head which saddened Paasikivi, and as he explained to Scott caused him to wonder if Russians really wanted peace with Finland or wanted to treat her like Baltic countries.¹² He recalled his experience as Minister in Moscow after '39

⁹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. The Soviet Union adhered to the Charter on September 24, 1941; see bracketed note, *ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁰ April 12.

¹¹ The parenthetical text probably was intended to read, in full, "A jest by Dr. Paasikivi."

¹² For correspondence on United States interest in the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

when Russians broke agreements in spirit, intervened in Finnish affairs, et cetera.

11. It is said in Moscow that Stalin is seriously ill.

12. Dr. Paasikivi asked Scott why the devil Americans kept urging Finns by radio to accept terms. He understood that we could not take commitments in Finland's needing support of 4,000,000 soldiers so why then did we interfere as with our broadcasts which assumed some responsibility.

13. He believed the peace already lost and that small nations are going to be cheated after war. In 20 years there will be war between Russia and Anglo-Saxon coalition. Russia won't be entirely at fault. Their policy to Finland resembles England's policy with Malaya or Ireland and ours toward Latin America. Perhaps if Finland were a great power it would do the same things but he hoped not.

GULLION

740.00119 European War 1939/2465 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 12, 1944—midnight.

[Received April 13—8:19 a. m.]

322. Diet today rejected Soviet terms in session practically identical with that of March 15.

Government's presentation of case¹³ indicated a desire to continue negotiations for more favorable terms and in proceeding to order of day without a recorded vote Diet approved of Government's action. Dr. Ramsay has promised to give me text of Finnish reply when drafted.

Repeated to Stockholm as our 75.

GULLION

740.00119 European War 1939/2501 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 19, 1944—noon.

[Received April 20—9:45 a. m.]

336. Dr. Ramsay this morning gave me Finnish text of Finnish reply to Russian terms as communicated to Dr. Paasikivi on March 21 [29]. With some hesitation he gave me an English trans-

¹³ In telegram 354, April 26, 1944, the Chargé reported part of the statement that Prime Minister Linkomies had made to the Diet: "The Government has decided unanimously . . . that it cannot accept the conditions presented. . . . While it is true that no assurance can be offered that circumstances would be such that better conditions might be obtained in the future, nevertheless we cannot be persuaded by fear of unfavorable developments to agree to conditions disastrous for the nation's existence." (740.00119 European War 1939/2529)

lation which he and I revised together. I promised I would make clear this translation was for purposes of convenient reference only and not to be considered official text. It follows in paraphrase.

"Russia's peace terms for Finland, which were transmitted in a more detailed form to Dr. Paasikivi and Mr. Enckell on March 29, have now been received by the Finnish Government.

These terms have been brought before the Diet and have been considered and examined by the Government. Acceptance of these terms, which for technical reasons alone could not be fulfilled would, it has been found, undermine and weaken fundamentally the existence of Finland as an independent country, imposing on Finland a burden far beyond its ability to support, according to unanimous expert opinion. Consequently Finland, still earnestly aiming at re-establishment of permanent and peaceful relations with its great neighbor to the east, after careful consideration of the terms, as now presented, regret that they do not offer opportunities for attaining this goal."

Finnish and English texts of this answer will be airmailed.¹⁴ Dr. Ramsay said he had not heard that reply had actually been handed over to Mme. Kollontay but he assumed it had since he had not heard to contrary. He then read to me with own comments a memorandum [describing the] difficulties of terms, which forms section II of this telegram.

Foreign Minister described memorandum which follows as statement from "purely Finnish" point of view of reasons which made peace on terms of March 29 impossible. These Finnish views have been represented in Legation's previous telegrams but is desired to point out relative emphasis placed on war indemnity demanded. Memorandum follows, extensively paraphrased.

1. For technical reasons it will be impossible to withdraw Finnish troops to frontier of '40 by end of April or within 30 days. Furthermore as in '40, some 300,000 persons or the entire civil population of evacuated regions would move to western Finland with all their property at same time as troops.

2. In addition to these persons the 150,000 people who had already left Karelia and who have been unable return would lose their homes. All of these displaced Karelians left home in '40 of their own free will thus testifying to their desire to remain Finnish, and if situation should again arise there is no doubt that they would once more present same unmistakable manifestation that proposed territorial changes are not in accordance with wishes of people involved. Furthermore there would be lost in purely Finnish territory to be ceded, natural waterways, the Saima Canal and the whole of the rail and road system of eastern Finland.

3. Finland would be left no opportunity to defend itself in midst of continuing war if Finnish Army is demobilized as proposed and

¹⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2725, April 19, 1944, from Helsinki; not printed.

this at a time when defenses of all neutral countries will be strengthened. Finland cannot permit foreign intervention at any particular time as to degree of demobilization. Principle of sovereignty would be infringed by such intervention.

4. Finland's economic capacity is not sufficient to provide the 600 million dollar war reparations demanded by Russia. This indemnity would be all the more crushing when it is taken into account that cession of Karelia would mean loss of about 15 percent of Finland's exports. For a period of 5 years almost all of Finland's export trade as it was before the war in the best years would be committed to payment of reparations. Exact burden of indemnity cannot be definitively estimated since there is no preliminary determination of prices of goods in which it is to be paid. Finland's economic life would be placed under external control by reason of fact that Russia could require delivery and stipulate cost of merchandise. The country would be led to economic peonage when account is taken of total sum in question. People's standard of living would be forced down by indemnity and Finland's path to economic advancement and better standards of labor would be definitely barred.

5. Gustav Cassel the well-known Swedish economist declared in *Svenska Dagbladet* of April 8 that he was filled with deepest concern at news of Russian war reparations demands of Finland. People of Finland would be most heavily stricken and they would also be deprived, for at least a whole generation, of economic health.

5. [6.] Finland's only ocean port is Petsamo which is of greatest importance as was proved in '40 and '41. Economic incorporation of Petsamo with Finland and its development has entailed heavy sacrifices for country. Solely for purposes of territorial aggrandizement Soviet Union now demands Petsamo.

6. [7.] Foundation of freedom and independence of Finland would be undermined by conditions set by Russia as stated above. Terms include conditions which cannot possibly be achieved."

In reviewing this memorandum with me Dr. Ramsay pointed out first the references to self-determination principle in paragraph 2, saying that right of small peoples to live in territories bounded by limits of their own choice had been frequently expressed in course of war. (I have reason to believe that this memorandum as first drafted included references to Atlantic Charter.)

When I had finished reading memorandum Dr. Ramsay asked me what I thought and I said that this was as he had stated the "purely Finnish point of view" and pointed out that it contained no reference to Finland's association with Germans, which was of greatest concern to our Government. I added that I would not venture an opinion on terms myself nor on findings in Finnish memorandum.

Dr. Ramsay replied to my point about Germans by saying that situation was indeed very complicated but that purpose of memorandum was to show that even if German question were disregarded terms still meant something like oblivion for Finland. He recalled

that he had some time previously asked my predecessor¹⁵ if our Government's attitude toward Finland would be the same if once Germans had left country Finns were to continue to fight Russians. I said that as far as I knew our views were still those expressed in my *aide-mémoire* of January 31.

Dr. Ramsay insisted on crushing nature of Soviet terms and I repeated that I had no opinion on terms but that average man in America probably wondered what Finland had to gain by rejecting them, pointing out our Government's view that Finland would have to accept the consequences. Dr. Ramsay said that it was easy enough for average man in America or for that matter in Stockholm to say to Finland to go ahead and surrender but that it was very, very complicated.

He confirmed that memorandum which he gave me was for our Government and not for dissemination. He also said that there would probably not be a communiqué about Finnish reply for some days at least until Russian reaction was known. As I left I repeated that I would not undertake to express any opinion on memorandum but would transmit it to Department.

To Stockholm as my 79.

GULLION

740.00119 European War/2514

The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On April 19, the Soviet Government has received through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden the reply of the Finnish Government to the Soviet terms of armistice of the following contents:

[Here follows text of the Finnish reply, substantially as it was reported in telegram 336 of April 19, *supra*.]

The Soviet Government intends to give the Finnish Government the following reply:

"The Soviet Government has received on April 19 the answer of the Finnish Government to the Soviet terms of armistice, transmitted in Moscow to the Finnish delegation, composed of Messers. Paasikivi and Enkel [*Enckell*].

"The Soviet Government takes into consideration that the Finnish Government in its reply has rejected the Soviet terms of armistice, as basis for negotiations and has ceased armistice negotiations."

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1944.

¹⁵ Robert M. McClintock.

740.00119 European War 1939/2518 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 24, 1944—noon.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

1416. With reference to Vyshinski's¹⁶ statements on the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, published in the Soviet press on April 23,¹⁷ to the effect that the most difficult question for the Finnish Government had been the demand to intern or expel the German troops in Finland and to break off relations with Germany rather than the question of reparations, the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires¹⁸ has told an officer of the Embassy that these statements do not correspond to the report given to him by Paasikivi when he was in Moscow. Paasikivi had told him that at the first meeting with the Russians, Molotov had asked what the Finnish attitude was toward the proposal to intern the German troops in Finland, to which Paasikivi had replied that if agreement could be reached on the other points he did not think that this particular one would prevent their reaching an agreement. He said the Soviets had been very tough at the first meeting but had later made concessions including that concerning the possibility of expelling rather than interning German troops.

Paasikivi had made it clear to the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires that he considered the Soviet reparation demand the greatest obstacle to Finnish acceptance of the Soviet terms. He said that the Finns had expected a demand of around 200 million dollars but that the Soviet demand of 600 million was equivalent to very near the entire value of Finnish exports for a period of 5 years.

I understand that the British Government, upon learning of the Soviet terms, expressed to the Soviet Government its opinion that the reparations demanded were too high. Although the amount demanded is doubtless very high from the Finnish point of view, the amount is so small when considered in relation to the importance of Finland's withdrawal from the war that it would seem exceedingly unfortunate if this relatively small amount of money were allowed to determine the important issues at stake. It would be helpful if I could be informed of any view the Department may have formed of this matter.

HARRIMAN

¹⁶ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

¹⁷ On April 22 Vyshinsky held a press conference in Moscow and announced the termination of Soviet-Finnish peace talks, recounting the series of diplomatic exchanges which had begun in February and citing seven major Soviet conditions to Finland; see *Izvestiya*, April 23, 1944, p. 1, or *New York Times*, April 23, 1944, p. 1.

¹⁸ Ingemar Hägglöf, who was First Secretary of the Swedish Legation.

711.60D/303a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1944.

Despite the efforts which this Government has made during the past two years to impress upon the Finns the importance of arriving at a peace settlement with the Soviet Union and the danger of continued collaboration with Germany, the Finnish Government has now rejected the Soviet peace offer with no request to continue negotiations. There now seems little prospect that the present Finnish Government will reopen negotiations before it is too late to do so. There also seems to be no prospect of the Soviet Government giving to the Finns new terms at this time.

As we have exhausted all other means at our disposal to influence Finland I believe you will now want to consider breaking diplomatic relations. A break at this time would, in my opinion, weaken the authority of the present Finnish Government and in the long run strengthen the hand of the peace activists in Finland even though one immediate result of the break might be the replacement of the present Government by one even more Nazi collaborationist. I am sure that a break would be well received in the Soviet Union and obviously it would also reduce the chances of United States involvement in the final settlement which must take place between Finland and the Soviet Union. Certain sections of our populations, however, particularly Finnish-Americans and other elements whose backgrounds are rooted in the smaller nations of Eastern Europe, might feel that our reaction resulted solely from Soviet pressure. On the other hand, not to break relations in the face of the recent Finnish action would be interpreted as signs of indecision on our part and of lack of unity of purpose among the major allies.

If you approve of the break,¹⁹ I suggest that we bring it about very shortly after the issuance of the Anglo-American-Soviet declaration²⁰ regarding the German satellite nations which I anticipate will be issued in a few days.

In the event of a break, I also propose for security reasons to segregate the Finnish Legation staff until their departure from this country.

¹⁹ President Roosevelt's reply reached Secretary Hull about May 18 and was to the effect that no action should be taken for the time being.

²⁰ The Declaration by the American, British, and Soviet Governments Regarding the Four Axis Satellites was made on May 12, 1944. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1944, p. 425.

740.00119 European War 1939/2609 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, May 15, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 16—8:52 a. m.]

392. 1. On Sunday May 14, before leaving Stockholm for Helsinki I talked with Vinogradov, First Secretary of Soviet Legation in Stockholm.

2. He made three observations which may be of some interest to Department:

a. During negotiations in Moscow in March M. Dekanozov told Mr. Paasikivi that if Finns did not desire Russian assistance in expelling German troops they were free to call on American or even British troops also or [*sic*] instead of Red Army. (I have not heard from any other source that such assurance was given and do not know how well informed my Russian colleague is.)

b. He claimed also that "the Swedes" had told Russians in Sweden that a new approach by Finns might be expected. He was eager to hear from me when such an effort might be made and I could only tell him that I had no information that any approach was planned, but that I did not exclude the possibility.

c. In studying causes of failure of peace negotiations Russians in Stockholm were agreed on three principal explanations: First, extreme German pressure including virtual German ultimatum which he claimed had been delivered; second, Finnish feeling that indemnity payments were too heavy; third, longstanding pro-German orientation of Finnish thought.

I do not know how reliable Vinogradov's observations may be. He appears to speak English somewhat better than he understands it. Stockholm may be able to give better idea of his reliability.

To Stockholm as my 98.

GULLION

740.0011 European War 1939/34488 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 6, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received June 6—10:13 p. m.]

442. 1. News of invasion²¹ was to Helsinki a partial release from the tension which has developed for several months. In this Finns' reactions were probably similar to those to be found in Allied countries and in many quarters there was even the same pleasure at Allied landings, so great are fond hopes based on presence of Allied troops in Europe. Newspapers issued extra bulletins and papers with quite

²¹ The invasion on June 6 of the northern coast of France by Allied armies.

fair coverage and radio broadcasts from American station in Europe and from BBC were eagerly heard. There was however no great excitement and no particular military measures seem to have been taken although people with whom I talked were keenly interested in prospect of landings in Denmark and Norway.

2. General Lundquist, Chief of Finnish Air Force, probably most defeatist general I ever met but courageous in his views, called news beginning of end. He is for peace even at a very great price and I believe would have accepted Moscow terms of March. He said at noon there had been as yet no particular activity on Russian fronts except slight air reconnaissance activity. General thought principal obstacle to Allied penetration in Baltic was not German Air Force nor mines but Stalin. He thinks Mediterranean will be principal theater. General informed me this morning that on Mannerheim's birthday celebration at a dinner for about 50 high officers, President Ryti definitely indicated just efforts to arrive at an accommodation with Russia were still under way. He gave no other details.

4. [3.] Erkko²² former Foreign Minister referred to feelings of relief among the people described above. He said he believed Government had made some further contacts with Russia since failure in March but that it had so far met with no success.

My 123 repeats this to Stockholm; No. 21 to London.

GULLION

740.00119 European War 1939/2694

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has considered the *Aide-mémoire* of June 5, 1944 from the British Embassy²³ in which it is suggested, in view of the changed circumstances, that the question of the surrender terms for Finland be referred for discussion to the European Advisory Commission.²⁴ It is noted that the British Government has requested the Soviet Government to provide the draft terms which would then become the basis for consideration by the European Advisory Commission.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of the Commission's terms of reference,²⁵ the American Government has no objection to this procedure and will instruct its representative²⁶ on the Commission in this sense.

²² Eljas Erkko, newspaper editor in Helsinki.

²³ Not printed.

²⁴ For correspondence regarding the participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

²⁵ Annex 2 of the Secret Protocol of the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, dated November 1, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 756.

²⁶ John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom, was also United States Representative to the European Advisory Commission.

In as much as the United States is not at war with Finland, it is not anticipated that the American representative on the Commission will participate actively in the formulation of the surrender terms for Finland. Consideration by the Commission, however, will provide a convenient method of keeping this Government informed of developments on this question.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1944.

760D.61/6-1344

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld*²⁷

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1944.

The Counselor of the Finnish Legation, Mr. Urho Toivola, called at my residence last night and discussed the news of the latest Soviet offensive on the Finnish front.²⁸

Mr. Toivola expressed the view that if and when the Russians reach the main Finnish defense line they would require very large masses of troops to break it, perhaps as many as fifty divisions. The marshes and lakes make this line especially defensible in summer. Mr. Toivola was in doubt as to the purpose of the Russian offensive in these circumstances. He suggested that, in view of the effect on other sectors of the Russian-German front of any such large diversion of Russian troops, it might not be the intention of the Russian High Command to force these operations through the main Finnish defense line but rather to bring about a situation of such potential pressure on the Finnish Government that a settlement would become possible without a final military decision.

He thought, however, that the action was susceptible of still another interpretation, assuming that the present offensive on the Finnish lines was intended to be final. This interpretation is that the Russians desire to establish control over all the areas on their western border formerly in Russian territory in advance of their final all-out assault on the Germans, this on the theory that by resuming possession of all such territory they could present their western Allies with a *fait accompli* in respect of these territories and so minimize dissension between the Soviet Union and the western Allies as to the small states in this area.

Mr. Toivola expressed the view that the occupation of eastern European territory by Russian forces after the victory over Germany

²⁷ Mr. Schoenfeld, Minister to Finland, had left Finland in December 1942, and did not return, being assigned to the Department of State in Washington.

²⁸ Finnish military headquarters announced that on June 9, Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus had begun "a general offensive supported by very strong artillery action and by strong air formations." (740.0011 European War 1939/-34594)

would create a very different state of affairs in territory so occupied from that which would prevail in those European areas which would be occupied by the western Allies following the defeat of Germany; and he had no doubt that all the eastern satellites of Germany would already be out of the war if they were not aware of this difference in their future status as compared with the condition of those European countries which will be occupied by the western Allies.

Mr. Toivola also expressed the opinion that, following Finland's rejection of the latest unacceptable Russian peace terms, public feeling in Finland had again hardened into a determination to resist the Soviet Union at any cost. *It was now hoped, however, that Finland could hold out on its main defense line until the defeat of Germany, whereafter the western Allies, believed by the Finns to be disposed to maintain Finnish independence, might make such views prevail over Russian plans for the absorption of Finland.*

Mr. Toivola, speculating on the effects of a possible Russian breakthrough at the main line of Finnish defense, thought that Swedish preparations to receive 1,000,000 Finnish refugees, as recently reported from Stockholm, were quite warranted. A mass exodus from Finland to Sweden in the event indicated would certainly take place, provided the Russians did not cut off the sea route over the gulf of Bothnia or the land route around the head of that Gulf. He thought Finnish strategy in this eventuality would involve the defense of a bridge-head on the Gulf of Bothnia of sufficient size to facilitate such an exodus.

Mr. Toivola alluded to the Department's recent statement,²⁹ following the reported suppression of a newspaper in Helsinki, to the effect that the present Finnish Government is pro-German, and inquired whether this unprecedented statement was the prelude to a rupture in Finnish-American relations. I answered that I had no such information but expressed the personal opinion that a rupture of relations remained a possibility.

H. F. ARTHUR SCHOENFELD

701.60D11/673b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (Gullion)

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1944—4 p. m.

117. See Department's telegram no. 116, June 15, 6 p. m.³⁰ It is expected that Procopé, Vahervuori, Toivola and Solanko will be

²⁹ On June 11 the Department issued a statement assailing the ban by the Finnish Government of the newspaper *Svenska Pressen* as a pro-German act; see the *New York Times*, June 11, 1944, p. 20. In telegram 448, June 6, 1944, the Chargé in Finland reported that the Finnish Government had "decided to forbid until further notice publication of the paper *Svenska Pressen*." (860d.911/34)

³⁰ Not printed.

given their passports at 5 p. m., EWT,³¹ today, June 16.³² As soon as you have been informed definitely that this action has been taken you should seek an appointment with the Foreign Minister or other appropriate official and inform him as follows:

Mr. Hjalmar J. Procopé, Mr. T. O. Vahervuori, Mr. Urho Toivola and Mr. Risto Solanko because of activities inimical to the interests of the United States have been found by my Government to be *personae non gratae*. They have been handed their passports and requested to leave the United States as soon as safe conducts and other travel arrangements for themselves and their families can be made.

This action does not constitute a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries and accordingly the Finnish Legation in Washington may remain open for the conduct of business.³³ The Legation will still enjoy code privileges.

You may add that Mr. Procopé and the other persons concerned in this action together with their families will be accorded all possible courtesies and protection.

You should not venture to speculate either personally or otherwise in your conversation on the nature of the activities of the persons mentioned which have led to their dismissal by this Government.

Sent to Helsinki, repeated to Moscow, Stockholm and London for information.

HULL

701.60D11/672: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 18, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 3:45 p. m.]

474. 1. The dismissal of the Finnish diplomats in Washington came as a dismal shock to the Finns, many of whom found in it an added bitterness to the death struggle in which they are now plunged.

2. The Foreign Minister called me to see him in the morning, after I had received text of Department's press release³⁴ but before receipt of Department's 117 of June 16. He had as yet received no wire from Procopé and asked me for confirmation of the news. I told him of contents of Department's release. Later in the day, I was able to give to a Foreign Office official the more detailed information in Department's telegram in reference. There was no comment from the Foreign Office men except that they could not imagine what the "inimical

³¹ Eastern War Time.

³² The decision was carried out that day as expected.

³³ The Secretary of Legation, Alexander Thesleff, was appointed Chargé d'Affaires on June 19, and accepted by the Secretary of State on June 23, 1944.

³⁴ Department of State *Bulletin*, June 17, 1944, p. 565.

activities" of the Finnish diplomats could have been. I did not speculate on these.

3. The news was too late for morning papers of the 17th but afternoon press carried it prominently without comment. It was pointed out in some news stories that diplomatic staffs of USA in Finland and of Finland in America were now brought to numerical equality. Other stories "including a United Press despatch from Washington" pointed out that technically Finland could ask the *agrément* of a new Minister.

4. Erkko, former Foreign Minister, who called on me apparently after consulting Foreign Office, tried to sound me on latter possibility. I was noncommittal but skeptical. He seemed distressed at our *dé-marche* and wondered what we hoped to achieve by it or what point we wished to make with the Finns that was not already clear to them. He said the feeling in Helsinki was bitter and that if our move was intended to weaken Finns' resistance, the contrary effect might be expected and the suicide temper intensified. He went over USA-Finnish relations since Winter War, referred to similar ideals of America and Finland . . . The Finnish point of view which Erkko expresses seems to be that we are hitting a man while he is down.

On the other hand, a member of opposition active for peace last March also called on me and said he understood our move but was saddened by it.

5. I believe it very unlikely that there will be any retaliatory action by Finnish Government since symbolic presence of American Legation is probably more important to Finns than ever. I anticipate a tightening up of police control and restrictions already in effect but loosely applied. Since I have been here, and I believe for most of the last year, these measures have been conspicuously relaxed in favor of this Legation. For instance, I have sometimes had to insist on applying for required travel permits as a question of principle. In this connection Ramsay asked me if the protection accorded to Finnish diplomats according to news from Washington meant a further curtailment of their movements. I would be pleased to have any information on this point.

6. Some weeks ago when Britain announced its restriction on diplomatic correspondence, I was discussing this with Ramsay and wondered if other countries would retaliate. Foreign Minister said sadly that if there were one thing his experience in last few years had taught him, it was that small nations could not indulge in retaliation. I believe [this?] philosophy will govern him now.

Repeated to Stockholm as my 134 and to London as my 25.

740.00119 European War 1939/2702 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 25, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 11:09 p. m.]

503. Stockholm please transmit code text this message to Department as my 503 Niact,³⁵ US Urgent. Not otherwise necessarily Niact for Stockholm.

In view of inability to get anything but evasive answers on Ribbentrop's presence³⁶ I called on highest authority who confirmed his visit and said that he came on his own initiative without Finnish invitation. As to Finland's course of action he claims that this is undecided. Project described in my secret 491, June 22,³⁷ said not to have materialized because soundings resulted in terms amounting to capitulation.³⁸ My impression is that within a very short time Finland will reaffirm its solidarity with Germany. I did not fail to indicate to Foreign Minister impression this would cause in United States. I explained to him, however, that I was speaking without instructions.

Repeated to Stockholm as my 151.

GULLION

740.00119 EW/2708 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 27, 1944—5 a. m.

[Received June 27—12:15 a. m.]

2296. After Johnston³⁹ withdrew I had the opportunity this evening to bring up with Marshal Stalin direct the subject regarding Finland raised in the Department's cable 1550 June 24, 10 p. m.⁴⁰

The Marshal stated that he did not believe at the present time any action on the part of the United States would be of any value. He

³⁵ Night action.

³⁶ The Chargé had reported in telegram 502, that day, that German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki on June 23. The actual arrival date was later reported as June 22; see telegram 515, June 27, from Helsinki, p. 605.

³⁷ Not printed; it informed the Department that a proposed new Finnish Government would undertake to end immediately Finland's co-belligerency with Germany, and that soundings to this effect had already been made with the Russians in Stockholm (740.00119EW1939/2695).

³⁸ The response of the Soviet Government to the eleventh-hour Finnish overture was that Finland must "capitulate". Some details of these final, unsuccessful Finnish-Soviet exchanges can be found in despatch 3630, July 1, 1944, from Stockholm, not printed. (740.0019EW/7-144)

³⁹ Eric Johnston, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, who was visiting the Soviet Union during June 1944.

⁴⁰ Not printed; it informed the Ambassador in the Soviet Union of the reported plans in Finland for a new government and for peace overtures to the Soviet Government (860D.01/6-2444).

explained that the controlling members of the Finnish Government were under complete domination of the Germans, the agents of Hitler. They were not thinking of the interests of the Finnish people. At the instigation of the Finns, Boheman had approached Madame Kolontay asking for the resumption of peace negotiations. The Soviet Government had replied that they would receive representatives of the Finnish Government after they had received a written statement from the President or the Foreign Minister that they were prepared to surrender. A week had gone by and no reply.

I said that we had heard from our Chargé in Helsinki there was a possibility of a change in government under Ramsay's leadership. Stalin replied "these are only rumors". He continued that the Finns have deceived the Swedes who though honest themselves have misled other people.

In reply to my further question he indicated he did not feel that assurances either to the Government or to the people that the Soviet Government would not swallow up Finland would be of any avail now. At one time in the conversation he stated that it was for the President and the United States Government to decide what course of action they wished to take regarding Finland and I got the impression that, in spite of his pessimism, he would not resent our giving informal indications to the Finns, if it is desired to do so, of our understanding of Soviet policy toward Finnish independence as outlined in your cable. I would appreciate being informed of your decision and any action taken.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/6-2744 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 27, 1944.

[Received June 27—11:45 p. m.]

514. Following is communiqué issued 8 o'clock tonight:

"The German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop has concluded his visit to the Finnish Government.

During this visit questions of interest to Finland and Germany were discussed, especially Finland's expressed desire with respect to military aid. The German Government has declared itself prepared to comply with this wish of the Finnish Government.

The discussions which were conducted between the President of the Finnish Republic Ryti and Foreign Minister Ramsay on one side and the German Foreign Minister on the other, are sustained by the spirit which has its roots in the comradeship in arms between the armies and the existing friendship between the two peoples.

Complete agreement and understanding were reached on all points between the Finnish Government and the German Government."

GULLION

860D.01/6-2744 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 27, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received June 28—1:11 a. m.]

515. See my 514. 1. The communiqué issued tonight represents a decision which Diet has not had opportunity to pass. It looks as if Government perhaps under German pressure failed to bring matter to test when it appeared that substantial opposition might appear.⁴¹

2. It is reported that Germans promised 6 to 7 divisions. A division and perhaps 2 armored brigades, miscellaneous troops and marines are here now. One division is the 122nd. Vehicles seen in street are camouflaged in light tan and gray desert style and bear an emblem of either a talon or a griffin volant. Horse-drawn vehicles and artillery teams common.

[3.] Apparently Finnish Government claim actually to have decided to break with Germany. My 492⁴² was given me by Foreign Office as from Government with reserve that Minister could not be mentioned. Then between Monday and Tuesday hesitation of headquarters prevented developments and on Thursday Ribbentrop arrived and achieved his usual success. Social Democrats are expected to withdraw Ministers from Government and Swedish Party contemplating some action but remains to be seen if they will stick to their guns.

4. Minor officials but not major ones now admit that decisions are influenced by fear of German strength. I think it can effectively be said that last lingering hope that Finland has liberty of action has vanished and that case for rupture of relations exists. Anticipate that Finns will claim that they sounded Russians and got answers which to them were tantamount to unconditional surrender. This was told me by Foreign Minister in last interview.

Repeated to Stockholm as my 157.

GULLION

⁴¹ On the basis of information received from the Swedish Government, the Minister in Sweden reported in telegram 2335, June 27, 1944, "that Finnish Government, faced with action of Social Democratic Swedish Peoples, and Progressive Parties against yielding to Ribbentrop's demands, decided not to present question to Parliament [Diet] . . . and instead carried out a coup against the Parliament by accepting Ribbentrop's demands without reference to the Parliament and calling in German troops." (860D.01/6-2744)

⁴² Dated June 23, 1944, not printed; it reported that no new Finnish Government had been formed, presumably because of a failure by political parties and leading groups to agree on personalities, and because of time needed to obtain Soviet reactions to a possible Finnish peace move. (860D.01/197)

711.60D/6-2944

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1944.

The principal basis for maintaining diplomatic relations with Finland has been the hope that we might be able to bring about Finland's withdrawal from the war and from association with Germany. The Finnish Government has now, despite the last minute opposition of three important Finnish political parties and apparently without reference to the Finnish Parliament, entered into a hard and fast military association with Germany for the purpose of waging war. A copy of the Finnish official communiqué is attached.⁴³

From the standpoint of interests of the United States in the foreign field and our foreign relations I believe that we must take some concrete action as a result of the Finnish Government's decision. Two possible courses of action short of war are open to us:

1. A break in diplomatic relations.⁴⁴ Consideration of foreign affairs would dictate this course because it would seem to be more consistent with our publicly declared attitude toward Finnish collaboration with Nazi Germany including the Tripartite Declaration on Satellite Nations. Should you, however, decide that a definitive rupture of relations is too drastic a step at this time we could limit our action to

2. Withdrawal from Helsinki of our entire Legation staff without breaking diplomatic relations. In such case the Finnish Legation in Washington would remain open but for security reasons would be deprived of code communication with Helsinki.

I believe that whichever course of action is determined upon should be undertaken as soon as possible in order that public opinion may understand clearly that such action is a direct result of the Finnish Government's decision to bind itself to Germany.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

860D.01/6-2944 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (Gullion)

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1944—6 p. m.

133. President has directed severance of diplomatic relations with Finland. Formal notice will be communicated to Finnish Chargé here at 11 o'clock, Eastern War Time, morning of Friday, June 30. Acknowledge receipt of this telegram immediately. Burn all codes and confidential papers and destroy seals, etc. Then arrange to be

⁴³ See telegram 514, June 27, from Helsinki, p. 604.

⁴⁴ Mr. Hull wrote in the margin: "I favor this CH." Another marginal note, by Hugh S. Cumming, stated that the memorandum was "taken to the White House by the Secretary and approved by the President this morning. 29 June 1944."

received by highest Foreign Office official available at a time approximating proposed hour of notification to Finnish Chargé here. Say to Foreign Office official that United States has broken relations with Finland and that Swiss Government will represent American interests and the foreign interests now under your protection. You may say that further relations between the Government of the United States and the Government of Finland have become impossible as a result of the hard and fast military partnership with Nazi Germany which the Finnish Government has now formally admitted to the world.

You should ask that facilities be granted for you and the American members of your staff and their families to leave Finland for Sweden as soon as possible. We will arrange for return to Finland of Finnish Legation personnel and families here.

We believe that your standing instructions cover all eventualities but after break you might request Swiss Minister⁴⁵ to transmit messages for you through Swiss and American Legations in Stockholm.

Department highly commends you and all members of your staff for your faithful and efficient services during the past trying months.

Sent to Helsinki, repeated to Stockholm for secret information of Minister only.

HULL

711.60D/6-3044

The Secretary of State to the Finnish Chargé (Thesleff)

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1944.

SIR: On June 27, 1944, the Finnish Government made the following announcement:

[Here follows text of the Finnish-German communiqué, transmitted in telegram 514 of June 27, 1944, from Helsinki, page 604.]

The Finnish Government has thus formally admitted to the world that it has now entered a hard and fast military partnership with Nazi Germany irrevocable throughout the war, for the purpose of fighting the Allies of the United States, in alliance with the enemies of the United States. This action was taken without recourse to the established democratic procedure of Finland, and responsibility for the consequences must rest solely on the Finnish Government.

The American Government is not unaware of the fact that the infiltration of German troops into Finland, with the consent of the Finnish Government and German infiltration into the councils of the Finnish Government have deprived Finland of liberty of action and reduced the Government of the Republic of Finland to the condition of a puppet of Nazi Germany.

⁴⁵ Karl Egger.

This necessarily changes the status of the Finnish Government. The United States, up to the present, has taken every opportunity, publicly and through diplomatic representations, to warn the Finnish Government of the inevitable consequences of continuing its association with Nazi Germany. These warnings have been ignored, and the partnership is now complete.

The Government of the United States must take into account the fact that at this decisive stage in the combined operations of the military, naval and air forces of the United States and the other United Nations, the Finnish operations have a direct bearing on the success of the Allied effort. Notwithstanding the esteem in which the American people have held the people of Finland, further relations between the Government of the United States and the Government of Finland are now impossible.

The American Chargé d'Affaires in Helsinki has therefore been instructed to request passports for himself and for the members of his staff and their families.

The American Government is requesting the Swiss Government to assume immediately the representation of American interests in Finland.⁴⁶

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

**UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE ALLIED ARMISTICE WITH
FINLAND OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1944**

740.00119 EW/2694: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1944—11 a. m.

4570. British Embassy presented *Aide-mémoire* of June 5⁴⁷ suggesting that, in view of the changed circumstances, the question of surrender terms for Finland be referred to the European Advisory Commission,⁴⁸ particularly as there was no longer the same urgency in considering these terms and as the EAC is now better equipped to deal with such questions than it was three months ago. The communication pointed out that this procedure would be in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Commission's terms of reference.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Representation of American interests and custody of American Government assets were entrusted to the Swiss Legation on July 3, 1944; the American Legation's affairs were fully terminated on July 4.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ For correspondence regarding the participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

⁴⁹ Annex 2 of the Secret Protocol of the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, dated November 1, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 756.

According to the British note, the basis for discussion in the EAC would be provided by the draft terms which the Soviet Government has been asked to supply.

The Department has replied ⁵⁰ to this communication by stating that it has no objection to the proposed procedure and will so instruct its representative on the EAC.⁵¹ The Department's note concluded in stating that as the United States is not at war with Finland, it is not anticipated that the American representative will participate actively in the formulation of these surrender terms; discussion by the Commission will, however, provide a convenient means of keeping this Department informed of developments.

Sent to London as Department's 4570: Repeated for information only to Helsinki as No. 113 and to Moscow as No. 1462.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EAC/210: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 24, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 3:05 p. m.]

5031. Department's 4570, June 9, 9 [11] a. m. We inquired today at the Foreign Office concerning the status of the proposal that peace terms for Finland might be referred to the European Advisory Commission. Foreign Office said that about 2 weeks ago it instructed the British Ambassador in Moscow ⁵² to ask whether the Russians would be willing to have this question come before the Commission and to date no reply has been received from Moscow and at present the Foreign Office has no information regarding possible Russian peace terms for Finland.⁵³

WINANT

740.00119 EW/8-1444: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Acting Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 14, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 15—2:35 a. m.]

3094. Following information given me this afternoon by Mr. Assarsson,⁵⁴ Acting Secretary General Foreign Office:

⁵⁰ *Aide-mémoire* of June 8, to the British Embassy, p. 598.

⁵¹ John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom, was also United States Representative to the European Advisory Commission.

⁵² Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁵³ The question of surrender terms for Finland was not subsequently considered in the European Advisory Commission.

⁵⁴ Per Vilhelm G. Assarsson.

Gripenberg⁵⁵ returned yesterday from Helsinki. He saw Assarsson last night and informed him that Marshal Mannerheim⁵⁶ is definitely prepared to seek peace from Russia. Before making initial move however Finnish Government desires assurance (not in writing) from Swedish Government that certain minimum food requirements may be counted upon by Finland from Swedish Government. Principal item is bread grain of which Finland is said to have 2 months' supply. Finnish industrialist said to be expert in these matters arrived this afternoon by plane from Helsinki with Finnish Government's list which Assarsson informed me is an extensive one. As soon as arrangements have been completed with Swedish Government for necessary assurances Gripenberg is to return to Helsinki (Assarsson thinks Wednesday or Thursday⁵⁷ of this week) and will return to Stockholm quickly with instructions to contact Madame Kollontay⁵⁸ immediately. This Assarsson presumes will be done through the Swedes. Assarsson states that he has impressed on Gripenberg that the Finnish communication to the Russians should be in writing and signed by Marshal Mannerheim.

Finnish request for Swedish guarantee of certain minimum supplies is now before Swedish Government and Assarsson says there is no doubt the Swedes will do everything they possibly can. He said however that Finnish demands are extensive and that it may not be possible for Swedes to guarantee entire amounts of each item requested by Finns. Assarsson says that there is no doubt from Gripenberg's account that Mannerheim has made up his mind and that peace endeavor will be a genuine one. Finnish Government is afraid to take immediate action without this guarantee from Sweden because supplies still coming in small amounts from Germany will be immediately cut off. Germans it seems have made every [*very*] generous promises of food supplies to come through the ensuing months. Germans are reported to have made no threat to Mannerheim Government of action to follow a Finnish attempt to secure peace but through indirect channels have made it clear that if Mannerheim takes this step Germans will occupy Åland Islands and ports of Cosa and Bjorneborg. Assarsson seemed convinced from his talk with Gripenberg of genuineness of Finnish intentions but given the Finnish mentality and the many disillusionments the Swedes have already experienced in endeavoring to play the role of intermediary between Russia and Finland he said that he could not avoid feeling some apprehension that

⁵⁵ Georg A. Gripenberg, Finnish Minister to Sweden.

⁵⁶ Karl Gustav, Baron Mannerheim, President of Finland from August 4, 1944, succeeding Risto H. Ryti in conformity with a special law passed by the Finnish Diet on August 1. Concurrently Mannerheim served also as Commander in Chief of Finnish Defense Forces.

⁵⁷ August 16 or 17.

⁵⁸ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden.

Finns may find excuses to delay. Assarsson has been in consultation today with Mr. Gunther ⁵⁹ (who has also seen Gripenberg) with Minister of Commerce ⁶⁰ and Minister of Supply ⁶¹ and I gather that Swedish Government is proceeding to examine Finnish request with speed. There is no doubt in my mind that Swedes will press the Finns to action to the utmost of their ability and will do everything possible to assist Finland in meeting her immediate food necessities.

Mr. Assarsson also informed me that according to Gripenberg Finland will take action to break relations with Germany as soon as hostilities with Russians have ceased. Swedish Government has information (not from Finnish sources) that German forces in north Finland have already begun to move into Norway.

Mr. Assarsson impressed on me the necessity for utmost secrecy regarding this information which he said is known only to two or three members of the Government. He also requests that for the present it is not [to] be communicated to any of our missions abroad including Moscow. I gave him to understand that it would be for your information only.

JOHNSON

740.00119 EW/8-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 26, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

3179. For the President and the Secretary. Molotov ⁶² called the British Ambassador and myself over this evening to consult the British Ambassador and inform me as representing our respective Governments of developments in regard to Finland. Madame Kollontay had been approached in Stockholm by Gripenberg with a letter from the Finnish Foreign Minister ⁶³ asking whether the Soviet Government would receive representatives of the Finnish Government in Moscow to discuss a peace or armistice. In addition Gripenberg told Madame Kollontay that he had been instructed to inform her that Mannerheim had declared to Keitel ⁶⁴ that he did not feel himself

⁵⁹ Christian Günther, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁰ Herman Eriksson.

⁶¹ Axel Gjöres.

⁶² Vyacheslav Mihailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁶³ Carl J. Enckell, who had replaced Dr. C. Henrik Ramsay as Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 8, 1944, when a new Finnish Cabinet under Prime Minister Antti (Anders) V. Hackzell took office.

⁶⁴ Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces High Command of Germany.

bound by the agreement⁶⁵ which Ryti had concluded with Germany.

The Soviet Government proposed to make the following reply:

"On August 25 the Soviet Government received the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Karl Enkel, and the *note verbale* of the Finnish Minister in Stockholm. Gripenberg requested that a delegation of the Finnish Government be received in Moscow to negotiate an armistice or a peace.

The delegation of the Finnish Government can be received by the Soviet Government only in case the Finnish Government accepts the following preliminary terms: It must be publicly declared by the Finnish Government that it will break off relations with Germany; that it will demand that Germany evacuate its troops from Finland during a period of 2 weeks from the day of the acceptance of the present proposal of the Soviet Government by the Finnish Government and in any case no later than September 15, 1944 and that if Germany does not evacuate its troops from Finland within the period named, the German troops will be disarmed and handed over as prisoners of war to the Allies.

If these preliminary terms are fulfilled by the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government will be prepared to receive a delegation of the Finnish Government in Moscow in order to carry on negotiations for either or both a peace and an armistice."⁶⁶

Molotov said he had no more information.

He explained that the above were the Soviet Government's preliminary conditions and that the remaining terms would be negotiated in Moscow. He agreed to discuss promptly with the British Government through Clark Kerr the armistice terms including the British proposals to be presented to the Finns.

Before leaving the subject, he asked me whether I had any comment to make. In reply to my question, he expressed the belief that the Finns could disarm the Germans without the aid of the Red Army.

Are there any comments you wish me to make?

HARRIMAN

⁶⁵ The Finnish-German agreement of June 27, 1944; see telegram 514 of June 27, from Helsinki, p. 604.

⁶⁶ The Minister in Sweden reported in his telegram 3378 of August 30, that this Soviet reply was delivered to Finnish Minister Gripenberg in Stockholm at 9:30 p. m., August 29, by Madame Kollontay in the presence of her Counselor of Legation, Vladimir Semenovich Semenov, at the latter's villa. On the problem of German forces in Finland, this telegram, presumably based on information received from the Swedes, stated that the Soviet reply specified that "the Allies are prepared to take measures with respect to the German forces within Finnish territory" in order to disarm and intern them as prisoners of war if those forces do not withdraw from Finland within the time limit of September 15. (740.00119 E.W./8-3044) In a subsequent telegram, No. 3424 of September 1, the American Minister corrected this statement by reporting that the Soviet reply did not use the term "Allies" in that context; but he also reported that Gripenberg insisted that the term was so used by the Soviet representative in transmitting the reply to him on August 29 (740.00119 EW/9-144).

858.9111 RR/9-444 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, September 4, 1944.

[Received September 5—1:55 p. m.]

3469. Swedish and Finnish comment Finland. All Stockholm papers 3d. At secret session Finnish Diet 2d, Finnish Government proposed acceptance Russian terms preliminary to armistice discussions. At 23:00 Finnish time Premier made nation-wide radio address repeating himself in Swedish at 23:40, at which time broadcast was relayed over Swedish radio hookup. In substance Hackzell's speech follows:

Finnish Diet, which this evening has been convened in secret session, has considered matter of reestablishing peaceful relations with Soviet Union. Problem of peace to which Government throughout early part of year in vain sought solution has again come to forefront because of recent changes in political situation. Government therefore deemed it necessary once more submit matter to Diet for consideration. Since Diet last considered this matter⁶⁷ there's been change in Finnish military situation that can only be described as unexpectedly unfavorable and which has made it necessary reconsider situation.

In April this year military situation was favorable. During June, however, Soviet armies broke through on Karelian Isthmus and it was only with tremendous difficulties possible stabilize front on that sector. Because of this break-through it was necessary withdraw Finnish troops also from positions they had occupied for strategic reasons during 1941. But it was not only Finland that's met with reverses. Germany also has suffered reverses all fronts. It's ever more obvious Germany must change its tactics; that it must use such forces as are still [at] its disposal for more restricted warfare for defense its home territory. Everyone who's followed situation in Germany has been able confirm fact that leading circles that country no longer consider military victory possible and are, therefore, endeavoring reach settlement politically. This change [in] Germany's position brought German-Finnish relations to new phase which cannot be left unnoticed.

German-Finnish relations have been based on realistic considerations. Finland was necessary for Germany in its effort gain control over Arctic Europe and retain its control. As long as Baltic front held maintenance of front in Finland was of prime necessity to Germany and it, therefore, strove support that front. But when this situation changed Finnish front was of less importance to Germany. Meaning [of] this to Finland must be thought about in time.

Finland now approaching stage where it can no longer obtain required aid from Germany but must rely more and more on own resources, significance of which mustn't be overestimated in comparison with resources of enemy. Our collaboration with Germany ever since 1941 been based on mutual military considerations without political commitments. When Karelian front broke in June and Finland requested more assistance from Germany latter was no longer willing

⁶⁷ See telegram 322 of April 12, from Helsinki, p. 591.

grant it on previous conditions but desired bind Finland with stronger ties than those required by military considerations.

Germany demanded Finland make no separate peace and it refrain even from attempts at reestablishing peaceful relations with Soviet Union. Therefore, when speedy stabilization of front necessary head of government gave required undertaking in own name in consideration of promised military aid from Germany.

It soon evident, however, Germany wasn't able give military assistance on expected scale. Indeed, Germany had soon begun withdrawing such troops it had provided for assistance Finland. All this strengthened supposition collaboration with Germans was heading toward end and that both parties had to draw appropriate conclusions therefrom.

After presidential change Finnish Government considered situation anew. Agreement made by President Ryti hadn't been submitted for approval of Diet and was therefore unconstitutional. For this reason pact doesn't bind new President. This was brought to knowledge of Reich Government some time ago in clear terms.

Therefore, in view of changed political situation, growing desire of Finnish people for peace, and increasingly perilous position Finland, Government considered it its duty once more establish contact with Soviet Union. After thorough preparations written note was submitted to Soviet Minister Stockholm August 25 in which Finnish Government inquired if Soviet Government willing receive Finnish delegation discuss question of armistice, final peace or both.

Present Russian terms more favorable [to] Finland than those last spring in that Finland under them would be able take up negotiations without prior demobilization. After considering Soviet reply Finnish Government reached conclusion negotiations with Soviet Union should be decided upon notwithstanding prior demands set by Soviet Union. Diet now approved this and authorized Government to act.

Honored citizens. Such in brief situation. We've taken first step toward reestablishment peace. We've taken step on road where unexpected dangers may lurk. We don't know conditions that will be imposed on us but in as much our great neighbor hasn't demanded unconditional surrender we've deemed it our duty fulfill prior demands set by Soviet Union and its Allies in order evince our sincere desire for peace. Marshal of Finland,⁶⁸ who has more experience and knowledge of prevailing conditions than others, has chosen road upon which we've now tread.

Editorials leading Stockholm papers 3d all deal with foregoing but add nothing new not revealed by Hackzell himself. Tone of editorials ranges from *Dagens*⁶⁹ and *Morgontidningen's* "I told you so" to *Tidningen's*⁷⁰ more practical suggestion Sweden must now help Finland with food and other supplies.

Afternoon papers 4th. Following communiqué issued by Finnish headquarters this morning:

⁶⁸ President Mannerheim.

⁶⁹ *Dagens Nyheter*.

⁷⁰ Probably *Aftontidningen*; both it and the *Morgontidningen* were organs of the Finnish Social Democratic Party.

"By agreement between Finnish Government and Government of Soviet Union hostilities in Finnish Army's sector of front shall cease on September 4, 8 o'clock a. m. President and Commander in which [*Commander in Chief*] has caused order to this effect to be issued to troops."

Tidningen 4th. Notice with Berlin dateline. It's confirmed German troops North Finland have for some time been prepared to withdraw. Evacuation now under way and now hastened by events in Finland which in Berlin characterized as suicidal.

Dagens 4th editorializes on Finnish supply situation, pointing out Germans have followed policy of not sending more than installments of any given quantity of promised food. However, Sweden with reserve supply of 400,000 tons grain in position to help Finland. Can also help regarding fats and sugar but not with potatoes, except possibly potato flakes.

Tidningen 4th. Finnish Government has broken relations with Germany and demanded German troops be withdrawn from Finland before September 15. In event German troops not withdrawn within this limit they'll be disarmed and handed to Allies as prisoners of war.

Idem. Finnish Minister to Berlin, Kivimäeki, requested leave with Legation personnel.

JOHNSON

740.00119 EW/9-444: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 4, 1944—noon.

[Received 3:42 p. m.]

3290. ReEmbs 3179, August 26, 9 [7] p. m. I have received this morning from Molotov a note dated September 3 which reads in paraphrase translation as follows:

I wish to inform you, in connection with the statement I made to you on August 26 concerning Finland, that the Soviet Minister in Sweden, Kollontay, transmitted to Mr. Gripenberg on August 29 the Soviet reply which was agreed to by the British Government and was received without comment by the United States Government. This reply was in answer to the statement dated August 25, of the Finnish Government in which the Finnish Government requested that a Finnish delegation be received in Moscow to negotiate an armistice or peace. Mr. Gripenberg transmitted to Madame Kollontay on September 2 the following appeal made by Mr. Mannerheim to the Soviet Government:

"In order to make sure that Finland can in fact carry out what it promises, the President and Commander in Chief of the Finnish Republic begs, before transmitting a final answer to the preliminary terms of the Soviet Union, to present the following statements and questions: Finland is able, under certain

conditions, itself to control or to effectuate the voluntary evacuation or internment of the German troops on that part of the Finnish mainland which lies south of the general line Oulunioki-Ouluniarvi⁷¹-Sotkamo water system, and canals Olok after the protection of that district from possible attack from the sea or from the north of the above indicated line.

This obligation which will require of Finland very considerable forces can only be carried out on condition that hostilities on the Eastern Front from the Finnish Gulf at least right up to the height (district) of Miinoa cease, let us say, on September 3 at 8 a. m. and that the cessation of hostilities be maintained right up to the completion of the negotiations on an armistice or peace. The retirement of the Finnish forces behind the frontier agreed upon in the Moscow peace treaty of 1940⁷² will commence on September 1 on the entire above mentioned sector.

The President and Commander in Chief of the Republic further proposes that the Soviet Army, in order to avoid any incidents, should commence their movement forward from the present line of the front only on September 11. The Commander in Chief in that case is prepared to guarantee that the last Finnish military units will be withdrawn behind the Moscow Treaty border by September 20 in this entire sector. He feels that Finland on its part will be able to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the preliminary terms of the Soviet Government provided that his proposals are accepted. He requests an answer to these proposals.[⁷³]

In transmitting Mr. Mannerheim's appeal, Gripenberg added that the Finnish Government would make the statement demanded by the Soviet Government concerning the rupture with Germany after the receipt of a reply from the Soviet Government to the Finnish proposals. Gripenberg declared at the same time that the Finns were prepared also to participate in the proposed disarmament of the German troops in the northern part of Finland but they would like to reach an agreement in Moscow with the Soviet Command on the coordination and assistance in this respect of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government instructed Minister Kollontay on September 3 to transmit to Gripenberg the following reply of the Soviet Government to the Finnish Government:

"1. The Soviet Government insists on the Finnish acceptance of the preliminary conditions which the Soviet Government advanced on August 29, namely, that it should be publicly declared by Finland that it would break off relations with Germany⁷³ and would demand the evacuation of German troops from Finnish territory no later than September 15; in the event that German forces should not be withdrawn from Finland in that period, the German forces would be disarmed and turned over to the Allies as war prisoners.

2. In case Germany should not evacuate its troops from Finland by September 15, the Soviet [Union] agrees to render assistance to the Finnish Army in disarming the German Armed Forces and in turning them over to the Allies as prisoners of war.

3. The Soviet Government agrees to cease hostilities at 8 a. m. on September 4 on the sector of the front south of the height (district) Miinoa if the Finnish

⁷¹ Intended were the Oulujoki and Oulujärvi water systems leading to the Sotkamo River in central Finland, which form a continuous waterway and a natural defensive position.

⁷² The Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, between the Soviet Union and Finland, is printed in Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Finnish Blue Book* (Philadelphia-New York, 1940), p. 115; in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 27, 1940, p. 453; and in U.S.S.R., *Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykh s inostrannymi gosudarstvami* (Moscow, 1955), vol. x, p. 11.

⁷³ The Finnish Government had already broken relations with Germany on the evening of September 2 and had informed German Minister Wipert von Blücher of the rupture. The Swedish press on September 4 reported the departure from Berlin of the Finnish Minister and Legation staff there, on request of the German Government.

Government fulfills the Soviet preliminary conditions in accordance with point 1 of the present Soviet statement, whereas all other questions shall be settled during the armistice negotiations."

As you see, this reply of the Soviet Government fully conforms with its former statement to the Finnish Government in connection with which the United States Government stated that it had no comments whatsoever to make.

I express in advance my appreciation for your kindness in transmitting the above to the attention of the United States Government. End of message.

Sent to the Department, to London as No. 160 and to Stockholm.

HARRIMAN

861.9111/9-544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 5, 1944.

[Received September 5—10:31 p. m.]

3315. Press for September 5 published following communiqué regarding Finland:

1. "On night of September 4, Finnish Government made statement by radio in which it announced that Finland had accepted the preliminary conditions advanced by Soviet Government regarding severance of relations with Germany and withdrawal of German troops from Finland not later than September 15.

2. Simultaneously with statement of Finnish Government regarding acceptance of Soviet preliminary conditions Finnish Supreme Military Command announced the termination of military operations on whole area of disposition of Finnish troops as of 8 a. m. September 4.

3. In connection with acceptance by Finnish Government of preliminary conditions of Soviet Government, Soviet Supreme Command ordered termination of military operations on sector of disposition of Finnish troops as of 8 a. m. September 5."

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 6, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received September 7—2:40 a. m.]

3342. Molotov has given the British Ambassador and myself a draft of peace terms for Finland. He has invited the British Ambassador and myself to discuss them this evening. I agreed to attend with the understanding that I would be present as an observer.

Molotov asked the British Ambassador to inform his Government in its consideration of the Rumanian reparations⁷⁴ that the Soviet Government was now proposing to reduce its reparation demands on Finland from \$600,000,000 to \$300,000,000.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 6, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 7—12:10 a. m.]

3346. Clark Kerr and I met tonight with the entire Soviet delegation to negotiate peace with Finland. They included Molotov, Dekanosov,⁷⁵ Litvinov,⁷⁶ Voroshilov,⁷⁷ the Admiral [*Commander?*] of the Baltic Fleet⁷⁸ and a Colonel General.⁷⁹ The Soviet draft terms were read. As Clark Kerr is cabling them to London and Washington he agreed to ask the British Embassy in Washington to transmit them to the Department. Other than the reduction of the indemnity demanded as reported in my 3342, September 6, 3 p. m. there was only one surprise: the lease on Hango is to be relinquished but a 50 year lease of an area for a new naval base is to be substituted. This is to be the Porkkala-Udd Peninsula and adjacent islands lying between Hango and Helsinki directly opposite Tallinn. Marshal Voroshilov stated that the Soviet Government intended to have a base on both sides of the Finnish Gulf at this point which would give them control of the approaches to Leningrad. He explained that the lease of this peninsula would be less objectionable to the Finns than Hango as it did not include a commercial port.

The Petsamo area⁸⁰ which is to be "returned to the Soviet Union" has a maximum depth from the sea of about 125 miles. This brings the Soviet frontier to Norway from the Arctic Ocean down to the southernmost point of the Norwegian frontier in this area. The line then runs

⁷⁴ For correspondence relating to the Soviet and Allied conditions for an armistice with Rumania, see vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania . . ."

⁷⁵ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁶ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁷ Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union; member of the Politburo, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party; and member (until November 1944) of the Supreme State Defense Committee of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁸ Adm. Vladimir Filippovich Tributs; replaced by Rear Adm. A. P. Alesandrov about September 15.

⁷⁹ Col. Gen. Sergey Matveyevich Shtemenko, a Red Army staff officer.

⁸⁰ Given "for perpetuity" by Soviet Russia to Finland by article 4 of the Treaty of Dorpat (Tartu) of October 14, 1920, between Finland and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic; for text of treaty, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. III, p. 5.

roughly south by south southeast until it hits the former Soviet border at about the sixty-eighth parallel. Finland is to cede this territory with its industries free of all claims and is to undertake to compensate foreign interests for the loss of their properties.

The other terms follow closely the proposed Rumanian armistice although the document is defined as a peace treaty. The Allied Control Commission will operate until cessation of the war against Germany.

Molotov raised no objection to the British Ambassador's proposal that he arrange with the Finnish delegation for a break of all relations with Japan.

In response to my question Molotov said that it was not the intention to exchange diplomatic representatives until the termination of the war against Germany and I inferred from this that political representatives of other governments of the United Nations would not be welcome, although the establishment of consulates would, I assume, be permitted.

The Finnish delegation which is expected to arrive tomorrow (Thursday) consists of Premier Hackzell, Minister of War Walden,⁸¹ Chief of Staff Hendricks,⁸² Lieutenant General Enkel,⁸³ Colonel Paasonen, in addition to a group of experts.

As discussions with them are expected to start promptly, any comments, even preliminary, on the Soviet proposal which the Department wishes me to make should be transmitted without delay. I am particularly anxious to know the Department's attitude regarding American political or military representation in Finland⁸⁴ and its attitude toward the Soviet proposal to have the Finns compensate American interests for the loss of their interests in the Petsamo area. I ask also instructions whether or not you wish me to attend the negotiations with the Finns as an observer.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-1044: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 10, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received September 10—2:23 p. m.]

3414. ReDeptel 2150, September 7, 1 p. m.⁸⁵ I am sure that the Department is giving consideration to the precedent which would be established if the Soviet Government's proposal were effectuated to

⁸¹ Karl R. Walden, Minister of Defense.

⁸² Gen. A. Erik Heinrichs.

⁸³ Lt. Gen. Oscar Enckell.

⁸⁴ See pp. 624 ff.

⁸⁵ Not printed.

take the Petsamo area including all properties of foreigners without compensation and leaving the foreign interests to obtain, if they are able, compensation from Finland. The British Government is objecting to this proposal and it might be that if the British are unable to move the Soviets from their position, we would consider it advisable to state our viewpoint. I suggest therefore, that this eventually be given consideration in order to be in a position to act quickly if need be.

I believe also that the Department should give consideration to the general position in which we will find ourselves in regard to the Finnish armistice and preliminary peace when finally concluded if they include any terms which are not in accord with our basic principles. The question is how far it will be interpreted that we have acquiesced if we make no comment or reservation before the documents are signed. With the exception of the above point, I have no other to raise at this time. I have not had the opportunity to give full study to the terms and all of their implications.

Sent to Department as 3414. Repeated to London as 167.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-1444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 5: 50 p. m.]

3491. The Foreign Office has informed the Embassy that Colonel General Zhdanov⁸⁶ has been included on the Soviet delegation to deal with the Finns. As the Department is aware, Zhdanov is Secretary of the Communist Party of Leningrad, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Council of the Union, and during the war years is reported to have been the Political Commissar attached to the Soviet armies in the north.⁸⁷ He is one of the most prominent figures in the All Union Communist Party. He is said to have a determined and ruthless character. He is often called Stalin's successor.

Zhdanov's appointment to the Soviet delegation is not surprising. He has been closely associated with recent Soviet policy vis-à-vis Finland and the Baltic; and it is probably due at least in some degree to his continued and powerful influence that this policy has shown no signs of variation since it was first manifested at the time of the

⁸⁶ Andrey Andreyevich Zhdanov, whose major political posts were Secretary, and member of the Politbureau, of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party; First Secretary of both the Leningrad *Oblast* (Region) and City Committees of the Communist Party; and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission, Council of the Union of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.

⁸⁷ Zhdanov had served since 1941 as a member of the Military Council (*Voennyi Sovet*) of the Leningrad Front.

signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.⁸⁸ In 1939 it was rumored that he engineered the border incident which set off the Soviet-Finnish war. He, with Molotov and General Vassielevski,⁸⁹ signed the Finnish Peace Treaty in March 1940. He also played the leading role in the incorporation of Estonia in the Soviet Union,⁹⁰ and was in effect the Soviet Governor there during the first months of Soviet rule.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-1444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 15, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received September 15—4:37 p. m.]

7620. In a further talk with Warner⁹¹ on the Russian-Finnish terms (see our 7588, September 14, 8 p. m.⁹²), we learned that Molotov quite unexpectedly told Clark Kerr yesterday that it had been decided to cover the terms with Finland in a single armistice document free of any peace-term provisions, even of a preliminary character.

The Russians, Warner went on to say, had been told earlier that if peace terms of any nature were included in the armistice document, then the Foreign Office would have to consult the Dominions and India as a preliminary step to their signing along with the United Kingdom Government.⁹³ When Molotov told Clark Kerr that it had been decided to limit the terms to a single armistice document, he explained that this had been done in order to simplify the signing. If, he continued, a document containing both armistice and peace

⁸⁸ The Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Soviet Union of August 23, 1939, was negotiated in Moscow. The text of the treaty is printed in Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, p. 245. For some papers on Soviet policy toward Finland about that time, see *ibid.*, vol. VIII, pp. 12, 106, and 231.

⁸⁹ Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, then an officer of the Red Army General Staff.

⁹⁰ For correspondence on United States interest in Estonia and the other Baltic countries, and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff. On Zhdanov's role with respect to Estonia, see especially telegrams 66 of June 19, 1940, and 82 of July 5, 1940, from Tallin, and telegram 135 of June 19, 1940, from Riga, *ibid.*, pp. 376, 384, and 378, respectively.

⁹¹ Sir Christopher F. A. Warner, Head of the Northern Department, British Foreign Office.

⁹² Not printed; this telegram reported that the British Foreign Office had put three requirements to the Soviet Government for an armistice with Finland: 1) exclusion of long-term peace arrangements from the armistice agreement; 2) provision for direct contact between British representatives on the Allied Control Commission and Finnish authorities; and 3) a solution to the question of compensating foreign property interests in the Petsamo District.

⁹³ The Governments of the British Dominions and India had declared war on the Axis States and their cobelligerents, acts which qualified them for participation in peace negotiations. For declarations of war, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, pp. 349 ff.

terms would, in the British view, have to be signed by the Dominions and India as well, then in the Russian view, the constituent Soviet Republics would also have to sign.⁹⁴ It was to avoid all this, Molotov said, that the simpler form of document had been chosen.

This issue, the signing of agreements and conventions by the constituent Soviet Republics, Warner continued, would no doubt keep recurring.

Warner also told us that Clark Kerr had informed the Foreign Office that he had definitely determined that the proposal put forward by Dekanozov⁹⁵ for meeting foreign interest claims in the Petsamo area was a firm offer. Clark Kerr also reported that the Russian insistence on treating an agreement as outlined by Dekanozov as a private one between the two Governments had been withdrawn. The way is therefore open, Warner added, to an approach to companies and firms with interests within this area. This will be done with a view to determining the value of these holdings and to drawing up an agreement with the Russian Government covering all the details of the proposal.

WINANT

740.00119 EW/9-1944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 19, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received September 19—6:27 a. m.]

3571. Vyshinski requested me to call on him in order to inform me that the Finnish armistice⁹⁶ would be signed at noon today, Moscow time. The only substantial change in it is that Finland is given 2½ months to transfer its Army to a peace time status (instead of 2 months as in the original terms) and 6 years to pay the indemnity (instead of 5 years).

HARRIMAN

⁹⁴ According to a law of February 1, 1944, passed by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, the sixteen constituent Soviet republics technically enjoyed the "right . . . to conclude . . . agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representations" with foreign states; see U.S.S.R., *Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsii, zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami*, vol. xi, (Moscow, 1955), p. 196.

⁹⁵ According to telegram 7588 of September 14, 8 p. m., from London (not printed), Dekanozov proposed that the Soviet Government pay the British interests \$20 million "as compensation for foreign interests in the Petsamo area, this amount to come from the indemnity which is to be paid by the Finns." (740.00119 European War 1939/9-1444)

⁹⁶ For a text of "Conditions of An Armistice with Finland," signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944, with Annexes and Protocols, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cXLV, p. 513; also *Izvestiya*, September 21, 1944, p. 1.

740.00119 E.W./9-2044 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, September 20, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 20—noon.]

3750. The following information from Finnish General Headquarters has come through Finnish informant afternoon of September 19. In addition to Finnish peace terms previously reported in my cables, all telegraph, telephone, post, radio, air and ship communications between Finland and other countries are to be controlled by Russian Commission⁹⁷ which will arrive in Helsinki today.⁹⁸ (My 1112, September 20, 1 p. m., to London repeats this message) Extensive control over Finnish ore industry with particular reference to paper and woodpulp, machine, and shipbuilding, is also in hands of the Commission. All Finnish ships in all foreign ports are to be recalled immediately and placed at disposal of commission. The Finnish Army after clearing at once a path for Russians is to remove all mines from mine fields within a period of approximately 72 hours and then to begin retreat to 1940 frontiers at rate of 15 kilometers per day. The army is to be completely demobilized within 2 months.⁹⁹ The Åland Islands are to be completely demilitarized. My informant says that anything can happen now in Finland and "the people in foreign countries will never know about it."

Please repeat at once to Creel's¹ people.

JOHNSON

740.00119 Control (Finland)/12-1844 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 18, 1944.

[Received December 19—11:31 p. m.]

5164. *Dagens* today quotes its Helsinki correspondent reporting that after lengthy negotiations between Finnish Government and Allied Control Commission agreement was signed last night by

⁹⁷ That is, the Soviet element of the Allied Control Commission which, by the terms of the armistice agreement (annex to article 22), "is an organ of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, to which it is directly subordinated."

⁹⁸ In his telegram 3813 of September 22, 1 p. m., the Minister in Sweden reported the arrival on September 21 of the "first Russian military planes" and stated that Pavel Dmitriyevich Orlov, Soviet Political Adviser to the Allied Control Commission, would arrive soon (103.918/9-2244).

⁹⁹ According to the armistice agreement, Finland was "to place her army on a peace footing within two and a half months from the day of signing" of that agreement. See article 4 of the agreement, in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 513.

¹ Possibly a reference to Capt. Paul H. Creel, in the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

Premier Paasikivi² and Colonel General Zhdanov³ providing that value of goods delivered by Finland to Soviet Union under indemnity clause shall be fixed according to 1938 price level with modification that increase of 10 [to] 15 percent is allowed on prices of certain goods. Russian leaders of Control Commission were guests of Finnish Government at banquet after agreement was signed.

Tidningen today adds that foregoing agreement will mean that Finland has undertaken to pay in reality about \$600,000,000 instead of the \$300,000,000 provided in armistice agreement.

Repeated today to Moscow as my No. 50 and London as my No. 1671.

JOHNSON

PREPARATIONS FOR REESTABLISHING AN AMERICAN MISSION IN FINLAND

740.00119 Control (Finland)/10-1344: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1944—6 p. m.

2423. Dept is anxious as soon as possible to send to Finland a representative of this Government (probably a Foreign Service officer) to look after specific American interests and American citizens in Finland as well as for purposes of general information. The question, however, rises as to the status of such an official. Dept does not consider it desirable at this time to have any such official accredited in any way, even as a consular representative, to the Finnish Government and since this Government is not a signatory to the armistice terms, no American official could be a member of the control commission.⁴

It has been suggested here that if the Soviet and British Governments were agreeable an American official could be designated as a liaison officer between this Government and the control commission with the understanding that his duties and activities would be confined to American interests or to American citizens in Finland.

Before reaching a decision on this question Dept would like the benefit of your views as to the attitude of the Soviet Government towards sending an American representative to Finland and your

² Dr. Juho K. Paasikivi became Prime Minister of Finland on November 11, 1944, succeeding Urho J. Castrén, who had succeeded Hackzell on September 21, 1944.

³ Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, to which post he was appointed upon conclusion of the armistice agreement in September 1944.

⁴ The Allied Control Commission was established by terms of the armistice agreement with Finland of September 19, 1944. See especially telegrams 3571 of September 19, from Moscow, and 3750 of September 20 from Stockholm, pp. 622 and 623, respectively.

comment on his proposed status. Following receipt of your suggestions we will of course also take up the matter with British Government but do not anticipate any difficulties from that quarter.

HULL

740.00119 Control (Finland)/10-1644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received October 17—2:23 a. m.]

3949. ReDeptel 2423, October 13, 6 p. m. I have no reason to suppose that the Soviet Government would be adverse to the despatch of an American representative to Finland. I would be glad to learn why Soviet Government does not consider it desirable to have such an officer accredited even as a consular representative to the Finnish Government.

I doubt that an officer designated as liaison officer between this Government and the Control Commission would be able to act effectively on behalf of American interests of American citizens since he would presumably lack direct access to the Finnish authorities. The functions the Department has in mind for such an officer are strictly consular ones and it seems to me that the appointment of a consular officer would be the natural solution.

Has the Department considered asking the Finnish Government to permit such an officer to function unofficially without exequatur? In this capacity he would presumably be able to fulfill all consular functions other than notarial ones. Another possibility would be to send an officer who already holds an exequatur from the Finnish Government.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW 1939/11-144: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 1, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 12:48 p. m.]

4188. ReDeptel 2519, October 25, 11 p. m.⁵ I have received a note from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs pointing out that in the execution of Annex II to article 5 of the armistice agreement⁶ the Finnish Government has suspended all types of communication

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Conditions of an Armistice with Finland, signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944. is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 513.

abroad on the part of diplomatic missions and consulates in Finland including the Swiss. This undertaking, the note goes on to say, is explained by the presence of German armed forces on Finnish territory and cannot be revoked or changed until their withdrawal is completed. To change it, it is stated, would be contrary not only to the armistice agreement but to the common cause of the Allies.

In general I fear we will get little satisfaction out of the Russians with respect to the recognition of the role of the Swiss in protecting our interests in territory occupied by Russian forces.⁷ The reasons are the following:

(1) The Russians may question the general propriety of our asking for third party representation of our interests in territory no longer under enemy control, but occupied by one of our allies.

(2) They will hardly understand the practical necessity for any such third power representation. It will not be clear to them why American representatives fail to arrive promptly in those capitals and take direct charge of American interests, as British representatives have done.

(3) Even if they could be persuaded of the propriety and necessity of representation of our interests by a third power they would almost certainly object to that power being one with whom they have no relations and would probably point to the impracticability of interests being represented by authorities who have no official access to the government of the occupying power. In the case of Switzerland, Soviet feelings are at the moment particularly strong and have only recently been underlined in the demonstrative withdrawal of Soviet participation in the Civil Aviation Conference.⁸ Soviet officials always sensitive to the trends of major Soviet policy would be sure to look askance at present to any approaches involving the functioning of Swiss representatives on territory under their control.

Sent Department, repeated to Caserta as 12.

KENNAN

123 Hamilton, Maxwell M.: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1944—5 p. m.

2664. The President has approved the assignment of Maxwell M. Hamilton to Helsinki as "United States Representative in Finland" with the personal rank of Minister.⁹ He would represent our interests

⁷ The Swiss Government had assumed representation of American interests in Finland on July 3, 1944.

⁸ International Civil Aviation Conference, held at Chicago November 1–December 7, 1944. For correspondence relating to the Conference, see vol. II.

⁹ Approval was granted by the President on November 11; the appointment was actually made on December 8, 1944.

in the same manner as the United States representatives who are being sent to Rumania and Bulgaria.¹⁰ He would not, of course, have any functions in connection with the Allied Control Committee [*Commission*] nor would his appointment involve the re-establishment at this time of diplomatic or consular relations with Finland. At the same time the United States Government would expect that its representative and his staff would be afforded every facility for informal contact with the Finnish Government and public and full freedom of movement and communication, including the right to send cypher messages, in order that he might effectively meet his responsibilities for the care and protection of American interests. We propose to send Randolph Higgs,¹¹ now at Stockholm on a temporary assignment to Helsinki to open the office of the "United States Mission in Finland" pending Hamilton's arrival.

In view of the contents of your 4188, Nov. 1, 11 a. m., we do not anticipate that the Soviet authorities would raise any obstacles in the way of the fulfillment of Hamilton's mission.

Please communicate the foregoing, therefore, to the Soviet Foreign Office in a note for its information. London is also being informed. You may state orally that Higgs will proceed in the near future and Hamilton shortly thereafter. While not requesting Russian consent, you should endeavor to obtain oral confirmation of our assumption that no objections will be raised.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Stockholm as Department's 2280 for information.

STETTINIUS

¹²³ Hamilton, Maxwell M.: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 17, 1944—9 a. m.
[Received November 18—12:50 a. m.]

4393. I presented yesterday afternoon to Dekanosov¹² a communication embodying the information contained in the Department's 2664, November 14, 5 p. m., concerning the appointment of Hamilton as United States representative in Finland. I reminded Dekanosov that we had appointed representatives in similar capacity to Rumania and Bulgaria and pointed out to him the necessity for some arrange-

¹⁰ For correspondence relating to the establishment of United States representation in Rumania and Bulgaria, see vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Post-armistice problems of occupation and control . . ." and *ante*, pp. 481 ff.

¹¹ L. Randolph Higgs had been assigned as Second Secretary of Legation and Consul in Sweden on April 27, 1944.

¹² Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

ment for representation of our interests in Finland in this interim period.

While Dekanosov could, of course, not give assurance off hand that the Soviet Government had no objection to this step, he was at pains to stress that the situation in Finland was not analogous to that in Bulgaria and Rumania. I am not sure that he was previously aware that we had representatives in Bulgaria and Rumania other than those accredited to the Control Commissions and this may have accounted in some degree for his reserve. I explained carefully to him the arrangements made in the cases of Bulgaria and Rumania but added that if the analogy bothered them they were at liberty to forget it and to consider the case of Finland on its merits.

While the Soviet Government will no doubt proceed with characteristic circumspection to make sure that our step has no implications which could possibly be detrimental to Soviet interests or prestige, I believe that Dekanosov's reserve was due principally to the customary caution of Soviet officials in discussing matters on which they are not completely instructed and I cannot see on that [*what*] grounds the Soviet Government could properly object to the assignment of an American representative in the capacity we have in mind to a capital where as I understand neutral representatives are still present.

On the other hand, it is not certain that we will receive any direct indication at all of Soviet views and even if we do it is not likely that this will occur very promptly. If Higgs encounters any [*no?*] difficulties in making preparations for Hamilton's arrival and if nothing further is heard here it seems to me that we would be justified after the lapse of a reasonable time in assuming that the appointment is agreeable to the Soviet Government and in proceeding accordingly. The Department may wish to consult Ambassador Harriman on this point.

KENNAN

123 Higgs, L. Randolph : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1944—3 p. m.

2434. For Higgs. Travel orders are being prepared and will be telegraphed shortly instructing you together with a small staff to proceed to Helsinki to open and take charge of the "United States Mission in Finland". You will remain in Helsinki until the arrival of Gullion [*Hamilton?*] sometime the latter part of January or early February. While in Helsinki you will have the title of and sign yourself "Secretary of Mission, in charge of United States Mission in Finland".

The basic purpose of your mission is to provide American political representation in Finland until normal diplomatic relations are estab-

lished between Finland and the United States. You should therefore make clear to the Finnish and Soviet authorities in Finland and to other interested persons that the opening of the United States mission does not constitute a resumption of diplomatic or consular relations between the United States and Finland.

You will have no consular functions and will perform no notarial or visa services. Question of issuance of passports will be dealt with in separate instructions which will be sent you later.

Immediately upon your arrival in Helsinki you will call upon the principal Soviet and British members of the Allied Control Commission. Subsequently you should call informally on the Minister for Foreign Affairs.¹⁴ You may also call on the chiefs of mission in Helsinki of friendly and neutral countries. During each of these calls you should explain the nature of your mission.

The Swiss Government is being notified of your mission and you should arrange with the Swiss representative in Helsinki¹⁵ to take over from him the premises of the former American Legation and gradually to take over the protection of American interests. You will not take over from the Swiss the representation of interests of other countries which were in the hands of the American Legation at Helsinki prior to the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland.

You will at all times bear in mind that although the United States and Finland have not been at war with one another diplomatic relations between the two countries remain severed and Finland is still in a technical state of war with our Soviet and British allies. You will conduct yourself accordingly especially in your relations with Finnish officials. Should Mr. Procopé,¹⁶ Mr. Vahervuori¹⁷ or Mr. Solanko¹⁸ endeavor to communicate with you you will bear in mind that they were expelled from the United States for "activities inimical to the interests of the United States".¹⁹

In the light of the foregoing you will appreciate that your functions will be the representation and protection of American interests in Finland and you will be guided accordingly in your relations with the Allied Control Commission and your informal relations with the Finnish authorities.

The missions at Moscow, London and Stockholm are instructed to communicate the substance of this telegram to the British, Soviet and

¹⁴ Carl J. Enckell.

¹⁵ Karl Egger.

¹⁶ Hjalmar J. Procopé, formerly Minister of Finland to the United States.

¹⁷ Torsten O. Vahervuori, formerly Counselor of the Finnish Legation in the United States.

¹⁸ Risto Solanko, formerly Counselor of the Finnish Legation in the United States.

¹⁹ See telegram 117, June 16, to Helsinki, p. 600.

Swedish Governments respectively. You should inform the Soviet and British Ministers²⁰ in Stockholm. You should keep in close touch with the Soviet Minister and should not leave for Helsinki until you are certain that the Soviet authorities in and en route to Helsinki have been apprised of your mission and have made arrangements to facilitate your travel including the extension to you and to the members of your staff of the customary diplomatic courtesies and privileges.

The Finnish Legation in Stockholm should not be informed of plans for the establishment of the mission at Helsinki and you should not request or accept Finnish visas for your passport or for the passports of the members of your staff.

At the appropriate time Department plans to make announcement in Washington of the establishment of the mission and hopes that in the meantime the matter will be kept secret by all concerned.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to Moscow as Department's no. 2787 and to London as Department's no. 10168.

STETTINIUS

123 Higgs, L. Randolph : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 8, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 11:00 p. m.]

4709. Kennan called yesterday on Dekanozov and presented to him personally a letter from me setting forth the substance of the first paragraph of the Department's 2786, December 5, 1 p. m.²¹ concerning the detailing of Higgs to Helsinki. Kennan took occasion to describe to Dekanozov the nature of Higgs's instructions as set forth in the Department's 2787, December 5, 3 p. m.²²

Dekanozov said that the Soviet Government had not yet arrived at any conclusion concerning Hamilton's mission to Helsinki, as made known to them by Kennan's letter of November 15 [16]²³ and he was therefore still unable to make any comment thereon. He explained that the letter had been referred to Zhdanov²⁴ who had

²⁰ Madame Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, and Victor A. L. Mallet, respectively.

²¹ Not printed; the first paragraph of this telegram informed the Embassy of Higgs's mission and of his delay in Stockholm awaiting confirmation that "Soviet authorities in Helsinki and other points en route have instructions to facilitate his journey." (123 Higgs, L. Randolph)

²² See last paragraph of telegram 2434, December 5, to Stockholm, *supra*.

²³ The contents of the letter were communicated to the Department in telegram 4393 of November 17, from Moscow, p. 627.

²⁴ Andrey Andreyevich Zhdanov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, who held the military rank of colonel general as well as political posts in the Soviet Union, including those of Secretary, and member of the Politburo, of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.

queried, first, the reference to the American representatives in Bulgaria and Rumania, and second, the use of the term "mission". Zhdanov had pointed out that our status in Finland could not be parallel to that in Bulgaria or Rumania because we had not been at war with Finland. The word "mission" had seemed to signify a regular diplomatic mission and had therefore caused concern.

Kennan again suggested that the situation in Finland be considered on its merits. With respect to the word "mission" he explained that this had doubtless been selected for the very purpose of avoiding any designation which might suggest that the leading official was accredited to any government.

In conclusion he stated that he hoped the information he had been able to give about Higgs' instructions would set to rest any uneasiness Mr. Zhdanov might have felt about the establishment of the mission and that arrangements would be made which would make it possible for Higgs to leave at an early date. Dekanozov appeared to be somewhat relieved by what Kennan had told him and showed signs of hopefulness as to Zhdanov's ultimate attitude. Nevertheless, I think it possible that there may be some delay before final arrangements are made to permit Higgs to proceed. I hope Stockholm will keep me closely informed on this point. If Higg's departure is delayed more than a few days, I will be glad to take the matter up again and try to expedite it.

Sent to Department, repeated to Stockholm as 26.

HARRIMAN

123 Higgs, L. Randolph : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 14, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:42 p. m.]

5122. Higgs saw Madame Kollontay this afternoon at her request. She informed him that she only wanted to tell him that she was still awaiting a reply from Moscow regarding the ATC²⁵ flight to Finland (my 5097, December 13, noon; ²⁶ repeated to Moscow as my 47) and remarked that Moscow's delay in replying to her cable was undoubtedly due to the fact that Moscow "had so many other things to deal with at the moment".

Though cordial throughout, she clearly showed no disposition to listen to Higgs' exposition of the purposes of the proposed United States mission in Finland (Department's 2434, December 5, 3 p. m.;

²⁵ Air Transport Command (U.S.). The American Government had arranged for an ATC plane to transport Higgs and his staff to Helsinki upon approval by the Soviet Government.

²⁶ Not printed.

repeated to Moscow as 2787) or otherwise to discuss the mission. She interrupted Higgs' explanation of the reasons why it was more feasible from our point of view for the mission to arrive in Finland at a Russian airport by saying that she fully understood our line of reasoning.

It would seem fairly clear upon the basis of our discussions so far with the Soviet Legation here that if the departure of the mission is to be expedited (Department's 2503, December 13, 8 p. m.; ²⁷ repeated to Moscow as 2829 and my 5097, December 13, noon to Department), instructions must come from Moscow.

My 49, December 14, 6 p. m. repeats this to Moscow.

JOHNSON

123 Higgs, L. Randolph : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 17, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received December 18—12:21 p. m.]

4879. ReEmbs 4709, December 8, 10 p. m. I have received a letter dated December 14 from Dekanozov.

Referring to Kennan's letter of November 16 ²⁸ about the appointment of Hamilton and stating that that letter had been submitted to the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Helsinki for his opinion, Dekanozov added that he wished however to invite attention to the passage in Kennan's letter stating that Hamilton would represent our interests in Finland in the same manner as the American representatives in Bulgaria and Rumania. As I would of course understand, there was no analogy between these questions, since the American representatives were appointed to Bulgaria and Rumania as the result of the armistice agreement concluded with those countries, and this had arisen from the fact that the American Government had been at war with each of them, whereas this had not been the case with Finland. He undertook to inform me of the decision which would be taken after the receipt of the answer of the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland.

I have replied to his letter under date of December 16 along the following lines: That I did not understand his statements about the lack of analogy between the manner in which Hamilton would represent our interests in Finland and the manner in which those interests were represented by our representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria; that as Kennan had explained, we did not wish to draw any analogy between Hamilton's functions and those of our representa-

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ See telegram 4393, November 17, 9 a. m., from Moscow, p. 627.

tives in the Control Commissions, that the officials we had in mind in Rumania and Bulgaria were political representatives; that he would see from our communications on this subject that these appointments were in no way connected with the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria and Rumania and that I did not recall anything in the armistice agreements which could be considered to have bearing on their appointments. I said in conclusion that Kennan had drawn this parallel only in order to help them to form a clearer conception of Mr. Hamilton's proposed position and functions in Finland and that since this purpose did not seem to have been achieved, I proposed that the pertinent passage in Kennan's letter be considered as withdrawn.

Sent to Department as 4879, repeated to Stockholm as 37.

HARRIMAN

123 Hamilton, Maxwell M. : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 5, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 6—10:45 a. m.]

54. ReEmbs 4393, November 17, 9 a. m. I have today received a letter from Dekanozov, dated January 4 stating that the Soviet Government has no objection to Hamilton's appointment as our representative in Finland and is agreed that he may enjoy, by way of exception, the facilities mentioned in Kennan's letter of November 16. (These were the facilities specified in the Department's 2664, November 14, 5 p. m., first paragraph.)

Dekanozov goes on to say that the Soviet Government has taken note of Kennan's statement to the effect that Hamilton's appointment did not involve the reestablishment at this time of diplomatic or consular relations with Finland. Finally, he states that Higgs' plans for proceeding to Finland have been brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Helsinki.

With respect to the reference to Higgs, the last information I have on this subject is Stockholm's 44, December 9 to me, repeated to Department as 5059, December 9, 6 p. m.²⁹ If Higgs has not yet been able to leave Stockholm, I feel that he should now, in view of Dekanozov's letter, renew his efforts to do so.

Sent to Department as 54, January 5, 7 p. m., repeated to Stockholm as 3, January 5, 7 p. m.

HARRIMAN

²⁹ Not printed.

FRANCE

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING LIBERATION FROM THE GERMANS; RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

851.01/3310 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 3, 1944—noon.

[Received January 4—12:28 p. m.]

13. The Communist delegation to the Provisional Consultative Assembly has made public a resolution submitted to the French Committee of National Liberation urging that the Committee transform itself promptly into a provisional government of the French Republic on the basis of a precise war program and with determined men capable of realizing such a program.

Reflecting the continuing differences with de Gaulle¹ over Communist representation on the Committee (see my telegram number 91 December 4 [5], and despatch number 13, December 1²), the resolution emphasizes that such a true national government could not be constituted without participation of representatives of the French Communist Party and the Confédération Générale du Travail.

Other steps urged by the Communist resolution include:

1. More exact determination of the duty of the Commander in Chief and the Commissioner of National Defense.

2. Creation of a special commissariat to bring the maximum aid to resistance groups in France, coordinating their action immediately with the general war strategy.

3. Intensification of industrial and agricultural production with greater over all powers for the Commissioner for Production. (A Committee post demanded by the Communists).

4. Full development of the war spirit through greater activity by the Commissariat for Information. (Another post sought by the Communists, involving reorganization of the press, cinema and radio).

5. Destruction of all vestiges of a fifth column by ruthless punishment of traitors, involving a decree putting "outside the law" any individuals who had participated in Vichy measures throwing Frenchmen into the service of the enemy, and all persons whether in official position or not who had in any manner aided "collaboration".

¹ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Committee of National Liberation.

² Neither printed.

6. Rapid completion and application of the program of improving the position of Moslems.

7. Reorganization of the Committee's diplomatic personnel abroad to make sure that these representatives are imbued with "the sentiment of the new France".

8. Reorganization of the Committee's work so that it would deal only with questions of principle, leaving application of general directives to the various Commissioners, and a clear separation between powers of the Committee and the Government General of Algeria.

Sent to Department. Repeated to London.

WILSON

851.01/3327 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 8, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received January 9—4:16 a. m.]

87. The debate in the Provisional Consultative Assembly on plans for the return to a republican form of government in France will begin in about a week. My telegram No. 197, December 19, 2 p. m.³ gave a summary of the report known as the De Menthon plan, drafted by a group of the French Committee presided over by De Menthon, the Commissioner of Justice. A counterproposal has been drawn up by a group of Socialist members of the Consultative Assembly, comprising Socialists of the resistance movement as well as former parliamentarians, which is known as the Vincent Auriol counterproposal.

The latter differs from the Committee's plan in that it opposes holding any elections in the period immediately following liberation. It expresses the view that conditions in the country, the state of mind of the people, et cetera, immediately after liberation will not be such as to permit the holdings of fair and regular elections. The proposal, therefore, provides for reconstitution of the municipal councils and the general councils by reappointment of members removed by Vichy, as well as for removal of those who have collaborated with the enemy or Vichy, and for filling of vacancies by various procedures. Upon the return of the war prisoners, general elections would be held for a legislative and constituent assembly which would elect a provisional President of the Republic of [apparent omission] who would also be prime minister. This assembly would draw up a new constitution for the Republic and would then be dissolved as soon as the assembly created under the new constitution has been elected. During this interim period between liberation and the holding of general elections

³ Not printed.

after return of the war prisoners (estimated to last about 5 months), the proposal is that the French Committee of National Liberation be regarded as the Provisional Government of France and that a Provisional National Assembly be constituted within 15 days after liberation, composed of 120 members elected by the Departmental resistance groups in France, 120 elected from the political parties in proportion to their representation following the last general elections, and 120 members elected by the general councils as soon as the latter have been reconstituted. The powers of this Provisional Assembly would be the same as those contemplated for the National Assembly with exception of the constituent power. This Provisional Government would be responsible for the Provisional Assembly and in the event of a vote of lack of confidence on the part of the Provisional Assembly confirmed by a second vote in the same sense 8 days later elections would then take place within a month for the Legislative and Constituent Assembly.

The following comment occurs to me regarding the two plans. The De Menthon plan with its provision for immediate elections for municipal councilors paving the way to constitution of a Provisional Assembly before which the French Committee would present its resignation represents the views of the younger militant members of the Committee and resistance groups who feel that new men must govern France and new forces be brought to bear in shaping the economic and social life of the country. They fear that if elections in any form are postponed for a few months and the Communal and Departmental Assemblies merely reconstituted with a few changes here and there, the old line party politicians will regain control and the country drift back into something like conditions in the years preceding the war.

The Socialist plan reflects primarily the traditional Socialist fear of the Communists, based on the belief that elections held in the turbulent atmosphere immediately following liberation would profit the extremists particularly the Communists.

It has been interesting to note in talking with supporters of both projects the great interest and concern expressed as to the reaction of American public opinion and of the United States Government regarding their plans. Both groups profess the same objective, namely, the return to a republican form of Government at the earliest possible moment under the conditions which they expect to find after liberation. The point on which they differ basically is the advisability of holding municipal elections immediately on liberation. I believe that there are many members of the Assembly and a few in the Committee who while sincerely apprehensive that immediate elections would be irregular and may play into the hands of the Com-

munists nevertheless will support the De Menthon plan because they feel that the feature of immediate consultation of the people following liberation will convey to public opinion abroad an impression of the sincerity of the authorities in Algiers in planning for the return to a democratic system. Conversely they fear that adoption of Socialist plan postponing any election for 5 months or so during which period the French Committee would remain as the Provisional Government would give the impression abroad of an intention to perpetuate the committee in power. In other words the estimate made here as to the reaction of opinion abroad will be an important factor in decisions reached regarding the principles incorporated in these plans.

The Communists are understood to be working on another counter-proposal.

Sent to Department as 87, repeated to London as 8.

WILSON

851.01/3386 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 11, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received January 12—3:15 a. m.]

110. The Consultative Assembly held debates upon the resistance movement in France on January 8 and January 10. The speakers uniformly emphasized that the resistance movement is in danger from lack of supplies, that the potentialities which it might otherwise possess remain unfulfilled. In practically all cases complaints were made that the hopes held out by the United Nations had remained without visible results and that the resistance movement has been practically ignored by the Allied Staffs. The efficacy and economy of the action of the resistance against enemy object[ive]s in France with less danger to the civilian population as against Allied air raids upon the same objectives were emphasized and it was pointed out that the Resistants, if armed, would in effect replace parachute troops. Practically every speaker attributed in part the failure in arming the resistance to uneasiness on the part of the Allied leaders that the arms might be used for internal political purposes and reiterated that the resistance movement had no other aim than to rid France of the Germans and of Vichy. Several speakers claimed that the Allies feared that France might liberate herself too completely and stated emphatically that whatever might be done or not done those who had collaborated with the Germans would be purged.

Several speakers including Grenier, the Communist delegate, demanded that the Committee make all possible use of the materials and means of transportation which are available to it in assisting the resistance which they stated is primarily the affair of the French Committee.

The Commissioner of the Interior, D'Astier, in replying to the speeches of the delegates stated that not a single military movement of any variety could be undertaken without the consent of the Allies, thereby implying that if the Committee is unable to assist the movement it is owing to Allied opposition. He asked that the Allies reconsider their position on supplies to the movement and stated that if there was any hesitancy on grounds of the use to which these arms might be put, the Allies should know that, with or without arms, the collaborationists would be purged and that the sooner this was done, the sooner order in France would be re-established.

The Assembly then adopted a resolution calling upon the Committee among other things to endeavor to secure official recognition from the United Nations of the resistance groups as the advance guard of the invasion and their inclusion in the strategic plans of the Allied Staffs.

General de Gaulle concluded the session with a brief speech in which he characterized the resistance movement as one for the renovation of France. He stated that much had been done by the Allies to assist the movement but not indeed to the extent which the efforts of the resistance had merited.

The next meeting of the Assembly is scheduled for today when the purge will be discussed.

WILSON

851.01/3342 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 12, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 11:31 p. m.]

129. I have received a note from Massigli ⁴ dated January 8 requesting assistance for the French resistance organizations which reads in translation as follows:

"The time is approaching when the Allied armies will undertake on French territory operations the success of which will deal a decisive blow to German military power. Nothing therefore must be neglected to insure their success and it is with this conviction that the French

⁴ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation.

Committee of National Liberation has directed me to call Your Excellency's attention to the following considerations:

Under the impulsion and direction of the French Committee of National Liberation French resistance has today become an organized force which represents a military potential ready for use in these operations. Organized at first on a moral plane it rapidly became an element of strategic value.

Right now the idea of destructions carried out enemy installations impede considerably the functioning of the German war machine in French territory. For example, an official document emanating from Vichy sets forth 1800 instances of sabotage carried out in the period from September 25 to October 25 last. At the moment of landing, the systematically prepared intervention of the patriot groups at certain sensitive points of the German front and in the enemy's rear will have an even greater importance and will represent substantial support for the Allied forces. The value of this support will increase in the same measure that arms and material placed at the disposal of French resistance permit of the calling in of a greater number of group.

It must, unfortunately, be noted that the material which the resistance groups dispose of at present is out of proportion to the number and quality of the effectives which it could put in line if proper steps were taken in good time. It is true that this situation is partly the result of unquestionable technical difficulties but it is due above all to the well known insufficiency of the material assigned to transport operations in France, an insufficiency all the more serious in that the French domestic war effort is growing every day.

The French Committee of National Liberation must understand that all deficiencies in French armament of French patriots and in the minor detail organized, in accordance with the expressed desire of Allied propaganda itself, for the purpose of fighting in the enemy's rear at the moment of landing, would involve grave military, political and moral consequences.

The British and American Governments alone are in a position today to furnish the necessary means for the battle of the rear. The preparation of this battle implies the preliminary elaboration of precise plans concerning the nature, quantity and kind of material to be sent to France.

But such an elaboration implies the cooperation of the qualified representatives of the competent American and British services, as well as those of the French Committee of National Liberation. In order to accomplish this under the best conditions, the Committee accordingly has the honor to propose that these representatives meet in London at the earliest possible moment.

It would be obliged if Your Excellency would be kind enough to lay before your Government the foregoing proposal, stressing the very great importance which the Committee attaches thereto."

A similar note has been received by my British colleague who is referring it to his Government.

In conjunction with this question please see my telegram No. 110, January 11, 2 p. m. regarding the debate in the Consultative Assembly

in which members of French resistance urged that greater assistance be supplied to their organizations in France.

Please furnish a copy of this telegram to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy making reference to the air mail letter which I addressed to him on January 3, 1944, through Dunn⁵ enclosing a copy of memorandum prepared by Frénay, member of the French Committee and one of the resistance leaders, regarding the activities of French resistance.

I have furnished a copy of Massigli's note to the Chief of Staff⁶ of Allied Force Headquarters.

Please instruct concerning the reply to be made to the proposal set out in the penultimate paragraph of the note.

WILSON

851.01/3345 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 12, 1944—11 p. m.
[Received January 13—6:10 a. m.]

130. Reference my 87, January 10 [8], 10 p. m. The Committee on State Reform of the Consultative Assembly is engaged in drafting a compromise between the De Menthon plan and the Vincent Auriol counterproposal. While complete agreement has not yet been reached within the Committee I am advised that something along the following lines is expected: elections in either first or second degree for a new Provisional Consultative Assembly as soon as possible after liberation; the elections will be on the basis of revised 1939 electoral lists (the plan to base them on ration cards will be abandoned because of the number of fraudulent cards, foreigners who possess them, et cetera); women will be ineligible to vote in these first elections (it would take months to prepare electoral lists for them, they would outnumber the men until the prisoners return, et cetera) but they will vote in the later general elections; the Provisional Consultative Assembly as soon as constituted will receive the resignation of the present French Committee and will designate a chief of the new Provisional Government who with the members of such government will present himself before the Assembly for a vote of confidence; the Provisional Assembly will not be dissolved but will continue in existence exercising "control" over the Provisional Government until the definitive government comes into being after general elections; general elections on the basis

⁵ James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

⁶ Lt. Gen. J. A. H. Gammell.

of universal direct suffrage will take place as soon as the war prisoners can be brought back.

It is believed that a compromise along the foregoing lines will have practically the unanimous support of the Committee and the members of the Consultative Assembly with the exception of the Communists.

Sent to Department as 130. Repeated to London as 13.

WILSON

740.0011 European War 1939/32741b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944—5 p. m.

356. There follows in my next succeeding telegram the text of a proposed statement on France. Its publication would, in our opinion, serve a useful purpose in clarifying a situation which has become somewhat confused by conflicting rumors and propaganda. You will note that it is drafted in the form of a joint pronouncement with the United Kingdom and Soviet Governments and we are hopeful that it will commend itself to them. It is our thought that this statement should be issued at such moment as the Supreme Allied Commander has made his arrangements for liaison in planning civil affairs procedure for the invasion period with the French, Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian and other authorities of occupied countries.

Please take the matter up immediately with Mr. Eden ⁷ with a view to obtaining his approval.

For your information, although we believe that the statement would be most effective if issued jointly, we may well employ it as a statement of our own policy if for any reason the British and Soviet Governments prove unwilling to subscribe to it.

A similar telegram is being sent to Moscow.

HULL

851.01/3369b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*⁸

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944—6 p. m.

357. "The Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, in pursuit of their paramount aim, the defeat of Germany, are determined to bring about the earliest possible

⁷ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸ This telegram contains text of proposed statement referred to in telegram 356, *supra*.

liberation of France from her oppressors, and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French Government may be reestablished. The ultimate aim of the three Governments is the free choice by the French people of the government under which they will live.

In conducting military operations in France, and so long as military necessity requires, it is manifest that the Supreme Allied Commander must have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war against Germany may be pursued relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. It is the intention of the Allies that civil administration shall, in so far as possible, be left to French citizens.

The three Governments are confident that at the proper time all French patriots will rise to the aid of the Allies in ejecting the Nazi oppressors from their land. The Allies and the Supreme Allied Commander will have no dealings or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of abolishing it. No person will be retained or employed in any office by the Allied military authorities who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in a manner inimical to the cause of the United Nations.

The restoration of civil administration in France will be left to the French people in conformity with their traditional love of liberty and independence.

It is the hope of the Allies that the French people, having as their primary objective the freeing of France from Nazi domination, will subordinate political activity to the necessity for unity in ejecting and destroying the enemy.

With these objectives in mind, the Allies will count upon the assistance of all Frenchmen in the maintenance of public order and conditions which will permit the restoration of government by consent of the people.”

HULL

851.01/3352 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 14, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received January 15—1:05 a. m.]

154. My 130, January 12, 11 p. m. The six former Communist Deputies delegates to the Assembly have now presented their own proposal for a plan for the return to a republican form of government in France.

They state by way of preface that while they would have preferred that the war program should have been completed by the Assembly before taking up the provisional organization of France upon its liberation the discussion having been raised they would submit their own plan.

The preamble stresses that until the meeting of a constitutional assembly any provisional government must have a popular mandate by [apparent omission] that no rigid lines can meet in advance the many problems which will arise during the intervening period. The FCNL⁹ should be recognized as the "Provisional Government of the French Republic." The two basic assumptions are (1) that France shall be free, democratic, and independent and (2) that only through liberty and equality can there be integration of the French Empire with the French community.

The preamble also envisages a list of some 14 urgent matters upon which the Provisional Government should take "immediate action". These comprise a number of popular measures some of which have demagogic overtones including such items as reparation of damages to individuals and to property, immediate increase in rations, low cost housing, organized recreation, aid to children and to mothers, extension of educational facilities, et cetera. First on the list is a provision for a high criminal court composed of two magistrates and three representatives of resistance groups to try "traitors" and one for the creation of a Garde Patriotique or auxiliary police drawn from resistance elements. Also envisaged is confiscation of property belonging to persons or entities having collaborated with the enemy.

The plan itself follows the general administrative framework of the other plans but springs from the proposal that each commune as it is liberated should elect, by show of hands in the public square, a communal patriotic delegation to take the place of the Municipal Council. All citizens of both sexes above 18 years of age are admitted to the vote. These delegations will in turn elect delegates to a departmental assembly according to a schedule of proportional representation. The departmental assembly, having come into being as a whole department may be liberated, would elect a departmental patriotic delegation of 15 members to act as an advisory council for the prefect and two representatives for the National Provisional Consultative Assembly. Having performed this task and emitted a vote of confidence or lack of confidence in the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the assembly will adjourn.

Three forms are provided for the Provisional Consultative Assembly: first, the existing Assembly is to continue in its present membership until at least a part of metropolitan France has been liberated;

⁹ French Committee of National Liberation.

the second stage envisages that as each metropolitan department is freed and until 25% of the population is freed two additional members, elected in accordance with the preceding paragraph, will be added to the assembly; finally after 25% of the metropolitan area has been liberated membership of the assembly would be reduced to two delegates of each department as freed, a representation from resistance groups and a representation from overseas territories.

An elaborate system is envisaged for elections in Paris.

Elections for the constituent assembly will be held as soon as 90% of French citizens are regularly inscribed in the voting list, or in any case not later than 6 months after the total liberation of the territory. Provision is made for absentee voting of soldiers, sailors, and prisoners. All Frenchmen and women above 18 years of age in good standing will be entitled to vote but candidates for office must be 21 years of age.

Upon the inauguration of the constituent assembly, the communal and departmental patriotic delegations and the Provisional Consultative Assembly cease to exist. The Provisional Government of the French Republic resigns and the constituent assembly elects a president of the new provisional government of the French Republic who would submit his cabinet for ratification by the constituent assembly to whom the president and his ministers individually are responsible. A new constitution must have been adopted within 3 months of the constituent assembly's inaugural session, and within a further 2 months arrangements must have been made for the election of such communal, departmental and national assemblies as are provided for in the constitution. With the entry upon their duties of these last named bodies, the Provisional Government will resign and the regular government of the French Republic will take over.

CHAPIN

851.01/3342 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1944—4 p. m.

161. Please draft an appropriate acknowledgment to Committee's note of January 8 quoted in your 129, January 12, and state that its contents have been brought to the attention of the competent military authorities of the United States.

For your information the matter has been referred to Admiral Leahy¹⁰ for information of and consideration by Joint Chiefs of Staff.

HULL

¹⁰ Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

851.01/3363 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 17, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received January 18—2:28 a. m.]

178. This morning Mr. Duff Cooper ¹¹ kindly showed me a copy of his [memorandum?] describing the recent visit of de Gaulle to Mr. Churchill in Marrakech at which he assisted.

The Prime Minister pointed out in a friendly way the unwisdom of alienating his goodwill and that of President Roosevelt by the persecution of persons who had rendered valuable services to the Allied cause. The P. M. had himself given definite assurances to Boisson ¹² and Peyrouton.¹³ As respects Flandin,¹⁴ while there was no similar commitment on the part of the British or American Governments the P. M. felt that if a division were made between the innocent and the guilty at a level which would include Flandin among the latter there was indeed a tragic future in store for France.

De Gaulle replied that the Assembly which had been set up as a democratic influence was almost unanimous in demand for severe penalties against collaborationists. He reiterated, however, to the P. M., assurances (which he had given to Mr. Wilson) that the trial judge would not find sufficient evidence to warrant formal trial until the liberation of France and that meantime the arrested men would receive good treatment.

Taken to task for the action of his representative in Syria and a failure to act upon decisions without consultation of his Allies the General could offer but lame excuses. Similarly the General disclaimed any intention of preventing General de Lattre from visiting the Prime Minister explaining that he had thought an interview inopportune for the moment since de Lattre had duties elsewhere.

In response to de Gaulle's complaint that the North African expedition ¹⁵ had been planned and carried out without any reference to him Mr. Churchill replied that the expedition had been primarily an American operation. Since he himself had acted only as a lieutenant to the President he had not been a free agent and consequently he could not have consulted anyone in advance without the consent of the President.

¹¹ Alfred Duff Cooper, British representative to the French Committee of National Liberation.

¹² Pierre Boisson, formerly Vichy Governor General of French West Africa.

¹³ Marcel Peyrouton, formerly Governor General of Algeria.

¹⁴ Pierre-Etienne Flandin, once French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and earlier, Prime Minister.

¹⁵ For correspondence regarding the Allied invasion and occupation of French North Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

In reply to de Gaulle's appeal for assistance in arming the resistance groups in metropolitan France, Mr. Churchill stated that such assistance would be given gladly to the extent that British availabilities permitted.

Mr. Churchill himself raised the question of civil administration in France after the invasion but the subject was not pursued since Mr. Duff Cooper suggested that this was already under active discussion in Washington and in London and was a highly complicated matter where the advice of technical, legal, and other experts was essential. (In response to my specific question Mr. Duff Cooper stated that de Gaulle made no plea for recognition of the French Committee as the provisional government of France). Mr. Duff Cooper stated that while the Prime Minister exposed the situation to General de Gaulle with great frankness the entire conversation was friendly and reasonably cordial in tone.

CHAPIN

851.01/3377 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 20, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received January 21—1:52 a. m.]

205. The Consultative Assembly concluded yesterday evening a 2 days' debate on the subject of national defense. Speeches by a number of members and by Le Troquer¹⁶ and Jacquinet¹⁷ were of general nature and contained no information of particular interest. General de Gaulle in the concluding speech expressed appreciation of the aid which had been given by Great Britain, United States, and Russia and stressed the continuity of France's war effort as carried on since the armistice by the forces under his command. The speech as a whole seemed to imply an indirect argument that the war effort of the forces wearing the Croix de Lorraine should entitle him to carry on with his colleagues as a government in liberated France.

Before an adjournment the Assembly unanimously passed a motion expressing confidence that the Provisional Government, the President and Members of the Committee of National Defense, the Commissioners of War and Air and of the Marine, would:

(1) Develop France's war effort to the fullest possible extent and obtain the maximum of armament, material, and equipment as rapidly as possible from the Allies;

¹⁶ André le Troquer of the French Algiers Committee.

¹⁷ Louis Jacquinet, Commissioner of the French Committee of National Liberation.

(2) Provide for the participation of French in the battles to liberate France;

(3) Eliminate as soon as possible from the French forces elements hostile to the nation and thus put an end to the uneasiness existing because of too slow purification; and

(4) Bring about the complete unification of French forces devoted to service to the nation and the Republic.

CHAPIN

851.01/3386 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 23, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 10:10 p. m.]

240. The Consultative Assembly adjourned yesterday evening until February 29 after having completed a 2-day debate on the form of the provisional government to be instituted in liberated France.

Various proposed plans were discussed the more important ones being (1) the Communist plan (my 154, January 14, 6 p. m.) and (2) the plan prepared by the Commission on State Reform of the Consultative Assembly on the basis of the De Menthon plan and the Vincent Auriol counterproposal (see my 130, January 11, 1 p. m.). This plan as finally submitted provided that (a) elections would not be held until 80% of the electorate [*electorate?*] were able to participate; (b) during the interim period the municipal councils and departmental assemblies existing in 1939 would be reconvened after having been purged of collaborationists; (c) the existing Consultative Assembly would continue to function augmented by two delegates from each liberated department; (d) after the liberation of two-thirds of the department and of Paris the Government's Assembly would become a Provisional Legislative Assembly; and (e) during the entire period until the holding of final elections the Committee would continue to be the provisional government of France.

It soon became obvious from the debates that neither plan had any chance of unanimous approval. With a view to bringing the debates to a conclusion and achieving some concrete result Mr. Philip¹⁸ speaking for the French Committee proposed that the Assembly agree on certain broad principles and refer the whole matter again to the Commission on State Reform and the French Committee for further study and resubmittal when the Assembly reconvenes at the end of next month. The broad principles suggested by him were (1) no

¹⁸ André Philip, member without portfolio of the French Committee of National Liberation.

definite constitutional change should be made until the sovereign people of France were given an opportunity to make their choice; (2) the immediate reconstitution of municipal governments and departmental assemblies; (3) the necessity for an assembly operating in conjunction with the department and (4) the final elections should be held at the earliest possible date.

The Assembly accepted this proposition in adjourning on the understanding that the Committee in conjunction with the Commission would prepare a draft ordinance which would be submitted to the Assembly at its next session.

The principles enumerated by Philip reflected the points upon which there had been unanimous agreements in the discussions the disagreements having arisen upon the methods of implementing the principles such as whether elections should be held immediately or not until after the return of prisoners and deportees, the manner in which the new elections should be held, the question of whether to restore the municipal and departmental bodies existing in 1939 and the membership of the Consultative Assembly and the manner of its choice.

Speakers including De Menthon and Philip unanimously rejected the reconstitution of the 1940 Assembly, any resort to plebiscites, and with the exception of the Communist members unanimously attacked any resort to elections by acclamation. Most of the speakers again including the two Committee members, rejected the application of the Treveneuc Law¹⁹ in that the existing General Councils are in no way capable of reflecting the popular will. Pierre Cot argued strongly against the institution of the Presidential system in France pointing out the radical differences, historical and geographical, between the United States and France, and stating that in French history the Presidential system had led inevitably to dictatorship. Several speakers exhibited considerable concern over the reactions of the Allied nations to measures which might be adopted for the provisional government.

It will be of interest to note that this debate is the first in which the Consultative Assembly has failed to reach unanimous agreement. While in the present instance this indicates that the prewar political parties appear to be continuing their differences in view, it is nevertheless encouraging to see that the Consultative Assembly is taking an independent line and is not acting merely as a rubber stamp for the French Committee.

CHAPIN

¹⁹ Treveneuc Law, French Constitutional Law of 1872 relative to part that may be played by the General Councils under certain circumstances. For text, see *Droit Constitutionnel*, vol. iv, p. 584.

851.01/3429 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 11, 1944—9 p. m.
[Received February 12—2:20 a. m.]

454. Since the despatch of my 429 February 9, 11 p. m.,²⁰ anticipation that US recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as a provisional government is just around the corner has greatly increased and admittedly the number of articles summarized in the local press from the American press tend to substantiate French optimism. The Secretary's statement to the press that French affairs are being actively considered in the White House and the announcement that the President is to speak at the ceremony of turning over a destroyer to the French naval authorities²¹ are all taken as signs of immediately impending favorable developments in the situation. Today I was greeted by Queuille, a leading member of the Committee, with the statement that according to French advices things were going extremely well in Washington and in my hearing he replied to a question put by another Frenchman that he supposed recognition would be forthcoming within a week or two.

In the absence of any information from the Department, I have naturally refrained from any comment, although I have felt it wise on several occasions as when talking to Queuille to give a friendly warning against exaggeration of news from Washington.

I have the impression, although I would find it difficult to produce any concrete evidence therefor, that the British civil and military authorities here are giving some encouragement to the belief of the French officials that an increased recognition is to be extended to the Committee. At any rate these authorities are cultivating de Gaulle and de Lattre far more assiduously than was the case some months ago.

I should be grateful for any instructions that the Department can give me for my guidance.

CHAPIN

851.01/3429 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1944—midnight.

488. As reported in radio bulletin 36, President stated at his February 10 press conference that only thing being discussed was what

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ For text of the President's speech delivered at the Washington Navy Yard, February 12, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 12, 1944, p. 167.

to do regarding government behind the lines in event we got into France. He specifically stated that he knew of no impending revision of our French policy (your 454, February 11).

You should continue whenever possible to warn those with whom you come in contact against taking a too optimistic view of the press reports from Washington. But, in line with the President's remarks, you may speak of the probability of closer working arrangements with the Committee with respect to those areas in France outside the actual combat zones.

STETTINIUS

740.0011 European War 1939/33516

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 17 February 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to your letter of 18 January 1944²² enclosing copies of telegrams from the Representative of the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation, and your letter of 29 January 1944²³ enclosing a communication from the British Embassy on the subject of providing arms and other assistance to resistance groups in France, these papers were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, after consideration, express the following views:

U. S. and British supplies to resistance groups in France are provided and distributed under the direction of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces,²⁴ who is also responsible for coordinating the activities of such groups with those of his own military forces in planning and executing offensive operations against Germany in western Europe.

It is therefore considered inadvisable that representatives of competent U.S. and British services, together with those of the French Committee of National Liberation meet as a separate body in London to consider the supply of munitions to resistance groups in France.

This same objective is being accomplished by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, whose staff is in continuing contact in London with the French Committee of Action which is understood to be an agency of the French Army.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have transmitted these views to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and have recommended that they be concurred in and that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces,

²² Not found in Department files.

²³ Not printed.

²⁴ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

be informed. The British Chiefs of Staff have been requested to inform their government and to suggest to it parallel action.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,

Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

851.01/3436 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 21, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received February 22—1 :35 p. m.]

570. For the Secretary and Under Secretary and Ambassador Wilson.²⁵ From a reliable source within the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs I learn that Monnet²⁶ continues to report in most optimistic terms with regard to the possibility of some early action by the United States looking toward recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as a provisional government. This same source informs me that these reports on the progress of the Washington "negotiations" are becoming increasingly at variance with concurrent reports from London which, while stating that a practical solution appears in sight as respects problems between the Allied Military Authority and the French Committee after the invasion of metropolitan France, have made no reference to recognition of the Committee as a provisional government.

However, in a postprandial conversation yesterday with a member of this Mission, Mr. Duff Cooper admitted in strictest confidence that the Prime Minister had now veered to the belief that the FCNL should be accorded recognition as a provisional government but that he understood that the Prime Minister had not as yet made known this recent evolution in his position to President Roosevelt and was probably deferring doing so for the time being.

Although I have no knowledge of what development affairs may be taking in Washington, it seems possible that Monnet either as a result of misunderstanding, wishful thinking, or desire to please, may be making overoptimistic reports to the FCNL. While so far as I am aware the question of recognition was never formally raised by de Gaulle or Massigli with Ambassador Wilson before he left here, it appears that recently, possibly as a result of Monnet's reporting

²⁵ Edwin C. Wilson, American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation, at this time in Washington.

²⁶ Jean Monnet, Commissioner of Armaments, Supplies and Reconstruction of the French Committee of National Liberation on mission to the United States.

and the fact that certain editorials and commentators are unable to distinguish between "recognition" and increased cooperation along the lines of a working agreement, the two matters have been fused to a point where they are now considered almost synonymous in the minds of certain members of the Committee.

The Department may feel that some clarification of issues is in order both as respects Monnet and possibly through some friendly commentators or editorial writers in the American press.

CHAPIN

851.01/3489b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1944—6 p. m.

1448. On February 20 Duff-Cooper told Chapin in strictest confidence that Prime Minister has veered to the belief that the French Committee should be accorded recognition as a provisional government. Duff-Cooper added that he did not believe Churchill had as yet notified President Roosevelt of his changed opinion and might not do so for the time being.

We would naturally be intensely interested in any information which may come to you tending to confirm or disprove this report.

STEFINIUS

851.01/3475 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 26, 1944—12 p. m.

[Received February 28—3:05 a. m.]

631. The full text of the draft ordinance on the organization of the provisional government of France adopted by the Committee, February 23, has just been obtained. Though its substance has been made public the full text has not. This draft ordinance will be submitted to the Consultative Assembly as was agreed at the end of the debates in the last session. (Reference this office's 197, December 19,²⁷ 87, January 8, 154, January 14 and 240, January 23).

Draft provides that a National Constituent Assembly shall be convoked at the latest on the expiration of 6 months after the return of four-fifths of the prisoners and deportees and that it shall be elected by secret and direct ballot by all French men and women who have attained their majority. The geographic basis on which delegates

²⁷ Not printed.

will be elected and the size of the membership will be determined presumably by a law to be adopted later.

In the interim, in order that the popular will may be consulted as soon as possible, the prefect of each department is to appoint a "*délégation spéciale*" for each municipality choosing persons who have taken part in the resistance, preferably from among the municipal officials in office 1939. The *délégation spéciale* will revise the electoral lists and will be responsible for the government of the municipalities until the election of provisional municipal governments and General Councils which is to take place not later than 3 months after the liberation of each department.

When municipal elections have been held in two-thirds of the administrative regions including Paris, a provisional National Assembly will be convoked. Upon [*Until?*] this time the present Consultative Assembly will continue to sit with the addition of 14 members from each administrative region as it is liberated to be designated by the resistance organizations on the nomination of departmental committees of liberation. The provisional National Assembly will be composed of 269 members elected by departmental electoral colleges composed of delegates chosen by the municipalities and of the members of the General Council, of 100 members elected by the National Council of Resistance and of 50 parliamentarians designated by the departmental electoral colleges and by National Council of Resistance. In addition there will be 21 representatives of the extra-metropolitan resistance. The Provisional Assembly will elect by majority vote the President of the provisional government who will form a cabinet to which the Committee of National Liberation will resign its powers, on the approval of the Provisional Assembly of its ministerial declaration the provisional government will receive full powers. Until the Constituent Assembly is convoked the Provisional Assembly will remain in session and must be consulted on international agreements, will vote the budget and may interpellate the Government. The Provisional Assembly must approve the law governing the method of election of the Constituent Assembly.

CHAPIN

S51.01/3477 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 29, 1944—midnight.

[Received February 29—10:14 p. m.]

1662. For the Acting Secretary. In answer to your 1448 of February 26, I do not believe that the Prime Minister has to date concluded that the French Committee should be accorded recognition

as a provisional government. He has been more friendly toward the Committee since his return from North Africa. I found that Eden's statement on February 23 in Parliament²⁸ was largely written by the Prime Minister.

I am certain that the British would not want to act without our collaboration and support.

I am sending you Eden's statement about France in my immediately following cable No. 1663.²⁹

WINANT

851.01/3511 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1944—noon.

759. This refers to your 799, March 11.³⁰ In replying to any questions which French officials or individuals may put to you in conversations regarding Pucheu³¹ trial and verdict you should scrupulously avoid any comment which could be interpreted as representing the views of this Government or which could even remotely be construed as an excuse to accuse us of intervening.

In this connection I believe it would be preferable if you even refrained from expressing any opinion regarding the position which American public opinion might take.

HULL

851.01/3342 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1944—4 p. m.

766. With further reference to your 129, January 12, British and American Chiefs of Staff concur in believing that the French proposal for a meeting of special representatives in London to discuss problem of arming resistance groups is unnecessary in view of steps already being taken there of which Committee has doubtless been informed by D'Astier.

Consideration will be given to possible further reply to French after final views of Combined Chiefs of Staff are made known to us.

²⁸ See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 397, cols. 929-933.

²⁹ Telegram not printed.

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Pierre Pucheu, once French Minister of the Interior, in a trial before a special military tribunal was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death.

It is suggested that you endeavor to ascertain from Duff Cooper what if any oral or written communication he has made to the Committee on the subject.

HULL

851.01/3539 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 17, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received March 18—11:35 a. m.]

875. Your telegram No. 766, March 14, 4 p. m., final paragraph. On March 7 the British representative stated in a written communication to Massigli "that a special committee has been set up by the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Economic Warfare on which will sit representatives of the British and American special services of the Air Ministry and of the French Committee of National Liberation. The terms of reference are to examine methods for increasing the flow of military equipment to the resistance groups in France."

In written acknowledgment of this communication dated March 14 Massigli expressed the thanks of the National Committee which in translation "would henceforth be assured that the groups of the French resistance will at the present moment and even more at the time of decisive military operations be able to make to the Allied war effort and to the liberation of their country an ever more effective contribution."

CHAPIN

740.0011 European War 1939/33516

The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1944.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: In your letter of February 17, 1944 you were good enough to set forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to a proposal of the French Committee of National Liberation looking toward the providing of additional arms and other assistance to resistance groups in France.

As of possible interest in this connection, I am quoting for your information a pertinent passage from a letter of March 10, 1944 from a member of the British Embassy in Washington ³² to Mr. James C.

³² Letter of Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, not printed.

Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs:

"The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff were communicated by the British representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff to London. The British Chiefs of Staff replied that they were in complete agreement that the special meeting in London proposed by the French Committee of National Liberation was not necessary, and that they were informing the Foreign Office accordingly. They added the information that the Prime Minister, who on his return from convalescence in the Mediterranean took an active interest in the resistance groups in France, had set up a Committee to examine methods of increasing the flow of military equipment to them. This Committee has as its Chairman the Minister of Economic Warfare, who is the British Minister responsible for S.O.E.³³ activities. Its members include representatives from S.O.E., O.S.S.,³⁴ the British Air Ministry and the French Committee of National Liberation. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, is kept closely in touch with the work of the Committee.

"The above information was communicated by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs on February 24th, together with a draft of a telegram which, they suggested, might be despatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces."

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff are probably already aware, the question of arming the resistance groups has become an important political issue in the eyes of all Frenchmen, wherever located, and the impression seems to have gained general credence that what is being done in this field is being done by the British and that the United States not only has played no part in the matter but is even opposed to arming the "underground" for political reasons.

Consequently, I was glad to note from your letter of February 17 that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff have endeavored to emphasize the fact that the United States and British supplies are provided and distributed under the direction of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces. However it is equally clear from the statement from the British Embassy quoted above, that the British are desirous of keeping the matter as much as possible in their own hands, thereby gaining credit in the eyes of the French and lending the appearance of truth to the claim that this Government is indifferent if not actually hostile to the resistance groups in France. It is for this reason that this Department is particularly interested in being informed of the decision which may ultimately be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and is hopeful that their decision will make it possible for us to counteract some of the unfriendly comment which is now being directed against this Government.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

³³ Secret Operations Executive.

³⁴ Presumably a reference to the Office of Strategic Services.

851.01/3557 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 23, 1944.

[Received March 23—10:36 p. m.]

2380. Yesterday in Parliament a member asked the Foreign Minister whether agreement had been reached with the French Committee respecting the administration of French territory if and when liberated. Eden replied that he had no statement to make on this subject at present "but the whole question is now under examination by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government". In a further question Eden was asked if he had seen the statement from Washington that President Roosevelt has come to a decision on this subject and "is it not time that the British Government came to a decision?" Mr. Eden replied that he did not think that the underlying assumption of the question was quite justified. "What I said was, that the two Governments are examining the position together, and whatever we say and do, we shall say and do together". William Astor then asked the following question to which Mr. Eden did not reply: "Do the Government appreciate the importance of ensuring that no temporary authority should take any action which might prejudice the free expression of French opinion at an election".

WINANT

851.01/3562 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 24, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received March 25—7 a. m.]

970. Reference is made to first sentence of paragraph 4 of my 900, March 19, 5 p. m.⁸⁵ Unfortunately because of a slight indisposition it was only today that I was able to inspect the plan for the resumption of civil government in France and its relations with the military authorities which Massigli had promised to show me.

The ordinance dated March 14 is highly secret and was shown me on the understanding that I would only report it to my Government. From the necessarily hasty perusal which I was able to make in his presence the following are the salient points.

⁸⁵ Not printed. This sentence reads: "Massigli stated that Committee had prepared a plan for resumption of local civil government in France and its relations with the military authorities." (851.01/3540)

A delegate is to be appointed who will be the direct representative of the FCNL in each theatre of operation in metropolitan France (in north and south). He will presumably be a civilian. He will be assisted on one hand by an administrative delegation upon which will be represented all the Civil Commissariats concerned and on the other hand by a military delegate who will be a general officer and who will represent the Military Commissariats and the French High Command.

The liberated territories are conceived as being divided into two zones, the forward or operational zone and an interior zone where local government will have already been set up and begun to function. Provision is made however that certain militarized zones may be created within the interior zone. Incidentally it is provided that the limits of the forward and interior zones are to be defined by the FCNL. When I asked Massigli about this he stated that of course such limits would be defined only in accord with the Allied High Command. However there is no mention of such fact in the document.

The chief function of the administrative or civil delegation will be to instill and insure the functioning of civil administration in all its aspects in the interior zone; to supervise measures for the welfare work of the civil population including such things as rationing, housing, transportation etc.; and finally to exercise the powers of government under an order of martial law (*état de siège*). The functions of the military delegate will be in all zones (1) to establish liaison with resistance groups and to insure their participation in the fight against the enemy (2) to assist in reestablishment and gain tenancy of communications and public utilities (3) to reestablish and maintain all the usual organs of military administration (4) in the advanced zones the military delegate will be charged with the reestablishment of local civil authorities as such establishment becomes possible.

Provision is made that under the military delegate liaisons will be established according to the various echelons between Allied military authorities and the French civil and military authorities. The chief or civil delegate may in his discretion grant to the military delegate such a portion of his authority as he may deem necessary in order to carry out his task.

Finally the two chief delegates are enjoined in the preparatory period before the beginning of military operations in France to take steps to build up the nucleus of their organization and to establish liaisons with the Allied military authorities so as to insure the prompt putting into effect of the measures envisaged in the ordinance.

Sent to the Department as 970, repeated to London as 113.

851.01/3612a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Rabat (Cole)

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1944.

14. Following is text of State Department release, March 21.

"The absurd reports and rumors periodically occurring, and which are evidently inspired, endeavoring to create the impression that this Government upon the liberation of France intends to deal with the Vichy regime or with certain individuals directly or indirectly supporting the policy of collaboration with Germany are false on their face. The fact that this Government kept representatives at Vichy for some time for such vital purposes as combating Nazi designs, the preservation of the French fleet from German hands, and the prevention of Nazi occupation of French Africa or the establishment of military bases there, has been most amazingly and falsely represented as founded upon a sympathetic relationship between the American Government and pro-Axis supporters at Vichy. Every person at all informed knew that throughout the entire period just the opposite was the truth.

No loyal supporter of the Allied cause would make the ridiculous charge that the United States Government while sending its military forces and vast military supplies to the most distant battlefields to prosecute the war against the Axis powers would at the same time have any dealings or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of abolishing it."

HULL

851.01/3582 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 28, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 11:09 p. m.]

1021. In a public meeting yesterday afternoon the Consultative Assembly concluded its article by article consideration of the draft ordinance on the organization of the provisional government of France. (See my 984 of March 25, 1944³⁶). The project as amended by the Assembly was then approved as a whole by a vote of 64 to 4. As soon as it is possible to obtain the text as finally adopted I shall cable a summary of the modifications effected by the Assembly in the National Committee's draft.

General de Gaulle was present at yesterday's meeting and made a brief address of which the following were the points of chief interest:

He had observed a certain discouragement in the Assembly because of the difficulties encountered in trying to reach absolutely precise and unanimous conclusions in regard to the constitution of the new pro-

³⁶ Not printed.

visional assembly for France. He himself did not share that discouragement because he felt that there was general agreement between the Assembly and the Committee on fundamentals and that it was only natural that there should be many opinions regarding details. For its part the Government had had no desire to intervene in the slightest way in the Assembly's debate and it would receive the decisions of the Assembly whatever they might have.

There had been talk of the effect upon foreign opinion of the attitude taken by the Assembly and by the Government. In that connection the Government requested the Assembly to take into consideration in its deliberation only that which had to do with the national will. He concluded: "France which gave liberty to the world and which had always been and was still its champion, France did not need in order to determine the manner in which she would re-establish her own liberty to consult the opinions which come to her from outside her frontiers. And as to the Provisional Government of the Republic which since June 1940 had not ceased no more than its predecessors to stand firmly on the basis of democracy and at the same time of war it can I assure you do without all advice which does not come to it from the French nation which is after all solely qualified to give directions."

CHAPIN

851.01/3583 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 29, 1944.

[Received March 29—7:57 p. m.]

1027. Following is summary of draft ordinance as approved Monday ³⁷ by Consultative Assembly.

PREAMBLE

Article 1. French people to determine future institutions. To that end National Constituent Assembly will be convoked as soon as circumstances permit regular elections; at latest, one year after complete liberation of France. Assembly chosen by secret ballot in one degree by all adult French men and women except those incapacitated under present laws.

Article 2. During transition period preceding convocation assembly, progressive reestablishment republican institutions will be effected as provided below:

³⁷ March 27.

TITLE I. LOCAL ASSEMBLIES

Article 3. Until it is possible to hold regular elections in each community, municipal assemblies elected before September 1, 1939, will be maintained or re-established [in?] office. Consequently municipal councils dissolved and mayors, assistants and councillors dismissed or suspended since that date will be immediately restored except in certain special circumstances.

Article 4. Under law of April 5, 1884, and decree of September 26, 1939, communal assemblies appointed by usurper and municipal delegations established since September 1, 1939, will be dissolved. Under said law and decree mayors, assistants, and municipal councils who served or assisted enemy or usurper will be dismissed.

Article 5. If municipal organizations which are maintained or re-established are reduced below quorum fixed by 1884 law, they will be provisionally filled by Prefect upon advice of departmental Committee of Liberation. Prefect will name French men or women who have been active in resistance against enemy and usurper taking into account vote of last municipal elections and tendencies manifested in community at time of liberation.

Article 6. Mayors and assistants deceased, resigned, or dismissed under article 4 above will be replaced through elections by secret ballot in municipal assembly as soon as latter has legal quorum.

Article 7. Under 1884 law and decree of September 26, 1939, elected assemblies which, having existed since July, 1940, favored or assisted the enemy or usurper will be dissolved. These dissolved assemblies will be replaced under legal provisions above mentioned by special delegation which will administer communities until elections.

Special delegations will be named by competent authority on advice of departmental Committee of Liberation from among French men and women who have been active in fight against enemy or usurper and including necessarily members of last elected municipality who remained faithful, taking into account vote in last municipal elections and tendencies manifested at time of liberation.

Number of members of delegations will equal quorum fixed for dissolved municipal council under 1884 law.

Article 8. If through enemy action territorial extent of communities has been modified through merging or partition, re-establishment of municipal councils or installation of special delegation will apply to the community as it existed in June, 1940, unless otherwise decided by French administration.

Article 9. As soon as municipality or special delegation is installed communal administration will undertake revision or re-establishment of voting lists in accordance with laws of the republic.

Time limits for procedure applicable in such revision will be fixed by decree.

Article 10. General Councils will be reestablished.

Article 11. Terms of General Councillors in office September 1, 1939, are extended to last until provisional departmental elections provided in article 15.

Article 12. General Councillors who served or assisted enemy or usurper will be dismissed by Commissioner or Minister of the Interior on advice of Prefect and of departmental Committee of Liberation.

Article 13. If because of decease, resignation or dismissal under preceding article the General Council is reduced to less than quorum fixed by law of August 10, 1871, and in the colonies by their appropriate regulations, it will be dissolved and replaced by departmental committee appointed by decree issued on recommendation of Prefect and on advice of departmental Committee of Liberation in accordance with following provisions.

Article 14. Number of members of departmental committee is equal to quorum for each department fixed by law of August 10, 1871.

Departmental committee will be composed preferably of members of dissolved General Council who remained faithful and also of French men and women who have taken active part in fight against enemy or usurper taking into account alignment in dissolved assembly as well as tendencies manifested at time of liberation.

Article 15. Special ordinance issued after consultation with Provisional Consultative Assembly will establish municipal administration of the Seine during transition period and will fix electoral regime provisionally applicable to Municipal Council of Paris and General Council of the Seine.

Article 16. In a department as soon as voting lists are drawn up, and not later than 3 months after liberation, Prefect will convoke electoral college to hold elections for municipalities and provisional General Council.

Article 17. Women will have the right to vote and hold office under identical conditions with men.

Article 18. The following will not be eligible for communal or departmental assembly or any special delegation or departmental committee:

a. Members or former members of alleged governments established in France since June 17, 1940.

b. Citizens who since June 17, 1940, by their activities, their writings or their personal attitude either favored the activities of the enemy, impeded the activities of the United Nations or of the resisting French, prejudiced the constitutional institutions or the basic public liberties or knowingly obtained or attempted to obtain direct material benefit from the application of the regulations of the *de facto* authority contrary to the laws in force on June 16, 1940.

c. Members of Parliament who abdicated their mandate by voting to delegate the constituent power to Philippe Pétain³⁸ in 1940.

d. Individuals who accepted from the structure called "the Government of the French State" a position of authority whether as National Councillor, as Department Councillor, or as Municipal Councillor of Paris.

Persons coming within the above categories, however, may be rehabilitated if upon investigation it is proved that they subsequently took direct and active part in resistance, such action to be determined by departmental Committee of Liberation.

Article 19. Immediately upon liberation there will be established in each department a departmental Committee of Liberation to assist the Prefect.

Committee will be composed of a representative of each resistance organization, union and political party directly affiliated with National Council of Resistance and existing in that department. Departmental Committee of Liberation will assist Prefect by representing before him opining [*opinions?*] of all elements of the resistance.

It will necessarily be consulted on all replacements of members of municipalities and the General Council.

It will cease to function upon establishment of all local assemblies hereafter provided.

TITLE II. TRANSITORY PERIOD AND PROVISIONAL REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Article 20. Consultative Assembly will move to France with French Committee of National Liberation and will meet in city where public authority is established.

It will be immediately completed by delegates of different organizations adhering to National Council of Resistance appointed by boards of directors of those organizations in the proportion now in force and in equal number.

Assembly will be further completed by members elected according to provisions of following articles:

Article 21. Each department within period provided in article 16 will elect by majority of secret ballot in two votes as many delegates as its population according to last legal census contains 150,000 inhabitants plus one for each fraction of 75,000 inhabitants.

No department will elect less than two delegates. Women will vote and be eligible the same as men.

Those persons listed in article 17 will be ineligible.

Article 22. During the month following the establishment in France of Consultative Assembly each of its members must inform

³⁸ Marshal Pétain replaced Paul Reynaud as Prime Minister of France, June 16, 1940.

the Bureau of the Assembly as to department or territory to which he is attached.

When in any department elections are held the delegates of that department who are not elected will cease to hold office.

Article 23. When elections have been held in two-thirds of metropolitan districts, including the Seine, Consultative Assembly will transform itself into Provisional Representative Assembly.

Article 24. Within 15 days following the second vote in the last election the Assembly will create its Bureau.

Article 25. Once the Bureau is created the French Committee of National Liberation will turn over its powers to the Assembly which by absolute majority will elect President of Provisional Government.

Latter will form Provisional Government and will present himself with it before Assembly which will pass upon the ministerial declaration.

Vote of confidence will confer upon Provisional Government until Constituent Assembly convenes powers defined by paragraph 3 of law of December 8, 1939.

Article 26. Members of Assembly will enjoy immunity fixed by constitutional laws of the Republic.

Article 27. Provisional Representative Assembly will function during all this period and will become lawfully extinct when Constituent Assembly begins to function.

It will necessarily be consulted on all international conventions which under republican laws were submitted to the approval of Parliament as well as on all draft ordinances. Decree laws adopted in cases of immediate necessity by virtue of final provision of article 25 will be submitted to ratification of Assembly within 1 month.

Article 28. Assembly will vote budget without having the right of initiative in expenditures.

Article 29. By a majority of its members it may summon the Government to explain its general policy or place upon its agenda any question of national interest.

Article 30. As soon as it arrives in France Assembly shall be consulted regarding establishment of a high court of justice.

Article 31. Assembly will be charged with determining in full accord with the Government the manner of representation in Constituent Assembly of the territories of the Empire.

It will be consulted on the date and rules of elections for Constituent Assembly.

Article 32. In these elections members of the armed forces of all ranks will be eligible to vote and hold office.

Suffrage by mail will be established for those categories of citizens who are kept through their profession away from their residence as well as for prisoners and deportees still kept away from their homes.

Article 33. Present ordinance will be fulfilled like a law and will be made known and registered wherever necessary.

Article 34. Present ordinance will apply in the French provinces overseas now represented in Parliament.

CHAPIN

851.01/3595 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 31, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 7:48 p. m.]

1052. With reference to my 977, March 25, 10 a. m.³⁹ Duff Cooper and I were called officially to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs last night and presented with copies of the ordinance concerning civil and military authorities in metropolitan France during the course of its liberation.

In presenting the copies Massigli again cautioned as to the extreme secrecy of the text and stated the time had come when in the opinion of the Committee it was necessary to explain to the British and American Governments the views of the French Committee on this matter. He stated that the document had been drawn up to accord with such limited information as had reached the FCNL from source in the US and Great Britain as to Allied plans for military and civil government upon the invasion. He reiterated what he had told me as reported in paragraph 4 of my 970, March 28 [24], 8 p. m. that the provisions of article 4 of the text did not mean that FCNL intended unilaterally to fix the limits of the forward and interior zones but rather expected to issue the decrees defining such zones only after receiving the wishes and indications of the Allied Commander in Chief.

Copy of text and translation are being forwarded by earliest courier mail.⁴⁰

Sent to the Department as 1052, repeated to London as 125.

CHAPIN

851.01/3655

The British Embassy to the Department of State

The Soviet Ambassador left with Sir Alexander Cadogan⁴¹ on March 25th an *Aide-Mémoire* regarding consultation about policy

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Despatch 195, March 31, 1944, not printed; for summary of draft ordinance, see telegram 1027, *supra*.

⁴¹ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

with regard to liberated France. (The text of this *Aide-Mémoire* is attached.)

Sir Alexander Cadogan said that, speaking without having had time to consult the papers, he felt sure that the interpretation placed by the Soviet Government on Mr. Eden's remarks⁴² must be based upon a misunderstanding. He recalled that the French question figured on the agenda of the European Advisory Commission, although the Commission had not been able to embark on discussion of it. He made it quite clear to Mr. Gousev that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference,⁴³ the policy to be pursued would have to be agreed between the United States Government, the Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government.

The Soviet Ambassador is being informed that Mr. Eden confirms Sir Alexander Cadogan's remarks. It is being explained to him that the discussions to which Mr. Eden referred in the House of Commons have been proceeding for the purpose of reaching agreement upon a modified version of the "basic scheme" as circulated and discussed at the Moscow Conference, and that it is hoped that this new scheme will shortly be available for consultation with the Russians in the European Advisory Commission in accordance with the Moscow decision. It is also being pointed out to Mr. Gousev that as France lies within the theatre of operations of the Combined Anglo-American Command, it is only natural that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government should seek to agree on the directions which will have to be given to General Eisenhower before embarking upon further consultation with the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1944.

[Enclosure]

SOVIET AIDE-MÉMOIRE DATED MARCH 25TH, 1944

According to the statement published on March 22nd by the Ministry of Information of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, replying to the question whether an agreement has been reached with the French Committee of National Liberation respecting the administration of French territory as and when liberated, said that he could make no statement on this subject and that the whole question is now under

⁴² Reference to remarks in the House of Commons on March 22, 1944. See telegram 2380, March 23, from London, p. 657.

⁴³ See Protocol of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, November 1, 1943, point 6 of the Agenda, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 751; and annex 5, *ibid.*, p. 760.

examination by the British Government and the United States Government and added: "Whatever we say and do, we shall say and do together". Thus it appears from Mr. Eden's statement that the two Governments, British and American, will act together on the question of administration of French territory after its liberation, thus having ignored the participation of the Soviet Government in this affair. Meanwhile according to the Moscow Conference's decision, this question was transmitted to the consideration of the European Advisory Commission in which representatives of the three Governments, not only of Great Britain and the United States, are participating. Thus Mr. Eden's statement is in contradiction with what was agreed between the three Governments at the Moscow Conference.

In connection with the above-stated, the Soviet Government would like to receive an explanation from the British Government on the following: whether Mr. Eden's statement should be understood as meaning that the Soviet Government must have no relation to the question of the administration of the territory of liberated France: in view of that does not Mr. Eden's statement about joint actions on that question of only the two countries, Great Britain and the United States of America, mean that the British Government do not have in mind to act on that question jointly with the Soviet Union?

The Soviet Government is interested also how such a position of Mr. Eden's concords with the Moscow Conference's decision concerning the transmission for consideration of the European Advisory Commission of "basic scheme for the administration of liberated France" worked out and submitted by the British and American Governments to the consideration of the Moscow Conference.

851.20/303 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 4, 1944.

[Received April 5—10:15 a. m.]

1104. Following is translation of decree concerning organization of National Defense adopted by the FCNL this morning.

"1. The FCNL insures the general prosecution of the war. It assumes authority over the totality of land, sea and air forces.

2. The President of the FCNL is Chief of the Armed Forces. The powers entrusted to the President of the Council of Ministers by the law of July 11, 1938, for the organization of the nation in time of war insofar as concerns the direction and coordination of national defense are exercised by the President of the FCNL.

3. The President of the FCNL, Chief of the Armed Forces: (a) Has final decision as to the composition, organization and employment of the Armed Forces; (b) Orientates and coordinates the activity of the military departments and establishes dispositions of common interest to their activity and that of other departments; (c) Directs the activity of military missions abroad.

4. The President of the FCNL, Chief of the Armed Forces, is assisted: by the Committee of National Defense (provided by decree of November 16, 1943 establishing the organization of the High Command).

He is assisted by the staff of National Defense whose composition he shall fix.

The Chief of Staff of National Defense is appointed by decree and carries out the functions of secretary of the Committee of National Defense.

5. All dispositions contrary to the present ordinance are abrogated.

6. The present ordinance will be published in the *Journal Officiel* of the French Republic and executed as law."

Sent to Department as 1104, repeated to London as 133.

CHAPIN

851.01/3623 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 4, 1944—midnight.

[Received April 5—8 :24 a. m.]

1109. This evening Duff Cooper and I called by request on Massigli who presented us with three documents, first and most important of which was a reply to the Combined Chiefs of Staff's proposed agreement contained in Agwars⁴⁴ 1913 Fan 343 March 11.

In substance note unnumbered dated April 3 refers first to letter of December 30, 1943,⁴⁵ to Wilson and Macmillan⁴⁶ and text of French draft agreement of December 27 transmitted therewith (Wilson's despatch 40 [41], January 1⁴⁵).

Massigli's note makes following points.

1. Agreement should be concluded between Allied Governments and Committee rather than between latter and CCS⁴⁷ and suggests text of preamble to this effect.

2. Note rejects proposal contained in article 3 of CCS draft agreement and then states that mere fact of rearming French forces does not *ipso facto* place them under command of the CCS although it is

⁴⁴ Adjutant General, War Department.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

⁴⁷ Combined Chiefs of Staff.

willing to accept general procedure directive of CCS provided original reservations contained in December 22 document are observed. FCNL considers it must be fully informed of plans of operation before it can give its consent to employment French forces in such operations and believes that CCS draft gives no satisfaction in this respect.

FCNL observes that CCS text carried to its logical conclusion would not permit FCNL to dispose of forces for maintenance of internal order and security of lines of communication.

3. Note expresses regret that CCS proposal provides for one representative to the ESC [*CCS*] who could only present views of FCNL and does not permit complete cooperation with that body. In same sense it allows only one liaison officer to Allied High Command. It therefore insists on provisions of article 3 in its entirety of proposal of December 27.

4. The next point made in note formulates objections against insufficient guarantees that French divisions will be kept intact.

5. The next representation objects particularly to deferment of providing secret means of communicating between French independent commands and higher echelons both Army and Navy and argues against present arrangement obtaining now in Italy (present arrangements are that all communications from French High Command in Italy are through Allied communications).

Summing up arguments FCNL insists upon the acceptance on the whole of the proposals presented in its draft of December 27 and refers to past agreements, specifically those of August 7, 1941 [*1940*], and July 25, 1941 between British PM and Oliver Lyttelton⁴⁸ on one hand and de Gaulle on other. It concludes with plea that American and British Governments may find it possible to reconsider the FCNL proposals of December 27 as plans are now being made for the employment of French forces and agrees that any delay in reaching an agreement would only postpone execution of its plans.

The two other notes refer to ancillary matters, namely, protests: first against the insistence that French aviation be integrated under MAAF⁴⁹ and second against obstruction by unilateral decision of movement of French forces from one part of the Empire to another. Massigli admitted this latter was motivated by AFHQ⁵⁰ objection to recent French arrangements for "replacements" of effectives in Levant.

General Devers⁵¹ requests that CCS be informed.

Sent to the Department as 1109, repeated to London as 136.

CHAPIN

⁴⁸ British Minister of Production.

⁴⁹ Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

⁵⁰ Allied Force Headquarters.

⁵¹ Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

851.01/3639 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 6, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 7—8:56 a. m.]

1149. From Murphy.⁵² On my return to Algiers last evening Duff-Cooper called to discuss the crises arising out of the decree issued by the French Committee of National Liberation which confers on de Gaulle full authority over French military forces. Duff-Cooper as stated by Chapin in his 1104, April 4 confirmed that this decree was issued by the Committee without prior consultation with Giraud, Commander in Chief French forces. Duff-Cooper also stated that he had discussed the matter with Giraud who indicated his intention to resign on the ground that thus stripped of authority his position had become untenable. Duff-Cooper said that he urged Giraud to remain, thus avoiding any appearance of French disunity and also any interpretation of his action as being precipitated by the entry into the French Committee of National Liberation of two Communist members. Duff-Cooper thought that Giraud's retirement at this time might be so misconstrued. He said that he had also asked Giraud to defer decision until he had discussed the matter with me.

Later in the evening Giraud called at my residence immediately after a meeting between himself and General de Gaulle during the course of which he said he had expressed to General de Gaulle his dissatisfaction with the action taken by the Committee and his surprise that General de Gaulle without prior consultation with Giraud should have inspired the Committee to clothe de Gaulle with full military powers heretofore enjoyed by Giraud. According to Giraud, de Gaulle made every effort to allay his dissatisfaction suggesting that, after all, the powers that Giraud had enjoyed as Commander in Chief were more apparent than real as all important decisions in this field were taken either by the Allied Commander in Chief or by the Allied generals operating in Italy. He proposed that Giraud accept the position of Inspector General of the Armies. Giraud pointed out that de Gaulle's present action is in defiance of all republican tradition and said that he recalled to General de Gaulle that under the Third Republic the Vice President of the Superior War Council (for example Foch, Gamelin, et cetera) had in times of peace been Inspectors General of the Armies but in time of war they became Commanders in Chief of the French forces.

In republican France the combination of civil and military power in one man had never been permitted. In Giraud's opinion this present action is the first clear cut step toward a personal dictatorship

⁵² Robert D. Murphy, American Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters.

in France. Under the circumstances he said he preferred to withdraw. He desired to give de Gaulle a reasonable opportunity to amend the decree to provide for the position of Commander in Chief of French forces. If that is not done within a reasonable time, let us say 48 hours, he would withdraw and ask permission to proceed to England. Should that happen what Giraud would hope for is some designation and an appropriate status near the Allied High Command.

In my opinion we should not only interpose no objection to Giraud's departure but facilitate it in the event that the decree of April 4 is permitted to stand. Giraud has been associated in the minds of the public with the USA and in fact his French critics have attacked him on the grounds that he is nothing more than an "American agent" or an "American valet". If these same critics convinced that this is true are permitted to observe that the authority and prestige of Giraud are diminished and changed at will by the de Gaulle faction such a condition of affairs could only be harmful to American prestige in this area. My first impression on return here is that American prestige has suffered a distinct setback in recent months.

The favorable and happy position which we enjoyed here prior to the November '42 landing⁵³ has largely disappeared. The causes which make for this situation are undoubtedly complex and that certain influences are at work with this objective in mind may be taken for granted. Our position will not be improved it seems to me by continued affiliation with and support of General Giraud if he is not [*sic*] to be the target and victim of continued political maneuver designed to cheapen his prestige and diminish his authority.

I have discussed the foregoing with Generals Wilson⁵⁴ and Devers who concur. Giraud indicated this morning that he hoped that it might be possible to enable him and his staff to proceed to London in the capacity of Commander in Chief of French forces and resign after his arrival there. It will be indicated to him that this solution would not appear practicable.

Giraud has stated that if he retires he naturally will avoid any action which might be disturbing to military operations. It is not believed that there would result any violent action either in the army or civilian population although there is evidence that moderate elements are disturbed over the centralization of power. General Wilson informs me that according to his Military Intelligence some French Army elements in Oran and Morocco also manifest dissatisfaction. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

⁵³ With regard to the Allied landings in North Africa November 8, 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429-432.

⁵⁴ Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

851.01/3644 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 7, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received April 8—6:30 a. m.]

1164. This morning General de Vinck, Giraud's Chief of Staff, took Dana Schmitt of the UP⁵⁵ to task roundly for having reported that Giraud had resigned and dictated to him a statement that "Giraud denies formally in person report of his resignation and states he will continue as CinC".⁵⁶ De Vinck added orally that Giraud would not leave post of CinC unless he were "kicked" out by Committee.

This morning Tixier⁵⁷ who called on me personally to thank me for obtaining air passage for his wife and himself to proceed to Philadelphia Conference of the ILO,⁵⁸ stated in response to my question that de Gaulle had informed the FCNL last night he had offered Giraud job of Inspector General of Army a position Tixier admitted which was purely honorific. Tixier stated that the decision to revamp the FCNL and to issue the ordinance of April 4 with regard to the reorganization of national defense and the centralization of powers in de Gaulle was dictated because of the desire to put things in order in ample time before the invasion. He implied further that the decree was admittedly aimed at eliminating Giraud from the functions of CinC whether he resigned or not and stated that there was growing dissatisfaction with Giraud in all ranks because of his antiquated ideas on military operation and administration. He baldly stated that while Giraud was a magnificent brigadier of 1917 vintage, his military ideas had not grown one iota since then. In response to a direct question he said that de Gaulle had informed the Committee that Giraud had said "neither yes nor no" to his proposal but that de Gaulle would see him again upon his return from Morocco late tomorrow evening.

The development reported by Schmitt would seem to indicate that Giraud has left the next move in his case up to the FCNL and that he is still free either to resign or to accept the position of Inspector General.

CHAPIN

⁵⁵ United Press.

⁵⁶ Commander in Chief.

⁵⁷ Adrien Tixier, Commissioner of Labor of the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁵⁸ International Labor Organization.

851.01/3639 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1944—10 p. m.

1055. For Murphy. We are in full agreement with your conclusion in your 1149, April 6, that we should interpose no objection to Giraud's departure.

HULL

851.01/3645a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944—2 p. m.

835. You will recall that towards the close of the Moscow Conference there was presented a paper⁵⁹ dated October 6, 1943 embodying the joint views of the United States and British Governments on the subject of the administration of civil affairs in France at the time of liberation. You will likewise recall that owing to lack of time this paper was not discussed in detail at Moscow but was referred for consideration to the European Advisory Commission to be established at London. Up to the present the Commission has not found it possible to take up the question.

Subsequent to the meeting at Moscow the British Government expressed itself as dissatisfied with the October 6 document. This unfortunately reopened a question which we had hoped had been satisfactorily disposed of between the British and ourselves prior to the Moscow Conference. After further study here the President on March 15 approved a new draft directive to General Eisenhower, which was duly referred to the British Government. The latter has not yet expressed its views. The text of the draft⁶⁰ follows in my next telegram the paragraphs of which will be transposed for security reasons.

In view of our desire to keep the Soviet Government fully and currently informed please make available to Molotov⁶¹ a copy of the draft, at the same time emphasizing to him its secret character.

In discussing the matter with Molotov you should inform him that under normal circumstances it would be our intention to refer the draft to the European Advisory Commission but that the urgency of reach-

⁵⁹ See Annex 5 to the Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 760.

⁶⁰ See *infra*.

⁶¹ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

ing agreement on the subject of civil affairs for France and the present pre-occupation of the Committee with other pressing matters has induced us to inform the Soviet Government directly. As an indication of our feelings regarding the manner in which the draft may be expected to work out in practice you should speak to Molotov along the following lines, but it is not desired that you leave with him any written record of your remarks.

As stated in the President's public announcement of August 26, 1943,⁶² this Government noted with sympathy the desire of the French Committee of National Liberation to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of French interests. Although the President found it necessary to reserve for consideration in each case as it arose the extent to which it might be possible to give effect to this desire, it has been the practice of this Government to comply with the wishes of the Committee to the fullest extent consistent with its oft-repeated policy of avoiding any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people, after their liberation, to exercise their free will in the choice of their leaders.

As the President has made known, he has reached certain conclusions with respect to the directive to be addressed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, with regard to the establishment of civil administration in France at the time of liberation. These conclusions have been conveyed to the British Government whose views are awaited.

The primary objectives of this Government remain unchanged. They are a determination to employ as the standard for all its decisions the effect which any action may have on our prosecution of the war against Germany and, as stated before, a determination to see the French people regain full freedom in the exercise of their political rights. In the light of the main military objective, which is shared by the French and all the Allies, it is obviously essential that there be reserved to the Supreme Allied Commander the right to deal as he thinks best with any contingencies which may arise, no matter how remote or unlikely they may appear at this time. The reservation of this right does not mean that this Government has in mind any individuals or groups in France with whom it would like to deal, to the exclusion of the French Committee of National Liberation, or is seeking such individuals or groups. Moreover, the assurances given to the Committee in January 1944 and the State Department's press release of March 21, 1944,⁶³ which denied categorically any intention

⁶² For text of announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 28, 1943, p. 125.

⁶³ For text of release, see *ibid.*, March 25, 1944, p. 278.

to deal with the Vichy regime or with individuals directly or indirectly supporting the policy of collaboration with Germany, should once and for all put at rest any such thoughts which may have been harbored in any quarter.

In his speech of March 18 before the Provisional Consultative Assembly, General de Gaulle stated that formulas could wait and indicated that practical considerations were of paramount importance. We are in full agreement with this view and it is our hope that the Committee's cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander will be close, cordial and effective. As long as this proves to be the case there is no reason to suppose that the latter will have any other desire than to reciprocate and to rely fully on the Committee in seeking a solution to the many complex problems which are bound to arise.

HULL

851.01/3645b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944—3 p. m.

836. Preamble. GENERAL EISENHOWER: This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory.

I. The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following: (A) The prompt and complete defeat of Germany. (B) The earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors. (C) The fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French Government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live.

II. The following powers and instructions are given you for your guidance in the achievement of the foregoing aims:

(1) The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. As such Allied Commander you will have the ultimate determination as to where, when and how the civil administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.

(2) When and where you determine that there shall be set up a civil administration in any part of France, so far as possible there

⁶⁴ This telegram is text of President Roosevelt's draft directive of March 15 to General Eisenhower. In reproducing this telegram the paragraphs which were transmitted out of order for security reasons have been printed in their proper order.

shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the United States.

(3) In order to secure the setting up of any such civilian administration locally in any part of France, you may consult with the French Committee of National Liberation and may authorize them in your discretion to select and install the personnel necessary for such administration. You are, however, not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgment you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable.

(4) Nothing that you do under the powers conferred in the preceding paragraph 3 in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation or with any other group or organization shall constitute a recognition of said Committee or group as the government of France even on a provisional basis.

(5) In making your decision as to entering into such relations with the French Committee of National Liberation or other committees or persons for that purpose, you should as far as possible obtain from it the following restrictions upon its purposes:

(a) It has no intention of exercising indefinitely in France any powers of government, provisional or otherwise, except to assist in the establishment by the democratic methods above mentioned a government of France according to the free choice of the French people, and that when such government is established it will turn over thereto all such powers as it may have.

(b) It favors the reestablishment of all the historic French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime or rule of personal government.

(c) It will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.

(6) In any area of liberated France, whether or not there has been set up local control of civil affairs as aforesaid, you will retain the right at any time to make such changes in whole or in part which in your discretion may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.

(7) As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of civil affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French, and American commands, and review all plans.

(8) You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

(9) You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration *in toto*.

(10) Instructions on economic, fiscal, and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

HULL

851.01/3649: Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 9, 1944—noon.

[Received April 10—7:43 a. m.]

1184. In the absence of Murphy who left early April 7 for Italy and of General Devers also in Italy I communicated the sense of the Department's 1055, April 7, 10 p. m. to General Barr and last night, upon his return, to General Rooks.

In the meantime de Gaulle, who returned yesterday, saw Giraud and formally offered him the post of Inspector General. Later this was followed by an official letter in writing confirming the offer and in a personal letter which, according to a source close to Giraud, expressed conviction "that in the knowledge that the country was invaded, aware of the difficulties of those who in the midst of foreigners must direct the state, Giraud would accept".

Giraud apparently still remains firm in his decision not to resign as CinC and to await action by the FCNL and has even prepared a draft of a possible reply to the formal letter mentioned above.

In a conference this morning at which General Gammell⁶⁵ and General Rooks were present General Wilson, whom I apprised of the Department's attitude, stated that he himself was not now opposed to Giraud's going, particularly if the reports were true that General Béthouart would become Chief of Staff. He admitted that Rooker, the British Counselor, had with his knowledge yesterday evening urged Giraud personally "not to act precipitately in the matter of his resignation" and I learn[ed] also that Colonel Dostert of Liaison Section was apparently instructed by Chief thereof, Colonel Higgins, to make some similar representations to General de Vinck.

As result of conference this morning General Wilson agreed that no further representations should be made on British side to persuade Giraud to accept post of Inspector General and that I should tell British Ambassador for him that there was no serious adverse military reaction to be expected from Giraud's resignation. It was agreed that while I would not volunteer any information with regard to our

⁶⁵ Gen. J. A. H. Gammell, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

Government's attitude to Giraud or to his staff, in event that I should be approached I had full liberty to give them the gist of Department's cable under reference. At General Wilson's request I have informed Duff-Cooper of decisions taken at this morning's conference.

In view of delicate situation in which he is placed General [Mr.] Rooker, who is on General Wilson's staff, has not felt entirely free in reporting this morning's conference and I therefore, request that Department inform our appropriate military authorities.

Sent to the Department as 1184, repeated to London as 140.

CHAPIN

851.01/3646 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 9, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received April 10—7 :25 a. m.]

1186. My 1184, April 9, noon. While I was at AFHQ this morning Duff Cooper, who returned late last night, was seeing Giraud to urge him to accept the post of Inspector General. (Neither Rooker whom I informed early yesterday afternoon of the substance of Department's 1055, April 7, 10 p. m. and who saw Giraud yesterday evening, nor Duff Cooper advised me in advance of their intention to see Giraud.) Giraud was adamant. The climax came when one of Giraud's aides brought in a report to the effect that de Gaulle's letter to him offering the post had been released to the press and was to be published in the *Dernières Nouvelles* this evening. Whereupon Giraud then stated that he wished his draft reply referred to in my preceding telegram (stating that he refused to resign as CinC and would await the action of FCNL) also published.

Duff Cooper apparently took his action on basis of a cable which he had just received from Prime Minister instructing him to urge Giraud not to resign and de Gaulle not to make his position untenable because of adverse effect which it would have on Franco-American relations. Unfortunately I was not able to read cable in question myself and had to be content with what was a bowdlerized version. While Prime Minister did instruct Duff Cooper to remind de Gaulle that it was thanks to expenditure of Anglo-American blood that there was any FCNL in North Africa and pointed out that British as well as Americans had rearmed French divisions and Navy I gained distinct impression that inference would be left with de Gaulle that it was chiefly because of United States of America President Roosevelt that British were taking action indicated. While Duff Cooper agreed no further action would be taken with regard to persuading Giraud he informed me he felt it was necessary to carry out fully his instruc-

tions. Accordingly he is seeing de Gaulle this evening although he remarked rather bitterly that if de Gaulle's letter should in fact appear in evening newspaper his late appointment will have no effect.

Sent to the Department as 1186, repeated to London as 141.

CHAPIN

851.01/3648 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 9, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received April 10—6:44 a. m.]

1191. As forecast in my 1186, April 9, this afternoon's newspaper prints ordinance relieving Giraud of his functions as CinC and appointing him as Inspector General. It is accompanied by official letter dated April 8 from de Gaulle to Giraud stating he had transmitted to him a copy of the decree that morning and had explained that FCNL had determined on this action in view of present organization of the Allied High Command and necessity that FCNL should during the phase now about to begin have on a governmental plane the power to make the principal decisions regarding disposition and employment of French forces. (This is not the personal letter referred to in a previous telegram).

In a conversation with General de Vinck tonight I learned that when General Chambre called on de Gaulle by request last night he was told it was necessary to find some ground of conciliation and understanding and it was intimated that de Gaulle was agreeable to Giraud continuing as CinC although there might be some modification in the service commands.

This morning Giraud replied in a courteous letter expressing appreciation of the words of de Gaulle as contained in his personal letter (second paragraph my 1184, April 9, noon) and those transmitted by Chambre. He stated his readiness to discuss the points at issue and his desire to sink all personal differences. When Chambre delivered Giraud's reply early this morning he found de Gaulle completely changed. Delivery of letter was taken without comment and Chambre dismissed. As reported in my 1186, April 9 sometime afternoon Giraud was informed that ordinance and de Gaulle's official letter were being published. The French Information Service then asked whether Giraud wished to make any reply thereto but stated that there would be no one on duty until 2:30; the afternoon newspapers appear at 3 o'clock.

De Vinck confirmed that Giraud today transmitted his formal reply to de Gaulle refusing to resign and stating he neither accepts the

suppression in time of war of the office of French CinC nor honorific post which de Gaulle has offered him. Text of his letter in translation follows in another cable.⁶⁶

De Vinck expressed considerable concern over consequences of de Gaulle's action. He believes many of the superior French generals may shortly be relieved by de Gaullists. He points out that a citation for General Juin⁶⁷ issued some 6 days ago was held up for publication until today in order to make it appear that this was one of the last acts of Giraud as CinC. De Vinck also expressed concern for Giraud's future and gave me text of a message which he requests be transmitted to President on Giraud's behalf. (My 1192, April 9.)⁶⁸ While he points out that Giraud may be relieved of duties and ordered to inactive duty (*congé actif*) he does not exclude possibility that he may be forbidden to leave country or in fact he may be placed under arrest. (I was informed by Rooker of British Mission that yesterday evening when he called Giraud's staff was burning some of his papers.) In latter case he believes blood may flow although he reiterated that Giraud at all costs wishes to avoid any division among French people which might hurt war effort or future of France.

Sent to the Department as 1191, repeated to London as 142.

CHAPIN

851.01/3623 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1944—7 p. m.

1211. This is secret for information of Murphy and Chapin. Substance of your 1109, April 4 was duly referred to Joint Chiefs of Staff in light of President's attitude as described in Department's 221 and 17 of December 23 and January 3 respectively.⁶⁹ We are now in receipt of reply from General Marshall⁷⁰ stating in substance as follows:

"The President's wish that all military matters be handled directly between General Eisenhower and French military authorities rather than on a Government or Committee basis was known to Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore it was at insistence of Joint Chiefs that London draft agreement was amended by Combined Chiefs to provide for signature and presentation to French Committee by General Wilson as Eisenhower's successor. In the circumstances there is no action which Joint Chiefs feel that they can appropriately take."

HULL

⁶⁶ Telegram 1193, April 9, midnight, not printed.

⁶⁷ Alphonse Juin, member of the Permanent Military Commission and Commander of French Expeditionary Forces fighting in Italy.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ Neither printed.

⁷⁰ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

851.01/3747 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 4, 1944.

[Received May 4—6:40 a. m.]

3631. Mr. Eden was asked yesterday in Parliament whether an agreement had yet been concluded with the French Committee for the administration of territory in metropolitan France as it might be liberated from German occupation. Mr. Eden replied: "I am happy to take this opportunity to emphasize that His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with the statement made by the United States Secretary of State on April 9⁷¹ in regard to the administration of liberated France. In accordance with this, conversations are now in progress between the Supreme Allied Commander and the French Military Mission in this country under General Koenig with a view to working out detailed arrangements".

The following further question was then asked: "Does that mean that the authority with which we deal in liberated France will be the French Committee of National Liberation?" Mr. Eden answered, "Yes, sir. I do not know of any other authority except Vichy, and we have no intention of dealing with Vichy in any circumstances whatever. It will be for the French nation in due course, as has been repeatedly declared by the leaders of the French Committee of Liberation, to make their own choice of government".

WINANT

851.01/3779

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 9, 1944.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull, Mr. Henri Hoppenot, Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation, and Mr. Mendes-France⁷²

Mr. Henri Hoppenot, Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation, called at his request and presented Mr. Mendes-France.

Mr. Hoppenot offered some expression of approval of my speech⁷³ as it was related to the French situation. I replied that I was under-

⁷¹ For text of Secretary Hull's address over the Columbia Broadcasting System, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

⁷² Pierre Mendes-France, Finance Commissioner of the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁷³ The speech delivered over the Columbia Broadcasting System, April 9, Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

taking for all concerned to deal with these matters to the best of my ability. I then said that I presumed the forty million people in continental France knew that only the large American and British Armies are capable of coming into France and freeing the people from German enslavement. He said yes, yes that was quite true. They did understand that. I stated that there was a rumor from time to time raising doubt about whether these forty million people of France really desired the American and British Armies to come in and free them from German bondage, and that I was wondering if he had any comment. He at once protested in the way of denial. I, of course, was referring to the speech of the day before by de Gaulle, in which he said in effect that other nations would have no right in France except for strategic purposes. I think Mr. Hoppenot understood at once what I referred to. I said that he and his people had a great opportunity to make a showing in the fighting that would be calculated to carry their leaders to the highest military rank. This did not seem to sink in very deeply.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁷⁴

LONDON, 11 May, 1944.

673. Your No. 536.⁷⁵ The Chiefs of Staff suggest the amendments contained in the following text. They seem to strengthen our statement.

“From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin.

In order to give maximum strength to the attack across the sea against northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France simultaneously with the OVERLORD ⁷⁶ assault. We are planning to make such an attack later, for which purpose additional landing craft are being sent to the Mediterranean from the United States. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from northern France and the eastern front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France. Signed Roosevelt Churchill.[”]

PRIME

⁷⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷⁵ Not found in Department files.

⁷⁶ Code word for the Allied invasion of France.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁷⁷

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1944.

538. For the Former Naval Person.⁷⁸ Your 673, meets with my approval. Please send it as being from both of us.

Your 674.⁷⁹ I have no objection whatever to your inviting De Gaulle and others of the French Committee to discuss your association in military or political matters; however, you must consider in the interest of security keeping De Gaulle in the United Kingdom until the OVERLORD landing has been made.

It is my understanding that General Eisenhower now has full authority to discuss with the Committee all matters on a military level. I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level and I am unable at this time to recognize any government of France until the French people have an opportunity for a free choice of government.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/3788 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 14, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 6:40 p. m.]

1568. The Foreign Office has officially delivered to me yesterday for transmission to the President a communication dated May 10 signed by 18 Socialist members of the Consultative Assembly headed by Vincent Auriol the last Secretary General of the Socialist group in the Chamber of Deputies. It is explained that the 4 Socialists, Bloch, le Troquer, Philip and Tixier, were not requested to sign because of their official positions.

The message starts with a tribute to the President on the eve of the invasion, especially for sympathy which he has expressed for the President of the Socialist Party, Léon Blum. It proceeds with a recent history of the Socialist Party, its protests against the Bordeaux capitulation, its purge of unworthy members and its response to de Gaulle's appeal of June 18, 1940. It quotes Léon Blum's opinions expressed December 1942 on the program of the Socialist Party when he predicted a provisional government with de Gaulle as head, advocated restoration of the national sovereignty but no immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly and unwillingness to accept even a "good tyrant".

⁷⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷⁸ Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

⁷⁹ May 12, 1944, not printed.

It appeals for the President's faith in their statements, arguing that the signers only a few months ago were in France, in the midst of their constituents and are therefore more capable of judging the state of mind of the French than those men who left the country in 1940 and who have fallen into error because of personal bitterness and antagonism.

With this introduction the signers state that they feel obliged to set forth their apprehensions. The people in France fear that the hesitation on the part of the British and American Chiefs of State to place confidence in the Government and Consultative Assembly in Algiers may give hope and strength to the Vichy usurpers and their associates. Only one authority can maintain national unity and public order because it alone possesses the confidence of French democracy and that is the Government and Assembly now at Algiers. The confident collaboration clearly and officially affirmed by the United Nations with that authority would reinforce democratic action, evoke the enthusiasm of an oppressed people and weaken the enemy and their accomplices. This is true particularly since the Algiers Government has made arrangements for the installation of local authorities and for taking on measures to aid the liberating armies. Any collaboration other groups or individuals could only end in trouble and disorder prejudicial to the United Nations.

While the French people will receive the Allied armies with enthusiasm, if liberation should take the form of occupation, faith would suffer and friendship be wounded. The French people understand so long as military operations are in course the authority of the army commanders must be total but expect after the tide of war rolls on to find protection under their own flag and civil authorities. Certain rumors are alarming. It is said that even when operations are finished, Allied occupation will remain and that United States Government will place into circulation special currency alongside of French money, the rate being raised to 300 francs to the pound. An appeal is made to the President to recognize that the issuance of currency is a sovereign privilege and that any foreign money could only bring recollections of occupation currency. It therefore states that it is indispensable to have an agreement between the United States Government and the Provisional French Government with regard to French currency. This subject is stressed as the men of the Allied armies can through unlimited spending raise prices beyond the purchasing power of the French masses.

It suggests that the United States might follow the British example of holding back from the troops all pay beyond that needed for immediate necessities and expresses the hope that the present rate of exchange confirmed by the recent Franco-British agreement can be maintained. It argues that a further arbitrary devaluation would

moreover gravely wound the faith and friendship of the French people. It concludes with the hope that the President will see in this frank approach only a desire to be worthy of the loyal, faithful and ardent people whom the signers represent and a passionate will to aid in the re-establishment throughout the world of a fraternal democracy and a durable peace.

Text translation follows by first air mail pouch.⁸⁰

CHAPIN

851.01/3790 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 16, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received May 16—8:12 a. m.]

1581. Assembly in today's debate continued from last Friday⁸¹ on foreign affairs unanimously passed resolution stating that henceforth French Committee on National Liberation will be known as Provisional Government of French Republic.⁸² Assembly had referred to FCNL as Provisional Government in past two sessions but present step formalizes action and will probably force FCNL to ratify this step.

Further details follow in full report on Assembly session.

CHAPIN

851.01/3802 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 16, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 8:18 p. m.]

1584. From Murphy. During the course of Monday's⁸³ debate in the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, Costa, a member from Tunisia, asked that additional information be furnished the Assembly regarding the Clark-Darlan "agreements".⁸⁴

General de Gaulle who was present made the following statement in reply:

"Will you permit me to say a word regarding the Darlan-Clark agreement? I wish to say publicly that France does not consider herself bound in the least by arrangements which may have been

⁸⁰ Despatch 280, May 16, from Algiers, not printed.

⁸¹ May 12.

⁸² The resolution was confirmed by the Committee on June 6, 1944.

⁸³ May 15.

⁸⁴ For text of the Clark-Darlan Agreement signed at Algiers November 22, 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 453.

made by the Allied military authorities on one hand and by Darlan on the other.

“As a matter of fact time has passed, and many *de facto* changes—a *de facto* situation then existed—have now taken place in the functioning of what I still hear called, I don’t know why, the Darlan–Clark ‘agreements’.”

The foregoing, read in the light of a resolution unanimously adopted by the Assembly at the end of the session, expressing the wish that the French Committee of National Liberation officially assume the title of “Provisional Government of the French Republic” has evoked considerable interest. As the Department is aware, the provisions of the Clark–Darlan agreement of November 22, 1942 provide bases on which Allied military operations in French North Africa are conducted. Conversations with the French looking to a revision of this agreement have been in course during the past several months. It is my understanding that the President and the Department desire that these negotiations be kept on a military level as a matter resting in the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

One interpretation of General de Gaulle’s public declaration made locally is that of a unilateral denunciation of an obligation. I have discussed this question with AFHQ (General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson left last evening for Italy) and it will be the subject of further discussion at today’s meeting of the political committee. I feel that we should, on the political level, choose to ignore the statement as an expression of de Gaulle’s personal opinion made without reflection during the course of debate. Macmillan and I agree that the best procedure would be for the Chief of Staff AFHQ to call in the French Chief of Staff, Béthouart, and inform him that we assume that this public declaration contemplates no change in the existing status and that it is also assumed that the provisions of the Clark–Darlan Agreement remain in full force and effect until they are revised by mutual consent.

As the Department may know, an Anglo-American French Committee has been considering over a period of months in that connection the revision of the agreement, and with the return of General Richmond, Judge Advocate, from Washington this week the conversations will be resumed.

When they have been concluded, the question of a signature will arise. The French undoubtedly will wish to treat the matter on a government level, but I assume that our position remains unchanged and that the Department will wish signature to be made in behalf of the United States and Great Britain by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. [Murphy.]

851.01/3804 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 16, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received May 17—11 :33 p. m.]

1600. From Murphy. In a conversation with General de Gaulle this afternoon he referred to his remarks yesterday on the floor of the Consultative Assembly reported in my 1584 May 16, 2 p. m. He said, in effect, that he did not attach much importance to the matter, that the Clark-Darlan agreement is a dead letter, and that he did not consider the French Committee of National Liberation actually bound by obligations undertaken by Darlan. In any event, he said, the Committee had tried over a period of months to negotiate a new agreement but without success as the Allies did not seem willing to do so. I referred to my understanding that the negotiations looking to such a revision are continuing and that we had not been informed that they were broken off. He said that it seemed to him as a practical matter that the subsequent agreement entered into between the French and ourselves replaced the provisions of the Clark-Darlan agreement. I asked him what agreement he had in mind. He said, "why, the Lend-Lease agreement,⁸⁵ of course".

I concluded the reference to this matter by suggesting that undoubtedly the Allied military authorities would pursue the matter further with the competent French officers. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN.

851.01/3805 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 17, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 6:42 p. m.]

1754. See Embassy's 1666, May 12, 10 a. m. and previous.⁸⁶ The following is a paraphrased translation of a note from Molotov dated May 16.

"The Soviet Government, having studied the draft directive⁸⁷ to General Eisenhower in the event of the occupation of French territory contained in your letters of April 11 and May 10, has reached the conclusion that the requirements of the military situation which will

⁸⁵ For correspondence concerning negotiations between the United States and France regarding Lend-Lease, see pp. 748 ff. For text of the *modus vivendi* on reciprocal aid, signed at Algiers, September 25, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 483, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1666.

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ See telegram 836, April 8, 3 p. m., to Moscow, p. 675.

be created as the result of an invasion of the territory of France by Allied forces are met by this directive.

I shall be grateful if you will transmit the above to the United States Government."

HAMILTON

851.01/3809 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 17, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 11 :53 a. m.]

1603. From Murphy. Massigli at dinner last evening informed me that at a meeting of the FCNL which he had just attended, consideration was given to motion passed yesterday by the Consultative Assembly suggesting that the name of the FCNL be changed to "Provisional Government of the French Republic". According to Massigli the Committee are inclined to adopt the change but are concerned that such action might be wrongfully construed as an evasion of the Committee's announced plan for self-liquidation under the procedure approved by the Committee for the post-liberation period.

While a first decision was not taken, the Committee, according to Massigli, favor the change of title on the theory that the French public demand something of the sort. A formula is being worked out under which apparently the title is to be adopted but the Committee members would retain the rank of "Commissaires" (commissioners) rather than call themselves Ministers. By such device they feel they will not be subject to the accusation of trying to perpetuate themselves in power.

De Gaulle is departing today for Italy where he will visit French corps headquarters and other points of military interest remaining in Italy, he informs me, 10 days.

After his return undoubtedly the FCNL will announce its decision regarding its future title. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3815 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 17, 1944—midnight.

[Received May 18—6 :14 p. m.]

1622. When I called on Massigli upon request this afternoon he said he had desired to explain the communiqué which appeared in this morning's press regarding the change of the name of the FCNL to

“Provisional Government of the French Republic” (see Murphy’s 1603, May 17, 11 p. m. [*a. m.*] and my 1611, May 17, 1 p. m.⁸⁸).

He stated that the Committee had decided in principle for the change in name but that mindful of public opinion in the United States and Great Britain, it was seeking a formula for the change which would make it clear that the engagements undertaken by the Committee both with foreign nations and toward the French people would be honored and which would explain the reason for the change. He developed in somewhat more detail what he had told Murphy, explaining that the demand from all sectors, including the Communists in metropolitan France, that the FCNL should become the “Provisional Government” had been so insistent that the Committee had not felt that it could disregard it. Furthermore it was felt that the change in name would provide an additional safeguard against disorders which might arise caused by undisciplined elements following the occupation. He reiterated the assurances that every effort would be made to avoid the erroneous impression that the members of the Committee were attempting to perpetuate themselves in power.

CHAPIN

851.01/3875a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944—midnight.

1574. For Murphy. We have been particularly interested in the telegrams which you and Chapin have been sending on subject of de Gaulle’s denunciation of Clark–Darlan Agreement and Assembly’s resolution that Committee adopt name of provisional government of France.

You are correct in your assumption that the question of revision of Clark–Darlan agreement should be kept on military level and that if new agreement is achieved it should be signed by Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

HULL

851.01/3869a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1944—11 p. m.

1613. Following account of conversation between Dunn and Monnet on May 20 is for information of Murphy and Chapin.

⁸⁸ Latter not printed.

Monnet inquired whether Dunn could inform him regarding attitude of this Government in event of action by Committee to change its name to that of Provisional Government of the French Republic since Committee was considering issuance of a decree to that effect. Dunn stated that as far as he knew there was no possibility of this Government dealing with any "Provisional Government" of France at this time since it would not be considered here that such a government existed. Monnet expected that this would be our position. He then asked whether, if Committee continued to deal with this Government as the French Committee of National Liberation, we would have any objection to its being called Provisional Government as far as France was concerned, or for other external purposes. Dunn stated he was not in position to give categorical answer to a question of that kind but said that he foresaw that the use of the title Provisional Government of France by any group or body would create many difficult questions in the relations between this Government and such a body which in his opinion it would seem highly desirable to avoid. Dunn concluded by expressing his personal opinion that it was unfortunate that there was any mention or discussion of the change of the name of the Committee at this particular time.

Repeated to London for Phillips.⁸⁹

HULL

851.01/3847: Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 26, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 8:28 p. m.]

1732. From Murphy. My telegram No. 1584, May 16, 2 p. m. Notwithstanding de Gaulle's statement in the Consultative Assembly on May 15 to the effect that France did not consider herself bound by the Clark-Darlan Agreement, there has been continued progress in the work of the revision of that agreement both in AFHQ and within the informal American-British-French Committee. At a meeting of the committee Tuesday ⁹⁰ the French representative made clear that de Gaulle's statement would not lead to any interruption in the discussions regarding revision and he accepted for reference to the French military authorities the proposed revised texts of the military clauses which had been prepared in AFHQ. Another meeting of the

⁸⁹ Presumably William Phillips, American Political Officer, with the rank of Ambassador, on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, London.

⁹⁰ May 23.

informal committee is to be held when the French have completed their study of the military clauses.

The latest development is that the Supreme Allied Command has approved the recommendation that article XVII⁹¹ be dropped. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3864

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1944.

THE SECRETARY: I think you will be interested in the following comparison of the recent statements by the Prime Minister⁹² and Mr. Eden⁹³ in the House of Commons on the French Committee.

In his speech on Wednesday the Prime Minister said:

"The reason why the United States and Great Britain have not been able to recognize it as the government of France, or even as the provisional government of France, is because we are not sure it represents the French nation, in the same way as the governments of Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia represent the whole body of their people.

"The committee will, of course, exercise leadership in the matter of law and order in the liberated area of France under supervision, while the military exigencies last, of the supreme Allied commander in chief. But we do not wish to commit ourselves at this stage to imposing a government on any part of France which might fall under our control without more knowledge than we now possess of the situation in the interior of France."

In the House of Commons Mr. Eden said the Allied Armies would deal with the Committee in all matters affecting Metropolitan France as "The French Authority which will exercise leadership in France as the liberation progresses."

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

⁹¹ "XVII—If the internal situation at any time be such as in his opinion to endanger his lines of communication or threaten disorder the Commanding General, United States Army will inform the French authorities of such danger and the French authorities will undertake, in concert with him, such administrative and other measures as may be necessary for the protection of the military interests of the forces under his command and supporting forces." *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 453, 456.

⁹² For text of Prime Minister Churchill's speech on Wednesday, May 24, see Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 400, cols. 771-781.

⁹³ For text of Mr. Eden's statement to the House of Commons on May 25, see *ibid.*, cols. 1044-1053.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1944.

544. For the Former Naval Person. Your 682⁹⁹ received. I am in complete agreement with you that the French National Spirit should be working with us in OVERLORD to prevent unnecessary loss of American and British lives.

You are fully informed in regard to my belief that Allied military power should not be used to impose any particular group as the Government of the French people.

At the present time I am unable to see how an Allied establishment of the Committee as a Government of France would save the lives of any of our men.

Any assistance that the Committee or any other Frenchmen can give to our Army of liberation is of course highly desirable from our point of view as well as to the interest of France.

I am hopeful that your conversations with General De Gaulle will result in inducing him to actually assist in the liberation of France without being imposed by us on the French people as their Government. Self determination really means absence of coercion.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/3881 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—8 p. m.

1704. This is for Murphy and Chapin. Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to Combined Chiefs the dispatch to General Wilson for transmission to General de Gaulle of a message of which following is paraphrase:¹

“During last 3 months the supplying of resistance groups in France has been carried out as combined operation by British and United States forces as integral part of over-all operational scheme for defeat of Germany and liberation of France. British and American resources, including means of delivery, have been used as a common pool for supply of resistance groups and not as exclusive responsibility of either country. For this purpose operations have been carried out by SCAEF² and SACMED³ who are employing the combined resources at their disposal in a way to fulfill as effectively as possible the over-all operational requirements in the theaters under their command. These facts are being brought to your attention by the CCS for the purpose of clarifying what appears to be a misunderstanding

⁹⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹⁹ May 27, 1944, not printed.

¹ No evidence has been found as to whether this message was transmitted.

² Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

³ Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

on your part concerning the above subject as evidenced by remarks attributed to you in the course of your April 21 press conference.”

Final sentence of message refers to report of Russell Hill, published in *New York Herald Tribune* April 22, stating that de Gaulle expressed satisfaction at the British efforts and “emphasized that they were solely British efforts” to arm resistance groups.

It seems possible that above message as drafted may prove unacceptable to the British and consequently it is not at all certain that it will go forward as a CCS directive as now contemplated by Joint Chiefs. The Department considers it important, however, that the facts on which the proposed message is based should be known as widely as possible in view of widespread tendency to portray this Government as indifferent if not actively hostile to arming of resistance groups. In circumstances it is suggested that you lose no opportunity discreetly to emphasize whenever possible the joint nature of the operations in question.

For your information General Eisenhower has reported that he will fully explain this Government’s position in the matter to General Koenig.⁴

Sent to Algiers, repeated to London for Phillips.

HULL

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁵

[WASHINGTON,] 31 May, 1944.

546. For the Former Naval Person. Your 684 and 685 ⁶ received.

I do want to make this de Gaulle matter clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

Less than a week ago, on May 25th, Admiral Fénard said goodbye on his way to see de Gaulle in Algiers. We had a very satisfactory talk and I think he is a first class man in every way, besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy.

He asked me if I had any message for de Gaulle. I told him that I had been hoping for a message from de Gaulle to me asking if I would see him if he came over here and that he could tell de Gaulle that if I received such a message my answer would be an immediate and cordial affirmative.

I explained to him, as I thought I had made the whole matter clear to many people before, that as the head of the Government and the head of the State I could not well invite de Gaulle to come, as the latter is only the head of a Committee and is not the head of the French

⁴ Appointed by French Committee of National Liberation as military delegate for the French Zone of the theater of operations to be established after D-Day.

⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶ Neither printed.

Government or the French State. Fénard was in complete accord, and that message ought to have been delivered to de Gaulle by now.

I feel very strongly that in his position he, in person and through nobody else, should ask if he will be received. This is simple, straightforward, and the reply would be expressed in cordial terms.

Now as to your 682,^{6a} in further reply, of course you and I must do everything possible to encourage the French national spirit and to get it working with us at top speed in the immediate future.

We do not know definitely what the state of that French spirit is and we will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

Marshall will be with you about D plus 4. We cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with de Gaulle singly or with you and de Gaulle jointly, because this is wholly a matter in the political and not in the military field. Marshall can, of course, talk about all military matters.

My suggestion is that after you talk with de Gaulle that he should ask me whether I would see him if he came here direct from London. Meanwhile you could send me a summary of your talks with him and we can be in complete accord by the time he reaches here.

As a matter of practical fact, the French military strength could not be used on OVERLORD until then anyway. All plans are for later than D-Day.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the de Gaulle conversations with you.

I should like very much to accept Dr. Churchill's advice to make a sea voyage in your direction and I hope to do so at a later date. Conditions here will not permit it shortly after D plus 14 as suggested by you.

Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined Staff is necessary. I think we had best await developments of OVERLORD before making a decision as to the next full Staff meeting.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/3866 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 31, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 9:10 p. m.]

1799. Duff-Cooper informed me this morning that he had called on de Gaulle yesterday afternoon to say that he had heard the various rumors circulating around to the effect that de Gaulle after having accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to London now appeared

^{6a} May 27, 1944, not printed.

to be hedging and demanding that some special representative of the United States should be sent to London to participate in the conversations. Duff-Cooper stated that he had decided that he would take the initiative in this case rather than permit de Gaulle to complain to him. Duff-Cooper added that he had stated frankly that all arrangements including the privilege of communications between London and Algiers in French cipher had been made following an acceptance given and that he was afraid that if de Gaulle now was making new conditions it might upset everything at this critical juncture.

De Gaulle said that perhaps the rumors had been exaggerated and that the only point upon which he desired assurances was that the proposed London conversations should be Tripartite between representatives of Great Britain, the United States and himself. In other words said he, he wished assurances that after reaching an agreement with the British Government he would not have to take up the matters discussed again separately with representatives of the American Government.

Duff-Cooper replied that as he had informed de Gaulle in transmitting the invitation he was quite convinced that the conversations would be truly Tripartite as the invitation had been extended with full approval of President Roosevelt. He pointed out that American representatives in London included General Eisenhower on a military and Ambassador Winant and Mr. Phillips on a political plane and that there were few persons in the United States who could be better qualified. He asked specifically whether the General would be satisfied if he obtained a statement to the effect that the conversations would be Tripartite and that General Eisenhower and Ambassador Winant would participate. De Gaulle replied in the affirmative.

Duff-Cooper fully reported the conversations to the Foreign Office last night and asked for instructions.

This afternoon when I called on Massigli he referred to de Gaulle's conversation yesterday with Duff-Cooper and said that he felt it was essential that assurances be given that the conversations be truly Tripartite. He reiterated the point made by de Gaulle that the French wished to avoid the delay contingent upon referring any agreement reached in London between the British and French representatives for new discussions with the American authorities in Washington.

As I have received no instructions or background information I stated that while I felt sure that the conversations were intended to be Tripartite I would cable the Department for instructions which I hope can be expedited to me.

Sent to the Department as 1799, repeated to London as 188.

851.01/3868 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1944—9 p. m.

1741. For information of Chapin and Murphy. The contents of your 1781, May 30,⁷ and 1799, May 31, have been brought to the attention of the President who up to the present has given no indication that proposed conversations in London will be "tripartite" to the extent that that implies our participation in discussions on a political level. As you of course know all discussions up to now have been held by General Eisenhower and his staff with General Koenig.

Hoppenot came to see me yesterday afternoon at his request and stated that the purpose of his visit was an informal attempt to clarify the present status of relations between the Committee and the United States. He said that since the statements contained in my speech of April 9,⁸ which had been received with great satisfaction by de Gaulle and members of the Committee, there had been no indication of any practical implementation of my remarks. While he would welcome a general clarification of the situation he wished particularly to speak of two specific points which were causing uneasiness and comment in Algiers. The first was the question of American participation in the conversations envisaged in London. The second was a statement attributed to a spokesman of General Eisenhower to the effect that the latter would be responsible for civilian administration in France after the Allied landings. I merely stated that I had just received two reports from you (your 1781 and 1799) which had been referred to the President. I concluded that I did not feel I could speak for the President but that if the latter had any comment to make, the substance of such comment would be communicated to our diplomatic representatives in Algiers and London.

Repeated to London for Phillips.

HULL

851.01/3948a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1944—10 p. m.

1742. For your secret information Phillips reports June 2 that he has learned that contrary to previous recommendations of security officers the Prime Minister extended an invitation evening of June 1

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ See footnote 73, p. 681.

through Duff-Cooper to de Gaulle to come to London at once. At the same time Prime Minister is reported to have offered to send his personal plane for the purpose indicated. Phillips adds that although no reply yet received from Algiers it is possible that de Gaulle will reach London by June 3.

HULL

851.01/3912 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 4, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

1837. From Murphy. Gabriel Puaux, French Resident General in Morocco, who lunched yesterday with General de Gaulle told me last evening that FCNL had decided to arrest "a number" of Arab Nationalists in French Morocco for anti-French agitation. He said he hoped this would cause no unfavorable comment or reaction in the United States similar he said to certain reactions regarding past events in the Lebanon. I inquired whether the alleged agitation had assumed dangerous proportions and Puaux replied in the affirmative. I asked whether foreign inspiration was at the root of it and he declared that undoubtedly German and Spanish influences are at work. Puaux said where it was found that enemy connections existed death penalties would be invoked.

Puaux as did Massigli earlier in the evening (see my 1835 June 4, 9 p. m.⁹) referred to mounting criticism and doubt on part of the FCNL in Algiers and many French officials regarding American policy toward France and especially General de Gaulle. Puaux said "you know I am not exactly Gaullist in my views and I have retained a certain independence but when I find de Gaulle full of suspicion concerning American intentions and furious because it appears that in London the Americans will not be prepared to discuss French affairs with de Gaulle on a governmental level as will the British then I begin to wonder where we are going".

I thought it might be well to emphasize to Puaux as I did to Massigli that very possibly continued French criticism would succeed in arousing unfavorable American reaction. Many Americans believe I pointed out that the United States is making a very important contribution at great expense of blood and treasure toward the liberation of France and its people. On the front in Italy from which I returned last evening perfect harmony reigns between French and

⁹ *Infra.*

American forces who are fighting side by side. In Algiers, however, the effects of a French inferiority complex (mentioned by both Masigli and Puaux) are manifest at every turn and have been since arrival in this area of General de Gaulle, marked by suspicion of Anglo-American motives and harping criticism of our military, economic, financial and political performance.

The facts that the United States has rearmed and helped train a new French Army, is rebuilding the French Navy, is supplying this theater of operations with the bulk of its supplies, has cooperated loyally with the FCNL in territories acknowledging [its?] jurisdiction, has publicly declared that its political purpose in France is to see a free and happy French people at full liberty to choose its own governmental institutions and personalities and to cooperate with the French in the relief and rehabilitation of the country—these do not seem to satisfy.

I also referred to fact that in London de Gaulle has access to General Eisenhower who has the President's confidence and authority, as well as Ambassadors Winant and Phillips on the civil side both of whom surely have adequate rank and prestige to satisfy General de Gaulle's sense of the proprieties. Should General de Gaulle decide to proceed to Washington after London he would unquestionably receive a dignified and appropriate reception. But the difficulty in all this, my contacts agreed, is that de Gaulle insists on American recognition of himself as head of Government of France. At that point his ideas and American policy seem to clash. Is the reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs that one man seeks to dominate the French picture and if not permitted to have his own way in all things he proposed to gain his points by employing a technique of blackmail and threats on the slightest provocation? Frenchmen who disagree are ruthlessly suppressed as witness yesterday's order consigning Senator Mallarmé at 70 years of age to forced residence in Algeria. We know that de Gaullist elements in North Africa for months have carried on a subtle campaign against Americans casting suspicion on American motives for example the whispering campaign that the United States intended to keep Morocco and that American troops would never leave there. When our troops left Morocco the same circles commenced stories that the Americans were buying up railways and public utilities and intended to dominate the economic life of French North Africa. The press under de Gaulle's influence frequently maintains a subtle anti-American line and has done so for a long time. We fared at least as well under the Vichy press as rotten as it was. Under the present system of course we are permitted to supply the newsprint.

Men like Massigli and Puaux are fully conscious of these things. They advance the reason, which I believe correct, that the French are torn by anxiety regarding their homeland, who suffer from the tortured mentality of exiles whose nerves are frayed as a result of humiliation and fears of uncertainty and privation. They suggest that even de Gaulle once his feet are planted again on French metropolitan soil will relax. Right now Franco-American relations suffer and it is to be recommended that we be as tolerant and kind as is our tradition.

Repeated to London. By courier to Tangier, Beirut, and Rabat. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3911 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 4, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:55 p. m.]

1835. From Murphy. On my return from Italy this evening Massigli asked me to call. He gave me a brief description of the developments with regard to de Gaulle's prospected visit to London informing me of latter's departure today accompanied only by members of his personal entourage including Gaston Palewski, Hervé Alphand and Courcelles and Duff-Cooper.

Today's departure followed a lengthy meeting of the FCNL last evening which debated the question. General de Gaulle and 4 members including Pleven and Grenier (Communist) opposed his going to London; 10 members favored it. No member of the Committee accompanied de Gaulle so that presumably he will be unable to take any action binding the FCNL.

Massigli deplored "The present state of Franco-American relations" particularly failure to reach an agreement satisfactory to the FCNL regarding the French currency issue for metropolitan France. According to Massigli the delay in the return of Mendès-France to Algiers is even viewed by members of FCNL with grave suspicion as further evidence of American reluctance to deal with the Committee.

Massigli referred to fact that the nerves of majority of Frenchmen in North Africa are frayed to the breaking point with anxiety and suspense. Many of them suffered from an unfortunate inferiority complex resulting from long exile. They are suspicious of everyone and everything. Once the military operation begins he said much of

this psychology should disappear. Right now the daily reports of deaths in French urban centers resulting from Allied (read American) aerial bombardment stimulate further the critical attitude of many vis-à-vis the United States of America.

I gather from Massigli that Vice Admiral Fénard who departed yesterday for the United States reported a conversation with the President which indicated that if after de Gaulle's visit to London he would express the desire to proceed to Washington that the President would be pleased to receive him. However, according to Fénard the President had no intention as Chief of State to invite de Gaulle as one occupying a similar status.

I gathered that Fénard had also related that at the time of his conversation with the President that the latter had before him a copy of the British Prime Minister's last speech before Commons¹⁰ and that the President seemed highly displeased with the portion concerning France.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3919 : Telegram

*The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*¹¹

ALGIERS, June 6, 1944—midnight.

[Received 2:47 p. m.]

1878. From Murphy. I am informed through AFHQ that Elmer Davis¹² has informed Barnes, Chief of PWB¹³ in Algiers, that OWI has received instructions from the President not to use the term "provisional government" in any way with reference to the French Committee of National Liberation. Barnes is further instructed that in view of the manner in which it was presented to the President for action it must be construed that even in quoting official communiqués the words "provisional government" cannot be used. Barnes' instructions concluded with the statement that OWI cannot be party to any directive or practice which violates this order. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

¹⁰ Speech of May 24. For excerpt from speech, see memorandum of May 26 by the Under Secretary of State, p. 691.

¹¹ On June 6 the Committee of National Liberation confirmed the resolution passed by the Consultative Assembly on May 15 that the Committee should be known as "Provisional Government of the French Republic."

¹² Director of the Office of War Information.

¹³ Psychological Warfare Branch.

851.01/3921 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 8, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received June 8—1:25 p. m.]

4582. From Phillips. Since his arrival on D minus 2, General de Gaulle has proved a difficult and non-cooperative guest of the British Government. There has been constant friction and no one has been more annoyed than the Prime Minister himself. The first impasse arose in connection with the Eisenhower proclamation¹⁴ to the people of Western Europe and with regard to de Gaulle's own broadcast. He took exception to parts of the Eisenhower message and General Koenig indicated to the Chief of Staff that therefore de Gaulle might not deliver his broadcast and furthermore might forbid the participation of the French liaison officers (who had been in training in England for a year at the expense of the British Government) to accompany the invasion forces. However, late in the afternoon of "D" day, de Gaulle made his broadcast, the text of which was passed on a technical level without formal approval. Yesterday, de Gaulle permitted 20 French liaison officers to participate in the invasion and today, in reply to a question it was stated that the remainder of the 500 will not be allowed to go.

The issuance of the SCAEF currency proclamation, which was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, has been delayed in the hope that de Gaulle would issue, at the same time, a supporting statement since it was felt here that some French recognition should be given to the presence in France of our currency notes. The General has refused to do so on the ground that France was being treated in this respect precisely like Italy and that he alone, as President of the FCNL, has the right to issue such a proclamation. Our proclamation, therefore, will be issued at midnight tonight, without his support and with as little publicity as possible.

I have learned that in spite of his non-cooperative attitude, the sentiment in Parliament and in the press is growing more and more in his favor on the ground that he is not being given proper consideration. It seems possible that he may be invited, as President of the FCNL, to agree to the plans which have been worked out for the administration of civil affairs in France. [Phillips.]

WINANT

¹⁴ For text, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. VI, p. 671.

851.515/206 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 8, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received June 9—12:52 a. m.]

1894. At Massigli's request the British Chargé¹⁷ and I called on him this afternoon. He appeared to be quite agitated and stated that the Committee had had a special session this morning to consider General de Gaulle's cable with regard to the emission and use of franc notes by the Allied Command (in reading from a cable of de Gaulle's he let slip the expression used by the General, "counterfeit money").

The following is a close paraphrase of the identic note delivered to Holman and myself which was approved by the Committee, text of which had been cabled to de Gaulle.

"Information has reached the Provisional Government of the French Republic with regard to the putting in circulation by the Allied High Command in the first liberated French territories of notes payable in francs.

The Government is astonished that the Allied Command should have taken this initiative which has never been undertaken in the past by a friendly army. The practical exigency requiring the military command to dispose of currency in the course of operations is fully realized by the provisional government. Military authorities have always received immediately and without limit such funds as they have requested throughout the whole of French overseas territories. The same system could and should have been put into practice in French Metropolitan territories at the time when the latter are about to acquire their full sovereignty. Within the framework of the agreement, whose conclusion it has been seeking from the Allied Governments for some months, the Government stands ready to take the necessary dispositions.

Since the right of issuing currency has traditionally belonged to the national authority in France and to it alone, the provisional government cannot accord any legal value to the stamped paper (vignettes) which has been put into circulation without its consent. Accordingly it makes reservations as to the political, moral and financial consequences which may result from this action of which it has been appraised.

In this spirit it draws the most earnest attention of the Government of the United States to the grave consequences which must follow in France under existing circumstances, the inevitable recognition of the fact that no agreement exists between the Allied Governments and the French authorities to which the French interior forces refer and upon which they depend."

¹⁷ Adrian Holman.

Massigli stated that according to advices from London the British Foreign Office had at de Gaulle's request asked General Eisenhower¹⁸ not to issue any proclamation in metropolitan France with regard to the acceptance of this currency and so far as he knew no proclamation had been issued. When asked specifically Massigli stated that the French authorities here did not intend to give any publicity to the matter, at least for the time being.

Saxon¹⁹ requests copy be furnished Treasury.

Repeated to London as 203.

CHAPIN

851.01/3936 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 9, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 10—5:18 p. m.]

1922. From Murphy. With further reference my 1886, June 7,²⁰ PWB informs me of the following incident:

Interior Commissioner d'Astier broadcast over Radio France the night of June 7 an appeal to resistance in which he mentioned de Gaulle as President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Radio France sent a recording of the broadcast to PWB with a request that it be rebroadcast over the more powerful United Nation's radio. PWB did not use it because of the ban against use of the "Provisional Government" term on its facilities. Yesterday morning d'Astier's office telephoned PWB to ask if his speech was to be rebroadcast and requesting an explanation if it was not. PWB asked my advice about the explanation and I suggested they explain to d'Astier that the Allied radio here could not broadcast anything containing the words "Provisional Government" but suggest to him that his message concerning resistance was after all much more important than terminology in identifying the well-known General de Gaulle, and invite him to make the broadcast without using "Provisional Government" terminology. PWB delivered a message in this vein to d'Astier's office which has reported back that he has no intention of so doing but has been unable to reach him personally last night or today.

In meantime French quarters made known to foreign press correspondents that United Nations' radio had declined to carry

¹⁸ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe.

¹⁹ James J. Saxon, Special Assistant to Director of Foreign Funds Control.

²⁰ Not printed.

d'Astier speech and most of the correspondents mentioned fact in their copy filed last night. As an example Harold Callender cabled *New York Times*:

"D'Astier known here as Minister Interior who has organized resistance was not permitted last night to speak to resistance over United Nations radio here on behalf of 'Provisional Government French Republic'—although French speakers broadcasting from London by another United Nations' station, that of BBC, could speak on behalf 'Provisional Government'".

Callender added that d'Astier declined to speak when he was not permitted to use that designation.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3938 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 10, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 8:40 p. m.]

1923. From Murphy. A reliable source in the French administration, who prefers that his name be not mentioned, said this morning that two telegrams had been received in Algiers from General de Gaulle. De Gaulle was in a very bitter state of mind. He had telegraphed French Committee on the details with regard to his arrival in London and briefly outlined his conversations with Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower, et cetera. He complained that he had been tricked into coming to London and had been presented with a *fait accompli*. Everything had been prepared for the invasion. The British had even had the impertinence to tell him he would be expected to make a speech over the radio on morning of D-Day immediately following Eisenhower. This he refused to do on the ground that he had not wanted to give the impression that he approved of everything that Eisenhower was doing with regard to France. Consequently he did not make his speech until the afternoon of D-Day.

- De Gaulle was furious over the question of the issuance of what he terms "counterfeit currency" (see our 1894, June 8).

Our friend went on to say that General de Gaulle had permitted his technical liaison officer to accompany Allied armies which went into France, but had refused to permit his administrative liaison officer to go in with the Allied troops and thus create the impression that he condoned the acts of American and British military commanders in connection with civilian affairs. General de Gaulle did report to French Committee that he was satisfied with military preparations for invasion and indicated confidence that invasion would

be a success. In one of the two messages which had thus far arrived in Algiers from London de Gaulle sought to give impression to members of French Committee that General Eisenhower was most apologetic with regard to the arrangements which had been made for handling of civilian administration in France; that he preferred not to have anything to do with it; that he was a soldier and not a politician; and that none of the present arrangements was his doing. In this connection deGaulle asserted to his commissioners that when General Eisenhower left North Africa last December he had called on him, de Gaulle, to say goodbye and that Eisenhower had admitted that he did not have a good grasp of the situation in North Africa and that he was sorry there had been so much difficulty and even apologized for the many mistakes which had been made. De Gaulle ended his comments on his conversation with Eisenhower with statement that Eisenhower was a good soldier who was being made to do something he did not want to do. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.515/210b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1944—10 p. m.

1836. For Chapin and Murphy. For your own information. Continuous conversations for the use in France of a supplemental issue of French franc currency by the Allied liberation forces have been held since last December with Monnet, the representative of the French Committee dealing with such questions. The French Committee requested and it was agreed that American and British currency would only be used in case of emergency. Since adequate supplies of French currency could not be obtained from occupied France, it was agreed that a special issue of supplemental French franc currency should be printed prior to military operations. It was also agreed that the currency should be printed under the supervision of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in the United States and the design was accepted by the Committee's representative. Mendes-France during his recent visit here reviewed the decisions which had been reached. While the representatives of the French Committee who carried on these conversations with the War and Treasury departments were not pleased with the decision that General Eisenhower was to issue this currency, they nevertheless accepted it and the rates of exchange vis-à-vis the pound and the dollar were selected by the French Committee. Under these circumstances the implication contained in the Committee's note (your 1894 June 8)

that it had not been consulted and had no previous knowledge of this matter gives an utterly false impression.

The issuance of the SHAEF Currency Proclamation was delayed in the hope that de Gaulle would at the same time issue a supporting statement. This he refused to do on the ground that he alone as President of the Committee had the right to make such a proclamation. While SHAEF has not as yet deemed it advisable to make any official statement or give any press release concerning these supplemental francs, it has now posted in the liberated areas a financial proclamation establishing this currency as legal tender.

The Department will take no action on the note delivered to you unless so requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have been given the information in your reference telegram.

STETTINIUS

851.01/3931 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 11, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

1949. From Murphy. I have learned from a member of de Gaulle's secretariat that a further report has been received from General de Gaulle for information of FCNL. It appears that when de Gaulle saw Churchill and began to explain French position with regard to various matters including the financial question Churchill said he regretted that there had been no agreement made with the French but now that the battle was beginning for the liberation of France all efforts should be concentrated on the battle and the various questions on which there was no agreement could be taken up later on. De Gaulle apparently went into a rage.

Later on de Gaulle saw Eden alone. Eden was most sympathetic according to de Gaulle and could not have been more kind. He went on at great length to explain how much he deplored France's present situation, how he and his colleagues in the Foreign Office had tried to do everything they could with House of Commons, with the press, et cetera, to be of assistance to French Committee. He reminded de Gaulle that as he had stated in House of Commons²¹ Great Britain needed France now more than ever before and he intended to see to it during his administration as Foreign Minister that everything possible was done to restore France to her former position and prestige. Eden asserted that as for himself he had done everything he could to be of assistance to the French but that the Prime Minister and the

²¹ See speech of May 25, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 400, col. 1044.

President of United States of America did not feel anything more could be done than had been done up to the present time.

De Gaulle then went on to say in his report that Eden had counselled him (de Gaulle) to sit down patiently in London with him and try to work out something which represented at least some progress. If de Gaulle would do this, his hand for his conversations in Washington would be considerably strengthened and his position would be much improved vis-à-vis the United States. De Gaulle said he derived impression from Eden that there was a possibility of working out some sort of a compromise on the issuance of bank notes.

The Secretary General of the FCNL stated last evening that in spite of the bad beginning of the de Gaulle visit to London he was convinced from reports he had seen that the trip will turn out to have been useful and he is certain the General's position will have been considerably strengthened. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.515/210a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)*²²

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1944—7 p. m.

1840. For Murphy and Chapin. U. S. Departments concerned are shocked at recent French utterances on currency matters, particularly in light of talks which have taken place with Mendes-France and Monnet. Accordingly, great importance is attached to having Mendes-France go immediately to London in an effort to clarify the situation with the French representatives there.

War Department has arranged to make plane available to Mendes-France in Algiers. British will facilitate his entry into U. K.

Please advise Massigli in above sense.

STETTINIUS

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²³

[WASHINGTON,] 12 June, 1944.

559. For the Former Naval Person. I share your view that this currency issue is being exploited to stampede us into according full recognition to the Comité. Personally I do not think the currency situation referred to in your cable is as critical as it might first appear,

²² Text approved by Mr. McCloy of the War Department and Mr. White of the Treasury Department. Message approved in principle by Mr. Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

²³ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

nor do I feel that it is essential from the point of view of the acceptability of the supplemental currency that De Gaulle make any statement of support with respect to such currency. I propose that De Gaulle should be informed as follows:

1. We intend to continue to use the supplementary franc currency in exactly the same manner as we have planned and as we have agreed with the British Treasury and as has been fully understood by Messrs. Monnet and Mendes-France of the French Comité.

2. If for any reason the supplementary currency is not acceptable to the French public, General Eisenhower has full authority to use yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes. Accordingly, if De Gaulle incites the French people into refusing to accept supplementary francs then the Comité will have to bear the full responsibility for any bad effects resulting from the use of yellow seal notes and BMA notes in France. One of the certain consequences will be the depreciation of the French franc in terms of dollars and sterling in a black market which will accentuate and reveal the weaknesses of the French monetary system. This is one of the important reasons why we accepted the request of the French Comité that we not use yellow seal dollars and BMA notes as a spearhead currency. There would be other adverse effects which would be apparent to De Gaulle and his advisers.

I would certainly not importune De Gaulle to make any supporting statement whatever regarding the currency. Provided it is clear that he acts entirely on his own responsibility and without our concurrence he can sign any statement on currency in whatever capacity he likes . . .

As far as the appearance of the notes is concerned, I have seen them before but I have looked at them again and think them adequate. I am informed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing counterfeiting experts that they will be extremely difficult to counterfeit by virtue of the intricate color combination. I am also informed that the British Treasury officials approved the note and that the French representatives here not only approved the note but were satisfied with the designs and the color.

It seems clear that *prima donnas* do not change their spots.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/3955 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 12, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received June 13—7:22 a. m.]

1974 [*bis*]. I have received note dated June 8 from Massigli stating that *Official Journal of the French Republic* had on the same day published text of ordinance whereby in response to wish of Consulta-

tive Assembly FCNL had decided thenceforth to take name of "Provisional Government of the French Republic" and that Committee's delegate had been instructed to inform American Government on following day of text of ordinance.

I have made no acknowledgement of receipt of this communication and will not do so unless instructed.

CHAPIN

851.01/3951a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944—8 p. m.

1849. For Murphy and Chapin. Winant has just telegraphed that Viénot, London representative of the FCNL, called at the Embassy to inform him about plans for de Gaulle's visit to this country: 1. De Gaulle is requesting Massigli to send a message via Hoppenot expressing appreciation for the chance to visit Washington and confer with the President. 2. De Gaulle will first return to Algiers for further discussions with the Committee and will cable from Algiers the exact date of his proposed visit, (your 1940, June 10²⁴).

Viénot indicated the visit would fall within the periods suggested by the President and that this information was being conveyed to our Embassy in London since a formal reply would be delayed until de Gaulle's return to Algiers.

HULL

851.515/211 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 12, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 13—10:23 a. m.]

1981. From Murphy. Your 1840, June 11. I have just had a talk with Mendes-France with whom I had an appointment today prior to the receipt of your telegram. He said that he plans to await the return here of General de Gaulle because he believes that if given an opportunity to make an oral report to de Gaulle regarding his conversations at Washington de Gaulle's understanding of the entire matter would be improved. He anticipates de Gaulle's return shortly.

In this connection he expressed regret that his departure from Washington was delayed—said that he had cancelled his reservation on a War Department plane leaving May 20 and subsequently, not-

²⁴ Not printed.

withstanding McCloy's intervention in his behalf, he was obliged to wait from May 24 to June 2. This caused him to miss de Gaulle who had departed from Algiers for London prior to Mendes-France's arrival. He believes he could have helped de Gaulle to a better understanding of the financial problem. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3951 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 12, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 13—10:56 a. m.]

1982. From Murphy. Your 1840, June 11. I dined with Massigli this evening. He was in a very depressed state of mind. He stated that he felt that everything was in a hopeless mess. He had worked day and night for months to try and improve relations between the United States and French Committee and just as he felt he was beginning to make some progress everything has taken a turn for the worse. He said that it was all well and good if we did not want to recognize the FCNL as the Provisional Government of France but he thought it was brutal at a moment when all of France was looking forward to liberation after 4 years of slavery and starvation for the United States Government to have prevented leaders of French resistance in North Africa to use the United Nations radio simply because the words "Provisional Government" were contained in a speech. He obviously was referring to Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie's speech which was cancelled because it referred to the "Provisional Government" of France.

When the subject of the issuance of the special currency for France was brought up Massigli stated that never was there the slightest question of Monnet or anyone else approving anything. He could not believe Monnet has done so and if he did he had exceeded his authority.

Massigli went on to say that some people in the British Government were still hopeful for some sort of compromise being worked out on the questions of the issuance of currency and of civil administration in France. In this connection he remarked ironically that the Allies had gotten off to a "good" start in France by retaining as Mayor of Bayeux the notorious Vichyite appointee.

Massigli added that de Gaulle would make every effort to set foot on French soil (probably Bayeux) before returning to North Africa. In any event he did not expect de Gaulle to return to Algiers before the end of this week. The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs then

went on to discuss the projected journey of de Gaulle to the United States. He said that he was frankly disturbed. In the first place he did not at all like the manner in which the invitation had been transmitted. Hoppenot should have been the channel of communication and not Admiral Fénard. He had reached the conclusion that the whole matter had been the invention of Fénard. When Fénard had been in Algiers he had called on him (Massigli) and had apprised him of the purpose of his quick trip to North Africa. Massigli said he had telegraphed Hoppenot to see Fénard immediately on the latter's return to Washington in order to get full information on the reasons for Fénard's journey. Fénard apparently had failed to keep Hoppenot informed. He, Massigli, was frankly disgusted with the manner in which French affairs in Washington were being handled what with Monnet and Fénard always interfering with what are normally Hoppenot's functions.

Massigli then asserted that unless something practical could be worked out before de Gaulle left for the United States he feared the trip might have the opposite effect from that so much desired. He did not mean by this that the United States must recognize the French Committee as the Provisional Government but something satisfactory to both sides must be worked out on civil administration in France. A compromise should be worked out on all financial questions also. He appealed for my support in this matter. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.515/213 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:10 p. m.]

1995. Departments 1840, June 11, 7 p. m. Although Murphy had discussed with Massigli informally last night the recent French utterances on currency matters, I called on Massigli this noon and made more formal representations. I stated that I could not hide the concern and shocked surprise of the Treasury and of the Department of State at the statements made in London, particularly since we had been given to understand that no publicity was to be given to the matter. Some of the statements were in fact a reflection upon the authority of the Commander in Chief. At a time when military operations were paramount, it was regrettable that the currency issue which was only incidental to those operations should receive such prominence as a point of disagreement. I added that this attitude if persisted in might adversely affect operations and hence have unfortu-

nate results not only for the United States and Britain but for France itself.

Massigli who took notes of these statements and said that he would transmit the substance thereof to London appeared very much worried. He attempted rather halfheartedly I felt to defend the position and suggested that the continued refusal by the United States Government to enter into an over-all political agreement with the French authorities was through its injurious effect upon French public opinion also harmful to the general war effort.

As I knew that Mendes-France had told Murphy (our 1981, June 12, midnight) that he did not feel it worthwhile to go to London at this stage, I asked Massigli if the General was returning shortly and could discuss currency matters with Mendes-France. He replied that he was returning within the week.

CHAPIN

851.01/3958 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 13, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 14—8:51 a. m.]

1997. Department's 1849, June 12, 8 p. m. In course of my conversation this morning with Massigli I asked if there was any news with regard to de Gaulle's visit to United States. Massigli replied he had received a cable from de Gaulle instructing him to send a message to Hoppenot expressing appreciation for the opportunity to visit the United States. He said the matter would be discussed at a special meeting of the Committee this afternoon, but it was not necessary to take a vote of the Committee on de Gaulle's visit.

Massigli appeared greatly concerned that there was little likelihood of laying the groundwork of an over-all political agreement between the United States and French authorities prior to General's visit to the United States, a prerequisite in his opinion to a successful visit. He feared that without such a basis the differences between President Roosevelt and de Gaulle might even be widened.

I stated my conviction that the General's visit would be most useful particularly in apprising the latter of our war effort and of general trend of public opinion in United States not only as regards conduct of the war in Europe but of the Far East and as respects postwar plans. I suggested that in any case we should not cross bridges before we came to them and expressed hope there would be no further declarations with regard to Allied currency for time being and that a period of *détente* might elapse until the visit to the President took place.

CHAPIN

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²⁵

[WASHINGTON,] 14 June, 1944.

561. To the Former Naval Person. Your 703.²⁶ I can see no objection to your action in permitting de Gaulle to visit France and feel that his visit may have the good effect of stimulating that part of the French underground over which he has authority or which he can influence to work against the common enemy.

In my opinion we should make full use of any organization or influence he may have in so far as is practicable without imposing him by force of our arms upon the French people as their government or giving recognition to his outfit as the Provisional Government of France. After all, the Germans control over 99% of the area of France.

His unreasonable attitude toward our supplementary French currency does not disturb me. My reaction to his action in the matter of currency is fully covered in my number 559 of 12 June.

I join with you in a hope that the Italian situation will clear up to the advantage of our military effort in Italy and elsewhere, and I regret exceedingly that it was not possible for me to be with you on your visit with our splendid soldiers who have made the first breach in Hitler's "citadel of Europe." But don't do it again without my going with you.

ROOSEVELT

851.515/220: Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 16, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received June 16—11:55 a. m.]

2035. From Murphy. Reference Department's 1836, June 10, 10 p. m. Massigli told me last evening that Mendes-France is disturbed regarding the President's comments on the issue under General Eisenhower's authority of French franc currency in metropolitan France and that Mendes-France is writing Secretary Morgenthau²⁷ a rather lengthy commentary on the entire question. I find that the public interest here in this matter has diminished and even in official circles there has been a certain adjustment of ideas. Massigli himself seems to take a calm view and even mentioned that as a practical matter France would not lose by the transaction. Massigli said that

²⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁶ Not found in Department files.

²⁷ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

de Gaulle's visit of yesterday had a reassuring effect on local opinion dissipating a certain uneasiness over what appeared to some as an Allied policy of excluding the French from the Normandy operation. So much of this he declared is sentimental and emotional to which of course must be added the fears of some French officials regarding their jobs and future careers once France is liberated.

Repeated to London as 223. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/3987 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 16, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:33 p. m.]

4835. Personal for the President and Secretary only. This afternoon Eden called to say that he had just said goodbye to de Gaulle, who is returning to Algiers. He told me that he found him more reasonable than at any time he had seen him. I think this was due in part to the friendly welcome he got from the French in Bayeux and elsewhere which gave him confidence and also because of a stern and realistic talk General Marshall had yesterday afternoon with General Béthouart and Colonel Le Bel in the Embassy and which was reported to de Gaulle. De Gaulle told Eden that he was not holding out for recognition but that his concern was administration and the currency issue. He said that if these two matters could be settled he would throw in all the strength he had back of the commanding general. He also said that criticism in the press in Algiers had been unfortunate and that he would try to correct it. De Gaulle still intends to go on to Washington.

Eden told me that he feels that it will be possible to work out an arrangement that will be acceptable. At any rate his office is trying their hand at it and as soon as a draft is formulated he will forward it for your consideration. I sincerely hope that a satisfactory formula can be found.

I hope you noted in an Embassy telegram²⁸ sent this morning that an effort to override the Prime Minister's request that debate on the French issue be postponed was defeated by 177 to 6.

On the military side Colonel Le Bel is being attached to General Bradley by General Eisenhower. This has General Marshall's full support.

The French problem during these days of invasion has taken up a great deal of time. It was discussed at great length at Chequers by

²⁸ Telegram 4814, not printed.

the Prime Minister, General Smuts and Eden with General Marshall and myself last week end. I spent an evening discussing it with our Chiefs of Staff and had talks with General Eisenhower and General Bedell Smith ^{28a} as well as meetings this week with the Prime Minister and Eden. I believe that an unnecessary crisis in the British Government has been avoided and that the question is under reasonable control for the time being.

WINANT

851.01/4013 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 19, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received June 19—2:29 p. m.]

4870. For Dunn ²⁹ from Phillips. At a conference between the Chief of Staff and General Koenig ³⁰ on Saturday which I attended, it was agreed as follows:

General Koenig will provide sufficient French liaison personnel to assist the French civil authorities in liberated territory at centers of French civil administration. These officers will be responsible to the French authorities for providing necessary liaison between the French civil administration and Allied military commanders and will operate from the civil administration center.

The necessary number of French Army officers as liaison officers to each headquarters down including army corps and later divisions will be provided by General Koenig. General Koenig will assign these officers as tactical liaison officers on the staffs of designated commanders and they will come under the command of the Allied commander to whom they are assigned. It is understood that in addition to tactical liaison and advice, the commander to whose staff these officers are assigned will use them as required to assist him in his dealings with the civil administration in France.

It was further agreed that all French forces of the interior will be commanded by General Koenig under the supreme command of General Eisenhower, and that Koenig's status will thus be the same as that of any Allied commander serving under SCAEF directly. [Phillips.]

WINANT

^{28a} Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower.

²⁹ James Clement Dunn, Director, Office of European Affairs.

³⁰ Gen. Joseph P. Koenig, Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces of the Interior.

851.01/6-2044

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

There is at present a difference between United States and British practice in referring to the French Committee of National Liberation in broadcasts, leaflets, etc.

The British and United States propaganda agencies are at one in avoiding in their own output the use of the words "Provisional Government" as a description of the French Committee. It is, however, from time to time necessary for them to quote official documents which do so describe the French Committee.

British propaganda agencies do not alter the wording of such quotations to omit the words "provisional government", whereas it is understood that American propaganda agencies do do so.

The resultant discrepancy between British and American propaganda output is liable to cause confusion. There is, for instance, at present a discrepancy in broadcasts from London and broadcasts from Algiers under the control of the Political Warfare Branch of Allied Forces Headquarters which is, of course, a combined Anglo-American body. Algiers normally rebroadcasts a certain number of London programmes.

It is felt that the retention of the words "provisional government" in quotations from official documents in no way carries with it recognition of the French Committee as a provisional government.

WASHINGTON, 20 June, 1944.

851.01/4066 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 26, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received June 26—5 :20 p. m.]

5058. Personal for the Secretary. I have just received an informal and unofficial memorandum on the progress of civil affairs discussions with the French which I promised you last night in my No. 5045.³¹ I was asked that it be treated in confidence. These exchanges should be over the middle of the week. The conclusions are then to be sent up to Mr. Eden and the Prime Minister and simultaneously forwarded to you and the President. No decision is to be taken until after you and the President have had an opportunity to consider the proposed arrangement.

³¹ Not printed.

In a message to the President sent by the Prime Minister yesterday this procedure was outlined and agreed to by the Prime Minister and concurred in by Mr. Eden.

I thought you might also like to know that in discussions with Robert Sherwood,³² General McClure,³³ Bruce Lockhart,³⁴ and Mr. Eden and myself we are trying to bring about greater agreement and a common front on radio programs and other propaganda directed to France.

The text of the memorandum follows:

"The talks have gone well and in a very friendly atmosphere. The French have, however, shown themselves very suspicious of AMGOT³⁵ and have referred several times to their treatment in administrative matters, in particular control of broadcasting stations, in North Africa.

"To meet this state of mind we have made some departures from the model agreement with the Belgian³⁶ and other Allied Governments. We have also included in our negotiations questions (publicity, censorship, property, and relief supplies) which were not dealt with in the agreements with the Belgian and other Allied Governments.

"The present position is as follows, all discussions being of course on the official level and not committing Government.

"(1) We have reached agreement upon clauses defining the respective powers of the Commander in Chief and the French authorities as regards civil administration proper. The basis of these arrangements is the division of France into 'forward' and 'interior' zones. This is necessitated by the large area which France covers as compared with the smaller Allied countries, but it is provided that the Commander in Chief's requirements must be met in the 'forward' zone and his forces shall have all the facilities which they require in the 'interior' zone.

"(2) Provisions on the complicated question of jurisdiction have been agreed subject to two points which it is hoped to settle today.

"(3) In the matter of finance, discussions are proceeding on the basis that a 'mutual aid agreement' would be concluded by which we would give the French forces 'Lend-Lease' and the French would give us supplies, facilities, et cetera, within France free of charge as 'mutual aid'.³⁷ The currency problem would be settled within this framework by a provision whereby the French are recognized as the issuing authority of the 'supplementary francs' and then proceed to put at our disposal all the currency required by the Allied forces. This arrangement, which would be an extension of the existing system in North Africa, would be retroactive to D-Day.

³² Director of Overseas Operations, Office of War Information.

³³ Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare Branch, Supreme Allied Command.

³⁴ Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, British Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office; Director General of Political Warfare.

³⁵ American Military Government, Occupied Territories.

³⁶ For Memorandum of Agreement with Belgium dated May 16, see p. 296.

³⁷ For correspondence regarding Lend-Lease negotiations between the United States and France, see pp. 748 ff.

"(4) Provisions regarding the restitution of French property in liberated France and the custodianship of enemy property, both matters to which the French delegation attach the highest importance, are being prepared.

"(5) Certain other miscellaneous provisions—publicity and censorship, fiscal, immunities of Allied forces, civil claims, et cetera, are at an advance stage of negotiation.

"None of the texts drafted contains any mention of 'The Provisional Government of the French Republic'. Our idea is that there should be four separate documents on (a) civil affairs and jurisdiction, (b) finance, (c) publicity, and (d) property, all of which could be turned into an agreement later by an exchange of letters. This would, on the British side, be the same procedure as was adopted in the case of Belgium. There would be no mention of the Provisional Government in the documents themselves or in the British note covering them. We contemplate that on the American side, if the arrangements on which we hope to agree with the French commend themselves to the United States Government, the agreement would take the form of a military agreement signed by General Eisenhower."

WINANT

851.01/6-2644 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1944—8 p. m.

2012. For Murphy and Chapin. On June 26 Hoppenot left *aide-mémoire* of message for the President from General de Gaulle of which following is substance:

De Gaulle will be happy to visit Washington and discuss with President problems of interest to United States and France. He regards visit as primarily to render homage to President and American people for their present sacrifices and exertions toward liberation of Asia and Europe. The General does not find dates suggested by President as most convenient since he wishes to be in Algiers for Bastille Day³⁸ but in deference to President he will plan to spend 3 full days between July 5 and 9. However his definite decision will await clarification of the program of discussions which he believes should be carefully studied and fixed in advance. For his part he has no specific requests or recommendations to advance. He states that question of formal recognition is of little interest in itself and he has no intention of raising it.

Hoppenot added orally that de Gaulle also wishes to know whether any restrictions or limitations will be placed upon his status similar to those attending Giraud's visit last summer.³⁹ At that time Giraud

³⁸ July 14.

³⁹ Gen. Henri Giraud, Co-Chairman of the French Committee of National Liberation, came to Washington on July 7, 1943.

was received in his military capacity only and only military subjects were open for discussion.

Message has been referred to the President and you will be informed of his reply.

Repeated to London.⁴⁰

HULL

851.01/6-2744 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1944—midnight.

2028. For Murphy and Chapin. Department's 2012, June 26. The following is substance of President's reply handed to Hoppenot June 27 for transmission to de Gaulle:

President is very pleased that de Gaulle expresses desire to visit America and hopes that conversations may be of assistance in our common determination and joint effort to drive Germans from French soil.

President has made no plans regarding conversations but does not wish to exclude or restrict the scope of any subject of discussion. His only wish is that limited time available will be used to further closer cooperation in our essential efforts.

President will be glad to receive de Gaulle between July 5 and 9 as suggested or any other time between July 6 and 14 which is only period in near future that can be made available.

With regard to Hoppenot's oral question de Gaulle is being informed that no restrictions or limitations shall be placed upon him during his visit.

Repeated to London.⁴¹

HULL

851.01/7-344 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 3, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received July 4—3:51 a. m.]

2252. From Murphy. Joxe, Secretary General of French Committee of National Liberation, has informed us that General de Gaulle would not attempt to take up any serious problems during

⁴⁰ Repeated to London as telegram 5041, for the Ambassador and Phillips.

⁴¹ Repeated to London as telegram 5072, for the Ambassador and Phillips, referring to Department's 5041, June 26 (see footnote 40, above).

his visit to Washington. He, de Gaulle, had been informed that the President had stated recently, "*je céderai rien*" (I will concede nothing) in connection with the forthcoming visit of de Gaulle. When told that this was a ridiculous statement Joxe smiled and asserted that he wished it were but unfortunately a Frenchman who had recently arrived in Algiers and who was well placed in Washington officialdom had brought this report. When told that it must be Jean Monnet who has just arrived here Joxe smiled again and said he could not reveal the name. It was obvious that he had Monnet in mind.

Joxe added that de Gaulle had returned from London in a very relaxed state of mind. His visit to France had undoubtedly done wonders to calm him. He felt confident that nothing could stop him from achieving his goal which was to be acclaimed as the liberator of France. Joxe stated that de Gaulle's attitude toward the British was much improved and that Duff-Cooper had done a great deal towards achieving this objective. He said among other things that de Gaulle was now convinced that Great Britain wanted a strong France in western Europe.

Joxe then asked for suggestions as to how de Gaulle should conduct himself in Washington. He was then asked how de Gaulle intended to conduct himself. Joxe replied that de Gaulle intended to be as agreeable as possible; that he would discuss any subject which the President might care to discuss; and that if there were any point to which he did not agree he would merely drop the subject and go on to something else. Joxe also stated that de Gaulle would present the President with a small gift probably a book at the beginning of his visit.

Joxe added that de Gaulle might make a very flattering statement on July 4 with regard to the United States.

Joxe then went on to say that while de Gaulle was in London he had had very intimate conversations with Eden on postwar plans. He said that Eden had spoken very frankly and fully and had not hesitated to say that he and Churchill were not in complete agreement. It seemed clear, said Joxe, that the Anglo-Saxons would probably be forced to allow the Soviet Union to do what she wished in Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans and what de Gaulle was concerned about was where the line would be drawn. He said that de Gaulle while in Italy would call on the Pope and that he was determined to speak quite frankly to the Holy Father about the future of France. He knew that the Holy Father was very sympathetic with France's position and he hoped to urge the Holy Father to use his great influence towards a real and just peace.

Joxe also spoke of recent reports received from French representatives in Italy regarding the Yugoslav situation.⁴² He asserted that it was completely incomprehensible to the French that the British should have fallen all over themselves playing up to Tito⁴³ at a time when Tito had received a thorough thrashing from the Germans and had even been obliged to leave Yugoslav territory. He said that in deference to the British the French had delayed sending in their military mission to Tito which General Velebit had requested but that they were now determined to go ahead and send it in as soon as possible. The French felt that the British were following a completely incomprehensible policy in the Balkans and could not see how it could come to any good.

Joxe concluded with the statement that he was very glad that General de Gaulle was going to Washington because "he has nothing to lose".

Joxe also referred to Giraud during the conversation and said that he believes that General Giraud would soon be given some sort of a military command which he would accept as all reports showed he had become very bored in his self-imposed retirement.

Massigli tells me informally that while he had hoped to accompany de Gaulle on this trip he now believes the plan not to include any commissioners in the party is a good one and that he will hope to proceed to Washington sometime in the future. He added in that connection that he hoped that the "impossible" situation of French representation in Washington confused by the overlapping activities of Hoppenot, Monnet, Fénard, and St. Didier⁴⁴ would be rectified. Massigli also confirmed in strictest confidence some phases of Joxe's remarks especially that regarding de Gaulle's intention to avoid opening subjects for discussion and that the initiative would be left to the President. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

851.01/7-344: Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 3, 1944—noon.

[Received July 4—3:45 a. m.]

2254. Following is list of party accompanying de Gaulle: General Béthouart, French Chief of Staff; Palewski, Chief of Civil Cabinet;

⁴² For correspondence regarding the Yugoslav situation, see vol. iv, section under Yugoslavia entitled "Concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia".

⁴³ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), President of the National Liberation movement in Yugoslavia, and military leader of the Partisan guerilla forces in that country.

⁴⁴ Brosse de Saint-Didier, chief of a French military mission to the United States.

Alphand; Jacques Paris, Counselor French Delegation London; Lieutenant Colonel de Rancourt, Military Cabinet; Cdt. de Lévis-Mirepoix and Captain Teyssot, Military Aides; Baubé, Press Attaché Washington; one additional Press Attaché and two more representative persons" to be selected definitely this evening.

When I saw the General this morning he repeated what I had already been told by Palewski that object of his trip to the United States was to pay friendly visit to the President and to discuss with him matters of general interest. He also reiterated that he personally did not intend to seek any specific agreements. He added he had long been anxious to know something of the United States and wished particularly to show his appreciation for the thousands of brave Americans who were fighting so valiantly and effectively in Europe. He said he intends to make a very strong statement on this last named point.

In reply to my question he stated he had read the draft agreement reached in London and had found them in general satisfactory although there were certain minor points which might require change. They were to be discussed at the meeting of the FCNL this afternoon. Only point which he specifically mentioned as being unsatisfactory was that covering reverse Lend-Lease to be furnished the British in France which he felt was perhaps more sweeping than France could afford.

Schedule has now been confirmed for departure from Algiers July 5, 3 a. m., and arrival Washington July 6 about 5 p. m. General plans to stay in Washington 3 full days arriving in New York afternoon of 9th. However, since he is apparently counting on a reception to be given by Mayor LaGuardia he feels it may be preferable to delay his arrival in New York until Monday,⁴⁵ the intervening time to be taken up perhaps by a trip to some point of interest. He said he would like to spend an hour or two in Philadelphia (as my own suggestion it may be Department might wish to arrange a visit to Annapolis or West Point or to some aircraft or munitions factory if such are open on Sunday).

De Gaulle from New York will proceed to Canada where he will spend the 11th and 12th and wishes to arrange his return trip so as to arrive Algiers not later than morning of the 14th for holiday festivities.

CHAPIN

⁴⁵ July 10.

851.01/7-444 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 4, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 10:16 a. m.]

2266. Reference my 2254 July 3, 12 noon. Following two names have been added to the party, Lieutenant Colonel Hartemann of the Air General Staff, and André Laguerre, Chief of de Gaulle's Press Bureau. Major Fitts of ATC,⁴⁶ although not a [member of] party, is accompanying it to insure smoothness of trip.

Members of party including myself but not including Fitts total 12.

CHAPIN

851.01/7-944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 9, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received July 10—3 :20 a. m.]

2490. For the President and the Secretary. One of my more reliable colleagues has reported to me that the French representative here told him that when he approached the Soviet Government asking for recognition of the French Committee as the Provisional Government of France he was informed that the Soviet Government would take no action vis-à-vis the French at variance with the Anglo-American position. Molotov has told me several times since I have been back that it was the Soviet policy to leave the initiative in French policy to the British and ourselves.

HARRIMAN

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁴⁷

[WASHINGTON,] 10 July, 1944.

582. Re your 713,^{47a} I am prepared to accept Committee as temporary *de facto* authority for civil administration in France provided two things are clear—first, complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations, and, second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own Government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base and modify them to insure these points, and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Sug-

⁴⁶ Air Transport Command (USAAF).

⁴⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

^{47a} Not printed.

gest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General De Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared.

The visit has gone off very well.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/7-1044: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions Including the Mission at Algiers

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1944—8 p. m.

Following is for your information.

General de Gaulle concluded his visit to the United States July 10 and proceeded to Canada the following day. He is expected back in Algiers July 14.

In addition to numerous social functions which included tea and luncheon at the White House and dinners given in his honor by me and the Acting Secretary of War, General de Gaulle had two conversations with the President in which all problems of mutual interest were discussed on a frank and friendly basis. The text of the General's statement to the press is being carried in the radio bulletin.⁴⁸

There were no untoward incidents and the friendliest atmosphere prevailed throughout the visit. Conversations with de Gaulle remained on a general plane and he did not request recognition as a head of government. There has been no change in this Government's position with respect to the French authorities in Algiers although there is every reason to hope that the present cooperation between Allied Commanders, Gaullist officials and local officials and population in liberated areas will continue and grow even closer, as envisaged in my speech of April 9.⁴⁹

An effort will be made to keep you informed of any further developments.

HULL

851.01/7-1144: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1944—8 p. m.

2175. For Murphy and Lawton.⁵⁰ General de Gaulle, in press conference yesterday, made clear that his mission here did not extend to

⁴⁸ Department of State Radio Bulletin No. 165, July 10, 1944.

⁴⁹ Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

⁵⁰ Edward P. Lawton, Consul at Algiers.

question of immediate agreement on French civil administration, but hoped that atmosphere created here would have "results along those lines." He revealed that he expects to return to France soon, and will install his capital provisionally in any of "towns and villages between Algiers and Paris", but emphasized that capital of France is Paris.

He said that he was convinced that "neither the President nor the Government nor the people of the United States have any intention of annexing any French territory," and added: "There is however the issue of international security for the future which may affect French territory and so lead to friendly discussions." Asked if he expects French empire to be returned intact, General de Gaulle said he was certain that France "will find everything intact that belongs to her," and reaffirmed his belief in Brazzaville goal of democratic confederation of French territories. Asked if France wants additional territory after war, General de Gaulle said that as far as Africa and Far East were concerned, France wanted nothing more than is hers now. "Europe is a different matter," he said. "For international security and for the security of France and her western neighbors, certain practical measures will be necessary and flag of French may well fly over additional territory." Asked if that meant the Rhineland, General de Gaulle replied, "Certainly." He said that plans for controlling Germany could not be realized without an inter-Allied agreement calling for "long occupation" with French participation. General de Gaulle scoffed at suggestions that France was "through" as an important power and made it clear he thought France would play an important role in post-war plans for international security. He denied that he and President had discussed when a plebiscite would be held in France to determine whether the French Committee would be recognized, emphasizing that that was "purely a French question."

In reply to inquiry regarding press censorship in France, he told reporters that Allied newsmen "will find in Paris the same facilities as in their own countries for expressing their opinions on political events."

General de Gaulle stated that it was not practical at this time to start controlled feeding in occupied areas through the Red Cross, or other agencies, because of the battle raging in Europe.

Callender reported in *New York Times* that General de Gaulle made highly favorable impression on reporters by straightforward answers to questions. Philip Whitcomb wrote in Baltimore *Sun* that General dealt "easily and in good humor with newspapermen." Robert Albright, writing in *Washington Post*, found complete absence of any show of personal glory or the Joan of Arc myth that had been built up around him. Bert Andrews, writing in *New York Herald Tribune*, described General as "surprisingly gentle in manner," with none of much-talked-about arrogance in evidence.

851.01/7-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 12, 1944.

[Received July 12—2:43 p. m.]

5488. Answering a question in Parliament regarding French affairs Mr. Eden said that the results of the discussions on civil affairs in liberated France and other questions which had taken place in London between British and French officials have been under examination. He said that he is now able to state that the British Government has endorsed the outcome of those discussions and that it had good hopes that on this basis an announcement would shortly be made that formal agreements have been concluded between the British Government, the United States Government and the French Committee of National Liberation. He declared that the British Government had thought it desirable however to make no statement of the British position upon these matters until after de Gaulle's visit to Washington. After referring to the President's press conference yesterday Mr. Eden said that the House would have observed that the United States has decided to recognise the Committee as the *de facto* authority for the Government of the liberated area of France pending an election and that the United States Government is prepared to use as a basis the draft agreements arrived at in London between representatives of the British Government and the French Committee. He declared that the British Government naturally welcomes this decision of the United States Government all the more so since the Anglo-French discussions in London were conducted on the basis that the French Committee would in fact exercise governmental authority in France as liberation proceeds. Mr. Eden said that the House would welcome this progress in Allied relations and would note that its own forbearance in not pressing for a debate was a by no means unhelpful contribution to the satisfactory developments which he had pleasure in reporting today.

A further question was asked as to when an announcement would be made on the basis on which these agreements had been reached. Mr. Eden replied that the President had told nobody what was in documents. He continued by saying that there are a number of documents covering civil affairs which the British Government has approved and he also understood that the French Committee had also approved of them. He concluded by saying that as soon as the agreements are finally approved they will be signed and will then be available to Parliament.

WINANT

851.01/7-2544 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 25, 1944—noon.

[Received July 26—(12:30?) p. m.]

2503. Mr. Bullitt,⁵¹ who is leaving for Italy tomorrow, informs me that in the course of a long interview which he had the other day with General de Gaulle, the latter expressed the earnest hope that a titular representative of the USA with the rank of Ambassador might be appointed in the near future to the French Committee. The General said that Franco-American relations in the past few months had been handicapped by the absence in Algiers of an official of that authority with whom he might have discussed upon a frank and intimate basis the problems affecting those relations. He added that if a successor to Mr. Wilson⁵² were appointed, he would hope to establish with him just such mutual confidence and reiterated the desirability of immediate action in view of prospective developments in the war. Moreover the General felt it would be helpful to be able to discuss with such a representative the main problems envisaged for the post-war period.

Mr. Bullitt asked him if existing impulse toward better relations resulting from the successful visit of de Gaulle to the USA might be diminished. While the effect which such a representative might have upon the attitudes and policies of de Gaulle and the French Committee should not be exaggerated, there is little doubt but what the right man, speaking with an authority based on your confidence and that of the President might exert a most beneficial influence.

CHAPIN

851.01/8-1144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*⁵³

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1944—4 p. m.

1912. Please inform Molotov⁵⁴ that our discussions with the French are nearing a successful conclusion and that we expect the final texts of the proposed agreements to go forward to General Eisenhower in the next few days. August 16 has been suggested as a pos-

⁵¹ William C. Bullitt, former Ambassador to France, serving as foreign correspondent for *Life* magazine.

⁵² Edwin C. Wilson, American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers, November 22, 1943, to May 8, 1944.

⁵³ Repeated to London as telegram 6343, for the Ambassador and Phillips. Also repeated to Algiers for Chapin and Murphy as 2382.

⁵⁴ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

sible date for signature. Copies will be handed to the Soviet Embassy here and also sent to you by next pouch.

You may inform Molotov that generally speaking the arrangements follow the pattern of the Anglo-French drafts with certain modifications intended to clarify the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, as envisaged in the President's draft directive of March 15,⁵⁵ to take whatever action the Supreme Commander may consider necessary in order that military operations may be unimpeded. Subject to the military situation it is our objective to leave the administration of civil affairs to French authorities wherever possible. In a covering letter to General Koenig, General Eisenhower will make it clear that he is authorized to conclude these arrangements on the understanding that as soon as the military situation permits, it is the intention of the French authorities to afford the French people an opportunity to select a government of their own free choice.

STETTINIUS

851.01/8-1444 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, August 14, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 7:48 p. m.]

2667. Massigli sent for me this morning to say, because of the insistence of rumors reported by foreign correspondents, he wished to inform me and my Soviet colleague that his forthcoming visit to London was merely to sign the memoranda agreements on civil affairs and have a general discussion with Eden as regards world problems both during and after the war and that no other significance was to be attached thereto.

I jokingly mentioned that I had heard reports that he might go to London as representative of the Committee with rank of Ambassador. This he half-heartedly denied.

He said that upon his return to Algiers from London, which would be some time around the 24th, he would be very glad if we thought it useful to make a brief trip to Washington and to have a general discussion of Franco-American and world problems along the lines of the conversations which he was to have with Eden.

I should be grateful for any instructions in regard to the preceding paragraph that the Department may care to give me.

CHAPIN

⁵⁵ For text of draft, see telegram 836, April 8, to Moscow, p. 675.

851.01/8-1444 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1944—8 p. m.

2427. With reference to your conversation with Massigli reported in your 2667 August 14 following summary of conversation between Mr. Dunn and Mr. Alphand on August 13 is for your confidential information.

Alphand stated that upon his return to Washington from London where he is proceeding to be present at signing of Franco British civil affairs agreements, he expected to continue negotiations with this Government regarding mutual aid and lend-lease with continental France and to take up other considerations such as French participation in problems relating to Germany and occupation of that country as well as certain other unspecified questions affecting relationship between French authorities and this Government.

Dunn stated that at present we had no authorization to deal with French on questions other than those touched on in agreements just concluded. He added that questions relating to surrender and post surrender treatment of Germany were being dealt with in European Advisory Commission⁵⁶ which was empowered to make and was making arrangements to inform other interested United Nations in Europe of developments along that line, at the same time offering nations most directly concerned an opportunity to state their views on German problem and that of other enemy states in Europe. Dunn stated that French authorities would be included in these discussions and that as we saw it the French had every reason to believe that they would be included in at least informal discussions on matters concerning them. This Government could not however deal with the Committee as the Government of France. Finally Dunn said that French authorities appeared to be unduly apprehensive concerning policies and attitude of this Government with regard to position of France in future and that we were most anxious that France should take its proper place in future developments in Europe and the world.

With respect to your specific question it is suggested that you informally tell Massigli, or in his absence the official in charge of Foreign Affairs Commissariat, that in principle we would welcome a visit from him at any time that he felt free to make the journey. You should add however that before giving an unqualified affirmative to his present inquiry we think it would be desirable from the French as well as our own point of view that we be given a clearer indication

⁵⁶ For correspondence pertaining to these questions, see vol. I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission," part V.

of the specific points which Massigli desires to bring up in order that it can be determined whether a visit at this time would have a reasonable chance of accomplishing a useful purpose.

Repeated to London.

HULL

851.01/8-2544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 25, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

6898. For Dunn from Phillips. I have learned from General Holmes' ⁵⁷ office that General Koenig has signed the United States-French civil affairs memoranda and that General Holmes has taken them to advanced headquarters France for signature by General Eisenhower at 2:30 p. m. today.⁵⁸ The press release is to be issued at 5 p. m. London time. [Phillips.]

WINANT

851.01/8-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 26, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received August 27—9:06 p. m.]

6934. For Dunn from Phillips. At his request, I called on Massigli this morning accompanied by Reber.⁵⁹ After I had congratulated him upon the liberation of Paris,⁶⁰ he expressed his sincere appreciation of the way in which this Allied Command had permitted the French forces to take the lead in freeing Paris. He said this would have a profound effect upon the future relations particularly of France and the United States. He has asked me to express the French gratitude to General Eisenhower.

⁵⁷ Gen. Julius C. Holmes, member of General Eisenhower's Staff for European Theater.

⁵⁸ For text of agreement with respect to civil affairs administration in France, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2313, or 2 UST 1714. The agreement was effected by exchange of letters, with memoranda, dated August 25, 1944, between Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General of United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations, and Gen. Joseph P. Koenig, Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces of the Interior. The memoranda related to (1) administrative and jurisdictional questions, (2) issuance and use of currency in France, (3) property in Continental France, (4) publicity arrangements, and (5) distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in Continental France.

⁵⁹ Samuel Reber, Political Adviser to General Eisenhower.

⁶⁰ The Allied forces entered Paris on August 25, 1944.

He said that General de Gaulle now intends to bring the Committee to Paris as quickly as possible and thus to effect the necessary changes of "government". He hopes that they can arrive from Algiers by August 31 or September 1. Massigli himself expects to proceed to Paris probably August 29 or 30, depending upon results of his conversations here with members of the European Advisory Commission. In this connection he pointed out that it was the French desire to participate from now on in the discussions of great powers and added that this had been made clear ("possibly too clear") by General de Gaulle in his statement of last night. Massigli added that he would discuss this matter with Ambassador Winant.

Great satisfaction is felt by Massigli and others of the French Committee in that when the call to arms was given in Paris, all elements were united under the Resistance Council. The decision to call upon the people to rise was made at the end of last week. Massigli said that this may have been premature from a military point of view but it was occasioned by a move on the part of the Communists to assume complete control of the situation in Paris. They had even gone so far as to name their own Prefect of Police. Once the decision to take unified action had been made the Communists however cooperated fully with the Resistance Council and withdrew the appointment. De Gaulle has now appointed Luixet as Prefect of Police.

I have recently returned from a tour of Normandy during which I called upon Coulet the French Commissioner at Bayeux and M. Daure the Prefect at Caen. I was much impressed with the stature of both men and the effective way they were meeting their many problems. British and American civil affairs officers who were in constant contact with both officials seemed entirely satisfied that the affairs of the province and department were being administered as well as possible under the circumstances.

The devastation of towns and villages throughout Normandy largely by our own bombing is far more serious than I had imagined. [Phillips.]

WINANT

851.01/9-944: Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris ⁶¹ (*Chapin*) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 9, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received September 11—6:45 a. m.]

2. For Dunn from Reber. We called on Massigli this afternoon and found him anxious to establish a relationship on an intergovern-

⁶¹ The seat of the "Provisional Government of the French Republic" was officially transferred from Algiers to Paris, August 30, 1944.

mental basis as soon as possible rather than continue present military arrangements. He said French had been trying to find a formula in which the civil delegate would be subordinate to the Military Governor in the forward zone and would act as liaison between different military and Allied authorities. It was proposed that Coulet former Prefect of Normandy would act as civil delegate. At same time Coulet might be appointed delegate for the interior zone when such zones are established thus permitting continuity.

Massigli stated that reshuffling of Council of Ministers would soon be completed, that the Communists had accepted participation in portfolios offered them and that Jeanneney former President of the Senate would likewise become a Minister of State. He said this change in the administration was perhaps being given undue significance abroad. From such information as had reached him the importance of the Communist Party in France especially in Paris suburban and industrial districts had been overestimated even by the French Committee. The paramount point politically in Massigli's estimation was that de Gaulle had been accepted universally and enthusiastically by the French people as the French leader.

Massigli asked us point-blank whether there was any indication that United States of America might now be prepared to change its policy toward France and to recognize present administration. He said he hoped that this universal acceptance of de Gaulle would permit us to close a chapter which if kept open would arouse considerable anxiety and misgiving among the majority of the people who had been unaware of the uneven nature of France American relations during recent months.

He informed us that the Canadian representative⁶² and Madame Vanier had arrived in Paris yesterday and that Duff-Cooper and wife were due next Wednesday.⁶³ Without so stating it was clear to us that if the equivalent American representative should not be appointed in the immediate future the French authorities would draw the conclusion that the United States was not prepared to give the same support that Great Britain, Canada and others of the United Nations were extending. The French authorities expect the entire Diplomatic Corps formerly accredited to Algiers to arrive in Paris shortly.

In these circumstances we urge that if our Government is considering any appointment here announcement thereof be made without delay even though the new appointee might not be able to arrive in Paris for some weeks. [Reber.]

CHAPIN

⁶² Maj. Gen. George P. Vanier.

⁶³ September 12.

851.01/9-1544 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 15, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 16—7:05 p. m.]

16. The recent course of events in France notably the completion September 10th of the new Council of Ministers and the program set forth by de Gaulle in his speech of September 12th before Council of Resistance⁶⁴ poses question whether we should not give new consideration to extending recognition to Provisional Government.

A formal request of establishment of a zone of the interior including Paris and most of France exclusive of military areas will undoubtedly be pressed by French authorities (Major Desmond Morton of Churchill's staff told me yesterday he understood that such a request had already been formulated and while Minister of Interior Tixier yesterday in response to my direct question would not officially confirm this he let me understand some steps had been taken in this direction).

The new administration has given firm public promises of its intention to follow liberal and legal republican principles and has already implemented these declarations with such positive steps as rescinding of press agency monopoly decree, my 9, September 13, 5 p. m.⁶⁵ There is little doubt de Gaulle has been accepted universally in metropolitan France as French political leader. In fact there is no other person outstanding on political horizon although it is of course possible that as months pass some of the new men who have emerged from resistance movement may attain national eminence. All existing parties and sections of resistance including the Communists have signified willingness to cooperate in present "government" and to eschew petty party squabbles in order to speed reconstruction.

The present French administration gives proof of a sincere desire to maintain public order and to provide all the essential services of government. Its popular acceptance gives every indication of a potential ability to do so when afforded means and opportunity on establishment of the zone of the interior.

I have been impressed with tolerance and restraint so far displayed not only in political but in economic and social matters. This is also true as respects treatment of collaborationists.

French people form a proud nation and withholding of recognition from the administration they have accepted would be interpreted as a lack of confidence in their ability to form a free government and to participate in the war. Of equal importance would be feeling that they were put in a decidedly inferior position with regard to partici-

⁶⁴ For text, see London *Times*, September 13, 1944, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Not printed.

pation in postwar readjustment and regulations particularly as affects Germany despite all assurances which we may give to the contrary.

The mass of the people of metropolitan France deprived as they have been of news of outside world have little or no knowledge of the sometimes uneven course of Franco-American relations. It would be impossible to explain to the French the shades of meaning implied by the appointment of a "representative of USA to the French Committee of National Liberation" when that Committee has in eyes of all Frenchmen been completely absorbed in the "Provisional Government". We must bear in mind that the FCNL as distinct from de Gaulle or resistance movement had little political meaning to vast majority of people of France. Withholding of recognition would probably at an early date require endless explanations and would even then result in a good deal of misunderstanding. We might well find a revival of the subtle campaign of anti-Americanism which was current in North Africa and which has since been completely dissipated.

Continued withholding of recognition would be construed in some quarters as encouragement on our part of such unimportant irreconcilable factions including elements which have bordered on collaborationism and raise hope that door was still open for their activities.

Recognition would unquestionably strengthen standing of the Provisional Government with the populace and assist materially in its control over elements subversive of public order. It would thus facilitate the task of the Provisional Government in holding the solemnly pledged elections which will enable the French people to give free expression of their will an aim which I take to be one of the cardinal tenets of our French policy.

It is clear that there is some point when we shall have to extend recognition and it is suggested that no more appropriate moment could be chosen than the present when enthusiasm for USA is at the crest.

Months will elapse before the millions of deportees and prisoners can participate in free elections which de Gaulle has promised will be deferred until their return. During this period as far as can be foreseen little change in essential composition of the French administration is to be anticipated although of course some ministers will be discarded and others substituted in an effort to achieve a strong council.

Since it is a provisional government which is at issue our recognition would seem not to constitute any permanent commitment and any substantial form [*change?*] of that government would automatically rescind such recognition unless we specifically chose to continue it.

While recognition might take various forms I most respectfully suggest that the most appropriate one would be the immediate appointment of an Ambassador.

Before making the above recommendation to the Department it seemed desirable to ascertain the views of the Supreme Commander and to this end I communicated my opinion to Reber. I now have heard from him that a telegram somewhat along the same lines as my recommendations went forward from SHAEF on September 13th to the War and State Departments.⁶⁶

CHAPIN

851.01/9-1944

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1944.

Subject: Considerations With Respect to Possible Recognition by Principal Allied Governments of a Provisional Government of France.

In my opinion the time has come to give serious consideration to the question of announcing this Government's recognition of the *de facto* French authority as the Provisional Government of France. Of course, the word "provisional" would not be dropped until after general elections are held in France.

I believe that this step is not inconsistent with the policy which we have carefully followed, namely, to refrain from any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people freely to exercise their will in the choice of their leaders.

The following factors suggest the advisability of taking this step at this time.

(1) There is every indication that General de Gaulle has been accepted for the initial period as the national leader in liberated France. This is fully corroborated by reports from our military authorities, who have been in touch with the local population in many parts of France. It likewise does away with the possibility of this Government ever being charged with imposing General de Gaulle on the French people.

(2) There are increasing indications that the resistance groups and others in France have no intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de Gaulle. The base of the governing authority has already been broadened by the inclusion of numerous representatives of metropolitan resistance. General de Gaulle's desire to maintain the thread of legal continuity and to work with democratic elements is likewise shown by the appointment of M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

⁶⁶ SHAEF telegram not printed.

(3) The Political Advisor on General Eisenhower's staff (Reber) reports that the Committee, with possible occasional changes of individual Commissioners, should be able to maintain control in France until such time as elections can be held.

(4) It will probably be many months before elections can take place owing to the absence of over a million prisoners-of-war and deportees in Germany.

(5) Lack of recognition will make it more difficult for the Committee to maintain the internal stability necessary for the prosecution of the war and orderly rehabilitation of the country.

(6) Our present popularity in France is high. It will suffer if we delay recognition unduly. Many Frenchmen undoubtedly understand and sympathize with our refusal to recognize the Committee when it was established in Algiers, but they will not understand this refusal now that France is largely liberated.

(7) General Eisenhower's headquarters agree that there is no reason to delay a further degree of recognition from a military point of view.

(8) Recognition would greatly simplify the solution of a number of practical problems of an economic and financial nature.

(9) A number of Governments have already extended recognition to the Committee as the Provisional Government of France and there are indications that the British and Canadians may shortly take this action even if we do not. American prestige would suffer severely if we were to be the only major power withholding recognition.

If you agree to the desirability of taking this step, either of the following two possibilities would present a suitable occasion for the extension of recognition, after consultation and agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

(1) The passage of a vote of confidence in General de Gaulle, and the *de facto* French authority as presently constituted, by the Provisional Consultative Assembly, established in Paris and broadened to include at least fifty percent of resistance membership.

(2) The setting up, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, of zones of the interior, thereby emphasizing the change from a strictly military to a predominantly civilian administration.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.01/9-2144 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 21, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 23—6:47 p. m.]

52. I called this afternoon on Monsieur Raymond Brugère, newly appointed Secretary General of the Foreign Office. He received me most cordially and after stating he was a strong friend of USA, said he hoped I would pardon his frankness since he was accustomed to use the direct method. Brugère said he was completely baffled by our

policy towards France. That while he knew the American people, and here he referred to magnificent role played by our soldiers, were sincere friends of France, he could not help but feel that on the official diplomatic level, our policy was one injurious not only to France but in long run to our own interests. Our hesitancy in extending recognition to the Provisional Government and the indications that France was to be excluded from world councils was humiliating to France and to Frenchmen like himself who felt we were treating a great continental nation with less consideration than that accorded a small Central American Republic.

“While your Government states it has never had any admiration for the Pétain⁶⁷ Government, it is difficult for me who was imprisoned in Vichy when you had an Ambassador to that Government to find that you do not recognize a Government which has restored me to freedom and which is founded on liberty and accepted by all Frenchmen.”

This evening's press carries pointed appeals for the earliest recognition and contrast[s] treatment accorded France with that adopted toward Belgium, Holland, *et al.*

CHAPIN

851.01/9-1944

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1944.

Subject: Proposed Recognition of a Provisional Government of France.

With reference to your memorandum of September 19,⁶⁸ in which you stated that you and Mr. Churchill had discussed the question of recognition of a provisional government of France and had decided against this step for the time being, it occurs to me that you may not yet have had an opportunity to give thought to the considerations set forth in my memorandum to you of September 17, of which I enclose a copy.⁶⁹

Although Mr. Churchill may still be opposed to the extension of provisional recognition at this time, we understand that a strong message was sent to him from the Foreign Office recommending this step. What I fear is a repetition of our experience with the North African situation in which Mr. Churchill consistently supported our policy, while all other British Services, from the Foreign Office down, fought tooth and nail against it. In other words, I fully expect that in innumerable ways it will be represented to the French that the British

⁶⁷ Henri Philippe Pétain, Chief of State of France during the Vichy regime.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ *Ante*, p. 735.

Government is willing, and even eager, to extend recognition but that the United States remains adamant in its opposition.

Every indication that I have seen is that American prestige and popularity in France are today higher than any time in our history. Some of this is bound to wear off but I think that today we have a unique opportunity, fully consistent with our policy toward France as publicly proclaimed, to place our relations on a more normal and stable basis and to take a step which should make difficult, if not impossible, the undermining of our position in France.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.01/9-1544: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Caffery)*⁷⁰

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1944—7 p. m.

55. The question of this Government's relationship with the *de facto* French authority and, more particularly, the question of the recognition of that authority as the provisional government of France continues to receive the most careful study. In this connection full attention has been given to the considerations set forth in your 16, September 15.

One of the factors which we have always regarded as being of the highest importance is the broadening of the base on which the French governing authority rests in order to insure that that authority represents the will of the majority of the French people.

It is our understanding that among other things the French Committee's Ordinance of April 21 provided that the number of the Provisional Consultative Assembly would be doubled; that within a month of the installation of the Assembly in France each member should declare in what Department he would stand for election; and that through local elections in two-thirds of France, including Paris, the Provisional Consultative Assembly would be transformed into the Provisional Representative Assembly which would in turn elect the President of the Provisional Government.

It may be that certain unforeseen factors such as the present lack of communication facilities within France have made it difficult, if not impossible, to set in motion the procedure envisaged in the April 21 ordinance. It would be useful to know whether the plan is to be followed and, if not, what steps the *de facto* authorities now have in mind for giving expression to the public will during the transitional period before final and fully representative elections can lead to the establishment of a definitive government of France.

HULL

⁷⁰ Jefferson Caffery was appointed to this post September 21, 1944.

851.01/10-344

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1944.

Subject: Proposed Recognition of a Provisional Government of France

In my memorandum of September 21 on the above subject I expressed to you my fear that the British would make every effort to make it appear that they favor extending recognition to the French and that it is due to the unyielding attitude of the United States that this has not been done.

The obviously inspired article in today's *New York Times* by Raymond Daniell in London fully confirms the fears which I expressed. I am quoting below for your information the most striking parts of the article in the event that you have not seen it:

"This Government (British) is more eager than ever to see full recognition extended to Gen. Charles de Gaulle's regime as the Provisional Government of France in order that it may share in the discussions leading up to the final settlement with Germany and assumes its share of responsibility for enforcing it."

"This viewpoint, it may now be disclosed, was presented to President Roosevelt in Quebec⁷¹ with all the eloquence that Prime Minister Churchill could muster, reinforced, it may be taken for granted, by all Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's background of experience and knowledge of European diplomacy." . . .

"But Mr. Roosevelt remained unconvinced. Therefore, while Britain and the United States agreed to exchange ambassadors with the Italian Government, Washington and London will be represented in Paris by special representatives to the French Committee of National Liberation with the technical rank of Ambassadors." . . .

"Were it not for the necessity for avoiding any action that might offend the United States Government the British Government would lose no time in recognizing the French Government on its own, purely as a provisional government pending an election. It is hardly a secret that diplomats here have been searching their brains for a way out that would not be taken as an affront in Washington." . . .

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷²

LONDON, 14 October, 1944.

798. I have been reflecting about the question of recognition of the French Provisional Government. I think events have now moved to a point where we could take a decision on the matter consistently

⁷¹ Documentation on the Second Quebec Conference, September 11-16, 1944, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁷² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

with your own policy and my latest statement in the House of Commons.⁷⁴

In your telegram number 623⁷⁵ you said that you thought that we should wait until France was cleared of the enemy and you implied that in any case de Gaulle must first show himself ready to take over from Eisenhower full responsibility for the administration of part of France as an interior zone. I for my part took the line in Parliament that the reorganization of the Consultative Assembly on a more representative basis ought to precede recognition.

I understand that Eisenhower is anxious to comply with the request he has already had from the French to constitute a large part of France into an interior zone. Negotiations between Supreme Headquarters and the French are making good progress and it appears that we may expect about three-quarters of France to become an interior zone very shortly.

The enlargement of the Consultative Assembly is also making good progress. Duff Cooper reports that owing to very real difficulties of communications in France, French have found it impracticable to proceed with the original Algiers plan of getting members of an enlarged assembly confirmed in their mandates by elections in liberated departments. They propose instead to add selected delegates from the resistance movement and parliamentary groups[.] I understand it is hoped to settle matter shortly and publish a new decree defining attributions of the reformed assembly and giving it increased powers over the executive. It is thought that the enlarged assembly should be able to meet at the end of this month.

There is no doubt that the French have been cooperating with Supreme Headquarters and that their Provisional Government has the support of the majority of French people. I suggest therefore that we can now safely recognize General de Gaulle's administration as the Provisional Government of France.

One procedure might be to tell the French now that we will recognize as soon as the enlarged assembly has met and has given de Gaulle's administration a vote of confidence.

An alternative procedure would be to recognize as soon as the interior zone has been formally established. I am inclined to think that this alternative is preferable as it would connect recognition with what will be a mark of satisfactory cooperation between the French authorities and A.E.F. in the common cause against Germany.

Please tell me what you think. If you agree that we should settle the matter by one or other of the procedures suggested above, the Foreign Office and State Dept might at once compare their ideas upon

⁷⁴ For Prime Minister Churchill's statement to the House of Commons on September 28, 1944, see Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 403, cols. 493-496.

⁷⁵ Dated September 28, not printed.

the actual terms in which we should give recognition. It is important that we should take the same line although we need not necessarily adopt exactly the same wording. We should have of course also to inform the Soviet Government of what we intend.

Recognition would not of course commit us on the separate question of French membership of the European Advisory Commission or similar bodies.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁷⁶

[WASHINGTON,] 19 October, 1944—7:40 p. m.

631. Replying to your 798. I think until the French set up a real zone of interior that we should make no move towards recognizing them as a provisional government. The enlargement of the Consultative Assembly which has already been extended and made more representative is almost as important and I should be inclined to hang recognition on the effective completion of both these acts. I would not be satisfied with De Gaulle merely saying that he was going to do it.

I agree with you that there must be no implication, if and when we do recognize a provisional government, that this means a seat on the European Advisory Council, etc. These matters can be taken up later on their merits.

I am anxious to handle this matter, for the present, directly between you and me and would prefer, for the moment, that the *modus operandi* not become a matter of discussion between the State Department and your Foreign Office.

Let me know your views upon this message.

Harriman's messages indicate that you have had a good and useful conference⁷⁷ and I shall be anxiously waiting to get a final summation from you.

I do hope you are free of the temperature and really feeling all right again.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/10-1544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1944—11 p. m.

197. Reurtel 18.⁷⁸ The President has decided to recognize as the Provisional Government of the French Republic the *de facto* au-

⁷⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷⁷ For correspondence on the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow in October 1944, see vol. IV, index entry under Churchill, Winston S.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

thority established in Paris under the leadership of General de Gaulle, at the time of announcement by the French of the creation of a zone of the interior. Parallel action will be taken by the British Government.

We assume that Duff Cooper will receive immediate instructions and will inform Bidault.

Report as soon as possible as to the exact time of the contemplated public announcement by the French of the establishment of the zone of the interior.

HULL

851.01/10-2044 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, October 20, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received October 21—10:45 a. m.]

74. For the Secretary, Under Secretary, Dunn, and Matthews.⁷⁹ General Eisenhower told me this morning that in reply to question from the Joint Chiefs of Staff he will telegraph this morning recommending early recognition of the de Gaulle government.

He remarked that it is definitely in the interest of our military authorities to have a strong French Government in power. In his opinion if our early recognition is not forthcoming there will be increasing opportunity for the forces of disorder to take advantage of the existing situation to endeavor to break down governmental authority in France thus creating an intolerable behind-the-line situation for our troops at the front. It is obvious, he said, that we shall have to face a hard winter; we can do very little for French civilian requirements; we can allot for instance only one-third of the amount of coal for civilian purposes that the Germans were allotting; the essential demands of our force at the front will require in face of transportation-communication difficulties and especially the approach of winter with consequent difficulties for the use of the beachheads that practically every available ton of material go forward to our troops at the front leaving very little transportation indeed for civilian requirements; there is coal at the mines and plenty of food in some districts but practically no transportation to move them. It is obvious that a disaffected population in the rear of the lines might play havoc with our military operations. Even factories still operating in the Paris area will close down in about 3 weeks.

⁷⁹ H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs.

He said also that whatever may be said about de Gaulle (and there is plenty to say) there is no opposition leader in sight who would have the slightest chance of overthrowing him at this juncture. (Even the Communists are giving him at least lip service.) If he were overthrown now General Eisenhower thinks chaos would ensue.

In that connection his Chief of Staff General, General Bedell Smith, believes that the declaration in regard to the zone of the interior would be an opportune time to recognize. My telegram 73, October 20, noon.⁸⁰ In this connection you will recall also my telegram number 40, October 18, noon.⁸⁰

General Eisenhower also believes that if France falls into the orbit of any other country the other countries of Western Europe will do the same; in other words as goes France so goes Western Europe. He does not believe that it would be in our interest to have the continent of Europe dominated by any single power (obviously in no event will France be in a position to dominate) for then we would have a super-powerful Europe, a somewhat shaken British Empire and ourselves. In our case would we maintain the adequate military naval and air forces which that would imply?

CAFFERY

851.01/10-2044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1944—6 p. m.

2483. For the Chargé d'Affaires. Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin :⁸¹

"Personal and Top Secret. For Marshal Stalin from the President. We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic recognition of the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. The recent enlargement of the Consultative Assembly has made these authorities more representative of the French people. It is expected that in the very near future the French, with the agreement of General Eisenhower, will set up a real zone of the interior which will be under French administration and that when this is done it would be an appropriate time to recognize the French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. I am informing you in advance of our intentions in this regard in case you wish to take some similar action at the time the zone of the interior is set up under French administration."

HULL

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

851.01/10-2144 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Caffery) ⁸³

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1944—11 p. m.

The President had decided to recognize the Provisional Government simultaneously with the announcement by the French of the creation of the interior zone. In view of your 108, October 21, midnight,⁸⁴ reporting earlier announcement by French, date and hour for release are now set for 12 noon Monday, October 23. British Embassy here is being requested to inform London so that announcement of recognition may take place simultaneously in Washington and London.

STETTINIUS

851.01/10-2244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 22, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received October 22—10:15 a. m.]

9072. Foreign Office immediately told of contents of Department's circular October 21, 11 p. m. Embassy now informed by Foreign Office that it will synchronize the timing of its announcement of recognition with Washington, that is the release will be 5 p. m. London time tomorrow.

Foreign Office said that the British are endeavoring to get the Soviet Government to take similar action at same time.

The Foreign Office having been informed that Caffery told the French on Friday evening⁸⁵ that the United States Government intended to recognize the French Provisional Government when the interior zone was declared, Duff-Cooper is being instructed to inform the French this afternoon in strict confidence that the French Provisional Government will be recognized by the British Government tomorrow. The British are also trying to get Bogomolov⁸⁶ to take similar action regarding Soviet recognition.

WINANT

⁸³ Repeated to Rio de Janeiro and Ottawa; repeated to Moscow with following additional paragraph: "Please bring foregoing immediately to attention of Molotov in connection with President's message to Stalin cabled yesterday" (see *supra*); and repeated to London with the following additional paragraph: "Please inform Foreign Office immediately."

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ October 20.

⁸⁶ Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, representative of Soviet Government in France.

851.01/10-2244 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, October 22, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received October 22—1:26 p. m.]

118. For Secretary, Under Secretary, Dunn and Matthews. My 109, October 22, noon.⁸⁷

1. The following is the draft of the note I propose to deliver to Bidault at 5 o'clock tomorrow afternoon Paris time :

2. I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the President has heard with gratification of the agreement reached between the Supreme Allied Commander and the French authorities for the transfer to French administration of full responsibility for the government of the larger part of France, including Paris, as envisaged in memorandum No. 1 of the agreement of August 25 last.⁸⁸

3. My Government is happy to take advantage of this occasion to extend recognition to the French administration as Provisional Government of France. As an immediate step towards placing the relationship between the United States and France on a more regular footing my Government desires to accredit its representatives in Paris as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Provisional Government of France and would be glad to know whether Mr. Jefferson Caffery is acceptable to the Provisional Government in that capacity.

4. I take the occasion to assure Your Excellency of my sentiments of most distinguished consideration and esteem.

CAFFERY

851.01/10-2244 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1944—9 p. m.

8790. The following is secret for information of Foreign Office and is to be held confidential until released here.⁸⁹ Reurtel 9075, October 22, 8 p. m.,⁹⁰ text of Department's proposed press release (arrange paragraphs in numerical sequence⁹¹) to be issued in Washington at time of recognition reads as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States has today recognized the French *de facto* authority established in Paris under the leadership of General de Gaulle as the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Mr. Jefferson Caffery, Representative of the United States at Paris, will assume the duties of Ambassador to France.

2. This action on the part of the United States Government is in harmony with its policy toward France as publicly enunciated from time to time by the President and the Secretary of State.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

⁸⁸ See footnote 58, p. 730.

⁸⁹ Released to the press October 23.

⁹⁰ Telegram not printed.

⁹¹ Paragraphs sent out of order are here rearranged in numerical sequence.

3. As the Secretary of State in his speech of April 9, 1944,⁹² stated, it was always the thought of the President and himself that Frenchmen themselves should undertake the civil administration of their country and that this Government would look to the organization then known as the French Committee of National Liberation to exercise leadership in the establishment of law and order. In accordance with this policy, agreements were entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the *de facto* French authority, headed by General de Gaulle, covering the administration of civil affairs in France and other related subjects.

4. In accordance with the procedure envisaged in the civil affairs agreement, an 'Interior Zone' has been established to include a large part of France, including Paris. The agreement provides that in the Interior Zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefor, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities.

5. Today the vast majority of Frenchmen are free. They have had opportunity during recent weeks to demonstrate their desire to have the duties and obligations of government assumed by the administration which is now functioning in Paris and which has been reconstituted and strengthened by the inclusion of leaders of the valiant forces of resistance within France.

6. The intention of the French authorities to seek an expression of the people's will at the earliest possible date, following the repatriation of French prisoners of war and deportees in Germany, has been made known on different occasions. Pending the expression of the will of the French people through the action of their duly elected representatives, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, in its efforts to prosecute the war until final victory and to lay the foundations for the rehabilitation of France, can count on the continued, full, and friendly cooperation of the Government of the United States."

STETTINIUS

851.01/10-2244: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 22, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received October 22—6:20 p. m.]

9076. ReEmbs 9075, October 22, 8 p. m.⁹³ Text of British note reads as follows:⁹⁴

"The Supreme Allied Commander has reached agreement with the competent French authorities regarding the transfer of the larger part of France, including Paris, from a forward to interior zone as defined in memorandum No. 1 of the Civil Affairs Agreement of August 25 last. This means that the conduct of the administration of the area of France in question and the responsibility therefor is now a matter

⁹² For text of speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

⁹³ Not printed.

⁹⁴ British note to the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

for the Central French authority, which thus effectively exercises the powers of Government in that area.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have decided that this circumstance makes it appropriate that they should recognize the present French administration as the Provisional Government of France and henceforth treat with it on that basis. In consequence, His Majesty's Government consider it desirable that their representation on Paris should be placed on a more regular footing and that their representative should be accredited to the Provisional Government by His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. They will be glad to learn whether the Provisional Government are willing to accept Duff Cooper in that capacity."

Text of statement for release to the press at 5 p. m. tomorrow reads:
[Here follows all of the note quoted above except the last two sentences.]

WINANT

851.01/10-2344: Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, October 23, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received October 23—9:50 a. m.]

124. For the Secretary, Under Secretary, Dunn, and Matthews: Duff Cooper went to see Bidault this morning and told him informally (as I had done) that recognition was in the offing.

The Russian representative received word this morning that he is to take action similar to ourselves and the British.

Duff Cooper sent me word through his counselor this morning that he had arranged for the Russian and Canadian to go at the same time as he did, at 4:30, to present a "united front". He wanted to know if I was in agreement and I said I was not; that is one thing for him and the Canadian to go a little before the hour set but it was quite another thing for the Russian to go with them to present "a united front". I suggested that if that was what he had in mind they all go at the same time as I do. He has agreed.

CAFFERY

851.01/10-2344: Telegram

*The American Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Paris (Caffery)*⁹⁵ *to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 23, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received October 23—2:29 p. m.]

132. For the Secretary, Under Secretary, Dunn, and Matthews. At 5 p. m. local time (noon Washington) I and my British, Russian

⁹⁵ Jefferson Caffery was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to France, November 25, 1944.

and Canadian colleagues called on Bidault and handed him our letters extending recognition to the French administration as Provisional Government France (we all made a few appropriate remarks. Bidault who was much moved replied in a dignified manner stressing the importance of getting on with the war and emphasizing the hope that France would increase her part therein). He added that the French Government recognized my colleagues and myself in our ambassadorial capacity; no further agreement was necessary he added.

CAFFERY

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE REGARDING A GENERAL LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT TO COVER ALL FRENCH TERRITORIES

851.24/370

Memorandum by Mr. Jean Monnet of the French Supply Council at Washington to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1944.

I.—The *modus vivendi* on Reciprocal Aid in French North and West Africa signed at Algiers on September 25, 1943,⁹⁶ provides that military supplies delivered to the French Committee will come under Lend Lease, whereas civilian supplies will be paid for in dollars by the French Committee of National Liberation. Article V expressly stipulates that “provisions which call for payments in dollars have been decided upon in view of the special situation arising from accumulated dollar balances and availabilities of dollar funds due to the presence of United States troops in French North and West Africa. Revision of the payment provisions of this *modus vivendi* will be made should the situation require.”

When the *modus vivendi* was signed, the United States and French authorities agreed that discussions should be held in the near future on the possibilities of concluding a general agreement on reciprocal aid which would apply to all French territories.

II.—During the discussions previous to the signing of the *modus vivendi*, the French Delegates expressed doubts as to the possibility for the French Committee to continue in the future to pay for civilian supplies. They pointed out that due to the decrease in the number of United States troops in North Africa, and to the functioning of reciprocal aid, the returns in dollars from the purchases of francs by the United States Army would be reduced whereas the total of imports would tend to increase.

On November 30, 1943 the dollar balances of the Treasury in Algiers amounted to twenty five million dollars whereas the total due for

⁹⁶ For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 483, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1666.

civilian goods, which had yet to be paid for, amounts to fifty million dollars. Even if the holdings from the "Caisse centrale" in London and from the various colonial foreign exchange offices of the former "Free French" territories are added to the resources of the Treasury, the total of the resources available to the Committee is not in excess of fifty million dollars. (A detailed statement of all dollar balances is attached.)⁹⁷

III.—Therefore the dollar balances of the French Committee are hardly sufficient to settle the total of the outstanding payments due for the civilian goods which have been imported in North Africa up to the present time. Moreover the imports of civilian goods are only a fraction of the Committee's dollar expenditures. In addition, its various Missions in the United States and in the Western hemisphere have to be paid in dollars. The Committee must also provide in dollars for the expenses incurred in the distribution of prisoner of war packages, and must also buy with dollars the pesetas needed for the upkeep and care of French refugees in Spain. A detailed statement of the amounts needed for this is also attached.⁹⁸

IV.—Under these conditions, the French Committee is led to request application of Article V of the *modus vivendi*, which contains provisions for the revision of conditions of payment. It is not their object to make any profit out of the presence of American Troops in French North Africa. They are willing to keep only a minimum reserve for the special expenses referred to under paragraph III above, and ask that the portion of civilian supplies which they can no longer pay owing to their lack of dollar exchange should come under lend lease.

V.—The present situation illustrates the need for a general lend lease agreement which would cover all French territories on a uniform basis. The dollar balances of the French Committee should be pooled and checked against the dollar requirements of all the territories under the jurisdiction of the Committee and the financial provisions of the new agreement should be drafted with due consideration to this problem.

851.24/370

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to Mr. Jean Monnet of the French Supply Council at Washington

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MONNET: The interested agencies and departments of this Government have considered the problems explained in your Memorandum of January 7, 1944, concerning financial difficulties arising under the Lend-Lease *Modus Vivendi* Agreement of September 25, 1943, on reciprocal aid in North Africa, and concerning the

⁹⁷ Statement not printed.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

proposal to enter into a general Lend-Lease Agreement which would cover on a uniform basis all French territories under authority of the French Committee of National Liberation.

All of the interested agencies and departments of this Government will, of course, view the financial problems of the French Committee of National Liberation with the utmost sympathy and consideration.

With reference to the problem of payment for civilian supplies under the Agreement, which has now arisen, we accede to the suggestion of Article IV of your Memorandum, that the Committee retain a minimum reserve in dollars, and make available in payment for civilian supplies such other dollars as it may presently hold or as may subsequently accrue to it. An approximate level of such a minimum working reserve in dollars can, I am certain, be readily agreed upon between us.

At the same time, I propose that the technical staff of your Mission work with officers of this Department, the Treasury Department and the Foreign Economic Administration, as in each case may be appropriate, to explore certain specific courses of action through which the expected French dollar deficit for 1944 can be offset, as follows:

(a) The possible increase in Foreign Economic Administration purchases of certain agricultural surpluses in North Africa and the Colonies, and of certain non-strategic commodities for which shipping is available;

(b) The renewed payment of expenses for French prisoners of war through access to funds of the Metropole;

(c) The possible transfer to the Committee of certain dollar balances attributable to private persons or firms resident in territories under the authority of the Committee;

(d) Any other methods or ways reasonably adapted to increasing the dollar assets available to the Committee.

Pending preparation of further detailed information as to the potentialities of these methods for meeting the expected deficit, and a clarification of the situation through the progress of events, payments in dollars on the part of the Committee for delivery of civilian supplies already shipped or to be shipped under the Agreement will be made only to the extent that funds are available with provision made for the agreed minimum reserve, it being clearly understood that no change in the obligations of both parties under the *Modus Vivendi* is intended at the present time.

As to the second point in your Memorandum, I am glad to confirm our agreement to the proposal that a general Lend-Lease agreement be entered into covering on a uniform basis all territories under the authority of the French Committee of National Liberation; and I invite an early consultation on the points of detail which may require clarification before this step is taken.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

851.24/2-2144

Mr. Jean Monnet of the French Supply Council at Washington to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. ACHESON : During the conversations which have taken place pursuant to your letter of January 27th, between the Officers of your Department, the Treasury, the Foreign Administration and the Technical staff of our Mission, the question of payment of expenses for French prisoners of war was discussed. It was agreed that I would submit to you in writing the views of the French Committee of National Liberation on the subject.

It is the feeling of the French Committee that in approaching this problem due consideration should be given to the very special nature of these expenses. Supplies of food and clothing to prisoners of war cannot be identified with civilian supplies and should not be treated as such.

The Government of the United States is aware of the importance given by the French people to all questions concerning prisoners of war. The French people know and deeply appreciate that all supplies from the United States to the French armed forces are furnished on a straight lend-lease basis. They might fail to understand the reasons why supplies of food and clothing to war prisoners should not be dealt with in the same way.

We suggest that supplies from the United States to all French soldiers whether prisoners or not should be treated alike. We believe that a great psychological effect would be derived from the fact that the United States would supply arms and equipment to the soldiers who fight and food and clothing to those who are prisoners on the same basis of straight lend-lease.

No special document would be necessary to enforce the procedure outlined above as it is in full concurrence with the *Modus Vivendi* of September 25th, 1943, which provides that military aid will be furnished under lend-lease and that the distinction between military and civilian supplies will be made by agreement.

Yours sincerely,

JEAN MONNET

851.24/413½

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Paul J. Sturm of the Supply and Resources Division

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1944.

Participants: Mr. Monnet, Mr. Valensi and Mr. Leroy-Beaulieu of the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation;

Mr. Acheson, Mr. Culbertson, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Merchant and Mr. Sturm of the State Department; Mr. Ferguson of the Foreign Economic Administration.

The French representatives called at Mr. Acheson's request to receive and discuss a proposed Mutual Aid Agreement governing lend-lease relations between the United States and all territories under the authority of the French Committee of National Liberation.

The *aide-mémoire*⁹⁹ accompanying the proposed agreement was read and discussed. Mr. Monnet pointed out that certain of the proposals made in the *aide-mémoire* and agreement raised difficult issues for the Committee, as to which he had grave doubts:

1. The *aide-mémoire* rejected the French request that supplies for French prisoners of war be made available on lend-lease terms, on the ground that such a procedure would be contrary to established lend-lease policy, and not within any of the existing exceptions to it. By utilizing certain resources available to the Committee, as outlined, the French would be able to pay for such supplies.

Mr. Monnet reiterated his previous contention that for political and psychological reasons it was most important for the Committee to be able to announce to the prisoners that they had been supplied on lend-lease terms. He added, moreover, that the French were unable to distinguish between supplies made available to soldiers while they were still fighting and after they had been captured. Mr. Monnet said also that while the yearly expenditures involved, estimated at approximately thirty million dollars, were considerable in view of the small dollar resources the Committee felt were at its disposal, the principle was of even greater concern. He ended by asking that the United States Government reconsider its position. Mr. Acheson replied that while we could and would review the matter, he could not be optimistic as to the result. Meanwhile, measures could be taken to facilitate the purchase of supplies for prisoners of war at the same time procedures were devised for meeting the cost of civilian supplies.

2. The size of the expected French dollar deficit, and of possible measures to reduce it, was then discussed.

(a) Mr. Monnet pointed out that some of the difficulty stemmed from a failure on the part of lend-lease officials to enforce Articles I(a) and (c) of the *Modus Vivendi* of September 25, 1943, in that too little attention had been given to the distinction between military aid, which is available on lend-lease terms, and civilian supplies, for which Article I(b) provides that payment shall be made in dollars. Mr. Acheson agreed that steps must be taken to rectify the past failure and insure against its repetition.

⁹⁹ *Infra*.

(b) Mr. Monnet went on to say that further difficulties lay in the way of the Committee's paying dollars in that most of the exports from North and West Africa were sold to the British for sterling. Under the arrangements with the British, the French Committee cannot dispose of its sterling without the consent of the British Government. Mr. Acheson agreed that the United States Government should explore the possibility of taking over British contracts, or of utilizing the current sterling balance, estimated at a minimum of fifteen million pounds, to pay for American civilian supplies.

(c) As to United States purchases of French supplies, other than those reserved for stockpiles, we had indicated our willingness to purchase needed materials and commodities, but were awaiting a report from the French experts as to what was available. Mr. Monnet replied that such a list had not yet been provided from Algiers, although he had urgently requested it.

(d) Concerning the proposal made in the *aide-mémoire* that the French Committee use the gold assets of the Bank of France within North and West Africa, Mr. Monnet stated that he felt sure the Committee would be most reluctant to take such a step. Its conception of its status, worked out in large part with this Government, would make the use of such assets extremely difficult for it.

FW 851.24/3-1544

*The Department of State to the French Supply Council at Washington*¹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

With reference to the Memorandum presented by Mr. Monnet to the Department of State on January 7, 1944, and to Mr. Acheson's letter of January 27, 1944, in reply, the following additional points are proposed for discussion.

1. There is attached for the consideration of the French authorities the draft of a Mutual Aid Agreement² defining the lend-lease relations between the Government of the United States and the French Committee of National Liberation on a uniform basis for all French territory under the authority of the Committee. This proposed agreement will replace the Lend-Lease *Modus Vivendi* Agreement of September 25, 1943, and the previous Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement with the French National Committee, dated September 3, 1942.³ The question of entering into a Master Lend-Lease Agreement with the French Committee of National Liberation of the type presented by the Preliminary Agreement with Great Britain, dated February 22 [23], 1942,⁴ and of certain other types of

¹ Handed to Mr. Monnet by Mr. Acheson on March 15.

² Not printed.

³ For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 273, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1614.

⁴ For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

lend-lease agreements, is under study, and will be further discussed at a later date. It is, however, the intent and desire of the United States Government to assure the French Committee of National Liberation that final lend-lease settlement for the aid rendered to the French National Committee, to the Haut Commandement en Chef Civil et Militaire, to the French Committee of National Liberation, and to other French forces by the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941,⁵ as amended, will be governed, so far as the United States is concerned, by the principles expressed in Article VII of the Preliminary Agreement with Great Britain, referred to above, and of like agreements with other allied governments. To this end, we suggest that Article VI of the attached draft, or a similar article, be incorporated into our new Mutual Aid Agreement.

2. In the proposed draft, the principle is maintained that civilian supplies furnished by the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941, be paid for in dollars, subject to Article V. Though the United States Government has noted with sympathy the immediate and temporary financial difficulties described in Mr. Monnet's memorandum of January 7, 1944, and will be pleased to render whatever aid it can to help resolve them, the maintenance of this principle is regarded by the United States as apt and appropriate. In this connection, the following observations appear to be in order:

(a) It has been, and is, the policy of the United States Government to provide civilian supplies on a Lend-Lease basis only to theatres of active military operations, when financial factors are such as to justify this procedure.

(b) Discussions are now proceeding between appropriate French and American officials with reference to the United States' purchase of certain commodities available in the French Empire. It is hoped that such purchases may reach the figure of \$60,000,000 during 1944. The proceeds of these sales by the French Empire to the United States will be available for French civilian purchases in the United States.

(c) Though American military expenditures in French territories are at present considerably less than during the first period after the landing in north Africa, it is anticipated that they will continue at a substantial volume.

(d) Mr. Monnet's letter of March 2, 1944,⁶ replying to one suggestion made by Mr. Acheson in his letter of January 27, 1944, reports that a census of all dollar balances attributable to private persons or firms resident in territories under the authority of the Committee, has been taken. This policy should result in a substantial mobilization of funds.

(e) If the expected deficit estimated in the French Memorandum of January 7, as subsequently revised, is not averted by the above, or similar, measures, the United States Government suggests that any deficit still remaining be met by proceeds of the sale of newly-mined gold, and by the gold and dollar assets of the French Treasury now

⁵ 55 Stat. 31.

⁶ Not printed.

within French African territories under the jurisdiction of the French Committee of National Liberation.

(f) It should be noted, in conclusion, that considerations leading the United States Government to propose that the French Committee continue to pay dollars for civilian supplies, as set forth above, are of a purely financial order.

3. The United States Government notes with sympathetic understanding the desire of the French Committee to provide French prisoners of war with necessary food and clothing. Mr. Monnet's letter of February 21, 1944, to Mr. Acheson on this subject, however, indicates a misunderstanding of United States policy in this matter. Such supplies have been made available on a lend-lease basis only in the most unusual circumstances and the expenditures of Lend-Lease funds for this purpose have been small. Some supplies have been provided in this manner for Yugoslav prisoners of war, who are considered stateless by the German Government, and in a few exceptional cases for Polish prisoners of war as well. None of the other allied nations has been granted Lend-Lease aid for this purpose. In view of the strictness with which the United States Government has adhered to this policy, it is felt that an exception should not be made in the case of French prisoners of war, for whom supplies can be purchased in line with the statements of paragraph two above. However, the United States Government assures the French Committee of its firm support in obtaining such clearance with supply authorities as may be necessary to put purchase programs for French prisoners of war promptly into effect.

851.01/5-144

Mr. Jean Monnet of the French Supply Council at Washington to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1944.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

With reference to the *Aide-Mémoire* presented by Mr. Acheson on March 15, 1944, and to the attached draft of the Mutual Aid Agreement defining the lend-lease relations between the Government of the United States and the French Committee of National Liberation on a uniform basis for all French territories under the authority of the Committee, I wish, on behalf of the French Committee of National Liberation, to make the following comments:

1. As regards the draft of the Mutual Aid Agreement attached to the *Aide-Mémoire*, the French Committee agree with the views expressed by the United States Government that it will replace the Lend-Lease *Modus Vivendi* Agreement of September 25, 1943, and the previous Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement with the French

National Committee dated September 3, 1942. They take due note that it is the intention of the Government of the United States to discuss with them at a later date the question of entering into a master agreement of the type of the Master Agreement with Great Britain dated February 22 [23], 1942, and of certain other types of Lend-Lease agreements.

2. The French Committee agree to the proposed text of Article VI of the draft of the Mutual Aid Agreement, which is identical with the first paragraph of Article VII of the preliminary agreement with Great Britain referred to above. They also agree to the remainder of the draft subject to the following two changes:

A. Suppression of Paragraph II(a)4, which provides that the French Committee will make available to the armed forces and to the governmental agencies of the United States "such other supplies, material, services or facilities as may be agreed upon as necessary in the prosecution of the war, but not including exports of civilian supplies to the United States from any such territories".

This provision does not exist in the Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement with the French National Committee dated September 3, 1942, nor in any other reciprocal aid agreement entered into by the United States Government. It was introduced in the *Modus Vivendi* of September 25, 1943, only in view of the dollar resources accruing to the French Committee at that date. The situation is now completely altered and, therefore, this exceptional provision should not, in the opinion of the French Committee, be maintained.

B. A new article, similar to Article VI of the Preliminary Agreement with Great Britain referred to above and other reciprocal aid agreements, should be added to the draft, reading as follows:

"In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States by the French National Committee, the Haut Commandement en Chef Civil et Militaire, and the French Committee of National Liberation, full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities or other benefits or consideration provided by the authorities referred to above subsequent to March 11, 1941 and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States".

3. The French Committee agree to the remainder of the draft of the Mutual Aid Agreement, which maintains the principle that civilian supplies furnished by the Government of the United States under the Act of March 11 shall be paid for in dollars subject to Article V. They also agree to the suggestion made in Paragraph II(e) of Mr. Acheson's memorandum that they should use, to meet their deficit, the proceeds of the sale of the newly-mined gold in the territories under the jurisdiction of the Committee. They do not think it possible, however, at this time to use the gold and dollar assets of the French Treasury, as suggested by Mr. Acheson. The gold,

although it is within African territories, belongs to the Bank of France, and the French Committee cannot use either this gold or the French Treasury's holdings before the Committee is established in France.

4. The French Committee suggest that the following measures be taken to overcome their present financial difficulties:

(a) The French Committee should keep a minimum reserve of twenty million dollars and make available for the payment of their administrative expenses in dollars and civilian supplies such other dollar funds as they may at present own or as may subsequently accrue to them;

(b) The dollars referred to above would include all dollars accruing from the sale to the United States of the newly-mined gold in the French territories under the jurisdiction of the Committee, as well as from the mobilization of dollar balances and securities attributable to private persons or firms resident in territories under the authority of the Committee. A census has been taken of these holdings and mobilization is now proceeding;

(c) All efforts will be made to increase exports to the United States. The measures contemplated would permit a substantial increase;

(d) The French Committee have approached the British Government to explore the possibilities of transferring to the United States Government part of their sterling balances;

(e) The French Committee maintain their request that supplies of food and clothing for prisoners of war should come under straight lend-lease;

(f) The dollar funds accruing to the French Committee, with Provision made for the agreed minimum reserve, would be made available by priority for the payment of the administrative expenses and of that part of the civilian supplies which have to be paid cash on the market, the balance being used to reimburse the Lend-Lease Administration for delivery of civilian supplies already shipped or to be shipped. Payment of a remaining deficit would be postponed until the Committee is established in France.

851.24/7-2044

*The Department of State to the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation*¹

MEMORANDUM

I. The United States Government proposes that aid be made available for Continental France on the following basis:

1. The United States Government will make current payment in dollars to the French authorities for the net amount of French franc

¹ Marginal notations state that the memorandum in this form was approved at a meeting in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, McCloy, attended, in addition to Mr. McCloy, by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Taft of the State Department, Mr. Bell of the Treasury Department, and Mr. Emerson of the Foreign Economic Administration, among others, and that the original was handed to Mr. Hervé Alphand by Mr. McCloy at the Pentagon on July 20, 1944. Mr. Alphand came to Washington in July with General de Gaulle to discuss relations between France and the United States.

currency used for the payment of the United States troops in France. In view of the provisional character of the present United States dollar-French franc rate of exchange, any such payment by the United States Government shall be equitably adjusted in the event of any change in this rate of exchange.

2. Equipment and supplies for the French armed forces and short-life industrial maintenance articles and materials for employment in French war production or communications, to the extent approved as necessary military aid, would be furnished under straight lend-lease until such time after the end of hostilities in Europe as the President may determine to be necessary in the war effort. Thereafter, such equipment, supplies, articles, and materials, to the extent that the United States Government had agreed to make them available and had them either in inventory or under contract, would be delivered and paid for on credit arrangements under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act.

3. Long-life industrial articles and materials for French production essential to the prosecution of the war in Europe or to the support, supply, and protection of Allied armed forces until such period after the end of hostilities in Europe as the President may determine to be necessary in the war effort, would be furnished on credit arrangements under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act.

4. All other supplies furnished by the United States Government would be paid for currently in dollars. These would include supplies furnished under Plan "A". If the amount of dollars acquired by the French authorities on account of troop pay, or from other sources, is inadequate to pay for such supplies, the French authorities will use for this purpose the gold now held in the territories under the control of the French authorities and such other gold and dollar assets as may be or may become available to the French authorities.

II. It is proposed that the following types of assistance would be made available as reciprocal lend-lease aid from France, and all territory under the control of the Committee, to the extent that they can be most effectively procured therein :

1. Military equipment, munitions, supplies, materials, services, projects, and facilities for the United States armed forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces;

2. Such materials required for use in war industries of the United States, as the Committee may be in a position to supply.

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1944.

851.24/8-2544

*The Department of State to the Delegation of the French Committee
of National Liberation*

MEMORANDUM

This will evidence the formal acceptance of the Memorandum concerning lend-lease and reciprocal aid informally agreed upon by the United States and French Delegations during the negotiations re-

cently carried on in Washington. Copies of the Memorandum are attached.

The acceptance of the Memorandum is based upon the support which the French Committee of National Liberation continues to receive from the majority of the French who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France. In evidencing such acceptance, the Department of State understands that it is the intention of the Committee that the French people will be given an opportunity to select a government of their own free choice as soon as the military situation permits. The Department also understands that when the authority now exercised by the Committee is transferred to such a government, the undertakings accepted by the French authorities in the attached memorandum, to the extent not at that time already performed, will be assumed by such a government.

It is suggested that the French Delegation signify its acceptance of the attached Memorandum by initialling.⁸

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1944.

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM RELATING TO LEND-LEASE AND RECIPROCAL AID

1. The appropriate United States and French authorities will continue negotiations immediately on the basis of this memorandum with a view to concluding as soon as possible, in accordance with the general principles governing lend-lease aid, a lend-lease and reciprocal aid agreement applicable to continental France, which, when and as concluded, shall be deemed to have been in effect on and after June 6, 1944.

2.(a) The agreement contemplated in Article 1 above will determine the aid which the United States will furnish to France and, in particular, to the French armed forces (including the French forces of the interior) under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, including credit arrangements under Section 3 (c) of that Act.

(b) The contemplated agreement will also determine the aid which the French authorities will furnish to the United States and, in particular, to the United States forces in continental France in the way of supplies, materials, facilities, and services.

(c) The contemplated agreement will provide that while each party retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, as far as possible, be made in common, in pursuance of the common plan for winning the war.

⁸ On the same day the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation expressed in writing to the Department its acceptance also of the memorandum.

3. The contemplated agreement will also be based on the following principles:

(a) The United States will make current payments in dollars to the French authorities for the equivalent of the amount of French francs used for the expenditures of the United States forces in continental France for purposes other than those treated as reciprocal aid under 2(b) above; in particular, for the net pay, allowances and other emoluments of the United States troops in continental France and for the cost of any articles requisitioned which are not supplied under 2(b) above.

(b) The French authorities will make current payments in dollars for civilian supplies furnished to continental France by the United States other than those furnished under the Lend-Lease Act pursuant to 2(a) above, and will use for this purpose French public dollar and gold assets including the holdings of the Bank of France.

4. Pending the conclusion of and without prejudice to the contemplated agreement:

(a) The United States will make current payments in dollars to the French authorities for the net amount of French franc currency used for the pay, allowances, or other emoluments of the United States troops in France, on or since June 6, 1944. Whenever it is mutually ascertained that supplies purchased with francs or requisitioned shall not be supplied under 2(b) above and will not be repaid in kind, payment in dollars will be made.

(b) The French authorities will make current payments in dollars to the United States for supplies furnished to continental France on or since June 6, 1944, by the United States under the agreed procedure under Plan A and Plan B. If the amount of dollars acquired by the French authorities on account of troop pay or from other sources is inadequate to make current payment for such supplies, the French authorities will use for this purpose other French public dollar and gold assets including the holdings of the Bank of France.

851.24/9-1144

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1944.

We need instruction from you on one important phase of this proposed agreement; i.e., how to deal with Monnet's request, which I understand he mentioned to you, for industrial items to get French production going again for the maintenance of the civil population.

We have been working under the memorandum of July 15, 1944,⁹ which you approved. This provides that

(a) The French get under straight lend lease what you approve as *necessary military aid* for their forces and for short-life supplies for war production. When you determine the aid to be no longer neces-

⁹ Not printed, but see memorandum dated July 20, p. 757, which is the form in which the memorandum was finally presented to the French on July 20, 1944.

sary, they will accept and pay for on credit terms the undelivered, non-munitions items you have authorized.

(b) They pay currently in cash for food, clothing, and other items consumed by the civil population.

(c) [Here is the trouble.]¹⁰ Long-life industrial articles and other industrial articles would be furnished to them on credit only if necessary to the prosecution of the war in Europe or to the maintenance of Allied forces in the period immediately following an armistice in Europe.

Viewed as of the present date and position of the war, the memorandum of July 15th means, in effect, a rejection of Monnet's program and would require the French to pay cash currently for all items not required as necessary military aid. I do not think you intended, nor would I recommend, so flat a position. On the other hand, you would not wish to approve at this stage the French program, amounting as it does to something over a billion dollars of industrial items to be paid for on credit terms. I do not think that there is any formula which describes what you may wish to approve and what you may not wish to approve. What seems to me necessary is to leave in your hands complete discretion to do what you may think necessary from time to time in the light of French behavior.

Therefore, I recommend that you authorize us to provide that such long-life articles and such other articles as may be included from time to time in a list to be attached to the agreement, and which are contracted for or purchased before you determine that aid under the Act is no longer necessary for the prosecution of the war, we shall deliver (subject to your right of cancellation in the national interest) and the French shall accept and pay for on credit terms. I recommend also that you instruct the Foreign Economic Administration to submit to you proposed French programs under this provision before they are included in this list. Such a disposition of the matter will give authority to go ahead, with flexible control in your hands to do as much or as little as you determine to be desirable at any time.

The Foreign Economic Administration agrees with this proposal.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.24/10-344

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1944.

I attach a copy of the memorandum which I sent on September 11¹¹ and which was given to you at Quebec by Mr. Hopkins.¹² This memo-

¹⁰ Brackets appear in the original.

¹¹ *Supra*.

¹² Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, was not at the Quebec Conference, but he sent the memorandum from Washington to President Roosevelt at Quebec.

randum suggested a basis for a Lend-Lease agreement with France differing somewhat from that set forth in my memorandum of July 15, 1944, which you approved on July 18. I also attach a copy of this memorandum.¹³

I understand that you requested Mr. Morgenthau¹⁴ to discuss this matter with me and with Mr. Hopkins. Before Mr. Morgenthau had an opportunity to discuss this question with us you approved on September 15 a memorandum¹⁵ which recommended indefinite postponement.

I wish to recall that on the basis of your July 18 approval we reached agreement with the French on August 25 to continue negotiations on Lend-Lease with a view to reaching agreement prior to its conclusion.

My staff is under almost daily pressure from the French to submit a draft agreement for discussion. Whatever may be your decision on the memorandum of September 11, we are under obligations to proceed in some way.

I would point out to you that in the draft upon which my memorandum of September 11 was based, there are four articles, VI, VII, VIII, IX, in which the Treasury has a specific responsibility. These they approved.

I hope very much, therefore, that you will authorize me to proceed to negotiate with the French on the basis which you decide is appropriate.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.24/12-2144

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1944.

A draft French lend-lease agreement has now been approved in the Department. It conforms to the Memorandum of July 15, which was agreed to by the Department, War Department, and Treasury, with reservations by FEA. This memorandum was approved by the President on July 18.

Monnet has now returned to Washington with authority to negotiate a lend-lease agreement and will be approaching the Department in the near future with an anticipated request for urgent action to complete negotiations. While I do not anticipate the difficulties with the Treasury now that we have accepted Morgenthau's general approach, I do expect considerable opposition from FEA to the tighten-

¹³ See footnote 9, p. 760.

¹⁴ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

¹⁵ Not found in Department files.

ing of the lend-lease terms as now proposed. The progress of events in France since July justifies, in my opinion, the narrower approach to French lend-lease as already approved by the President, and may also satisfy the previous opposition to this approach which has existed in FEA. I am afraid, however, that submitting another revised draft to Treasury and FEA will accentuate the policy differences between the two agencies that have existed in this matter and will delay an approach to the French for further negotiation which may have unfortunate political repercussions.

Under the circumstances, I am wondering whether you would be willing to call both Morgenthau and Crowley¹⁶ stating that the Department has prepared a revised draft of the lend-lease agreement for French following the terms already approved by the President in July, and asking them to meet with you and myself at an early date to discuss the finally revised proposal, which thereafter can be presented to the French.

DEAN ACHESON

[The following agreements between the United States and France were signed at Washington, February 28, 1945: Agreement between the United States and France relating to principles applying to mutual aid and the prosecution of the war against aggression; agreement relating to supplies and services; and agreement relating to principles applying to the provision of aid to the Armed Forces of the United States, effected by exchange of notes, with accompanying memorandum and exchanges of letters. For texts of agreements, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 455, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1304.]

SPECIAL ECONOMIC MISSION TO FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND MOROCCO

851R.50/9-844

The Chairman of the Special Economic Mission to French North Africa (Culbertson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, September 11, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to submit the report of the Special Economic Mission to North Africa.¹⁷ The members of the Mission are: William S. Culbertson, Chairman; Donald Gilpatric, Homer S. Fox, R. C. Miller, Van Lear Woodward, John L. Gillis, William M. Friedlaender, Victor Bowman, and Richard C. Thompson.

¹⁶ Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator.

¹⁷ Not printed.

The instructions issued to each member of the Mission stated that the objectives of the Mission are

“. . .¹⁸ to review on the ground the problems involved in returning trade to normal channels as rapidly as wartime conditions permit, and to recommend procedures which would ensure the fullest possible participation of private business in such Government transactions as may be required in view of wartime exigencies. More specifically, it is desired that the Mission make a study of the following:

(1) the possibility of increasing the procurement of goods in North Africa for export to the United States;

(2) study of the procurement programs of other United Nations as they may affect North Africa;

(3) review of problems involved in the resumption of trade to and from the United States through commercial channels, including the question whether such resumption is feasible under present conditions.”

During August and the first weeks of September, the Mission visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and in each locality studied economic conditions and conferred with many individuals in both official and private life.

The report, which is in every respect a joint product of the Mission, contains observations and recommendations on both policy and operations. I believe that its contents will reveal that in the opinion of the Mission, policy lacks reality if divorced from operations, and operations, unguided by sound policy, may not serve the public interest.

Very respectfully yours,

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON

851.50/4-745

The American Embassy in France to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in compliance with instructions from its Government has the honor to convey the following:

1.—During August and September of this year, a Special Economic Mission, under the chairmanship of Ambassador William S. Culbertson, visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in order to study the desirability and feasibility of bringing about the resumption of more normal commercial relationships between the United States and those areas. The Secretary of State recently requested Ambassador Culbertson to proceed to Paris in order to assist the American Ambassador in presenting to the Provisional Government of the French Republic

¹⁸ Omission indicated in the original letter.

certain views of the American Government based upon the report of the Special Economic Mission.

2.—Complete import supply programs for Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and French West Africa during 1945 have been agreed upon and presented with the endorsement of the French authorities. Applications for allocations of supplies and shipping are now in process. In view of this progress and the present availability of dollar exchange to the French Provisional Government, the American Government feels that dollar exchange should be provided on a current basis by the French authorities. Accordingly, the American Government feels warranted in the decision that it has reached that no such civilian supply purchases for French North and West Africa will be made through the Lend-Lease facilities of the Foreign Economic Administration under the cash reimbursable procedure after January 1, 1945, without payment in dollars on delivery.

3.—As the French authorities were informed in the Tri-Partite Committee meeting and through Mr. Monnet on February 7th last in Washington, the traditional policy of the Government of the United States is to foster the movement of trade through private commercial channels. Therefore, it is the American Government's intention to withdraw Lend-Lease procurement assistance for civilian supplies for the French African territories above mentioned not later than June 30, 1945. During the intervening period and thereafter, it is hoped that the French Provisional Government will wish to join the American Government in accomplishing the resumption of normal commercial trade in such civilian supplies and that bulk procurement through the French Supply Council for French North and West Africa will be limited to those few exceptional cases wherein it is mutually agreed that such bulk purchases are demonstrably more effective. It is the expectation of the American Government that private trade in a large majority of civilian supplies for North and West Africa may be restored through this cooperation with the French local and central authorities.

4.—The Government of the United States understands that for the present emergency period a system of import licensing will be effected separately in French West Africa and in each North African territory and that issuance of import licenses within agreed programs under this system will automatically insure the availability of the required foreign exchange. Coincident with the issuance of licenses, French African importers can negotiate directly with traders in the United States or other areas for their purchases and arrange direct consignment and delivery. In establishing such import licensing procedures, the American Government respectfully draws attention to the importance that it places upon continued observation of its rights under existing agreements, including its special treaty rights in Morocco.

5.—Representatives of the United States present in French African areas will be available to assist the French authorities upon request in expediting the flow of private trade. They will also undertake most willingly to supply trade information, to expedite shipments or delivery and to facilitate communications.

6.—It is hoped that the French Provisional Government and local governments of French North Africa will, as has been the case in French West Africa, encourage private commercial representatives to come to the United States to assist in the resumption of private trade, and will promote direct contact between the American and French importers and exporters. Allied military restrictions on travel in North Africa have been lifted to permit commercial travel in both directions and the Government of the United States will continue its efforts to facilitate such travel. It is hoped that the French authorities will cooperate in the issuance of documents necessary for such travel.

7.—The Government of the United States is particularly anxious to stimulate the flow of exports from North and West Africa to the United States and will contribute all possible assistance to obtain this objective, as it realizes that both North and West Africa normally are not exporters to dollar destinations in sufficient volume to create a sufficient dollar exchange to cover the purchase of imports now included in existing programs and contemplated in the near future.

8.—The Government of the United States will welcome any suggestions from the French authorities looking toward the accomplishment of the purposes stated above and, in general, the fostering of normal commercial relationships between residents of French North and West Africa and the United States.

[PARIS,] December 12, 1944.

851.50/7-245

*The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy
in France*

[Translation]

PARIS, December 27, 1944.

On December 12 last the Embassy of the United States was good enough to send to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an *aide-mémoire* concerning the resumption of private trade between the African territories and the United States.

In reply to that communication, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to set forth below, for the Embassy of the United States, the position of the French Government in this matter which has been

the subject of conversations that His Excellency William Culbertson has just had in Paris, following the mission in North Africa that was entrusted to him by the Government of the United States in the summer of 1944.

As has been recalled in the course of these conversations, the Provisional Government and the Government of the United States are already in agreement that the Lend-Lease arrangement involving instalment payments would cease to be in force in 1945 with regard to civilian purchases originating in the territories designated by the Franco-American *modus vivendi* of September 25, 1943.¹⁹ Purchases made in the United States for the supplying of North African territories and French West Africa shall henceforth be paid for in cash, in dollars, and therefore the method of payment thus applied shall no longer differ basically from that governing private purchases.

Furthermore, the French Government fully agrees with the Government of the United States regarding the desirability of resuming trade, on the basis of private commerce, between the United States on the one hand and the French territories of North and West Africa, as well as the other French colonies, on the other, although the latter were not expressly mentioned in the *aide-mémoire* of December 12.

The French Government is happy to note that the American Government has made arrangements to facilitate exports from the French African territories to the United States. The French Government, for its part, is making every effort to facilitate the issuance of export licenses for exports to the United States within the limit of availability in overseas French territories of goods capable of interesting the American market, taking into account local needs, the needs of Metropolitan France, and needs in connection with the war effort. The French Government is confident that the American Government will give exporters in Overseas France full facilities for making sales in the United States, especially with respect to ocean shipping and the transfer to local exchange offices of the dollar amounts realized from these sales, which amounts will make it easier for these territories to make purchases in the United States and in other countries that make their international payments in dollars. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this occasion to call the attention of the Embassy of the United States to the difficulties created by the American Government that impede the granting of licenses for such transfer to the exchange offices.

With regard to purchases in the United States of civilian goods intended for North Africa and territories under the jurisdiction of the French Ministry of Colonies, the French Government intends

¹⁹ Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 483, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1666.

that those operations shall, to the largest possible extent, be private transactions.

It is distinctly understood that, as long as there is a world shortage of supplies and ocean shipping facilities, these purchases may be made only within the framework of the import programs jointly agreed upon by the French Government, the Government of the United States, and the competent interallied organizations. Licenses may be issued to importers. When these licenses have been certified by the local exchange offices, they shall, in accordance with general exchange regulations, authorize the recipient to acquire, under the conditions laid down in the license, the dollars needed to pay for the said imports.

However, the French Government does not think that it is in a position to make this purchasing procedure general, and for the following reasons:

1. A number of products are now imported on behalf of State agencies such as the Office des Céréales (Grain Bureau), the Services du Ravitaillement Général (General Supply Services) etc., and consequently, the corresponding orders can be placed on the American market only by the French Purchasing Mission through administrative channels.

2. With respect to the territories in North Africa, the small volume of imports which will be possible within the framework of the programs, as compared with the normal volume of imports, would not, in the case of many products, allow for fair allotment among the various importers without dividing purchases to such an extent that the program would become unrealizable on a commercial basis. If it were desired not to effect the purchase of these products through administrative channels, such purchase would have to be entrusted to special groups. In that case the desired direct contact between purchaser and seller would not be established and we would run the risk of witnessing an increase in the activities of importer-groups, whereas these groups are considered by the French Government as temporary organizations that are inherent in a state of war. Consequently it appears inevitable that, in the case of all products that could not be imported in sufficient quantities to satisfy the demands of an impossibly large number of importers, the French Purchasing Mission must continue temporarily to effect purchases on behalf of the Offices du Commerce Extérieur (Foreign Commerce Offices) or the local supply services.

Therefore, in spite of the French Government's expressed desire, purchases in the United States for the supplying of North African territories can only gradually become private purchases. The French Mission will have to continue its activities; to that end it will maintain

essential contacts with the competent American services and will continue, in particular, to take action to secure the necessary transportation facilities, both for purchases it makes itself through administrative channels and for private purchases. In this connection, the French Government is counting on the Foreign Economic Administration to continue to lend its assistance to the French Mission. It appears desirable to the French Government that an accurate procedure be worked out between the American Government and the French Purchasing Mission; this procedure should be the subject of conversations in Washington.

As to the other overseas French territories, the French Government is willing for direct contacts to be established at once between American businessmen and businessmen of the colonies. The French Ministry of Colonies will, for its part, strive to facilitate these contacts, which could most conveniently take place in Paris where the major colonial companies have permanent agencies.

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN ITS LIBERATION FROM JAPANESE OCCUPATION

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²⁰

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944.

Last week in a conversation²¹ which I had with the British Ambassador he stated that, according to information from his Foreign Office, you had spoken rather definitely during your recent trip of your views concerning the future of French Indo-China. According to Lord Halifax' information you had expressed the opinion that Indo-China should be taken away from the French and administered by an international trusteeship.²² He wondered whether this represented your final conclusions and attached importance to the matter in view of the fact that reports of your alleged conversations would undoubtedly get back to the French. I informed the Ambassador that I did not know whether you had come to any final conclusions on the subject and added that, in my judgment, you and Mr. Churchill would find it desirable to talk this matter over fully, deliberately, and perhaps finally at some future stage.

²⁰ Copy of memorandum obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²¹ For extract of memorandum of this conversation, dated January 3, 1944, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 864.

²² A memorandum of July 21, 1943, obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., records a statement by President Roosevelt in the thirty-third meeting of the Pacific War Council that Indochina should be placed under a trusteeship until it was ready for independence.

As of possible interest to you I am enclosing two brief memoranda citing the more important public statements or commitments by ourselves and the British with regard to the future of French territory after the war.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Enclosure 1]

JANUARY 7, 1944.

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH TERRITORY AFTER
THE WAR

During the past three years there have been a number of public pronouncements, as well as unpublished statements, by the President, the Secretary of State, and other high ranking officials of this Government regarding the future of French territory after the war. The most important of these pronouncements and statements are set forth below.

1. In a statement issued on August 2, 1941, concerning the agreement entered into between the French and Japanese Governments regarding French Indochina, the Secretary of State said:²³

"This Government, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In its relations with the French Government at Vichy and with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof." (Department of State Press Release No. 374)

2. In a letter to Marshal Pétain in December, 1941,²⁴ President Roosevelt stated that so long as "French sovereign control remains in reality purely French" the American Government has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or any of the French colonies "pass to the control of any other nation".

3. A State Department press release of March 2, 1942²⁵ (No. 85) relative to the situation in New Caledonia, included the following words:

"The policy of the Government of the United States as regards France and French territory has been based upon the maintenance of

²³ For complete text of statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1941, p. 87.

²⁴ For text of letter of December 27, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 205.

²⁵ Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1942, p. 208.

the integrity of France and of the French empire and of the eventual restoration of the complete independence of all French territories.”

The above statement was qualified by the following words :

“In its relations with the local French authorities in French territories the United States has been and will continue to be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect their territories from domination and control by the common enemy.”

4. In a note of April 13, 1942,²⁶ to the French Ambassador at Washington, relative to the establishing of an American consular establishment at Brazzaville, the Acting Secretary of State said :

“The Government of the United States recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over the territory of France and over French possessions overseas. The Government of the United States fervently hopes that it may see the reestablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory.”

5. At his press conference on May 21, 1942, in reply to an inquiry as to whether the United States considered itself bound to the restoration of the whole French Empire after the war, the Secretary of State said that this question had not arisen.

6. In an unpublished letter of November 2, 1942, to General Giraud, the President's Personal Representative, Mr. Murphy, wrote :

“It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be reestablished as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939.”

7. The landing of American forces in North Africa on November 8, 1942,²⁷ was the occasion for a number of assurances to the French people regarding American motives. Among them were the following :

In his message to Marshal Pétain²⁸ the President said :

“I need not tell you that the ultimate and greater aim is the liberation of France and its empire from the Axis yoke.”

The President's message²⁹ to Admiral Esteva, Resident General at Tunis, concluded with these words :

“I know that I may count on your understanding of American friendship for France and American determination to liberate the French empire from the domination of its oppressors.”

²⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 561.

²⁷ For correspondence concerning the landings of November 8, 1942, see *ibid.*, pp. 429-432.

²⁸ Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, pp. 904, 905.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 908.

In his broadcast to the French people on November 8³⁰ the President said:

“We assure you that once the menace of Germany and Italy is removed from you, we shall quit your territory at once.”

8. The preamble of the unpublished Clark–Darlan Agreement of November 22, 1942,³¹ contains the following words:

“It has been agreed by all French elements concerned and United States military authorities that French forces will aid and support the forces of the United States and their allies to expel from the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate France and restore integrally the French Empire.”

[Enclosure 2]

JANUARY 7, 1944.

BRITISH POSITION WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH TERRITORY AFTER THE WAR

Prime Minister Churchill has more than once expressed the desire to see France, including Alsace-Lorraine, restored, and both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden³² have repeatedly denied any territorial ambitions on the part of Great Britain with respect to the French Empire.

1. On June 10, 1941, the Prime Minister assured the House of Commons³³ that

“We have no territorial designs in Syria or anywhere else in French territory”;

and subsequently, on November 10, 1942, he said:³⁴

“For ourselves we have no wish but to see France free and strong, with her empire gathered round her and with Alsace-Lorraine restored. We covet no French territory. We have no acquisitive designs or ambitions in North Africa or any other part of the world.”

These commitments, however, are not interpreted by the British Government as including any guarantee of particular frontiers or of the integrity of the French Empire. The British Foreign Secretary, in a letter to the American Ambassador on November 16, 1942,³⁵ stated:

“You will see that we have taken care to avoid guaranteeing the integrity of the French Empire and have concentrated upon asserting our intention to restore ‘the independence and greatness of France’ and denying any desire to annex French territory”.

³⁰ Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 892.

³¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 453.

³² Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³³ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 372, col. 157.

³⁴ For entire text of speech, see the *London Times*, November 11, 1942, p. 8.

³⁵ Not printed.

Much earlier, in connection with his note of August 7, 1940, to General de Gaulle, Mr. Churchill, in an unpublished letter of the same date, had said:

"I think it necessary to put on record that the expression 'full restoration of the independence and greatness of France' has no precise relation to territorial frontiers. We have not been able to guarantee such frontiers in respect of any nation now acting with us, but, of course, we shall do our best."

2. Like the United States, the British Government has made a number of commitments relative to the maintenance of French sovereignty in North Africa, and on March 17, 1943, the Lord Privy Seal stated in the House of Lords³⁶ that

"North Africa is French territory";

and

"The relationship of the British and United States Commanders is not that of an occupying power toward the local authority of an occupied region".

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*³⁷

[WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1944.

I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship. France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.

As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek³⁸ and by Marshal Stalin.³⁹ I see no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of Indo-China.

Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case of Indo-China is perfectly clear. France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

³⁶ See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 126, col. 737.

³⁷ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

³⁸ President of the National Government of China and Supreme Allied Commander of the China Theater.

³⁹ Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

851G.01/46

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to
President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1944.

The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department has indicated its desire to proceed at once with civil affairs planning for Indo-China and before doing so has requested political guidance from the State Department.

A number of important decisions depend upon whether French troops are to be used in the military operations to regain control of Indo-China, and whether French nationals are to be used in civil administration and planning. There is ample evidence that the French hope to be consulted and to play a part in driving the Japanese from that area.

Subject to your approval, the State Department will proceed on the assumption that French armed forces will be employed to at least some extent in the military operations, and that in the administration of Indo-China it will be desirable to employ French nationals who have an intimate knowledge of the country and its problems. We would assume further that the use of French forces or civilians would be without prejudice to the question of the ultimate status of French Indo-China and would be related solely to problems directly connected with and flowing from possible military operations.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

851G.00/8-2644

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1944.

There is attached herewith a copy of an *aide-mémoire*⁴⁰ left with the Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indo-China.

The Ambassador stated that the question is of considerable urgency owing to Mr. Eden's desire to give an answer on two definite points before the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give an affirmative answer are:

(1) The attachment to the South East Asia Command Headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and

⁴⁰ Not printed, but for substance, see Secretary Hull's memorandum of October 10, p. 775.

(2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Léger d'Intervention" which apparently has already been established at Algiers.

Although these suggestions are ostensibly military in character, they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decision we can so inform Lord Halifax.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851G.014/8-2844

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1944.

In regard to your memorandum of August 26th on the subject of questions raised by Lord Halifax in reference to French Indo-China, I suggest this matter be deferred until after my meeting with the Prime Minister in Quebec.⁴¹

The same thing applies to the *Aide-Mémoire* covering the French Committee's proposals.⁴² It should be remembered that in relation to (IV) participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East involves one of the principal partners i.e. China.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

851G.00/8-2644

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1944.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN LIBERATION OF INDOCHINA

On August 26, 1944 I sent you a memorandum with a copy of a British *aide-mémoire* dated August 25 stating that the French had requested British approval of:

- (a) Sending a French Military Mission under General Blaizot to be attached to SEAC⁴³ headquarters;
- (b) Sending to India a light intervention force for later use in Indochina;
- (c) Sending, later on, a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina;
- (d) Participation by the French in planning the war against Japan;
- (e) Participation by the French in planning political warfare in the Far East.

⁴¹ Documentation on the Second Quebec Conference, September 11-16, 1944, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁴² For substance of French proposals, see Secretary Hull's memorandum of October 10, *infra*.

⁴³ South East Asia Command.

The British requested American concurrence on the first two points by August 29. You informed me orally that you planned to discuss the French proposals with the British Prime Minister at Quebec; accordingly no reply has been made to the British *aide-mémoire*.

The Consul at Colombo has reported that on October 4 it was learned from an unimpeachable source that the British plan to bring a French Mission under General Blaizot to SEAC headquarters in the immediate future; that full collaboration is to be given the French Mission which will participate officially in activities of the SEAC; that as American agreement has not been obtained, the Mission will be ostensibly unofficial and will be housed at first in a hotel; that as soon as the concurrence of the Allies is forthcoming it is planned to move the Mission into permanent quarters; and that French parachutists are continuing to be trained by the British in groups of four or five for clandestine activities in Indochina.

As you will recall, the British proposed in their *aide-mémoire* that all details of French political warfare relating to Indochina should be a matter for arrangement between SEAC and the French Military Mission, although, according to the latest information in the Department, Indochina is in the China theater and not in the SEAC theater.

Will you inform me whether the reported sending of this Mission is in accordance with any understanding which may have been reached with Mr. Churchill on the French requests together with an indication of whether you desire the Department to take any action?

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851G.48/10-1044

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1944.

A letter has been received from General Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, asking the views of the State Department on the following contemplated operations:

"The staff of the Theater Commander for the CBI⁴⁴ theater has under consideration operational plans involving the furnishing of supplies and equipment to resistance groups. It is contemplated that these operations will be under American command although there will be collaboration with the French."

In amplification of the foregoing, it was explained orally that the proposed assistance would be to resistance groups within Indochina; that the proposed collaboration would be with the French Military Mission at Chungking; that such collaboration would not prevent

⁴⁴ China, Burma, India.

assistance to all resistance groups whether French or native, but that without such collaboration, it would not be possible effectively to assist resistance groups among the French military forces in Indochina, and that this would result in retarding resistance efforts.

Subject to your approval, the Department will reply to General Donovan that it has no objection to furnishing supplies and equipment to resistance groups, both French and native, actually within Indochina, nor to American collaboration with the French Military Mission at Chungking or other French officers or officials in furtherance of the contemplated operations or any other military operations in Indochina for the defeat of Japan.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851G.00/10-1644

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1944.

In regard to this Indochina matter, it is my judgment on this date that we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indochina. You might bring it up to me a little later when things are a little clearer.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

851G.01/11-244

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)*⁴⁵

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

According to Ambassador Winant's⁴⁶ recollection, Indochina was dealt with only briefly at the White House conversation on March 27, 1943 and in other conversations with Mr. Eden.⁴⁷ In the March 27 conversation the question of trusteeship was discussed at some length, Mr. Eden advocating the advantages of national rather than international administration. There was considerable inconclusive discussion as to the degree to which governments other than the one having sovereignty or administrative responsibility for a particular area might properly intervene in matters involving the administration of the area or its relations with other areas. Mr. Eden emphasized

⁴⁵ Addressed to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) and to the Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Moffat).

⁴⁶ American Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁴⁷ For correspondence regarding the visit of Mr. Eden to Washington, March 12-30, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

the belief that the goal for small colonial areas should be economic, social, and political advancement and an autonomous status rather than independence, which would subject them to both economic and military dangers.

The Ambassador does not recall that the question of restoring Indochina in full sovereignty in France was discussed at the time but expressed the opinion that the French will be highly sensitive about the restoration of all parts of their colonial empire to the *status quo ante* and that the British Government will firmly support the French position in view of its desire for the closest possible relations with France.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

740.0011 P.W./11-244

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to
President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

INDOCHINA

In order that you may be kept fully informed on developments in relation to Indochina, there has been prepared the memorandum attached hereto.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Annex]

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INDOCHINA

The following are recent developments in relation to Indochina: Colombo⁴⁸ has reported that:

The British staff at headquarters of SEAC has protested to the British Chiefs of Staff in London against the inclusion of Indochina in the theatre under the new United States Army Commanding General in China, urging that Indochina be included in the SEAC theatre.

The French Military Mission, which is large, has arrived in Ceylon and has received American approval and is now recognized openly and officially. Apparently, General Blaizot has not yet arrived. Baron de Langlade who parachuted into Indochina some weeks ago with a letter of introduction from de Gaulle is also in Ceylon. He spent twenty-four hours with French Army officers in Indochina, and stated, upon his return that a basis for a French resistance movement exists

⁴⁸ Seat of the American Consulate in Ceylon.

there, but reportedly declined to say more until Blaizot's arrival. Blaizot, a Lieutenant General, was formerly Chief of Staff in Indochina. He is a "colonial" general.

Although SEAC was advised specifically that only military, and not political, questions might be discussed with the French Mission, political questions are in fact under discussion.

The British SOE⁴⁹ which is actively engaged in undercover operations in Indochina has recently received orders from the Foreign Office that they should have nothing to do with any Annamite or other native organizations in Indochina, but are to devote their efforts to the French.

The OWI⁵⁰ representative at New Delhi has received indication that the British wish OWI activities directed at the native populations in Thailand and Indochina be eliminated so as not to stir up native resistance to the Japanese and so incite the Japanese to send more troops into those areas. Colombo states that it is apparent SOE desires severely to restrict OSS⁵¹ operations in the SEAC theatre and to give SOE preeminence or, failing that, to establish combined SOE-OSS operations.

British propaganda agencies are emphasizing the recent appeal by the French War Ministry for recruits to participate in the campaign for liberation of Indochina on the ground that news of any French military efforts to recover Indochina would encourage the French in Indochina. OWI has so far refrained from mentioning the French appeal or other phases of French preparations for military participation fearing the adverse effect on the native populations in Indochina and elsewhere in the Far East on the restoration of the *status quo ante* which such preparations would appear to imply. OWI has specifically requested State Department guidance on United States policy in this regard, and have been advised to be silent on the subject despite the anticipated British broadcasts.

General Donovan has submitted to the Secretary of State a report from the OSS representative in SEAC reading in part:

"There can be little doubt that the British and Dutch have arrived at an agreement with regard to the future of Southeast Asia, and now it would appear that the French are being brought into the picture. . . .⁵² It would appear that the strategy of the British, Dutch and French is to win back and control Southeast Asia, making the fullest use possible of American resources, but foreclosing the Americans from any voice in policy matters."

⁴⁹ Secret Operations Executive.

⁵⁰ Office of War Information.

⁵¹ Office of Strategic Services.

⁵² Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

740.0011 P.W./11-344

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State
(Stettinius)*

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1944.

I have yours of November second, enclosing memorandum on recent developments in relation to Indo-China. I wish you would make it clear that:

1. We must not give American approval to any French military mission, as it appears we have done in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

2. Referring to the third paragraph, it must be made clear to all our people in the Far East that they can make no decisions on political questions with the French mission or anyone else.

3. We have made no final decisions on the future of Indo-China. This should be made clear.

4. In the final paragraph it is stated the British and Dutch have arrived at an agreement in regard to the future of Southeast Asia and are about to bring the French into the picture. It should be made clear to all our people that the United States expects to be consulted with regard to any future of Southeast Asia. I have no objection to this being made clear to the British, the Dutch or the French.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

851G.01/11-444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 4, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 2:37 p. m.]

316. ReEmbs 279, November 1, 4 [8] p. m.⁵³ Chauvel⁵⁴ remarked yesterday that France is most desirous of participating to the greatest possible extent its capacity permits in the recovery of Indochina (he recalled that little less than a division has been training at two points in North Africa for service in the Pacific). He added that there is a token detachment of a couple of thousand men already in India. Moreover, he said recruiting has been active and training has already commenced in metropolitan France for a French expeditionary force to the Pacific. It is hoped that these forces may eventually amount to two normal divisions. Personnel is to be drawn from the regular army and the FFI;⁵⁵ the whole force is to be under the command of General Blaizot (Corps d'Armée) who recently arrived in India.

⁵³ Not printed.⁵⁴ Jean Chauvel, of the French Foreign Office.⁵⁵ Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur.

General Blaizot has been instructed to report to Lord Louis Mountbatten.⁵⁶

Adverting to France's primary interest in Indochina, Chauvel made the point that the French Government is interested not only in a French force in India but also would be interested in French units to be included in forces which might strike from the Philippines toward Indochina if such plans were on foot.

CAFFERY

740.0011 P.W./11-2344

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1944.

MY DEAR ED: I send you herewith an *Aide-Mémoire* concerning proposals for the use of the French in pre-operational activities in Indo-China.

This is a matter which Mountbatten and all of us have very much at heart. Until we have the all-clear from your side he cannot effectively carry out sabotage etc. activities which he is satisfied should contribute very considerably to his task.

You will see that the matter is urgent and I would be grateful if you could let us have a very early reply.

V. sin[cerely,]

HALIFAX

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. In August last His Majesty's Government invited the concurrence of the United States Government in the following proposals:

(1) The establishment of a French military mission with the South East Asia Command. This would facilitate the work of the Secret Operations Executive and of the Office of Strategic Services and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. The function of the mission would be primarily to deal with matters concerning French Indo China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would, therefore, be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese missions attached to the South East Asia Command.

(2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Léger d'Intervention" composed at the start of 500 men and designed to operate exclusively in Indo China on Japanese lines of communication. The activities of

⁵⁶ Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

this body would correspond to those of the American and British Secret Operational organizations and its establishment could be without prejudice to the wider question of from what sources French forces participating in the Far East should be equipped.

(3) French participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East. This would be a matter for arrangement between the South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view concurred with these proposals except that they believe that French participation in the planning of political warfare should be restricted to the area of the South East Asia Command. No further action could be taken by them in this matter as it was understood that the President had expressed the desire first to discuss the question of French Indo China orally with the Prime Minister.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff took occasion to point out that in their view, French Indo China was part, not of South East Asia Command, but of the China Theatre and was an American sphere of strategic responsibility. They recognised that an oral understanding had been come to between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo by which both Commanders would be free to attack Thailand and French Indo China, and boundaries between the two Theatres would be decided at an appropriate time in the light of progress made by the two forces.

4. This agreement was recognised by the Generalissimo after *SEXTANT*⁵⁷ as applying to preoperational activities. It has however never been formally confirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. No further steps could be taken in obtaining the necessary approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the proposals outlined in paragraph 1 of this *aide-mémoire* until the President and the Prime Minister had had an opportunity to discuss them. It was anticipated that this discussion would take place at the Quebec Conference, but in fact the subject was never raised. Consequently no further progress has been made in this matter which is becoming increasingly urgent.

6. Admiral Mountbatten is strongly of the opinion that useful and important work on irregular lines could immediately be done in French Indo China. The French Army and Civil Service are unquestionably anxious to take part in the liberation of the country from the Japanese and constitute virtually a well-organised and ready-made *Maquis*.⁵⁸ The secret organisations operating from South East Asia Command have made contact with these elements

⁵⁷ Code word for the Cairo Conference of December, 1943; for correspondence on this Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

⁵⁸ French underground force.

and are now in regular communication with them. All that is necessary to exploit the situation is the presence in South East Asia Command of the necessary French personnel from whom alone the French in French Indo China will take the direction necessary to produce the action required.

7. Admiral Mountbatten has pointed out that French Indo China constitutes an area of vital importance to the operation of his Command since it lies on the Japanese land and air reinforcement route to Burma and Malaya. Irregular activities therefore on the lines envisaged in the proposals which are the subject of this *aide-mémoire* are for him a matter of urgency.

8. His Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the United States Government will concur as to the desirability and urgency of pushing on with the irregular operations outlined above and will take such action as will make possible the issue of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (*a*) confirming the oral understanding already existing between the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten, and (*b*) approving the program set out in the opening paragraph of this *aide-mémoire*. Such action would in no way prejudice the question of the ultimate settlement of the boundary between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Command, which, by the agreement between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, is at present left open, nor the wider question of the participation of regular French armed forces in the Far Eastern War.

WASHINGTON, 22 November, 1944.

851G.01/12-2744

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1944.

With reference to the British *aide-mémoire* of November 22, requesting approval of the French Military Mission to the Southeast Asia Command and French military participation in the liberation of Indochina, a proposed reply to which was sent to you with a memorandum on December 11,⁵⁹ the British are obviously perturbed about the situation.

On December 8 Lord Halifax called at his request and stressed to me the importance of a prompt reply.⁶⁰

Ambassador Winant has now reported that Mr. Bennett, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, has expressed his concern that the United States apparently has not yet de-

⁵⁹ Memorandum not printed; proposed reply not found in Department files.

⁶⁰ Memorandum by the Secretary of State of this conversation not printed.

terminated upon its policy towards Indochina. Mr. Bennett stated that it would be difficult to deny French participation in the liberation of Indochina in light of the increasing strength of the French Government in world affairs, and that unless a policy to be followed toward Indochina is mutually agreed between our two Governments, circumstances may arise at any moment which will place our two Governments in a very awkward situation. Although Mr. Bennett was expressing his personal views only, Mr. Winant stated his belief that the Foreign Office generally shares these views.

In a conversation yesterday Lord Halifax again referred to the importance which his Government attaches to a prompt decision on the questions raised in his *aide-mémoire*.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

GERMANY

[For correspondence regarding consideration in the European Advisory Commission of surrender terms and controls for Germany and for Austria, see volume I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission", parts V and VI, respectively. See also *ibid.*, section entitled "Consideration of the application of 'unconditional surrender' terms to Germany; unofficial peace feelers from Germany."]

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY FOR THE EXCHANGE OF AMERICAN AND GERMAN NATIONALS¹

740.00115 EW '39/8668½

The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State

The Minister of Switzerland in charge of German and French interests presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Secretary's note of December 18, 1943,² and to preceding correspondence concerning the proposed exchange of certain nationals between the United States and Germany.

The Minister now wishes to draw attention to an urgent cable just received from abroad, reading in translation as follows:

Primo: The German Government agrees to effect the exchange on the basis now proposed by the United States Government. Accordingly, the following groups of persons are to be included in the exchange from America in return for the repatriation of the American diplomatic groups held in Baden-Baden and Bad Godesberg, as well as Panamanian nationals in the areas under German control:

1.) The twenty-six members of the former German Consulate General in Algiers, presently interned at the Hotel Ingleside, as well as the former German Honorary Consul in Bari, Friedrich Thisson, and his wife.

2.) The six hundred eighty-seven German nationals already named by the United States Government. Should some of these persons be unwilling to return to Germany, or for other reasons be prevented from participating in the exchange, they are to be substituted by a corresponding number of other German nationals in the United States.

3.) Furthermore, other German nationals interned in the United States, the members of whose families have already been

¹ For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 49 ff. and pp. 73 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 115.

repatriated to Germany, and whose repatriation appears to be warranted for humane reasons.

4.) The one hundred thirty-two German nationals from Brazil, who have already been considered for repatriation.

5.) The members of the French official group named by the United States, who are held in Hershey and who are willing to return.

“Secundo: In addition, the German Government asks that the question be examined whether there is any possibility of including within the framework of the exchange the German nationals from Central and South America who are presently interned in Crystal City, Texas, and who are named in the enclosed list.³ In view of the consent already given by the United States Government to the repatriation of the majority of the German nationals held in the Crystal City Internment Camp, it would constitute a hardship if the remaining German nationals included in the above-mentioned list, whose repatriation had not yet been proposed, could not participate in the exchange. The German Government, on its part, is endeavoring to offer an opportunity to participate in the exchange to all the persons previously named by the United States and Central and South American Governments, who had not yet been added to the exchange groups in Bad Godesberg and Baden-Baden. The German Government firmly expects, however, that the United States Government will also take into account the German wishes, and will give its consent particularly to the repatriation within the framework of the exchange, of the German nationals

Mrs. Lina Graff,⁴
Dr. Ernest Kohlschuetter, and
Professor Adolf Kappus.

“Tertio: The German Government will expedite preparations for the transport of the American groups of persons to Portugal in order that the exchange can be effected in Lisbon starting on February 20, 1944. The German Government expects early notification from the United States Government concerning the exact date of arrival in Lisbon of the steamer carrying the German exchange groups. Furthermore, details would be required regarding the markings and the time of departure of the steamer from the American port of embarkation, in order that proper instructions can be given to the German naval authorities so that safe crossing of the exchange vessel may be assured. In consideration of the reference contained in the American note to the effect that the Brazilian Government is to deliver in Portugal one hundred thirty-two German nationals from Brazil in return for the delivery in Portugal of the Brazilian diplomatic group held in Bad Godesberg, the German Government has repeatedly endeavored to secure details from the Brazilian Government concerning the identity of the persons in this group. No reply has been

³ Not printed.

⁴ In a note of February 12 to the Swiss Legation, the Department stated that Mrs. Graff, an American citizen, was unable to travel because of illness and that the other two had sent the Department signed statements refusing the opportunity to return to Germany (740.00115 European War 1939/7874).

received from the Brazilian Government to date. Should the German group from Brazil arrive in Portugal at the time of the scheduled exchange in Portugal, the German Government will include the Brazilian exchange group held in Bad Godesberg with the remaining Central and South American diplomatic groups to be delivered in Portugal. In the event the date of delivery of the German group from Brazil is postponed, however, the Brazilian diplomatic group in German hands will be delivered in Portugal at such a time as to coincide with the arrival of the German group from Brazil.

“*Quarto*: Anticipating reciprocity, the German Government intends to permit all the members of the American exchange groups to take along their entire personal belongings with the exception of furniture and motor vehicles. In particular, it is not the intention of the German Government to prohibit the export of gold, jewelry or foreign currency, or to subject the United States groups to restrictions in this connection. However, in view of foreign exchange regulations, the export of Reichsmark or French Franc amounts cannot be permitted. The German Government intends to refrain from examining the baggage of the American repatriation groups. The German Government expects a reply to the effect that the United States Government will follow the same procedure with respect to the German exchange groups.

“*Quinto*: In accordance with the policy pursued in previous exchanges with American countries, the German Government plans also in this instance to defray the cost of the transport of the American exchange groups as far as Lisbon, on the assumption, however, that the United States Government will, as heretofore, also defray all expenses in connection with baggage and transport of the German repatriation groups to the American port of embarkation. The German Government would appreciate receiving confirmation as soon as possible from the United States Government that it agrees to this procedure.”

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1944.

740.00115 European War 1939/8155 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944.

363. American Interests—Germany. Your 610, January 29.⁵ Department is addressing to Swiss Legation Washington⁶ a reply to German communication regarding Baden Baden exchange reading as follows:

“I. Lists of the Germans to be repatriated by the United States Government under the terms of the agreement now concluded have previously been sent to the Legation. To the extent that changes have

⁵ Not printed; it transmitted text of note of January 28 from the German Legation in Switzerland, quoted in communication from the Swiss Minister, *supra*.

⁶ Note dated February 3, 1944.

occurred in the composition of these lists, revised lists will be sent to the Legation in the immediate future.

II. The new proposal of the German Government in the second part of its communication appears to bring into consideration the repatriation of additional individuals not heretofore considered within the framework of the exchange agreement. The Department of State is giving this matter serious consideration from the point of view of national security and the wishes of the specific individuals named by the German Government and of others who on compassionate grounds seem to have a meritorious claim to similar treatment. A cursory survey indicates that the great majority of the individuals named in the list attached to the German note will probably wish to be repatriated and that others are also seeking repatriation.

It is the desire of the United States Government that the exchange of the official groups proceed immediately and that the repatriation of additional individuals such as those referred to under this heading be dealt with entirely separately. The United States Government is willing, however, to arrange for the transportation to Lisbon of such of these additional individuals as can be gotten ready in time to avail themselves of the transportation facilities established for the official exchange. Those who are found available for repatriation but who cannot get ready in time to avail themselves of the transportation facilities offered by the official exchange can undoubtedly be accommodated by other means. The United States Government assumes that the German Government is prepared to release and transport to Lisbon against the individuals being considered under this heading at least an equal number of bona fide nationals of the United States and the other American republics, but urgent confirmation of the German Government's willingness to do so is requested. The United States Government will transmit to the Swiss Government in charge of American interests in Germany a list of individuals to whom the United States Government would like to have extended an opportunity for repatriation.⁷ It is expected that similar lists will be furnished by the other American republics concerned. Additionally the Swiss representatives in Germany and German-occupied territory may suggest other names of bona fide American nationals desiring repatriation on compassionate grounds or suggest substitutes for any who do not avail themselves of the opportunity offered.

III. In the interest of the Germans to be repatriated who have not so far been informed that their repatriation is under consideration and of the proper prosecution of the voyage, the motor vessel *Gripsholm*, the characteristics of which have already been communicated to the German Government in connection with other exchange movements, cannot leave New York to effect the present exchange until February 15, 1944. The exchange can then take place at Lisbon, commencing with February 24 or 25, depending upon the weather conditions encountered by the vessel. A further separate statement regarding the characteristics of the *Gripsholm*, its time of departure and the course to be followed will be made as quickly as possible.

Although the repatriation of the 132 German nationals from Brazil will necessarily have to take place by separate vessel, the United States

⁷ Telegrams 418, February 8, and 476, February 12, 1944, not printed.

Government expects in the interest of uniformity of treatment that the Brazilian nationals to be exchanged will depart from Germany with the remainder of the nationals involved in these negotiations and that arrangements be made by the German Government for them to be held, if necessary, in Portuguese territory until the arrival of the 132 Germans from Brazil completes the exchange with Brazil.

IV. Those German repatriates leaving the United States who have official status will be permitted to take with them without exception all their personal effects short of furniture and motor vehicles. They will be permitted to carry up to \$300 in United States currency. Their baggage will not be subjected to examination.

The German repatriates who do not have official character will be permitted to take with them a maximum of \$60 in United States currency and such personal baggage as is usually allowed on commercial passenger vessels. Their baggage will be subjected to normal Customs examination and during the course of that examination there will necessarily be enforced the usual war-time controls regarding the character of articles which may be exported in baggage. There will be no prohibition regarding export of foreign currency, of jewelry or of gold articles intended for personal adornment.

V. The United States Government will pay the cost of transporting the Germans to New York (having already paid the cost of their transportation from their former residences to their present place of detention). It is expected that the cost of transportation across the Atlantic will be determined and met as previously agreed in respect of the exchanges on the *Drottningholm* in 1942.⁸

VI. The United States Government is requesting the Portuguese Government to lend its facilities for the exchange at Lisbon and is providing the Portuguese Government with a statement of the conditions of the exchange as agreed upon. As the Portuguese Government has repeatedly stated that it will sanction an exchange only upon the request of both adverse governments party thereto, it is expected that the German Government will take parallel action.

It is requested that the foregoing be communicated promptly to the German Government and that the date of this note be specified in the Legation's communication of transmittal to Bern. For the Legation's information the Department of State is undertaking to proceed with all arrangements necessary to the departure of the exchange vessel on February 15 with the assumption that no unforeseen difficulties will arise."

United States nationals and nationals of the other American republics who may be able to leave German-controlled territory in accordance with the present provisions of the exchange or such additional provisions as may be included therein may be granted by the appropriate Swiss representatives loans against their promissory notes in accordance with existing instructions. Loans advanced under this authorization should be sufficient only to meet minimum necessary incidental expenses in reaching Lisbon where, if funds are not provided

⁸ See telegram 880, April 7, 1942, to Bern, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 352.

them from other sources, such persons will be asked to sign promissory notes for ocean passage and for cost of sojourn while awaiting sailing.

It is essential, henceforth, that Lisbon be kept fully informed of all developments respecting this exchange which might affect performance of its duties. It is therefore requested that you repeat to Lisbon any telegrams or other communications to Department on the subject which you consider of interest to that office.

List referred to under II will follow. By bona fide nationals Department intends to cover only those whose citizenship has been satisfactorily established by protecting Power (in cases where that is necessary) after reference to represented government.

HCLL

711.62114 Sick/190 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1944.

389. American Interests—Germany. Following proposal is on a par with that contained in heading II of Department's note of February 3 to Swiss Legation, Washington, in charge of German interests, which was repeated to you by telegram on the same date.⁹ In other words this proposal is not to be considered as a part of or be permitted in any way to delay the effectuation of the official exchange. It is merely intended to make available to seriously sick and seriously wounded American and German prisoners of war the exceptional transportation facilities arising out of the official American-German exchange. Please arrange to have the sense of this proposal presented to the German Government on a most urgent basis and request that the German Government consider it on the same basis and reply urgently, since its acceptance and the requested assurances must reach the Department not later than February 10 in order to give necessary time for transportation of repatriables from distant camps and hospitals to New York in time for sailing of *Gripsholm* on February 15.

"Sailing of *Gripsholm* for Lisbon February 15 on diplomatic exchange mission affords an exceptional opportunity for repatriation at same time of seriously sick and seriously wounded German prisoners of war in detention in United States, against repatriation by German Government of equivalent number, as nearly as may be, of American prisoners in its custody. If German Government seasonably expresses its readiness to make the proposed exchange, the United States Government will deliver, via *Gripsholm* sailing referred to, the 85 German prisoners already determined to be eligible for direct repatriation whose names were transmitted for communication to the

⁹Telegram 363, *supra*.

German Government in Department's 298 of January 28.¹⁰ In addition, a Mixed Medical Commission has been touring further prisoner of war camps since January 20, and, making necessary allowance for technical obstacles, United States Government proposes also to deliver via *Gripsholm* all those whose eligibility has been determined during this current tour in time to include them. United States Government adheres firmly to the basic principle established by Geneva Prisoners of War Convention,¹¹ that exchanges of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war shall be made without regard to rank or numbers, and therefore, in making the instant proposal United States Government does not exact as a condition that German Government must deliver American prisoners in identical number with those whom United States will deliver. United States Government does expect, however, that if German Government agrees to the exchange it will deliver to Lisbon all seriously sick and seriously wounded whose eligibility for repatriation has already been determined or can by diligent effort be determined in time to deliver them at Lisbon, including the 7 American prisoners¹² whom the German Government stated that it did not deliver for technical reasons in the last exchange.¹³ In this connection, the attention of the German Government is also called to the 50 names which have been heretofore transmitted of probable American repatriables in addition to the 7 already mentioned, and to the following further personnel believed to be probably also repatriable:

[Here follows list of names.]

"It should be emphasized that in order to make the suggested exchange possible, it is essential that this proposal be transmitted most urgently to German Government, that the German Government be requested to consider it on a most urgent basis and that the German Government's reply, giving its acceptance and the requested assurances, reach the United States Government not later than February 10, in order to give necessary time for transportation of repatriables from distant camps and hospitals to New York in time for sailing of *Gripsholm* on February 15. It should be further emphasized to the German Government that this proposal is without derogation or prejudice to the broader proposal transmitted by Department's 3081 of December 10, 1943,¹⁴ the contents of which were transmitted by the Swiss Government to the German Legation at Bern December 14, 1943, no reply to or acknowledgment of which has yet been received."

HULL

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ International convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 336.

¹² Telegram 3081, December 10, 1943, midnight, to Bern, listing the seven American prisoners of war, not printed (711.62114 Sick/158).

¹³ In October 1943, 234 German sick and wounded prisoners of war and 1,732 surplus protected personnel, a total of 1,966 Germans, were repatriated by the United States Government; the German Government at that time sent back only 14 sick and wounded American prisoners of war (telegram 644, February 25, 9 p. m., to Bern, not printed; 711.62114 Sick/244).

¹⁴ Not printed; it contained a proposal for increasing the number of categories of sick and wounded prisoners for direct repatriation on a reciprocal basis (711.62114 Sick/158).

740.00115 European War 1939/8225 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1944.

426. American Interests—Germany. Department has delivered to Swiss Legation Washington a note dated February 8,¹⁵ transmitting following lists:

1. German non-officials to be repatriated within the framework of the existing agreement 687, to which are added 54 German men whose families were repatriated by other means, total 741. Note points out that 139 Germans originally listed have declined repatriation at this time and that 139 other individuals have been substituted therefor. It continues that a list of additional German nationals will be provided in the immediate future to provide replacements for any individuals among above-mentioned 741 who may at the last moment be unable to travel. Note points out that any of these additional persons not so substituted may depart in accordance with provisions of following paragraph.

2. List of 300 German nationals—250 at Crystal City, 40 at Kenedy and 10 chronically ill who are being offered opportunity to return to Germany in exchange for equivalent number United States nationals and nationals of the other American republics as proposed in Department's note of February 3,¹⁶ Heading II.

Note continues that a list of substitutes to cover last-minute withdrawals from this list is also being drawn up, which substitutes may also depart even if the number of 300 is exceeded. It should be noted that the 300 individuals include a majority of those named by the German Government in its recent communication to this Government as individuals at Crystal City who should be repatriated.

Note concludes that Department expects urgently indication of German willingness to implement proposals under Heading II by undertaking to facilitate travel to Lisbon to take advantage of exceptional transportation facilities offered by exchange of approximately equal number of United States nationals and nationals of the other American republics parties to this separate arrangement.

A separate note¹⁵ forwarded to Swiss Legation unchanged lists of German and French officials to be repatriated.

Inform Swiss Foreign Office, expressing hope of Department that arrangements referred to in your 778, February 8,¹⁵ will prove sufficiently flexible to cover any large number of individuals whom the Germans may add to the repatriation movement in accordance with Heading II.

HULL

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ See telegram 363, February 3, to Bern, p. 787.

711.62114 Sick/190 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1944.

452. American Interests Germany—Repatriation Sick and Wounded. At 9 p. m., Thursday, February 10, the Swiss Legation at Washington received and communicated to the Department the German Government's reply to proposal set forth in Department's 389, February 5.

According to the German Government's reply, inquiries have revealed that at the present time there are only about twenty American prisoners of war in German custody who have been examined by a mixed medical commission and found eligible for repatriation; the German Government is willing to send them to Lisbon in time for inclusion in the diplomatic exchange; the German Government wishes to receive immediate assurance that the Government of the United States for its part will embark on the *Gripsholm* all German prisoners of war in the United States who have until now been found eligible for repatriation, from 80 to 100; and any American prisoners of war in a list received by the German Foreign Office from the Swiss Legation in Berlin who are found to be eligible for repatriation will, circumstances permitting, likewise be sent to Lisbon to avail themselves of the transportation facilities of the diplomatic exchange. Because of the brief time available the German Government states that it does not feel that it will be able to include American prisoners of war whose eligibility for repatriation has been determined only by German camp physicians, and finally that in the opinion of the German Government the organization of transportation makes it essential that the reply of the United States Government reach Berlin early on February 11.

Please request Swiss Government urgently to communicate the following reply to the German Government :

"While the United States Government is distressed to learn from the German Government's communication of February 10 received in Washington at 9 p. m. the same day (21:00 o'clock) that so few of the American prisoners of war in German custody who are believed to be eligible for repatriation have so far been so designated by a mixed medical commission, it will nevertheless for its part, as proposed in its communication of February 5, return on the *Gripsholm* all sick and wounded prisoners of war who, in time to embark on the vessel, have been certified for repatriation by the mixed medical commission, which since November 20, 1943 has been functioning in the United States. The number to be embarked will not be less than 85 and is expected to be substantially greater.

The United States Government will expect the German Government to send to Lisbon for repatriation the 20 American prisoners

of war who that Government states have already been found by a mixed medical commission to be eligible for repatriation and as many more as the German Government, with diligent effort, can get ready in time to reach Lisbon by February 24 or shortly thereafter. The United States Government particularly counts upon receiving from the German Government the seven American prisoners of war who were omitted from the last exchange although included in the nominal rolls and who, according to the German Government's statement, were not repatriated because of technical difficulties.

The United States Government will furnish as quickly as possible nominal rolls of repatriable German prisoners of war not heretofore notified to the German Government, and requests the German Government for its part to furnish to the United States Government immediately the nominal rolls of those already stated to be ready for repatriation and to communicate from time to time as available the nominal rolls of additional repatriables.

It is, of course, expected that either by examination by the mixed medical commission or by examination by the medical authorities of the German Government, or by both means, commencing immediately and proceeding diligently, the eligibility of all other potential repatriables will be determined, and such of them as can be delivered at Lisbon in time for the sailing of the *Gripsholm* will be so delivered. It is further expected that such of them as cannot be delivered at Lisbon in time to embark on the exchange vessel shall be so assembled that they can readily be included in a further repatriation movement at an early date, specific proposals for which will shortly be communicated to the German Government by the Government of the United States."

Because of the small margin of time allowed by the German Government for a reply, which would have necessitated our requesting the Swiss Legation here to work all night, as the Swiss Legation kindly offered to do, this reply is being transmitted through you and a copy is being provided the Swiss Legation, Washington.

STETTINIUS

740.00115 European War 1939/8277 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 12, 1944.

[Received February 12—5:01 p. m.]

876. American Interests—Germany Baden Baden Repatriation. Legation's 870, 12th.¹⁹ Following is summary translation note dated February 12 from German Legation Bern to Swiss Foreign Office, latter has made copy available to Legation.²⁰

I. German Government considers exchange of both groups composition of which has already been foreseen in former negotiations as definite.

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ Copy of German note transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Swiss Minister on February 13, not printed.

II. German Government acknowledges willingness of United States Government to repatriate apart from 741 repatriable German nationals already named an additional 300 German nationals. German Government prepared in compensation for those 300 German nationals, pursuant United States Government's desire, to make it possible for another 300 nationals of United States or Central and South American countries to return to their native country. It might for technical reasons no longer be possible to arrange departure of those 300 persons so that they could arrive Lisbon by February 24, possibility must therefore be envisaged that group will not arrive Lisbon until beginning of March.

III. As repatriation 132 Germans from Brazil cannot take place with *Gripsholm* but with another transport, German Government will make it possible for Brazilian diplomats now detained Germany to depart from Germany and return Brazil in due time so that they arrive Lisbon simultaneously with German repatriates from Brazil. German Government awaits report concerning time of arrival Lisbon of German nationals from Brazil.

IV. German Government acknowledges receipt of information from United States Government concerning carrying of personal effects, foreign exchange and jewelry. German Government will proceed similarly at time of departure of American nationals to be repatriated but proposes an increase to \$100 the dollar amount that the repatriable nationals of both groups who have no official status be allowed to take with them.

Furthermore, German Government wishes to recall in this connection that according to a former engagement of United States Government the property which remained in North Africa belonging to members former German Consulates General Algiers and Casablanca shall also be transferred to Lisbon in execution of present exchange and shall arrive there at same time as German exchange group.²¹

V. German Government will also request Portuguese Government to make German-American exchange possible and to assume guarantee for its execution.

HARRISON

740.00115 European War 1939/8155 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1944.

533. American Interests—Germany. *Gripsholm* left New York last night carrying a total of 1310 passengers as follows:²²

I. *Official exchange:*

German officials 28; French officials, 18; German non-official nationals from other American republics included in the official ex-

²¹ Telegram 532 of February 23, to Lisbon, noted a report from Casablanca stating that "effects German Consulate shipped to Lisbon on steamer *Silva Gouvya* due Lisbon February 25th" (702.6281/79a).

²² The exchange vessel arrived in Lisbon on February 25. For additional information concerning the groups of American and German nationals exchanged, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 19, 1944, p. 189. A list of passengers aboard the *Gripsholm*, returning from Lisbon on March 6, 1944, is contained in Department of State press release No. 75 of March 11, 1944.

change, 687; additional non-official German men who were included in the official exchange at the request of German Government in order to be reunited with their families repatriated earlier, 54.

II. *Non-officials:*

Non-official German nationals being reciprocally repatriated on humanitarian grounds, 375.

III. *Sick and wounded:*

Seriously sick and seriously wounded German prisoners of war from United States, 117; seriously sick and seriously wounded German prisoners of war from Canada, 14; one of the seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war, Erich Eberhardt, who was to have been repatriated was at the last moment too ill to undergo the rigors of the journey and the number placed on board the vessel was thus 117 instead of 118 as originally contemplated.

IV. *Technical staff:*

Swiss representative, 1; Department of State representatives, 3; medical attendants, 13.

Please inform Swiss Foreign Office for information German Government, adding that Department understands that Swiss Consulate General New York is telegraphing data regarding number of invalids, number of children and quantity of baggage.

Attention of German Government should be particularly invited to fact that to meet the urgent pleas of numerous Germans that they be repatriated on compassionate grounds, 75 non-official Germans who had originally been considered as a pool from which to make replacements of last minute declinations were embarked in addition to the 300 non-official Germans whose repatriation on a reciprocal basis was originally envisaged when accepting the German Government's proposal (Heading II of Department's note February 3 to Swiss Legation, Washington, Department's 363, February 3 to you). Some of these urgent pleas were received within less than 24 hours of the sailing of the vessel; nevertheless, the United States Government overcame great technical obstacles in order to ensure the departure of those concerned. Thus the United States Government was able, without affecting the quota of 741 non-officials set for the official exchange or the quota of 300 originally set for the supplemental exchange, to embark as well the list of 75 extra persons originally designated as a pool from which to provide replacements for those two quotas.

The United States Government hopes German Government will likewise find it possible to overcome technical obstacles in order that opportunity for repatriation can be extended to a sufficient number of additional persons so that total to be exchanged in category II will not be less than 375 on each side, and suggests possibility that addi-

tional individuals to reach 375 total be drawn from internment camps in France or alternatively that United States nationals or nationals of the other American republics in France to meet this number be afforded opportunity for repatriation whether or not they are interned (see in this connection and request Swiss to repeat to German Government sense of Department's 488, February 13²³).

STETTINIUS

711.62114 Sick/342: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) ²⁴

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1944—9 p. m.

1267. American Interests—Germany—Repatriation Sick and Wounded. Your 1969, March 31.²⁵ Request Swiss Government urgently to communicate following reply to the German Government to reach that Government before the close of business on April 14.

“The Government of the United States notes the agreement of the German Government to a further exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and surplus protected personnel. The Government of the United States proposes May 17 as the earliest date for the commencement of the exchange in view of the necessity of transporting German prisoners of war held in the United States and Canada to the port of exchange.

The Government of the United States would prefer for practical reasons that the operation be carried out at one place rather than two and in this connection draws the attention of the German Government to the fact that a substantial number of the German repatriables are already assembled in Northwest Africa and that arrangements are in hand to transport the remainder from North America also to Northwest Africa in time for the exchange. It would, therefore, be most convenient if the exchange could be effected in that area and, in appreciation of the German Government's suggestion that Lisbon involves an unnecessarily long journey by rail, the Government of the United States suggests Barcelona as an alternative.

The Government of the United States notes with regret that the German Government is not at present willing to discuss the question of further exchanges.²⁶

²³ Not printed.

²⁴ Repeated to London on the same date as telegram 2948.

²⁵ Not printed; it transmitted the substance of a reply from the German Government to proposals by the United States Government concerning repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war and protected personnel (711.62114-Sick/342).

²⁶ The United States Government had proposed that similar exchanges of sick and wounded prisoners of war be conducted without further negotiation at regular intervals of 3 months beginning with 3 months from the proposed May 17 exchange. (Telegram 642, February 25, to Bern; 711.62114 Sick/244.)

The Government of the United States notes the agreement of the German Government to the use of the *Gripsholm* for the exchange as well as for the forwarding of next-of-kin parcels and prisoner of war mail. To meet the German Government's requirements in regard to the safe conduct of the vessel, necessary information including the route to be followed is being transmitted in a separate message today.²⁷

If the German Government decides to make use of a ship or ships in this connection, the Government of the United States is ready on behalf of itself and its Allies to grant safe conducts for this purpose, subject to an agreement as to the particular ship or ships and to the route selected.

As soon as the German Government accepts either Lisbon or Barcelona as the port of exchange,²⁸ the Government of the United States will request the Portuguese or Spanish Governments to cooperate. It is expected that the German Government for its part will do likewise.

The Government of the United States notes the agreement of the German Government to include in the exchange prisoners of war of Category II B²⁹ and its undertaking to communicate the nominal rolls of American repatriables 10 days before the date of the exchange. In order to insure that all American prisoners of war who have been duly nominated shall be examined medically in time for those approved for repatriation to be included in the exchange, the Government of the United States expects the German Government to employ the procedure indicated in paragraph 3 of the Department's telegram no. 3081 dated December 10, 1943,³⁰ which is already being followed by the Government of the United States.

In order that final preparations may be concluded, the Government of the United States requests that the decision of the German Government with regard to the date and port fixed for the exchange be made known by April 21.

The Government of the United States understands that the British Government is addressing a substantially similar reply to the German Government.³¹

Please acknowledge the receipt of this message immediately.

HULL

²⁷ Telegram 1266, April 13, not printed.

²⁸ According to telegram 2609 of April 24 from Bern, the German Government agreed to proposals of the United States and British Governments to effect exchange of seriously wounded on May 17 at Barcelona (740.00115 European War-1939/401).

²⁹ See model agreement annexed to the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 336, 363.

³⁰ Not printed: the United States proposed that on a reciprocal basis the qualifications for repatriation of prisoners of war whom a mixed medical commission had not been able to examine in time to permit their inclusion in the exchange operation should be determined by the medical doctors of the detaining power and that prisoners qualified for repatriation in this manner should be included in the exchange (711.62114 Sick/158).

711.62114 Sick/573a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1944.

1341. Your 1619, May 10.³¹ *Gripsholm* left New York May 2 with following categories of persons aboard:³²

195 German Prisoners of War from United States
211 German Prisoners of War from Canada
90 German civilians
Total 496.

The group of 90 German civilians is composed of the following individuals:

60 German nationals from United States to be exchanged against 60 nationals of the United States and the other American republics.
6 German nationals from Haiti to be exchanged against 6 Haitians.
21 German nationals being transported at the request of the British Government for exchange at Barcelona against 21 British nationals.
3 German nationals, Probst, Hohenberger and Schmidt³³ for whom this Government is to receive *quid pro quo*. Hohenberger is being exchanged against Louise Davies Louis, Probst against a United States national yet to be named and Schmidt against a national of one of the Central American republics yet to be named.

There will be embarked at Algiers:

144 German Prisoners of War held by the American Armed Forces.
164 German Prisoners of War held by the British Armed Forces.
82 German Prisoners of War held by the French Armed Forces.
Total 390. Grand total of 886 persons to be exchanged at Barcelona.

If information is received from Algiers of any change in number to be embarked Department will inform you.

It is understood that British will receive 812 or more repatriated Prisoners of War. No satisfactory statement has yet been received from Germans regarding United States Prisoners of War to be repatriated.

Spanish Government should be notified that exchange of civilians, unlike exchange of prisoners of war, is on a strictly numerical basis.

Repeat to Barcelona for Smith on *Gripsholm*.

HULL

³¹ Not printed.

³² On its return voyage the exchange vessel sailed from Barcelona on May 19, 4:30 p. m., and docked at Jersey City, N. J., on June 6. For additional data concerning the exchange of American and German nationals, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1944, p. 535.

³³ Walter Probst, Therese Hohenberger, and Elizabeth Schmidt.

711.62114 Sick/661 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—9:30 a. m.

A-295. As explained in an earlier telegram the *Gripsholm* is chartered by the United States Government and is operated for the Department of State by the War Shipping Administration. In making the *Gripsholm* available for exchanges of sick and wounded prisoners of war the Department of State reserved control of the vessel and the right to use it to effect concurrent exchanges of civilians to the extent such civilians might not displace or incommode prisoners of war. It was felt that public criticism would result if available space on the vessel were not used for this purpose. The repatriation of civilians was arranged by the Department and is not a concern of the Combined Repatriation Committee³⁴ which deals exclusively with the exchange of prisoners of war. This is in reference to your 1771, May 21, 10 p. m.³⁵ which Department notes was repeated to London for the Combined Repatriation Committee.

The Department agrees that it would have been desirable to notify the Spanish Government in advance of any complications which might arise in connection with the civilian exchange.³⁶ Unfortunately the Department did not itself learn until shortly before dispatch of its 1384 May 16³⁷ that the German Government had chosen to disregard the nominations made by this Government and the other American Republics for inclusion of verified nationals in the exchange. This action of the German Government was unexpected and confronted the Department with various problems. Refusal to accept the individuals approved by the Germans for inclusion in the exchange would not only have exposed these persons to serious peril but would probably have influenced the Germans to give unfavorable treatment to others of the same category. We had just received word from the Germans that

³⁴ A central organization established at London to complete the administrative arrangements necessary to carry out repatriation of prisoners of war.

³⁵ Not printed; in this telegram Ambassador Hayes indicated the desirability in future, in his opinion, to keep separate the exchanges of prisoners of war and civilians (711.62114 Sick/661).

³⁶ The German Government failed to deliver a number of civilians for exchange equal to the number of nationals of Western Hemisphere delivered in the May exchange on Spanish territory. (Telegram 1406 to Madrid; 711.62114 Sick/680g).

³⁷ Not printed; it transmitted instructions concerning disposition of nationals of the United States and the other American Republics approved by the Germans for exchange against a group of Germans from the United States contrary to the recommendations of this Government: (a) alien relatives of American citizens, and (b) persons bearing Latin American passports whose nationality had not yet been established (711.62114 Sick/598a). Ambassador Hayes reported, however, in his telegram of May 21 that no civilian repatriates were prevented from embarking on the *Gripsholm*.

(1) they had taken upon themselves to deport to the East non-Aryan alien relatives of American citizens whom we did not agree to accept for the exchange at Lisbon in March and (2) they would be similarly guided in respect of future exchanges if we refused to accept those persons nominated by Germany. Moreover the charter of the *Gripsholm* precludes its being used for refugee traffic and there were no arrangements for the reception in the Western Hemisphere of certain individuals whom the Germans were releasing. The Department accordingly made arrangements for the reception of these individuals elsewhere and for that reason gave you the instructions in its 1384, 1398 ⁸⁸ and associated telegrams. In taking this action the Department was guided by its experience in connection with exchanges at Lisbon where the Portuguese Government has not on any occasion endeavored to control the destination of the persons arriving in exchanges, merely making certain that the individuals arriving in its territory for exchange are exchanged and that appropriate provision is made for their eventual departure from Portuguese territory. It was assumed that the Spanish Government would be disposed to act similarly.

It should be clearly understood that there was no question of any of the individuals delivered by Barcelona not being accepted in the exchange by the United States and the other American Republics. Our acceptance of individuals in an exchange does not, however, oblige us to transport those individuals on any specific vessel or to carry them to any specific destination. We do not propose to insist to the Spanish Government that Germans delivered in exchanges on Spanish territory must proceed to Germany. There is no reason why the German Government might not take them to Paris, to Marseilles or to any other place where it arranges for their reception. Furthermore if the German Government should wish some of its exchanges to leave Barcelona by train and others by vessel this Government would not be disposed to object to such an arrangement. It appears that for reasons best known to the German Government and assumably associated with its desire to obtain the protection of a hospital ship to Marseilles and hospital trains north from that port, that the Government preferred in this exchange to have all the exchanges depart from Barcelona simultaneously on one vessel.

The Department would be grateful if you would inform it as soon as possible if it is wrong in assuming that in any future exchanges of civilians which may take place on Spanish territory it may be

⁸⁸ Not printed.

possible to arrange with the Spanish authorities that the question of the destination of the exchangees be not raised provided the exchange takes place and concrete arrangements are made for the exchangees to leave Spanish territory within a reasonable period of time.³⁹

HULL

711.62114 Sick/7-1144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1944.

2381. American Interests Germany—Repatriation Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War. Request Swiss Government to inform the German Government that the Government of the United States is prepared to arrange a further exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and surplus protected personnel upon the basis of the following proposals:

“1. The exchange shall take place at a port or ports to be agreed upon.

2. A Mixed Medical Commission has just completed its tour of United States camps in which German prisoners of war are detained, and has qualified about 125 German prisoners for direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country. This number is in addition to those German prisoners named in the Department's 2127 of June 22,⁴⁰ numbering 37, who since the last repatriation operation were determined to be eligible. If agreeable to the German Government, the Government of the United States is prepared to return all of the above prisoners in exchange for the approximately 250 American prisoners of war in German custody who were determined by the Mixed Medical Commissions to be eligible for direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country prior to the exchange which occurred at Barcelona on May 17, 1944, but who were not included therein. The date of September 1 is suggested for the consideration of the German Government as the date for the proposed exchange.

3. The Government of the United States would expect nominal rolls of the American personnel who will be repatriated under the proposal outlined in Paragraph 2 to be submitted by the German Government at the earliest feasible date, but in any event, so as to reach the Government of the United States not later than July 25, unless such rolls already have been transmitted prior to that time in execution of point *Quarto* of the United States-German agreement concerning the activities of Mixed Medical Commissions.⁴¹ The

³⁹ In airgram A-268, June 21, 7 p. m., Ambassador Hayes assured the Department that the Spanish Government had not raised and was not expected to raise any question with respect to the destinations of civilian repatriates exchanged in Spain provided satisfactory arrangements were made for their prompt departure from the country (740.00115 European War 1939/6-2144).

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ See note of May 27, 1943, from the Swiss Legation, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 50.

Government of the United States would further expect to be assured that such nominal rolls comprise all the United States prisoners of war in German custody who were determined by Mixed Medical Commissions to be eligible for direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country prior to the exchange which occurred at Barcelona on May 17, 1944, but who were not included therein. The Government of the United States would, naturally, furnish nominal rolls of the German prisoners of war qualified during the tour of the Mixed Medical Commission referred to in paragraph 2, and furnish the German Government equivalent assurances as to them.

4. It is understood that a parallel proposal for a repatriation will shortly be made to the German Government by the British Commonwealth Governments."

Please ask German Government urgently to reply if possible by July 20 as to whether it agrees, in order that necessary technical arrangements may be initiated without delay.

HULL

711.62114 Sick/7-2144: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 21, 1944.

[Received July 21—6:54 p. m.]

4685. American Interests Germany. Legation's 4658, July 20.⁴² Foreign Office note dated today quotes German reply Department's 2381 July 11 (translation follows).

1. German Government agrees to further exchange seriously wounded soldiers and excess protected personnel.

2. German Government reserves right propose place exchange.

3. German Government intends repatriate in new exchange all British and American officers and soldiers in German custody who have thus far been declared eligible for repatriation by Mixed Medical Commission. Among these there should be approximately 250 American POWs.⁴³

4. German Government assumes American Government will repatriate:

(a) Approximately 400 German sanitary officers, sanitary non-commissioned officers and sanitary enlisted men who at end February were excess in American POW camps North Africa especially in camps numbers 131 and 326.

(b) 700 members German sanitary service who are in excess in North America especially in Crossville, Mexia and Ruston camps also in most other camps.

(c) 800 seriously wounded who were left behind in Italy by German troops i.e. 150 in civilian hospital at Rome and 650 at Civita Castellana.

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ Prisoners of War.

5. German Government assumes further that seriously wounded and excess protected personnel from camps North Africa to extent that they are not under immediate British or American administration will be repatriated. In last exchange May 17 only those repatriables given consideration who were under medical treatment near Oran. According information given by repatriates substantial number those eligible for repatriation are in other hospitals and camps.

6. German Government agreeable beginning September as probable exchange date.

7. Lists both exchange groups are to be forwarded at least 10 days in advance of exchange date to Swiss Government Bern.

HARRISON

711.62114 Sick/7-2144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*⁴⁴

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1944.

2682. American Interests Germany—Repatriation Sick and Wounded. Your 4685, July 21. Please request Swiss urgently to communicate following reply to German Government to reach that Government before the close of business on August 5.

“1. The United States Government notes the agreement of the German Government to a further exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and surplus protected personnel and to beginning of September as a probable exchange date.

2. This Government suggests to the German Government for its consideration and agreement the date of September 8 as the exchange date and the port of Göteborg, subject to the agreement of the Swedish Government, as the point of exchange. As soon as the German Government accepts Göteborg as the port of exchange, the United States Government will request the Swedish Government to cooperate, and it expects the German Government for its part will do likewise.

3. The United States Government will repatriate in the proposed exchange approximately 356 seriously sick and seriously wounded German prisoners of war, including not only the approximately 162 German prisoners of war who have already been passed by the Mixed Medical Commissions as heretofore notified to the German Government, but also prisoners of war recently taken in Normandy who, by reason of their physical condition, are deemed by the United States medical authorities to be entitled to repatriation. This Government would appreciate it if, in view of the manifest humanitarian considerations, the German Government also could see its way clear to add to the approximately 250 American prisoners of war in its custody who, it has stated, have been declared eligible for repatriation by Mixed Medical Commissions, any American prisoners of war who could be approved for repatriation by the German medical authorities in time to be included in the exchange.

⁴⁴ Repeated to London on the same date as telegram 6163, with heading “For Combined Repatriation Committee”.

4. Since eligibility of the majority of prisoners of war to be returned in this repatriation has already been determined, this Government proposes to transmit to the German Government, through the Swiss Government, nominal rolls of the German prisoners of war to be returned by it so that such rolls will be received by the German Government five days prior to the sailing of the exchange ship from New York. The United States Government expects that the German Government will likewise transmit nominal rolls of the American prisoners to be returned by it in this repatriation, so that such rolls will reach the United States Government five days prior to the sailing of the exchange ship from New York. In order to be at Göteborg for the September 8 exchange date, it will be necessary for the exchange ship to sail from New York not later than August 24.

5. With reference to numbered paragraph 4 in Legation's telegram under reference, the United States Government invites the attention of the German Government to the German-American agreement⁴⁵ which permits the retention of two medical officers, one dental officer, one chaplain, and six enlisted sanitary personnel per 1000 German prisoners of war. Since samples of the official identification documents issued by the German Government to German protected personnel, in accordance with Article 21 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention,⁴⁶ were not received by this Government until July 28, 1944, in spite of repeated requests made by this Government therefore, the United States Government has not been able in the past to establish satisfactorily the status of certain German prisoners in its custody who claim to be protected personnel. However, a survey among German prisoners of war in United States custody who claim to be protected personnel is now being made and the United States Government will return in the proposed September 8 exchange all surplus German protected personnel, whose status can be satisfactorily established in time, and who can be accommodated without reducing the number of spaces required for German seriously sick and seriously wounded being returned from the North American continent. If it should not be possible to include in this exchange all of the protected personnel who may be found to be in excess of the number this Government is permitted to retain, this Government desires to assure the German Government that they will be returned in the earliest subsequent repatriation operations. It is the intention of the United States Government to notify the German Government of the results of the mentioned survey when it has been completed. This Government wishes to point out to the German Government that the United States Government has consistently acted in good faith in returning surplus German protected personnel as is evidenced by the return of 1763 to whom it accorded such status in the three repatriation operations that have been completed to date. In these operations, no American surplus protected personnel were returned by the German Government.

6. The United States Government notes the request of the German Government for the inclusion in this exchange of the 800 wounded

⁴⁵ See note of August 6, 1943, to the Swiss Minister, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 65; see also Swiss note of May 17, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴⁶ International convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and the sick of armies in the field, signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, *ibid.*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 321.

Germans left behind in Italy by German troops. These prisoners have been absorbed into United States and British prisoner of war camp and hospital systems and it is impossible to determine to what extent they are included among the German sick and wounded to be repatriated.

7. The United States Government understands that the French authorities in North Africa intend to avail themselves of the opportunity presented by this exchange to return German seriously sick and wounded in their custody. The United States Government will be glad to make available to the French authorities in North Africa for this purpose, and to the extent desired by them, United States facilities in that area. However, this Government wishes it to be understood that in so proceeding it does not assume any responsibilities by reason thereof.

8. The United States Government intends to use the *Gripsholm* to transport German repatriates from North America and the United Kingdom to Göteborg and to return from there with Allied repatriates. Should the German Government contemplate the use of a vessel or vessels to transport the repatriates to and from the exchange port, the United States Government should be promptly notified, and in any event not later than 14 days prior to sailing, with respect to the characteristics of the vessel or vessels so to be used, the approximate date of their departures and arrivals and the courses to be followed in order that assurances of safe conduct may be granted by the United States Government and its associates. To meet the German Government's requirements with regard to the safe conduct for the *Gripsholm*, necessary information including the route to be followed and approximate dates of arrivals and departures, will be transmitted in a separate message at the earliest moment.

9. The United States Government understands that the British Government is addressing a substantially similar reply to the German Government in this connection.

10. It is proposed if agreeable to the German Government to utilize the *Gripsholm* for the carriage of prisoner of war mail and relief supplies in each direction.⁷⁷

Please acknowledge receipt of this message immediately.

STETTINIUS

711.62114 Sick/8-1344 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 13, 1944.

[Received August 13—10:16 a. m.]

5266. American Interests Germany POW repatriation. Department's 2682, 4th, Legation's 5186, 10th.⁴⁷ Foreign Office made available to Legation at 11:45 a. m. Sunday,⁴⁸ copy of note dated August 12

⁴⁷ Latter not printed.

⁴⁸ August 13.

from German Legation Bern ⁴⁹ of which following substance translation.

1. German Government agrees to exchange of seriously wounded and seriously sick soldiers and excess sanitary personnel on September 8 at Göteborg as well as simultaneously to exchange approximately 500 German civilians from Great Britain against a corresponding number of British civilians.

2. As United States Government has on various occasions cited figures regarding seriously wounded German POWs repatriated from American custody and those concerning the number of repatriated American POWs whereby to draw comparison it must be observed that after effecting the Göteborg exchange the number of repatriated Americans will attain one and one half percent of total number American POWs in German hands while United States Government with a total of 660 repatriated seriously sick and seriously wounded will represent only a small fraction of one percent of total number of German POWs in American custody. No American sanitary personnel have been included in exchange transport because there are fewer than 200 members of such personnel in German hands that is fewer than ten by 1,000 and which can therefore be retained.

At present it is not yet possible to determine whether in view present transport difficulties it will be possible in accordance wish of United States Government to include in exchange those seriously wounded who have not already been examined by mixed medical commission.

3. German Government agrees to transfer of German seriously wounded and seriously sick from North Africa with American facilities.

4. German Government agrees that *Gripsholm* may be used for carrying POW mail and relief supplies on outward and return voyage.

HARRISON

711.62114 Sick/8-2344: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 23, 1944.

[Received August 23—9:45 a. m.]

5501. American Interests, Germany. POW Repatriation. Department's 2682, 4th. Swiss note August 23 quotes note dated August 22 from German Legation, Bern of which following substance translation.

⁴⁹ Telegram 5270, August 14, from Bern reported: "Swiss note August 13th received Monday confirms Legation's 5266, August 13." (711.62114 Sick/8-1444)

German Government from outset made repatriation of excess German sanitary personnel from American custody an assumption (*Voraussetzung*) for the exchange of seriously wounded POWs and excess sanitary personnel in September this year and in that connection pointed out that 700 excess German sanitary personnel are in United States and 400 in North Africa (German Legation refers to its note, substance of which communicated Legation's 4685, July 21). American Government now intends repatriate only 100 German sanitary personnel on exchange vessel *Gripsholm* instead of 1100. German Government desires from United States Government clarification concerning computation this number. German Government is not prepared accept American proposal that excess sanitary personnel in so far as they are not now repatriated be included in a future exchange.

HARRISON

711.62114 Slek/8-2344 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1944.

2917. American Interests—Germany—Repatriation POWs. Reurtel 5501, August 23. Please request Swiss to inform the German Government that the communication regarding surplus protected personnel was received August 23, the date upon which the *Gripsholm* sailed in accordance with previous assurances given the German Government.

The United States Government explained fully in its telegram no. 2682, August 4 the situation with regard to the identification of surplus protected personnel held in the United States. The reply of the German Government to the proposals set forth in Department's 2682, which reply accepted September 8 as the exchange date at Göteborg (Legation's 5266, August 13), made no further reference to surplus protected personnel in American custody. The United States Government, therefore, proceeded with the repatriation operation on the assumption that the German Government fully understood the situation and comprehended the difficulties encountered by the American authorities in identifying German protected personnel. In this connection, it is to be noted that the examination then in progress of those claiming protected status was based upon the official identification documents furnished by the German Government which were received by this Government July 28, 1944. This examination is still continuing and will not be concluded for several weeks. Upon its conclusion, the German Government will be informed of the total number of surplus protected personnel in the custody of the United States Armed Forces.

In accordance with the assurances contained in paragraph 5 of the Department's 2682, all available accommodations aboard the *Gripsholm* which were not needed for the return from the North American continent of German seriously sick and seriously wounded were filled with the protected personnel who at that time were found to be surplus. Thus the one hundred protected personnel placed aboard the *Gripsholm* were included as earnest of this Government's good faith although the examination referred to above was not completed prior to the departure of the *Gripsholm*.

The Government of the United States renews its assurances to the German Government that protected personnel which the present survey may reveal in excess of the number this Government is permitted to retain, will be returned as soon as possible.

HULL

711.62114 Sick/9-244 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 2, 1944.

[Received September 2—6: 18 p. m.]

5775. AmInterests Göteborg Exchange. Department's 2917, August 24. Swiss note September 2 quotes note August 31 from German Legation Bern of which following substance translation.

German Government by German Legation notes dated July 21 and August 22 (corresponding Legation's 4685, July 21 and 5501 August 23) pointed out to United States Government that repatriation approximately 1100 excess sanitary personnel calculated by German Government was made an assumption (*Voraussetzung*) of the exchange from the outset. Simultaneously it was communicated that German Government is not prepared to accept the United States proposal that excess sanitary personnel insofar as not now repatriated be included in a future exchange. In this connection the decision was left to the United States Government as to whether it would select the repatriable sanitary personnel from its custody in North America, Africa or Europe. Inasmuch as according to lists thus far available only 100 German sanitary personnel are returning from the United States, the earliest possible report is requested whether the American Government contemplates the inclusion of further sanitary personnel held in its custody in Africa or Europe.

It is also pointed out that American Government in its statements conveyed both in Swiss notes dated August 7 and August 28 (Department's 2682, August 4 and 2917, August 24) declared with respect to point 5 that all available berthing space on *Gripsholm* not required for seriously wounded returning from North American continent would be filled with protected personnel. In Barcelona exchange, for

example, *Gripsholm* had minimum capacity 800 seriously wounded and 200 or more able-bodied persons. However as it embarked, according to figures thus far available, only 523 seriously wounded and 150 sanitary personnel, it could have well taken aboard another 300 to 400 able-bodied sanitary personnel. German Government, in view above-mentioned American declaration, had therefore to expect that at least this number of sanitary personnel would still be added from American custody in Africa or possibly Europe, and awaits clarification this question.

HARRISON

711.62114 Sick/9-244 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) ⁵⁰

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1944.

3048. American Interests Germany—Göteborg Exchange. Reurtel 5775, September 2. Please request Swiss to inform German Government as follows:

The Government of the United States which received the substance of the German Legation's note of August 31 ⁵¹ on September 3, refers to its communication of August 4 (Department's 2682) which informed the German Government that the United States Government would return in the Göteborg exchange "all surplus German protected personnel, whose status can be satisfactorily established in time, and who can be accommodated without reducing the number of spaces required for German seriously sick and seriously wounded being returned from the North American continent". The United States embarked 100 protected personnel as an earnest of its good faith, despite the fact that the survey mentioned in paragraph 5 of Department's 2682 had not at that time been completed and therefore an actual excess had not yet been ascertained.

Furthermore, no additional space could have been available on the *Gripsholm* in any case, because the large number of litter and mental cases who were being embarked unavoidably reduced the total numbers which could be safely and humanely transported.

The survey of German personnel claiming protected status is expected to be concluded about the middle of September. The Government of the United States, recognizing the obligation imposed by Article 12 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, assures the German Government that it will return all surplus protected personnel as soon as possible after the completion of the survey referred to irrespective of further exchange operations.

HULL

⁵⁰ Repeated to London as telegram 7143, with heading "For Combined Repatriation Committee".

⁵¹ See *supra*.

711.62114 Sick/9-1044 : Telegram

The Consul at Göteborg (Corcoran) to the Secretary of State

GÖTEBORG, September 10, 1944.

[Received September 10—8:42 a. m.]

73. *Gripsholm* sailed at 8:30 this morning September 10 carrying 967 passengers of which 42 are Canadians, 689 British and 236 American.

Total repatriates on three vessels⁵² approximately 2700.⁵³

CORCORAN

711.62114/11-744 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1944.

4085. The following communication has today been transmitted to the Swiss Legation at Washington with regard to the repatriation of surplus protected personnel:

"The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of a memorandum dated October 23, 1944, from the Legation of Switzerland⁵⁴ in charge of German interests in the United States inquiring with regard to the number of German protected personnel in the custody of the United States Government who are eligible for repatriation and when they will be returned. The Department of State also refers to a note dated November 7, 1944, from the Legation of Switzerland⁵⁵ quoting the text in translation of a note dated November 3, 1944, from the German Legation at Bern in which the German Government raises the question as to the proper status of surplus sanitary personnel after their repatriation.

The survey of German protected personnel conducted by the United States Government has revealed a deficiency in medical and dental officers and chaplains in the custody of the United States Government, but a surplus of approximately 3500 enlisted protected personnel all of whom are held in Europe and North Africa. This number is naturally subject to change in accordance with the number of German combatant troops held by the United States Government.

In this connection, this Government's attention has been recently drawn to a press release datelined Berlin September 8, which appeared in *Voelkische Beobachter* Number 253, dated September 9, 1944, and which stated in translation "Through the assignment of necessary skilled women employees several 10,000 [*sic*] soldiers in the sanitary

⁵² The *Gripsholm*, *Drottningholm*, and *Arundel Castle*.

⁵³ The *Gripsholm* arrived on September 26 at Jersey City, N. J. For additional data concerning (1) the American and German nationals exchanged, (2) repatriation of British personnel at the same time, at Göteborg, and (3) detention of the exchange ship at Kristiansand, Norway, by German authorities and the forcible removal from the vessel of two crew members, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1, 1944, pp. 355-356.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Missing from Department files.

service of the armed forces who are strong enough for combat duty will be released for the front.' This Government cannot fail to observe that, under the aforementioned policy of the German Government, the able-bodied among the surplus sanitary personnel who would be repatriated might be diverted to other than sanitary duties. It is the opinion of this Government that if such an action is accomplished, it would be contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, which contemplates the return of sanitary personnel solely in order to enable them to resume their sanitary activities in their own armies. It is observed that the German Government is apparently in agreement with the Government of the United States on this point, since in the aforementioned note of November 3, 1944, from the German Legation in Bern the German Government expresses its adherence to the principle that sanitary personnel captured by the enemy are not prisoners of war but are to be returned to resume their sanitary activities in their own armies.

Accordingly, the United States Government desires to be assured by the German Government that none of the repatriated German sanitary personnel will be utilized in any military duties other than those which gave rise to their protected status and, further, requests that the German Government will issue the necessary instructions, through the protecting Power, to enable the United States Government to secure prior to repatriation the written parole of each individual repatriate not to assume combat duties against the United States or any of its allies or cobelligerents. Upon receipt of the aforementioned assurance and individual paroles, the United States Government will return these surplus sanitary personnel at the earliest possible opportunity by the most convenient way compatible with their present location. Upon receipt of the reply of the German Government communicating the requested assurance and indicating that the requested instructions have been transmitted the United States Government will propose specific ways and a time or times for the return of these personnel.

The United States Government hopes that the German Government on its part will take advantage of the occasion of the return of German protected personnel as proposed above, to repatriate any surplus American protected personnel in its custody. According to information thus far received from the German Government, it has in custody a surplus of 93 United States enlisted protected personnel. This suggestion is not a condition to the return of the German surplus protected personnel by the United States Government as set forth above, but is merely proposed for consideration by the German Government in order that the purposes of the Convention may be mutually accomplished. The United States Government assures the German Government in this connection that any surplus American protected personnel who are returned by the German Government will not be utilized for combat duty, and is agreeable to issuing, through the protecting Power, instructions which will authorize American sanitary personnel who may be repatriated to give their individual written paroles in the same sense as that set forth above.

The sense of the foregoing has been transmitted to the American Legation, Bern, for communication to the German Government, through the Swiss Government.

The matters set forth in the Legation's note dated November 7, 1944, are still being investigated and a further reply will be made at the earliest opportunity with regard to them.

This Government would appreciate receiving an early reply from the German Government in this connection."

Please notify Swiss Government of the foregoing and request it urgently to inform German Government.

Sent to Bern repeated to London as Department's 10142 of Dec. 4 with heading for Combined Repatriation Committee.

STETTINIUS

711.62114 Sick/12-544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1944—9 p. m.

2437. Reurtel 4919, December 1, 7 p. m.⁵⁶ This Government and the British Commonwealth are negotiating with the German Government for a further exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and civilians. It has been proposed to the German Government that such an exchange take place on January 17 at Göteborg, Sweden, subject of course to the agreement of the Swedish Government. It is proposed to repatriate from the United States in this exchange 850 civilians and 1100 sick and wounded prisoners of war. It is anticipated that the Canadian Government will repatriate approximately 100 sick and wounded, and the British Government 1000. It is therefore expected that the exchange at Göteborg will involve 3050 German nationals and a number of Allied nationals yet to be determined.

This Government expects to use the *Gripsholm* and such other supplementary shipping as may be necessary to transport the repatriates from the United States. As soon as details have been worked out in regard to additional shipping necessary for this operation, you will be advised.

You should inform the Swedish Government in the above sense and inquire whether that Government is agreeable to the use of Göteborg as an exchange point on the date indicated. In discussing this question, you should again refer to the great appreciation of this Government for the splendid cooperation of the Swedish Government in the two previous exchanges and express the hope of the United States Government that the Swedish Government will find it possible to participate in this humanitarian endeavor. In discussing this question with the Swedish Government, you should stress our desire to avoid any publicity whatsoever, pending an agreement with the German Government in regard to such an exchange.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

The Department will furnish you with further details as early as possible and will keep you informed of all developments.

You should repeat your reply to Bern and to London for the information of the Combined Repatriation Committee.

STETTINIUS

740.00115 E.W./12-544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1944.

4103. Reference Department's 4010, November 27, 1944.⁵⁷ In a separate telegram,⁵⁸ the Department is communicating to you proposals to the German Government for an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. This communication suggests that an exchange take place at Göteborg, Sweden, subject to the concurrence of the Swedish Government, on or about January 17.

The Swiss Legation in Washington has furnished the Department⁵⁹ with a list of German nationals whose repatriation is desired by the German Government, and has indicated that the German Government desires that after consideration of this list, preference be given to German nationals from the other American republics interned in the United States and to German nationals formerly resident in the United States, now interned in this country.

Please request the Swiss Government to inform the German Government of our desire to proceed with the civilian exchange as outlined in previous instructions to you and of our desire that such an exchange take place in conjunction with the sick and wounded exchange and at the place and on the date suggested in the proposals for the latter exchange.

The *Gripsholm*, which will be used in this exchange, will carry 300 sick and wounded prisoners of war and 850 civilians on the outward voyage. The remainder of the German sick and wounded will be transported by facilities mentioned in the Department's separate message under reference.

The United States Government is giving all possible consideration to the list of German nationals furnished by the Swiss Legation and will at the earliest possible time communicate to the Swiss Government a list of the German civilians to be repatriated from this country.

STETTINIUS

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ Telegram 4108, December 5, *infra*.

⁵⁹ Memorandum of November 28, 1944, not printed.

711.62114 Sick/12-544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1944.

4108. American Interests Germany—Repatriation Sick and Wounded. Please request Swiss Government to inform the German Government that the United States Government is prepared to arrange a further exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war upon the basis of the following proposals:

“(1) The exchange shall take place on or about January 17. The United States Government suggests for the consideration and acceptance of the German Government, subject to the agreement of the Swedish Government, that Göteborg shall be the exchange point to which German repatriables from the North American continent, other than those included in paragraph 2, and the American repatriables, shall be delivered.

(2) The United States Government suggests that the German Government employ the hospital ship *Gradisca* to collect, from Mediterranean ports to be designated later, German repatriables who may be held in the custody of the United States Government in that theater, and to deposit them at Trieste or some other port to be agreed upon. In order to facilitate the movement of German repatriables, the Government of the United States is willing to arrange for the *Gradisca* to make a call prior to the exchange date to remove such German repatriables as can at that time be delivered to German Government. Except for this proposed call, the remainder of the German repatriables to be carried by the *Gradisca* will be delivered contemporaneously with the Göteborg operation.

(3) If the foregoing is agreeable, the number of German sick and wounded prisoners of war to be returned by the United States Government through each of the aforementioned points will be notified sufficiently in advance to permit the German Government to make the necessary arrangements.

(4) The number of German seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war in the custody of the United States Government to be repatriated in the proposed exchange is expected to be approximately 2800. This number includes prisoners of war in categories II-A and II-B of the Model Agreement annexed to the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, who have been found eligible for repatriation by Mixed Medical Commissions and American military medical authorities in accordance with the recent arrangement between the United States Government and the German Government.

(5) The United States Government will transmit the nominal rolls of the German prisoners of war who will be repatriated in this exchange not later than 10 days prior to the exchange date. The United States Government expects that the German Government for its part will likewise transmit not later than 10 days prior to the exchange date, the lists of the names of American prisoners of war it will return.

(6) The United States Government further expects to be assured by the German Government that (1) the lists furnished by the German Government will comprise all the seriously sick and seriously wounded

American prisoners of war held by the German Government who, at the time of the transmission of the nominal rolls, have been found eligible for direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country, by either Mixed Medical Commissions or German military medical authorities; (2) that the German Government will continue after the transmission of the nominal rolls to examine sick and wounded American prisoners of war and will return those found eligible for repatriation in time to be included in the exchange; and (3) that all American prisoners of war in (1) and (2) above will be repatriated in the proposed exchange. The United States Government now furnishes to the German Government the equivalent assurances as to those German prisoners of war in the custody of the United States Government who are determined to be eligible for repatriation.

(7) The United States Government has been informed that the German Government was not able to return at Göteborg, Sweden in September 1944, five seriously sick and seriously wounded American prisoners of war who had been approved for repatriation by the Mixed Medical Commissions in May 1944. The United States Government therefore expects that the German Government will also return these individuals in the proposed exchange.

(8) The United States Government intends to make use of the *Gripsholm* and such additional supplementary shipping as may be necessary to transport German repatriables in its custody to the exchange points. Upon the acceptance of these proposals by the German Government, the United States Government will request assurances of safe conduct from the German Government and its associates for the vessels used in this exchange. In this connection the United States Government recalls the incident which occurred off Kristiansand, Norway, on September 11, 1944, when the *Gripsholm*, carrying British and American repatriates from Göteborg was stopped and forced to put into Kristiansand where two members of the crew were forcibly taken from the vessel. The United States Government wishes to be assured by the German Government that it will not interfere in any way with the vessels used by the United States Government in this exchange, the members of their crews or their passengers.

(9) It is proposed if the German Government is agreeable to utilize the *Gripsholm* and supplementary shipping used in this operation to carry prisoner of war mail and relief supplies in both directions.

(10) It is understood that parallel proposals for an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war will shortly be made to the German Government by the British Commonwealth Governments."

Please request Swiss Government to transmit these proposals to the German Government to reach that Government before the close of business on December 6 and to ask the German Government to reply urgently and, if possible, by December 13 as to whether these proposals are acceptable in order that the necessary technical arrangements for this exchange may be initiated without delay.

STETTINIUS

711.62114 Sick/12-1544 : Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 15, 1944.

[Received December 15—11: 59 p. m.]

8150. American Interests Germany, Repatriation Sick and Wounded. Foreign Office note December 14 quotes following from note December 14 from German Legation Bern (translation from German). Numbered paragraphs refer numbered paragraphs your 4108, December 5.

“The German Government agrees to a further exchange of sick and wounded POWs on January 17, 1945.

The five POWs left behind in September (paragraph numbered 7) will be included in the forthcoming exchange.

The German Government gives the assurance desired by the American Government regarding paragraph 6 concerning American POWs in German custody.

The German Government agrees to the use of the proposed exchange ships for the transportation of POW mail and NOK⁶⁰ parcels in both directions (numbered paragraph 9) and expects a similar assurance from the British Government.

In paragraph numbered 2 of the American proposal it is not clear what is meant by the use of the German hospital ship *Gradisca*. The German Government prefers not to consider at all the use of the *Gradisca* and to carry out the whole exchange insofar as possible through Switzerland as the exchange point. This would also be in the interest of those British and American repatriables who are interned in middle and south Germany.”

Swiss note adds that as regards German proposal that exchange take place on Swiss territory the Swiss authorities agree in principle to facilitate transit through Switzerland of repatriate convoys.

HUDDLE

740.00115 EW/12-1844 : Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 18, 1944.

[Received December 18—5: 40 p. m.]

8203. American Interests. American-German Civilian Exchange. Your 4103, December 5th. Foreign Office note today quotes following from note December 16 from German Legation, Bern (translated from German).

“(1) The German Government agrees with the proposed German-American exchange of civilians for the middle of January. It proposes Switzerland as exchange point.”

⁶⁰ Next-of-kin.

"(2) To avoid transportation difficulties it is necessary that the exchange of civilians on the SS *Gripsholm* does not take place at the same time as the seriously sick and wounded exchange, but approximately four days prior thereto."

"(3) 34 Cuban nationals are held in Spain from a partially carried out Cuban-German exchange, whose repatriation is desired by the Cuban Government. The German Government agrees to authorize the repatriation of these Cuban citizens within the framework of the number of 850 Americans who are to be exchanged."

HUDDLE

711.62114 Sick/12-2144: Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 21, 1944.

[Received December 21—10:58 a. m.]

8249. American Interests American German Exchange. Your 4223, December 15.⁶¹ Legation's 8209, December 18.⁶¹ Following is translation from French substance Swiss Foreign Office notice December 19th received today.

(1) Swiss Government agrees that exchange seriously wounded sanitary personnel and civilians to be completed in whole or in part in January 1945 take place Swiss territory.

(2) In case where it appears necessary in carrying out exchange to lodge for several days in Switzerland POWs and civilians, Swiss authorities prepared, if American Government so desires, to take necessary measures this effect. In this case Foreign Office should be informed earliest possible time in advance of number persons to be lodged and also date of their entry into Switzerland and length their sojourn.

(3) To facilitate exchange operations Swiss Government will willingly make available sanitary trains which will travel between German-Swiss frontier and a port in southern France including locomotives and coal necessary for journey. Simultaneously Swiss Government expresses the hope that an equivalent quantity of coal may be returned, for example, at the Mediterranean port designated as terminus.

(4) If American Government accepts offer utilize Swiss sanitary trains Foreign Office requests Legation so inform it earliest possible time and subsequently at least a week in advance of number of persons to be transported and itinerary proposed.⁶²

HUDDLE

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² According to telegram 8334, December 26, from Bern, official acceptance by the German Government of Swiss proposal to effect exchange in Switzerland was received by the Swiss Foreign Office on December 26 (711.62114 Sick/12-2644).

740.00115 EW/12-2044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1944.

4307. American Interests—Germany—Civilian Exchange. There was delivered to the Swiss Legation at Washington today, the list of 750 German civilians, plus the 25 referred to in the Department's 4282, December 20.⁶³ Of the 208 specifically named by the German Government for repatriation, 136 are included in the list, 29 refused repatriation, 5 could not be found and this Government, on grounds of national security, was unable to agree to the repatriation at this time of 38 of those named by the German Government.

The Swiss Legation was informed that the seamen included in the list would be embarked on the *Gripsholm* to the extent to which the German Government agrees, prior to the sailing date, to permit the departure from Germany of the American counterparts.

It was pointed out to the Legation that this Government had given preference as requested by the German Government to German nationals from the other American republics and to those former German residents of the United States, who are now interned in this country. Reciprocally, it was expected that the German Government would give consideration to the repatriation of American civilians in line with suggestions which may be made by the Swiss representative at Berlin in charge of American interests.

STETTINIUS

740.00115 EW/12-2644 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1944—4 p. m.

4342. Department is communicating to you two separate telegrams in plain language regarding: (1) civilian exchange and (2) sick and wounded exchange. These messages are numbered respectively: 4340 and 4341.⁶⁴

These messages are to be held by you and not delivered to Swiss for transmission to German Government until receipt by you of a telegram from the Embassy at London stating that the Allied Military authorities have given their approval for the exchange to take place through Switzerland.⁶⁵ London is obtaining the necessary approval

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ Both dated December 26, printed *infra*.

⁶⁵ Telegram 11457, December 27, 1944, 3 p. m., indicated concurrence by Allied military authorities in proposal that the entire combined exchange of civilians and sick and wounded prisoners of war be effected in Switzerland (via Marseilles) (711.62114 Sick/12-2744).

and is being instructed to advise you immediately by telegraph when these messages may be delivered to the Swiss.

Furthermore, the Embassy at Paris is being requested to inform you direct when French authorities have agreed to the exchange operation.

Please coordinate the delivery to the Swiss of these messages with your British colleague.

STETTINIUS

740.00115 EW/12-1844 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1944.

4340. American Interests Germany—Civilian Exchange. Your 8203, December 18. It is noted (1) that German Government is agreeable to proposed civilian exchange to take place the middle of January and that German Government proposes Switzerland as an exchange point, (2) that in order to avoid transportation difficulties, it is necessary that the civilian exchange not take place at the same time as the seriously sick and wounded exchange, but approximately four days prior thereto, and (3) that German Government is willing to authorize, within the framework of this exchange, the repatriation of the 34 Cuban nationals now held in Spain who are a part of a partially carried out Cuban-German exchange.

With reference to (1) the United States Government is agreeable that the exchange take place in Switzerland to the extent that such an exchange can be coordinated with the sick and wounded prisoner of war exchange which forms the subject of a separate message.⁶⁶ With reference to (2) the proposals being made by this Government in regard to the sick and wounded exchange suggest that, because of transportation difficulties, there take place in Switzerland a combined exchange of sick and wounded and civilians in two parts: the first part involving 1900 persons, to take place on January 17 and the other involving the remainder of the sick and wounded and the civilians to take place on January 25. It is believed that such an exchange in two installments eight days apart will fully meet the requirements of (2) above. In so far as this Government is concerned, it makes no difference whether the 875 United States and other American civilians (ReDeptel 4282 December 20, 1944⁶⁷) are included in

⁶⁶ Telegram 4341, *infra*.

⁶⁷ Not printed; in this telegram the Chargé in Switzerland was instructed "to inform German Government that this Government is prepared to include in the forthcoming exchange 25 German civilians now held in the European theater of operations who are considered eligible for repatriation because of illness or old age" and that the German Government, reciprocally, should permit the departure from Germany of 25 United States nationals deserving special consideration because of illness or age (740.00115 E.W./12-2044).

the first or second group to reach Switzerland, but it is emphasized that the German civilians must, because of transportation conditions, be included in the second group. (3) In order to be of assistance to the Cuban Government, this Government is agreeable to the proposal made by the German Government in regard to the repatriation of the 34 Cuban nationals now in Spain, on the condition that the German Government accepts the proposals made in the Department's 4282 in regard to the 25 civilians in Europe, thus increasing to 875 the total number of United States and Latin American nationals, inclusive of the 34 Cubans in this exchange. Of these 875, it is thus expected that 841, including the merchant seamen, will be exchanged through Switzerland. The United States Government will deliver 875 German civilians, including seamen through Switzerland.

It is to be understood, of course, that the German Government will, upon the date which the final exchange occurs, authorize the Spanish Government to release the 34 Cuban nationals for repatriation by neutral vessels to Cuba. The German Government will be expected to give the necessary assurances of safe conduct for the travel of these Cubans from Spain to Cuba, individually or as a group.

Cuban Government has been informed of this proposal of the German Government and has indicated its agreement thereto.

STETTINIUS

711.62114 Sick/12-2644: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1944.

4341. Your 8150 December 15. American Interests Germany—Repatriation Sick and Wounded. Please ask the Swiss to communicate the following reply to German Government:

“The United States Government notes the agreement of the German Government to a further exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war to take place on January 17, 1945. The United States Government agrees for its part to carry out the exchange using Switzerland as the exchange point.

Since the transmission of Department's 4108 of December 5, it has developed that the vessels which the United States Government intends to utilize in this exchange will not be able to leave New York before January 6, 1945. It will, therefore, not be possible to transport all of the 2250 German prisoners of war and civilians now held in continental United States in time to be exchanged on January 17. However, by the use of United States hospital shipping it will be possible to transport 700 of this number in time to be exchanged on that date. In addition, the United States Government proposes to return via Switzerland on January 17, the approximately 600 German prisoners of war now held in the custody of the United States Government in the Mediterranean Area who have been found eligible for repatriation. It is understood that the British Commonwealth Gov-

ernments will propose the exchange of about 500 German repatriables held in their custody in the Mediterranean Area through Switzerland on that date. There will thus be available for exchange via Switzerland on January 17 a total of approximately 1800 German sick and wounded prisoners of war.

The remainder of the German repatriables and civilians held in United States custody in the United States and by American armed forces overseas will be repatriated to Germany via Switzerland on January 25. This group will consist of approximately 1250 German prisoners of war and 850 civilians.

The United States Government requests the agreement of the German Government to the carrying out of this exchange in two operations on January 17 and January 25, as described above, and further the assurance of the German Government that on the occasion of the January 17 exchange it will return Allied repatriables in substantially the same number as the German repatriables then being returned, in order that the most economic use may be made of available transportation facilities. The assurance of the German Government is also requested that it will return on January 25 the American civilians and all those American prisoners of war entitled to repatriation who were not returned in the January 17 operation.

The United States Government expects to be informed immediately as to the total numbers of Americans who will be returned on January 17 and January 25 respectively, in order that appropriate arrangements may be made for their reception and disposition. The German Government is requested, for the same reasons, to include details as to the numbers of mental, litter or ambulatory cases. Similar information with respect to German repatriables in United States custody will be forwarded shortly.

The German Government in its reply to the United States Government's proposals does not state whether it will transmit nominal rolls 10 days prior to the exchange dates. The United States Government again requests the assurance of the German Government that it will do so. The United States Government reiterates its prior assurances in this regard."

When you transmit foregoing to Swiss Government please ask it to request German Government to reply urgently in order that the necessary technical arrangements for these exchange operations may be concluded without delay.

STETTINIUS

711.62114 Sick/12-2944: Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 29, 1944.

[Received December 29—6:39 p. m.]

8418. American Interests Germany Repatriation Seriously Sick and Wounded. Swiss Foreign Office official telephoned 4:45 p. m. December 29th that a note has been received from German Legation Bern containing the following numbers of Allied seriously sick and seriously wounded POWs to be repatriated from Germany.

(a) Americans

(1) 323 passed by Mixed Medical Commissions during October tour (326 actually declared eligible for repatriation but three since deceased).

(2) 112 passed by German army doctors.

(3) Five additional omitted from September exchange.

(b) British Commonwealth

(1) 1504 passed by Mixed Medical Commissions (1505 declared eligible with one death).

(2) 250 declared eligible by German army doctors.

(3) Two additional omitted from September repatriation operations.

Swiss Foreign [Office] official also indicates that subject German note offers to repatriate British merchant seamen and inquires as to number German seamen to be repatriated by British Government.

Swiss Foreign Office official adds that a telegram has just been received from Swiss Legation Berlin to the effect that German authorities have delivered to it lists of American POWs declared eligible for repatriation by Mixed Medical Commissions and those passed by German army doctors who are to be included in forthcoming exchange operation. Swiss Legation, Berlin, forwarding lists by courier who will probably arrive Bern December 30.

Repeated London.

HUDDLE

711.62114 Sick/12-3044: Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 30, 1944.

[Received December 30—6:45 p. m.]

8449. American Interests, Germany, Repatriation Sick and Wounded POWs. Swiss note December 30 quoted German Legation note which was subject Legation's 8418, December 29. Figures concerning repatriable groups are thereby confirmed, with added statement that there will also be included undetermined number of British merchant seamen and those American and British POWs who may still be declared eligible for repatriation by German camp doctors.

German note adds that nominal lists of repatriable American POWs have been delivered to Swiss Legation Berlin and that German Government accordingly considers that Department's request that they be delivered 10 days prior exchange date has been met.

Repeated to London.

HUDDLE

711.62114 Sick/12-3044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1944.

4410. Please request Swiss Foreign Office to transmit following message to German Government regarding forthcoming prisoner of war exchange:

"Canadian hospital ship *Letitia* will be employed in forthcoming exchange to carry from New York to Marseille approximately 577 sick and wounded prisoners of war from Canada and the United States.

After disembarkation of repatriates at Marseille the *Letitia* will carry repatriates to United Kingdom or otherwise continue its activities as a hospital ship."

STETTINIUS

[For additional data concerning the combined exchange of American and German nationals (*Gripsholm* voyage of January-February 1945), see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 7, 1945, page 44; *ibid.*, February 11, 1945, page 196; and *ibid.*, February 18, 1945, page 252.]

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR GERMANY AND AUSTRIA DURING INVASION AND OCCUPATION

800.515/931c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944—11 p. m.

85. 1. Currency arrangements that will prevail during the invasion and occupation of Germany have been discussed by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee consisting of representatives of the American and British State, Treasury and War Departments.

2. The following are the current currency proposals:

(a) The military money will be known as the "M" mark and a large "M" will be superimposed in the background of the note of each denomination.

(b) There will be eight denominations of notes, ranging from 1,000 marks to 1 mark.

(c) There will be two sizes of notes, the smaller ones being one half or three quarters the size of the American dollar bill; the larger ones being exactly the size of the current American dollar bill. In addition to the denominations the wording to appear on the notes (all wording will be in German) will consist of "issued in Germany" and "series 1944" and it is felt expedient that there should appear on the note some such expression as "Allied Military Authority".

(d) The present intention is that all notes shall carry serial numbers although it is possible that the smallest denominations may be issued without serial numbers in order to expedite the printing program.

3. The exchange rate that will prevail for the M-mark or its relationship to the Reichsmark has not been decided.

4. For some time the Treasury Department has worked on this program and has developed preliminary designs for the note, as well as taking over the facilities of plants to produce the currency and laying in a stock of bank-note paper. A first order of six billion M-marks, comprising roughly 100 million pieces, is called for by present Treasury plans.

5. The British Government has been kept advised of the foregoing by the British Treasury. There have been held preliminary discussions with representatives of the Russian Embassy here and we have requested that they advise their Government that the military authorities here have imposed upon the Treasury a time limit which does not permit of great delay. The receipt of their comments before the completion of the plates has been hoped for.

6. That you should review this matter in its entirety with the appropriate Russian authorities and attempt to obtain their immediate comments and suggestions is considered desirable. Both the British and American Governments are desirous of having Russian cooperation and concurrence in this matter and any suggestions that the Russians may have will be taken into account if they reach us in time so as not to delay the printing program unduly. In as much as the dies will soon be complete you should treat this matter as one of urgency and advise the Russians that you would appreciate receiving their reply at the earliest possible date.

7. It is also desired to obtain any possible information regarding the currency the Soviet authorities expect to use when they enter Germany.

HULL

800.515/932 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 18, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received January 19—1:40 p. m.]

165. I transmitted to Molotov⁶⁹ on January 17 the information contained in the Department's 85, January 14, 11 p. m., and requested an urgent reply.

HARRIMAN

⁶⁹ Vyacheslav Mikailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

800.515/939: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 26, 1944—noon.

[Received January 27—12: 21 p. m.]

252. Reference your 85, January 14, 11 p. m., and my 165, January 18, 9 a. m. 1. During a call on January 25 on Dekanozov,⁷⁰ Hamilton⁷¹ mentioned the question of currency arrangements during the invasion and occupation of Germany. Dekanozov asked whether this was urgent and Hamilton explained again that the question of completing the plates and printing program called for early decision. Dekanozov said that the matter had been referred to the Soviet military financial people; that they regarded the matter as one requiring considerable study; and that it would not be possible to reach an immediate decision. Hamilton asked that the Soviets proceed with their consideration as rapidly as practicable.

2. The British Foreign Office has informed the British Embassy here that we are raising this matter with the Soviet Government and the British Embassy has inquired in what terms we presented the matter, saying that they wished to harmonize any approach they might make to the Soviet Government with ours. We have told the British Embassy of our instructions. The information the British Embassy has given us indicates that their instructions differ from ours in a number of respects. The British plan envisages presenting a general scheme of invasion currency arrangements to the Soviet authorities. If they agree to these arrangements, designs containing inscriptions in Russian characters would be submitted for Soviet approval, the notes printed in the United Kingdom or the United States and sent to the Soviet Union as soon as stocks were available. We assume that the question of working out any differences between the United States and British views will be done in Washington and in London. It would be helpful if you could inform us promptly of status of our discussions with British on this subject in order to avoid confusion here.

HARRIMAN

800.515/931c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*⁷²

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1944—11 p. m.

707. By Department's 85, January 14, 11 p. m., we asked Ambassador Harriman to clear with Soviet Government type of mark cur-

⁷⁰ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷¹ Maxwell M. Hamilton, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union.

⁷² Repeated to Moscow as telegram 171.

rency we expect to use in forthcoming operations. This type has been generally agreed to between the United States and British Governments. Soviet Foreign Office states matter is before their military financial people and we are awaiting a reply.

Mr. Harriman now informs us that British Embassy, Moscow, has instructions from its Foreign Office which, in describing designs for mark currency, include inscriptions in Russian characters to be submitted for Soviet approval. Question of using Russian characters on German military currency has never been considered or approved by the authorities of this Government dealing with Civil Affairs matters. We hope that such a question will not be raised with the Soviet Government until there has been an opportunity to discuss it with the appropriate authorities of this Government and agreement reached thereon. Please take this up with the Foreign Office at the earliest opportunity.

HULL

800.515/943 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 29, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 3:52 p. m.]

294. Reference Embassy's 252, January 26, noon, paragraph 2. The British Embassy states it has received new instructions regarding the proposed currency arrangements for Allied-occupying forces in Germany and have forwarded a letter to the Foreign Office of which the following is a summary:

1. British Embassy understands United States Embassy has communicated to Foreign Office details of currency scheme worked out by British and American authorities.

2. British Government considers most desirable all occupying forces so far as possible use same currency. Unsafe rely on adequate supply reichsmarks since Germans may destroy plates and printing press. Even if supply initially available, inflation and financial chaos might later develop and advisable have another currency in reserve. British and American authorities have agreed prepare and hold in readiness supply of marks for use their military forces. These would be used at the outset to pay Allied troops in districts under their control even if fighting were still going on in other parts of the country. They would also be used on termination hostilities if enough marks unobtainable from German Government or if chaotic conditions prevail.

3. British Government attach great importance to participation Soviet Government in this scheme.

4. British understand scheme already discussed by Mr. White⁷³

⁷³ Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

with Soviet representatives in Washington and Soviet Government, therefore, aware certain details remain to be worked out. In view desirability Soviet authorities using same notes, British anticipate arrangements will be made to include suitable inscriptions in Russian characters in the design.

HARRIMAN

800.515/944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 31, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received January 31—12: 45 p. m.]

846. Your 707 January 28 received this morning. I have already taken this matter up with Mr. Eden ⁷⁴ and he has promised to act on it.

WINANT

800.515/939 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944—7 p. m.

244. Department's 85, January 14, 11 p. m. and Embassy's 252, January 26, noon. Due to the necessity for proceeding with producing currency, discussed in reference telegrams, we will have to go forward with printing starting no later than February 14.

We are very desirous of having some comment from the Soviet Government if possible before that date as it will be impossible to make any changes once the process of production starts.

We are contemplating producing enough to supply Soviet needs if desired. Would like very much to know whether Soviet use of this form of currency is contemplated, and, if not, what kind of currency they expect to use.

HULL

800.515/961 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 15, 1944—11 a. m.
[Received February 17—1: 22 a. m.]

509. I received today a letter from Molotov dated February 14 with regard to the proposed currency arrangements during the invasion and occupation of Germany communicated in the Department's 85, January 14, 11 p. m.

⁷⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In his reply Molotov states that :

1. The Soviet Government shares the desire of the American and British Governments to collaborate in the issuance of military currency on German territory during the invasion and occupation of Germany by the Allied armies.

2. The Soviet Government agrees with the currency measures proposed by the Department and in particular with the expediency of issuing in Germany during this period military "M-marks" of the design, denominations, and sizes contemplated.

3. It would be expedient that the expression "Allied military authorities" be printed on the notes.

4. The Soviet Government desires to receive the proposals of the Treasury Department regarding the exchange rate of the "M-mark" and its relationship to the reichsmark.

5. The People's Commissariat for Finance considers that it would be expedient to have serial numbers on bank notes of all denominations not excluding those of small denominations.

6. In preparing the currency the Commissariat for Finance considers that it would be more correct to print a portion of the currency in the Soviet Union in order that a constant supply of currency to the command of the Red Army may be guaranteed.

7. In order that the "M-marks" may be of like design it will be necessary to furnish the Commissariat for Finance with plates of all denominations, a list of the serial numbers and models of the paper and colors for printing "M-marks" when the necessity therefor arises.

In conclusion Molotov asks that he be informed in the near future when the Commissariat for Finance may expect to receive the plates, list of serial numbers and models of paper and colors for the "M-marks" which it requests. I should appreciate instructions on this point.

HARRIMAN

800.515/961 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 29, 1944—6 p. m.

437. The substance of the Soviet reply on the proposed currency arrangements as set forth in your 509 of February 15 has been communicated to the War Department.

With respect to paragraph 4 of Molotov's reply, the question of the exchange rate is receiving attention in the State, War, and Treasury Departments, and the views of this Government will be transmitted when they are completely formulated.

The War Department has not as yet given any answer to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Soviet reply.

STETTINIUS

800.515/988

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*⁷⁶

[WASHINGTON, March 22, 1944.]

DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: The Treasury Department, at the present time, is engaged in the printing of an Allied Mark Currency for use by the Allied Forces in Germany. Some time ago, the designs for this currency were approved by the American, British and Russian Governments. In the discussions concerning this currency in Moscow, the officials of the Soviet Commissariat of Finance stated their desire to have duplicate sets of the plates made available to them, in order that they may guarantee the printing of sufficient marks for the needs of the Red Army. The attitude of the Russians is set forth in an attached cable, under date of February 15, 1944, from Ambassador Harriman.⁷⁷

I have had several conversations with the Soviet Ambassador⁷⁸ concerning this matter. The difficulties in acceding to the Russian request are set forth in the attached memorandum,⁷⁹ a copy of which has been made available to the Soviet Ambassador. In spite of the difficulties in meeting this request, the Soviets are very insistent in their desire to obtain duplicate plates and specimen models of the paper and inks that we are using in the production of this A. M. Mark Currency.

The chief difficulty in acceding to the Russian request arises out of the fact that to meet the demands of the War Department for the A. M. Mark Currency within the time limits we have been given, it has been necessary for the Treasury to secure the services of an outside, privately-owned printing plant, the Forbes Lithograph Manufacturing Company, Boston. The Forbes Company advises us that if the plates or duplicates thereof are taken out of its possession for any purpose whatsoever, it will have to request the Treasury to relieve it of its contract and all liability and accountability under its bond. This would necessitate the completion of the order by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and there would ensue a delay of six to eight months for reasons set forth in the attached memorandum.

Under date of March 7, General Eisenhower⁸⁰ advised the U.S. War Department that he desired assurances that 40-45 percent of the

⁷⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Secretary of the Treasury on the same date.

⁷⁷ Telegram 509, p. 828.

⁷⁸ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

⁷⁹ Not printed.

⁸⁰ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe.

initial order for 10 billion A. M. marks would be completed by April 15, 1944. It would not be possible to obtain this objective if the printing of the currency were taken over by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. It would therefore be appreciated if you would place this matter before the Combined Chiefs of Staff and advise me promptly whether, in their opinion, the military situation could afford such a delay as would be involved in the event that duplicate plates were made available to the Government of the U.S.S.R.

I have advised the Russian Ambassador that I have put this question up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that he will be informed as soon as a reply is forthcoming from that body.

Very truly yours,

H. MORGENTHAU, JR.

800.515/961 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1944—6 p. m.

674. Department's 437, February 29, 6 p. m. For your information, the Secretary of the Treasury in a letter dated March 22⁸¹ has informed the Department that because of the difficulties which would arise with respect to production of Allied mark currency if duplicate plates were made available to the Russians, he has requested Admiral Leahy to place the matter before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Morgenthau has advised the Russian Ambassador of this step, and has also made available to him a memorandum prepared by the Treasury's technical experts setting forth in detail these difficulties which, in their judgment, would entail a delay of 6 to 8 months. In view of this very considerable delay, it is not anticipated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will favor the delivery of plates to the Russians.

HULL

800.515/1009

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the
Office of European Affairs (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1944.

Mr. Morgenthau telephoned me this morning to say that he was informing the Soviet Ambassador this afternoon that the duplicate plates for the printing of the Allied military mark to be used in the invasion of Germany would be furnished to the Soviet Government in response to that Government's request. He asked whether the Department of State was in favor of this action.

⁸¹ See footnote 76, p. 830.

I replied that it was the opinion of this Department from the political point of view, aside from any military considerations or any technical questions or difficulties, that if possible it was highly advisable to have the duplicate plates furnished to the Soviet Government in order that the three Governments and the three Armies entering Germany would be using the same identical currency. The Soviet Government had informed us that if the plates were not furnished to it, that Government would proceed to produce a separate currency for use in Germany. It was our opinion that it would be a pity to lose the great advantage of having one currency used by the three Armies, which itself would indicate a degree of solidarity which was much to be desired not only for the situation in Germany but for its effect on the relations in many other aspects between the Soviet, British, and United States Governments.

Mr. Morgenthau said he was very glad to have this expression of the Department's views on this question as there might be some technical difficulties arise which would require Treasury to take over, under the President's War Powers, the plant which is now using the original plates for the production of these marks.

This question has been up between the United States and Soviet Governments since last November, and it has become perfectly clear to us as a result of the exchanges of correspondence on the subject that the Soviet Government is not ready to join in the common use of the same currency unless it receives the duplicate plates from us. In order to convince the Soviet Government of our sincerity in the desire to have the closest collaboration in these military operations against Germany, it becomes essential that we make every effort within our possibility to furnish the plates to that Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

800.515/961 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1944—1 p. m.

1055. Your 509, February 15, paragraph 4. The Soviet financial experts here have been told informally by the Treasury Department that no view has as yet been formulated regarding the rate of exchange. There is some divergence of opinion among the various interested departments, the range of which has been indicated. The Soviets have been told that we would like to have their ideas and to discuss the matter with them. They were also asked whether they would prefer to have the discussions in Moscow or Washington. A reply as to the last point is expected within the next few days.

HULL

800.515/1060: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1944—midnight.

4388. For Phillips.⁸² We are somewhat puzzled by the situation which has developed with reference to the proposal to use a military schilling in Austria. Several months ago the British approached us with the suggestion that we should use a military schilling. While it had been our thought that military marks should be used in initial operations in that area we agreed to the proposal and indicated we would support a British approach to the Soviet Government on the subject. As it appeared that the British had in mind not only using the military schilling for military expenditures but also for supplanting the mark entirely in the area, we asked for more information on their thinking on the subject.

The British informed us that they wished to defer approaching the Soviets until agreement had been reached between the two Treasuries on all technical details concerning the currency. We understand an agreement was reached some weeks ago.

In the meantime, reports have reached us through the U. K. Treasury Delegation in Washington of differences of opinion within the British Government regarding the use of the schilling which appeared to be confirmed by the Embassy's 3969 of May 16⁸³ from Taylor⁸⁴ to Treasury. Within the past several days we have learned from the U. K. Treasury Delegation that the British are inclined to believe that the schilling should be introduced immediately for use by the troops but are reluctant to make a final decision. We understand the British view to be based upon political considerations and gather that it may represent foreign office views as against contrary views of the Bank of England. We have also gathered that, despite the foregoing, the British have no immediate intention of proceeding with the printing of schillings, since they do not wish to discuss the matter with the Russians until they are able to give the Russians a better idea of our views with respect to Austria. We are not clear whether the British have in mind more definite political plans or financial plans.

Any background which you could give us on this subject would be most helpful. We assume that Taylor will report fully to Treasury on the technical aspects of the subject and that copies of relevant papers (such as minutes of Austrian working party mentioned in paragraph 1 of Embassy's 3969) will be sent to Washington in sufficient number for distribution to interested agencies here. The only

⁸² William Phillips, Political Adviser to General Eisenhower.

⁸³ Not printed.

⁸⁴ William H. Taylor, Treasury representative to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London.

copies of these minutes the Department and the Treasury have received so far have come to us through the U. K. Treasury Delegation.

HULL

800.515/1212 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 12, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received June 13—4:10 a. m.]

4692. From Phillips and Taylor. Your 4388, June 2, midnight. As indicated in telegram No. 4619, June 9, 6 p. m.⁸⁵ for Treasury, the British have decided to approach the Soviet Government without delay on the question of Austrian schillings. The Foreign Office has not yet decided, however, whether to make the approach through British Embassy in Moscow or through Ambassador Gusev⁸⁶ in London. Because of possibility of whole matter being referred for detailed action to the Foreign Office am inclined to favor latter approach. Embassy will be kept informed of developments.

It would seem that the differences between the Foreign Office and the Treasury have been ironed out and the Foreign Office preference (based on political reasons) for schillings over marks adopted. The proposal to delay approaching the Russians as indicated in our 4585 June 8, 6 p. m.⁸⁷ apparently was not due to this divergence of views but to a feeling in some quarters that it might be preferable to postpone currency discussions until Anglo-American agreement on the financial directive for Austria had been reached thus permitting both questions to be presented to Moscow at the same time.

As indicated in both of our telegrams under reference, British are proceeding with the printing of Austrian schilling currency.

Please inform Treasury. [Phillips and Taylor.]

WINANT

800.515/1248 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 14, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received 11:59 p. m.]

4755. From Phillips and Taylor. Our 4692, June 12, 4 p. m. Foreign Office has decided to approach Soviet Government on subject of Austrian schillings through British Ambassador Moscow⁸⁸ who is

⁸⁵ Not printed.

⁸⁶ Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁸⁷ Telegram not printed.

⁸⁸ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

being instructed to inform American Ambassador and withhold action until Harriman receives instructions from Department.

British Embassy Washington is being instructed to inform Department fully on the above and to request appropriate instructions be sent Harriman.

Please inform Treasury. [Phillips and Taylor.]

WINANT

800.515/1212 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*⁸⁹

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1944— 5 p. m.

1519. I. The Department was informed by the British Embassy in Washington June 15, 1944⁹⁰ that the Foreign Office has sent a communication to the British Embassy at Moscow along the following lines:

“It seems desirable for both political and practical reasons to introduce a separate currency in Austria to replace the Reichsmark as soon as possible and not to use the Allied Military Mark currency in Austria in view of the decision made at Moscow to establish a free and independent Austria.”⁹¹

The establishment of a separate currency will help to disentangle the Austrian from the German economic system and will strengthen belief on the part of the Austrian people in the reality of the promise of independence.

A flight from currency into goods and a loss of all confidence in the Reichsmark may be expected in Austria after the defeat of Germany. The task of occupation forces or commissions in Austria may be seriously impeded by the resultant hoarding and economic difficulties. Not only should schillings be used but there should be sufficient supplies to make possible the complete replacement of all Reichsmark notes currently in circulation as soon as this becomes feasible in the light of existing circumstances. It should be possible to hold off currency chaos through the use of schillings at a fixed rate of exchange with mark notes even if complete replacement does not prove to be immediately possible.

The printing of notes in nine denominations is involved in this program. These denominations being 1000, 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, 2, and 1 schillings and 50 groschen. The order involves a total face value of 4678 million schillings and a total of 236 million pieces.

The needs of Soviet forces as well as British and United States forces can be met by the stocks provided under this program.”

⁸⁹ A copy of this telegram was transmitted to London on the same day as telegram 4858.

⁹⁰ Note not printed.

⁹¹ See Declaration on Austria, November 1, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 761.

II. The British Government in its June 15 note through the British Embassy at Washington expressed the hope that the United States Government would be willing to ask the United States Ambassador at Moscow to make a joint approach to the Soviet Government with the British Ambassador on this matter.⁹²

III. The Department perceives no objection to this proposal and accordingly requests you to act in concert with the British Ambassador at Moscow in advising the Soviet Government along the above lines. You should point out that this proposal is not intended in any way to prejudice decisions concerning the occupation or administration of Austria which may hereafter be made as a result of EAC⁹³ recommendations or otherwise.

HULL

800.515/7-2444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 24, 1944—midnight.

[Received July 25—7:04 p. m.]

2741. ReDeptel 1519, June 20, 5 p. m. In a letter dated July 22, Vyshinski⁹⁴ states that the Soviet Government has informed the British Government of its agreement with the proposal for the introduction in Austria of a special currency separate from the Allied military mark and with the proposal that the part of the Austrian currency needed by the Soviet Government should be printed by the British Government.

The letter states that in this regard the Soviets have in mind that from the total sum of the Austrian currency which the British Government proposes to print, one-third be allotted for the needs of the Soviet Government (not less than one and one-half billion schillings) and that these monetary tokens be supplied to the Soviet Government at their net cost (of production). The Soviet Government has also expressed the desire that the delivery of the bank notes to the Soviet Union should begin with the month of August.

HARRIMAN

⁹² In a memorandum of June 20 (not printed) the Department informed the British Embassy that this was being done (800.515/6-2044).

⁹³ European Advisory Commission.

⁹⁴ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union; Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

862.5151/8-744: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1944—8 p. m.

1923. ReDeptel 1855 August 4 and reurtel 2884 August 7.⁹⁵

1. We have reconsidered with British and Treasury matters related to introduction and use of military marks and have agreed with British that parallel approach should be made to Soviets on lines indicated below. British here have recommended to London that similar instructions be sent to British Ambassador in Moscow. Impending entry of Allied forces into Germany makes matter urgent.

2. Points on which we agreed with British (subject to London's concurrence) and would like to reach agreement with Soviets are as follows:

(a) General rate of exchange for mark should not be established until some time following surrender but should be fixed as soon after our entry into Germany as circumstances require. In our judgment establishment of general rate will not be necessary for one month or so following surrender. General rate should be fixed by tripartite agreement and should be applied by Allied authorities to all transactions under their control.

(b) Rate for military purposes will have to be fixed prior to entry of Allied armies into Germany and establishment of general rate. In case at least of American and British forces this rate would be used for converting troop pay from dollars and pounds into marks and for other essential military purposes. We believe that different armies should not give different values to the mark for military purposes and that rates used by the respective armies should result in uniform cross rate. Military rate should be between 8 marks to dollar (32 to pound) and 6 to dollar (24 to pound). This rate could be adjusted later if necessary.

(c) Allied military mark should be freely interchangeable with Reichsmark and should circulate at par with it. We expect that military mark and Reichsmark will continue circulating at parity. Any adjustments made necessary by depreciation of Reichsmark should preferably be made by changing rate between military mark and Allied currencies rather than by establishing differential rate between Reichsmark and military mark.

3. Despite possibilities suggested in paragraph 2 of 2884, points which you raise do not in our view affect desirability of attempting to reach agreement. We attach importance to reaching agreement at least in form since this is one of first problems to arise in connection with occupation of Germany. We feel it would be undesirable to propose to Soviets that each army group act independently and, as

⁹⁵ Neither printed.

result, reach different decisions. Question of whether Allied military mark is to circulate at par with Reichsmark is of great importance and must in any event be subject to agreement. Question of rate used by different armies is of lesser importance and divergence in rate would not, in our opinion, seriously hamper operations in Germany if Soviets do not agree to a uniform cross rate as suggested in 2(b) above. We wish to make clear that we do not intend to raise questions or objections if Soviets follow course suggested in paragraph 2 of your 2884.

4. You are requested to obtain Soviet agreement on above points if possible. With respect to paragraph 3 of your 2884, you are authorized to present this matter to Soviets in whatever manner you consider most effective. Message in our 1855 was sent from Morgenthau to Commissar for Finance⁹⁶ at suggestion of Soviet financial experts presently in Washington who had been authorized by the Soviet Government to discuss these matters with this Government. We understand they have reported our proposals to Commissariat for Finance. We suggest you inform Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of this fact and state that Secretary of Treasury would be grateful if our view could also be communicated to Commissariat for Finance on his behalf. No action should, therefore, be taken on Deptel 1855 but contents thereof will be useful to you for background in discussing subject with Soviets.

5. Your approach to Soviets on this matter should be parallel with that of your British colleague. It is suggested that you act on this message only after he has received similar instructions from London.

STETTINIUS

800.515/7-2444 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1944—10 p. m.

1926. Reurtel 2741, July 24. We have been having informal discussions here with the British regarding the Austrian schilling currency in connection with production plans. We understand the British have informed the Soviets of their agreement to supply one billion five hundred million schillings to the Soviet Government. They may also have instructed the British Ambassador to inform the Soviets that the currency is to be used not only for military expenditures but for introduction as the ordinary currency of the country as well. The latter use, with which we are in agreement, will naturally require a large volume of notes.

⁹⁶ Arseny Grigoryevich Zveryev.

The discussions have led us into the question of the rate of exchange, whether the schilling is to be introduced at par with the mark and other related matters. We are at present trying to iron out some differences of opinion on these subjects between us and the British. As soon as we have harmonized our views, we will ask you to take the matter up with the Soviets and the British will undoubtedly instruct their Ambassador to do likewise. We will also discuss the matter with the Soviet financial experts here.

We see no necessity for your saying anything to the Soviets at the moment. However, if it appears desirable you may indicate our agreement on the points dealt with in the first paragraph of this message.

STETTINIUS

800.515/8-2644

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Collado) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1944.

Mr. Acheson ⁹⁷ has asked that I bring directly to your attention the following situation with respect to currency arrangements for the military forces in Germany:

1. The subject of what type of currency the armed forces should use upon entering Germany and what rate of exchange would be involved has been under discussion in the Civil Affairs Committee, and with the British and Russian Governments for many months.

2. Initially, all agencies of this Government and the British Government suggested the use of Allied military marks, but there was considerable disagreement on the rate of exchange. The British and the FEA ⁹⁸ have wanted a rate of five to the dollar. We in the State Department have felt that a rate of six to eight to the dollar would be more appropriate. The Treasury originally urged a rate of twenty to the dollar. The Russians have shown little interest in the rate of exchange to be employed.

3. Although the Treasury has never admitted it, it is our feeling that Mr. Harry White, at least, wishes a very low rate in order to bring financial difficulties and economic pressure on Germany, as he feels that the Allied control policies otherwise may be too lenient.

4. Early in the summer, the Treasury proposed that we negotiate with the British on the basis of ten to the dollar, and the Department agreed to this proposal for bargaining purposes. As the British held

⁹⁷ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

⁹⁸ Foreign Economic Administration.

out for five to the dollar, at Bretton Woods⁹⁹ Mr. White suggested the fixing at this time of only a rate for purely military purposes with the thought that a general rate for both commercial and military purposes could be determined more properly a month or two after the surrender of Germany. The Department somewhat reluctantly acquiesced and in discussions with the British in Washington a range of six to eight to the dollar for military operations was tentatively fixed. Subject to London's concurrence, it was agreed to approach the Soviets on this basis.

5. Early this week, the British indicated that London still wants to talk in terms of between five and eight to the dollar, rather than six to eight.

6. Yesterday, the Secretary of the Treasury saw the President and without prior consultation with the State Department made some proposal which has not been revealed to us. In any event, the President directed that no rate be fixed for the time being, and that dollars be used for troop pay. The Treasury yesterday informed us of this decision and subsequently added that Allied military marks would, however, be used for local expenditures by the Army which themselves would not involve a rate of exchange.

7. The Treasury yesterday informed the British of this unilateral decision. The British reaction was one of some indignation of our departure from the previous practice of working these matters out jointly with the British and the Russians. They indicated that they would telegraph London at once. They also pointed out that sooner or later a rate of exchange would have to be set, and that the only result of delay would be to set up black-market transactions against the yellow seal dollars which probably would result in a rapid depreciation of the mark and a runaway inflationary situation in Germany.

8. We believe the proposed action would be unfortunate because (a) it is a unilateral action breaking the joint front which has previously been presented on military financial and civil affairs matters, and (b) the economic consequences in Germany will probably be inconsistent with our policy objectives and make much more difficult the task of occupation and control. As indicated, however, we suspect the Treasury would not be unhappy to see a precipitous decline in the mark rate of exchange.

Mr. Acheson suggests that we may wish to wait until we hear from the British before considering any steps in the matter. He felt that you should be informed at once, however, in case the President mentions the matter to you, and in case you wish at once to take the matter up with the President.

⁹⁹ United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944. For correspondence regarding this Conference, see vol. II.

800.515/9-544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944—midnight.

7203. For L. C. Aarons¹ from Treasury. You are requested to transmit the following to Mr. Winant for his confidential information.

Brand, the Chief British Treasury Representative in Washington, called on Secretary Morgenthau today at the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer² to present representations against the possibility that yellow seal dollars would be used for pay of American troops in Germany. The main argument advanced by the British was that whatever else happens in Germany, immediately upon its occupation we should wish to make such civilian administration as may be found to exist in Germany work and especially to make it take the responsibility for maintaining such production as is necessary for the requirements of the occupying army and the minimum essentials of life of the German people. The British state that the Allied Armies should not have among their first tasks the restoration of the economy of Germany. The Secretary replied that the President is insistent on the use of dollars. However, the Secretary informed Brand that this matter will be again reviewed and the Secretary is trying to obtain agreement to the use of Allied Military Marks at a 10 cent rate. Brand stated that his government thought that a rate of 20 cents per mark would be more appropriate. The Secretary said that he did not feel that he could go to the President again with any rate higher than 10 cents. The Treasury has always preferred a 5 cent rate, but in order to meet strenuous British objections, had modified their position to take in the 10 cent rate. You will be advised of further developments in this matter. [Treasury.]

HULL

862.5151/9-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944—11 p. m.

2173. You are requested to convey to the Soviet Government the decisions outlined below. The impending entry of American troops into German territory has made decisions on a number of these points imperative.

¹ Lehman C. Aarons, Assistant to the General Counsel of the Treasury Department.

² Sir John Anderson.

1. It has been decided that upon their entry into Germany United States troops will receive their pay in Allied military marks converted at the rate of 10 marks per dollar. This is not a general rate of exchange and will not be publicly announced. The only purposes for which this military rate is to be used are for converting troop pay into marks and for such internal bookkeeping transactions as are made necessary by military operations.

2. Allied military marks will be made equivalent to and will circulate at par with Reichsmarks.

3. It is our view that a general rate of exchange between the mark and external currencies should not be fixed until some time after the entry of Allied armies into Germany. A general rate of exchange would be established as soon as desirable after the entry of our forces.

The considerations which have led us to make the foregoing decisions have been indicated in Deptels 1855 August 4³ and 1923 August 12. As indicated in first reference telegram, they have also been given to Soviet financial representatives here.

In presenting the matter to the Soviet Government, you should make the following observations.

a. With reference to the military rate, while there is no necessity for Soviet procedures regarding military expenditures to be identical in all respects with ours, we hope that the Soviet Government may find it possible, in making arrangements for military expenditures in marks, to adopt procedures which would be consistent with a rate of the order we have selected.

b. We would appreciate receiving the agreement of the Soviet Government to the adoption of an internal rate of one Allied military mark to one Reichsmark.

c. We will of course keep the Soviet Government closely informed of developments concerning currency in the territory occupied by our forces and of all action in this respect taken by our troops. We should be glad if we could be similarly informed as to action and developments in German territory occupied by Soviet forces.

We understand that the British Ambassador will also be receiving instructions from his government on these matters. We do not know whether they will be identical with the above or not but in any event you should proceed with the foregoing.

Sent to Moscow repeated to London.⁴

HULL

862.5151/9-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1944—8 p. m.

2427. It has been found desirable to issue public announcement respecting conversion rate set for military mark despite statement to

³ Not printed.

⁴ Repeated to London as telegram 7333.

contrary in paragraph 1, Deptel 2173, September 9. This announcement is quoted in full in Deptel 2426, October 13.⁵ Parliamentary question concerning military mark was lodged in House of Commons and it was accordingly decided to make public announcement in United States simultaneously with reply to question in London.

With reference to paragraphs *a*, *b* and *c*, Deptel 2173, and your 3440 September 12,⁶ we would appreciate learning what reaction, if any, has been forthcoming from Soviet Government and what plans Soviets have for currency issue in areas they occupy.

HULL

800.515/10-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944—noon.
[Received October 16—7:03 a. m.]

3944. ReDept's 2427, October 13, 8 p. m. On September 11 as indicated in my 3440, September 12, 4 p. m.,⁵ I informed Molotov in a letter that American troops would be paid in Allied military marks at the rate of 10 marks to the dollar and that this was not a general rate of exchange and would not be announced publicly.

The British Embassy sent a similar communication on September 22.

On October 4 our radio bulletin contained an item to the effect that a joint announcement had been made by the War and Treasury Departments to the effect that an Allied military mark had been distributed to troops invading Germany on a provisional basis of 10 marks to the dollar. In view of these circumstances I do not think that it would be advisable for us to make any further communication to the Soviet Government at this time on this subject.

Molotov has not replied to my letter referred to above, and I have no information as to the policy the Soviet authorities intend to follow in this respect.

HARRIMAN

800.515/10-1644 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1944—10 p. m.

2487. Department understands from your 3944, October 16, that Soviets have not been officially informed respecting public announcement on Allied military mark and suggests for your consideration

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Latter not printed.

possibility of informing Soviets in some appropriate way. Articles on military mark had appeared in U.S. and British press and it was therefore felt advisable to issue public announcement quickly. Department also desires that you utilize first suitable occasion to follow up inquiry respecting Soviet plans for use of military currency in Germany.

HULL

800.515/7-2444 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1944—10 p. m.

2583. ReDeptel 1926, August 12. From Treasury and Department. You are requested to convey to the Soviet authorities the following statement of principles which, in our view, should govern the introduction of Allied Military Schillings into Austria. We should like to obtain the reaction of the Soviet authorities to these proposals as quickly as possible. Your British colleague is receiving similar but not necessarily identical instructions and if you consider it appropriate, you may concert with him in your approach to the Soviets. London has been notified respecting this communication.

1. Allied Military Schillings will be used by Allied occupying forces and will be proclaimed legal tender on their entry into Austria, but Reichsmarks will remain legal tender until conversion.

2. Conversion of Reichsmarks circulating in Austria into Allied Military Schillings will take place as soon as administratively feasible and all frontiers can be effectively closed.

3. Allied Military Schillings are to be used by the Allied forces for pay of troops and their own direct expenditures. So far as possible financial requirements of Austrian authorities and institutions will be met by advances from banks under instructions from Allied Military authorities, rather than by direct advances from Allied Military authorities. Advances from local banks will be in Reichsmarks before conversion. Direct advances of Allied Military Schillings by military authorities will only be made in exceptional circumstances.

4. The exchange rate between the schilling and the Reichmark should be fixed on the eve of entry by tripartite agreement. For reasons of administrative convenience, we should hope that the rate could be fixed at one Reichsmark equals one Allied Military Schilling. If adequate supplies of Allied Military Schillings are not available and there is a marked depreciation of the Reichsmark in Austria before Allied entry, it might prove advisable to give the Allied Military Schilling a higher value in terms of Reichsmarks.

5. The military rate for the schilling in terms of dollars and pounds should be fixed initially by reference to the mark-schilling rate and the military rate for the mark in dollars and pounds. Thus, if the mark-schilling rate is one to one and the mark rate is 10 to the dollar, the provisional military rate for the schilling will be 10 to the dollar.

6. No general exchange rate between the schilling and other currencies should be established until complete withdrawal of Reichsmark currency has been accomplished and there has been an opportunity to observe the general situation in Austria. Thereafter, the schilling exchange rate can be fixed independently of that for the mark currency in Germany.

Sent to Moscow. Repeated to London.¹⁰

STETTINIUS

800.515/11-1044 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 10, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11:07 p. m.]

4313. ReDept's 2487, October 20, 10 p. m. On October 25 I wrote to Vyshinski to inform him concerning the public announcement made by the Treasury and War Departments respecting the Allied military mark. I also repeated the request originally made in Ambassador Harriman's letter of September 11 to Molotov for information on Soviet plans for the use of military currency in Germany. As yet I have had no reply.

KENNAN

¹⁰ Repeated to London as telegram 9129.

GREECE

(See Volume V, pages 84–231.)

HUNGARY

GERMAN OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY, DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-GERMAN MOVEMENT IN HUNGARY, AND NEGOTIATIONS BY THE ALLIES OF AN ARMISTICE WITH HUNGARY, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, JANUARY 20, 1945

864.01/1-3144

*Memorandum by the Office of Strategic Services*¹

A high Hungarian official reports to our representative that his government is facing a crucial decision, namely, whether Hungary should accept German assistance or resist the Germans by force. The official in question is a trained and discreet man. He is very serious and fully aware of the significance of his statement to us.

One of the principal questions that faces Hungary is whether the Russians would halt their invasion forces at the Carpathian Mountains if Hungary resists the Nazis and prevents Germany from making use of Hungarian facilities within her borders, such as air bases and others of the kind.

This official believes that Hungary has reached the point where it would be willing to assume the risk of open hostilities with Germany.

He wants to know whether, if he were authorized by his government to make a definite proposal, we could see that it would be placed before the Russians.

In reply, the Hungarian was informed that it would be better to report the suggestion simply as a matter of military importance, to which he responded that he sincerely hoped some clue would be forthcoming which would help Hungary in determining her course.

It is possible that Hungary might be afraid to make such a desperate decision but in the opinion of this official, they would be willing to risk a break with the Reich and try to defend their own frontiers if safeguards could be obtained against an invasion by the Russians. He believes that an occupation by the Anglo-Saxons would be welcomed by Hungary.

¹ Handed to Fletcher Warren, of the Office of Assistant Secretary of State Berle, on January 31 by Whitney Shepardson, of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On February 8 Mr. Warren telephoned in reply, giving the position stated by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn), approved by Mr. Berle, that "We don't deal with any of these overtures except on the basis of unconditional surrender." (864.01/1-3144)

864.01/456

*Memorandum by Archduke Otto of Austria to Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army*²

Mr. Tiber Eckhardt,³ member of the Hungarian Parliament, and I have received in the first days of this month detailed and reliable informations from our political friends in Hungary concerning the recent political and military developments. The outstanding facts are the following:

A. *In the political field:*

(1) In August 1943, after the collapse of the Fascist regime in Italy,⁴ the Small Farmers (Peasant) Party together with the Christian Popular Party and the Socialist Party had addressed a Memorandum to Regent Horthy^{4a} asking for:

- (a) Immediate severance of Hungary's ties to the no more existing Axis and a declaration of neutrality in the present war;
- (b) A change of policy in favor of the Allies.

The Memorandum also stated that only by accepting risks and sacrifices can the future of Hungary be saved. The Memorandum was signed not only by the leaders of the three aforementioned Parties, but also by prominent non-partisan Legitimists (Cardinal Seregy, Senator Count Sigray) and by such Conservatives as Count Stephen Bethlen (former Prime Minister). The Regent reacted favorably to the Memorandum and received a member of the Peasant Party for personal discussion of its content.

(2) A formal anti-Nazi coalition has been concluded in autumn of 1943 between the Small Farmers (Peasant) Party, the Christian Popular Party and the Social-democratic Party, thus uniting on a parliamentary basis the peasant and labor masses in Hungary. Their program for collaboration is: Constitutional Government, progressive Democracy, timely social Reforms, complete withdrawal from the Axis and a pro-Allied foreign and military policy.

In November and December this coalition has conducted in the Budapest Parliament a vivid campaign during the debate on the budget. This debate brought much popularity to the coalition which

² Copy transmitted by General Bissell with his covering memorandum of February 20 to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn), with the comment that "Archduke Otto visited me on February 8. He left with me the attached paper containing data on the political and military situation in Hungary." Archduke Otto of Habsburg was the eldest son of the late Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary and was pretender to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones.

³ Tibor Eckhardt, President of the Independent Smallholders Party; in exile in the United States during World War II.

⁴ For correspondence on the overthrow of the Fascist regime in Italy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 314 ff.

^{4a} Adm. Nicholas (Miklós) Horthy, Regent of Hungary.

is rapidly growing in membership. Neither Party has been obstructed in its work of organization by the Kallay⁵ Government.

There can be no doubt that a complete change of Hungary's present pro-Axis policy could be legally and constitutionally effected. The constructive forces represented by the above-mentioned oppositional parties, form a majority of the electorate in Hungary. They could take over power in perfect order, excluding chaos and Bolshevisation.

(3) The action of the United Opposition advocating the urgent renewal of friendly relations with Hungary's southern neighbours, the Yugoslav nations, has also met with some success. Serb refugees are being granted friendly reception in Hungary and as a first step of appeasement, the Kallay Government has indicted the Hungarian officers guilty of acts of violence committed in occupied Yugoslav territory.

(4) In January 1944 the Small Farmers (Peasant) Party has published its program concerning the restitution of Transylvanian independence, with equal rights to the three component nations. Hungarians and Rumanians of Transylvania have responded favorably to this appeal. No information has been obtained concerning the third nation, the Saxon's reaction.

B. In the military field:

[Here follows information regarding Hungarian Army and Air Forces.]

864.01/456

*Memorandum by Mr. Frederick T. Merrill, of the Division of Southern European Affairs, to Mr. Cloyce K. Huston, of the Same Division*⁶

[WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1944.

It seems to me that Archduke Otto and Eckhardt are exaggerating (purposely or unconsciously) the present strength and cohesion of the so-called anti-Nazi democratic coalition of opposition parties.⁷

In A (1) I believe the memorandum mentioned was presented by Peyer⁸ and was some forty pages long. We have no information as to who signed it and I would have reservations that Bethlen and Seredy's signatures could have been obtained on a document drawn up by a Social Democrat. Although the Regent did react favorably, as I remember it, he discussed it mostly with Peyer and not with a

⁵ Nicholas (Miklós) Kallay, Hungarian Prime Minister, March 1942-March 1944.

⁶ Copy transmitted to Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell by Mr. Dunn with covering memorandum of March 15.

⁷ See memorandum *supra*.

⁸ Charles (Karolyi) Peyer, leader of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party.

member of the Smallholders' Party, which of course still recognizes Eckhardt as its leader.

In (2) I also have reservations that any real coalition has yet been formed. The coalition appears to be a popular frontist movement particularly among the intellectual opposition. Evidence from OSS sources indicates that some elements among the opposition could never work together or "take over power in perfect order." Many Social Democrats apparently consider the majority of Smallholders reactionary.

In (3) the Otto memorandum seems to indicate that it was the action of the opposition advocating urgent renewal of friendly relations with Yugoslavia that brought about the indictment of the Hungarian officers guilty of the Serb massacres. Obviously the opposition played a part but I believe the action against these officers is all a part of the Kallay Government's efforts to pave the way for postwar.

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum by the Division of Southern European Affairs*⁹

[WASHINGTON, March 1944.]

As an Axis satellite Hungary not only participated in the Nazi attack on Russia, but declared war on the United States and other United Nations, and accepted the German invitation to occupy substantial territories belonging to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In addition, of course, Hungary profited from the Vienna award of 1940¹⁰ by which Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy required Rumania to give up a large share of Transylvania.

Although the Hungarians argue that they could not have done otherwise, they now see their mistake. They want to get out of the war and have for months now been trying to get their soldiers home from the front. The Germans are suspicious and dissatisfied with Hungary's attitude, but so far have not occupied the country.

The Hungarians now say that Hungary is not an enemy of the United States or Great Britain and will not offer resistance to Anglo-American troops, that the Hungarian Government adheres to the Atlantic Charter¹¹ and trusts the wisdom and motives of the American and British Governments and that the present Hungarian attitude is

⁹ Prepared for Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in connection with his departure for London for discussions with members of the British Government, held April 7-29. For a report on this mission, see pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰ Signed August 30, 1940; see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. x (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 581. See also telegrams 3826, August 30, 1940, from Berlin, and 509, September 6, 1940, from Bucharest, *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. I, pp. 501 and 505, respectively.

¹¹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, August 14, 1941; for text, see *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

serving the Allied cause in many respects, but that the whole nation will rise to defend itself against Russian attack. They can not, they say, accede to unconditional surrender terms, as that would in effect mean giving themselves over to the Russians.

As in the case of the other small Axis nations, the particular problems in connection with Hungary are, first, to find a means of getting that country out of the war and, second, to determine how much we (and the British) shall have to say in Hungarian affairs. Our instrumentalities for resolving the first are dependent upon the answer found for the second. We believe that the British and ourselves should accept definite responsibilities for ensuring to these countries an application of the principles for which we profess to be waging this war against Nazism.

Although Hungarian claims to territory now occupied in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia presumably will not be entertained, at least until Hungarian forces are withdrawn from the areas disputed, the question of Transylvania (see memorandum on Rumania¹²) may be difficult to evade in case the Russians put it forward in connection with their claim to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina¹³ or the Hungarians and Rumanians should use it as a cause for armed conflict. We are not well informed as to the British view on this subject, but our own studies have pointed to the conclusion that Hungarian troops should be required to withdraw from that part of Transylvania occupied on the basis of the Vienna *Diktat* of 1940 and that probably some form of autonomy for the entire Transylvanian area may prove to be the solution best suited to serve the interest of international security and of future collaboration and peaceful relations among the Danubian states.

740.0011 European War 1939/33623 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 22, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 11:15 a. m.]

862. I have learned from a reliable source that the Hungarian Minister here¹⁴ has secret instructions that in the event of an invasion of Hungary by the Germans or of any German act which might result in depriving the legitimate Hungarian Government of its independence of action he is to put himself at once in touch with me and with the British Ambassador¹⁵ with an offer to place himself and his Legation at our disposal.

¹² Dated March 1944, vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania . . ."

¹³ For activities of the Soviet Union and seizure of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. i, pp. 444 ff.

¹⁴ Andor Wodianer.

¹⁵ Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

This contingency appears now to have arisen and in order to anticipate the approach which I understand he is about to make I would welcome instructions.

I have it on good authority that he called together all the members of his Legation night before last and asked them to sign a pledge of loyalty to him, explaining that this might involve acting independently of Budapest and accepting guidance from the Anglo-American Missions.

As far as I can learn they all signed excepting the Assistant Military Attaché who is now denied access to the Legation's premises and whose papers and office was sealed and being guarded by loyal staff members.

It may interest the Department to know that as far as I can determine all the possible outlets for a Hungarian underground movement have been concentrated in this Hungarian Legation here during the past few months and that this may present us with certain opportunities which perhaps should not be overlooked.

I have not consulted with my British colleague.

NORWEB

864.01/465a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1944—4 p. m.

485. You should immediately inform the Hungarians that the Department has taken note of their declaration reported in your 958 of March 21¹⁶ and that you will be glad to report what practical steps the Hungarian diplomatic representatives may contemplate with a view to effective action against the Germans. You should suggest that it certainly would be to the interest of all Hungarians abroad and to the ultimate benefit of their country, if the Hungarian diplomatic representatives in the neutral countries could work out a common plan for effective action. It would not be desirable for you to act as a means of direct transmission of messages for Hungarian missions, but you should offer to communicate at once to appropriate American missions in neutral countries the substance of inquiries or declarations looking toward the strengthening of Hungarian resistance, for such action by the receiving mission as may be appropriate. Such messages should be repeated to the Department for its information. Similar instructions are being sent to the other neutral capitals.

HULL

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported information from the Hungarian Legation in Sweden that it would be out of the question for the Hungarian Minister and Legation to take orders from the Germans who had occupied Budapest on March 19 (740.0011 European War 1939/33621).

864.01/467 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 25, 1944—6 p. m.
 [Received March 26—11:25 p. m.]

901. Following is translation of circular telegram sent by Hungarian Minister Lisbon to his colleagues at Stockholm, Bern and Madrid¹⁷ and to Consul General Istanbul.¹⁸

"Am glad that our views regarding attitude we should take coincide. Have no intention to resign and am negotiating with Portuguese Government, supported by influential quarters, with view to my continued recognition by it as representative of legal government. For Switzerland only: Urge you under no condition to resign. As for Stójay¹⁹ Government I simply ignore it, make no reports, do not obey instructions, do not reply to wires. Am in contact here with Otto's brother Archduke Karl Ludwig; Bela Radvanszhy who is Bethlen's spokesman; and was able to inform Eckhardt through American channels. Re public declaration of our position I believe that leaving Budapest momentarily in uncertainty re my intentions has tactical advantages greater than possible propaganda value of a premature public declaration. I informed at once American authorities of my position and I assume this was brought to knowledge of British.

In my view it would be most important that until a Committee of Liberation or some similar body could be formed our Legations in neutral countries and our Consul General in Istanbul should concert their actions and should not initiate any major steps without consulting each other. Until our status with governments to which we are severally accredited is settled neither of us should try to form any committees or initiate or join to any free movements.

Eckhardt appears to me most suitable person to organize Hungarian resistance movement. Reason why I believe Otto would not be a proper choice for this role is that by calling on him cause of Hungary would be immediately tied to cause of legitimism and thereby all opposition to Hapsburgs would automatically operate against Hungary.

From here I have possibility of safe and speedy communication with Otto and Eckhardt. Since we four envoys are now sole legal representatives of Hungarian sovereignty I request your authorization to send in our name a message in above sense to Eckhardt and to request him to assume, in collaboration with Pelenyi²⁰ and with support of Otto, in protection of Hungary's interest not only in the United States but everywhere until liberated Hungarian people can freely choose their spokesmen. I also ask authorization to declare that inasmuch as the United States Government grants us necessary technical facilities we are prepared to place ourselves under his and

¹⁷ Antal Ullein-Reviczky, György Baron Bakách-Bessenyey, and Ferenc Ambró, respectively.

¹⁸ Dezső Ujváry.

¹⁹ Döme Sztójay, Hungarian Prime Minister, March-August 1944.

²⁰ John (János) Pelenyi, Hungarian Minister in the United States until November 1940; professor at Dartmouth College.

his associates' leadership. As Barcza²¹ is senior Hungarian diplomatic officer abroad and free of German control it seems to me that they ought to be asked whether he is in a position to coordinate our activities until Eckhardt's position is clarified with competent United Nations' authorities.

Signed Wodianer"

This circular was not sent to Hungarian Minister at Ankara²² because he is considered to be entirely pro-Nazi.

NORWEB

864.01/466 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 26, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

1021. Following telegram has been sent to Lisbon.

3. March 26, 7 p. m. Pursuant to authorization contained in Department's 485 March 23, 4 p. m., Legation transmits substance of declaration from Hungarian Minister Ullein-Reviczky addressed to his colleagues in Bern, Lisbon, Madrid, Vatican,²³ and Hungarian Consul General at Istanbul, not to Hungarian Minister in Ankara, for whatever action receiving American Mission may deem appropriate.

Begin Declaration:

Minister of Hungary at Stockholm sends you following message:

1. There are rumors concerning formation of Hungarian Government abroad. I have declared myself opposed to this project because need of moment is to work for liberation of our country. Nevertheless it could be harmful to our cause if in each country we were known by different name. Therefore I propose to you that we all adopt the name "Free Hungarian National Movement" (Szabad Magyarok Nemzeti Mozgalma).

2. This "Movement" needs no leader. The group in each country should exert its best efforts for common cause in close collaboration with the Allies through intermediary of American Diplomatic Mission. It is however understood that the Group in each country will be presided over by Minister (or Consul General) of Hungary who has adhered to Movement. Communication between the different Groups will be maintained through intermediary of American Diplomatic Missions.

3. All honest Hungarians will be welcomed without distinction as to party or religion. All discussion of domestic policy will be avoided and postponed until later. Our sole common aim at present should be liberation of country.

²¹ György Barcza, Hungarian Minister in the United Kingdom, until April 1944; in Switzerland in 1944 on a secret, semi-official mission to make contact with American-British representatives.

²² János Vörnlé.

²³ Baron Gábor Apor d'Altorja, Hungarian Minister to the Holy See.

4. Each Group will furnish to American Diplomatic Mission complete list of members of Hungarian Legation or Consulate who have adhered to Movement.

5. Each Group will indicate immediately to American Mission whether there are in its district entirely reliable Hungarian nationals who would volunteer to go to Hungary on special missions.

6. Each Hungarian Minister will refrain from resigning—on contrary he will remain at post and maintain that he represents principle of legality in contrast to illegality of Quislings in Budapest. Naturally he will not turn over anything whatsoever to any Nazi Minister sent from Budapest.

7. Each Hungarian Minister will exert every effort to use his influence with Government to which assigned in order that country in question shall not recognize *de jure* the Nazi Cabinet of Budapest.

8. Please give me your consent to send by Allied radio a spoken message to Hungarian nation in your name too, exhorting every patriot to combat the invaders to best of his ability. *End of Declaration.*

Ullein-Reviczky is particularly anxious that each Hungarian mission retain control over money, passports, seals, etc., now in its possession. One reason for his wanting list of personnel which adheres to Movement is hope that Military Attaché at some post will join. Exhortations to Hungarian patriots will, Ullein believes, have added effect if endorsed by army officer. Minister's plan under point 8 is to make phonograph recording here for broadcast from London or other Allied stations. Ullein wants to avoid sending presumptions [*seeming presumptuous?*] in eyes of his colleagues and says he submits declaration for sole purpose of expediting common action.

Repeated to Lisbon, Madrid and Ankara. Transmitted to Department as my 1021, March 26, 7 p. m., for repeating, in Department's discretion, to Bern and Vatican in safe code.

JOHNSON

864.01/469 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 26, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:16 p. m.]

1023. Although Hungarian Minister disclaimed March 25 having had any direct personal contact with British or Soviet Legation (see my 1022, March 26, 8 p. m.)²⁴ it appears that Hungarians have taken care indirectly to keep British and Soviets currently informed. As British employee, Boehm²⁵ would naturally supply that Legation with whatever information he obtains. Already on March 22 Madame

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Willi Boehm, Hungarian refugee employed by the British Legation in Sweden.

Kollontay²⁶ was aware of Ullein-Reviczky's sentiments and intentions.

Italian Minister²⁷ told Ravndal²⁸ March 22, that in course of conversation with him Ullein had said "four Hungarian divisions at Russian frontier" might attempt to return to Hungary or, if that proved impossible, "they would join the Russians". Renzetti also reported that Ullein considered army about evenly divided between those who would collaborate with Nazis and those who would not; however, if a Hungarian leader, for instance a general, would assume direction then army would fight Germans. Italian Minister said Ullein wanted it clearly understood that he was anti-Nazi and entirely "at our disposal".

In course of conversation with me Boheman²⁹ said he was much inclined to believe that Ullein had orders before he came here how to act in certain eventualities and that he is now endeavoring to carry out those orders. Fact that Ullein has personal money here to last him about a year would seem to support this view.

JOHNSON

864.01/471: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 27, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

922. I am transmitting to Wodianer, Hungarian Minister here, substance of declaration made by Hungarian Minister at Stockholm contained in Minister Johnson's 1021, March 26, to Department.

In belief that Hungarian mission here which I have learned is unanimously in favor of joining in with any free Hungarian movement or council of resistance, should be encouraged in this position, I am keeping in close touch with Wodianer through an intermediary. I feel, however, that time is at hand when I should have open contact with him in order to strengthen his position and I would therefore welcome a reply to my 862, March 22.

For many reasons, chief one being facility of communication to the United States where Tibor Eckhardt and other prominent anti-Nazi Hungarians are now residing, I believe that cultivation of Wodianer and his staff might bear fruitful results if we desired to employ his mission in guiding under United States-British control or communicating with resistance and underground activities within occupied Hungary. I am satisfied after the most careful examina-

²⁶ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden.

²⁷ Giuseppe Renzetti.

²⁸ Christian M. Ravndal, Counselor of the American Legation in Sweden.

²⁹ E. C. Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office.

tion into the facts as I know them that Wodianer is to be relied upon. He is without personal political ambition and has amply demonstrated his only wish is to cooperate fully with any free Hungarian movement without necessarily seeking leadership. Implicit in this is his willingness and desire to cooperate with this mission as well as with the British Embassy and I must repeat that the facilities for communication here make it evident that through Lisbon such a liaison can be effected. Please also reread penultimate paragraph of my 862.

Since drafting the above I have just learned that Wodianer who has been also seeking an interview with Campbell is being received by latter tonight. This is in line with instructions which Campbell had previously received from London.

NORWEB

864.01/477 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 29, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:34 p. m.]

1069. See my 1023, March 26, 9 p. m. Italian Minister arranged meeting March 27 between Hungarian Minister and Soviet First Counselor Semenov. Latter wished Ullein Reviczky hearty welcome to ranks of peoples fighting Hitler. Semenov indicated Madame Kollontay would like to see Ullein sometime. Latter asked Semenov to convey his compliments to her. No appointment made yet but interview is likely.

British Legation informed Ullein by telephone that Chargé Montagu-Pollock wished to see him at 11 o'clock, March 28. Ullein called as requested. Pollock gave him friendly welcome and stated that according to instructions from London British Government did not favor creation of any free Hungarian Government or committee and would in fact not recognize one. However, British Government would welcome any cooperative effort of anti-German Hungarians outside Hungary.

Pollock inquired what contact Ullein has with other Allied Legations. Hungarian Minister mentioned having just met Semenov and added that Hungarian Legation had been for some time in private contact with American Legation and he himself had come into contact with Americans more recently. This contact was developing favorably.

Hungarians declare their intention of responding to friendly approaches of Allied Legations while maintaining principal contact with American Legation in order to avoid confusion. They are con-

fidant that American Government will coordinate with other Allied Governments to insure uniform Allied policy for fostering Hungarian resistance.

Ullein believes his message to other Hungarian Chiefs of Mission (my 1021, March 26, 7 p. m.) is in keeping with British instructions which Pollock expounded to him.

JOHNSON

864.01/489a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1944—11 a. m.

922. Information so far reaching the Department indicates that the Hungarian Ministers and most of their staffs at Lisbon, Stockholm, Helsinki,³¹ Bern and Madrid, as well as the Hungarian Consul General at Istanbul have taken the position that they will not accept instructions from the new puppet government in Budapest. No news has been received regarding the Hungarian Minister to the Vatican, although he is reported to be strongly pro-Allied in his personal sentiments.

While it is expected that a common policy will eventually be worked out with the British and Soviet Governments governing the treatment and facilities to be accorded diplomatic and other pro-Allied Hungarian elements, the following is sent to supplement the Department's preliminary instruction of March 23:³²

1. You are authorized to have contact with any Hungarians who may establish to your satisfaction that they are genuinely desirous of enlisting Hungarian support for the Allied cause against the Germans.

2. You should indicate our wish to encourage by every feasible means the efforts of all Hungarians in or out of Hungary who are desirous of building up the greatest possible Hungarian resistance to the Germans.

3. You may make it known that our future attitude toward Hungary cannot but be influenced by the manner in which the Hungarian people respond to the present opportunity and necessity for resistance.

4. It will not be desirable for you in any way to suggest that this Government favors any particular Hungarian organization abroad or that it recognizes or sponsors any special group. (For the Department's attitude on free movements see Department's confidential circular instruction of March 23, 1943 [1944].)

³¹ György Szabó de Szentmiklós was Hungarian Minister in Finland.

³² See telegram 485, March 23, 4 p. m., to Stockholm, p. 852.

5. It will be useful for the Department to have any information that may come into your possession regarding resistance movements, "underground" facilities and other developments.

6. Whereas you may continue to transmit to other American Missions such messages as you believe will contribute to the development of Hungarian resistance, it should be made clear that this facility is of an emergency character and subject to eventual modification in consultation with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

For your own confidential information, the Department's information indicates that the Hungarian Minister in Ankara is definitely pro-Nazi and the Hungarian Minister at Stockholm, who has the reputation of having been pro-Nazi in the past although making every protestation of pro-Allied sentiment at present,³³ does not enjoy the full confidence of his colleagues and would not be looked upon by them as a desirable leader.

At least some of the Hungarian diplomatic representatives are not resigning but taking the position that they continue to represent the only legal government of Hungary, i.e., the government in power prior to the German occupation. It is important to bear in mind that in so far as they succeed in maintaining this position they will, since the United States is at war with Hungary, also technically retain their quality as representatives of an "enemy" state.

Sent to Lisbon, Stockholm, Bern, Madrid, Ankara and Cairo.³⁴

HULL

864.01/482: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 31, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 11:30 a. m.]

956. For Stockholm 138, March 31, 11 a. m. Following the meeting between the Hungarian Minister and my British colleague, reported in my 922, March 27, 9 p. m., I received Wodianer and had a brief talk with him. The following day he sent me a signed note in which he informed me that he would remain at his post as the representative of the legal government of Hungary and that he would not recognize the present regime which he considered as imposed upon his

³³ In telegram 1112, April 1, 1944, the Minister in Sweden reported that the Swedish Foreign Office did not share this opinion and "had documentary evidence of Ulein-Reviczky's anti-German attitude before he was named Hungarian Minister to Sweden" (846.01/490). Subsequently, Minister Johnson sent additional reports to the same effect.

³⁴ As Nos. 922, 551, 1076, 904, 281 (for repetition as 236 to Istanbul), and Yugos 19, respectively.

country by force. He informed me orally that he was sending an identic communication to my British colleague.

He also enclosed a copy of a note addressed to Salazar³⁵ along the same lines which he said he would present "as soon as it appears opportune."

I informed Wodianer that I was without instructions and was therefore unable to do more than to assure him that his approach and the substance of his communications would be made known to my Government. I did what I could personally however to encourage him in his present stand and to stiffen his back. I also offered to assist him in communicating with his colleagues in other neutral countries.

Copies of his communications going forward by pouch tonight.³⁶

Sent to Department. Repeated to Madrid 79; to London 138 for Stockholm.

NORWEB

864.01/529

*Archduke Otto of Austria to President Roosevelt*³⁷

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1944.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: First of all, let me thank you most warmly for your kindness for having acted rapidly on my requests in these last days. I am the more grateful as I know that you have not been feeling well and that therefore my letters and notes meant an added strain on you.

For this reason also it is only reluctantly that I send you this letter and the vital Annexes to it. I would have certainly waited if I was not forced to act because of the situation in Europe. But without endangering the whole future I can no longer let the Hungarian diplomats and the Underground wait for instruction and for guidance.

I join to this letter three Annexes, which cover the problems:

1. A short historic review of the events leading to my present letter to you;
2. The plan of the Hungarian Council for Resistance.
3. A short outline of measures that would be necessary and for which we would ask your kind assistance in order to help the Hungarian Council for Resistance.

I would be most grateful if you could let me know as soon as possible, for the aforementioned reasons, your views, your advice and your decisions on all these matters.

³⁵ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³⁶ Despatch 344, March 31, 1944, not printed.

³⁷ On April 7 President Roosevelt transmitted this letter with enclosures to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) with a memorandum as follows: "Will you be good enough to let me have your views on the enclosed from Archduke Otto? F.D.R." For reply, see memorandum of April 12 by the Secretary of State, p. 866.

Needless to say that, as in the past, you can be assured of my absolute discretion on this entire subject.

With my best wishes for a prompt and complete recovery of your health and with my renewed thanks for your kindness and respectful regards I remain, dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

OTTO OF AUSTRIA

[Enclosure 1]

ANNEX I

HISTORIC REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY EVENTS LEADING TO THE PRESENT LETTER

N.B. This is a compilation from Hungarian official documents and official telegrams from Lisbon.

1. Evolution of the situation since January: Hitler refuses to General Szombathely, Chief of Staff of the Royal Hungarian Army, the return of the remainders of the eight Hungarian divisions, which are scattered behind the Russian front. He demands new action against the Jews, the sending of Hungarian workers to Germany, more supplies and more raw-materials. He demands the extradition of the interned American and British pilots. All these demands are rejected. Hitler declares early in February that he expects that the Hungarian army shall fight on the Hungarian border against the Russians. In the same time Hitler conspires with Hungarian Nazis.

2. On March 14th Hitler demands in a stiff note the shipping of 25,000 Jews per week to Germany. Reason: In Hungary live in freedom more than a million Jews, more than in the whole remainder of Europe; this becomes intolerable with the approach of the Soviets.—The Hungarian Cabinet rejects this demand unanimously and notifies the Germans on March 15th.

3. On March 16th Hitler invites Horthy urgently for a visit at his headquarters in Germany on the matter of the Hungarian troops in Russia.—Horthy sends a telegram to the Hungarian ministers in neutral countries ordering them that, in case of German invasion, they should immediately seek contact with their American and British colleagues and should put themselves at my disposal. He furthermore sends a document for me as the legitimate King of Hungary, containing full powers. This document is deposited with my brother Charles Louis in Lisbon. Horthy orders the army to resist in case of invasion. Only then does he leave for Hitler's headquarters.

4. A Hungarian Underground is organized and its arming had also been started. It is put under my orders through an intermediary agent in a neutral country.

5. At Horthy's arrival Hitler demands from him the complete mobilization of Hungary against Russia, the extradition of all Jews, refugees and prisoners of war to Germany, the shipping of 250,000 workers to Germany, the handing over of the Hungarian food and raw-material reserves; Horthy refuses these requests. Since that time nobody has seen him and the place of his present residence is unknown.

6. While these conversations take place, the Germans attack by surprise Hungary with extensive use of parachutists. The Hungarian troops offer scattered resistance.

7. The Kallay Government refuses to resign and the Germans, not Horthy, appoint a new Government in Hungary, which at once suppresses the Hungarian Constitution.

8. Only the Hungarian Minister in Ankara follows the orders of the Quisling Government. The other heads of diplomatic Missions follow Horthy's orders to keep the Legations for the legal Government, subject to my instructions. This is done in Lisbon, Madrid, Bern, Helsinki and Stockholm. There is good outlook that the neutral countries will continue to recognize these diplomats as the representatives of the legal Government of Hungary.

9. The just mentioned five Ministers report to me on March 29th, they ask for further instructions, suggesting that, in conformity with their instructions and the powers deposited by Horthy, I at once appoint a new Hungarian Government.

[Enclosure 2]

ANNEX II

PLAN OF THE HUNGARIAN COUNCIL FOR RESISTANCE

Although the legal basis obviously exists I do not intend, for the time being, to create a Hungarian Government in exile. On the other hand, it has become urgent and indispensable that some competent Hungarian Authority be created for guidance and coordination of all Hungarian efforts for the fight against Hitler.

It is therefore planned to organize a Hungarian Council for Resistance, composed now of the five loyal Hungarian Ministers, namely the Ministers in Lisbon, Stockholm, Madrid, Bern and Helsinki. As soon as this Council is organized, it shall elect as its Chairman Mr. John Pelenyi, former Hungarian Minister in Washington, D.C., and at this time Professor in Dartmouth College. The members of the Council retain their present diplomatic posts. Membership of the Council is limited to active diplomatic representatives of Hungary, whose number might still increase. Besides electing Mr. Pelenyi as its President, the Council may designate also other Hungarian per-

sonalities for specific tasks or missions. Neither myself nor Mr. Eckhardt are included in the Council.

The Council is not a Government. It constitutes nevertheless the only existing organ of the legal Hungarian Government deprived at present of its liberty of action. By the formation of this Council, the continuity of Hungarian constitutional life is maintained. The Council shall cease to exist when constitutional order on Hungarian soil is restored.

The Council offers its services to the Allies.

The Council's aims are :

1. To unite, organize and direct the Underground Forces in Hungary as well as Hungarian factors abroad for political resistance and for armed fight against Hitler.

2. To save patriots, Jews and refugees in Hungary from extermination by the Nazis.

The Council has no other aim. But by its existence and by its actions Hungarian Statehood survives and the participation of Hungary in the fight against Hitler is assured.

I believe it to be my duty to proceed to the formation of this Hungarian Council for Resistance as soon as your acceptance of this plan has been won.

[Enclosure 3]

ANNEX III

REQUESTS :

Leadership of the contemplated action and the Central Office of the Council for Resistance, is planned to be located in Washington D.C., as I desire to keep all activities of the Council in full harmony with the U.S.A. views and policies. Should I be fortunate to receive your consent, the following assistance seems indispensable for the efficient and orderly functioning of the Council :

A. *In General:*

1. Authorization for the publication of the organization and the aims of the Council, with the moral backing of the U.S.A. Government.

2. As the main activity of the Council for Resistance would be carried on along Underground lines, some form of stable military collaboration, also by appointment of a military liaison Officer with the Council. Designation of an Officer of liaison also by other interested Government agencies would improve efficient collaboration in every respect.

3. Authorization of rapid and secure means of communication between the Central Office in Washington D.C. and each member of the Council in neutral countries.

4. Authorization for the use of an adequate news and propaganda service directed towards Hungary for the information and guidance of the Hungarian people.

5. If necessary: the unfreezing of some Hungarian assets in order to cover the costs of the Washington Central Office and eventually also of member-legations in neutral countries which do not possess adequate financial means.

Should you, Mr. President, approve of these measures, I beg to ask you to give the necessary orders to the interested Government agencies.

B. Specific Instructions: seem further needed in order to secure urgently harmony amongst the widely scattered Hungarian forces of resistance in Europe:

1. An order to General Bissell to grant me the possibility to wire to my brother through General Bissell's channels (as in the past week). Also authorization to my brother Charles Louis to send me wires through the same channel.

2. Authorization for Archduke Charles Louis to travel by the Military Transport Plane from Lisbon or from the Azores to the United States and back to Lisbon. Also instruction to grant to him the U.S. Visa in Lisbon as well as an immediate Exit-Permit from the United States for his return to Lisbon. The reasons for his trip are:

a. Charles Louis has received valuable secret information which he should report personally to you and to myself.

b. Charles Louis is seriously ill and has to go to a hospital, probably for an operation, which should be performed here and not in Portugal. But he cannot leave Lisbon before he is adequately replaced by his brother Rudolf.

3. Authorization that my brother Archduke Rudolf be granted the use of the Military Transport Plane to the Azores or to Lisbon, in order to replace urgently Charles Louis, especially in maintaining contacts with the Underground.

864.01/500 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 6, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 10:18 p. m.]

1031. [To Buenos Aires:] Please transmit following message from Hungarian Minister, Lisbon, Wodianer, to Semsey, Hungarian Minister to Argentina,³⁸ who we are informed has refused to recognize present Hungarian Government.

³⁸ Count Andor Semsey was the Hungarian Chargé in Argentina at this time.

Message begins. I and my colleagues in Madrid, Bern and Stockholm, and Ujvary in Istanbul, refuse to recognize or obey the present government which we consider illegal and having come into being under pressure of a foreign power. We continue to represent last legal government and have requested recognition of this status from the governments to which we are accredited. We are endeavoring in consultation with United States and British Missions to form the core of a Hungarian resistance movement to the leadership of which we believe Eckhardt to be the best man in cooperation with Pelenyi and with the support of Otto. All of these are now in United States. I hope you will join us in order that we alone, free to speak and act for the Hungarian people, can present a united front and by concerted action can inspire and guide effective resistance. We plan to authorize Ullein to record our joint appeal for resistance to Hungarian people to be broadcast from Allied stations. We should like your consent to our requesting Eckhardt to assume direction with consent and in cooperation with Allied authorities of resistance movement together with Pelenyi and with Otto's support until Hungary liberated and people free to choose its government. Madrid and Bern already agreed with this step and we suspect Stockholm's approval. Barcza in Switzerland agreed to join our group and Minister to Finland who resigned and went to Sweden is also expected to join. We have not yet been able to contact Apor at the Vatican although we have no doubt as to where he stands. Signed Wodianer. *Message ends.*

Sent to Buenos Aires as No. 3, April 6, 4 p. m.³⁹ Repeated to Department.

NORWEE

864.01/522: Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State

ISTANBUL, April 11, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received April 12—6:43 a. m.]

239R48. This is my April 11, 11 a. m. to Stockholm to be repeated at the discretion of the Department to Berne:⁴⁰

April 11, 11 a. m. Dezsö Ujvary, Consul General of Hungary in Istanbul, has returned from Ankara trip reported in my 210R37 March 29, 6 p. m.⁴¹ While there he had two conversations with Kemal Aziz,⁴² Director General, Consular Section, Turkish Ministry Foreign Affairs, and made following queries.

1. What would be the attitude of Turkish Government if he led, or took active role in formation of, Free Hungarian movement in Turkey.

³⁹ The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) in his telegram 948, April 10, 7 p. m. expressed reluctance to deliver this message to Count Semsey; the Minister in Portugal was so informed (864.01/514). Similarly, a subsequent message, sent to the Ambassador in Argentina in Department's telegram 790, May 15, 7 p. m., also was not communicated to Count Semsey (864.01/514, 584).

⁴⁰ The Department repeated this telegram to Bern and Lisbon.

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² Kemal Aziz Payman.

2. Whether he might expect Turkish Government to permit him unofficially to enjoy personal status of Consul General.

Kemal Aziz appeared friendly and sympathetic in morning conversation but assumed distant and formal attitude in afternoon at which time he made following replies:

(1) It would be inadvisable for Ujvary to engage in any political activity whatsoever. It even would be appropriate for Ujvary not only to refrain from political activity but to use his influence to persuade local Hungarian colony to take same attitude.

(2) In view of his resignation it would be extremely difficult for the Turkish Government to permit him to enjoy even unofficially the personal rights and status of a Consul General.

In general conversation Kemal Aziz [stat]ed that Turkish Government was especially anxious to avoid friction with Germany in view of problems posed by Kallay's use of Turkish Legation in Budapest as refuge. He implied that if Ujvary refrained from political activity Turkish Government might not raise the question of his personal status.

After consultation with political friends in Istanbul, Ujvary will inform me as to his and their decisions.

BERRY

864.01/529

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1944.

With reference to the letter of April 4 addressed to the President by the Archduke Otto, and the President's covering memorandum of April 7 ⁴³ requesting comment on the Archduke's proposals:

Action by this Government along the lines suggested by the Archduke would require consideration of several matters of major importance, to wit:

1. The plans outlined by the Archduke Otto in Annexes II and III to his letter amount in substance to a proposal that the direction of the resistance movement within Hungary, and the operations leading to the restoration of the Crown of Hungary to the Archduke, be conducted from the United States, with the active participation of agencies, military and civilian, of this Government;

2. The support required for the proposed Hungarian Council of Resistance which would be established in Washington, would involve even more than the "recognition" the Archduke is willing to forego, in that the detail of liaison officers, the use of American communica-

⁴³ See footnote 37, p. 860.

tions services, the authorization of publicity and propaganda agencies, and the allocation of blocked funds (Annex III), would place the Hungarian Council directly under the auspices of this Government;

3. The proposal contemplates an exclusively American sponsorship for the conduct of the Hungarian resistance movement, whereas this Government has agreed that our dealings with Hungary, as with the other enemy states in Europe, will be in full consultation with the British and Soviet Governments.

The implications of these considerations suggest that neither from the point of view of public opinion in this country nor in view of our political and military engagements for acting jointly with other governments in the conduct of the war in Europe, would it be to our national interest for this Government to agree to the proposals advanced by the Archduke.

It should be observed that steps have already been taken to achieve some of the aims set forth in the Archduke's proposals. Immediately after the German occupation of Hungary the Department authorized our representatives in the neutral capitals informally to assist in enabling the various Hungarian diplomatic missions and underground agents to coordinate their plans for building up the resistance forces within Hungary. These were provisional and emergency steps, but they served their purpose in enabling the Hungarians abroad to survey their prospects for contributing to Germany's defeat. The British are informed of what these Hungarian representatives are planning, and the Russians are probably now coming into the picture as well. The British, in fact, have now notified the Department of their views as to a more definite policy, and hope that Washington and Moscow will express their general agreement and thus make it a joint policy. In summary the British proposal discourages the recognition of a free Hungarian movement, but favors steps to build up the Hungarian officials who have repudiated the present regime, with emphasis on strengthening the resistance elements within the country, leaving Hungary's future to be worked out by the people at home if they unite in active resistance to the Germans.

The Department has not replied to the British suggestion, but would recommend it to the President as being in substantial accord with the Department's views, and preferable to a unilateral support, on our part, of any particular Hungarian group. It would be appreciated if the President would indicate whether he approves. Moreover, the advantages of a joint policy, with its additional value as an example of cooperation of the principal Allies in European questions, are apparent.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

864.01/544a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1944—9 p. m.

1065. The British Foreign Office has given some study to the question of dealing with the Hungarians abroad, and has notified the Department of its conclusions which are also now being communicated to the Soviet Government, presumably with the idea of determining certain principles of common policy in the matter. The main points put forward by the Foreign Office are as follows:

1. We should take no initiative in and assume no responsibility for the formation of a free Hungarian movement.

2. Should the *émigrés* themselves of their own accord tend to come together we should not discourage such tendency but should reserve our position vis-à-vis any organization that might eventually be formed.

3. We should encourage the governments of neutral countries where Hungarian representatives have repudiated the authority of the present Hungarian Government to continue their recognition of such representatives and to refuse to accept any new representatives who may be named by that Government. Dissident Hungarian representatives should in the interests of the common cause be encouraged to remain at their present posts.

4. In our propaganda we should make it clear that the future of Hungary is primarily in the hands of the Hungarians within Hungary, who regardless of party affiliations should be given every encouragement to unite in active resistance to the Germans and the present Hungarian Government. They should be advised wherever possible to get into touch with Tito ⁴⁴ and his partisans.

5. We should ourselves endeavor to get into direct touch through Yugoslavia with any resistance groups that may emerge in Hungary, but not using Hungarian *émigré* organizations for this purpose.

6. Such a policy may have to be reconsidered if it becomes clear later that there is little prospect of organized resistance inside Hungary.

The Soviet Government has not yet commented on these views. The Department, however, has indicated its general agreement and you may therefore use them, together with the observations contained in the Department's circular of March 31,⁴⁵ for guidance in dealing with the Hungarian question, pending a further clarification of the situation. Regarding paragraph 3 above, if you have a suitable opportunity you should make known to the Foreign Minister that, on the basis of information available to us, we believe the new Hungarian Government is in fact unconstitutional and should in every way be

⁴⁴ Marshal Josip Broz Tito, President and Minister of Defense of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia; Supreme Commander of Yugoslav Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments.

⁴⁵ See telegram 922, March 31, 11 a. m., to Lisbon, p. 858.

considered as a "puppet" government entirely subservient to the Germans. You may therefore express the hope that the government to which you are accredited will not recognize the present Nazi-imposed Hungarian Government and accordingly refuse to accept any representative whom it may seek to appoint.

As for paragraph 4 above, the Department realizes that as the military situation in Southeastern Europe now stands the best means of contact with Hungary may be through northwestern Yugoslavia where the Partisan forces are active. There is no change, however, in our general policy as regards Yugoslavia, where our relations with the Partisans have been on a strictly military basis, and our acceptance of this point would not exclude contact with other groups actively resisting the Germans.

Sent to Lisbon, Bern, Madrid, Stockholm, repeated to Ankara and Moscow.⁴⁶

HULL

864.01/546: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 21, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received April 22—11:13 a. m.]

1201. Department's 1065, April 17, 9 p. m. The British and ourselves have made strong representations to the Portuguese Foreign Office in an endeavor to prevent the Portuguese Government from extending recognition to the Hungarian puppet Government.

The Foreign Office states that according to information received from the Portuguese Minister at Budapest⁴⁷ the Sztojaj Government has been in fact established on a legal basis and that as Wodianer has stated that he does not represent that Government he is no longer recognized as the Hungarian representative in Lisbon. Ujpetery⁴⁸ would be recognized as Chargé d'Affaires.

When we protested that it appeared to us that Portugal's action was far ahead of that of any of the other neutrals we were informed that this did not necessarily constitute recognition or anything more than a change in Hungarian representation here; and that in any case if a new Minister were to be named action on the request for agreement could be delayed.⁴⁹

NORWEB

⁴⁶ As Nos. 1065, 1319, 1063, 688, 341 (for repetition to Istanbul), and 936, respectively. The last-named telegram added: "Since this matter is being presented to Moscow by the British no action on your part is necessary." (864.01/544b)

⁴⁷ Carlos de Sampaio Garrido.

⁴⁸ Elemer Ujpetery, First Secretary of the Hungarian Legation in Portugal.

⁴⁹ In telegram 1245, April 25, 6 p. m., 1944, Minister Norweb reported British representations to the Portuguese Foreign Office in regard to this matter (864.01/549).

864.01/560 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 29, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 6:34 p. m.]

1302. Wodianer has received following from Hungarian Minister in Bern, Bessenyei, dated April 26.

“Final plan of Envoys Committee is that Envoys and Mission Chiefs who rejected Sztojay Government form a committee regardless of date on which they took anti-Nazi stand. This committee would be rallying point of all anti-Nazi Hungarian diplomats, civil servants and patriots and would serve as an organization of information and consultation for the United States, Great Britain and the Allies generally regarding questions affecting Hungary. It will endeavor to organize military and civil resistance against German occupation. The committee aims to assist in the reestablishment of Hungary’s independence and sovereignty within the framework of constitutional democracy but it takes no position regarding domestic policy questions and does not represent any Hungarian political party. To insure concerted action Barcza agrees to act as coordinator of the Committee in Europe and Pelenyi will be invited to accept same task in America. American and British Ministers at Bern have submitted this plan to their respective Governments which have taken notice thereof.

While it is not intended to make formal announcement of the committee’s formation it would be useful to give it publicity in the local press as far as possible.”

An identical communication has been sent by Bern to Madrid and Stockholm also. Wodianer here and Ambro at Madrid have accepted the plan; and from Ullein’s last message to Wodianer (see Stockholm’s 1437, April 24, midnight, to the Department ⁵⁰) the latter assumes that both Ullein and the Hungarian Minister at Helsinki, now in Stockholm, will also be agreeable.

This mission has no indication regarding the Department’s views as to the proposed committee and the information reaching us from Bern and from Stockholm seems to conflict, in that according to Bern we and the British Government have “taken note of” the proposed committee of Envoys, while according to Ullein’s message to Wodianer, transmitted by Johnson, we and the British Government “have approved” Eckhardt’s leadership of a committee of Resistance. Accordingly, the Department’s instructions would be appreciated.

NORWEB

⁵⁰ Not printed.

864.01/535 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1944—6 p. m.

381. Lisbon's telegram of April 21⁵¹ repeated to you as number 3 refers to a message from Hungarian Consul General Ujvary at Istanbul to Hungarian Ministers at Stockholm, Lisbon and Bern as contained in Istanbul's 251R53 April 17 to the Department.⁵² This message stated that since the Turkish Government had not shown much willingness to continue recognition of Ujvary's personal status as Consul General following his repudiation of the new Hungarian Government it would be desirable for Hungarian Ministers who have likewise broken with Budapest to ask their Turkish colleagues to exert influence with the Turkish Government to the end of alleviating his isolated position.

Although our information indicates that Ujvary is genuinely desirous of aiding the Allied cause and it seems likely that he could be useful in fostering Hungarian resistance to the Germans, the Department does not feel that you should make any formal or direct representations on his behalf. You may, however, take suitable opportunity to express informally to the Turkish Foreign Office our hope that his repudiation of the Nazi-imposed Hungarian Government and his present desire to collaborate with the Allies will not be allowed to place him in embarrassment with the Turkish authorities.

Sent to Ankara, repeated to Lisbon.⁵³

HULL

701.6454/5 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 2, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 8 : 41 p. m.]

2776. Hungarian Minister here, Baron Bakach-Bessenyey, requests transmission following message to Count Semsey, Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, Buenos Aires, to Laszlo Hertelendy, Counselor of Hungarian Legation, Rio, and also asks that copy be handed John Pelenyi, former Minister Washington.

"The plan for forming a committee of ministers is taking shape. All ministers and heads of missions who have not recognized Sztojaj Government will form committee to group reliable Hungarian diplomats, employees and other patriots and to act, as occasion permits, as an informative and advisory organization on matters regarding Hungary for the USA, Great Britain and other Allied powers. Commit-

⁵¹ No. 1196, not printed.

⁵² Not printed.

⁵³ Repeated to Lisbon as No. 1211.

tee will promote organization of military and civil resistance against the German invaders. While committee's main aim is reestablishment Hungarian independence and sovereignty, based on constitutional democracy, it assumes no standpoint on matters of internal policy and represents no political party.

To ensure unity of procedure Mr. Barcza, Dean of Hungarian Ministers, would undertake coordination of work in Europe and Mr. Pelényi is being asked to assume same task in America. U.S.A. and British Ministers have been informed. You are asked to make known your approval by telegraphing 'J'accepte'. Besseneyey."

For Department only: Baron Besseneyey has communicated this message directly by his own cipher facilities to Ministers at Stockholm, Lisbon and Madrid and has received approval from Madrid and Lisbon. No reply from Stockholm yet. He would appreciate Department's good offices in presenting matter to Pelényi with an expression of hope of senders of message, namely Besseneyey and Barcza, that he, Pelényi, will accept.

(2) Baron Besseneyey asks message quoted above sent to Ujvary with following addition:

[Here follows personal message to the Hungarian Consul General at Istanbul (Ujvary).]

HARRISON

864.01/560 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1944—9 p. m.

1271. The Department has not approved Eckhardt's leadership of the Hungarian resistance committee. From reports received locally it appears that he does not seek and probably would not accept any position requiring public activity. Until the receipt of your (Lisbon's) telegram no. 1302 of April 29, 1944 (Bern's 2776 transmitting Bessenyi's proposal was not received until the evening of May 2), we had had no knowledge of the proposed committee of envoys to be headed by Barcza in Europe and Pelényi in the United States. Although the Department perceives no objection to the organization of a committee of Hungarian diplomats for informative and advisory purposes as proposed by Bessenyi it prefers not to indicate any special interest in these plans since there are indications that the dissenting Hungarians are looking particularly to this Government for sponsorship. The temporary facilities for communication which we afforded were and are intended only to make sure that advantages in promoting resistance to the Germans should not be lost.

The Russians have not indicated what attitude they intend to adopt toward the Hungarians abroad. Messages from Stockholm of

April 29 and 30⁵⁴ report, however, that the Soviet Minister has received Ullein-Reviczky and that the British have undertaken to transmit messages to persons in Hungary. Accordingly, it is felt that in general the plan for dealing with the Hungarian envoys abroad is developing along the lines of the British proposals mentioned in the Department's circular telegram of April 17,⁵⁵ although some six weeks have passed without any concrete evidence of active resistance within Hungary or of the establishment of effective liaison between the Hungarians abroad and elements within the country.

The Department will again communicate with you as soon as it can evaluate the results of the British initiative both in underground contacts and in the matter of the proposed joint policy of the Allied Governments.

Sent to Lisbon, repeated to Madrid, Stockholm, Ankara (to be repeated to Istanbul), Moscow,⁵⁶ and to Bern in paraphrase.

HULL

864.01/580a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1944—11 p. m.

1124. Pending an expression of the views of the Soviet Government on the British proposal for a joint policy for strengthening resistance within Hungary and for utilizing to this end the former Hungarian representatives abroad, the Department has continued to maintain the contacts between these representatives.

Since the former Hungarian Minister at Stockholm is now reported to be in touch with Mme. Kollontay the Department's most recent circular telegram to the neutral missions⁵⁷ is being repeated to you separately.

HULL

701.6454/5 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1944—11 p. m.

1571. The statement quoted in your 2776 May 2 is being repeated as requested. Pelényi is a professor at Dartmouth College. He was recently reported to be favorable in principle to the idea of such a committee, though already under attack in the Leftist Hungarian-American press.

⁵⁴ Telegrams 1527 and 1532, respectively; neither printed.

⁵⁵ Telegram 1065, p. 868.

⁵⁶ Repeated as Nos. 1275, 840, 398, and 1125, respectively.

⁵⁷ *Supra*.

The following is a paraphrase of a telegram sent to the usual missions:

The question of Eckhardt's leadership of a resistance committee has not been before the Department for consideration or approval. Recent reports indicate that he does not seek and probably would not accept any position which requires activity of a public nature. The Department had not known of the proposed committee of envoys under Barcza and Pelényi until the receipt of Lisbon's telegram of April 29.⁵⁹ We prefer not to show any particular interest in these plans in view of the indications that the Hungarian envoys are looking for sponsorship from this Government especially. In affording temporary facilities for communication it was and is the purpose only to make certain that advantages in furthering resistance to the Germans should not be lost.

It is not yet known what attitude will be adopted by the Russians toward the Hungarians abroad. The Soviet Minister at Stockholm is reported to have received Ullein-Reviczky and the British are also reported to have offered to transmit messages to individuals in Hungary. Thus, it appears that the plan for dealing with the Hungarian envoys is developing in general along the lines of the British proposal circularized to you in the Department's telegram dated April 17,⁶⁰ even though several weeks have elapsed without any specific evidence of effective liaison between the potential resistance groups in Hungary and the Hungarians abroad, or of active resistance to the Germans within Hungary.

A further instruction will follow as soon as the Department can evaluate the results of the British initiative both in the matter of the suggested joint policy of the principal Allied Governments and in establishing underground contacts.

HULL

864.01/571 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 6, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received May 7—2: 25 p. m.]

1567. In the course of my interview this morning with the Foreign Minister,⁶¹ I also asked him about the notice Foreign Office had recently served on the Hungarian Minister that the Spanish Government would recognize as Chargé d'Affaires of the present Hungarian Regime, the former Counselor of the Hungarian Legation in Lisbon.⁶² He said that Spain as well as Portugal had no choice but to recognize the present Hungarian Government with which its Minister in Budapest⁶³ was in contact as the legal successor of the previous Gov-

⁵⁹ Telegram 1302, p. 870.

⁶⁰ Telegram 1065 to Lisbon, p. 868.

⁶¹ Lt. Gen. Count Francisco Gomez Jordana.

⁶² Sándor Hollán.

⁶³ Miguel Angel de Muguero.

ernment and, in this connection, he cited at some length Spain's action in recognizing the Badoglio⁶⁴ Government.

The Hungarian Minister, whom I saw previously, seemed quite complacent about giving up his Legation and plans to go to Lisbon where he can be in touch with the former Hungarian Minister to Portugal.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

864.01/529

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With my memorandum of April 12 concerning certain projects proposed by the Archduke Otto I returned to you a long letter which he had written to you,⁶⁵ in the course of which he referred to another matter which has now arisen; namely, a plan that his brother, Charles Louis, should return from Lisbon, and that the younger brother, Rudolf, should then proceed to Lisbon to carry on the activities in which Charles Louis had been engaged.

Charles Louis has in fact returned to this country, and the Department now has before it for consideration a request for an exit permit for the Archduke Rudolf, who wishes to proceed to Lisbon early in June.

I think there are good reasons why permission should not be given for this travel. The presence of the Archduke Charles Louis became generally known in Lisbon, where Mr. Wodianer, the Hungarian Minister, with whom he was in contact, is now active in an informal group of former Hungarian diplomats, stationed at Lisbon, Madrid, Bern, Stockholm, and Istanbul, in opposition to the present puppet government at Budapest and in plans for strengthening resistance within Hungary. Both the British Government and ourselves have extended some facilities of communication for these former officials, and the British and Soviet Governments are informed of their activities and plans. We have, as you know, a definite agreement with the British and Soviet Governments, which we have loyally kept and which I consider of great importance, to keep each other informed of all our transactions regarding the enemy states. The Archdukes are very definitely political and conspicuous personalities, and the departure of any of them from this country for Lisbon at the present time would surely give rise to wide speculation. I think you will agree

⁶⁴ Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government; for correspondence regarding concern of the United States over maintenance of responsible government in Italy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 402 ff. and *post*, pp. 996 ff.

⁶⁵ Letter dated April 4, p. 860.

that the involvement of this Government in questions concerned with the Archduke Otto's political aspirations is something very carefully to be avoided because of the political implications, both in this country and abroad.

I fear moreover that the Archdukes have not observed sufficient secrecy concerning the facilities of communication which have been afforded, and think that the impending military events⁶⁶ would justify our withdrawing the privileges of secret and cipher traffic between the Archdukes in Lisbon and Washington which were extended some months ago.

I would therefore suggest that we terminate their communications through the special channels with which you are familiar, and, unless we are prepared to apprise the British and Soviet Governments of the nature of the Archduke Rudolf's proposed activity, that we take negative action on his application for an exit permit, since his travel abroad at this juncture would certainly be interpreted as being undertaken with the approval, or even on the initiative, of this Government.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

864.01/6-2744

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 3596

STOCKHOLM, June 27, 1944.

[Received July 5.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram to the Department No. 2283 June 23, 9 p. m.,⁶⁷ I have the honor to transmit the text of a letter dated June 17⁶⁷ delivered here June 20) in which Hungarian Minister Antal Ullein-Reviczky describes the advantages which he believes would attend the clarification of the attitude which the three principal Allied Governments have hitherto shown toward the dissident Hungarian diplomats. It is understood that similar letters were addressed to the British and Soviet Ministers in Stockholm.⁶⁸

In his letter, Mr. Ullein-Reviczky endeavors to demonstrate that some form of public encouragement or approval on the part of the three principal Allies is necessary if the dissident Hungarian diplomats are to develop their anti-Nazi activities successfully.

Minister Ullein-Reviczky has correctly sensed a progressive deterioration in his position and that of his Legation. The formation of a group styling itself the "Association of Hungarian Democrats in Sweden" has already been mentioned (see my despatch No. 3436 of May 31, 1944)⁶⁹ as an indication that the Hungarian colony here is

⁶⁶ Reference is to Allied landing in France in June.

⁶⁷ Not printed.

⁶⁸ The British Minister was Sir Victor A. L. Mallet.

⁶⁹ Despatch not printed.

now drifting away from Minister Ullein-Reviczky. He has also been disappointed by the Swedish Government's decision to accept a Chargé d'Affaires from the puppet regime in Budapest (cf. my telegrams to the Department Nos. 1899 May 27, 6 p. m., 2069 June 9, 6 p. m., and 2231 June 21, 4 p. m.).⁷⁰ The report of this Swedish intention soon spread among the Hungarian colony, apparently as a result of boasting to third parties by some of the few members of the local Hungarian Legation who have accepted the present "Government", namely either Assistant Military Attaché Major Vöczköndy, Press Attaché Morvay, or Major Vöczköndy's clerk.

Respectfully yours,

HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

864.01/7-344 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State*⁷¹

ISTANBUL, July 3, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 8:09 p. m.]

385R86. Direct reliable information from Budapest indicates Sztojaj made most emphatic request for establishment of full Hungarian sovereignty during recent visit to Hitler. Sztojaj argued that Hungary's position, even among the satellite nations, is inferior, and listed following ways in which sovereignty of Hungary has been infringed:

1. Activities of Gestapo⁷² in Hungary, carried out without knowledge and against will of Hungarian Government.

2. Use of title, Special Commissioner of the Führer, by the German Minister in Hungary,⁷³ a title ordinarily used in occupied countries such as Denmark, and not in Allied countries such as Bulgaria or Rumania.

3. German control, without Hungarian permission or cooperation, of all traffic in and out of Hungary.

4. Arrest of Badoglio officials by Gestapo in violation of right of asylum.

Sztojaj informed Hitler that position of his Government has been seriously undermined by continuing charges within Hungary that it lacks full sovereignty.

In contrast to position taken in conversations with Hitler, Sztojaj is making strong attempt to secure acceptance of new Hungarian Ministers by Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal and Spain, claiming present Government enjoys full sovereignty and is therefore entitled to replace diplomats now aligned with Allies.

⁷⁰ None printed.

⁷¹ Substance of this telegram was sent to Stockholm, Madrid, Lisbon, and Naples in telegrams 1385, 1960, 1978, and 352, respectively, July 12, 7 p. m., and to Bern as 2396, July 13, 2 p. m.

⁷² Geheime Staatspolizei (German Secret Police).

⁷³ Edmund Veessenmayer.

Hungarian circles here urge strong Allied representations to neutral powers against acceptance of new Hungarian diplomats and state that refusal of neutrals to accept new diplomats on plea that present Government lacks sovereignty would sharply accelerate developing demoralization within Hungary.

Repeated to Amrep Algiers⁷⁴ as my No. 35 and true reading sent to MacVeagh in Cairo.⁷⁵

BERRY

864.01/7-1344 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley)

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944—2 p. m.

632. Solely for Kelley from Berle. Previous reference is Department's No. 381, April 29th. I understand that Ujvari, pro-Ally Consul at Istanbul of the former Hungarian Government, is being reduced to the status of an exiled alien by the Turkish Government. It would be useful if his consular status could be maintained. It is believed that the pro-Nazi Hungarian Minister is back of attempt to remove him in order that a consul favorable to the Germans can be appointed. Please report if you consider there is anything which you can do urgently, discreetly, to assist him. Do you consider that it would be helpful if the matter were mentioned to the Turkish Ambassador here?⁷⁶ Please telegraph reply.⁷⁷

Please repeat to Istanbul for information of Berry. Ambassador Steinhardt has been informed. [Berle.]

HULL

864.01/7-2744 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 27, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received July 28—6:09 a. m.]

2593. In accordance with sense of Department's 904, March 31,⁷⁸ Embassy has informally encouraged trusted members of former staff of Hungarian Legation in Madrid in their effort to establish contact with potential resistance groups inside German occupied Hungary.

⁷⁴ Selden Chapin.

⁷⁵ Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador near the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Exile.

⁷⁶ Mehmet Münir Erteğün.

⁷⁷ In telegram 1289, July 15, 1944, 5 p. m., the Chargé in Turkey replied that the Turkish Government was permitting Mr. Ujvary to remain in Turkey as a private individual, the Hungarian Government having removed him as Consul. The Chargé did not believe the situation could be changed by taking the matter up with the Turkish Ambassador in Washington. (702.6467/7-1544)

⁷⁸ See footnote 34, p. 859.

These persons have now informed the Embassy that they have established such a contact and have just received the following message which paraphrased reads as follows:

"To resist German invasion and Nazism all Hungarian parties from the Extreme Left to the Christian Socialists have now reached a complete understanding on the policy to be followed and have signed an agreement and this group includes the Hungarian Clergy, Working Class Leaders, Social Democrats, Peasant League, Small Land Owners Party and other social organizations. It represents a collaboration of a scale unparalleled in pre-war Hungary. This group has a printing press at its disposal which will enable it to edit a paper which can be distributed secretly. The organization looks to the United Nations for moral support and its work would be greatly advanced by radio programs giving the Hungarian people the hope of future good will in the event of their collaboration with the anti-Nazi elements in Hungary. The organization expects a message or instructions as to when and in what manner to start full activity and also when to start distributing its propaganda paper. Such a message or instructions can be forwarded by the same means that this message is delivered."

The Embassy informants, which include Count Gabor Bethlen, former First Secretary of the Hungarian Legation and son of ex-Premier of Hungary, have confirmed that they can communicate with this group and it has been suggested to them that they endeavor to ascertain in more detail the nature of its proposed activities. It is their stated opinion that the information which they have received represents possible inception of well-grounded resistance movement with potentialities of broad popular support.⁷⁹

Repeated to Naples for Murphy,⁸⁰ repeated by courier to Lisbon.

BUTTERWORTH

864.01/8-544: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1944—8 p. m.

The following is in clarification of the Department's position in respect of the status of dissident Hungarian diplomats previously set forth in its circular telegrams of March 31 and April 17⁸¹ on that subject.

⁷⁹ In telegram 2230, August 11, 1944, 2 p. m., the Department expressed its interest in the contents of this telegram and said that the Office of Strategic Services would instruct its representative at Madrid to work out a mutually satisfactory plan with the Embassy to take advantage of the opportunity (864.01/8-944).

⁸⁰ Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED), December 1942–August 1944.

⁸¹ See telegrams 922 and 1065, to Lisbon, pp. 858 and 868, respectively.

The Department has refrained from giving any recognition, "approval", or special status to the diplomats, as a group or as individuals, for the following reasons: (1) it has been our consistent policy not to give approval or recognition to any *émigré* group claiming to represent the people and interests of any enemy state; (2) since the value to the Allied war effort of the activities of these diplomats has been a matter of conjecture, the Department has desired to avoid being put in a position whereby in consequence of endorsement of their movement, there would be an implication of responsibility for their actions and pronouncements; (3) in view of the disunion among Hungarian exiles it has been considered inadvisable to take any action which, by giving a preferred status to any one individual or group, might be interpreted as a promise of political support for that particular individual or group in Hungary; (4) in view of the lack of disposition on part of British and Soviet Governments to accord special status to Hungarian diplomats, the Department does not desire to appear to assume role of sponsor by taking such action on its own initiative.

The Department appreciates the difficult position in which the dissident diplomats find themselves. However, we are not convinced that their usefulness to Allied cause would be enhanced by our granting them a special status. If members of the dissident Hungarian group should request guidance from you, you may inform them that they can best help by supplying reliable information, by suggestions on propaganda, and by countering the influence of the representatives of the Sztojay regime. You should do whatever is possible, within the limits of the general policy outlined above, to retain the good will of the dissident Hungarians and encourage them to render useful service.

The Department and the British Foreign Office are in substantial agreement on the attitude to be adopted toward the Hungarian diplomats. It is expected that you and your British colleague will cooperate and keep each other informed on these matters, especially on messages submitted by Hungarian diplomats for transmission to their colleagues, in order to avoid duplication in transmission through both British and American channels.

The Department has given considerable thought to the possibility of utilizing dissident Hungarian diplomats in connection with propaganda and special operations for Hungary organized in Italy. Contact has been established with Apor in Rome whose knowledge and influence should be of assistance to our military authorities and political representatives. The question of the desirability of encouraging other dissident diplomats or exiled Hungarian politicians to proceed to Italy is being currently examined.

Sent to Bern,⁸³ Stockholm, Lisbon, Madrid, Cairo (AmEmBalk), Ankara (for Istanbul), Caserta (AmPolAd), and Rome (for Taylor⁸⁴).

STETTINIUS

864.01/7-2944

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State is in substantial agreement with the position taken by His Majesty's Government in respect of the dissident Hungarian diplomats, as set forth in the recent undated *aide-mémoire*⁸⁵ on the subject transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy in Washington. The following paragraphs indicate briefly the policy which has guided American representatives in their contacts with the dissident diplomats since the German occupation of Hungary in March of this year.

The Department of State welcomed the decision of the Hungarian diplomats in neutral capitals to break with Budapest and to declare their support of the United Nations. The Department was hopeful that they might be allowed by the neutral governments to remain at their posts, and that they might be able in some way to contribute to the Hungarian resistance movement against the Germans. It did not, however, see fit to grant them any official recognition or public support either as individuals or as a group.

The basic reasons for the Department's attitude were the following:

[Here follows paraphrase of the four points enumerated in second paragraph of circular telegram of August 5, 8 p. m., printed *supra*.]

In the months which have passed since March nothing has occurred to cause the Department to adopt a more positive policy in respect of the Hungarian diplomats. The activities and accomplishments of the "Committee of Ministers"; which was formed on the initiative of Barcza and Bakacs-Bessenyei in Switzerland and joined by most of their colleagues in other neutral countries, have not been such as to induce a change in this Government's attitude. Meanwhile the positions of the individual diplomats have become more difficult owing to the acceptance by the neutral governments to which they were accredited of new diplomatic representatives named by the Sztojay regime. Certain of the dissidents, notably Ullein-Reviczky in Stock-

⁸³ Paraphrase for Bern inadvertently not sent.

⁸⁴ Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

⁸⁵ Not printed.

holm, have raised the question of their legal and personal status vis-à-vis the Allied governments, complaining that the lack of any support and recognition by the Allies has hampered their efforts to foster resistance to the Germans in Hungary. Although the Department is ready to receive and to acknowledge actual contributions which they may make to the Allied cause in the way of assistance in propaganda and in intelligence work, it still considers that the services which they probably will be able to render would hardly warrant, according to present indications, the extension to them of any formal recognition or special status.

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1944.

740.00119 E.A.C./8-1144

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As the State Department are aware the European Advisory Commission which, under paragraph 3 of its terms of reference, is competent to make recommendations about the terms of surrender to be imposed upon any of the European Enemy States, has now submitted its recommendations for Germany⁸⁶ and is about to discuss Bulgaria.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the European Advisory Commission should now also consider the case of Hungary in order that Three Power agreement may be reached in good time on the terms to be imposed upon that country. As Hungary cannot profitably be discussed in isolation from Roumania His Majesty's Government would further suggest that the European Advisory Commission should be asked to take note of the terms which have already been communicated to the Roumanian emissaries⁸⁷ and to consider whether these terms should now be amplified in any way.

In communicating the above views to the State Department, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to ask whether the State Department agree that the European Advisory Commission should now be instructed to consider surrender terms for Hungary and Roumania as suggested above. His Majesty's Government would be grateful for a very early reply.

A similar approach is being made to the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1944.

⁸⁶ See vol. I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission," part V.

⁸⁷ See telegram Yugos 84, April 8, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador near the Yugoslav Government in Exile, vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania . . ."

740.00119 E.W./8-1544

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

No. 4433

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1944.

The Secretary of State encloses herewith a document entitled "Proposed Terms of Surrender for Hungary" (WS-222) dated July 26, 1944. This document has passed through the Working Security Committee and has now been cleared both by the Department and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Accordingly, the Ambassador is requested to place the document before the European Advisory Commission as soon as possible. Such minor changes in drafting as may be required to bring it into a suitable form for presentation to the Commission are authorized.

[Enclosure]

WS-222
CAC-263

JULY 26, 1944.

PROPOSED TERMS OF SURRENDER FOR HUNGARY

I. THE PROBLEM

In view of the recent statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the desirability of the withdrawal of the Axis satellites from the war and of the favorable position of the United Nations developing from the continued military progress in the Eastern Mediterranean and Eastern European theaters of war, especially, serious consideration should be given to the means available for accelerating the surrender of Hungary.

Together with Rumania and Bulgaria, Hungary was warned by the Secretary of State on December 11, 1943,⁸⁸ that since the Hungarian Government had recklessly continued its participation in the war, it would have to share the responsibility for and the consequences of the defeat to be inflicted on Nazi Germany by the United Nations. Following the occupation of Hungary by German troops in March 1944 and the establishment of a puppet government under the Horthy Regency, the United States Government warned the Hungarian People that only by firm resistance to the invaders could Hungary "hope to regain the respect and friendship of free nations and demonstrate its right to independence". The declaration issued by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on May 12, 1944,^{88a} advised Hungary, as one of the satellite states, (1) against contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine by its present attitudes and policies; and warned (2) that Hungary

⁸⁸ See Department of State *Bulletin*, December 11, 1943, p. 413.^{88a} *Ibid.*, May 13, 1944, p. 425.

had it in its power, by withdrawing from the war and ceasing its collaboration with Germany to shorten the struggle, diminish its own sacrifices and contribute to the victory of the United Nations; (3) that the longer it continues in the war, the more disastrous will be the consequences to Hungary and the more rigorous will be the terms imposed on Hungary; (4) that Hungary must therefore decide, while there is yet time, whether to continue the policy of opposing the United Nations. The implication was that an early capitulation would be rewarded by less severe terms than those which would be imposed if Hungary did not surrender before the defeat of Germany.

The primary problem is to determine the degree to which this could be achieved without compromising the war aims of the United Nations. Over-generous terms to Hungary would not only tend to alienate members of the United Nations, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which have suffered from Hungary's aggressions, but might also seem to justify within Hungary the policies of the reactionary and pro-Fascist groups which have dominated Hungary for more than two decades. On the other hand, unduly harsh terms would probably fail to win the support of any significant segment of Hungarian opinion and might actually strengthen the determination of the Hungarian Government to continue resistance to the United Nations.

II. TERMS OF SURRENDER

A. *Obligations to be Imposed on Hungary*

1. *The Signatories.*—The instrument providing for the termination of hostilities should be signed by the Allied Theater Commander, by the Chief of the High Command of the Hungarian Armed Forces or his representative and, if possible, by an authorized civilian official representing the Hungarian Government.

2. *Evacuation of Occupied Territories.*—Without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Hungarian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than territory held by Hungary on September 1, 1938, their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the occupation authorities. Hungarian officials in such areas, except those whose continued presence is desired by the occupation authorities, should likewise be withdrawn. Individuals or units in such areas may be designated to be held as prisoners of war.

3. *Right of Occupation.*—The Allied Governments signatory to the instrument of surrender should have the right to occupy with any forces they may designate and in any way they deem necessary, and to utilize in any way they deem appropriate, any or all parts of Hungarian territory heretofore acknowledged to be under Hungarian sovereignty or in dispute as to such sovereignty, and to exercise throughout the country the legal rights of an occupying power.

4. *The Terms of Occupation.*—In case the occupation of all or part of Hungary should be found necessary to the prosecution of the war, Hungary should place at the disposal of the occupation authorities such troops, materials of war, public and private archives, power and transportation facilities as the occupation authorities may demand. This assistance will be used by the Allied forces in their military operations against Germany. Hungary will not, however, be given the status of co-belligerency. The occupation authorities may determine according to the circumstances, the degree of Hungarian disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.

5. *Maintenance of Order.*—In case Hungary should not be occupied, or in such parts of Hungary as may not be occupied, the maintenance of order will be the responsibility of such Hungarian Government as may be established with the approval of the Allied signatory governments. In addition to its ordinary responsibilities, the Hungarian Government will be required to hold and to deliver as directed by the Allied signatory Governments all Axis nationals and persons designated as war criminals who may be found on Hungarian soil.

6. *Prisoners of War.*—Hungary should be obligated to release, as directed by the occupation authorities and to protect in their persons and property, pending release, all prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, all other nationals of those countries, who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be similarly confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of Hungarian or Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, creed, color, or political belief.

7. *Reparation and Restitution.*—Hungary should be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the United Nations may require. Hungary should also be required to take all necessary measures to safeguard all property removed from United Nations territory which has been under Hungarian occupation or control, and all property in Hungary belonging to the governments or nationals of the United Nations.

8. *Economic Reconstruction.*—Hungary should be required to assist and cooperate with the United Nations in such measures for relief, rehabilitation, and economic reconstruction as the United Nations may decide to undertake.

B. *Eventual Advantages for Hungary*

In case the military and political situation prevailing at the time of the negotiations for surrender of Hungary should warrant it, the United Nations should be prepared to offer positive inducements to Hungary in return for its withdrawal from the Axis. The full terms suggested below should be regarded as the maximum concessions to be made in case Hungary should resist the German armed forces

within its territory and deliver them with their equipment to the forces of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, Hungary should delay surrender until the defeat of Germany is imminent, the United Nations should make no concessions to Hungary except with respect to the ultimate restoration of its independence.

1. *Independence and International Status.*—One of the primary fears of the Hungarian people appears to be that Hungary is to be deprived of its independence and that the country will be subjected to the Soviet Union. The independence of Hungary after the war and its territorial integrity within its 1938 frontiers could be assured. The assurance that the independence of Hungary is to be restored, with political and economic foundations enabling Hungary to play a constructive role, together with its neighbors, in the Danubian region, and that the Hungarian people will have the right ultimately to determine their own form of government, would facilitate the withdrawal of Hungary from the Axis. Hungary might also be assured of participation in such general international and regional arrangements as may be established after the war, as soon as it gives convincing proof that it has embraced loyally the basic principles of peaceful processes in international relations.

2. *Occupation.*—Hungary might be assured that neither Czechoslovak nor Yugoslav troops will participate in the occupation of the country, since participation of troops from these countries might result in widespread disorders and lasting resentment. It might also be stated that if the Hungarian people resist the Germans and establish a more democratic government friendly toward the United Nations, military occupation and military government might not be necessary. Nevertheless, if military government is not established, the United Nations will have to determine whether a commission or other agency should be established to control such matters as disarmament, reparation and the punishment of war criminals.

3. *Territorial Settlement.*—In the past two decades Hungary has had territorial claims against all its neighbors. The 1937 Hungarian frontiers with Czechoslovakia and the 1940 frontiers of Hungary with Yugoslavia should be restored, subject to any rectifications which these two countries might agree to make as a part of a general settlement of the issues in dispute between them and Hungary. The existing Austro-Hungarian frontier should also be preserved. Although Hungary should not be permitted to retain the territory acquired in Transylvania from Rumania in 1940, Hungary might be assured that an attempt will be made to establish a more just ethnic boundary between Hungary and Rumania, the territory in dispute to be controlled by the United Nations pending the final territorial settlement.

4. *Economic Settlement.*—In assessing Hungary's reparation obligations, it will not be the intention of the United Nations to impose such

an economic burden on the country as to reduce disastrously its standard of living or to endanger permanently its economic independence.

740.00119 EAC/8-1144

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State shares fully the view of the British Foreign Office, as contained in the British Embassy's memorandum of August 11, 1944, that the European Advisory Commission should be instructed to take up the subject of surrender terms for Hungary and Rumania as soon as may be possible.

The American representative on the European Advisory Commission has for some time had authorization to engage in discussions regarding the surrender terms for Hungary and Rumania and he has been provided with several papers embodying the American proposals for both countries. A further paper on the Hungarian terms, revised in the light of recent events and changed circumstances, was despatched to London on August 12 [15?], 1944,⁸⁹ and a revision of the proposals for Rumania will go forward in the very near future.⁹⁰

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1944.

740.00119 European War/9-244: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944—midnight.

7124. The Department has received reports from its missions in various neutral capitals regarding approaches by Hungarian officials or other Hungarians purporting to be in communication with Horthy and other Hungarian leaders seeking to initiate discussions concerning surrender terms for Hungary. American diplomatic and consular officials have been instructed to say in connection with such approaches that any offer of Hungarian surrender should be addressed to the three principal Allies and that if the Hungarian Government is genuinely desirous of concluding an armistice with the Allies it should designate a representative or mission with full powers to sign such an armistice.

⁸⁹ *Supra.*

⁹⁰ Revised proposals for Rumanian Armistice terms were not sent to nor was the subject further discussed in the European Advisory Commission. A *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944, in Rumania accelerated the tripartite Allied armistice negotiations with Rumanian representatives at Moscow and culminated in the signing of an armistice agreement at 5 a. m. on September 13, 1944 (although it was dated September 12). For correspondence on this subject, see vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

The British Embassy here has informed the Department that the British Ambassador to Moscow ⁹¹ has been instructed, in consideration of a similar approach made to the British representative in Bern,⁹² to seek the assent of the Soviet Government to a proposal that the Hungarians be informed that the three Allied Governments are prepared to present surrender terms to any plenipotentiary named by the Regent and that the meetings for such purpose should take place in Italy. The British Foreign Office suggested that the Department send similar instructions to its representative.

The Department agrees to the suggestion that the Hungarians be informed that the Soviet, British and American Governments are prepared to present surrender terms for Hungary to any plenipotentiary named by the Regent. While we would not wish to interpose special objection to Italy as a place for armistice discussions with the Hungarians, we believe that for geographic and other reasons Ankara would be more suitable.

The Department's proposals on terms of surrender for Hungary, which were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were forwarded to London with the Department's despatch no. 4433 of August 15 for consideration by the European Advisory Commission. The Department hopes that the British and Soviet Governments will share its view that the terms for Hungary should receive the urgent consideration of the Commission.

Please inform the Foreign Office of the views of the Department as set forth above. Repeated to Moscow.⁹³

HULL

740.00119 E.W./9-644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1944—midnight.

7412. Reurtel 7216 September 6.⁹⁴ The United States Government expects to have political representation in Hungary, as well as in Rumania and Bulgaria, in the post-armistice period. An inter-Allied Control Commission, on which the United States will be represented, has already been agreed upon for Rumania. The adequacy of such machinery as it works out in practice in Rumania may have a bearing on the Department's views when the question arises with respect to Hungary. In the meantime, when armistice terms for Hungary are discussed in the EAC, the Department sees no objection to the inclusion therein of provision for the appointment of an Allied Control Commission.

⁹¹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁹² Clifford John Norton, British Minister in Switzerland.

⁹³ As telegram 2115.

⁹⁴ Not printed.

With reference to your second inquiry, the Department believes that the procedure worked out with respect to participation of the smaller Allies in the handling of the Bulgarian armistice terms would be suitable in the case of the armistice with Hungary (ReDeptel 6866 August 26, 6998 August 30, 7123 September 2),⁹⁵ the position of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with respect to the Hungarian armistice being closely parallel to that of Greece and Yugoslavia with respect to the armistice for Bulgaria.

HULL

740.00119 E.W./9-2144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 21, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received September 21—2:18 a. m.]

3605. I have received a letter from Vyshinski ⁹⁶ dated September 20 in reply to my letter of September 4 which was based upon the Department's 2115, September 2, 12 p. m.,⁹⁷ stating that the Soviet Government agreed that the Hungarian Regent be informed that the British, American and Soviet Governments were prepared to present surrender terms to Hungarian representative who had full powers. Vyshinski's letter continued that the question regarding the meeting place with the Hungarian plenipotentiary could be discussed subsequently. No mention is made in the letter to the consideration of the surrender terms by the European Advisory Commission.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./9-2444 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1944—9 p. m.

2278. Kirk ⁹⁸ has reported an interview yesterday at Caserta between SACMED and General Naday,⁹⁹ a Hungarian who arrived in a Hungarian plane at AFHQ with authority to speak for the Regent and the present Hungarian Government, and to seek an armistice.

From this conversation and a slightly different account given by Lt. Colonel Howie, a South African officer who had been living in Hungary as an escaped POW and who accompanied General Naday,

⁹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 372, 382, and 391, respectively.

⁹⁶ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁷ See footnote 93, p. 888.

⁹⁸ Alexander C. Kirk, U.S. Political Adviser, Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, from September 1944 to October 1946.

⁹⁹ Col. Gen. Istvan Naday, former Commander of the Hungarian 1st Army.

the Hungarians appear now to realize that there can be no negotiation, and suppose that Soviet occupation is inevitable, but want some assurance that "Allied troops" will participate, so that the country will not be left entirely to Soviet control. Otherwise, according to Colonel Howie's account of Horthy's statement to him, the Hungarians would go on fighting, since German occupation of the country and Gestapo control are so complete that only with the assistance of Allied forces could they hope to crystallize Hungarian action against the Germans.

Kirk adds that the substance of this interview has been reported also to the British Foreign Office. In the circumstances the British Government will probably desire to take the initiative in apprising the Soviet Government of this approach. The foregoing is therefore for your information in the event that conversations on this matter take place in Moscow.

Meanwhile the Department is inquiring what progress may have been made in the EAC on the Hungarian terms of surrender papers, and is also requesting the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspect of the matter.

Our immediate reaction is that the Hungarians even now do not expect to undertake any serious action against the Germans, but at this late hour, with Soviet armies drawing ever closer to Budapest, they hope (1) to establish what credit they can if a break with Germany can be made; and (2) to induce, if possible, Anglo-American troops to enter the country in order to have them on hand, for political purposes, as a counter-balance to the Soviet army arriving from the east. Though this approach thus still fails to reflect the realities of the situation, it is evident that the Hungarians are ready to consider whatever terms the Allies wish to present to them.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London.¹

HULL

740.00119 EAC/9-2544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 25, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 25—11:59 p. m.]

7991. Comea^{1a} 99. At today's meeting of the EAC Strang² reported the substance of information contained in Department's 7792, September 24, 9 p. m.³ He further announced that his Government

¹ As telegram 7792.

^{1a} Series indicator for telegrams concerned with the work of the European Advisory Commission.

² Sir William Strang, British representative on the European Advisory Commission.

³ See footnote 1, above.

had approached United States and Soviet Governments on September 24, proposing that armistice terms be presented as soon as possible to General Naday in Italy by Macmillan⁴ and by United States and Soviet representatives there, and asking whether this procedure was agreeable to the two other Governments and whether they would empower their representatives on the EAC to draft the terms. In accordance with Department's 7791, September 24, 9 p. m.,⁵ and Department's 7124, September 2, midnight, I stated that my Government was willing to discuss Hungarian armistice terms in the EAC. To my query Strang stated that it was not clear whether the Hungarian Government wished to fight Germany or merely to withdraw from the war. Strang felt that despite the absence of written credentials Naday's approach is an authorized one and that he is a suitable channel for the communication of terms. The Soviet Delegate⁶ is referring to his Government for instructions.

The British Delegation proposes that a joint communication be made to the Hungarian Government on behalf of the three Governments, setting forth the evacuation of non-Hungarian territory as a pre-condition to presenting armistice terms. "The Governments of the United Kingdom, USA and USSR, having considered the request of the Hungarian Government for an armistice have decided that it is an indispensable prerequisite to the opening of armistice negotiations that the Hungarian Government should give an undertaking to withdraw all Hungarian troops and officials within the frontiers of Hungary as they existed on 31 December 1937. Such withdrawal must begin at once and must be completed within 15 days from the date of this communication. The Hungarian Government must undertake to receive in Hungary and afford all requisite facilities to such military representatives or missions as the three Allied Governments may send for the purpose of verifying and controlling the withdrawal." In addition the British Delegation presented a draft armistice as follows:

"The following conditions have been presented by blank acting on behalf of the United Nations Governments at war with Hungary and have been accepted by the Hungarian Government. (1) Hostilities to cease between Hungary and the United Nations at blank hour blank date. (2) Hungary to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers; to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property. Enemy war material and property to be held at the disposal of the Allies. (3) Hungarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw forthwith within the pre-1938 frontiers

⁴ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev, Soviet Representative on the European Advisory Commission.

of Hungary. (4) The Supreme Allied Commanders to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Hungarian territory if the military situation requires or if the Hungarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice. (5) Hungary to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization as may be required. Hungarian war material to be held at the disposal of the Allies. (6) Hungary to release and take all necessary steps for the protection, maintenance and welfare of Allied prisoners of war and internees until repatriated. Lists of all such persons indicating their places of detention to be furnished. Hungary to supply information on United Nations displaced persons, to accept financial responsibility for them and to take such measures for maintenance, welfare and control as may be required by the Allies. Hungary to be responsible also for the control of enemy refugees and displaced persons under the direction of the Allies. (7) Hungary to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of shipping and transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities. (8) Hungary to release all persons detained for political or racial reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed and the effect of such legislation to be reversed. (9) Hungary to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes. (10) Hungary to protect and restore all United Nations property; to make reparation for war loss and damage; and not to dispose of any of her assets without the consent of the Allies. (11) Hungary to furnish free of cost supplies, services and facilities as the Allies may require for the use of their forces, missions or agencies and such local currency as they may require for expenditure within Hungary. Hungary to redeem and hand over to the Allies free of charge any currency issued by them in Hungary. (12) Hungary to furnish such further supplies (including foodstuffs), services or facilities as the Allies may require. (13) Hungary to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice and to the Allied interpretation thereof; to give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security. These instructions and requirements will be communicated to the Hungarian Government by an Allied Control Commission which will be appointed to Hungary for that purpose. Footnote to Articles II and V: war material includes all material or equipment belonging to, used by, or intended for use by enemy military or part[*para*]-military organizations and members thereof in connection with their operations."

In the case of the negotiations over armistice terms for Bulgaria it will be essential for me to know at an early stage the Department's views concerning the mode of signature, the character of the Control Commission and the proposed degree of the participation of smaller Allies particularly Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the formulation and presentation of the terms (my 7286, September 6, 8 p. m.).⁷

WINANT

⁷Not printed.

740.00119 EAC/9-2544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1944—midnight.

7929. Reurtel 7991 September 25 midnight. The Department informed the British Embassy here on September 25 that it was agreeable to the Foreign Office proposal that armistice terms be presented as soon as possible to General Naday by the British, Soviet and American representatives in Italy. The Embassy was also reminded that the Department's instruction to you of September 2⁸ had expressed the hope that the Hungarian terms would be given urgent consideration in the EAC.

The Department has examined the text of the British draft of armistice terms for Hungary⁹ and believes that on the basis of it and of the American document (WS-222, "Proposed Terms of Surrender for Hungary") transmitted to you by despatch no. 4433 of August 15, as well as of any proposals which may be presented by the Soviet representative, it should be possible to reach prompt agreement on a final text. There is given below for your guidance in the discussions the Department's comment with respect to certain provisions of the British draft:

Preamble. The Department sees no good reason why the Allies should insist on a Hungarian pledge of withdrawal to the Trianon¹⁰ boundaries as a condition for opening discussions, rather than merely including it in the armistice as one of the terms. The proposal raises practical difficulties and might interfere with our main purpose of getting Hungary out of the war as quickly as possible.

Article 2. The Department believes the reference to "other enemy powers" should be eliminated. The question of Hungary's breaking relations with Japan could be dealt with separately by the American, British and Hungarian Governments, as was done at Moscow in the case of Rumania. Slovakia and Croatia are not recognized as independent states by the United Nations and should not be mentioned.

Article 3. The provision for the withdrawal to the pre-1938 frontiers should not include Hungarian nationals. The term "nationals" is in this case subject to varying interpretations, and to include it in the armistice instrument would probably only serve to invite confusion.

Article 12. The Department considers the wording of this article as unnecessarily sweeping, particularly since Allied military requirements are provided for in Article 11. It is suggested that Hungary's

⁸ Telegram 7124, p. 887.

⁹ See *supra*.

¹⁰ For text of treaty of peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, signed at Trianon, June 4, 1920, see *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of American and Other Powers, 1910-1923* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III, p. 3539.

obligation "to furnish such further supplies, services of facilities as the Allies may require" be limited by the phrase "for the purpose of conducting military operations against Germany or for use in general relief and rehabilitation". (In this connection see Department's document WS-222, page 3, paragraph 8¹¹).

Article 13. The Department prefers a wording similar to that of Article 17 of the Rumanian terms, namely "Hungary undertakes to carry out, in the interests of the reestablishment of peace and security, instructions and orders of the Allied High Command issued for the purpose of securing the execution of these armistice terms". We favor limiting Hungary's obligation to matters connected with the execution of the armistice terms in preference to leaving it in the vague form it has in the British draft. The Department also takes the view that the functions of the Allied Control Commission should be stated to be the regulation of and control over the execution of the armistice terms, whereas the British draft describes its function merely as "communicating further instructions and requirements" to the Hungarian Government. With respect to the relationship between the Allied High Command and the Control Commission, the Department believes that the compromise formula suggested for Bulgaria (reurtel 7902 September 23)¹² would properly be applicable also to Hungary.

The British draft makes no mention of Hungary entering the war on the side of the Allies. Since our military authorities have recently expressed the view, in the case of Rumania and Bulgaria, that the participation of the armed forces of former satellites in the war against Germany has definite military advantages, the Department has no objection to the inclusion in the armistice document of provision for Hungary's waging war on Germany. There would then be no need to retain the clause on disarmament and demobilization (Article 5 of the British draft), although utilization of Hungarian troops in Allied territory should be subject to the consent of the Allied country concerned.

In regard to signatories, the Department is disposed to favor double signature of the armistice by the Soviet Commander and by SACMED. We realize, however, that there is less reason for such double signature in the case of Hungary than in the case of Bulgaria, unless land forces from the Mediterranean Theater actually take part in operations in Hungary or in the occupation of any part of that country.

The Department would like to see included in the armistice an article providing for the dissolution of fascist and pro-fascist organizations. This point was not mentioned in the British draft.

HULL

¹¹ Paragraph numbered 8, p. 885.

¹² *Ante*, p. 435.

740.00119 EAC/9-2944: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 29, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received September 29—1:30 p. m.]

8138. Comea 103. My 8056, September 27, 7 p. m.¹³ Thank you for Department's 7929 (September 28, midnight) outlining the United States position on Hungarian armistice terms. Discussion will go ahead on this question as soon as we have had the Soviet reaction to our Bulgarian armistice proposals.

WINANT

740.00119 E.W./10-644: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, October 6, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:04 p. m.]

656. Reference Department's 171, September 24, 9 p. m.¹⁴ Information has reached AFHQ from British Ambassador in Moscow that Soviet Government has informed him that, although it is still prepared for armistice terms with Hungary to be presented to duly authorized representative, Soviet Government does not consider that General Naday possesses such authority. The Soviet Government also stated that it does not consider it expedient to say anything to Naday about possible help from Soviet armed forces against Nazis.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as 35.

KIRK

740.00119 EW/10-644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 6, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:28 p. m.]

3816. Supplementing Embassy's 3815, October 6, 7 p. m.¹⁵ Molotov called the British Ambassador and myself over late this afternoon

¹³ *Ante*, p. 439.

¹⁴ Not printed; it reported that instructions respecting a Hungarian approach could be sent to SACMED only when the three Allied Governments had reached agreement on action to be taken (740.00119 E.W./9-2444).

¹⁵ Not printed; it reported that the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, had informed the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, and Ambassador Harriman that "Hungarian emissaries have arrived in Moscow bearing a personal message from Horthy to Stalin asking terms for the cessation of hostilities" (740.00119 European War-1939/10-644). Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier).

to hand us the *aide-mémoire* quoted in paraphrased translation as follows:

"A Hungarian mission which was passed through the front lines was brought several days ago to Moscow. It stated that it had full powers of the Hungarian Regent Horthy to conduct armistice negotiations. This mission consisted of the following persons: Chief of Mission, Colonel General Faragho Gabor; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Dr. Szentivanyi Domokos and Count Teleki Geza, Professor of the Kolozsvar University and son of the late Hungarian Premier.¹⁶ The Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General Antonov,¹⁷ received the Hungarian mission on October 5. The mission handed General Antonov a personal message from Regent Horthy addressed to Marshal Stalin. There is attached herewith a copy of this message.

In reply to the questions raised by General Antonov regarding the purpose of the mission's trip, the latter declared that it requested that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Government be informed as follows:

(1) Hungary is prepared to cease hostilities against the Soviet Union and to fight against Germans together with the Soviet Armies.

(2) The Soviet Armies will be given possibility of free movement in any direction on Hungarian territory.

(3) The mission requests that Budapest be quickly occupied by the Soviet Armies.

(4) The mission requests that the Rumanian Armies should not cross the frontiers established in 1940.

(5) The air bombardment of Hungary to cease.

(6) The mission be permitted to transmit cypher radiograms to Budapest.

General Antonov stated to the Hungarian delegation that it would be permitted to send cypher radio telegrams to Budapest but that replies would be later given to the remaining questions raised by the delegation.

Having examined Regent Horthy's message and the declaration of the Hungarian mission, the Soviet Government considered that the Hungarian proposals were unsatisfactory and unacceptable.

The Soviet Government on its part proposes to make to the Hungarian Government the following statement:

"The Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States consider it necessary that Regent Horthy and the Hungarian Government should accept the following preliminary condition:

Hungary must withdraw all Hungarian troops and officials from the territories which it has occupied in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania within the Hungarian frontiers existing on December 31, 1937. This withdrawal must start immediately and must be completed within 10 days from the day the Hungarian Government receives the present statement. In order to verify and control this withdrawal, the three Allied Governments will send their representatives to Hungary who will act in the capacity of a joint Allied military mission under the chairmanship of the Soviet representative.

Hungary undertakes to break all relations with Germany and to declare war immediately upon Germany; the Soviet Government being ready to render assistance to Hungary with its army."

¹⁶ Count Paul Teleki, Hungarian Prime Minister, 1939-41.

¹⁷ General of the Army Alexey Innokentyevich Antonov.

The Soviet Government in addition considers it necessary to solve the following questions:

(1) It is proposed to empower the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in Moscow to work out the armistice conditions with Hungary. Under present circumstances this would lead to expediting the matter.

(2) In case the Hungarian Government accepts the above-mentioned preliminary condition, the armistice negotiations with the Hungarians would also be carried on in Moscow. The experience of the drafting of the Rumanian armistice conditions¹⁸ has shown that this would serve to expedite the solving of the questions.

It is hoped by the Soviet Government that a reply from the Government of the United States may be received as soon as possible."

I will send in a separate telegram¹⁹ paraphrase of Horthy's letter to Marshal Stalin. Consideration of the above, however, need not wait on its arrival. Its primary importance is in informing Stalin that the delegates are fully authorized to negotiate an armistice.

Molotov stated that he had attempted to follow as closely as now appeared desirable the British proposal for preliminary conditions submitted to the EAC in London and expressed the urgent hope that an immediate answer could be obtained from the British and ourselves.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/10-644: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1944—2 p. m.

2381. The Department, after consultation with the appropriate military authorities, is in agreement with the Soviet proposal that the statement quoted in your 3816 October 6 should be presented to the Hungarian mission now in Moscow on behalf of the Soviet, British and American Governments. The Department also agrees that the armistice discussion with the Hungarians should take place in Moscow and hereby authorizes you to join your British colleague and such representative as the Soviet Government may designate for the purpose in working out the terms of the armistice to be signed by the Hungarian representatives.

Additional instructions for your guidance in the discussions will follow.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London and AmPolAd (Caserta).²⁰

HULL

¹⁸ For correspondence concerning this subject, see vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."; for text of the Armistice Agreement dated September 12, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712.

¹⁹ No. 3820, October 6, not printed.

²⁰ Repeated as telegrams 8217 and 221, respectively.

740.00119 EW/10-944: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 9, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received October 9—6:57 a. m.]

3849. ReDepts 2381, October 7, 2 p. m. I have just received a letter from Molotov of today's date thanking me for the letter in which I informed him of the agreement of our Government to the proposed joint statement to the Regent and Government of Hungary as well as to the conducting of armistice negotiations in Moscow. Molotov goes on to say that on October 8 he was informed by Clark Kerr that the British were likewise in agreement with these proposals. Finally he asked me to inform my Government that on October 8 at 11:30 p. m. he received the Hungarian mission comprised of Colonel General Faragho Gabor, Szentivanyi Domokos and Teleki Geza and presented to them the statement in question in the name of the three Allied Governments. The Hungarian Mission undertook to transmit the statement to the Regent and Government of Hungary.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-644: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1944—10 p. m.

2398. ReDeptel 2381, October 7. In view of your authorization to engage in discussions with British and Soviet representatives in Moscow looking to agreement on conditions of armistice for Hungary, the Department transmits for your background information the following summary of the draft terms of armistice which the Department sent to London on August 15²¹ as guidance for Ambassador Winant in discussions to be held on this subject in the EAC. These terms have been cleared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may be taken as representing the general lines of the American point of view.

"1. Surrender instrument to be signed by Allied Theater Commander by Chief of High Command of Hungarian Army or his representative, and if possible by authorized civilian official representing the Hungarian Government.

"2. Without prejudice to ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Hungarian armed forces to be withdrawn according to schedule laid down by Allies from areas occupied by Hungary since 1937; Hungarian officials likewise to be withdrawn from such areas except those whose continued presence there is desired by Allied High Command.

²¹ See instruction 4433, August 15, to London, p. 833.

"3. Allies to have right to occupy and make use of Hungarian territory in any way they deem necessary. (However, Hungary might be given assurance that Czechoslovak, Yugoslav or Rumanian troops will not be used to occupy Hungary, and also that if Hungary actively resists the Germans full Allied occupation may not be required.)

"4. Hungary to place at disposal of Allied High Command such troops, materials of war, transportation and power facilities, industrial enterprises, etc., as may be required for the conduct of military operations against Germany. (Hungary should not, however, be granted the status of co-belligerency.) The Allied High Command to determine, according to circumstances, the degree of Hungarian disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.

"5. The maintenance of order to be the responsibility of the Hungarian Government in such parts of Hungary as are not occupied by the Allies. The Hungarian Government also to be required to hold and to deliver, as directed by Allied Governments, all German nationals and persons designated as war criminals who may be found on Hungarian soil.

"6. Hungary to release prisoners of war and interned nationals of United Nations, as well as all persons confined or interned for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory laws.

"7. Hungary to be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the Allied Governments may require, and to safeguard pending return all property in Hungary belonging to United Nations Governments or nationals. (In assessing Hungarian reparation obligations it will not be the intention of the Allies to impose such a burden on Hungary as to reduce disastrously its standard of living or to endanger permanently its economic independence.)

"8. Hungary to make such contribution to general relief and rehabilitation as Allies may require."

On September 25 the British presented to EAC their draft of armistice conditions for Hungary.²² Summaries of this draft and of the Department's comments thereon will be sent to you immediately in separate telegrams.²³

HULL

740.00119 E.W./11-1144: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 11, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received October 12—7:35 a. m.]

3900. ReEmbs 3816, October 6, 8 p. m. Molotov requested me to call on him this afternoon to discuss the Hungarian armistice terms. Eden²⁴ and Clark Kerr were present. Molotov handed the British

²² See telegram 7991, September 25, midnight, from London, p. 890.

²³ Telegrams 2397, October 9, 9 p. m., and 2403, October 10, 8 p. m., not printed. For the Department's comment, see telegram 7929, September 28, midnight, to London, p. 893.

²⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was on a visit to Moscow.

Ambassador and myself notes dated October 11, which read in paraphrased translation as follows:

The Hungarian Mission of which you are aware transmitted to me on the morning of October 11 the following reply of the Hungarian Government which has been received by radio:

"Hungary accepts the preliminary armistice conditions. It requests that the detailed armistice negotiations be initiated without delay and be carried on in complete secrecy in order that Hungarian forces may be sent from the front against the overwhelming German forces in Budapest, since there is danger of the Germans striking after which there will be massacres and pogroms which must be avoided.

The Hungarian Government requests, in order to effect the transfer of the troops and to make possible the execution of the armistice terms, that the advance of the Russian Armies toward Budapest be suspended."

The Soviet Government having studied this reply considered it possible to grant the above mentioned request of the Hungarian Government. The Soviet Government in this connection deems it possible to authorize the representatives of the Soviet High Command to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Hungarian command in order to establish the time of cessation of the advance of the Soviet Armies toward Budapest and also to determine exactly which Hungarian military units should be sent to Budapest for immediate tasks against the Germans.

The Soviet Government furthermore considers it necessary that the representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and the USSR immediately undertake to examine the Hungarian armistice conditions and that in the first instance they study the question concerning the despatch of a joint Allied military mission to Hungary under the chairmanship of a Soviet representative to verify and control the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from the territories of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania occupied by Hungary.

Please inform me as soon as possible regarding the reply of the United States Government to the proposals set forth above.

Molotov stated in explanation that the Hungarians had requested to be allowed to move military units immediately to Budapest to protect the Jewish population there from the Germans. He explained that the Germans had stated to the Hungarians that if they were forced to withdraw from Budapest they would exterminate the Jews numbering over 200,000 now in the city. The delegation stated that several weeks ago there were 4,000 to 5,000 members of the Gestapo in Budapest and two German divisions in the vicinity. He continued that the Soviet Government was anxious to prevent the massacre of the Jews and was prepared to agree to the Hungarian request. He con-

sequently hoped that we would agree that the Soviet commander of Hungary might enter into negotiations with the Hungarian High Command over the withdrawal of the Hungarian units. He said that he had promised a reply to the Hungarian delegation within the course of the day. Eden stated that in his opinion it was appropriate to leave this question to the decision of the Soviet military authorities. I concurred. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government would thereupon issue instructions to the Soviet High Command to enter into negotiations with the Hungarians only on the question of cessation of the advance of the Red Army to permit the withdrawal of Hungarian forces to Budapest. As the question of the armistice terms would be discussed in Moscow he stated that the Soviet draft terms would be presented to the British Ambassador and myself tomorrow. He stated that the draft terms would follow closely the Rumanian terms.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 12, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received October 13—8:50 a. m.]

3914. ReEmbs 3900, October 11, 8 p. m. I have received a letter from Molotov dated October 12 enclosing a copy of the text of the preliminary condition as signed in Moscow on October 11 by the delegates of Regent Horthy.

No change was made in the wording of the condition as proposed by the Russians (see my 3816, October 6, 8 p. m.).

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1944—midnight.

2417. ReEmbs 3900 October 11. It is our understanding that by accepting the preliminary armistice conditions the Hungarian Government has agreed to cease hostilities against the Allies and to enter the war against Germany. We agree that the arrangements to be made between the Soviet High Command and the Hungarian command for carrying out this *volte-face* are a matter for the decision of the Soviet military authorities.

Since you have already informed Molotov of this Government's agreement to the dispatch of a joint military mission to verify the withdrawal of Hungarian troops and officials from territory beyond Hungary's 1937 frontiers (ReEmbs 3849 October 9), as provided in the preliminary conditions now accepted by Hungary, it would be useful if you were to obtain any indications regarding the British and Soviet expectations with respect to the number and respective ranks of each country's contingent on such mission, as well as the time and manner of their entry into Hungary.

The Department agrees that the representatives of the three Allied Governments should immediately begin discussions on armistice conditions for Hungary. (ReDepts 2398 October 9 and 2403 October 10.)²⁵

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London and AmPolAd (Caserta).²⁶

HULL

740.00119 E.W./10-1344: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 13, 1944—noon.

[Received 1:12 p. m.]

3927. ReEmbtel 3900 of October 11, 8 p. m. I have informed Molotov in writing that I concurred for my Government to the proposal of the Soviet Government that the Soviet High Command should enter into negotiations with the Hungarian command in order to establish the time of the cessation of the Soviet advance towards Budapest and also to decide which Hungarian military units should be sent to Budapest for immediate tasks against the Germans, and that I was prepared immediately to commence examination of the Hungarian armistice conditions; I also set forth the considerations contained in the Department's 2417 of October 12.

In view of the urgent military considerations which are involved in Hungary and which, as the Department is aware, are quite different from those pertaining in Rumania at the time of the Rumanian armistice negotiations, I trust that the Department is handling this question with all possible speed and secrecy. I am meeting with Molotov at 4:00 this afternoon to discuss Hungarian armistice terms and expect to receive the Soviet draft today.

HARRIMAN

²⁵ Latter not printed.

²⁶ Repeated as telegrams 8436 and 241, respectively.

740.00119 E.W./10-1344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 13, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received October 13—4:35 p. m.]

3930. ReDept's 2381, October 7, 2 p. m. At a meeting this afternoon Molotov handed to Clark Kerr and myself the Russian proposals for Hungarian armistice terms.

This document is now in process of translation and I may wire further details at a later hour.

The proposals are along the general lines of those finally agreed upon in the case of Rumania. The reparations clause is almost identical in wording with that contained in the Rumanian agreement but the sum demanded by the Soviet Union is 400 million dollars instead of 300 million, the period for payment is 5 years instead of 6 and there are slight changes in the types of commodities envisaged.

In view of the presence of the Prime Minister²⁷ and Eden in Moscow the British will probably be able to act rapidly in this matter and I do not wish to delay the proceedings any more than necessary. I should appreciate immediate authorization to negotiate on the basis of the Russian draft according to the general tenor of the Department's previous instructions with respect to the Rumanian armistice allowing for appropriate alterations where necessary to meet the peculiarities of the Hungarian situation. In this case I would not have to wire the whole Russian draft in detail to the Department for consideration before joining in discussions and I believe we would be able to make rapid progress here.

In particular since the clause on reparations may well again prove one of the most difficult and important points I hope the Department will be able to let me have our Government's views in this respect without delay.

It has been agreed that we will meet again tomorrow to discuss the Hungarian terms and it would be most helpful if I could have a reply to this message before going into that meeting.

Sent to London as 211 and to Rome as No. 1.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 13, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received October 14—2:10 a. m.]

3933. ReEmbtel 3930, October 13, 7 p. m. to Department. An examination of the Soviet draft for armistice terms for Hun-

²⁷ British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill.

gary presented today reveals that the document follows closely the Rumanian terms as finally signed. Articles IV and XIX of the Rumanian terms are, of course, omitted. The Hungarian draft, on the other hand, carries the second paragraph of Article X of the Rumanian terms as a separate article and includes a clause for which there is no parallel in the Rumanian terms requiring withdrawal of Hungarian forces from Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The total number of terms is thus the same as in the Rumanian agreement, namely 20.

The Department will be able to reconstruct the present Russian proposals from the following:

The preamble is almost identical with the Rumanian agreement. The Hungarian draft contains a statement to the effect that Hungary has accepted the preliminary condition relative to a rupture with and declaration of war on Germany and to the withdrawal of Hungarian forces within the 1937 frontiers from the territories of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania occupied by it. Like the Soviet proposal for the Bulgarian agreement the Soviet draft for Hungary uses the wording "acting on behalf of all the United Nations which are in a state of war with Hungary".

Article I follows closely in its first part the wording of the first article of the Rumanian terms but leaves out references to Germany's satellites and ends with the phrase "for which purpose she will supply and maintain such land, river and air forces as may be determined by the Allied (Soviet) High Command for waging war against Germany under its general leadership." A phrase is added binding Hungary to "take such step for the demobilization of the Hungarian Army as may be indicated to it by the Allied (Soviet) High Command".

Article II of the Hungarian draft calls for the transfer of German prisoners to the Allied (Soviet) High Command and internment of German citizens whereas Article II of the Rumanian armistice merely provided for the disarming and interning of Germans and Hungarian forces and not for their turning over.

Article III of the Hungarian terms provides for the withdrawal of Hungarian forces from Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, within the 1937 frontiers by October 22, 1944.

Article IV of the Hungarian terms reads substantially the same as Article III of the Rumanian terms.

Article V of both documents are almost identical. The Hungarian draft calls for the liberation as well as the handing over of these persons.

Article VI of both documents are substantially the same. The Hungarian draft adds the words "or for religious convictions" after "because of their racial origin".

Article VII of Hungarian terms is identical with Article XII of Rumanian terms.

Article VIII Hungarian terms is identical with Article VII of Rumanian terms except that it omits reference to Germany's satellites.

Article IX Hungarian terms is identical with Article VIII of Rumanian terms.

Article X Hungarian terms is identical with Article IX of Rumanian terms except that reference to Hungarian Danubian ports.

Article XI Hungarian terms is second paragraph Article X of Rumanian terms.

Article XII Hungarian terms identical with first paragraph of Article X of Rumanian terms.

Article XIII of Hungarian terms is substantially the same as Article XI of Rumanian terms. Compensation to be made by Hungary is in amount of 400,000,000 US dollars payable over 5 years in commodities (machine equipment, river craft, grain, livestock, et cetera) in second paragraph the words "or in territories occupied by it" follow the words "in Hungary".

Article XIV Hungarian terms is identical with Article XIII of Rumanian terms.

Article XV Hungarian terms is identical with Article XIV of Rumanian terms.

Article XVI Hungarian terms is identical with Article XV of Rumanian terms.

Article XVII Hungarian terms is identical with Article XVI of Rumanian terms.

Article XVIII Hungarian terms is identical with Article XVII of Rumanian terms.

Article XIX of the Hungarian terms reads in paraphrase as follows:

"An Allied Control Commission will be established in Hungary for the whole period of the armistice under the chairmanship of the Soviet representative and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command." (See annex to Article XIX.) This wording is the same as that proposed by the Russians in the case of Bulgaria.²⁸

Articles XX are identical.

The concluding paragraph of the Hungarian agreement is identical with that of the Finnish agreement.²⁹

²⁸ See telegram 8651 (Comea 110). October 12, 9 p. m., from London, p. 450.

²⁹ Signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944, for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 513.

There are seven annexes to the draft. Annex A to Article I (furnishing of information regarding German armed forces) is identical with paragraph number 1 of Annex B to Article II of the Finnish agreement.

Annex B to Article II (internment of Germans not extending to Jews) is identical with Annex A to Article II of Rumanian agreement.

Annex C to Article IV (use of Hungarian military and other facilities) is identical with Annex B to Article III of Rumanian agreement.

Annex D to Article XII (withdrawal and redeeming of currency issued by Allies) is identical with Annex C to Article X of Rumanian agreement.

Annex E to Article XIII (nomenclature of commodities to be delivered to Russia by Hungary) is identical with Annex H to Article XI of the Finnish agreement.

Annex F to Article XVII (communication abroad of foreign missions in Hungary) is identical with Annex E of Article XVI of the Rumanian agreement.

Annex G to Article XIX (Control Commission) is identical with Annex F to Article XVIII of the Rumanian agreement.

Sent Department, repeated to London as 212.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1344: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—midnight.

2437. ReEmbs 3930 October 13; reDeptels 2398 and 2403 October 9 and 10.³⁰ You are authorized to join the British and Soviet representatives in discussions of the Hungarian armistice terms on the basis of the Soviet draft, having in mind, of course, the desiderata embodied in the American draft proposals and our comment on the British draft.

Although additional instructions will be sent to you as soon as possible after the receipt of the full text of the Soviet draft, the Department desires now to draw your special attention to the following points:

1. The Department regrets that the Soviet Government has decided to press for a unilateral settlement of reparations with Hungary by stipulating a specific sum in this case as in that of Rumania. During the discussions on the Rumanian terms this Government made clear its view that the stipulation of a specific sum to be paid as reparations

³⁰ No. 2403, October 10, not printed.

should not be included in the armistice document and that it did not regard its action in agreeing to the Russian reparation demands on Rumania as setting a precedent in any way for the reparation settlements with Germany or with other satellite countries (reDepts 2176, September 9³¹). Before the receipt of your telegram the Department had prepared an instruction directing you to present an *aide-mémoire* placing on record for this Government the substance of the Department's views as outlined briefly above. You should accordingly reiterate this position in strong terms and make full reservation on this article pending the receipt of more specific instructions which will follow in a separate telegram. We shall be able to amplify our position with respect to this point when we have had an opportunity to examine the precise text; we are particularly interested in the types of commodities which may be specified since there is, as you may know, a substantial American interest, for example, in the oil industry in Hungary which is still in the development stage and which represents a continuing interest to us because it is almost entirely American-owned.

2. With respect to the nature and functions of the Allied Control Commission, the Department prefers, as explained in its comment on article 13 of the British draft, that the Control Commission for Hungary act under the instructions of the Soviet High Command only during the military period which will come to an end with the termination of hostilities against Germany. Between that time and the conclusion of peace with Hungary we believe that the three Allied Governments should have equal participation in the work of the Commission and that the several representations [*representatives*] should report directly to their respective Governments. See in this connection a separate telegram concerning Article 18 of the Bulgarian armistice.³²

3. Your 3930 does not state whether the Soviet draft includes any reference to Transylvania or other territorial matters. You will undoubtedly have in mind the Department's firm view in this regard as made clear in the course of the Rumanian negotiations, namely, that territorial settlements should not be embodied in the armistice document and that no final decisions on territorial disputes should be taken during the course of the war.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London.³³

HULL

³¹ Vol. iv, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania . . ."

³² See telegram 8526, October 14, midnight, to London, p. 455.

³³ As telegram 8519.

740.00119 EW/10-1344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—midnight.

2438. Reurtel 3930, of October 13 and Depstel 2437, of October 14. Before the receipt of your telegram on the Hungarian Armistice Terms the Department was preparing to instruct you to present an *aide-mémoire* to Molotov with regard to the Rumanian Armistice Terms which would have read in part as follows:

“It is the view of the U.S. Government that because of the interest which all the Allies have in the reparation recoverable from each enemy country and because of the economic interrelationships of the reparation paying and receiving countries, the reparation settlements with all enemy countries should be decided jointly after discussion and deliberation by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and other interested countries rather than unilaterally and should be treated as related parts of one broad problem.”

In your negotiations on the Hungarian Armistice Terms you should strongly oppose the reparations clause in its present form. Such opposition should be based primarily on the general grounds set forth in the above quotation and on the following considerations:

1. As previously indicated to you, the Department believes it undesirable to attempt to fix the amount of reparations in the terms of surrender. In the case of Hungary an attempt to set a definite amount is even less defensible than in the case of Rumania where specific areas of Russia were occupied by Rumanian forces.

2. The amount of reparations suggested by the Russians is in our opinion clearly excessive, both from the point of view of Hungarian capacity to pay and the point of view of legitimate Russian claims on Hungary. Collection by Russia of the amount demanded might have the effect of making impossible the satisfaction of claims of other United Nations which may conceivably exceed justifiable Russian reparations claims against Hungary.

3. The Russian public opinion argument stressed so heavily in the discussion of Rumanian terms would appear to be much weaker in its application to Hungary in view of the great differences in the character and scope of the military operations of Hungary in Russian territory.

4. The Department is not opposed to the payment of reparations. It believes, however, that these payments should consist of goods to be used directly in reconstruction in the recipient countries and should not be effected in ways which would unduly prejudice the resumption of normal commercial relations in accordance with the international economic policies of this government. For example, the Department

does not believe that goods received as reparations payments should be re-exported. The nature and amount of the Russian demands may be in conflict with the above-mentioned principles.

5. While we have not yet seen the Hungarian Armistice Terms the reparation clauses of the Rumanian Armistice Terms are so vague and general, apart from the fixing of the specific amount, that it is impossible to evaluate adequately their consequences or to understand the policies and procedures which the Soviet Government intends to follow in their implementation. This is one of the principal reasons we believe that the Armistice Terms should do little more than establish the principle that Hungary should agree to pay such reparations as the United Nations may subsequently require.

The Department would appreciate any information or opinions you may have with regard to any ulterior economic motives which may explain in part the reparation policies which the Soviet Government is pursuing with respect to satellite countries.

Sent to Moscow repeated to London.⁸⁴

HULL

740.00119 E.W./10-1544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 15, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received October 15—2:40 p. m.]

3937. ReEmbs 3927, October 13, noon. Stalin gave Prime Minister Churchill and myself last night a copy of a secret communication dated October 14 addressed to the Chief of the Hungarian Mission, Colonel General Gabor, and signed by the Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of Army Antonov, on the authority of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armies. The communication reads in paraphrased translation as follows:

The Hungarian Parliamentary Representative, Colonel Utassy Lorand, who has arrived in Szeged from Budapest is a completely uninformed person and consequently could not carry on negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Command on the question of the execution of the preliminary armistice terms by the Hungarian Government.

The Soviet Government was requested by the Hungarian Government to cease its advance in the direction of Budapest in order that the latter might withdraw a part of its troops and send them to Budapest.

This request of the Hungarian Government was granted by the Soviet Government; however, the former not only did not withdraw its troops from the Tisea River for dispatch to Budapest but has

⁸⁴ Repeated as telegram 8528.

ordered its troops into action especially in the Solnok [*Tiszà Szolnok*] Region.

The above circumstances indicate that the Hungarian Government evidently has chosen the course of not fulfilling the preliminary armistice terms which it has taken on itself.

The Supreme Command of the Soviet Armies in this connection demands that the Hungarian Government fulfill the obligations which it accepted, within 48 hours from the time of the receipt of the present representation regarding the preliminary armistice terms and in the first instance: One, rupture all relations with the Germans and start active military operations against their troops. Two, begin the withdrawal from the territories of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia of Hungarian troops. Three, deliver by this same channel through Szeged by 8 o'clock on October 16 to representatives of the Soviet Command complete information on the disposition of the German and Hungarian troops and, at the same time, report on the course of the execution of the preliminary armistice terms to the aforementioned Soviet representatives.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received October 17—6:25 a. m.]

3951. No preliminary discussions relating to the Hungarian armistice terms were held over the week-end. The matters treated in the Department's 2437 and 2438, October 14, midnight, have, therefore, not yet been discussed here and we will, of course, be guided by those messages in the discussions which will presumably take place today or tomorrow.

I doubt that there are any ulterior economic motives for the reparations policies of the Soviet Government. Destruction in the enemy-occupied portions of the Soviet Union was extremely severe and the Soviet Government is determined to get everything it can out of Germany and her satellites rapidly to make good at least a portion of these losses.

I believe that the Russians wish eventually to see economic stability in central Europe and I would not wish to suggest that they would deliberately pursue a policy of economic disruption in those countries. But for the moment their main preoccupations there are military and political rather than economic.

And they are aware that if a certain amount of economic distress should result unavoidably from the policies they see themselves obliged to pursue this would not be wholly to their own disadvantage. It would result in a reduction of the industrial and military potential

of the countries in question. It would reduce the standard of living to something nearer the Russian level thereby obviating invidious comparison and satisfying a deep-seated demand on the Russian side that defeated enemies should not live better than the Soviet peoples. It would undermine the economic position and thereby the influence of the wealthier and more conservative classes. Finally the Russians are aware that the governments in those areas in the immediate post-hostilities period are not apt to be composed entirely or even predominantly of elements whom they regard as entirely reliable. Economic difficulties would have a tendency to discredit these regimes and to put people in a frame of mind to accept the authority of any groups which could hold out hope of restoration of order and stabilization of economic life, if even at a lower level than before.

Naturally groups able to bespeak the favor and support of Moscow are in the best position to hold out such hope. In this way a certain amount of economic distress would have tendency to contribute to the establishment in power of groups entirely friendly to the Soviet Union.

All these factors might well operate to temper the desire of the Soviet Government at this time for economic stability in the central European area and to reconcile it to the necessity of a certain degree of disruption of economic life in the period immediately following the termination of hostilities.

Repeated to London as 217 and to Rome as 4.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944—midnight.

[Received October 16—11:21 p. m.]

3953. One of Molotov's secretaries read to an officer of the Embassy this evening over the telephone a note received by the Foreign Office from the Hungarian delegation in Moscow, dated October 16, of which the following is a paraphrase translation :

Begin paraphrase.

The Soviet Government is requested by the Hungarian Delegation in Moscow to give favorable action to the following :

The three Allied Powers to broadcast a message to the Hungarian people on Hungarian wave lengths, the text of which to be along the following lines :

"Control over the Hungarian radio has been seized by the Germans, as a result of which false information is being spread. The Germans misstated on October 15 an appeal of the Hungarian Chief

of Staff.³⁵ They have betrayed the Hungarian people in the most flagrant manner. Hungary has been plundered by them. Russia is not endeavoring to harm the peaceful and normal life of the people of Hungary. The Red Army is not going forward with a view to fighting the Hungarian Army but as a friend, with the purpose to liberate Hungary from the German yoke." *End of paraphrase.*

Molotov desired to know whether I would approve of the Soviet radios making a broadcast along the aforementioned lines. I replied that I did not feel that my Government would object to such a broadcast made independently by the Soviet provided, of course, that it was not in the nature of a joint tri-partite statement, in which case I would have to obtain the agreement of my Government. I added that I would cable the Hungarian request to my Government and suggest that it arrange broadcasts in the same sense.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./10-1644: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1944.

[Received October 17—12:45 a. m.]

3957. *Pravda* for October 16 published prominently despatch from Chernovtsy on Hungarian situation. Despatch cited Budapest radio to effect that Horthy had, on afternoon of 15th, stated over radio that Hungary intended to begin negotiations for armistice. Somewhat later Interior Ministry announced disappearance of Horthy's son over radio and instructed local authorities and police not to permit single motorcar to leave country without careful search.

Subsequently, radio broadcast order of Chief of Hungarian General Staff, General Voros, pointing out that Horthy's message did not mean termination of military operations. Despatch quotes from order to effect that until outcome of negotiations Hungarian units must continue to resist any attack.

Concluding despatch reports midnight radio broadcast by leader of Hungarian Fascists, Szalasy.³⁶ It states that from Szalasy's speech it was apparent that internal struggle was raging in capital and that radio station was in hands of Hitlerites. Szalasy reportedly accused Horthy of treason to Hungary's ally and stated that Hungary would continue war on side of Hitlerite Germany. He demanded that his auditors obey his orders.

Repeated to Algiers.

HARRIMAN

³⁵ Gen. János (John) Vörös.

³⁶ Maj. Ferenc Szálasi, who became Hungarian Prime Minister on October 16, 1944.

740.00119 EW/10-1744: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 17, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

3971. I have received from Molotov a copy of a *note verbale* dated October 16 which the Soviet Government has received from the Hungarian delegation in Moscow. This note reads in paraphrase translation as follows:

The Hungarian delegation in Moscow has the honor to inform the Soviet Government that it has just received the following three telegrams:

1. "The time of the German ultimatum ends at 22:00 o'clock today. A German attack is unavoidable. It is requested that immediate assistance be rendered with paratroops and by a quick advance on Budapest."

2. "All our communications are broken; it is doubtful that the Parliamentarian will be able to reach his objectives. It is requested that communications be established through the front with the command of the First and Second Hungarian Armies. If it is impossible to establish communications with us please inform the Soviet Government that Colonel General Vorosh has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers; continue negotiations with it; the issuance of instructions has been authorized but the Hungarian radio has fallen into German hands."

3. "The radio, which is in German hands, has falsified the statement of the Chief of the Hungarian Staff."

The Hungarian delegation, in view of the above, requests the Soviet Government to take favorable action on the following:

(1) The three Allied Powers also to send on Hungarian wave lengths a message to the Hungarian people, the text of which would be along the following lines:

"The Hungarian radio has been seized by the Germans who are disseminating false information on it. Thus on the 15th of October they falsified the appeal of the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff (the Hungarian delegation requests the Soviet Government to furnish it with the text of this appeal).

"The Hungarian people have been betrayed by the Germans in the most abominable way. The country has been plundered by them.

"The Russians will cause no damage to the normal and peaceful life of the Hungarian people. With respect to the Hungarian Army, the Red Army is not advancing to fight with it but as a friend and liberator from the German yoke."

The Hungarian delegation in Moscow requests at the same time that it be permitted to have immediate and regular contact with the Russian radio administration so that it might assist by giving advice in the wording of such transmissions.

(2) That Budapest be quickly occupied by the Russian-Hungarian armies in first instance in order to secure the bridges and make massacres impossible. It would be very desirable to use parachute units.

(3) That liaison officers be sent to Colonel General Lashis Presh [*Lajos Veress*] and Béla Miklós, the Commanders of the First and Second Hungarian Armies, in order to establish radio, telegraphic communication with the Hungarian delegation in Moscow; that the Allied Powers render their assistance. The delegation has already requested that this be done for the following objectives:

(a) Prevent German air attack on Budapest.

(b) Support the rapid advance toward Budapest.

(c) Prepare parachute landings.

(d) Attack the fortified points of the Germans as well as the citadel on Gellert Mountain which, according to information ascertained by Commandant Nameth who arrived in Moscow yesterday, has been turned into a second Alcazar by the Germans in order to resist at that point up to the last. It would be much easier to destroy the fortress in the next few days than after several days had passed at which time the work would already be finished.

The Hungarian delegation has just been informed that telegraphic communications with Budapest have been interrupted.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War/10-1844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 18, 1944—midnight.

1996. The Swedish Minister³⁷ called to see me this afternoon to inform me as follows:

The Hungarian Minister³⁸ called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs³⁹ at noon today and informed him that he did not recognize the authority of the Szalasy government in Budapest but only that of Horthy and delivered to Saka a message which reads as follows in translation:

"Ankara, October 16. I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Royal Hungarian Government according to an instruction signed by the Royal Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁴⁰ dated Oct. 15 and received today, has addressed a request to the Royal [Hungarian Legation?] to convey to the Government of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the following message:

'I have the honor to request Your Excellency to convey to your Government for the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and Northern

³⁷ Einar Modig.

³⁸ János Vörnle.

³⁹ Hasan Saka.

⁴⁰ Col. Gen. Gusztáv Hennyey.

Ireland and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the following message:

"The Hungarian Government has decided to cease hostilities against the United Nations and requests the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to inform it where and when plenipotentiaries of the Hungarian Government may be received with a view to concluding a treaty of armistice. At the same time the High Command of the Hungarian Army has addressed itself to the High Command of the Soviet Army (to regulate?) the conditions under which the cessation of hostilities may take place."

"On behalf of my Government I have the honor to beg Your Excellency to communicate the message above quoted to the representatives of the three great powers in question in Ankara.

Please accept, et cetera."

Supplementing the foregoing Modig also handed me at the request of the Hungarian Minister an *aide-mémoire* which in translation reads as follows:

"Royal Hungarian Legation, Ankara, Oct. 18. The Royal Hungarian Government makes following requests of the Allied Powers: 1. That the occupation of Hungary by the Allied Powers be limited to places of strategic importance in the country; 2. that the countries adjoining Hungary, i.e., Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Slovakia, will not participate in the occupation of the country in order to avoid eventual friction; 3. that the administration of Hungary may continue under the Hungarian authorities; 4. that the Hungarian authorities called upon to assure security and public order may continue their duties, and 5. that an appropriate delay shall be given to the German troops to retire from Hungary."

Repeated to Moscow.⁴¹

STEINHARDT

740.00119 E.W./10-2044: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 20, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

4011. ReEmbs 3965, October 17, 2 p. m.⁴² The British Ambassador has informed me that when Mr. Eden lunched with Molotov on October 17 he objected to Article XIII of the Hungarian terms and added that the American Government also felt strongly about it. In general he based his objection on the considerations set forth in the Department's 2438 of October 14, midnight. Molotov came for-

⁴¹ As telegram No. 1.

⁴² *Ante*, p. 459.

ward with an offer of 20% of the \$400,000,000 to be set aside for Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Eden held out for a greater sum.

When Eden saw Stalin that evening the latter raised the subject and offered to reduce the sum to \$300,000,000, of which \$100,000,000 would be set aside for the "little countries". This was agreed to by Eden subject to consent of the American Government.

I understand that no written communications have been exchanged on this specific subject. The British Ambassador, however, sent a communication to Molotov on October 18 stating that once the Hungarian armistice terms had been agreed upon by the Soviets, British and Americans the question would arise as to the best manner of securing Czech and Yugoslav concurrence. Clark Kerr's letter continued that it seemed to the British Government that there were two possible procedures: (a) A joint communication might be made to the Czech and Yugoslav Governments in London by the Soviet, British and American Ambassadors accredited to those Governments; (b) a joint communication might be made to the Czech and Yugoslav Ambassadors in Moscow by the American and British Ambassadors. The letter concluded by stating that the British Government would be ready to agree with the views of the Soviet Government with respect to the method of consultation. No reply has yet been received to this communication. The British Ambassador has informed me that he assumes that no reparations clause along those lines would be submitted to the Hungarians until concurrence of the Yugoslav and Czech Governments had been obtained.

The British Embassy also informs me that it has suggested to its Foreign Office that attempts be made to bring the Soviet draft more in line with the latest Bulgarian draft,⁴³ especially with respect to Articles I, XI, and XVIII and to include in the Hungarian draft the second paragraph of Article XVIII of the Bulgarian draft.

I understand that the British are reporting in full on these matters today.

The Russians have not yet suggested the resumption of tripartite conversations of the Hungarian terms. Vyshinski intimated to me yesterday in conversation that they were waiting for further clarification of the situation in Hungary.

I would be grateful if the Department would communicate this information to Ambassador Harriman.⁴⁴

Repeated to London as No. 230 and to AmPolAd Caserta.

KENNAN

⁴³ See telegram 8905, October 18, 9 p. m., from London, p. 465.

⁴⁴ Mr. Harriman had left Moscow for the United States on leave.

740.00119 E.W./10-2144

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Luthringer)

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1944.

Participants: A-A—Mr. Acheson ⁴⁵ SE—Mr. Cannon ⁴⁹
 EUR—Mr. Matthews ⁴⁶ FMA—Mr. Luthringer
 ECA—Mr. Haley ⁴⁷ EE—Mr. Durbrow ⁵⁰
 Mr. Hiss ⁴⁸

A meeting attended by those listed above was held in Mr. Acheson's office on October 19 to consider the question of how far this Government should go in the negotiations concerning the Hungarian armistice terms in opposing the Soviet reparations demands on Hungary. The Russians are proposing that Hungary agree to pay \$400,000,000 which would be "payable over five years in commodities, machine equipment, river craft, grain, livestock, etc." The Department has already instructed Mr. Harriman at Moscow to oppose these terms strongly and has suggested the general and specific grounds for such opposition. In reply Mr. Harriman has indicated that he thought a strong stand should be taken but stated that there was little use in arguing the question with the Russian negotiators unless he was authorized to carry opposition to the extent of refusing to sign the proposed agreement. The purpose of the meeting was to decide whether opposition should be carried to that extreme.

The following decisions were reached:

1. Our Embassy at Moscow should be instructed to oppose the naming of a specific amount of reparations in the armistice terms and should be authorized to inform the Soviet Government that if it did not yield on this point, the United States would sign the armistice terms only with a specific reservation with regard to Article 13, the reparations article. It was not considered advisable, however, to push opposition to the point of not signing at all.
2. It was agreed that opposition should be based on general principles, such as the excessiveness of the demands from the standpoint of the effect on the Hungarian economy and the claims of other United Nations, the United States' interest in seeing a speedy restoration of international trade on a liberal basis, and America's interests in Hungary both in the investment and trading sense. It was decided, however, that in expressing these views the possible effects on the

⁴⁵ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

⁴⁶ H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

⁴⁷ Bernard Francis Haley, Director of the Office of Economic Affairs.

⁴⁸ Donald Hiss, Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Affairs.

⁴⁹ Cavendish W. Cannon, Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs.

⁵⁰ Elbridge Durbrow, Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.

American oil investments should not be made a specific basis of the objections.

3. There should be no departure from our general position of not objecting to payments in kind to a position of suggesting to the Soviet that in the case of oil reparations should be paid in cash acquired by sale of the oil through American owned distributing channels in Europe. It was agreed that the Embassy should, rather, stress our belief that reparations should consist primarily of goods to be used directly in reconstruction in the recipient countries and should not be re-exported.

(In his memorandum of October 12, 1944,⁵¹ Mr. Loftus of the Petroleum Division suggests that an arrangement for payments in cash should have been advocated by the Department in connection with the Rumanian Armistice negotiations in order to protect the American interests in the petroleum distributing system in Europe. He further suggests that failure to do so raises serious questions as to whether the Department properly discharged its duty with regard to protection of American property when it assented to the Rumanian Armistice terms.)⁵²

4. The Embassy should not re-open the question of Rumanian reparations while discussing Hungarian reparations in an attempt to have extended to the former any reservations it might make with regard to the latter. This was based largely on the feeling that our case was much stronger in the case of Hungary than in the case of Rumania and that such a move would further complicate the Hungarian negotiations.

740.00119 EW/10-1344 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1944—8 p. m.

2498. The text of the Soviet draft of armistice terms for Hungary, as put together on the basis of your 3933 October 13, has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment with respect to the military aspects. The Department cannot, of course, authorize signature of the armistice in the name of this Government until clear-

⁵¹ Memorandum not found in Department files.

⁵² In a memorandum of October 26, 1944, Mr. Loftus noted that this parenthetical paragraph "does not correctly state my position, which was that *unless* there were fairly clear evidence that oil products would be used directly in Russian reconstruction it would be preferable for the oil content of the aggregate reparations liability to be paid in cash or free foreign exchange, since in such case the legitimate benefits to Russia would be the same and the incidental damage to American property interests would be very much less". (740.00119-E.W./10-2644)

ance from the Joint Chiefs is received. There is given in the following paragraphs, however, for your guidance in the negotiations, the position of the Department on those points in the Soviet text to which it takes exception on political grounds. In suggesting the degree of insistence on the various points which we wish you to raise, we are taking into account the three recommendations made in your 3965 October 17.⁵³

The Department is reserving its further instructions regarding the article on reparations pending your reply to Harriman's inquiry made in a separate telegram.⁵⁴

The Department does not approve the present wording of article 19 on the Allied Control Commission, although the first sentence is acceptable. As in the case of Bulgaria, we should like it clearly stated in the armistice itself or in an annex or protocol thereto that the "general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command" of the activities of the Commission is to endure only so long as hostilities against Germany continue. The Department's view on this question is set forth in numbered paragraph 2 of its 2437 October 14 midnight. See also in this connection Department's 2490 of today's date.⁵⁵ You should support this view strongly, though we would not make a decisive issue of this article.

On the matter of signature of the armistice, while the Department prefers signature by SACMED as well as by the Soviet Commander as suggested in the penultimate paragraph of Department's 2403 October 10,⁵⁶ and supposes that the Joint Chiefs will favor it, as in the case of Bulgaria, we are not in a position to instruct you to take an unyielding stand on this point.

You will recall our objection, in the case of the Rumanian and Bulgarian armistices, to the phrase "in particular to the Soviet Union" (article 16 of the new draft). We hope the Soviet Government can be prevailed upon, as in the case of the Bulgarian terms, to dispense with such language as would give special and conspicuous application to the Soviet Union. We attach considerable importance to the implications of this article.

On the following three minor points you should suggest modifications of the Soviet text, but should not insist on them if the British and Soviet representatives are not disposed to accept them.

(1) Provision should be made in article 3 for the withdrawal of Hungarian officials as well as Hungarian armed forces;

⁵³ *Ante*, p. 459.

⁵⁴ See telegrams 2437 and 2438, October 14, midnight, pp. 906 and 908, respectively.

⁵⁵ See footnote 16a, p. 470.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

(2) The provisions of article 7 should apply to the return of property to Czechoslovakia and to Yugoslavia as well as to the USSR;

(3) We should like to see included in the armistice an article obligating Hungary to contribute to general relief and rehabilitation measures.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./10-1644

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* dated October 16, 1944,⁵⁷ conveyed to the Department of State the view of the British Government that, once the terms of armistice for Hungary have been agreed upon and before their presentation to the Hungarian delegates, steps should be taken to obtain the concurrence of the Governments of the other United Nations which are at war with Hungary. The *aide-mémoire* states that the British Government is keeping the Governments of the four Dominions informed of developments and suggests that the United States Government take such action as might be necessary in this regard vis-à-vis the Governments of Haiti and Nicaragua, and that the Governments of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia be informed by the representatives of the three principal Allied Governments in either Moscow or London.

The Department of State agrees that the Governments of those United Nations which are at war with Hungary should be consulted with respect to the terms to be presented to the delegates of that country and will accordingly take such steps as may be necessary to this end with respect to Haiti and Nicaragua. As regards Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, it is the Department's view that, since the Governments of those two countries are now situated in London, a joint communication should be made by the American, British and Soviet representatives accredited to those Governments.

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1944.

740.00119 E.W./10-2544 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1944—2 p. m.

8874. In reply to an *aide-mémoire* received from the British Embassy in Washington concerning the concurrence in the Hungarian armistice terms of the United Nations at war with Hungary other than

⁵⁷ Not printed.

the three principal Allies, the Department has indicated its view that, with respect to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, a joint communication informing them of the terms should be made to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in London by the American, British and Soviet representatives accredited to those Governments. The present telegram may be considered as authorizing you, in case the foregoing procedure is found to be acceptable to the British and Soviet Governments, to associate yourself with your British and Soviet colleagues when the time comes in making an appropriate joint communication to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments.

Sent to London, repeated to Moscow.⁵⁸

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./10-2544 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1944—3 p. m.

8875. The Lakatos Government of Hungary,⁵⁹ through its Foreign Minister Hennyey, transmitted on October 16 by way of the Swedish Government a message to the United States Government stating that Hungary had decided to cease hostilities against the United Nations and asking that the Governments of the three principal Allies inform it where and when plenipotentiaries of the Hungarian Government might be received with a view to concluding a treaty of armistice. The same message was communicated to Ambassador Steinhardt in Ankara together with an *aide-mémoire* containing certain requests of the Hungarian Government regarding the nature of the armistice terms.

Please inform the Foreign Office that the United States Government has not made any reply to the message in question since we have considered that, in so far as anything could be achieved by dealing with Horthy or with ministers appointed by him, it could best be done through the authorized mission now in Moscow. For your own information, it is not clear to us why Hennyey sent the message in question at a time when the Hungarian Government had already requested an armistice through its delegates in Moscow and had agreed to carry out the preliminary conditions required by the three Allied Governments.

Sent to London ; repeated to Moscow.⁶⁰

STETTINIUS

⁵⁸ Repeated as telegram 2515.

⁵⁹ Regent Horthy and the government of Gen. Géza Lakatos, Hungarian Prime Minister, were overthrown by the *coup d'état* of October 15 at Budapest.

⁶⁰ Repeated as telegram 2516.

740.00119 E.W./11-244: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1944—4 p. m.

2584. Your 4011, Oct. 20. The Department has given careful consideration to the proposed reparation clause in the Hungarian armistice terms and is of the firm opinion that before the United States Government can give its consent to the terms as proposed it must make certain that every effort is made to assure that in carrying out these terms direct American interests will not be adversely affected.

In order to attain this end, you should present to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a close paraphrase of the following *aide-mémoire*:

"The early recovery and general economic stability of Europe is a matter of direct interest to the United States. This interest derives not only from American trade and financial relations with the European countries but also from the realization, which we are certain is shared by all the United Nations, of the grave effects which economic instability in Europe would have throughout the world.

If European economic stability is to be attained, many factors, some of which cannot now be evaluated, must be carefully coordinated. Among the most important of these factors are the policies and procedures adopted by the Allied Nations in collecting reparations from enemy countries.

The U.S. Government is of the opinion that the desired coordination can be attained by the adoption of either of the following proposals:

A. To exclude from Article 13 of the proposed Hungarian armistice terms specific amounts of reparation payments, thus leaving this question open for decision on a tripartite basis at a later date when factors which it is impossible to evaluate now will make it possible to fix the amount of reparations which Hungary can pay. The U. S. Government would prefer, as it indicated in connection with the discussions regarding the Rumanian armistice terms, this solution of the reparations question; or

B. To accept the provisions of Article 13 as now drafted which call for the payment by Hungary of a total reparation payment of 300 million United States dollars, 200 million of which will be paid to the Soviet Union, with the remainder to be paid to other Allied states claiming compensation against Hungary, provided: (A) the term of payment be extended to 6 years to bring it in line with the terms fixed in the Rumanian armistice; (B) in addition to the general arrangements for the Allied Control Commission, and in order to achieve a coordinated policy, a reparations section of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary should be set up on a tripartite basis composed of representatives of the three Allied countries signatory to the armistice. At some subsequent time, if necessity requires, there could be included on the membership of the section, representatives of other Allied governments having substantial reparations claims against Hungary with such voting power as may be decided upon by the three original members of the section.

In order to regulate reparation payments in such a manner as will not constitute too severe a burden on general European recovery and stability, this government believes that such reparation section of the Allied Control Commission should be guided in its work by the following principles:

1. In so far as possible, reparation payments should consist of goods to be used directly in the rehabilitation or reconstruction of the recipient country and the goods should not, unless in exceptional circumstances agreed to by the members of the reparation section, be exported to a third country.

2. Reparation deliveries out of current production should generally be valued on the basis of the prices of similar goods currently prevailing in world markets or if this basis of valuation is not feasible, on some other agreed equitable basis.

3. In order to minimize the possible adverse effects upon general European economic stability, reparation payments should be scheduled in such a way as to interfere as little as possible with normal trading relations.

In order to make provision for such tripartite reparation section, there is enclosed for the consideration of the Soviet Government a redraft of Article 13 and Annex E of the Hungarian armistice terms.

In expressing its firm desire for the adoption of either one of the above proposals, the Government of the United States of course recognizes fully the right of the Soviet Government to receive just compensation in the form of reparations for the damage done by enemy troops in the Soviet Union.

The United States Government expresses the hope that the Soviet Government, which undoubtedly has the same interest in European stability as the United States and other United Nations, will, in order to obtain this desired aim, agree to either one of the proposals outlined above."

In presenting the *aide-mémoire* you should emphasize the direct interest of the United States in the rapid reestablishment of European economic stability and our desire to see that every effort is made to prevent factors which cannot be evaluated now from unduly disturbing the normal development of this stability. You should use, in your discretion, any or all of the arguments outlined in the Department's 2438 Oct. 14, as to why we cannot consider accepting Article 13 as contained in the Soviet draft.

If the Soviet Government declines to accept either one of the proposals (A and B) set forth above, you should make it clear to them in writing that, while we will not withhold signature of the Hungarian armistice on behalf of the United States, we would specifically disassociate ourselves with respect to Article 13 and any annexes thereto. In pointing this out to the Soviet Government in your written communication it should be made clear that we reserve the full right at a future date to reopen the question of reparations in any or all of its aspects, if in our judgment the implementation of this reparation clause is having an adverse effect on general European stability. In

presenting this written communication you should inform the Soviet Government that we may find it necessary to publish our reservation.

The redraft of Article 13 referred to above is given in the Department's next following telegram.⁶¹ For reasons of security the paragraphs are given in the wrong order and should read as follows: 3, 2, 4, 1.

This message and the immediately following one are being repeated to London. The Chargé is being instructed to bring the views of the American Government on this question to the attention of the British Government and seek its support for these proposals. In your discretion you may discuss them with the British Ambassador.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./10-1344: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1944—5 p. m.

2585. The Department's position on the reparations article of the Hungarian armistice terms having been omitted from our comments on the Soviet draft text and instructions transmitted to you in the Department's 2498 October 21, 8 p. m., there is quoted below a re-draft of article 13 and Annex E which you should propose and support in your discussions with the Soviet and British representatives.⁶²

"1. Article XIII. Losses caused to the Soviet Union and the other Allied states and their nationals by military operations and by the occupation by Hungary of territory of the Soviet Union and other Allied states will be made good by Hungary to the Soviet Union and other Allied states, but, taking into consideration that Hungary has not only withdrawn from the war but has declared war and in fact is waging war against Germany, the parties agree that compensation for the indicated losses will be made by Hungary not in full but only in part, namely the amount of 300 million United States dollars, payable over 6 years in commodities. The amount of compensation to be paid by Hungary to the Soviet Union will be 200 million United States dollars. The amount of compensation paid to the other Allied states will be 100 million dollars, the share of each other Allied state claiming compensation to be determined by consultation among such Allied states and to be notified to Hungary through the Allied Control Commission to be established in Hungary.

"2. E. Annex to Article XIII. The precise nomenclature and varieties of commodities to be delivered by Hungary to the Soviet Union and to the other Allied states in accordance with Article 13 of this Agreement, and also the more precise periods for making deliveries each year shall be defined in special agreements with Hungary negotiated through the Allied Control Commission.

⁶¹ *Infra*.

⁶² Numbered paragraphs quoted below were sent out of order for security reasons but are here printed in their proper order.

"3. As basis for accounts regarding payment of the indemnity foreseen in Article 13 of the Agreement the American dollar is to be used at its gold parity on the day of signature of the Agreement, i.e. \$35.00 to one ounce of gold. The value of commodities to be delivered by Hungary in terms of United States dollars will be determined by the Allied Control Commission.

"4. The Allied Control Commission to be established pursuant to Article 19 and the Annex thereto of this Agreement will establish a special organ or section to be entrusted with the execution of the various functions of the Allied Control Commission relating to compensation to be paid by Hungary pursuant to Article 13 of the Agreement. The special organ or section to be established for this purpose shall include representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Subsequent to the establishment of such special organ or section and when circumstances should require, there may be included as members of such section representatives of other Allied Governments having substantial reparations claims against Hungary."

Your instructions regarding the manner in which you should present our position on this article in the tripartite discussions were transmitted to you in the Department's immediately preceding telegram.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London.⁶³

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./10-1344: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1944—10 p. m.

2590. ReEmbs 3933 October 13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Department that they perceive no objection from the military point of view to this Government's agreement to the armistice terms for Hungary proposed by the Soviet Government. They point out, however, that "with reference to the Annex to Article I, it is considered desirable that, in the future tripartite discussion of these terms, the United States secure assurance that the military information obtained as a result of the armistice shall be made equally available to all three Allies". You should therefore, in your discussion of the terms in Moscow, endeavor to secure the desired assurance, either by the insertion of the necessary phrases in the text of Annex A to Article I as it now stands in the Soviet draft or by securing a separate agreement among the three Allied Governments, in a protocol or other suitable form, that military information obtained as a result of the armistice be made equally available to all three.

STETTINIUS

⁶³ Repeated as telegram 9155.

740.00119 EW/10-1444

*Memorandum by Mr. John Coert Campbell of the Division of Southern European Affairs*⁶⁵

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1944.

The attached report from Merrill⁶⁶ throws some light on the confused situation with respect to the various approaches made by the Hungarian Government to the Allies in September and October. Merrill was informed by Lt. Colonel Howie that Horthy in early September made the decision to get in touch with the Anglo-Americans. Note that this was not a decision to surrender simultaneously to the three principal Allies.

Horthy is reported to have drafted, with the aid of Count Bethlen and General Voros, a message for delivery to the British and the Americans. He attempted to get this message out both by radio and by diplomatic courier to Switzerland and to Sweden. On September 18 [20?] we received from our Legation in Bern⁶⁷ a message purportedly from the Hungarian Government containing the proposal that "Anglo-Saxon troops" occupy key positions in Hungary, that the Russians and Rumanians be made to halt their advance, in order that Hungary might turn against the Germans. Apparently no message got through to Stockholm until October 7, when Minister Johnson was given a message purportedly from the Hungarian Government which stated that Hungary wanted the assurance that, upon its surrender at least part of the country would be occupied by "Anglo-Saxon troops", and that without such assurance it would continue to fight as Germany's ally.⁶⁸

Meanwhile General Naday and Lt. Colonel Howie arrived in Italy on September 22.⁶⁹ The message which they delivered orally on behalf of Horthy was substantially the same as that which we had already received through Bern and that which we were later to receive through Stockholm, namely, that Hungary wanted to surrender but would not do so if it was to be placed entirely under Soviet occupation and control.

Looking back on the whole affair it seems to me that the Naday mission, like the approaches through Bern and Stockholm, was an attempt to bargain with Great Britain and the United States and not a sincere offer to surrender simultaneously to all three Allies, and that the Russians therefore had some justification in refusing to deal with Naday and in waiting for a direct offer of surrender made to them.

⁶⁵ Addressed to the Chief of the Division, Cavendish W. Cannon, and to Cloyce K. Huston of the same Division.

⁶⁶ Report not printed; Frederick T. Merrill was Special Assistant at Istanbul.

⁶⁷ Telegram 6246, September 20, midnight, from Bern, not printed.

⁶⁸ Telegram 4075, October 7, 2 p. m., from Stockholm, not printed.

⁶⁹ See telegram 2278, September 24, 9 p. m., to Moscow, p. 889.

740.00119 EW/11-644: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 6, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 10:35 p. m.]

4254. ReDeptel 2516, October 25, 3 p. m.,⁷⁰ regarding armistice approach by Hungarians. I have received a note from Vyshinski dated November 5 stating that similar messages from the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lakatos Government have been received by the Soviet representatives in Stockholm and Ankara to the effect that Hungary has decided to cease hostilities against the United Nations. Vyshinski's note continues that the Soviet Government has made no reply to these messages not only because a Hungarian Mission, empowered by Horthy to carry on armistice negotiations, is in Moscow but also because events in Hungary have taken an entirely different course. From October 15, the time of the Fascist *coup d'état*, there has been no connection between the Hungarian Mission and Horthy or members of the Lakatos Government and the Hungarian army is carrying on hostilities as previously on the side of the Germans.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/11-744: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 7, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

4262. I have given careful study to the Department's 2584 of November 2 and have conferred with the British Ambassador. We have agreed that as soon as the present Soviet holidays are over we will suggest to Molotov resumption of the tripartite discussions on the Hungarian armistice terms. By that time the British Ambassador hopes to have instructions from London on the subject of our proposals about reparations. I propose to present the *aide-mémoire* in question and to emphasize orally the points set forth in the Department's 2438 of October 19 [14], and in the telegram under reference when article XIII comes up for consideration in the course of the discussions.

Sent Department, repeated London as 251.

KENNAN

⁷⁰ See footnote 60, p. 921.

740.00119 EW/11-1044: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 10, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

4311. ReEmbs 4262, November 7, 2 p. m. I have today addressed a letter to Molotov stating that I would be prepared to proceed with discussions on Hungarian armistice terms and asking for an expression of his views in this respect. The British Ambassador tells me that he has no instructions. I think it likely that he has heard from his Government on this subject but has gone back at them. He is personally strongly in favor of the attitude we propose to take concerning reparations.

Sent to Department, repeated to London as 253 and to AmPolAd, Caserta, as No. 23.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/11-244: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1944—10 p. m.

2739. Please refer to the *aide-mémoire* contained in Deptel 2584 November 2 and proposed revision of Article XIII of Hungarian armistice terms contained in Deptel 2585 November 2. These were repeated to London with a view to obtaining British support for our position. London has informed us that British are in general agreement but that they would like to see certain changes made in our proposals before instructing Clark Kerr to support our *démarche* without reservations. They also stated that if we cannot accept their suggested amendments Clark Kerr would still inform the Soviet government that the United Kingdom agrees in general with our proposals but would suggest the amendments desired by the British.

(1) The major amendment suggested by the British was that we omit reference to principle 1 of the *aide-mémoire* which states that in so far as possible reparation payments should consist of goods to be used directly in the rehabilitation or reconstruction of the recipient country and that the goods should not, unless in exceptional circumstances agreed to by the members of the reparation section, be exported to a third country. The Department cannot accept the British suggestion that this principle be dropped. American interests have important investments in Hungary and American public opinion would undoubtedly expect this Government to take cognizance of that fact. However, your attention is called to two points: (a) The principle in question is suggested as one of the criteria which should guide the proposed reparation section of the Control Commission;

it is not incorporated as a part of the armistice terms. (b) The wording of the principle is not rigid; it permits of a considerable degree of latitude in exceptional circumstances.

(2) In the event that the Soviet Government should object to the foregoing principle you may assure them that it in no way represents an attempt on the part of this Government to reduce Russia's absolute or relative share of reparation or to reduce the amount of the Hungarian obligation. If the operation of the principle should make it difficult for Russia to receive directly from Hungary the amount of reparation which Hungary will be obligated to pay to Russia, alternative arrangements to satisfy Russia's claim will be possible. Feasible alternatives would include (a) pooling of reparation obligations whereby any deficiency in Hungary's deliveries to Russia would be made up by correspondingly larger deliveries from another Axis country, or (b) other compensatory action carried out under the auspices of the proposed Reparation Section of the Allied Control Commission.

The British have also suggested the following two changes which the Department authorizes you to incorporate in the documents in question if you have not already presented them to the Foreign Affairs Commissariat:

A. Principle 3 of our *aide-mémoire* is to be re-worded as follows: "As a means of minimizing possible unfavorable effects upon overall European economic stability, payments for reparations should be scheduled in such a manner as not to interfere unnecessarily with essential normal trade."

B. The concluding words in paragraph 1 of our redraft of Annex to Article XIII which now read ". . . deliveries each year shall be defined in special agreements with Hungary negotiated through the Allied Control Commission" are to be changed to read as follows: ". . . deliveries each year shall be defined in special directions notified to Hungary by the Allied Control Commission."

Please inform the Department of present status of negotiations on this question.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London.⁷¹

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/11-2744: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 27, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

4523. ReDepTel 2739, November 25, 10 p. m. As reported in my telegram 4311, November 10, I advised Molotov on November 10 that I was prepared to proceed with the discussions on the Hungarian

⁷¹ Repeated as telegram 9928.

armistice. I have had no reply from him nor has the British Ambassador received any indication of his views as to the desirability of resuming discussions at this time. I have consequently not yet presented the *aide-mémoire* or proposed revision of article XIII to the People's Commissariat.

As indicated in my 4262, November 7, 2 p. m., I would prefer to do this when the article in question comes up for consideration in the course of the tripartite discussions which will presumably be held.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/10-344 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1944—midnight.

2752. The British Embassy here has given the Department the substance of the comments of the British Foreign Office on the Soviet draft of armistice terms for Hungary. Those comments were sent from London to Clark Kerr in two telegrams dated October 16 and 27. The reparations article was taken up separately and was not referred to in those telegrams. The Department's views given below on certain points of the British commentary should serve as guidance to you, in addition to the instructions already sent by the Department, in the discussions which take place in Moscow. We are assuming that the British proposals are available to you in the same form as they have been transmitted to the Department. Articles are numbered below as in your 3933 October 13, 10 p. m.

Article 1. Department agrees that Article 1 of the Bulgarian armistice is preferable as a model to the corresponding article of the Rumanian armistice. We desire to avoid any implication that Hungary is being given the formal status of cobelligerent.

Article 5. Department would prefer a text similar to Article 4 of the Bulgarian armistice.

The British Embassy here has informed the Department that Clark Kerr has been instructed to raise with the Soviet Government the matter of a public declaration by the Hungarian Government, at the time of the signature of the armistice, regarding the treatment of refugees and displaced persons. The British originally made this proposal on September 13, with the intention of having such declarations made by Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Department's 2232 September 18⁷² informed you of the proposed text and of our agreement with the purpose of the British proposal. The British have since given up the idea of having such declarations made by

⁷² Not printed.

Rumania and Bulgaria but still believe it desirable in the case of Hungary. The Department considers that the obligation in question is properly one which should be incorporated in the armistice agreement with Hungary and need not be made the subject of a separate declaration. Article 5 or Article 6 would appear to be the proper place for it.

Article 7. Department agrees that this article should be amended to conform to Article 11 of the Bulgarian armistice, with specific mention of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Article 12. While the Department does not see the need for a complete redraft of this Article, we should like to see it explicitly provided that the expenses of the Allied Control Commission would be met by the Hungarian Government.

Article 18. We favor the inclusion of the words "or the Allied Control Commission" after the phrase "orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command". To substitute the Control Commission for the High Command in this article, as the British recommend, seems unrealistic since there may be a period, as in the case of Rumania, in which the ACC is not functioning; also, at least in the period of military operations, it is reasonable that the Soviet High Command should issue instructions for the execution of the armistice.

We do not favor the inclusion of a "general powers" clause such as the British re-wording of the remainder of Article 18 would introduce.

Article 19. With respect to the character and functions of the ACC the Department's views remain as set forth in its 2437 October 14 midnight and 2498 October 21, 8 p. m.

In general the Department agrees with the British that "Allied Control Commission" should be substituted in the text for "Allied (Soviet) High Command" wherever, as in Articles 5, 9, 15 and 17, it is practicable and is clearly a matter of control of the execution of the armistice terms and not closely connected with the conduct of military operations.

The Department agrees with the British suggestion that an article be included providing for Allied supervision over the disposal of Hungarian assets. The Department believes this desirable because of the heavy reparations obligations which may be imposed on Hungary and because of the usefulness of such control from the standpoint of restitution and looted property problems. Since it is almost certain that the ACC will find it necessary to exercise these powers, we believe that they should be stated in the armistice terms rather than left to inference.

The Department would like to see included in the Hungarian armistice terms, or in a protocol thereto, the provisions of the protocol to the Bulgarian armistice agreement. With respect to Article 4 of that

protocol, the view indicated in Department's 2490 October 21⁷³ on Bulgaria applies also to Hungary. We believe that the Hungarian Government should be obliged to pay the expenses of American missions which are there in connection with the execution of the armistice terms, but not of our political representation.

The Department expects you to present its views as set forth above and to do what you can to secure British and Russian agreement to them. As was made clear in Department's 2498 October 21, however, we do not regard any of the points mentioned in the present telegram as sufficiently vital to warrant an inflexible stand or a reservation to our signature of the armistice.

The Department's position on the reparations article remains as set forth in its telegrams nos. 2438 October 14, 2584 and 2585 November 2.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London as 9978.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/10-2544 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1944—4 p. m.

2764. The Czechoslovak Government on November 17 notified the British, American and Soviet Governments of its desire to be consulted on the terms of surrender to be imposed upon Hungary. It referred to a note of February 26, 1944,⁷⁴ discussing the then contemplated work of the European Advisory Commission, in which I had stated to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Washington⁷⁵ "I am confident that the Czechoslovak Government will be given an opportunity to examine and comment upon the terms of surrender . . ."⁷⁶ for imposition upon Germany and Hungary."

The Department believes that it should be left to the discretion of the representatives of the three principal Allied Governments in Moscow to decide at what point during the discussions of the armistice the representative of the Czechoslovak Government might be consulted.

If it is agreeable to the Soviet Government and the British representative that the Czechoslovak Government be consulted before presentation of the terms to Hungary, you are authorized to agree that the Czechoslovak representative in Moscow⁷⁷ be informed at any time during the course of the discussions, of the terms contemplated or

⁷³ See footnote 16a, p. 470.

⁷⁴ See vol. I, section entitled "Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission," part III.

⁷⁵ Vladimir Hurban.

⁷⁶ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

⁷⁷ Zdenek Fierlinger, Czechoslovak Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

formulated for Hungary, and that the comments of his Government be invited. If the terms are communicated to him at Moscow, there will be no necessity for formal communication of them by Schoenfeld⁷⁸ in London as suggested in Department's 2515, October 25, 2 p. m. (8874 to London⁷⁹).

Please inform the Department and Schoenfeld of any indications of the Soviet and British attitudes.

Although no similar request has been received from the Yugoslav Government, the Department believes that, in principle, the same considerations would apply with respect to Yugoslavia.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London as 10067.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/12-244

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1944.

The progress of our negotiations with the Soviet and British Governments concerning the Hungarian armistice has been somewhat delayed because of conditions in Hungary resulting from the present military operations there. We think it essential nevertheless that the American representative who will be sent to Hungary for the armistice period be designated at an early date, and the Department is accordingly assembling a part of the subordinate personnel in Italy, in order that the mission can be established immediately upon the presentation of an armistice.

We should like to appoint as the head of this mission the Honorable H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, a Foreign Service Officer, formerly Minister to the Dominican Republic, and latterly to Finland. Since June 30, 1944 he has been assigned to the Department.

Although there will doubtless be an Allied Control Commission in authority in Hungary during the armistice period, we expect that the political mission can be established independently in such a way as to constitute, for practical purposes, during this period, the equivalent of a combined diplomatic and consular establishment. We therefore suggest that in order for Mr. Schoenfeld to perform these functions properly he have the personal rank of Minister.

If you approve, the Department will immediately proceed with the necessary arrangements, in order that Mr. Schoenfeld can proceed overseas without delay as soon as the situation warrants.⁸⁰

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

⁷⁸ Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of Embassy near the Governments in Exile of Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland, in London.

⁷⁹ *Ante*, p. 920.

⁸⁰ President Roosevelt on December 7 replied as follows: "ERS Jr OK FDR" (740.00119 Control (Hungary) 12-744).

740.00119 EW/12-244 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 2, 1944—2 p. m.
 [Received December 4—4:30 a. m.]

4618. ReDeptel 2764, December 1, 4 p. m. In connection with the desire of the Czechoslovakian Government to be consulted on the terms of surrender to be imposed on Hungary, the Department may be interested to recall that the Soviet Government undertook an obligation to Czechoslovakia in this respect under the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation which was signed in Moscow on December 12, 1943.⁸¹ Article II of this treaty provides that neither the Soviet Union nor Czechoslovakia will conclude any armistice or other treaty of peace with Germany or with any state associated with in [*it*] in acts of aggression without prior mutual agreement.

If any implementation of this provision took place in the cases of Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria, we were not informed of it; and I am not sure the Russians have had it in mind at all in recent months.

KENNAN

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/12-1344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 13, 1944—6 p. m.
 [Received December 15—12:10 a. m.]

4807. With respect to the Department's several messages setting forth the views of our Government with respect to the armistice agreement to be concluded with Hungary, I wish to invite the Department's attention to the extent of which the situation envisaged in those messages has been and is being changed by the actual conquest of the major part Hungarian territory by Russian forces and by the continued absence of a responsible Hungarian Government willing to enter into armistice negotiations with the Soviet Command. If there is any change in the views of our Government toward the armistice arrangements in the light of these developments I would appreciate being informed.

HARRIMAN

⁸¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 238. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 670-734, *passim*.

740.00119 EW/12-1544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 15, 1944—1 p. m.

4838. ReEmbs 4311, November 10, 5 p. m. I received late last evening a letter from Dekanozov⁸² dated December 12 in reply to Kennan's letter of November 10 in which he expressed readiness to proceed with the preliminary Hungarian armistice discussions. Dekanozov states in this letter that the German *coup d'état* in Hungary has retarded the withdrawal of that country from the war and that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, this makes the present time inappropriate to discuss the Hungarian armistice terms.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/11-2744 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1944—4 p. m.

2846. Since the British Foreign Office has already been informed of the American position on the reparations article of the Hungarian armistice, as set forth in Department's telegrams 2584 and 2585 November 2 and 2739 November 25, the Department believes it might be advantageous to present this Government's views to the Soviet Government for its consideration prior to the resumption of the general discussions on armistice terms for Hungary. This might serve as a means of re-opening the discussions. The Department sees no reason why they should be longer delayed, since it would be desirable for the Allied Governments to have reached agreement and to have surrender terms ready for acceptance by a Hungarian Government when one with which they can deal comes into existence.

The matter of timing the presentation to the Soviet Government of this Government's position on the reparations article (reEmbs 4523 November 27) is left to your discretion. We think, however, that since the British views on the substance of the article are not entirely in agreement with ours, and since we desire to avoid the appearance of a previously agreed British-American position against the Russians, it would be better that our views be presented to the Soviet Government independently.

STETTINIUS

⁸² Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/12-2444: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 24, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received December 24—4:15 p. m.]

4978. Moscow press this morning publishes announcement of formation on December 21 of a "Provisional National Assembly" of Hungary in the town of Debrecen and publishes the proclamation issued by the Assembly on that date to the Hungarian people. The Assembly announces itself as a rallying point for the public life of liberated Hungary and all elements opposed to the war on the side of Germany. It is stated that the members were all elected by democratic processes from various communities of liberated Hungary. This Assembly unanimously elected as its chairman Zsedéni Béla, a professor of the Academy of Law in the town of Miskolc. His assistants are the professor of the Debrecen University, Santa Kálman, and Dr. Yukhasz-Nagy Sandor, described as a well-known figure in the reformed church. The Assembly's proclamation reverts to the traditions of Kossuth and the revolution of 1848, and calls for an independent, friendly and democratic Hungary. Its program calls for wide political life, the preservation of private capital and extensive land reform. Its rhetorical conclusion hails in succession both the Provisional National Assembly and the Provisional National Government but there is no explanation of whether the two are supposed to be identical. The appeal to the Hungarian people makes no mention of friendship with the Soviet Union but refers to the Red Army as the liberator of Hungary.

Complete translation will be sent after Christmas.⁸³

Repeated to Caserta as No. 63.

HARRIMAN

864.01/12-2544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 25, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 25—9:10 p. m.]

4985. During a call this evening in connection with other matters Dekanozov told me that Gromyko⁸⁴ had been instructed several days ago to submit to the Department an *aide-mémoire*⁸⁵ regarding the developments in Hungary leading up to the formation of the Pro-

⁸³ Telegram 4982, December 25, 1944, not printed.

⁸⁴ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

⁸⁵ See *infra*.

visional Government. He said further that the Provisional Government had asked for an armistice. He explained that when Mr. Molotov was well enough, which would be in a few days, he would ask the British Chargé⁸⁶ and myself to discuss the terms to be offered.

It would be helpful if I could be informed of the communications received by the Department from the Soviet Embassy regarding Hungarian developments, the attitude that the Department takes towards the new Provisional Government and whether there are any changes in instructions previously given as to the proposed armistice terms in the light of the new situation.

HARRIMAN

864.01/12-2544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1944—8 p. m.

2889. ReEmbs 4985, December 25, midnight. The following is paraphrase of *aide-mémoire* which was transmitted to Dept by Soviet Embassy on December 25.

Begin paraphrase. The Soviet Government has already informed the United States Government about the preparations for the creation of the Provisional National Government of Hungary. This Government which has now been formed on liberated Hungarian territory in the city of Debreczen has informed the Soviet Government that it considers that the rupture of its existing alliance with Germany, the declaration of war on Germany and the immediate conclusion of an armistice with the Soviet Union and the other Allied Powers with which Hungary is at war constitute the first tasks of the Government. The Provisional National Government, with this object in view, has requested the Soviet Government to communicate the conditions for an armistice and to permit an armistice delegation to be sent to Moscow.

It is the intention of the Soviet Government to reply favorably to the approach of the Provisional Hungarian Government, and the Soviet Government would like to know the views of the United States Government on this question.

The Soviet Government considers that conversations between the Allied Governments concerning the conditions of an armistice with Hungary should begin at once in Moscow. *End paraphrase.*

You will be informed in a separate telegram⁸⁷ of the position of this Government.

STETTINIUS

⁸⁶ John Balfour, British Minister in the Soviet Union.

⁸⁷ Telegram 2893, December 27, p. 938.

740.00119 EW/12-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 26, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received December 26—4:40 p. m.]

5011. Molotov has called a meeting of the British Chargé and myself for 5 o'clock tomorrow afternoon December 27 to discuss the Hungarian armistice terms. I explained to Molotov that I would gladly discuss the terms of an armistice but could not commit my Government until I had from the Department its position in respect to negotiations with the new Provisional Hungarian Government.

I am anxious to know the Department's views on whether detailed understanding should be reached with the Soviets in respect to the functioning of the Control Commission, in light of our experiences in Rumania and Bulgaria. I request urgently instructions on this point.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/12-2744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 27, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:51 p. m.]

5028. I am not certain that I have made clear what I had in mind in the second paragraph of my No. 5011, December 26, 10 p. m.

I understand from copies of cables received here that our representatives on the Control Commissions in Sofia and Bucharest are not being accorded the consideration from the Allied (Soviet) High Command that we consider they are entitled to receive. I am fearful that unless we register our demands in regard to the status of our representatives in Hungary before we agree to the Hungarian armistice, not only will our representatives receive the same treatment in Hungary but also the Soviets will interpret our failure to insist on our demands as acquiescence in the status of our representatives on the Control Commissions in Bulgaria and Rumania.

I urgently request instructions.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/12-2744 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1944—8 p. m.

2893. The Department is replying to the Soviet Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, (reDeptel 2889, December 26, 8 p. m.), indicating the will-

ingness of this Government to resume at once in Moscow the conversations among the three principal Allied Governments on armistice terms for Hungary, to be communicated to representatives of the "Provisional National Government of Hungary" recently established at Debrecen.

The course of military and political events in Hungary has not altered in any fundamental respect the views of the Department on terms of Hungarian surrender as already transmitted to you. (ReEmbs 4807, December 13 and 4838, December 15.)

Since the military value of possible Hungarian help in the war against Germany is a matter which the Russians are in the best position to judge, the Department will not at this juncture do more than re-emphasize its preference for article 1 of the Bulgarian armistice over article 1 of the Rumanian armistice as a model for Hungary.

The Department did not consider that its position on the reparations question was affected by the delays and uncertainties which have arisen with respect to the conclusion of an armistice with Hungary (reEmbs 4950 December 21)⁸⁸ and therefore thought it desirable that this Government's views on Hungarian reparations be presented to the Soviet Government at the earliest appropriate moment, leaving to your discretion the timing of the presentation (reDeptel 2846 December 18). Since the tripartite talks on armistice terms are now to be resumed, you will be able to state your Government's position on reparations when the text of Article 13 is discussed.

The Department's views on the questions raised in last paragraph of your 5011, December 26, 10 p. m. will form the subject of separate instructions to be sent to you immediately.

For your confidential information, the Department had hoped that the matter of the formation of a Hungarian provisional government with which the Allied Governments would sign an armistice would be made the subject of consultation among the three Allied Governments. Although the authorities which have now been set up at Debrecen appear to be broadly representative of the pro-Allied political forces in Hungary, pending an examination of more detailed information concerning this group the Department cannot make a definite statement of its willingness to give formal recognition to it as the provisional government of Hungary.

The formation of a provisional government raises the question of American representation in Hungary. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, who has been appointed American Political Representative, is now in the Department and will shortly proceed to Italy where a part of his staff is being assembled. You may inform the Soviet Government of his designation, saying also that arrangements will be made for his entry into Hungary as soon as an armistice is concluded.

⁸⁸ Not printed.

A recent telegram from Caserta states that the British political representative, Gascoigne, is in Italy prepared to leave for Hungary as soon as the matter can be cleared with the Soviet Government. British section of prospective Allied Control Commission for Hungary is also ready to proceed to Hungary on short notice.

STERTINIUS

740.00119 EW/12-2744: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 27, 1944—9 p. m.
[Received December 28—7:30 a. m.]

5034. The British Chargé d'Affaires and I met with Molotov this afternoon to discuss armistice terms with Hungary. Molotov recapitulated recent events in Hungary, stated that the Provisional Government there had made known its intention of breaking with the Germans and declaring war on Germany⁸⁹ and had asked permission to send a delegation to Moscow to receive the armistice conditions laid down by the Allies. The Soviet Government considered it appropriate to conclude an armistice with this group and had agreed to accept the delegation in Moscow. The Hungarians were accordingly sending a delegation but it was expected that due to difficulties of travel at this season it would take them some time to reach Moscow. The delegation was composed of Dr. Yanosh Diendishi [*János Gyöngyösy*], present Minister of Foreign Affairs; Colonel General Yanos Veresh [*János Vörös*], Minister of Defense; and Dr. Ishtvan Balog, State Secretary of the Council of Ministers. Our comments were invited.

I said that I had not heard from the Secretary since he had received the notification of the setting up of the Provisional Government in Hungary and that technically I was not authorized to deal with this group. I said that I had no doubt, however, that I would receive new instructions soon and that meanwhile I saw no reason why we should not proceed with the discussion of the terms among ourselves. Balfour said that he had been told by his Government that he would receive instructions very shortly.

Molotov pointed out that conditions had changed somewhat since the Soviet had proposed their original draft terms and that they now considered it advisable to put forward a new draft.

He then handed us the new draft and pointed out that it contained the following six changes as compared with the old draft.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ On December 30, Soviet Ambassador Gromyko informed the Secretary of State of a Hungarian note of December 28 saying that war had been declared (740.0011 E.W./12-3044).

⁹⁰ See telegram 3933, October 13, 10 p. m., from Moscow, p. 903.

1. In preamble: The words "Regent and Government of Hungary" had been replaced by the "Provisional National Government of Hungary". In this connection Molotov pointed out that while the Regent was now in the hands of the Germans, all the representatives who had originally come to Moscow to negotiate an armistice on behalf of Horthy had returned to Hungary to join the new Provisional Government with the exception of Szentivanyi Domokos who remained in Moscow for liaison. In addition to this they omitted from the preamble all mention of the preliminary condition.

2. Article I of the new draft has been considerably changed and now reads as follows:

"Hungary has withdrawn from the war against the USSR and the other United Nations and having broken all relations with Germany has entered the war and will wage war on the side of the Allies against Germany for the purpose of restoring Hungarian independence and sovereignty for which purpose she will provide not less than eight infantry divisions with corps troops.

"Military operations on the part of Hungarian armed forces, including the River Fleet and the Air Forces, against Germany will be conducted under the general leadership of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. See annex to Article I.

"Hungary will take such measures for the demobilization of the Hungarian [Army] as may be laid down by the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

3. In Article III all mention of the preliminary condition has again been omitted and the entire second paragraph has accordingly been deleted.

4. Article XIII has been revised to accord with the Eden understanding of October 17, i.e., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are mentioned throughout along with the Soviet Union, the total now has been changed to 300,000,000, the term of payment to 6 years, the amount to the Soviet Union to be 200,000,000 dollars, and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to receive 100,000,000, and the last paragraph has been omitted entirely.

5. Article XIX. The wording of Article XVIII of the Bulgarian armistice has been inserted in place of the former wording of Article XIX.

6. Molotov said the Soviets would propose one additional article, the draft of which was not yet ready. It would concern cancellation of agreements entered into by Hungary at the expense of Czechoslovakia and other neighboring states and would be like the Transylvanian article (Article XIX) of the Rumanian agreement.

Balfour and I both asked for an opportunity to examine these changed articles in detail before commenting on them but at my suggestion we went through the remaining articles point by point and Balfour and I expressed such views as our Governments held on each point. The Soviets simply made notes of our comments, and it was understood that they would give consideration to them so as to be able to discuss them when we next met, which is to be on December 29.

With respect to Article XIII, I presented the *aide-mémoire* transmitted in the Department's 2584 of November 2, 4 p. m., but since we were not attempting to discuss any of the points in detail at today's meeting, I did not attempt to set forth orally the Department's views on this subject as expressed in its 2438 of October 14, midnight, and other telegrams. Molotov seemed to be well aware that we held strong views on this subject and showed considerable curiosity as to our position. Balfour took occasion to make clear that his Government also had very definite views about pricing of reparations deliveries which he would have to put forward in detail when we came to discuss this article.

Molotov then raised the question of consultation of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, and proposed that the draft armistice be shown to them when we three had agreed on it, to which I assented.

With respect to the contemplated declaration [as] to treatment of refugees and displaced persons, I proposed that this be included in Article VI. Balfour proposed that the Hungarians be asked to issue it as a separate statement. I expect to get Molotov's views on this subject at the next meeting.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./12-2944

The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Soviet Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of December 25, 1944,⁹³ asking the opinion of the United States Government concerning the request of the "Provisional National Government of Hungary," recently established at Debreczen, to be permitted to send a delegation to Moscow to receive terms of armistice. Although the United States Government has as yet little information regarding the "Provisional National Government of Hungary," it concurs in the decision of the Soviet Government to give a favorable reply to this approach.

The United States Government is also in agreement with the Soviet Government's view that the conversations among the three principal Allied Governments concerning conditions of armistice for Hungary should be resumed in Moscow at once.

The Department of State has not received the communications from the Soviet Government referred to in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* concerning the preparations for the establishment of a provisional government in liberated Hungarian territory.

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1944.

⁹³ See telegram 2889, December 26, 8 p. m., to Moscow, p. 937.

740.00119 EW/12-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1944—8 p. m.

2908. Reurtels 5011 December 26, 10 p. m., and 5028 December 27, 5 p. m. The Department agrees that the position and functions which our representatives are to have on the Allied Control Commission should be clearly stipulated at the time of the signature of the armistice. We suggest that these matters be covered by a special protocol to the armistice agreement.

Such a protocol, signed by the representatives of the three Allied Governments, would serve as the fundamental statute of the ACC. Difficulties similar to those in Rumania, where the Soviet Government issued a set of statutes which were never formally agreed to by ourselves and the British, and in Bulgaria, where so far as the Department is aware the ACC operates under no statutes at all, might thus be avoided.

The protocol should set forth the organization of the ACC and should state clearly the powers which will be exercised by the representatives of the participant Allied Governments. You are already informed of the Department's view that the organization and functions of the ACC should undergo a change after the termination of hostilities against Germany (reDeptels 2403 October 10,⁹⁴ 2437 October 14, 2498 October 21). The Department would of course desire to have such provision included either in the armistice agreement or a protocol.

The protocol should also state clearly the rights and prerogatives which the non-Soviet representatives on the ACC will have during the time that the ACC is operating under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, which may, of course, cover the entire armistice period. The Department would like to see the following rights expressly stipulated :

1. Policy directives should not be issued in the name of the ACC to the Hungarian Government until after consultation with the American and British representatives. If one of the latter (or both) regards the directive as not consistent with the general policies of his Government, he may refer the matter to his Government requesting instructions.

2. The American and British representatives should have freedom of direct communication in code with their Governments.

3. These representatives should have freedom of movement throughout Hungary, but should give prior notification of extended travel to the Chairman of the ACC.

4. The chief of each delegation should be the judge of the proper size of his delegation.

⁹⁴ Not printed.

5. The chief of each delegation should be the judge of the amounts of money which he requires from the Hungarian Government for the expenses of his staff.

6. American and British delegations should have the right to receive oral and written information from Soviet officers on the ACC and to put forward for the consideration of the ACC proposals of their Governments on matters connected with the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement.

If your negotiations on the American proposal for the reparation article result in modification of the Soviet position, provision for the special reparation section of the ACC described in Department's 2585 November 2, 5 p. m., might be made in the protocol on the organization of the ACC as well as in annex E to the armistice.

When the character and functions of the ACC for Hungary come up for discussion, you should propose that a protocol covering this subject be adopted. If the Soviet and British representatives agree, you should then endeavor to have included in the protocol the points mentioned above.

With respect to our political representation in Hungary, we think it important to have it clearly understood by the Soviet Government that we expect Schoenfeld to have direct contact with Hungarian authorities, direct code communications with Washington and with other American missions abroad and freedom of movement except in military zones. In informing the Soviet Government of his designation (reDeptel 2893, December 27, 8 p. m.) you should make this clear.

Your 5034 December 27, 9 p. m., has just been received, part of it garbled. The Department will reply as soon as the omissions can be serviced.

If you think it would be helpful, the Department sees no objection to your informing Balfour separately of the substance of our proposal regarding the ACC protocol.

Sent to Moscow. Repeated to London.⁹⁵

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/12-3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 30, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received December 30—9:12 a. m.]

5060. Molotov has sent me a draft of the additional article referred to in point 6 of my 5034, December 27, 9 p. m. It reads as follows:

⁹⁵ As telegram 10814.

“Article XIX. The Allied Governments consider the decision of the Vienna Arbitration Commission of November 2, 1938⁹⁶ and also the Vienna award of August 30, 1940⁹⁷ as null and void.”

I would appreciate instructions on this point.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/12-3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 30, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received December 31—9:46 a. m.]

5074. ReEmbs 5034, December 27, 9 p. m. Balfour and I called on Molotov yesterday afternoon at his request to discuss the Hungarian armistice terms.

Molotov opened the conversation by handing us an *aide-mémoire* on reparations in reply to my *aide-mémoire* of December 27 and by stating that he believed it would be preferable to postpone discussion of this question until the Soviet reply had been considered. The text of the Soviet *aide-mémoire* is going forward in my immediately following telegram.⁹⁸ We then proceeded to discuss the armistice conditions as revised by the Soviets after our conversation of December 27. The following observations were brought in our discussion.

Preamble. Balfour suggested that the words “acting on behalf of all United Nations at war with Hungary” be inserted in the second paragraph of the preamble after the words “and the United States of America”. Molotov concurred and I stated that I was entirely willing to accept this amendment.

Article I. It was agreed that Article I should more closely conform to the Bulgarian armistice and should read as follows :

“A. Hungary has withdrawn from the war against the USSR and the other United Nations and has broken all relations with Germany.

B. The Government of Hungary undertakes to disarm the German armed forces in Hungary and to hand them over as prisoners of war.

The Government of Hungary also undertakes to intern nationals of Germany.

C. The Government of Hungary undertakes to maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. In this respect Hungary will provide not less than eight infantry divisions with corps troops. These forces must not be used on Allied territory except with the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.

⁹⁶ *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. iv, p. 125.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. x, pp. 581-587. See also telegrams 3826, August 30, 1940, from Berlin, and 509, September 6, 1940, from Bucharest, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 501 and 505, respectively.

⁹⁸ *Infra*.

D. On the conclusion of hostilities against Germany the Hungarian armed forces must be demobilized and put on a peace footing under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission. See Annex to Article I."

Note: The Department will note that this article not [*now*] includes Article II of the former draft. Consequently the enumeration of the following articles in the present Soviet draft advance[s] by one number. For example, Article III of the former draft now becomes Article II of the draft under consideration and so on. Furthermore, annexes A and B of the former draft are now combined into annex A of the present draft. Former C thus becomes present B.

Article II. I suggest that this article be prefaced with the words "without prejudice to ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims". It was decided to postpone final consideration until I had received Department's reactions to the new Soviet article on the Vienna Awards.

Article III. No comments.

Article IV. Molotov agreed to accept the wording of Article IV of the Bulgarian text.

Article V. Molotov agreed to the inclusion of a paragraph reading as follows: "The Government of Hungary undertakes to take all necessary measures to ensure that all displaced persons or refugees within its territory, including Jews and stateless persons, are accorded at least the same measure of protection and security as its own nationals.["] Balfour stated that this was acceptable.

Article VI. Molotov agreed to make specific mention of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav property. It was also agreed to include the words "to Hungary" after the words "during the war" and to omit the words "by Bulgaria from United Nations territory".

Article VII. Molotov agreed to Balfour's suggestion that the words "including vessels of the fleet of Germany located in Hungarian waters" be deleted.

Article VIII. Molotov agreed to replace the words "Allied (Soviet) High Command" by the words "Allied Control Commission".

Article IX and X. No comments.

Article XI. Molotov proposed a redraft which was substantially the same as the original draft but which explicitly provided that the expenses of the Allied Control Commission would be met by the Hungarian Government. Balfour, however, did not find this redraft satisfactory since he considered it unduly limiting. It was decided to postpone final consideration of this article until he had received instructions from his Government.

Article XII. Discussion postponed.

Article XIII. No comment.

Article XIV. Molotov agreed to have the words "Allied (Soviet) High Command" replaced by "Allied Control Commission".

Article XV. Molotov agreed to the deletion of the words "in particular to the Soviet Union".

Article XVI. Molotov declined to substitute the words "Allied (Soviet) High Command" with "Allied Control Commission". In reply to my question he stated that Article XVIII foresaw that the authority of the Allied (Soviet) High Command passed to the Control Commission after the end of hostilities with Germany. I stated that I would have to reserve judgment of this article until I had consulted the Department.

Article XVII. Considerable discussion took place as to whether the words "Allied Control Commission" should be substituted for "Allied (Soviet) High Command". I pointed out that, although it would be the duty of the Allied (Soviet) High Command to define what areas should be turned over to the civilian authorities, the whole purpose of the Control Commission was to regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice. Molotov agreed to reconsider the article with a possible view to redrafting it.

Article XVIII. Molotov agreed to accept the wording of Article XVIII of the Bulgarian armistice. I stated that I could not accept the article before coming to an agreement on the statutes of the Control Commission (reDeptel 2908, December 29, 8 p. m.). I remarked that I believed this should be agreed to beforehand and stated that we would submit draft statutes on this matter. In reply to an observation, Molotov admitted that the three principal Allies should share more equally the responsibilities of the Allied Control Commission after the defeat of Germany.

Article XIX. (See my 5060 of December 30, 3 p. m.) I stated that this article seemed acceptable but that I would have to defer judgment until I had heard from the Department.

Article XX. No comment.

Annexes A, B and C (including D of former draft), no change. Molotov indicated that the Soviet Government agreed that a protocol be signed by the three Governments which would provide that military information obtained from the Hungarian High Command as foreseen under annex A would be made equally available to all three Allied Governments. He said that he would send us tomorrow a draft on this subject.

Annex D (former annex E). The words "Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia" have been included after the words "to the Soviet Union". Consideration of this annex was postponed until the general subject of reparations is discussed.

Annex E (former annex F). I stated that we desired to see the words "Allied Control Commission" replace the words "Allied (So-

viet) High Command". Final decision on this annex, as on Article XVI, was deferred until I have heard from the Department.

Annex F (former annex G). Although this annex was accepted I pointed out that I would wish to submit the aforementioned statutes on the Control Commission.

Molotov stated that he expected to let us have shortly the draft of the protocol, which will presumably be similar to that which accompanied the Bulgarian agreement.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/12-3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 30, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received December 31—noon.]

5075. ReEmbs 5074, December 30, 7 p. m. The *aide-mémoire* on the subject of Hungarian reparations received from Molotov yesterday afternoon contained after the introductory sentence seven numbered paragraphs. The text with paragraphs juxtaposed for purposes of security reads as follows: ^{98a}

Moscow, December 30, 1944.

1. The Soviet Union as a European power is of course interested in the rapid reestablishment of stability in Europe and consequently there exists agreement between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States on this important question. The Soviet Government however cannot recognize as correct the statement regarding the necessity with respect to Hungary to accept a method of regulating the reparation question different than that which was applied in regard to Rumania under agreement of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain and in respect to Finland by agreement between the USSR and Great Britain.

2. As is well known to the Government of the USA, the amounts of reparations established for the former satellites of Germany are several times less than the actual losses sustained by the Soviet Union as a result of their activities. The absolute size of these amounts is so insignificant that they can neither create any insurmountable difficulties for the economies of the respondent countries or have any noticeable influence in any way on the general economic situation in Europe. The Soviet Government therefore maintains the opinion that the Hungarian reparations, fixed at the more than modest figure of 300 million dollars (of which 200 million dollars will go to the USSR and 100 million dollars to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), give no basis for concern that they (that is the reparations) would unduly impede general rehabilitation or would reflect on the stability of Europe.

3. The best illustration of the moderation of the amount of reparational demands from the former satellites of Germany is indeed the

^{98a} Order of items restored in the text as here printed.

case of Hungary. The 300 million dollars which Hungary should pay in merchandise to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia during the period of 6 years (as is foreseen in the Soviet draft armistice with Hungary) means payments of 50 million dollars per year. The relative meaning of this figure may be measured by the two following comparisons: Firstly, Hungarian average yearly exports during the last 5 years before the war (1934–1938) amounted to about 500 million pengo or according to the official rate of exchange at that time (20 cents per pengo) to about 143 million dollars. The amount of reparations claimed by the Soviet Government therefore equals about one third of the prewar exports of the country. Two-thirds of the exports remain at the disposal of Hungary for commercial purposes. Secondly, according to the calculations of the most authoritative Hungarian economist, Henrich Fellner, who during more than 30 years has been issuing yearly figures on the national income of the country, the national income of Hungary in 1938 amounted to 4.8 billion pengo or 1.4 billion dollars. Reparations in the amount of 50 million dollars amount therefore to only $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent of the prewar national income of the country (postwar Hungary in point of territory and population will evidently be approximately equal to Hungary at the beginning of 1938). If it is admitted that as a result of the war that national income of Hungary during the first postwar years is somewhat lower in comparison with the national income of 1938, even then the percentage of reparations to the national income in no case will be able to reach a level which would be dangerous for the economic development of the country. From the aforementioned it is absolutely clear that reparations of such a scale will not present any threat either to the economy of Hungary itself or to the economy of Europe. From this it also follows that there is necessity to establish any limitations on the use by the recipient countries of the merchandise delivered to them as reparation since the sum total of the reparation is absolutely negligible in comparison with the general European trade turnover.

4. The agreement of the Soviet Government to be satisfied with the modest amounts of reparations from Hungary as well as from other former satellites of Germany is an expression of its goodwill and also of its desire to facilitate the countries in question to return rapidly to normal conditions of economic life. Nevertheless attempts have been and are being observed actually to reduce to naught even these minimal reparation amounts which were already included in the armistice agreements or are to be included in the armistice agreement with Hungary. The proposal to accept as a basis of reparation deliveries prices effective “at the present time on world markets”, that is, prices which reflect the abnormal conditions of war times or the first postwar years would have precisely this result. It is natural that the Soviet Government cannot agree to this.

5. Proceeding from the above the Soviet Government both in relation to Hungary as in relation to Rumania and Finland proposed as a basis for figuring indemnity payments the American dollar at a definite firm gold parity which did not meet with objection on any side and also to fix a stable price level which would conform to the firm prices of the prewar period (1938). Meeting the wishes of the Governments of Rumania and Finland the Soviet Government agreed to increase by 10 percent the 1938 prices with respect to manufactured goods and

15 percent in respect to heavy equipment. The Soviet Government is prepared to make similar increases for Hungary. Only the above mentioned procedure may create firm relations with countries which are paying reparations without making these relations dependent on transient and large sized price fluctuations which are unavoidable in the war period and in the years of transition from war to peace. Indeed an additional argument in favor of such a method of pricing of reparational deliveries is the consideration that since the treacherous attack of Germany and its satellites lead to the destruction or elimination of values which can be defined only in prewar prices there is very [every] reason for appraising also merchandise received on reparation accounts at prewar prices.

6. From the conversations which preceded the conclusion of the armistice with Rumania the Government of the United States became well acquainted with the motives why the Soviet Government did not consider it possible to refrain from fixing in the armistice treaties a definite reparation amount. The Soviet Government therefore considers it necessary in the Hungarian armistice, as was agreed upon at the time of the visit in Moscow of Prime Minister Churchill and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eden to fix precisely the reparations figure at 300 million dollars of which 200 million dollars goes to the USSR and the remaining 100 million dollars to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Government advanced a proposal that the entire amount of the reparations which would be due would be paid off during a period of 6 years and article XIII of the Hungarian armistice, handed by the Soviet side to the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain, contains this condition.

7. With respect to the proposals of the American *aide-mémoire* concerning the establishment in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary of a special "reparations division made up of representatives of the three Allied Powers signatory to the armistice agreement", the Soviet Government, taking into consideration the experience with Rumania and Finland, sees no necessity in this. On the other hand the Soviet Government is prepared jointly with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to whom Hungary will also pay reparations on the basis of the present agreement to examine the question regarding the participation of their representatives in the work of the Allied Control Commission connected with the collecting of reparations in Hungary."

The British Chargé d'Affaires has requested that the above text be made available immediately to the British Embassy in Washington.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/12-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1944—9 p. m.

2922. ReEmbs 5034 December 27, 9 p. m. The Department agrees to the change proposed by Molotov in the preamble. We still prefer the wording of the Bulgarian armistice as a model for Article I but would accept Molotov's proposed text.

Article III, as summarized in your 3933 October 13 contains only one sentence; your reference to the deletion of a second paragraph is therefore not understood. The text of the new Article III proposed by Molotov, as it appears in a telegram from Clark Kerr to Lord Halifax⁹⁹ made available to us by the British Embassy, is acceptable to the Department. This text is as follows: "Hungary undertakes to evacuate all Hungarian troops and officials from the territory of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania occupied by her within the limits of the Hungarian frontiers existing on December 31, 1937".

On Article XIII and Article XIX you are already in possession of the Department's views. We welcome the use of Article XVIII of the Bulgarian armistice as a model for Article XIX of the Hungarian terms, but would like to see added a sentence covering the second part of the armistice period. As was indicated in Department's 2498 October 21, you should support this view strongly but should not make a decisive issue of it.

The Department agrees to the inclusion of an additional article stating that the signatories regard as null and void the agreements by which Hungary acquired territory from neighboring states.

Molotov's proposal that the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav representatives be informed of the terms after agreement has been reached by the three principal Allies is entirely acceptable to the Department. We hope that the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments will be given time to comment on the terms before they are handed to the Hungarians.

Although it seems reasonable to us that the matter of the treatment of refugees and displaced persons should be included in the armistice, we have no real objection to its being issued instead in a separate declaration, and are willing that this matter be worked out by you with the British and Soviet representatives.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Hungary)/12-3144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 31, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1945—4 a. m.]

5079. I feel that the most significant point in the *aide-mémoire* which Molotov handed me on the question of Hungarian reparations, transmitted in Embassy's 5075 December 30, 8 p. m., is the refusal to allow the British and ourselves to participate in the handling of reparation payments, though indicating willingness to consider consultation with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

⁹⁹ British Ambassador in the United States.

I must confess that I have some sympathy for the Soviet view that 50 million dollars a year of goods as reparation payments from Hungary over 6-year period is not in fact excessive, and I also feel that there is real value to us in having the claims of the Soviet Union for reparations fixed at this time as otherwise we might have serious difficulties in the future should their appetite grow. On the other hand it seems clear that the manner in which reparations are completed, the character of goods demanded, and the value placed on them, are all matters which would vitally affect the recovery and stability of the economy of Hungary and Central Europe. Whoever controls reparation deliveries could practically control Hungarian economy and exercise an important economic influence in other directions. The Soviet Government's position that only these countries receiving reparations should be involved in the way in which reparations are collected does not seem reasonable. The British and we have an equal interest in the economic stability of Europe even though neither of us are demanding reparations from Hungary.

It seems to me that in this connection the status of our representatives on the Control Commission is also a matter of prime importance. There seems little to be gained by our participating in a control commission unless we have a clear cut agreement that our representatives can have a participation commensurate with the responsibilities we take under the armistice. After consulting with my British colleague, I intend at the next meeting to present to Molotov proposals for statutes for the Control Commission which will include the points outlined by the Department in its telegram 2908, December 29, 8 p. m. I will not press discussion on the Soviet *aide-mémoire* in reparations until I ascertain the Soviet attitude regarding the Control Commission statutes. We will then know more clearly what the Soviet attitude is on our participation in the responsibilities for the carrying out of the armistice, in general as well as in respect to the reparation payments. If their position, in our view, is unreasonable it seems to me that we have a major issue to face.

My present instructions indicate that I should inform the Soviets that we disassociate ourselves from the reparation clause. I am afraid that this will not be effective in changing the Soviet position and I have therefore been puzzling over what additional pressure we can exert. It has occurred to me that I might be instructed to call to the Soviet Government's attention the enormous aid given under Lend-Lease, both direct military and to the Russian people, and explain without commitment that, if the Soviet Government is unwilling to cooperate with us in economic matters such as in the case of Hungary, this cannot help but affect the final Lend-Lease settlement adversely to the Soviet interest.

By our participation in the armistices with Rumania and Bulgaria we assumed substantial responsibilities and we now find ourselves blocked by the Soviets from any real participation in their administration. I presume that we do not wish to put ourselves in the same position again and would not wish to participate in another armistice over such conditions. It would be most helpful if I could get your general guidance at this stage of the negotiations, even though it might not be possible to give specific instructions until you know all the questions confronting us.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 2, 1945.

[Received January 2—8:49 p. m.]

6. Moscow papers January 2 announce delegation of Provisional Hungarian Government has arrived in Moscow for armistice negotiations. It consists of János Gyöndesy [*Gyöngyösy*], Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of Delegation; Colonel General János Vörös; and Istvan Balog, Secretary of State.

Repeated to Caserta as 1.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 2, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

14. ReEmbs 5074, December 30, 7 p. m. I met with Molotov and the British Chargé d'Affaires¹ again this afternoon to discuss the Hungarian armistice terms.

We ourselves have now reached agreement with the Russians on all points of the armistice except those on reparations and the statutes of the Control Commission for inclusion in a tripartite protocol. There are one or two minor points which are under discussion between the British and the Russians.

Molotov opposed the inclusion of the phrase "without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims" in article II as he was fearful this would cause concern on the part of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He stated categorically that this clause related only

¹ John Balfour.

to the withdrawal of troops and could not and would not be interpreted as relating to final boundary settlements at the peace conference. I stated that this was the interpretation which my Government placed on the clause and that I accepted his statement as assurance that his Government placed the same interpretation on it. Balfour for his part agreed for the British Government as they have raised the same question in connection with article XIX. I therefore agreed to the articles appearing in the armistice without this additional language. In article XIX Molotov similarly gave the same assurances as to interpretation.

In article XVII Molotov agreed to the inclusion of the words "or the Allied Control Commission" after the words "Allied (Soviet) High Command".

I submitted a proposal for statutes for the Control Commission explaining our dissatisfaction with the present situation in Rumania and Bulgaria. Molotov agreed to examine it and comment.

I pressed for a tripartite protocol on making available to the British and ourselves military information obtained from the Hungarian Government.

Molotov argued that this was not suitable for a protocol and should be settled between the military authorities. I insisted that Molotov should commit the Soviet Government at least in the form of a letter to giving us this information as our experience indicated that we had not received this information in the case of Rumania and Bulgaria. He agreed to consult his military authorities and let me know.

I am cabling you tomorrow the full text of the articles of the armistice agreement as now agreed upon.

I have not discussed the Soviet Government's *aide-mémoire* on the question of reparations pending a reply to my cable 5078 [5079], December 31, 10 p. m. This article is therefore left open for future discussion.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/1-345: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1945—4 p. m.

13. Dept is giving consideration to Soviet *aide-mémoire* concerning Hungarian reparations and to points raised in your 5078 [5079], December 31, 10 p. m. Following is in response to your request for general guidance pending issuance of instructions on such specific points as may be raised in the course of negotiations.

Dept approves procedure of taking up the question of status of our representatives on Control Commission before attempting to reach a

final decision on reparations question. We are not prepared at present to go so far as to refuse to participate in the armistice if our position in respect to the Control Commission is not accepted. In discussing this matter you may wish to inform Molotov that while we accepted the position of the Soviet Government that executive functions on the Control Commissions in Rumania and Bulgaria would be responsibility of the Soviet High Command, we are not satisfied with the manner in which these arrangements have worked out in practice. You may cite the fact that, for example, instructions appear to have been issued to Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments in name of the Allied Control Commissions without knowledge of the American representatives on these Commissions.

Dept does not desire to raise question of Lend-Lease in connection with this discussion. We are still inclined to disassociate ourselves from the reparations clause but our position in this matter might be modified to some extent by the outcome of the discussion of the statutes of the Control Commission.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/1-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 4, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received January 4—8:35 a. m.]

28. ReDept's 13, January 3, 4 p. m. It is my belief that Molotov will object to the statutes for the Control Commission in the form that I have presented them but it is my impression that we can get some assurance that our representatives on the Control Commission will receive consideration more in line with that accorded the Russians in Italy. I am hopeful that this question will be worked out in a manner acceptable to the Department.

As to reparations, since Churchill and Eden while in Moscow last October approved the sum now proposed it would seem most difficult if not impossible to reduce the Russian demands.

On the question of pricing, now that the Soviet Government has obtained the agreement of Finland and Rumania to the application of the 1938 price levels plus 10 to 15 percent and since these agreements have been made public it would seem most unlikely that Molotov would be willing to deviate from these precedents. The greatest concession that I believe it will be possible to obtain would be our participation in a sub-committee of the Control Commission on reparations.

I do not believe it would serve a useful purpose for me to have further talks with Molotov on the subject of reparations until I have

final instructions from the Department. The Hungarian delegation has arrived in Moscow and Molotov is pressing for conclusion of the armistice. Under the circumstances I hope the Department will send me at the earliest possible moment final instructions on the two matters referred to above.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW1939/1-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 4, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received January 5—10: 15 p. m.]

40. For convenience of the Department in connection with the final phases of negotiations and the eventual release of the Hungarian armistice agreement I am wiring below the text of the entire agreement as it stands at the present stage of negotiations, in the translation agreed between ourselves and the British Embassy here. It consists of 20 numbered articles of the actual agreement, in addition to the preamble and conclusion, plus 6 lettered annexes, running from A to F, plus 3 articles for conclusion [*inclusion?*] in a tripartite protocol similar to that which accompanied the Bulgarian agreement. The protocol articles are designated by the letters "Prot" followed by the number of the article in the protocol. This make a total of 31 items the order of which has been disarranged for purposes of security in this message but which are marked by their appropriate numbers in the text.²

We find ourselves in agreement with the Russians on all of these items except articles XII and XVIII, with their annexes, concerning reparations and Control Commission respectively, on which we have reserved our opinion. The version wired for these articles is the most recent Russian proposed reading. If changes are later made on these points or on points still under discussion between the Russians and the British, the exact changes in wording will be reported. The text follows immediately:

[PROPOSED AGREEMENT]

Agreement concerning an armistice between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on one hand and Hungary on the other.

The Provisional National Government of Hungary, recognizing the fact of the defeat of Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and other United

² Order of items restored in the text as here printed.

Nations, accepts the armistice terms presented by the Governments of the abovementioned three powers, acting on behalf of all United Nations which are in a state of war with Hungary.

On the basis of the foregoing the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, Marshal Malinovski,³ duly authorized thereto by the Government of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the USA acting on behalf of all the United Nations which are at war with Hungary, on the one hand and the representatives of the Provisional National Government of Hungary on the other, holding proper full powers, have signed the following:

I. (a) Hungary has ceased hostilities against the USSR and the other United Nations, has severed all relations with Germany and has declared war on Germany.

(b) The Government of Hungary undertakes to disarm the German armed forces in Hungary and to hand them over as prisoners of war.

The Government of Hungary also undertakes to intern nationals of Germany.

(c) The Government of Hungary undertakes to maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. In this connection, Hungary will provide not less than eight infantry divisions with corps troops. These forces will not be used on Allied territory except with the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.

(d) On the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Hungarian armed forces will be demobilized and put on a peace footing under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission. (See annex to article I).

II. Hungary has accepted the obligations to evacuate all Hungarian forces and officials from the territory of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania occupied by it within the limits of the frontier of Hungary existing on December 31, 1937.

III. The Government and High Command of Hungary will ensure to the Soviet and other Allied forces facilities for free movement on Hungarian territory in any direction if, in the opinion of the Allied (Soviet) High Command the military situation requires this, the Government and High Command of Hungary giving such movement every possible assistance with their own means of communication and at their own expense on land, on water and in the air. (See annex to article III).

IV. The Government of Hungary will immediately release all Allied prisoners of war and internees. Pending further instructions

³ Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky.

the Government of Hungary will at its own expense provide all Allied prisoners of war and internees, displaced persons and refugees, including nationals of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with adequate food, clothing, medical services, and sanitary and hygienic requirements, and also with means of transportation for the return of all those persons to their own country.

V. The Government of Hungary will immediately release, regardless of citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement in connection with their activities in favor of the United Nations or because of their sympathies with the United Nations cause or for racial or religious reasons, and will repeal all discriminatory legislation and disabilities arising therefrom.

The Government of Hungary will take all necessary measures to ensure that all displaced persons or refugees within the limits of Hungarian territory, including Jews and stateless persons, are accorded at least the same measure of protection and security as its own nationals.

VI. The Government of Hungary undertakes to return to the Soviet Union, and to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and to the other United Nations, by the dates specified by the Allied Control Commission and in a good state of preservation, all valuables and materials removed during the war to Hungary from United Nations territory and belonging to state, public or cooperative organizations, enterprises, institutions or individual citizens, such as factory and works equipment, locomotives, rolling stock, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum treasures and any other property.

VII. The Government and High Command of Hungary undertake to hand over as booty into the hands of the Allied (Soviet) High Command all German war material located on Hungarian territory, including vessels of the fleet of Germany.

VIII. The Government of Hungary undertakes not to permit, without the authorization of the Allied Control Commission, the export or expropriation of any form of property, including valuables and currency, belonging to Germany or her nationals or to persons resident in German territories or in territories occupied by Germany. The Government of Hungary will safeguard such property in the manner specified by the Allied Control Commission.

IX. The Government and High Command of Hungary undertake to hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all vessels belonging or having belonged to the United Nations which are located in Hungarian Danubian ports, no matter at whose disposal these vessels may be, for the use of the Allied (Soviet) High Command during the period of the war against Germany in the general interests of the Allies, these vessels subsequently to be returned to their owners.

The Government of Hungary bears the full material responsibility for any damage or destruction of the aforementioned property until the moment of its transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

X. Hungarian merchant vessels, whether in Hungarian or foreign waters, shall be subject to the operational control of the Allied (Soviet) High Command for use in the general interest of the Allies.

XI. The Government of Hungary will make regular payments in Hungarian currency and will provide commodities (fuel, foodstuffs, et cetera), facilities and services which might be required by the Allied (Soviet) High Command for the fulfillment of its functions as well as for the needs of Missions and representatives of the Allied States connected with the Allied Control Commission.

It will also ensure, in case of need, the use on Hungarian territory of industrial and transportation enterprises, means of communication, power stations, enterprises and installations of public utility, stores of fuel and other material in accordance with instructions issued during the armistice by the Allied (Soviet) High Command. (See annex to article XI).

XII. Losses caused to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia by military operations and by the occupation by Hungary of the territories of these States will be made good by Hungary to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but taking into consideration that Hungary has not only withdrawn from the war against the United Nations but has declared war and will wage war against Germany, the parties agree that compensation for the indicated losses will be made by Hungary not in full but only in part; namely, to the amount of 300,000,000 American dollars payable over 6 years in commodities (machine equipment, river craft, grain, livestock, et cetera), the sum to be paid to the Soviet Union to amount to 200,000,000 American dollars and the sum to be paid to Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia to amount to 100,000,000 American dollars. (See annex to article XII).

XIII. The Government of Hungary undertakes to restore all legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals on Hungarian territory as they existed before the war and to return their property in complete good order.

XIV. The Government of Hungary will cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

XV. The Government of Hungary undertakes to dissolve immediately all pro-Hitler or other Fascist political, military or part [*para?*] military and other organizations on Hungarian territory conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations and not to tolerate the existence of such organizations in the future.

XVI. The publication, introduction and distribution in Hungary of periodical or non-periodical literature, the presentation of theatri-

cal performances or films, the operation of wireless stations, post, telegraph and telephone services will take place in agreement with the Allied (Soviet) High Command. (See annex to article XVI).

XVII. Hungarian civil administration will be restored in the whole area of Hungary separated by not less than 50–100 kilometres (depending upon conditions of terrain) from the front line, Hungarian administrative bodies undertaking to carry out, in the interests of the reestablishment of peace and security, instructions and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command or Allied Control Commission issued by them for the purpose of securing the execution of these armistice terms.

XVIII. For the whole period of the armistice there will be established in Hungary an Allied Control Commission which will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

During the period between the coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of military operations against Germany, the Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. (See annex to article XVIII).

XIX. The Allied Governments consider the Vienna arbitration award of November 2, 1938 and also the Vienna award of August 30, 1940 as null and void.

XX. The present terms come into force at the moment of their signing.

[Done in] Moscow 1945, in one copy which will be entrusted to the safekeeping of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the Russian, English and Hungarian languages, the Russian and English text being authentic.

Certified copies of the present agreement, with annexes, will be transmitted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the other Governments on whose behalf the present agreement is being signed.

For the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America :

For the Provisional National Government of Hungary :

[PROPOSED ANNEXES]

A. Annex to article I.

(a) The Hungarian Military Command shall hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command within a period fixed by the latter all the information at its disposal regarding the German armed forces and the plans of the German Military Command for the development

of military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the other United Nations and also the charts and maps and all operational documents relating to the military operations of the German armed forces.

(b) The measures provided for in Article I of the agreement regarding the internment of nationals of Germany now in Hungarian territory do not extend to citizens of that country of Jewish origin.

B Annex to article III.

The assistance specified in Article III of the agreement shall be taken to mean that the Government and High Command of Hungary will place at the disposal of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, for use at its discretion during the armistice, in complete good order and with the personnel required for their maintenance, all Hungarian military, air and naval installations and buildings, ports, barracks, warehouses, airfields, means of communication and meteorological stations which might be required for military needs.

C Annex to article VII [XI].

The Government of Hungary will withdraw and redeem within such time limits and on such terms as the Allied (Soviet) High Command may specify, all holdings in Hungarian territory of currencies issued by the Allied (Soviet) High Command, and will hand over currency so withdrawn free of cost to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

D Annex to article XII.

The precise nomenclature and varieties of commodities to be delivered by Hungary to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in accordance with article XII of the agreement and also the more precise periods for making these deliveries each year shall be defined in a special agreement between the respective Governments.

As the basis for calculation regarding the payment of the indemnity foreseen in article XII of the agreement, the American dollar is to be used at its gold parity on the day of signature of the agreement, i.e., \$35 to one ounce of gold.

E Annex to article XVI.

The Hungarian Government undertakes to ensure that wireless communication, telegraphic and postal correspondence, and correspondence in cipher and by courier, as well as telephonic communication with foreign countries, of Embassies, Legations and Consulates situated in Hungary will be conducted in the manner laid down by the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

F Annex to article XVIII.

Control over the exact execution of the armistice terms will be entrusted to the Allied Control Commission to be established in conformity with article of the armistice agreement.

The Government of Hungary and its organs will fulfill all instructions of the Allied Control Commission arising out of the armistice agreement.

The Allied Control Commission will set up special organs or sections entrusting them respectively with the execution of various functions. In addition, the Allied Control Commission may have its officers in various parts of Hungary.

The Allied Control Commission will have its seat in the city of Budapest.

[PROPOSED PROTOCOL]

Prot 1. In connection with Article XII it is understood that the Hungarian Government will immediately make available certain food supplies for the relief of the population of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, territories which have suffered as a result of Hungarian aggression. The quantity of each product to be delivered will be determined by agreement between the three Governments and will be considered as part of the reparation by Hungary for the loss and damages sustained by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Prot 2. The term "war material" used in article VII shall be deemed to include all material or equipment belonging to, used by, or intended for use by the military of [or] paramilitary formations of the enemy or members thereof.

[Prot] 3. The use by the Allied (Soviet) High Command of Allied vessels handed over by the Government of Hungary in accordance with Article IX of the armistice and the date of their return to their owners will be the subject of discussion and settlement between the Allied Governments concerned and the Government of the Soviet Union.

Done in Moscow in three copies, each in the Russian and English languages, the Russian and English text being authentic; on 1945.

By the authority of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For the Government of the United States of America. For the Government of the United Kingdom.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/12-3044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1945—7 p. m.

30. ReEmbs 5060 December 30. The Department agrees to the proposed text of Article XIX of the Hungarian armistice terms. In view of the statement made by Molotov that neither Article II nor Article XIX could or would be interpreted as relating to final boundary

settlements (reEmbs 14 January 2), the Department is not disposed to press for the inclusion in either Article of the phrase "without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims".

Only a part of the full text of the articles of the armistice as now agreed upon (reEmbs 40 January 4) has reached the Department. On the basis of the information contained in your recent telegrams to the Department, however, it is not anticipated that the Department will have any objections to the text as it now stands except on Articles XII and XVIII.

On the question of the Control Commission, we do not consider adequate the text of Article XVIII as it now stands. We accordingly will be obliged, in case the Russians refuse to modify their position in this regard, to qualify our acceptance of this article with a reservation of the right to raise the matter at a later date. In this event, you should inform Molotov that, as in the case of the Bulgarian armistice, the United States Government would find it necessary to send identical notes to the Soviet and British Governments stating its belief that Article XVIII should properly have contained an additional provision to the effect that in the period between the conclusion of hostilities against Germany and the conclusion of peace with Hungary the ACC, organized on a basis of equal representation and participation of the three Allied Governments, will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice.

The Department shares your feeling that it would be optimistic to expect any major concession from the Russians on the status and powers of our representatives on the ACC (reEmbs 28 January 4), but believes that we have a right to expect Soviet agreement to the points suggested in Department's 2908 December 29 which really do not affect the leading position of the Soviet High Command in the first period of the armistice. The Department cannot state its final position on this matter until we know the Soviet reaction to your draft protocol.

On the question of reparations you will receive separate instructions shortly.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 E.W./1-645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1945—7 p. m.

37. 1. With regard to your request for final instructions on the reparation Article (reurtel 28, January 4) Department is in agreement with the views you express on reducing Soviet demands and the question of pricing. It seems further apparent that there is little

likelihood of securing Soviet agreement to the other principles which the Department believes should guide the reparations section of the Allied Control Commission (reDeptel 2584, November 2). Although Department believes that there are counter arguments to those advanced in the Soviet *aide-mémoire*, some of which you have indicated in your telegram 5078 [5079], December 31, it seems clear that no amount of argumentation would compel the Soviet Government to recede materially from its views.

2. The Department is in agreement with your remarks in the third [second] paragraph of your telegram 5078 [5079], December 31, with regard to Soviet contention that only countries receiving reparations should be involved in the way reparations are collected. The Department believes that we should insist on our participation in a subcommittee of the Control Commission on reparations. You may inform the Soviet Government that unless their agreement is obtained on this point this Government will sign the Armistice Terms only with a written reservation to the effect that the United States reserves the right to reopen with the Soviet and British Governments the question of the execution of the reparations Article if in the light of later circumstances it is found that American economic interests are being unwarrantably prejudiced. This reservation will be communicated by letter to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom at the time of signature of the Armistice Terms.

3. Department is not clear as to the meaning of your statement at conclusion of third [second] paragraph of your telegram 5078 [5079] "even though neither of us are demanding reparations from Hungary". It is true that neither we nor the British are demanding reparations in the same sense or to the extent as the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. It was our intention, however, in our proposed phrasing of the former Article XIII (reDeptel 2585, November 2) to establish the obligation of Hungary to compensate us as well as any other Allied state for losses or damage to property resulting from Hungarian military operations. In our opinion, this was taken care of by the phrasing of the first sentence of our draft of Article XIII and it was for this reason we omitted from our draft the sentence reading "Compensation will be paid by Hungary for losses caused to the property of other Allied states and their nationals in Hungary or in territories occupied by it during the war, the amount of compensation to be fixed at a later date." Department notes that sentence quoted has been omitted from Article XII of latest Soviet draft (Your telegram 40, January 4). Department instructs you to endeavor to secure reinsertion of sentence quoted above if the Soviet intention is that Article XII should limit compensation to USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia and exclude other Allied states.

You may inform the Soviet Government that unless their agreement is obtained on this point this Government will sign the Armistice Terms only with a written reservation to the effect that the United States Government reserves the right to demand compensation from Hungary for losses to the property of the United States or its nationals in Hungary or in territory occupied by Hungary and recognizes that other United Nations have the same right. This reservation will be communicated by letter to the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and to the Hungarian Delegation at the time of signature of the Armistice Terms.

4. The Department authorizes you to accept the reparations Article if agreement can be secured on the points covered in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Otherwise you are to accept only with written reservations along the lines indicated. It should be made clear to the Soviet Government that we may find it necessary to publish either or both of these reservations if it is necessary to make them.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/1-845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 8, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received January 9—1:15 a. m.]

75. We met again today to discuss Hungarian armistice terms. Molotov consented to restore the clause envisaging possible reparations claims by other countries, as proposed in paragraph 3 of the Department's 37, January 6, 7 p. m. I emphasized again our insistence on participation in a committee of the Control Commission on reparations. While Molotov gave no encouragement as to a favorable reception of our views he said he would report them to the Soviet Government.

With respect to the Control Commission, we received from the Foreign Office shortly before the meeting a Soviet counter-draft of the statutes for that body. Our original draft had followed closely the lines of the statutes for the Rumanian commission (reEmbs 3651, September 23, 9 p. m.)⁴ adding such of demands brought out in the Department's 2908, December 29, 8 p. m., as were not already included in that document. The principal change embodied in the Soviet counter-draft, as compared with our proposals, was that whereas we had provided for consultation of our representatives on policy directives during the first period and their concurrence in such directives

⁴ Vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Post-armistice problems of occupation and control of Rumania . . ."

during the second period, the Soviet draft merely provides that they should be informed of the issuance of such directives during the first period and should be consulted about them during the second. The Russian draft on this point read as follows:

“During the first period (i.e. from the moment of the entry into force of the armistice to the end of the military operations against Germany) the Chairman (or Vice Chairman) shall call meetings and inform the British and American representatives of policy directives (i.e. directives involving matters of general principle) being issued to the Hungarian authorities in the name of the Commission. During the following period (i.e. from the moment of cessation of hostilities with Germany until the conclusion of peace with Hungary), no policy directives (i.e. directives involving matters of general principle) shall be issued to the Hungarian authorities in the name of the Commission except after consultation of the Chairman (or Vice Chairman) with the British and American representatives.”

(Molotov explained at the meeting, in response to my inquiry, that this did not necessarily mean that during the first period our representatives would be informed in advance of the issuance of policy directives in the name of the Commission) saying that whether notification would precede or follow the issuance of the directive would depend on circumstances. In addition to this, the Soviets eliminated entirely from the draft statutes our proposed clause which would have assured to our representatives all facilities, including landing privileges for airplanes, for the entry and exit of members of their staffs and diplomatic couriers. Our proposal that our representatives on the Control Commission should be allowed to determine the size and composition of his own staff was watered down to a clause, similar to that contained in the Rumanian statutes, that this should be determined in agreement with the Chairman of the Commission. Our proposal that our representative should be permitted to move freely throughout Hungary was replaced by a clause which recognized his theoretical right to make journeys into the provinces but required him to apply to the Vice Chairman of the Commission with respect to the arrangements for the journey. All other points listed in the fourth paragraph of the Department's 2806 [2908], December 29, 8 p. m., are satisfactorily covered in the Soviet draft.

I did not undertake to discuss this draft at today's meeting, and merely said that I would study it myself and communicate further with my Government on the subject. I took occasion, however, to stress the unhappy nature of our experiences in Rumania and Bulgaria with respect to the Control Commissions and to emphasize the need for assurance of better treatment in the case of Hungary.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-645: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1945—3 p. m.

50. 1. British Embassy has informed Department that British will propose that reparations Article or its Annex clearly state that 1938 prices will be used in pricing reparations deliveries if it is necessary to accept Soviet formula. Department agrees that this would be desirable and unless you perceive objection you may support the British in their attempt to have pricing basis clearly stated.

2. British Embassy further informed Department that British are going "to put on record with Molotov" their view that: (a) Reparations sum should not be fixed in Armistice Terms; and (b) Mention of sum fixed does not prejudice revision if sum proves to exceed Hungary's capacity to pay. While Department does not object to British action along these lines it prefers that you follow instructions in Department's telegram 37, January 6, rather than support British approach. Soviet Government is already familiar with our views on (a). If it should not prove necessary to make reservation suggested in paragraph 2 of Department's 37, the British reservation would not appear particularly useful. If on the other hand a reservation is necessary we prefer the wording we have suggested.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/1-945: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, January 9, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

87. The Czech Ambassador has given me a copy of a memorandum which he has submitted to the Narkomindel^{4a} containing certain Czech desiderata in relation to the Hungarian and German armistice terms. The memorandum suggests that the following points be included in the Hungarian armistice:

(1) A proposal that certain enactments, such as the Vienna Awards, which affect Czech territory be recognized as null and void.

(2) That it be stipulated that a state of war between Czechoslovakia and Hungary existed as of October 7, 1938.

(3) A proposal that Hungary take on certain obligations with respect to Magyars who possessed Czech citizenship but who will be transferred to Hungary.

(4) A proposal that Czechoslovakia participate in the occupation of Hungary if states other than Great Britain and the United States,

^{4a} Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narodnyi Komissariat I nostrannykh Del).

the Soviet Union and France participate in the occupation of that country.

I understand from the British Embassy that the Czech proposals were presented in full to the Department early in December. Since it is likely that these proposals will be raised when we present the Hungarian draft to the Czech and Yugoslav Ambassadors here (Department's 2764, December 1, 4 p. m. and penultimate paragraph of Embassy's 5034, December 27, 9 p. m.), I would appreciate Department's views thereon.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 9, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 10—11:39 a. m.]

88. We met again today, at Molotov's request, to discuss armistice terms for Hungary. Molotov stated that after final examination of the question the Soviet Government still saw no necessity for a subcommittee on reparations and considered that the economic section of the Control Commission would be quite sufficient for the purposes we had in mind. I inquired whether the economic section would receive currently full reports on reparations matters. The answer was yes. I then stated that in these circumstances we would accept the proposed clause on reparations, but would be obliged to give to the Soviet and British Governments at the time of the signing of the armistice a written communication reserving to ourselves the right to reopen this subject in case we should find this necessary. Molotov replied that there was no need for this, that these matters could always be taken up through diplomatic channels. He said that the submission of such a letter would weaken the armistice. To this I replied that these were my instructions, and I pointed out that the letter would be addressed to the other two Allied Governments and not to the Hungarians. I mentioned, however, that we might find it necessary to publish the letter. Molotov then remarked that the Soviet Government [might?] find it necessary to reply in a similar way. I said that their right to do this was fully recognized on our part.

At Balfour's suggestion, Molotov agreed to delete in article XII the words "and will wage war".

It was thereupon agreed that the discussion of the reparations question was completed as between our Government and the Soviet Government. Balfour maintained that his instructions were still not final and reserved the right to return to the subject at a later date.

We then took up the question of the Control Commission. I recited our various objections to the Soviet draft of the statutes. I stressed

particularly our desire for assurances that policy directives would be communicated to the Allied representatives sufficiently in advance of their issuance to permit those representatives to communicate with their Governments on the subject. Molotov maintained that during the first period the military situation would not always make this possible and that, therefore, they could give no such general assurances. He pointed out that their wording left open the possibility of communicating the information in advance in cases where the military considerations permitted, but he insisted that more precise wording was not possible because the freedom of action of the Soviet command could not be restricted. I also stressed our desire for a specific recognition of the tripartite character of the Control Commission in the second period. On this point, too, Molotov gave no satisfaction and stuck to the principle of consultation set forth in their draft statutes.

We then turned to the question of the rights and privileges of the Allied representatives. Molotov agreed to insert a clause recognizing the right of our representatives to courier and pouch service. He declined to include in the statutes assurances concerning the landing rights for airplanes and stated that it would be the duty of the local Soviet military authorities to make these arrangements with our representatives. With respect to the right to travel throughout Hungary, he pointed out that the Soviet representative on the Italian Control Commission had at first not been permitted to travel freely, although the restrictions had later been relaxed. In general I told him that I was interested not so much in getting clauses along these lines into the statutes as in obtaining his own assurance that our representative on the Hungarian Control Commission would be better treated in these respects than our representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria had been.

I can now proceed no further until I receive an expression of the Department's views with respect to the Control Commission. Since Molotov is pressing hard for early presentation of the terms to the Hungarians, I hope I may receive instructions without delay.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 10, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received January 10—8 a. m.]

91. ReDepts 50, January 9, 3 p. m.

1. The British Chargé has already presented to Molotov the British proposal that the reparations article or its annex state that 1938 prices plus 10% to 15% will be used in pricing reparation deliveries.

Molotov has categorically refused as he does not wish to have any change in wording from the Rumanian and Finnish armistices. As there is no doubt the Hungarians already know of the pricing arrangements made in connection with reparations from these two countries it does not seem to me that much is gained by the British proposal and I feel that it would be a mistake for us to involve ourselves in this proposal at this late date.

2. I have concluded our negotiations with Molotov on the reparations clause as explained in Embassy's No. 88, January 9, 7 p. m. I have not given Molotov, however, the exact wording of our reservation. Under all the circumstances and in light of the experience in Rumania I believe it would be preferable if we were to delete the word "economic" from our reservation. I request the Department's authority to do so.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-1045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1945—6 p. m.

74. Reurtel 91, January 10.

1. Department approves your decision not to support British with regard to inclusion of pricing formula in reparations clause.

2. You are authorized to omit the word "economic" as suggested in your telegram 91 from the written reservation you were instructed to make in paragraph 2 of Department's 37, January 6.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/1-945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1945—9 p. m.

82. ReDeptel 30, January 5. The Department has desired to secure Soviet agreement to our position respecting the second period of the armistice either in Article XVIII or in the protocol containing the ACC statutes. We can accept the present wording of Article XVIII, without making the same reservation as was made in the case of the Bulgarian armistice only if the statutes of the ACC are satisfactory on that point. The employment of the word "concurrence", as you proposed, would of course meet our position. The word "consultation" does not meet it. If Molotov remains firm on this point, we should prefer to have the paragraph on the second period eliminated entirely from the statutes. We would then be in a position to make a

clear-cut reservation to Article XVIII along the lines stated in the Department's 30, January 5, indicating that we consider the organization of the ACC in the second period to be an open question which we may take up at a later date. If Molotov does not consent to eliminate the paragraph from the statutes, you should make clear to him that our acceptance of the statutes and our interpretation of Article IV thereof must be considered in the light of our reservation to Article XVIII.

With respect to the first period the Department has always acknowledged the chief responsibility of the Soviet authorities in the conduct of the affairs of the Control Commission (reEmbs 88, January 9), and of course considers that the "consultation" which was proposed in your draft should not be operative in such a way as to prevent the Soviet High Command from taking action which it considers necessary for military reasons. If the term "consultation" seems to the Soviet Government to mean prolonged discussion and to imply an obligation to accept modifications, their objection to the term might be met by the following change in the language of the Soviet text as it appears in the second paragraph of your 75, January 8:

" . . . shall call meetings and inform the British and American representatives of policy directives (i.e. directives involving matters of general principle) prior to the issuance of such directives to the Hungarian authorities in the name of the Commission, and take note of such observations as the British or American representatives may desire to make."

We should like you to urge the Soviet Government to agree to this alternative text, failing which you may yield on the point of formal provision for prior consultation in the first period, putting it on record that our chief purpose in seeking a formal agreement on this matter has been to prevent a situation from arising whereby, precisely in matters of policy, the American representative on an Allied Commission should be subjected to a position where he learns, only after their promulgation, of decisions taken in the name of the Allied Governments, and may then be compelled publicly to disassociate his Government from such decisions.

We would not hold up the armistice by insistence on the formal provision that our representative should determine the size and composition of his staff, although this seemed to us a thoroughly reasonable provision, and it too was designed to remove occasion for complaints on individual cases as they may arise. We are also willing not to press for detailed stipulations regarding landing rights, entry and exit of staff personnel and travel within Hungary, provided we are given assurances that the Soviet authorities on the spot will be instructed to make prompt and satisfactory arrangements for the needs of our mission.

The British may propose that the statutes provide for the access to the ACC on the part of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav representatives. The Department is willing that such a clause be included.

Has anything been heard from Molotov on the question of making available to all three Allied Governments the military information obtained from the Hungarians (reEmbs 14, January 2)? In apprising the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the present state of the negotiations the Department would like to be able to inform them on this point.

GREW

740.00119 E.W./1-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 14, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received 9 : 30 p. m.]

127. Preliminary discussions on the Hungarian armistice were resumed yesterday afternoon. The Department's 82, January 12, 9 p. m., was fortunately received just prior to the meeting.

The results of the discussion were as follows:

1. Preamble. Molotov explained that the Soviet Government wished the armistice to be signed not by Malinovski but by Voroshilov⁵ who he said would also be chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. I would appreciate receiving specific authorization to address a letter to Marshal Voroshilov authorizing him to sign the armistice for the Government of the United States. The Department will note that according to the Soviet plan, of which I approve, there will be only two signatures to the document, that of Voroshilov and that of the Hungarian representative. This will make it possible to avoid the cumbersome procedure of the alternate.

2. On the first 11 articles there were no further differences of opinion.

3. With respect to second paragraph of Article XI to satisfy the British the final reading of the second part of the paragraph was agreed as follows: ". . . will in case of need ensure the use and regulation of the work of industrial and transportation enterprises, means of communication, power stations, enterprises and installations of public utilities, stores of fuel and other materials in accordance with instructions issued by the Allied (Soviet) High Command or the Allied Control Commission." The Department will note that the words "on Hungarian territory" have been dropped.

⁵ Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Assistant Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

4. Molotov agreed to the British proposal to include in the annex, with reference to Article XI, a clause about assets, to read as follows: "The Government of Hungary will not permit the disposal of external Hungarian assets or the disposal of international Hungarian assets to foreign governments or foreign nationals without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command or the Allied Control Commission." I accepted this proposal.

5. With respect to Article XII:

(a) Balfour questioned the wording of the additional paragraph which the Soviets, at my request, had undertaken to restore (reEmbs [*reDepts*] 37, January 6, 7 p. m., paragraph 3). After some discussion we agreed that the wording would follow that of the Bulgarian agreement. The sentence will thus read as follows: "Compensation will be paid by Hungary for loss and damage caused by the war to other Allied States and their nationals in Hungary, the amount of compensation to be fixed at a later date."

(b) On the question of having it specified in the armistice that reparations should be valued at 1938 prices plus agreed percentages, disagreement continued between the British and the Russians, Balfour maintaining his Government's position that this should be clearly stated in order to avoid ambiguity and misleading of public opinion, Molotov on the other hand being reluctant to depart from the Rumanian and Finnish precedents. Molotov grudgingly agreed at my suggestion that the Hungarians should be informed verbally of this intention before signature of armistice. Balfour undertook to report this to his Government.

(c) It was agreed that Article I of the protocol should go into the annexes where it will form the third paragraph of Annex D to Article XII. The wording of this provision, however, has been modified as follows. It will now read: ". . . make available certain food and other supplies required for relief and rehabilitation of the population of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, et cetera." I agreed to this modification.

6. Articles XIII to XVII, inclusive, produced no further comment.

7. With respect to the Control Commission the discussion of the rights and privileges of the American and British representatives was continued at length and grievances were freely aired on both sides. In discussing the analogy with Italy, Molotov was [at] pains to point out that the Soviet Government had learned from the press of the recent announcement by the President and Prime Minister to the effect that the word "control" should be dropped from the designation of the Allied Control Commission in Italy.⁶ The upshot of the discussion of the rights of our representatives with respect to policy directives in

⁶ For statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, September 26, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1, 1944, p. 338.

the two periods was that Molotov refused to depart in any way from the position set forth in the Soviet draft. I consequently agreed to the first part of Article IV of the proposed statutes as set forth in the Soviet draft but emphasized in the strongest way our desire to avoid a situation where our representative would learn only after their promulgation of decisions taken in the name of the Allied Governments and would be then obliged to disassociate our Government from these decisions. Balfour likewise stated that his Government would agree to this point but only with a reservation which he would embody in a letter of the right to disassociate itself from any action of the Commission with which it might disagree. His Government hoped that there would be no occasion to express such disassociation but felt it necessary to reserve the right to do so. With regard to the second part of Article IV dealing with the second period, since Molotov was unwilling to admit any formula envisaging our prior approval of or concurrence with policy directives, Molotov proposed that this paragraph be omitted entirely, to which I assented with the understanding that the entire subject was thus left open for future discussion. To this Molotov agreed. Balfour was unable to agree to this and undertook to go back at his Government.

With respect to the privileges, Balfour had stronger instructions than I and we both pressed these points energetically. We obtained from Molotov firm assurances that the provision concerning freer movement of our representatives would be interpreted as liberally in Hungary as in the case of the Soviet representative in Italy, and we would be able to determine the size of our own staffs during the second period. We also obtained his agreement that there should be added to section 5 (*h*), which accords to the American and British representatives the right to communicate directly in code with their respective Governments, a further phrase which would recognize their right to courier communication by air by arrangement with the local Soviet commander.

On these points, too, Balfour was obliged to reserve the position of his Government. I stated that while we would prefer to see these points covered with greater clarity in the statutes, I would not insist thereon. I made it clear that I was taking this position in the belief that the Soviet authorities would be generous in their interpretation of these points and would see that due respect was paid throughout to the needs of our representatives. Molotov gave definite assurances on these lines. I said that I felt considerable relief on this score since learning that Marshal Voroshilov was to be the chairman of the Commission and I was sure that our representative would be able to work out all difficulties satisfactorily with him. While I did not say this to Molotov it is my expectation that Voroshilov will have greater

independence of action and a wider view of his responsibilities towards us than the chairmen of the Control Commissions in Rumania and Bulgaria. It may well be that his appointment at this late date was due to my strong protest a week ago over our treatment in Sofia and Bucharest.

8. Balfour proposed two new wordings for Article XIX of which the second was finally accepted by all of us. It reads as follows: "The Vienna arbitration award of second November, 1938, and the Vienna award of thirtieth August, 1940, are hereby declared to be null and void." This wording should therefore be substituted for the wording of Article XIX as previously telegraphed.

9. With respect to the question of making available to all three Allied Governments military information obtained from the Hungarians, Molotov agreed at a previous meeting that although he did not wish to see this stated in the protocol he would be willing to give me a letter at the time of signature of the armistice containing this undertaking on the side of the Soviet authorities.

10. It has been agreed that we will present the terms of the armistice (please note that this does not include the protocol) to the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs tomorrow, January 15.

11. As the Department will see we are now in agreement with the Russians on all points of both armistice and protocol subject to the submission of my two letters of reservation on the reparations and Control Commission questions, respectively. There remains only the clarification of the British attitude on the question of specifying the [19]38 prices and on certain points of the statutes of the Control Commission. For the Department's convenience, I shall soon send a complete text of the draft statutes as now agreed by the Russians and ourselves.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/10-2544: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1945—6 p. m.

92. ReDeptel 2764, December 1. If it is decided to give consideration to points recommended by the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments for inclusion in the armistice terms for Hungary, the Department has the following comments to make on the three points raised by the Czech Ambassador reported in your 87 January 9:

- (1) Already covered by Article XIX;
- (2) The Department sees no useful purpose in delaying the armistice for the study that would be required to determine with assurance

the advisability of referring to this particular date in the text of the Armistice Agreement;

(3) The Department would not press for this provision but is willing that a sentence be added to the second paragraph of Article V providing that Hungary should accept as Hungarian nationals and residents all Magyars who may be transferred to Hungary from neighboring Allied states as a consequence of agreements reached among the Governments of the USSR, the United Kingdom, the USA and Allied states immediately concerned. For your confidential information the Department does not favor any large-scale expulsion of Magyars from Czechoslovakia and believes that such transfers as do take place should be carried out only after agreement between Czechoslovakia and the principal Allied Governments;

(4) As no occupation of Hungarian territory by small Allied states is contemplated, no provision need be made for Czechoslovak occupation of any part of Hungary.

The principal additional requests made by Czechs in documents submitted to the EAC in London may be summarized as follows:

1. Recognition of the nullity of all agreements between Hungary and the so-called Slovak State;
2. Recognition of the nullity of the incorporation of Ruthenia and Eastern Slovakia into Hungary;
3. Immediate renewal of provisions of international regime on Danube so far as it affects Hungarian territory.

The Department does not see the necessity of including any of these points in the armistice agreement, but would have no objection to the inclusion of the first and the second in the form of an addition to Article XIX worded along the lines of the last part of Article II of the Bulgarian Armistice. The third point is properly a matter for later international agreement and does not appear to be appropriate for inclusion in an armistice with one Danubian state.

The Department considers that the remaining points mentioned in the Czechoslovak Government's documents are either covered by the armistice terms as they now stand or are inappropriate for inclusion.

GREW

740.00119 E.W./1-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 15, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received January 17—4:40 p. m.]

142. Molotov, Balfour and I met this afternoon with the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Ambassadors⁷ to hear the comments of the latter with respect to the draft Hungarian armistice terms which had been sent to them yesterday for their consideration.

⁷ Zdenek Fierlinger and Stanoje Simić, respectively.

1. The Czechoslovak Ambassador had four points to make. They were as follows:

(a) He considered that Article II should set forth the principle that Hungarians who had formerly had Czechoslovak citizenship and who might be deprived of the same would be recognized by Hungary as Hungarian citizens and admitted to Hungary, that Hungary would look after them from the moment of their crossing the Hungarian frontier, would see to their resettlement and would take all appropriate measures of a legislative and administrative character to this end. He explained that there would be many of these Hungarians, members of the former Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia who would be regarded as collaborationists by the loyal Czechoslovak population and that the Czechoslovak Government for humanitarian reasons wished to be able to get rid of them promptly and avoid bloodshed.

Balfour stated that in the opinion of his Government this related to the movement of populations and was therefore more suitable for treatment in the peace settlement. After some discussion in the course of which it developed that there was no telling how many people this might affect it was agreed that the proposal was too vague for inclusion in the armistice agreement but might well be the subject of further discussion between the governments concerned and authorities at a later date. The Czechoslovak Ambassador asked that our Government be informed of the interest of his Government in this question, not only with respect to Hungary but with respect to Germany as well.

(b) He asked that there be added to the agreement the additional phrase which appeared in Article II of the Bulgarian agreement and which read as follows: "and to repeal all legislative and administrative provisions relating to the annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Greek or Yugoslav territory." This proposal was accepted. In the present agreement it will of course read "incorporation in Hungary of Yugoslav or Czechoslovak territory." The words will follow immediately on those of Article II as part of the same sentence.

(c) He asked that there be stipulated in the agreement the exact moment from which Czechoslovakia has been at war with Hungary and proposed in this connection either October 7, 1938, on which date the first act of Hungarian aggression had been committed, or November 3, 1938, the date of the first Vienna Award. He explained that his Government was afraid the Hungarians might dispute the legal existence of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state at the time of Hungary's actual entry into the war on the side of Germany and would therefore plead that Hungary could not have been at war with Czechoslovakia.

Balfour's instructions did not permit him to agree to this proposal.

He suggested tentatively however that the difficulty might be solved if we were to add to article I (*a*) after the words "other United Nations" the words "including Czechoslovakia." This proposal commended itself to the rest of us and Balfour undertook to ask his Government whether he might agree to it formally.

(*d*) He asked that Czechoslovak representatives be admitted to the Control Commission in Hungary. Molotov stated that his Government had no objection to this. Balfour and I both stated that our instructions permitted us to agree that Czechoslovak and Yugoslav representatives should have access to the Commission. We were not sure that we could agree to their being actually a part of it. It was finally agreed that nothing should be put into the armistice to this effect but that Molotov should address a letter to the two Ambassadors assuring them that their representatives would enjoy access to the Commission in questions of interest to their respective Governments.

The Yugoslav Ambassador then explained that while he had instructions from Subasić⁸ he was not quite sure whether that went for Marshal Tito as well.⁹ He was waiting to find out. Molotov took occasion to point out that this was an excellent object lesson of the need for greater unity in the Yugoslav Government.

Acting on his incomplete instructions, the Yugoslav Ambassador then advanced two proposals. The first was that the armistice should include an obligation of [*on?*] the part of Hungary to renounce once and for all her aspirations to the Yugoslav territory occupied by her during this war. This proposal met with no one's approval and was rejected. The second proposal related to the obligation of Hungary to deliver up war criminals who had committed crimes on Yugoslav territory. To meet this proposal, Molotov suggested that article VI be slightly amended, to read as follows: "Hungary will cooperate in the apprehension and trial, as well as the surrender to the governments concerned, of persons accused of war crimes." This suggestion was accepted.

The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Ambassadors then withdrew and we proceeded with the tripartite discussion of the armistice terms and protocol. Molotov began by stating that the Soviet Government had decided to accede to the wish of the British Government that the character of the prices for evaluation of reparations deliveries be specified in the agreement.

⁸ Ivan Subasić, Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, at London.

⁹ In November 1944, Prime Minister Subasić and Marshal Tito reached agreement on the establishment of a united government in Yugoslavia. For correspondence, see vol. iv, section under Yugoslavia entitled "Concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia".

It was agreed that a suitable clause should be included in the annexes. The exact wording is to be worked out tomorrow, and I shall wire it as soon as we know it.

Proceeding to the statutes of the Control Commission, Molotov then inquired whether, if the Soviet Government would accept the wording for the first paragraph of Article IV which I had proposed at the last meeting (see Department's 82, January 12, 9 p. m.) (second paragraph), and agree to omit entirely the further paragraph relating to the second period we would then be able to dispense with written reservations. I told him that I would not be obliged to make any written reservation with respect to the first paragraph, although I would still have to give him a letter similar to that which Mr. Winant had addressed to his colleague on the ETC [EAC]²⁰ in connection with the Bulgarian Armistice. Molotov found this satisfactory, and it was agreed that it should rest this way, subject to the final approval of the British Government, which Balfour was not yet able to give. (In connection with this gratifying concession on the Soviet side, I think I should explain that although Molotov, as already reported in my 127, January 14, 4 p. m., declined to agree to our proposed wording when it was first presented to him, I asked him at that time to take it away with him and give it further study, expressing my belief that if the Soviet Government would examine it carefully they would see that it took full account of the needs and interests of the Soviet Commander. I believe that this may have accounted for the reconsideration of the proposal on the part of the Soviets.)

Turning to the question of the privileges of the American and British representatives, Molotov said that the Soviet Government had decided to accept the principle, embodied in our original draft, that each of our representatives should be entitled to determine the size and composition of its staff and that they would not insist on this being agreed with the Chairman of the Control Commission. He likewise accepted our redraft of point 5 (*h*), concerning privileges of communication, which now envisages courier as well as code communication and gives our representative the specific right to receive and despatch diplomatic couriers by air, at regular intervals, in agreement with the Soviet Commander. Balfour was still not able to agree to the statutes; but he was, like myself, highly gratified at Molotov's last minute concessions, and I think his Government should not now find it difficult to agree to the remaining points at issue.

As soon as final agreement has been reached with the British Government, we will arrange for presentation of the terms to the Hungarians.

HARRIMAN

²⁰ For text of letter, see telegram 9077, October 22, midnight, from London, p. 472.

740.00119 EW/1-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 19, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received January 19—4: 50 p. m.]

182. Molotov, Balfour and I met last night for the first time with the Hungarian delegates and submitted the armistice terms to them.

They have been given until 2 o'clock today to familiarize themselves with the terms, and we are to meet with them again at that hour to hear their comments. It is possible, depending on the Hungarian reaction, that the signing may take place this afternoon.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/1-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 19, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 19—4: 50 p. m.]

183. Meeting with the Hungarians took place today as scheduled. The Hungarian delegation questioned the interpretation of various of the articles but no changes were made in the text of the document. It was agreed that the armistice would be signed tomorrow at 3: 30 p. m. Moscow time.

I understand that a general statement will be made over the Soviet radio tomorrow night, Saturday, at 7 p. m. and we have agreed that the text of the armistice will be released simultaneously in the three capitals at 7 p. m. Sunday Moscow time.

A few very minor last minute changes in wording will be wired by the British Embassy.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W./1-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 20, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received January 20—7: 40 a. m.]

185. There follows translation of communiqué concerning signing of Hungarian armistice which will be released to press in Moscow this evening by Soviet Foreign Office:

“Signature of armistice agreement with Hungary.

From January 18 to January 20 negotiations took place in Moscow between representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America acting in the name of the United Nations who are at war with Hungary on the one hand and a delegation of the Pro-

visional National Government of Hungary on the other hand concerning the conclusion of an agreement for an armistice with Hungary.

The following participated in the negotiations: For the Soviet Union, V. M. Molotov, V. G. Dekanozov, G. M. Pushkin, Colonel General I. Z. Susaikov, Rear Admiral Trainin; for the United States of America, the Ambassador Mr. Harriman, Mr. G. [F.] Kennan and Major General [John] R. Deane;¹¹ for Great Britain, the Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. J. Balfour, and Mr. P. [M.] Crosthwaite.¹² As representatives of Hungary, the following plenipotentiaries of the Provisional National Government participated in the negotiations: The Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Janos Gyongyosi, the Minister for Defense Colonel General Janos Voros, and the Secretary of the Council of Ministers and [Mr.] Istvan Balogh.

The negotiations ended with the signing of an armistice agreement with Hungary on January 20. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov signed the armistice agreement on behalf of the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America.

For the Hungarian side the agreement was signed by Messrs. Janos Gyongyosi, Colonel General Janos Voros, and Istvan Balogh.¹³

The text of the armistice agreement will be published separately.¹³

HARRIMAN

[The armistice agreement with Hungary was signed at Moscow, January 20, 1945, and the accompanying protocol was signed the same day. Texts were released that evening and printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 21, 1945, page 83; printed also as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456, and 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1321.]

740.00119 E.W./1-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 20, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

188. ReDeptel 2908, December 28 [29], 8 p. m. I have received a note from the Foreign Office concerning the appointment of Arthur Schoenfeld as political representative of the United States in Hungary. The note states that the Soviet Government, of course, understands that Schoenfeld will enjoy the rights necessary for the execution of his functions as an American political representative in Hungary and, furthermore, that the Soviet Command in Hungary will be appropriately informed.

HARRIMAN

¹¹ Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

¹² Acting First Secretary of the British Embassy in the Soviet Union.

¹³ See bracketed note, *infra*.

740.00119 E.W./1-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 20, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received January 20—5:30 p. m.]

192. ReEmbs 142, January 15, 10 p. m. Prior to yesterday's meeting with the Hungarians Balfour informed Molotov that his Government agreed to all the amendments adopted at the meeting on January 15th with the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Ambassadors. He stated that the British Government would be ready to approve that the Czechs and Yugoslavs be included in the membership of the ACC for Hungary provided identical treatment be accorded to the Greeks and Yugoslavs in Bulgaria.

— He continued that his Government was equally ready to approve the present arrangement whereby Molotov would inform the Yugoslav and Czech Ambassadors in writing that representatives of their respective Governments would have access to the ACC on all questions affecting their interests, it being understood that Molotov would also write similar letters to the Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors advising them that it had been decided that their Governments would be permitted to send representatives to Sofia to be given similar access to the ACC there. Balfour concluded that if the Soviet Government preferred that the Yugoslav and Czech Governments be granted full or restricted membership on the Commissions in both Hungary and Bulgaria it was his Government's understanding that their representatives would not enjoy better positions on either of the Commissions than the American or British representatives.

Molotov was noncommittal. He suggested that the entire question of Greek and Yugoslav participation in the ACC for Bulgaria be discussed at a later date.

Molotov has sent me for my approval copies of draft letters to the Czech and Yugoslav Ambassadors stating that it was considered advisable that their Governments should send representatives to Hungary where they would have access to the ACC on all questions concerning their Governments. I have informed Molotov that I saw no objection to the letters. I understand that Balfour will also not object to the letters on condition that similar ones be sent to the Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors in connection with the ACC for Bulgaria.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Control Hungary/1-3045 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 30, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 3:58 p. m.]

280. British Chargé d'Affaires has sent me a copy of a letter dated January 21 in which he acknowledged receipt of a letter from Molotov dated January 20 enclosing the text of the statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. Balfour stated in this letter that he had been instructed to inform Molotov that the British Government accepted the statutes as a satisfactory definition of the status and functions of the British Military Mission in Hungary during the first period of the armistice, but reserved its position in regard to the second period, as stated in a previous letter sent to Molotov on January 20.

Sent to Department as 280, repeated to Caserta as 16.

HARRIMAN

ICELAND

RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICELANDIC REPUBLIC

859A.01/124

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European
Affairs (Cumming) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1944.

MR. DUNN: On June 17, 1944 the full independence of Iceland will become a fact and an Icelandic Republic will be established. In my opinion, our present relations with Iceland due to the presence of our troops, et cetera, and our post-war interests, such as requests for naval and air bases in accordance with plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, require that we take special notice of this occasion historic in Icelandic national life.

Mr. Morris¹ is urgently needed in Iran, I am informed by Mr. Alling,² and should leave Iceland at the earliest possible moment in order to get on his way to Tehran.

I suggest that:

(1) Mr. Louis G. Dreyfus arrange to be in Reykjavik at least a week or so prior to June 17.

(2) We recommend to the President that Mr. Dreyfus be appointed Ambassador on Special Mission for the purpose of showing the Icelandic Government and people our appreciation of their entry into the family of nations as a fully sovereign and independent republic.

(3) We arrange to have Mr. Dreyfus' credentials as Minister to Iceland addressed to the President of Iceland and that these credentials not be presented by Mr. Dreyfus until the ceremonies on June 17 which will be held in the open air at the ancient meeting place of the Icelandic Althing and at which, the Icelandic Minister³ tells me, the Icelandic Government will wish the American Minister to make the principal address by a foreign diplomatic representative welcoming the establishment of the Icelandic Republic.

If you approve of the foregoing, I shall work out the necessary details in consultation with Protocol and other interested divisions.

HUGH S. CUMMING, JR.

¹ Leland B. Morris, Minister in Iceland, assigned as Ambassador to Iran, March 21, 1944.

² Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director, of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

³ Thor Thors, Icelandic Minister in the United States.

S59A.01/126 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Morris) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, May 5, 1944—9 p. m.
[Received May 5—8:05 p. m.]

171. The Legation has received from a confidential source the text of a message from the King of Denmark⁴ to the Icelandic Prime Minister. Local newspapers carried big headlines saying King asks postponement of separation of Iceland and Denmark and a brief news item says the request is based on the presence of foreign forces in both countries. Full text has not been released here and should be regarded as confidential for the present.

Text in translation follows:

“In conjunction with the reports which have come from Iceland concerning action by Althing and the Government concerning a change in form of Government, we wish the following communication brought to the attention of Iceland Government and people:

During all our reign it has consistently been our effort to advance the Icelandic people's welfare and in these years when war makes its deep imprint on the lives of people we have sought to follow the situation in Iceland and have carefully weighed our attitude toward the Icelandic people doing so with an eye to what might be gained for that country as a Scandinavian nation. The willingness to listen to the views of the people which Iceland's Althing and Government have always met with from us can obviously all the more be counted upon in this most important issue as to the future of the country. We may in the meantime on our hand feel it right to nourish the hope that final conclusions as to the future form of Government under which the bond between the Icelandic people and the King would be severed does not become an actuality as long as Iceland as well as Denmark is occupied by foreign powers. And we hold the firm conviction that it would bring little of good fortune to the fine brotherly spirit between these two Scandinavian nations which is uppermost in our mind, if this were to occur. We wish therefore that before the final action comes about you inform Iceland's Government and people that we, so long as the present situation obtains, cannot recognize the change in governmental form which Iceland's Althing and Government without consultation with us have decided upon. Given at our Palace Sorgenfri, the 2nd of May, 1944, (signed Christian R).”

MORRIS

S59A.01/130 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Morris) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, May 9, 1944—noon.
[Received 3:40 p. m.]

177. Some further background on Danish King's message (see my 171, May 5, 9 p. m.) has come to light. When Danish Minister de

⁴ Christian X.

Kauffmann⁵ passed through Iceland April 29 he told the Norwegian Minister that at the Danish Minister's meeting in London Reventlow,⁶ Kauffmann and de Fontenay⁷ agreed to send a message to the Danish King via Sweden asking his opinion on the matter of Icelandic independence. This inquiry may have given rise to the King's message. People here thought de Fontenay was behind the message, but the Foreign Minister⁸ told me today that he and his colleagues do not share this opinion.

There is general regret that the King was so ill-advised as to comment at this late date thereby injuring his personal status. The opinion seems unanimous that his message will not affect the outcome. Moderate and inactive people feel that Icelanders were also at fault, that they could have kept the King informed and saved his dignity, rather than handling the matter with political rudeness which makes the King feel he is being overthrown. In this connection the Foreign Minister told me in March of this year, after the Althing resolution to hold a plebiscite had been agreed to, that the Icelandic Government sent a message through its Legation in Stockholm to its Legation in Copenhagen to inform the Government and King of this fact and received a report that the message had been delivered but no acknowledgment from the King or Danish Government was received.

MORRIS

859A.01/127 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Morris)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1944—8 p. m.

166. Your 171, May 5, 9 p. m. The Danish Legation here has informally expressed to us its regret at the action of the King. On May 10 the Danish Minister called on Thor Thors and gave him a note which reads substantially as follows:

"The Minister of Iceland is informed that he is free to report to his Government that Minister de Kauffmann and Legation Counselor Brun have declared to him that they deeply regret the message from His Majesty the King to Iceland and that they are convinced that the statement contained in the message can only be occasioned by the fact that the King owing to the German occupation cannot have formed a clear idea of all the circumstances. They entertain no doubts that the Danish people when they are free to form an opinion and to speak will understand all these circumstances which determined the decision made by Iceland."

⁵ Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Minister in the United States.

⁶ Count Reventlow, Danish Minister in the United Kingdom.

⁷ F. le Sage de Fontenay, Danish Minister in Iceland.

⁸ Vilhjalmur Thor.

Thors was asked to transmit the statement to the Icelandic Government with the request that it be treated as confidential and not published.

The attitude the Danish Legation here has maintained with respect to the Icelandic independence movement is described in its *pro memoria* of January 13 which was transmitted to you as enclosure to instruction no. 70, of February 4.⁹ A copy of this document was also forwarded to the King of Denmark. (Your 177, May 9, 12 noon.)

HULL

859.01/201

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of States refers to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* no. 261, May 9, 1944,¹⁰ in regard to the attitude which the British Government proposes to adopt in respect to the establishment of the Republic of Iceland.

As regards the first factor mentioned in the *aide-mémoire*, the Department of State concurs in the view of the British Government that no legal difficulty exists in recognizing the Icelandic Republic. Iceland has, in fact, been an independent state since 1918 and, further, has endeavored, so far as circumstances have permitted, to carry out the severance of its relations with King Christian X in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Union¹¹ between Iceland and Denmark.

As regards the attitude previously adopted by this Government, it will be recalled that in 1942 representations, similar to those made by the British Minister at Reykjavik in 1941, were made to the Icelandic Prime Minister with a view to dissuading Iceland from abrogating the Act of Union at that time.¹² In making such representations, the Icelandic Prime Minister was informed that this Government recognized that the proposed unilateral abrogation of the Act of Union and change in form of the Icelandic Government were decisions which, in principle, must be taken by the Icelandic people in accordance with their own desires and needs. The Icelandic Minister in Washington was subsequently informed that this Government had no objection to the adoption by the Althing of a resolution declaring that Iceland should become a Republic in 1944.

⁹ Neither printed.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ Danish Law of November 30, 1918; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXXI, p. 703.

¹² For text of note delivered to the Icelandic Prime Minister August 20, 1942, see telegram 268, August 18, 1942, 9 p. m. to Reykjavik, *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. III, p. 17.

It will also be recalled that paragraph two of the Agreement between the United States of America and Iceland for the defense of Iceland by United States forces, effective July 1, 1941,¹³ stipulates that "United States further promise to recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland and to exercise their best efforts with those powers which will negotiate the peace treaty at the conclusion of the present war in order that such treaty shall likewise recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland."

As regards the general question of expediency, the Department of State concurs in the view of the British Government that it would be most inadvisable to withhold recognition from the Republic of Iceland. The American Minister will therefore be appointed as the special representative of the President of the United States with personal rank of Ambassador for the ceremonies to be held on June 17, 1944, in connection with the establishment of the Republic of Iceland and will thereafter be accredited as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the President of the Republic to be elected by the Althing on the same date.

The Department of State also concurs in the view that, so far as possible, it would be advisable to avoid giving offense to the susceptibilities of the people of Denmark, in general, and the King of Denmark, in particular. It had therefore hoped that King Christian X, in his capacity of King of Iceland, would, despite the difficulties of his position in Denmark, find it possible to interpose no objection to the proposed action of his Government and people in Iceland. However, the King of Denmark for reasons which are not entirely clear transmitted a message to the Prime Minister of Iceland which has occasioned a certain amount of resentment in Iceland. The Department of State regrets that King Christian X felt impelled to take such action, which, however, in fact may have been taken under German duress, but considers that the previously-determined decision of this Government to recognize the establishment of the Republic of Iceland is in no way affected thereby.

With respect to the general attitude to be taken by the American Minister at Reykjavik and the various agencies of this Government, it is proposed that the Republic of Iceland will be cordially welcomed as the latest addition to the family of nations. In so doing, care will be taken not to give offense to the people and King of Denmark.

The Department of State agrees in the general line proposed by the British Government that the matter of the abrogation of the Act of Union should be treated as a Danish-Icelandic question and the

¹³ For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 232, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1547; for correspondence regarding negotiation of this agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 776 ff.

fact that the protection of Iceland by British and, subsequently, American forces has no bearing on the matter. Commentary will, so far as possible, be confined to an explanation of the background with little or no discussion of the legal questions involved and the procedure followed by the Government of Iceland in severing its ties with the Danish Crown. Every effort will be made to avoid any remarks or statements which might suggest that a dispute exists between Iceland and Denmark on this question.

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944.

859A.01/124 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1944—5 p. m.

4259. Following is a summary of Reykjavik's 222, May 26, 9 p. m.¹⁴ to the Department :

The British and Soviet Ministers and the American Chargé d'Affaires have agreed to ask two separate appointments with the Foreign Minister for May 30 in order to express to him orally the felicitations of their governments on the results of the plebiscite and to assure him that the Republic of Iceland will be welcomed into the Family of Nations. They will also ascertain whether the Foreign Minister considers a further expression to be desirable such as a call on the Regent and delivery of a brief address of good wishes. The Chargé adds that similar action will probably not be taken by the representatives of Norway, Denmark and Sweden who appear to be drifting into a bloc which may withhold recognition.

We are telegraphing Reykjavik ¹⁵ that we approve of the individual calls on the Foreign Minister but have added that, unless specifically suggested by the Foreign Minister, we think that it would be inadvisable to call on the Regent for the following reasons :

(1) Such a step would not only accentuate the divergence in attitude between representatives in Reykjavik of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Scandinavian States on the other, but also might supply fuel to the German propaganda contention that we and the British have been instrumental in bringing about the severance of the Act of Union.

(2) It would tend to render somewhat anticlimactic the June 17 ceremonies at which the chiefs of the diplomatic missions to Iceland are to deliver formal addresses of welcome.

We are requesting the Chargé to bring these observations to the attention of his British and Soviet colleagues as well as to the Foreign

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ Telegram 195, May 28, 5 p. m., not printed.

Minister should he himself propose a call on the Regent. Should the British and Soviet Ministers insist on carrying out the original procedure, our Chargé may, in his discretion, associate himself with them.

Please inform the Foreign Office of the foregoing.

HULL

859A.01/155

The Icelandic Minister (Thors) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Reykjavik has instructed me to convey the following message to you:

According to a treaty concerning the Union between Iceland and Denmark dated November 30, 1918 each contracting party could demand immediately after the end of the year 1940 that the treaty be revised three years later. Each contracting party could decide onesidedly that the treaty be cancelled unless otherwise negotiated before the expiration of this three years period. In order to cancel the agreement in this way two thirds of the members of the Althing had to vote for the cancellation. In addition to this at least three fourths of all voters should participate in a plebiscite out of which again three fourths should also vote for the abrogation.

On May 17, 1941 the Althing passed unanimously a resolution in which it was stated that Iceland would not renew the treaty. Furthermore another resolution was also passed, unanimously stating that Iceland should become a republic as soon as the Union with Denmark had been formally cancelled.

The passing of these resolutions was immediately communicated to the King and the Danish Government through diplomatic channels.

On February 25, 1944 the Althing unanimously with votes of all the members passed a resolution regarding the abrogation of the Icelandic-Danish Union Act from 1918 and on March 8 the Althing passed also unanimously with votes of all the members a constitution for the Republic of Iceland.

The plebiscite for the cancellation of the Union Act and for the assent of the Republican constitution took place during May 20-23, 1944.

The final figures on the voting are not yet at hand from all the electoral districts but there is no doubt that they will hardly cause any change in the final result.

The vote is as follows. The number of voters who have participated is 72,640 which equals 97.86% of all the voters. A total of 70,725 or 97.36% have voted for the cancellation of the Union Act, while 370

or 0.51% have voted against it. There were 1545 or 2.13% blank and void votes.

In the vote about the constitutional change of the Government 69,048 or 95.06% voted for the change while 1042 or 1.43% voted against it. There were 2550 blank and void votes which equal 3.51%.

The people of Iceland have thus in an entirely free plebiscite fully assented to the resolution passed by the Althing concerning the cancellation of the Union Act and for the re-establishment of a Republic in Iceland.

The Althing has been summoned to convene on June 10 to pass the final decision on the abrogation of the Union Act and the re-establishment of a Republic of Iceland.

Such a decision it is planned will lead to the inauguration of the Republic on June 17.

Accept [etc.]

THOR THORS

859A.01/169a

The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the Other American Republics, Except Argentina and Bolivia

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1944.

SIRS: The people of Iceland in a plebiscite held on May 20-23, 1944, voted overwhelmingly in favor of a Resolution passed by the Althing on February 25, 1944, to abrogate the Act of Union between Iceland and Denmark of December 1, 1918, and the Constitutional Bill passed by the Althing on March 8, 1944, providing for the establishment of a republican form of government. In taking this action, Iceland, so far as circumstances have permitted, has carefully observed the provisions of the Act of Union relating to its abrogation.

Both the United States and British Governments consider that the change in form of the Government of Iceland in no way affects the recognition they have previously extended to that country, and they propose to accredit their Ministers at Reykjavik to the first President of the Republic of Iceland who will be elected by the Althing on June 17, 1944, the date on which the Republic will formally come into being.

In connection with the recognition of Iceland, the following commitments made by the Government of the United States are contained in paragraph two of the Agreement between the United States of America and Iceland for the Defense of Iceland by the United States Forces, effected July 1, 1941:

"The United States further promise to recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland and to exercise their best efforts with those powers which will negotiate a peace treaty at the conclusion

of the present war in order that such treaty shall likewise recognize the absolute independence and sovereignty of Iceland.”

The President has designated the Honorable Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., the American Minister to Iceland, as his Special Representative with the personal rank of Ambassador to attend the ceremonies to be held in Iceland on June 17 in honor of the establishment of the Republic.

Since Iceland may itself notify the Government of the other American republics of the change in its status, you are requested orally to inform the appropriate authorities of the Government to which you are accredited regarding the attitude adopted by this Government with respect to the establishment of the Republic of Iceland. In your discretion, you may add that although Iceland has given no indication that it desires to be classified as an American republic, preferring to consider itself as lying outside both the European and American Hemispheres, it is felt that the Government of Iceland would be gratified to receive on the day of the establishment of the Republic messages from the other American republics welcoming the Republic of Iceland into the family of nations.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

859A.01/155

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1944.

The Icelandic Minister, Mr. Thor Thors, called upon me this afternoon at his request to hand me the attached note¹⁶ relative to the treaty between [*concerning*] the Union of Iceland and Denmark. I inquired from the Minister as to the reaction of the Danish people to this action. He stated that the King of Denmark had sent a wire requesting the Icelandic Government not to take the step until after the war. He further stated that Minister Kauffmann feels this was done under pressure of the Nazis and that they feel confident that there is no question that the free Danes of the world have been happy to see the step taken and are confident that the people of Denmark will state their approval after liberation.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

859A.01/156a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Morris)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1944—10 p. m.

221. The House of Representatives unanimously passed this morning a concurrent Resolution expressing the congratulations of the Con-

¹⁶ Note dated June 1, p. 990.

gress to the Althing on the establishment of the Republic of Iceland. The full text of the Resolution will be telegraphed ¹⁷ to you after it has been voted by the Senate.

STETTINIUS

859A.01/164 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Dreyfus ¹⁸)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1944.

230. Department's 221, June 10. The following is the text of the Concurrent Resolution on Iceland which has just been passed unanimously by the Senate:

"WHEREAS the people of Iceland in a free plebiscite on May 20 to 23, 1944, overwhelmingly approved the constitutional bill passed by the Althing providing for the establishment of a republican form of government; and

WHEREAS the Republic of Iceland will be formally established on June 17, 1944: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress hereby expresses to the Icelandic Althing, the oldest parliamentary body in the world, its congratulations on the establishment of the Republic of Iceland and its welcome to the Republic of Iceland as the newest republic in the family of free nations."

HULL

859A.01/6-1744

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1944.

The Minister of Iceland called at his request and proceeded to hand me a communication in writing, a copy of which is attached.¹⁹ I congratulated and felicitated his people and his Government on the new change of government and the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic. I elaborated on every form of good wish for the people of Iceland under the new Republic.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

859A.01/6-1744

The Icelandic Minister (Thors) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944.

SIR: Acting under instructions from my Government and with reference to my note June 1, 1944 I have the honor to inform Your Excellency as follows.

¹⁷ Telegram 230, June 15, *infra*.

¹⁸ Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., presented his credentials as Minister to Iceland, June 14, 1944.

¹⁹ *Infra*.

At a meeting in the united Althing on June 16, the following resolution was passed unanimously with the votes of all members of the Althing:

the Althing resolves to declare that the Danish-Icelandic Union Act from 1918 is cancelled.

Immediately thereafter the Althing equally unanimously resolved that the constitution of the Republic of Iceland shall enter into force on Saturday, June 17, 1944 when so declared by the President of the united Althing at a meeting in the united Althing.

The President of the united Althing has at two o'clock p. m. today at a meeting in the united Althing at Lögberg declared the entering into force of the constitution of the Republic of Iceland and thereby the Republic of Iceland has been re-established.

Then the election of the President of Iceland took place and Mr. Sveinn Björnsson was elected President. Immediately thereafter he took oath of office and entered upon his duties.

Accept [etc.]

THOR THORS

859A.01/161 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, June 21, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 1:08 p. m.]

269. Text of Danish King's message received June 17 (see my 267, June 18)²⁰ given by confidential source in translation paraphrases as follows:

"Though I regret that my connection with the Icelandic nation has been severed under present circumstances, I wish to express my best wishes for people of Icelandic nation and the hope that ties binding Iceland to other Scandinavian nations will be strengthened."

DREYFUS

859A.01/6-2144

The Minister in Iceland (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

No. 5

REYKJAVIK, June 21, 1944.

[Received June 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copies of remarks²⁰ exchanged by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, as Dean of the special representatives, at a dinner given to the President by the Icelandic Government at the Hotel Borg.

²⁰ Not printed.

Several times during the celebration of June 17 high officials, including the Foreign Minister, mentioned to me and members of the Legation staff their appreciation of the part played by the United States in leading the way in the appointment of special diplomatic representatives. The Department's initiative in this regard has produced very fruitful results.

Vilhjalmur Thor is a great friend of the United States and as Foreign Minister is of invaluable assistance in maintaining most satisfactory relations.

With regard to the second paragraph of the Foreign Minister's remarks, reference is made to my telegram no. 266, June 18.²¹ As stated therein, the Russian Government is the only Government with a diplomatic representative here which has not publicly expressed good wishes for the Icelandic Republic.

My remarks, which were apparently very well received by the Icelanders, were translated into Icelandic, and were broadcast from the dining hall during the dinner.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

859A.01/164 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, June 21, 1944.

[Received June 21—1:20 p. m.]

271. Speaker of joint Althing yesterday read joint resolution of Congress transmitted in Department's 230 June 15. He said Althing was greatly honored as the United States was the first power to support the re-establishment of the Republic and the first to appoint a special Ambassador for the occasion. He said Althing and nation were very grateful and he would on behalf of the Althing send United States Congress a message of thanks.²² Communists were only members of Althing who did not rise to show their agreement.

DREYFUS

²¹ Not printed.

²² For text of message conveyed to the American Legation at Reykjavik through the Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs in a note dated June 22, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1944, p. 126.

ITALY

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE MAINTENANCE OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN ITALY¹

740.00119 ACI/46

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador² called at his request and said that Major General Solodovnik had been designated as a member of the Advisory Council for Italy and that his information is that this Government had not notified the proper authorities at Algiers that it is agreeable to the appointment. I said that there must be a mistake, that when this matter was brought to my personal attention, I immediately spoke to Mr. Dunn,³ who is connected with this phase of the work here, and said that I was agreeable to this appointment, to which Mr. Dunn replied that he was likewise agreeable. Later in the day in conversation with the President, I brought up the matter and the President stated that he was agreeable to the appointment. I said that while the Ambassador was present Mr. Dunn had informed me that the Commander-in-Chief⁴ for that area is to approve the appointment and that notice was given to the proper military authorities here in Washington, whose function it is to send this information to the Commander-in-Chief, probably through the British Government at London, and that for some reason, presumably because a Frenchman was not also appointed and the appointment agreed to by this Government, a delay had ensued. Mr. Dunn added that Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, now stationed at Algiers and performing the functions of Robert Murphy⁵ during his absence, was notified by this Government of our approval of the Soviet appointment. I suggested to the Ambassador that in my judgment this may be the fault of the British but that we would seek to have the President send a message to London

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 402-445.

² Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

³ James Clement Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

⁴ Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, and Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, from January 8, 1944.

⁵ American member, with personal rank of Ambassador, of the Advisory Council for Italy, temporarily in the United States. Mr. Murphy was also United States Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

asking the British Government to instruct their Commander-in-Chief in charge of the North African area to approve and recognize the Soviet appointment.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.00119 ACI/39: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 11, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received 7:43 p. m.]

Greek 13. Acting on behalf of Macmillan, Chairman of the Advisory Council for Italy the British Ambassadors to Greece and Yugoslavia on January 8, 1944 transmitted invitations to those two Governments to appoint representatives to the Council and as instructed I associated myself with those invitations as did the Soviet Ambassador and the delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation.

While I have not yet received official replies to my communications in this connection I learn informally that the Yugoslav Government has appointed Dr. Miha Krek a Slovene and former deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia as its representative on the Council and that the Greek Government has similarly appointed Jean Politis former Minister to Rome.

Repeated to Algiers for Reinhardt.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 Control (Italy)/17: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1944—midnight.

130. For Reinhardt. The Department's 212, December 22, 10 p. m., and your 259, December 26, 6 p. m.⁶ Appropriate instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Allied Commander-in-Chief approving the appointment of a Soviet representative to the Allied Control Commission has been delayed by action of the British Chiefs of Staff in refusing to approve the dispatch of such instructions without simultaneous approval of French representation on the Commission. The Soviet Ambassador has again raised the question here and pointed out that the appropriate authorities at Algiers have not yet been notified of General Solodovnic's designation. You should inform your Russian colleague that the Secretary and the President have both agreed to the placing of a Soviet representative on the

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 442 and 443, respectively.

Allied Control Commission and that any delay in instructions to that effect to the Allied Commander-in-Chief has been occasioned by difficulties in reaching a decision with respect to French representation. You may say that it is hoped that appropriate instructions with respect to Soviet representation will go forward from the Combined Chiefs of Staff without further delay and without waiting for a decision with respect to French representation.

Your 131, January 12, midnight,⁷ just received. The present telegram and the Department's 212 are your authorization to join in the Council's recommendation that a Soviet representative be accepted on the Control Commission. You may say that you are still without instructions with respect to French representation on the Commission.

HULL

865.01/921 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 14, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:11 p. m.]

151. From Reinhardt.

1. At the Naples meeting of the Advisory Council, Massigli⁸ as Acting Chairman presented a petition addressed to the Council from Mario Ercoli (Togliatti)⁹ for permission to return to Italy. He stated that an earlier request for a transit visa for French North Africa had been referred to the Italian Government through the British Resident Minister. Macmillan thereupon informed the Council that a reply had now been received from the Italian Government indicating agreement to his return and proposed that the Council recommend to the Commander in Chief that Ercoli be permitted to proceed to Italy, to which Vyshinski¹⁰ and Massigli assented. In the absence of a reply to Murphy's 194 of December 19, 9 a. m. [*p. m.*]¹¹ I reserved my opinion. The Council's recommendation is awaiting the receipt by me of instructions in the matter.

2. AFHQ,¹² apprised of the Italian Government's decision is opposed to the granting of permission at this time on grounds of military security. The military aspects of the case, however, would not seem to be within the competence of the Council which has as its

⁷ Telegram not printed.

⁸ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁹ Palmiro Togliatti, leading Italian Communist, who had spent many years in Russia.

¹⁰ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet member on the Advisory Council for Italy.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Allied Force Headquarters.

directive the Moscow Declaration for Italy.¹³ With this in view, together with the fact that the Italian Government has already given its consent, and the consent of the British, Soviet and French members of the Council is a matter of record, the Department may consider it desirable in the circumstances that I be authorized to join in the Council's recommendation.

Your urgent instructions are respectfully requested.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of Murphy. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1944—2 p. m.

147. For Reinhardt. Your 194, December 19, 9 p. m.¹⁴ The Department has no objection to Ercoli's return to Italy if agreeable to AFHQ and the Italian Government. It is assumed that AFHQ knows that Ercoli (whose real name is Palmiro Togliatti) is one of the world's ten leading international Communists; that he is the number one Italian Communist in the world; and that during its existence he was a member of the directorates of the Communist International, such as the Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Executive Committee and the Secretariat of the Executive Committee, which plans the policies and tactics of the Communist International.

Ercoli has likewise taken up his proposed return to Italy with the British through their Embassy at Moscow. The Foreign Office has taken the position that it will not object, but has asked our opinion. We are informing the British Embassy that we likewise have no objection if agreeable to AFHQ and the Italian Government. It is understood that the Foreign Office has referred the question to AFHQ which in turn has referred Ercoli's return to the Italian Government.

HULL

865.01/929 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 15, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received January 16—11: 50 a. m.]

158. From Reinhardt.

1. After an informative inspection of Allied control operations in Sicily and Sardinia which appeared favorably to impress my Soviet colleague the Advisory Council party was joined in Naples by Mac-

¹³ For text of Declaration regarding Italy, see the Moscow Conference Protocol, Annex 4, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 759.

¹⁴ Not printed.

millan and Massigli where on January 9 the Council held informal meetings with the Neapolitan leaders of the six anti-Fascist parties composing the Committee of National Liberation. The following day January 10 the Council held a formalizing [*formal meeting?*], its fifth during the course of which General Joyce¹⁵ and Marshal Badoglio¹⁶ accompanied by members of his Government met with the Council. On January 11 Vyshinski and Massigli visited Croce and Sforza¹⁷ [at?] Sorrento and the morning of January 12 the whole party returned to Algiers with the exception of Livengood¹⁸ who is remaining a few days in Sicily to examine the sulphur mines and other industrial installations.

2. The Neapolitan political leaders although reflecting the divergent philosophies of their several parties were unanimous in their insistence that Victor Emmanuel¹⁹ must go and in their willingness to accept a regency until the liberation of Italy permitted the "institutional" question to be submitted to the vote of the Italian people. The parties of the right indicated that if necessary they would accept Piedmont or some other member of the House of Savoy for the duration of the war in Italy but this view was not shared by the other leaders who considered Piedmont as unacceptable as the King himself. A corresponding divergence of opinion was expressed regarding the probable effect that the King's abdication would have on the loyalty of the Italian Armed Forces. All party representatives made a plea for greater Allied understanding of the grave economic situation in liberated Italy and the parties of the left urged more freedom of the press and public meetings as well as a more radical application of the process of de-Fascistization.

3. Marshal Badoglio read the Council a set paper which contained emotional expressions of his devotion to the Allied cause, enmity for Fascism and requests for war materials with which to make possible active Italian participation in the fight against Germany. It contained moreover a gratuitous interpretation of the invitation to meet with the Council as being tantamount to an invitation to participate regularly in its work. He was gently disabused of this misapprehension. He carefully avoided making any statements with regard to the Monarchical question other than to say that it would, of course, have to be submitted to the Italian people after the war. He was evidently unwilling to discuss the person of the King in the presence

¹⁵ Gen. Kenyon Joyce, American representative and Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

¹⁶ Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government.

¹⁷ Benedetto Croce and Carlo Sforza were leaders of the anti-Fascist group at Naples.

¹⁸ Charles A. Livengood, American member of the Advisory Council for Italy.

¹⁹ King of Italy.

of the Council and when asked how he proposed to form a representative Government of Ministers after moving to Salerno in the face of the unanimous opposition to Victor Emmanuel on the part of all of the six anti-Fascist parties satisfied himself with the remark that should any one refuse for this reason to join his Government he would pick someone else. It would, therefore, appear that he is thinking in terms of a government of men rather than of parties. The position of his Government with respect to the King is simply that the conditions raised by the six parties can at this time only tend to divide, not to unite the country. Although the Marshal cannot be said to have made a particularly forceful presentation or advanced arguments of a nature best suited to impress an Anglo-American audience, Vyshinsky appeared to be impressed by what he described as the "real patriotism" of the man.

After Badoglio and his party withdrew, General Joyce, in reply to a question, stated that the Marshal was to his knowledge the only person of leadership available in liberated Italy. With reference to the cooperation of the Italian Armed Forces, he felt that on the part of the Navy and Air Force it had been quite good, and on the part of the Army reasonably so considering the difficult circumstances. It was his opinion that there was a high degree of loyalty to the King in all ranks of the Italian Navy and Air Force, and in the higher brackets of the Army.

General Joyce stated that the Italian Government would move to Salerno as soon as it had accepted the terms of transfer which were almost ready for presentation to it. The government might be expected to be established in its new seat by the end of the month.

4. The Council in executive section [*session?*] raised the question of Soviet and French participation on the Control Commission and as reported in my 131, January 12²⁰ was informed that I was still without instructions in the matter.

5. It was agreed to study the problem of developing a procedure governing the return to Italy of political exiles. A recommendation proposed by Macmillan that Mario Ercoli be permitted to return to Italy was supported by the other members but I reserved my opinion pending the receipt of instructions. See my 151 January 14.

6. The Council was provided by AMG²¹ officials with reports on the food situation, progress of de-Fascistization and the problems of the press and public political meetings.

7. Livengood and I will report by despatch on the general political and economic situation encountered in Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy.

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ Allied Military Government.

Please bring foregoing to attention of Murphy.

7. [8.] Sent to Department as 158, repeated to London as 19 and Moscow as 3. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

740.00119 Control (Italy)/34 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 15, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received January 16—11 : 19 a. m.]

139. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.²² Molotov²³ asked me to come over this evening and, among other matters, raised with me the question of representation of the Soviet Government and the French Committee on the Control Commission in Italy. He said that Eden²⁴ had given his consent but had informed the Soviet Government that the United States had not yet reached a decision. In addition Molotov stated Vyshinski had informed him that the American member of the Advisory Council had approved in principle but had not received instructions from Washington and the decision would be delayed until February.

After some discussion of the background, Molotov asked me to cable you for information and expressed his hope that the matter could be settled promptly. He explained that two Soviet officers were in Italy ready to take up their functions.

In view of the importance that Molotov places on this matter, I hope that I may receive instructions at an early date.

HARRIMAN

865.01/965 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 22, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 8 : 40 p. m.]

216. From Reinhardt. Macmillan, who is at present in Italy, has telegraphed the Foreign Office, in agreement with General Mason MacFarlane,²⁵ with respect to the situation which may be found when Allied forces enter Rome, asking immediate guidance in connection

²² Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

²³ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

²⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²⁵ Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

with certain problems which may be expected to arise at such a time. Reber ²⁶ has asked that I telegraph you in similar terms.

1. The appointments of Armellini as military governor of Rome and of Motta as civil administrator are designed to insure that there shall be no political activity, such as an attempt to form as [*an*] alternative government, in any period between German withdrawal and Allied entry.

2. The King, we have been warned, wishes immediately after the Allied entry, to be allowed to pay at least a short visit to Rome accompanied by Badoglio. Delay in permitting such a visit they point out will prejudice the King's chances of being able to form the broad based political government which he has undertaken shall be set up when we have reached Rome. We consider this is true in view of his hasty departure last September: In fact the postponement of his visit will have just as positive results as the granting of permission for it. Although it is admitted that such a visit may be represented as evidence of Allied support the refusal will be tantamount to direct opposition. In our view therefore he should be given this chance to carry out his pledge to the Italian people.

3. In the event that he succeeds, the constitutional question may thus be deferred until all of Italy can participate in the decision. If, on the other hand, he fails because of the refusal of the Rome party leaders to serve under him, he will have shown himself incapable of carrying out this pledge and should either abdicate forthwith or withdraw until the constitutional question can be settled. Voluntary abdication without foreign intervention would be preferable in every way.

4. The probability so far as we can see here is that the King will (1) fail to form a government, and (2) refuse to withdraw from the scene. In these circumstances Allied pressure would be justified on military as well as other grounds provided a genuinely representative national government can be formed and we should favor its use.

5. Immediate guidance is needed as to whether Allied authorities in Italy can use their own discretion on the above lines as regards (1) the King's visit to Rome and (2) position to be adopted in the event of his failure to form a broad based government. Should these questions be left for decision until they arise there will be unavoidable delay which will hinder the positive direction of policy.

6. Macmillan does not anticipate any undue difficulty with the Advisory Council on the line recommended, with which I concur.

Please bring foregoing to attention of Murphy. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

²⁶ Samuel Reber, Vice President of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

865.01/1-2544 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*²⁷

[LONDON, January 23, 1944.]

553. I should like you to see the following telegram I have sent to Harold Macmillan which is, of course, one of our internal messages, so I send it to you quite informally.

Text begins. The Prime Minister to Mr. Harold Macmillan. Most Secret and Personal.

1. I have talked over the whole position with the Foreign Secretary and we are both agreed we should hold on to Badoglio and the King till we can be sure of something better and more effective for our purpose. It would follow, therefore, that we should do nothing to weaken them in the interval. On the contrary, should we become masters of the realm in the near future, the early return to the capital of Badoglio and the King would be beneficial. Thereafter at leisure we can survey the scene and see what other alternatives are in sight. No doubt the Vatican would play a part in this.

2. You should be on your guard against the kind of views put forward by Massigli. President Roosevelt has misgiving about our having let the French in on this Italian business on account of the hatred prevailing between the two nations. I, too, was chilled by Massigli's views. Vyshinsky seems to chop and change. You are quite right to keep in close touch with him, but it does not follow we have to obey everything he says. *Text ends.*

865.01/1-2544

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received through the office of your Military Aide a memorandum dated January 24²⁸ enclosing a paraphrased copy of a message (no. 553) from the Prime Minister²⁹ concerning the Italian political situation in the light of recent military developments in Italy.

I and my advisers on the Department's Policy Committee have reached the conclusion that any political reconstruction in Italy is impossible under the present King and that there should be no further delay in the reconstruction on a broad political base of the present Italian Government.

I consider this an admirable opportunity to submit our views, if you approve, to the Prime Minister and enclose a suggested draft telegram³⁰ in reply.

²⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on January 25, 1944.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ *Supra.*

³⁰ Draft not printed. The records in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., indicate that the telegram was not sent.

I am receiving indications continually from various serious sources that there is widespread feeling in this country concerning what appears to be our continued support of a discredited King. While I recognize that it has been the British policy to support the King, I feel that it is now essential for us to state our position to the British Government and to make that position public if necessary.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

740.00119 ACI/47 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 25, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received January 26—4 : 50 a. m.]

259. From Reinhardt. The Advisory Council held its sixth meeting in Algiers yesterday January 24.

1. With respect to the question of Soviet and French representation on the Allied Control Commission, I carried out the instructions contained in the Department's 130, January 13, midnight. The Council accordingly agreed on a recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief that the participation of the Soviet representative should be accepted and further that the Commander-in-Chief should intervene with Combined Chiefs of Staff with a view to an early solution of the question of French participation. Massigli took the occasion to express grave concern at prolonged delay in reaching a decision in this connection.

He referred to the high importance to France of her relations with Italy and political and moral implications of a refusal to permit French membership in the Allied Control Commission which was engaged in the actual day to day solution of Italian problems. He urged me to intervene with my Government with a view to obtaining an early decision of the question. Following adjournment of the Council meeting he earnestly repeated to me his case, mentioned French troops fighting in Italy and the effect on future work of Advisory Council which could not but result from an unfavorable decision. Chapin requests that Wilson be informed of foregoing.

2. A proposal put forward by Vyshinsky recommending to the Commander in Chief a greater degree of civil liberty in Sicily was in great part met by calling to his attention a recent order of FHQ [AFHQ?] on this subject. It was however agreed to recommend to the Commander in Chief political prisoners that liberty should be given to all adversaries of fascism arrested for political reasons and that for the future there should be no arrest of anti-Fascists on grounds of political activity.

3. Massigli presented the members of the Council with copies of a note ³¹ which the respective representatives of the French Committee

³¹ Dated January 25, not printed.

of National Liberation had been instructed to deliver yesterday in Washington, London, and Moscow setting forth the opinion that the Allies should without further delay require the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and the withdrawal of Marshal Badoglio from the Italian Government. It was the opinion of all the other members of the Council that to raise this question through diplomatic channels was premature at this time. It was pointed out that the Council could as yet hardly claim to know Italian public opinion and that although the French Committee had apparently crystallized its view with respect to the question of the King certainly the American, British, and Soviet Governments had not as yet done so. Macmillan suggested this was the kind of problem which should properly be discussed informally by the Advisory Council before its formal presentation through diplomatic channels.

It was in just such an exchange of views and information, he thought, that the Council could be most helpful to the several governments in reaching the wisest solution of matters of such importance. Vyshinsky pointed out that the question of the King could not be treated by itself, but that it inevitably brought in its wake many other important and related problems. He believed that the Advisory Council would need more information before it could properly form its opinion. With Massigli's agreement it was decided to defer further discussion of the question until some not too distant future meeting when the other members would have been able to ascertain the positions of their respective governments.

4. An exchange of views of the members' impressions, derived from the recent trip of the Advisory Council to Italy, revealed reasonable satisfaction with Allied control operations in general. Vyshinsky stated that his only observation was one he had made before, namely, that Allied authorities were too cautious in the matter of extension of political liberty in Italy, but he recognized that considering the importance of the current military operations the Advisory Council should itself be cautious for the time being with respect to the recommendations it might make to the Commander in Chief. A memorandum submitted to the Advisory Council by AMG officials in Naples on the subject of increasing the number of newspapers and political publications in that area received general approval, but at Vyshinsky's request it was agreed to recommend that if possible the projected measures be accomplished in a shorter period of time than the memorandum contemplated.

5. Macmillan proposed a procedure for the examination of requests from political exiles for permission to return to Italy which envisaged their being handled entirely by the Allied Control Commission and the Italian Government except in cases where the Commander in Chief specifically desired an opinion from the Advisory Council.

Vyshinsky referred the proposal to his Government and it will be taken up again at the next meeting.

6. With respect to Ercoli's desire to return to Italy, I joined in the Council's recommendation to permit his return as authorized in the Department's 147, January 15, 2 p. m. Since the Italian Government had already expressed its agreement the matter was referred to the Commander in Chief.

Please bring foregoing to attention of Murphy.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow and London. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/965 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944—4 p. m.

248. For Reinhardt. Your 216, January 22, 11 a. m. In the Department we have come to the conclusion as a matter of policy that reorganization of the Government of Italy should no longer be delayed. When the decision was taken to permit the present "government of technicians" to carry on until the Allied armies should reach Rome, it was generally believed that that interval would be a question of weeks rather than months. We now feel that the reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis should be undertaken without further delay and that the liberal forces in Italy should be permitted to proceed forthwith to the setting up of a representative Italian regime to function until the full liberation of Italy.

We have come to the further conclusion that no political reconstruction under the present King is possible. It is our opinion that he will never abdicate voluntarily; that the longer his abdication is postponed the more difficult it will be to facilitate it and that, particularly, his return to Rome will strengthen, if anything, his own determination to remain.

In outlining the above policy we do not intend to go into the constitutional question of the monarchy as an institution and a form of government. The form of government in line with our announced policy should be left to the determination of the Italian people when all of their country has been liberated. We would like your comments, after consulting with Reber, of what steps we should take to implement the policy set forth above.

We are definitely opposed to the return of Victor Emmanuel to Rome as King even for a short visit for the reasons stated above.

HULL

865.01/978 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 26, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received January 27—2:21 a. m.]

270. From L'Heureux.³² During a long conversation with MacFarlane on January 24, the King gave him a document summarizing his political intentions and suggested that it be publicized before the conference at Bari January 28. MacFarlane reports that the King wanted the program published without coming directly from himself. AFHQ has advised MacFarlane there is no objection to publication of the King's intentions and that the method of publication can be decided by the King.

As summarized by MacFarlane these intentions are: Until the Government is established in Rome, the present cabinet will remain in charge; a new cabinet will be formed as soon as Rome is reached, on a broad basis, giving representation to all parties and eliminating men in any way compromised by fascism; a new Chamber of Deputies to be elected within 4 months after end of war; political institutions to be discussed freely by Parliament which will proceed to make as far-reaching reforms as it desires; being called on to freely express their will, the people will be the supreme master of their fate; the will of the people as expressed by freely elected representatives will be faithfully followed by the Crown; the authority of the State, essential to carrying on the war against the German and Fascist remnants, would be jeopardized by any different line of conduct at this delicate juncture. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/979 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 26, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:28 p. m.]

271. From L'Heureux. Our 216, January 22. MacFarlane reports that in talks with the King and Badoglio January 24 both again strongly urged that they be permitted to enter Rome as soon as possible after occupation by Allies. They contended it was imperative that the King contact leading politicians in Rome and attempt to form a broad based Government as quickly as possible. Badoglio reiterated that he felt entering Rome with the King would mark the end of his task and that he did not intend to remain in office after

³² Hervé L'Heureux, Secretary and Consul at Algiers.

that although he always would be loyally at Allied disposal. MacFarlane said he told Badoglio and the King that consideration is being given to the question of their entering Rome. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

740.00119 Control Italy/60

The Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation to the Department of State

[Translation]

No. 306

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1944.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The British Government has just given its consent to the admittance of a Representative of the Soviet Government and a Representative of the French Committee of National Liberation to the Allied Control Commission in Italy.

The War Department has likewise consented to the admittance of the Soviet Representative, but it has still reserved its reply with respect to the admittance of the French Representative.

The French Committee of National Liberation has felt keenly this difference of treatment. It deems that the very particular importance of Franco-Italian relations, and of the problems to be settled between France and Italy, give the Committee a right, at least equal to that of the other Governments represented on the Consultative Council for Italian Affairs, to participate likewise in the work of the Allied Control Commission. Substantial French forces are at present fighting in Italy at the side of the Allies. It would be scarcely conceivable that the French Committee of National Liberation, which is making these forces available to the Inter-Allied High Command, should not be immediately represented on the Allied Control Commission, which is at present the only organization qualified to enter into contact with the Italian authority and to follow up the questions to which the evolution of the military and political situation in Italy gives rise.

Acting on instructions of the Committee, the Delegate³³ in the United States of the French Committee of National Liberation has the honor to invite, in a very urgent manner, the attention of the Department of State to this question,³⁴ and it begs the Department to intervene to the end that the War Department may grant to our request, as soon as possible, the same equitable reception that the said request has received from the British authorities.

³³ Henri Hoppenot.

³⁴ In a letter dated February 11, the Department informed Mr. Hoppenot that instructions had been dispatched to the American representative on the Advisory Council for Italy stating that the Government approves the participation by a representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in the Allied Control Commission for Italy on the same basis as the Soviet representative (740.00119 Control Italy/61d).

740.00119 Control Italy/34 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1944—8 p. m.

159. Department's telegram no. 114, January 20, 6 p. m.³⁵ The Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed General Wilson on January 21 that the appointment of a Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Italy was approved and that the question of French representation on the Commission was still under consideration. You should inform Mr. Molotov of the action taken by the Chiefs of Staff with respect to Soviet representation.

HULL

865.01/985 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 27, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:44 p. m.]

281. From L'Heureux. A message from the Rome Committee is carried by three representatives who have arrived in southern Italy for the political conference convening at Bari tomorrow, according to a report from General MacFarlane to Allied Force Headquarters. MacFarlane understands that the message recapitulates the October 16 declaration³⁶ calling for assumption of all constitutional powers of the state by an extraordinary government. He comments that this phrase is purposely vague because of apparent lack of full agreement among the Rome Committee as to whether these powers should be assumed by the proposed extraordinary government itself or delegated to it by the King.

The more responsible party leaders in Naples have indicated in conversations with MacFarlane, he adds, that they are determined to avoid any action in the conference that might prejudice their future position. He is assured Sforza and Croce will strive to keep the meeting orderly and preserve the agreed policy that until all Italy is liberated so the people can make their own choice there can be no fundamental change in the Government's structure. There is little doubt, however, that the trend of the meeting will be against Victor Emmanuel and his unwillingness to abdicate until conclusion peace.

MacFarlane also reports that leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties in Naples recently refused a new request by Badoglio to serve in the Cabinet until liberation of Rome and the establishment of a new government because they were unwilling to compromise their

³⁵ This telegram repeated to Moscow the Department's telegram 130, January 13, to Algiers, p. 997.

³⁶ Declaration made by the six anti-Fascist parties in Rome.

position regarding the King for this interval and there had been no change in this situation since Badoglio's similar efforts in October.

MacFarlane intends to see Badoglio today and has agreement of General Alexander³⁷ to propose February 10 as a date for transfer of territory to Italian administration since it will take that long for the Italian Government to become settled in Salerno. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/986 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 27, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received January 28—1:35 a. m.]

283. From L'Heureux. See Reinhardt's No. 216, January 22, 11 a. m., numbered paragraph 1. For the Department's information, General MacFarlane has informed AFHQ that Armellini reports from Rome that despite communication to the six parties thereof an AFHQ request that there be no open political activity in Rome between departure of the Germans and entry of the Allies, the party of Action has adopted resolution affirming its intention of expressing the will of national resurgence at the moment of enemy evacuation.

In response to Armellini's request for very specific instructions to be made known to the political leaders, MacFarlane proposed that Badoglio send Armellini a telegram repeating that Allied authorities will not tolerate any open activity after German evacuation of Rome until authorized by the Allied military commander in Rome. The telegram emphasizes that the city will be under absolute control of Allied military command.

Badoglio suggested that the message be sent by the Allied Commander in Chief rather than by himself. AFHQ assumed that this might be due to some apprehension on Badoglio's part that it might not be obeyed and so instructed MacFarlane to insist that the telegram go in Badoglio's name rather than run the risk of disobedience of an order directly from the Commander in Chief. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/1079

The Head of the Italian Government (Badoglio) to President Roosevelt

27 January, 1944.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT: General Donovan³⁸ has promised to represent to you my ideas on the present situation. I am very grateful to him

³⁷ Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

³⁸ William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

for this and will be grateful to you if you will give my ideas your kind consideration.

I only wish to confirm to you my dear President, that I, as an old soldier have only one aim in my actions, and only one guiding thought in mind: to help with all our forces the Allies to drive the Germans out of Italy. Any other question can be of only secondary importance.

But in order to be able to inspire and galvanize the country, I must receive assistance from you, because if I am always and only considered as the representative of a country that has been conquered and has asked for armistice, I cannot have the prestige to be able to give my people forceful leadership in the war of liberation. An act of generosity on your part would increase my strength in the greatest measure and enable me to furnish the contribution that the Allies are expecting from us.

My dear President, if Italy who is now fighting the same common enemy could be declared an ally, you would have the eternal gratitude of the Italians living in Italy and in the United States.

You will forgive me if I have approached the question in such a frank way, but I am a soldier and not a diplomat.

With the expression of my highest consideration I am

Sincerely yours,

BADOLIO

865.01/995: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 30, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 10:34 p. m.]

322. From L'Heureux. Following is a summary of General MacFarlane's report to Allied Force Headquarters on the opening session of the Bari Political Congress January 28:

With Albert Cianca presiding Croce made opening address criticizing the King and an alleged tendency by the Allies to keep persons of a Fascist character in power.

Longo Bardi, Socialist delegate from Rome, submitted a message from the Central Committee of National Liberation in Rome which declared that the Badoglio government had been unable to bring about effective participation of the nation in the fight against the invader and his Fascist servants or to contribute to resistance in German-held Italy. Therefore the present government must be replaced by an extraordinary government of National Liberation which should assume all constitutional powers without prejudicing national unity or the free expression of the people's will regarding the institutional question of the monarchy.

The Socialist, Communist, and Action Parties then presented a proposal based on the position of the Rome parties and claiming to represent the unanimous desire of the Italian people. This called for:

(1) A bill of indictment against the present government, citing all violations of statutes committed by the King.

(2) Proclamation by the Congress of itself as the representative assembly of liberated Italy, to be augmented by representatives of other provinces as fast as they are liberated, to meet in Rome as soon as possible and sit until a constituent assembly can be formed. Its duties would be: (a) formation of an extraordinary government on a wide base to unite the powers of the Crown and the dissolved Parliament; (b) intensification of the war effort; (c) preservation of liberties newly won.

(3) Appointment of an Executive Committee for liberated Italy to function pending Rome's liberation. This Committee would: (a) do everything necessary to carry out the (b) and (c) points of the preceding paragraph; (b) act as the Italian people's representative in relations with the United Nations; (c) promote mass action to assure verification of the powers and the legal foundation of the Congress; (d) through the Communal, Provincial and Trade Union organization set up in liberated territory by anti-Fascists take measures to alleviate the food situation, destroy the black market and eliminate employment.

The Congress decided that before taking any action on these proposals a definite program should be prepared by a group composed of two representatives of each of the parties. The result of this group's work was expected to be submitted to the Congress yesterday but as yet has not been reported here. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/998 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 31, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 9:35 p. m.]

324. From L'Heureux. My 322, January 30, 5 p. m. A compromise program formulated after refusal by the Christian Democrat and Liberal Parties to accept the proposal of the Socialist, Action, and Communist Parties was adopted by the Bari Congress yesterday. General MacFarlane reports.

This program calls for:

(1) Organization promptly of a government possessing all necessary powers and including representatives of each of the 6 parties;

(2) A constituent assembly to be created immediately upon cessation of hostilities;

(3) Abdication of Victor Emmanuel.

Establishment of an executive committee including representatives of all parties to bring about the foregoing objectives was then voted by the Congress.

Abdication of the King was considered an essential condition for unification of Italian effort by Congress although it agreed that immediate solution of the institutional question is not allowed by the present situation. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

740.00119 Control Italy/52: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 3, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received February 4—7: 12 a. m.]

356. For Wilson.³⁹ In an after dinner conversation last night Massigli drew me aside and said that he wished to express to me personally and through me to you his deep disappointment at the delay in permitting French representation on Allied Control Commission in Italy. While he did not specifically so state it was apparent from the general tenor of his conversation that he felt that the opposition to such participation came entirely from the United States. Massigli said that if France were refused participation in the labors of the Control Commission it would not only be a heavy blow to the prestige of the French nation but that the work of the Advisory Council would be adversely affected. He developed at some length the importance of Franco-Italian relations and necessity from French point of view that France should take part in actual solution of Italian affairs.

I replied that it was my understanding that no definite decision had been taken in the matter and added that the problem which concerned itself mainly with Italian affairs appeared to be on outside of my province. I agreed, however, that I would transmit his views to you.

I learn on reliable authority that Massigli did not inform de Gaulle⁴⁰ prior to his departure for Brazzaville of the results of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Council (see my telegram 259, January 25, 11 a. m. [2 p. m.] from Reinhardt). De Gaulle returned to Algiers yesterday but it is doubtful whether he had seen Massigli before the dinner last night.

This morning Reinhardt called by request on Hubert Guerin, Massigli's alternate on the Advisory Council, who repeated to him similar arguments and expressed grave concern.

CHAPIN

³⁹ Presumably Edwin C. Wilson, American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers.

⁴⁰ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Committee of National Liberation.

865.01/1023 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 6, 1944—noon.

[Received February 7—2: 58 p. m.]

383. From Reinhardt. Yesterday morning the Executive Junta of the six parties represented at the Bari Congress called on General MacFarlane to communicate to him the immediate tasks which the parties they represented had entrusted to them. These tasks were (1) to secure abdication of King; and (2) prepare formation of a government with full powers including some of those exercised by the head of the state. This Government would continue in office until such time as general elections would be possible after all Italy had been liberated.

Their spokesman stressed fact they represented those elements of Italian people who had always been anti-Fascist and they represented a large majority of population of liberated Italy. They asserted that the King's Government was and evidently must remain weak and without influence and that it was self-evident that he would never be able to form a broad-based government. Unfortunately a situation was now being created in Italy which amounted to a complete political deadlock. Only speedy substitution for King's Government of a government by the parties which they represented would enable Italy to contribute more effectively than at present to common fight against Germans.

MacFarlane made no comment on their statement but assured the delegation that Allied Governments were being kept closely informed of the Italian political situation. He undertook to forward to the Allied Governments the program they had presented together with their representations that the situation be dealt with urgently. He made it clear to them that the preservation of the tranquility of the country and its administration was of highest importance.

General MacFarlane comments that although the Executive Junta of the opposition parties appears to be considering the taking of active steps in an endeavor to implement their program, it seems equally clear that they do not know what tactics they should employ. They would appear to be anxious to obtain views of Allied Governments on political situation in general and on the tactics which might safely be adopted by them. MacFarlane is of the opinion that it is daily becoming more apparent that the situation regarding the views of the Allied Governments in these respects requires clarification with some degree of urgency. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/1030 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 8, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received February 9—2:30 a. m.]

403. From Reinhardt from Reber. I am in full accord with the general lines of the Department's recommendations as regards the King contained in its telegram No. 248, January 25, and welcome this guidance. I do not believe however, that the longer the King's abdication is postponed the more difficult it will become to facilitate, or that a visit to Rome will strengthen his position. His delay in abdicating and the weakness of his present Government have already greatly diminished what was left of his prestige; and there is evidence that he, himself, is conscious that his position has not been consolidated in recent months.

It is clear that in the face of the Bari Congress resolution and the continued inability of the Badoglio government as at present constituted to gain sufficient support to enable it to proceed more rapidly to the implementation of its program of action and "de-Fascistization", little substantial progress toward the rehabilitation of the country can be made. There is no doubt that the King must go. The question of "when" is, however, not so easy to answer. There is as yet no alternative coalition government in sight in southern Italy. As explained in Fargo telegram No. 701, February 3, (Algiers 375, February 6 [5], 9 p. m.⁴¹) no agreement as to what might follow the King's abdication appears to have been achieved and the parties themselves seem to have no clear program. Whether one is possible prior to the liberation of Rome is open to doubt. The leaders of the parties themselves apparently prefer to defer action until Rome, unless its liberation is long postponed; and only a few such as Sforza are prepared to take decision before the national leaders are available. In this connection it is worth noting that Sforza's position seems to have been weakened since his arrival. His speech at Bari did not help him and we are informed that selfish motives are now being generally attributed to him particularly by the Communists.

Our information as to the attitude of the Rome leaders is very meager. Their delegate to Bari brought a declaration to the effect that the six parties in Rome had agreed that the position of the parties in regard to "the appointment of an extraordinary Government of National Liberation, assuming all the constitutional powers of the state, without compromising national concord and without prejudice to the free expression of the popular will as regards the institutional form, represents the essential condition which will enable Italy to

⁴¹ Not printed.

conduct the war with the necessary strength and to insure its own future". This, however, adds little in clarity to their October declaration and seems to reflect the same compromise as the Bari resolution.

In Fargo telegrams Nos. 498, January 25 and 701, February 3 (Algiers 281, January 27 and 374 [375], February 5, 9 p. m.⁴²) we have endeavored to explain the difference between the two contrasting points of view; that of the Action Party group on the one hand and that of the liberal Christian Democrat group on the other. The solution envisaged by the first group, which provides for the assumption of all constitutional powers by a government of the six parties, with or without the consent of the monarchy, would mean that the balance was weighed in favor of the eventual republic. We are informed that regardless of the potential dangers inherent in the coexistence of two governments, members of this group look to the creation of such government in the capital even before Allied troops have arrived. The second alternative, which provides for specific delegation of powers by the monarchy and a continuity of authority, would leave a member of the House of Savoy or possibly a regency in a nominal position enabling either in the interval before the constituent assembly to influence the latter's choice in favor of the continuance of the monarchy. It is difficult for these reasons to persuade either group to accept the proposals of the other. Although both have agreed to postpone the institutional question, neither wishes to adopt a compromise which in their opinion might later prejudice their position.

The King, with the knowledge that the opposition is divided and can only claim to represent a section of the country, is apparently not disposed now to take any action. He, like the parties, is waiting for Rome. He has, however, reiterated his promise to consult the leaders and form his representative government. It seems unlikely that he will be able, and the question of his abdication could then be pressed.

In the meanwhile it would be of little advantage to the Allied cause and to the military effort in Italy to insist upon the King's abdication without a definite substitute government in view. It's becoming increasingly evident that, unless the Allied Governments are prepared to put forward and support an alternative program, such a substitute government will not be achieved before Rome. In fact even then the Allies will probably have to decide which alternative to favor and use their influence to secure its general acceptance. An early decision as to Allied policy is, therefore, desirable. Prior to that time we might well encourage the Executive Junta of the six parties to go to work and endeavor to prepare an agreed program for adoption in Rome although its present composition does not inspire us with confidence

⁴² Latter not printed.

that it can succeed. Twenty years of fascism have so destroyed the fabric of the Italian state that its rapid recreation along democratic lines without outside help is difficult to envisage.

Before any other government can be permitted to assume office the Allied Governments must be guaranteed that the obligations under the armistice and those subsequently taken by Badoglio both in fulfillment of the armistice obligations and in connection with the transfer of territory will be loyally fulfilled and in the same spirit of cooperation as now evidenced, for example, by the Italian Air Force, Navy, and other technical services. In spite of the deficiencies of the present government and its political ineptitude we must recognize that up to the present it has carried out its obligations and has considerably facilitated the prosecution of the campaign. More effective collaboration is however possible. Whether or not this is attainable depends upon the nature of the government to be created and the attitude of the Allied Governments in regard to it. [Reinhardt, Reber.]

CHAPIN

865.01/1021 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944—midnight.

416. For Reinhardt. Reference your 382, February 6, 8 p. m.⁴³ Department concurs in your recommendation that you refrain from taking Sforza into your confidence at the present time with respect to contents of the Department's telegram no. 248, January 25, 4 p. m. However, it is still of the opinion that you should inform your French colleague on the Advisory Council of this Government's attitude with respect to Victor Emmanuel and the reconstitution of the Italian Government. As you have pointed out, the Advisory Council would appear to be the appropriate place for discussion and exchange of views on this important question. You have already informed your British colleague and it would appear desirable and even necessary that your French colleague be informed of our position without further delay. In your experience on the Advisory Council your British and French colleagues have on several occasions been in open agreement on recommendations formally introduced in which you were not in a position to concur. In this instance it would not appear necessary to postpone discussion among Council members until our own and the British view are reconciled particularly since delay favors the British position.

We agree that it is desirable to obtain a coordinated opinion of the Advisory Council on these questions before making them known to the Italians.

HULL

⁴³ Not printed.

740.00119 Control Italy/52 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1944—8 p. m.

455. For Reinhardt. Your 259, January 25, 2 p. m. and 356 of February 3, 4 p. m. The President has approved the appointment of a French representative to the Allied Control Commission on the same basis as the Soviet representative. You should inform your French colleague of this Government's approval of French representation on the Control Commission and take the earliest opportunity to concur with the recommendation already endorsed by the other members of the Advisory Council that a French representative be admitted to the Commission.

STEMINIUS

865.01/1030 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1944—7 p. m.

468. For Reinhardt and Reber. The British Ambassador⁴⁴ called on the Secretary on February 9 to discuss our attitude toward the King of Italy.⁴⁵ The Secretary said that when the Department had recommended that the King not be permitted to go to Rome and that other arrangements be considered in connection with the political situation it appeared that the Allied armies would be in Rome within a few days, whereas it now appeared that they would not be there for some time to come. The Secretary added that therefore the application of our attitude toward the King was not of the same urgency as formerly.

On February 11 Mr. Dunn⁴⁶ discussed the same question with Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy.⁴⁵ Mr. Dunn said that the Secretary had directed him to say that while the position of this Government with respect to the King remained as described in our telegram number 248, January 25, 4 p. m. to you we had no present intention of taking any steps which would cause any difficulties in the very critical present military situation in Italy. However, Mr. Dunn went on to say that it appeared desirable for our two governments (British and American) to arrive at an agreed position with respect to the King; that the discussion of this matter did not involve the constitutional question of the monarchy as an institution and form of government; that we felt very strongly that it would not be possible to make any progress with reconstruction, either economic

⁴⁴ Lord Halifax.

⁴⁵ Memorandum of conversation not printed.

⁴⁶ James Clement Dunn, Director, Office of European Affairs.

or political, in Italy under Victor Emmanuel and that it would be well to have a formula agreed upon between the two governments with a view to its being put into effect at the earliest possible date practicable. Mr. Dunn added that one phase of the whole problem on which we felt very strongly was that Victor Emmanuel should not be permitted to return to Rome as King even for a visit and that the question of the formation of a government without him should be solved if possible before the Allies arrive in Rome.

The President has seen Naf 612⁴⁷ from General Wilson and has likewise received the following telegram from the Prime Minister:

"I am much concerned at any attempt at working with Sforza and the Italian Junta at this critical moment in the battle. If you read Sforza's original letter to Berle⁴⁸ you will see how completely he has broken his undertaking. I do beg that no decisions will be taken without our being consulted and without you and me trying to reach agreement. We are in for a very heavy struggle on the Italian front."

In view of these messages the President has requested the Secretary to take the necessary action to ensure that "no effort is made by the United States Government to effect any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time and until our military situation in the Italian campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied armies." (Underlining is the President's).

We also have seen Naf 612 and, while our policy remains as described to you in our 248, you should of course hold in abeyance any steps looking to the implementation of our position prior to a clearing up of the present critical military situation in Italy in order to avoid any action detrimental to our war effort. However, you should make it clear to your British colleagues that our position remains the same with respect to the King and the early reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis. Reinhardt should inform Massigli in utmost confidence of our position as described in this telegram and our 248 emphasizing that we do not intend to press this position on the Allied Commander-in-Chief at this time because of the present critical military situation. He should inform Macmillan of this action and say that we consider it important to have the French informed of our position.

We are grateful for Reber's helpful comments repeated in Algiers' 403 of February 8 and endorse his suggestion that the Allied authorities encourage the Executive Junta of the six parties to begin working

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; for letter, see telegram 1944, November 8, 1943, 5 p. m. from Algiers, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 420.

in earnest and endeavor to prepare an agreed program for adoption in Rome.

We consider that whatever the solution, the Americans and British should begin working toward an agreed policy immediately. It is suggested that the discussions might best be carried on at Algiers between Reinhardt and Macmillan with the cooperation of Reber and Caccia⁴⁹ if available. Any agreed policy could then be made known to the Executive Junta which would be given assurances of our support within the framework of such a solution. This should inspire the parties, united in their desire to depose the present King, to adopt a more vigorous and positive attitude toward the solution of the problem than they are at present demonstrating.

STETTINIUS

865.01/1064 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 16, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 10:39 p. m.]

494. From Reinhardt. General Wilson has handed Makins⁵⁰ and me a communication from General MacFarlane with which was enclosed together with other documents a telegram from Croce and Sforza addressed to the Secretary, Eden, and Molotov.

The text which is transmitted in my immediately following telegram,⁵¹ represents the redraft of a more impetuous and less coherent message which demanded forceful Allied intervention to rid Italy of Badoglio and the King and which, MacFarlane induced Sforza and Croce to withdraw.

In his accompanying memorandum MacFarlane urges the Allied Governments to choose one of two alternative policies at an early date. He points to the growing vocal opposition to the Badoglio government and to the possibility that, having no other means of getting its way and due to the delay in reaching Rome, it might be tempted to resort to direct action. He thinks therefore that it is no longer safe to sit by and do nothing and proposes as the two alternative courses: (1) To bring pressure on the King to abdicate if, as is most likely, he refuses to do so of his own volition. This would leave the way clear to the possible succession of the Crown Prince and the reformation of representative government which might include

⁴⁹ Harold Caccia, British Vice President of the Allied Control Commission.

⁵⁰ Roger M. Makins, Assistant to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

⁵¹ *Infra*.

Badoglio. (2) To warn the opposition including their leaders in Rome that no interference with the Badoglio administration will be tolerated until we get to Rome. MacFarlane believes it might be possible to get the available leaders to agree to this although they have already told him that they could not guarantee the action of less responsible elements.

It is MacFarlane's opinion as well as that of his responsible advisers that it is necessary to take one course or the other and that from the local point of view the first would appear to present greater advantages and fewer dangers to the Allied cause than the second.

General Wilson discussed the matter with General Devers,⁵² Makins and me and it was the General's preliminary view that the present developments do not warrant any modification of the decision that no political change should be allowed to occur during the present phase of the military operations and that any efforts by the political leaders to stir up trouble at this time by direct action should be firmly discouraged. I pointed out that while my Government agreed to this as a short term policy I doubted whether it would be prepared to maintain the position if the capture of Rome was long deferred.

MacFarlane has been asked to prepare for the Commander-in-Chief a considered estimate of the effect the abdication of the King might have on the Italian Armed Forces and thus upon the prosecution of the war in Italy.

It was generally agreed that the circumstance, whether any political change is the result of direct Allied intervention or is worked by the Italians themselves, will have an important bearing in this connection.

Generals Wilson and Devers are proceeding to Italy where they will see MacFarlane and it is proposed to review the position on their return to Algiers at the end of the week.

The texts of MacFarlane's memorandum, the two telegrams prepared by Croce and Sforza together with a supporting legal document are being forwarded by airmail.⁵³

I am preparing a supplementary telegram on the foregoing indicating the latest developments in the political situation at Naples. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

⁵² Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

⁵³ Copies transmitted to the Department by Mr. Reinhardt, Acting American member of the Advisory Council for Italy, in his despatch 428, February 16; received March 2. One of the telegrams prepared by Croce and Sforza is quoted in telegram 495, *infra*.

S65.01/1065 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 16, 1944—noon.

[Received February 17—2:43 a. m.]

495. From Reinhardt. The following is the text of a telegram from Sforza and Croce to the Foreign Ministers of United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union dated Naples, February 10.

“Being in constant intimate touch with the six parties but being personally independent our appraisalment of the situation might perhaps be useful.

Junta sent letter to King urging him abdicate immediately for nation's and war effort sake.

Most probably King will not unless he receives secret hint from Allies who alone have the force.

If abdicating in favor of his son present Cabinet is obliged by our laws to resign at once into the hands of new King.

But no responsible statesman will accept form a new Cabinet unless new King signs decree yielding all military civil powers to an extraordinary government or to a Lieutenant General (*luogotenente*) of Realm chosen among some most respected private citizens. A scheme communicated to General MacFarlane shows all this is consistent with precedents.

New King will accept at once this condition if same secret hint takes place it being understood that new rulers assure respect of national consultation of whole liberated nation. All this [should] seem imperative to Allies as to us because a second Cabinet of generals and officials would mean complete lack of popular support and because only a Cabinet including six parties may save Italy from growing disintegration and may start war effort. We, too, for example are decided not to join Cabinet on different conditions since silent acceptance of this compromise has been maximum reached from Leftist parties and since a minor formula would not be accepted North.

Necessary to form new Cabinet at once in order to avoid possible serious danger of two governments, one in Salerno and one in Rome, dreamed of by daring elements there.

First duties of new Cabinet:

1. To include only four or five Ministers, each keeping various interims, in order to make easy and immediate a reshaping of Cabinet when in Rome.

2. To reaffirm not only most complete loyalty to armistice rules but add that supreme duty is to organize much more intimate collaboration than at present with Allies for war effort and future general policy.

3. In order to avoid depressing influence of defeated pro-Nazi generals to create only one civilian Minister for National Defense with three military Under Secretaries, the names of which are ready.

4. In order to create new war atmosphere to try and eliminate all big military and civil Fascists who betrayed last September

but to forgive all minor Fascists, urging them to rehabilitate in war.

5. Knowing that present big army is definitely made [*rotten*]⁵⁴ to create only a small decent standing army South, and organize volunteers North, which has never been done in a national form.

6. New government is sure of its will because it knows it has no other means to assert itself and save Italy."

[Reinhardt]
CHAPIN

865.01/2168

*Memorandum by the Executive Junta of the Italian Committee of Liberation to the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission for Italy (MacFarlane)*⁵⁵

I. *Premise:*

The Executive Junta has received a mandate from the Congress of Bari to prepare the way for a strong Government which reflects the anti-Fascist spirit of the Italian people. The Executive Junta believes, therefore, that it is its duty to submit to the Allied Governments a plan of solution of the Italian crisis which, while remaining within the limits of our constitutional law, would postpone to the end of hostilities the institutional problem, would reduce to a minimum the harshness of the present political strife, would allow the formation of a truly anti-Fascist Government representative of the Italian nation, and would create that harmony of the people as necessary to the war effort, as it is to the effort of reconstruction.

II. *Proposal of Solution:*

For well known reasons the anti-Fascist parties do not under any condition intend to collaborate with the present King of Italy. Victor Emmanuel III ought, therefore, to abdicate.

The present Prince of Piedmont would succeed. It can not be forgotten that the Prince was personally in command of the group of armies that attacked France, and that as "Inspector of the Infantry" he has his share of responsibility in the dark page written by the Italian army on the 8th of September.⁵⁶ Nor can his numerous acts of friendly support of Fascism and its Duce be forgotten. It may, however, be admitted that his responsibilities are less great than those of his father.

⁵⁴ Corrected on basis of copy of message transmitted to the Department in despatch 428, February 16, from the Acting American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy.

⁵⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by Mr. Reinhardt in his despatch 436, February 24; received March 9.

⁵⁶ Following the announcement on September 8, 1943, of Italy's surrender to the Allies, the King, Badoglio, and the Italian High Command left Rome early the following day without issuing any orders for the Italian Army.

The Parties would, therefore, accept his presence with the express reservation that he should delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers by a specific act of his own and for a definite period of time.

This reservation is essential because all of the most dangerous elements of Fascism, in alliance with those military gangs which, afraid of being called to account and intending to defend their untenable positions at any cost, are regrouping themselves automatically around the Monarchy and the surviving Monarchical forces.

By accepting the Government under different conditions, Italian anti-Fascism would expose itself to three most serious dangers:

(1) to see the reforming and re-organization of Fascist military and reactionary groups in the heart of the state administration and around the person and prerogatives of the King. By an act of force or by a simple gesture of the Sovereign these groups might return to power and at an opportune moment nullify the will of the people. Sooner or later this would mean revolution;

(2) To see unconscious or open sabotage of the war effort as is happening today;

(3) To see itself disavowed by the Italian people as a whole and by its supporters in that part of Italy which is still occupied. These supporters have already made it explicitly known that they do not accept any other solution.

In summary, it is today necessary that the King abdicate and that upon ascending the Throne, Humbert cede his constitutional powers to an individual or collective Lieutenancy which can inspire the trust of the country and which in any event does not include a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier. The Lieutenancy should then proceed to the immediate constitution of an anti-Fascist Government. All of the foregoing should last to the time when war conditions will permit the convocation of an Assembly regularly elected by the Italian people.

III. *Constitutional Aspects of the Proposal:*

The proposal as outlined above is consistent with the practice of our constitutional law. In fact, Victor Emmanuel II as well as Humbert I and Victor Emmanuel III have in the past ceded some of the powers granted them by the "Statuto Albertino" in favor of Lieutenants.

Moreover the present King approved the law which created the Fascist Grand Council and which even permitted that body to intervene to determine the order of succession to the Throne. He has also divested himself of the most specifically royal of the powers granted him by the constitution when he yielded the supreme command of the armed forces to Mussolini.

Therefore, on juridical grounds, it can not be seen why the Crown should hesitate to adopt a procedure the duration of which would be

strictly limited and the purpose of which would be clearly defined more particularly so since now this procedure would correspond to the desires and to the requirements of the country.

IV. *Means of Achieving the Determined Goal:*

The Allies have always declared that they desire the Italian people to be free to choose their own Government and the institutions which will in the future govern their political life. Consequently they are affirming their strict neutrality in Italian political strife on the condition that this strife not be harmful to their war effort against Germany.

The Executive Junta deeply appreciates this view and is grateful for the sincerity of the effort to put it in practice.

It must nevertheless point out that in spite of everything Allied action in Italy takes the form of a support given to the personal Government of the King and of Badoglio. A clear indication has been given to the King in every way possible in existing circumstances that his person stands as an obstacle to national unity. No one who is political or morally responsible has agreed to collaborate with him and the unanimous vote of the Bari Congress has disqualified him. He, however, stubbornly refuses to give way and poses the question of using force which for the present the Parties refuse to use because of their sense of responsibility to the Allies.

Therefore should the Allies approve the moderate and transectional formula posed by the Executive Junta they must make this clearly understood by Victor Emmanuel III and the House of Savoy.

Only in this way will it be possible without violence and disturbance to achieve the result for which all true Italians are longing. Whereas the present *status quo* is guaranteed through the weight of Allied strength and through the respect which the anti-Fascist Parties have for the Allies, they unwillingly find themselves in the position of blocking the will of the Italian people and acting not only against the principles which they themselves have affirmed but even against their most obvious interests.

V. *When Action Should be Taken:*

It is necessary to act immediately first because the situation is tense and is worsening every day. The solution now presented is valid today but may be superseded tomorrow by the state of public opinion or by more serious events; secondly because the Parties and the patriots of occupied Italy see that this equivocal situation is being prolonged, depriving them of any organic direction and help and preventing free Italians from fighting. Should the occasion arise they might therefore decide to have recourse to their own solutions far more radical than

those put forward by the Junta. Such initiatives would not only make the already tense political situation even more grave, but they would in all probability force the Junta radically to review its attitude toward the people responsible for further Italian suffering.

VI. Conclusion:

The Executive Junta believes that it is fulfilling its duty by submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments. Its duty would not be fulfilled entirely until the Junta did not also call the attention of the Allied Governments to the extreme gravity of the Italian situation and to the urgency of a solution. The Allies know that the King and his Government, conscious of their faults which are perhaps even greater than we think, do not hesitate to use the worst scoundrels who may become efficacious instruments of the reaction and of the civil war that is being prepared. A few of these have apparently been eliminated, only after direct Allied intervention.

The Allies know that an absolutely unjustifiable increase of the "Arma dei Carabinieri" and of the "Guardie di Finanza" is in the course of development. Ex-Fascists, ex-members of the Fascist militia are being shamelessly recruited even for the highest ranks.

The Allies know that except in the large towns and in places directly controlled by them freedom of press, freedom of meeting and even personal freedom are nothing but verbal expressions. The Allies also know that the blood of the anti-Fascists has already been spilled as a result of royal reaction. As an example, the sanguinary incidents which took place in Montesano on the 12th of December may be cited.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the leaders of the Parties of the masses to restrain the understandable impatience of the population. The recent events occurring in Puglia (riots at Taranto, Canosa and in other communes) are of significance in this respect.

The Executive Junta therefore requests the Allied Governments to consider that its proposals are not the fruit of animosity or of party passions. They are the result of an examination developed with full knowledge of the causes and with the most serene objectivity. They represent the strict minimum by which a solution of the Italian situation can still be achieved.

Should this situation develop for the worse, it should be clear that the responsibility for it must neither be ascribed to the Italian people nor to their legitimate representatives.

Signed for the Executive Committee

The Secretary

FILIPPO CARACCILO

NAPLES, 18 February, 1944.

865.01/1070: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 18, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received February 19—3:24 a. m.]

530. From Reinhardt. MacFarlane reports that day before yesterday he called on the King at the latter's request in the villa in Ravello where the King and Queen are now living.

During the interview Count Aquarone⁵⁷ and other members of the King's personal staff in the ante-chamber told MacFarlane's personal assistant that the King would ask whether he should abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince since Italy was rapidly splitting into two camps which was a dangerous development and the worst possible for the country; that he would ask whether MacFarlane thought it possible to obtain guarantees that the Crown Prince would not be subjected to the same attacks as had been the King. He would also ask whether there would be any objection to his moving to Naples.

McFarlane reports that, as a matter of fact, the King spoke to him on entirely different lines. He dwelt on the urgency of his getting to Rome at the earliest possible moment, claiming that he would have no difficulty there in having some such responsible politician as Bonomi,⁵⁸ or Orlando,⁵⁹ form a new government. He expressed the view that abdication even in favor of the Crown Prince would have a very bad effect on the country and he complained that the Allied censorship and publicity in Bari were unfair and displayed a marked partiality in favor of his opponents.

The King thought that Badoglio was getting very tired and that his filling the ministerial posts in his Cabinet with comparatively unknown men was a great mistake. The King attributed in great part his present difficulties to Count Sforza and said that he had heard stories that the Allies wished him to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince and to install a government representing the opposition parties of the Bari Congress. He expressed the hope that there was no truth in these rumors and inquired whether MacFarlane thought he should make some personal reply to the Bari pronouncements. To this MacFarlane replied first that the country was, in fact, full of irresponsible rumors, and secondly that the King must decide for himself on the question of issuing any personal reply to the pronouncement of Bari Congress.

In transmitting foregoing MacFarlane states that he received following impressions:

⁵⁷ Tietro Acquarone, Minister in the Royal Household in Italy.

⁵⁸ Ivanoe Bonomi, Chairman of the Roman Committee of National Liberation.

⁵⁹ Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, President of the Italian Council of Ministers, 1917-19.

1. The King failed to speak on the lines anticipated by his immediate advisers and it seems clear that there is little possibility of his considering question of abdication before Rome is reached except under very strong pressure from the outside.

2. Apparently the King is either misinformed or at least not fully informed of present political situation. MacFarlane doubts if the message to him from the Executive Junta of the Committee of Liberation has been allowed to reach him.

[Reinhardt]
CHAPIN

865.01/2162 : Airgram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 19, 1944—noon.

[Received March 8—3 p. m.]

A-53. From Reinhardt. During the first week of February a deputation from Marshal Badoglio called on General MacFarlane to make representations concerning the lack of control of criticism of the Italian Government as well as concerning the activities of officials of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Allied Armed Forces in Italy. They raised the question of whether it should be permitted, so long as there is a constitutional monarchy in Italy, to give publicity to statements which bring the King and the armed forces into disrepute and undermine their prestige in the country. The deputation stressed the unfortunate effect which, in its opinion, the Bari Conference and the publicity given to it had had in particular on the officers of the Italian Navy, and stressed equally the fact that a very large proportion of the Italian population had been entirely unrepresented at Bari.

The delegation formulated the following specific requests which it considered were the conditions *sine qua non* for an efficient government activity:

1. The censorship which is exercised jointly by the Government and by the Allies must ensure that the head of the State and of the armed forces should not be continuously and basely insulted, and that the armed forces should not be constantly criticized and diminished in the eyes of public opinion.

The exercise of criticism, which any free government cannot but desire, must be kept within legal forms, and must represent a useful collaboration.

2. Government supporters and the opposition should be freely allowed to publish newspapers—both partisan and non-partisan.

3. The intervention of the P.W.B.⁶⁰ should be avoided in matters that concern policy, publications, choice of radio or newspaper collaborators, among both government and opposition supporters; it should be limited to the strict control of all publications and expressions of

⁶⁰ Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters.

public opinion, so as to keep them in harmony with the political and military conduct of the war.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Wilson, after considering the foregoing representations from Marshal Badoglio, instructed General MacFarlane to reply on the following lines:

(1) To say, with respect to the first point, that it is the Allied policy that there be free expression of public opinion in liberated Italy subject to the requirements of public order and security.

(2) To say, with respect to the second point, that such facilities as may be available for the publication of newspapers will be distributed impartially among all sections of public opinion.

(3) With respect to the third request to reply that the policy is that all Allied officers in Italy who are concerned with matters of censorship, propaganda or information will act on a basis of strict impartiality and without bias toward any section of Italian public opinion.

[Reinhardt]
CHAPIN

865.01/1075 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 19, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

537. From Reinhardt. Reber reports that last night a circular, numbered 1, from the Executive Junta was being circulated in Naples and reached several American and British correspondents. It was addressed to all employees and officials of the State, administrations and organizations, to be distributed by the provincial Committees of National Liberation and contained the allegation that because he failed to abdicate in response to the request of the Bari Congress the King has rebelled against the nation. The circular calls upon all officials and personnel of all state organizations, administrations and bodies both military and civil, "not to participate in rebellion of the King and his accomplices". It was clear that the circular constitutes an incitement to civil disobedience or even revolt although it did not [*sic*] say that all persons should remain at their posts in the service of the nation which has now resumed the exercise of its sovereign powers.

In view of the foregoing and with the approval of the CinC⁶¹ the Allied Control Commission imposed a complete censorship stoppage on military grounds. It appears however that AP correspondent had already filed a story based on the circular which may have been stopped. The AP office has protested against this censorship but it should be understood that the censorship was imposed not on political grounds but for reasons of military security.

⁶¹ Commander in Chief.

The CinC has informed the Junta that he cannot permit such encouragements to disorder.

A further report on the situation will be submitted later. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

740.00119 European War 1939/2557

*President Roosevelt to the Head of the Italian Government
(Badoglio)*

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1944.

MY DEAR MARSHAL BADOGLIO: General Donovan has handed me your letter of January 27, which will have my most earnest attention.

I thank you for expressing in this forthright way, as a soldier and patriot, your desire to give the greatest possible effectiveness to the effort the Italian armed forces are making to drive the Germans from their country and to find every means to unite, to strengthen, and to sustain the Italian people in this task.

I appreciate the candor of your letter. You will understand if I am equally frank. I do not underestimate the difficulties under which you and your countrymen have had to work in rendering that effective assistance so necessary to an early expulsion of the enemy. At the same time I feel that events since October 13⁶² have made it evident that until the Government of Italy can also include the articulate political groups of anti-Fascist, liberal elements within its composition it will not be possible for any Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require. There is, I understand, a plan for the reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis as soon as the present critical military situation will permit and not later than the liberation of Rome.

With all these considerations in mind I feel that it would be better to hold in abeyance any major changes in our present relationship.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

865.01/1091½: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 22, 1944—12 a. m.

[Received 9:08 p. m.]

573. From Reinhardt. Yesterday Victor Emmanuel asked General MacFarlane to call on him at Ravello saying that he had a very important communication to make to him.

⁶² Italy declared war on Germany October 13, 1943.

The King asked MacFarlane to inform the Allied Governments that he felt his position had become almost impossible owing to fact that the Allies had permitted him to be openly discredited and attacked through PWB and lax censorship. Therefore he proposed to create a lieutenancy in accordance with precedent and to nominate as Lieutenant of the Realm with full power the Crown Prince. Although the lieutenancy would come into operation only when Rome was reached he was prepared to make the announcement at once. This postponement was desired by the King because he wished to reenter Rome himself and because it would be easier there for the Crown Prince to form a government. The Badoglio government would resign on reaching Rome. In connection with the Government which the Crown Prince would form the King mentioned names of Bonomi, Orlando, and De Nicola.⁶³ This proposal was made, the King stated, on the understanding that he would be given assurances that there would be no more publicity given to attacks upon him by Italian press or radio. He was making a very great personal sacrifice in the interests of his country and he would not go an inch further he said. Furthermore, he would not permit the Crown Prince or his grandson to succeed him if he had to abdicate and the House of Savoy would thus no longer exist. De Nicola with whom he had discussed the above proposal was in favor of it. The King said that the only people on the Italian [apparent omission] Umberto, Aquarone, and Ferance of the Italian Foreign Office.

MacFarlane promised the King to forward his proposal and in due course to let him know reaction of Allied Governments.

MacFarlane makes the following comment:

1. There is no evidence to show that King's proposal might be acceptable to more than the Right Wing of the anti-Fascist group.
2. The King's categorical statement that this is the limit to which he will go should be treated with reserve.
3. The principal interest of this proposal is that it is the first indication that the King has really been impressed by the weight of the attacks made upon him.

[Reinhardt]

CHAPIN

865.01/1104: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 25, 1944—noon.

[Received 9:05 p. m.]

605. For the Acting Secretary from Reinhardt.

1. Yesterday Signor de Nicola called on General MacFarlane and said that the proposal which the King made to MacFarlane reported

⁶³ Enrico de Nicola, President of the Italian Council of Ministers in 1924, and a member of the Senate in 1929.

in Algiers' 573, February 22, noon, had been the result of his own efforts to find a solution to the present political impasse. De Nicola said that after obtaining the approval of Croce and Sforza to his proposals, he had spent 4 hours persuading the King to come to a decision. Croce and Sforza had now been informed of exactly how far the King is prepared to go and although they would much prefer action to be taken at once instead of being postponed until Rome, they were definitely prepared to accept the King's proposal.

2. Although De Nicola is doubtful that the King's proposals would prove acceptable to the three parties of the Left, he assured MacFarlane that he is quite certain they will be acceptable to the three parties of the Center. He emphasized fact that the Christian Democratic Party enjoys the support of a large proportion of the population.

3. De Nicola believes that if adopted, the King's proposal would insure the loyalty of the armed forces as Victor Emmanuel would remain titular King, while Humbert acted as Lieutenant of the Realm with the Royal powers unimpaired.

4. In the event the Allied Governments permit the King to follow his proposed course of action, the sequence of events would be the following:

a. Immediate announcement by Victor Emmanuel that upon reaching Rome, he would designate Humbert Lieutenant of the Realm with full Royal powers while he himself retaining only the title of King, retired from public life.

b. Once in Rome, the King would proceed directly to his villa not even going to the Quirinal.⁶⁴

c. The Badoglio Government would resign same day and Humbert would immediately call upon the Center Party's candidate for Prime Minister to form a government. This Government which would take office immediately would have been agreed upon before the arrival in Rome.

5. It was insisted upon by De Nicola that formation of the new Government must precede our arrival in Rome and that certain vacancies in the Cabinet must be reserved for leading politicians in that city.

6. According to De Nicola it should not be difficult to induce the [garbled group] until Rome. If De Nicola's information is correct (it was confirmed in the conversation yesterday between Reber and Sforza) this would appear to be an agreed solution between the Center Parties and the King which would be in accord with the policy outlined in Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons.⁶⁵

MacFarlane comments that this solution, however, might produce a situation in which we would find ourselves after arrival in Rome

⁶⁴ Royal palace in Rome.

⁶⁵ On February 22, 1944; for text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 397, cols. 679-701.

with a government of the Central one [*Center alone?*] and possibly a strong Left opposition which had no more possibility of making itself felt politically than at the present time. They might easily become a very disturbing factor in the new Italian administration. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/1113 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 27, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received February 28—12: 48 a. m.]

639. For the Acting Secretary from Reinhardt and Reber.

1. As we understand it present position of U.S. Government with regard to the Italian political issue is that no changes will be permitted at present time which might adversely affect military situation. The Prime Minister's statement to House of Commons would further indicate that U.S. has provisionally assured that the time when such changes might be contemplated would be after capture of Rome.

2. To implement such a policy and to minimize risk of disturbances behind the lines, it is essential however, that intervening period prior to Rome be utilized both by the King and by the opposition, with the encouragement of the Allies, to prepare a program for adoption in Rome. Otherwise we shall continue to be faced by the gap between the King and his people which might require imposition of radical solutions after Rome or even before if its liberation is greatly delayed. The maintenance of *status quo* without any assurance that a solution is under way would be likely to lead to pressure for direct action; therefore, not only must the parties be given some encouragement that a solution acceptable to them will be agreeable to Allied Governments but the King must also be encouraged to feel that the De Nicola proposal represents a step in the right direction.

3. At the present the primary importance of King's acceptance of this proposal is that it constitutes the first indication that Victor Emmanuel has begun to appreciate the depth of the feeling against him and to recognize that unless he does something to meet the wishes of the majority that feeling may easily turn against the institution of the monarchy itself. As at present conceived the proposal probably does not go far enough to secure a sufficient measure of acceptance to make possible collaboration of all parties. If after arrival in Rome a government of the Center alone can be formed a strong Left opposition would continue as a disturbing factor in the new Italian administration. Furthermore although King should retire for time

being to private life, he would always be in the background. His presence would complicate the issue between the monarchy and the republic. Sforza's advocacy of the proposal must moreover be considered in the light of his personal ambitions to become Prime Minister.

4. It is important to recognize that the King's decision now means that he is, without pressure from the Allied Governments, prepared to abandon his previous position. Consequently, although his plan may not be entirely satisfactory he must be required to make it known that he is considering a step of this sort and is ready to enter into negotiations looking toward an agreed settlement.

5. In the meanwhile the Junta's memorandum ⁶⁶ is still under consideration by the Allied Governments. The opposition has been warned and has agreed that pending this consideration they must do nothing to aggravate political tension. The reply, therefore, should not be too long delayed. Should it be necessary in that reply to state that no final solution is possible until Rome the opposition must be admonished to keep the truce until such time; but in order to maintain the degree of tranquility required by the military situation they must at the same time be shown that their views are influencing the final solution and that similarly the King's supporters will not be allowed on their side to take provocative action.

6. Since both sides are now awaiting an indication of Allied policy it is important that some guidance be given them. For this purpose an early Allied agreement is essential. The program should further be agreed prior to Rome as this will inevitably be a period of confusion and in particular the Allied commander desires to be in a position to give a directive to the Allied military governor in advance.

7. In answering the Junta memorandum or the King's message it would not be sufficient simply to reiterate that the entire position will be discussed after entry in Rome. Both factions have indicated that agreement is possible with respect to Humbert either as Lieutenant or as King with little or no power until such a time as the Constituent Assembly can ultimately decide the institutional question. From the local point of view it would, therefore, be most desirable if we could now inform them that the principles of the King's withdrawal in favor of Humbert has been approved by the Allies. The opposition could also be told that Victor Emmanuel had himself proposed the lieutenantancy. We could then bring pressure to bear on both factions to negotiate the conditions of succession and of the formation of the new government. [Reinhardt and Reber.]

CHAPIN

⁶⁶ Dated February 18, p. 1024.

865.01/2161a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1944—7 p. m.

686. For Reber. You will remember that in November the Italian Government inquired of the Control Commission of Allied intentions as regards the occupation of Rome. It is understood that in making this inquiry the Italian Government wished to preserve the status of the capital as an open city⁶⁷ and considered that under these circumstances it would not be possible for the Allied or Italian Governments or military headquarters to be set up there after its liberation.

The Foreign Office proposed to reply to the Italians along the following lines:

The British and American Governments have never recognized that Rome is an open city and have no intention of departing from their present attitude which is to ignore appeals addressed to them on that subject. The chances of a successful reconstruction of the Italian Government would be reduced if it were established outside Rome; the machinery of the Italian Government could function efficiently only through the various ministries in Rome; and that therefore the Italian Government should recognize that in its own interests as well as that of the Allies it should not throw away the advantage of reestablishing itself in Rome.

As the Department had the question up at that time with the President and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, we told the Embassy here that we were giving further consideration to the whole question but that we could not at that time concur in the British draft reply to the Italians.

The British have recently asked us again if we agreed with their position as stated in the draft reply to the Italians. The Embassy has been informed that, while we have not recognized Rome as an open city, we would not wish to make any statement to the Italians or publicly which would commit us or tie our hands with respect to any possible opportunity which might arise effectively to safeguard the religious and historical monuments of Rome during the battle for the capital; that we prefer to leave the door open on the question of the open city status of Rome and that, consequently, we could not concur with the first part of the proposed British reply to the Italian Government through the Control Commission. With respect to the Italian Government reestablishing itself in Rome, the Embassy was informed that we saw no objection to replying to the Italians along the lines in the latter part of the British draft to the effect that it would be to the advantage of the Italian Government to reestablish

⁶⁷ For correspondence regarding the appeals of the Vatican that the American and British Governments refrain from bombing Rome, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 910 ff.

itself in Rome after the liberation of the capital; that we had always anticipated that the Italian Government would reestablish itself in Rome.

Your recent reports would indicate that the Italian Government itself now intends to return to Rome and it may not be necessary to make any reply to the inquiry of last November.

STETTINIUS

865.01/2295

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

It is understood that as a result of the exchange of telegrams between the Prime Minister and the President⁶⁸ the decision has been reached that there should be no change in the present Italian administration or in the position of King Victor Emmanuel until after the liberation of Rome. His Majesty's Government have been considering the course of action which should be followed in Italy as a result of this decision, and have come to certain conclusions. These conclusions rest on the assumption that the capture of Rome will not be unduly delayed and will take place within a period not much exceeding three months. If it appears that this assumption will not be realised the policy proposed may require reconsideration.

2. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is necessary, in order to hold the position in Italy to the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the President, that King Victor Emmanuel, Marshal Badoglio and the Opposition Leaders both in Southern Italy and in Rome should immediately receive a firm warning from the Allied Control Commission that while all their various plans and suggestions will be taken note of and used in arriving at a solution of the problem at the appropriate time, no agitation calculated to disturb the military situation will meanwhile be tolerated. His Majesty's Government consider that the Advisory Council for Italy should be asked as a matter of urgency to recommend to the Commander-in-Chief the best method of communicating this warning to the persons concerned. The Council should also be informed of the various proposals made by the King and by the Opposition affecting the former's position and the formation of a new Government. But His Majesty's Government feel that the Council, which is of an advisory and not of a policy-making character, should not embark on the discussion of these proposals until requested to do so. Meanwhile the use of the machinery of the Council in this way will have the effect of bringing the other Governments represented on it into the picture.

⁶⁸ See telegram 468, February 12, 7 p. m., to Algiers, p. 1019.

3. The steps proposed in the preceding paragraph are designed for the immediate future. His Majesty's Government have also considered the eventual solution which it would be in the common interest to see emerge when the liberation of Rome obliges the King and Marshal Badoglio to implement their respective pledges. In the view of His Majesty's Government recent developments indicate that in all probability a compromise solution of this problem is likely to be built up round Crown Prince Umberto. This solution may take the form either of His Royal Highness's being appointed Lieutenant of the Realm to perform the Royal functions without the formal abdication of King Victor Emmanuel, or of his becoming King with either full or restricted powers, following the abdication of his father. His Majesty's Government feel that the present stage is too early for an attempt to estimate which of the above solutions is the more likely to be realised. But they feel that the negotiations to be undertaken after the fall of Rome should enable an agreement to be reached somewhere within the above framework and without revolutionary methods. Meanwhile it is undesirable for the Allied Governments to declare themselves for any of the possible variants of the above solutions, and their policy should be to watch the development of events.

4. If the United States Government concur in the course of action outlined in paragraph 2 above, instructions on these lines should no doubt be sent to General Wilson through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in addition to those which will be received through the diplomatic channel by the United Kingdom and United States representatives on the Advisory Council for Italy.⁶⁹

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1944.

865.01/2171 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 9, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received March 10—9 : 52 a. m.]

774. For the Acting Secretary from Reinhardt. General MacFarlane reports that Reber yesterday learned the following from Prunas :⁷⁰

Bogomolov⁷¹ (reference my 696, March 2, 9 p. m.⁷²) saw Badoglio

⁶⁹ For Department's reply to the British *aide-mémoire*, see telegram 883, March 24, 6 p. m., to Algiers, p. 1074.

⁷⁰ Renato Prunas, Secretary General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Badoglio government.

⁷¹ Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, Soviet member of the Advisory Council for Italy.

⁷² Not printed.

Tuesday⁷³ morning and told him that the Soviet Government was prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the Italian Government and to exchange representatives who would have all the rights and privileges of Ambassadors and the same status as the Allied representatives near the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers. Since this was an offer from one of the Allied Governments the Italian Government felt that it must accept and informed Bogomolov accordingly. Bogomolov is telegraphing Moscow and it is Prunas' understanding that an announcement in this connection may be expected shortly from the Kremlin. The Italian Government hopes that the United States and British Governments in the meantime will not disclose to the Soviet Government the fact that they have received this information.

At the same meeting Bogomolov also asked Badoglio for facilities for the Soviet air force in southern Italy. Badoglio did not commit himself but simply inquired whether the attitude of the other Allied Governments had been ascertained in this connection. For the Department's information Bogomolov has made a similar request to MacFarlane, explaining that his Government desired to maintain its own communications with Marshal Tito.⁷⁴ MacFarlane referred the question to Allied Force Headquarters which is submitting it to the Air Ministry London.

MacFarlane calls attention to the fact when Bogomolov saw him Tuesday afternoon Bogomolov did not mention the fact that he had seen Badoglio in the morning, not even in connection with his request for facilities for the Soviet Air Force which he made at that time. MacFarlane reports that Bogomolov will arrive in Algiers today, March 9, and has requested that we exercise extreme care not to disclose the fact that his meeting with Badoglio is known to us.

Sent to the Department as 774; repeated to Moscow as 12. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2178 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 10, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received March 11—6:20 a. m.]

792. From Reinhardt. On the assumption that the statement made to Reber by Prunas reported in my 774, March 9, 4 p. m., is accurate I venture to make the following observations:

⁷³ March 7.

⁷⁴ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), President of the National Liberation movement in Yugoslavia, and military leader of the Partisan guerrilla forces in that country.

1. As seen from here the Soviet offer to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Badoglio government may possibly be a logical sequence of the fact previously reported to the Department that Vyshinsky was measurably impressed by Badoglio and apparently considered him the best available man to administer liberated Italy. At the same time it would seem to reflect Soviet impatience at the not inconsiderable barrier to unhampered Soviet activities in Italy presented by the machinery of the Allied Control Commission and the Advisory Council.

If the Soviet Government proceeds to send an ambassador to Badoglio it will mean that the Advisory Council is pretty well finished as a body advisory to the Commander in Chief and must inevitably become a kind of conference of the Allied Ambassadors accredited to the Italian Government.

This would be of course contrary to the intent of the terms of reference established for the Council at the Moscow Conference.⁷⁵ And in fact it should be pointed out that the Soviet proposal implies not only a breach of the understanding reached at Moscow but its acceptance on the Italian side is an infraction of the principle that the Control Commission should be the only body to deal directly with the Italian Government.

In short this new development if permitted to take place would appear to signify that the Allied machinery set up to deal with Italy had in large measure failed to realize its purpose while at the same time the Soviet Government had succeeded in seizing the political initiative in an Anglo-American theatre of operations.

2. When considered however in the light of their recent request for air facilities in Italy for the purpose of developing communications with Tito as well as other developments of the last few days this Soviet initiative seems possibly to have been motivated primarily by considerations of Balkan policy and its bearing on Italian matters only incidental.

While Bogomolov was asking for his air facilities Partisan representatives have been presenting to Allied military authorities a series of requests that are not without considerable implications. They have demanded the release of a group of Partisans allegedly being in prison in Taranto; they have requested the exchange of certain German prisoners in Allied hands with a view to effecting the release from German custody of some dozen "highly important" associates of their own; finally they have made representations concerning the alleged maltreatment of Italian soldiers of Slav origin, especially in Sardinia

⁷⁵ Annex 3 to the Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference, entitled "Advisory Council for Italy", *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 758.

and have requested that the matter be submitted to the Advisory Council and a mixed commission be sent to investigate. (In point of fact the greater part of these people who were in Sardinia are actively engaged elsewhere in labor battalions under Allied supervision.) In the meanwhile in Naples Solodovnik as well as Bogomolov were approaching MacFarlane with the request that the thousands of Italian soldiers of Slav origin be made available for Tito's army (this request has been reported to AFHQ and is being referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff).

This general emergency [*emergence?*] of Soviet and Partisan activity follows shortly upon the safe arrival in Partisanian of a Soviet lieutenant general supported by a major general and a staff of more than a dozen other persons. When coupled with the request for air facilities and troops (the latter obviously of political rather than military import) it would in the aggregate appear to evidence a new move to secure with the least possible delay Soviet ascendancy [*ascendancy?*] and a base of operations in the Adriatic just to bring to bear in Yugoslavia the maximum degree of Soviet influence either for the purpose of accelerating the war effort or looking to all Slav postwar relationships or both.

When viewed in this light the sudden and otherwise paradoxical Soviet decision to end [*lend?*] all-out support to Badoglio takes on a comprehensible if somewhat cynical significance.

Sent to the Department as 792, repeated to Moscow as 13.

[Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2179 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 11, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received March 12—1:05 a. m.]

796. From Reinhardt. The following comment has just been received from Reber with reference to my 774 March 9, 4 p. m.:

The Badoglio Government views with mixed feelings the decision of the Soviet Government to announce the establishment with it of diplomatic relations. The Italians could not even hesitate to accept this offer from one of the Allied Governments and it is clear that they hope it will be followed by a similar decision on the part of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain.

Although the announcement of this decision will no doubt temporarily strengthen the position of the Badoglio Government vis-à-vis the opposition parties, the underlying reasons for this move are evident. The Soviet Government anticipates that by thus taking the

initiative its influence among the Italian people, particularly the workers of the north, will become greater than that of the American and British Governments. The Soviet Government, recognizing that the general trend is towards the creation of a Left Government in Italy, would seem to be willing, in order to gain its own ends, to establish relations with the King's Government in the knowledge that the latter cannot last and that such an initiative will already have increased its possibilities of influencing future political trends in Italy. The present position of the Soviet Government is a strong one, the limitations and restrictions imposed on the country by the requirements of the Allied Military Government are not attributed to the Russians, and such a gesture of friendship as the establishment of relations would tend to outweigh any temporary political inconvenience of maintaining relations with a government which may be unpopular.

In respect of the request for facilities for the Soviet Air Force, the consequences of which are difficult to assess, the Italian Government is concerned lest this request will eventually lead to the establishment of a more permanent form of air base on the shores of the Adriatic Sea. The Italians point to a newspaper report that Tito has offered the Russians similar facilities on the Dalmatian coast. The Italians fear that if these are maintained in the post-war period it will mean that Soviet aviation will control the entrances to the Adriatic.

[Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

740.00119 ACI/73 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 12, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received March 13—4:34 a. m.]

810. From Reinhardt. Bogomolov called on me yesterday ostensibly to arrange a minor correction in the minutes of the last meeting of the Advisory Council held on February 18.

He then asked me what I thought of Badoglio's recent letter to General MacFarlane, again raising the question of Italian participation in the Advisory Council which I had circulated a few days ago to the Council members with a view to its possible consideration at the next meeting. I replied that I assumed this request should receive the same treatment as had previous ones, namely, negative treatment. Bogomolov however expressed the opinion that it would be wiser to refer the matter to the several Governments since it dealt with a question of principle of not inconsiderable importance. I said I did not perceive any objection to referring the matter, but pointed

out that even the submission of the question to the Governments for consideration implied the possibility that they might be thinking of modifying the terms of reference of the council laid down at Moscow, an implication which I felt at least in the case of my own Government, was quite contrary to the facts. Bogomolov took no exception to the foregoing but said that if he obtained Moscow's approval he would propose at the next meeting that Badoglio's letter be referred to the several Governments for their consideration.

Bogomolov's insistence in this connection may possibly reflect a Soviet plan to achieve Allied agreement to the sending of diplomatic representative to the Badoglio Government as a compromise between more extensive recognition of Italy as a full ally on the one hand and the present position on the other.

Macmillan has also seen Bogomolov since his return to Algiers and has been equally unsuccessful in inspiring any confirmation of recently reported Soviet intentions in respect of Italy.

In agreement with General Wilson and me, Macmillan suggested to Bogomolov that it would be appropriate for him to resubmit through his Military Mission to the Supreme Allied Commander the Soviet request for air facilities in Italy originally made to MacFarlane. He was also asked to provide full technical details of what was wanted. In discussing the matter with Macmillan, Bogomolov admitted to having made a similar request of Badoglio when in Italy but volunteered no further information. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/3-1444 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷⁶

[LONDON,] March 13, 1944.

618. Eden's number 1783 to Halifax⁷⁷ shows the kind of policy we should like to embark upon. I should be most grateful if you would read it. I am in complete agreement with you in the big objective of self determination. "Timing" is all I plead for. The ambitious wind-bags, now agitating behind our front that they may themselves become the government of Italy, I do not believe have any representative footing. We shall only have complicated the task of the armies, I fear, if we drive out the King and Badoglio at this stage.

This is also the Soviet view, I see. They are certainly realistic but of course their aim may be a Communist Italy, and it may suit

⁷⁶ This paraphrase of code copy transmitted to the State Department from the White House.

⁷⁷ See *aide-mémoire* of March 6, from the British Embassy (p. 1037), which was based on telegram 1783.

them to use the King and Badoglio till everything is ready for an extreme solution. That this danger is also in my mind I can assure you. My idea remains that, taking into account the opinion of the democratic North of Italy and seeking representatives from there, we should try to construct a broadly-based government. If we cannot get Rome for several months of course, we shall have to act earlier, but without the favourable conditions which will be open to us once we are in possession of the capital. Chances of finding a really representative footing will then be much better.

865.01/2185 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 13, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received March 14—3 : 50 a. m.]

822. From Reinhardt. Bogomolov has just called to inform me officially that his Government has reached an agreement with the Badoglio government providing for the exchange of diplomatic representatives. These representatives are not to be ministers or ambassadors in the usual sense but are being appointed at the request of the "Italian Government" for the purpose of providing closer contacts between the two Governments.

I evidenced astonishment and said I must assume that the Soviet Government had already discussed this matter in London and Washington. He replied he did not know but that in any event he was now informing me officially and wanted me to understand significance of this development should not be exaggerated. It was simply that Soviet Government felt the need for more intimate contact with Badoglio government. He repeated that Soviet representative would not be an "ambassador" but simply a "representative". It was desired that he have diplomatic status so that nobody could lay hands on him. Both United States and British Governments enjoyed a degree of contact through the machinery of the Allied Control Commission and the Allied Military Government which was denied the Soviet Government, since these institutions were purely Anglo-American in character and composition. He repeatedly emphasized that this move was of small importance and that it in no way reflected any change in Soviet policy toward Italy nor in that collaboration between the Three Great Powers which he described as highly important both for the successful prosecution of the war and for the establishment of a lasting peace. As evidence of the particular importance his Government attached to collaboration with the United States Government he cited the fact that I was the first person to be informed of this new decision.

Bogomolov's reiterated insistence on collaboration in the face of this diplomatic coup old style could not but call to mind the ancient story of the camel's nose. I limited my comment however to saying that I knew that in the absence of prior notice my Government would be greatly surprised at this move since it must be expected to produce a development the relationship between Italy and the Allied Governments beyond that agreed upon at the time Advisory Council was set up. I asked Bogomolov if he thought position of Soviet representative to Italian Government would be held by same person who was Soviet member on Advisory Council. He replied that he thought not and that he expected his Government would appoint an additional person as their representative to Badoglio.

When asked if he had any information about Vyshinsky's return to Algiers Bogomolov said that although he knew Vyshinsky was still interesting himself in the Advisory Council and in Italian affairs in general, the latter was for the present very occupied with the problem of reorganization arising out of the recent amendments to Soviet Constitution and there was at the moment no information with regard to his return.

Macmillan informs me that his conversation with Bogomolov which followed immediately upon mine was very similar. He asked Bogomolov not to make any announcement in the press until he, Macmillan, had time to inform his Government, but he did not succeed in obtaining definite agreement to this although Bogomolov admitted that he had no specific instructions to release matter to the press.

Macmillan also inquired of Bogomolov whether he was going to inform the French to which Bogomolov replied that he had no instructions to do so. Macmillan is asking Foreign Office whether it wishes him to inform the French. I would be grateful for a communication of the Department's desires in this connection.

Sent to the Department as 822. Repeated to Moscow as No. 15. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2701

The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter) to Mr. J. Wesley Jones of the Division of Southern European Affairs

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1944.

DEAR JOHNNY: I send you for your information a copy of a telegram sent on March 12th by the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Moscow.

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM HAYTER

[Enclosure]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the
British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr)*

[LONDON,] March 12, 1944.

It is satisfactory that the realistic views of Vyshinski seem to have prevailed in Moscow in that the Soviet Government would appear to be willing to continue working with Badoglio and King Victor at any rate until we get to Rome. There are, however, objections to the establishment at this stage of direct diplomatic relations between the Soviet and Italian Governments. The establishment of such relations if followed by those of other Allied Powers would undermine the whole basis of the Advisory Council and Allied Control Commission which is the official vehicle for relations between Allied Powers and the Italian Government. In the normal course of events the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Italian Government would not take place while the Allies are still at war with Italy which will continue to be position until the armistice is replaced by the peace treaty. It is true that we are sending out Charles ⁷⁸ but we do not contemplate accrediting him as Ambassador. The intention is that he shall be High Commission[er] and British member of the Advisory Council.

Please ask the Soviet Government urgently whether it is their intention to establish direct diplomatic relations with the Italian Government and if this is the case represent to them the disadvantages mentioned in the preceding paragraph, ask them for their reasons and press them to allow us and the U.S. Government to consider the question in all its aspects before they proceed with their intention.

Whatever the merits of the Russian proposals, I find it extraordinary that Monsieur Bogomolov appears to have canvassed the matter with the Italian Government without a word to us and without the Soviet Government having said a word to us in the matter and I think you should make this plain.

865.01/2186 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, March 13, 1944—midnight.

[Received March 14—11 : 15 a. m.]

836. Department's 556, March 11, 7 p. m.⁷⁹ I called on Vyshinski this evening to ask about the press report of the Soviet intention to exchange ambassadors with the Badoglio government.

⁷⁸ Sir Noel Charles was appointed British High Commissioner to Italy, April 5, 1944.

⁷⁹ Not printed; it instructed Harriman to find out the views of the Soviet Government regarding exchange of representatives between the Soviet Union and Italy (865.01/2181a).

In reply Vyshinski said there was no basis for the report; that there was no intention to exchange ambassadors. He said that the discussions had been initiated by Prunas and that there was need for the establishment of direct contact between the two Governments. He used the Russian word "faktisheski" contact (which literally translated means actual or practical) as distinguished from formal diplomatic relations.

In reply to my question as to what need there was for such contact he cited the question of Italian prisoners of war and property in the USSR and emphasized the desire of the Italian Government to terminate Japanese representation of Italian interests in the Soviet Union. He particularly stressed that the Soviet Government agreed to the latter point.

On further questioning from me he stated categorically that he did not consider the activities of the Advisory Council and the Control Commission would be affected in any way by this move and that those agencies would continue to supervise the armistice conditions and related subjects.

When I stated that it seemed to me unfortunate that my Government had learned of this matter through a press report he explained that Bogomolov had received instructions 3 days ago to inform the American and British representatives in the Advisory Council. I asked whether they would be advised prior to the discussions with the Italian Government and he said that he did not know whether the British and American representatives were in Algiers therefore he could not say whom he would talk to first. He did not know [how] Bogomolov had interpreted his instructions.

I expressed the personal hope that the views of the American and British Governments would be sought as to the contemplated step before any definite action was taken. Vyshinski contended that there was no need for consultation since in substance the situation remained unchanged. He said there had always been contact by American and British representatives direct with Badoglio and through AMG⁸⁰ and the Control Commission. I asked if I was right in assuming that the American and British representatives on the Advisory Council would be kept informed of the Soviet negotiations with the Badoglio Government to which he replied in the affirmative.

When I further pressed him for assurance that the Soviet Government would keep us informed of important matters in the future upon the establishment of this new relationship Vyshinski replied, "I do not doubt it".

⁸⁰ Allied Military Government.

You will see from the above that in reply to my persistent direct questions Vyshinski did not give fully straightforward answers. At one point in the conversation I asked him to give me a memorandum explaining the Soviet point of view. He replied that he would be willing to reply to any written questions I submitted to him. I said that as this matter had been initiated by them I assumed they would want to inform us about it in their own manner. He then referred to the instructions which had been sent to Bogomolov.

The British Ambassador saw Vyshinski shortly before I did and left with him under instruction a memorandum⁸¹ which listed the objections the British Government had to the establishment by the Soviet Government of a diplomatic relationship with the Italian Government. Vyshinski told the British Ambassador that he would study the memorandum and submit a reply. In the conversation that followed some of the same points brought out in my talk were covered. Vyshinski's only additional statement was that if it had been a question of establishing diplomatic relations the British and U.S. Governments would have been informed.

HARRIMAN

865.01/2188 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 14, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 2 p. m.]

826. From Reinhardt. Italian Government has informed MacFarlane that it proposes to issue for publication and broadcast today March 14 a communiqué along the following lines:

The Government of the USSR and the Royal Government of Italy, though [the desire was?] officially expressed some time ago on the part of the latter, have agreed to establish direct relations between the two countries. They will proceed without delay to the exchange of representatives enjoying the usual diplomatic status, in compliance with this decision.

MacFarlane has been informed by Foreign Office that the first phrase was inserted at the request of the Soviet representative and refers in fact to the general expression of Italian desire for closer relations with the Allied Powers, a general request made in December to all members of the Advisory Council when on their trip to Italy. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

⁸¹ See *supra*.

FW865.01/2197 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 14, 1944.

[Received March 15—1:06 p. m.]

842. *Izvestiya* for March 14 publishes the following Tass despatch from Algiers dated March 13:

"On March 7, 1944, the Italian Government through the President of the Council of Ministers, Marshal Badoglio, addressed to the Soviet Union a request for the establishment of direct relations between the Soviet and Italian Governments and for the exchange of representatives of the two Governments. On March 11, 1944, the Soviet Government informed Marshal Badoglio of its agreement to the establishment of direct relations between the two Governments and the exchange of representatives."

HARRIMAN

740.00119 ACI/78a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1944—6 p. m.

767. For Reinhardt. It is understood that there will be a meeting of the Advisory Council tomorrow, March 15. We suggest that the Soviet representative be invited to furnish an explanation of the action taken by his Government with respect to the Italian Government and to state if the Soviet Government intends to receive an Italian representative in Moscow. If so, what kind of credentials will he bear and how will the Soviet representative be accredited to the Italian Government?

You should also ask the Soviet member whether the Soviet Government proposes to retain a representative on the Control Commission and its member on the Advisory Council and, if so, what their relations will be with the new Soviet representative to the Italian Government. Bogomolov should further be asked whether, in view of this recent unilateral action on the part of his Government, the Soviet Union intends to continue consulting and advising with the other United Nations represented on the Advisory Council with respect to all political questions relating to Italy.

Your British colleague will receive similar instructions before tomorrow's meeting.

HULL

865.01/2198 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 14, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received March 15—12:47 p. m.]

855. Vyshinsky asked me to call on him this afternoon. When he finished the matter he had in mind I spoke to him again about the agreement which they had entered into with the Italian Government for exchange of representatives. As a matter of convenience and clarity I handed him a memorandum for his interpreter to read, and I left with him paraphrase of which is as follows:

“This morning I received advice that on yesterday afternoon Mr. Bogomolov informed Mr. Reinhardt of the agreement between Soviet Government and the Italian Government to exchange representatives, after the conclusion of the agreement and thus without giving the U.S. Government an opportunity to express its views on the matter.

Inasmuch as I feel certain that my Government will find it difficult to understand that, I desire to express to you my personal regret that the Soviet Government has considered it necessary to take a step of this character without consultation as I feel it will be considered not consonant with the spirit of our agreement to work together on the basis of mutual consultation on such matters as the Italian situation. I am not in expressing this view commenting on the desirability of the agreement itself. My remarks are addressed only to the manner in which the agreement was effected. Concern cannot help but be aroused in the minds of many people in the United States in respect to the cooperative understandings reached at the Moscow Conference when, as I believe is bound to happen, the fact becomes known that the Soviet Government took this step without consultation with the Government of the United States. I am expressing this personal view to you so that you may have before you for your consideration a knowledge of what I am satisfied will be the reaction in Washington and generally in the United States.”

Vyshinsky said that he could not understand why such a small matter would cause such great concern in the United States; that they had talked the matter over and decided that as it didn't affect us in any way there was no need to consult us in advance. He said he was not informed whether Bogomolov had been able to get in touch with Reinhardt before he had concluded the agreement with the Italian Government. If he had not it was a matter of Bogomolov and Reinhardt being in different places.

I pointed out to him that I could not understand why the matter was of such urgency that Bogomolov could not have awaited not only an opportunity to see Reinhardt but also to give Reinhardt time to communicate with you.

Throughout the conversation Vyshinsky tried in the most affable way to convince me that the matter was of small importance. Although he attempted to discuss the substance of the agreement I stuck entirely to the question of their failing to consult us in advance.

The British Ambassador had seen Vyshinsky previously on further instructions from his Government and had laid before him again the objections of the British Government and the adverse reaction this development would have in the House. Vyshinsky attempted to play the matter down with him as he had with me.

Repeated to London and Algiers.

HARRIMAN

865.01/2192 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 14, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received March 15—1:02 p. m.]

856. In view of the carefully worked out and comprehensive basis for mutual consultation on the Italian situation I cannot regard lightly the action of the Soviet Government in arranging an exchange of representatives with the Badoglio government without prior consultation with us and the British. I feel that the matter should be handled with directness and firmness although it should not be magnified. The Soviets should be made to understand that they have made an error in procedure which if continued will have serious repercussions on over-all collaboration.

As one step to this end I suggest for your consideration that in response to inquiry at your press conference you state for attribution that the United States Government was not consulted in regard to the step which the Soviet Government has taken and that it is a matter of regret to the United States that the Soviet Government did not discuss the matter in advance with this Government.

It would be helpful if I could have advice as to your reaction both to the substance of the action taken as well as to the method.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 ACI/76 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 15, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received March 16—6:25 a. m.]

847. From Reinhardt. At the meeting of the Advisory Council this morning Macmillan raised with Bogomolov all but the last of

the questions set forth in the Department's telegram No. 767, March 14, 6 p. m. in connection with the recently announced intention of the Soviet Government to exchange representatives with the Italian Government. I associated myself with Macmillan's inquiry and in addition stated that my Government was interested to know whether in view of this recent unilateral action on the part of the Soviet Government, the Soviet Union intends to continue consulting and advising with the other United Nations represented on the Advisory Council with respect to all political questions relating to Italy.

Bogomolov showed evident reluctance to discuss this subject in the Council and prefaced his remarks by saying that he had no instructions and that anything he might say was purely personal and unofficial. He then proceeded to expound the same explanation he had given to Macmillan and me when he called on us on Saturday last,⁸² (reported in my 822 March 13, 5 p. m.). He said in addition that the whole matter was clearly set forth in the Soviet communiqué which was to be published today. In reply to my specific question he said he thought that the Soviet Government had no intention of making any change in its relationships either to Allied Control Commission or the Advisory Council and added that if the United States Government wished to take up this question with the Soviet Government it should do so directly; that the Advisory Council was not the proper place for it to be discussed. I reported that I felt a question which so vitally affected the very existence of the Council could be discussed in no more fitting place than in the Council itself. To this his only rejoinder was a muttered something about "no instructions".

Massigli showed a lively interest in the subject and developed the idea of the paradox which would result from the coexistence of an Allied control machinery and direct relationships with the Italian Government. He said that the Italians who up until the present were treated as minors had suddenly succeeded in acquiring the stature of adults. It was not the presence of a Soviet representative in Italy but the apparent freedom of the Italian Government to set up representations abroad which endangered the machinery of control. Macmillan endeavored to obtain discussion of the question of what action should be recommended to the Commander in Chief in view of the Italian Government having taken this initiative without permission of the Control Commission. To this Bogomolov replied that he was not responsible for the actions of the Italian Government.

Bogomolov asked that no record be made in the minutes of the foregoing discussion. His proposal was not accepted but it was agreed that he might strike his rejoinders from the record if he so wished or limit them to the simple statement that in the absence of instructions

⁸² March 11.

he had referred the Council to the Soviet communiqué which was being published in this connection today.

Following the meeting I suggested to Macmillan that it would be [well?] if we both sent Bogomolov an *aide-mémoire* of the questions which he had asked to which Macmillan agreed. This action seemed desirable both because of some doubt as to Bogomolov's complete understanding of the questions since he had not brought an interpreter with him to the meeting and because he had given some indication to me that he would like to have my question in writing.

Sent to the Department as No. 847, repeated to Moscow as 16. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2212a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1944—9 p. m.

783. For Reinhardt. The following exchange of telegrams has taken place between the President and the Prime Minister on the Italian political situation. You may in your discretion pass this information on to Reber.

March 7 from the President to the Prime Minister: ⁸³

"Our advices from Italy indicate that the political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six opposition parties is essential.

"General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups. I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.

"One of General Wilson's telegrams of February 29 (Naf 634) reports that the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of Allied policy with regard to their respective plans. I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply. As you know, we prefer the program put forward by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a 'Lieutenant' of the Realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wilson and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active cooperation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian Government.

"If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week."

⁸³ This message is No. 490, March 7, 1944.

March 8 from the Prime Minister to the President:⁸⁴

"I am concerned about your Number 490. This message is a departure from your agreement with me of February 11 (your 464⁸⁵) which in your Number 483 you kindly reaffirmed describing the matter as 'finished business'. I made my statement to Parliament on the strength of the first assurances.

"I do not find any reason to believe from my advices that any new facts of importance have arisen or that order cannot be maintained by the Allied forces in the regions which they occupy as the result of the Italian 'unconditional surrender'. I think it would be a very grievous mistake to yield to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of politicians who are seeking office. We should then be liable to establish in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but would attempt to make its position with the Italian people by standing up to the Allies. In fact we should have another but more intractable version of the de Gaullist Committee. Meanwhile we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of Badoglio and the King in the midst of a heart-shaking battle, which is trying to aid us and work its passage.

"The course you recommend, I readily admit, would have at least a transitory success and would be more popular. But it would be unfortunate, I am sure, for the victorious conquerors to have their hands forced this way by sections of the defeated population. The obvious open division between you and me and between our two Governments would likewise be unfortunate. I gave loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair to you and the State Department. It was never more necessary than at the present time to have unity of action between our two Governments considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead. I am quite willing to discuss with you now the proposals set forth by General Wilson in his Naf 634 whereby the Crown Prince becomes Lieutenant of the Realm. I understand from Macmillan that Croce is a dwarf professor about 75 years old who wrote good books about aesthetics and philosophy. I have no confidence in either Sforza or Croce. Vyshinsky tried to read these books and found them even duller than Karl Marx.⁸⁶ In his letter to Mr. Berle of September [19]43,⁸⁷ Sforza has definitely broken his undertakings. I hope therefore that we may open discussions with you on the basis of Eden's telegram No. 1783 to Halifax.⁸⁸ I repeat that I am most anxious to have a broad based government assume power in Italy, but this can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or, best of all, when Rome is taken, and ought not to be done under duress by the Allies. Macmillan is returning immediately."

⁸⁴ This message is No. 610, dated March 8, 1944.

⁸⁵ This telegram is printed in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1959), p. 497. President Roosevelt stated that he had directed the Department of State to take no action toward effecting any change in the existing Government of Italy "at the present time".

⁸⁶ German philosopher, 1818-1883, co-author of *Communist Manifesto* and *Das Kapital*.

⁸⁷ Not found in Department files.

⁸⁸ See footnote 77, p. 1043.

March 8 to the Prime Minister:

"Your 610. My dispatch No. 490 on the Italian political situation was sent with the purpose of trying to meet the difficulties presented in Naf 634 by General Wilson.

"I would appreciate your sending me suggestions as to a way to remedy the serious situation which will be acceptable to your Government.

"That you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others is my strongest wish. Things like timing, on which we may differ, can be worked out, and on the big objectives like self-determination we are in complete agreement."

March 13 to the Prime Minister:⁸⁹

"With further reference to your No. 610, I am sorry if my earlier messages were not clear. I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken. The political situation in Italy has developed rapidly since our earlier messages; the military situation has not kept pace. The capture of Rome is still remote and major political decisions must be taken.

"I do not like having to use stern measures against our friends in Italy, except for good reason. In the present situation the Commander-in-Chief and his political advisers, both British and American, have recommended that we give immediate support to the program of the six opposition parties. Thus we have, happily for once, our political and military considerations entirely in harmony.

"We do not need to intervene beyond informing the Executive Junta of our support of their program, as described in Naf 622, 624 and 628, and confirm this to the King if necessary. The Italians can present the solution to the King and work out the program among themselves.

"I cannot for the life of me understand why we should hesitate any longer in supporting a policy so admirably suited to our common military and political aims. American public opinion would never understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel."

HULL

865.01/2208: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 16, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received March 17—12:05 a. m.]

875. I am not sure that I made plain in my 856, March 14, 10 p. m. my feeling regarding the lack of consultation in arranging for the exchange of representatives between the Soviet and Badoglio Governments and the manner in which we should deal with it.

⁸⁹ Presumably this message is No. 498, March 13, 1944.

On the one hand I feel strongly that we should not let the Soviets get away with this sharp practice without full understanding of its adverse reaction on us and on the American public as well if the facts become generally known. This would only invite the Soviets to do the same sort of thing again at a time when it might have more serious consequences. It is not at all clear why they did this—whether they have some devious motive behind the act or whether it is an indication that they wish to keep a free hand on all matters which they do not consider basically affect us or on which they do not have a specific prior agreement to consult. In any event their act it seems to us here strikes at the heart of the spirit of collaboration we believed had been initiated at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences⁹⁰ and therefore the incident although perhaps of lesser importance in its substance is of major importance in its method.

I would therefore recommend against any course of action on our part which would produce in the Soviet mind the impression that we did not regard it seriously. Just how to accomplish this without magnifying the incident in the public mind in America beyond its importance is a matter of tactics regarding which it is difficult for me to make a specific recommendation as I am out of touch with the feel of things at home. I wish therefore to withdraw the specific suggestion that I made in my cable and to limit my recommendation to the objective described above as I do not feel qualified at this end to suggest a method. Another idea that comes to mind however which might be given consideration is a personal telegram from the President to Stalin⁹¹ or one from you to Molotov.

We have a long and perhaps difficult road while the Soviets learn how to behave in the civilized world community. Effective results can I believe be obtained by taking a firm position when they take improper steps. They certainly do not hesitate to be abrupt with us when they do not like our proposals or actions. If we don't follow this procedure now in connection with each incident we may well look forward to a Soviet policy of playing the part of a world bully.

We must of course be prepared to exercise patience, but forbearance is a sign of weakness to these people. They respect firmness even though they may not fully understand the reasons behind it.

HARRIMAN

⁹⁰ For records of the Tehran Conference, held November 27–December 2, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. For records of the Moscow Conference, held October 18–November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

⁹¹ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

865.01/2216 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 16, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 7:28 p. m.]

859. From L'Heureux. AFHQ has instructed General MacFarlane to ask Badoglio for an explanation of the reasons why without prior notification to the Allied Control Commission the Italian Government took the initiative for exchanging representatives with the Soviets. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2186 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944—midnight.

602. Your 836, March 13, midnight. You should see Molotov if possible and if not Vyshinski concerning the Italian recognition. You should explain that the entire machinery of control in Italy, including the Allied Control Commission, the Advisory Council for Italy, and, of course, Allied Military Government, was carefully designed, worked out, and developed as a military instrument and necessity. This whole structure and development is designed to implement the supreme authority of the Allied Commander in Chief and to protect the Allied military operations in Italy against the Nazi enemy. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean theater, is the supreme authority in liberated Italy. As the Soviet Government knows, General Alexander, as a result of delegation of authority by General Wilson, is the President of the Allied Control Commission and Military Governor of those areas under Allied Military Government in Italy. In the territories under Allied Military Government the authority of the Italian Government is temporarily suspended. In Sicily, Sardinia, and the Southern provinces which have been restored to Italian administration, the Italian Government functions only under the control and supervision of the Allied Control Commission. It is not in a position to enter into any agreements or relations with United Nations or neutral powers without the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief. It is evident that all of the complicated machinery of control for Allied Government in Italy is designed to support and secure the supreme authority of the Allied Commander in Chief or his deputy.

Consequently, the introduction of any new element into this carefully worked out plan, such as direct and separate relations between

a United Nations Government and an existing Italian Government is contrary to the arrangements providing for military security. It must be constantly kept in mind that Italy is a combat zone, and every decision and every action is taken in the first instance with reference to military considerations. Any development, therefore, outside the established machinery of control over Italian administration, economy, and resources must be brought into relationship with the Allied military authorities responsible for that major theater of operations.

You should recall that at the Moscow Conference the United States and Great Britain, in accordance with Soviet desires, welcomed and agreed to full Soviet participation in all matters of policy in regard to Italy. The Moscow Conference, thus, established the principle of Allied as against individual approach to particular questions in the liberated areas of Italy, including relations with the Italian Government. There has been up to the present no indication from the Soviet Government that these arrangements were in any way unsatisfactory, and it is a fact that Soviet representatives on the Advisory Council and on the Control Commission were afforded means of contact with the Italian authorities identic to those enjoyed by the American and British representatives.

The entire purpose and underlying aim of the arrangements established by the Moscow Conference were precisely to avoid the seeking by individual members of the Allied nations of special advantage or influence through bilateral arrangements with the Italian Government signing the armistice and to insure unity of action among the Allies in dealing with the political aspects of the Italian problem. It should be added that in an area where the responsibility for military operations rests on the Governments of the forces operating in that area, the Moscow decisions, to permit the participation of representatives of governments not directly connected with the military operations, represented an important contribution to the principle of cooperation and collaboration between the Allies in the political aspects of the prosecution of the war. It is, therefore, difficult for this Government to understand why, without prior consultation or even notification, the Soviet Government should have proceeded to negotiate a special arrangement with the Italian Government with no attempt to ascertain in advance the views of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, upon whom rests and continues to rest the primary responsibility for all matters relating to the Italian theater of operations. Had the Soviet Government made known to the Allied Commander-in-Chief or to this Government its dissatisfaction with the possibilities of contact with the Italian Government in areas under Anglo-American

control, every effort would have been made to meet the Soviet Government's wishes in this respect.

In conclusion you might state that this Government desires to point out that the supreme responsibility for matters relating to the Italian theater continues to be vested in the Allied Commander-in-Chief and that no special arrangement between the Italian Government and one of the Allied Governments can modify in the slightest degree that responsibility. This Government therefore proposes, without giving publicity to the proposal, that the relationship of the Soviet representative to the Italian Government be worked out in the Advisory Council with a view to bringing him and his functions into the framework of the existing Allied Control machinery.

Sent to Moscow. Repeated to Algiers and London.

HULL

865.01/2218a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944—6 p. m.

797. For Reinhardt. With reference to Department's earlier telegram quoting President and Prime Minister on the Italian political crisis, replies from the Prime Minister, recently received, to the President's messages of March 8 and March 13⁹² are quoted below:

[Here follows the first of Churchill's replies, message No. 618, March 13, printed on page 1043; the second reply is printed below.]

"My number 618 crossed your number 498.⁹³ The Russians meanwhile have announced that they have sent to present Italian Government, with whom technically we are still at war, a fully credited Ambassador. Without further consideration, I do not think it would be wise to accede to the proposals of the six parties and demand immediately the abdication of the King and the installation of Signor Croce as Lieutenant of the Realm of Italy. Upon this proposal, which you properly call 'a major political decision', I will consult with the War Cabinet. We have suffered 232,000 casualties in our war with Italy which has lasted since June 1940, as well as extensive warship losses. That our view in this matter will receive consideration from you, I am sure. Every effort ought to be made by us to act together. Please remember that I made a public commitment on the strength of your number 464⁹⁴ and that any divergence cannot possibly avoid notice."

HULL

⁹² For messages of March 8 and 13, see telegram 783, March 15, 9 p. m., to Algiers, p. 1053.

⁹³ See footnote 89, p. 1055.

⁹⁴ See footnote 85, p. 1054.

865.01/2219 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 17, 1944.

[Received March 18—11 : 51 a. m.]

871. From L'Heureux. In response to AFHQ instructions mentioned in my 859, March 16, 6 p. m., General MacFarlane telegraphs that his previous messages should have made it clear that the decision for exchange of Italian-Soviet representatives was that of the Soviet Government following the general request for closer relations made in December to all members of the Advisory Council, although the communiqué implies that the Italian Government took the initiative. MacFarlane points out that the Allied Control Commission was notified immediately by the Italian Government of the Soviet proposal. He comments that if any protest should be made to Badoglio at this stage, it would constitute in fact a protest against Russian rather than Italian action.

AFHQ is assuming that Macmillan and Reinhardt are considering with MacFarlane directly whether the instructions should be carried out. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2218b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—11 a. m.

803. For Reinhardt. The President has received the following telegram from the Prime Minister with further reference to the Italian political situation: ⁹⁵

"The proposal that the American and British Governments should accept without further delay the Six Party program was taken up by me this morning with the War Cabinet. The Cabinet asked me to give you my assurance that they are in full agreement that the future Italian government can only be settled by self-determination and also agree with your wish to establish a more broadly based government in Italy. They also agree with you that timing is the point to consider, but on this they have no doubt that before parting company with Badoglio and the King it would be far better to wait until we have taken Rome. From Rome a more representative and solidly based administration can be set up than is possible to construct now. The Cabinet feels that nothing could be worse for our joint interests and for the future of Italy than to set up a weak democratic government which flopped. Because it would be necessary to review it when the provinces in the north and great industrial centers favorable to us and essential to a democratic solution, like Milan and Turin, have been liberated, even a settlement reached at Rome could not be final.

⁹⁵ This is telegram 621, March 15, 1944.

The Cabinet does not think that the six parties could now replace the existing Italian government, which has worked in our interests loyally and effectively, nor that they are in any true sense representative of the Italian democracy or Italian nation.

The telegrams sent by the Allied Commander in Chief were before the War Cabinet while reaching these conclusions, but they do not share his views. Meanwhile we are quite ready to discuss the suggestions put to the State Department in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Secretary's number 1783.^{95a} Also it is of course recognized that the question of timing would have to be reviewed if the capture of Rome should be unduly delayed, say for two or three months.

They ask me, finally, to emphasize the great importance of not exposing any differences of opinion between our two governments to the world, especially now that Russia has taken independent action without consultation with other Allies in entering into direct relations with the Badoglio government. When waiting a few months might make it possible for all three governments to take united action, it would be a great pity if our respective viewpoints had to be argued out in Parliament and the Press."

You will be informed of any reply which the President may make.

HULL.

865.01/2198 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—7 p. m.

632. You will note from the instructions contained in our 602, March 16, midnight, which was drafted and approved by the War Department before the receipt of your 855, March 14, 9 p. m., and subsequent telegrams on the subject that our views are identical with your own in regarding seriously the action of the Soviet Government in recognizing the Badoglio Government without prior consultation with us or the British. I desire to commend you for the initiative which you took with Vyshinski and the views expressed in your memorandum⁹⁶ to him, and I believe that our instructions will effectively support the position you have taken. We will of course give consideration to the further step of a personal message from the President to Stalin or from me to Molotov when we have received your report of the reaction of the Soviet Government to the proposal contained in the last paragraph of our 602.

You will likewise have seen from the radio bulletin that yesterday in response to a direct question I told the correspondents that this Government had not been consulted in advance by the Soviet Gov-

^{95a} Not printed, but see *aide-memoire* of March 6 from the British Embassy (p. 1037), which was based on this telegram.

⁹⁶ For paraphrase of memorandum, see telegram 855, March 14, 9 p. m., from Moscow, p. 1050.

ernment in regard to the exchange of diplomatic representation with the Badoglio regime. I also made it clear in reply to further questions that the Advisory Council on Italy would have been the appropriate organization to give attention to any such arrangement and that this Government under its present policy did not contemplate the establishment of similar relationship with the Badoglio Government.

Press and radio comment in the United States in regard to the Soviet action has on the whole avoided undue speculation as to Soviet motives but has called attention to the establishment of special machinery for coordination of policies of the three Governments with regard to Italy. This latest move of the Soviet Government has, however, added to the uncertainty and apprehension in the mind of the American public as to the sincerity and willingness of the Soviet Union to accept wholeheartedly the principle of collaboration in the conduct of international affairs.

We are in entire accord with the views expressed in the last two paragraphs of your 875, March 16, 4 p. m., but contemplate no further steps in regard to the Soviet action until we hear from you.

HULL

865.01/2704

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the Soviet Government I am forwarding to you the enclosed memorandum.

The first part of the memorandum is being transmitted for the information of the Government of the United States in view of the importance of the questions touched upon in this part.

Sincerely yours,

A. GROMYKO

[Enclosure]

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*⁹⁷

MEMORANDUM

In connection with the decision reached by the Soviet Government following the request of the Italian Government on the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, the Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. Kerr, in a conversation with Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on March 13, 1944 stated, in passing, the following:

1) The British Government should like to stress, that the action of the Soviet Government, if it will be followed by other Allied Govern-

⁹⁷This memorandum is apparently a copy of the Soviet reply to British representations.

ments, would inevitably undermine the whole foundation of the Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commission ;

2) Besides, this would not be in full accord with the articles 37 and 42 of the terms of armistice with Italy.⁹⁸

1. The Soviet Government considers that the stated above assertions are baseless and erroneous in essence.

It is impossible to agree with the statement that the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy, as well as between other Allied nations and Italy could in any way affect negatively the activities of the Advisory Council or the Control Commission. It is sufficient to recall the tasks and competence of the Advisory Council, as they were determined at the Moscow Conference, in the proper provision, in order to convince oneself that the Advisory Council contrary to the above-mentioned assertions is not an official instrument of the Allied Governments for contact with the Italian Government.

The same has to be said about the Control Commission. It is known that the articles 37 and 42 of complete terms of armistice with Italy have determined the authority of the Allied Control Commission as an instrument established with the purpose to carry out the regulation and execution of terms of armistice and only in these limits to maintain the necessary contact with the Italian authorities. The establishment of direct relations between the Allied countries and Italy is not in any discord with these provisions. The reference to these articles thus is groundless and, evidently, is a result of a misunderstanding.

As to the decision of the Soviet Government on the establishment of factual relations of the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, it is necessary to keep in mind that up to the present time the Soviet Government having no direct contact with the Italian Government was in an unequal position as compared to its Allies who had established from the very beginning a direct contact with the Government of Badoglio through their numerous institutions and numerous representatives on the territory of liberated Italy. The establishment of a direct contact between the Soviet Government and the Government of Italy to a certain extent eliminates the above-mentioned inequality and provides a possibility of direct contact between them, which already exists for a long time in the relations between Italy and the governments of Great Britain and the United States.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that the establishment of a direct contact between the U.S.S.R. and Italy is an establishment of relations with the Government of Badoglio *de facto*. The decision adopted on this question by the Soviet Government does not go beyond the limits

⁹⁸ For text, see Department of State, *United States and Italy, 1936-1946, Documentary Record* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 55.

of factual relations between both governments and is just putting those factual relations into official form. In view of this a decision was made to establish not diplomatic relations between the two countries and exchange Ambassadors or Ministers but to establish only direct relations and exchange representatives between the governments.

2. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on the question regarding the political situation which has developed in Italy. This is the more necessary since up to the present moment the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America together have not yet considered the political situation in Italy and have not yet discussed together the question what kind of government should be in Italy in the period of armistice and what measures should be taken for its democratization.

It is impossible not to acknowledge that at the present time the situation in Italy is developing not in the direction of improvement in the desirable for the Allied countries direction, but on the contrary in the direction of deterioration. The affairs in Italy have come at the present time to a dead end, and the economic and political collapse of Italy is growing. On the territory of liberated Italy there exists, on one hand, the Government of Badoglio supported by certain groups of the population and expressing readiness to take part in the common struggle of democratic countries against the German-Fascist oppressors. Alongside with this on the territory of liberated Italy there exists a permanent executive Junta which is backed by anti-fascist parties and groups and striving to unite the Italian people for the fight against Hitlerite Germany and fascism and it is impossible not to see that on the side of the permanent executive Junta there is a considerably wide union of democratic elements expressing an inclination to active operations together with the Allied democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany and the fascist band of Mussolini. Thus, the Government of Badoglio as well as the permanent executive Junta are striving to take part on the side of the Allies in the struggle against the band of Hitler and Mussolini still controlling central and northern Italy, but in the course of all these months the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Junta not only were not united for combined actions against the common enemy but, on the contrary, were wasting strength fighting each other. Such a situation is, of course, only playing into the hands of the enemy of the Allies and is inevitably leading to the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of Italy. The experience of the recent months has shown to the full that the question regarding the uniting of democratic and anti-fascist forces in Italy for the speeding up of the destruction of Hitlerite bands of the fascist gang of Mussolini and, thus, the question of the establishment of such an Italian Gov-

ernment which would unite these forces and would facilitate the carrying out of the task of the Allies in Italy is an immediate task. Meanwhile the establishment of such a Government, if one judges from the statements of the British and American representatives, is being postponed until the capture of Rome and until the conclusion of military operations connected with this aim, and the existing split of forces in the anti-fascist democratic camp of Italy is increasing more and more.

From the statements of the British and American governments it is known that at the present time it is not considered expedient to change the government of Badoglio and to support the demand regarding the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel. The Soviet Government is ready to agree with the mentioned point of view, even in spite of the fact that the government of Badoglio has not proved to the proper extent its ability to carry on the struggle against the fascist and pro-fascist elements. Besides, the Soviet Government has in view the fact that the question concerning one or another form of government in Italy will be solved later, when the Italian people itself will find it timely from the point of view of securing sufficient democratic conditions for the expression of its free will.

Since, thus at the present time, the governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union voice for the necessity to keep the government headed by Badoglio, in as much as the latter must secure the putting into practice the certain measures on uniting the democratic and anti-fascist forces of Italy in the interests of intensification of the struggle against our common enemy, and on the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that the present negative attitude of the political groups and trends, united by the permanent executive Junta, toward the government of Badoglio, cannot be overcome, if a certain reorganization and improvement of the Italian government will not be carried out in accordance with the wishes of the Junta.

Proceeding from the desirability and necessity of the speediest liquidation of the split in the camp of the political groups and trends inclined to cooperate with the Allied democratic countries, the Soviet Government proposes to the governments of Great Britain and the United States to take steps toward the possible union of all democratic and anti-fascist forces of liberated Italy on the basis of appropriate improvement of the Government of Badoglio. The Soviet Government is offering for the consideration of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States the above-mentioned proposals regarding the general situation of the affairs in liberated Italy, bearing in mind that this will assist the efforts of the Allies in the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini in Italy.

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1944.

865.01/2222 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*ALGIERS, March 19, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received March 20—5:33 a. m.]

905. From Reber and Reinhardt.

1. During past few days we have had an opportunity to review Italian political situation with Macmillan and MacFarlane. Although it is still too early to determine effect of recent Soviet move on opposition parties, particularly Communist Party, recent events have again underlined desirability of reaching an agreed Allied policy.

2. All that is necessary are certain general principles within framework of which we can encourage contending Italian factions to work toward common agreement. This would avoid disadvantages inherent in our supporting either the Junta's memo or the De Nicola plan as the basis for negotiation and would provide more latitude for compromise. It is clear that King's presence is principal stumbling block to any agreement and that the longer such agreement is delayed the greater will be strength given to radical parties to impose their own solutions which is likely to endanger the two basic principles of United States policy, namely: that Italian people shall be free to choose own government at end of war and that a broad based representative government be formed not later than liberation of Rome. The extent of powers to be retained or delegated by Victor Emmanuel's successor does not now in our opinion offer an insurmountable obstacle.

3. If the United States and British Governments can agree upon some such general framework of principles and authorize their representatives so to inform both the King and the opposition, negotiations can promptly be encouraged in Italy thus making possible a solution before Rome and eliminating danger of either freezing the position as it now is under the King or of permitting the more radical elements to get out of control.

4. We understand that Macmillan in general agrees with foregoing estimate and plans to make recommendations to London accordingly. His telegrams will, however, no doubt reflect the particular importance which British Government attaches to preservation of a stable Italy in the Mediterranean. [Reber and Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2221 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 19, 1944—9 p. m.
[Received March 20—9:10 a. m.]

906. From Reber and Reinhardt. Soviet decision to exchange diplomatic representatives with Badoglio government has introduced a new element in relations of Allied Powers with Italy. Regardless of eventual form that Soviet political representation will take they have already secured whatever advantages may accrue from being first of United Nations to establish reciprocal relations with a former enemy.

As we see it there are two courses of action which might be open to the American and British Governments (a) to establish direct diplomatic relations with Italian Government in order not to leave Soviets alone in the field; or (b) to remain with the present control relationship in political matters. In our opinion diplomatic recognition is incompatible with the armistice position and would weaken the degree of control required by military situation in Italy. Consequently we do not believe that the United States or Great Britain should at this time consider the appointment of diplomatic representatives. This view is shared by Mr. Macmillan and General MacFarlane. Should it be desirable for political reasons, which are not possible to estimate here, to introduce an element of reciprocity in our relations with Italy to match the Soviet position, an opportunity would however be presented by the prisoner of war agreement now under discussion, to permit the Italians to establish a prisoner of war mission both in London and in Washington which by agreement could develop other limited functions.

In addition to the Soviet move there are other recent developments which require that political phases of work of Allied Control Commission be adjusted to fit new circumstances. Advisory Council has now decided to hold all its meetings in Naples. A large Soviet delegation is established there and will be shortly followed by delegations of other members of Council. As Department is aware (see Algiers 809, March 12, noon ⁹⁹) British Government is appointing Sir Noel Charles who has ambassadorial rank as its permanent resident representative in Italy although he may temporarily act as Macmillan's deputy for this purpose. It is important that the U.S. have a similar form of representation and it would be desirable that the two appointments be concerted and timed with an agreement upon the line of policy to be followed by the two Governments.

With the inevitable increase of political activities in Italy as a result of the foregoing there is danger that position of Allied Control Com-

⁹⁹ Not printed.

mission and degree of its control over Italian political scene will be prejudiced unless means are found to provide an adequate link between the U.S. and Great Britain's political representatives and the Allied Control Commission. Their relationship therefore should be advisory rather than executive and they should consequently have a position in relation to General Alexander's command similar to that held by Murphy and Macmillan in Algiers under General Eisenhower. Whether attached to staff of Allied CinC in Italy or associated with his deputy General MacFarlane their work would then not conflict or compete with supreme military requirements of control. [Reber and Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2227 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 20, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received March 21—1 :02 a. m.]

910. From Reinhardt. Reference Algiers 871, March 17, 6 p. m.

1. General MacFarlane saw Badoglio alone Saturday night.¹ He asked Badoglio how it was that in view of their hitherto close and cordial collaboration the latter had issued his announcement regarding the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union without first consulting him. Badoglio replied that the Soviet approach had come to him as a complete surprise. Bogomolov had come to see him and had informed him that the Soviet Government had accepted the proposal made by Prunas to Vyshinsky at the time of a meeting of the Advisory Council in Italy. Badoglio said that Prunas had in fact informed Vyshinsky that Badoglio had once suggested to General Joyce that an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the Italian Government and the Allied Governments would be most welcome to the Italian Government. After Bogomolov's visit Badoglio had at once told Prunas to inform the political section of the Control Commission of what had occurred. Again, after Bogomolov revisited Badoglio with the draft text of the announcement, Prunas had immediately notified the political section. In both cases, MacFarlane recalls, he immediately telegraphed the information to General Wilson. Badoglio then stated that he thought he had acted perfectly openly with MacFarlane and that as the latter had taken no action in the matter he had naturally carried through the desire of the Soviet Government. This also of course had resulted in great advantage to his, Badoglio's, government. It had had a great effect on the Communist Party in Italy and on the parties of the Left.

¹ March 18.

MacFarlane comments that in the absence of instructions he clearly could not have intervened on his own initiative as he had no information as to whether the Soviet action was unilateral or not.

2. Badoglio also told MacFarlane that he hoped to have ready for transmission within a day or two his memorandum to the Allied Governments requesting them to accord Allied status to Italy. At the end of their talk Badoglio informed MacFarlane that he was prepared now to undertake categorically that Italy would continue the war against the Axis after the Germans had been driven out of Italy and that he wished the Italian forces, especially the Italian fleet, to take part in the war against Japan. The treatment accorded to Italy in the meantime by the Allies, he stressed, would very largely determine the degree of support which he could expect from his country to such a proposal. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2229 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 21, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:55 p. m.]

925. From Reinhardt. General MacFarlane reports that on Sunday² Prunas warned the political section of the Control Commission that Bogomolov had told him in strict confidence that the Soviet decision to exchange diplomatic representatives was not to be regarded as isolated act but would be followed by other Soviet proposals based on a policy of closer relations between Italy and the Soviet Union. Bogomolov frankly admitted, according to Prunas, that the Soviets intend to exploit their privileged position in Italy where there was no Soviet army of occupation and where in the minds of the Italian people they were not directly associated with the restrictions imposed by Allies military control.

Although Bogomolov did not indicate the nature of any new proposals, Prunas surmised that they [might] take the form of an agreement along the lines of the Soviet-Czech accord.³ Prunas also felt that the Soviets might put forward some guarantee of Italy's eastern frontier where, on account of their relations with Tito, their influence is becoming predominant. He thought it might even be that the Soviet Union was considering a change in its relations with the Italian Government which would eliminate the present paradox of the armistice

² March 19.

³ Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed December 12, 1943. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 238.

on one side and co-belligerency and the exchange of diplomatic representatives on the other.

(3) According to Prunas the Soviet move was very well received by the Italian people, particularly in the north insofar as could be determined from the limited information available from that area. He emphasized that for this reason it would not be possible for any Italian Government to decline any further offer of Soviet friendship even though the Government did not wish for such a one-sided development of Italy's international position. Quite on the contrary the Italian Government wished to base the rehabilitation of the country upon a closer association with the United States and Great Britain but it felt, however, that it was being pushed in the opposite direction.

(4) Prunas stated that it was the earnest desire of the Italian Government that something should be done to neutralize the present trend but he himself realized that the moment had not yet come for Italy to be acceptable as an ally. Yet he believed that something might be done to regularize the present position whereby Italy was both a defeated enemy and a co-belligerent. In his opinion many of the armistice clauses which had already been carried out were no longer applicable. Finally he asked whether the time had not now come when the American and British Governments could consider a substitute agreement which would retain all the military requirements of the armistice and leave over questions that could not be decided now but which would give Italy some of the formal and legal benefits that it might expect to derive from the fact of co-belligerency.

(5) On Rumbold's ⁴ and my recommendation AFHQ is instructing MacFarlane to point out to the Italian Government that it is not in a position to enter into agreements with any foreign country without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander which must be sought through Control Commission. MacFarlane is being told that he will be kept informed of the two Governments' reaction to Prunas' statement.

We felt this was necessary in order to preclude Badoglio from again confronting the American and British Governments with a *fait accompli*. As reported in my 918, March 20, 8 p. m.,⁵ Bogomolov plans to return to Naples on Thursday.

General Wilson and Macmillan who are both in Cairo are being informed of the foregoing. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

⁴ Sir Horace Anthony Rumbold, Assistant to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Command.

⁵ Not printed.

865.01/2232 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 21, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received March 22—2: 20 p. m.]

952. I find that Molotov, in his recent conversation with me, expanded somewhat the argument contained in the memorandum answering the British objections to the recent Soviet action in Italy referred to in my 923, March 19, 10 p. m.⁶

He stated that the Soviet Government had learned of British and American policy in respect to the maintenance of the Badoglio government until the capture of Rome and to the position of the King of Italy only through public statements which had appeared in the press. He referred specifically to Churchill's declaration in the House⁷ in which Churchill announced the "Allied" position, thereby including the Soviet Government. He maintained that these questions had not been discussed with his Government in the Advisory Council or in Moscow, London, or Washington, and that they had been arrived at and announced without consultation with the Soviet Government. I said that it was my understanding that these matters had been the subject of constant discussion by the members of the Advisory Council. He would not admit this, contending that the minutes of the Council recorded no such discussions.

Sent to the Department; repeated to London as 55 and to Algiers for Reinhardt.

HARRIMAN

865.01/2233 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 22, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received 9: 22 p. m.]

937. From Reber. Upon receipt of the President's letter to Marshal Badoglio⁸ I called upon him on March 19 to deliver the communication personally.

He said he would like to take the occasion to speak frankly in regard to the extremely difficult position in which the Italian Government found itself. On the one hand he and his Government had loyally endeavored not only to carry out the terms of the armistice, but to make the maximum contribution possible to the prosecution of the

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ February 22, 1944; for text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 397, cols. 679-701.

⁸ Presumably the letter of February 21, p. 1031.

common war against Germany. He was continually using his best efforts to galvanize the Italian people to this end. On the other hand he felt that the actions of the Allied Governments showed that they continued to regard the Italian people as a defeated nation in spite of "cobelligerency". Soviet Russia had now openly extended the hand of friendship to the Italian people whereas he and his Government had hoped that by making common cause with the Allies they could pay their passage and earn a more favorable relationship with the United States and Great Britain. He was fully appreciative of the great assistance as regards food supplies for the Italian population but said that there were times when bread was not enough to rebuild a nation.

In discussing the lack of internal political unity we [*which he?*] insisted was more apparent than real he nevertheless admitted, in spite of his efforts to unify the country on the basis of the war effort, that the King's position made the formation of a more representative government impossible at this time. In this connection however he said he would discuss the President's letter with the King and would again emphasize to His Majesty the importance which the Allied Governments attached to the unification of the Italian people in the common cause.

In conclusion he said he deeply regretted what seemed to have been the decision of the United States Government to "pull out of" the Mediterranean both politically and militarily leaving to others the dominant role. [Reber.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2240 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 23, 1944.

[Received March 23—10:32 p. m.]

2378. In House of Commons yesterday, members asked Foreign Secretary whether British Government proposed to establish formal diplomatic relations with Italy, and whether it had been consulted before Soviet action in this matter.

Mr. Eden's reply was as follows:

"No communications have passed between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government regarding an exchange of diplomatic representatives between this country and Italy. His Majesty's Government do not intend to alter the existing position under which relations between this country and the Italian Government are conducted through the medium of Allied Control Commission set up under the terms of the armistice with Italy. His Majesty's Government are in communication with the Soviet Government regarding the exchange of representatives between that Govern-

ment and the Italian Government as to which they were not consulted beforehand and I have no further statement to make on this matter at the present time."

Asked if he could say whether decision he had announced was made after consultation with United States Government, Mr. Eden said: "Yes, certainly; my honorable friend will observe that Mr. Hull used language very similar to that which I have just used".⁹

A member of House asked whether before diplomatic representatives were exchanged, it would be kept in mind that it was essential for Italian Government to be made more democratic by introduction of elements who had always opposed fascism. Mr. Eden answered: "Perhaps the honorable gentleman will argue that out with the Soviet Government."

Another member inquired whether the Soviet Government was associated with the provisional agreement between Great Britain and the U.S.A.¹⁰ to take a new view of the future government of Italy after the occupation of Rome. Foreign Secretary replied: "The Italian campaign is a combined Anglo-American operation, and for this reason the British and United States Governments were alone parties to the provisional agreement mentioned by the Prime Minister in his statement of February 22. The Soviet Government are, of course, represented on the Advisory Council for Italy, and they have not expressed any dissent from the course of action agreed upon, either to His Majesty's Government or to the Council."

Asked if affairs were not apt to go more smoothly if Soviet Union were associated with this provisional agreement between Great Britain and United States, Mr. Eden said: "I really do not think that is justified. The actual operations which have taken place in Italy are military operations with which our Government and the United States Government are in particular concerned. The Soviet Government is fully represented on the Advisory Council where it can state what views it likes. If the honorable member is suggesting that this action in some way did not concur with the views of the Soviet Government, he has only to remember the action they have taken in recognizing the Badoglio government".

Answering another inquiry, Mr. Eden said that, "Immense pains have been taken by His Majesty's Government and the American Government" to consult Russia "at every stage of this Italian business."

WINANT

⁹ See telegram 632, March 18, 7 p. m., to Moscow, p. 1061.

¹⁰ See British *aide-mémoire*, March 6, p. 1037.

865.01/2229 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—1 p. m.

689. The following telegram has been received from Reinhardt at Algiers:

[Here follows telegram 925, March 21, 5 p. m., printed on page 1069.]

You should ask to see Molotov or Vyshinski with further reference to the exchange of representatives with Italy and tell him that certain rumors have reached us which would indicate Soviet intentions to follow a separate course in their dealings with the Italian Government and to attempt to achieve closer relations with the Italian Government than exist now between the other Allied Nations and Italy. In your conversations you may in your discretion use as much of Prunas' story as you consider appropriate. You will not of course make any reference to the source.

You should again emphasize the function of the Advisory Council in considering questions of a non-military nature relating to Italy and tell Molotov that we expect that, during the period of our active military operations against the Germans, any further developments in the relations of the U.S.S.R. with Italy will be referred to the Advisory Council of Italy for consideration and appropriate action.

HULL

865.01/2283a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—6 p. m.

883. For Reinhardt. On March 6 the British Embassy presented an *Aide-Mémoire* based on a telegram from Mr. Eden (1783), outlining the British position with respect to the present Italian political situation.

[Here follows substance of the *aide-mémoire* printed on page 1037.]

In reply, the Department's note¹¹ may be summarized briefly as follows:

The British understanding that the American Government has agreed to preserve the status of the present Italian Government and King until after the liberation of Rome is incorrect. In early February the President directed the Department to make no effort to effect any change in the existing Government of Italy at that time and until the military situation in Italy was improved. This decision was influenced by the military situation existing at that time and the military considerations advanced by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

¹¹ *Aide-mémoire* to the British Embassy, March 25, not printed.

After a visit to Italy and a review of the political situation there, General Wilson, however, decided that political developments would not wait until Rome was reached and recommended in Naf 622, 624, and 628 that he be authorized to support the program presented by the Executive Junta.¹² On March 13 the President sent a letter to the Prime Minister¹³ in which he said in part, "I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken."

This Government favors the proposal presented by the Junta involving the abdication of the King and the delegation of all or some of the powers of his successor to a lieutenant. It desires an immediate solution along these lines. However, in view of the recent decisions of the British War Cabinet, the President has agreed that the two Governments should not permit their divergent views to become public knowledge. The American note points out that the mere policy of preserving the *status quo* until after the liberation of Rome is in fact favoring the position of one group of Italians, and that the weight of Allied authority in Italy is such that we cannot avoid the responsibility of supporting one of the various solutions. Furthermore, we are opposed to a policy, in those areas of Italy restored to Italian administration, calculated to suppress normal political activity.

Because of the divergence of views between the two Governments and the major political considerations involved, the American note proposes that a solution should be worked out in the Advisory Council. It is held that the Advisory Council is the appropriate place for these considerations and decisions, and the note concludes by informing the British Embassy that the Department will instruct its representative on the Council to initiate discussion in an early meeting of the Council.

You are accordingly instructed to have placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Council a general discussion of the solutions presented by the various Italian groups with a view to obtaining an agreed recommendation to the Allied Commander-in-Chief for a solution satisfactory to all members of the Council. You should support the proposal of the Executive Junta described in Naf 622, 624, and 628, using the affirmative arguments outlined therein. The Department would like to see a recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief somewhat along the following lines: It is recommended that the Allied Commander-in-Chief secure from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, providing it will not prove harmful to current military operations, authority to notify the six opposition parties that their program as presented by the Executive Junta has his support and that of the interested United Nations. The representatives of the six opposition parties should then inform Victor Emmanuel of their program and they would be free to inform him that it had the support of the Allied military authorities and the United Nations represented on

¹² The Executive Junta's program involved the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of all or some of the powers of his successor to a "Lieutenant" (see memorandum by the Executive Junta, p. 1024).

¹³ See telegram 783, March 15, 9 p. m., to Algiers, p. 1053.

the Advisory Council. The Allied Commander-in-Chief should confirm, if necessary, his support of the opposition program to the King. Undertakings from the opposition parties would have to be secured that they subscribed severally and collectively to all the engagements by the Badoglio Government.

Sent to Algiers. Repeated to London.¹⁴

HULL

740.00119 A.C.I./160

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In view of the situation presented by the agreements between the Italian and Soviet Governments, Mr. Macmillan, who is at present in Cairo, has been instructed to proceed at once to Italy to discuss the matter with Monsieur Bogomolov and General Mason MacFarlane and decide whether the Advisory Council should not be convoked immediately in order to deal with the questions raised in telegrams received from Algiers.

Points for consideration are:

(1) Did the Italian Government consult the Control Commission before agreeing with the Soviet Government for the exchange of representatives with the latter?

(2) What line should be taken in regard to the memorandum, which Marshal Badoglio proposes to present to General Mason MacFarlane requesting the Allied Governments to accord Allied status to Italy?

(3) What line should be taken as regards the further proposals, which according to Signor Prunas, Monsieur Bogomolov intends to put to the Italian Government in order to establish still closer relations with them?

As regards (1) this is a minor question, but it is important to get the facts clear so as to know whether the Italian Government can be convicted of having behaved improperly to the Control Commission.

As regards (2) the inclination of His Majesty's Government is to reject the proposal to allow Italy to obtain Allied status, and it is suggested that Marshal Badoglio should be persuaded not to put such a proposal officially to the Allied governments.

As regards (3) Mr. Macmillan is instructed to enquire from Monsieur Bogomolov exactly what the Soviet Government are contemplating and to insist that if they do contemplate any further arrangements with the Italian Government, these must be discussed in the Advisory Council before they are put to the Italian Government. At the same time Mr. Macmillan is instructed to tell Monsieur

¹⁴ As telegram 2255.

Bogomolov that the Italian Government are being informed that they are not entitled to enter into any engagement with any foreign Power whether Allied or neutral without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander, which should be sought through Control Commission. This will be based not so much on the inherent rights established by the armistice conditions as on the general right of a Commander-in-Chief of occupying forces on the grounds of military security to control relations between the occupied territory and all other countries. As soon as Monsieur Bogomolov has been so informed General Mason MacFarlane should speak to the Italian Government on the lines indicated.

His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will consider it desirable to send similar instructions to their representative on the Advisory Council.

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944.

865.01/2227 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—midnight.

890. For Reinhardt. You should proceed to Italy to be present should there be a meeting of the Advisory Council to discuss the situation arising from the agreement of the Soviet Government with the Italian Government to exchange diplomatic representatives. Macmillan has already been instructed to go to Italy to take this matter up with General MacFarlane and Bogomolov, and to decide whether the Council should be immediately convoked.

The following is a summary of the points telegraphed by the British to Macmillan for consideration:

(1) Did the Italian Government consult the Control Commission prior to its agreement with the Soviets for an exchange of representatives? (In the Department's view this question was satisfactorily answered in your 910 of March 20, 4 p. m.)

(2) Badoglio's proposal to MacFarlane that allied status be accorded Italy. (See Algiers' telegram 937, March 22, 4 p. m., and copy of the President's letter to Badoglio in Reber's possession.) You should take the position that it is premature to consider full allied status for Italy now and recommend that Badoglio be dissuaded from presenting his proposal officially at this time.

(3) It is believed that Bogomolov intends to propose still closer relations with the Italian Government. He should be asked exactly what the Soviet Government contemplates and advised that any further arrangements must be previously discussed in the Advisory Council, and also that the Italian Government is being informed that they are not entitled to enter into any arrangement with any foreign power, whether Allied or neutral, without the consent of the Supreme Allied

Commander which should be sought through the Control Commission. This is based on the inherent rights established by the armistice, and on the general right of a Commander-in-Chief of occupying forces on the grounds of military security, to control relations between the occupied territory and all other countries. After thus informing Bogomolov, MacFarlane should be instructed to speak to the Italian Government along the lines indicated.

The British Embassy consulted with the Department on the above directives and expressed the hope that this Government would instruct its representative on the Advisory Council in a similar vein. The Department is in accord with the British views and the above is for your guidance should a meeting of the Council be held.

HULL

865.01/2218 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1944—11 p. m.

907. For Reinhardt. Department's telegram No. 803 of March 18. The President sent the following reply to the Prime Minister on March 17:

"Thank you for your no. 621, March 15,¹⁵ reporting the decisions of the War Cabinet with respect to the Italian political situation. I am in full agreement with you and them that we should not permit our divergent views to become known publicly particularly at this time.

However, I still feel that if the pressure of the six opposition parties comes to a point where it will have an adverse effect on the situation, we should support their program. I think that we should watch political developments carefully in Italy for the present with that in mind and keep the matter continually before the Advisory Council."

HULL

865.01/2252 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 26, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received March 27—12:20 p. m.]

1050. Department's 602, March 16, midnight; Embassy's 923, March 19, 10 p. m.¹⁶ I have received the following letter dated March 25 from Molotov:

"In its memorandum transmitted to the American Government in Washington prior to the receipt of your letter on March 18, the Soviet

¹⁵ For text of Churchill's message of March 15, see telegram 803, March 18, 11 a. m., to Algiers, p. 1060.

¹⁶ Latter not printed.

Government set forth the motives for its decision to establish direct relations with the Badoglio government. In view of this, there is no need to return to this question at the present time.

I consider it first of all necessary to remark with respect to the questions touched upon in your letter, that there is no basis to accede to such an interpretation of the rights and authorities of the Supreme Command in the liberated territories of Italy, the meaning of which would result in a denial, unacceptable for the Soviet Union, of the right of an Allied Government to establish immediate relations with the Italian Government without the sanction of the Supreme Command. There is no basis, moreover, to agree that the establishment of direct relations between the Italian and Soviet Governments is capable in any degree whatsoever of being in contraction [*contradiction?*] to the undertakings which assure military safety since such a contact can only be profitable for the common cause of the Allies in Italy. Furthermore, direct contact between the Soviet and Italian Governments cannot entail the consequences mentioned in your letter, as the establishment of such a contact has no relation either to the conduct of military operations in Italy or to the fulfillment of the armistice terms, that is, to the questions concerning the authority of the Allied Control Commission or to the authority of the Supreme Command of the Anglo-American armed forces in Italy. With respect to the proposal of the United States Government that the question of the establishment of relations between the Soviet and Italian Governments be referred to the examination of the Advisory Council, I must call attention to the fact that the examination of such a question does not come under the authority of the Advisory Council. There would be no objection from the Soviet side, however, to the study of this question through regular diplomatic channels if this is considered desirable by the United States Government.

With regard to the question to the effect that the decision of the Soviet Government to establish direct relations and to exchange representatives with the Italian Government was taken not only without consultation but also without advance notification to the United States Government, in actual fact, such a notification was, as you know, made through the Soviet representative on the Advisory Council for Italy on the direct instructions of the Soviet Government".

Sent to the Department; repeated to Algiers and London.

HARRIMAN

865.01/2256 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 27, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received March 28—11 : 35 a. m.]

1076. Your 689, March 24, 1 p. m. As Molotov was unable to see me till tomorrow I saw Vyshinski this evening and told him that rumors had come to the attention of my Government to the effect that

the Soviet Government intended to follow a separate course in its dealings with the Italian Government and to achieve closer relations with the Italian Government than were now maintained by the other Allied Governments, and that the Soviet Government intended to conclude various political agreements directly with the Italian Government. I expressed the earnest hope that the rumors had no basis in fact. He stated that the rumors were without any basis. He continued that the Soviet Government had expressed its position in the memorandum of March 19 delivered to you by the Soviet Ambassador, and that any rumors that went beyond the statements set forth in this memo were without foundation.

He asked whether the rumors contained any further details as to the agreements I had referred to. I explained to him that the rumors as far as I understood it were generally about the intention of the Soviet Government to exploit its more favored position to the advantage of the Soviet Government as against the British and ourselves. He said that there was no foundation for such rumors. He added that they did not consider that they had a more favorable position in comparison with us.

In leaving I expressed the personal opinion that my Government would be disappointed in Mr. Molotov's reply of March 25,¹⁷ regarding the question of exchange of representatives with the Italian Government because of the Soviet Government's unwillingness to have the question resolved in the Advisory Council. He said the Soviet Government considered that it was better to deal with it through diplomatic channels as the members of the Advisory Council would only have to refer the question back to their Governments. He further expressed the hope that the matter could be worked out to the satisfaction of us all. I said I could not express a further opinion about it till I had heard from my Government.

Sent to Department, repeated to London as No. 62 and to Algiers for Reinhardt.

HARRIMAN

865.01/2257 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 28, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 11 : 30 p. m.]

1024. From Reinhardt. 1. General MacFarlane saw Badoglio alone morning of March 25 half an hour before latter was due to see Bogomolov.

¹⁷ See telegram 1050, March 26, *supra*.

The Marshal promised he would make no arrangements further with the Soviet Government without first consulting MacFarlane. Subsequently MacFarlane sent Badoglio a memo stating that Italian Government is not entitled to enter into any arrangement with any foreign power whether Allied or neutral without consent of Allied Commander which should be sought through Control Commission.

2. On March 26 Reber saw Badoglio who said that Bogomolov had informed him that Soviet Government was appointing as its representative in Italy, Kostylev, at present senior member of Vyshinsky's staff. It was not clear except to Badoglio what rank Kostylev would have but the impression was that Kostylev would subsequently be appointed Minister. At the same time Badoglio informed Bogomolov that Signor Quarroni, Italian Minister of Kabul, would be the Italian representative at Moscow. Bogomolov indicated that such an appointment would be acceptable to the Soviet Government. Badoglio said that announcement of the appointments would be made in the near future.

On the same occasion Bogomolov had proposed that the Italian Government release those Italians of Slav origin at present in the Italian Army in order that they might be incorporated into Tito's Partisan forces. Badoglio said that he had replied that such a proposal would present extreme difficulties involving as it would the release to a foreign army of persons of Italian nationality. Badoglio assured Reber that he had made no commitments on the subject.

3. On March 26, Macmillan saw Bogomolov who gave him a similar account of his conversation with Badoglio except that he said Kostylev would have the rank of Counselor. Bogomolov endeavored to make the point that the Soviet action did not constitute establishment of normal diplomatic relations and added that a memorandum setting forth the Soviet point of view on this and other Italian questions had been delivered to the British and American Governments. Bogomolov stated that Vyshinsky would continue as Soviet member of the Council and that for the present he, Bogomolov, would serve as the former's deputy.

Macmillan returned from Naples today. With reference the Department's 890 of March 24, it is my understanding that at the Council meeting scheduled for Friday, March 31, in view of the adamant position taken by the Soviet Government in the face of Anglo-American representations in Moscow, Macmillan intends simply to inform the Council of the steps already taken vis-à-vis the Italian Government and does not intend to seek further clarification of the Soviet position from Bogomolov. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2259 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*ALGIERS, March 29, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received March 30—12:30 a. m.]

1029. From Reinhardt. General MacFarlane reports that Bogomolov called on him the evening of March 27. Bogomolov talked for nearly an hour and was clearly anxious to be friendly. According to MacFarlane he gave the impression of a penitent cobra being matey. Bogomolov contended that we had attached too much importance to the recent agreement to exchange representatives between the Soviet and Italian Governments. He assured MacFarlane that this had not involved reopening diplomatic relations with Italy. The sole object was to ensure a closer liaison. Bogomolov stated that if the Russians had wanted to do any abnormal business with the Italian Government they would not have been so stupid as to exchange representatives. They had quite different and much more effective ways of carrying on that kind of business.

Bogomolov told MacFarlane at considerable length of the memorandum which the Soviet Government recently presented to the United States and British Governments. He explained the Soviet Government's proposals for solving the political problem in Italy. It is MacFarlane's understanding that the Soviet Government attaches little importance to whether the King remains or not and that it wishes the Badoglio Government to broaden its structure by including in the Government representatives of the opposition parties. Bogomolov spoke at length on the necessity of obtaining a Government which would be capable of producing more effective help to the Allied war effort. MacFarlane believes that the Russians intend to take a strong line with the parties of the Left in Italy and that they intend to insure that these parties do nothing which may dislocate the administration and thus upset the war effort.

Bogomolov frequently stressed the fact that in spite of the great differences between the Soviet and British ideologies and political structures and in spite of the inevitable occasional minor friction such as resulted from the recent exchange of representatives with Italy it was essential that the three Allied Governments should collaborate fully both for the present and for many years in the future.

He expressed the opinion that the Prime Minister's recent remarks in the House¹⁸ about the Italian opposition had been politically most inept. He also expressed surprise that the United States Government was proposing to establish consular representation in Naples. MacFarlane reports that bit him heavily on both points.

¹⁸ The speech of February 22, 1944.

The interview concluded by Bogomolov inviting MacFarlane to dine with him to discuss in more intimate surroundings local politics and especially opposition personalities. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1944—6 p. m.

935. For Reinhardt. Your 1010, March 27, 4 p. m.¹⁹ Murphy will depart by plane April 2 barring delay in flight schedule. He can be in Naples by April 6. If you can postpone the meeting of the Advisory Council until that date, he and the Department would consider it desirable. Furthermore, it would seem inadvisable to inform Bogomolov along the lines suggested in the Department's paragraph 3, telegram 890, March 24, midnight, unless you are satisfied that MacFarlane will follow Macmillan's instructions to speak to the Italian Government along the lines indicated. When MacFarlane raised the question of the basis of his authority to make representations to the Italians along the lines indicated in the Department's 890, General Wilson referred his inquiry to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and until the Combined Chiefs of Staff reply to General Wilson, MacFarlane may feel that he cannot make the desired representations to the Italian Government. It is hoped that the CCS will reply to General Wilson's inquiry early next week.

With reference to your paragraph 3, telegram 1010, this Government would welcome a wholly Italian solution to the present political impasse. If a satisfactory compromise between the King and the majority of the political groups represented in the Committee of National Liberation can be worked out without our interference, it would seem desirable to support such a solution. This Government favored the proposal of the Executive Junta principally because it carried with it the promise of greater unity than any other plan. If the negotiations reported in your 1010²⁰ result in a solution enjoying similar united support, this Government would, of course, give its whole-hearted concurrence.

HULL

865.01/2188 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1944—8 p. m.

937. For Reinhardt. The chronology of events leading up to the Italian announcement of an exchange of diplomatic representatives

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ Negotiations between the King and the opposition parties which might produce a compromise plan of government before the next meeting of the Advisory Council.

with the Soviet Union is not clear to us. You reported in your 822, March 13, 5 p. m., that "Bogomolov has just called to inform me officially that his Government has reached an agreement with the Badoglio Government". March 13 was Monday. In your 847, March 15, 8 p. m., you say, "He (Bogomolov) then proceeded to expound the same explanation he had given to Macmillan and me when he called on us on Saturday last, (reported in my 822, March 13, 5 p. m.)." "Saturday last" was March 11.

In your 826, March 14, 1 p. m., you report that the Italian Government will issue its official communiqué concerning the establishment of direct relations with the Soviet Union on March 14. However, the press in this country reported that the Italian Government made the announcement on the evening of March 13. This point is of interest to ascertain if Bogomolov notified you officially of his Government's action before, simultaneously or after the day of the official Italian announcement.

HULL

865.01/2271 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 30, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received 11:41 p. m.]

1049. From Reinhardt. In reply to the first paragraph of Department's 937, March 29, 8 p. m., the phrase "Saturday last" contained in my 847, March 15, 8 p. m., is in error. It should read "Monday last" as in fact Bogomolov called on me the morning of Monday March 13.

With reference to time of issuance of Italian official communiqué our information is that this communiqué was issued on the night of March 13 for release after 12:01 a. m., March 14.

It would appear, therefore, that Bogomolov notified me officially of his Government's action approximately 12 hours before the official Italian announcement. [Reinhardt.]

CHAPIN

740.0011 European War 1939/34265

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

At the end of 1943 the Italian Government indicated that they wished to adhere publicly to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter.²¹

²¹ For text of joint declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 367.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom suggested to the United States Government that an informal and tactful indication be given to the Italian Government that such action on their part might be misunderstood by allied public opinion. The United States Government did not however feel able to associate themselves with such action.

2. His Majesty's Government appreciate that, in general, adherence to the principles of the Charter is to be welcomed, but, particularly since the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has stated publicly that the second clause of the Charter relating to territorial changes does not apply to enemy countries, they feel it would be most inexpedient that any action should take place which would give even the appearance of creating an obligation to maintain Italian territories intact.

3. His Majesty's Government trust, therefore, that Mr. Hull may find it possible to send instructions to the United States representative on the Allied Control Commission in Italy which would enable agreed action to be taken to dissuade the Italian Government at the present time from publicly proclaiming their adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

WASHINGTON, 31 March, 1944.

865.01/2288

The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union

MEMORANDUM

The statements of the Soviet Government, in reply to representations made by the British Ambassador at Moscow on March 13, 1944 concerning the establishment of direct relations with Italy and the exchange of representatives, have been noted. The Ambassador's courtesy in bringing the views of his Government in this regard promptly to the attention of the United States Government is appreciated.

The Department agrees with the view of the Soviet Embassy that, in accordance with the terms of reference, the Advisory Council for Italy is not the "official instrument of the Allied Governments for contact with the Italian Government". It must be observed, however, that the idea of the Advisory Council as conceived during the Moscow Conference was to establish the principle of allied as against individual approach to political questions in the liberated areas of Italy, including relations with the Italian Government. The entire purpose of the arrangements established by the Moscow Conference was precisely to avoid the seeking by individual members of the Allied nations of special advantage and to insure unity of action among the Allies in dealing with Italian problems.

The Soviet Government is undoubtedly aware that one of the functions of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, as established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is to be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations is conducted with respect to the Italian Government and through which the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are conducted. While it is true that the relationship of a Control Commission with the Italian Government is established by Articles 37 and 42 of the "long terms" of surrender, the broad scope of its functions and authority are provided by the various directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief. Furthermore, the terms of surrender signed on September 3 and September 29, 1943 are comprehensive and, in carrying out its function of enforcing the terms of surrender, the Control Commission and the Allied representatives on that body are required to deal with the Italian Government with respect to every phase of Italian political, economic and military life. Consequently, the Department finds it difficult to agree with the Soviet belief that Allied contacts with the Government of Italy through the Control Commission are limited.

Furthermore, the Department cannot accept the contention of the Soviet Government that it has been denied "up to the present time" direct contact with the Italian Government and thus has found itself in an unequal position, compared with the British and American Governments. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the appointment of a Soviet representative to the Allied Control Commission in January. Since that time General Solodovnik has been an active member of the Control Commission and has had the same opportunity for contacts with the Italian Government as have his British and American colleagues. As has been previously stated, the Control Commission is the established organ through which the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are conducted and the Soviet Government is represented on that body. In view of the Allied nature of the Control Commission its relations with the Italian Government have, of course, a united character which do not permit individual or separate approach by any one of the Allied Governments represented therein or by the French Committee of National Liberation.

With reference to the second portion of the Soviet note, the United States Government agrees with the Soviet Government that a solution to the present political crisis in Italy is urgently required. It is grateful for the views of the Soviet Government in this regard and it may be said that the Government of the United States is in general accord with the Soviet views and recommendations. This Government considers it essential that a solution to the present political

crisis in Italy be reached not later than the liberation of Rome and earlier if possible. Furthermore, it would like to see representatives of the six opposition parties brought into the Italian Government at the earliest possible moment and believes that the reasonable and constructive proposal put forward by the Executive Junta is the most satisfactory solution.

The Government of the United States desires that a solution should be worked out among the various United Nations at present directly interested in Italian affairs and considers the Advisory Council for Italy the appropriate place to work out a solution satisfactory to the various United Nations concerned. It proposes to instruct its representative on the Advisory Council to place on the agenda for consideration by an early session of the Council the problems involved in the present Italian political situation.

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1944.

740.00119 European War 1939/2557

*The Head of the Italian Government (Badoglio) to President
Roosevelt*

[Translation]

SALERNO, April 3, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish indeed to thank you for your letter of February 21. I am particularly grateful to you for the frankness with which you expressed yourself. In the very difficult and very grave hours through which Italy is passing, your word serves me as consolation and at the same time as a spur.

You write me that until such time as the Italian Government includes also the representatives of the leading anti-fascist political groups, it is not possible for a Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require.

Now Italy is on the eve of such an event. I hope, that is, within a very short time to present to the country, after the many recent vicissitudes, a truly national government which will include within its composition the representatives of all the leading parties, organized and finally and solely directed toward the war against the Germans. And I wish to notify you thereof before anyone else, since to you more than to anyone else I feel bound by friendship and gratitude for the great deal you have already done for my country and for that which—I firmly hope—you will continue to do to restore it to that honorable place in the world of which you spoke in the unforgettable and dark hours of the armistice.

Fully aware of the importance of your precious time and the great burden of work that weighs upon your shoulders, I wish merely to tell you how wise and humane it would be if the advent of the new democratic Italian Government were accompanied by full reexamination of the very harsh terms made to us six months ago: that is, briefly, Italy's transition from cobelligerency to alliance.

No occasion could be more propitious, no occasion more favorable. You yourself, moreover, refer to it explicitly in your letter. And no living man could better than yourself, Mr. President, perform this task of synchronizing the imminent advent of the new democratic Italy with her definitive alignment among the Allied nations.

The United States would in this way assume in Italy and the Mediterranean a leading part vis-à-vis all the other Powers; she would assure for herself a decided and decisive influence on Italy and Italian affairs; would neutralize any action and influence from the East; would thaw the rigid, intransigent British policy, impelling it toward more constructive goals and tasks. Moreover, she would galvanize the whole nation, both in the south and the north, for the final struggle against the Germans and for the work of rebuilding the country on those liberal and democratic bases which are your and our common ideal.

Italy has, as you know, passed through the sorriest phase of her history; other hard phases await her. Her cities are semi-destroyed; three-fourths of her people groan beneath the German heel; suffering is the lot of each and all.

It is not vain and empty rhetoric to tell you, Mr. President, that all Italy is at this moment looking to you, and these, I believe, are rare moments in the lives of men and peoples.

It is certain that a word and a move from you in this direction could do more than anything else for Italy's revival and regeneration, which are and must be spiritual above all.

Please accept the assurance, Mr. President, of my loyal and cordial friendship.

BADOGLIO

865.01/2233 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1944—6 p. m.

991. For Reber. Was Badoglio's comment reported in the last paragraph of your 937, March 22, 4 p. m., based on the President's letter or was it an interpretation of general events?

If any suggestion comes to you that we are "pulling out" you should state that the policy of this Government has undergone no change

whatever from the time we undertook the campaign in Italy with the Anglo-American landing in Sicily. We have just as much interest in the Italian situation, and we have just as much hope that Italy will be restored to the family of nations and that the Italian people will, as soon as the military exigencies permit, be free to choose their own leaders and their own Government.

HULL

865.01/2299 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 4, 1944.

[Received April 5—2:30 p. m.]

1174. *Pravda*²² for April 3 publishes a 14 column inch [*sic*] despatch from London reporting Ercoli's announcement that the Italian Communist Party had decided to propose to the other opposition parties that their demand for the abdication of Victor Emmanuel be postponed and that they support a proposal for the formation of a government enjoying the support of all parties.

The item identifies Ercoli as "the well-known Italian Communist leader" and states that a week ago he arrived in Naples from Moscow where he had spent 18 years in exile and was a member of the Comintern.

The new program of the Communist Party as announced by Ercoli contains three main points:

1. Assurance of unity of the anti-Fascist parties.
2. Solution of the question of the state structure of Italy after the war by democratic methods.
3. The formation of a national government on broad basis.

In a statement in the Communist paper units [*L'Unita?*]^{22a} Ercoli is reported to have referred to the effort to find a way out of the impasse into which the political parties of liberated Italy have fallen since the armistice. He emphasized that the principal immediate task is to carry on and win the war and to this end suggests the formation of a broad front of united political parties. An elementary condition for a national reconnaissance is the purging of fascism from Italian life. This however does not mean revenge or the removal of experienced and capable army officers who are necessary for the conduct of the war. There are however two governing considerations. (1st) Italy was led to the brink of catastrophe and it is impossible to avoid the question of responsibility for this situation. (2nd) The war against the Germans must be won.

²² Organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.

^{22a} Communist newspaper published in Rome.

The immediate tasks of the Communist Party are action in close agreement with the Socialists and an alliance with all other anti-Fascist forces of the country. Italy must take effective action against Hitlerite Germany. To remain an indifferent spectator would not only be an error but a crime. The Communist Party must raise the flag of national interests which were betrayed by fascism.

Ercoli stated that the Communist Party was republican in principle and proposed the conversion of the Italian State into a democratic republic at the proper time. For the present however the decision of these questions must be postponed since the abdication of the King cannot be effected immediately.

Repeated to London and to Algiers for Reinhardt.

HARRIMAN

865.01/2316: Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Murphy)*²³ to the Secretary of State

SALERNO, April 10, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

During course of a long conversation with Count Carlo Sforza on April 7 he said that he could not describe with sufficient urgency the necessity of immediate action by Great Britain and the United States to avoid all of Italy falling under complete domination of Soviet Union. He said that extraordinary progress had been made in Italy by Communist Party particularly since arrival of Togliatti (Ercoli) whom he described as the brains and leader of the organization stating that Tedeschi is a gangster type lacking in education and playing a minor role. Sforza said that the problem may seem to the United States in its security one of minor significance. He sees in it, however, the first step in what he calls the process of the "Diplomatic Sovietization of Europe". Same process in his opinion will be applied to the Balkans, France, and Spain. A different procedure will be applied to Germany where more direct and destructive methods will be used. In his opinion the Comintern remains the active force it has been in the past and the public statements regarding its dissolution are pure hypocrisy. Sforza became bitter in his denunciation of Prime Minister Churchill whose obtuseness he blames for failure to comprehend true nature of problem. He realizes he said that Churchill is opposed to Communistic encroachment in Central and Eastern Europe but he maintains that Churchill fails to grasp necessity of pursuing a different line of action than he has adopted. He asserts that Churchill's blind and stubborn adherence to the notion of supporting

²³ Mr. Murphy was succeeded as American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy by Alexander C. Kirk, who was appointed on March 31 but did not arrive at his post until April 29.

present King and a weak Badoglio government has given the Communists an ideal and fertile field for their development. Ercoli, he said, has been conducting negotiations with Badoglio which in Sforza's opinion will place the eventual power squarely in hands of Italian Communist Party. The latter, he states, is growing by leaps and bounds and daily before the central office of the Communist Party is a long line of applicants, former [*applicants for*] membership in the party including every type of citizens: businessmen, professional men and artisans. Since Ercoli's arrival the known funds of the party have increased to 25,000,000 lire.

Sforza stated that he has had several conversations with Togliatti and Tedeschi. The former suggested that in the new government the Communists want to see Sforza included since he is an old tried anti-Fascist but they made the suggestion that they would like to have the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and hoped that Sforza would not insist on that particular portfolio.

Sforza pleaded that both Britain and the United States take a more realistic view immediately and intervene for purpose of bringing pressure upon King to retire now and agree to appointment of Humbert as Lieutenant General of the Realm. He states, however, [*moreover?*], that he has had exchanges with Humbert and is convinced that Humbert is willing to work with him in the formation of a strong liberal coalition government.

Sforza urged again that we give prompt consideration to question whether it is in Anglo-American interest to permit Soviet Union to lay cornerstone of its plan to construct a diplomatic hegemony of Europe.

[MURPHY]

865.01/2315 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

SALERNO, April 10, 1944—noon.

[Received 5:15 p. m.]

As reported in my telegram ²⁴ on yesterday's meeting of Advisory Council, the present position with regard to Italian political developments is that the Executive Junta of opposition parties with concurrence of Croce and Sforza is now prepared to collaborate with Badoglio government on condition that King put into effect his plan to retire and appoint Prince Humbert Lieutenant of the Realm.

The Executive Junta has accepted King's plan (Plan A) with modification that it should be put into effect immediately (Plan B) rather

²⁴ *Infra.*

than following liberation of Rome. Accordingly only difference between plans A and B and only outstanding issue between King and opposition is simply one of timing.

With respect to position of King, however, it is consensus here that should Junta fail to induce him to retire now, the opposition parties one after the other following lead of Communist Party will drop their objection to serving in a government under the King and proceed to active collaboration with Badoglio regime and the Socialist and Christian Democrat parties would be the first, the Liberal and Active [*Action*] parties the last to take this step. Such a development would, of course, spell end of the common front of the six opposition parties.

Under these circumstances, obviously the King is jockeying for time and it is also apparent that he is an obstacle to a coalition of liberal elements. It is doubtful that they will take the initiative to announce his retirement. I am informed that he is even now suggesting the possibility of a technical retirement without public announcement. Victor Emmanuel does not appear conscious or he may be indifferent to prevailing adverse public opinion at home and abroad regarding himself and his record. It may be necessary for some outside agency to give direction to the King's thought if a satisfactory adjustment to this question is to be found with reasonable speed.

(Please note that due to unsatisfactory cable service from Naples, there is considerable delay in despatch of our telegrams).

[MURPHY]

740.00119 ACI/100 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

SALERNO, April 10, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received April 11—7:37 p. m.]

1. At the meeting of the Advisory Council yesterday afternoon, April 8, principal item on agenda was discussion of Italian political situation. General MacFarlane who had been invited to attend the meeting gave an interesting account of the organization of the Control Commission and military government. He then reviewed political developments in Italy from armistice up to present.

MacFarlane then described how with return of Togliatti (Ercoli) to Italy the Communist Party had withdrawn its opposition to the King and Badoglio. The latter as before were prepared to accept collaboration of any or all of opposition parties in the Government and the governments [*parties?*] themselves gave every indication of eventually following lead already taken by Communist Party. The Executive Junta had met with Sforza and Croce at Sorrento on April 6 and

decided to ask DeNicola to propose to the King on its behalf that he put his plan into effect immediately. It is important to note, however, that the Junta while accepting his plan (call it plan A) has done so on condition that it be put into effect immediately (call this plan B) rather than following the fall of Rome as envisaged by King. But DeNicola had refused to act as the spokesman of the Junta in whose deliberations he had never participated. The Junta accordingly had decided to meet again on Wednesday, April 12, to consider question of how to communicate with the King. Such was situation as of the moment.

2. The Chairman Guerino stressed on behalf of French Committee the gratification felt by French at this progress toward a democratic solution of Italian political impasse.

I stated that my Government took a similar view. There had been no concern [*had been concern?*] in the U.S. over slowness in implementation of the Moscow Conference decisions. The American people favor a rapid solution of the question along democratic lines.

3. Macmillan echoed these sentiments and proposed a recommendation to the Supreme Allied Commander which I seconded containing these views together with the advice that in event of formation of a new government the following two principles should be safeguarded:

“(a) That the new government must formally declare its willingness to assume all the obligations towards the Allies entered into by old Government.

(b) That any adjustment of the institutional question which may now be reached should be regarded as stable until such a time as the Italian people can freely express their views.”

The members of the Council all agreed to the recommendation with exception of Soviet member who stated that he would have to consult his Government. He undertook to do this immediately.

4. After considerable difficult[y] Bogomolov was induced to agree to a press communiqué simply stating the Council's gratification at progress being made for an early solution of Italian political problem and formation of a broad based democratic government.

5. The several members of the Council each designated a staff member to participate in a committee of secretaries which is to investigate question of organization of a Council secretariat. It is not anticipated that they will recommend establishment of a permanent secretariat but rather will draw up a recommended procedure for handling of Council business and documents. I designated Goshie to act as secretary of the American delegation.

6. Noel Charles who reached Naples several days ago attended the meeting together with Macmillan.

Sent to Department. Repeated Algiers, London, Moscow.

[MURPHY]

865.01/2479 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, April 11, 1944—11 p. m.

The King received Macmillan, Sir Noel Charles and me yesterday and as result of conversation and further one today with Marshal Badoglio, King decided to carry out proposal conveyed to American and British Governments through General Mason MacFarlane on February 21²⁵ announcing his irrevocable decision to retire from public life and appoint Crown Prince Humbert, Lieutenant of the Realm on the day the Allies enter Rome. This announcement will be made at midday Wednesday.²⁶

We welcomed King's decision though strongly advised him to hand over his power to Crown Prince immediately as we thought such action would be of greatest benefit to Italy in bringing together moderate elements to assist in forming all around democratic government. At same time it would probably meet wishes of the Government and people of the United States and Great Britain.

Marshal Badoglio hopes on strength of King's initiative to form broad-based government in which all six parties with possible exception of Party of Action will participate. He proposes to make Benedetto Croce Minister without Portfolio, give important Ministry of Interior to a Liberal and keep Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his own hands.

While I trust that the sanguine hopes of the King and Marshal will be fulfilled, I think they would have stood more chance of success had the King been able to make a bolder gesture.

MURPHY

865.01/2316 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1944—2 p. m.

1088. For Murphy. Your April 10, 10 a. m. Thank you for your report of conversations with Sforza on April 7 concerning the present political situation in Italy. It is hoped that a basis for the action which Count Sforza urges upon us to solve the present political crisis will be found in the present deliberations of the Advisory Council. (See the Department's 883, March 24, 6 p. m., and 935, March 29,

²⁵ See telegram 573, February 22, 12 a. m., from Algiers, p. 1031.

²⁶ April 12.

6 p. m.) As you know, the British Government has indicated its willingness to discuss in the Advisory Council the various proposals to bring all the opposition groups into the government. We have also informed the Soviet Government of our intention to discuss and arrive at a solution of the problems in the Advisory Council. You will, of course, keep this question constantly before the Advisory Council and endeavor to obtain an agreed recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief at an early date.

If there are any questions of policy which require clarification, please let us know.

HULL

865.01/2288

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum (copy attached) regarding the action of his Government in exchanging diplomatic representatives with the Badoglio régime. I thanked him and remarked that this presented a relatively and entirely small question and that in my opinion the handling of this matter publicly has resulted in one hundred times more harm than good to Russia, both in connection with the international movement of collaboration and cooperation and public opinion in the United States. I expressed the earnest hope that in the future Russia would undertake to talk such matters out, as each of the three great nations should do, rather than go into the press with premature and unilateral decisions.

C[ORDELL] H[HULL]

[Annex]

The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

In connection with the memorandum of the United States Government,²⁷ transmitted on April 3, 1944 by Secretary of State Hull to Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

1) The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the agreement of the Government of the United States with the [apparent omission]

²⁷ Dated April 1, p. 1085.

stated in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of March 19, considerations that the Consultative Council on Italian questions is not an official instrument of the Allied governments for contact with the Italian Government.

2) The Government of the United States, recognizing as correct the assertion that the relations of the Control Commission with the Italian Government are determined by articles 37 and 42 of the terms of armistice, is asserting also that the broad scope of functions and powers of this Commission is provided by various directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Allied Commander in Chief what gives reason to consider that the functions and powers of the Control Commission were broadened by these directives as compared to how this is provided by the above-mentioned articles of terms of armistice. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the United States to the fact that any change of the scope of functions and powers of the Allied Control Commission as compared to how these functions and powers are provided by the stated terms of armistice, cannot be made without preliminary agreement between the three governments on whose behalf those terms are signed. Another situation, undoubtedly, would represent a violation of the principle of uniformity of policy on Italian questions set as basis of the establishment of the Control Commission,—the principle, the importance of observance of which is pointed out in the memorandum of the Government of the United States of April 3 [1?].

3) In the memorandum of April 3, is being denied the assertion that the Soviet Government as compared to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain was in an unequal position in regard to Italy. The Soviet Government finds such a denial unfounded. The Soviet Government considers it absolutely indisputable that since the governments of the United States and Great Britain have realized and are realizing their connections with the Italian Government through their numerous institutions and their numerous representatives, while the Soviet Government did not have direct contact with the Italian Government, it cannot be asserted that the Soviet Government was in an equal position with the American and British Governments in regard to Italy.

4) In accordance with the wishes of the American Government the Soviet Government has already given instructions to its representative to the Consultative Council to discuss with the Council the question on the political situation in Italy so that this question could afterwards be considered and solved by the three governments.

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1944.

865.01/2256 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1944—3 p. m.

896. For your background information, in view of your statement to Vyshinski (your 1076, March 27, 9 p. m.), which the Department approves, to the effect that Molotov's reply (your 1050, March 26, 11 a. m.) would not be regarded as satisfactory, we consider it preferable not to pursue the subject further until we are in a position to make some constructive suggestion of our own designed to fit the Soviet representative and his functions into the machinery of Allied control in Italy.

The best solution to achieve this purpose and to reestablish the principle of allied rather than individual approach to Italian political problems appears to be that the Soviet representative in Italy should be made a member of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission which is the agency of the Control Commission designated to handle relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government. Since any appointment to the Allied Control Commission must be approved by the Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, this suggestion is being put before them for consideration and we expect to have a reply within a week. If this suggestion is approved you will be instructed to present it to the Soviet Government.

HULL

865.01/2336 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 14, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received April 15—9:31 a. m.]

1243. From Murphy. Macmillan and I returned last evening from Naples. I regret the complicated communications arrangements at Naples prevented more detailed and rapid reporting. After Brandt's²⁸ arrival cipher transmission should improve.

On arrival in Naples April 7 I immediately consulted with British and Soviet representatives and Count Sforza (my April 10, 10 a. m.) and I had a frank discussion privately with Macmillan, Noel Charles, and General MacFarlane to whom I described point of view conveyed to me by Department. They expressed concern over fashion in which Soviet Union is showing a tendency independently to intervene in internal Italian affairs and in strengthening position of Italian Communist Party. Incidentally they seem fully in agreement with

²⁸ George L. Brandt, assigned as Consul General at Naples, March 9, 1944.

Sforza's opinion that Soviet Union is striving for "diplomatic Sovietization" of Italy as a focal point in a wider European program. This does not mean however that British have changed their attitude regarding Sforza whom they damn with faint praise at every opportunity.

Macmillan agreed time had arrived when it would be well by an Anglo-American *démarche* to demonstrate that our respective Governments who had borne and are bearing brunt and burden not only of Italian military campaign but economic supply of liberated Italy as well have gone as far and as fast as situation permits in facilitating democratization of Italy. The British evince greater concern even than do we regarding the Soviet effort, which becomes daily more obvious, to gain political profits at Anglo-American expense.

As it was appropriate that Sir Noel Charles should present his respects to Victor Emmanuel, and also that I do so after an extended absence, we arranged to call on the King at his temporary residence in Ravello on the morning of April 10. It was agreed that I should lead off the discussion regarding the purpose of our visit. In doing so I told the King frankly that it was our considered opinion that he would best serve Italian interests and the Allied cause by retiring from public affairs immediately. I described to him as best I could the state of American public opinion and expressed the opinion that his continued presence obviously was proving an obstacle to the coalition of liberal forces in Italy which might have an adverse effect on the conduct of the war. The King expostulated a number of times during our conversation, describing his accomplishments in favor of the Allied cause, reiterating that his decisions in July, 1943 resulting in the dissolution of the Fascist Party, the expulsion from the government of Mussolini, the negotiations for an armistice, and finally that the transfer to the Allies of the Italian fleet and the Italian declaration of war against Germany could not have happened without his decision. I replied that we gave him full credit for his actions and were deeply grateful for them, and that they partially at least served to counterbalance other features of his record which included close affiliation with and submission to the Fascist program during a period of 22 years leading up to the Italian declaration of war against the United States, to say nothing of the acts which Italy had committed against our Allies, especially France, Greece, and Great Britain. Whether his heart was in such a program or not, he submitted to it and gave his approval by his continued acceptance of the situation. This acceptance had led inevitably to the death of many Americans as well as our Allies, had made the task of the United States in combatting nazism far more prolonged and difficult and had done unlimited harm to the Italian people. We were glad that he should have been able to make a contribution during the past 8 months to redeem himself, but that

the moment seemed to have arrived where it would be in the common interest for him to withdraw. The King grew excited and protested that it had never been possible prior to July 1943 for him to take action breaking with fascism and that throughout the years he had remained on in the hope of finding an opportunity to rectify the misguided Italian trend.

During the course of his remarks he also referred to the bombing by Allied airmen of the Roman population which resulted in the death of several hundred Italians. At this point Macmillan took up the cudgels and vehemently stressed to the King the sufferings of the English population as a result of Italy's entry into the war, its participation in raids against Britain, and cited the figure used by Mr. Churchill of 230,000 casualties in the Mediterranean campaign which might have been avoided if Italy had remained out of the war. For this, said Macmillan, the King could not hope to escape all responsibility.

The King protested on leaving that we had "placed him up against the wall" and objected that he had no warning of the purpose of our visit and that we had not given him an opportunity to consult with his Ministers. I informed him that our purpose was to save him from embarrassment and for that reason we had desired to talk with him privately inasmuch as we had not up to the present acquainted him with the state of public opinion in the United States of America and Great Britain. I said that we would like a reply by evening if possible.

We, later in the day had several conferences with members of the King's entourage (Aquarone, Prunas, and Ferraci) who begged that we allow until the following day for final word. On April 11 we also had a long and frank conversation with Marshal Badoglio who called on us at the Villa Cimbrone. He had obviously been primed and he inquired regarding the object we were trying to achieve whether it was the formation of a broad based democratic government or the disappearance of the King from public life. We replied that we had both purposes in mind and felt that they were inextricably bound together. He said that in his opinion the four popular and organized political parties in southern Italy had arrived at point influenced by the attitude of Italian Communist Party where they were willing to accept participation in his Government even though the King remained using the formula that the King would reconsider the position after the capture of Rome. He said he felt sure that the right wing Liberals, the Democratic Christians, the Socialist and Communist Parties were prepared to accept such a situation and that the Labor Party and Party of Action did not represent anything but small and badly organized minorities whose presence in or out of the Government was not of great importance.

Both Macmillan and I are suspicious that our Communist friends have secretly given to Badoglio much encouragement and assurances of support.

Later on April 11 the King sent Prunas to us several times and it appeared that he was willing to go no further than the formula which was finally published and of which you have the text.

At this point Macmillan emphasized to me that as he had acted without specific instructions from his Government and solely on the basis of his own understanding of the situation and of the Prime Minister's point of view as gathered by him during his recent visit in England and from Sir Noel Charles who saw the Prime Minister a few days ago he felt unable to go further in forcing the issue of the King's immediate retirement from public affairs. I concluded that the Department would wish under the circumstances to accept the formula and this was agreed upon with Macmillan.

We also agreed and so informed the Italians that we would regard the action as one arising from spontaneous Italian initiative pointing out that in essence the King had himself suggested such a program on February 21 and that as we understood it the other Allied Governments including the Soviet Union had no objection.

On returning to Naples after having received assurances from the Italians that the King's announcement would be made at midday April 12 we met the British and American press correspondents and opportunity to note the reaction of certain Italian elements including Count Sforza. These generally are favorable, Sforza expressed to me, and later made a public statement of his approval and satisfaction over the action taken by the King. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2349: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 18, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received April 18—11:19 a. m.]

1292. From Murphy. MacFarlane reports following under date of April 17.

Badoglio government has submitted its resignation and King has asked Marshal to form new government on a broad base to include representatives of the six parties according to official announcement today.

Badoglio is conferring with representatives of various parties and Croce during course of today and tomorrow. By April 19 he hopes to have completed his Government. Final discussions for composition of new government will take place when Junta meets again tomorrow. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2336 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1944—9 p. m.

1173. For Murphy. Thank you for your 1243, April 14, 5 p. m. which gave necessary and interesting background to the developments in Italy last week. It had not been clear from press reports that the King's announcement on April 12 provided the "solution" to the political crisis. The decision of the Executive Junta on April 15 has apparently confirmed the acceptability of this proposal, at least to the majority of the parties represented on it.

The Department approves your action in taking the initiative with regard to the King's position. It is, of course, satisfied with the formula which you adopted if it assures the immediate cooperation of the liberal political groups within the Government.

With reference to your 1246, April 15, 9 a. m.,²⁹ you or your Deputy in Naples should inform Bogomolov of the conversations which you and your British colleagues had with the King on April 10 and advise Noel Charles of this action.

If not too long to send by cable, please telegraph the text of the Advisory Council's recommendation to the Commander in Chief referred to in paragraph 3 of your telegram of April 10, 3 p. m. from Naples. When did the Council receive the concurrence of the Soviet member to this recommendation and has it yet been made to the Commander in Chief?

HULL

865.01/2256 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1944—midnight.

977. We have been informed by the War Department that the Combined Chiefs referred the suggestion contained in our 896, April 13, 3 p. m., to the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Area, who has replied recommending that in view of the present situation in Italy no initiative along these lines be undertaken with the Soviet Government. The reply continues that should the Soviet Government on its own initiative, which is doubtful, raise the question of representation on the political section of the Control Commission consideration would be given in the light of the then prevailing situation in Italy.

While we would have much preferred to have worked out some arrangement whereby the Soviet representative to the Badoglio Gov-

²⁹ Not printed.

ernment would have been brought within the existing Allied machinery in Italy, in view of the decision of the Commander in Chief, which from other information we believe reflects the views of the British Government, there does not seem any basis for a further approach to the Soviet Government on this question.

HULL

865.01/2361 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 21, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 8:20 p. m.]

1316. From L'Heureux. General MacFarlane reports that Togliatti (Ercoli) conferred with him yesterday afternoon and that they were in complete accord that a most urgent necessity was formation of a government to include all the political parties.

A definite statement that the Communist Party was very ready to serve under Badoglio as Prime Minister was given MacFarlane by Togliatti who said that Badoglio had a perfectly clean record in his opinion.

Togliatti asked MacFarlane how he would view defection of the Action Party which Togliatti definitely believed would not agree to join the new government. MacFarlane replied that he would regard the defection of one relatively small party with equanimity provided the other five opposition parties agreed to collaborate with Badoglio.

The Communist Party was claimed by Togliatti to be the best organized in Italy by far but he reiterated that all efforts must be devoted now to insuring maximum war effort against Germany and that until the war is won political disputes must be postponed.

He considered favorable progress was being made toward formation of the new government and planned to see Badoglio later yesterday. [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2364 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, April 22, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received April 23—6:30 a. m.]

3668. Last evening Badoglio beaming with satisfaction told me of his labors during the past week in working what he described as the "Alchemy of politics" to produce the broad based Liberal Government which was announced by him yesterday.

Badoglio said frankly that the Communist, Togliatti (Ercoli), had proved the most effective collaborator throughout the negotiation with the Party leaders. Badoglio described Togliatti as an able and intelligent Italian patriot working for the national welfare but Badoglio was noncommittal regarding Togliatti's long term purposes or affiliation with the Soviet Union. Badoglio stated that when representatives of Italian Communist Party insisted that a Party member hold portfolio of War Minister that Togliatti interposed objection and moved that there be no change in present composition of War, Navy, and Air Ministries. He made the point that everything must be sacrificed if necessary to promote the war effort and that qualified technicians should be kept in charge of these vital Ministries.

Badoglio said that he wanted to talk frankly and confidentially to me. He recalled recent Russian proposal regarding exchange of diplomatic representatives. He said "You Americans must not leave me in a position where without warning I might be subject to a further proposal from the same source looking to an alliance with Soviet Union. You know that I wish to treat in all loyalty with the Anglo-Americans but remember that I signed an armistice with the Three Powers. Who am I, the representative of the defeated Power, to cavil or object if one of the Three Powers comes to me with an offer designed to improve the status and condition of my country? But you should not permit me to be placed in that awkward situation. The USA and Great Britain should be able to so organize matters that such independent moves would not be possible".

Badoglio also referred to apparent withdrawal of the USA directing influence in the Mediterranean saying "If you permit me I think that for the longer term the US is making an error in surrendering (or so it seems to me) its influence in this region. The Mediterranean will become the pivot in the future of a huge new European-African politico economic setup in which Italy will play a certain role. Your Soviet ally and Great Britain seem to see and appreciate this. Why do you withdraw? We Italians like to deal with Americans and we think we know that our economic future is bound with the west. We can hope for little or no material support from the Soviet Union for many years to come and also but little from Great Britain. But what happens. You withdraw your good Eisenhower and the sympathetic General Smith³⁰ and General Wilson whom I esteem takes over. It leaves my people with an impression that the US is abandoning Italy to Great Britain and the Soviet Union".

I took pains to describe to Badoglio something of our vast worldwide military operations and obligations reassuring him of the sym-

³⁰ Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower.

pathy and interest of the US in Italian welfare suggesting that he should not place too firm a long-term construction on the temporary swings of military strategy which at times merely reflected the excessive demands made on our resources. I also congratulated him on the strenuous and successful effort he has made with so much patience and tenacity to comply with Allied desire to see Italian people equipped with a democratic representative government. He said that when he came to die that he hoped to reach Heaven, find an easy chair reserved for him labeled "patience".

On departing Badoglio handed to me following list of names of persons constituting his new Government as approved by himself and the King and stating that they were all committed to one prime objective, the successful and urgent prosecution of the war.

Names listed on my immediately following telegram 36689 [3669].³¹
[MURPHY]

865.01/2367 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, April 23, 1944—noon.

[Received 11:32 p. m.]

3707. Sforza and Tarchiani³² dined with me last evening. The former wanted the President and Secretary to know that in accepting a Ministry without Portfolio in new Badoglio government he considered that he had made a substantial and important contribution both in Italian and Allied interest. It was not the solution he had sought. The King should have been eliminated long ago. Sforza would have found it easy, he said, to work with Humbert who "after all is not such a bad fellow". But when five parties including Italian Communist Party found it possible to support the present formula his remaining aloof would have been misunderstood both in Italy and in the United States. The present Government, he said, is the most representative obtainable under present unfavorable circumstances. How long it lasts remains to be seen.

Sforza said confidentially that he wondered whether it might be useful for him to visit the United States where he could exercise some influence on the 5 million Italo-Americans and help them arrive at a better understanding of Italian situation and the satisfactory progress which has been made in eradication of fascism and in returning to liberal democratic forms. I was noncommittal but it is not improbable that Sforza might be helpful if given the opportunity.

[MURPHY]

³¹ Not printed.

³² Alberto Tarchiani, Italian Minister of Public Works in the Badoglio Cabinet.

865.01/2385a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1944—midnight.

1308. For Murphy. Marshal Badoglio in a personal letter to the President refers to the formation of the new Italian Government and requests (translation) "a full reexamination of the very harsh terms made to us 6 months ago" with a view to Italy's transition from cobelligerency to alliance. Badoglio makes a plea for the President's good offices towards this end.

About the time of the receipt of Badoglio's note a representative of the British Embassy called and presented an extract from a Foreign Office telegram dated April 20.³³ This message referred to the formation of the new Italian Government, and stated that this might lead to revival of proposals that Italy be accorded Allied status. The British interpret the following moves as leading towards this end: Italy's request to be represented on the Advisory Council, desire to adhere to the Atlantic Charter,³⁴ and request to participate in the International Labor Office. The extract continues that while Italy's position as a cobelligerent merits better treatment than as merely a defeated enemy, she must not forget her position as a defeated enemy nor claim the privileges of an ally; the greater the concessions now made, the more difficult will it be to impose such sanctions as the Allies may deem desirable when all Italy shall be freed, and at the end of the war.

The representative of the British Embassy stated that they planned to seek Soviet accord in taking a positive stand that Allied status for Italy cannot be considered at this time. He said that before drafting this note it seemed desirable that our and the British view be coordinated in order that they might so indicate in the communication to the Soviets.

For your information should the matter be raised in the Advisory Council, the Department has no intention of agreeing to Allied status for Italy at this time, and has so informed the British. You should maintain this view in any conversations you may have on the subject with your British and Russian colleagues.

HULL

³³ Not printed.

³⁴ Presumably adherence to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, which incorporated the principles of the Atlantic Charter. For text of the United Nations Declaration, See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

740.00119 European War 1939/2557

*President Roosevelt to the Head of the Italian Government
(Badoglio)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1944.

MY DEAR MARSHAL BADOGLIO: Your letter of April 3, 1944, informing me that a new government would shortly be formed, reached me just as the first announcement came that a new cabinet comprising representatives of the leading Italian parties had, in fact, been constituted. This is indeed welcome news to the Government and the people of the United States, who earnestly hope that this step will serve to unite the spiritual and physical forces of the nation in the struggle against our common enemy.

You ask that this event be accompanied by a reexamination of the armistice terms. Any revision of the terms, of course, could come about only after consultation with the military authorities and as a result of concerted action among the Allied Governments. The matter is, however, receiving my full consideration. The American people are not insensible to the peculiar moral tragedy of Italy's situation, nor am I insensible to the grave difficulties which beset the Italian Government.

May I meanwhile speak again with that frankness which my countrymen and yours prefer? Now that Italy has moved in the direction of truly democratic government, public opinion in the United States is watching earnestly for clear evidence that the Italian people are sincerely and passionately resolved to drive the invader from their soil and contribute to that common victory which Italy's defection under fascism rendered so much costlier. I know that all Italian patriots share the feeling of the peoples of the United Nations that it is for the Italians themselves to prove that they do not seek spurious rehabilitation through external acts but Italy's national and international regeneration through their own courageous efforts. Every sign that Italy has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibilities and has aligned herself in deed and spirit with those who fight for the triumph of humanity will, I am sure, be received with genuine sympathy by the peoples of all the United Nations.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.00119 ACI/117: Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 3, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received May 11—5: 10 p. m.]

13. From Kirk. I called today on Secretary General of Italian Foreign Office as a former acquaintance and at end of conversation

which dealt with personalities and generalities he asked to take me to see Badoglio. Although I assumed that it would be merely a courtesy visit the Madyal [*Marshal?*] took the occasion to make the following observations and affirmations:

After rehearsing the developments of events affecting Italy beginning with the short term armistice operative on September 8 through the period of collaboration which followed and the period of cobelligerency initiated by the declaration of war on Germany Badoglio referred to the letter which he addressed to the President in February [*January*] ³⁶ through General Donovan ³⁷ and the reply thereto ³⁸ which he stated was to effect that consideration of matters set forth in that letter should remain in abeyance pending formation of a truly democratic government in Italy.

The Marshal then said that such a government had now been formed and a decision would have to be taken on the status of Italy. He explained that he had done everything in his power to prove his friendship for the Allies and his sincerity as an Italian patriot, although he had encountered grave difficulties and had experienced great disappointments, especially in the failure to use to advantage the Italian officers and men who were eager to fight with the Allies against Germany. In spite of these efforts and the assistance which he had received from within the country and from the Allies, he was now confronted with the situation in which he needed [*headed?*] a government without real power but responsible to the country and in which the Allied Control Commission disposed of all the elements of power but had no responsibility before the country. This state of affairs should not continue and he had written in explanation to the President in early April.³⁹ As matters now stood, he continued, a representative government had been formed which, in his view, answered condition in the President's reply to his first letter. The Italian people, he stated, who in spite of their suffering had supported him up to now could no longer endure a continuance of the hopeless state in which they found themselves and the government itself would not last more than a month or two at the most. The time has come, the Marshal concluded, when a decision must be taken: Either Italian Government must be given an equal status with Allies in their fight against Germany or face consequences which present bondage will inevitably produce.

I fully realize that any comment which I might make on foregoing statement might be questioned on basis of a lack of opportunity to evaluate factors involved and acquaint myself with course of develop-

³⁶ Letter of January 27, p. 1011.

³⁷ William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

³⁸ Letter of February 21, p. 1031.

³⁹ Letter of April 3, p. 1087.

ments which have preceded but cannot on that account withhold my views. I do not propose to evaluate the concatenation of circumstances and events which have resulted in present situation in this operational theater. I have lived too long in Italy in the past to hold any illusions as regards the qualities or capacities of the Italians. Furthermore, I view with warranted cynicism the hopes which may be prompting the aims which Badoglio in all sincerity is implying and I am not blind to complications which their satisfaction may entail. I submit, however, that in absence of countervailing considerations of a strictly military nature, of which I may be unaware, it would be preferable to accord now to the Italian Government satisfaction of its request for a status of formal equality with the Allies than to run risk of being jockeyed into a position where we would be accused of creating by a refusal consequences of extreme gravity to government. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2399 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 5, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received May 7—1 a. m.]

17. [From Kirk.] The question of the Allied status of Italy discussed in my 13, May 3, 10 p. m. was further developed in conversations which I had yesterday with various foreign officials. Agreement was frequently found as to the desirability of making some gesture destined to inject a vitalizing element into the present state of dejection of Italian people, not from any unnatural or misguided sympathy for population of a country which chose to fight with the Axis, but from practical consideration of facilitating task of Allies in their operations in an area which is not being treated strictly as an enemy-occupied territory, but has been accorded the equivocal favor of cobelligerency. Furthermore, it is being admitted that question of Allied status is an important factor in maintenance of present broad-based Government or in constitution of any succeeding government when changes may occur.

Chief objection to alteration of so-called cobelligerency status of Italy seems to be that it is obviously impossible to turn over to the Italians full administration of liberated territory owing to fact that it is either a military base or an operational theater and as every consideration in this theater must be ultimately subordinated to the priority of military operations, it is impossible to guarantee the conditions requisite for these operations unless a considerable degree of control is maintained by the Allies. Another objection offered is the unfavorable impression which a change in status of Italians might

create among certain peoples such as the Greeks and Yugoslavs who have suffered more directly at the hands of Italians. As regards first objection, however, I submit that a concession to Italy on matter of its juridical status should be accompanied not only by the safeguards of control essential to maintenance of the tranquility and effectiveness of this war theater but also by clear indications of the grievous consequences to the country of any failure to preserve that tranquility or develop that effectiveness. As for second objection, it may be argued that the struggle against the enemy which Greeks and Yugoslavs are pressing is prompted more by a natural patriotism than by a spirit of Allied solidarity and that anyway, for the moment at least, the priority in Mediterranean area which Italian theater holds would warrant risk of disturbing equanimity of certain other countries whose exiled governments have been of problematic assistance to Allies.

On basis of foregoing objection to which other might be added in argument, suggestions have been offered that instead of acceding to Italian aspiration for Allied status, alleviating concessions should be made to the Government in such matters as prisoners of war or elimination of terms of armistice which may have become obsolete and a more accurate application of these provisions which you [*may*] have been incorrectly implemented in practice. To such suggestion, however, it can be countered that palliative measures would neither alter the undetermined status which bears the title "cobelligerency" and which has produced so many contradictions and misconceptions nor mark a step in revival of the Italian people which at present stage is claimed to be only alternative to worse confusion.

In evaluating factors involved in the problem under consideration the question naturally arises as to determination of time best suited to effect a change in status of Italy if such a decision should be reached and in that regard as in many others references are regularly made to entrance into Rome as decisive moment.

Certain acts of internal political importance are scheduled as contingent on that event for execution and from the military standpoint it is essential that those acts be accomplished with speed and in a state of order and tranquility. If therefore statements made in my telegram of yesterday ⁴⁰ are to be credited even in part, a further advance in status from cobelligerency to Allied status would tend to assure that order and tranquility and in addition it would seem that an insistence on safeguards essential to Allied control in occupied Italy would be more readily obtained at present time when newly constituted government is seeking reinforcement and changes which may develop after entrance into Rome have not yet developed.

⁴⁰ No applicable telegram has been found in Department files.

I have learned that Badoglio has made same exposé to British representative [on] Advisory Council as he made to me and it is expected that he will see Soviet representative for same purpose. Accordingly it is probable that matter will come before Council and it is possible that one of interested Governments may singly take question under active advisement. I inquire therefore if you would take the initiative in presenting problem of Italy's status to interested Governments on basis of statements and observations contained in this and my telegram under reference. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2399 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1944—5 p. m.

77. For Kirk and Murphy. The Department has read with much interest your telegrams Nos. 13 of May 3 and 17 of May 5 suggesting that Allied status be considered for Italy at this time and inquiring if the Department would take the initiative in presenting the problem, and also your telegram No. 18 of May 6 and Murphy's 1483 of May 7⁴¹ proposing that as an alternative, a concrete gesture be made by the Allied governments in the form of alleviating concessions which would serve to strengthen the new government by winning for it popular support.

The Department is fully sympathetic towards the present plight of Italy and concurs in the desirability of this Government taking its part in Allied steps which may be feasible in strengthening the new government and assuring its position until Rome is reached. However, the Department after careful study considers that to raise now the question of Allied status for Italy is premature and that it had best remain in abeyance for the time being, not only because of the unfavorable impact which this move would likely have on the French, the Greeks, and the Yugoslavs, all of whom suffered the consequences of Italian aggression, but also because of its far reaching consequences in tending toward the disintegration of the whole machinery of the Allied Control Commission and the terms of the armistice, far in advance of the date when Italy, as a defeated power, shall inevitably become a signatory to a peace treaty with the three Allied nations.

The Department, however, is fully in accord with the desirability of a favorable concrete gesture at this time on the part of the Allied Governments, and in this connection views with particular approval the proposals advanced in Kirk's 17 of May 5 as alternatives to Italian aspirations for Allied status. Of these, the prisoners of war

⁴¹ Neither printed.

question is one on which the Department would welcome a solution, and thus an end to the contradictory situation of Italian cobelligerency on the one hand, and on the other, continuance by the Allies of the prisoner of war status for those Italians who are already contributing or about to contribute to the Allied cause (Murphy's airgram No. 127 of April 28⁴²). Badoglio would no doubt also welcome this move. The Department also approves an examination of the terms of the Armistice which may have become obsolete with a view to their modification or elimination, and also concurs that terms of the armistice which may have been incorrectly carried out in practice should be promptly adjusted; a brief report from you as to the specific examples of both categories would be useful for further study. In connection with the foregoing the Department understands that the British also have under consideration certain proposals destined to soften the terms of the Italian surrender, and would appreciate a report from you on their plans.

In general line with the foregoing, the Department believes that it would not be best at this time to encourage the Italian Government to accomplish its desire to make formal acknowledgement of its adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, (Kirk's 26 of May 8⁴²) and if the matter should again be raised by the Italian Government, you should tactfully suggest that it be held in abeyance for the time being. The Department has communicated its views in this connection to the British, with specific reference to the personal call of the British Ambassador on the Secretary on March 31⁴³ when he sought concurrence of this Government towards that end.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/34265

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the personal call of His Excellency the British Ambassador on the Secretary of State on March 13 [31], 1944, at which time he left a memorandum⁴⁴ on the subject of the desire of the Italian Government to adhere publicly to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. The British Ambassador after explaining why his Government felt that the Italian Government should be advised that such action on its part would be inappropriate at this time, expressed the hope that this Government might adopt the same view and find it possible to send instructions in that sense to its representative on the Advisory Council for Italy.

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ Memorandum of this conversation not printed.

⁴⁴ *Ante*, p. 1084.

Telegraphic instructions⁴⁵ have now been sent to the American member of the Advisory Council, informing him that this Government feels it inadvisable for the Italian Government at this time to proceed with its intentions regarding adherence to the Atlantic Charter, and that if the Italian Government should bring the subject up again, he should tactfully suggest that it be held in abeyance for the time being.

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1944.

865.01/2458

*Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

No. 519

ALGIERS, May 15, 1944.

[Received May 26—9:18 a. m.]

SIR: With reference to my despatch 483 of April 27, 1944⁴⁶ which contained a discussion of Soviet policy in Italy and of the present position of the Italian Communist Party particularly as seen by Count Sforza, I have the honor to transmit as of interest to the Department copy of a memorandum reporting the strength of the Communist Party in influencing politics in Allied occupied Italy and the influence of the Soviet Union in determining the policy of the Party.

This memorandum, dated April 19, 1944, was prepared by the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

The events of the past month illustrate two things with remarkable clarity; the strength of the Communist Party in influencing politics in Allied-occupied Italy and the influence of the Soviet Union in determining the policy of the Party.

One month ago the Communist Party were, with the Action Party, the most *intransigent* in their attitude towards the King and Marshal Badoglio. They had been responsible for the plan to hold a strike on the 4th March as a protest against the Prime Minister's speech of the 22nd February. They had been the most prominent in organising and carrying out the public meeting held in Naples on Sunday, March 12th. They were the instigators and prime movers behind the proposal that the Six Parties should organise a petition in support of the Bari resolutions for the abdication of the King and the formation

⁴⁵ See telegram 77, May 11, *supra*.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

of a broad based government. They had even let it be known privately that they were prepared to pay the total cost of the petition. Up to this point the Communist Party were driving all other Parties to more decisive action to gain their ends and the other Parties only once jibbed, when the three moderate Parties, that is, the Liberals, Labour Democrats and Christian Democrats refused to support the proposal for a strike.

On the 14th March the announcement was made of an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Badoglio Government. This was only two days after the public meeting of the 12th March at which Tedeschi had been the most prominent and the most violent orator. He immediately volunteered a statement that the Russian move made no difference to the Communist Party policy in Italy. In doing so he was probably speaking "without the book". In any case, action is more eloquent than words and on the 16th March, to the general surprise, the Communist Party at the Junta meeting that day dropped all further support for the petition and by tacitly withdrawing their offer to pay for it, killed the proposal stone dead. This first indication of a change of policy was soon followed by more definite evidence. On the 26th March the titular head of the Communist Party in Italy, arrived in Naples from long exile in Russia and a meeting of Communist representatives from Allied-occupied Italy was arranged for the 1st April. The result of that meeting was a unanimous resolution calling for a broad based government, and although it was given to be understood that this process would be facilitated by the withdrawal or abdication of the King, it was made clear that the Communist Party did not wish to insist on either as a necessary pre-condition. The main reason advanced was the paramount necessity for a strong government in Italy for the purpose of fighting the war effectively.

On the 12th April the King announced that he intended to withdraw from public life when Rome was entered by Allied troops and to appoint the Crown Prince Lieutenant-General of the Realm. At a meeting of the Junta on the 15th April all Six Parties decided to join the Government.

This decision marked the culmination of a progressive reduction in the Parties' demands. Before Christmas they had insisted on the abdication both of the King and the Crown Prince in favour of a regency for the Prince of Naples and on the understanding that the Regent should not be chosen from the Royal House. At Bari on January 28th nothing was said against the Crown Prince but the King's abdication was demanded. In the Junta memorandum of February 16th this demand was again reiterated and the proposal was made that the Crown Prince on accession should give up much,

if not all, of the royal powers. In the upshot the Parties have neither obtained the King's abdication nor any derogation of royal power. It is obvious to all Italy that it is the Communist Party which has now induced them to revise so completely their previous attitude.

Evidence of this is provided by the rapid increase now taking place in the membership of the Communist Party in South Italy. In recent weeks many professional men, officials and officers have joined. The Communist Party executive claim that these new adherents avow that only in the forthcoming attitude of Russia can they see any future for Italy and, if in many cases the effective reason for their joining the Party is "insurance", the fact remains that at the moment the Communists have a double prestige. They assert that they can show a way for Italy out of her external and even her internal difficulties. Finally, funds are not lacking. Some are derived from legitimate subscriptions and in a single day these are known to have amounted to more than one hundred thousand lire. In addition there have almost certainly been subsidies from Soviet sources and there is evidence that by March the Party possessed more than twenty million lire deposited in various banks in the names of members of the Party trusted by the party directorate. In consequence, the Party is the most wealthy as well as the best organized in South Italy. At the same time all the evidence available shows that the only strong and well disciplined party in Northern Italy is the Communist Party and that it plays a dominating role insofar as active resistance is concerned.

The power of the Communist Party is growing daily. Vyshinski and Bogomolov have both insisted that Russia wishes to see a "strong Italy". Russia has, through the exchange of diplomatic representatives, been the first to make a gesture towards removing Italy from the position of a conquered enemy. There are no Russian troops of occupation and there is consequently none of the friction between Italians and Russians that inevitably arises in areas under foreign military control. As the Russian armies approach the Balkans Italians feel that, through the strong influence which Russia will have on Yugoslavia, Italy will be faced in effect by Russia on her Eastern boundary. These cumulatively powerful influences are superimposed on a country already ripe for that swing towards extremes which is the inevitable corollary of a shattered economy and the threat of inflation.

More than twenty years ago a similar situation provoked the March on Rome and gave birth to Fascism. We must make up our minds—and that quickly—whether or not we wish to see this second march developing into another "ism".

APRIL 19, 1944.

740.00119 ACI/129 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 23, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received May 23—2:23 p. m.]

81. From Kirk. My 61, May 17, 1 p. m.⁴⁷ At a meeting of Advisory Council for Italy held on May 19 the representatives on the Council were unable to agree on a resolution referring to the purge program and consequently it was decided at that time to adjourn discussions on this subject until next meeting tentatively scheduled for June 2 at which time it was agreed the French and Russian representatives would introduce separate resolutions on this subject for consideration by the Council. On May 20 the day after the meeting the acting Soviet representative distributed to all other representatives copies of the draft on a resolution he intends to submit for discussion at next meeting. The salient points of this Bogomolov resolution are:

(1) The Council notes with satisfaction that first point of the "Moscow Declaration on Italy"⁴⁸ has been realized by the inclusion in the Italian Government of representatives of parties who have always been anti-Fascist;

(2) The time has come to effectuate other points of the Moscow Declaration especially the 3d on suppression of Fascist institutions and the 4th on elimination of Fascists from public offices;

(3) Having noted with pleasure the Italian Government's intention expressed in article II of its April 27 "Declaration of aims and policy" calling for a punishment of Fascist criminals and removal of all Fascist elements from public office the Council observes that in several regions of Italy points 3 and 4 of the Moscow Declaration have not been effectuated and;

(4) (Following paraphrase of text) The SAC⁴⁹ is requested to inform the Italian Government that Council hopes the broad based government will strive to implement article II of its April 27 declaration aimed at democratizing the administrative structure of the Italian Government thereby bolstering the internal structure and creating an atmosphere favorable to development of participation at side of Allies of Italian forces in struggle against Hitlerite Germany. (End paraphrase) *End Bogomolov resolution.*

Inasmuch as Bogomolov resolution reported in this telegram is practically identical with the one the Soviet representative introduced for consideration at May 19 meeting of Council and to which Couve de Murville⁵⁰ raised certain objections, I anticipate that French representative will be instructed to repeat same objections when this resolu-

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ Annex 4 of the Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 759.

⁴⁹ Supreme Allied Commander.

⁵⁰ Maurice Couve de Murville, French Delegate to the Advisory Council for Italy.

tion is considered by Council; namely (1) the part of resolution expressing satisfaction with present composition of Italian Government constitutes in effects a reiteration of the Macmillan resolution⁵¹ with reference to which French representative had made a reservation at time of the acceptance by Council (see Algier's despatch 490, April 29, 1944⁵²) and (2) the latter part of paragraph 4 of the resolution implies a statement on cobelligerency to which the FCNL⁵³ could not subscribe. I also anticipate that the Greek representative will make same reservation as the French regarding the implied reference to the status of cobelligerency.

My British colleague has dispatched text of this Bogomolov resolution to the Foreign Office for comment and instructions. In meantime, Bogomolov left for Algiers yesterday and Couve de Murville, the French representative, is scheduled to get here [*there?*] tomorrow admittedly for purpose of conferring with FCNL on this resolution.

In regard to the resolution as a whole I have expressed opinion on several occasions in course of the discussions that in view of progress which has been made by broad-based government in matters with which resolution deals, further time should be allowed to the Government to prove its capacity and effectiveness in problem of epuration. Bogomolov, however, has persisted in pressing his resolution.

In regard to the part of Bogomolov resolution referring to utilization of Italian forces, I submitted that it might be interpreted as a recommendation of a military nature and, therefore, beyond the province of the Council and I have emphasized this point in the course of the discussion.

In view of fact that this resolution will be introduced at next meeting of Council for examination and consideration, I would appreciate receiving Department's reaction to, and instruction, on this subject. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/5-2544

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been studying the situation resulting from Marshal Badoglio's request for allied status for Italy and his forecast that the Italian Government may collapse if concessions are not made in this direction.

2. His Majesty's Government point out that Marshal Badoglio's argument that his Government could not last more than a few weeks

⁵¹ See paragraph numbered 3 of telegram of April 10, 3 p. m., from Salerno, p. 1092.

⁵² Not printed.

⁵³ French Committee of National Liberation.

without some gesture of definite support from the Allies is scarcely consistent with his having informed General MacFarlane as recently as the 6th May that he had revised his intention of resigning when the Allies reached Rome, in view of the fact that he had been successful in reforming the Italian Government on a broad basis and of indications from Rome that political opinion there welcomed the new government. His plea, indeed, appeared to His Majesty's Government to contain a strong element of blackmail. Nevertheless if the Italian Government did fall, political confusion might result in embarrassment to military operations; the Italian people might become hostile, to the advantage of the neo-Fascists and Communists; and there might be disturbances among the Italian forces.

3. These considerations do not alter the opinion of His Majesty's Government that it would be premature to give Italy allied status at this stage. Such a move would not be well received by British public opinion and would almost certainly be opposed by the French, Greeks and Yugoslavs who would bitterly resent Italy being placed on a footing similar to theirs. Immediate grant of allied status might make the situation of Italy at the peace settlement very embarrassing to the allies. Moreover, as General MacFarlane has pointed out, the whole basis of the relationship between the allies and the Italian Government cannot well be changed while military operations are in progress.

4. In order, however, not to adopt a completely negative attitude towards repeated Italian requests for an improvement in status, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider abolishing the present armistice regime and concluding a preliminary peace treaty with the Italian Government as soon as it can be demonstrated that the military situation permits of it and that the Italian Government have sufficient authority to speak on behalf of the whole Italian people and without relinquishing their authority over that part of it at present under their administration.

5. His Majesty's Government also feel that every possibility of improving the economic situation in Italy should at once be explored. They note that the matter has been very much in the mind of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Allied Control Commission and that the inflationary situation is about to be examined by special United States and British experts; but they feel that consideration should also be given to the question of increasing supplies of consumer goods to the Italian people and to other long-term projects which would, if successful, indirectly strengthen the more moderate elements in Italy.

6. It might also be worthwhile to examine what concessions can be made in regard to the repatriation of Italian prisoners-of-war or improvement in their status.

7. There are of course a number of gestures which could be made such as to allow the Italian Government to enjoy the benefits of lend-lease and to participate in United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and in the work of the International Labour Organisation, but in the opinion of His Majesty's Government to make such gestures piecemeal would only whet the appetite of the Italian Government and it would be preferable that they should accrue automatically to the Italian Government as a result of signature of the peace treaty.

8. If the United States Government agrees that it would be desirable to reach a settlement with the Italian Government along the lines suggested in paragraph 4, it is suggested that the next step would be to approach the Soviet Government and to inform them of the reasons for which His Majesty's Government and the United States Government do not desire the immediate grant of allied status to Italy, particularly in view of the opposition with which this would meet from British and American public opinion as well as from the French, Greek and Yugoslav allies. It would then be suggested to the Soviet Government that it will clearly be difficult to perpetuate the anomalies of a situation in which Italy is at one and the same time a co-belligerent and a defeated enemy. There would therefore be considerable advantage in concluding a partial peace treaty as soon as conditions permit and, subject to the concurrence of the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government would propose that the Italian Government be notified in the sense of paragraph 4 above.

WASHINGTON, 25 May, 1944.

865.01/2462 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 25, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received May 26—4 a. m.]

87. From Kirk. During discussions last night between Badoglio and MacFarlane, following preliminary arrangements regarding Rome were made.

As soon as MacFarlane informs officially Badoglio that Allied troops have reached Rome the Marshal notifies King who will immediately transfer powers to Crown Prince as Lieutenant General of Realm. Transfer can be effected at short notice according to Badoglio.

To the Lieutenant General of Realm the Government will tender its resignation as matter of form only who will invite them to continue.

In order to contact party leaders and leading politicians in Rome the Lieutenant of Realm, Badoglio, and leaders of six parties will proceed to Rome as soon as conditions there permit. Changes in

composition in Government will be made to ensure adequate representation of political material in Rome.

Badoglio agrees that during early stages of our occupation the King should not be allowed to visit Rome. End preliminary arrangements.

I understand that local Communist elements report that Rome Committee of National Liberation is prepared to cooperate with Badoglio in the formation of a new government. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2467 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 27, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received May 29—6:48 a. m.]

95. From Kirk. My 87, May 25, 9 p. m. [a. m.]. MacFarlane reports that at Royal request he went to Ravello yesterday and saw King and Crown Prince alone. His majesty read to MacFarlane a letter which Badoglio had sent to the King outlining preliminary arrangements regarding Rome made by Badoglio and MacFarlane.

At King's request MacFarlane confirmed contents of letter. His Majesty expressed the hope that Badoglio in reforming his government in Rome would include Liberal Democrats and urged strongly that he be permitted to enter Rome and there transfer officially royal powers to Crown Prince. King gave MacFarlane a short note stating his case and MacFarlane promised to transmit his request to proper quarters and to obtain an early reply.

King inquired whether he could move from Ravello to Naples when Allies reach Rome expressing preference for Villa Emma to be near to Crown Prince before latter moved to Rome. MacFarlane promised to have this question considered.

MacFarlane comments that until such time as Crown Prince and Government have been established for some time in Rome he is opposed strongly to allowing King to enter Rome.

After audience with King, MacFarlane saw Badoglio who expressed strong opposition to permitting King to go to Rome adding that he thought such action might prejudice gravely prospects of Crown Prince and his government.

It is MacFarlane's opinion that King should be held strictly to his promise to transfer power to Crown Prince "as soon as Allied troops reach Rome".

MacFarlane has requested authorization from AFHQ to notify King in name of SAC that until Crown Prince and Government are installed in Rome King will not be allowed to move to Naples. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

740.00119 ACI/129 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1944—9 p. m.

122. For Kirk. The Department has given careful consideration to the resolution which Bogomolov proposes to introduce in the next session of the Council (your 81 of May 23, 4 p. m.). There appear to be no substantial objections to the recommendations contained or the sentiments expressed therein, except that it fails to take cognizance of the steps which the Italian Government has taken since April 27 in the elimination of Fascists from public life (your 56, May 16.⁵⁴) You should endeavor to have inserted in the Soviet resolution some expression of recognition of the de-Fascistization program adopted recently by the Italian Government and about to become effective. With this amendment you are instructed to support the Soviet resolution. You should inform your British colleague of these instructions and you are of course free to inform the other members of the Council, including the Soviet representative, concerning the position you will take, if you consider it desirable.

It is our feeling that more harm from misunderstanding can result in continued efforts to block the Bogomolov resolution, whose sentiments appear consistent with our political aims in Italy, than by concurring in a recommendation of this nature to the Supreme Allied Commander who should not, and it is believed will not, consider it a serious criticism of Allied policy in Italy. It is of course the function of the Council to make recommendations of this nature from time to time to General Wilson, and we should not permit other national delegations to place us in a position of appearing reluctant to concur in general recommendations of a politically desirable nature.

Sent to Naples, repeated to Moscow, London, and Algiers for Murphy.⁵⁵

HULL

865.01/2469 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 29, 1944—midnight.

[Received May 30—1:45 p. m.]

101. [From Kirk.] At a further meeting with Generals Wilson and MacFarlane, Macmillan and myself today, there was discussion regarding the proposal for Crown Prince, Badoglio and members of Italian Government to accompany MacFarlane as head of ACC on a visit to Rome at earliest moment of relative security. MacFarlane who supported such a visit urged that it was necessary that premature

⁵⁴ Not printed.⁵⁵ Repeated as telegram 1357 to Moscow, 4284 to London, and 1689 to Algiers.

contacts between party leaders from Naples and those in Rome which might lead to all sorts of political effervescence should be prevented. He said Sforza was urging that Omodeo⁵⁶ and others involved in the defascistization program be permitted to enter practically with combat troops and that he opposed the plan. The meeting supported MacFarlane on this point but I questioned whether it would not add to prestige of present Italian Liberal Government if Rome party leaders came to the Government in Salerno first. That visit could then be followed as promptly as convenient by a brief visit by Italian Government accompanied by MacFarlane to Rome which as AMG territory would not be open to Italian Government as its seat for some time to come. It was agreed MacFarlane would present this view to Badoglio.

MacFarlane also referred to King's urgent request for permission to visit Rome. He was informed it was not considered advisable or necessary that King visit Rome but that King should be informed Allies expected he would fulfill his promise to retire from public life immediately Allied troops enter Rome. This MacFarlane was instructed to do and it was agreed General Alexander would inform MacFarlane for information of King exact time this occurred for his guidance. I suggested MacFarlane request Badoglio to have necessary transfer document prepared now.

MacFarlane closed meeting after discussion of number of details of operation of ACC with plea that he be authorized to explain to Badoglio exact status of Italian prisoner-of-war question and fact that Allies were proceeding to dispose of this question exactly as they would have if Italians had signed the agreement on this subject which Badoglio refused. MacFarlane said his position vis-à-vis Badoglio is becoming extremely embarrassing on this point as Italians learn every day of new dispositions made by Allies including shipments of their prisoners to United Kingdom and other places whereas all MacFarlane is able to tell Badoglio is that he has no instructions from Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject. MacFarlane was informed that for moment there is nothing further he could say to Badoglio in this respect except that Italian requests are receiving careful study. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2469 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1944—8 p. m.

133. For Kirk and Murphy. The Department approves of your suggestion that the Italian Government stay at Salerno for a time after the liberation of Rome and that the party leaders from the

⁵⁶ Adolfo Omodeo, Italian Minister of National Education.

capital be brought to Salerno for their first contact with the Government. (Your 101, May 29, midnight.) It also concurs in the position which you have taken with respect to the King's desire to delegate his powers to the Crown Prince only after he has returned to Rome (your 95, May 27, 10 p. m., and your 101). We feel that under no circumstances should the King be permitted to return to Rome at this time.

HULL

740.00119 ACI/136 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 3, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 5:36 p. m.]

116. From Kirk. Translation of Couve de Murville-Bogomolov resolutions drafted in French reads as follows:

"The Advisory Council for Italy, considering articles 3 and 4 of the Declaration on Italy adopted at the Moscow Conference according to which: 'No. 3—all institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed, No. 4—all Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the direction and administration of public services'; considering that the existing conditions in liberated Italy as yet do not comply in general with the principles mentioned above;

Notes with satisfaction the declaration of April 27, 1944, of the Italian Government according to which the depuration program will be pursued energetically and carried out successfully as rapidly as possible as well as the measures which have been subsequently adopted or announced by that Government;

Expresses the wish that the above-mentioned Government will do its utmost to apply this declaration and these measures in a complete and rapid manner in order to democratize the internal administration of Italy, to improve thereby the situation from the standpoint of morale and to create an atmosphere favorable to the development of Italian participation in all measures necessary to the struggle against Hitlerite Germany."

[Kirk]

BRANDT

865.001/14 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 6, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 4:43 p. m.]

130. From Kirk. In amplification of my 127, June 5,⁸⁷ MacFarlane reports that yesterday Italian Cabinet considered King's request transmitted by Badoglio, that he be allowed to go to Rome or Rome Province and there sign act of transfer of powers to Crown Prince, and that

⁸⁷ Not printed.

Cabinet decided act must be performed soon as Allied troops reach Rome and that if for operational and transportation reasons King could not be taken to Rome at once, the act would have to be signed immediately in Ravello.

Yesterday MacFarlane and Badoglio went to Ravello where they informed King it was impossible to transport him to Rome within next few days and that transfer of powers would have to be signed at once. King accepted this as inevitable but requested and received an official letter to this effect from Badoglio.

King then signed act of transfer of powers (see my 128, June 5⁶⁸). After signing act of transfer, King assured MacFarlane he would disappear completely from the political scene.

Sent to Department; repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2494 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 6, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:09 p. m.]

132. From Kirk. The question of the Crown Prince's going to Rome with Badoglio and the party leaders when this group makes its trip to contact political leaders in Rome was considered by the Italian Government during its June 5 meeting and it was decided unanimously that for his own sake and for the success of the Government reformation negotiations the Crown Prince should not be permitted to go to Rome until after Cabinet changes had been arranged. Badoglio immediately informed MacFarlane of this decision (see my 123, June 5, 11 a. m.⁵⁹)

Yesterday evening the Crown Prince informed MacFarlane that he was very anxious to arrive in Rome at the same time as Badoglio and the Party leaders and stated that it was his intention to go directly to the Quirinal and remain there during his entire stay in Rome except for one official call on His Holiness. MacFarlane told the Crown Prince that the Cabinet was against this visit to Rome prior to the reconstruction of the Government to include Rome representatives and advised the Crown Prince to speak to Badoglio on this subject.

MacFarlane reporting to AFHQ on this subject observed that if the Allies wished to establish the Crown Prince, there is much to be said in favor of granting the Prince's request and noted that it was his own original intention to permit the Crown Prince to go to Rome with Badoglio and the party leaders.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ Telegram not printed.

At the same time MacFarlane suggested to AFHQ a compromise arranging for Badoglio and his party to arrive in Rome at an early hour and to leave late in the afternoon and for the Crown Prince to arrive shortly after lunch going directly to the Quirinal where he will be allowed to receive visitors, to visit the Pope in the afternoon and return to Naples the next morning.

Promising to explore and report on possibilities of this compromise MacFarlane informed AFHQ that he intended to be guided by reports he expects from Rome on the probable reception the Prince might receive there. This matter is being discussed further with Badoglio this afternoon.

Sent to Department, repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2499 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 7, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 2:12 p. m.]

137. From Kirk. Last night both the Crown Prince and Badoglio accepted the compromise suggested by MacFarlane regarding the Crown Prince's visit to Rome (see my 132, June 6, 5 p. m.). MacFarlane is scheduled to leave for Rome this afternoon to make necessary arrangements with military authorities for the Rome trip of entire official Italian group.

Sent to Department, repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2492 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 7, 1944.

[Received June 7—2:28 p. m.]

139. From Kirk. Communiqué on the resignation of Badoglio government reads in translation as follows:

“Marshal Badoglio today visited the Prince of Piedmont, Lieutenant General of the Realm, and in accordance with Constitutional procedure submitted the resignations of his government. His Royal Highness acknowledged the resignations and instructed Marshal Badoglio to proceed with the formation of a new government to include political leaders now in liberated Rome. In this way it will be possible to set up a government composed of political figures from many regions of Italy. Until the new ministry is constituted the present ministry is to remain in office to deal with current matters.”

Interpretative comment: It is understood that the Marshal with representatives of the political parties forming the present Italian

Government will proceed to Rome in the very near future for the purpose of meeting representative political leaders there and of deciding how best a representative government of all parties can be immediately formed.

No immediate move of the Italian Government to Rome is contemplated. Any Italian Government must necessarily function in territory which has been handed over to its jurisdiction; and it is clear that military necessity does not permit the immediate handing over of the Capital City. The Italian Government, therefore, will continue for the time being to act from Salerno.

Sent to Department, repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2511 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 10, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 8:26 p. m.]

1932. From Murphy. General MacFarlane, Chief Commissioner, ACC, has sent a personal message this morning to General Wilson for the advice of Macmillan and myself stating he had seen Bonomi⁶⁰ this morning who told him Bonomi hoped to complete his Cabinet by this evening. MacFarlane states that Bonomi asked him whether MacFarlane thought Sforza would be a good choice for Foreign Minister. MacFarlane replied that appointment would not meet much approval on part of Allied Governments. (MacFarlane stated in another message immediately following the one above referred to that he had done everything he could to keep Bonomi from appointing Sforza as Foreign Minister and had hopes that he had succeeded). MacFarlane suggested to Bonomi that unless he had some other candidate in view, there was much to be said for his reserving this appointment for himself.

As MacFarlane is speaking in behalf of the United States Government, I wonder whether Department will approve this action. We have known for some time that the British generally disapprove of Sforza particularly since he called on Churchill in London before arriving in Italy and disagreed with him on Badoglio and the King. Reber also has expressed considerable reserve and so far as I know Kirk is open-minded.

Ever since I have been connected with Italian affairs, I have found Sforza very friendly and cooperative. As the Department is well aware, during his many years of exile from Fascist Italy he has been a friend of the United States and other democracies. Since he entered

⁶⁰ Ivañoe Bonomi succeeded Marshal Badoglio as Italian Prime Minister on June 18, 1944.

the Government he has kept us informed and the information he has furnished with regard to the role of the Communists in the Government and of Communist Party in Italy has been invaluable. Whatever may be his defects and British feeling that Sforza will be difficult to deal with because he does not hesitate to argue a point, Sforza has always manifested and proved a definite friendship for the United States. He has always seemed to understand our position and I believe we could depend on him to keep us fully informed on Italian political developments. I personally feel that if he should not be appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and MacFarlane has now done his utmost to prevent it, the United States will be the loser.

I should very much appreciate Department's comments on foregoing as soon as possible. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

865.01/2631a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1944—1 p. m.

1839. For Murphy. You should inform General Wilson with reference to General MacFarlane's messages concerning Sforza (your 1932 June 10, 6 p. m.) that this Government would have no objection to Bonomi's appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister. Since MacFarlane represents and has acted in this matter for both Governments you must request General Wilson to direct him immediately to inform Bonomi that his (MacFarlane's) position does not represent the views of the United States Government; that Sforza's appointment to the post of Foreign Minister would be entirely agreeable to this Government. If possible you should send a personal and confidential message to Reber asking him also to inform Bonomi in this sense.

Sent to Algiers; repeated to London and to Naples for Kirk.⁶¹

STETINIUS

865.01/2511 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1944—1 p. m.

4636. The following telegram has been received from Algiers.

[Here follows text of telegram 1932, June 10, 6 p. m., from Algiers, printed on page 1125.]

The Department has replied as follows:

(See No. 4637, June 11, 1 p. m.,⁶² to London for reply to Algiers as Department's No. 1839, June 11, 1 p. m.)

⁶¹ Repeated on the same date to London as telegram 4637, and to Naples as 181.

⁶² See footnote 61, above.

Please see Mr. Eden at the earliest opportunity and inform him of the developments described above. Tell him that we are surprised that General MacFarlane in representing the Allied Governments in Rome, would undertake to express the opinion of the United States Government on a question of this nature without first consulting it. Point out that the position taken by MacFarlane did not represent the views of this Government and express our expectation that he will in any future representations assure himself of this Government's views beforehand.

STETTINIUS

865.01/2628 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 12, 1944—noon.

[Received 12:45 p. m.]

172. From Kirk. My British colleague and General A. MacFarlane have just informed me they have received messages from Churchill protesting against formation of Bonomi government without approval of Allies; that he is consulting with American and Soviet Governments in the premises and that the Bonomi government cannot be accepted until Allies have agreed. MacFarlane accordingly is now seeking appointments with Lieutenant General Badoglio and Bonomi to inform them that pending result of foregoing consultations induction of new government cannot take place. He will add that if this matter is not settled by tomorrow when new government is expected to take oaths of office and delay is questioned by press Bonomi should tell press he has been asked to await official acceptance by Allies of his proposed government before taking office.

In connection with foregoing I made it clear to MacFarlane that during course of negotiations leading up to formation of new government with which he had been good enough to acquaint me promptly, insofar as the unsatisfactory communication with Rome permitted I had received no observation from my Government nor as yet any message relating to position which Churchill seems to have taken and that accordingly he, MacFarlane should make it clear to all that in making statement outlined above to the Italians he was acting so far under instructions from London. The matter of the formation of the new government has not been before Advisory Council as it has not met since inception of negotiations leading thereto and the Soviet representative has been absent since last meeting. Furthermore there was apparently some hesitancy on part of Supreme Allied Commander to involve in this matter other members of the Council such as the Greeks and Yugoslavs and, I might add on this particular point, that when I suggested prior to last meeting of Council that MacFarlane include

in his report on current political developments before the Council a statement regarding imminent fall of Rome with its resulting consequences a decision was apparently reached that for obvious military reasons a discussion of this matter before all members of the Council was inadvisable.

As the Department has received the factual accounts of the formation of the Cabinet as communicated to me by General MacFarlane and has consequently as much information at its disposal as I have I can only say without reference to the nature of the negotiations in Rome of the past few days or attempt to evaluate [*evaluate*] the probable effectiveness of the government as now composed that an adherence on the part of the United States Government to a decision to discredit it at this late moment what in so far as outward appearances are concerned may be characterized as an attempt on the part of the Italians to form a government under hurried and difficult circumstances might bring us to a pass which could scarcely be reconciled with our established policy. A withdrawal of Churchill's objection on the other hand would not implicate us and the new government could then be judged on the merits or demerits of its future achievements. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2630 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 12, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:28 p. m.]

174. From Kirk. See my 172, June 12, noon. Acting under instructions received today by High Commissioner from Foreign Office General MacFarlane today in Salerno informed Bonomi and Badoglio who apparently are on very friendly terms with each other that Allied Governments were considering question of accepting proposed Bonomi government and that until a decision had been reached Bonomi and his government could not take office and that Badoglio government would continue to function in meantime in accordance with directive from Lieutenant General of Realm.

MacFarlane again impressed on Bonomi that if his government were accepted by Allies it would have to assume all the Badoglio government obligations towards Allies, the long armistice terms included and Bonomi again assured MacFarlane of his government's readiness to assume all and any such obligations without question.

Should any public curiosity develop over Bonomi's delay in taking office Bonomi and Badoglio who were anxious to avoid publishing fact that delay was due to Allied Governments, agreed to give some organi-

zational reason if necessary. MacFarlane today requested approval of SAC on this point.

MacFarlane reports he also explained situation to Crown Prince in Naples today who made no comment but asked what Allies' decision might be and that his reply was noncommittal.

Sent Department. Repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2636a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944—7 p. m.

1848. For Murphy. The President has received the following message from the Prime Minister concerning the composition of the new Italian Government: ⁶³

"Badoglio's replacement by this group of aged and hungry politicians is, I think, a great disaster. From the time when, in spite of the enemy, Badoglio safely delivered the fleet into our hands, he has been a useful instrument to us. It was understood, I thought, that he was to carry on, at least until the democratic north could be brought in and a thoroughly sound Italian government could be formed. We are confronted, instead, with this absolutely unrepresentative crew. As far as I can ascertain, the Italian Advisory Committee has not been consulted. I do not suppose you have had much time to consider it, and I have not had the opportunity of bringing the matter before the Cabinet. At the present time, I was not aware that we had given the Italians, who have cost us so dearly in life and material, the right to form any government they chose without reference to the victorious powers, and without even the slightest pretense of a popular mandate. I view this situation most seriously, and I trust before you make a final decision, you will inform me of your views and give me the opportunity of answering."

The President has suggested that we obtain your advice and comments before replying to Mr. Churchill.

We have not received any official reports or comments since the formation of the new Government concerning its composition and are thus far dependent on somewhat meagre press reports for our information. Can you or Kirk establish contact with Reber and keep us regularly informed of political developments in Rome and their significance during this decisive period?

We would appreciate your and Kirk's reaction to the Prime Minister's message at the earliest possible moment.

Sent to Algiers, repeated to Naples for Kirk and to Moscow.⁶⁴

HULL

⁶³ This is message No. 699, dated June 10, 1944.

⁶⁴ Repeated on the same date to Naples as telegram 183, and to Moscow as 148.

865.01/2629 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 12, 1944—8 p. m.
 [Received June 12—5 : 45 p. m.]

175. From Kirk. Count Sforza called on me this evening and condemned in most emphatic terms the implications in the representations made by MacFarlane this afternoon on instructions from London (see my 174, June 12, 6 p. m.) which he characterized as a betrayal of the basic policy of the United Nations, as a denial of efforts towards a united Italy and an obstruction to the successful prosecution of the war. In my presence he wrote the following message which I quote verbatim as no other copy was retained:

“It is not for Italy but for the sake of democracies and out of my deep personal devotion to America that I must warn against possible results of this step. If somewhere it was thought that we may be frightened, the disillusion will be big indeed. We are ready to go to jail even to be shot by a military reaction rather than to betray the cause of Italian freedom and of the very principles on which the glory of the United States stands.

We are the first group of Ministers who have always all of us opposed fascism and expressed devotion to the United Nations which cannot be said of previous Cabinets.

If this is our crime, we are sure that the American nation will be with us.”

[Kirk]
 BRANDT

865.01/2657a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1944—9 p. m.

193. For Kirk. The contents of your 172^{64a} have been brought to the President's attention in connection with the message he has received from the Prime Minister concerning the composition of the new Italian Government (Department's no. 183 of June 12⁶⁵). The President will send a reply to Mr. Churchill when he also has Murphy's views which have been requested.

Meanwhile, however, it has been suggested to the President that we should not be unduly influenced by Churchill's precipitate action; that his alarm may be unwarranted and that his attitude toward the political developments in Rome appears at variance with American policy. The Department said that until all of Italy is liberated there appears to be no better indication of popular will than that expressed

^{64a} Dated June 12, p. 1127.

⁶⁵ See footnote 64, p. 1129.

through the parties of the Committee of National Liberation; that it has been our policy to welcome democratic political solutions worked out by the Italian people themselves; that the present Government appears to be such a solution and that its anti-Fascist and democratic character should be welcomed and supported by this Government and the other democracies. The Department concluded its comments to the President by expressing the opinion that any interference on our part at this time to change the complexion of a Government which we have every reason to believe is friendly to the Allies and bitterly anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi would be misunderstood generally and would appear to be contrary to the Moscow Declaration and to our general policy of encouraging the development of a truly democratic and representative government in Italy.

Sent to Naples. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy and to London and Moscow.⁶⁶

HULL

865.01/6-1444

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have instructed Sir Noel Charles to arrange for a meeting of the Advisory Council for Italy to be summoned as soon as possible in order to discuss the political situation in that country. His Majesty's Government feel that in view of the inevitable public speculation in Italy and elsewhere it is highly desirable that the meeting of the Council should take place urgently to regularise the position of the Government and have instructed Sir Noel Charles to take the following line at the meeting of the Council:

Italy is a conquered country and though a cobelligerent is living under an armistice regime which subjects her to direct control or indirect supervision of the Allied Control Commission. Moreover, as a result of the Moscow Conference the Advisory Council for Italy was established for the purpose of making recommendations on Italian affairs to the Governments represented on it and to the President of the Allied Control Commission.

His Majesty's Government feel that they and other Allied Governments concerned have a right to be consulted before the agreement of any change in Government and that before any such change is recognised the Advisory Council for Italy should be fully mindful of the situation and should thus be in a position to advise the Governments represented on it and the President of the Allied Control Com-

⁶⁶ Repeated on the same date to Algiers as telegram 1865, to London as 4691, and to Moscow as 1485.

mission in regard to any change which may be proposed or be in contemplation.

As a result of discussions which have been taking place in Rome, the last Italian Administration under Badoglio has apparently been unable to meet with the necessary support from the Italian political parties in Rome, whereas the Italian political parties concerned are prepared to serve in a new Italian Government under Senor Bonomi. His Majesty's Government would wish to have the recommendation of the Advisory Council as to whether the setting up of an administration on the lines proposed should be permitted by the Allies. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the two prerequisites to the acceptance of any such administration by Allied Governments would be that:

(1) the new Italian Government should formally express their readiness in writing to accept all obligations towards the Allies entered into by former Italian Governments since the conclusion of the armistice including the long armistice terms and that every member of the administration should be personally acquainted with the terms of all such obligations, and

(2) the new Italian Government must undertake not to reopen the institutional question without the prior consent of the Allied Governments.

Lord Halifax is instructed to inform the United States Government of these instructions and to express the hope that the United States Government will concur in them and will be prepared to send urgently similar instructions to their representative on the Advisory Council.

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1944.

865.01/2655a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*⁶⁷

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1944—5 p. m.

1489. For your background information only. The following is a paraphrase of a telegram received from Prime Minister Churchill to the President quoting a message from Stalin in reply to the Prime Minister's message concerning the formation of the Bonomi Government in Italy.

Begin paraphrase. I have received from Stalin the following message:

"I have received your message in regard to the departure of Badoglio which was also unexpected to me. I had not imagined that Badoglio could be removed and Bonomi appointed without the permission of the British and American Allies. Judging from your

⁶⁷ Repeated on the same date to Algiers as telegram 1878, and to Naples as 198.

message, however, this event occurred irrespective of the desire of the Allies. From this fact it must be assumed that certain Italian circles are preparing to attempt to alter to their own advantage the terms of the Armistice. You may rely in any event on no objection from the Soviet Government should you and the Americans consider that circumstances make it necessary to have a different government in Italy from that of the Bonomi Government." *End paraphrase.*

We have not had the Prime Minister's message to which this is a reply.

HULL

865.01/6-1444

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

With reference to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of June 14, 1944 outlining instructions to Sir Noel Charles, the British High Commissioner in Italy, concerning the position of the British Government toward the newly formed Italian Government, the following is a paraphrase of a message⁶⁸ which the President has sent to the Prime Minister defining this Government's position.

After having consulted with my advisers here and abroad concerning your telegram no. 699⁶⁹ and my reply no. 558,⁷⁰ and regardless of some surprise here that General MacFarlane acted apparently without consulting the other Allied governments, I have concluded that it would be a serious mistake if we did not permit the prompt inauguration of the Bonomi Government. It is my feeling that Badoglio's withdrawal, although I regret it, may be of distinct advantage to us. It is desirable that the surrender terms—associated with Marshal Badoglio in the public mind up to the present time—should become the obligation of the most representative Italians available today, composing a government regarded as completely anti-Fascist. Furthermore there is the desirability of implementing our proclaimed policy and allaying domestic and foreign criticism concerning our Italian policy. The new government has pledged itself, I understand, to assume all obligations, including the postponement of the institutional question, until the end of the war, and the long terms of surrender existing between the Allies and the Badoglio Government. It has been foreseen for some time that the Government would be broadened when Rome was reached. Following the liberation of Rome the negotiations were carried on in constant consultation with the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission and his American and British advisers in the political field and with the approval of the Control Commission. Signor Bonomi was the unanimous choice of all the parties represented in the Rome Committee of National Liberation, although the parties were divided in their will-

⁶⁸ This is message 562, dispatched June 15, 1944.

⁶⁹ See footnote 63, p. 1129.

⁷⁰ Telegram in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., not printed. This was merely a preliminary reply.

ingness to enter the Government under Badoglio. The best available channel existing in Italy today for the expression of popular will appears to be the Committee of National Liberation. I fear that there will be serious repercussions both at home and in Italy if we interfere at this late date in the installation of what appears to be a representative government. I fear such interference would work to the advantage of mischievous elements in Italy and to the detriment of the military situation there. I also question if such interference would not be directly contrary to our declared policy to leave the choice of government to the people.

It is understood that the British High Commissioner in Italy has been instructed to convene the Advisory Council for Italy on Saturday, June 17, at 4 p. m., to consider the political developments in Italy since the fall of Rome. In order to avoid further delay in seating the new cabinet, with attendant deterioration in the internal political situation, it is the opinion of this Government that it would be highly desirable if objection to the new government could be withdrawn prior to the consideration of this question by the Council on June 17. In such circumstances the British High Commissioner could review political developments since the fall of Rome, express the Council's hopes for the success of the new, representative government, take note of the assurances it has given General MacFarlane and recommend to the Supreme Allied Commander that the new government should formally express its readiness in writing to accept all the obligations toward the Allies entered into by former Italian Governments since the conclusion of the Armistice, including the long Armistice terms, and that every member of the new government should be personally acquainted with the terms of all such obligations.

It is hoped that the Ambassador will find it possible to recommend this course of action and this solution to his Government in order that the British High Commissioner may receive appropriate instructions before the Council's meeting tomorrow.

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1944.

865.01/2677a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—noon.

1502. You are requested to inform Molotov personally of the position of this Government in regard to the Bonomi Government as set forth in Department's telegrams to Kirk, repeated to you as nos. 1485 ^{70a} and 1484 of June 13 and no. 1498 of June 16.⁷¹

^{70a} See footnote 66, p. 1131.

⁷¹ Department's telegrams 192 and 206 to Naples, repeated to Moscow as 1484 and 1498, respectively, not printed; but for United States position regarding Bonomi government, see *aide-mémoire* to the British Embassy, June 16, *supra*.

In conveying the foregoing to Molotov you should explain to him that this Government has very much in mind the principles set forth in the Declaration on Italy adopted at the Moscow Conference to which the three Governments have subscribed.

Under the circumstances Allied refusal to permit the inauguration of the Bonomi Government which as you are aware is the first Italian Government composed entirely of representatives of anti-Fascist parties would run directly contrary to the principles contained in the Declaration on Italy and would gravely impair public confidence in the sincerity in the expressed aims and principles of the United Nations. You may express to Molotov the confidence of this Government that the Soviet Government will share our views on this subject.

HULL

865.01/2661 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 17, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 1:20 p. m.]

218. From Kirk.

The Advisory Council for Italy have examined the events leading up to the formation of the proposed new government by Signor Bonomi and they consider that in all the circumstances this government should prove satisfactory in furthering the main purpose of the Allied Powers which is the final defeat of Germany.

They must however insist that:

(1) The new Government express their readiness in writing to accept all obligations toward the Allies entered into by the former Italian Governments since the conclusion of the armistice signed on the third of September, 1943, and that every member of the Government should be personally acquainted with the terms of all such obligations including the terms of the armistice signed on twenty-ninth of September, 1943;

(2) The new Government undertake not to reopen the institutional question until such time as Italy has been liberated and the Italian people can freely express their views.

Repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

865.01/2671 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 18, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 4:12 p. m.]

234. Last night MacFarlane told Captain Stone ⁷² to notify Bonomi that subject to his signing the two undertakings embodied in Ad-

⁷² Capt. Ellery Stone, U.S.N.R., Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission.

visory Council resolution (see my 225, June 18, 9 a. m., from Kirk ⁷³) Allied Governments approved his Government and after following required procedure under Italian constitution it could be installed.

Bonomi told Captain Stone that he would sign required undertakings today at about 6 p. m. The Allied Governments decision has been brought to attention of Lieutenant of Realm and Badoglio.

BRANDT

865.01/2876 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 19, 1944—12 p. m.

[Received June 19—3:03 a. m.]

2186. Department's 1502, June 17, noon. As Molotov was unable to see me today I called on Vyshinski to inform him of the position of my Government in regard to the Bonomi government and left with [him?] a memo summarizing the pertinent points of the Department's cables on this question. I said that I was aware of the exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and Stalin on the matter and added that Secretary Hull hoped that on further consideration the Soviet Government after recovering from surprise at the manner the recent political developments in Italy had taken place would view this question in the same light as we do. Vyshinski stated that it was his understanding that the Advisory Council would consider this question on June 17. I said that my memo was the line which Kirk would follow at the meeting. In reply to my inquiry as to instructions to the Soviet representative he said that the Soviet representative had been instructed to work out a solution with the American and British representatives on the Council. Vyshinski said that he would transmit the memo to his Government and expressed the hope that agreement could be reached in the same spirit in which we personally were then discussing the matter. I explained that we had no previous information as to the change in the Italian Government and made it clear that we had been in no way involved. Vyshinski readily accepted my statement. He said that the Soviet Government had first thought that there had been previous agreement by all concerned including the Soviet representative but later discovered that he too had received no advance information with respect to developments.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Naples.

HARRIMAN

⁷³ Not printed, but for the two undertakings, see telegram 218, June 17, from Naples, *supra*.

865.01/6-2344 : Telegram

*The Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower),
to the War Department*¹⁴

ALGIERS, 22 June, 1944.

F 63007. Translation of message sent by Badoglio follows:

"Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, Washington D.C.

I desire, Mr. President, to thank you for the support and assistance which you have been good enough to give to the Italian people in particularly hard and difficult moments. My separation from the government will not interfere for a single day with my activity as sponsor of the friendship between Italy and the United States. I shall retain as one of the best of my public life, the memory of your friendship. Signed Badoglio."

865.01/2691 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, June 23, 1944.

[Received June 23—5:05 p. m.]

269. From Kirk. According to the communiqué released last night the Lieutenant of Realm in his address to new Government yesterday declared that the first task of all Italians was to drive the Germans from Italian soil and punish those who through their cooperation with the enemy have betrayed the Fatherland. He paid tribute to the armed forces and to the patriot bands in German occupied Italy and expressed his confidence that the new Government would intensify and invigorate Italy's part in the struggle to which its destiny is linked; in reply Bonomi called his Cabinet a "Government of harmony" which would postpone controversies such as the institutional question. He said that the two foremost tasks of liberation and reconstruction had been entrusted to men who had always been faithful to those ideals which Fascism and Nazism tried to destroy and expressed his confidence that Italy would be able to regain its place among free nations in the world of tomorrow.

The communiqué also gave the text of the oath of office signed by the Ministers as follows:

"We swear on our honor to exercise our functions in the supreme interest of the nation and until such time as the Constitutional Assembly can be conveyed [*convened?*], not to commit acts which might prejudice the solution of the institutional question."

[Kirk]
BRANDT

¹⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department of State by Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

865.01/2678 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1944—3 p. m.

1578. Your 2205, June 20, 8 p. m.⁷⁶ The Department has made every effort to keep you fully and promptly informed of its position and of developments concerning the establishment of the Bonomi Government. At the time the Department's 1502, June 17, noon, was drafted and also at the time it was sent, the Department had no knowledge of the decision of the Advisory Council with respect to the new Government and consequently no information concerning the position to be taken by the Soviet representative other than Stalin's message to Churchill quoted in the Department's 1489, June 14.

In the Department's 1501 of June 16⁷⁶ you were informed that the Advisory Council would meet on June 17, 4 p. m., Naples time. Summaries of the Council's meeting and General Wilson's implementations of its recommendations were sent to you when the facts were known in the Department. (Department's circular telegrams of June 20, 2 and 8 p. m.⁷⁷) The principal reason for the Department's 1502 was to insure that the Soviet Government was informed of and understood our position with respect to the Bonomi Government. While the Department hoped that the Soviet position would be similar the important phase of this action was to keep the Soviet Government informed of developments from our viewpoint and this you have done.

Kirk and Murphy have been specially instructed to repeat direct to you all telegrams to the Department concerning the deliberations and recommendations of the Advisory Council.

HULL

865.01/7-144 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, July 1, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 4:37 p. m.]

323. From Kirk. At today's meeting of Advisory Council held under chairmanship Soviet representative, Ambassador Bogomolov, (see my 292, June 27 and my 311, June 29⁷⁸) the Council passed a resolution addressed to Supreme Allied Commander recommending Italian Government be permitted to transfer at an early date from

⁷⁶ Not printed.⁷⁷ Neither printed.⁷⁸ Telegrams not printed.

Salerno to Rome. (Text of this resolution is transmitted in my next following telegram.)⁷⁹ The condition in resolution stipulating that transfer is recommended in the absence of military objections was inserted upon my recommendation in accordance with instructions of Department transmitted to me in its 271, June 29.⁸⁰

Sent to Department; repeated to Algiers, Moscow, London, Cairo for MacVeagh. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

*The President of the Italian Council of Ministers (Bonomi) to President Roosevelt*⁸¹

SALERNO, 2 July, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT: Ever since the very first days of my advent to the government it has been my intention to contact you directly, to express, above all, the vivid and profound sense of solidarity and admiration with which Italian democracy, living once again today after so many years of silence, follows your activity and your work.

If I do so at this time, though a few weeks have elapsed since the formation of the new government, I am hoping that you will be so kind as to attribute it both to my reluctance to deprive you of some of your time, more precious now than ever, and to my desire to wait for a propitious occasion, which presents itself only today, permitting me to write directly to you in a more lengthy manner than could be accomplished by a mere telegram.

You know that today my government is composed exclusively of men absolutely free from any fascist contamination, of the most authorized and representative exponents of the six Italian political parties, that is, of men with deep conviction and profound sincerity, all of whom are capable of bringing Italy back to the road of her best liberal and democratic traditions, for which, in fact, they have lived and suffered for twenty years.

All these men are counting a great deal upon your support and assistance. They are all perfectly aware of the fact that no one can be more disinterestedly close to them in this, our effort of material and spiritual reconstruction and elevation of the country, than the President of the great and free North American Republic.

They turn, therefore, to you, with great faith and great hope.

I do not wish to tell you that the conditions given to Italy at the time of the Armistice were unjust. I simply want to mention to you that almost a year after the Armistice, and with an Italy so transformed, these still prevailing conditions are becoming progressively graver and therefore more unjust.

⁷⁹ Telegram 324, July 1, not printed.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Why is it that, on the one hand, we are not allowed to participate with our own forces in the liberation of our national territory from German oppression as we would like to do, as we could do and as would be morally necessary for us to do; and why, on the other hand, is that free development of our democratic life, the very condition of our salvation, denied us with excessive controls, excessive interference and excessive burden of occupation.

In these last few days, with the help of my old friend Marshal Badoglio, I have prepared a summary⁸² in the form of a document which I am forwarding to you by a personal and secret means. This document points out the greatest difficulties, the stumbling blocks and the gravest obstacles which we have found in our path during these eight months of cobelligerency. It is an elaborate document based upon data and material for the most part official but nevertheless unpublished.

I trust you will be able to peruse it and have it studied by your subordinates in a more thorough manner. Above all, I trust that you will be able to find in it, the incentive and the inspiration for gesture and an initiative of human generosity which would give, to the new Italian democracy, the feeling that fascism is as dead internationally as it is dead in the hearts of the Italians, and which would finally allow us that determination and that impetus, devoid of humiliation and impotence, which we need so much in order to meet, with greater energy, the difficult tasks that await us.

The enthusiasm with which the North American troops have been received in Rome has certainly conveyed to you, more than any affirmation on my part, the spirit and fervor with which a people of 45 million souls looks to the United States and to its President. The Italian people have undergone indescribable sufferings and will continue to suffer. However, they are a sane, honest and solid people to whom credit can be given. Their activity and industriousness will be necessary to the reconstruction of Europe. Every aid and assistance which will be given them in this dark hour will certainly be a constructive deed towards the free world of tomorrow.

I repeat, Mr. President, that the free men who today govern Italy look to you with great faith and great hope.

In conclusion, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what admiration we follow, in these days, the gigantic effort directed by you which has brought North American troops to French soil and with what complete solidarity, Mr. President, we send you our most cordial and warm best wishes.

I beg you to believe in my sincerest sentiments.

IVANOE BONOMI

⁸² Attached copy not printed.

865.01/7-644 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1944—10 a. m.

313. For Kirk. Your 180, June 13, 3 p. m.⁸³ The question of the transfer of further territory to Italian administration as well as the move of the Italian Government to Rome has been referred by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Advisory Council for Italy according to Murphy's telegram repeated to you as no. 21.⁸⁴ Provided that the safeguards established in the earlier transfer of territory are maintained and that there are no military considerations to the contrary, you are requested to support a recommendation to the SAC that the contemplated transfer be carried out at the earliest possible opportunity.

Your 323 and 324, July 1,⁸⁵ report the action of the Advisory Council with respect to the return of the Italian Government to Rome.

Sent to Naples, repeated to Algiers for Murphy with reference to his 2171, June 29, 3 p. m.

HULL

865.01/7-944 : Telegram

The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, July 9, 1944.

[Received July 9—4:40 p. m.]

371. From Kirk. This morning's press carries following announcement:

"The Allied Control Commission announced late yesterday evening that Rome will be 'from July 15 on' the seat of government of liberated Italy.

While the Ministers of the Bonomi Cabinet, shortly following formation of the Government, moved to Salerno, the subsecretaries of the Cabinet remained in Rome to prepare the Government's return to the capital.

At the same time also, general headquarters of the Allied Control Commission will be transferred from Naples to Rome.

This announcement has been made by Captain Ellery Stone USNR as Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission."

Repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

⁸³ Not printed.

⁸⁴ Telegram 2171, June 29, 3 p. m., not printed.

⁸⁵ Latter not printed.

740.00119ACI/7-2244

*Memorandum by the President of the Italian Council of Ministers
(Bonomi) for the Secretary of State*⁸⁶

[Translation]

1. Next September marks the anniversary of the first year of Italy's war at the side of the United Nations. The process of evolution which the Italian situation, both internal and external, has undergone during this year is undeniable. Thus the terms of the armistice of September 1943 certainly now represent only a *de facto* situation which has been superseded historically and politically. It would be an act of justice and political wisdom to adjust the *de jure* situation imposed upon Italy last September to the *de facto* situation existing today. The armistice period must, that is, be considered over and the equivocation between unconditional surrender, armistice and co-belligerence finally settled. The continuation of the present situation is politically sterile and detrimental for us and for everybody.

2. The promises and pledges made by the United Nations to the Italian people are, moreover, explicit: they solemnly promised that the alleviation of the armistice terms depended upon the extent of Italian assistance in the common war effort. Now it is perfectly clear that if Italy's adequate military participation in the liberation of her territory is hampered and prevented, as up to yesterday it has been, one is merely perpetuating a sterile vicious circle which must be broken. The Italian Corps of Liberation must, therefore, be vastly increased in numbers and units. There are men, and they want to fight; the question is to arm and feed them.

3. The Italian people still feel themselves quarantined, shut off, as they are, in hermetic isolation. They must be brought back into that free circulation of international ideas and events which is one of the fundamental conditions for the resumption and progressive development of free democratic institutions.

Any move in this direction has, instead, so far been barred to us. The principal ones are mentioned:

(a) request for Italian adherence to the Atlantic Charter, so far unanswered;

(b) request for Italian participation in the International Labor Office, postponed indefinitely;

(c) request for participation in the Monetary Conference, not granted.

⁸⁶ This memorandum was brought by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Allied Control Commission for Italy to the United States the latter part of July (740.00119ACI/7-2244).

4. The occupation costs, the enormous and unknown mass of currency issued by the Allies, and the high pound-dollar-lira rate of exchange cut most seriously into the exhausted Italian resources. We are told about UNRRA,⁸⁷ the Committee for Italian Relief, etc. These are excellent initiatives, but they are still to come. The Italian people meanwhile are being bled white. While waiting until such measures can become active and operative, it is necessary to alleviate the economic burdens which the armistice placed upon a country which was already poor and already at the end of its tether, and which make any recovery whatsoever impossible.

Italy asks to be placed in a position to burden Allied resources as little as possible, especially during this crucial period of the war. Her economic recovery is consequently our interest and the common interest. Italian experts and technicians should be authorized to discuss directly, in London and Washington, the more urgent and serious problems with the interested circles. These are technical and not political problems. Italy's inclusion in the Lend-Lease Act⁸⁸ could unquestionably constitute a step in the right direction.

5. The Control Commission should progressively be relieved of at least three-fourths of its duties and turn toward less oppressive and encyclopedic forms of interference and intervention in all sectors of Italian life. There are already in Italy organs which are ready to succeed it: the High Commissioners, for example, who could in turn evolve in the direction of those conferences of ambassadors which have in the past proved capable and efficient. The present situation should in any case be unfrozen. It is impossible for a country to be long, and without serious dangers, administered by two Governments. Similarly, it is impossible for a highly civilized people like the Italians to be kept indefinitely in a state of tutelage and minority.

6. Almost everywhere the vast, constructive, hard-working Italian colonies throughout the world are subject to a regime which, in some countries, is definitely comparable with the anti-Semitic persecutions. Heads of families have for years been in concentration camps, their women abandoned to prostitution and misery, and their interests, the fruit of hard and patient work, injured and compromised. One may cite, for example, the cases of the Italian colonies throughout the Mediterranean basin and, particularly, in Tunisia and Egypt. Also the situation of our 40,000 prisoners held by the French has now reached the limit of all possible physical and moral endurance. An end must at last be put to this anti-Italian crusade, which can be documented in an irrefutable manner. It serves no purpose save to

⁸⁷ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

⁸⁸ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

create further abysses of suffering and to sow the seeds of future conflicts.

7. New democratic Italy is most firmly resolved to place the country upon the former path of full, complete, and confident collaboration with the western powers. In the extremely grave material and spiritual crisis that will sweep over Europe upon the cessation of hostilities, she wishes to represent a factor for stability and order. Her people are sober, constructive, hard-working. The force of Italian labor will constitute one of the fundamental elements for European reconstruction. It must, therefore, be given credit. One must decide to begin in Italy a truly reconstructive policy. One must be convinced that 45 million Italians are inevitably one of the fundamental factors for Mediterranean and European appeasement and must act accordingly. This, moreover, is in line with the generous proposition President Roosevelt has expressed on many occasions and with the generous humanity of the American people.

ROME, July 22, 1944.

740.00119 ACI/8-344

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1944—7 p. m.

45. Your 96, August 3, 4 p. m.⁸⁹ Your understanding of this Government's policy in avoiding unnecessary interference in Italian politics is correct. With the exception of our interest in the de-fascistization of Italian administration, this Government does not wish to become involved in the various changes which will normally occur in the Italian cabinet during this transition period. Within the general framework of our desire to assure the Italian people a representative, anti-Fascist Government the Italian political groups and the Government should be allowed to work out the composition of the cabinet and to make changes when considered desirable with minimum foreign interference.

In conversations with your colleagues along these lines, you might point out the limitations on the effectiveness of an Italian official who had been "approved" by foreign powers and the damage to the prestige of the present Government if such a procedure were required by the United Nations.

STETTINIUS

⁸⁹ Not printed.

740.00119 Control Italy/8-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1944—4 p. m.

49. Department does not wish to pass on individual appointments to Italian cabinet positions or diplomatic and consular posts. This Government is, of course, interested in the elimination of Fascists from such positions and in the appointment abroad of men who will cooperate wholeheartedly with their United Nations colleagues. Names of appointees should, therefore, be reported to the Department for its information but not for its advance approval in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

With the foregoing premise, the Department has no comment to make on the appointments referred to in your 93, August 9,⁹⁰ of Rossi Longhi and Gallarati Scotti.

Repeat to Kirk.

HULL

740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-1944 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the
Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1944—4 p. m.

A-7. Please deliver to President of Council of Ministers following reply to his memorandum of July 22 which Reber brought with him. Translation of memorandum was sent you by air mail August 12.

"Thank you for your memorandum of July 22, delivered by Mr. Reber, containing your views on the various political and economic problems confronting your country. It will be helpful to those of us here giving attention to such problems. I have given it careful thought.

With respect to the Armistice terms, you are fully aware that in their application by the Allied Governments they are being used for the sole purpose of furthering the prosecution of the war against Germany, whose total defeat is the primary objective of all of us. Should the Italian Government have specific proposals to make with regard to their amendment, the United States Government would be glad to receive them. The *de jure* position of Italy with respect to the terms of the Armistice seems to me to be secondary to the *de facto* relations with the United Nations which your country is daily creating by its increasing contribution to the successful military campaign in Italy. When final victory over our enemies has been achieved you may be sure that the contribution of the new Italy will not be ignored.

⁹⁰ Not printed.

Your country's desire to participate actively in the struggle against Germany is appreciated and understood. You and your Chiefs of Staff realize, of course, that there are practical limitations with respect to equipping and supplying a large armed force. Sympathetic consideration will continue to be given, within the limit of military requirements and supply possibilities, to increasing the active military participation of the Italian Armed Forces in the present campaign. As you are aware a definite proposal to this end is now under study.

I also have every sympathy with your desire that Italy be permitted to participate in the various international organizations, conferences and ideas whose success must ultimately depend, of course, on the contributions of all free and peace-loving nations. You are keenly aware, I am sure, that the crimes of the Fascist Government committed in the name of Italy against many of the United Nations will require patience, understanding, and hard work to overcome. You may count, however, on the sympathy and support of this Government in any endeavors and aspirations in this direction. This Government would be prepared to receive in an unofficial capacity a technical representative or representatives of Italy who might not only discuss economic and financial questions but also could report directly to your Government in regard to such matters as the treatment of Italian prisoners of war, et cetera.

Italy's economic position has been the subject of constant and careful study by this Government and its Allies ever since the beginning of the liberation of Italian territory. As the military campaign moves further north and the military interest in the more remote liberated areas diminishes, this Government has been giving serious attention to ways and means of financing and improving Italy's imports for civilian needs. For various reasons, principally the limitations placed on lend-lease funds with respect to civilian supply and rehabilitation, it is not practical to consider lend-lease aid as a solution to Italy's present economic problems. It is hoped, however, that some satisfactory formula will be evolved in the near future.

I am glad to have your views concerning the functions of the ACC and its relationship to Italian life. Until our armed forces, and those fighting with them, have achieved victory over the Germans, it is essential that the Allied Theater Commander retain the authority which he exercises through the ACC to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. The present composition of the ACC is, however, being studied by the Allied Governments in the light of increasing civilian problems confronting the Italian Government and the ACC. The desire of the Allied Governments to return to Italian administration liberated areas as soon as military conditions permit is manifested in the recent restoration to the Italian Government of seven provinces in Central Italy including the capital of the country.

It is a matter of record that Italian citizens residing in this country were relieved of the application of enemy-alien regulations as early as October 1942 and, except for a handful of persons of doubtful loyalty, they have since enjoyed liberty of movement within the country and freedom of opportunity to earn their livelihood. This Government has in no instance discouraged other nations having an Italian population from following a similar course.

This Government welcomes the expression of the course which the new democratic Italy has set for itself and your assurances of the

part it will undertake in the reconstruction of Europe and a stable and ordered world. This is, of course, in harmony with the aims of this country and in the fulfillment of these aims Italy may be assured of the collaboration and the friendship of the U.S.A.”

Please inform Murphy and Stone.

HULL

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Italian Council of Ministers (Bonomi)*⁹¹

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I thank you for your letter of July 2, 1944, written after the inauguration of the new government. I followed with keen interest the political developments in Italy immediately after the liberation of Rome. It was a source of satisfaction to the people of this country and to me personally to observe free men taking an active part again in the direction of Italian affairs and solving problems of government in the true democratic spirit. I congratulate you and your colleagues for the fine contribution you are making, under difficult circumstances, to the political life of Italy.

Your observations on the various problems confronting your country and the exhaustive document accompanying your letter have been referred to the Secretary of State for study. I believe that Mr. Hull has recently communicated with you through Mr. Kirk regarding various aspects of Italian political and economic life.⁹² Thus you will already have at hand, when this reaches you, an expression of this Government's views on the several questions which you have raised and to which it is giving active and sympathetic consideration.

Thank you for your good wishes for the success of the Allied landings and battle in northern Europe. This operation is now being supported by a second successful invasion of France, from the south. We can have good hope that total victory over our common enemy in Europe will now not be long delayed.

Sincerely yours

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-2844

Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

No. 714

AUGUST 28, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum⁹³ addressed on August 23 by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Allied

⁹¹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹² See airgram A-7, *supra*.

⁹³ Not printed.

Control Commission on the subject of its relations with the Italian Government. It will be noted that the Allied Control Commission is instructed to make clear to the Italian Government that its approach to the Allied authorities must be through the Allied Control Commission. The enclosure points out that the Advisory Council for Italy on the other hand is in direct contact with the Allied Control Commission and that the members of the Advisory Council may make joint or several representations to their Governments, but that they are not in direct contact with the Government of Italy.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

865.01/9-944 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, September 9, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 11—12: 15 p. m.]

329. My next following telegram⁹⁴ contains the text of a message which Count Sforza has brought me with the request that it be sent to the President.

Prior to Sforza's visit the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs called on me and stated that the President of the Council had instructed him to tell me that if Sforza should ask me to send some message **Bonomi would be grateful if I would notify my Government that he did not believe it expedient to hurt Sforza's feelings by discouraging him from sending a message but that it should be regarded as a personal expression of Sforza's.** Bonomi, the Under Secretary added, wishes it understood that he is convinced that the US and British Governments have adequate appreciation of Italy's problems and of the present plight of the Italian people and he fully trusts those Governments to aid in the solution of those problems within the just limit of possibility.

KIRK

865.01/9-944 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, September 9, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received September 11—12: 58 p. m.]

330. "Rome September 9, 1944. Deeply grateful for your declarations. I think it necessary, with Bonomi, to submit to you secretly some urgent considerations:

⁹⁴ *Infra.*

Communist leaders have behaved and behave loyally in our coalition but imminent liberation of their stronghold not unexpected and approaching of Soviet forces to Trieste may oblige them to ask for greater representation in Cabinet. It is true that great majority of nation is with us, but we must take no risks. Only way to ensure healthy vitality of progressive Italian democracy is to adopt rapidly following concrete manifestations: (a) Suppression of present cumbersome administrative relations under armistice and creation of normal, if not yet quite formal, relations; (b) Immediate initiation of studies for Italo-American collaboration aiming to invest in rapid hydro-electric development of the south, including Sicily and Sardinia about which I had already had contact last September in New York with Wall Street personalities; (c) Holding confidential conversations for economic help with American advantages; these conversations might take form of private visit to America of some statesman above parties with two economic experts.

Only such facts will create atmosphere on confident hope eliminating possibility of hungry crowds turning to extremist preachers. Please do not forget that a healthy, democratic, individualistic Italy will have tremendous influence on developments in France and Balkans while the contrary may bring surprises, even for victors.

Bonomi, with whose warm approval am wiring you, does not doubt loyalty of our Communist colleagues, but is afraid of movements in spite of them. Litvinov⁹⁵ spoke the truth when he told me, 'We do not want revolutions in the West, but if they happen we must approve.'

We would lack loyalty not adding that under present armistice responsibility of events rests with those who have power not with those who are powerless."

KIRK

865.01/9-1144

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1944.

Dom Luigi Sturzo,⁹⁶ who has been seeing various of the people in the Department, came in to see me to urge that a solution of the Italian problem be reached. He made three points:

1. For more than a year Italy has been in the anomalous status of being at once an enemy, and a cobelligerent; a sovereign government and a government under the control of Allied Armies. He felt that this, which affected the political and economic paralysis, ought to be

⁹⁵ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁹⁶ Founder of the Partito Popolare (Catholic).

cleared up. The British, he said, had proposed a provisional treaty of peace leaving territorial and other similar questions for later decision; but they had given the Italian Government to understand that this arrangement had been opposed by the State Department. He said he had talked to Sir Alexander Cadogan⁹⁷ about it. I inquired what attitude Cadogan had taken.

Dom Luigi said that Cadogan had told him of the British desire to rectify the situation and of their proposal for provisional peace; Cadogan had intimated or probably stated that the plan had failed because the United States objected.

Dom Luigi then said that he hoped we could get some sort of solution. It was his distinct impression that if the Americans and British, who had the primary responsibility since they were occupying Italy, did not supply a solution, some day Moscow would propose and carry out one as they had done on one previous instance. All that would be gained by that, he said, was the creation of an Italian feeling that "all good comes from Moscow".

His second point was that some sort of economic arrangement ought to be made for feeding and providing the country. As things stood, Italy was lying in ruins and was not even able to get up. Her internal transport was so badly disorganized that one province might have plenty while famine ruled in the next and there was no way of getting the surplus from one part to another. Of course, she had no ships, and only a small amount of coal. He hoped that possibly the UNRRA would take up the matter but in any case some sort of vigorous overhauling of the situation appeared to be needed. I said the matter was having our constant study. Since his picture was not wholly overdrawn, I did not undertake a comeback to his statements very much.

His third point was that some sort of Italian mission, whether an Ambassador, a military mission, or other type of representation, ought to be opened here. He said there were 600,000 Italian citizens in the United States, and many tens of thousands of Italian prisoners of war; and that somebody ought to be here to look out for the situation.

I said that that point too had been under consideration.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

(NOTE: I feel bound to say that Dom Luigi put up an able and impressive argument, which in the main was in line with the facts. He was appreciative of the President's statement of the other day; but his real point was that if Italy was ever going to get up and get going, a political status and organization ought to be worked out which would let her develop her own energies; and economic assistance ought to be given at least to the point where she could make the most of her own face. He pointed out that aside from the harbor

⁹⁷ British Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

of Naples and one or two other things the wreckage of war lay exactly where it had fallen with only a slight amount of cleaning up. This was perhaps slightly overdrawn, but the underlying situation is unhappily there.)

A. A. B., JR.

865.01/9-1744

Memorandum by the British Embassy to the Department of State

Mr. Eden has received a telegram from Count Sforza, the gist of which is that unless the Armistice Régime is terminated and normal relations with His Majesty's Government are restored, the Communists may threaten to upset the present Italian Government with disastrous results not only for Italy but for Europe. He asks for confidential and personal exchanges of views.

Mr. Eden has already instructed Sir Noel Charles on a previous occasion to intimate to Count Sforza that he is not prepared to receive communications from him direct. Accordingly no reply will be sent to his present telegram.

Since Count Sforza states, however, that he has telegraphed on behalf of Signor Bonomi to President Roosevelt apparently on similar lines,⁹⁸ Mr. Eden desires to inform the United States Government of his views and to ask them to agree that no reply should be sent to Count Sforza by either side. If President Roosevelt chose to regard the telegram which has apparently been addressed to him as coming from Signor Bonomi and felt obliged to reply direct to the latter, Mr. Eden would of course see no objection.

WASHINGTON, 17 September, 1944.

865.01/9-2544 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1944—5 p. m.

On receipt of specific instructions by separate cable please see the Foreign Minister immediately and convey to him confidentially the information contained in the following numbered paragraphs.

1. This Government has come to the conclusion that, in view of the demonstrated will of the Italian people to fight for their own freedom and for the principles of the United Nations, it is desirable at this time to encourage Italians who are participating in the destruction of Fascism and in the political rebirth of their country by extending to them a larger opportunity to help defeat our common enemies.

⁹⁸ See telegram 330, September 9, 2 p. m., from Rome, p. 1148.

2. Toward this end increasing control will gradually be given to the Italian administration, and the Italian Government will be permitted to send representatives to Washington. It is our understanding that the British Government will also invite the Italian Government to send representatives to London.

3. This Government is also giving serious consideration at this time to the desirability of establishing full diplomatic relations with the present Italian Government. It believes that such a step would be of material aid in the successful conclusion of the war in Europe and the reestablishment of democratic government. In accordance with Article I of the Resolutions of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro,⁹⁹ this Government wishes to consult with all those American republics which broke diplomatic relations with the Fascist Government of Italy to obtain their views on that subject.

Please obtain from the Foreign Minister as soon as possible a statement of the opinion of the government to which you are accredited concerning the resumption of diplomatic relations with Italy and cable the Department. For your confidential information a public statement of the desire of this Government to adopt a more favorable attitude toward the Italian Government, including the invitation to the Italian Government to send direct representatives to Washington, is now under consideration for release within the next few days.

It is emphasized that you are to take no action concerning the above until instructed by a following cable.

HULL

865.01/9-2644 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1944—5 p. m.

Please see the Foreign Minister at once and carry out instructions contained in the Department's secret circular of September 25, 5 p. m. A joint statement¹ is now being made public by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill incorporating the information contained in numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 of the circular of September 25. Please explain to the Foreign Minister that this announcement was decided on as being necessary for the successful prosecution of the war and, of course, does not constitute establishment of diplomatic relations with the Italian Government.

This Government is awaiting with interest the views of the government to which you are accredited concerning the question of full recognition of the Italian Government.

HULL

⁹⁹ See the Final Act, Resolution I, especially section IV, Department of State *Bulletin*, February 7, 1942, p. 117.

¹ See *infra*.

S65.01/9-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the
Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1944.

205. The following statement by the President and Prime Minister Churchill was released last night:

"The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday, September 18 and 19, at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe.² The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi over-lordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed "The Allied Commission".

The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA Conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy. We are happy to know that this view commended itself to other members of the UNRRA Council.

At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.

We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and

²³ Documentation relating to the Hyde Park conversations following the Second Quebec Conference, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations.”

HULL

865.01/9-3044 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
(Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, September 30, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received October 1—6: 03 p. m.]

424. I called this evening on Bonomi at his request and he expressed his cordial appreciation of statement on Italy by President and Churchill which he characterized not only as proof of comprehension of President of problems confronting Italy but as promise of concrete manifestations of that comprehension through future treatment of Italy.

Specific points in statement to which Bonomi referred were question of Italian representation to United States and functions of ACC. As regards the first, he inquired as to nature of Italian representation in United States envisaged by President indicating clearly the hope that an Ambassador would be permitted and I told him that I had sent query to Department on this point at request of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs but had not yet received a reply (my 404, September 27, 7 p. m.³). As regards the second point, Bonomi said that, gratifying as was removal of word control from ACC, there should be corresponding broadening in viewpoint of that organization which would not only render it a more constructive factor in Italian rehabilitation; it especially would speed up its decisions so that it would not constitute unnecessary drag on Italian Government. In latter connection, he spoke of the time which was required in obtaining decisions from ACC on matters which required prompt action and particular burden incident to ACC requirement that it pass upon even minor officials before appointment by Italian Government with result that posts in provinces were often held vacant owing to delay in obtaining ACC approval. In this connection, Bonomi suggested that business of the Government would be greatly expedited if members of Government could sit upon at least some of committees of ACC.

Following his remarks on statement itself, Bonomi referred briefly to internal situation here. He said that Government was functioning well but that it would have to be strengthened by introduction of new members who would be available when north of Italy was freed. He

³ Not printed.

referred also to matter of epuration which, essential though it was must be hastened in its process as it was keeping country in a state of tension and disrupting mechanism of civil administration through continued uncertainty in minds of officials and employees due to fear that anyone who served under Fascist regime might be denounced for epuration. The economic and financial situation of country was also briefly referred to and he was emphatic in expression of his anxiety in matter of adequate food and shelter for population during coming winter.

In conclusion, the President of the Council reverted to matter of President's statement and said that he hoped that I would present him further information as to proposed implementation as Italy looked for guidance more to United States than to any others. In fact, it was clear from Bonomi's conversation, that although he recognized responsibility of Italian Government and people in working out their own salvation need of assistance from abroad and especially from United States is essential and that if the hopes raised by Anglo-American statement are not promptly realized, at least in part, the effect thereof will be destructive rather than constructive.

KIRK

865.01/10-1444 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—6 p. m.

This Government has consulted with the governments of the other American republics except Argentina (which has not severed relations with Italy) and has received expressions of opinion from all of them concerning establishment of diplomatic relations with the Italian Government. It wishes to bring to the attention of each the following summary of the views expressed by all.

1. Each Government has expressed itself as favorable to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Italian Government provided agreement is reached by all governments to that end, as provided for in Resolution I of Rio de Janeiro.

2. Special interest in the subject on account of the number of citizens of Italian extraction was expressed by the Foreign Ministers of several countries, particularly Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico. The latter two referred also to the excellent conduct of Italian born minorities within their countries during the past year.

3. The Foreign Ministers of Peru and Venezuela indicated that considerable discussion had already been given to the question within their governments. The Peruvian Government was considering sending a consul or other agent to Italy.

4. The Chilean Foreign Minister expressed the belief that recognition of the Italian Government would effectively aid the establishment of democratic government in Italy and the winning of the war in Europe.

5. The Haitian Foreign Minister believes the step justified by the attitude of the Italian Government and the support of the United Nations war effort rendered by the Italian people.

6. The Paraguayan Foreign Minister pointed out that consideration of this step at this time was in accord with the high ideals that have been expressed during the war.

7. The Panamanian Foreign Minister commented favorably on the steps already announced to give greater control to the Italian Government and was confident that accord on the subject of recognition would be reached by the American governments through the consultations being held.

The Department has been informed that various republics held further consultations among themselves before replying to the inquiry which this Government addressed to them.

Several of the American republics, including Brazil, Chile and Paraguay, have stressed the importance of arranging for simultaneous action on the part of the American republics in announcing recognition of the Italian Government. This Government is thoroughly in accord with that view.

In view of the unanimous opinion reported above, this Government believes it desirable to proceed with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Italian Government.

This Government suggests that October 26, 1944, be tentatively established as the date on which each American republic wishing to do so may announce in whatever manner it sees fit its intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the Italian Government. The announcement of the United States will be on the date agreed upon and will take the form of a public statement that Ambassador Kirk is being nominated as United States Ambassador to the Italian Government.

Between now and October 26 this Government will proceed to request an *agrément* for Ambassador Kirk from the Italian Government. It is believed that other American republics may wish to take similar action and this Government is glad to offer its services to other American Governments which do not now have representatives in Italy to facilitate the reestablishment of diplomatic relations through channels presently available.

Please communicate the foregoing to the Foreign Minister as soon as possible and inform the Department whether the procedure regarding announcement and the proposed date are satisfactory to the gov-

ernment to which you are accredited. Please point out the need for keeping this matter in strictest confidence until the date for public announcement.

HULL

865.01/9-2644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1944—4 p. m.

2441. To implement the joint statement on Italy of the President and Prime Minister (Department's 2295 of September 26, 6 p. m.⁴), the British Government informed the Department that it intended to accredit its representative in Rome formally to the Italian Government and that he should have in future direct access to the Italian Government rather than through the Allied Control Commission as at present. In considering the British proposal the Department has requested the views of the other American Republics in accordance with its obligations under the Resolutions of Rio de Janeiro dated January 1942. The response of the other American Republics has been unanimously in favor of resuming direct relations with the Italian Government. Consequently the Department has decided to resume full diplomatic relations with the Italian Government and has so informed the British Government and the other American Republics. The President has approved the appointment of Alexander Kirk as United States Ambassador to Italy. Mr. Kirk has been instructed to obtain the agreement to his appointment. It is contemplated that public announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations with Italy will be made on October 26⁵ by this Government and by the Governments of the other American Republics. Mr. Kirk's nomination cannot be sent to the Senate for confirmation until after it reconvenes on November 14, and he will of course not be able to present his letters of credence until after that date. You should inform the Soviet Foreign Office of the above and state that should the Soviet Government wish to accredit formally its representative in Rome, it might wish to take this occasion to do so. It has been suggested to the British Government that it may wish to announce the resumption of relations with Italy on October 26 in concert with the American Republics.

HULL

⁴ Not printed; but for text of joint statement, see telegram 205, September 27, to Rome, p. 1153.

⁵ For text of press release announcing renewal of diplomatic relations with Italy, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1944, p. 491.

865.01/10-2744 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1944.

338. Acting Secretary Stettinius made the following statement in press conference this morning :

"The resumption of formalized relations with Italy is an implementation of the joint statement on Italy by the President and the Prime Minister of September 26, 1944. It is in recognition of the efforts of the Italian people during the past year to establish a healthy political basis for government. It is in recognition of the representative, national Government that has been formed and supported by the various anti-fascist parties of liberated Italy. It is in recognition of the loyal cooperation of the Italian people and armed forces, during the past year, in the bitter struggle against our common enemy.

"The resumption of diplomatic relations with Italy does not re-establish peace, nor does it settle the many questions which will have to be dealt with before a formal state of peace is declared. Only the Congress can pass upon that final step. The resumption of formal relations with Italy is intended, however, to facilitate our return to a state of peace which is, of course, an objective of our Italian policy."

STETTINIUS

865.01/11-2844 : Telegram

The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 28, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

814. I am informed that yesterday evening representatives of the Committee of National Liberation who were mostly Ministers without Portfolio called on Bonomi and told him that in any new government Sforza should be given the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Bonomi replied that this appointment was impossible owing to British opposition (see my 801 November 26, 5 p. m. last paragraph⁶) the representatives said that in that case no Ministry could be formed and that Bonomi should make an announcement to that effect. Three representatives of the CNL are calling upon Noel Charles today to discuss this matter further. Both Noel Charles and Stone are aware of the Department's position as regards Sforza as expressed in its 181 June 11, 1 p. m. to Naples.⁷

⁶ Not printed.⁷ See footnote 61, p. 1126.

The positive action taken by British in favor of Orlando⁸ (see my 810, November 27, 5 p. m.⁹) and in disapproval of Sforza in so far as to state that, when the question of the tranquility of war theater is not immediately involved, I deplore these sporadic incursions from abroad into the internal politics of Italy in that they serve to sap the little vitality now existing in the Italian body politic and not only give occasion to even the civic minded to shift to a foreign power the responsibility for the consequences of their own shortcomings but also furnish to other elements, both foreign and national whose aims are less altruistic, opportunities to develop situations conducive to the furtherance of those aims.^{9a} I need not add that this state of affairs is especially unfortunate under a regime of Anglo-American combined operations.

KIRK

865.01/11-2844 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1944—midnight.

10051. Following message has been sent to Rome as Department's 501, November 28, 1 p. m.

Begin paraphrase. We suggest that if a solution has not yet been reached you express to Bonomi our concern over the prolonged crisis in the government, which will inevitably have a deplorable effect on public opinion here especially now when Congress is to consider resumption of full diplomatic relations with Italy. (Your nomination¹⁰ will probably go this week to the Senate.) This Government earnestly hopes any solution will preserve the representative character of the preceding Italian Government. Although considering the cabinet composition to be a purely Italian problem, we are naturally interested in the measure of friendliness and cooperation any new Government would show toward the United Nations and prosecution of the war in Italy. Any new Government, moreover, must necessarily confirm all Italian commitments toward the Allies since November 3, 1943.

Before instructing you to present letters accrediting you to the Italian Government, this Government would have to consider all these factors. *End paraphrase.*

Kirk reported on November 28¹¹ that the Chief Commissioner of the AC had requested instructions of the AFHQ with respect to the following: Should he advise the Lieutenant General of the Realm and the new Prime Minister that the Supreme Allied Commander will

⁸ Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, President of the Italian Council of Ministers, 1917-19.

⁹ Not printed.

^{9a} Sentence obviously garbled in transmission.

¹⁰ Alexander Kirk was appointed Ambassador to Italy on December 8, 1944.

¹¹ Telegram 813, not printed.

require, in connection with the formulation of the new government, (1) that for military reasons certain officials be reappointed, (2) that before the new cabinet is installed the names of ministers and Under Secretaries must be submitted to SACMED¹² through the Allied Commission for the approval of the Allied Governments.

In his capacity as Political Adviser to SACMED, Kirk was instructed that if his advice was requested in formulating a reply to the Chief Commissioner's inquiry, he should take the following position:

While it is understood that SACMED's approval must be obtained for military reasons, the Department does not agree that the composition of the entire new government should be submitted to SACMED for approval by the Allied governments before the new Italian government may be inaugurated. SACMED may approve or disapprove names to be included in the new government, solely on important military grounds. Once this approval has been given SACMED should not be required to make further reference to allied authorities or governments. It is expected, of course, that any new government must agree to abide by undertakings to the Allies of the previous Italian Government.

The British Embassy has been informed of the substance of the above messages.

A recent report from Kirk indicates that the British will maintain the position that in the event of a change in the presidency of the Council approval of the British Government must be obtained before the new cabinet can take office. We suggest that you bring the Department's position on the Italian government crisis as outlined in the messages referred to above to the attention of the Foreign Office and express our earnest hope that the British Government will follow a similar course, leaving any objection to personalities in the new government to SACMED for purely military reasons.

You should also express our regret that the Foreign Office felt it necessary to intervene in an internal political crisis in Italy, particularly without prior consultation with us. Not only does it appear to have further complicated the crisis and to have made the task of our people on the Allied Commission relatively more difficult but it has occasioned widespread critical comment in press and radio in this country, where Sforza is generally held in high esteem. This is unfortunate to the extent that it touches Anglo-American solidarity in the public mind. In view of the Allied nature of military control in Italy, both governments bear equal responsibility in the policy toward that country, even though certain steps may be taken in the name of the British government only.

It is difficult for the Department to reconcile the emphasis which the British placed on the need of joint prior consultation in connection

¹² Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

with our recent efforts to eliminate Swedish exports to Germany,¹³ with the important unilateral British step of officially vetoing a candidate for the post of Italian Foreign Minister (Sforza) and suggesting the inclusion of an individual (Orlando) in any new Italian Government without any prior discussion whatsoever with the American side in an area of combined responsibility.

STETTINIUS

865.01/12-444

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome reported on December 1st that the Lieutenant of the Realm had said that he had requested Signor Bonomi to form a Cabinet but that if Signor Bonomi were not accepted by the six parties, he would ask Signor de Gasperi¹⁴ or Signor Ruini.¹⁵ If these had no success, His Royal Highness would consider Signor Croce or Signor Orlando.

2. On the same date His Majesty's Government informed Sir Noel Charles that their interests demanded that the Italian Government should command the allegiance of the principal parties so that the risk of civil disturbance, which would embarrass their military requirements, might be so far as possible avoided. They would therefore much prefer that the Communists and the Socialists should be represented in the new government; though if they refused to come in, His Majesty's Government would not on that account withhold approval from any alternative government that might be formed. Any of the personalities mentioned in Sir Noel Charles' telegram above referred to would be acceptable to His Majesty's Government as Prime Minister. Sir Noel Charles was informed that in these circumstances he should not hesitate to make known, in whatever manner he thought fit, the strong hope of His Majesty's Government that the Italian parties will all cooperate in a new government and agree to continue to sink their political differences until their country, with Allied help, was cleared of the enemy. Sir Noel Charles was given authority, if he thought politic, to get into direct contact with Signor Togliatti.

3. On December 2nd Sir Noel Charles reported that Signor Bonomi was not likely to succeed in forming a government of the six parties and that at present he only had the support of the Liberals and Labour Democrats. The Christian Democrats were shy of joining him

¹³ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv, first section under Sweden.

¹⁴ Alcide de Gasperi, Italian Minister without Portfolio; appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 12, 1944.

¹⁵ Meucci Ruini, Italian Minister without Portfolio; appointed Minister of Public Works on December 12, 1944.

as they feared a split in the party. If they were to do so it would be a right-wing government of three parties, as it seemed doubtful that the Communists would come in also.

4. His Majesty's Government's comment on this report is that the formation of a government, representing only two or three of the six parties, obviously has drawbacks and that any government so constituted seems unlikely to last long. But as indicated in paragraph 2 above, they do not feel that their approval should be withheld from it on that account. They trust that the United States Government holds a similar opinion.

5. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will ask the United States Representative in Rome to support Sir Charles in carrying out the instructions set out in the second paragraph of this *Aide-Mémoire*.

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1944.

865.01/12-544: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1944.

549. Department released following statement to press today:

"The Department has received a number of inquiries from correspondents in regard to its position concerning the recent Cabinet crisis in Italy.

"The position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where important military factors are concerned. This Government has not in any way intimated to the Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Sforza. Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories."

STEMINIUS

865.01/12-444

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Instructions have been sent to the United States representative in Rome to inform Signor Bonomi of this Government's concern over the prolonged crisis in the Italian Government. Mr. Kirk was instructed to emphasize its deplorable effect on public opinion in the

United States, particularly at the time when the Congress is considering the resumption of diplomatic relations with that Government. Mr. Kirk expressed this Government's earnest hope that the representative character of the preceding Italian Government would be preserved in any solution. He went on to say that while his Government viewed the composition of the Italian Cabinet as purely an Italian problem it was interested in the measure of cooperation and friendship which any new Government would extend to the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against Germany and would expect it, of course, to assume all previous Italian undertakings with respect to the United Nations. The United States representative was advised that all these factors would be considered before he would be instructed to present letters accrediting him to the Italian Government.

He was further instructed for his guidance, that when the new Italian Cabinet should be submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, for approval, this Government was of the opinion that individual nominations might be approved or disapproved by the Supreme Allied Commander solely on important military grounds, and that further reference to Allied authorities or Governments by the Supreme Allied Commander was not necessary or desirable.

The Department also expressed to Mr. Kirk its approval of a statement of policy which Allied Force Headquarters recently made to the Chief Commissioner in response to his request for guidance in the present crisis. It was along the following lines: Allied policy and objectives continue to be to welcome democratic political solutions worked out by the Italian people themselves in the furtherance of the war effort.

All of these instructions seem to be in general agreement with the instructions to Sir Noel Charles recited in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of December 4, 1944 (paragraph 2) and it would appear that Mr. Kirk has already received sufficient guidance to enable him to adopt a similar course in speaking to the Italian Government.

With regard to granting Allied "approval" of any Italian Government which may evolve, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that objection to individuals should be made by the Supreme Allied Commander only on important military grounds. This Government, however, does consider the representative character of a new Government to be of major importance and concern to the Allied Governments and will wish to give careful consideration to this aspect of the political solution, when found, before extending recognition to the new Government.

It is anticipated that there will be consultation in this regard between the British and American Governments at the appropriate time.

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1944.

865.01/12-1044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

ROME, December 10, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 3:50 p. m.]

932. My 927, December 9, 9 p. m.¹⁶ Although it is too soon to assess with certainty the significance of the new Government, it is apparent from the competition [*composition?*] of the Cabinet that the Communists and Christian Democrats are in a position to dominate Government policy. The Communists were well rewarded for their participation; with Togliatti as Vice President, Bonomi will probably not have as free a hand as in the previous Government and will undoubtedly find it more difficult to temporize. Control of the key Ministries of Agriculture and Occupied Territory will greatly facilitate the Party's activities among agricultural workers and fortify their already dominant influences in the Partisan movement of North Italy. As regards the Finance Ministry, today's *L'Unita*¹⁷ states flatly that Communist policy is "to get the money wherever you can find it" (see my 930, December 10, noon¹⁸). It is probable that the list of Under Secretaries to be completed today will show a strategic distribution further strengthening the Communist position and the control in depuration is yet to be clarified.

Bonomi in commenting today on the new Government expressed satisfaction with its composition which he felt would tend to greater unity and effectiveness. He added that the Action Party had always contributed a disturbing element in the former Government and that the Communists who up to the present had not manifested *intransigence* would at any rate be well counterbalanced by the three moderate parties.

The official list of Ministers and Under Secretaries will be published tomorrow unless any objection is offered by British sources which is not expected. The requisite undertakings as to commitments to the Allies are in process of completion and it is understood that the Government will take office on Dec. 12.

KIRK

865.01/11-2844 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1944—midnight.

10352. Department's 10051 November 30, midnight. Kirk has reported that the British Minister of State at AFHQ has received in-

¹⁶ Not printed.¹⁷ Communist newspaper published in Rome.¹⁸ Telegram not printed.

structions regarding the position he should take on the inquiry of the Chief Commissioner with respect to the formation of a new Italian Government. The instructions were along the following lines:

The position of AFHQ that the procedure established at the time of the change in Government last June should be followed in the present occasion is concurred in. Similar undertakings concerning the institutional question, the armistice and other obligations should likewise be given. The British Government considers that the present agreement requiring the submission of cabinet appointments to the Allied Commission should remain in force. The British Government does not approve AFHQ concession that the Government of Italy be permitted to appoint all officials not connected with the war effort. There is no agreement with the Government of Italy which justifies AFHQ nominating the Service Ministers. Cancellation of any communication already made to the Italians however is not suggested since it is assumed that the Americans have agreed to this proposal. It is hoped that the Italians will not make issue of this point. (End of British instructions.)

The fundamental point of difference between the British and American view is reflected in these instructions, namely, that the British Government does not approve of AFHQ position that the Italian Government should be free to choose the men who will form a new government, with the exception of those directly connected with the military effort. In this connection, reference is made to that portion of your representations expressing the hope of this Government that the British Government will concur in the policy expressed in the Department's 10051 of November 30 and will leave any objection to personalities in the new government to SACMED for purely military reasons.

You should seek to work out with the Foreign Office some basis for a common approach to the Italian political problem within the framework of the Department's policy. The Department considers that the representative character of any new Italian Government is of real concern to the British and American Governments. It does not agree that the two governments should concern themselves generally with the appointments of individuals.

STETTINIUS

865.01/12-1444 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1944.

618. The Department is giving the following release to the press this afternoon.

"The United States Ambassador in Rome, who has been maintaining close consultation with his British colleague, has kept the Depart-

ment carefully informed of recent political developments in Italy. The new Government of Italy is supported by a majority of the political parties, comprising the Committee of National Liberation, and thus maintains a representative character.

This Government, in accord with the British Government, is happy to see the new Italian Government, under Signor Bonomi, take office."

The British Government is releasing a similar announcement at the same time in the following terms:

"During the recent Italian political crisis leading up to the formation of a new government under Signor Bonomi, the British and United States Ambassadors in Rome have kept in close consultation. The reports of the two Ambassadors having been considered satisfactory by their respective governments, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government, whose views are in agreement, have now informed their respective Ambassadors that they welcome the representative character of the new government and are glad to see it assume office."

STETTINIUS

POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH REGARD TO DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTS IN LIBERATED ITALY¹⁹

740.00119 European War 1939/2019a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1943—7 p. m.

103. For Murphy.²⁰ The Belgian, Netherlands and Polish Governments have, independently, within the past few days raised the question of representation in Italy for the protection of their respective interests in that country including their nationals.²¹ Since it is not feasible to arrange places for these and other United Nations on the Advisory Council or Control Commission, it is suggested that they be permitted to assign consuls or consuls general to Italy to look out for their respective interests.

Please ascertain the views of the Commander-in-Chief²² bearing in mind that there will undoubtedly be several other governments of the United Nations in addition to those represented on the Advisory Council who will desire consular representation in Italy once the precedent is established. It is our feeling that we should not deny

¹⁹ For correspondence on the maintenance of responsible government in Italy, see pp. 996 ff.

²⁰ Robert D. Murphy, American member, with personal rank of Ambassador, of Advisory Council for Italy; also U.S. Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters.

²¹ For the Belgian note of December 3, 1943, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. II, p. 398. The Netherlands *aide-mémoire*, dated December 3, 1943, and the Polish *aide-mémoire*, dated December 6, 1943, not printed.

²² Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

members of the United Nations who have legitimate interests in Italy from having appropriate representation in the liberated areas of that country sufficiently removed from the zone of active military operations.²³

We would be grateful for the comments of the Commander-in-Chief concerning the above suggestions and concerning the general problems involved in representation of United Nations in Italy.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/2048 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 29, 1943—noon.

[Received December 30—6:06 p. m.]

285. This is in reply to Department's 103, December 10. We have now received a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief expressing following views.

"1. In general, it may be said that so far as such representation will relieve our forces of any burden it will be looked on with favor by this headquarters. The care of the property of such governments or the property of their nationals, the provision of food, shelter and the basic necessities for their citizens found in Italian occupied territory are examples of burdens which now fall on Allied Military Government or Allied Control Commission.

2. It is not deemed advisable to permit a resumption of consular functions in forward areas where Allied Military Government prevails. As soon, however, as the administration of an area has been made a responsibility of the Italian Government, it seems desirable to allow Consuls of United Nations Governments to enter and take up their functions—subject in every case to the specific concurrence of this headquarters and of the Allied Control Commission.

3. Since the Italian Government is still technically in a state of war with the United Nations and under the terms of the armistice is subject to the direction of the Allied Control Commission, it is regarded as inappropriate that the Consuls of Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland act under an exequatur expressed in the form of a license by the Italian Government to exercise their functions. Instead, the Allied Control Commission should in each case call upon the Italian Government, by decree or other appropriate method, simply to announce that has been appointed by the Government to be its Consul at and accordingly to direct that his acts in that capacity will throughout Italy be duly noted and respected by all concerned."

WILSON

²³ The Combined Chiefs of Staff in telegram Tam 60, October 23, 1943, requested General Eisenhower's views on attaching British and American consular officers to the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission to perform notarial and other consular services. His approval was received on October 28, 1943, in telegram Mat 67. (125.0065/306)

702.0065/26a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1944—9 p. m.

705. For L'Heureux.²⁴ The British Embassy has raised the question of communication privileges to be accorded the consuls of the United Nations who will establish themselves in liberated Italy. The Foreign Office view is that cipher privileges should be denied them; that any messages which they do not wish to send in plain language may be sent through the Control Commission which will encipher them.

The Department is of the opinion that, since members of the Advisory Council can communicate with their respective Governments in cipher, consular officers of those nations represented on the Advisory Council should be granted similar privileges. The Department does not intend to deprive itself of communicating with its consulates in Italy in code. With respect to the consular officers of other United Nations we consider the question of their code privileges should be determined on the basis of military security. Please ascertain the views of AFHQ²⁵ with respect to this latter category making it clear that you are not raising the question with respect to United States consular traffic.

The British Embassy here has been informed of our position.

STETTINIUS

702.0065/28 : Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 25, 1944—10 a. m.
[Received March 26—3:29 a. m.]

995. From L'Heureux. Reference Department's 705, March 7, 9 p. m. Chief of Staff²⁶ has approved cablegram F 22464, March 24 to Agwar²⁷ expressing view no cipher facilities should be granted Consuls in Italy other than American and British. Consuls of countries represented on Advisory Council may communicate with their Governments through their representatives and pouch facilities should be granted between United Nations Consuls and their Governments.²⁸ [L'Heureux.]

CHAPIN

²⁴ Hervé J. L'Heureux, Secretary and Consul at Algiers.

²⁵ Allied Force Headquarters.

²⁶ Lt. Gen. J. A. H. Gammell.

²⁷ Adjutant General, War Department (Washington).

²⁸ In his despatch 147, July 28, 1944, Alexander C. Kirk, American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, indicated that the original telegram from

701.0065/34

The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Barclay) to Mr. Heyward G. Hill of the Division of Southern European Affairs

Ref. 321/27/44

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1944.

DEAR HILL: I am writing to confirm what I told you on Friday ²⁹ about the view of the Foreign Office on the question of Swiss and other neutral diplomatic representation in Italy.³⁰

The Foreign Office say that they have not yet gone fully into the question of neutral diplomatic representation in Italy and they have been working on the assumption that the question would only arise after the capture of Rome when certain neutral representatives left over from fascist days would be found and it would have to be decided on general grounds and on grounds of military security whether they should be allowed to stay, and if so on what conditions, or should be asked to leave under the power granted by article 25 *b* of the armistice.³¹ It seems desirable to the Foreign Office that so long as Italy is occupied by the Allies neutrals should only conduct their relations with the Italian Government through the Control Commission, representing the Occupying Powers. They admit that an awkward precedent has been created by the Russian action in exchanging direct (but not diplomatic) representatives with the Italian Government ³² but they consider that any extension of the precedent would be undesirable and that it would be anomalous if the Allied Governments were confined to conducting their relations with the Italian Government through the Control Commission machinery while neutrals had direct and individual diplomatic relations with the Italian Government. Moreover, if neutral diplomatic representatives were to have direct relations with the Italian Government there would be some doubt about the position of neutral consuls who, if assimilated to the position of Allied Consuls, would only be able to conduct relations

the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, to the War Department and the War Office contained the additional requirement that "the transmission of pouches would be effected where necessary through Allied military channels." He added that the policy of bag and cipher restrictions was reaffirmed on June 9, 1944, in a memorandum from the Offices of the United States Political Adviser and the British Minister Resident in reply to an inquiry from the Communications Censorship Branch, Information and Censorship, Allied Force Headquarters. (702.0065/7-2844)

²⁹ April 28.

³⁰ A marginal comment reads as follows: "Barclay informs me this was drafted and signed before my call on Monday [May 1] when I informed him we had sent a message stating no Swiss dip. rep. should be permitted at this time. May 2."

³¹ The Italian Armistice, signed on September 3, 1943, was announced by General Eisenhower on September 8, 1943. For the text of article 25 (*b*), see "Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy, September 29, 1943," *United States and Italy, 1936-1946: Documentary Record* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 55, 60.

³² See telegram 822, March 13, 5 p. m., from Algiers, p. 1044.

with the Italian authorities through the political section of the Control Commission (though the latter may grant them permission to approach directly local Italian officials within their respective districts.)

The Foreign Office understand that you recently informed your representative on the Advisory Council ³³ that the Department for their part had no objection to the Swiss Government sending a diplomatic representative to Salerno ³⁴ though you considered that the final decision should be left to A.F.H.Q. If this is correct, they wonder whether you had taken the above considerations into account since, in their view, it would clearly be undesirable in present circumstances to permit the return of a Swiss diplomatic representative to function in liberated Italy. They point out that in any case the Swiss have not themselves apparently asked for diplomatic representation and they hope that they will not be encouraged to do so. The Foreign Office would be glad to have your views both on this question of Swiss representation and on the general question of neutral representation in Italy which they think should be cleared up before the Allied forces reach Rome.

The Foreign Office say that they are considering separately the question of Swiss Consular representation in Italy to which they are inclined to see no objection in principle provided the Swiss Consuls do not enjoy any cypher facilities or rights of access to the Italian authorities beyond those permitted in the directive on the subject from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Allied Commander-in-Chief (Tam 125 of January 8th ³⁵).

Yours sincerely,

R. E. BARCLAY

701.0065/34

Memorandum by Mr. Heyward G. Hill of the Division of Southern European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1944.

Mr. Barclay of the British Embassy has left a note at the Department stating that the Foreign Office would be glad to have the views of this Government on the general question of neutral representation in Italy which they think should be cleared up before the Allied forces reach Rome. The following is quoted from this note:

[Here follows second paragraph of British note dated May 1, *supra*.]

Article 25 (b) of the long terms of the armistice states as follows:

³³ Telegram 1122, April 14, 1944, not printed.

³⁴ Both the Royal Italian Government and the Administrative Section of the Allied Control Commission were located at Salerno prior to the fall of Rome.

³⁵ For pertinent section, see memorandum by Mr. Heyward G. Hill, May 6, *infra*.

"The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing the procedure for and methods of communication between the Italian Government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating from or destined for the representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory."

The Allied military authorities have no objection to the appointment by the United Nations of consuls to liberated Italian territory. They would function through the political section of the Allied Control Commission. The following is quoted from Tam telegram 125 of January 8:

"The United States State Department desires to appoint consular officers and open consulates in Sicily and southern Italy as soon as Allied Military Government is terminated in those areas. It has also been proposed by several of the other United Nations to appoint consuls general or representatives to liberated Italian territory. It is contemplated that contact between the Italian Government and these consular officers, including United States consular officers, will be through the political section of the control commission only. Such officers will not be members of or attached to the commission as suggested in Tam 60.³⁶ In this way the present balance of the control commission will not be disturbed. Consular officials may, in the discretion of the control commission, be granted permission to approach directly local Italian officials within the consuls respective districts. Authority to act in lieu of exequaturs, if deemed necessary, will be issued by you in your capacity of President of the Allied Control Commission."³⁷

After Rome is liberated and the Italian government is set up there, it is suggested that the Italian government can conveniently carry on its relations with the allied and neutral nations through the exchange of consular representatives. These would be concerned with such matters as economic proceedings, commercial and banking transactions, citizenship, welfare and protection cases, etc.

Until a peace treaty is signed and Italy again takes its place as a fully sovereign member of the family of nations, it will not be in a position to send or to receive duly accredited diplomatic representatives, nor would there appear to be any necessity for it to do so. Nations now or shortly to be represented by consuls in liberated Italy: United States, United Kingdom, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland.

³⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 23, p. 1167.

³⁷ The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, agreed to Tam 125 in his telegram Mat 136, February 5, 1944 (not printed) adding: "Considering policy of the Headquarters to devolve upon GO CinC ACMF [General Officer, Commander in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force], who is also representative in Italy of President of Allied Control Commission, responsibility for Italian civil affairs, it is contemplated that requests for authority to act as consul would be referred to him for consideration and action."

As regards the neutral diplomatic representatives now in Rome, I suggest that they be considered as having no diplomatic status with the present Government of Italy, and that, under the terms of Article 25(b) of the armistice, they be requested to withdraw when Rome is occupied by the Allies. Their governments might be given the option of naming them consuls.

The problem is still left as regards Italian diplomatic representation now functioning in certain neutral countries (Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Buenos Aires, Eire, Turkey, Switzerland). As all of these representatives now conduct their negotiations with the Italian Foreign Office through the Allied Control Commission, they could continue to do so.

701.0065/30a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Naples (Brandt)*³⁸

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1944—8 p. m.

93. For Kirk.³⁹ The British have approached us informally for our views regarding neutral representation in Italy following the fall of Rome, expressing the opinion that it seemed desirable as long as Italy should be occupied by the Allies for neutrals to conduct their relations with the Italian Government only through the Allied Control Commission.

The Department is considering replying along the following lines:

“Machinery already exists whereby the United Nations and neutral nations may designate consular officials to liberated Italy.⁴⁰ The following nations have already named such representatives: United States, Great Britain, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland.

It would appear that until the defeat of Germany and the subsequent consideration which may be given to the return of Italy to the status of a fully sovereign member of the family of nations, Italy will not be in a position to enter into, nor will it require, diplomatic relations with other nations. Meanwhile, all its essential activities with other nations in the economic and welfare field may be conducted through consular channels.

Neutral diplomatic representatives now in Rome could be requested to withdraw (Article 25(b) of the Armistice) or their governments could designate them consuls to the new Italian Government, or they

³⁸ Repeated as telegram 1539, May 18, to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) for Murphy.

³⁹ Alexander C. Kirk, appointed American representative on the Advisory Council for Italy with rank of Ambassador on March 31, 1944.

⁴⁰ See footnote 23, p. 1167; see also note of December 3, 1943, from the Belgian Embassy to the Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 398.

could be permitted to have contact with the Italian Government through the Allied Control Commission.

Italian diplomatic representatives now in neutral countries (Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Argentina, Eire, Turkey, Switzerland) could continue to conduct their negotiations with the Italian Foreign Office through the Allied Control Commission.”

Your comment would be appreciated.

HULL

701.0065/31 : Telegram

The Consul at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, May 20, 1944—12 p. m.
[Received May 21—12:30 p. m.]

74. From Kirk. Department's 93, May 18, 8 p. m. Commenting on the subject of neutral representation in Italy following fall of Rome I recommend that neutral diplomatic representatives now in Rome be permitted to stay there subject to such measures and precautions as the military may deem necessary for security reasons. The removal of neutral diplomats would appear to be unnecessary provided all proper security measures are taken and aside from the factor of the usefulness to the Allies of the representatives of the protecting powers in a transition period would in effect force a suspension of diplomatic relations between the RIG⁴¹ and the neutrals involved which in turn would unnecessarily weaken and humiliate the Italian Government at home and abroad. Furthermore it is assumed that basic reason for considering removal of neutral diplomats from Rome is one of military security and in this connection it is pointed out that within the bounds of Rome there is another state⁴² to which foreign diplomats are accredited.

While from a theoretical angle it may be desirable as long as Italy is occupied by the Allies to channelize contact [*contact?*] with the Italian Government through the ACC⁴³ the actual and present practice does not conform to the theory because it is impossible to stop social and official encounters between members of the Italian Government and representatives of foreign Governments present on liberated Italian territory.

It might be more realistic and practical to recognize that it is impossible to establish an exclusive channel of approach to the Italian Government and to permit direct contact and communications between

⁴¹ Royal Italian Government.

⁴² State of Vatican City.

⁴³ Allied Control Commission.

the representatives of United Nations and of neutral nations and the RIG subject to the conditions that the ACC be informed by Italian Foreign Office of all discussions and negotiations and that the Italian Government may not sign any foreign agreement without consent and approval of the ACC.⁴⁴ [Kirk.]

BRANDT

701.0065/32: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 5, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received June 6—1:17 a. m.]

1857. From Murphy. The British Resident Minister⁴⁵ informs me that the British Embassy in Washington has been instructed to take up with the Department question of treatment of neutral missions in Rome after Allied occupation. My colleague understands that the Foreign Office feels that all neutral missions in Rome should be deprived of cipher and bag facilities throughout period of Military Government⁴⁶ and that Spanish Embassy should be asked to discontinue its radio transmissions. On the other hand, it does not think it necessary that neutral missions should be withdrawn from Rome because it does not believe security questions will present much difficulty and there are advantages in allowing them to stay. It thinks that decision as to when cipher and bag facilities should be restored would depend on various factors upon which Supreme Allied Commander would eventually have to advise and initiative for proposing restoration of these privileges should be left to him. It thinks that privileges of friendlier neutrals could if necessary be restored before those of the others.

I should be grateful for Department's comments.

Repeated to Naples for Kirk. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

⁴⁴ For the original composition of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, November 10, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 6, 1944, p. 137. For details on the reorganization of the Commission in February 1944, see *History of the Second World War* (United Kingdom Military Series), C. R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy 1943-1945* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 117-120.

⁴⁵ Harold Macmillan.

⁴⁶ In telegram 2370, July 12, 1944, Mr. Murphy notified the Secretary of State that Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy, had requested that pouch and code facilities be withheld from neutral missions in Italy. These missions were not to travel beyond the limit of the Rome Area Command and such restrictions would remain in force until relaxed by Allied Force Headquarters. (701.0065/7-1244)

701.6266A/6-344

*Mr. J. Wesley Jones of the Division of Southern European Affairs to the Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Middleton)*⁴⁷

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1944.

DEAR MIDDLETON: I refer to Barclay's letter of May 1, 1944 (Ref. 321/27/44) to Hill concerning the status of neutral diplomatic representation in Italy. After careful consideration it is the Department's opinion that the diplomatic representatives of neutral states accredited to the Royal Italian Government be permitted to remain in Rome. The security measures to be applied to these neutral representations must, of course, be determined by the Allied military authorities; and whatever steps, relating to communication facilities, circulation of personnel, etc., are considered necessary from a military standpoint will be acceptable to the Department. There should, of course, be no violation of diplomatic immunity with respect to persons and establishments of neutral representations in Rome.

Concerning the relations of the neutral missions with the Italian Government, the Department would prefer to see no ruling on this question at the present time; rather to await developments and consider the problems involved as they may arise after the Italian Government has returned to Rome. It may prove impractical to insist that all contact between the neutral missions and the Italian Government after its establishment in Rome be conducted through the Allied Control Commission. We could instruct the Allied Control Commission through appropriate military channels that it should direct the Italian Foreign Office to keep it informed of all discussions and negotiations with foreign governments and that it may not sign any foreign agreements without the consent and approval of the Commission. With the exception of Soviet Russia, it is anticipated that the various United Nations, which have all broken relations or are at war with Italy, will have no interest or desire to conduct relations with the Italian Government except through the Allied machinery already in existence. The position of neutral powers is, of course, somewhat different since they have never broken relations with the Royal Italian Government.

It is understood that the British military authorities will treat any Finnish diplomatic representative found in Rome as an enemy diplomat.⁴⁸ The Allied military authorities, however, may wish to con-

⁴⁷ The substance of this letter was transmitted to Mr. Kirk as telegram 158, June 7, as a reply to his telegram 74, May 20, p. 1173. Mr. Murphy was informed in telegram 1835, June 10, and a circular telegram was sent June 9, 8 p. m., to London, Moscow, Madrid, Lisbon, Algiers, Stockholm, and Cairo.

⁴⁸ The British Government, having broken diplomatic relations with Finland on August 1, 1941, declared war on December 6, 1941. For correspondence regarding this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

sider different treatment for the representative of the Danish Government if he is still in Rome, in view of the suppression of the Danish Government and Denmark's occupation by the Germans.⁴⁹ It is understood that the Danish Minister in Rome, Mr. Otto Wadsted, has pro-Allied sympathies and will probably renounce, if given the opportunity, his relationship with any Danish administration under German occupation as his colleagues in London⁵⁰ and Washington have done.⁵¹

On the assumption that some guidance should be sent to the Supreme Allied Commander, I am enclosing a proposed cablegram to AFHQ for submission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to consider at its meeting next Thursday, June 8. If you concur with the general line of such a directive, we can submit identical drafts to our respective Secretaries on the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

J. WESLEY JONES

[Enclosure]

DRAFT CABLEGRAM TO GENERAL WILSON FOR CONSIDERATION OF
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

The State Department and Foreign Office have been giving consideration to the status of diplomatic representations in Rome of neutral countries. The British and American Governments have agreed that neutral diplomatic missions and personnel should be allowed to remain in Rome. You will, of course, apply whatever security measures you consider necessary with respect to the communications and circulation of personnel of the various neutral missions. In reply to any protest, you may cite the extraordinary measures which have been adopted in the British Isles with respect to Allied as well as neutral diplomatic missions. The inviolability of the person and establishment of neutral diplomatic representations should, of course, be respected.

Representatives of Finland are to be accorded, by the British military authorities, the same treatment as other enemy diplomats. You should give the Danish Minister, if found in Rome, the opportunity to declare his political sympathies and to renounce his relationship with the Danish administration under German occupation as his colleagues in London and Washington have done.

While it has been established that relations between all foreign governments and the Italian Government be conducted through the Allied Control Commission, it is considered in some quarters that this may

⁴⁹ German troops occupied Denmark on April 9, 1940.

⁵⁰ Count Eduard Reventlow.

⁵¹ For correspondence regarding the recall by the Danish Government of the Danish Minister to the United States, Henrik de Kauffmann, in April 1941, his refusal to accept recall on the ground that the Danish Government was acting under duress, and his continued recognition by the United States as Danish Minister, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 47 ff.

not be practical as regards neutral diplomatic missions in Rome after the return of the Italian Government to the Capital. Your recommendations on this point are requested.

701.0065/6-844

The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Middleton) to Mr. J. Wesley Jones of the Division of Southern European Affairs

Ref: 62/18/44

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1944.

DEAR JONES: May I refer to your letter of June 5th concerning the status of neutral diplomatic representatives in Rome?

The Foreign Office have now suggested the following amendments in the draft instruction to General Wilson which you put up for submission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee:—

(a) The end of the first sentence to read: "diplomatic representatives in Rome to the Italian Government of neutral countries".

(b) The middle of the third sentence to read: "with regard to communications (including suspension of bag and cypher facilities and discontinuance of wireless transmissions) and circulation of personnel".

(c) Penultimate sentence of first paragraph to read "in reply to any protest you may refer to the necessities of military operations and security, quoting the precedent of security measures taken in Egypt if you consider that this helps".

The first two amendments are merely designed to clarify details. As regards the third amendment, it is felt that the Egyptian precedent⁵² is much more analogous to conditions in Rome than the restrictions now in force in the United Kingdom.

As regards the last paragraph of your draft it is suggested that this should read:—

"It has been established that relations between all foreign governments and the Italian Government be conducted through the Allied Control Commission and it is thought that this should apply to neutral diplomatic missions in Rome after the return of the Italian Government to the Capital insofar as this may be practicable. Your recommendations on this point are requested".

In the view of the Foreign Office the overriding point is that Rome and other parts of Southern Italy will for some time be under Allied Military Government. So far as is known none of the neutral governments has maintained unbroken diplomatic relations with the

⁵² In a letter from William G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy, to J. Wesley Jones, dated January 4, 1944, Mr. Hayter stated: "Bag and cypher facilities were withdrawn from all neutral diplomatic missions in Egypt (except the Swiss Legation) when Egypt was in the zone of hostilities, and this precedent might be followed with neutral missions in Rome." (701.0065/28) See also George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War*, in the series *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946* (London, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 207.

Royal Italian Government and the fact that certain neutral governments may have maintained relations with the puppet government set up by the Germans under Mussolini is felt not to be quite the same thing.

If you concur in the above amendments, I suggest we should try to clear the joint draft instruction with the C. C. A. C.⁵³ by informal action through our respective Secretaries as there seems to be some doubt when the Committee will next meet.⁵⁴

Yours sincerely,

G. H. MIDDLETON

701.0065/7-544 : Telegram

The Consul at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State

NAPLES, July 5, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5 : 15 p. m.]

349. From Kirk. Italian press yesterday reported that on a visit to Rome the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Visconti Venosta received calls from representatives of five neutral Governments and it is understood that some American correspondents have interpreted these calls as establishing normal diplomatic relations between Italy and the neutral states. Acting Chief Commissioner ACC⁵⁵ has now informed me that word has been received from Visconti Venosta that he regrets publicity given to calls which were informal and at request of neutral representatives. Under Secretary explained to representatives that he was in Rome for two days merely to organize his Ministry, that he could not discuss political matters with them and that all such discussions must take place through channel of ACC. He asked that this explanation be brought to early attention of the Allied Governments.

Repeated Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-844 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Naples (Brandt)

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1944—8 p. m.

335. For Kirk. Reports have reached us from various sources that the Swiss, on behalf of the Italian Government, are approaching the Governments of the other American republics with a view to recognition of, or the reestablishment of normal relations with the new Italian

⁵³ Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

⁵⁴ The draft cablegram printed *supra*, incorporating the British recommendations, was sent to Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, on June 12, 1944. After approval, the cablegram was transmitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson) as telegram Fan 374, June 28, 1944 (not printed).

⁵⁵ Capt. Ellery W. Stone, USNR.

Government.⁵⁶ Specifically, the Governments of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, have been so approached.

It should be understood by the Italian Government that the Allied Control Commission is the appropriate channel for communication with United Nations and those associated with them in the conduct of the war. You or the appropriate authorities of the Allied Control Commission should impress upon the Italian Government at the earliest opportunity the necessity of taking up questions of this nature, in the first instance, with the Control Commission.⁵⁷ Sent to Naples, repeated to Algiers and Bern.⁵⁸

HULL

[With specific reference to the appointment of a Polish representative to the Allied Authorities in Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander (Wilson) reported in Naf 717, July 13, 1944 (not printed), that the Political Commission of the Allied Control Commission discussed the problem of representation on July 13th. General Wilson further reported:

“It was agreed that any problem of diplomatic representation in Rome of countries which are neither (a) neutral, nor (b) members of the Advisory Council for Italy should be treated as a whole and a line of policy agreed.

If they are allowed to come, they should not be formally accredited to the Allied Control Commission although they should be allowed to discuss matters of interest to themselves with the chief commissioner and the political section. They could have informal relations with the Italian Government but so long as the Allied Control Commission operates under the armistice conditions, they would be informed that they should raise questions with the Italian Government through the machinery of the control commission. . . .”]

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1744 : Telegram

The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

ROME, July 17, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 1:57 p. m.]

15. Under Secretary Foreign Affairs has assured ACC that if reports given in the Department's 335, July 8, 8 p. m., to me at Naples

⁵⁶ A circular telegram of July 8, 1944, midnight, informed American Diplomatic Officers in the American Republics of the Swiss *démarches*.

⁵⁷ A circular telegram of July 21, 1944, 6 p. m., informed the American Diplomatic Officers in the American Republics that the Allied Control Commission had received assurances from the Italian Foreign Office that the Swiss Government acted without the knowledge of the Italian Prime Minister or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1744).

⁵⁸ Repeated as telegrams 2149, July 8, and 2372, July 11, respectively.

are true, Swiss Government has acted without knowledge of Bonomi⁵⁹ and Foreign Office. He reiterated that Italian Government fully appreciates ACC is appropriate channel for communication with foreign governments and that there was no intention to depart from this practice.

Repeated to Algiers as Number 8. Please inform Bern.⁶⁰

KIRK

701.0065/7-1744: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 17, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received July 18—6:02 a. m.]

2431. From Murphy. In Fan 374⁶¹ Combined Chiefs of Staff issued instructions to AFHQ regarding treatment of representatives in [of] neutral states in liberated Italy and asked Supreme Allied Commander's recommendations with respect to the relations of these representatives with Italian Government. Supreme Allied Commander has replied in Naf 744⁶² that it is not considered either necessary or practicable to require neutral diplomatic missions to conduct their relations with Italian Government through medium of Allied Control Commission for Italy since it would be impossible to prevent them from direct dealing; that it is believed, however, that Italian Government should be informed that they are expected to keep Control Commission fully advised as to their dealings with neutral representatives. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

701.0065/7-2644

The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to General J. H. Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1944.

With reference to CCAC 111,⁶³ there is attached a draft reply to General Wilson for your consideration. This represents the State Department's views and, if you approve, you may wish to circulate something along these lines as the American position for consideration by the CCAC.

⁵⁹ Ivanoe Bonomi succeeded Marshal Badoglio as Italian Prime Minister on June 18, 1944.

⁶⁰ Telegram 2483, July 21, 1944, not printed. A circular telegram of the same date informed diplomatic representatives in the American Republics of the contents of this telegram.

⁶¹ Not printed. It was the Draft Joint Instruction discussed in the exchange of correspondence with the British Embassy, dated June 5 and 8, pp. 1175 and 1177, respectively.

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ Not printed, but see bracketed note regarding Naf 717, with which it was concerned, p. 1179.

The British Embassy has been informed of this position with respect to Polish representation in Rome.⁶⁴ Before informing the Polish Embassy, we are waiting for the British attitude which we believe is similar. We have already suggested to the Brazilian Government that their "observer" in Rome be designated as Consul General and they have agreed.⁶⁵ The British have informed the Czechoslovak Government that there is no objection to its having consular representation in Italy.

There is, of course, good reason why the United Nations should have consular rather than diplomatic representation in Italy. All of them are either in a state of war with Italy or have broken diplomatic relations with that country, and are not yet in a position to resume diplomatic relations with the Royal Italian Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

[Enclosure]

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO
GENERAL WILSON

Principle of United Nations representation in Liberated Italy by Consular Officers has been established in Tam 125,⁶⁶ agreed to by you in Mat 136.⁶⁷ The various United Nations have been informed of this procedure. Consequently, M. Loret should be recognized as Polish Consul General in Rome. The Polish Government will be informed that this appears to be an appropriate solution to the question raised concerning M. Loret, and that, if considered desirable, there would be no objection to his having the personal rank of Minister.

It is desirable that all the United Nations, not represented on the Advisory Council for Italy, should have uniform representation in Liberated Italy by consular officers. The Belgians already have a consular representative in Italy.⁶⁸ The Government of Brazil has recently been informed by the State Department that it might appoint a Consul General to Rome.

While consular officers at the Italian capital should be permitted to have informal relations with the Italian Government, their recog-

⁶⁴ In telegram 2059, June 30, 1944, the Department informed Ambassador Murphy that the Polish Embassy had notified the Department that Mr. Loret, with the rank of Minister, was the Polish liaison with Allied authorities in Italy (740.00119 ACI/6-3044). In an *aide-mémoire* of July 7, 1944, the British Embassy objected to the term "Minister." On July 19, 1944, the Department replied that Mr. Loret might be designated Consul General. (740.00119 ACI/7-744)

⁶⁵ In telegram 2470, July 21, 1944, the Chargé at Algiers notified the Department that permission had been granted the Brazilian Government to reopen the Consulate at Naples (702.3265/7-2144). Vasco Tristao Leitao da Cunha became Brazilian Consul General at Rome on August 30, 1944.

⁶⁶ Dated January 8, 1944, not printed; for pertinent portion of text, see memorandum of May 6, p. 1170.

⁶⁷ Not printed, but see footnote 37, p. 1171.

⁶⁸ Georges Carlier.

dition and official functions should conform to the procedure already established for United Nations consular officers in Liberated Italy.

701.6500/8-544 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 5, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received 11:14 p. m.]

5048. Mr. Pilet-Golaz⁶⁹ informed me this morning that on or about June 29, Royal Legation of Italy in Bern on behalf of Royal Italian Government requested Swiss Government as protecting power to inform Governments of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Haiti that in view of developments Italian Government proposed resumption of normal diplomatic relations.⁷⁰ Swiss Government acted accordingly and Mr. Pilet said that several answers had been received from Swiss representatives concerned regarding which he would give me details soon. In general they were to effect that question was delicate and probably involve consultation with Allied Governments particularly Government of United States. This is supplementary to my 5022 of August 5.⁷¹ Any additional information received from Foreign Minister will be notified to you promptly.

HARRISON

701.0065/7-2144

*Memorandum by Mr. J. Wesley Jones of the Division of Southern European Affairs*⁷²

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1944.

The British Foreign Office has concurred in our draft on the representation of U.N. by consular officers in liberated Italy. Consequently the CCAC paper circulated on the basis of our draft will be approved by them on Thursday with the addition of one sentence at the end to the effect that there would be no objection to U.N. consuls general in

⁶⁹ Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Chief of the Political Department of the Federal Council of Switzerland.

⁷⁰ Relations with Italy had been broken by these countries on the following dates: Brazil, January 28, 1942; Chile, January 20, 1943; Mexico, December 26, 1941; Venezuela, December 31, 1941; Nicaragua, December 13, 1941; and Haiti, December 18, 1941.

In telegram 2643, August 1, 1944, the Department requested the Minister in Switzerland to ascertain from the Swiss Foreign Office at whose instance the Swiss *démarches* on behalf of the Italian Government to other American Republics had been made (740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1744). See telegram 335, July 8, 8 p. m., to Naples, p. 1178, and telegram 15, July 17, 10 a. m., to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, p. 1179.

⁷¹ Not printed; it reported that Count Magistrati, the Italian Minister in Switzerland, requested Swiss assistance in reestablishing diplomatic relations in South America. The Italian Minister had approached the Brazilian Minister at Bern directly. (740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-544)

⁷² Addressed to Messrs. Labouisse, Dunn, and Matthews, of the Office of European Affairs.

Rome having the personal rank of Minister.⁷³ I said that we would have no objection to the addition of such a sentence to the proposed cablegram.

The Foreign Office has further agreed to a compromise on the access of the neutral diplomats in Rome to the Italian Government. It will agree that representatives of the neutral states in Rome may have informal relations directly with the Italian Government but that formal relations should be conducted through the control machinery, that is the ACC. While this is not entirely in line with the Theater's recommendation,⁷⁴ I would be willing to go along on this and let the Theater give it a wide interpretation if they so desire.

702.0065/8-1044

*Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

No. 669

AUGUST 10, 1944.

[Received August 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose for the Department's information a letter addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,⁷⁵ proposing a new and more convenient procedure for obtaining permission from the appropriate military authorities for the opening of United Nations consulates in liberated Italy.

The British Resident Minister and I have concurred in the recommendation and the Department will be informed if the new procedure is adopted.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

[Enclosure]

*The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Allied Force Headquarters
(Spofford) to the Chief of Staff (Gammell)*

6 August, 1944.

Subject: Procedure on Opening Consulates

To: Chief of Staff

I. Discussion

1. Tam 125 (Tab A)⁷⁶ conveyed the proposal of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that members of the United Nations be permitted to open con-

⁷³ The added sentence read as follows: "As in the case of M. Loret, however, if desired, Consular representatives concerned may be allowed to have personal rank of Minister."

After approval by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on August 10, 1944, the draft telegram was sent on August 12 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who agreed to it informally on August 18 when it was transmitted to General Wilson as Fan 396.

⁷⁴ The Theater recommendations were contained in Naf 744; see telegram 2431, July 17, 8 p. m., from Algiers, p. 1180.

⁷⁵ Army general staff section dealing with Civil Affairs.

⁷⁶ Not attached to file copy. For pertinent portion of telegram Tam 125, January 8, 1944, see memorandum of May 6, p. 1170.

ulates in liberated Italy. The Consul's authority to act—in lieu of the exequatur which under normal conditions the Italian Government would issue to authorize him to exercise his functions throughout the locality—would if deemed necessary be issued by the Supreme Allied Commander in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission.

2. AFHQ's reply (Mat 136, Tab B)⁷⁸ agreed to the proposal, but added that in view of the policy of this Headquarters to devolve upon the GO CinC ACMF⁷⁹—who also acts as the representative of the President of the ACC—responsibility for Civil Affairs in Italy, it was the intention of this Headquarters to refer all requests to open consulates to him for consideration and action.

3. Thereupon the staff procedure adopted was for one or other of the Political Advisers⁸⁰ to advise G-5 Section that the Foreign Office/State Department had been approached by a designated government with a request that it be permitted to open a consulate at a given city in Liberated Italy. Did the Supreme Allied Commander⁸¹ consent? Thereupon G-5 would cable ACC, which would respond, affirmatively. A staff study would then be permitted and circulated for the concurrence of all interested parties at AFHQ. When the staff study was approved, the Supreme Allied Commander's assent was communicated to the Political Adviser who was taking the initiative in the matter, to be conveyed to the Government concerned.

4. In the six months which have passed since Mat 136 was sent, the opening of consulates has become such a common occurrence that the foregoing procedure has come to seem needlessly cumbersome. It now appears that there is, in principle, no reason why the governments among the United Nations should not establish consulates in such cities in liberated Italy as are most convenient for attending to their respective interests.

II. *Action Recommended.*

It is accordingly proposed that the following abbreviated procedure be approved. Let the Political Adviser to whom the request is brought consult the other Political Adviser, G-2⁸² and G-5, and upon receiving these concurrences the Political Adviser would be authorized to reply that the request was approved. G-5 Section would continue normally

⁷⁸ Not attached to file copy, but see footnote 37, p. 1171.

⁷⁹ General Officer, Commander in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force. The ACMF was created by Lt. Gen. Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane in his reorganization of the Allied Control Commission in February 1944. For further details, see C. R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945*, pp. 117-120.

⁸⁰ Samuel Reber of the Department of State, and Harold Caccia of the British Foreign Office.

⁸¹ Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

⁸² Army Intelligence Section.

to consult the ACC, but this might well be done over the telephone. In the absence of more special circumstance, it is believed that no staff study need be circulated.

III. Concurrences.

British Resident Minister
 United States Political Adviser
 G-2
 CAO ⁸³

IS&PS ⁸⁴ (as to all requisite concurrences having been effected).

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Colonel, G.S.C.

702.0065/8-1544

*Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
 to the Secretary of State* ⁸⁵

No. 683

AUGUST 15, 1944.

[Received August 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 669 dated August 10, 1944 and to inform the Department that the revised procedure described therein for the opening of United Nations consulates in Liberated Italy has been approved by AFHQ. Accordingly, the action recommended in part two of the enclosure to the despatch under reference will be the normal practice in considering the opening of consulates.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

701.0065/10-2744 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy
 (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, October 27, 1944.

[Received October 27—3 : 39 p. m.]

604. Morning press publishes following official communiqué on Italian resumption of diplomatic relations with United Nations.

“Italian Government has been officially informed today that all of the Latin American Republics have decided to resume diplomatic relations with Italy. Since the United [States] had already made

⁸³ Civil Affairs Office.

⁸⁴ Inter-Service and Political Secretariat.

⁸⁵ Copies of this despatch were transmitted to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy and the Consulate General at Naples.

the same decision⁸⁶ and as relations with Argentina have continued normally, Italy now finds itself in full diplomatic relations with the whole American continent. In Europe following the decision of Great Britain to resume relations with Italy,⁸⁷ Russia has also acted. The Soviet Union announced to President of the Council Bonomi last night its decision that its present representative in Italy will have the rank of Ambassador as will the Italian representat[ive] in Moscow through reciprocity. The Italian Government has already given its agreement to the naming of M. Kostylev⁸⁸ as Soviet Ambassador in Rome. With these decisions Italy emerges from isolation and resumes normal relations with the world."

KIRK

⁸⁶ After consultations with the other American Republics as provided in article I, part IV of the Resolutions of Rio de Janeiro, 1942, the Secretary of State announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Italy on October 26, 1944. The Senate confirmed the nomination of Alexander C. Kirk as Ambassador to Italy on December 7, 1944. For the Resolutions of Rio de Janeiro, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 7, 1942, pp. 117-141. For the Secretary's announcement and information on Mr. Kirk's appointment, see *ibid.*, October 29, 1944, pp. 491 and 736, respectively.

⁸⁷ October 26, 1944. The Department was notified in a memorandum of September 23, 1944, that the British Government would name Sir Noel Charles, British Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, as Ambassador (701.4165/10-544).

⁸⁸ Mikhail Alexeyevich Kostylev.

LUXEMBOURG

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LUXEMBOURG RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION IN LUXEMBOURG TERRITORY LIBERATED BY AN ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Files of Legal Adviser

Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and Luxembourg Respecting the Arrangements for Civil Administration and Jurisdiction in Luxembourg Territory Liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force

The discussions which have taken place between the representatives of the United States of America and Luxembourg concerning the arrangements to be made for civil administration and jurisdiction in Luxembourg territory liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force under an Allied Commander-in-Chief have led to agreement upon the following broad conclusions.

The agreed arrangements set out below are intended to be essentially temporary and practical and are designed to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Commander-in-Chief and to further our common purpose, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Luxembourg and the final victory of the Allies over Germany.

1. In areas affected by military operations, it is necessary to contemplate a first, or military, phase, during which the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force on land must *de facto* exercise supreme responsibility and authority to the full extent necessitated by the military situation.

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the military situation permits the resumption by the Luxembourg Government of responsibility for the civil administration, he will notify the appropriate representative of the Luxembourg Government accordingly. The Luxembourg Government will thereupon, and to that extent, resume such exercise of responsibility, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied Forces, such as lines of communication and airfields, and without prejudice to the enjoyment by the Allied Forces of such other facilities as may be necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

3. *a.* During the first phase, the Commander-in-Chief will make the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance which will be tendered

to him through Luxembourg liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs and included in the personnel of a Luxembourg Military Mission to be appointed by the Luxembourg Government. He will also make the fullest possible use of loyal Luxembourg local authorities.

b. The Luxembourg liaison officers referred to in sub-paragraph *a* above will, so far as possible, be employed as intermediaries between the Allied Military authorities and the Luxembourg local authorities.

4. During the first phase, the Luxembourg Government will promulgate or pass such legislation as in their opinion may be required after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief.

5. *a.* In order to facilitate the administration of the territory during the first phase, the Luxembourg Government will reorganize or re-establish the Luxembourg administrative and judicial services, through whose cooperation the Commander-in-Chief can discharge his supreme responsibility. For this purpose, the instructions of the Luxembourg Government will be communicated through the appropriate members of the Luxembourg Military Mission referred to in sub-paragraph 3 *a* above. However, the appropriate members of the Luxembourg Mission are authorized to act on the spot in the event that the normal procedure as prescribed in the preceding sentence is impracticable or impossible.

b. The appointment of the Luxembourg administrative and judicial services will be effected by the competent Luxembourg authorities in accordance with Luxembourg law. If, during the first phase, conditions should necessitate appointments in the Luxembourg administrative or judicial services, such appointments will be made after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, who may request the Luxembourg authorities to make appointments when he considers it necessary.

6. *a.* In accordance with the arrangement made between the Governments of Luxembourg and Belgium, Luxembourg subjects serving in the Belgian Army with an Allied Expeditionary Force in Luxembourg territory will come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Luxembourg courts. Luxembourg subjects serving in Luxembourg territory in any separate Luxembourg unit that may be formed will also come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Luxembourg courts.

b. Persons who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Luxembourg authorities, in the absence of Luxembourg authorities, may be arrested by the Allied military police and detained by them until they can be handed over to competent Luxembourg authorities.

7. In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Luxembourg Government will make the necessary arrangements for ensuring the speedy trial in the vicinity by Luxembourg courts of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offenses against the persons, property

or security of the Allied Forces, or against such proclamations of the Commander-in-Chief as fall within the limits of the jurisdiction which can be exercised by Luxembourg military authorities, without prejudice, however, to the power of the Commander-in-Chief, if military necessity requires, to bring to trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offense of this nature.

8. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 15, Allied Service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied Forces respectively, and over all persons of non-Luxembourg nationality not belonging to such Forces who are employed by or who accompany those Forces and are subject to Allied naval, military or air force law.

9. Persons thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied Service courts and authorities may, however, be arrested by the Luxembourg police for offenses against Luxembourg law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied Service authority. A certificate, signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent, that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in paragraph 8 shall be conclusive. The procedure for handing over such persons is a matter for local arrangement.

10. The Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Luxembourg authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or Luxembourg jurisdiction.

11. There shall be established by the respective Allies, claims commissions to examine and dispose of claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred by Luxembourg civilians against the Allied Forces, exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.

12. Members of the Allied Forces, and organizations and persons employed by or accompanying those forces, and all property belonging to them or the Allied Governments, shall be exempt from all Luxembourg taxation (including customs) except as may be subsequently agreed between the Allied and Luxembourg Governments. The Allied authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that such property is not sold to the public in Luxembourg except in agreement with the Luxembourg Government.

13. The Commander-in-Chief shall have power to requisition civilian labor, billets and supplies, and to make use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of his command. For this purpose, the fullest use will be made of Luxembourg liaison officers attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

14. The immunity from Luxembourg jurisdiction and taxation resulting from paragraphs 8 and 12 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments present in Luxembourg on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Expeditionary Force as may from time to time be notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the competent Luxembourg authority.

15. Should circumstances, in future, be such as to require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-Luxembourg members of the Allied Forces present in Luxembourg, the Allied Governments concerned and the Luxembourg Government will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.

16. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of Luxembourg territory by an Allied Expeditionary Force (in particular, questions relating to finance, currency, the ultimate disposition of booty, the custody of enemy property and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first phase) which are not dealt with in this agreement shall be regarded as remaining open and shall be dealt with by further agreement as may be required.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed in duplicate as of this 27th day of July, 1944, on behalf of the parties hereto under the respective authorizations hereinafter set forth.

Duly authorized to execute this instrument on behalf of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

PIERRE DUPONG
*Prime Minister and Minister of
the Armed Force*

Pursuant to instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I hereby execute this instrument on behalf of the United States of America.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army

NETHERLANDS

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION IN NETHERLANDS TERRITORY LIBERATED BY AN ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

[For text of Agreement signed at London May 16, 1944, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2212, or United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, volume 2, page 601.]

NORWAY

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT FOR OBTAINING MATERIALS TO RESTORE NORSK HYDRO CHEMICAL PLANT IN NORWAY BOMBED BY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE¹

740.00112 European War 1939/9877 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1943 [1944]—4 p. m.

3. Norwegian Series. From Department and FEA.² Regarding your Norwegian Series cable 20 of December 30,³ it will be agreeable to FEA and the Department that the matter of informing the Norwegians of our detailed objections to the Norsk-Hydro transaction be left to your discretion. After a study of the text of the note of the Norwegian Government of December 4 [November 29], 1943, on this subject, sent with your Despatch No. 71, Norwegian Series of December 4,⁴ we do not feel that any new arguments were advanced by the Norwegian Government to justify reversal of our former decision in the case. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9986 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 19, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

2. Norwegian Series. Your 3, January 8, 4 p. m. Foreign Minister Lie was advised on January 12 of our position regarding non-reversal of earlier decision in Norsk Hydro case.

After consultation with EWD⁵ which in turn has consulted MEW⁶ (Dingle Foot⁷) I am refraining from informing Norwegians of our detailed objections to the transaction, believing it inadvisable to open up a discussion at this time.

[SCHOENFELD]

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 489-495.

² Foreign Economic Administration.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 495.

⁴ Neither printed, but see telegram Norwegian Series 18, December 4, 1943, from London, *ibid.*, p. 493.

⁵ Economic Warfare Division in the Embassy at London.

⁶ Ministry of Economic Warfare.

⁷ Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1940-45.

740.0011 European War 1939/32666

*The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Ambassador
(Morgenstierne)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Norway and has the honor to refer to his call of December 15, 1943⁸ in regard to the Allied bombings of objectives in Norway, in particular, the plants of the Norsk Hydro Chemical Works on the island of Herøya and near Vemork and Rjukan.

The Secretary of War,⁹ to whom this matter was referred, has informed Mr. Hull that a thorough investigation was made of the bombing of targets in Norway on July 24 and November 16, 1943 by the VIII United States Bomber Command. In the opinion of the competent officials of the War Department, both attacks were necessary in the furtherance of the defeat of Germany.

The attack of July 24, 1943 had as its objective the light metals plant on Herøya which was engaged in the manufacture of light metals for the use of the German war effort. It is regrettable but unavoidable that some damage resulted to the adjacent fertilizer plant.

The primary objectives of the attack on November 16, 1943 were targets at Knaben and Kjelber, with the power station at Vemork as a secondary target. The plant at Vemork was engaged in the manufacture of "heavy water" for utilization by the German armed forces. In the ensuing bombardment certain damage was unfortunately sustained by the Rjukan nitrate plant of the Norsk Hydro Chemical Works which is situated near Vemork.

The Secretary of War has further informed Mr. Hull that cooperation and coordination with the Norwegian Government is effected by close consultation between representatives of that Government and those of the British Air Ministry and the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. In addition, there is stationed at the Headquarters of the United States VIII Bomber Command a liaison officer of the Norwegian Air Force.

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944.

740.00112 European War 1939/9986 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Norwegian Government
in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London*

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1944—8 p. m.

6. Norwegian Series. The Norwegian Ambassador recently called on the Department under instructions of his Government to press for a reconsideration of our decision with respect to

⁸ For memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 494.

⁹ Henry L. Stimson.

the Norsk Hydro case referred to in your no. 2, January 19. The Ambassador was informed that the appropriate authorities of this Government who had originally decided against permitting the export to Norway from Sweden of the equipment required to rebuild the Norsk Hydro plant had just reconsidered the matter upon learning of the strong feelings with respect thereto of the Norwegian Government. The Committee felt, however, that its original decision should stand unless new evidence were presented and in this connection we would be very glad to receive information regarding any other considerations involved in the matter which his Government might care to present. He was informed that the original decision was based upon the considerations in points numbered 1 through 7 in our telegram no. 6862 of November 1¹¹ to London which were read to him *in toto*. It was further explained to the Ambassador that it was the feeling of the Committee that it must proceed on the assumption that the Germans would destroy this plant when they were forced to leave Norway and it was hence illogical to assume that the plant if reconstructed at this time would be available for Norwegian use after the Germans departed. Furthermore, if the plant were reconstructed at this time Norwegians would not be able to obtain any benefit of increased harvests this year as it must be assumed that even if the plant could be reconstructed quickly enough the Germans would destroy the harvest when they left. It was pointed out that if the plant were reconstructed the exportation of the products thereof to Sweden would increase the amount of exchange available to the Germans for purchases in Sweden and that the Germans obviously would use such exchange to purchase products not for the use of the Norwegian people but for their own use in building fortifications, etc.

The Ambassador said his Government laid great stress on the alleged fact that the plant had been bombed in the first place by mistake. He reasoned that therefore there should be no objection to the reconstruction of the plant. It was pointed out to him that it did not necessarily follow that even if the plant were not the objective of this particular bombing mission it was not a legitimate target for bombing when opportunity afforded.

The Ambassador seemed impressed by the arguments advanced against reconstructing the plant at this time. He said that he had received no details of the reasons why his Government was so anxious to reconstruct the plant and would have to report his conversation and ask for further instructions.

HULL

¹¹ *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. II, p. 491.

857.24/102

The Norwegian Embassy to the Department of State

From an economic as well as from a political point of view the Norwegian Government attaches the greatest importance to the question of rebuilding the fertilizer plant at Herøya, which by accident was damaged and put out of operation during the bombing raid last summer. The Norwegian people had willingly and even cheerfully carried all the burdens which present conditions impose upon them, and they have never objected to destruction of lives and property in their country as long as it served our common war aims.

They will find it hard to understand, however, that they should not be permitted to rebuild a factory which was not the objective of the bombing, and which does not produce for the benefit of the enemy.

It must be considered out of the question that the articles needed for the rebuilding of the factory—and which are now awaiting export license from Sweden—will be sent to Germany. It is a question of special machinery and spare parts for same, exclusively manufactured and destined for Herøya. On the contrary, German industry will be deprived of important material, as most of the articles in question, viz. pumps, pipes etc., all made from iron, originate in Germany. What Germany cannot furnish, which is chiefly acid resistant material, will be bought in Sweden.

Information which has been received indicates that the factory could be rebuilt in time to produce for this year's harvest.

Nitric acid was produced at Rjukan only, and not at Herøya. The acid was exported mainly to Sweden and possibly a very small quantity to Finland, but not at all to Germany, which covers its own needs. Heavy water likewise was only produced at Rjukan. It may be mentioned that according to reports now received, the heavy water production at Rjukan has been stopped until after the war. Sulphuric acid was not yet produced at Herøya. A factory for the production of sulphuric acid was under construction, but far from finished. The production of soda ash at Herøya was not sufficient for Norwegian consumption. The greater part of the soda ash produced was used in the soap industry. Only a very small part was used by the aluminum industry.

It should be added that the rebuilding of the fertilizer factory at Herøya would employ a great many people whom the Germans might otherwise use for their own purposes.

It is true that the nitric acid factory was, and still is, on the list of bombing objectives. It is understood, however, that this by no means signifies that this factory was to be bombed. The list of objectives is very long and comprizes all kinds of objectives. The fact that an objective has been made part of the list is understood to be indicative

of a certain control only, and that a factory will be actually bombed only whenever specific reasons are present. It would seem that it is the priority which is decisive, and not the fact of inclusion in the list. The factory in question did not have a priority, and it is generally agreed that the destruction of the nitric acid factory was "accidental".

With regard to the risk of the enemy destroying the rebuilt factory in connection with the evacuation of Norway, this would, of course, be a very deplorable thing. Norway, however, is ready to run that risk and take the consequences thereof. The importance of the rebuilding now of this factory overshadows all such risks.

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944.

857.24/104: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 29, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received March 1—2: 39 a. m.]

687. With reference to Norsk Hydro case, Legation has been informed by British Commercial Counselor¹² that his instructions from London were to give noncommittal answer to Norwegian request for replacement machinery from Sweden. He has suggested therefore that if Americans' desire is to prevent shipments from taking place we should make our views known in a more decisive manner to Norwegian Government so that they will discontinue their efforts to replace damage done by our air force in Rjukan raid.

Since we understand that this matter has been extensively discussed in London and that joint views of British and United States Governments were to be made clear to Norwegians there, Legation suggests that Embassy in London be instructed to ensure that Norwegian Government does not misunderstand decision.

This suggestion is made because Legation has obtained from British Commercial Counselor copy of letter sent by official of Norwegian Legation here to Swedish General Electric Company on February 24 in which definite impression is given that Norsk Hydro repairs have been approved "from London". Urgent action is therefore required if this export is to be prevented.

Both British Commercial Counselor and Legation feel that if this transaction is to be prevented best procedure would be to have Norwegian Government take necessary steps. Attempt by United States to accomplish this result through official request to Swedish Government or unofficial pressure on Swedish General Electric Company might prove embarrassing.

This has not been repeated to London.

JOHNSON

¹² J. M. L. Mitcheson.

857.24/106

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Norwegian
Ambassador (Morgenstierne)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to your recent conversations with Mr. Stettinius regarding the desire of your Government that the exportation to Norway of certain machinery in Sweden be permitted in connection with the rebuilding of the fertilizer plant at Heroya which was damaged and put out of action by American bombers. As was previously indicated to you this matter was referred to other interested agencies of this Government for their consideration and advice. Their reply has now been received and I am thus now able to furnish you with a definitive statement of this Government's position in the matter as follows:

This Government has consistently taken the view that it would be impossible to approve the proposed export. It is not felt that the considerations cited in the memorandum of the Norwegian Embassy dated February 8 are such as to justify any change in the policy thus far pursued as none of those considerations meet the original objections to the proposed export. These objections include:

1. Norsk Hydro, the company which owns the fertilizer plant in Heroya, is completely under the control of the Germans. Its activities are directed by the I. G. Farben¹³ which owns 80 percent of the company's stock.

2. Only a comparatively small share of the total fertilizer production of Norsk Hydro remains in Norway. During 1942-1943, of the total production of 64,700 tons of fertilizer only 18,000 tons remained in Norway while 27,000 tons went to Denmark, 15,500 tons to Sweden and 4,200 tons to Finland.

3. A primary objective in the War Trade Agreement with Sweden has been to diminish Swedish imports from enemy controlled territory so as to reduce Swedish exports to the enemy and increase Swedish dependence on United Nations sources for necessary supplies. Elimination so far as possible of Norwegian exports to Sweden which in 1942 were valued at over 90,000,000 kronor contributes to the achievement of this primary objective. As you know from the available facts relating to the Swedish-Norwegian Trade Agreement the Germans do not utilize the funds obtained by them from these exports to Sweden to import from Sweden products which contribute to the well-being of the Norwegian people; such funds in fact are used to import from Sweden cement, iron and steel products and similar products used by the Germans in building fortifications, et cetera.

4. Since the power installations of Norsk Hydro supply electricity to aluminum and other plants in the region there is danger that the

¹³ A German chemical combine.

proposed exports would help to restore production in other bombed factories.

Other objections to approval of these exports have been given to you orally by the Department and to your Government in London. It is hoped that in view of the strong feelings of the competent agencies of this Government that permission should not be granted for the exportation from Sweden to Norway of the machinery necessary to rebuild this plant in view of the substantial assistance which would be given the German war effort if the machinery were exported, your Government will find it feasible to adopt a similar position and extend its cooperation to the end that the exportation of the machinery to Norway will be effectively blocked.

Very sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES BY NORWAY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE NETHERLANDS REGARDING IMMUNITY FROM SUIT OF THE M. V. "NORSKTANK"

311.5754 Janko/2

The Norwegian Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Norwegian Embassy has been instructed by the Royal Norwegian Government to take all requisite steps to assert sovereign immunity in the case: *Pankos Operating Company S.A., Libelant*,—against—*Motortank Vessel "Janko" (otherwise called "Norsk-tank" ¹⁴), her engines, boilers, etc.*,—and against *O. Nygaard ¹⁵ or John Doe, Respondents*, pending in United States District Court Eastern District of New York.

A claim of immunity, of which a copy is annexed hereto ¹⁶ for the provisional information of the United States State Department, will be filed today with the District Court concerned. The Embassy will approach the State Department again as soon as after further study of the case it shall be in a position to submit such further information thereanent as would seem required in order to be in a position to request the kind assistance of the State Department in establishing the sovereign immunity sought.

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1944.

¹⁴ The *Janko* was renamed *Norsktank* in November 1941 during the Prize Court proceedings of October–November 1941.

¹⁵ Appointed Master of the *Norsktank* in November 1941.

¹⁶ Not printed.

311.5754 Janko/6

*The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary
of State*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1944.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Acting under specific instructions from the Royal Norwegian Government, I have the honor to request Your Excellency's good offices in order that, in accordance with the procedure established by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of *Ex Parte Muir*, 254 U.S. 522, and *Ex Parte Republic of Peru*, 318 U.S. 578, (See, also, *Ioannis P. Goulandris*, 40 F. Supp. 924; *Maliakos*, 41 F. Supp. 697; *Tassia*, 41 F. Supp. 699), Your Excellency kindly, through the Attorney General of the United States,¹⁷ or other competent authority, make the appropriate suggestion to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to the end that the suit and the process to which the Norwegian motor-tank vessel *Norsktank* is presently subjected be vacated.

The motor-tank vessel *Norsktank*, which at the time of its entry of American jurisdiction and uninterruptedly thereafter has been under the Norwegian flag and in the possession of the Kingdom of Norway and manned by a Norwegian crew employed by the Kingdom of Norway, was seized on January 13, 1944, in a possessory action *in rem* in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in a suit entitled: *Pankos Operating Company, S.A.*,—against—*Motor-tank Vessel "Janko" (otherwise called "Norsktank")*, her engines, boilers, etc.,—and against—*O. Nygaard or John Doe (said name being fictitious) and any and all other person or persons in possession of said vessel or lawfully intervening for any legal interest in said vessel, etc.*

The Kingdom of Norway does not desire the continuation of the suit at present pending, but that the suit be dismissed on the ground that the vessel is in the possession of the Kingdom of Norway and is being operated by a friendly sovereign power in the service and interest of the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to which Government the *Norsktank* is under charter.

The *Norsktank* has been in the continuous possession of the Kingdom of Norway for over two years, since November 20, 1941, on which date she was put at the disposition of the Kingdom of Norway by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and has been employed during that period under time charter to a nominee of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the transportation of oil to the United Kingdom. On occasion she has delivered oil at sea to escort

¹⁷ Francis Biddle.

vessels protecting Allied convoys. The *Norsktank* is armed with a large gun forward and another gun aft and six smaller anti-aircraft guns amidships, which guns are served by members of the Royal Norwegian Navy.

The *Norsktank* arrived at New York in September, 1943, and has remained there making repairs until January, 1944. The seizure by Pankos Operating Company, S.A., was made only a few days before the date when the ship would be ready to sail in ordinary course.

Your Excellency will, I am confident, agree that it is singularly undesirable that the United States of America should through its Courts permit a Panamanian corporation to interfere with the possession of its Ally, the Kingdom of Norway, or with the operation of its Ally, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to whom the Kingdom of Norway has time chartered this vessel as a part of the united war effort. To do so would not only violate long-established principles of comity but would set a precedent capable of leading to very serious injury to the efficient maintenance of the war's lifelines of supply.

As soon as the *Norsktank* can be released from the attachment which has been obtained against her, she will be employed in the transportation of oil to the United Kingdom, a service which is vital to the war effort of the United States and that of the United Nations.

I wish further to point out to Your Excellency that, under the circumstances of this case, the ship cannot be removed until an appropriate Suggestion is made to the Court. I trust, therefore, that Your Excellency will act with all dispatch in requesting prompt action on the part of the Attorney General.

The Kingdom of Norway accordingly prays that Your Excellency's department will request the Attorney General that the appropriate United States Attorney be instructed to file a Suggestion of sovereign immunity in which the State Department will state that it recognizes the contents of this appeal and desires the suit referred to to be dismissed.

Accept [etc.]

W. MORGENSTIERNE

311.5754 Janko/6

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1944.

The Norwegian Ambassador called at his request this afternoon and left with me the attached papers¹⁸ pertaining to a tanker which is being held in New York because of a suit against the Norwegian

¹⁸ The two documents *supra*.

Government by a Panamanian Corporation. This tanker is definitely needed in the war effort for the transportation of petroleum. The Ambassador urgently requests the Department to appeal to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York on the basis of sovereign immunity. These papers are being directed to Mr. Hackworth¹⁹ with a copy of this memorandum.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

311.5754 Janko/5

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 22 January, 1944.

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that the attention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has been drawn to a suit entitled "*Pankos Operating Company S.A., New York, Libelant, against Motortank Vessel "Janko" (otherwise called "Norsktank"), her engines, boilers, etc., and against O. Nygaard or John Doe, Respondents,*" at present pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, as a result of which suit the motor-tank vessel *Norsktank*, flying the Norwegian flag and in the possession of the Kingdom of Norway, was on January 13th, 1944, seized in a possessory libel *in rem*.

2. The vessel concerned has been for two years in the possession of the Kingdom of Norway and is manned by Norwegian Master and crew employed by the Kingdom of Norway. His Majesty's Government understand that the vessel was delivered to the Kingdom of Norway by the Prize Commissioner of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands by an order of the Prize Court in Curaçao, Netherlands West Indies. The vessel was seized in Prize on October 7th, 1941, while lying in the Port of Aruba, Netherlands West Indies, within Netherlands territorial waters and the proceedings for Condemnation and Prize were thereafter duly instituted before a competent prize court in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

3. It is also understood that the Norwegian Ambassador has made representations to the Department, in accordance with the procedure established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of *ex parte Muir*, 254 U.S. 522 and *ex parte Republic of Peru*, 318 U.S. 578, and other decisions of that court, with a view to having a plea of sovereign immunity recognised by the Court in the case under reference and the suit vacated and quashed.

¹⁹ Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

4. The concern of His Majesty's Government in this case arises out of the fact that this vessel, while in the possession of the Kingdom of Norway, is now engaged under time charter to carry cargoes for His Majesty's Government under the direction of His Majesty's Minister of War Transport. The said vessel is a very large tanker of 14,460 deadweight tons. She has recently been undergoing repairs in New York and is now ready to sail. Her large size and capacity for carrying oil makes her immediate sailing of great moment in connection with the prosecution of the war effort of the United Nations. Any delay in her sailing would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war.

5. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government express the earnest hope that the United States Government will consider that the claim of immunity by the Kingdom of Norway is properly made and should be allowed, and will take action, as a matter of urgency, in the manner requested by the Norwegian Ambassador.

I have the honour [etc.]

HALIFAX

311.5754 Janko/4

The Netherlands Ambassador (Loudon) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1944.

SIR: My Government has noted with deep concern the fact that the motor-tank vessel *Norsktank*, flying the Norwegian flag and in the possession of the Kingdom of Norway, was on January 13, 1944, seized in a possessory action *in rem* in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in a suit entitled: *Pankos Operating Company, S.A.,—against—Motor-tank Vessel "Janko" (otherwise called "Norsktank"), her engines, boilers, etc.,—and against—O. Nygaard or John Doe (said name being fictitious) and any and all other person or persons in possession of said vessel or lawfully intervening for any legal interest in said vessel, etc.*

I am informed that the Kingdom of Norway, through its Ambassador, has addressed to you a request that you use your good offices to the end that the United States District Court in which the suit is pending vacate the suit and process to which the *Norsktank* is now subjected.

My Government has instructed me to convey to you its urgent request that Your Excellency comply with the request of the Kingdom of Norway. My Government's vital interest in the matter will be clear from the considerations set forth below.

[Here follows a detailed history of the *Norsktank*, beginning in November 1941.]

From the foregoing, it would seem abundantly clear that Pankos Operating Company, S.A., has submitted itself completely to the

jurisdiction of the Curaçao Prize Court, not only by filing its answer on the merits and its general appearance but by actively participating in the proceedings over a period of more than two years.

As it is not believed that Your Excellency will consider it admissible to look behind the action of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a friendly sovereign, in taking possession and control of the vessel as the result of the pending proceedings in Prize referred to above, and thereafter putting her at the disposal of the Kingdom of Norway under the arrangement referred to above, the facts giving rise to her seizure are not here adverted to. As Your Excellency is, of course, aware, however, it is well established in the Law of Prize that no more than a "reasonable suspicion" of the facts calling for condemnation is necessary to justify the original seizure of a vessel. It is then for the Defendant to come "before the Prize Court to show that there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure or to displace such reasonable suspicion as in fact exists." (*The "Louisiana,"* [1918]^{19a} A.C. 461.) See, also, *In re Part Cargo ex s/s "Monte Contes" Conservas Cerqueira Limitada v. H. M. Procurator General*, reported *Times Law Reports* November 26, 1943.

In the middle of the pending Prize proceedings, Pankos Operating Company, S.A., abandoning its efforts to prevent the final condemnation of the vessel on the merits, and, notwithstanding its participation for over two years in the proceedings at Curaçao and submission to the jurisdiction of that Court, has now seen fit to take steps which amount to a collateral attack on the Prize Court proceedings by instituting these proceedings in New York.

The Netherlands Government feels confident that the United States of America will not through its Courts interfere with the orderly progress of the proceedings in Prize in a Court of one of its Allies, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, or with the *ad interim* possession of another Ally, the Kingdom of Norway, arising out of those proceedings, or with the operations of still another Ally, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to whom the Kingdom of Norway has time chartered the vessel—all as part of the united war effort. This conclusion would seem to be all the more inescapable by reason of the fact that if the Prize Court decrees that the *Norsktank* should not be condemned, the Kingdom of Norway will, of course, return the vessel (or her value if lost in the meantime) to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in accordance with the agreement embodied in the notes of November 13th and 15th, 1941,²⁰ above referred to, in which case the Kingdom of the Netherlands will return it to Pankos Operating Company, S.A., the Claimant.

^{19a} Brackets appear in the original.

²⁰ Neither printed; these notes between the Norwegian and the Netherlands Governments set forth the terms under which the *Norsktank* was turned over to Norway by the Netherlands (311.5754 Janko/8).

I therefore respectfully ask that Your Excellency accede to the request of the Kingdom of Norway to the end that the claim of immunity be allowed and a Suggestion to that effect be filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

Please accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador,
B. KLEIJN MOLEKAMP
Minister Plenipotentiary

311.5754 Janko/13

The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne)

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of January 21 and 29, 1944,²¹ with accompanying documents, concerning the seizure of the motor-tank vessel *Norsktank* (formerly the *Janko*), in a possessory libel *in rem* pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, entitled: *Pankos Operating Company, S.A.*,—against—*Motor-tank Vessel "Janko" (otherwise called "Norsktank")*, her engines, boilers, etc.,—and against—*O. Nygaard or John Doe (said name being fictitious) and any and all other person or persons in possession of said vessel or lawfully intervening for any legal interest in said vessel, etc.* Notes in the matter have also been received from the British and Netherlands Embassies.

The Department has requested the Attorney General to instruct his appropriate representative in New York to appear in the proceedings in this case and to present to the court certified copies of the several notes received by it, and to state to the court that the Department of State accepts as true the statements of fact contained in your notes and recognizes and allows the claim presented by you on behalf of the Kingdom of Norway that the vessel is entitled to immunity from judicial process in the courts of this country.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State
EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

311.5754 Janko/16

The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of February 3, 1944 concerning the seizure of the motor-tank vessel *Norsktank*, in a possessory libel *in rem* pending

²¹ Latter not printed; it supplied additional background data on the *Norsktank* (311.5754 Janko/8).

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

I am pleased to note that the Department of State has requested the Attorney General to instruct his appropriate representative in New York to appear in the proceedings, and to present to the Court certified copies of the several notes received by it, and to state to the Court that the Department of State accepts as true the statements of fact contained in my notes of January 21 and 29, 1944,²² and recognizes and allows the claim presented therein on behalf of the Kingdom of Norway, that the vessel is entitled to immunity from judicial process in the courts of this country.

In conclusion I would like to express my sincere appreciation of the kind cooperation and promptitude with which your department has attended to my request in the matter.

Accept [etc.]

W. MORGENSTIERNE

311.5754 Janko/18

The Attorney General (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1944.

SIR:

Motor Tank Vessel *Norsktank* (Ex *Janko*) Libel of possession of Pankos Operating Company, S.A. and plea of sovereign immunity—Your number Le 311.5754 Janko/6

The question of immunity of the Norwegian Motor Tank Vessel *Norsktank* from seizure and arrest in the above proceedings was submitted to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and on February 10, 1944, the order of the Court was entered, releasing and discharging the *Janko* from the custody of the Court.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General,
FRANCIS M. SHEA
Assistant Attorney General

**ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSPORTATION BY THE UNITED STATES AIR
TRANSPORT COMMAND OF NORWEGIAN AVIATION TRAINEES FROM
SWEDEN TO THE UNITED KINGDOM**

841.79658/65 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1943—8 p. m.

1436. The War Department informs us that the Norwegian Government has requested the British Government to proceed immediately

²² Latter not printed.

to withdraw from Sweden approximately 2,000 Norwegian "trainees".²³ The British have asked the American Air Transport Command to undertake the job which the latter has agreed to do.

The Air Transport Command is prepared to call its planes which are, in fact, Army transports, civilian aircraft, to operate them with personnel not in military uniform and without armament. It does not, however, desire to operate its planes ostensibly or otherwise as BOAC²⁴ craft.

You are requested to take up with the Swedish Government immediately the conditions under which they would give their permission for American planes to be operated for the purpose mentioned between Sweden and Scotland and inform us as urgently as possible, as it is desired to begin these flights with the least possible delay.

HULL

841.79658/66: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 4, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 9:22 p. m.]

23. Department's 1436, December 31, 8 p. m. Foreign Minister Gunther this afternoon informed me in reply to an oral inquiry made yesterday that Swedish Government has no objection to have Air Transport Command civilian status withdraw from Sweden approximately 2,000 Norwegian trainees.

Mr. Gunther stated that he would have to state his consent with reservation, that it had not yet been taken up with Prime Minister²⁵ and Government but that he anticipated no difficulty. He appreciates our necessity to effect these withdrawals as rapidly as possible but said that Swedish Government would have to request that withdrawals be made gradually and that no "armada" of planes should arrive at any one time. In this connection it may be pointed out that landing facilities in Sweden would in any case necessitate a gradual withdrawal. As soon as Mr. Gunther has indicated formal approval of Government I can request Military Attaché²⁶ to take up technical questions involved with appropriate Swedish authorities.

Mr. Gunther mentioned in confidence program for training young Norwegians as a police force which is now under way in Sweden pursuant to an understanding between Swedish Government and Norwegian Legation. He informed in strict confidence that number of men now undergoing this training is about 12,500. He emphasized

²³ Air crew trainees of Norwegian nationality who had escaped from Norway into Sweden.

²⁴ British Overseas Airways Corporation.

²⁵ Per Albin Hansson.

²⁶ Col. Charles E. Rayens, Military Attaché and Military Attaché for Air.

importance of this work and of availability of these trained young men to proceed into Norway immediately after German evacuation. He hopes that Norwegian Government does not plan to withdraw any larger number than 2,000 now projected as he feels that numbers available for police work in Norway at conclusion of hostilities should be as large as possible. While this is a Swedish interest he considers it also of vital importance to Norway.

JOHNSON

841.79658/66 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1944—11 a. m.

61. Without jeopardizing possibility of favorable action by Swedish Government, please endeavor to expedite final decision on subject matter of your 23, January 4.

HULL

841.79658/68 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 14, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 3:32 p. m.]

128. Foreign Minister presented yesterday to Prime Minister and Cabinet question referred to in Department's 61, January 13, 10 [11] a. m. Foreign Office has informed me that Government approved statements made to me by Foreign Minister Gunther on January 4 and reported in my 23, January 4, 6 p. m. Foreign Office official reiterated certain conditions which Swedish Government desires be carried out in connection with this operating, primarily that planes used shall be unarmed and that all markings of plane and dress of crew shall be of a civilian character. Foreign Office official further emphasized that trips made to Sweden by these transport planes must be spaced and that no large number arrive at any one time. He accepted a suggestion from me that as soon as proper directives came from Washington, Military Attaché be authorized to contact appropriate Swedish authorities with a view to affecting all practical arrangements regarding arrival, landing, take off. Foreign Office agreed. Swedish Government also requests that these planes bring as much as possible of oil and gasoline which will be required for return flight. Swedish Government will be glad to assist in this matter in any case of emergency. Mr. Boheman²⁷ pointed out that if Sweden furnishes oil and gas for return flight it will necessitate its being replaced by new shipments from abroad which would raise questions with Germans which might

²⁷ Erik C. Boheman, Secretary General, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

be embarrassing and he thinks it is unnecessary to create the issue. Mr. Boheman also suggested that Swedish Government would greatly appreciate it if some of these planes on their trip to Sweden might bring valuable freight belonging to Sweden from Great Britain within limits of import quotas set up by trade agreement. As planes will be travelling empty we might possibly be able to do Swedes a favor in this connection which would be appreciated and could be turned to our benefit later.

JOHNSON

841.79658/72 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 31, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:51 p. m.]

313. Colonel Hardison, Military Air Attaché, who has just arrived in Stockholm informs me that he learned in London from military authorities that General Spaatz²⁸ has received instructions from General Arnold²⁹ to undertake mission which was subject of my 128, January 14, 2 p. m. and previous correspondence. Colonel Hardison says that this message from General Arnold to General Spaatz was only information Army authorities in London had about matter. Colonel Rayens has received nothing from War Department. I think it important that matter be closed by War Department at once. This undertaking will require most detailed and confidential liaison between our Air Attaché and Swedish authorities and it is, in my opinion, advisable for preliminary work to be begun without delay. I respectfully suggest that American Embassy, London, be advised in full and that Norwegian Legation, particularly Military Attaché Colonel Berg in Stockholm, receive appropriate instructions. Colonel Berg is a man of utmost discretion. His close cooperation is essential to carrying out this mission. Colonel Rayens who has already spoken to him about it discovered he had no information.

JOHNSON

841.79658/73a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1944—9 p. m.

802. Norwegian Series. Air Transport Command has received a request from British military authorities to assist in air transportation from Sweden to the United Kingdom of about 2,000 Norwegian air crew trainees of military age. Department has obtained Swedish

²⁸ Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commander, United States Army Air Forces in Europe.

²⁹ Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Government consent for the necessary flights from Scotland to Sweden and return. These flights would be made in American Army aircraft which would be unarmed and manned by American Army crews in civilian clothes.

Swedish Government consent having been obtained all that remains is the working out of technical details between the American Military Attaché in Stockholm and the Swedish authorities and instructions from the Norwegian Government to Colonel Berg, Norwegian Military Attaché in Stockholm, to cooperate with his American colleague. We understand that if operation is to take place and is to function smoothly early action must be taken by Colonel Berg and Norwegian authorities in Sweden with respect to selection of the men to be flown out and their assembly at points to be agreed upon.

As Air Transport Command is prepared to undertake operation in the very near future please inquire of the Norwegian Government direct whether they desire the operation of an American service.

Urgent telegraphic reply requested.

HULL

841.79658/73 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 2, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received February 2—6 : 32 p. m.]

3. Norwegian Series. Foreign Minister Lie³⁰ assures me orally (and will confirm by letter) that Norwegian Government desires operation of the American air service described in your 802, February 1, 9 p. m. and states appropriate instructions will be sent immediately to Colonel Berg, Norwegian Military Attaché at Stockholm. He asks me to convey Norwegian Government's deepest appreciation.

[SCHOENFELD]

841.79658/76a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1944—midnight.

1472. With reference to our 802, February 1, Noweg, we now learn informally from the War Department that the British Air Ministry is withholding its consent to the operation and may have indicated that a formal request therefor from this Government to the Foreign Office will be required before further consideration can be given to the matter.

The question of evacuating as many as possible of the Norwegians in Sweden has been taken up with this Government by the Norwegian Ambassador on many occasions during the past two or more years

³⁰ Trygve Lie, Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

and is dependent on the question of improvement of air service between Scotland and Sweden. As you know, even before the United States entered the war we turned over to the Norwegian Government for operation by the British a number of transport planes to be used on this service. Other planes have been turned over since. Unfortunately the urgent need for space on these planes for American and British official personnel and mail and for critical materials such as ball bearings has made it impossible to utilize the planes entirely for their original purpose, namely, transportation of Norwegian personnel.

During the past year or more both the British and Norwegian Governments have pressed us continually to allocate a number of additional transport planes to this service. The urgent need for transport planes elsewhere made it impossible however to accede to their request. The present operation results from a request addressed to our Air Forces by the Royal Air Force Transport Command for assistance in providing facilities for the movement of these Norwegians. Our Air Force found that while it had no planes available for transfer to the Royal Air Force Transport Command it would be practicable for the operation to be carried out at this time by American units presently available in the United Kingdom. The American operation has the consent of the Swedish Government and as you are aware of the Norwegian Government in London, and the Norwegian Ambassador on instructions of his Government inquired of me yesterday regarding the reasons for the delay in commencing the operations. In view of the past history we are at a loss to understand what objections if any the British may have toward our proceeding immediately with the operation.

The War Department informed us that you have already interested yourself in the matter presumably at the request of the American Army authorities in London. We wish you to pursue the matter further with a view to ascertaining the precise British objections to the operation, particularly whether they are based on military or political considerations or both, or are related in any way to British civil aviation plans.

STETTINIUS

841.79658/79a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1944—10 p. m.

1644. Norwegian Ambassador is pressing us on matter referred to in our 1472, February 26 and is calling on me on March 6 in that connection. Can you give us a preliminary reply to our reference telegram before then.

STETTINIUS

841.79658/77 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, March 6, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received March 6—11 : 56 a. m.]

1818. In answer to your 1644, March 4, the British have been holding an inter-Departmental meeting all morning but have not reached a final decision in this matter. The chief difficulties involve questions of security. The British are in touch with the Norwegian Government here on the question. Foreign Office hopes that some "compromise" can be worked out and will let me know as soon as possible.

I am sorry I could do no more than to get them to meet this morning and that I can give you no further word for the Norwegian Ambassador in Washington.

WINANT

841.79658/77 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1944—8 p. m.

1764. Thank you for your 1818, March 6, regarding transportation of Norwegians from Sweden. General Arnold wishes to press ahead with this operation by the Air Transport Command and hopes that you will do everything possible through the diplomatic channel to bring about an early decision in accordance with the wishes of this Government. I understand that appropriate instructions are being telegraphed General Spaatz and that he is being told to keep in close touch with you.

STETTINIUS

841.79658/79 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, March 9, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received March 9—4 : 20 p. m.]

1921. For the Acting Secretary. Your 1764 of March 8. I have been promised an answer by Eden³¹ within 48 hours. I hope it will be favorable.

WINANT

³¹ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

841.79658/79 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1944—1 p. m.

1940. Please telegraph whether decision referred to in your 1921, March 9, has yet been made. Norwegian Ambassador informed us that last week King Haakon accompanied by his Prime Minister ³² and Foreign Minister discussed the matter jointly with Mr. Churchill ³³ and Mr. Eden.

HULL

841.79658/80 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, March 15, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received March 15—3:40 p. m.]

2086. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Since receiving your 1764, March 8, 8 p. m., I have pressed this matter and this morning I received a copy of Mr. Eden's note of March 14 to Lie, Norwegian Foreign Minister. I have communicated the substance of this note to General Spaatz and he is contacting the Air Ministry. The note reads as follows:

"I am glad now to be able to give you details of the arrangements in connection with the transference to this country of the 2,000 Norwegians whom the Americans are prepared to bring over from Sweden by air.

As you know, it is the security problem that has been causing us difficulty. You will I am sure appreciate that it is at this time necessary to be stricter than ever in taking measures to ensure that enemy agents are not sent over here and that the advent of a large body of men who have come out of a country in German occupation and have been in the interval in a neutral country, would provide the Germans with exceptionally favourable opportunities. The examination of 2,000 of your countrymen strains to the limit our resources for examining Norwegians and you, who have been over the patriotic school, will know that we could not possibly accommodate them all there, together with the numbers of other foreigners who have to be there at the same time. As the Prime Minister told King Haakon on March 9, however, we have after much consideration thought it justifiable, in order to assist the Norwegian Government in getting over here 2,000 valuable recruits, to make some exception to our usual rules, since we assume that the Norwegian authorities will take every precaution in their power in selecting the men.

It will be necessary, as I am sure you will agree, to keep the men in a camp and under supervision until they have undergone examination

³² Johan Nygaardsvold, Norwegian Prime Minister.

³³ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

and the only place in which a camp can immediately be provided for this purpose is, I regret to say, the Isle of Man. We have been into this question very carefully as we realise that the use to which the Isle of Man has been put hitherto may not make it very palatable, but I am afraid that there really is no other alternative. The camp should be ready to take the majority of the 2,000 by March 22.

We shall of course require the cooperation of the appropriate Norwegian authorities in providing administrative and policy officers to be attached to the camp and to supervise the filling in of questionnaires which our security authorities will provide. Mr. . . . of the Security Service will be making contact with Major Nagell of your 'E' office in order to arrange details. After the examination of the questionnaires by the latter, it is anticipated that it will be possible to release a considerable number of the men at once, the remainder going to the patriotic schools for further examination.

I have informed the American Ambassador that we are prepared to deal with the whole 2,000 and the U.S. air authorities will no doubt now make arrangements for bringing them over, in consultation with the Air Ministry.³

WINANT

841.79658/83 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, May 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 13—4: 38 p. m.]

1701. Legation has noted considerable disappointment among local Danish refugees, who now total about 14,000 and include some hundred of military age and anxious to join Allied war effort, that recently instituted American plane service to Scotland is carrying only Norwegians. This is obviously a problem for Allied High Command and Legation presumes it is basically due to absence any central Free Danish organization which could negotiate with British and American military authorities. Legation believes Department, Danish Legation Washington and Allied military should be informed regarding this situation, as number of Danish refugees in Sweden is now about two-thirds Norwegian total, and many young Danes must sit by and watch their Norwegian friends depart, inevitably obtaining impression that they are not "wanted" by the Allies, with consequent bad effects on whole Danish Activist movement.

JOHNSON

841.79658/84 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—9 p. m.

4814. Your 2086, March 15, 5 p. m. Stockholm Legation informed us several weeks ago that the morale of young Danish refugees in

Sweden was being adversely affected by the fact that the transportation of air corps trainees from Sweden to the United Kingdom was limited to Norwegians. In view of the primarily military considerations involved, the Department referred the matter to the War Department with the suggestion that it might wish to transport some Danes to the United Kingdom after all the Norwegians have been evacuated. The War Department has just replied that in the light of numerous practical difficulties involved, it cannot utilize the services of Danish refugees in a military capacity. It adds that the British may desire the services of some Danish refugees of military age and adds that it is prepared to consider modification of the present agreement to include such Danes as the British may desire.

Please bring this matter to the attention of the Foreign Office.

HULL

841.79658/7-544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 5, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 4:25 p. m.]

5300. Immediately upon receipt of Department's 4814, June 17, 9 p. m., an officer of the Embassy discussed the matter with Sir Alexander Cadogan³⁴ at the Foreign Office. We have today received a communication on the subject from Cadogan the text of which is quoted below :

"You will remember speaking to me on the 19th June about the willingness of the United States air transport authorities to bring to this country from Sweden a number of Danes. I have now been able to look into this.

"I am glad that you have taken this up officially with us as Colonel Balchen³⁵ had already held out hopes to the Danes before there had been any consultation with the Air Ministry or home office and we were afraid that confusion would result, as in the Norwegian case. The Air Ministry would be very grateful if such matters could always be taken up first with us through the orthodox channels before anything is said to the foreigners concerned. Would you impress this on your air authorities?

"We are grateful for their offer of help but we only need twenty Danish doctors whose transport we are ourselves arranging. Moreover, I understand that, for operational reasons, the Terminal Airfield in this country for the flights of your aircraft from Sweden cannot be made available after the middle of August, and that at the present rate of transport, all the 2,000 Norwegians will not have been brought

³⁴ British Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

³⁵ Col. Bernt Balchen, representative of the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe since January 27, 1944, and responsible for the establishment and operation of air service between the United Kingdom and Sweden.

over by then, since your air people have not been able to bring them over anything like as fast as they had expected. I should be grateful if, when explaining to your air transport authorities our reasons for not availing ourselves of their kind offer, you would draw their attention to the importance of completing their carriage of Norwegians from Sweden by the middle of August, if possible."³⁶

Embassy has not repeated this telegram to Stockholm.

WINANT

**MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
NORWAY RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL ADMINIS-
TRATION AND JURISDICTION IN NORWEGIAN TERRITORY LIBER-
ATED BY AN ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE**

[Memorandum of Agreement signed May 16, 1944, by Trygve Lie, Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, General, United States Army, pursuant to instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1514, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1581. Similar arrangements were signed on this same day between Norway and the United Kingdom, and Norway and the Soviet Union.]

³⁶ By the end of 1944 there were 400 of the Norwegian trainees not yet transported to the United Kingdom.

POLAND

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION¹

760C.61/2130 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 5, 1944.

[Received January 5—6 : 55 p. m.]

1. Poles. Frankowski, Under Secretary of Polish Foreign Office, tells me Polish Government will tomorrow issue following declaration :

“In their victorious struggle against the German invader, the Soviet forces are reported to have crossed the frontier of Poland.

This fact is another proof of the breaking down of the German resistance and it foreshadows the inevitable military defeat of Germany. It fills the Polish Nation with the hope that the hour of liberation is drawing near.

Poland was the first nation to take up the German challenge² and it has been fighting against the invaders for over 4 years at the cost of tremendous sacrifices and sufferings without producing a single Quisling and rejecting any form of compromise or collaboration with the aggressor.

The underground movement among its many activities concentrated upon attacking the Germans in their most sensitive spots, upon sabotage in every possible form and in the carrying out of many death sentences on German officials whose conduct had been particularly outrageous.

The Polish forces, twice reorganised outside their country, have been fighting ceaselessly in the air, at sea and on land, side by side with our Allies. There is no front on which Polish blood has not been mingled with the blood of other defenders of freedom; there is no country in the world where Poles did not contribute to furthering the common cause.

The Polish Nation therefore is entitled to expect full justice and redress as soon as it will be set free of enemy occupation. The first condition of such justice is the earliest reestablishment of Polish sovereign administration in the liberated territories of the Republic of Poland and the protection of life and property of Polish citizens.

The Polish Government, as the only and legal steward and spokesman of the Polish Nation, recognized by Poles at home and abroad as well as by Allied and free Governments, is conscious of the contribution

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 314—496.

² For correspondence concerning German aggression against Poland in September 1939, see *ibid.*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 402 ff.

of Poland to the war and is responsible for the fate of the Nation. It affirms its indestructible right to independence confirmed by the principles of the Atlantic Charter,³ common to all the United Nations, and by binding international treaties. The provisions of those treaties, based on the free agreement of the parties, not on the enforcement of the will of one side to the detriment of the other, cannot be revised by accomplished facts. The conduct of the Polish Nation in the course of the present war has proved that it has never recognized and will not recognize solutions imposed by force.

The Polish Government expects that the Soviet Union, sharing its view as to the importance of future friendly relations between the two countries, in the interest of peace and with the view to preventing a German revenge, will not fail to respect the rights and interests of the Polish Republic and of its citizens.

Acting in that belief, the Polish Government instructed the underground authorities in Poland, on October 27, 1943,⁴ to continue and intensify the resistance against the German invaders, to avoid all conflicts with the Soviet armies entering Poland in their battle against the Germans, and to enter into cooperation with the Soviet commanders in the event of the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations.

If a Polish-Soviet agreement such as the Polish Government had declared itself willing to conclude, had preceded the crossing of the frontier of Poland by the Soviet forces, such an agreement would have enabled the underground Polish Army to coordinate its action against the Germans with the Soviet military authorities. The Polish Government still considers such an arrangement highly desirable.

At this crucial moment, the importance of which for the course of the war and for its outcome in Europe are evident to everyone, the Polish Government issues the above declaration confident in a final victory and in the triumph of the just principles for which the United Nations stand."

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2142: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 11, 1944—2 a. m.
[Received January 11—12:45 a. m.]

76. For the President and the Secretary. Without advance notice Molotov⁵ called me to the Kremlin shortly after midnight. After keeping me waiting for some 15 minutes he received me and apologized for the delay by saying that the paper he was giving me had just been

³ Joint statement of principles by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

⁴ "Instructions for Poland Established by the Polish Cabinet Meeting" were reported to the Department in Polish Series despatch 463 of November 16, 1943, from London, not printed (740.0011 European War 1939/32018). For correspondence on the Polish underground, see pp. 1354 ff.

⁵ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and First Assistant Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

completed. Molotov said he hoped the statement, which related to Poland, would be found to conform to the spirit of the conversations at Tehran⁶ with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and added "as everyone else is talking about Poland it would be wrong for us to remain silent". The text is to be released by Tass⁷ this morning as an authorized statement. The Embassy's translation is contained in my next following telegram.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/2147 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*⁸

Moscow, January 11, 1944.

[Received January 11—12:40 p. m.]

77. On January 5 there was published in London a statement of the Emigrant Polish Government with reference to Soviet-Polish relations,⁹ which contained a series of incorrect assertions, including an incorrect statement concerning the Soviet-Polish frontier. As is well known, the Soviet constitution established the Soviet-Polish frontier in accordance with the will of the population of the western Ukraine and western White Russia, expressed in the plebiscite conducted on a broad democratic basis in 1939. By this plebiscite the territories of the western Ukraine, the population of which is overwhelmingly Ukrainian, entered into the Soviet Ukraine, and the territories of western White Russia, the population of which is overwhelmingly White Russian, entered into Soviet White Russia.¹⁰ The injustice which was committed by the Riga agreement of 1921,¹¹ which was imposed on the Soviet Union, with relation to the Ukrainians living in western Ukraine, and the White Russians living

⁶ For documentation on the conferences between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, with their advisers, at Tehran, November 28–December 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

⁷ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communication organization of the Soviet Government.

⁸ This telegram is the translation of the statement referred to in the Ambassador's telegram 76, *supra*.

⁹ See Polish Series telegram 1, January 5, from London, p. 1216.

¹⁰ Following appeals by the "elected" National Assemblies of the Western Ukraine and Western White Russia, in the territories taken from Poland after its collapse, the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union acceded to their petitions and incorporated these areas into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic at the beginning of November 1939. See telegrams 826, October 28, 1939, and 850, November 2, 1939, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 785 and 790, respectively.

¹¹ Treaty of peace between Soviet Russia and Poland signed at Riga on March 18, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty series, vol. vi, p. 51.

in western White Russia, was thus corrected. The entry of the western Ukraine and western White Russia into the Soviet Union not only did not injure Polish interests, but on the contrary, created a solid basis for a firm and permanent friendship between the Polish people and the neighboring Ukrainian, White Russian and Russian peoples.

The Soviet Government has frequently stated that it advocates the creation of a strong and independent Poland and friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland. The Soviet Government declares again that it desires to establish friendship between the USSR and Poland on the basis of firm good neighborly relations and mutual respect and, if the Polish people so desire, on the basis of an alliance for mutual assistance against the Germans, who are the principal enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland. The adherence of Poland to the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation¹² can assist in the realization of this task.

The successes of the Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front hasten each day the liberation of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union from the German invaders. The self-sacrificing struggle of the Red Army and the unfolding military activities of our Allies are bringing closer the defeat of the Hitlerite military machine and effecting the liberation of Poland and of other peoples from the yoke of the German occupants. In this battle of liberation the "Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR"¹³ and the Polish Army Corps which it has created,¹⁴ which is operating hand in hand with the Red Army on the front against the Germans, are already fulfilling their glorious tasks.

Now the possibility of the renaissance of Poland as a strong and independent state is opening up. But Poland should be reborn not by the seizure of Ukrainian and White Russian lands, but by the return to Poland of the ancient Polish lands taken from Poland by the Germans. Only in this way can confidence and friendship by [be] established between the Polish, Ukrainian, White Russian and Russian people. The eastern boundaries of Poland can be fixed by agreement with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government does not con-

¹² Signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943, with a protocol of the same date. The official text is published in U.S.S.R., *Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsii, zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami*, vol. XI (Moscow, 1955), p. 28; unofficial translation in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 238. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 670-734, *passim*.

¹³ This organization, successor to an earlier "Committee of Polish Patriots", held its first congress in Moscow on June 8, 1943, and exchanged letters with Stalin, which were printed in *Pravda* for June 17, 1943.

¹⁴ The Soviet-sponsored Communist Polish army, organized by Maj. Gen. (later in 1944, Lt. Gen.) Zygmunt Berling, which had entered active service about September 1943.

sider the boundaries of 1939 irrevocable. Rectifications may be made in these boundaries to the advantage of Poland so that districts in which the Polish population predominates may be granted to Poland. In this case the Soviet-Polish boundary might follow approximately the so-called Curzon line, which was accepted by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in 1919¹⁵ and which envisaged the incorporation of the western Ukraine and western White Russia in the Soviet Union. The western boundaries of Poland should be extended by the incorporation in Poland of ancient Polish lands which long ago were seized by Germany, without which it is impossible to unite the entire Polish nation in its own state, which would receive thereby its necessary outlet to the Baltic Sea. The just aspiration of the Polish people should receive recognition and support.

The Emigrant Polish Government, separated from its people, has shown itself incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁶ It has also shown itself to be incapable of organizing the active struggle against the German invaders in Poland itself. Furthermore, by its incorrect policy it not infrequently plays into the hands of the German occupants. Meanwhile the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union require the establishment of firm friendly relations between our countries and the union of the peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union in the struggle against the common external enemy, which is demanded by the common cause of our Allies.

HARRIMAN

¹⁵ The Soviet statement of January 11 wrongly characterized this boundary as the final frontier accepted by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in 1919. In the "Declaration relating to the Provisional Eastern Frontiers of Poland" dated at Paris on December 8, 1919, a line is described for the eastern frontier of Poland proceeding from the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia to the point where the former frontier between Russia and Austria Hungary met the Bug River. On November 21 the Supreme Council accepted the text of a Statute of Eastern Galicia in which article 1 laid down a line separating Western and Eastern Galicia, which carried on the line for an eastern frontier of Poland to the juncture with the Czechoslovak frontier in the Carpathian Mountains. These two lines formed a continuous frontier from the border of East Prussia to the border of Czechoslovakia. The Allied and Associated Powers had definitely reserved their decision on the disposition of the territories eastward of these lines which Poland claimed. In the note of July 11, 1920, sent from Spa by George Nathaniel, Earl (later Marquess) Curzon of Kedleston, then the British Foreign Secretary, to Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin, the Foreign Commissar of Soviet Russia, these two lines were detailed as a proposed armistice line in the Polish-Soviet Russian war, but not as a final frontier. Thereafter, this boundary became known as the Curzon line. For further details and descriptions of these lines, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, pp. 272-273, 286, 434, 446-447; *ibid.*, vol. xiii, pp. 793-794; *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, pp. 971-972; H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (Oxford, 1924), vol. vi, pp. 233-283, 317-322; and S. Kononov, *Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey* (London, 1945), pp. 33-38, 57-63.

¹⁶ Relations with the Polish Government in Exile had been broken by the Soviet Government on April 25, 1943; see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. iii, pp. 389-393.

760C.6115/29½

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1944.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NEW FRONTIER WITH POLAND

According to newspaper reports it appears to be clear that the proposal announced yesterday by the Soviet news agency Tass offers to Poland a frontier based on the Curzon line, which ended at the Eastern Galician frontier, while the latter area which never formed part of the Czarist empire¹⁷ is now to go to the Soviet Union.

There seems to be little doubt that this proposal is an effort by the Soviet Government to reach a unilateral solution of its western frontier. In presenting the proposal the Soviet announcement gives the impression that they are making considerable concessions favorable to Poland. If the Polish Government does not accept this proposal they will probably be denounced again as "reactionary" for not having accepted a very "fair" proposal.

While the disputed area is inhabited by Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians and while the majority of the persons living in this area in 1939 were of non-Polish race, the most reliable statistics available, which come from Polish sources and therefore are obviously not unfavorable to Poland, show that 36 percent of the persons in the disputed area are of pure Polish race.¹⁸ In this connection there seems to be little doubt that in certain areas to the east of the proposed line the Polish population makes up the vast majority of the inhabitants.

On an ethnographical basis there would appear to be little question as to the desirability of making certain changes in this area; however, the Soviet proposal, particularly in regard to the areas in Eastern Galicia, is quite unfavorable to the Poles since it deprives them of half of the province of Lwow which includes the predominantly Polish city of Lwow and the Polish oil fields. Available statistics indicate that in the part of this province which would go to the Soviet Union under the present proposal the largest racial group is made up of Poles.

The same situation obtains in the eastern part of the province of Bialystok which under the Soviet proposal would go to the USSR.

¹⁷ Although Eastern Galicia never formed part of the Russian Empire under the tsars, as the Principality of Galicia it was a part of ancient *Rus* during the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries under the rule of the Rurikovich Grand Princes.

¹⁸ The last prewar census in Poland was made in 1931, and was published in *Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludnosci, Statystyka Polski*, December 9, 1931, Series C (Warsaw, 1937), where 38% of the population of this area is claimed to be of Polish race; see U. S. Bureau of the Census, *The Population of Poland*, by W. Parker Mauldin and Donald S. Akers (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 152 ff.

It should be pointed out in connection with the Soviet desire to annex Eastern Galicia, a province never held by the Czars, that its incorporation in the USSR is envisaged in order for the Soviet Union to have a comparative large common frontier with its new ally Czechoslovakia.

In considering the Soviet proposal it is felt that the United States Government should bear in mind that the acceptance of this unilateral proposition would tend to run counter to the basic policy laid down by this Government of not reaching final settlements on frontier questions until after the termination of hostilities.

While there seems to be little doubt that the Polish Government will be very reluctant to accept this proposal it would appear that on the basis of confidential indications from Polish sources that that Government might be willing to accept a compromise frontier which included all of the provinces of Lwow and Bialystok.

It should be noted that the Soviet Government, at least through its news organs, has indicated that Poland should be compensated for the loss of eastern provinces by obtaining East Prussia, part of the area west of the Polish Corridor (Pomerania) as well as most of German Upper Silesia.

There is attached a table showing the areas which Poland would lose if the line were fixed along the Ribbentrop-Molotov line of 1939¹⁹ or the Curzon line of 1919. There are also shown in the table the approximate areas which Poland would gain if she should take over the German territories indicated above.

ELBRIDGE DURBROW

[Annex]

TOTAL AREAS INVOLVED IN SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NEW FRONTIER
WITH POLAND

Areas Which Would Go To The Soviet Union

East of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line	East of the Curzon Line including Eastern Galicia
-------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------

78,900 Square Miles

70,049 Square Miles

Areas Suggested as Compensation for Poland in the West (East Prussia, Part of Pomerania and German Upper Silesia and Danzig)

East Prussia	14,283 Square Miles
Upper Silesia	3,751 Square Miles
Pomerania (approx)	8,800 Square Miles
Danzig	731 Square Miles

Total Compensating Area

27,565 Square Miles

¹⁹ This line is provided for in the Treaty of Boundary and Friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union signed at Moscow on September 28, 1939. The text of the treaty and maps of the boundary line are in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VIII (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 164 and Appendix VI, respectively.

<i>Recapitulation of Territorial Changes Under Soviet Proposals</i>	
To Russia	70, 049 Square Miles
To Poland	27, 565 Square Miles
Total Loss by Poland	42, 484 Square Miles

760C.61/2150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 11, 1944—4 p. m.
[Received January 12—2:17 p. m.]

91. For the President and the Secretary. Supplementing my 76, January 11, 2 a. m., last night when Molotov handed me the Soviet statement on Poland he showed he was most anxious and hopeful that you would react favorably to it. I feel the door is wide open for me to go to him informally with any comments or reactions you may have. Within certain but important limits I believe he is anxious to conform Soviet foreign policy to accord with your ideas, even more so than with those of the British. For example, as I have explained before I have the impression he acceded to the British request to endorse the Greek Prime Minister's²⁰ appeal for unity among the partisan groups in Greece²¹ not so much because of Eden's personal request as because of the Secretary's position in the matter.

From the evidence we have including Beneš' recent talks with Stalin²² the Soviet Government indicates a desire to deal with the Polish Government in London provided it is reconstituted by eliminating the extreme irreconcilable anti-Soviet elements and provided it would tacitly recognize or at least not make an issue at the present time of the position the Soviets have taken on the boundary question as outlined in today's public statement.

The first move of course would have to come from the Poles with a convincing and genuine desire to reestablish permanent relations.

The Soviet Government would undoubtedly be ready to give them all the assurances given to Beneš and I believe some additional such as an agreement to allow Polish racial minorities in territory now claimed by the Soviets to move to Poland.

²⁰ Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance.

²¹ For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 124 ff.

²² Eduard Beneš was President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939-45. See particularly telegrams 2264, December 18, 1943; 2284, December 20, 1943; and 2317, December 23, 1943, from Moscow, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, pp 728, 731, and 734, respectively.

I recognize that we should not become directly involved in attempting to negotiate this question between the two Governments. On the other hand I cannot help but be impressed by the chaotic conditions adversely affecting our vital war interests that will probably result as Soviet troops penetrate Polish territory unless relations are reestablished promptly between the Governments.

It would seem that the Poles can make a better deal now than if they wait living as they appear to be in the hope that we and the British will eventually pull their chestnuts out of the fire.

If it is clear and I believe it is that we will not be able to aid the Poles substantially more than we already have in the boundary dispute are we not in fairness called upon to make plain the limitations of the help that we can give them and the fact that in their own interest the present moment is propitious for them to negotiate the reestablishment of relations with the Soviets?

If you wish me to do so I can readily have an informal talk with Molotov without commitment and I believe I can obtain from him information on any aspect that you consider might be useful.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/2149: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 11, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received January 11—7:20 p. m.]

265. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. This evening Eden²⁸ told me that he had talked this afternoon to the Poles. They had prepared an uncompromising statement in opposition to the announced position of the Russians. He tried to explain to them that the Russian statement gave a degree of latitude in relation to frontiers and said he thought that a more helpful position on the part of the Poles would be to recognize that the immutability of what had appeared to be the Russian stand should be welcomed by them even if the specific proposals were not acceptable to them.

In the early part of the conversation the Poles refused even to consider any proposition that suggested the Curzon line as an equitable settlement of the frontier problem and were in what Eden described to be as a kind of "suicide mind". He felt that he had made some little impression on them and tried to persuade them to move forward toward concession as he felt the Russians were doing on their side. I felt that Eden was a bit discouraged as a result of his conversation but still had some hope of a modified reply by the Poles to the Russian statement.

WINANT

²⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

760C.61/2153 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:28 p. m.]

Czechoslovakia 1. I saw Acting Foreign Minister Ripka²⁴ yesterday. He referred to Beneš' recent return from Moscow and said Beneš had been most satisfied with his trip.

Ripka spoke first of Beneš' impressions regarding Soviet-Polish relations. He said Stalin and Molotov had spoken to him along the lines of the Tass declaration of January 11²⁵ but somewhat more specifically. Beneš had recently given his impressions to Eden and Mikolajczyk.²⁶ Ripka then got out a memorandum of Beneš' conversation with Mikolajczyk the main points of which were: (1) Stalin and Molotov had told him that the Soviet Government was not against an arrangement with the Poles and the resumption of diplomatic relations. (2) They had no desire to see a Bolshevized Poland. (3) They did not insist on the 1941 frontier. They desired the Curzon Line with some rectifications so that in the north the Poles should have the area around Bialystok, in the center the area around Lomza and in the south the area in Eastern Galicia which included Przemysl. The Soviets would not give up Lwow. (4) They would support territorial compensation for Poland in the west. This could extend as far as the Oder if Poland, Britain, the United States and Czechoslovakia agreed. (5) Changes in the Polish Government were essential. They were not opposed to Mikolajczyk. They objected to General Sosnkowski.²⁷ (6) They desired that the Poles should associate themselves with the policy of alliance against Germany represented by the Czechoslovak-Soviet pact of December 12 last, as envisaged under the protocol thereof.

I inquired whether Ripka was optimistic about a settlement. He said he personally was skeptical. Mikolajczyk had said to Beneš that the settlement suggested would be difficult.

[The remainder of this telegram is printed in volume IV, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Reports on developments of significance concerning Soviet relations . . ."]

[SCHOENFELD]

²⁴ Hubert Ripka, sometimes Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in place of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile.

²⁵ See footnote 8, p. 1218.

²⁶ Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile and leader of the Peasant Party of Poland.

²⁷ Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces.

760C.61/2159 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 14, 1944.

[Received January 14—2:17 p. m.]

9. Polish Series. For the President and the Secretary. Romer²⁸ has just sent me a revised text of the statement quoted in my 7, January 14.²⁹ Revised text is considerably softened in tone and reads as follows:

"The Polish Government have taken cognisance of the declaration of the Soviet Government contained in the Tass communiqué of January 11th, 1944, which was issued as a reply to the declaration of the Polish Government of January 5th.

The Soviet communiqué contains a number of statements to which a complete answer is afforded by the ceaseless struggle against the Germans waged at the heaviest cost by the Polish nation under the direction of the Polish Government. In their earnest anxiety to safeguard the complete solidarity of the United Nations especially at a decisive stage of their struggle against the common enemy, the Polish Government consider it to be preferable now to refrain from further public discussions.

While the Polish Government cannot recognise unilateral decisions or accomplished facts which have taken place or might take place on the territory of the Polish republic, they have repeatedly expressed their sincere desire for a Polish-Soviet agreement on terms which would be just and acceptable to both sides.

To this end the Polish Government are approaching the British and United States Governments with a view to securing through their intermediary the discussion by the Polish and Soviet Governments with the participation of the British and American Governments of all outstanding questions, the settlement of which should lead to a friendly and permanent cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Polish Government believes this to be desirable in the interest of the victory of the United Nations and harmonious relations in post-war Europe."

Text is to be released to the press at 12:30 a. m. London time January 15.

[SCHOENFELD]

²⁸ Tadeusz Romer, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

²⁹ Not printed; this telegram communicated to the Department a draft of the Polish Government's statement regarding the differences dividing the Soviet and Polish Governments. The Chargé also reported that Polish Foreign Minister Romer said that "he was hereby making formal request for our good offices." (760C 61/2157)

760C.61/2161 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 15, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 2:26 p. m.]

384. You will have already received the Polish declaration dated 14th January through the Embassy forwarded by Schoenfeld and his message No. 8 Polish Series of yesterday.³⁰ Cadogan³¹ told me last night that a communication has also been forwarded to Halifax³² for transmission to the Department.

In contacting Eden at a later hour he told me that in talking with the Russian Ambassador yesterday evening on the Polish statement Gousev³³ was not inclined to be receptive to the Polish position. He wanted to know why the Poles did not accept the Curzon line and made some further statement about the retention of persons unfriendly to Russia both in the Polish Government and in the military. Eden told him that he could not expect the Polish Government to concede in its first statement the frontier position set out by the Russians and that it was only natural that they should expect this issue to be made a matter of discussion; that their willingness to discuss after the Russian position had been publicly stated was in itself a concession in the direction of a reasonable approach to the problem. In regard to the question of personalities Eden said he could not say. There was some discussion as to whether the position taken in the Polish statement would be accepted by those in the Polish Government opposed to Russia or whether it would lead to resignations. I am told through Beneš (see my 386 of today³⁴) that Stalin is friendly to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk. You already know that General Sosnkowski and Kot³⁵ are unfriendly to the Russians and that the Russians distrust them.

I know that including us as an intermediary creates difficulties for us. I do not think Eden could have kept this out of the statement. He had a long hard tussle to get a statement from the Poles that would permit discussions at all. In support the Prime Minister forwarded a statement to be read to the Poles. He wanted the President and you to know that he had done his best to bring about a *rapprochement* in the hope of possibility of settlement.

WINANT

³⁰ Not printed, but see Polish Series telegram 9, January 14, *supra*.

³¹ Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

³² Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

³³ Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁵ Stanislaw Kot, Minister of Information of the Polish Government in Exile; former Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

760C.61/2182a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1944—7 p. m.

88. I have talked over with the President the request of the Polish Government for this Government to act with the British Government "with a view to securing through their intermediary the discussion by Polish and Soviet Governments with the participation of British and American Governments of all outstanding questions,"⁸⁶ and we desire that you take up the matter with the Soviet Government along the following lines:

As the Soviet Government well knows, we are committed to the principle of the settlement of disputes by peaceful accord, and the most important recent official declarations on the part of the leading peace-loving nations of the world have been along these lines.

Without regard to the merits of the case, it is the hope of this Government that the Soviet Government will give the most favorable consideration to the Polish offer to discuss outstanding questions, presumably on the basis of a renewal of official relations between the two Governments. The effect of any hesitancy or refusal by the Soviet Government at this time would adversely affect the cause of general international cooperation. Conversely, an amicable solution of the Polish-Soviet differences, in conformity with the principles of international cooperation, would have far-reaching effects on world opinion.

We must not overlook the very considerable advantages to our common war effort of the restoration of unity in the ranks of the United Nations. Our interest in the resumption of relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments and the amicable settlement by mutual agreement between them of outstanding questions is directly related to the furtherance and the acceptance by all peace-loving peoples of the reality of the basis for international cooperation established at Moscow⁸⁷ and Tehran.

If the Soviet Government finds it agreeable and desirable, this Government would be glad to extend its good offices in the matter of arranging for the initiation of discussions between the two Governments with a view to resumption of official relations between them.⁸⁸

For your own individual information, this is intended primarily as an earnest, friendly effort to be of aid to Russia in reaching a settlement of this difficult problem. The effect on opinion in this country

⁸⁶ See text of the Polish statement quoted in Polish Series telegram 9, January 14, from London, p. 1226. For statement by the Secretary of State regarding this request, see press release of January 17, Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1944, p. 96.

⁸⁷ The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers held October 18–November 1, 1943. For papers relating to the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 513 ff.

⁸⁸ In telegram 417, January 17, 1944, the Chargé near the Polish Government in Exile was instructed to inform Foreign Minister Romer confidentially of this offer of good offices (760C.61/2157).

of the *Pravda* reply to Mr. Willkie's article³⁹ and the interpretation by the public and press here of this reply as an indication that the Soviet Government proposed to follow a course of unilateral action, has been far-reaching. Very considerable and important elements in this country are viewing the attitude and actions of the Soviet Government with regard to the Polish boundary question as a test of the reality of international cooperation in its broad future aspects on a basis of friendly accord and respect for the rights of nations. We have had encouraging results in this country from the declaration of Moscow and the meeting at Tehran but we would not be frank if we did not point out the danger to the cause of cooperation in an international security system which would result from an arbitrary dealing with the Polish-Soviet differences.

These observations are not intended to reflect or deal with the merits of the case in question.

HULL

760C.61/2163 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 16, 1944.

[Received January 17—12:31 p. m.]

143. There follows a translation of the text of a statement released by Tass for the January 17 morning papers:

"With reference to the declaration of the Polish Government in London of January 15, Tass is authorized to communicate the following:

"1. The declaration of the Polish Government, in which the main question of the recognition of the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish boundary is entirely avoided and ignored, cannot be considered otherwise than as a rejection of the Curzon Line.

"2. With regard to the proposal of the Polish Government concerning the opening of official conversations between it and the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government presumes that this proposal is calculated to lead public opinion astray, since it is not difficult to understand that the Soviet Government can not enter into official conversations with a government with which it has suspended diplomatic relations.

"Soviet circles recall that diplomatic relations with the Polish Government were suspended through the fault of that Government because

³⁹ Reports on the visit of Wendell L. Willkie, personal representative of President Roosevelt, in the Soviet Union during September 1942 are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 637-650. Mr. Willkie had written an article which appeared in *Life* magazine for October 5, 1942, describing his conversations with Stalin.

of its active participation in the hostile anti-Soviet slander campaign of the German occupants concerning the 'Katyn murders'.⁴⁰

"3. In the opinion of Soviet circles, the circumstances set forth above demonstrate once more that the present Polish Government does not desire to establish good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union."

HARRIMAN

760C.61/2173 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 18, 1944—midnight.

[Received January 19—5:21 p. m.]

183. Supplementing my 146 January 17, 11 a. m.,⁴¹ there was evidently something unusual going on at the Kremlin yesterday because I could not reach Molotov or either of his secretaries with whom we usually freely deal until it was too late for him to receive me last night. Today at 4 p. m. I handed him the *aide-mémoire* containing your views on the Polish question and offer of good offices as expressed in your No. 88, January 15, 7 p. m.

Molotov expressed to you thanks for your willingness to assist in the Polish matter but pointed out that Marshal Stalin had stated clearly at Tehran that the Soviet Government could not deal with the present Polish Government in London and that this attitude had been publicly stated since. He repeated that no permanent friendly neighborly relationship could be established with this group because it contained Fascist elements.

In reply to my request for clarification of this error of his statement to me of January 16 that they were willing to deal with a Polish Government in London if reconstructed,⁴² he explained that the Soviet Government envisioned an entirely new Polish Government including perhaps some of the present members of the London Government, prominent Poles in the United States and Poles now in the Soviet Union.⁴³ He said that, although he did not have sufficient informa-

⁴⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 374-404, *passim*; and *post*, pp. 1238-1243, *passim*.

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² In his telegram 142, January 16, 1944, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that Molotov had stated that "the Soviet Government was not unwilling to deal with a Polish Government in London but that it would not deal with the present Government as now constituted", and that the persons opposed to friendly relations with the Soviet Union "must be eliminated" from the Polish Government (760C.61/2162).

⁴³ With regard to the concern of the United States over Soviet support of Polish groups within the Soviet Union in connection with the formation of a new Polish government, see pp. 1398 ff.

tion to come to a final conclusion, he believed Prime Minister Mikolajczyk would be acceptable in a reconstituted government but he had some doubts about Mr. Romer. He did not mention any individuals now in Russia but on his own initiative mentioned the following names of individuals in the United States as possibilities: Krzewicki,⁴⁴ Professor Lange,⁴⁵ Olemanski.⁴⁶

I made it plain that I had no idea whether my Government would want to involve itself in any way in discussions concerning possible changes in the Polish Government and that my [instruction?] was only to develop the Soviet Government's attitude. I told him I was sure that in extending good offices you had in mind that the Polish Government in London had now indicated its willingness to reestablish permanent friendly relations and that you had hoped your offer would be helpful in bringing about discussions between the Soviet and Polish Governments.

Molotov again stated that the Soviet position on this question had been made clear, that the Soviet Government was unwilling to deal with the present Polish Government in London, and that the time had often [*now?*] come for the formation of a new government of "honest" men, untainted by Fascism and well-disposed toward the Soviet Union.

He stated that the Soviet Government had proposed the Curzon line for settlement of the boundary question as the basis for the resumption of relations.

I emphasized the distinction between the Soviet Government unilaterally fixing the Curzon line as the boundary, as against its proposing the Curzon line as a basis for negotiation. He replied that the Curzon line should be the basis for negotiations subject to some adjustments and stated the Soviet Government would support the extension of the Polish boundaries to the west.

In reply to my inquiry, Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government appreciated the importance of finding a solution and would welcome the continued efforts of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden in that direction, but hoped that Mr. Hull understood the Soviet Government's position.

During the conversation I took the opportunity to explain to Molotov the public reaction in the United States to the *Pravda* reply to the Willkie article and other Soviet statements on the Polish question as you described them in the next to the last paragraph of your cable.

⁴⁴ Leo Krzycki, Vice President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (CIO), and National Chairman of the American Slav Congress.

⁴⁵ Oscar Lange, professor of economics at the University of Chicago.

⁴⁶ Father Stanislaus Orlanski, pastor of a Roman Catholic church in Springfield, Mass.

In his conversations with the British Minister ⁴⁷ and me on the 16th Molotov gave each of us the impression that the reconstruction of the Polish Government desired by the Soviet Government was the elimination of the irreconcilably anti-Soviet members and nothing he said then could be interpreted to indicate such a sweeping proposal as he described to me today. I still feel that the Soviet Government might be satisfied with the more moderate changes. Unless something of this kind is accomplished soon, however, I believe the Soviet Government intends to stand pat in the expectation that with their encouragement a new Polish Government friendly disposed toward the Soviet Union can be developed.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/2187 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 21, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received January 22—4:11 p. m.]

213. In thinking over the developments of the past 10 days on the Polish situation, the following points stand out :

1. There is no doubt the Soviets have a fundamental distrust of the Polish Government in London because of their knowledge of the hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union of almost all of its members which has, during the months, been freely and openly expressed in London. They are convinced that no lasting relationship can be established with this group.

2. The Soviets are fearful that representatives of the landowning class and the military officers are so bitter against the Soviet Union that they are capable eventually, after this war, of conspiring with the Germans against Russia.

3. The Soviets have such contempt for the Polish Government in London that they do not believe they have been able to organize an underground movement of any substance. Whatever strength it has, they fear, will be used to establish the Polish Government in power rather than to fight Germans.

4. I believe the Soviets are sincere in their willingness to have a strong and independent Poland emerge providing, of course, that it is well disposed toward the Soviet Union. They seem to feel that the vast majority of the Polish population, particularly the peasants and workers, are so disposed and, if given a chance to express their political

⁴⁷ John Balfour, British Minister in the Soviet Union.

views, would elect a democratic government friendly to the Soviet Union. There is no indication as yet that they wish to foster a Bolshevik form of Government in Poland, and some indication to the contrary.

5. The Soviets believe they have made a substantial concession in offering the Curzon line as a basis for negotiation of the settlement of the Eastern boundary with support of compensation in the west.

6. It seems clear that from the standpoint of our own national interest, we should make every effort to avoid the Polish question becoming a definite issue between the Soviet Government and ourselves. On the other hand, it seems also clear that unless the Soviets deal honorably and fairly with the Polish people, the chance to work out over-all world security plans in which the Soviet Union would play such an important role would suffer a serious setback.

7. As a general observation the Soviets have been so successful in making the Russian people believe that anything coming from the Kremlin is the truth, they appear unable to understand why the world will not accept their word with similar credulity. They give evidence frequently that they consider it an insult to the Soviet Union if anyone doubts the accuracy of their pronouncements and they do not appear to understand why it is necessary for them to give any evidence as to the validity of their statements. This is a basic difficulty that we are going to face for some time at best.

8. I believe we should make continuous attempts to get the Soviets to talk over mutual problems currently in the atmosphere that was temporarily created at the Moscow Conference and at Tehran.

9. It would be helpful if I can be informed of the Department's views on developments in order that I may take advantage of such opportunities as present themselves to advance our viewpoint to Molotov. It is unfortunate that your promptly dispatched cable number 88 of January 15 was so long delayed in transmission that I did not receive it until after the Soviet Government had made its last statement, as I could have at least registered our strong objection to their action prior to its being taken.

10. Against the background of the foregoing, I offer in my immediately succeeding telegram some suggestions.⁴⁸

HARRIMAN

⁴⁸ In his telegram 214, January 21, 8 p. m., Ambassador Harriman suggested that the Soviet Government would recognize a reconstituted government in London under Mikolajczyk which accepted the Curzon Line; that, failing such development, the Soviet Government would support a new committee government in Poland; and that U.S. policy should aim toward effecting a reconstituted Polish government in London (760C.61/2188).

760C.61/2194a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1944—midnight.

135. Referring to Soviet-Polish differences, from the present trend of the impressions that seem to be gaining circulation that the Soviet Government is embarking upon an arbitrary line of conduct in the matter of its relations with the Polish Government, I feel that you should at least informally get before the Soviet officials our sincere hope that they would not want to tie themselves down to a procedure of narrow unilateralism. The last thing we would want to do would be to even suggest that there would be any question of the Soviet Government putting aside any of their rights, but we feel that there must be ways of having discussions within the larger framework of cooperation without in any way jeopardizing the rights the Soviet Government may have in the premises. We hope to send you further thoughts on this in a later communication.

HULL

800.00 Summaries/7t : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944—9 p. m.

150. The Department desires to give you these additional thoughts for your background information in considering recent developments at Moscow. We are naturally much disturbed at the Soviet Government's present method of approach to Polish problems and the much wider implications as to future Soviet policy. If the Soviet Government does not, in fact, intend to return to the doctrine of unilateralism as a fixed policy which we thought and hoped had been renounced at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences, then that Government has failed to make clear its position in recent statements emanating from Moscow. It has thus thrown itself open to critics in this country and elsewhere to place their own interpretation on Soviet policy and to charge a complete reversal of attitude since the Four-Nation Declaration at Moscow.⁴⁹ Specifically, present Russian insistence on an almost complete reconstitution of the Polish Government in exile with persons of its own choosing as an essential prerequisite to any direct discussions of mutual problems is an approach which American public opinion will not understand. Large elements of our people who

⁴⁹ Signed on October 30, 1943, *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, p. 755.

recognize that there is a complicated Russian-Polish boundary question requiring full and frank discussion, will not accept as valid the Russian contention that only after imposing a government of its own selection on Poland will it be prepared for direct exchange of views. The overwhelming majority of our people, as you know, welcomed with enthusiasm the broad principle of international cooperation laid down at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences and it seems to us of the highest importance that faith in this groundwork should not be undermined by any course of unilateral action. As you well know, without the whole-hearted support of public opinion, this great movement toward international cooperation cannot be transformed into a solid practical basis for the establishment of a stable and durable peace. Unfortunately, public opinion in the United States has been confused and upset by *Pravda's* reply to Mr. Willkie's article and more recently by that journal's publishing of reports of British attempts to negotiate a separate peace. These two incidents have to some degree already dampened the spirit of hope and confidence which was born with the Moscow Conference and stimulated and confirmed at Tehran; they have played into the hands of those skeptical elements in this country who have continued to insist that "you can't do business with Russia".

It is vitally important that the Soviet Government be brought to understand that the faith of the people of this country in the workability of any international security organization with the Soviet Union as a full and cooperating member depends upon the willingness of the Russian Government to abandon unilateralism and to seek its ends by free and frank discussion with a Polish Government that is not hand-picked. Opinion in this country will not understand how such direct talks would involve the relinquishment of any Russian rights nor would our Government wish to suggest a course of action which would prejudice such rights; the unwillingness to hold such talks without demanding the substitution of the present Polish Government for one of its own choosing—as the Soviet Government is now insisting—will inevitably be interpreted by a large section of American opinion as a significant step backward in the direction of power politics and spheres of influence. We believe the Soviet Government must realize how serious the effect of this will be upon our public opinion and upon Congress in respect of the cooperation of this country in any international system of world security.

Your telegrams nos. 213 and 214⁵⁰ have just been received and the analysis and presentation of the problems contained therein are much appreciated. A further telegram will be sent in reply thereto.

HULL

⁵⁰ Latter not printed, but see footnote 48, p. 1233.

760C.61/2198

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1944.

The Polish Ambassador⁵² called at his request and handed me a document (copy attached) which he said was sent to him under urgent instructions of his Government to be transmitted to the President for his reply or comment. I said that I would be glad to comply with his request. The Ambassador, in response to questions of mine, said that his Government desired the comment of the President and also of the underground Polish forces on the document before the Polish Government itself undertook to pass on it.

The Ambassador then inquired about the nature of the Russian reply⁵³ to this Government in response to its tender of good offices to aid in bringing the Soviet and Polish Governments together in order that they might consider matters of difference between them. I said that it was not an outright rejection but that it stated in effect that conditions had not sufficiently ripened thus far so as to make the offer of the United States of desirable utility.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Polish Government in Exile for President Roosevelt

A conversation took place between Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Mikolajczyk in the presence of Foreign Secretary Eden, Under Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan, Minister Romer and Ambassador Raczynski,⁵⁴ in the course of which the situation between the Polish and Soviet Governments was discussed. Mr. Churchill suggested that:

1) The Polish Government should agree to accept the so-called Curzon Line (prolonged through Eastern Galicia) as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Government.

2) The final settlement of the Eastern frontier to be linked with the grant to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia to the River Oder.

3) All Poles left on the Soviet side would be given the right to return to Poland.

⁵² Jan Ciechanowski.

⁵³ A reply from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov), which was handed to Secretary of State Hull in a note dated January 24, 1944, by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, repeated substantially the statements which had been made by Molotov to Ambassador Harriman as reported in telegrams 183, January 18, and 213, January 21, pp. 1230 and 1232, respectively. On January 26, Secretary Hull announced to the press the nature of the reply from the Soviet Government; see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 29, 1944, p. 116.

⁵⁴ Count Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

4) All the German population within Poland's new boundaries to be removed from Poland.

5) The solution as enumerated above would receive the approval and guarantee of the three principal United Nations.

Mr. Churchill intends personally to telegraph to Premier Stalin suggesting such a solution on his own behalf and demanding that the Soviet Government engage itself to refrain from any further calling in doubt of the Polish Government and any interference or *ingérence* in the internal affairs of Poland. He would likewise indicate to Premier Stalin the indispensable necessity of bringing about an understanding between the Polish and Soviet Governments regarding the coordination of action and of the safeguarding of forces fighting in Poland against the German forces of occupation.

In view of the fear of accomplished facts being created in Poland, Prime Minister Churchill urged that the Polish Government authorize him to express in his telegram to Premier Stalin the consent of the Polish Government to negotiate on the basis of the Curzon Line.

Premier Mikolajczyk explained to Prime Minister Churchill that his suggestions raise a series of grave doubts and requested their thorough elucidation. For instance,—an a priori acceptance by the Polish Government of the Soviet demands would render further negotiations futile and would create, in the form of a surrender to a Russian dictate, a legal and *de facto* situation highly dangerous to the national unity of the Polish people and untenable for the Polish Government,—without at the same time giving to Poland the effective guarantee that the Soviets would respect her sovereignty, or that the program of her territorial adjustment in the West would be carried out.

Premier Mikolajczyk informed Prime Minister Churchill that, before deciding on their final reply to his suggestions, the Polish Government intend to consult the Polish underground authorities in Poland and the United States Government.

The Polish Ambassador is personally authorized by Prime Minister Mikolajczyk most urgently and personally to submit to the President the views express[ed] by Mr. Churchill to the Polish Government and to ask the President very kindly, confidentially to inform Prime Minister Mikolajczyk through the Ambassador:

1) Whether the U. S. Government considers it advisable to enter already now upon the final settlement of territorial problems of Europe.

2) Would the U. S. Government be prepared in principle to participate in bringing about such settlements and to guarantee them.

3) Does the U. S. Government regard it possible to lend its support to Prime Minister Churchill's plan and to its realization.

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1944.

740.00116 European War 1939/1280 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 26, 1944.

[Received January 27—8 :37 p. m.]

260. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* for January 26 devote over two and one-half pages to publication of the report of the Special Commission for the Investigation of the Shooting of the Polish Captured Officers in the Katyn Forest.⁵⁷

Both papers publish front page editorials on this subject. Editorials declare that investigation establishes the truth regarding the German killing of the Polish officers.

They state that Polish prisoners who had been working in a Soviet camp fell into the hands of the Germans during the Red Army retreat. The Germans, carrying out their policy of physical annihilation of the Poles, in the autumn of '41 shot the Polish prisoners who had been in the captured camp. The Germans, in order to conceal their crime and also to achieve their foul political aims, resorted to a monstrous provocation.

In the spring of '43 they published a communiqué attributing the Katyn crime to Soviet organs, dating the murders back to the spring of 1940. The editorials state that the Germans resorted to this trick early in '43 when their military fortunes were on the wane, and that they sought to incite Russians and Poles against one another. This attempt was a failure. The Soviet Information Bureau exposed the Hitlerite slander. Freedom-loving peoples looked with disdain on the Hitlerite slander against the heroic Soviet people.

However the emigrant Polish Government took an active part in the anti-Soviet campaign regarding the "Murders in Katyn". The *Pravda* editorial states that as a result of the participation of the Polish Government in the anti-Soviet campaign, diplomatic relations

⁵⁷ The Moscow press on January 17, 1944, announced the formation of this Special Commission by decision of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes Committed by the German Fascist Invaders and Their Accomplices, which had itself been created by an ukaz of November 4, 1942. See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 473.

On September 18, 1951, a "Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre" was unanimously authorized under House Resolution 390, 82d Congress, 1st session. Extensive hearings were held by the Committee between October 11, 1951, and November 14, 1952. The testimonies received, together with voluminous accompanying documents, were published under the full title of *Hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952, 7 parts, 2362 pages). The text of the report of January 24, 1944, by the Soviet Special Commission is printed in pt. 3, pp. 228-247 (Russian text reproduced, pp. 248-309).

between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government were broken off.

Now, as a result of materials in the possession of the Special Commission, including testimony of over a hundred witnesses and medical and other data, the base sequence of German Fascist provocations, murders and falsifications which constitute the "Katyn" affair has been revealed. The evidence establishes, according to the editorials, that the Poles were killed in the fall of '41, having been in the camp up to September '41.

The *Pravda* editorial cites the data in the communiqué of the commission to the effect that a German military organization concealed under the designation of "Staff of the 537th Construction Battalion" and headed by Overlieutenant Arnes, Overlieutenant Rechst and Lieutenant Hott, carried out the mass shootings.⁵⁸

The Germans by threats and tortures and bribery found false witnesses from whom they obtained lying testimony about the "Katyn affair". Moreover they brought to the Katyn Forest corpses of prisoners shot in other places, utilizing Russian prisoners, who after completing the work were also shot.

The concluding paragraph of the *Pravda* editorial compare[s] the Katyn crime with the crimes investigated in Krasnodar and Kharkov,⁵⁹ and declare[s] that the Katyn murders were executed by direct order from Berlin "in effectuating the policy of physical destruction of the Slavic peoples". These base crimes will arouse the wrath and indignation of the Soviet and Polish peoples and of all progressive humanity. None of the crimes committed by the Hitlerite bandits will be forgotten and none will remain unavenged. The Red Army's blows and the unshakable will of all the freedom-loving peoples to achieve final victory and the complete crushing of Hitlerite Germany in the shortest period attest to this.

The *Izvestiya* editorial, besides making similar statements regarding vengeance against the Nazi criminals, contains a paragraph denouncing the Polish Government. It declares that in the light of the facts the shameful role of the Polish Government stands out more clearly. The Polish Government by participating in the anti-Soviet campaign aided the hangmen of the Polish people. It struck a blow at the Soviet Union whose people are exerting all their efforts to de-

⁵⁸ This organization was actually the Army Group Signal Regiment No. 537, of which Lt. Col. Friedrich Ahrens was the commanding officer only from early November 1941 until August 1943. First Lieutenant Rekt was regimental adjutant, and Second Lieutenant Hodt was with this regiment.

⁵⁹ For reports concerning the trial and sentencing of German war criminals and their Russian accomplices in Krasnodar and Kharkov, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 845 ff.

feat the common enemy of the Russian and Polish peoples and the peoples of all the freedom-loving democratic countries.

“Acting in unison with Hitler, the most evil foe of the Polish people, the Polish Government did enormous harm to the cause of Poland.”

The newspapers containing the full text of the Special Commission's communiqué are being sent to the Department through the usual channels.⁶⁰

HARRIMAN

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁶¹

LONDON, 28 January, 1944.

557. After much thought and talk I have sent the following signal to U. J.⁶²

1. On Thursday last,⁶³ accompanied by the Foreign Secretary and with the authority of the War Cabinet, I saw representatives of the Polish Government in London. I informed them that the security of the Russian frontiers against Germany was a matter of high consequence to His Majesty's Government, and that we should certainly support the Soviet Union in all measures we considered necessary to that end. I remarked that Russia had sustained two frightful invasions with immense slaughter and devastation at the hands of Germany, that Poland had had national independence and existence restored after the first world war, and that it was the policy of the Great Allies to restore Poland once again after this war. I said that although we had gone to war for the sake of Poland, we had not gone to war for any particular frontier line but for the existence of a strong free, independent Poland, which Marshal Stalin had also declared himself supporting. Moreover, although Great Britain would have fought on in any case for years until something happened to Germany, the liberation of Poland from the German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous sacrifices and achievements of the Russian armies. Therefore Russia and her Allies had a right to ask that Poland should be guided to a large extent about the frontiers of the territory she would have.

2. I then said that I believed from what had passed at Tehran that the Soviet Government would be willing to agree to the Easterly frontiers of Poland conforming to the Curzon line subject to discussion of ethnographical considerations, and I advised them to accept

⁶⁰ Not printed, but see footnote 57, p. 1238.

⁶¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶² Uncle Joe, meaning Marshal Stalin.

⁶³ January 27.

the Curzon line as a basis for discussion. I spoke of the compensations which Poland would receive in the North and in the West. In the North there would be East Prussia; but here I did not mention the point about Königsberg. In the West they would be free and aided to occupy Germany up to the line of the Oder. I told them it was their duty to accept this task and guard the frontier against German aggression towards the East in consequence of their liberation by the Allied Forces, I said that in this task they would need a friendly Russia behind them and would, I presumed, be sustained by the guarantee of the Three Great Powers against further German attack. Great Britain would be willing to give such a guarantee if it were in harmony with her Ally, Soviet Russia. I could not forecast the action of the United States, but it seemed that the Three Great Powers would stand together against all disturbers of the peace, at any rate until a long time after the war was ended. I made it clear that the Polish Government would not be committed to the acceptance of the Curzon line as a basis of examination except as part of the arrangement which gave them the fine compensations to the North and to the West which I had mentioned.

3. Finally I said that if the Russian policy was unfolded in the sense I had described, I would urge the Polish Government to settle now on that basis and His Majesty's Government would advocate the confirmation of such a settlement by the Peace Conference or by conferences for the settlement of Europe following the destruction of Hitlerism, and would support no territorial claims from Poland which went beyond it. If the Polish ministers were satisfied that agreement could be reached upon these lines, it would be their duty at the proper time not merely to acquiesce in it but to commend it to their people with courage, even though they ran the risk of being repudiated by extremists.

4. The Polish ministers were very far from rejecting the prospects thus unfolded, but they asked for time to consider matters with the rest of their colleagues, and as a result of this they have asked a number of questions, none of which seems to me to be in conflict with the general outline of my suggestions to them. In particular they wish to be assured that Poland would be free and independent in the new home assigned to her; that she would receive the guarantee of the Great Powers against German revenge effectively; that these Great Powers would also assist in expelling the Germans from the new territories to be assigned to Poland; and that in regions to be incorporated in Soviet Russia such Poles as wished would be assisted to depart from their new abodes. They also inquired about what their position will be if a large part of Poland West of the Curzon line is soon occupied by the advancing Soviet armies. Will they be allowed

to go back and form a more broad based government in accordance with the popular wish and allowed to function administratively in the liberated areas in the same way as other governments who have been overrun? In particular they are of course deeply concerned about relations between the Polish underground movement and the advancing Soviet forces, it being understood that their prime desire was to assist in driving out the Germans. This underground movement raises matters important to our common war effort.

5. We also attach great importance to assimilating our action in the different regions which we hope to liberate. You know the policy we are following in Italy. There we have taken you fully into our counsels, and we want to do the same in regard to France and other countries to whose liberation we look forward. We believe such uniformity of action is of great importance, now and in the future, to the cause of the United Nations.

6. The earliest possible agreement in principle on the frontiers of the new Polish State is highly desirable to allow of a satisfactory arrangement regarding these two very important points.

7. While however everyone will agree that Soviet Russia has the right to recognize or refuse recognition to any foreign government, do you not agree that to advocate changes within a foreign government comes near to that interference with internal sovereignty to which you and I have expressed ourselves as opposed? I may mention that this view is strongly held by His Majesty's Government.

8. I now report this conversation which expresses the policy of His Majesty's Government at the present time upon this difficult question to my friend and comrade, Marshal Stalin. I earnestly hope these plans may be helpful. I had always hoped to postpone discussions of frontier questions till the end of the war when the victors would be round the table together. The dangers which have forced His Majesty's Government to depart from this principle are formidable and imminent. If, as we may justly hope, the successful advance of the Soviet armies continues and a large part of Poland is cleared of the German oppressors, a good relationship will be absolutely necessary between whatever forces can speak for Poland and the Soviet Union. The creation in Warsaw of another Polish government different from the one we have recognized up to the present, together with disturbances in Poland, would raise issues in Great Britain and the United States detrimental to that close accord between the Three Great Powers upon which the future of the world depends.

9. I wish to make it clear that this message is not intended to be any intervention or interference between the governments of the Soviet Union and Poland. It is a statement in broad outline of the

position of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain in regard to matters in which they feel themselves deeply concerned.

10. I should like myself to know from you what steps you would be prepared to take to help us all to resolve this serious problem. You could certainly count on our good offices, for what they would be worth.

11. I am sending a copy of this message to the President of the United States with a request for complete secrecy.

740.00116 European War 1939/1301½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 1, 1944.

[Received February 2—5:01 p.m.]

320. *Pravda* for January 31 and *Izvestiya* for February 1 contain long special articles describing ceremonies in which members of the Polish corps in the USSR honored the Polish officers murdered in the Katyn Forest.

These articles quoted Polish soldiers on the good treatment they had received in Soviet camps long after the Germans claimed that Poles in these camps had been killed. General Berling, the Priest Kupsz, and Major General Swierczewski and Major Zawadski, deputies of General Berling, took the most prominent part in the ceremonies.⁶⁴ Divine services were held, tribute was paid to the murdered Polish patriots and vows of vengeance against the Germans were taken. Solidarity of the Polish and Soviet people was again affirmed.

Sent to Department. Repeated to London.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/2203a : Telegram

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) ⁶⁵

I have followed with the closest attention the recent developments in your relations with Poland. I feel that I am fully aware of your views on the subject and am therefore taking this opportunity of communicating with you on the basis of our conversations at Tehran.

⁶⁴These dedication ceremonies, a religious service, and a parade of Polish troops were held on January 30, 1944, at a new grave site in the Katyn Forest.

⁶⁵This message was sent in telegram 236. February 7, 1944, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, with instructions to seek an immediate interview with Stalin in order to deliver it to him.

First of all, let me make it plain that I neither desire nor intend to attempt to suggest much less to advise you in any way as to where the interests of Russia lie in this matter since I realize to the full that the future security of your country is rightly your primary concern. The observations which I am about to make are prompted solely by the larger issues which affect the common goal towards which we are both working.

The overwhelming majority of our people and Congress, as you know, welcomed with enthusiasm the broad principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences, and I know that you agree with me that it is of the utmost importance that faith in these understandings should not be left in any doubt. I am sure that a solution can be found which would fully protect the interests of Russia and satisfy your desire to see a friendly, independent Poland, and at the same time not adversely affect the cooperation so splendidly established at Moscow and Tehran. I feel that it is of the utmost importance that we should bear in mind that the various differences which inevitably arise in the conduct of international relations should not be permitted to jeopardize the major all important question of cooperation and collaboration among nations which is the only sound basis for a just and lasting peace.

I have given careful consideration to the views of your Government as outlined by Mr. Molotov to Mr. Harriman on January 18⁶⁶ regarding the impossibility from the Soviet point of view of having any dealings with the Polish Government-in-exile in its present form and Mr. Molotov's suggestion that the Polish Government should be reconstituted by the inclusion of Polish elements at present in the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate your desire to deal only with a Polish Government in which you can repose confidence and which can be counted upon to establish permanent friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but it is my earnest hope that while this problem remains unsolved neither party shall by hasty word or unilateral act transform this special question into one adversely affecting the larger issues of future international collaboration. While public opinion is forming in support of the principle of international collaboration, it is especially incumbent upon us to avoid any action which might appear to counteract the achievement of our long-range objective. I feel I should ill serve our common interest if I failed to bring these facts to your attention.

Prime Minister Churchill tells me that he is endeavoring to persuade the Polish Prime Minister to make a clean-cut acceptance as a basis for negotiation of the territorial changes which have been proposed by your Government. Is it not possible on that basis to arrive

⁶⁶ See telegram 183, January 18, midnight, from Moscow, p. 1230.

at some answer to the question of the composition of the Polish Government which would leave it to the Polish Prime Minister himself to make such changes in his Government as may be necessary without any evidence of pressure or dictation from a foreign country?

As a matter of timing it seems to me that the first consideration at this time should be that Polish guerillas should work with and not against your advancing troops. That is of current importance and some assurance on the part of all Poles would be of great advantage as a first step.

ROOSEVELT

760C.61/2203b : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁶⁷

I share your concern over the potential dangers of the present Polish-Soviet situation, and I understand the spirit in which you sent your number 33 to U. J.⁶⁸ Isn't there a possibility that the wording of paragraphs 7 and 8 will give him the impression that you are wedded to the present personalities of the Polish Government-in-exile and are determined to see them reinstated as the future government of Poland? He may interpret this as evidence of a design on your part to see established along the borders of the Soviet Union a government which rightly or wrongly they regard as containing elements irrevocably hostile to the Soviet Union. I know that this is not your intention and that you are only interested in preserving the principle of the right of all countries to choose their government without interference, and specifically to avoid the creation by the Soviet Government of a rival Polish Government. Might it not be well to make this clear to U. J. by some reference to the possibility that the Polish Government would of its own accord, if a real solution on the frontier and other questions with Russia was in the offing, accept the resignation of those persons known to be particularly objectionable to the Soviet Government.

I recognize that because of treaty obligations with both sides you are more directly concerned with the immediate issues between the USSR and Poland. Our primary concern is the potential dan-

⁶⁷This message was sent in telegram 952, February 8, 1944, noon, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, with instructions to deliver it to the Prime Minister. Ambassador Winant replied in telegram 1100, February 9, 6 p. m., that he had that day delivered the message. The Prime Minister had asked that the President be informed that "all this is being pressed forward on the lines you desire and in a few days I will have something further to report to you". (760C.61/2207)

⁶⁸See telegram 557, January 28, from the British Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, p. 1240, which repeated what had been sent to Stalin as telegram No. 33.

gers of this situation to the essential unity which was so successfully established at Moscow and Tehran. It is for this reason that I have confined the official action of this Government to a tender of good offices looking towards the resumption of relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. Feeling, however, that this unity and the larger issues connected therewith are now definitely at stake, I have just sent the following message to U. J.:

[Here follows text of message printed *supra*.]

760C.61/2206 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 8, 1944—midnight.

[Received February 9—11:35 a. m.]

423. For the President and the Secretary only. Molotov told me at lunch today that Stalin had gone to the front. Your cable 236 February 7, 7 p. m.,⁶⁹ arrived this afternoon.

In view of the time given by Stalin's absence, I would appreciate clarification of the meaning of the last sentence. I have been puzzling over it and do not understand the thought it is intended to convey.⁷⁰

I also respectfully make the following suggestions which it appears to me from here would strengthen the presentation of your basic concept and avoid possible misinterpretation: ⁷¹

1. In the second paragraph omit the last sentence beginning "I feel that it is" and ending "for a just and lasting peace". It seems to me that this thought is effectively and adequately expressed in the next paragraph.

2. In the third paragraph change the words "neither party shall by hasty word or unilateral act transform" to read "nothing should be done to transform".

3. In the third paragraph omit the last sentence beginning "I feel I should" and ending "to your attention".

If, on receipt of your reply, I find Stalin has not returned to Moscow, do you wish me to deliver the message to Molotov for forwarding

⁶⁹ See footnote 65, p. 1243.

⁷⁰ The President replied to Ambassador Harriman through Secretary of State Hull in telegram 269, February 9: "This means what it says: The boundaries can be talked about in the next few months, but as the Russian Armies are actually getting into Poland the immediate business is to get them the help of the Poles of all kinds." (760C.61/2206)

⁷¹ These suggestions were approved by the President in Department's telegram 269, February 9, to Moscow, not printed.

to Stalin? Unless Stalin's absence is too protracted I feel there is considerable advantage in awaiting his return in order to get his personal and immediate reaction.⁷²

HARRIMAN

033.60C11/69

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1944.

The Polish Ambassador came in this morning to say that he had been informed by his Government that the Polish Prime Minister expected soon to have another conversation with Mr. Churchill, after which Mr. Mikolajczyk would wish to come to the United States. The Polish Ambassador asked whether he was correct in his understanding that the Polish Prime Minister's visit had been indefinitely postponed by the President and that it would be necessary to take up the question anew in the event of his desiring to come here in the near future. I said that the Ambassador's impression of the present status of the visit was entirely correct—that it had been postponed for an indefinite time.

The Ambassador then stated that his Government desired him to raise the question of whether a new United States Ambassador would be appointed to replace Mr. Biddle, recently resigned.⁷³ He said his Government felt that the absence of a new Ambassador was causing them considerable embarrassment in their present difficult position as this was being interpreted by the Soviet Government, as well as by the German Government to indicate that the United States Government did not consider the Polish Government at the present time worthy of a new Ambassador to replace Mr. Biddle. He said his Government hoped very sincerely that an announcement could shortly be made of the appointment of a new Ambassador even if the new appointee were to remain in the United States and not proceed to his post immediately. The important thing to the Polish Government was the appointment and announcement of such a new Ambassador.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

⁷² Telegram 269 instructed Ambassador Harriman to deliver the message to Molotov with the approved changes for transmission to Stalin upon his return to Moscow. The Ambassador reported in his telegram 462, February 11, that he had fulfilled these instructions (760C.61/2216).

⁷³ Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., resigned on January 22, 1944, from the post of Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile in order to enter military service.

760C.61/2217a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1944—8 p. m.

281. For your background information there are given below paragraphs of three questions asked by the Polish Government and the replies approved by the President to these questions. For reasons of security it is not possible to give you the exact wording of the President's replies which were very carefully worked out.

As a result of recent conversations between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Mikolajczyk during which the former made certain proposals for the settlement of the Polish-Soviet dispute (Churchill's telegram to Stalin, January 28), the Polish Government on January 26 asked that the following three questions be submitted to the President for his consideration and reply :

1. Does the United States Government believe it to be advisable to enter at the present time upon discussions for the final settlement of European territorial problems?

2. In principle is the United States Government prepared to participate in bringing about settlements of this kind and in guaranteeing them?

3. In regard to Mr. Churchill's plan and its realization does the United States Government feel it possible to lend its support to this plan?

The following replies approved by the President were made to the numbered questions asked by the Polish Government :

1. It is well known that the basic position of the United States Government is that general discussions of the various European frontier problems during the period of hostilities against the Axis run the risk of creating confusion and diverting concentration from the principal objective of defeating Germany. It should be understood, however, that this attitude does not preclude the possibility of a direct settlement by mutual accord between any two countries which have mutual territorial problems. In view of recent developments the United States Government recognizes that certain complex and vital considerations may render it desirable for the Government of Poland to endeavor to reach without delay a solution with regard to its territory.

2. In principle the Government of the United States would be prepared through the offer of good offices to the Polish and to the Soviet Governments to assist in helping the Polish Government freely to reach a settlement of its territorial problems by facilitating direct discussions between the Polish and Soviet Governments. Although the Government of the United States would welcome the achievement of a solution by friendly accord of the outstanding questions between Poland and the Soviet Union, the United States Government is not in a position to guarantee any territorial settlement.

3. While, as stated above, there can be no question of guarantees as far as the United States Government is concerned, it is prepared to lend its support to the British Prime Minister's endeavors to bring about the reestablishment of relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments on the basis of a friendly solution of all outstanding difficulties.

STETTINIUS

760C.61/2215 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 11, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

1177. For the President. Your 952 of February 8, and my 1100 of February 9.⁷⁴ I have just received the following message for the President from the Prime Minister:

"I send you herewith the agreed record of our conversation with the Poles last Sunday. I will shortly send you a report on our further talks with them."

The record of the conversation mentioned by the Prime Minister in his message is as follows.

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT CHEQUERS ⁷⁵ ON SUNDAY, 6TH
FEBRUARY 1944 AT 3 P. M.

Present:

The Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill, C. H., M. P., Prime Minister, in the chair.

M. Micolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister.

The Right Honorable Anthony Eden M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

M. Romer, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Lord Cherwell, F.R.S., Paymaster General.

Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador to Great Britain.

Sir Owen O'Malley, British Ambassador to the Polish Government.

Secretariat: Mr. J. R. Colville.

The Prime Minister read the text of his telegram to Marshal Stalin of the 28 January (No. 227 to Moscow), in which he had said that the Polish Ministers were far from rejecting the proposals put forward, but that after considering them, they had asked a number of questions which he had agreed to pass on to Marshal Stalin.

⁷⁴ See footnote 67, p. 1245.

⁷⁵ The country residence of British Prime Ministers.

Mr. Churchill then referred to the American attitude, which he summarized as follows: There could be no legal bond, as far as the U.S. was concerned. This certainly did not mean that American aid would be withheld, and he asked the Poles to work on the basis that the U. S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. would cooperate for many years to come in the task of maintaining world order and unity.

Mr. Eden read out extracts from Sir A. Clark Kerr's⁷⁶ telegrams numbers 281 and 282 of the 3rd February, in which the Ambassador described his discussion with Marshal Stalin of the Prime Minister's message of the 28 January. He pointed out that Stalin had, without hesitation, answered the five questions put by the Polish Government and contained in the Prime Minister's message. Marshal Stalin had said:

(a) That, after the war, Poland would certainly be free and independent, as much so as Czechoslovakia, and he would not try to influence either country's choice of government.

(b) That, if Poland required a guarantee from Russia, one would be given.

(c) That Poland could count upon all Russian help in expelling the Germans.

(d) That all Poles would be free to move out of the former Polish territory assigned to Russia, and the same facilities should apply to Ukrainians at present west of the Curzon line.

(e) The Polish Government would be allowed to return to Poland and establish a broad based government, which could function administratively in the liberated areas.

The Prime Minister said that, as regards the underground movement, Stalin maintained that the Polish Government has directed it to refuse cooperation with the Russians. If the movement opposed the Russian troops and partisans, it would be attacked; if it did not, it would receive assistance. The matter would all depend on the attitude of the Polish Government.

M. Micolajczyk said he wanted to clarify the Polish Government's position. He had shown to the British Government the instructions which had originally been sent to the Polish underground movement to the effect that, if relations with Russia were re-established, the movement should come into the open in support of the Soviet troops but that otherwise its members were to remain inactive. Orders to oppose the Russian troops had never been given.

You will now allow me, said M. Micolajczyk, to place before you our information. Our former instructions to the Polish underground movement were to the effect that in case Polish-Soviet relations had not been renewed, at the moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland our underground forces should not come into the open.

⁷⁶ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, we acquired the conviction that the reestablishment of mutual relations was most unlikely, and in this situation the Polish Government addressed an enquiry to the country as to the readiness of the underground movement to disclose its identity even in the absence of Polish-Soviet relations and without regard to the dangers which such a step involved.

The answer received (dated the 28th November, 1943) was that the underground army was ready to come into the open and to meet the requirements of the Soviet commanders.

Mr. Eden attached great importance to this information and asked whether it could be conveyed to the Soviet Government.

M. Micolajczyk expressed his agreement with this. He further explained that the local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian (underground) authority, would receive orders to meet the commander of the incoming Soviet troops and to declare that following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remained faithful, they were ready to join in the fight against the common foe.

The Prime Minister: This is very important. I agree with this line of action.

M. Micolajczyk: There is only one essential reservation. Our underground forces are determined to preserve their own organisation and they are not prepared to join Polish formations created in Russia under the auspices of the so-called Polish Patriots and placed under Berling's command. On the other hand, in order to secure friendly cooperation, Polish detachments, which had in the past had any friction with local Soviet "partisans" have been ordered to move to other districts and change places with other Polish forces free from such disability.

The country is anxiously expecting to receive an ample supply of arms indispensable in view of a general rising behind the lines of the retreating German armies.

M. Micolajczyk handed to the Prime Minister a copy of the telegram received from Warsaw on the 22 January in reply to M. Micolajczyk's speech to the country of the 6th January. He pointed out that the country's willingness to join with the Soviet forces in their fight against Germany was clearly shown in this telegram. But as regards the political aspect it equally clearly showed the country's determination to maintain Poland's territorial integrity. The reply was drafted before the country was informed of the last conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Micolajczyk on the 20 January. The Polish Government withheld its publication in order to avoid difficulties, but the British Government must see in it an indication of the country's opinion.

The Prime Minister: In that case the situation is hopeless. No agreement could be reached on such a basis and the Soviets having occupied the whole of your country will impose their will.

M. Micolajczyk handed over to the Prime Minister a copy of a telegram from Poland received in London on the 27th January 1944 announcing the setting up in Warsaw by the "Polish Workers Party" (Communist) of a "National Council"⁷⁷ in opposition to the Polish underground movement. He considered this move as clearly indicating the real intentions of the Soviet Government with regard to Poland.

The Prime Minister: Yes, this danger exists and will only increase if no agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia is reached.

M. Micolajczyk: I am only placing before you the information I possess: For the time being, i.e., before the "Curzon Line" is crossed by Soviet troops, the Soviets have in view the setting up of a "Committee of National Liberation," composed of Polish pro-Soviet elements in the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and, if possible, also the United Kingdom.

Later, after the Curzon Line is crossed the plan foresees the creation of a "Polish Government" by the "National Council" recently formed in Poland under Moscow's auspices. This information throws a revealing light on the cryptic sentence of Molotov addressed to Ambassador Harriman that the situation had not yet matured for the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations.

Mr. Eden said that this talk about a committee would automatically cease if agreement were reached on the lines of Stalin's latest telegram.

The Prime Minister said that if matters were allowed to drift, such a committee would undoubtedly be established and the Polish Government would have no say in the matter.

M. Micolajczyk: The latest changes introduced in the constitution of the U.S.S.R. finally complete the picture.⁷⁸

M. Micolajczyk recalled the reply given by Mr. Eden on the 1st February to a letter which was addressed to him on the 23rd of January by Ambassador Raczynski on instruction of the Polish Government, and also the memorandum of the 1st February⁷⁹ handed

⁷⁷ The National People's Council (National Council of the Homeland, *Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) was organized in Warsaw during December 1943 and January 1944 "by Democratic partisan groups fighting the German invaders" as a temporary parliament inside the country, the Communist-sponsored rival to the Government-in-Exile at London. Boleslaw Bierut was elected Chairman.

⁷⁸ By decrees of February 1, 1944, approved by the X Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, the constitution was amended to change the People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and Defence from All-Union to Union-Republican commissariats. On the significance of these changes, see vol. iv, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Reports on developments of significance . . ."

⁷⁹ Not found in Department files. The answers were paraphrased to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 281, February 10, p. 1248.

to Ambassador Ciechanowski in Washington in reply to the question[s] put by him to the American Government and pointed out that the Polish Government was not offered guarantees which would protect Poland against imminent dangers and safeguard her independence and sovereignty as well as as the life and property of her inhabitants.

He had already stated that he was willing to enter into discussion on all outstanding questions including frontiers. This in itself had caused serious concern in Polish circles. The acceptance of the "Curzon Line" as a starting point of any discussion would, in fact, constitute dictated terms and would preclude any real negotiation. Such a course could only undermine the Polish Government's authority with the Polish nation and also disrupt the latter's unique solidarity.

The Prime Minister said the Curzon Line was the best that the Poles could expect and all that he would ask the British people to demand on their behalf.

M. Micolajczyk: The Soviet Government invokes the "Curzon Line of 1919". This is confusing. The "line" of 1919 did not extend to former Austrian Galicia.

M. Micolajczyk handed over to the Prime Minister a memorandum on the Curzon Line, together with a map illustrating this subject.

The Prime Minister said the Russians must have Lwow. Przemysl and Bialystok would be left inside Poland.

M. Micolajczyk repeated that the Curzon Line did not apply to Galicia. If he were honestly convinced that the Russians were acting in good faith, he would give the matter more serious consideration. But he was not. If the Russians meant to honour their word, it would be simple for them to bring the Polish Government into negotiations, since they had all the trump cards. He suspected that they were purposely trying to make the Polish Government refuse their terms in advance.

The Prime Minister replied that, had not the Russians won great victories, Poland would have no future at all. If necessary, he was prepared to tell the Russians and the British people what conditions His Majesty's Government would endorse at the peace. He would do his utmost for Poland, but, if he could not reach agreement with the Polish Government, he would have to make his own position clear to the Russians and to come to an understanding with them. For this he would take full responsibility before Parliament and the world.

There were three courses open:—

(1) To make an agreement in which all parties joined.

(2) To make an Anglo-Russian agreement, in which he would endeavour to settle the frontier problem and to procure humane treatment for the Poles.

(3) To do nothing, while the Russian steam roller moved over Poland, a Communist Government was set up in Warsaw and the present Polish Government was left powerless to do anything but make its protests to the world at large.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the second course would be of small value to the Polish Government, as it would preclude their return to Warsaw.

M. Micolajczyk said he must state his case. He was not at all anxious to be left out of the agreement. He had already gone so far as to accept negotiations on all questions, including changes of frontier during the war, and had issued orders to the underground movement to enter into friendly contact with the Russians even though no agreement should be reached. He could not announce that he would accept the Curzon Line and give away Wilno and Lwow.

The Prime Minister said that, in that case, he must look at the matter from the British point of view and make his own agreement with Stalin. He thought that the Polish Government had no grounds for complaint, and he would say so in Parliament. He must frankly say that, while the Polish troops over here, and particularly the air force, had made themselves both loved and respected, the people of Poland had lost their independence more than 150 years ago, and even after its recovery during their short period of freedom had not always had a record of which they could be proud. Now they had a fine opportunity if they were prepared to take it. If they were not, he would certainly make the agreement without them.

Mr. Eden asked whether the Polish Government could not state publicly—

(1) That they would consider the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga as admitting of alteration.

(2) That they wished to be a homogeneous state.

(3) That they would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Curzon Line.

M. Micolajczyk replied that, while it might look as if only the frontier line were in question, he was convinced that his Government were in reality defending the independence of Poland itself.

The Prime Minister said that the Polish Government had no power to defend it. It was arguable whether they had a moral right, since after the last war Poland had occupied Vilna by an act of war against the wishes of the Allied Governments.⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Russians, in view of the blood they had shed, had a moral right to the security of their western frontiers.

⁸⁰ For correspondence concerning the Vilna dispute after World War I, see *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. III, pp. 401-402, 650, 652, and 653; *ibid.*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 871-873.

M. Micolajczyk: The existence of Lithuanian claims to the Polish city and territory of Wilno is no justification for Russian claims to the city.

Mr. Eden said that, if the Polish Government went back to Warsaw, they would do so under joint Anglo-Russian auspices. The Russian guarantee would be underwritten by His Majesty's Government. How could this be called sacrificing the independence of Poland?

M. Micolajczyk restated the impossibility of accepting the Curzon Line. Perhaps a solution might be found on the basis of a demarcation line within which the Polish administration would be set up immediately after the liberation of the territory from German occupation. The fixing of the Polish-Soviet frontier would be left over to be decided after the conclusion of hostilities.

The Prime Minister then informed the Polish Government that Marshal Stalin demanded Königsberg and the part of East Prussia lying to the east of it.

M. Micolajczyk said this showed that the Russian scale of demands was increasing and would increase. They started asking for the Curzon Line, then for a change in the Polish Government, and now for half of East Prussia.

The Prime Minister replied that Poland had taken many wrong turns in her history and that a refusal now might be the most fatal and disastrous of all.

If the Poles turned down this offer, he would certainly explain their views to the Soviet Government but he would also state the British view and would make the separate agreement of which he had spoken. If the Soviet Government should refuse to guarantee Poland her rights, her independence and adequate territory, he would certainly resist. But he would not exert the strength of Britain for Poland's exact frontiers; he was struggling for the life of the Polish nation and for a home for the Polish people. These were the great objectives.

M. Micolajczyk said that to adopt a demarcation line for the duration of the war might be a solution justified by circumstances. If this were impracticable and no agreement could be reached, he hoped that Mr. Churchill would do everything in his power to help ameliorate the position of those in Poland.

The Prime Minister read Marshal Stalin's reply to his message of the 28th January. The following points arose:

(1) Marshal Stalin was incorrect in stating that the Polish Government continued to declare the Riga Treaty frontier unalterable. The Polish Government had agreed to discuss all problems, including that of frontiers.

(2) Mr. Churchill suggested the Polish Government should make a declaration that the Riga Treaty admitted of alteration, and that in

principle they agreed the Curzon Line should form the basis of discussion subject to ethnographical modifications.

(3) Mr. Churchill emphasized the advantages which Poland would derive from possessing nearly 250 miles of Baltic seaboard and the town of Danzig. This was a fair healthy and wholesome offer. To refuse it would be a mistake comparable to the use in former times of the "liberum veto" in the Polish Parliament.⁸¹

(4) The demands for a reconstitution of the Polish Government were trifles compared with frontier question, and would fade away if the latter were settled. If M. Mikolajczyk made changes in his Government, they would not be dictated but would be decisions taken in consultation with Poland's friends and allies.

(5) Poland was to be a strong free independent state. This was a line on which the Prime Minister could bind the Russians down. He could obtain a firm engagement for Poland similar to the Anglo-Russian 20 years treaty.⁸²

The Prime Minister asked the Polish Ministers to think carefully over what had been said. They had these alternatives: A fine land of security and peace, or the certainty either that an Anglo-Russian agreement would be made apart from the Polish Government, or that things would be left to drift into chaos.

M. Mikolajczyk said he understood Marshal Stalin's conclusions to be that:

(1) The Polish Government must announce that they did not consider the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga to be unalterable.

(2) They must recognize the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier.

(3) Marshal Stalin did not recognize the present composition of the Polish Government.

He had done [as much as he could?] but he could not go so far as was proposed without abandoning Poland's moral right and losing the support of his people.

The Prime Minister said that he intended, in consultation with Mr. Eden, to draw up a note stating the kind of proposition to be made to the Soviet Government. He asked the Polish Government to consider this note and, if they wished, to draw up alternative proposals for submission to His Majesty's Government. If the Polish Government

⁸¹ The *Liberum veto* was a parliamentary practice in 17th and 18th century Poland by which unanimity of votes for or against a question was required for decisions of the Polish diet.

⁸² The Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union was signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. corv, p. 353; for draft of treaty and subsequent changes, see telegrams 2897, May 24, 1942, and 2922, May 26, 1942, from London, *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively. For correspondence regarding the conversations leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see *ibid.*, pp. 490-566, *passim*.

finally refused to join in this approach to Marshal Stalin he would, with Cabinet concurrence, take the necessary action himself.

M. Micolajczyk reminded the Prime Minister of the urgent need of supplying the Polish underground army with arms indispensable in view of the general rising against the Germans, the time of which was approaching.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government had already decided to treble for the next 3 months the load to be carried to Poland by air in order to hasten the fulfilment of the agreed programme.

M. Micolajczyk expressed his thanks for this decision.

WINANT

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁸³

[Translation]

I have received your message on the Polish question. It goes without saying that a correct solution of this question is of great importance for us as well as for our common cause.

There are two principal points: first—the Soviet-Polish border, second—the composition of the Polish Government. The point of view of the Soviet Government is known to you from the recently issued statements and from Mr. Molotov's letter⁸⁴ sent in reply to Mr. Hull's note received in Moscow on January 22 through Soviet Ambassador Gromyko.⁸⁵

First of all about the Soviet-Polish border. As it is known, the Soviet Government officially stated that it did not consider the border line of 1939 inalterable and has agreed to the Curzon line, thus having made considerable concessions to the Poles in the border question. We had the right to expect an appropriate statement from the Polish Government. The Polish Government should have made an official statement that the border line established by the Riga Treaty was subject to change and that the Curzon line was being accepted by it as the new border line between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Such a statement of recognition of the Curzon line should have been made by the Polish Government in the same official manner as it was done by the Soviet Government. None the less the Polish Government in

⁸³ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁸⁴ Not printed; Ambassador Gromyko transmitted this letter on January 24. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union had already reported on his interview with Molotov in telegram 183, January 18, p. 1230.

⁸⁵ Not printed; the contents of this note had been sent to Ambassador Harri-man with instructions to "take up the matter with the Soviet Government", in telegram 88, January 15, p. 1228.

London did not make any move, stating, as before, in its official declarations that the border line, which was forced upon us at a difficult moment by the Riga Treaty, should remain inalterable. Hence there is no ground for an agreement, as the point of view of the present Polish Government, as it appears, excludes the possibility of an agreement.

In connection with the above-mentioned circumstances the question regarding the composition of the Polish Government became more acute. Besides, it is clear that the Polish Government, in which the principal role is played by hostile to the Soviet Union pro-fascist imperialist elements, such as Sosnkovsky, and in which there are almost no democratic elements, can find no ground in Poland itself, and cannot, as experience has shown, establish friendly relations with Soviet democratic states. Naturally, such a Polish government is not in a condition to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and it is impossible to expect from it that it will not introduce dissensions into the midst of the democratic countries, which, on the contrary, are interested in the strengthening of unity among themselves. It follows from the above that the basic improvement of the Polish government appears to be an urgent task.

I was late with the reply in view of tasks at the front.

FEBRUARY 16, 1944.

800.00 Summaries/9w : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1944—7 p. m.

364. For your information only the following is a summary of two resolutions adopted by the Polish Cabinet on February 15 which were communicated to Prime Minister Churchill on February 18:

Resolution Number 1: The Government of Poland in its declaration of January 14 stated that it was ready to take up conversations with the Soviet Government together with the British and American Governments participating in discussing all outstanding questions in order to reach a settlement which would lead to permanent and friendly cooperation between the Soviet Union and Poland.

In this statement the Government of Poland did not exclude territorial matters from such conversations with it being understood that these would extend to the northern, western and eastern frontiers of Poland.

The dictated demand of the Soviet Government to the effect that the Polish Government should agree to the so-called Curzon Line as the future Soviet-Polish frontier is not acceptable to the Government

of Poland. Only after the war can the final results of conversations regarding frontiers be effected. However, immediately, during the course of the war—a line of demarcation passing to the east of the cities of Lwow and Vilno should be agreed to with the Polish Government who would consult in this matter with the Polish Underground authorities. The Polish authorities would take over the administration of the territories liberated from German occupation to the west of this line of demarcation; in regard to areas to the east of this line, they would be administered, for the time being, by the Red Army authorities working with the participation of other United Nations representatives. It is the duty of the Government of Poland to state that it considers it contrary to the interests of the Polish State to grant to the Soviet Union a part of East Prussia including the port of Koenigsberg since this would limit to a great extent the free access to the sea by Poland.

Resolution Number 2: Changes in personnel in the composition of the Polish Government and of the Polish High Command cannot be made dependent upon demands of a foreign state.

STEFANINIUS

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁸⁶

LONDON, 20 February, 1944.

585. My immediately preceding telegram.⁸⁷ Following is text of telegram which I have sent to Marshal Stalin.

1. The Foreign Secretary and I have had numerous long discussions with the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I shall not attempt to repeat all the arguments which were used but only to give what I conceive to be the position of the Polish Government in the upshot.

2. The Polish Government are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities and with our participation to discuss with the Soviet Government as part of the general settlement a new frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union together with the future frontiers of Poland in the north and west. Since however the compensations which Poland is to receive in the north and west cannot be stated publicly or precisely at present time the Polish Government clearly cannot make an immediate public declaration of their willing-

⁸⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁸⁷ In telegram 584, February 20, 1944, the Prime Minister said that this telegram to Stalin had been "textually agreed with the Poles" and he called the attention of the President to the fact that it achieved, without actually saying so, the essentials of "the settlement outlined at Teheran". The Prime Minister then added: "Anything you can do to commend its acceptance to the Soviet Government will be of great assistance."

ness to cede territory as indicated above because the publication of such an arrangement would have an entirely onesided appearance with the consequence that they would immediately be repudiated not only by a large part of their people abroad but by the underground movement in Poland with which they are in constant contact. It is evident therefore that the Polish-Soviet territorial settlement which must be an integral part of the general territorial settlement of Europe could only formally be agreed and ratified when the victorious Powers are gathered round the table at the time of an armistice or peace.

3. For the above reasons the Polish Government until it has returned to Polish Territory and been allowed to consult the Polish People can obviously not formally abdicate its rights in any part of Poland as hitherto constituted but the vigorous prosecution of the war against Germany in collaboration with the Soviet Armies would be greatly assisted if the Russian Government will facilitate the return of the Polish Government to the territory of liberated Poland at the earliest possible moment: and in consultation with their British and American Allies as the Russian Armies advance arrange from time to time with the Polish Government for the establishment of the Civil Administration of the Polish Government in given districts. This procedure would be in general accordance with those to be followed in the case of other countries as they are liberated. The Polish Government are naturally very anxious that the districts to be placed under Polish Civil Administration should include such places as Vilna and Lwow, where there are large concentrations of Poles, and that the territories to the east of the demarkation line should be administered by the Soviet Military Authorities with the assistance of representatives of the United Nations. They point out that thus they would be in the best position to enlist all such able bodied Poles in the war effort. I have informed them and they clearly understand that you will not assent to leaving Vilna and Lwow under Polish administration. I wish on the other hand to be able to assure them that the area to be placed under Polish Civil Administration will include at least all Poland west of the Curzon Line.

4. At the frontier negotiations contemplated in paragraph 2 above, the Polish Government, taking into consideration the mixed character of the population of eastern Poland, would favour a frontier drawn with a view to assuring the highest degree of homogeneity on both sides while reducing as much as possible the extent and hardships of an exchange of populations. I have no doubt myself, especially in view of the immediate practical arrangements contemplated by the Polish Government as set out in paragraph 3 above, that these negotiation[s] will inevitably lead to the conclusion you desire in regard to the future Polish-Soviet frontier, but it seems to me unnecessary and undesirable publicly to emphasize this at this stage.

5. As regards the war with Germany which they wish to prosecute with the utmost vigour, the Polish Government realise that it is imperative to have a working agreement with the Soviet Government in view of the advance of the liberating Russian Armies onto Polish soil from which these armies are driving the German invader. They assure me emphatically that they have at no time given instructions to the Underground Movement to attack "Partisans". On the contrary, after consultation with the leaders of their Underground Movement and with their accord they have issued orders to all Poles now in arms or about to revolt against the Hitlerite tyranny as follows:— When the Russian Army enters any particular district in Poland the Underground Movement is to disclose its identity and meet the requirements of the Soviet Commanders, even in the absence of a resumption of Polish-Soviet relations. The local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian Underground Authority, will meet and declare to the Commander of the incoming Soviet Troops that, following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remain faithful, they are ready to coordinate their actions with him in the fight against the common foe. These orders which are already in operation seem to me, as I am sure they will to you, of the highest significance and importance.

6. For the first time on February 6th I told the Polish Government that the Soviet Government wished to have the frontier in east Prussia drawn to include, on the Russian side, Königsberg. The information came as a shock to the Polish Government who see in such a decision a substantial reduction in the size and in economic importance of the German territory to be incorporated in Poland by war [*way?*] of compensation. But I stated that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government this was a rightful claim on the part of Russia. Regarding as I do this war against German aggression as all one and as a 30 years' war from 1914 onwards I reminded Monsieur Micolajczyk of the fact that the soil of this part of east Prussia was dyed with Russian blood expended freely in the common cause. Here the Russian Armies advancing in August 1914 and winning the battle of Gumbinnen⁸⁸ and other actions had, with their forward thrusts and with much injury to their mobilization, forced the Germans to recall two Army Corps from the advance on Paris, which withdrawal was an essential part in the victory of the Marne.⁸⁹ The disaster at Tannenberg⁹⁰ did not in any way undo this great result. Therefore it seemed to me that the Russians had an historic and well founded claim to this German territory.

⁸⁸ A significant Russian victory over the Germans, August 19-20, 1914.

⁸⁹ During the period between September 5 and 12, 1914, the German advance into France was here thrust back.

⁹⁰ The complete defeat of a Russian army occurred here between August 26 and 30, 1914.

7. As regards the composition of the Polish Government, the Polish Government cannot admit any right of a foreign intervention. They can however assure the Russian Government that by the time they have entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, they will include among themselves none but persons fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union. I am of opinion that it is much better that such changes should come about naturally and as a result of further Polish consideration of their interests as a whole. It might well be, in my opinion, that the moment for a resumption of these relations in a formal manner would await the reconstitution of a Polish Government at the time of the liberation of Warsaw, when it would arise naturally from the circumstances attending that glorious event.

8. It would be in accordance with assurances I have received from you that, in an agreement covering the points made above, the Soviet Government should join with His Majesty's Government in undertaking vis-à-vis each other and Poland first to recognize and respect the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of the reconstituted Poland and the right of each to conduct its domestic affairs without interference: secondly, to do their best to secure in due course the incorporation in Poland of the free city of Danzig, Oppeln, Silesia, East Prussia, west and south of a line running from Königsberg and of as much territory up to the Oder as the Polish Government see fit to accept: thirdly, to effect the removal from Poland, including the German territories to be incorporated in Poland of the German population: and fourthly, to negotiate the procedure for an exchange of population between Poland [and] the Soviet Union, and for the return to their mother country of nationals of the powers in question. All the above undertakings to each Kingdom should, in my view, be drawn up in such a form that they could be embodied in a single instrument or exchange of letters.

9. I informed the Polish Ministers that should the settlement which has now been outlined in the various telegrams that have passed between us become a fact and be observed in the spirit by all parties to it, His Majesty's Government would support that settlement at the conference after the defeat of Hitler, and also, that we would guarantee that settlement in after years to the best of our ability.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹¹

LONDON, 21 February, 1944.

587. 1. My telegram number 585. While the Polish Ministers cannot formally authorise us to proceed on this basis, they are ready that we should do so on their behalf and assure us that they will not sub-

⁹¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

sequently disavow our actions. For the reasons explained in my message they cannot however themselves come out formally and publicly at this stage in the sense of this message. There is the further difficulty that three of the four parties represented in the Polish Government, i.e. all except the Peasant Party, refuse to authorise Monsieur Mikolajczyk to go as far as we would have wished. The present proposals therefore represent agreement with Monsieur Mikolajczyk, Monsieur Romer and Count Raczynski for which they would hope subsequently to secure the support of the Polish Government and the Polish underground movement in Poland if it proves acceptable to U.J.

2. You will see that my message goes very far to meet Soviet requirements in so far as

(1) Orders have already been issued to the Polish underground movement to cooperate with the Soviet forces (see paragraph 5 of my telegram) :

(2) The Polish Government will accept a position under which the Soviet Government hand over to them for administration only those areas of Poland west of the Curzon Line (this abandonment of large Polish agglomerations in Vilna and Lwow areas means a great sacrifice to them) :

(3) The Polish Government agree and are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities. They realise that while reserving their formal rights their acceptance of a demarkation line based on the Curzon Line in fact prejudices the future frontier about which they are ready and indeed anxious to open negotiations soon. It has been made very clear to the Polish Ministers in this connection that His Majesty's Government regard the Curzon Line as the appropriate future frontier and will support this at the postwar settlement.

3. Clark Kerr has been instructed to emphasize the above points when communicating my message to U.J., and also to stress the necessity for reserving the formal settlement of future Polish frontiers until we are in a position to deal with the western and northern as well as the eastern frontiers.

4. Clark Kerr has also been asked to draw Stalin's attention to the great public and parliamentary interest and anxiety here regarding Polish-Soviet relations, pointing out the importance of reaching some early practical arrangements on the lines suggested in my message to calm public anxiety and to avoid grave embarrassment to the United Nations war effort as a whole. Ambassador is to add that we also have to consider the effect of what we are now doing upon the Polish divisions which have now gone into action in Italy or are preparing to go into action from the United Kingdom and upon the Polish Air squadrons and Navy who have already rendered notable services to the United Nations.

5. Instructions to Clark Kerr conclude: The Polish Ministers have recently shown great restraint by refusing to enter into polemics as a result of the bitter and unjustified attacks upon them in the recent *Pravda* article. They are showing realism and courage in enabling us to proceed on the present basis despite the contrary view held by large sections of the Polish Government and population in Poland and abroad and despite their own misgivings regarding the overwhelming Soviet power. We doubt very much whether we can push them any further and we should feel alarmed about the effect upon opinion here and in the USA, and therefore upon the United Nations war effort, of a Soviet refusal to give sympathetic consideration to the present proposals. You should make use of the above arguments in you[r] representations to Marshal Stalin.

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*⁹²

The text of the Prime Minister's message of Feb. 20 to you on the subject of a tentative settlement of the Polish post-war boundary by an agreement between the Soviet and Polish Governments is known to me.

If accepted, the Prime Minister's suggestion goes far toward furthering our prospects of an early defeat of Germany and I am pleased to recommend that you give favorable and sympathetic consideration to it.

I think, as I intimated before, that the most realistic problem is to be assured that when you get into Poland your armies will be assisted by the Poles.

760C.61/2239 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 3, 1944—midnight.

[Received March 4—10 a. m.]

716. Personal for the President and the Acting Secretary. I was asked to call on Stalin this evening. Stalin again made it plain that he would not deal with the Polish Government in London as now constituted. Although at one point he indicated that he would deal with

⁹² On February 22, 1944, Ambassador Harriman telegraphed to President Roosevelt that he would hold up delivery of this message until Stalin returned to Moscow, so that it would be received just before a message from Prime Minister Churchill would be delivered by the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. The next day the President telegraphed approval of this postponement. The message was received by Stalin on February 28.

them if the Government was reorganized he later stated that he considered they were fooling Churchill and that he did not believe Churchill would be able to accomplish anything.

I explained to him your concern over the reaction in America and asked him what alternatives he had in mind. He stated that the Poles were welcoming the Red Army as it advanced and would continue to do so. Either Mikolajczyk's Government would change or another Government would emerge in Poland. Although I pressed him he did not indicate that he had any moves in mind at this time except to say that Molotov had already given me in January his suggestions for a possible solution.

I explained that, as you had indicated, this proposal would not be a representative government but would be a hand-picked group with no popular movement behind it. He replied that there were no grounds for this assumption saying "Poland needs democrats who will look after the interests of the people, not Tory landlords".

I explained that what was uppermost in your mind was that all Poles should join in assisting the Red Army rather than for a situation to develop which would lead to civil war. He said that there was no danger of this as Mikolajczyk had no armed forces of any size in Poland and the landlords would not be re-admitted. They would be the only ones to create disorder and revolution.

When Stalin said that the Polish Government in London were a group of *émigrés* who did not represent their people I asked him what information he had about the sentiments of the Poles within Poland toward the London Government. He said that the attitude was negative and Molotov would give me such detailed information as was available.

In reply to my question as to the size of the Polish underground forces he said that he couldn't answer exactly but their numbers were not great and "they (the Polish Government) have a few agents."

I expressed the belief that we all had the same eventual objective of a democratic government through the free choice of the Polish people and raised the question of how he thought this objective could be reached. He replied he didn't know how the situation would work out, circumstances would show.

He referred to his request which had been submitted to you by Ambassador Gromyko to allow Lange and Orlemanski to come to Russia and asked whether I had your answer. As I had not heard of this request I was unable to reply. I asked him what he hoped would be accomplished by this visit to which he replied that they would meet the Poles in Moscow, find out what was going on in Poland from information here, look the situation over and return to the United States.

In closing the conversation on this subject I said that I understood he would await developments and take no immediate action to which he replied that the time was not ripe. I reemphasized the unfavorable public reaction created in America. He remarked that he was concerned about public opinion here. When I commented that he was skillful in dealing with public opinion he replied "we have had three revolutions in a generation."

HARRIMAN

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁹³

[Translation]

Despite the strongest desire on my part to consider favorably the familiar to you message regarding the Poles, addressed to me by Mr. Churchill, I have to state, that the emigrant Polish Government does not want the establishment of normal relations with the U.S.S.R.⁹⁴ It is sufficient to say, that the Polish emigrants in London not only reject the Curzon line, but lay claim to Lwow and Vilno (capital of Lithuania).

It is necessary therefore to state, that the solution of the question regarding Polish-Soviet relations has not ripened yet. For your orientation I am enclosing a copy of my reply to Mr. Churchill⁹⁵ regarding the said matter.

[Moscow,] March 3, 1944.

860C.515/116

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)*⁹⁶

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1944.

Pursuant to our conversation this morning I enclose herewith the original copy of a letter⁹⁷ received from Mr. Karpinski⁹⁸ with which

⁹³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation at the end of this letter, dated March 15, reads: "The President says 'No reply necessary' —".

⁹⁴ Ambassador Harriman reported in telegram 821, March 12, 1944, that a colleague had told him that he had learned that "most of the members of the Polish Government were much pleased that Stalin has declined Churchill's proposal for settlement of the Soviet Polish controversy" and that "the Polish Government had agreed to go along with it only under the most extreme pressure from Eden" (760C.61/2247).

⁹⁵ In this reply Stalin further stated: (Translation) "As regards the desire to put under foreign control the administration of certain Soviet territories, we are unable to accept such wishes for discussion, because even the raising of that kind of a question we consider as insulting to the Soviet Union."

⁹⁶ Addressed to Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long and David M. Key, assistant liaison officer in the office of the Secretary of State.

⁹⁷ Not printed.

⁹⁸ Zygmunt Karpinski, Director of the Bank of Poland.

he gives assurances that the Polish gold⁹⁹ to be transported to the United States is ready for shipment from Dakar and that arrangements have been made with the Federal Reserve Bank to insure each shipment for the amount of \$3,125,000.¹

I have been assured by Mr. Kwapiszewski,² the Chargé d'Affaires a.i., that he will execute the waiver of responsibility certificate and send it to me within the next two days.

You may care to pass this information on to the Navy Department.

ELBRIDGE DUBROW

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*³

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1944.

The United States Government continues to recognize the Polish Government as the legal Government of Poland and no efforts have been made to bring any pressure on this Government to change its composition because of pressure from any foreign government since such action would be interference in the internal affairs of a friendly government. Prior to the termination of hostilities when the Polish people will be in a position freely to express their will, there would appear to be no reason for the United States Government to recognize any other government which may be set up as representative of the Polish people.

The United States Government has offered its good offices to the Polish and Soviet Governments for the purpose of reestablishing diplomatic relations between them, and this offer is still open to acceptance by both parties.

In regard to the territorial question it is the basic position of the United States Government that general discussions of the many European frontier questions during the period of hostilities against the Axis would run the risk of creating confusion and diverting concentration on the over-all objective of defeating Germany. It is felt, therefore, that a settlement of these problems should by their very nature be postponed until the termination of hostilities. If, however, the Polish Government should deem it advisable to attempt reaching a solution of the territorial dispute with the Soviet Government, the United States Government has indicated that it would, in principle,

⁹⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 443, and footnote 4, p. 444.

¹ The total amount of gold to be shipped was held in 445 cases containing gold bars and coin valued at approximately \$27,200,000.

² Michal Kwapiszewski, Counselor of the Polish Embassy in Washington, who held the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

³ Prepared in the Division of Eastern European Affairs in connection with the departure for London of Under Secretary of State Stettinius for discussions with members of the British Government, held April 7-29, 1944.

be prepared to assist through the offer of its good offices to facilitate direct discussions between the Polish and Soviet Governments. In any event it has been made clear to the Polish Government that the United States Government cannot give guarantees for any solution which may be reached.

It would be difficult for the United States Government to give its official approval to any territorial settlement which might be reached between the British and Soviet Governments without the participation of the Polish Government regarding the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union. Moreover, if the British Government should desire that the United States Government bring pressure on the Polish Government to change its composition to conform to the wishes of the Soviet Union, it is not felt that the United States Government could acquiesce in this matter since, as indicated above, any such arrangement would undoubtedly be considered to be interference in the internal affairs of a foreign state on behalf of a third power.

On the positive side, pending a final solution of these problems after hostilities, the United States Government should continue to use its influence wherever possible to bring about a resumption of relations between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Government in order to heal this breach in United Nations unity and bring the full weight of all allied nations to bear against our common enemy.

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁴

[Translation]

Recently I received from you two messages on the Polish question and have acquainted myself with Mr. Kerr's statement to Mr. Molotov, made on your instructions on the same question. I could not give a timely reply as the matters at the front frequently distract me from non-military questions.

I give answers to questions inherent.

It stands out that your message as well as, and particularly, Kerr's statement are interspersed with threats in regard the Soviet Union. I should like to draw your attention to this fact as the method of threats is not only incorrect in the relationship of the Allies but is harmful, as it can bring about reverse results.

The efforts of the Soviet Union in the matter of defending and realization of the Curzon line you qualified, in one of your messages, as a policy of force. This means that now you try to qualify the

⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Stalin sent this copy to President Roosevelt.

Curzon line as not rightful and the fight for it as unjust. I cannot at all agree with that position. I cannot but remind you that in Teheran you, the President and I came to an agreement regarding the rightfulness of the Curzon line.

You considered then the position of the Soviet Government on this question as entirely correct, and you called the representatives of the emigrant Polish Government insane if they reject the Curzon line. But now you are defending something entirely opposite. Does not that mean that you do not recognize any more the matters we agreed upon in Teheran and that by doing this you are breaking the Teheran Agreement? I do not doubt that if you had continued to stand firmly on your Teheran position the conflict with the Polish emigrant Government would have already been solved. As to me and the Soviet Government, we shall continue to stand on the Teheran position and do not think to depart from it, as we consider that the realization of the Curzon line is not a manifestation of a policy of force but is a manifestation of reestablishment of lawful rights of the Soviet Union to those lands which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied powers still in 1919 recognized as non-Polish.

You state in your message of March 7 that the question of the Soviet-Polish border should be postponed until the peace conference. I think that we have here a certain misunderstanding. The Soviet Union is not at war and does not intend to fight against Poland. The Soviet Union has no conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an Ally of Poland and the Polish people. That is why the Soviet Union is shedding blood for the liberation of Poland from German oppression. Therefore it would be strange to talk about armistice between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. But the Soviet Government has a conflict with the emigrant Polish Government which is not expressing the interests of the Polish people and does not express its hopes. It would be the stranger to identify with Poland the separated from Poland emigrant Polish Government in London. It is difficult for me even to point out a difference between the emigrant Government of Poland and the like emigrant Government of Yugoslavia, as well as between certain generals of the Polish emigrant Government and the Serbian General Mikhailovich.⁵

In your message of March 21 you inform me that you intend to speak before the House of Commons and make a statement that all questions regarding territorial changes should be postponed until armistice or peace conference of the victorious powers and that until then you cannot recognize any transference of territory *effected by force*. As I understand it, you are showing the Soviet Union as a

⁵ Draza Mihailovich, Yugoslav guerrilla leader of the Chetniks, Minister of War in the Yugoslav Government in Exile.

hostile to Poland power and are practically renouncing the liberative character of war of the Soviet Union against German aggression. This is equal to the effort to ascribe the Soviet Union things that do not exist in reality and thus discredit it. I do not doubt that the people of the Soviet Union and the world public opinion will regard such a speech of yours as an undeserved insult to the Soviet Union.

Of course, you are free to make any speech in the House of Commons—this is your affair. But if you make such a speech I shall consider that you have committed an act of injustice and unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union.

In your message you express the hope that the failure of the Polish question will not influence our cooperation in other spheres. As to me, I stood and continue to stand for cooperation. But I am afraid that the method of threats and discreditation, if it will be used in the future as well, will not favor this cooperation.

MARCH 23, 1944.

860C.01/716

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State*⁶

49-N/SZ-t/3

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1944.

SIR: In view of the approach of the decisive and final phase of the war and of the time when the Germans will be expelled from Poland, the Polish Government deem it indispensable, apart from the questions of military and administrative nature which have already formed the subject of communications on their part, to draw the attention of the United States Government to an important aspect of the problems likely to arise on the cessation of hostilities, a timely and proper solution of which may favorably influence the post-war settlement.

The Polish Government have been authoritatively informed by the British Government that the question of the presence of Allied troops on Polish territories after the cessation of hostilities, and the problem of the occupation of German territories by Allied troops were not, so far, dealt with in conversations between the Government of Great Britain, the United States of America and Soviet Russia and that in any case no decisions have as yet been made in this respect binding the three Powers. As these problems vitally affect Polish interests the Polish Government are of the opinion that they are justified in expecting that decisions concerning these problems will not be taken

⁶ In a covering note of the same date the Polish Ambassador informed the Secretary that an identical message had been given to the British Government on April 13.

without their participation. They further consider that the time has now come for their examination and settlement.

In consideration of the above the Polish Government take the liberty to present their views on the subject:

a) As a result of military operations against the German army, the Soviet armies are likely to enter a major part or perhaps the whole territories of the Polish Republic. From the moment of the cessation of hostilities there will exist no valid reasons for the remaining of the Soviet troops on Polish territories, i.e. Allied territories. The Polish Government, therefore, expect the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territories immediately after the cessation of hostilities against Germany.

However, apart from the fact whether at the time of the cessation of hostilities Soviet troops will be present on the whole or only on a part of Polish territories as a result of military operations, the Soviet Government may claim that some lines of communication between the armies occupying Germany and the territory of Soviet Russia should remain for a given time at their disposal on Polish territory for the transit of their troops. Should such a demand be made by the Soviet Government it ought, in the opinion of the Polish Government, immediately to become the subject of an agreement between the Polish Government and other interested Allied Governments, similarly to the question of the presence of American and British troops on the territories of France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, which has already become the subject of inter-Allied negotiations.⁷ In the event of such negotiations, the Polish Government would suggest that these specially reserved lines of communication in Poland should be placed under the joint control of the military authorities of Allied Powers including Poland, with the effective participation of United States and British forces.

b) The Polish Government are also deeply concerned with the solution of the question of the occupation by Allied troops of the German Reich.

The Polish Government would be desirous that Poland's vital interests in this matter, present and future, should be taken into special consideration and that Polish troops and administrative organs be entrusted with the occupation in a part of German territories, and particularly in regions immediately contiguous to the Polish State.

In the light of what has been laid out above, the Polish Government would consider as very useful an early exchange of views with the United States Government on the subjects involved.⁸

Accept [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

⁷ For references to agreements between the United States and these countries on questions of military and civil affairs, see pp. 730, 296, 1191, and 1187, respectively.

⁸ The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Charles E. Bohlen, wrote a memorandum on July 1, 1944, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs, James C. Dunn, in which he stated that in view of the conversations which in the meanwhile had occurred between Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and President Roosevelt (see *infra*, and pp. 1280-1282 and 1285-1289), he did not believe that "any specific reply is necessary or possible at the present time". In the margin Mr. Dunn wrote "I agree", and he underlined the words "or possible" in the memorandum.

860C.002/5-2444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1944.

Participants: Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski; Charles E. Bohlen, Chief, EE,⁹ and Mr. Durbrow, EE.

At Mr. Dunn's request I saw the Polish Ambassador this morning to tell him that the President had invited Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to come to the United States on June 6.¹⁰ The Ambassador expressed great gratification at this news and said that he thought this visit would be extremely helpful.

I asked the Ambassador how long he thought the Prime Minister would be here, and he said that he understood he would not stay in the United States more than a week. The Ambassador went on to say that as he had already told Mr. Dunn, the Prime Minister would make no public speeches nor meet with any groups of Polish-Americans in the United States and in general would exercise the utmost discretion in order not to have his visit become involved in internal political matters.

I told the Ambassador that I thought that was a very wise decision since there would undoubtedly be groups in the United States who would be quick to seize upon any indication that the Prime Minister's visit in this country was connected with Polish groups in America or the coming election. I added that the Polish Information Center and any Polish organization in the United States should be equally careful to avoid creating any wrong impression of the purposes of the Prime Minister's visit.

The Ambassador assured me that in so far as any official Polish organization in this country was concerned this would be so.

The Ambassador then said that he hoped to avoid in every way any premature publicity in regard to the Prime Minister's visit and hoped that every precaution would be taken to this end. He felt that the first news of the Prime Minister's visit should be made after his arrival here by the White House or the Department of State. I assured the Ambassador that no word of the Prime Minister's impending visit

⁹ Division of Eastern European Affairs.

¹⁰ The Department of State in Polish Series telegram 15, May 23, 1944, instructed the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile at London to extend the invitation to Premier Mikolajczyk (033.60C11/73). The Chargé replied in Polish Series telegram 48, May 27 (033.60C11/74%), that the invitation was accepted and that Mikolajczyk would arrive by June 6. He would be accompanied by Gen. Stanislaw Tabor, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Polish Underground Army; Witold Kulerski, member of the Polish National Council in London; and Josef Zaranski, Counselor of the Polish Embassy in the United Kingdom.

would come from the Department of State and that every precaution would of course be taken to avoid premature publicity.

The Ambassador then asked if it would not be possible to have the Prime Minister come from England and return by Air Transport Command as he felt that this would be the quickest, safest and generally most desirable. I told the Ambassador that we would be glad to take up this question with ATC and that I anticipated no difficulty in this regard particularly since the Prime Minister was coming as a guest of the President.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

860C.01/732 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 1, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

50 Poles. President Raczkiewicz has agreed to relieve Sosnkowski of his position as Successor-designate to the President (my 45, May 22¹¹). When this decision will take effect, however, is still uncertain as it has not yet been possible to decide who will be designated for the position. Sosnkowski will retain his position as Commander-in-Chief.

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2346

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador¹² called upon me at my request this morning at 11:30. I explained to him the nature of the Polish Prime Minister's visit to Washington,¹³ the general conversations that we were having and that no new proposals were contemplated by this Government relative to solving the Soviet-Polish difficulties.

The Ambassador appeared to be thoroughly satisfied with my statement and asked whether or not the Polish Prime Minister would be making any statements. I explained it was my belief that he came

¹¹ Not printed; in this telegram the Chargé had reported on disagreements among the Poles in London concerning the continuance in office of General Sosnkowski, and General Marjan Kukiel, the Minister of Defence, against whom opposition had arisen (860C.01/722).

¹² Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

¹³ Prime Minister Mikolaǳczyk arrived in Washington about noon on June 5 and was scheduled to see President Roosevelt on June 7.

with the understanding that he was not to make any speeches and then the Ambassador asked whether or not any joint communiqué would be issued at the close of the conferences. I assured him that a joint communiqué would not be issued but that I, of course, could not guarantee that the Polish Prime Minister himself would not make a statement to the press some time while he was in the country.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

*The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*¹⁴

SUMMARY OF REMARKS OF THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER MR. MIKO-LAJCZYK TO THE UNDERSECRETARY CONCERNING THE POLISH SITUATION AND POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

Polish-Soviet Relations.

Whereas previously the Soviet position was that the Polish Government must accept the Curzon Line as the Polish-Soviet frontier before a resumption of relations, there have recently been indications that the Soviet Government now considers the resumption of relations to be the first step, and a definite frontier settlement to await the end of the war. This change in emphasis in the Soviet position is probably due to the Soviet realization of the strength of the Polish Underground and the Soviet failure to obtain any appreciable support within Poland by by-passing the Polish Government and official Underground.

Informal contacts on the political level through an intermediary in London have led to nothing since Soviet officials, although without definite instructions from Moscow, insist upon reorganization of the Polish Government to an extent which would be impossible for the Polish Government to accept. These Russian officials had mentioned specifically the Polish President, Commander-in-Chief, and Ministers of War and Information as unacceptable individuals to the Soviet Government.

While it is not entirely clear on what basis the Soviet Government would consider a resumption of relations the general atmosphere is somewhat more propitious than at any time since the rupture.

Underground Relations with the Soviet Armies.

On entering Polish territory the Soviet Armies had refused to recognize any Underground and had subsequently attempted to induce Polish resistance groups to join General Berling's divisions. Upon realization of the strength of the Polish Underground organization,

¹⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. Mr. Stettinius sent this summary to the President on June 6, 1944.

even east of the Curzon Line, the Soviet Commander in Volhynia established contact the beginning of April with members of the Underground. However, as the result of a German counter-attack these contacts had been broken off, and since then the only contacts have been between Soviet partisans and the Polish Underground. The Polish Underground was highly organized and prepared to take its part as an army in the decisive battles to come but needed more supplies and the establishment of coordinated contact on a centralized basis with the Soviet Armies. The Prime Minister has with him a General recently arrived from Poland who was a strategic staff officer of the Underground Army, and he felt that it was very important that this General should be brought into contact while he is here with the appropriate American military officers.

The Prime Minister gave the following summary of the attitudes and views of the Polish Government and the Polish people towards present and postwar problems.

1. All Poles desired good and neighborly relations with the Soviet Union but not that Poland should become a satellite in any sense.

2. No settlement, territorial or otherwise, could be accepted which would leave the Polish people with the sense that injustice had been done to them.

3. Poland should not emerge from the war with diminished territory. The Polish people, who had endured frightful hardships for five years in fighting Germany, would not understand why Poland should be asked to sacrifice territory. Frontier adjustments in the east could be made a part of the general settlement. The Polish Government did not desire to discuss now any general territorial compensation in the west for losses in the east since the shifts of population proposed by Churchill might well be unacceptable to British and American public opinion at the end of the war. The only territorial acquisitions which the Polish Government envisaged are East Prussia and Silesia: the first, for the purpose of providing Poland with a free and broad access to the sea which would also serve as an outlet for eastern and other countries in central Europe; and Silesia, not only for ethnic reasons but also to deprive Germany of a most important industrial base.

4. There should be absolutely no interference in the internal life of Poland by any outside power.

5. The Polish Government favored the idea of economic federations in Europe in order to counteract German economic supremacy. Without such economic associations Germany, although defeated, will have, by organizational economic measures effected during the war, a completely dominant position in Europe, many of which measures it might prove impossible to disentangle. The Polish Government considered it of great importance that the occupied countries of Europe should at least be given every opportunity to start on an economic level with Germany and utilize for the good of all the most acceptable economic measures which the Germans have introduced. This could only be done by strong economic ties between non-German states. The Polish

Government did not in any sense regard such federation or association as a *cordon sanitaire* against Russia.

6. The Polish Government and people felt themselves at the present time isolated and that matters of direct concern to Poland were being discussed by the three great powers without Polish participation. Furthermore, because of the hostile attitude of one of the powers Poland's interests in general were being adversely affected since there seems to be a tendency because of the Soviet attitude to exclude Polish representatives from consideration of questions in which as an independent state Poland was interested.

7. The Polish Government desired to discuss the question of relief supplies, Lend-Lease assistance and matters affecting the economic reconstruction of the Polish State with the Government of the United States and in particular the question of the administration of Poland as the country was liberated. There exists an organized, secret administration of the Polish State which numbers 30,000 people, but as yet there has been no agreement with any country as to the administration of Poland by this organization.

760C.61/2337 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 7, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

2014. Personal for the President and the Secretary. I called on Mr. Molotov on my return from meeting of first bomber mission in Russia¹⁵ and informed him that you and Mr. Hull were firm in your determination to carry out the understandings reached at Moscow and Tehran for solidarity in Soviet-American relations and that no minor difficulties would affect this determination to work out agreements on all questions.

I informed him of Mikolajczyk's visit to Washington, of the agreement that you had with him regarding no public speeches on his part, and what you intended to say to him. I said you had confidence that the Soviet Government would carry out the commitments taken by Molotov at Moscow and Stalin at Tehran for the true independence. At this point Molotov interrupted and asked whether your attitude was still the same as expressed at Tehran, to which I replied "of course". He said that he would inform Marshal Stalin at once and that Marshal Stalin would be gratified. I continued that you hoped the Soviet Government would find it possible to work out their Polish relations in such a way that all Poles could unite to fight wholeheartedly the common enemy. I said you hoped that the Soviet

¹⁵ The first shuttle raiding bombers of the 15th Army Air Force reached the Soviet Union on June 2, 1944.

Government and Soviet press comments on Poland would be confined to constructive statements and avoid acrimonious arguments with groups criticising Soviet policy, including those in the United States.

I asked about the Polish leaders who had recently come to Moscow out of Poland.¹⁶ Molotov explained that they were four in number representing different democratic parties including Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party and that they had reported the overwhelming majority of the Polish people were not in sympathy with the London Government.

When I saw Molotov the second time he mentioned that he had told Marshal Stalin of your attitude and that Marshal Stalin was greatly pleased.

HARRIMAN

711.60C/6-944

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1944.

Participants: Polish Prime Minister, Polish Ambassador, Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Matthews,¹⁷ and Mr. Durbrow.

The Prime Minister brought up the question of the possibility of his paying a visit to Stalin. Mr. Stettinius, in discussing this question, stated that the President, as well as himself, felt that most likely it would be a good idea for Mr. Mikolajczyk to make such a visit, and that careful consideration should be given to all aspects thereof. In weighing the various pros and cons, consideration was given to the question of whether this would be the proper time to make such a visit or whether it might be advisable to delay it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the President also had given careful consideration to the possible effects and repercussions of the visit and, on second thought, he wondered whether it would be advisable for him to send a message at this time to Stalin suggesting that Mr. Mikolajczyk visit Moscow.

In exploring the situation further, Mr. Stettinius asked whether, if Mr. Mikolajczyk agreed that it might be advisable to make a trip at this time, someone else other than the President or Mr. Churchill could make the suggestion to Stalin that he see the Polish Prime Minister. The only name that was mentioned was that of Beneš, and the Prime Minister replied that, although he was on good personal

¹⁶ See telegram 1867, May 24, from Moscow, p. 1412.

¹⁷ H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs.

terms with Mr. Beneš, he did not feel that an approach to Stalin made by Beneš would be the proper way to handle this matter.

The Prime Minister and the Ambassador finally came to the conclusion that there were so many imponderables and possible repercussions that it might not be advisable to attempt to make the trip at this time. It was therefore suggested that the matter should be held in abeyance for at least one month and further consideration could then be given to the advisability of making this trip.

In view of this decision, consideration was given to other possible approaches to the Soviet Government looking toward bringing about closer collaboration with the Polish Government. It was suggested that it might be possible for the President and Mr. Churchill to make a joint approach to Stalin suggesting the desirability from every point of view of bringing about close collaboration and coordination of activities between the Red Army and the Polish Underground. It was indicated that the President and Churchill might make this suggestion solely on military grounds but pointing out that such collaboration would be most effective in helping not only the Red Army in the East but would have a beneficial effect in tying down further German troops which might be used against the Anglo-American Armies in the West.

The Prime Minister thought that perhaps an approach might be made at this level, but he wondered whether, if the approach was made at the military level, the Soviet authorities might accept with alacrity military collaboration, but as their armies advanced, they would go ahead independently on the political level and organize the administration in Poland along their own lines without consultation with the Polish Government-in-exile. No final decision was made as to the advisability of making this second approach.

760C.61/2339 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 9, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received June 10—3 a. m.]

2064. Personal for the President and the Secretary. In London on May 27 I had a 2-hour talk with Beneš alone at luncheon.

Part 1. He described the developments in the Polish Government over their relations with the Soviet Union in the period since I had seen him in Moscow.

He explained that on his return to London he had reported his conversations with Stalin to Mikolajczyk. He believed Mikolajczyk was impressed and had wanted at that time to work out a settlement. Mikolajczyk was unable however to carry his associates with him and events developed as is known.

He said that recently reports from within Poland have come to the Polish Government that the majority of the Polish people are severely critical of the Government in London for their Soviet policy. On the other hand there appears an unwillingness of the Polish people to give up Lwow and to a lesser extent Vilna. The result of these reports Beneš believes has been to crystallize the division between the two groups within the Government in London. Mikolajczyk and those who follow his view feel that the settlement with the Soviet Union must be made promptly or the Government will lose all standing with the Polish people whereas the opposition has become more firm in opposition to a settlement of the boundary question as proposed. Beneš believes that at some stage there will be a definite break between the two groups.¹⁸

Part 2. Beneš explained in great detail his satisfaction with relationship that he had developed for Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union.¹⁹ He outlined also the agreement he had reached with the Czech Communist Party for their joining a national front government when Czechoslovakia was liberated. He does not intend to change his government until he returns to Prague at which time an election will be held.

It is agreed with the leaders of the five parties including the Communists that a national front government will then be organized accepting Beneš' leadership. The policies will include (1) greater authority to the provincial governments; (2) recognition of the principle of private ownership as well as state ownership and cooperative ownership of productive property. The state will own the munitions industries including the Skoda works. Other properties seized by the Germans will be returned gradually to their owners, consumer goods industries will be under private ownership. Large landed

¹⁸ In a letter of April 28, 1944, to the Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., the Director of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, DeWitt C. Poole, wrote that he had learned that Jan Masaryk, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, had expressed "complete despair" of the Poles who formed the government in London. "He had never seen a group of politicians, he said, who could by their every act commit suicide with such professional thoroughness." (740.00119-European War 1939/2659)

¹⁹ Eduard Beneš had succeeded in signing a treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Postwar Cooperation on December 12, 1943, in conversations with Stalin in Moscow. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 670-734, *passim*. For text of the treaty, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, no. 4 (July 1948), p. 228, or *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 238.

estates will be broken up and sold to peasants. Private ownership of farms will be recognized and no pressure will be exerted to collectivize; (3) the national front government to last for the first election period of 6 years; (4) the government will take responsibility for employment and other social reforms.

Beneš seems confident that this program will get support of the Czechoslovakian people and that he can hold together the national front government for the first phase of the reconstruction period. He is completely satisfied that the Soviet Union is sincere and will be loyal to the undertakings reached.²⁰ He believes the Communist Party in his country will become more and more nationalist in its policies as time goes on.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/6-1244

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1944.

We ²¹ spent forty-five minutes with the President this morning. He was very sympathetic.

The President spent considerable time describing the present situation relative to the war, having just come from his map room. He spoke specifically of the new airport which had been created as the result of sinking a large number of Liberty Ships.

The President stated that he felt Poland and Russia were at an impasse at the present moment, and the sooner the Polish Prime Minister returned to Poland with his Government, and went to Moscow for conferences, the better.

The President spoke of the fact that Queen Wilhelmina ²² and King Haakon ²³ had both agreed to return to their countries at the first moment possible. Furthermore, they had agreed to select new members of their cabinets from their countrymen who had remained at home during the war and had gone through the terrible suffering.

The President at this point stated that he felt it was important for the Polish Prime Minister to make the changes in his Government

²⁰ In a letter of April 28, 1944 (cited in footnote 18, p. 1279), DeWitt C. Poole wrote that he had been informed that Jan Masaryk would "jump at it" if he knew of "a practical alternative to Beneš' Russian policy". Masaryk disclaimed any "difference between his policy and that of Beneš", and explained that "Beneš and I simply work by different methods". (740.00119 European War 1939/2659)

²¹ Mr. Stettinius, the Polish Prime Minister, Stanislaw MikolaJczyk, and the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski.

²² Queen of The Netherlands.

²³ King of Norway.

which the Russians were demanding, for after all, it was only four people²⁴ and it might be the deciding factor. The Polish Prime Minister did not agree with this, saying it would be misunderstood and that he would be losing face.

The Prime Minister spoke of the commitment that had been made in December 1939 by his country, to hold an election the first three weeks of liberation so that the people could decide what kind of Government they wanted and who their leaders would be. The President stated that he remembered this, but thought it had been forgotten, and said it would be a good thing to have restated at this time.

The President said he was convinced the Russians were sincere in their desire for a strong independent Poland, and indicated that he thought they could trust the Russians to give them fair treatment.

The Polish Prime Minister indicated that he could trust America to give them fair treatment politically and economically, but did not trust Russia.

The President said that he was not worried about territorial matters, that they would get East Prussia and Silesia, and if they had to give up a little something somewhere else, he thought it was a pretty good exchange.

The President said he did not agree on the formula based upon the old Curzon Line. He did not feel the Russians would insist upon this. Further, the President stated, he did not feel that Stalin would insist on Koenigsberg, and that he felt Stalin would be willing to have Koenigsberg as a "shrine for the world," inasmuch as the city controlled Danzig and was an important locality. The President recalled Stalin having referred to it as the "Home of the Teutonic Knights."

The President referred to his disappointment in the Finns and felt that they had missed an opportunity for a fair settlement of their problem.²⁵

The President spoke also of his desire to see the Ruhr and the Saar under a trusteeship.

The Polish Prime Minister spoke of the need of having available sources of oil in the post-war period. The President stated that he hoped the Russians would agree eventually on pro-rating oil among the United Nations.

The Polish Prime Minister was most frank, most cordial, and there is no question in my mind that the President and the Prime Minister have established a complete faith between two men.

²⁴The President of Poland, Wladyslaw Rackiewicz; the Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski; the Minister of War, Lt. Gen. Maryan Kukiel; and the Minister of Information, Stanislaw Kot.

²⁵Regarding the failure of Finland to withdraw from the war and the rupture of relations between the United States and Finland, see pp. 556 ff.

The President invited the Prime Minister to return to his office on Wednesday,²⁶ on his way to the plane, to say goodbye and be photographed together.

The President presented the Prime Minister with an autographed photograph of himself.

Upon leaving the President's office, the Prime Minister asked me what he should say to the press. I asked him if he was satisfied with his talk with the President, and was he encouraged. He stated, "Yes, I am." I then suggested that he make the following statement to the press, which he did:

"I have just had a most frank, satisfactory and reassuring discussion with the President."

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*²⁷

Moscow, 12 June, 1944.

Personal for the President. I told Stalin last night that you were continuing to consider all matters between us in the atmosphere of Teheran and went over briefly the ground in my talk with Molotov about the Poles as previously reported explaining that you had complete confidence that Stalin would carry out the policies toward the Polish people we had outlined then to you. I had an opportunity to tell him that you were puzzled about the future of Lwow and hoped he would give sympathetic study to the matter in his dealings with the Poles. I told him that this and the other boundary questions could best be worked out between him and the Poles if they were dealt with in an understanding manner. He appeared pleased to learn of your attitude and said that he appreciated your position at the present time and would keep you informed of any important developments in Soviet Polish relations.

He had been much interested to meet with the four Polish leaders who had come out of Poland. He said they were "living men not émigrés". He told me they were anxious to see me and I indicated that if they approached me I would see them entirely unofficially. He thought that this would be useful as they had much information of interest. The Department had previously authorized me to see them

²⁶ June 14.

²⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

unofficially if approached.²⁸ If they do I will of course insist on no publicity unless I am instructed otherwise.

This was the first friendly talk I have had with Stalin about the Poles and I got the feeling that he saw a solution in the making which would be acceptable all around.

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²⁹

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1944.

In a conversation this morning with the Under Secretary, Prime Minister Mikolajczyk expressed a natural desire to be sure that he clearly understood your offer to lend him moral support in any efforts he might be able to make to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with the Soviet Government.

The Prime Minister foresees that the need for such moral support might arise under the following possible circumstances:

"For instance, if there should be a possibility of establishing direct conversations between the Polish and Soviet Governments, Premier Mikolajczyk would appreciate it if the President could lend his moral support to the Polish Government by an expression of hope to the Soviet Government that such conversations might be successful provided he felt it opportune to do so at that time. In the event that such conversations take place and a stalemate should ensue therefrom, Premier Mikolajczyk expresses the hope that, if in the prevailing circumstances the President should feel it to be opportune, he might again lend his moral support in an effort to overcome the stalemate.

"Since it is the sincere desire of Premier Mikolajczyk to make every effort to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with the Soviet Government, he hopes that in the event that such conversations should not take place, or if such conversations should be broken off, he could still count upon the moral support of the United States Government for a free and independent Poland."

The Prime Minister would appreciate any observations or corrections you might care to make in regard to his understanding of this matter when he calls to take leave of you today.

It is felt that in discussing this question with the Polish Prime Minister, it would be advisable to reiterate to him that such moral support as we may be in a position to give will, of necessity, fall within the framework of our tender of good offices.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

²⁸ Regarding the presence of the four representatives of the Polish National Council in Moscow after May 22, and Ambassador Harriman's conversation with them on the evening of June 11, see pp. 1412-1418.

²⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

760C.61/2343a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—5 p. m.

1506. Please transmit the following message to Marshal Stalin from the President: ³⁰

"As you know, the Polish Prime Minister Mr. Mikolajczyk has just completed a brief visit to Washington. For reasons which Ambassador Harriman has already explained to you I considered his visit at this time to be necessary and desirable.

You are aware, therefore, that his visit was not connected with any attempt on my part to inject myself into the merits of the differences which exist between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Government. Although we had a frank and beneficial exchange of views on a wide variety of subjects affecting Poland, I can assure you that no specific plan or proposal in any way affecting Polish-Soviet relations was drawn up. I believe, however, that you would be interested in my personal impression of Mr. Mikolajczyk and of his attitude toward the problems confronting his country.

Premier Mikolajczyk impressed me as a very sincere and reasonable man whose sole desire is to do what is best for his country. He is fully cognizant that the whole future of Poland depends upon the establishment of genuinely good relations with the Soviet Union and, in my opinion, will make every effort to achieve that end.

His primary immediate concern is the vital necessity for the establishment of the fullest kind of collaboration between the Red Army and the forces of the Polish Underground in the common struggle against our enemy. He believes that coordination between your Armies and the organized Polish Underground is a military factor of the highest importance not only to your Armies in the East but also to the main task of finishing off by our combined efforts the Nazi beast in his lair.

My impression is that the Prime Minister is thinking only of Poland and the Polish people and will not allow any petty considerations to stand in the way of his efforts to reach a solution with you. In fact it is my belief that he would not hesitate to go to Moscow, if he felt that you would welcome such a step on his part, in order to discuss with you personally and frankly the problems affecting your two countries particularly the urgency of immediate military collaboration. I know you will understand that in making this observation I am in no way attempting to press upon you my personal views in a matter which is of special concern to you and your country. I felt, however, that you were entitled to have a frank account of the impressions I received in talking with the Polish Prime Minister.[""]

HULL

³⁰ Ambassador Harriman sent this message in a personal letter to Molotov with a request that it be transmitted to Stalin.

033.60C11/80a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—10 p. m.

1512. For your private and confidential information there is given below a summary of the talks that Premier Mikolajczyk had while in Washington for 9 days.

During his stay Mikolajczyk had four talks with the President and several lengthy discussions with the Acting Secretary, other officials of the Department, and called on the Secretary after the latter's return from his holiday. Mikolajczyk made a very favorable impression on all who talked with him as being very reasonable, understanding and quite objective in his approach to the many problems facing his country.

He brought no concrete plan for the solution of the Polish-Soviet question and no detailed plans were discussed with him. No binding commitments made.

The following are the principal specific points that he raised :

1. He reiterated his firm desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union on a mutually satisfactory and permanent basis. He felt, however, that this could not be attained if the settlement should leave the people of Poland with a sense of injustice.

The Prime Minister stated that he had the feeling, without being in a position to give positive proofs thereof, that the possibilities of reestablishing relations with the Soviet Government were more propitious today than heretofore. He indicated that his feeling was based upon the fact that the Soviet Government, having tried by various methods to build up, without success, strong pro-Soviet support inside Poland, was more disposed to consider the resumption of relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile as the first step. Mikolajczyk added that while he had this feeling, he did not know what conditions the Soviet Government might make in order to re-establish relations.

In this connection, he gave details of an informal Soviet-Polish contact made in London just before his departure. According to the Prime Minister, the informal Soviet representative, who apparently was not acting on specific instructions from Moscow, broached the question of reestablishment of relations but made the unacceptable conditions that the Polish Government-in-Exile be reorganized by removing the President, Commander-in-Chief, and the Ministers of War and Information.

The Prime Minister insisted that any settlement would have to be based upon as concrete assurances as possible that there would be no

interference in the internal affairs of Poland. He insisted that the so-called National Council of Poland, whose representatives are now in Moscow, has at the most a very small following in the country, and he felt that it represented a new and again unsuccessful effort on the part of the Soviets to build up a rival government organization in Poland.

In regard to the question of the President-designate, the Prime Minister stated in confidence that the Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Polish Underground Government in the country had been asked if he would be willing to take Sosnkowski's place. If he accepts, he will be brought to London and his appointment will then be announced. If he should not accept, the Polish Underground has been asked to name another prominent person in the country who could be brought to London to fill this post.

2. On the territorial questions, he stated that he felt that no final settlements should be made until after the termination of hostilities. He admitted that in such final settlement territorial adjustments in the East might be made. He again brought up the question of establishing at this time a temporary demarcation line in eastern Poland which would run east of Vilna and Lwow with the territory west of this line to be under the administration of the Polish Government-in-Exile and the territory in the east to be under Soviet administration.

He stated that he felt that, for the future peace of Europe, and not as compensation for lost territory in the East, Poland should acquire East Prussia and Silesia. His basic reasons for desiring East Prussia were to eliminate the question of the Polish Corridor as well as the German springboard on the flank of Poland, and in regard to Silesia, to deprive Germany of an industrial area which she might use as an armament center for any future war. His government has no desire to acquire any other German territories.

3. The Prime Minister expressed a strong desire to reach an agreement for permanent collaboration during the war between the Polish Underground and the Red Army in order that the full weight of the combined forces could be brought to bear against the Germans, and thus assist the Russians as well as be of an indirect assistance to the Anglo-American forces in the West. He described in some detail his version of the successful contact made between these Polish and Soviet forces in eastern Poland and explained that, although these contacts had been broken off by a German counter-attack, he hoped that they could be renewed, not on a local basis, but on the basis of coordinated activities by the central military leaders of both groups. Despite the breaking off of direct contact with the Red Army, Mikolajczyk stated that the Polish Underground was nevertheless collaborating with Soviet Partisan paratroopers in the Lwow area.

In order to bring the full weight of the Polish Underground to bear against the Nazis, the Premier made a strong plea for American financial and material assistance to them.

The Prime Minister brought with him the second in command of the Polish Underground Army who left Poland about 6 weeks ago. This officer, who is in charge of strategic planning for the Underground Army, discussed with the President and, at the latter's suggestion, with high ranking military officers all aspects of the activities of the Polish Underground Army and its plans. He apparently gave a convincing picture of the potentialities of this force.

4. The Prime Minister asserted that he favored a general European economic federation in order to raise the standard of living of the people of all countries. He felt that the creation of such a federation is necessary in order that the occupied countries of Europe can start their reconstruction on at least an equal basis with Germany. He indicated that his government was willing to relinquish certain sovereign rights in order to attain the benefits of such a federation and he was particularly insistent that he did not wish in any way to create a *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union.

He expressed the hope that conversations might be opened as soon as possible with appropriate United States officials in order to draw up plans for the economic reconstruction of Poland.

5. Mikolajczyk discussed at some length the question of sending relief supplies to Polish liberated areas. He was told that in principle we were prepared to make available such supplies during the military period provided arrangements could be made with the Soviet Government for their transit to Poland. It was pointed out that we had been giving consideration to this for some time and we were now discussing the question with the British before taking it up formally with the Soviet authorities. It was also made clear that we hoped that arrangements could be made to have UNRRA³¹ take over this work as soon as possible. In regard to the distribution of relief during the military period it was made clear that these activities would, in all probability, be handled by the Red Army. While the Prime Minister agreed to this, he suggested that if a satisfactory arrangement for collaboration between the Red Army and the Underground should be worked out, arrangements might be made for the distribution of these supplies by the Underground authorities. Mikolajczyk expressed concern regarding the possible political implications involved in the distribution of relief, and hoped that some satisfactory arrangement could be made which would prevent the Soviet Government from building up its own political machine, such as the so-called National Council of Poland, by using relief supplies for this purpose.

³¹ The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

He was informed that if arrangements could be made to send American supplies to liberated areas, we would make every effort to insure that the people receiving these supplies were informed fully as to their origin.

6. Mikolajczyk also indicated that his Government felt that they, at the present time, are somewhat isolated and that matters which they consider to be of direct concern to Poland were being discussed by "the big three" without Polish participation. He therefore expressed the hope that arrangements could be made for consultation with his Government when matters affecting his country were under consideration.

The President apparently found Mikolajczyk's approach to the many problems discussed to be objective and indicated to him that he could count upon the moral support of the United States Government in any efforts that the Premier might make to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with the Soviet authorities. The President explained that he had outlined to Stalin at Tehran the reasons why he could not at this time enter into any detailed discussion on the Polish question. The President apparently intimated to Mikolajczyk that he might be able to be of further assistance later on. Mikolajczyk stated that he understood the President's position and did not wish to do anything which would be embarrassing to him. The President expressed the hope that Mikolajczyk might be able, as a minimum achievement, to work out a satisfactory arrangement which would bring about full cooperation between the Polish Underground and the Red Army and indicated in this connection that he would be willing to give consideration to furnishing supplies and funds to the Underground Army so that it might effectively carry on the fight against the Germans.

The President, in referring to the plans of the other exiled governments to return to their countries as soon as possible, suggested that it would be advisable for Premier Mikolajczyk to make similar plans but that, in order to assure success of such plans, he felt it was important for Mikolajczyk to bring about the reconstruction of his Government by eliminating the four persons who the Soviet Government felt are not friendly to it. Mikolajczyk indicated that he could not agree with this, stating that it would be misunderstood, particularly since one of them is the President of the Republic. He added that the Polish Government had declared on several occasions that it was their firm intention to hold elections as soon as possible after liberation in order that the people in the country could choose their own government. The President suggested that he publicly reiterate this plan.

The President expressed the conviction that Stalin did not wish to "Sovietize" Poland and urged Mikolajczyk to have faith in the good intentions of Stalin. In this connection the President suggested that it might be advisable if Mikolajczyk himself should go to Moscow to discuss various problems with Stalin. The President added that, although he did not feel that he could make this direct suggestion, he might be willing to intimate to Stalin that Mikolajczyk was inclined to carry through such a plan. Mikolajczyk, while not committing himself definitely on this point, indicated that he felt that it might be advisable for him to see Stalin provided no prior conditions were laid down for the meeting.

The President indicated he felt that if other matters could be worked out, Stalin would be reasonable in regard to the territorial question. He urged Mikolajczyk to make very effort possible now to reach a mutually satisfactory solution with the Soviets.

The Secretary, in his discussion with Mikolajczyk, urged that an effort be made to establish contact between Polish and Soviet representatives in order to reach a satisfactory friendly solution.

In conformity with his desire to find a solution to the Polish-Soviet difficulties, Mikolajczyk had a long talk with Professor Lange. It is understood that Mikolajczyk found his talk with Lange to be very interesting, particularly in regard to the purely Polish sentiments expressed by the members of Berling's Army. The Premier is reported to have been non-committal in his talk with Lange.

The press reaction to his visit has been quite favorable.

Repeated to London.³²

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*³³

[Translation]

Thank you for the information regarding your meeting with Mr. Mikolajczyk.

If it is a question of the establishment of military collaboration between the Red Army and the forces of the Polish underground movement fighting against the Hitlerite occupiers this is without doubt an essential matter at the present time in the final defeat of our common enemy. In this connection an important consideration is of course the

³² Telegram 4813 to London contained the following instructions: "Please furnish copy of this message to Schoenfeld for his information and you may inform the British Government of the substance of this telegram."

³³ This copy of telegram was sent by Foreign Commissar Molotov to Ambassador Harriman on June 29, 1944.

correct solution of the question concerning Soviet-Polish relations. You are aware of the point of view of the Soviet Government and its desire to see Poland strong, independent and democratic and Soviet-Polish relations good neighborly and based on firm friendship. The Soviet Government considers as a most important premise for this the reorganization of the emigrant Polish Government which would provide for the participation in it not only of Polish public figures in England but also of Polish public figures in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and especially Polish democratic public figures in Poland itself and also the recognition of the Curzon Line by the Polish Government as the line of the new frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

It must be said, however, that it is not evident from the statements made by Mr. Mikolajczyk in Washington ³⁴ that he has made any step forward with respect to this question. That is why it is difficult for me at the present time to express any opinion concerning Mr. Mikolajczyk's coming to Moscow.

The attention you are giving to the question of Soviet-Polish relations and your efforts in this regard are highly appreciated by all of us.

Moscow, June 24, 1944.

033.60C11/6-2944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 29, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

2351. For the President and the Secretary. In my conversation with Molotov last night, he referred to our conversation of June 3 ³⁵ in which I had transmitted to him the President's verbal message regarding Mikolajczyk's visit to the United States. Molotov recalled that the President had agreed to meet Mikolajczyk on the condition that he make no official statements while in the United States, whereas it had come to Molotov's attention that Mikolajczyk had made such a statement to representatives of the press on June 14.

I interrupted him to explain that I had said the President's condition was against public speeches, not statements to the press. (In checking on my return to the Embassy my interpreter's notes of the June 3 conversation, I find that I had correctly stated the President's

³⁴ An exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, on the occasion of his departure, is printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, June 17, 1944, p. 565.

³⁵ See telegram 2014, June 7, from Moscow, p. 1276.

condition.) After some discussion Molotov fully accepted my explanation.

He continued, however, and called my attention to the fact that Mikolajczyk had spoken not only for himself but for the United States Government in connection with leaving boundary settlements till after the war. Molotov said that while he did not consider it expedient to discuss at the present time the merits of Mikolajczyk's statement, he wished to draw my attention to the matter. I said I had not seen a full account of Mikolajczyk's press interview and with that the subject was dropped.

In puzzling over what was in Molotov's mind in mentioning this subject in the manner he did, I could not help but connect it with the previous subject of our conversation regarding the Soviet communications with Turkey.³⁶ In this case he should have had a guilty conscience for not having informed us several weeks ago, and perhaps, Russian style, wanted to balance off any criticisms of his omission.

HARRIMAN

860C.012/7-644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 6, 1944.

[Received July 6—4:50 p. m.]

2452. The *Gazette* of the Supreme Soviet of June 30 published a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated June 22 which reads in translation as follows:

“Regarding the rights to take on Polish citizenship for members of the Polish Army in the USSR and persons assisting it in the struggle for the liberation of Poland, and also for members of their families.

1. It is established, as a special exception to the operation of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR concerning the acquisition of USSR citizenship by inhabitants of the Western oblasts of the Ukrainian and Belo-Russian Soviet Socialist Republics dated November 29, 1939,³⁷ as well as in relation to Soviet citizens of Polish nationality of other oblasts of the USSR, that those of them who are members of the Polish Army in the USSR or were previously in its ranks and also persons actively assisting the Polish Army [in?] liberation of Poland from the German Fascist aggressors, have the right to take on Polish citizenship. Such a right is also accorded to members of the families of members of the Polish Army in the USSR and of the aforementioned persons who are rendering assistance to the Polish Army in the USSR.

³⁶ See telegram 2327, June 28, from Moscow, vol. v, p. 863.

³⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 210, footnote 16.

2. The citizenship of children who have not reached the age of 14 is correspondingly determined by the selection of citizenship by the parents. All children between the ages of 14 and 18 have the right of independent selection of citizenship. In case the parents choose different citizenship, the citizenship of children who have not reached the age of 14 years is determined by an agreement of the parents, but in the absence of such an agreement, citizenship is dependent on the territory of either of the governments on which the minor children shall live.

3. Declarations regarding the desire to take on Polish citizenship shall be submitted to the Commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on examination of questions of acceptance, renunciation, and laws of Soviet citizens, directly or through the command of the Polish Army in the USSR, representatives of the Union of Polish Patriots³⁸ in the USSR being on the Commission."

HARRIMAN

780C.61/7-944: Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 9, 1944—8 p. m.
[Received July 10—5:25 a. m.]

62 Poles. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Premier Mikolajczyk has given me the following account of recent conversations regarding possible resumption of Polish-Soviet relations. He requests that the fact of such conversations as well as their substance be kept completely secret.

Since his return from Washington he has had three conversations with Ambassador Lebedev.³⁹ These talks started out with a certain amount of promise but the early hopes were not fulfilled. The talks have been broken off.

I understand that Mikolajczyk when in Washington reported tenor of certain preliminary conversations between Grabski⁴⁰ and Lebedev and between Beneš and himself. I shall therefore not review them.

Grabski and Lebedev had a further meeting on June 10. L[ebedev] inquired as to the results of the Beneš-Mikolajczyk meeting. G[rabski] said that as far as he knew it concerned the problem of Polish Government personalities which was an internal problem.

³⁸ An organization of Poles sympathetic to Communism constituted within the Soviet Union about May 8, 1943, which had held its first Congress in Moscow on June 8, 1943.

³⁹ Viktor Zakharovich Lebedyev, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to many of the Governments in Exile at London, succeeding Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov.

⁴⁰ Stanislaw Grabski, Chairman of the National Council of the Republic of Poland, in London.

L concurred but said that if those problems were settled on Polish initiative all controversial problems between Russia and Poland could be settled later very easily and favorably for Poland and M's visit to Moscow could take place very soon.

G replied that when the principle of collaboration should be agreed upon the problem of personalities would be no obstacle. L said if, however, M made any changes after his visit to Moscow this would create a bad impression in the world, for this should be Poland's internal question. Hence it would be well if he would settle this problem now. It was agreed to have a meeting with M on his return from Washington.

Such a meeting took place on June 20. G was also present. M inquired as to what L thought should be done to reestablish diplomatic relations. L said he had no instructions but he could state that Stalin intends to come to an agreement with a Polish Government friendly towards Russia. If the Polish Government would drop those persons concerning whom Russia had reservations and thus guarantee a friendly collaboration in the future, all controversial problems could be easily settled in direct negotiations between Stalin and M.

M said a change of the President was out of the question and all problems of changes of personalities had to remain Poland's internal problem. It was necessary first of all to agree on the principles of collaboration and then to adjust the composition of the Cabinet accordingly, so that the agreed obligations could be carried out loyally and exactly.

L inquired as to those principles and M said they were (a) resumption of normal diplomatic relations; (b) a common plan of action for the Polish home forces and the Soviet armies; (c) cooperation between the home authorities of the Polish Government in their administrative capacity with the Soviet military authorities entering Poland; (d) possible changes of frontier to be postponed until the end of the war.

L said he did not think there would be any difficulties regarding the problem of administration. The Czech-Soviet agreement⁴¹ provides that the Czechoslovak authorities should take over administration immediately and unlike some other treaties, it had been published. He was convinced a Polish-Soviet agreement on administration would not be less favorable.⁴²

⁴¹ Agreement between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Government regarding the administration of liberated areas of Czechoslovakia, signed at London, May 8, 1944; for text, see Louise W. Holborn (ed.), *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, vol. II, 1943-1945 (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1948), pp. 767-769.

⁴² Such an agreement on relations between the Soviet High Command and the Polish administration following the entrance of Soviet troops on Polish territory was signed in Moscow on July 26, 1944, by the Soviet Government with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, represented by Osobka-Morawski; for text, see *ibid.*, pp. 770-771.

L suggested that when Moscow's replies to the four points were received, they should be kept secret and that certain changes in the Polish Government should then be made so that M would go to Moscow as the Prime Minister of this new government. All decisions concerning the four points would be announced in Moscow during his visit. As to Moscow's reply to those four points, L felt confident it would be rather favorable.

On June 22 L proposed a further meeting to take place that day. He and M arranged to meet at 6:00 that evening. L indicated he did now [*not?*] see difficulties regarding resumption of diplomatic relations and an agreement concerning administration on Polish territories. He desired elucidation, however, as to what was meant by postponing the problem of the future Polish-Soviet frontier until the end of the war.

M explained that constitutionally the Polish Government was not empowered to cede any part of Poland's territory and therefore could not enter now into any agreement that would change the hitherto existing frontier between Poland and Russia. The Polish Government, however, had already declared its readiness to enter into discussions on problems of frontiers in conjunction with the whole of future territorial problems. At the present moment it was important to establish a demarcation line, to the west of which there would be Polish state administration. This demarcation line should assure the maximum war effort on the part of the Polish nation and should leave under the administration of the Polish state those territories with the greatest concentration of Poles. Yet the ethnographic frontier was not simple. In the north and in the south the main concentrations of Poles were more to the east than in the center and therefore the demarcation line could not be identical with any future frontier. They had to be treated separately and differently.

L said the Soviet Government standpoint was still that in principle the Curzon line⁴³ should be the future frontier and that here the discussion should start.

M said a frontier drawn along this line would deprive Poland of half its territory and of 11 millions of its population, including at least 5 million Poles. Therefore a frontier drawn along this line was unacceptable and would wrong the Polish nation so grievously as to make a friendly Polish-Russian cooperation afterwards impossible.

L said Poland would have far more favorable frontier in the west.

M said that at present there was only one frontier between Poland and Russia, namely, the one existing in 1921. The Ribbentrop-Molotov line was a Russo-German frontier and had been abolished by the

⁴³ See footnote 15, p. 1220.

Polish-Soviet agreement of 1941⁴⁴ and neither the Soviet Union nor Poland had ever legally recognized the Curzon line nor had this line ever existed in southern Galicia. If the Soviet Government desired to enter into negotiations on frontiers, Poland was ready to negotiate a change of its eastern frontiers only in conjunction with discussions on the problem of assuring better frontiers in the west and in the north. The principle that Poland could not emerge from this war wronged and diminished had to be upheld, whereas all that was now being proposed to Poland represented only one-third of what it would lose by accepting a frontier along the Curzon line.

L asked whether this meant that the territory of Poland, including gains in the west and the north, could not be smaller than the territory Poland had before 1939. M answered: Yes.

L asked for an approximate description of the demarcation line and proposed a continuation of the discussion next day.

On June 23, M, L, and G met again. At this meeting L said he had had no instructions from Moscow regarding the demarcation line of which he had never heard anything before the preceding day. As to the future frontier, the Soviet Government's standpoint was that it should be run along the Curzon line. To the west of that line Polish administration would be established as soon as the Soviet Armies crossed it. L asked what was the Polish viewpoint.

M said the Government had no right to cede any part of Polish territory. It could not discuss a revision of the Riga treaty, not knowing what would happen regarding Polish frontiers in the west and north. The best thing would be to postpone discussions on the Polish-Soviet frontier until the end of the war and to agree now on the principles of future negotiations only. These principles were: Poland cannot emerge from the war with diminished territory; Poland does not wish to retain within its frontiers those who would not wish to remain there; thus if the Soviet Government should wish to discuss the whole problem of frontiers the Polish Government would not evade such discussions.

L said he could inform M of the Soviet standpoint. This was as follows: Before the resumption of diplomatic relations, the following conditions had to be fulfilled. President Raczkiewicz, General Sosnkowski, Minister Kukiel and Minister Kot had to resign the posts enabling them to influence the policy of the Polish Government. A reconstruction of the Government had to take place and the new Cabinet had to include representatives of Poles from London, the USSR, the U.S.A., and the National Council in Poland. The recon-

⁴⁴ Agreement for mutual aid, with a protocol, signed at London on July 30, 1941; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cXLIV, p. 869. See also telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 243.

structed government would condemn the previous government for its mistake in the Katyn affair. The Curzon line was to be the new frontier.

After the foregoing conditions had been fulfilled it would be possible to resume diplomatic relations and an agreement on Polish administration on Polish territories would be signed.

L asked M whether there was anything he could transmit to the Soviet Government. M replied that he had nothing to say. As to the conditions, he merely wished to stress that they did not seem to denote either good intentions with respect to renewing diplomatic relations or the wish not to wrong Poland in the interest of future friendly Polish-Soviet relations and collaboration.

M tells me that the conversations were thus broken off and there has been no contact since. He expressed the opinion that the Soviet Government, as its recent propaganda suggests, would renew its efforts to develop pro-Soviet support among different Polish elements. He thought if it failed, it might later be disposed to enter upon discussions again.

He asked me whether I had had any word from Washington regarding a recent message from the President to Premier Stalin regarding him. I told him I had not. He said he understood such a message had been sent.

I inquired whether Washington had been informed of developments through Ambassador Ciechanowski. M said Ciechanowski had not been informed. He did not desire this information to pass through too many hands. It was known to only a very few persons.

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/7-2044

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: The Red Army having crossed the Curzon Line,⁴⁵ it is possible that new developments in the Polish-Soviet dispute will arise at any time.

There is attached for your consideration a memorandum outlining the latest developments and suggesting the policy which it is believed we should follow in the event of unilateral Soviet action in this matter.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

⁴⁵ Rapid inroads into Polish territory occurred in offensives undertaken by the Soviet armies early in July. Vilna was captured on July 13, and Lublin on July 23.

[Annex]

*Recommendations as to Policy in the Event of the Expected
Developments in the Soviet-Polish Dispute*

From the failure of the secret conversations which Prime Minister Mikolajczyk has been having with the Soviet Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Government in London, and Stalin's reply to the President discouraging a visit by Mikolajczyk to Moscow, it is clear that there is virtually no hope of any resumption of diplomatic relations between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Government. The last Soviet conditions conveyed to Mikolajczyk amounted not to a demand for the reorganization of the Polish Government-in-exile but for its dissolution and the formation of an entirely new Government; it is also clear from Stalin's statement to Professor Lange⁴⁶ when he was in Moscow, that the Soviet Government does not intend to set up a Soviet military administration in the liberated areas of Poland proper.

Under the circumstances, with the Soviet armies beginning to enter Poland, the most likely alternative, and all our information tends to bear this out, would be for the Soviet Government to deal with and possibly recognize some rival Polish organization as the provisional representative of the Polish people. This rival organization would probably be the "National Council of Poland" whose representatives recently visited Moscow. This Council has already been referred to in the Soviet-controlled Polish press in Moscow as the provisional government of Poland. Should this probable development take place, and it may occur in the very near future, the situation which the British and ourselves have sought to avoid will be created. The British and the United States Governments would be dealing with and recognizing as the only legal representative of Poland the present Polish Government-in-exile in London while the Soviet Union would be dealing with and supporting, if not openly recognizing, a rival organization. This split between British-American policy on one hand and Soviet policy on the other in regard to Poland would be complete. The obvious danger of civil war is very real, with one side (and probably the losing one) fighting with at least moral support from the United States and Great Britain, while the other was being actively supported by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the recognition by the Soviet Government of a rival Polish organization would impose a severe strain on the unity of the Allies since throughout the world such a rival government or organization would be regarded as a Soviet puppet whether or not this was strictly true.

⁴⁶ See memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, June 28, p. 1418.

In considering the best, or rather the least undesirable, policy for this government to follow in the face of some such development, it must be borne in mind that there is very great doubt as to the degree of real support which a rival Polish organization would have inside Poland. It is virtually certain that the entire weight of the Soviet propaganda machine, both from Moscow and sympathetic sources abroad, will be brought to bear to convince the world that the new organization represents the "real democratic forces" inside Poland and as such is entitled to be considered in international affairs as the legal *de facto* government. It is felt, however, that before this government considers any revision of its present attitude of recognizing and dealing only with the Polish Government in London, substantial proof must be forthcoming either through reports of American observers in Poland or by means of a genuine election that the new organization commands the support of the majority of the Polish people. Therefore, during the war until this question can be clarified, we should abstain from any act or word which would further the propaganda attempts to depict such organization as the genuine representative of the Polish people.

On questions involving relief and other practical matters, this principle should in general be followed, but for humanitarian reasons, it might be possible to examine each case on its merits. In short, the only possible policy for the United States Government is to watch closely the developments in Poland and avoid being stampeded by any propaganda campaign into the support of claims which subsequent events might reveal to be unfounded. We should, on the other hand, avoid any positive statement which would bind us irrevocably to the permanent support of the Polish Government-in-exile *per se*.

JULY 19, 1944.

860C.01/7-2644 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 26, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received July 26—7:02 p. m.]

Polish Series 68. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Romer tells me that as a result of the meeting with Churchill last evening (my 66, July 25)⁴⁷ Mikolajczyk, Professor Grabski and he have de-

⁴⁷ This telegram read as follows :

"Romer tells me Churchill telegraphed Stalin several days ago saying that if Mikolajczyk should desire to go to Moscow, Churchill hoped Stalin would receive him. Stalin has replied that he would receive Mikolajczyk but suggests latter talk first with the new Polish Committee of National Liberation.

"Romer states he and Mikolajczyk are seeing Churchill this evening about the question. He will let me know the result tomorrow." (860C.01/7-2544)

cided to go to Moscow. According to Romer they are going without any pre-conditions either positive or negative. They do not plan to meet first with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation⁴⁸ as suggested by Stalin. They regard this reference in his wire to Churchill as only a suggestion and not as a condition.

They leave London tonight by plane; stop-off briefly at Gibraltar and then continue on to Tehran. They hope their Soviet visas will be awaiting them there and that they can then continue on to Moscow.

Romer states British Foreign Office is advising its Embassy in Moscow of their coming. He hopes Ambassador Harriman may also be informed and asked to extend to them such facilities as may be practicable.

Romer referred to the answer to a question which Mr. Eden was making in the House of Commons today regarding the British Government's recognition of the Polish Government in London⁴⁹ and suggested that if some similar reference were possible from the American side he believed this would be helpful.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.012/7-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 26, 1944.

[Received July 26—9 :58 p. m.]

2763. The *Gazette* of the Supreme Soviet for July 23 carried a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated July 14 extending the decree of June 22 (Embassy's 2452, July 6 regarding the right of certain persons of Polish nationality in the Soviet Union to [opt?] for Polish citizenship) to inhabitants of regions transferred by the Soviet Union into the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Full text by air mail.⁵⁰

HARRIMAN

⁴⁸ The Polish Committee of National Liberation had been established in Kholm (Chelm) by a decree of July 21, 1944, by the National People's Council of Poland. It soon transferred its activities to Lublin. See telegram 2736, July 24, from Moscow, p. 1425.

⁴⁹ Mr. Eden's remarks were to the effect that the British Government continued to recognize the Polish Government in Exile and were doing all in their power to further an early solution of the Polish-Soviet problem.

⁵⁰ Forwarded in despatch 725, July 26, from Moscow. The decree read, in part: "Soviet citizens of Polish nationality domiciled in different regions of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic acquire the right to take on Polish citizenship" in accordance with the decree of June 22, 1944. (860C.012/7-2644)

860C.01/7-2744 : Telegram

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)

[Paraphrase]

[WASHINGTON,] 27 July, 1944.

31. Your telegram regarding the Polish situation has been received.⁵¹ The Prime Minister tells me that Mikolajczyk is leaving to call on you. It is unnecessary to say that I greatly hope this whole matter with him can be worked out to the best advantage of our common effort by you.

860C.01/8-1144 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

[Paraphrase]

[LONDON,] 29 July, 1944.

[740.] This seems to me the best ever received from U. J.

Begins:

I have received your messages of July 25th and July 27th on the subject of departure of Mikolajczyk. Monsieur Mikolajczyk and his party will be given necessary assistance on arrival in Moscow.

You know our point of view on the question of Poland, who is our neighbour and relations with whom have an especial importance for the Soviet Union. We welcome National Committee, which has been created on territory of Poland from democratic forces and I think by creation of this Committee a good start has been made for unification of Poles friendly disposed towards Great Britain, U.S.S.R. and the United States and for the surmounting of opposition on the part of those Polish elements, who are not capable of unification with democratic forces.

I understand the importance of Polish question for the common cause of the Allies and for this very reason I am prepared to give assistance to all Poles and to mediate in attainment of an agreement between them. The Soviet forces have done and are doing everything possible to hasten the liberation of Poland from the German usurpers and to help Polish people in restoration of their freedom and in the matter of welfare of their country.

Ends.

Message of July 25th is contained in my telegram of July 26th. to you.⁵² Following is text of my message to U. J. of July 27th.

⁵¹ See footnote 86, p. 1424.

⁵² For text of the message of July 25 from Churchill to Stalin contained in this telegram, see Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (English edition published by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1958), p. 244.

Begins:

Mikolajczyk and his colleagues have started. I am sure that Mikolajczyk is most anxious to help a general fusion of all Poles on lines on which you and I and the President are I believe agreed. I believe the Poles who are friendly to Russia should join with Poles who are friendly to Great Britain and the United States in order to establish the strong free, independent Poland, the good neighbour of Russia and an important barrier between you and another German outrage. We will all three take good care there are other barriers also.

It would be a great pity and even a disaster if the Western democracies found themselves recognising one body of Poles and you recognising another. It would lead to constant friction and might even hamper the Great business which we have to do the wide world over. Please therefore receive these few sentences in the spirit in which they are sent, which is one of sincere friendship and our twenty year alliance.

860C.01/7-3144 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 31, 1944—noon.

[Received 2:05 p. m.]

555. For the President from Polish Prime Minister.

“On leaving here for Moscow, I consider it my duty to inform you personally that I agreed to undertake this trip on Prime Minister Churchill’s initiative after he had informed Marshal Stalin.

In spite of grave difficulties created for the Polish Government by recent actions on the part of the Soviet Government,⁵³ I attach nevertheless the utmost importance to my personal contact with Marshal Stalin. I shall endeavor to prove once more at this last moment my Government’s entire good will in order to bring about not only the establishment of Soviet-Polish relations on a new and firm basis but also a clarification of political atmosphere between the Allies in this decisive stage of the war.

Remembering with everlasting gratitude the friendly welcome you generously accorded me, I trust that you Mr. President and the United States Government will lend your further friendly assistance and support at this moment, all important for Poland.

On this occasion, Mr. President, I convey to you my highest and most friendly regards.” Signed Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.

Above message is a paraphrase.

FORD

⁵³ For correspondence concerning the Soviet Union’s efforts to set up a new government inside Poland, and policies pursued in liberated areas of Poland, see pp. 1398 ff.

860C.01/8-144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 1, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received August 2—12:45 a. m.]

2832. For the President and the Secretary. I called on Mikolajczyk yesterday. Romer was also present. Mikolajczyk expressed himself as being extremely pessimistic about the outcome of his visit to Moscow. He believed that with the successful Allied landings in France and improved military outlook Stalin had changed his attitude. He could not reconcile Stalin's statements to Lange with his own final talks with Lebedev and other recent Soviet actions. He said he was now convinced that the Soviet Government intended to communize Poland.

I told him that it was of course impossible for me to attempt to reconcile conversations of others but I could assure him that from my many conversations over many months with Stalin and Molotov there had been consistency in the point of view and objectives expressed and that since January it had been plain that the Soviets were unwilling to recognize his Government as long as it included the named individuals who rightly or wrongly were considered irreconcilably antagonistic to friendship with the Soviet Union. I explained that it was my opinion that this question came first and that other matters including the boundary question could not be dealt with until this question had been disposed of. In some detail I explained to him the evidence that satisfied me that the Soviet Government had no intention of communizing Poland.

I told him that I believed he could reach an agreement providing he was willing and in a position to eliminate individuals from his Government and bring in some of the members of the new Committee of Liberation. He said that he could get the resignation of Sosnkowski and others except the President but it had to be in connection with a constructive move. He did not know however whether he should take responsibility for bringing into the Polish Government people without previous political standing and who were not representative of the established Polish parties. He explained the shortcomings of several of them.

Marowski,⁵⁴ a Social Democrat had had a difference with his party some years ago and had later acted quite improperly in using the name

⁵⁴ Edward Boleslaw Osobka-Morawski, Chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and Director of Foreign Affairs.

of the party organ *The Worker* when in June 1942 he had started an underground publication without authorization from his party. He admitted that Marowski when contacted by members of the party had agreed to give up the name.

Vitos⁵⁵ had left the Peasant Party many years ago.

General Rola-Zhimersji⁵⁶ had a prison record. Mikolajczyk later admitted that Rola had been imprisoned because of disagreement with Pilsudski⁵⁷ and that the sentence was of a political nature but he contended that this incident had taken him out of the line of the senior command.

In reply I commented that in history national emergencies found strange bedfellows.

He described the military achievements of his underground forces which he appeared to consider had made the rapid advance of the Red Army possible. He said he had been informed that the commanding Polish officers at Vilna had been imprisoned by the Red Army after assisting in the liberation of the city. He explained that if this type of treatment continued it would end all cooperation with the Red Army.

I told him that it was his responsibility, not my Government's, to negotiate a settlement but it was of great interest to the United States that all Poles should unite for the defeat of the Germans in collaboration with the Red Army. I said it was obvious that Stalin wanted to find a solution and that he knew the United Nations were looking upon the treatment of Poland as a test case of Soviet foreign policy.

Mikolajczyk heartily endorsed the latter and said that to be successful in this the Soviet Government would have to deal with his Government. I pointed out that the Soviets were ready to look at things from a long view and take criticism for a considerable period of time providing the final results accomplished their ends.

The British Ambassador saw Mikolajczyk shortly before I did. His impression of Mikolajczyk's attitude was the same as mine and he had talked to him along the same lines.

Mikolajczyk saw Molotov⁵⁸ later in the day. I will get a report of this meeting tonight.

HARRIMAN

⁵⁵ Andrzej Witos, Vice Chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and Director of Agriculture and Agricultural Reform.

⁵⁶ Col. Gen. Michal Rola-Zymierski, Polish Director of National Defence.

⁵⁷ Jozef Pilsudski, Marshal of Poland; Chief of State, 1918-22; Prime Minister, 1926-28, 1930; quasi-dictator until his death in 1935.

⁵⁸ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

860C.01/8-244: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 2, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received August 2—6:28 a. m.]

2836. For the President and the Secretary. I saw Mikolajczyk last evening at the British Embassy. He was well satisfied with what he described as Molotov's friendly reception. The principal matters discussed were the meeting with Stalin which should take place Thursday or Friday⁵⁹ and a meeting with the Poles. Mikolajczyk is ready to see the Poles but they are at present at Chelm and will not return for several days.

The British Ambassador and I found Mikolajczyk and Romer in a better frame of mind and more hopeful.

HARRIMAN

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁰

I have received your messages of July 28.⁶¹

I share your opinion regarding the significance which our meeting could have, but circumstances, connected with military operations on our front about which I wrote previously, do not allow me, to my regret, to count on an opportunity of such a meeting in the nearest future.⁶²

As regards the Polish question, the matter depends, first of all, on the Poles themselves and on the capability of these or other persons from the Polish *émigré* government to cooperate with the already functioning in Poland Polish Committee of National Liberation around which more and more are rallying the democratic forces of Poland. On my part, I am ready to render to all Poles any possible assistance in this matter.

AUGUST 2, 1944.

⁵⁹ August 3 or 4.

⁶⁰ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶¹ The messages were sent on July 27; for texts, see *ante*, p. 1300, and *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 4.

⁶² A meeting was held at Quebec September 11-16, 1944 (the Second Quebec Conference), attended by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt with their civilian and military advisers. Premier Stalin did not attend.

861.014/8-444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 4, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 11:15 a. m.]

2859. Full page map in press August 3 showing territory liberated by Russians between June 23 and August 2 shows the Curzon Line which gives Lwow to Russia and Belostok⁶³ to the Poles. The press articles on Belostok in contrast to those on Lwow have not characterized it as a Soviet town.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 4, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 5:15 p. m.]

2860. Personal for the President and the Secretary. Mr. Romer called this morning to tell me about the conversation with Stalin and Molotov last night. Mikolajczyk was accompanied by Romer and Grabsky. The conversation lasted two and a half hours.

The first part of the conversation was devoted to a discussion of the character of the cooperation of Poles with the Red Army. Mikolajczyk explained to Stalin the operations of the underground forces. At first Stalin belittled them but later listened attentively. Stalin explained that Partisan activity was valuable but that he was not interested in mobilizing a large percentage of the population into the Army. The most important assistance the Poles could give was the development of a stable civilian life behind the Red Army front so that agriculture could be stimulated and assistance given in transport and so forth.

The conversation then turned to the boundary question. Stalin explained that he would support Polish boundaries to the north and to the west including even Stettin and Breslau which Romer told me was beyond what the Poles considered sensible. Stalin told him that he wished to incorporate the northern portion of East Prussia that included Koenigsberg into the Soviet Union and that the Curzon line should be the eastern boundary. Mikolajczyk argued for Lwow and Vilna on the grounds of Polish rights and from the standpoint of

⁶³ Bialystok.

world opinion. Stalin emphasized the rights of White Russians and Ukrainians and that the Curzon line was set by an impartial International Commission. Although firm, he gave some encouragement to the idea that the setting of the boundary could be left for future determination. Romer got the impression that the question of Vilna was difficult but that there was some hope for Lwow although the conversation was so general that no interpretation could be made that Stalin was ready to agree to a modification of the Curzon line in favor of the Poles.

The third and last phase of the conversation dealt with the question of the Polish Government. Stalin stated frankly that he hoped Mikolajczyk could work out an agreement with the Committee of Liberation, that he was interested in having all Poles united so that there would be a stable Poland both during and after the war with a minimum of internal conflict. He said that if Mikolajczyk did not succeed in making arrangements with the Committee he would of necessity have to back and deal with the Committee. Mikolajczyk said that he was ready to meet with members of the Committee. Stalin agreed to telegraph them to come to Moscow or Kiev and that this meeting should take place within the next day or two.

No mention was made of any individuals in the Polish Government objectionable to the Soviet Government nor to the Katyn incident.

Romer appeared quite optimistic but he gave me a message from Mikolajczyk to the effect that in reporting the conversation to you I should not give you an over optimistic impression. Mikolajczyk considers that the ice has been broken but nothing so far accomplished.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 8 [7], 1944—midnight.

[Received August 8—10:58 a. m.]

2885. Personal for the President and the Secretary supplementing my No. 2860, August 4, 1 p. m. Mikolajczyk asked the British Ambassador and myself to call on him this afternoon August 7 to tell us of his two talks with the members of the Polish Committee of Liberation. The first talk occurred last night and the second this morning. At the first meeting he, Romer and Grabski met with Morawski, Witos, Wanda Waselewska⁶⁴ and General Rolazymierski. This morning the

⁶⁴ Wanda Lvovna Wasilewska, Vice Chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, and editor of *Wolna Polska* (Free Poland).

new personality, Berut,⁶⁵ was present and presided. Mikolajczyk had never met him before and does not know his background. He described him as a man of force and education and when present dominated the discussion. Although not officially a member of the Committee he is evidently the chairman of the Polish National Council in Warsaw.

The discussions so far have apparently covered a good deal of background, have been sparing [*sparring?*] in character and inconclusive. Mikolajczyk asked the British Ambassador and myself not to report on the conversation in detail as he deemed it wise to await the third meeting tonight before reporting to his own Government. He said that he would inform us tomorrow of the results of the discussions releasing us to report fully to our Governments. Mikolajczyk took a gloomy view of the talks.

HARRIMAN

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁶

[Paraphrase]

[Moscow,] 9 August 1944.

I should like to inform you of my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski. Judging from my conversation with Mikolajczyk, I am convinced that he has unsatisfactory information about Polish conditions. I was, however, left with the impression that Mikolajczyk is not opposed to finding ways to unite the Poles.

I suggested to Mikolajczyk, since I did not think it possible to press any decision on the Poles, that he and his colleagues meet together and discuss their problems with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, and above all the question of the earliest union of all democratic forces of Poland on liberated Polish land. These meetings have taken place, and I have been informed by both sides about them. The National Committee delegation proposed as the basis of the Polish Government's activity the Constitution of 1921,⁶⁷ and on this basis offered four portfolios to Mikolajczyk's group, among them the post of Premier for Mikolajczyk. However, Mikolajczyk did not give his agreement to this. Although it is to be regretted that these meetings have not achieved the desired results, they

⁶⁵ Boleslaw Bierut, Chairman of the National People's Council of Poland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa).

⁶⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶⁷ The Polish Constitution of March 17, 1921; for text, see Michal Potulicki, *Constitution de la République de Pologne du 17 mars 1921* (Varsovie, Société de Publications Internationales, 1921).

have had a positive significance by permitting both Mikolajczyk and Morawski and Bierut, who had just come from Warsaw, to exchange their points of view, and especially in the development that both Mikolajczyk and the Polish National Committee expressed a desire to work together and to find the practical possibilities to achieve that end. In relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk this might be considered the first stage, and we shall hope that in the future the business will go better.

The Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin, I am advised, has decided to invite Professor Lange to join it as a director on Foreign Affairs. It would undoubtedly be in the interests of unifying the Poles and of the struggle against our common foe if Lange who is a well-known Polish democratic leader would get the opportunity to come to Poland to take this post. I hope that you share this view and will not refuse the necessary support in this matter which is of such great importance to our common cause.⁶⁸

860C.01/8-1044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 10, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received 4 p. m.]

2923. For the President and the Secretary. Mikolajczyk and his party left Moscow early this morning. Mikolajczyk accompanied by Romer called on me late yesterday afternoon and I saw him again after midnight. In the meantime he had had his final talk with Stalin.

Mikolajczyk leaves Moscow much more hopeful of the possibility of settlement than when he arrived. He was impressed by his cordial reception and his frank discussions with Stalin and Molotov. At the meeting last night Stalin agreed to undertake to drop arms in Warsaw for the underground forces. A communications officer will first be parachuted to the Polish headquarters with ciphers in order to establish direct communication to facilitate this operation. Stalin at last admitted that his information agreed with Mikolajczyk's that all Poles were united for resistance in Warsaw under the leadership of the commanding general of the underground forces⁶⁹ at whose headquarters there is now a Red Army observer. Stalin told him that he had expected to take Warsaw on August 6 but that because the Germans had brought in four new Panzer divisions and two other di-

⁶⁸ The President's response to this proposal is given in his telegram 42, August 12, p. 1432.

⁶⁹ Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski, commander in chief of the Polish Home Army, the "General Bor" of the Warsaw uprising in 1944.

visions to hold the bridgehead, the taking of the city had been delayed but he was confident that the new difficulties could be overcome.

Mikolajczyk is at least partially convinced that it is not the objective of the Soviet Government to communize Poland. He is however still suspicious that this is the objective of the majority of the members of the Council of Liberation.⁷⁰ He believes that the Soviets realize that they cannot attain their objective in having a united Polish people behind the Red Army without the cooperation of Mikolajczyk and his government.

He believes further that the Committee for Liberation has found that they are not getting the full support of the Polish people and that they realize that they cannot set up competent governmental machinery without the cooperation of himself and the leaders in his government. This situation gives him confidence that some arrangements can be worked out through which all factions can unite. He has however not been able to agree with the Committee on a plan.

The Committee proposed that Mikolajczyk and three members of his government come to Warsaw and join the Committee in establishing a government, Mikolajczyk to head this new government, under the authority of the Polish National Council in Warsaw. This new government would have 18 members of which 14 would be drawn from the present Committee of Liberation or those associated with the Council. The 1935 Constitution⁷¹ would be repudiated and the 1921 Constitution accepted. Mikolajczyk pointed out that this government would have no constitutional basis. He proposed that they continue to work under the 1935 Constitution, much as he himself disliked its provisions. The President should be retained and a new Cabinet formed consisting of the representatives of the four established democratic parties (eliminating the Sanacja⁷²) and adding representatives of the Workers Party and, if desired, of the Communists.

After lengthy arguments between the Poles, a meeting was held at which Molotov presided. Molotov listened to the arguments of both sides. It was Mikolajczyk's feeling that Molotov was impressed with his position and appreciated lack of clarity and practicability of the approach of the Committee. Mikolajczyk hopes that he can work out some plan with his colleagues when he returns to London, perhaps finding a way to install a new individual as President. He intends to submit this proposal to Moscow by telegraph and hopes that it will become a basis for discussion which will permit him and some of his

⁷⁰ The Polish Committee of National Liberation.

⁷¹ The Polish Constitution of April 23, 1935; for text, see *Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (Warsaw, Polish Commission for International Law Cooperation, 1935).

⁷² The prewar ruling party in Poland from about 1926, often called the party of "the Colonels".

associates to return to Warsaw, when taken, to work out the details, including the reaching of an agreement on individuals to be selected to make up the new Cabinet. His primary interest is to join all factions at this time in a government which will have a legal basis and which can hold the country together until such time as a truly free general election can be held to establish a new constitution and government. He is satisfied that the Committee of Liberation has not the standing with the Polish people to take control of Poland without the force of the Red Army, but is fearful that if it once gets control, there will not be a free election.

He was much impressed with the ability of this mysterious figure, Bierut. He cannot figure out who he is or his background. Bierut talks sensibly about the social and economic program for Poland, but admits he has had no experience in politics and wants to leave that to Mikolajczyk. Bierut is impatient with Mikolajczyk when the latter speaks of the necessity of bringing in the party leaders, saying that parties are a thing of the past and that he and his associates represent the Polish masses. His governmental ideas are revolutionary and the question of the authority of the new government does not bother him. Mikolajczyk, on the other hand, lays first importance on the development of a basis for authority of the government and is unwilling to dissociate himself from the constitutional basis of his present government, although he is willing to have complete reorganization of the membership of the government in any reasonable way to meet the wishes of the Committee.

An unsuccessful attempt was made among the Poles to agree on a joint communiqué, but it was verbally agreed that public recriminations should cease. Mikolajczyk doubts that the Committee will live up to this.

I will cable further giving more details of the conversation and background.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-1144: Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 11, 1944.

[Received August 11—2:07 p. m.]

Poles 70. President Raczkiewicz has named Tomasz Arciszewski in place of General Sosnkowski as successor designate to the Presidency (my 55, June 5⁷³). Arciszewski arrived in London from Po-

⁷³ Not printed; but on the question of Polish presidential succession, see Polish Series telegram 50, June 1, from the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile, p. 1273.

land about 10 days ago. He was proposed for this post by the Council of National Unity in Poland.⁷⁴ He is 66, a Socialist and has been Chief of the Executive of the Polish Socialist Party.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/8-1144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 11, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 12—1:25 a. m.]

2955. For the President and Acting Secretary. I called on Molotov this evening to obtain his reactions to the Mikolajczyk visit. He said that Stalin had cabled the President on the day of Mikolajczyk's departure a full report of what had transpired and that he would give me the substance of this report.

Stalin had estimated the situation as a definite step forward. Although a basis for understanding between the London Government and the Polish Committee had not yet been found, hope had not been given up that agreement would be reached. In reply to my question Molotov said that the Soviet Government was very anxious to see a merger between the two parties. He asked me what I had learned from Mikolajczyk as to his attitude. I told him Mikolajczyk was hopeful that a solution could be found and that he was firmly convinced that the Russians desired agreement. Molotov replied, "Of course. Our minds would not be at ease unless an agreement were reached."

Molotov said that he had found Mikolajczyk to be "a wise man" and that he had made a good impression. He continued that both sides wanted him to be Prime Minister. However, he held a conflicting position: He was ready to replace the President but was unable to do so under the Constitution and was reluctant to abandon the 1935 Constitution.

Molotov stated that, although Mikolajczyk and his colleagues did not approve of this Constitution, they maintained that the United States Government had insisted that it be adhered to. I endeavored to explain the background of the formation of the London Government and our recognition thereof, stating that the Soviet Government had also recognized it on this basis. Molotov said that both sides now preferred the 1921 Constitution and he could not understand why Mikolajczyk and his colleagues could not now revert to it.

⁷⁴ The political representation in Poland of the Polish Government in Exile was transformed on January 9, 1944, into a Council of National Unity composed of delegates from the four main political parties.

I commented that Mikolajczyk had not taken seriously the proposal of the Committee that the London Government be given only 4 seats in the new government and had assumed that a more equitable distribution between the various parties could be arranged. Molotov believed that agreement could be reached on this question.

The only sharp note in the conversation was that in conclusion he stated that the Poles had always been late "last year and even up to the present. Now they must make up their minds quickly or it will be too late."

He spoke of the communication that the Polish Committee had addressed to the President regarding Professor Lange, which subject Stalin had referred to in his cable. He considered that Dr. Lange would have to renounce his American citizenship and asked whether the President would support it. I said that I could not speak for the President but that an American citizen had the privilege of renouncing his citizenship, that it was entirely up to Lange and that as we recognized the Polish Government in London, I did not believe that the President would wish to become involved in the matter.

I asked Molotov what he knew about Bierut. He said that he had never met him before these conferences. He mentioned that he spoke Russian fluently, and gave me a brief sketch of his background substantially as I have reported to the Department in my No. 2954, August 11, 11 p. m.⁷⁵

In reply to my question he said that he understood Bierut had been a member of the Communist Party but had left it and he did not know whether he was a Communist now or not. He described Bierut as being broadminded, reasonable, reserved and a real Polish patriot, and one who fully understood the situation in Poland.

Finally, I asked Molotov about the fighting in Warsaw. He explained at great length that the resistance had started too soon on August 1 without any knowledge of the Soviet Government.⁷⁶ The first they had heard of it was from a Reuter's report on August 2. Stalin had promised Mikolajczyk to make every effort to assist in every possible way and plans were being made to drop a Red Army officer in Warsaw.

He said that they could not identify the Russian officer who was already there, a Captain Kalugin,⁷⁷ who had unexpectedly showed up and claimed to be an officer in the Red Army. They were attempting to identify him. He explained that the premature move of the Poles

⁷⁵ Not printed.

⁷⁶ This Warsaw uprising endured through 63 days until the resources of the Poles were completely exhausted on October 3.

⁷⁷ Konstantin Kalugin, a captain in the Soviet intelligence service, according to a former official of the Polish underground.

was embarrassing. It was too costly for the Red Army to make a frontal attack and it would take time to outflank the city.

Molotov left me without any doubt that the Soviet Government is most anxious that agreement be reached between the Poles but that the Soviet Government is going ahead with its plans to support the Committee regardless and that delay on the part of Mikolajczyk and his colleagues would work against their interests.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 12, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received August 13—9:05 p. m.]

2972. Supplementing my 2923, August 10, 2 p. m. For the President and Acting Secretary. When Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow he told me that it was his belief that the Soviet Government intended to communize and Sovietize Poland and the National Council [*Committee*] for Liberation was an instrument for this purpose. At our first talk the British Ambassador and I told him that our evidence did not conform to this opinion, and shortly afterward when he expressed the same opinion to a group of American newspapermen several of the more responsible took strong exception to it.

As a result of his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Mikolajczyk's opinion appeared to change and the British Ambassador suggested that he put the question directly to Stalin in his last talk. Mikolajczyk told me that he raised the question indirectly, first by repeating a story he had heard of a statement by an Austrian prisoner of war to the effect that Germany had been beaten in the war but would now achieve her objective through other means. Germany would denounce Communism and because of her higher intellectual power would get control of Russia. Stalin commented "Communism fitted Germany as a saddle to a cow". Mikolajczyk then asked Stalin how he viewed the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. Stalin, after explaining his fears as to the possible rebirth of militarism in Germany within 25 years, said that to avoid this danger the Soviet Union and Poland must "march together" each leaving to the other country its own internal affairs. He emphasized also the need for the development of close relations by Poland with the United States, Britain and France.

Mikolajczyk, however, is still worried that the majority of members of the Committee of Liberation are determined to communize Poland and to use him and others to that end. When Bierut said that the

parties didn't count and that he, Bierut, represented the feeling of the masses, Mikolajczyk felt that he was following a Communist line. He respects Bierut's ability but fears him.

I questioned Mikolajczyk in some detail on his discussion with Bierut about Bierut's objection to recognition of the parties and was not entirely convinced that Mikolajczyk's deductions were correct or whether Bierut was pointing out that the war had deeply affected Polish popular opinion and that old party lines were no longer playing the role in Polish thinking that they had in the past.

In my talks with Morawski whom Mikolajczyk also classifies as a determined Communist he told me that he was a socialist not a Communist. He said that there was no danger of Poland becoming Communist, the Peasant Party was the strongest in Poland, the peasants were wedded to their individual ownership of the land and the population was so largely Catholic.

Mikolajczyk's suspicions were further aroused by a private talk he had with one of the members of the Committee whom I took to be General Rola-Zymierski who urged him not to return to London but to accept the proposition of the Committee and go to Warsaw saying, "If you don't they will take control and it will be too late". Here again Mikolajczyk inferred that Rola feared the leading members of the Committee were determined to seize power and establish a Communist regime while they had the support of the Red Army.

After questioning Mikolajczyk, I felt that these remarks of Rola's might well have been intended as personal advice to Mikolajczyk, and that Rola felt more confidence in the stability of the situation if Mikolajczyk and some of his colleagues were to participate in the new Government.

I am spelling this out in such detail as it is my impression that Mikolajczyk's deep-seated suspicions and fears of Communism will play a part in decision that he and his associates take on his return to London.

Although it is impossible to foresee how events will develop in Poland, I believe that at this time Mikolajczyk and his associates must put suspicion aside and earnestly attempt to make a reasonable settlement, being prepared (after their return to Warsaw) to fight out any situation with which they are confronted.

Mikolajczyk in his conversation with me indicated that he was weighing the advisability of joining forces with the Poles here as against allowing the situation to run its course. He seemed to be convinced that the Committee were so unrepresentative and inexperienced in government affairs that they would get into great difficulties and that it might be more advisable to delay action on the part of the London Government until this was proved to be the case.

I cannot disagree too strongly with this reasoning. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government wants to see a settlement now and it is obvious that the Committee feel they need the help of Mikolajczyk and some of his colleagues but there is no way to predict how successful the Committee alone will be, but to the degree that they are unsuccessful in establishing stable conditions in Poland that war effort will suffer. If Mikolajczyk is sincere, which I believe him to be, in stating that his primary present objectives are to achieve the earliest liberation of Poland and to insure a truly free election, his policy is clearly indicated, namely that he should make every effort to work out a merger of all Polish factions at this time.

By his visit to Moscow he has gained a major advantage in the acceptance by all of his leadership as Prime Minister. He has also attained a major success in obtaining Stalin's recognition for the first time of his underground forces fighting in Warsaw and agreement to assist them.

It is my earnest hope that the British Government bring full pressure on Mikolajczyk and his associates to act quickly and realistically, and I recommend that we support this position.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/8-3044 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 30, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

Poles 88. I saw Romer at 6:30 this evening. He gave me the final text of the proposals which the Polish Government is submitting to Moscow. He said these proposals were being transmitted through Ambassador Lebedev today. He added that they were, of course, a compromise but that following the receipt of approval and suggestions from the Polish Underground they had been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet. The Socialists had thus reversed their earlier vote.

The text of the proposal is as follows:

"After the liberation of the capital of Poland, the Polish Government will be reconstructed on the following lines:

The parties mentioned below will, in equal strength, form the basis of the Government: The Peasant Party, the National Democratic Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Labour Party and the Polish Worker's Party.

The possibility of joining the Government by representatives of the Fascist-minded and non-democratic political groups, also by those

responsible for the pre-September 1939 system of Government, was ruled out.

Agreement between the Prime Minister and the political parties concerning the choice of candidates for the Government from amongst these parties will take place in Warsaw, and thereafter the President of the Republic will, on the motion of the Prime Minister, appoint a new Government.

The programme of the Government will rest on the following bases:

The Government will bring about the resumption of diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR.

The Government will immediately proceed to take over the administration of the liberated Polish lands and to prepare the taking over of the new areas to be surrendered by Germany.

To this end the Government will conclude with the Soviet Government an agreement with the view of defining the forms of collaboration with the Red Army in the military sphere. This agreement will be modelled on and carried out in the spirit of agreements concluded by the Allied powers with the Governments of the liberated countries of western Europe. The Government will assure order in the rear of the Soviet Army.

All foreign troops will be withdrawn from Polish territories on the cessation of hostilities.

The Government will, as soon as possible, arrange for the elections to the Constitutional Diet as well as for elections to the local Government authorities on the basis of a decree providing for universal, equal, direct, secret and proportional suffrage. The elections will take place as soon as normal conditions are established in the country.

The new democratic constitution will be passed immediately after the convocation of the Constitutional Diet. A new President of the Republic will be elected on the basis of this constitution.

The Government will undertake the carrying out of social reforms based on the declarations of principles made during the period of occupation by the representatives of the nation in the homeland and by the Polish Government abroad. In particular the agricultural reforms will be enacted without delay.

Until the convocation of the Constitutional Diet a National Council will be appointed to assist the Government as an advisory body. It will be composed of representatives of the aforesaid five political parties, each of which will be represented by equal numbers. Smaller democratic political groups may also be represented on a correspondingly lesser scale.

The Government will bring about an agreement with the Soviet Government with the view to the joint prosecution of the war against Germany and the laying of foundations for a durable Polish-Soviet friendship after the war based on a Polish-Soviet alliance aiming at close political and economic collaboration between Poland and the USSR, while respecting the principle of the sovereignty of both states and of the mutual obligation of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state. It will be the object of the alliances to devote constant care to the elimination of all German influence in central Europe and the prevention of the possibility of renewed German aggression.

This object will also be served by the alliances between Poland and Great Britain⁷⁸ and France,⁷⁹ by the conclusion of a Polish-Czechoslovak alliance and by the maintenance of the closest ties of friendship between Poland and the United States of America.

Poland would expect fully to participate in the planning for the safeguarding of peace by a system of general security of peace-loving nations; also to take part in the occupation of Germany, especially of her eastern territories adjacent to the future western boundaries of Poland.

With regard to the settlement of the frontiers of Poland, the Polish Government will act on the following principles agreed upon with the Soviet Government in the spirit of friendship and in respect of the fundamental interests of the Polish nation:

Poland who has made so many sacrifices in this war and is the only country under German occupation which produced no Quisling, cannot emerge from this war diminished in territory. In the east the main centres of Polish cultural life and the sources of raw materials indispensable to the economic life of the country shall remain within Polish boundaries. A final settlement of the Polish-Soviet frontier on the basis of these principles will be made by the Constitutional Diet in accordance with democratic principles.

All Germans will be removed from the territories incorporated into Poland in the north and the west by mutual Soviet-Polish cooperation.

Questions of citizenship and repatriation will be duly settled. Polish citizens who have been interned, arrested or deported both in Poland and on territories of the USSR will immediately be released by the Soviet authorities who will assist in their repatriation.

A voluntary exchange of the Polish, White Russian and Ukrainian population will be carried out.

The prosecution of the war and the general direction of all matters concerning the Polish armed forces will pass into the hands of the Polish Government who will form to this end a war cabinet. The latter will, in particular, be competent in the following matters:

- a. Problems connected with the general prosecution of the war,
- b. Polish-Soviet military collaboration,
- c. Polish-British military collaboration,
- d. Military cooperation between Poland and other Allied Nations,
- e. Unification of all armed forces of the Polish Republic.

The discussions of the War Cabinet may be attended apart from Ministers appointed by the Council of Ministers, by the Chief of the General Staff, and, if necessary, by the chiefs of the services and the commanders of individual groups of the Polish armed forces.

The Polish armed forces will operate under Polish command; in the eastern zone of operations under Soviet Supreme Operational Command; on other theatres of war under the Supreme Operational Allied Command of the respective area."

WINANT

⁷⁸ Agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland, signed at London, August 25, 1939; for text, see British Cmd. 6144 (1939), and with text of secret protocol, British Cmd. 6616 (1945).

⁷⁹ Protocol on mutual assistance between France and Poland signed at Paris on September 4, 1939; for text, see Das Deutschen Institut für Aussenpolitische Forschung, *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, vol. VI, no. 9/10 (September/October 1939), pp. 914-915, 887-889.

760C.61/9-2444 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 24, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received September 24—9:15 p. m.]

Poles 104. Premier Mikolajczyk tells me that several days ago Mr. Eden, following his return to London from Quebec indicated a desire to push Polish-Soviet questions and suggested that Mikolajczyk should perhaps again go to Moscow.

Mikolajczyk replied that he regarded this as impracticable at this time. The situation was just as it had been more than a month ago except perhaps somewhat worse. When he visited Moscow Marshal Stalin had said he should discuss the situation with the Polish Committee of National Liberation. After his return the Polish Government had drawn up and submitted its proposals for a settlement. Moscow had replied that the proposals had been referred to the Committee since this was an internal matter between Poles (my 96, September 9⁸⁰). There were other difficulties particularly the action of the National Council of the Homeland in making Bierut the "shadow President of Poland." This rendered it impossible for him to talk with Bierut.

Eden asked what he would propose. Mikolajczyk suggested that the British should press the Soviet Government to open conversations regarding the Polish proposals (my 88, August 30). They could authorize Ambassador Lebedev to discuss them with the Polish authorities here. If they could agree on principles Mikolajczyk might then go to Moscow.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/9-2844 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:32 p. m.]

Poles 107. I saw Premier Mikolajczyk this noon. He said the controversy over General Sosnkowski's continuance as Commander in

⁸⁰ Not printed; this telegram informed the Department of the reply by the Soviet Government to the proposals of the Polish Government sent through Ambassador Lebedev, to the effect that the Soviet Government "was passing on the proposals to the National Liberation Committee since this was a matter between Poles." (760C.01/9-944)

Chief of the Polish forces (my 105, September 24⁸¹) had now been successfully settled. President Raczkiewicz had agreed to dismiss General Sosnkowski. The decision would be announced tomorrow evening.⁸² General Bor, leader of the Warsaw rising, would be his successor.

A decree had also been drawn up designed to meet the transition period until General Bor could take over his duties. This decree would provide that the President in agreement with the Cabinet could delegate to others the functions of the Commander in Chief when the latter was prevented from exercising them. The military functions of the CinC would be delegated to General Kopanski, Chief of the Polish General Military Staff, and the administrative and policy functions to the Minister of War.

Premier Mikolajczyk indicated that these developments had not been made contingent on a general reshuffle of the Cabinet. Certain changes would however probably take place in the near future. General Kukiel, present Minister of War, would be replaced shortly by General Tabor who was formerly a prominent member of the Polish Underground Army and who accompanied Mikolajczyk to the United States last June. The Socialists might also make a change in their representation in the Cabinet. They might name Ciokolcz⁸³ in replacement of Grosfeld⁸⁴ now Minister of Finance. This would, however, be merely an internal party move. The Socialists, he said, fully supported the policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, as embodied in the memorandum submitted to Moscow (my 88, August 30).

Whether any change would take place in the representation of the National Democrats (Endek) in the Cabinet was still uncertain. This depended on whether the party would formally agree to support the policy embodied in the proposals submitted to Moscow. Berezowski⁸⁵ who was one of the principal leaders of the party and who had come out of Poland a few months ago, had recently signified to Mikolajczyk that the Endek Party would support those proposals but Bielecki,⁸⁶ leader of the extreme right wing, yesterday indicated in a meeting that his group would not support them. Mikolajczyk told me that unless the party in its entirety agreed to support the proposals, there

⁸¹ Not printed; this telegram reported the motion by the Polish Cabinet in London to recommend that General Sosnkowski be removed as Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. It further stated that Polish President Raczkiewicz was reluctant to remove him, but that strong pressure, supported by the British Government, was being applied to accomplish the removal. (860C.01/-9-2444)

⁸² The announcement was delayed until September 30.

⁸³ Adam Ciolkosz, a prewar Polish journalist.

⁸⁴ Ludwik Grosfeld.

⁸⁵ Zygmunt Berezowski, who became Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Tomasz Arciszewski on November 30, 1944.

⁸⁶ Tadeusz Bielecki.

would be no changes in its present representation in the Cabinet, consisting of Komarnicki⁸⁷ and Seyda.⁸⁸ On the other hand if the party should agree, Berezovski would be included but not Bielecki. Berezovski's inclusion would be appropriate since he had been a prominent member of the underground organization of the Endek Party in Poland and since the party organization desired his inclusion in the Cabinet.

The removal of Sosnkowski and Kukiel will mean the disappearance of two of the personalities to whom the Soviets have strongly objected and may thus open the way to progress in the Polish Government's dealings with the Soviet Government. But there are Polish elements who are not without misgivings about the effect of Sosnkowski's removal on opinion in Poland and in the Polish forces. The majority feel however and I understand this includes General Anders⁸⁹ who was recently in London that the change is unlikely to cause any untoward results among the Polish military.

[SCHOENFELD]

740.00116 EW 1939/10-244

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1944.

Mr. Ciechanowski then said that he was in a most depressed state of mind, partly because of the news of the tragic surrender of General Bor's insurgent groups who have been fighting so valiantly in Warsaw for the past 63 days, and partly because of the Russian attacks on General Bor (Tadeusz Komorowski) who has just been appointed in place of Sosnkowski.⁹⁰ He said that he felt that this meant but one thing: Stalin is decided to have nothing further to do with the Polish Government in London or any efforts to work out a compromise solution, unless he finds that the reaction of public opinion in England and the United States, and the reaction of the British and American governments, is such as to make him reverse his decision. The Ambassador said that in his view it was most important at this time that the American and British governments should show no sign of "abandonment" of the Mikolajczyk Government. The least sign of weakness, he said, would mean an All Clear signal to Stalin to pursue his present course. This course, he said, will inevitably lead to civil

⁸⁷ Wacław Komarnicki, Minister of Justice.

⁸⁸ Marjan Seyda, Minister of Preparatory Work for Peace Conference.

⁸⁹ Gen. Władysław Anders, commander of the Polish forces in Italy.

⁹⁰ Lieutenant General Komorowski was named by Mikolajczyk on September 29 as Commander in Chief of the Polish Army succeeding General Sosnkowski.

war in Poland. I asked why he thought Stalin wanted civil war in Poland in view of his earlier declarations that a strong and friendly Poland was strongly desired by the Soviet Government. The Polish Ambassador replied that he felt that Stalin had changed his mind on this question and wanted to be able to say to the world: "You see, there is nothing but chaos and civil war in Poland. The Poles cannot settle their own affairs. We Russians must therefore perform the task of maintaining order and temporarily administering the country." A course such as this, Mr. Ciechanowski said, would permit the Russians to eliminate elements in Poland whom they consider unfriendly and to set up a regime of their own choosing. In conclusion, he reiterated the hope that we would show no weakening of the "moral support" which he said the President had promised Mr. Mikolajczyk at the time of his visit.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

860C.01/10-1044 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 10, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received October 10—3:10 a. m.]

Poles 115. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Premier Mikolajczyk has just sent me word through a member of his Cabinet that he is leaving tonight for Moscow accompanied by Foreign Minister Romer, Professor Grabski, General Tabor and Colonel Novicki.

This source states Mikolajczyk yesterday received a telegram from Churchill stating that Stalin desired him, Romer and Grabski "to join the conference". He replied that he would come if his discussions were to be with the Soviet Government and not with the National Liberation Committee and if they were to be on the basis of the memorandum already submitted to Moscow (my 88, August 30). In a second telegram received this evening, Churchill advised Mikolajczyk that Stalin agreed to his coming on that basis and desired him to set out immediately.

In a Cabinet meeting held this evening, Polish Government confirmed Mikolajczyk's full powers to reach agreement on the basis of the memorandum. Mikolajczyk also saw President Raczkiewicz who signified his full agreement.

Mikolajczyk hopes to see Ambassador Harriman prior to his conversations to acquaint him fully with his plans.

Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow as 109.

[SCHOENFELD]

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*⁹¹

Moscow, 14 October 1944.

Stalin and Churchill⁹² met with Mikolajczyk and his associates yesterday afternoon. Molotov and Eden were present. I was invited as an observer and took no part in the discussion. Mikolajczyk was first given the opportunity to outline his position. He presented the memorandum of his proposals of August 30 handed to the Soviet Ambassador in London. With some difficulty Churchill forced Mikolajczyk to allow Grabski to outline the oral statement he had made at that time to the Soviet Ambassador. I understand you have copies of the memorandum and oral statement⁹³ referred to. Stalin stated that there were two great defects in the memorandum which would prevent an understanding on that basis. First it unrealistically ignored the existence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Second it failed to accept the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish boundary. He said that there were good points in the memorandum especially the emphasis on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the future. Churchill supported unequivocally Stalin's position in regard to the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement. Mikolajczyk denied that he intended to ignore the Committee but indicated that in his memorandum it was intended that the settlement should go deeper than one between the members of the Committee and of the Government in London and that the new government should be based on the five democratic parties in Poland. He explained at great length why he could not accept the Curzon Line. The cession of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Churchill told Mikolajczyk that he must accept the Curzon Line as the *de facto* line of demarcation. He suggested a formula on this basis which would allow the Poles to present their case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table. He warned Mikolajczyk however that he and the British Government were committed to support the Curzon Line as the

⁹¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation on the telegram states that a paraphrased copy was sent to the Secretary of State for information.

⁹² Prime Minister Churchill was already in Moscow holding conversations with Premier Stalin; for correspondence concerning these meetings October 9-18, 1944, see vol. iv, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Reports on developments of significance . . ." See also *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 202, footnote 2.

⁹³ A notation on the original reads as follows: "Not in Map Room nor Miss Turner's files." Copies are in the Moscow Embassy Files, now in the Department.

basis for settlement and bluntly told him that this was no time for the Poles in London and the British Government to separate.

Both Churchill and Stalin committed themselves to support the claims of Poland in the west including East Prussia and west of Königsberg and the line of the Oder including Stettin. Molotov interjected that the Curzon Line had the support of the three major Allies since at Teheran you had indicated that you considered that the Curzon Line was right although you did not consider it advisable to make your position public. He added that he recalled no objection on your part to the Polish claims in the west as outlined. Molotov did not refer to me for confirmation and I decided it would only make matters worse if I being present as an observer had attempted to correct his statement. I talked to Churchill about Molotov's statement afterwards at dinner. He recalls as clearly as I do that although you showed interest in hearing the views of Stalin and Churchill in the boundary question you had expressed no opinion on it one way or the other at Teheran.⁹⁴ I intend to tell Molotov privately at the next opportunity that I am sure you will wish that your name not [be] brought into the discussions again in regard to the boundary question.

In reply to these statements Mikolajczyk said that he was not authorized to accept the Curzon Line and that he understood that the members of the Committee even still hoped for Lwow. Stalin said that a major adjustment of this kind could not be possible if the economic systems of the Soviet Union and Poland were different. It would cause great hardship to socialize these areas and then go back to another system. He said that the Curzon Line must be the basis for settlement. He agreed that there could be minor adjustments up to say 7 or 8 kilometers when the boundary was finally fixed.

The meeting broke up with the understanding that Mikolajczyk would consider the situation and have a talk with Eden. Churchill made it very plain that his Government would consider it had fulfilled its obligations to Poland by providing a home for the Poles within the territory that was now proposed and that a strong free independent Poland was the objective not only of the British Government but also the Soviet Government. Stalin unequivocally endorsed this declaration.

⁹⁴ Prime Minister Mikolajczyk expressed his anxiety over Molotov's characterization of President Roosevelt's position toward the Curzon Line at the Tehran Conference in a letter of October 16, 1944, to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow. During a conversation on the same day with the Polish Foreign Minister (Romer), Ambassador Harriman corrected the misstatement of the President's position. For a memorandum of the conversation and text of Mikolajczyk's letter of October 16, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 204-205.

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁵

Moscow, 14 October 1944.

Supplementing my 141705.⁹⁶ Yesterday, later in the evening, a meeting was held with the Polish Committee represented by Bierut, President of the Council, Morawski, President of the Committee, and General Zymierski, Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. Bierut indicated that the principle differences in the talks with Mikolajczyk 2 months ago had been the adoption of the 1921 Constitution and the speed of the land reforms. Morawski with passion accused Mikolajczyk of encouraging terrorism in liberated Poland and sabotage of the Committee's work. There were protracted arguments on such subjects as whether there was real necessity for speed in land reforms and whether General Bor was a patriot or a criminal.

Churchill gave the Committee a sound and useful drubbing along the lines that all the Allies were united to beat Hitler except for the Poles who were fighting among themselves and that if this continued it would not be long before the Poles would lose the respect of the world. Stalin, although he supported the Committee members in the opinions they expressed, agreed with Churchill that the differences were small as compared to the major objective of a settlement being reached between the Poles. Bierut unqualifiedly accepted the Curzon Line as the proper basis for the settlement of the Soviet-Polish boundary thus creating the necessary conditions for the establishment of friendship between the peoples of the two countries. He asked for the support of the Allies in the return to the Poles of their historic lands in the north and the west. Churchill stated that he and Stalin agreed to support these Polish claims.

It was agreed that a meeting presided over by Eden and Molotov should be arranged between the two Polish factions. Eden is now trying to persuade Mikolajczyk to attend. Difficult as some of the specific issues are the strong feelings and suspicions that exist between the two Polish groups appear now to be the greatest obstacle to the formation of a partnership in the new government. On the other hand Churchill and Stalin are determined to force a settlement if at all possible in the interests of the prosecution of the war and harmony in Europe.

⁹⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation on the telegram states that a paraphrased copy was sent to the Secretary of State for information.

⁹⁶ *Supra*.

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁷

Moscow, 15 October 1944.

Since the meetings with the Poles reported in my 141625,⁹⁸ Churchill and Eden have found it impossible to [obtain?] Mikolajczyk's agreement to any [frontier?] formula regarding the boundary question acceptable to Stalin. The proposed meeting therefore between the two Polish groups has so far not taken place. Churchill has had a further long personal talk with Stalin in which Stalin explained more clearly his conception that the Curzon Line must be accepted as the basis for the boundary. He envisions certain minor adjustments up to 7 or 8 kilometers one way or another when the exact boundary is demarked, but no major change. Churchill told Stalin that, although he did not know your position, you [might?] well at the final settlement wish to make a strong appeal for generosity to the Poles by allowing the retention of Lwow. To this Stalin made no comment.

Churchill came to an amicable agreement with Stalin that if it was found impossible to reach now a settlement between the Poles, both groups would return to their respective seats of government and a public statement would be issued to the general effect that useful conferences have been held and that both groups had returned to consult their associates. Thus there would be no breaking off of negotiations and further steps might be undertaken at some later time.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁹

LONDON, 18 October, 1944.

799. I send you in my immediately following text of document to which Mikolajczyk's delegation agreed together with two amendments on which Stalin insisted. Mikolajczyk said that if he accepted the first of these amendments he would be repudiated by his own people. Stalin's position is that in this case it is not worth while proceeding to the difficult discussions arising out of the second amendment. These could probably have been surmounted had the first been accepted.

2. Both the London and the Lublin Poles will now return home to consult their colleagues on outstanding points and our communiqué

⁹⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation on the telegram states that a paraphrased copy was sent to the Secretary of State for information.

⁹⁸ *Supra.*

⁹⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

from here will explain that progress has been made and differences narrowed.¹ Meanwhile, only the London Poles and Russians know of this document and every endeavour will be made to prevent it leaking out, though London Poles will have to consult some of their people.

3. You will see I have not gone at all beyond the position adopted by His Majesty's Government in your presence at Tehran, though possibly the regions to be ceded by Germany have been more precisely stated. I have made it clear throughout that you are not committed in any way by what I have said and done. It only amounts to a promise on the part of His Majesty's Government to support the Curzon Line and its compensations at the armistice or peace conference, which alone can give a final and legal validity to all territorial changes. I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east, and our 20-year treaty with Russia makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Averell² will have reported, that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles that you had expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Tehran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles. I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasised his earnest desire for your return at the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

5. Meanwhile, in other directions, considerable advantages have been gained. You have already been informed about the obvious resolve of the Soviet Government to attack Japan on the overthrow of Hitler, of their detailed study of the problem and of their readiness to begin inter-Allied preparations on a large scale. When we are vexed with other matters, we must remember the supreme value of this in shortening the whole struggle.

¹ In telegram 801, October 22, 1944, Churchill informed President Roosevelt of the compromises proposed by both sides and the reasons for feeling "hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement." The text of this telegram is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 206.

² W. Averell Harriman.

6. Arrangements made about the Balkans are, I am sure, the best that are possible. Coupled with our successful military action recently we should now be able to save Greece³ and, I have no doubt that agreement to pursue a 50-50 joint policy in Yugoslavia will be the best solution for our difficulties in view of Tito's⁴ behaviour and changes in the local situation, resulting from the arrival of Russian and Bulgarian forces under Russian command to help Tito's eastern flank. The Russians are insistent on their ascendancy in Roumania and Bulgaria as the Black Sea countries.

7. Although I hear most encouraging accounts from various quarters about United States politics, I feel the suspense probably far more than you do or more than I should if my own affairs were concerned in this zone. My kindest regards and warmest good wishes.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵

LONDON, 18 October, 1944.

800. This is text referred to in paragraph 1 of my immediately preceding telegram. Text begins:

"British and Soviet Governments, upon conclusions of discussions at Moscow in October 1944 between themselves and with Polish Government, have reached the following agreement.

"2. Upon unconditional surrender of Germany, territory of Poland in west will include the Free City of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia, West and South Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and lands desired by Poland to east of line of the Oder. It is further agreed that possession of these territories shall be guaranteed to Poland by Soviet and British Governments. It is understood that Germans in said regions shall be repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany shall at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

"3. In consideration of foregoing agreement, the Polish Government accept Curzon Line as basis for frontier between Poland and USSR.

"4. Separate Soviet-Polish agreements will regulate reciprocal transfer and repatriation of population of both countries and release of persons detained. It is agreed that necessary measures will be taken for the transfer of all persons of both countries desiring to change their allegiance in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

³ For correspondence concerning the policy of the United States toward political developments in Greece after liberation from German occupation, see vol. v, pp. 84 ff.

⁴ Josip Broz (Tito), leader of the guerrilla Partisan forces in Yugoslavia. In regard to the concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia, see vol. iv, section on Yugoslavia.

⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

"5. It is agreed that a Polish Government of National Unity under Prime Minister Mikolajczyk will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian arms.

"6. The Soviet Government take this occasion of reaffirming their unchanging policy of supporting establishment within the territorial limits set forth of a sovereign independent Poland, free in every way to manage its own affairs, and their intention to make a treaty of durable friendship and mutual aid with Polish Government, which it is understood will be established on an anti-Fascist and democratic basis.

"7. The treaties and relationships existing between Poland and other countries will be unaffected by this settlement, the parties to which declare again their implacable resolve to wage war against Nazi tyranny until it has surrendered unconditionally." End of text.

Herewith amendments to text:

Paragraph 5 should read as follows:

It is agreed that Polish Government of National Unity in accordance with agreement (or understanding) reached between the Polish Government in London and Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin will be set up at once in territory already liberated by Russian armies. (Amendment to para 5 ends).

(Further amendment). Note reference to second amendment Stalin said he agreed that M. Mikolajczyk should be Prime Minister. End of amendment.

740.0011 EW 1939/10-1844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 18, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received October 18—6 p. m.]

3981. Moscow press for October 15 features announcement of complete liberation of Ukraine, leading articles and about half total space being devoted to this achievement and progress of reconstruction there. *Pravda* leader refers to Kiev, Kharkov, and Lwow as being in a single and indissoluble family of Soviet Ukrainian cities, thereby confirming previous indications that the Soviet Government has abandoned any thought of returning Lwow to Poland.

HARRIMAN

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Acting Secretary of State*⁶

The Polish Ambassador has received today a telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk dated London, October 26th, instructing him immediately to communicate to the President the following personal appeal of Premier Mikolajczyk. Premier Mikolajczyk would greatly appre-

⁶ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

ciate it if he could receive at the President's earliest convenience the reply and decisions of the President in view of the great urgency of the situation.⁷

Text of Premier Mikolajczyk's telegram to the President reads as follows:

Mr. President,

From Ambassador Harriman you undoubtedly know the pressure being exercised on the Polish Government definitely to accept already at present and without any reservations the so-called Curzon Line as the basis of the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. In all my political activities I have proved how fully I realize the necessity of Polish-Soviet understanding and how sincerely I desire to achieve it, not only in the interest of my own country, but also in that of the common cause of the United Nations and of future peace.

I am no less convinced, however, that the Polish nation would feel itself terribly deceived and wronged if, as the response to all its sacrifices, to its indomitable attitude, and its uninterrupted part in the fight in the course of this war it were faced as a result with the loss of nearly one-half of its territory on which are situated great centers of its national and cultural life and considerable economic values. The Polish Government cannot give its agreement to such a solution, as it realizes that it would thereby lose the confidence and following of its nation to such an extent that this would close its way to the exploration of possibilities of reaching understanding with the Government of the USSR in other fields. It would in fact deprive the activities of the Polish Government of practical value.

In the course of the Moscow conversations I have applied all my best efforts to convince Marshal Stalin and Premier Churchill of the importance of the above considerations. In particular I stressed that it would constitute a great conciliatory and amicable gesture on the part of Russia towards Poland,—a gesture which would be regarded as such by the Polish people and make it easier for the Polish nation to reconcile itself with the other already so great territorial sacrifices demanded of it, if the City of Lwow and the East Galician oilfields were left with Poland in accordance with the so-called Line "B".⁸ This line would not infringe on the principle of the Curzon Line, as the latter did not formally extend through East Galicia.

However, my endeavors in this direction have hitherto remained unsuccessful. I cannot, in the face of my great responsibility, regard these endeavors as exhausted as long as you, Mr. President, have not expressed your stand in this matter. I retain in vivid and grateful memory your assurances given me in the course of our conversations of June, last, in Washington, pertaining particularly to Lwow and the adjacent territories. The memory of these assurances has not been

⁷ In a memorandum of October 27, 1944, the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Charles E. Bohlen, recommended: "It is felt that, in view of the importance of this matter, every effort should be made to comply with the Ambassador's request that the full text be sent to the President immediately."

⁸ Two alternative extensions to the south from the point on the Bug River where the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires met were considered by the Commission of Polish Affairs of the Supreme Council in Paris. Line A had been proposed as the boundary between Poland proper and a possibly autonomous Eastern Galicia. Line B, more to the east, left Lwow and the oil fields to Poland.

dispelled even by Mr. Molotov's onesided version about your attitude in Teheran, which he gave me during the last conversations in Moscow. I have no doubt that in your attitude, Mr. President, purely objective arguments have played the most important part. It is known that for the last six hundred years Lwow has been a Polish city no less than Cracow and Warsaw, and one of the sources of Polish civilization. On the other hand, the production of the East Galician oil fields, so important to the economic system of Poland, constitutes barely one per cent of the oil production of the USSR.

I fully realize how deeply absorbed you are in your duties at this time and in the course of the next days. I believe, however, that in the face of the great importance of the decisions facing the Polish Government, which will bear on the entire future of the Polish Nation, and in a great measure on world relations as a whole, you will not refuse, Mr. President, my fervent prayer once more to throw the weight of your decisive influence and authority on the scales of events.

I am firmly convinced that if you, Mr. President, will consider it possible immediately to address a personal message to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that it is of consequence to you that the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lwow and the oil field basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland,—such a *démarche*, as foreseen by you, would have chances of being effective.

By removing from the way the chief and basic difference of opinions in the present negotiations between the Polish and the Soviet Governments,—such a *démarche* would render possible the achievement of an over-all Polish-Soviet understanding and would bring to you, Mr. President, not only a new title to the warm gratitude of the Polish people, but likewise an agelong merit of having solved one of the capital difficulties on the way of collaboration of the United Nations and of the future peace of Europe and the world.

I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest confidence and I shall await your decision. Mikolajczyk

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1944.

012.3/11-144: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1944—1 p. m.

Poles 24. Please deliver the following message for Prime Minister Mikolajczyk from the President:

“Personal for Prime Minister Mikolajczyk from the President. Your message of October 26 is receiving my personal consideration. I very much hope that your problems will be composed satisfactorily. I expect to send you another message soon.”⁹

STETTINIUS

⁹ In a memorandum of November 9, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius recalled to the President that “the Polish Government is waiting some further word from you.” A short, suggested message was enclosed for the President to approve, but it was not sent. After another reminder on November 15 (*post*, p. 1334) the President approved the communication which was sent to Mikolajczyk on November 17 (*ibid.*).

760C.61/11-944 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 9, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received November 9—11 :50 a. m.]

Poles 119. I saw Premier Mikolajczyk yesterday. He told me that following insistence from Mr. Churchill a week ago he gave a reply on the proposals advanced at Moscow. The Polish Government had reached a negative decision.

Mikolajczyk said that on November 2, Churchill had asked for a reply the Moscow proposals within 48 hours. He had said that otherwise he would wire Marshal Stalin that the Polish Government could not reach a decision. Mikolajczyk therefore next day called a Cabinet meeting which after considering all points decided that it could not accept because British clarification of certain points still left important questions open and because the Polish Government was awaiting a reply from Washington to certain inquiries.

Mikolajczyk recalled that at Moscow Stalin insisted that as a precondition to the settlement of other questions the Polish Government must accept the Curzon line as its eastern frontier and publicly announce its decision. Great Britain and the Soviet Union would agree to compensate Poland in the west up to the Oder. They would also guarantee the new Poland. A fusion of the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee was envisaged. On the Russian side the method was left vague. Churchill advocated a 50-50 basis.

Before undertaking to decide on the proposals, Mikolajczyk said the Polish Government asked the British (a) what would be the status in the west in [*if*] the United States did not agree on the Oder line, and (b) would the British guarantee the independence of Poland in its new frontiers?

On point (a) the British answered that they would continue to "advocate" the Oder line; and on point (b) they would guarantee the independence of the new Poland in conjunction with the Soviet Union pending the inclusion of the guarantee in an international security organization which it was hoped would be set up.

Mikolajczyk pointed out that this meant that the Polish Government would be expected to accept the Curzon line definitely at this time; that the question of its western frontier would be left open until the peace conference; that the British were only willing to give a joint guarantee with the Soviets, which meant that if the Russian guarantee failed the British guarantee would fall away; also that contrary to the understanding at Moscow the old Anglo-Polish alliance would be superseded. As for the question of fusion with the Lublin

Committee a 50-50 formula had no meaning as regards real independence. Whoever effectively controlled the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs would be the real governing force.

Mikolajczyk said that when he gave Churchill his decision Churchill was highly displeased and indicated that he might have to withdraw his support. Mikolajczyk said in that case he would have to resign and explain his reasons for doing so.

A couple of days later he saw Eden and Cadogan who indicated that it was British policy to leave frontiers until the end of the war unless two countries voluntarily agreed regarding their own frontiers. In the matter of a British guarantee the British would be willing to negotiate for continuance of the Anglo-Polish treaty. They would explain to the Soviet Ambassador (Gusev) the reason for delay in a reply.

Mikolajczyk told me that despite the pressure for him to return to Moscow he had told Churchill it would be useless for him to do so even if he personally agreed on the Curzon line unless he had the support of the Government and the Polish people.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/11-1144

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)

[WASHINGTON,] November 11, 1944.

Participants: Jan Ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador; Charles E. Bohlen, Chief of EE; Elbridge Durbrow, Assistant Chief, EE.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request. He said that he had been asked by his Government to endeavor to ascertain the attitude of the United States Government towards the proposed territorial changes¹⁰ involving Poland which had been proposed to the Polish Government by the British Government in agreement with the Soviet Government. The Ambassador said that Prime Minister Mikolajczyk found himself, of course, in a very difficult position; that the Soviet insistence, with which the British concurred, on the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland with compensation in the west of German territory, East Prussia and Upper Silesia up to the Oder River presented the most serious problems to the Polish Government and that up to the present the United States Government had not made its attitude officially known in regard to these territorial changes. He said under the circumstances Mr. Mikolajczyk naturally wanted to know the attitude of the United States Government on these ques-

¹⁰ For illustration of proposed territorial changes, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, map facing p. 233.

tions, particularly whether the United States would support the proposed compensation in the west and also whether the United States would support the proposed transfer of German population from those areas and whether American assistance would be given in the economic reconstruction of the Polish State in the postwar period.

The Ambassador went on to say that because of the importance of these questions he would like very much to see Mr. Stettinius and also the President in order to discuss these subjects with him.

Mr. Bohlen said that the views expressed by the Ambassador and his request to see Mr. Stettinius and the President would be conveyed promptly to the appropriate quarters.

In reply to the Ambassador's question Mr. Bohlen said that while he could not, of course, undertake to say what the United States attitude would be on the questions raised since they would be decided by the highest authorities, he personally felt that any question of an American guarantee for any specific frontiers in Europe would be in the highest degree improbable since it would contradict a very basic and traditional American policy; that if an international organization is set up and the United States was a member thereof, the United States responsibility would be on the basis of general security which would apply to the whole world.

Mr. Bohlen further pointed out that as the Ambassador knew, this Government earnestly desired to see a satisfactory, just and stable solution of the points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland and that any agreement which might be reached between the three countries particularly concerned, namely, Poland, the Soviet Union and England, would be very much welcomed by this Government but that he could of course not undertake at this time to say what the definite attitude of the United States Government would be on any territorial question.

The Ambassador said he fully understood this but merely desired to emphasize the vital importance to Poland of Lwow and the oil fields southwest of Lwow. He said that unless this city and district were left within the future frontiers of Poland he personally did not see how the Polish Government could accept the proposed territorial settlement.

In conclusion Mr. Bohlen assured the Ambassador that he would immediately convey his request to Mr. Stettinius.¹¹

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

¹¹ On November 16, 1944, the Polish Ambassador was informed by Mr. Stettinius that the President probably could not receive him within the following few days, and that it would be desirable "to postpone the formulation of the United States attitude on the Polish question until the President would have an opportunity to discuss it with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill provided that such a meeting was not too long delayed" (860C.01/11-1644).

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President
Roosevelt*¹²

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1944.

The following suggestions as to policy in regard to the Polish question and in particular to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's message of October 26 and recent conversations with the Polish Ambassador are predicated on the possibility that you do not expect to meet with Mr. Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill before the end of the year.

The Polish issue is so acute that we believe some statement of this Government's position on general lines is due Premier Mikolajczyk. I therefore suggest for your approval the attached letter¹³ for your signature to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk. It covers the points on which from our information we know the Polish Government is especially anxious to learn our attitude.

I suggest that Ambassador Harriman, who is shortly returning to Moscow via London, present this letter to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in person and at the same time discuss the question of Lwow. If as a result of this discussion Ambassador Harriman is convinced of the necessity of our making a last attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to leave Lwow and the oil fields within the frontiers of Poland, I hope you will authorize him on his return to Moscow to take up orally on your behalf the question of Lwow with Mr. Stalin.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

*President Roosevelt to the Prime Minister of the Polish Government
in Exile (Mikolajczyk), at London*¹⁴

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have had constantly in mind the problems you are facing in your endeavors to bring about an equitable and permanent solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties and particularly the questions which you raised in your message of October 26. I have asked Ambassador Harriman, who will bring you this letter, to discuss with you the question of Lwow.

While I would have preferred to postpone the entire question of this Government's attitude until the general postwar settlement in Europe, I fully realize your urgent desire to receive some indication

¹² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹³ *Infra.*

¹⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Ambassador Harriman had dinner on November 21 with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden and showed them this letter, which, he reported, they believed would assist in clearing the atmosphere. Harriman delivered the letter to Mikolajczyk the next morning.

of the position of the United States Government with the least possible delay. Therefore, I am giving below in broad outline the general position of this Government in the hope that it may be of some assistance to you in your difficult task.

1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammelled rights of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. In regard to the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement on this subject including the proposed compensation for Poland from Germany is reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments, this Government would offer no objection. In so far as the United States guarantee of any specific frontiers is concerned I am sure you will understand that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, cannot give a guarantee for any specific frontiers. As you know, the United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with the other member states will assume responsibility for general security which, of course, includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.

3. If the Polish Government and people desire in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish state to bring about the transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities, the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.

4. The United States Government is prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist in so far as practicable in the postwar economic reconstruction of the Polish state.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

860C.01/11-2344: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 23, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received November 23—5:20 p. m.]

10326. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. I lunched with Mikolajczyk and Romer today. Mikolajczyk told me that since receipt of your letter, he had had discussions with his associates in his Government. He is now convinced that he can not get any support for his program for reconciliation with the Soviets and the Lublin Poles.

He has obtained from the Peasant Party leaders within Poland complete support and authority to act but the leaders of the other

three parties in his Government are all definitely opposed to settlement at the present time. Under the circumstances he cannot now in fairness ask you to intervene with Stalin in an attempt to obtain a more favorable settlement of the boundary to include the Lwow area, since, even if Stalin would agree to inclusion of Lwow within Poland, he could not obtain the consent of his associates to any boundary settlement now. Therefore, unless you instruct me otherwise, I will not discuss the question of Lwow at this time with Stalin.

Mikolajczyk is very grateful to you for your letter and for your sympathetic consideration of the Polish problems. He will so communicate to you direct. He asked me to express to you his apologies for having asked you to intervene at a time when it develops he cannot obtain the support of his associates in attempting to reach a realistic settlement with the Russians.

Mikolajczyk said his associates were convinced what [*that*] the Soviet policy was to communize Poland, and that they intended to wait until Poland was liberated, to retain within Poland a resistance to Russian domination, and to hope that at some future time the influence of Great Britain and the United States might be brought to bear on Russia to induce her to give the Polish people a free right of choice of their Government. Mikolajczyk personally does not agree with this policy and deeply regrets that he cannot get his associates to join him in making an earnest attempt now to find a solution.

Under these circumstances, it is Mikolajczyk's intention, after a further talk with Churchill and Eden, to resign. He feels that if he remains Prime Minister, he will be involved in recriminations and counterrecriminations with the Russians, that no good will come from it and that his usefulness in the future to his people will be destroyed.

I am waiting over one more day to see Churchill and Eden and will report to you their reaction to these developments.

Mikolajczyk told me further that the Communist influence in the Lublin Committee was increasing[;] that several of the more independent individuals had been forced out or had resigned; and that he is fearful terrorism and counterterrorism will result. He is very pessimistic over the developments in London and Lublin and feels that his best course is to withdraw, keeping himself available to be of use if the moment arises in the future. He does not believe that the Lublin Committee, even with full Soviet support, can control Polish sentiment and that some day some compromise may be found which will give a chance for expression of Polish nationalism. [Harriman.]

WINANT

860C.01/11-2444 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, November 24, 1944—9 p. m.
[Received November 24—6:31 p. m.]

Poles 124. Mikolajczyk has resigned as Prime Minister (see London's 10326, November 23 from Harriman). Vice Premier Kwapinski (Socialist) has been entrusted with the task of forming a new Cabinet. Mikolajczyk's resignation will probably not be announced until tomorrow since there has not yet been time for the Polish Government to frame an appropriate communiqué.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/11-2544 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, November 25, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received 9:52 p. m.]

Poles 125. I saw Mikolajczyk this morning. He told me he had resigned as Premier (my 124 November 24) because he felt a Polish-Soviet agreement was a necessity at this time, whereas the three major political parties other than his own felt that the question of frontiers should be left until the end of the war.

He realized the attack he would have been subjected to if the Government had made the concessions desired by the Soviets but he reasoned that without an agreement, Poland would risk not only the loss of its eastern territories but probably also real compensation in the west. Once the war was over, he believed British and American public opinion would not support radical compensation for Poland in the west. Moreover, without an agreement, Poland was sure to be subjected to severe efforts at communization. The Lublin Committee was already largely Communist and those elements which were not Communist were being rapidly eliminated. If members of the London Government could return to Poland soon, they might succeed in preventing the country's communization. He could agree with those who doubted Soviet intentions, but if there was the slightest change [*chance*] of success, he thought they should at least try. Furthermore, without an agreement and in view of Soviet advances from the north and the southeast, the Polish Government was faced with the prospect of increasing difficulty in maintaining its communications with and supplying the underground organization of Poland.

[If] he could have had more time, he would also have wished to gather up and preserve the "capital of energy" that Poland still disposes of abroad. If the parties could have united on a policy this would have been a source of strength in withstanding efforts to pro-

duce a Communist Poland. But divided they were necessarily ineffective. Furthermore, there were several hundred thousand Poles in western Europe and perhaps even a million in Germany. A surprising number had already been found in prison camps in recently captured German territory. He would have liked to recruit them for military service both in the interests of the war effort and of their own rehabilitation and to use them as a nucleus to build up Poland anew. But the Supreme Allied Command felt it was too late to train them for the war effort and would permit only the numbers necessary to replace losses in existing Polish military units. Without unity among the parties and without greater support from the Allies, he could not hope to bring about this conservation of Polish energies.

In all the circumstances, he had felt obliged to resign.

Mikolajczyk referred to his recent conversation with Harriman and said he was grateful for the President's willingness to intervene with Stalin regarding Lwow and the oil areas in Galicia, but he had not felt he could take advantage of it since he could not in any case secure his own Government's support for the general boundary settlement proposed by the Soviet Government.

Mikolajczyk said that perhaps he was wrong in his estimate of the future and "the others" right, but this was his honest conviction and in the circumstances he had not felt he could stay on as Prime Minister.

As for his immediate plans, Mikolajczyk said he did not know what he would do. I asked him whether, in case Kwapiński failed to form a government, he would perhaps undertake to do so. He said he would not.

He spoke throughout with quiet simplicity and, though somewhat more subdued than usual, retained all his normal calm and self-possession. Only as I took leave [*leave*] of him and told him how sorry I was that he had given over, did he show any emotion. He expressed deep appreciation of the understanding that had always been shown him from the American side and asked me to express his appreciation and great admiration to the President.

[SCHOENFELD]

*The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*¹⁵

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1944.

Subject: Resignation of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk

I assume that you have read Ambassador Harriman's report of the 23rd (No. 10326) from London, regarding his conversation with Mik-

¹⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. For two other communications from Stettinius to President Roosevelt on November 28 and December 1, 1944, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 213.

olajczyk, and that you have noted that Mikolajczyk's decision to resign was because he was unable to obtain the support of his Government to his program of a settlement of the territorial issue with the Soviet Union.

Mikolajczyk's resignation will, in our opinion, render the Polish question much more acute and difficult. The Polish Government in London without him, and possibly his like-minded colleagues, will have no basis whatsoever for continued negotiations with the Government or the Lublin Committee. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Government will be quick to take advantage of Mikolajczyk's resignation in order to proceed more vigorously with the establishment of the Lublin Committee as the sole representative authority of Poland. We could easily be faced with a most difficult problem in regard to Poland. On the one hand, we would have the Lublin Committee backed by the Soviet Government but which, according to all our information, has very little support inside Poland; and on the other, the Government in London which we recognize, probably led by Polish socialists who adamantly refuse to consider the Soviet proposals.

We are following the situation with the closest attention and we recommend that for the moment our best policy is to take no action but carefully watch developments.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

860C.01/11-3044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*¹⁶

[Extract]

LONDON, November 30, 1944.

[Received November 30—10:06 p. m.]

10603. Diplomatic correspondents of the London papers this morning report the formation of a new Polish Cabinet by Mr. Arciszewski, the Polish Vice-President. The *Daily Telegraph* correspondent writes:

"I understand that the new government includes no members of the Peasant Party or the Christian Labor Party, both of which refused to collaborate with M. Kwapinski, the Socialist Deputy Prime Minister, when he tried to form a government after M. Mikolajczyk resigned. It does include several members of the Polish Underground Movement who have arrived in London during recent months. Their presence will be adduced as proof that the new government represents patriotic Polish opinion."

¹⁶ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of State on November 30, 1944.

The *Times* correspondent writes concerning Mr. Arciszewski :

“He left Poland last July after gallantly continuing under the German terror the resistance work which, before the last war, he had organized when Poland was under the Russian Tsar.¹⁷ On his way to this country he chanced to meet M. Mikolajczyk, who was traveling to Moscow for the first of the conferences with Soviet leaders; and he afterwards described his surprise at learning how far M. Mikolajczyk was ready to go in reaching an agreement with Moscow.”

He reports the opinion of “some Poles in London” that the new government will be an interim arrangement and that Mikolajczyk will return sooner or later. He continues :

“Among some Polish groups several reasons are given for delaying acceptance of the proposals which M. Mikolajczyk brought back from Moscow. Both they and M. Mikolajczyk recognize that the Lublin Committee is facing many material and political difficulties and they reject its claim to be the true voice of Poland. But from that point their policies diverge. M. Mikolajczyk and those around him see that agreement will become even harder to reach as the Lublin Committee takes over the administration of more territory in Poland. Others argue that acquiring new territory will land the Committee into difficulties so crippling that its lack of popular support will be apparent to all and a fresh attempt at wider agreement will be made. Such arguments, and others heard on similar lines, seem to disregard many real factors in the situation, and are hardly likely to influence any responsible Cabinet.”

WINANT

860C.01/12-644

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)*¹⁸

LONDON, December 6, 1944.

I paid my initial call on the new Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Arciszewski, at 3:15 this afternoon. Mr. Victor Padowski, Chief of the American Section of the Polish Foreign Office, was also present. As the Prime Minister speaks only Polish and Russian, Mr. Padowski acted as interpreter.

Mr. Arciszewski said that he was most pleased to receive the representative of the United States Government. Polish opinion had the greatest regard for President Roosevelt. He personally had been a witness in Poland to the effect there of the President's statements and pronouncements during the war. Opinion in Poland had derived par-

¹⁷ Nicholas II.

¹⁸ Sent to the Department as enclosure to despatch 695, December 6, from the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile; received December 21.

ticular encouragement from the President's statement that Poland in this war had been an inspiration to other nations, and from the Atlantic Charter. I told him that I knew the President took a deep interest in Poland and in a happy issue from the war for it.

Mr. Arciszewski referred to the fact that he had come from Poland only a few months ago and that up till then he had been an active participant in the Polish Underground Movement. He gave an extended account of its organization. The Polish Underground Army, he said, had been organized immediately after the defeat in 1939. From the moment of the German attack on Russia it had cooperated with the Soviet forces. It had engaged in extensive sabotage behind the German lines when the Russians were being driven eastward. Later, when the German advance had been stayed and the Russians were advancing in Poland, the Polish Underground forces had cooperated actively with them. The units of the Underground Army had been ordered to reveal themselves to the advancing Soviet forces and to offer to place themselves under the Soviet Commander while retaining their allegiance to the Polish Government in London. Unfortunately their action had not been received in the same spirit and there had been arrests, deportations and even executions. If, he continued, the Soviet Government had accepted the Polish offer, the Polish Underground Army could have placed at its disposal an organized force of 300,000 men. Those instructions regarding cooperation were still in effect.

The Underground Political Organization, he said, was the counterpart of the Government in London. It extended throughout the country and into the small villages. The Germans had never been able to break it down or secure Polish collaboration. They had repeatedly approached important Polish leaders in an effort to persuade them to head a Quisling Government. They had, for example, approached Prince Radziwill, former Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Polish Parliament. He had refused. They had approached Mr. Lipski, former Polish Ambassador in Berlin. He had refused. They had approached many others and all had refused.

I enquired whether the rising in Warsaw had seriously disrupted the Underground Organization. Mr. Arciszewski said that two heads of Departments (that is Underground Ministries) and a member of the Council of National Unity had been killed and various lesser officials, but the majority of leaders had escaped. Communications had become more difficult than formerly, in part because the radio transmitters which had to be operated secretly had in some instances been captured or destroyed. But communications had been restored and the Polish Government in London was in touch with the Underground leaders.

Speaking of his Government's policy, Mr. Arciszewski said that the present Polish Government intended to carry forward the policies pursued by General Sikorski¹⁹ and Mr. Mikolajczyk. There were some persons who criticized certain members of the Government as being anti-Russian. There were, for example, Mr. Berezowski of the National Democratic Party and Professor Folkierski²⁰ of the Christian Labor Party. These accusations were unjustified. Both of the parties in question had signified their approval of the proposals submitted to Moscow in August by Mr. Mikolajczyk. They had also supported the declarations of policy of August 15, 1943 and March 1944 which looked toward the introduction of various liberal measures such as revision of the Constitution, Agrarian reform, and nationalization of certain key industries. These measures were to be taken when free conditions were restored in Poland. Indeed, all four of the principal parties and minor groups had given their approval. The only exception was the Polish Workers Party which was the communist group.

Mr. Arciszewski did not enter upon a comprehensive discussion of the proposals for a settlement of Soviet-Polish difficulties as advanced recently at the Moscow meeting. He made no mention whatever of the Curzon Line. He referred, however, to the question of territorial adjustments in the west and said that he felt Poland should not take German territory to the point which would render impossible its relations with Germany for all the future and in consequence convert it into a prisoner of Russia. Poland should have East Prussia and Silesia, but he questioned the wisdom of taking Stettin and Breslau.

He spoke of the Lublin Committee and asserted that it did not represent public opinion in Poland. Bierut and Morawski, two of its principal members, were communist agents who prior to the Soviet Union's entry into the war had been writing articles critical of Great Britain and charging it with being engaged in an imperialist war. He recalled that in 1920 a similar committee had been set up under Soviet auspices at Bialystock. He felt that just as that Committee had not gained the support of Polish opinion, so the Lublin Committee could not gain it.

Mr. Arciszewski said that his own Government had received the approval of the principal parties in Poland. While members of the Peasant Party were not included in his Cabinet, he had received through Mr. Kulerski a message from the Peasant Party in Poland indicating its support of the present Government (Mr. Kulerski is

¹⁹ Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, former Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, killed in an airplane accident at Gibraltar on July 4, 1943.

²⁰ Wladyslaw Folkierski, Minister of Preparatory Work concerning the Peace Conference, and Minister of Education and Religious Affairs in the Arciszewski Cabinet.

Secretary of the Polish National Council in London and an official of the Peasant Party). He was also in friendly relations with Mr. Mikolajczyk who had assured him of support. He hoped that in time the Peasant Party would take over the Ministries which were now held in an interim capacity by other Ministers.

Mr. Arciszewski went on to say that Poland desired good relations with its eastern neighbour. It had made strong efforts to arrive at an understanding with Russia. This would continue to be the policy of the present Government. The Russians had, however, treated Poland worse than if it were an enemy state. Poland had lost six millions of its people through the war. Of its three and a half million Jews, perhaps 160,000 remained. As the country which had been the first to take the burden of the German attack and had fought with all its means throughout the war, the Polish Government felt that it was entitled to be represented and heard at the Peace Conference.

In conclusion Mr. Arciszewski brought up the question of possible supplies from UNRRA ²¹ for Poles in France. I suggested that this would seem to be a matter that should be taken up directly with the UNRRA offices here. It was of course an independent organization. I remarked that Governor Lehman ²² had been in London recently and that I had arranged an interview for him with the former Prime Minister, Mr. Mikolajczyk. I understood Governor Lehman planned to return to London before long and if so I should be glad to mention the matter to him. Mr. Arciszewski said that he would like to see Governor Lehman if he should return to London.

I expressed my appreciation to Mr. Arciszewski for being so generous with his time. I expressed the hope that he would at all times feel disposed to keep me abreast of developments and assured him of my interest in being of any service that I properly could.

711.60C/12-1844

*The Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile (Arciszewski)
to President Roosevelt* ²³

LONDON, December 14, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT: Upon assumption of my duties as Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Poland, I have the honor to convey to you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Polish Government and

²¹ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

²² Herbert H. Lehman, former Governor of New York, Director General of UNRRA.

²³ Left with H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, by Polish Ambassador Ciechanowski on December 18, 1944.

on my own, expressions of deep gratitude for your constant friendliness to Poland and the Polish Nation.

Your name, Mr. President, is on the lips of all Poles fighting in Poland as well as of those fighting in foreign lands for the freedom and independence of their State. They firmly believe that their sacrifices in the present war will not be in vain.

With this in mind the Polish Government fervently appeals to you, Mr. President, for your support of its endeavors in view of assuring for Poland just bases of national existence, of freedom and independence.

I beg to assure you, Mr. President, that the Polish Government will be faithful to the same principles which have guided the preceding Polish Governments since the German aggression on Poland. This Government, as its predecessors aiming at the strengthening of our alliances and of our friendship with other United Nations, will not spare any effort to reach an equitable, just and durable understanding with our Eastern neighbor.

In closing, may I express to you, Mr. President, my heartfelt thanks for your friendship for Poland expressed in your letter of November 17, 1944, handed to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk by Ambassador Harriman. I shall have the honor in the nearest future more extensively to refer to the problems discussed with Ambassador Harriman.

Please accept [etc.]

TOMASZ ARCISZEWSKI

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²⁴

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 15 December, 1944.

674. I have seen the newspaper reports of your statement in the House [of Commons] on the Polish question.²⁵ In order that we may cooperate fully in this matter I would appreciate receiving the benefit of your ideas as to what steps we can now take in regard to this question. Particularly I would like to have your evaluation of the possibility of Mikolajczyk's coming back into power with sufficient authority to carry out his plans and what action you feel we should

²⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁵ Prime Minister Churchill delivered an extensive speech in the House of Commons on December 15, 1944, about the problems of Poland, its frontiers, and the difficulties in the way of satisfactory solutions. (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 406, cols. 1478-1489.) Secretary of State Stettinius sent a telegram on December 15 to President Roosevelt, staying temporarily at Warm Springs, Georgia, in which he reminded the President of the United States position on the Polish question as formulated in the President's letter of November 17 to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, coupled with the suggestion that "in view of the uncertainty as to Churchill's plans" this present telegram should be sent to him. For text of the Secretary's telegram to the President, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 214-215.

take in the event the Lublin Committee should declare itself to be the provisional government of Poland and Stalin should recognize it as such.²⁶ In view of this possibility I wonder if it would be helpful if I should send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together.²⁷

You will recall the contents of the letter I sent to Mikolajczyk by Mr. Harriman which he showed to you and which outlines our policy in regard to Poland. I anticipate strong pressure here for the position of this Government to be made clear, and I may therefore have to make public in some form the four points outlining our position contained in my letter to Mikolajczyk referred to above.

Knowing that we have in mind the same basic objectives in regard to Poland I want to be sure to coordinate with you any steps which I may contemplate in this matter.

ROOSEVELT

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) ²⁸

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 16 December, 1944.

136. In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in the next few days for this Government to issue some statement on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our attitude somewhat along the following lines:

[There are omitted here the four points of the proposed statement to be made in regard to the United States position on Poland. This telegram was delayed in reaching the Embassy in Moscow, where it arrived on December 20. Meanwhile the statement on Poland had been issued on December 18, by the Department of State. In this

²⁶ In telegram No. 854, December 16, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill told the President that the British Government did not see any immediate prospect for Mikolajczyk to return to power, that it did not intend to recognize the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin, and that it would continue to regard the Government in Exile at London as the legal Polish government (Hyde Park Papers).

²⁷ Prime Minister Churchill in his telegram No. 853, December 16, 1944, approved the proposal that President Roosevelt should send a message to Premier Stalin suggesting that the latter should take no positive action on the Polish question until the three could meet together. He hoped that the President could send his message on this same day, because he feared that Stalin might make some move to recognize the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland (Hyde Park Papers).

²⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

form the wording differed slightly, and Ambassador Harriman attached a copy of this text in full, instead of the earlier version as telegraphed, when this message was sent to Stalin. The statement issued on December 18 is printed *infra*. The earlier wording as sent in the message of December 16, from President Roosevelt to Stalin, is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pages 217-218.*]

The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present form.²⁹ I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point.

ROOSEVELT

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 18, 1944*³⁰

The United States Government's position as regards Poland has been steadfastly guided by full understanding and sympathy for the interests of the Polish people.³¹ This position has been communicated on previous occasions to the interested governments, including the Government of Poland. It may be summarized as follows:

²⁹ Further communications exchanged, discussing the prospect of early recognition of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin) as the provisional government of Poland by Stalin before a meeting of the three could be held, were: Stalin to Roosevelt, December 27, 1944; Roosevelt to Stalin, December 30, 1944; and Stalin to Roosevelt, January 1, 1945, *post*, pp. 1442, 1444, and 1445, respectively. See also *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 221-223, 224-225, and 225-226.

³⁰ Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, December 24, 1944, p. 836.

³¹ See remarks by President Roosevelt when meeting with officials of Polish-American organizations on October 11, *ibid.*, October 15, 1944, p. 428.

1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, and independent Polish state with the untrammelled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government that questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. As Secretary Hull stated in his address of April 9, 1944,³² "This does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be settled by friendly conference and agreement." In the case of the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations directly concerned, this Government would have no objections to such an agreement which could make an essential contribution to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy. If, as a result of such agreement, the Government and people of Poland decide that it would be in the interests of the Polish state to transfer national groups, the United States Government in cooperation with other governments will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in such transfers. The United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of declining to give guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with other member states would assume responsibility for the preservation of general security.

3. It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to legislative authority, to assist the countries liberated from the enemy in repairing the devastation of war and thus to bring to their peoples the opportunity to join as full partners in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the other United Nations.

The policy of the United States Government regarding Poland outlined above has as its objective the attainment of the announced basic principles of United States foreign policy.

760C.61/12-1944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 19, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received December 21—11:30 a. m.]

4913. I am somewhat concerned over the expanding concept of the Soviet Government in connection with the future western frontier of Poland.

³² Address by the Secretary of State on the foreign policy of the United States broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System, Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, pp. 335-342.

The first Soviet proposal indicated a willingness that Poland should have East Prussia except the Koenigsberg area and an expansion of her western frontier perhaps even as far as the Oder and possibly including the cities of Stettin and Breslau. Subsequently the Soviet intention appeared fixed that the western boundary should be the line of the Oder including Stettin and Breslau. In discussions with de Gaulle,³³ Stalin now proposed the line of the Oder to the confluence of the lower Neisse and then south along the Neisse to the Czech border near the city of Gorlitz. (This proposal was confirmed by the recent *Pravda* article.) In this connection Stalin indicated to de Gaulle that the Czechs might wish to expand their boundaries to the north somewhat into Silesia, although this suggestion was not defined precisely. Beneš, in talking with me a year ago,³⁴ did not appear to be interested in taking German territory which would increase his problems.

When Mikolajczyk was in Moscow he indicated that he was not at all certain that it was wise for the Polish boundary to go as far as the Oder and particularly to include the cities of Stettin and Breslau, as these cities and certain of the area were almost completely German. The Lublin Poles however showed complete readiness to assume these new responsibilities. Churchill indicated that he was willing to have the Polish frontiers go as far as the Poles wished, but I believe that at that time he had in mind only the line up to the Oder, but not beyond. What the British position is on the question of the lower Neisse line I do not know.

Both the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczyk indicated in the October talks that they did not wish any German population to remain within Polish territory because of the acute minority problem that this would create. The Russians and British accepted this principle. Churchill in his recent speech mentions the transfer of six million Germans out of territory to be given to the Poles. The new suggested boundary to the Neisse would evidently necessitate the transfer of several million more Germans.

Stalin also agreed with Beneš in December 1943 that some if not all of the Sudeten Germans should be transferred.

We have not here exact information on the total transfers of Germans involved in these various areas nor have we information on where these people could be reestablished within Germany. We have little information to appraise the consequences to European economy and stability if so large an area were to be occupied by Poles presumably evacuated largely from the backward districts incorporated into the Soviet Union and to answer the question of where the technical

³³ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government of France.

³⁴ Ambassador Harriman reported upon these conversations in his telegrams 2264, December 18, and 2284, December 20, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 728 and 731, respectively.

skill could be found to administer and operate these highly developed and industrialized areas.

The Soviet policy towards Poland superficially appears to be that the Soviets are attempting to justify their annexation of old Polish territory and their domination of the internal affairs of Poland by expandingly generous offers of territory in the west at the expense of Germany.

I fully recognize our policy is not to commit ourselves in boundary questions until the peace settlement. The question I have in mind however is whether, if we have reservations in the present case they should not be registered on an appropriate occasion with the British and Soviet Governments before these concepts become so fixed that they are virtually a *fait accompli*.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/12-2044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 20, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received December 21—10:30 p. m.]

4936. I wish to invite attention to the significance of the article by Dr. Stefan Jedrychowsky which appeared in *Pravda* for December 18 and was reported in my 4899, December 18.³⁵

Jedrychowsky is not only a member of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, charged in particular with the conduct of propaganda and informational activities but is also the Chief Assistant to the representative of the Polish Committee in Moscow. Actually, the representative himself, Rzymowski, has not been much in evidence here, so that Jedrychowsky seems to have been thus far for all practical purposes the principal liaison man between the Soviet Government and the Lublin Poles.

The devotion of nearly one-half of the foreign affairs page of *Pravda* to an article written by a person who is ostensibly a foreign representative in Moscow and treating of central European border questions which are of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union is not a common occurrence, and could hardly have taken place except as a result of a decision in high Soviet circles. For this reason, particular attention should be given to Jedrychowsky's statements, which call for a future boundary between Germany and Poland running from north to south along the line of the Oder River and the lower Neisse to approximately the most northerly point of the Czechoslovak frontier, Goerlitz, and including the port of Stettin in the Polish area.

HARRIMAN

³⁵ Not printed.

860C.01/12-2144 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 21, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 9:32 p. m.]

Poles 134. I had a talk day before yesterday with former Premier Mikolajczyk. He referred to the debate on Poland in the House of Commons on December 15 and said he was dissatisfied with Mr. Churchill's statement that at the peace conference the British Government would support the Curzon Line, inclusive of Lwow and the oil bearing areas in Galicia, as the Soviet frontier. He said that when Ambassador Harriman was recently in London and discussed the President's willingness to intervene with Marshal Stalin in favor of leaving Lwow and the oilfields in Galicia to Poland, Mr. Churchill had offered to reinforce such an intervention. Now, about a fortnight later, he had publicly committed himself and the British Government to the inclusion of those areas in Soviet Russia. He regarded this as unfair and as presenting an added obstacle to a solution of Polish Soviet difficulties.

At the Moscow meetings, Mikolajczyk continued, Churchill had not touched on the question of Lwow. Even with regard to Vilna he had been more guarded even though he had indicated that the British had not approved of the manner in which Poland had taken Vilna.³⁶ Besides the geographic position there was less favorable for Poland. An extensive area lies between Vilna and the proposed Polish Soviet frontier, but this is not the case with regard to Lwow and the oilfields. The latter area is small and could readily be given to Poland.

Mikolajczyk was pleased on the other hand that the question of Poland's western frontiers had been publicly discussed by Mr. Churchill and been the subject of debate.

He thought the debate indicated that British opinion was conscious of the immense transfer problems that the proposed frontier arrangements would involve. He had always had this in mind. On a visit to Chequers last spring he had urged Mr. Churchill not to commit himself to the Curzon line, for it was evident that the more Poland was cut in the east the more it had to receive in the west. He had asked why make the transfer question harder than necessary, and had expressed his belief that the Prime Minister with all his popularity would not succeed in making so drastic a plan acceptable to British and American opinion. The debate had confirmed this.

³⁶ Gen. Lucien Zeligowski with a large number of irregular Polish troops drove the Lithuanian soldiers out of Vilna on October 9, 1920, and claimed the city and most of the province for Poland.

As for the Arciszewski Cabinet's reaction to the debate, Mikolajczyk thought it was singularly unrealistic. They were pleased that Mr. Churchill had said that the British Government continued to recognize the Polish Government in London. They were also pleased by the amount of sympathy expressed for the Polish point of view in the debate and by the reactions of the British and American press. Mikolajczyk thought, however, that the Arciszewski Cabinet was naïve in the satisfaction they derived from the speeches favorable to the Polish point of view. They did not seem to distinguish the difference in importance between a speech, however favorable, made by a back bencher like Mr. Pickthorn³⁷ and a pronouncement of policy by the British Prime Minister adverse to the Polish point of view.

He thought the present Polish Cabinet had also taken an unrealistic view regarding Mr. Stettinius's statement on Poland. They had taken it as an endorsement of their view that the question of frontiers should be left until the end of the war. He on the other hand thought that while this was the general principle, the Secretary's statement meant that there could and ought to be exceptions.

Mikolajczyk indicated that there was an active ferment within the Polish political parties with respect to the present Polish Government, but he thought it would be a mistake to overestimate the likelihood of any change of government in the immediate future.

Of the four principal political parties only one, namely the National Democrats, is satisfied with the government.

The Peasant Party, Mikolajczyk said, had decided to go into open opposition. When the new Cabinet was formed, the Peasant Party had taken the position that it would support it as the legal government. This did not mean that the party supported the government's policy (its role is something in the nature of "His Majesty's loyal opposition"). He was in agreement that the new Cabinet should try out its policy but he objected to its pretending to follow his policy of seeking a Polish-Soviet settlement when in reality it was seeking to postpone a settlement until the end of the war.

The Socialists were divided. The more moderate members had refused to join the Arciszewski government. Moreover, following Mr. Churchill's speech, Mr. Ciolkosz, one of the most influential Socialist leaders, came to see him and said he felt something had to be done. Mikolajczyk asked him whether this meant he would withdraw support from the present Cabinet. Ciolkosz was not prepared to go so far. It was arranged that a Socialist delegation should later confer with Mikolajczyk.

³⁷ Kenneth W. M. Pickthorn, the Senior Burgess for Cambridge University, who participated in what he judged to be "a very sad" and "rather disappointing Debate." *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, December 15, 1944, 5th series, vol. 406, cols. 1502-1574, *passim*.

The Christian Labor Party was also divided and there was some question of the party withdrawing its representatives from the Cabinet. A decision, however, had not yet been reached.

If the Christian Labor Party should withdraw and with the Peasant Party in opposition, the Arciszewski Cabinet would be left only with members of the Nationalist Party and the more irreconcilable wing of the Socialist Party. Though in agreement in their attitude toward a settlement with Russia, the Nationalists and Socialists were otherwise as fire and water in their views. Normally such a combination could not survive. But it would be hazardous to underrate the tenacity with which they might cling to office, especially as they represented the viewpoint of President Raczkiewicz and his closest advisers regarding a settlement with Soviet Russia. (Those advisers include Zaleski, former Foreign Minister who resigned³⁸ from Sikorski's Cabinet in protest against the Soviet Polish treaty of July 1941, and Lukasiewicz,³⁹ former Polish Ambassador to France.)

An element which may affect the situation is the attitude of the underground administration of Poland. On December 9 a message was received from it stating that the Arciszewski Cabinet should be reorganized so as to be fully representative of all parties and that the underground was drawing up its ideas on policy and would submit them when completed. Mikolajczyk said that when the proposals submitted to Moscow last August were drawn up, they supposedly represented the last word of the underground administration. By his resignation he had brought it about that they were now drawing up revised proposals. He imagined that their views should be nearer his views than those of the present government and that they would favor a settlement with Russia at this time and would agree to certain concessions. He did not know, however, whether they would go as far as Moscow desired in the boundary matter. On this point, his own (Peasant) Party in Poland had sometime ago given him full authority to make any frontier settlement that he considered necessary, provided that the independence of the rest of Poland was fully assured.

He continued to be convinced that some effort had to be made to prevent a policy of draft [*drift*]. He thought the present Cabinet did not recognize the dangers. Merely letting matters run until the peace conference would not meet the situation. If meanwhile the Soviets and the British agreed on Poland's eastern frontier, the United States would later scarcely be able to oppose it successfully. Meanwhile the Soviets were in actual possession and the results of not having an arrangement would be that several million Poles east of the

³⁸ Concerning his resignation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 245.

³⁹ Juljusz Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador in France at the outbreak of war in 1939.

Curzon line would be in danger of deportation and destruction, which would mean a permanent and irreparable loss to the Polish nation. There would in addition be the uncertainties regarding the western frontiers.

There was also the question of the Lublin Committee. He doubted whether the question of its recognition as the provisional government was immediate. He was aware, however, that the British had received a message on December 13 from Marshal Stalin (*a*) stating that the Soviet Government was unwilling that supplies should be sent to the Polish underground over Soviet occupied areas; and (*b*) asking whether the time had not come to recognize the Lublin Committee. He was also aware that the French were sending an unofficial representative to the Committee. If the Committee should be recognized, this could be an added complication.

In the circumstances he was convinced that some effort had to be made to devise a positive policy. He felt particularly that when the President, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin held their meeting,⁴⁰ there should be some coherent plan regarding Poland which would take into account all the elements in the situation and which would permit the organization of a government which might go to Poland. He was giving thought to the working out of such a plan.

He indicated that a further element which might eventually have an influence on the situation was the possible arrival here before long of Vicente Witos,⁴¹ the well-known Peasant leader (not to be confused with his brother Andre Witos,⁴² recently removed from the Lublin Committee). If Vicente Witos should get out of German-occupied Poland and come here a reformation of the Polish Government around him might be possible.

While these are the principle elements in the situation at the moment, it is still too early to forecast in what form or when they will crystallize. But it should be remembered that changes in the Polish Government are less dependent on pressure of opinion or of parties than on the decisions of the Polish President. In consequence the present situation may readily run on for some time.

Repeated to Moscow.

[SCHOENFELD]

⁴⁰ This was the tripartite conference held at Yalta in the Crimea from February 4 to February 11, 1945. For records of this Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*.

⁴¹ Wincenty Witos, leader of the Polish Peasant Party before the war.

⁴² Andrzej Witos, who had been a vice chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and Director of the Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Reform.

SUPPORT BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE POLISH UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO SECURE SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THEM

760C.61/2146 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 8, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received January 9—1:33 p. m.]

5 Poles. Reference my despatch 487, December 24,⁴³ reporting Foreign Minister Romer's⁴⁴ statement that at Eden's suggestion Polish Government was drawing up its views on possible coordination of activities of Polish Underground and Soviet forces and his further statement that this might be an approach to question of resumption of Soviet-Polish relations,⁴⁵ I have now been given copy of *aide-mémoire* on this subject handed British Foreign Office by the Polish Government on December 30.

The essence of the *aide-mémoire* is in its final paragraph which reads:

"In view of the approaching time, when it will become necessary to issue the order for a general rising in Poland against the Germans, we declare to the British Government our readiness, jointly with the participation of the Soviet Government, to adjust political and military occupation in the war against Germany, and propose in conformity with the decision of the Polish Government of October 25, 1943, that Polish armed action should be included in the general strategic plans of the Allies. Details of this action could be agreed jointly by the representatives of the Polish, Soviet, British and American General Staffs."

The rest of the *aide-mémoire* refers to the uncompromising struggle waged against Germany by Poland since September 1, 1939; alludes to Polish Government's instruction of October 25, 1943 to the Polish Underground organization which anticipates, in agreement with the Allies, the issue of an order for a general rising (text of which was enclosed in Ambassador Biddle's⁴⁶ despatch 463, November 16, 1943⁴⁷); states that execution of this instruction requires that the

⁴³ *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 492.

⁴⁴ Tadeusz Romer, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.

⁴⁵ For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 1216 ff.

⁴⁶ Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., American Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, who resigned on January 22, 1944, in order to enter military service.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

anticipated operations should be brought within the framework of the strategic plans of the Allies; denies that Communists in Poland were being murdered by order of the Polish authorities although Polish population is exposed to terrible reprisals, arising in some cases out of the activities of Soviet partisans; and cites past efforts on the Polish side to reach an understanding on Polish-Soviet cooperation looking toward consolidation of effort against the common enemy.

Full text of *aide-mémoire* is being sent air mail.⁴⁸

Prime Minister Mikolajczyk tells me he understands the British have taken up the matter with Soviet Government but that as yet there has been no reply. I asked whether he thought the problem would be worked out. He said he personally had doubts. It had not been possible to work it out in "the best times" of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941.⁴⁹

[SCHOENFELD]

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*⁵⁰

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1944.

I wish to refer to telegram no. 9050 of December 29⁵¹ from Ambassador Winant which reads in part as follows:

"The Department will be familiar with the Soviet accusations against the Polish resistance groups in Poland which were lodged at Teheran to the effect that these resistance groups were actually cooperating with the Germans in that they were fighting the so-called partisans which were really Russians dropped by parachute."

It would be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Department who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the pertinent sections of the report on the Tehran Conference⁵² with regard to the aforementioned Soviet accusations might be made available to the Department.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁴⁸ Forwarded in Polish Series despatch 493, January 9, 1944; not printed.

⁴⁹ Agreement for mutual aid, with a protocol, signed at London on July 30, 1941; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 869; and see telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 243.

⁵⁰ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁵¹ Not printed.

⁵² The conference at Tehran was held between November 28 and December 1, 1943, and was attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, with their advisers. For the record concerning the accusations here referred to, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 596.

760C.61/2170 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 18, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received January 19—8:20 a. m.]

13 Polish. I have today received communication quoted below dated January 17 addressed to me by Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and marked secret.

“On January 14 at 5:30 p. m. I received a telegram from the Commander of the Polish Underground Army⁵³ in which he informed the Polish Government that an order from Moscow to the Soviet partisans operating in Eastern Poland had fallen into his hands. This order is as follows:

On the instructions of Comrade Nozenko, all partisans are ordered to disarm Polish detachment. Those resisting are to be shot on the spot. All Polish underground organizations are to be exterminated and their leaders executed. Signed: Dubov.

Following this order, one of the detachments of the Polish Underground Army has been surrounded by Soviet partisans on December 1, 1943. Nine officers and 135 men have been taken. Their Polish distinctions have been torn off. The men were forbidden to use their language, and the commander of the detachment and our [four?] officers were shot. The fate of the remaining officers and men is unknown. During the disarming of this detachment, 7 men were killed and 12 wounded.

While protesting most emphatically against this outrage, I should be grateful if you would, dear Mr. Schoenfeld, kindly transmit the foregoing to the State Department with the suggestion that the American Government consider the possibility of taking this matter up with the Soviet Government with a view to preventing the occurrence of acts of violence of that sort in the future.”

I understand that a similar communication has been addressed to Mr. Eden.⁵⁴

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2202 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 4, 1944.

[Received February 4—7:30 p. m.]

17 Poles. My 2, January 7 and my despatches 494, January 10 and 486, December 22.⁵⁵ In a statement issued last evening, Polish

⁵³ Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski, Commander in Chief of the Home Army, the “General Bor” of the Warsaw uprising (August–October 1944), and Commander in Chief of the Polish Army succeeding Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski after September 29, 1944.

⁵⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁵ None printed.

Government announces creation in Poland of a "Council of National Unity".

Text of statement is as follows:

"In his broadcast speech to Poland on the 6th January 1944 the Polish Prime Minister S. Mikolajczyk referred to the temporary organization of Polish authorities within Poland and revealed the fact that a Polish Government's delegate was active there as the Prime Minister's deputy.

Recent news received from Poland reveals another important step in the organization of the Polish underground state. It has been decided to transform the present political representation in Poland into a larger body and on January 9th the Polish Government's delegate announced in a decree the formation in Poland of a Council of National Unity composed of delegates of the four main political parties. For the time being the Council of National Unity is holding its meetings in secret but the names of the members of the Council of National Unity will be revealed at the appropriate time.

The underground Polish state organization which has been active without any interval since the outbreak of war is assuming an increasingly formal aspect and beginning to work more and more openly in preparation for the moment when it will take full charge of the administration of Polish territories freed from the German invader."

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2248

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1944.

The attached despatch ⁵⁶ from Mr. Schoenfeld encloses an official request ⁵⁷ made by the Polish Government-in-exile that the United States Government exert its influence with the Soviet Government to prevent possible Soviet repressions and afford protection to persons working with the Polish Underground.

The note from the Polish Foreign Minister emphasizes again that strict instructions have been given to the leaders of the Polish Underground which require them to disclose their identity and meet the requirements of the Soviet commander when the Red Army enters any particular district of Poland. This provision holds whether or not relations between the two countries have been restored and contains provisions for the Polish Underground Army to coordinate its actions with those of the Red Army.

Although it is of course impossible for us to ascertain whether the Polish Underground is carrying out these instructions, it is believed

⁵⁶ Despatch No. 543, March 9, 1944, not printed.

⁵⁷ Note of March 6, 1944, from Polish Foreign Minister Romer, not printed.

that in the interests of our common war effort we should in a friendly and firm manner bring this request to the attention of the Soviet Government. In so doing we would undoubtedly invite a rejoinder from the Soviet Government along the lines of claims already made by them that the Underground of the Polish Government-in-exile does not exist in fact but is composed of only a few agents who are endeavoring to stir up trouble with pro-Soviet elements in the country.

Despite this possible rejoinder, it is felt that we should at least express our interest in connection with this effort to bring the full weight of all forces to bear against the Axis armies.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

760C.61/2263 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 5, 1944.

[Received April 5—9:35 p. m.]

33 Poles. The Polish Telegraph Agency has issued an authorized statement to the press denying that existing orders to the Polish underground forces to make themselves known to and to cooperate with Soviet forces entering Poland have been revoked and referring to an approach by the Polish Government to the British and American Governments designed to secure their assistance in the prevention of incidents between the Polish and Soviet forces.

The statement summarizes the orders issued to the Polish underground which provide: That the representatives of the underground civil administration shall approach the Soviet commanders and inform them that they meet the Soviet forces as co-belligerents in the fight against Germany; that they shall state that there is in existence an administration secretly organized by the Polish State; and that they expect that in accordance with international law, the Soviet Army will enable Polish authorities during military operations on Polish soil to assure the social and economic welfare of the population.

The communiqué goes on to say that reports received in London indicate that formations of the Polish underground army have revealed themselves to the Soviet forces at a considerable number of places and the regional commander of the Polish underground army established contact with the commander of the Soviet cavalry division near Luck, and further that Polish formations have established contact with Soviet paratroops beyond the front line and the Polish underground army has increased its activities in the rear of the German Army.

"Messages from Poland confirm," the statement continues, "that the Soviet commanders receive assistance everywhere and that they praise the fighting spirit and the leadership of the Polish underground forces. On the whole Soviet cooperation with the Polish underground army has been satisfactory. However reports have been received from one or two localities which have caused anxiety and require elucidation. The Polish Government has communicated the facts of such reports to the British and American Governments and requested their assistance in the prevention of incidents which may hinder the further coming into the open of the Polish underground army and render impossible concerted military operations against the Germans. Instructions to come into the open and to cooperate with the Soviet Army in the fight against the Germans have not been revoked and still remain in force."

Repeated to Moscow.

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2253: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1944—midnight.

2715. The Polish Embassy just presented a note to the Department⁵⁸ (indicating that a similar note has been presented to the British Government) giving detailed reports which the Polish Government states have been received from Poland indicating that when units of the Polish Government's Underground Army disclosed itself to the advancing Red Army the Soviet authorities arrested the Polish soldiers and executed their officers. The note refers to the previous request (note of March 6)⁵⁹ received from the Polish Government asking that the British and American Governments use their influence with the Soviet Government to prevent possible Soviet repressions and afford protection to members of the Polish Underground who disclose themselves to the Red Army authorities.

In view of this second request and the allegations made therein and in view of the fact that cooperation between the Polish Underground and the Red Army would have a direct and beneficial effect upon the prosecution of the war, please ascertain whether the British Government, on the basis of this second request by the Poles expects to re-

⁵⁸ Note of March 31, 1944, delivered by the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski, on April 1; not printed.

⁵⁹ Not printed, but see memorandum of March 16 by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, p. 1357.

consider its position as outlined in your 2432, March 25⁶⁰ and whether it considers it advisable and desirable to make a parallel British-American approach to the Soviet Government on this question.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/33940b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1944—midnight.

890. For your background information, according to a report received by Premier Mikolajczyk⁶¹ the first contacts made between the Polish Underground forces and the Red Army led to certain difficulties since the Soviet authorities insisted that the Poles in Eastern Poland were on Russian territory and were Russian citizens and, therefore, should serve in the Red Army Divisions of General Berling.⁶² During this period certain friction developed and according to Polish reports the Red Army authorities executed a number of Poles and forced the others to join the Red forces.

A new phase developed on March 26 when the Polish Regional Commander in Volhynia made a successful and more friendly contact with the Soviet Commander. The latter proposed that a Polish Division should be recruited; that it would be permitted to operate under its own commander; that it should maintain allegiance to the Polish Government in London, but that it should be under the tactical command of the Red Army. This proposal was submitted to the Polish authorities in Warsaw who together with the Polish Government in London approved of the arrangement.

Premier Mikolajczyk attributes this change in the Soviet attitude primarily to the following three reasons:

1. That the discipline and strength of the Polish Underground is much greater than Stalin⁶³ at first believed;
2. That the Red Army authorities were desirous as they advanced further that the Underground forces should come to their aid against

⁶⁰ Not printed; this telegram reported that the British Foreign Office considered that relations between the Polish Underground and the Red Army formed only one aspect of the whole Polish-Soviet problem, and that it was therefore not advisable to take it up alone for discussion. The British Government was not considering an answer to the Polish request (760C.61/2253).

⁶¹ In his telegram 2901, April 9, 1944, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom informed the Department of Mikolajczyk's report about contacts between Polish and Soviet military units in eastern Poland (760C.61/2265).

⁶² Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Berling, organizer of the Soviet-sponsored Polish army, which had entered active service about September 1943.

⁶³ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

the Germans rather than remaining dormant or perhaps take a hostile attitude toward them;

3. That on the part of the Soviet authorities anxiety was felt about the feeling of American and British peoples on this subject.

For the first time in several months Mikolajczyk has displayed optimism regarding the prospect for Polish-Soviet relations.

In view of these new developments the Polish Government has revived its proposal to send American and British liaison officers both to the Polish Underground forces operating in German-controlled areas as well as those in areas under Red Army control. The British Government still feels that the time is not ripe for making such appointments and the Department concurs in this view.

On the basis of the earlier reports received by the Poles indicating that friction had developed between the two forces, the Polish Government asked the British and ourselves to use our influence with the Soviet Government in order to prevent possible Soviet repressions and to afford protection to the members of the Polish Underground who disclose themselves to the Red Army. In view of the later encouraging reports it is felt that no good purpose would be served in formally bringing the Polish request to the attention of the Soviet authorities. It is felt, however, that it would be helpful if when a suitable opportunity arises you informally indicate to Molotov⁶⁴ that the United States Government is gratified to learn that the Red Army and the Polish Underground have been able to effect an arrangement for cooperation between the two forces for the purpose of coordinating their efforts in the prosecution of the war against our common enemy.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/33994 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 18, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

1343. In my talk with Molotov last evening I had an opportunity to mention my Government's gratification over the reported arrangement for cooperation between the Red Army and the Polish underground (Department's 890, April 12, midnight).

Molotov responded that his only information about the subject had come from the British press, that in accordance with what he had told Clark Kerr⁶⁵ there had been two groups of Partisans who had come

⁶⁴ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁶⁵ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

over to the Red Army but in answer to my inquiry he made it plain that these were Partisans and not connected with the Polish Government's underground. In response to my further direct questions he maintained that he had had no information of any contact with the Red Army.

The Polish statement of the arrangement agreed to by the Soviets does not sound plausible, as it is difficult to believe that the Soviets would bring into the Red Army detachments of Poles loyal to the London Government recruited in areas claimed by the Soviet Union.

Is there anything further in the matter that you wish me to do?

Sent to the Department, repeated to London, secret for Stettinius.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/2275 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 25, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received April 26—7:01 a. m.]

1435. I asked Molotov in my talk this afternoon whether he had any new information on the situation in Poland. He replied that nothing of importance had come to his attention. He emphasized, however, that any reports which had been put out by the Polish Government in London concerning collaboration or contact between the Polish underground and the Red Army were pure inventions and disseminated for the purpose of confusing the situation. He said that all information which had come to his notice was to the effect that such contact and collaboration did not exist.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/33994 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1944—4 p. m.

1033. In view of the reply made by Molotov to your questions regarding the Polish underground reported in your 1343, April 18, there would appear to be no further action which you should take in this matter for the time being. We have been informed by London that five leaders of the Polish underground have recently arrived at Bari from where they are being brought to England for questioning by the British authorities on conditions inside Poland. Any information received from this source which tends to confirm the claims of the Polish Government will be communicated to you.

HULL

760C.61/2302 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 12, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 7:54 p. m.]

43 Poles. Mikolajczyk tells me that a recent report from the Polish underground indicates that the working arrangement between the underground and the Soviet Commander in Volhynia (my 35, April 10, 1 p. m.)⁶⁶ was not fulfilling initial hopes.

Cooperation between the Polish underground forces and the Soviet Military continues on the fighting front but relations with the Soviet civil authorities behind the lines are bad. The Soviet authorities are also compelling Poles to join the Berling armies.

Mikolajczyk states he believes the arrangement will continue to operate where there is active fighting; i. e., both at the front and in the areas behind the German lines where Soviet parachutists have been dropped. The latter particularly need the assistance of the underground. But he indicated doubt as to the eventual outcome of the arrangement and mentioned that Moscow had still not publicly affirmed or denied the arrangement.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.51/1552

The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1944.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: There is attached a copy of a memorandum⁶⁷ to the President submitted to the Department by the Polish Prime Minister relative to the desire of the Polish Government to obtain a substantial credit, as well as lend-lease materials, for the purpose of strengthening the combat facilities of the Polish Underground Army.

For your background information it is perhaps pertinent to point out that for the past two years the President has made available from

⁶⁶ Not printed, but see telegram 890, April 12, to Moscow, p. 1360.

⁶⁷ In this memorandum of June 9, 1944 (not printed), Prime Minister Mikolajczyk requested Lend-Lease facilities for the supply of war weapons, ammunition, and equipment to meet the increased requirements of Poland's Underground Army. He also requested an increase of funds for the Polish Government to \$97 million, because of greatly expanded activities by Polish organizations in 1944. These funds were to be allocated as follows: \$38 million for upkeep, maintenance and development of the Underground Army and Administration in Poland; \$7 million for cost of the Underground Army in guerrilla action; \$45 million for manufacture of armaments and ammunition in Poland; and \$7 million as a special fund for expenditures immediately before the uprising of the Underground Army and at the beginning of the uprising. (860C.51/1552)

his emergency fund \$10,000,000 a year for the same purpose given in the attached memorandum.

I understand that when the President discussed this question with the Polish Prime Minister he indicated that in principle he was favorably disposed to granting additional credits for the use of the Polish Underground Forces and stated that the matter would be given careful consideration by the appropriate American authorities. In this regard I understand the President informed the Prime Minister that if it should not prove possible to make the entire sum available at once he might be able to make available, as an initial installment, approximately \$20,000,000.

In discussing this question with Premier Mikolajczyk I also indicated that I felt that sympathetic consideration should be given to this request but told him that naturally it would have to be submitted to the appropriate United States military authorities before a final decision could be reached.

Since Premier Mikolajczyk expressed his sincere hope that comprehensive arrangements might be made for permanent collaboration between the Polish Underground Forces and the Red Army and since the President, I understand, expressed the same hope, the Department would appreciate receiving, before making the final decision from a political point of view, the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether, from a military point of view, they feel that it would be useful to the general war effort if the sums requested or any part thereof are made available to the Polish Government.

In view of the urgency of this matter, it would be appreciated if the Joint Chiefs of Staff could give the Department the benefit of their opinion as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

760C.61/7-1744

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

No. 630

LONDON, July 17, 1944.

[Received July 24.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Polish Government has publicly protested by inference against Marshal Stalin's Order of the Day on July 13, 1944, in which he announced the liberation from the Fascist invaders of Vilna, "the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic," by troops of the Third Byelorussian Front and ordered a salute of 24 salvos from 324 guns to be fired in Moscow in honor of the troops which captured the "capital of Soviet Lithuania."

In a statement issued to the press on July 15, 1944, the Polish Government says that from March, 1944, in accordance with its instructions and those of the Supreme Command of the Polish Armed Forces, the Polish Underground Army has cooperated with the Soviet armies in open fighting in the rear of the German armies and has contributed effective military aid, particularly in the Vilna area. By so doing, the Polish Underground Army has proved its close ties with the Polish State and Government. The Polish Government, the statement concludes, expects the United Nations to recognize this stand of the Polish people and its sacrifices and to maintain the principle of the Allied Nations that no territorial changes shall be recognized without the freely expressed consent of the peoples concerned.

A copy of the Polish Government's statement is enclosed.⁶⁸

Respectfully yours,

RUDOLF E. SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/7-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1944—midnight.

1731. You are aware for the past 2 years the President has authorized the allocation of \$10,000,000 to the Polish Government to be used for the financing of the operations of the Polish Underground Forces in Poland. During his recent visit,⁶⁹ Prime Minister Mikolajczyk raised the question of the allocation of such funds this year and the President has now authorized the allocation to the Polish Government, for this purpose, the sum of \$10,000,000 on condition that the Polish Underground Forces will cooperate with the Soviet armies in the struggle against Germany. The Department has been officially informed in this connection by the Polish Ambassador that the Polish Government has recently renewed its instructions to the Polish Underground to cooperate with and assist the Soviet armies in every way, and on the basis of these assurances the \$10,000,000 will be made available to the Polish Government. Although in the past we have not officially informed the Soviet Government of the fact that funds for this purpose have been made available by the United States Government, we believe at the present time that the appropriate Soviet officials should be so informed in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding.

In order to avoid in so far as possible any political implications and to keep the entire question on a military level, it is suggested that

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ In regard to this visit, June 5-14, see pp. 1272-1291, *passim*.

General Deane⁷⁰ could merely inform the appropriate Soviet military officials emphasizing to them that this money has been and is being made available for purely military reasons in order to help keep alive an underground force engaged in fighting the common enemy, and on the basis of official assurances from the Polish Government that these underground forces will cooperate to the full with the Red Army entering Poland. Subject to your discretion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved this action on the part of General Deane.

It is not our intention to request Soviet approval for this action but merely to inform the Soviet Government that this action has been taken.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/7-2044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 20, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

2682. Department's 1731, July 18, midnight. On the basis of my past experience with the members of the Soviet Government I doubt that it would be wise to volunteer this information to them at this moment. The decision in question represents only a continuance of past practice. I feel instinctively that if we were to tell the Soviets about it now, it would probably not be properly understood, and that it would give rise to more questions and suspicions than it would allay. The Russians will not be impressed by the Polish Ambassador's assurances, and will almost certainly take the view that the funds are being used to support activities opposed to groups which they themselves view with favor in Poland.

If the information must be imparted, then I feel that it should preferably be done informally in Washington. Whoever takes this step should be prepared to follow it up, if necessary, by giving the Russians a full picture of the exact uses to which the money is put. We are not in a position to do this here.

In particular, I cannot recommend that General Deane undertake this task. It would be difficult to persuade the Russians to view this matter as a purely military one; and again they might read into General Deane's action entirely unjustified and unfortunate implications with possible adverse effect on his relations. The Red Army, in our experience, is never willing to discuss anything which the Soviet Government considers to have a political color.

General Deane concurs.

HARRIMAN

⁷⁰ Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, head of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

740.0011 European War 1939/7-2544

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1944.

The Polish Ambassador called at my request. He handed me a secret communication (copy attached) summarizing a letter from Premier Mikolajczyk to the President which was handed to Minister Schoenfeld in London on July 21, for transmission to Washington. I said that all I could do was to forward the letter to the President just as early as possible, adding that the President was some distance away.

The Ambassador then brought up the question of the so-called new governmental organization which Russia is reported to be supporting.⁷¹ I said that there was nothing I could say at this time. I added that, of course, I understood the position of the Ambassador's Government.

[Annex]

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State

On cable instructions received July 23 from the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the Polish Ambassador personally submitted to the Secretary of State the following urgent matter:

1) On July 21 the Polish Government handed to Minister Schoenfeld in London for re-transmission to the President of the United States a letter from Premier Mikolajczyk concerning the active participation of the Polish Underground Army in the taking of Wilno and its collaboration with the Soviet Armed Forces on the territories of the north-eastern confines of Poland. The latest information received by the Polish Government directly by radio from the Commander of the Polish Underground Army are annexed to the letter of Premier Mikolajczyk to the President. In his letter the Premier stresses that all these informations prove the most accurate and precise carrying out of the instructions issued by the Polish Government to the Polish Underground Army. These instructions, pertaining to collaboration with the Soviet Armed Forces against the common enemy and the increased activities of the Polish Underground Army, are known to the President and the United States Government.

2) On the territory of the Province of Wilno active military collaboration with the Soviet Armed Forces has been established similarly to the collaboration in the Province of Volhynia by the Polish Underground Army. In the opinion of Premier Mikolajczyk,

⁷¹ For correspondence concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a Soviet-supported government within Poland, see pp. 1398 ff.

this creates a new opportunity for a wider Polish-Soviet understanding, the importance of which was so greatly stressed by President Roosevelt. Premier Mikolajczyk is convinced that the latest instances of collaboration between the Polish Underground Forces and the Soviet Forces in Poland could be utilized in a positive way providing proper measures are immediately taken. At the same time, however, he expresses the fear that if these facts are not fully taken advantage of by means of appropriate steps, contact between the Soviet and Polish Armies may become a source of friction and difficulties harmful to the collaboration between the United Nations.

3) Conscious of the deep sympathy and understanding shown by the President for what the Polish Nation has already undergone, Premier Mikolajczyk again appeals to the President to use all his influence with the Soviet Government in order to make it refrain from taking steps which would be detrimental to the vital interests of Poland and to the Allied War effort.

4) Moreover, Premier Mikolajczyk points out that at the time when the war has entirely involved the territories of Poland, the Polish Underground Army should be given the fullest possibility of continuing its fight against the Germans under the authority of the Polish Government and under Soviet operational command in accordance with the agreement reached by the Polish Underground Forces and the Soviet Armed Forces in Volhynia in March, 1944.

5) On the basis of the above stated facts, the Polish Premier, on behalf of the Polish Government and on the basis of the appeal contained in the enclosed telegram from the Commander of the Polish Underground Army, submits to the President the urgent request that American liaison officers, at present in Moscow, should be immediately sent to Wilno.

6) Simultaneously Premier Mikolajczyk renews the request he made of the President that American representatives be sent secretly to German-occupied Poland in order to be in contact with the Polish Underground Organization under German occupation. The very presence of such American representatives would greatly and appropriately influence the course of events. The Premier likewise stresses the deep impression which the absence of any Allied representatives in Poland would inevitably create among the Polish population at this most vital moment for the future of the Polish State.

7) Premier Mikolajczyk emphatically stresses the importance and great urgency of these matters and expresses the hope that, in view of this great importance and urgency, he may count on a favorable answer from the President.

Texts of the telegrams mentioned above, received by the Polish Government from the Polish Underground Command and Administration, are attached.⁷²

Premier Mikolajczyk instructs the Polish Ambassador personally to submit these matters to the Secretary of State and to stress that the passing of the Polish Underground Army from sabotage and diversion activities to open fight against the Germans in the Province of Wilno had already started in the month of May, and that, regardless of exceptionally difficult conditions, the organization of a full division of the Polish Underground Army on the territory of the Province of Wilno, from previously prepared smaller units, has been successfully achieved and brought into the fight.

Premier Mikolajczyk also informs the Ambassador that he has submitted this situation to Prime Minister Churchill.

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1944.

740.0011 European War 1939/7-2744

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) ⁷³

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1944.

The Polish Ambassador called this morning at his request and left the attached memorandum ⁷⁴ giving the latest Polish reports on the difficulties between the Polish Underground forces and the Red Army. The important points of this memorandum are as follows:

The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Underground reported to the Polish Government in London on July 19 that in the Wilno area, after an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Commander ⁷⁵ for the Polish Underground forces to operate with the Soviet forces under the orders of the Polish Government in London, the Soviet authorities on July 17 arrested the Polish Army staff.

The note then refers to the *aide-mémoire* handed to Schoenfeld on July 25 (see attached telegram from Schoenfeld ⁷⁶) which refers to further proof of lack of good will on the part of the Soviets, and states that it may become impossible to carry out the instructions of the London Government to its Underground to collaborate with the Soviet forces.

⁷² None printed.

⁷³ Directed to the Secretary of State, to James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and to H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Army Gen. Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky, who led the offensive of the Russian Army in the capture of Vilna.

⁷⁶ The substance of this *aide-mémoire* was communicated to the Department of State in Polish Series telegram 65, July 25, 1944, from London; not printed.

The Polish Government requests us to approach the Soviet Government (1) to obtain the release of the arrested officers, (2) to enable the Polish Army to fight in collaboration with Soviet troops against Germany, (3) to obtain from the Soviets the recognition of the Polish Army in Poland as a cobelligerent Allied army.

The *aide-mémoire* then states that the Germans are executing members of the Polish Army in Poland when taken prisoner and requests that a joint American-British declaration be issued stating that "the Polish Army in Poland is an Allied Army and as such enjoys all the rights of a regular belligerent army."

A similar appeal has been made to Secretary Eden in London.

ELBRIDGE DUREBROW

860C.51/8-444

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: In your absence I have just received a letter from General Marshall,⁷⁷ presenting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the allocation of ten million dollars for the use of the Underground Forces of the Polish Government in Exile.

In July the Joint Chiefs approved this allocation provided that the activities of the Polish Underground were closely coordinated with the military operations of the Red Army.

In view of the Soviet recognition of the Polish Committee of National Liberation,⁷⁸ the Joint Chiefs feel this proviso may not be fulfilled and suggest that the allocation of the funds be temporarily deferred.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

740.0011 European War 1939/8-544

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1944.

I

The Polish Ambassador came in this morning to present a memorandum, a copy of which is attached,⁷⁹ on the developments in connec-

⁷⁷ General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

⁷⁸ The Polish Committee of National Liberation had been established in Kholm (Chelm) by a decree of July 21, 1944, by the National People's Council of Poland. It soon transferred its activities to Lublin. See also telegram 2856, August 3, 8 p. m., from Moscow, p. 1428.

⁷⁹ Not printed.

tion with the advance of the Soviet Red Army on Polish territory and the Red Army's treatment of the Polish Underground. This memorandum presents the situation as becoming extremely serious in that the Red Army Commanders are requiring the Polish Underground to disband and enter the forces of either the Soviet Army or the forces of General Berling, the Polish General who is commanding Polish contingents which form a part of the Red Army.⁸⁰ I will not recite the complete details of this memorandum as the copy is attached. The Ambassador asked that this report from his Government be called to the attention of the Acting Secretary and the President as soon as possible, and that some action be taken by this Government to prevent the progressive disbandment of the Polish Underground forces which have been recognized as an army by the British and American military forces.

II

The Ambassador then asked whether we had any report regarding the visit of the Polish Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin yesterday. I told the Ambassador that according to a telegram from Mr. Harriman,⁸¹ a conversation between Mr. Mikolajczyk and Marshal Stalin had consisted of three parts:

- (a) The Polish Underground Army;
- (b) The question of the territorial status of Poland;
- (c) The relationship between the Polish Government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

I said that nothing new had developed in this conversation according to our reports as the position of the Soviet Government had been stated in pretty much the same form as they had stated it heretofore. It appeared that Marshal Stalin had offered to arrange for a meeting between Mr. Mikolajczyk and the Polish National Committee to which Mikolajczyk had acceded, and the meeting would take place within a day or two either at Moscow or Kiev.⁸²

III

I then told the Ambassador that the Acting Secretary of State had instructed me to inform Mr. Ciechanowski that the United States military authorities had requested a delay in the transfer of the \$10,-

⁸⁰ The memorandum gave an illustration of this practice in the Lvov area: "In the fighting for the City of Lwów our detachments, amounting to 3,000 men, took an active and effective part. After our Commander had disclosed himself to the Soviet Command he was told that the region of Lwów is Soviet territory and that his detachment must therefore surrender arms within two hours and consider itself as liquidated. It was added that the mobilization will be carried out by the Soviet authorities in that region. The Poles will then be given the choice between entering the Berling army or the Soviet Army."

⁸¹ See telegram 2860, August 4, from Moscow, p. 1305.

⁸² See telegrams 2885, August 7, and 2923, August 10, from Moscow, pp. 1306 and 1308, respectively.

000,000 which this Government had arranged to convey to the Polish authorities for the purpose of assisting in equipping the underground forces in Poland. Mr. Ciechanowski said that he understood the first installment of this sum had been already paid to the Polish authorities. I said that I was not informed in detail with regard to this transaction but that in any event the Acting Secretary had desired the Ambassador to know as soon as possible that there would be a delay for the time being in carrying out this transaction. The Ambassador asked who the military authorities were who had requested this delay. I replied that I was not informed on that point as it had come to me merely as the "American military authorities". The Ambassador also asked how long we thought this delay would be. I informed him that in the opinion of the Acting Secretary this delay would probably continue until the return of the President. The Ambassador asked when that would be, to which I replied that I did not know exactly when the President would return to Washington but that probably it would not be for about two weeks. The Ambassador was extremely disappointed and asked whether there was any reason which could be given for this delay. I said that I did not know anything further of the circumstances than that the matter had been requested to be held in abeyance for the time being. The Ambassador thereupon said that he would inform his Government immediately of this development.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

860C.24/8-644 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1944—2 p. m.

1874. On instructions from the President of Poland⁸³ the Polish Ambassador called on me this morning and left the following memorandum which is given in paraphrase.

"The Polish President and the Acting Premier Kwapinski sent a telegram from London to the Polish Ambassador here on August 5 depicting the situation of the Underground Army of the Polish Government which is now fighting the Germans openly inside Warsaw. The following is the message received by the Polish Ambassador:

'Although the greater part of the city of Warsaw is now held by the Polish National Underground Army, the situation there is most serious. They have been urgently asking in vain for 4 days for assistance in the form of anti-tank guns, ammunition and have asked that there be sent from England the Polish Paratroop Brigade. The ammunition and arms which Churchill kindly promised to be sent to Warsaw by parachute have not been sent. The reason for nondelivery has been given as technical.

⁸³ Wladyslaw Raczkiwicz.

“Because of the urgency and gravity of the situation in Warsaw, the Polish President has instructed the Polish Ambassador in Washington to lay immediately before the highest American military officials the facts of the situation and to ask that authority be given urgently to General Eisenhower⁸⁴ to take up the matter of supplying by parachute the Polish forces fighting in Warsaw with adequate ammunition and arms or to arrange the supply from American Air Bases in the Soviet Union of German munitions captured from the enemy by the Red Army.[’]

“The Ambassador’s memorandum adds that in the telegram he received from the Polish President the latter stressed that failure to give immediate assistance to the Polish underground forces in Warsaw would cause incalculable consequences, which might affect directly the course of the Red Army’s operations in the region of Warsaw. Moreover, in the event the Germans should be successful in overpowering and destroying the underground units in Warsaw, this would result in disorganizing the whole structure of the Polish Government Underground Army the headquarters of which are in Warsaw and the underground ramifications might reach deep into Germany. Furthermore it is possible that such a development might have a bearing on the military operations in the western part of the European Continent.”

The Ambassador asked that the foregoing be made available to Premier Mikolajczyk. Unless you perceive a serious reason why this should not be done please inform Mikolajczyk of the foregoing.

STETTINIUS

740.0011 European War 1939/8-844

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: On August 6, the Polish Ambassador called on me and later on Lt. General McNarney⁸⁵ to present an urgent request which he had received from the President of Poland for supplies to be furnished by the United States military authorities to the Polish Underground Army which is fighting the Germans in the city of Warsaw. The Polish request asked that either General Eisenhower be authorized to send in supplies by air to these Polish forces or that German munitions captured from the enemy by the Soviet forces be sent to Warsaw from United States bases in the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador’s memorandum stressed the urgency of this matter and pointed out the possible repercussions if these Polish forces should be overcome by the Germans. He added that the arms and ammunition which Prime Minister Churchill had promised to parachute to Warsaw had not been sent because of technical difficulties.

⁸⁴ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General of Allied Forces in European Theater of Operations.

⁸⁵ Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army.

In a letter dated August 7, 1944,⁸⁶ the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that it "believed the Polish Ambassador should be informed that his appeal has been given most sympathetic consideration by the United States military authorities and that the matter has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for such action as is possible under the circumstances." The above reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be given to the Polish Ambassador.

In the annexes to the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is stated that, in accordance with the agreed policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that supplies and equipment for the Polish Underground Forces is a British responsibility, the Polish request should be referred to the British Chiefs of Staff for such action as they may deem necessary and desirable.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot 53 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Moscow,] August 15, 1944—8 p. m.

3000. For the President and Acting Secretary. I sent Molotov yesterday, August 14, an urgent letter stating that our Air Force Command here had received from USSTAF an urgent directive to obtain immediate approval from the Red Air Force for a shuttle mission of American bombers to drop arms on Warsaw for the resistance forces and then proceed to bases in the Soviet Union. I said that I was taking up this question with him because political considerations were involved and I concluded that my Government was extremely desirous that this attempt be made to get arms to the resistance groups in spite of its risks and difficulties.

I received a note this morning from Vyshinski⁸⁷ stating that he had been instructed by Molotov to advise me that the Soviet Government "could not go along" with this project and that the "action in Warsaw into which the Warsaw population had been drawn was a purely adventuristic affair and the Soviet Government could not lend its hand to it". Vyshinski's letter concluded that Stalin had pointed out to Churchill on August 5 that one could not imagine how a few Polish detachments of the so-called National Army possessing neither artillery, aviation, or tanks could "take" Warsaw at a time when the Nazis had at their disposal four tank divisions for the defense of that city.

⁸⁶ Not found in Department files.

⁸⁷ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

I discussed this matter with Clark Kerr this morning who had talked with Molotov about it last night. At that time no decision had been reached and Molotov explained that an attempt had been made to drop a Red Army liaison officer in Warsaw but that the officer had been lost.⁸⁸ Clark Kerr had received a communication from Eden this morning to the effect that the question of supplying the resistance groups in Warsaw was the crucial matter in the Soviet-Polish situation. We decided that we jointly should immediately ask to see Molotov and endeavor to prevail upon him to change the decision of the Soviet Government.

In Molotov's alleged absence Vyshinski received us early this afternoon. We informed him that we believed the decision of the Soviet Government was a grave mistake and that it would have serious repercussions in Washington and London. We pointed out that Vyshinski's letter did not tally with Stalin's promise to Mikolajczyk to assist the resistance movement in Warsaw.⁸⁹ Although admittedly premature, the Warsaw Poles, like the French underground and Tito's forces, were killing Germans even without tanks and aircraft. It was therefore in the interests of the common cause and of humanity to support them. We emphasized at some length the seriousness of this decision, to prevent our air force from assisting the Poles in Warsaw, and the effect it would have not only on our common cause but also on world opinion when it became publicly known. Vyshinski adhered to the statements made in his letter and to the view that the outbreak in Warsaw was ill-advised, not a serious matter, not worthy of assistance, and that it would have no influence on the future course of the war. There were no reasons to reconsider the Soviet position. He said that the Soviet Government had nothing to fear as to public reaction abroad since the exploits of the Red Army and the Soviet people clearly spoke for themselves. I pointed out that we were not requesting Soviet participation in the operation and stated that I could not understand why the Soviet Government should object to our endeavor to assist the Poles even if our attempt to get arms to them should not bring about the desired results. Vyshinski maintained that the landing of the American planes at the Soviet bases constituted participation and that the Soviet Government did not wish to encourage "adventuristic actions" which might later be turned against the Soviet Union. In reply to my question as to what exactly he meant, he made vague references to hostile press statements in connection with the

⁸⁸ Konstantin Kalugin, a captain in the Soviet intelligence service, according to a former official of the Polish underground. A different version of how he got "lost" is presented in Stefan Korbonski, *Fighting Warsaw* (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1956), p. 386.

⁸⁹ See telegram 2923, August 10, 2 p. m., from Moscow, p. 1308.

Soviet position vis-à-vis the uprising in Warsaw. These statements, he said, demonstrated what kind of an affair the uprising was.

Clark Kerr inquired whether he understood correctly that there had been a change in Soviet policy from Stalin's promise to Mikolajczyk to assist the Poles in Warsaw. Vyshinski maintained that there had been no change in policy, that it was primarily a matter of the best ways and means of effecting this policy, that the Red Army was helping Poland, and that the question was purely military in character. He was evasive when asked whether the Soviets intended to assist directly the Poles fighting in Warsaw.

I told Vyshinski that under our agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the shuttle operations the Warsaw project would have to be abandoned, but that I understood a shuttle mission would be undertaken shortly in which a German war production target would be attacked. If there were any change in Soviet policy regarding the Warsaw proposal as a result of our conversation, I hoped he would let me know today as there was still time to change our plans. Vyshinski said that he would report our conversation to his Government and let me know if there was any change in Soviet policy.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to London as no. 139.

HARRIMAN

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot 53 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Moscow,] August 15, 1944—11 p. m.

3002. For the President and the Acting Secretary, supplementing Embassy's no. 3000, August 15, 8 p. m. For the first time since coming to Moscow I am gravely concerned by the attitude of the Soviet Government in its refusal to permit us to assist the Poles in Warsaw as well as in its own policy of apparent inactivity. If Vyshinski correctly reflects the position of the Soviet Government, its refusal is based not on operational difficulties or denial that the resistance exists but on ruthless political considerations.⁹⁰

The British Ambassador received shortly after our conversation with Vyshinski instructions from Eden to inform the Soviet Government that 28 British aircraft had successfully dropped some supplies in Warsaw on August 13 and that further British operations were contemplated, and to support our request for Soviet approval for a

⁹⁰ In reporting another meeting with Vyshinsky on the next day in his telegram 3021, August 16, Ambassador Harriman declared: "This conversation reinforces my conclusion of yesterday that the Soviet Government has no present intention of attempting to drop arms to the Poles fighting in Warsaw."

daylight shuttle mission landing on Russian bases. Eden explained further that he and the Prime Minister are watching developments closely and with concern. Clark Kerr has written Molotov a letter this evening covering the above. It seems clear that when the Prime Minister and Eden receive Clark Kerr's account of Vyshinski's position they will take further steps.

I request instructions on what you wish me to do.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/8-1644

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON, August 17, 1944.]

You will have seen Harriman's telegrams 3000 and 3002 of August 15 that the Soviet Government has apparently reversed its promise given by Stalin to Mikolajczyk to assist the Polish Underground in Warsaw and has even expressed its disapproval of any attempts by the British or ourselves to send such aid. The arguments advanced by Vyshinsky in his letter to Harriman and in a subsequent conversation with Harriman and the British Ambassador were of such a nature as to lead Harriman to the conclusion that the present Soviet attitude can only be explained on the grounds of ruthless political considerations.

I believe for a number of considerations that it is impossible for us or the British to abandon to their fate the Polish Underground forces which are actively fighting the Nazi invaders of their country simply because such action might not accord with Soviet political aims.

We have also received an urgent request from the British Government that Harriman be authorized to associate himself with the British Ambassador in making representations to Stalin or, if he cannot be seen, to Molotov urging the Soviet Government to reconsider its attitude on the question of using the shuttle bombing arrangements. There is attached for your approval draft telegraphic instructions⁹¹ to Harriman authorizing him to associate himself with the British Ambassador in this request and at the same time instructing him to inform Stalin or Molotov that even if the Soviet Government does not find it possible to cooperate in bringing aid to the Polish Underground that we and the British intend in so far as practicable to furnish such aid on the grounds of our clear obligation to aid any forces of the United Nations which are engaged in fighting the Germans.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁹¹ See telegram 1962, August 17, to Moscow, p. 1378.

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot 53 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Moscow,] August 17, 1944—6 p. m.

3045. For the President and Secretary. ReEmbs 3028, August 17, 4 p. m.⁹² The British Ambassador has received a telegram from his Foreign Office bringing to his attention the fact that for some time the Soviet radio has been urging the Poles to throw caution aside and rise against the Germans. In particular, according to this message, on July 29, 3 days before outbreak of the Warsaw uprising, Moscow broadcast an appeal from the Union of Polish Patriots⁹³ to the people of Warsaw calling upon them to join battle with the Germans for decisive action. The hour of action, the broadcast stated, had already arrived for Warsaw. The Germans were planning to bring about the destruction of the city. Whatever could not be saved by direct effort would be lost. Liberation would be hastened and Polish lives saved by direct active struggle in the streets and in the houses.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/8-1644 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1944—7 p. m.

1962. Your 3020, August 16, 11 p. m.⁹⁴ The President has authorized you to make personal representations to Stalin, or if he is unavailable, to Molotov to urge the reconsideration of the Soviet attitude in regard to the use of the shuttle bombing arrangements to drop supplies to the Polish Underground forces in Warsaw. You should at the same time point out that, while we earnestly hope that the Soviet Govern-

⁹² Not printed; Ambassador Harriman recommended that President Roosevelt should "send immediately a strong message to Stalin and instruct me to deliver it personally", together with guidance for oral explanation to make certain that Stalin understood the President's views. Harriman further said that "Stalin should be made to understand that American public belief in the chances of success of world security organization and postwar cooperation would be deeply shaken if the Soviet Government continues such a policy" of refusing itself to assist the Poles fighting in Warsaw and preventing others from making efforts to assist them.

⁹³ This organization of Poles sympathetic to Communism, successor to an earlier "Committee of Polish Patriots", held its first Congress in Moscow on June 8, 1943, and exchanged letters with Stalin.

⁹⁴ Not printed; this telegram advised the Department that the British Ambassador had been instructed to make representations on the subject of aid to Warsaw directly to Stalin or Molotov, if possible in association with Ambassador Harriman, but not to delay action on this account.

ment will cooperate with the British and American Governments in the matter of furnishing assistance to the Polish Underground forces and that the Soviet Government will for its part furnish such aid as may be practicable under the circumstances, even if such cooperation is not forthcoming, the United States military forces intend in so far as militarily feasible to continue to furnish aid to the Polish Underground forces inside German-occupied Poland since this Government perceives no grounds for departing from its consistent policy of furnishing all possible aid to any forces of the United Nations who are engaged in fighting our common enemy.

The Department desires to commend you for your representations made to Vyshinski on this subject (your 3000, August 15) and in discussing this matter with Stalin or Molotov you are authorized to present the position of this Government in such manner as you consider to be most effective.

The President received your 3028, August 17,⁹⁵ before approving above instructions, but he still feels that at the present stage of this matter it would be best to act on those instructions and hold in abeyance the question of a personal message from him to Stalin.

HULL

760C.61/8-1844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 18, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:50 p. m.]

6672. Please see Schoenfeld's No. 73, August 18, Polish series.⁹⁶ I have just left Mr. Eden's office. He wanted to check with me on the Soviet-Polish situation in relation to Warsaw and showed me a memorandum which O'Malley, the British Ambassador in London to the Poles, had given him after a conversation with Romer, Polish Foreign Minister, at noon today. I asked him if he would let me have this Foreign Office memorandum in order that I might forward it to you. He gave it to me with the understanding that it would be given no distribution and that it was for your personal information.

The text of the memorandum follows:

"I saw M. Romer at midday on August 18th.

He said M. Mikolajczyk had been knocked down by an American car and was in hospital. He will be at work again tomorrow, but the accident had delayed the deliberations of the Polish Cabinet.

⁹⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 92, p. 1378.

⁹⁶ Not printed; this telegram reported information given by Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and Foreign Minister Tadeusz Romer about their conversations with Stalin. Both reported that they felt that Stalin understood the difficulties and that he wanted a "satisfactory arrangement."

M. Romer then read to me telegrams exchanged with Moscow, of which the following is a summary, leaving out all the trimmings:

1. From M. Mikolajczyk to Marshal Stalin, August 13. M. Mikolajczyk referred to his conversation with Marshal Stalin on August 9, during which he had asked (a) for bombardment of Warsaw aerodromes, armoured trains, et cetera; (b) Russian fighter patrols to operate against the Luftwaffe, and (c) extensive droppings. M. Mikolajczyk had reiterated his request for such assistance and had urged that it was very desirable from a political point of view that the Red Army should enter Warsaw as liberators instead of capturing a town in which the large part of the population had been massacred.

2. From Marshal Stalin to M. Mikolajczyk, August 16, which arrived during the night of the 17th/18th. Stalin said that after the promise which he had given to M. Mikolajczyk he had ordered extensive droppings to be made on the city and for a liaison officer also to be dropped. The officer had been killed. After reexamination of the whole position Stalin had come to the conclusion that the fight in Warsaw was a reckless adventure undertaken by the Poles without consultation with him. (As M. Romer read a French translation of the Russian text I recognized that the words were identical with those in our telegram from Sir A. Clark Kerr). The telegram went on to say that calumnies in the Polish press had now made it clear to the Soviet authorities that they had been deluded about the motives from which and the spirit in which the rising had been made. Marshal Stalin concluded by saying that he had finished with any idea of giving assistance to Warsaw and that he could not and would not take any share in the responsibility for what was occurring there.

3. From M. Mikolajczyk to Marshal Stalin. This telegram was going off this afternoon. M. Mikolajczyk said that he understood that Stalin was in no way responsible for a rising which had turned out to be premature. So far as Polish newspapers were showing themselves to be over-excited, he was taking appropriate counteracting action. He was confidently expecting Russian collaboration in Warsaw. The rising had been ordered by the commander of the underground army in response to fervent appeals remitted by the Russian radio system (dates were given). He asked Marshal Stalin whether if, in the face of these appeals, the population of Warsaw had been made passive he would not have been exposed afterwards to a charge of failing to comply with the reiterated and urgent appeals of the Soviet Government. He had informed M. Molotov on 2nd August that the rising had begun at a moment when the Soviet armies were only 10 kilometers distant. It was a fact that the Poles in Warsaw had now been fighting for 18 days and also that they were fighting the Germans in many other parts of Poland. Russian assistance was not only due on the merits of the case but was extremely desirable in view of M. Mikolajczyk's hopes of lasting friendship between Poland and Russia. He therefore issued this further appeal for technical contact and assistance. He also begged that the Soviet Government would quickly agree to the American proposal to send help to Warsaw.

I cannot remember the exact words used in this telegram but it gave me the impression of being couched in very conciliatory language.

I asked M. Romer why he thought Marshal Stalin had gone back on his promise. He said he thought that the reason was that Stalin

now realized the strength of the underground army and administration and that successful action by it in Warsaw would get much credit for Poland all over the world. This would not assist Marshal Stalin in getting unilateral solution of the Polish question which he desired. M. Romer said that this was, of course, pure speculation.

He went on to say that he was not unduly cast down by Stalin's telegram. He knew the Russians well and he thought it would not be inconsistent with the capricious manner in which they often conducted their affairs for Stalin to change his mind once again. At any rate, there was nothing to do for the moment but to hope that this would happen. Meanwhile, he was grateful for British and American efforts on Poland's behalf and hoped that this would be persisted in.

I asked whether he thought the Americans would get permission to land in Russia, and he said that he had no indication of what the Russian answer would be.

M. Mikolajczyk's discussions with other Poles in London were still going well but he had nothing definite yet to tell the Secretary of State and would not, therefore, ask for an interview at the moment."

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/8-1744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1944—3 p. m.

1974. Although it is apparent from your 3049, August 17, midnight,⁹⁷ that at the time of your interview with Molotov you had not yet received our 1962, August 17, 7 p. m. containing the instructions authorized by the President, you presented the position of this Government essentially along the lines of these instructions.⁹⁸

In view of Molotov's definite statement that the decision of the Soviet Government in regard to furnishing aid to the Polish Underground would not be reconsidered and also Vyshinski's statement (your 3031, August 17)⁹⁹ that the Soviet Government would not object to independent British and American action in furnishing supplies, the question arises whether it is desirable to attempt to press the Soviet Government to change its position on the use of shuttle bombing arrangements. Our chief concern from a political point of

⁹⁷ Not printed, but see telegram 3108, August 22, from Moscow, p. 1386.

⁹⁸ Although the instructions had not arrived before this conversation, Ambassador Harriman advised the Department of State in telegram 3081, August 19: "I have, however, today addressed a letter to Molotov pursuant to your telegram stating in direct terms that it was the earnest hope of my Government that the Soviet Government would cooperate with the British and ourselves in our attempts to give aid to the Poles in Warsaw and would make every effort to render aid itself, but that if this was not forthcoming we would continue to furnish aid as far as feasible, as my Government perceived no grounds for departing from its consistent policy of giving all possible aid to United Nations forces fighting our common enemy. Although I do not believe this letter will produce any change in announced Soviet policy. I feel it important to make the record clear." (740.0011 European War 1939/8-1944)

⁹⁹ Not printed.

view in regard to the Soviet refusal as first outlined to you by Vyshinski (your 3000, August 15, 8 p. m.) was the strong implication therein that the Soviet Government was attempting to arrogate to itself the right to prevent our actions through threat of Soviet displeasure in regard to the question of furnishing aid to the Polish Underground. We attribute in large measure Vyshinski's subsequent clarification on this point to your vigorous and timely representations.

While we will leave to your discretion the advisability of pressing further for a reconsideration of the Soviet position on the use of the shuttle bombing arrangements, we know you will bear in mind the importance of not allowing this question in any way to imperil the continuance and smooth function of the shuttle bombing arrangements. This is a consideration of primary importance to our military authorities which for obvious reasons we feel is not to the same degree present in the British approach to the question of aid to the Polish Underground, and we have sensed in the British instructions to Clark Kerr, which we received from their Embassy here, a tendency to go considerably farther than the President is prepared to go in attempting to force Soviet cooperation or participation in sending aid to the Underground.

While we share your views as to the motives and character of the Soviet attitude, we feel that since the Soviets are not attempting to prevent our independent actions in this matter our chief purpose has already been achieved as a result of your representations.¹

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/8-1944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 19, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received August 20—3 p. m.]

3084. ReEmbtel 3079, August 19, 6 p. m.² While Demidov's argument seems most plausible to one not familiar with the background, it is at complete variance with the Soviet attitude to the Underground

¹ This sentence caused Ambassador Harriman to comment in telegram 3091, August 21: "While I realize that the peculiar conditions in Moscow do not always lead to clarity of thinking, I do not see how it can be considered that 'our chief purpose has already been achieved' and I feel strongly that we should make the Soviets realize our dissatisfaction with their behavior even though this may not bring immediately visible results." (740.0011 European War 1939/8-2144)

² Not printed; Ambassador Harriman outlined a vehement front page article in *Pravda* for August 19, written by Konstantin Demidov, who characterized the Warsaw uprising as a "failure". Demidov agreed with the view that the Polish *émigré* government had resorted to a tricky maneuver in ordering the Polish Underground to begin the uprising, and that this premature order had been given to produce propaganda effect. He declared that neither the Red Army, nor the Soviet and British Governments had been warned of the planned uprising, and that cooperation with the insurgents had never been discussed. It was the Red Army which was really freeing Poland. (861.9111/8-1944)

resistance throughout the war. At the very outset, Stalin urged Soviet patriots in occupied territory to go underground and wage unremitting war against the Germans. Active resistance movements in occupied countries, such as Tito's³ in Yugoslavia,⁴ have been encouraged and *émigré* governments have been constantly criticized for counseling a waiting policy. On August 16 in an article on White Russians Partisans, *Izvestiya* paid fulsome tribute to their activities, estimating that they had killed more than half a million German soldiers and officers and stating that on the eve of the July offensive, they controlled 60% of the occupied White Russia including twenty rayon⁵ centers. The same issue of *Pravda* in which Demidov's article appears has laudatory articles concerning the assistance rendered the Allied Armies by French and Italian Partisans.

There was every reason for the Warsaw patriots to anticipate, even without instructions, that the time had come to arise and contribute to their liberation when the Red Army approached the city after its rapid victorious advance through White Russia. But the basic weakness in Demidov's whole position is that as reported in my 3045, August 17, 6 p. m., such instructions were actually broadcast by the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow. Had the Polish Government advocated a waiting policy to the population of Warsaw, it would doubtless have been excoriated in the Soviet press.

HARRIMAN

*President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill) to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*⁶

20 AUGUST, 1944.

We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, or you will agree to help our planes in doing it very quickly. We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

³ Josip Broz (Tito), leader of the Partisan guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia.

⁴ For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in the developments in Yugoslavia, see vol. iv, section on Yugoslavia.

⁵ A district.

⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

740.0011 European War 1939/8-2144 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 21, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received August 21—2:13 p. m.]

78 Poles. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 76, August 19.⁷ I have just seen Romer who asked me urgently to call on him. He said the Polish Government was in the greatest difficulty. No word had been received from Stalin in response to Mikolajczyk's requests for aid for Warsaw. On the other hand most depressing telegrams had been received from Warsaw. The situation there was most serious. These telegrams reported that 70% of the town was already in flames or destroyed. Opinion there could not understand the lack of aid.

Romer went on to say that because of the Warsaw situation serious opposition to Mikolajczyk's proposals for a Soviet-Polish settlement had developed within the Government and it had been necessary to postpone action on those proposals. Members of the Government felt that if there were no word from Stalin and no aid after his promise to Mikolajczyk this meant that Moscow did not contemplate a settlement. They felt it would consequently be useless to consent to the proposals if there were no chance of success. The Government would in fact find it difficult to carry through the proposals if it could not succeed in bringing aid to Warsaw in face of the resultant state of feeling in Polish political and military circles and on the part of Polish opinion.

Romer said he and Mikolajczyk were seeing Eden at 4 o'clock this afternoon. They intended to explore with him whether anything could be done. They would inquire whether there had been any word from Moscow, whether the British would urge action on Moscow and whether the situation could be clarified. He asked if I would make similar inquiry in Washington.

He said if it seemed unlikely that anything could be done he feared the Mikolajczyk Government would be obliged to resign.

A further Polish Cabinet meeting to consider matters would be held tomorrow. He added he would be grateful if I could pass on to him as soon as possible any information I might receive from Washington.

[SCHOENFELD]

⁷ Not printed. See telegram 6672, August 18, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, particularly section 3, pp. 1379, 1380.

740.0011 European War 1939/8-2144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1944—9 p. m.

Poles 20. Reurtel 78, August 21. In reply to Romer's inquiries, you are authorized to inform him in strict confidence that the United States Government has urged the Soviet Government to cooperate in getting aid to the Polish forces in Warsaw, and that, although our intervention has not as yet had the desired results, we have not given up hope. In this connection, you might informally indicate to Romer that, while we deeply sympathize with the feeling of all Poles in regard to the plight of the heroic Warsaw garrison, and while we can not give them assurances that the Soviet Government will be willing to cooperate in this matter, we feel that these unfortunate developments should not deter the Polish Government from presenting any reasonable proposals to the National Committee for a settlement of the Polish question. We feel, for obvious reasons, that a refusal to present reasonable proposals to the Committee and any government crisis in London could only greatly worsen the situation.

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F96 : Telegram

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) and President Roosevelt

[Moscow,] August 22, 1944.

I have received the message from you and Mr. Roosevelt about Warsaw. I wish to express my opinions.

Sooner or later the truth about the group of criminals, who have embarked on the Warsaw adventure in order to seize power, will become known to everybody. These people have exploited the good faith of the citizens of Warsaw, throwing many almost unarmed people against the German guns, tanks and aircraft. A situation has arisen in which each new day serves not the Poles for the liberation of Warsaw but the Hitlerites who are inhumanly shooting down the inhabitants of Warsaw.

From the military point of view, the situation which has arisen, by increasingly directing the attention of the Germans to Warsaw, is just as unprofitable for the Red Army as for the Poles. Meanwhile the Soviet troops who have recently encountered new and notable efforts by the Germans to go over to the counter attack, are doing everything possible to smash these counter attacks of the Hitlerites

and to go over to a new wide-scale attack in the region of Warsaw. There can (be?) no doubt that the Red Army is not sparing its efforts to break the Germans round Warsaw and to free Warsaw for the Poles. That will be the best and most effective help for the Poles who are anti-Nazis.

740.0011 European War 1939/8-2244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 22, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received August 23—10:30 p. m.]

3108. Following is detailed report of conversation with Molotov reported in my 3049, August 17, midnight.⁸ The British Ambassador began by stating that our Governments were gravely concerned at the decision of the Soviet Government concerning dropping supplies to the Poles fighting in Warsaw and the withholding of use of Soviet bases to American aircraft engaged therein. He explained that he had received a letter from Molotov that afternoon which he understood to be a refusal of a request of the British Military Mission that crippled British aircraft returning from Warsaw be allowed to land in Soviet territory. After a lengthy discussion on this latter point, Molotov agreed that British crews could parachute out on Soviet territory but would not give an answer to the question whether the Soviet Government would approve the landing of the crippled planes.

Molotov explained that the Soviet Government considered the Warsaw affair to be a pure adventure involving great and useless sacrifice of life. It had been started by a band of adventurers and certain elements of the Polish Government in London. The Soviet Government did not wish to have any hand in it directly or indirectly or to take any responsibility for it. This had been made clear.

He referred to the slanderous campaign exceeding all bounds which the Polish press and wireless had been carrying on since early August against the Soviet Government, implying that the Red Army Command was to blame for the difficult situation in Warsaw and was letting the Poles down. Such slander was an attempt by these adventurers [and by] Sosnkowski and others to place responsibility upon the Soviet Government for their own guilt. He read Stalin's messages to the Prime Minister and Mikolajczyk and concluded [*contended*] that these messages made clear the reasons for the Soviet Government's decision.

⁸Not printed. This conversation took place on the night of August 17, between Ambassador Harriman and the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, and Molotov, as Stalin was too busy to attend; it lasted for 3 hours.

The British Ambassador then presented the views of his Government in accordance with his instructions, summarized as follows:

It was felt that the issues at stake were of vital importance and went far beyond the immediate fate of the Polish population in Warsaw. Deep anxiety was felt regarding the probable effects of the Soviet decision, not only upon the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union but those between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States. The fighting in Warsaw was for the common cause and everything possible should be done by the American, Soviet and British Governments to support it, even though mistakes had possibly been made by the Polish Government in its timing of the uprising and in its failing to consult the Allies. The achievements of the Partisans in the Soviet Union had long been watched with admiration and the high value of their contribution, even in the days when they had no arms, had been recognized. The same has been felt about the Poles, whatever their political persuasion, who are fighting against the common enemy, as are the Yugoslavs and recently the French. For some time past the official Polish underground had been criticized by Soviet public opinion for its apparent inactivity and at the same time the Poles and Poland had been exhorted by the Soviet press and wireless to rise up, just as the French were now being exhorted to rise and attack the Germans. This imposed upon the three Governments a strong moral obligation to render assistance. No attempt had been made to judge the political color or the precise extent of the resistance in Warsaw. Reliable information had indicated however that in fact Poles of all parties have joined in the struggle, and with a deep sense of moral obligation the British were doing their best, at heavy cost, to bring assistance to Warsaw.

Stalin had assured Mikolajczyk that he would assist the Warsaw Poles. According to information received from Eden, Mikolajczyk returned to London with a determination to base his future policy upon faith in the Soviet Government's good will. He was prepared to go very far with his colleagues to bring about a solution of the Polish problem in the sense desired by the Soviet Government and to invite all Polish political forces to unite behind a policy of friendship toward the Soviet Union. Mikolajczyk's main trump card was Stalin's assurance to assist the Warsaw Poles. If the Soviet Government's present decision were maintained, Mikolajczyk's personal position would be fatally harmed and the prospect of a solution of the Polish problem made much more difficult. The complete absence of Soviet cooperation would be misinterpreted and would seriously prejudice Soviet-Polish relations.

Much irresponsible and mischievous comment had already been publicly made about the Warsaw uprising. The Soviet Government could of course afford to ignore such comment, but inactivity now would only

strengthen the hands of such critics and would also provoke damaging comment amongst those who have so far remained silent. The British Government would do its best to present the facts in the most favorable light. (In referring to these remarks later in the conversation, Molotov stated "We shall judge from these comments who are our friends against the common enemy".)

Upon the conclusion of the British Ambassador's remarks I stated that although it was physically possible for American planes to fly small loads of supplies to Warsaw and return to their bases in the United Kingdom or Italy, such missions could not be undertaken with fighter escort because of the length of the flight. I said that Molotov could well understand public opinion in the United States and in the American Air Forces if it became known that we had been obliged to undertake Warsaw missions without fighter protection when fighter security could have been available if the Soviet Government had permitted the missions to land in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had stated that it did not object to the dropping of arms on Warsaw if Soviet bases were not used. If this were done, our losses would undoubtedly be very heavy—uselessly and without any good reason. I said that I felt confident that when Molotov and Stalin understood these facts they would reconsider their decision and would permit American aircraft to land in the Soviet Union.

I continued that, as Molotov well understood, the whole Polish problem was being watched with the keenest of interest in the United States and was being viewed as the first case of Allied collaboration in dealing with mutual problems. It had been the President's constant aim to bring the Poles together to fight the common enemy. Now, when the Poles of all political color were fighting the Germans in Warsaw, to deny them aid would not be understood. Under these circumstances the American people would expect their Government to do everything possible to assist them and to prevail upon the Soviet Government to do likewise. If it became known that such aid was denied, or at least made much more difficult to render because of the absence of Soviet cooperation, the question would be raised whether the collaboration established between our countries was as effective as had been hoped.⁹

I recalled that on August 9 Stalin had agreed to Mikolajczyk to aid the Poles, but sometime between the 9th and 14th the position of the

⁹ In an earlier telegram, No. 3081 of August 19, Ambassador Harriman had stated: "From Moscow it is my feeling that if Stalin does not make good on his promise to Mikolajczyk to make every effort to render aid there is little hope of an agreement between the Polish factions, and we will therefore probably be faced with all the complexities arising therefrom. I feel further that when the American public understands fully the facts there will be serious repercussions in public opinion in the United States toward the Soviet Union and even in its confidence and hopes for the success of postwar world collaboration." (740.0011 EW 1939/8-1944)

Soviet Government had changed, and I was anxious to ascertain what had occurred to cause this change in position. Molotov replied that during this period it had become clear that the Warsaw action was a purely adventurist light-minded affair which was causing many sacrifices and that the Soviet support of it would only lead to increasing sacrifices. I endeavored to ascertain whether the Soviet Government had any information which had not been made public that had caused it to change its position. Molotov evasively again referred to the adventurist character of the uprising and to the attempts which had been made to take advantage of it for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union. He said that the information which had been published in the press had reflected the information at the disposal of the Soviet Government and was sufficient in substance to cause the Soviet Government to change its position. In reply to a further question he said that the Warsaw picture had sufficiently clarified itself by August 12 to permit the publication of the Tass¹⁰ statement which had defined the attitude of the Soviet Government. Molotov was also evasive and noncommittal in reply to my question as to whether the Soviet radio had toward the end of July exhorted the Poles to rise up and fight for their liberation. In general he adamantly adhered to the established line.¹¹

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-2344 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 23, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 24—3:05 a. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 80. I had a 2-hour talk with Premier Mikolajczyk this evening. I saw him at his request.

I asked him how he was. He said he was all right but this did not apply to the situation. The state of affairs in Warsaw was a serious problem. On August 21 he had received a message from the Vice

¹⁰ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications organization of the Soviet Union.

¹¹ In his first telegram, No. 3049, August 17, about this meeting, Ambassador Harriman summed up: "As you know, I have been consistently optimistic and patient in dealing with our various difficulties with the Soviet Government. My recent conversations with Vyshinski and particularly with Molotov tonight lead me to the opinion that these men are bloated with power and expect that they can force their will on us and all countries to accept their decisions without question." (740.0011 European War 1939/8-1744)

Two days later in telegram 3081, Ambassador Harriman further declared that "in our long term relations with the Soviets I feel that whenever they take action of which we strongly disapprove we should impress our views on them as firmly as possible and show our displeasure. It is only by such procedure that I would have confidence that we can eventually find common ground". (740.0011 European War 1939/8-1944)

Premier and Government delegate in Poland¹² and the chairman of the Council of National Unity¹³ there saying that as the Government seemed unable to obtain aid for Warsaw it should resign.

Mikolajczyk reviewed the position regarding aid given Warsaw. He said 134 planes carrying supplies had been sent to Poland since the rising started. Twenty-three had been lost including three that crashed on their return to their base. Thirty-four had actually flown to Warsaw. The rest had stopped at intermediate places. The Polish insurgents reported receiving 77% of what was dropped. This aid was useful. But 150 flights had been scheduled for this period. The planes sent therefore did not equal the number regularly scheduled.

After August 16 he continued, Polish crews only were allowed to fly to Poland. The English crews went as far as Italy. The Poles were allowed four crews nightly. From August 16 to 20 no planes flew to Warsaw due to operational difficulties. On each August 20 and 21 one Polish crew flew as far as Warsaw, the remaining three dropped their supplies in forests some distance away but this material was useful nevertheless. But the sum total of supplies was not adequate for the needs.

Mikolajczyk said that on August 21 he saw Eden and made two suggestions. He asked for additional planes. He suggested one large operation which would provide the Polish forces in Warsaw with enough material to fight for a fortnight. He also suggested that if British air crews could not be used, Polish air crews should be allowed to undertake the task. He also asked the British to issue a statement recognizing the Polish underground army as a military force with combatant rights as had been done with the Maquis in France.

At a further meeting with Eden and Sinclair, British Air Minister, next day, Mikolajczyk was told the British War Cabinet had decided it was not practicable to send the desired large operational flight. When Mikolajczyk proposed 14 Polish crews nightly instead of 4, Sinclair said that from the military point of view he could not agree to this, but if it were politically necessary he would agree. But in that case he would not order the competent air marshal to permit this but would advise him to do so. To Mikolajczyk's enquiry whether the British could supply the necessary machines, Sinclair said he thought the machines were available. But SOI¹⁴ said that only four machines could be made available each night.

Mikolajczyk said he was seeing Eden again tomorrow. He hoped then to have a reply on the two points raised, namely (a) the addi-

¹² Jan Jankowski. By a decree of the President of Poland on September 1, 1942, a delegate of the Polish Government in Exile at London represented the Prime Minister in German-occupied Poland, and was also a member of the Cabinet.

¹³ Kazimierz Puzak.

¹⁴ Signal Operations Instructions (Army).

tional crews and planes, and (b) combatant rights. If he could obtain them he thought this would enable him to counteract the present attitude of the political elements in Warsaw.

The military situation there, he said, was still not hopeless. The Polish forces had even gained ground recently. They had captured some munitions from the Germans. He mentioned 11,000 rifles and 6,000 hand grenades.

He felt there was no hope of securing Soviet permission for use of the American shuttle service to assist Warsaw. He said the situation was growing particularly difficult as there were many wounded and a growing shortage of food, and such an expedition could provide badly-need medicines and condensed foods.

Passing to the problem of Polish-Soviet relations Mikolajczyk said the Polish Cabinet had yesterday drawn up its counter proposals. (He would provide the United States and British Governments with a translation tomorrow for their secret information.) A definite decision on them had not yet been taken.¹⁵ They had been referred to the underground authorities in Poland. The telegram went last night and he expects an answer in a day or two. It was considered essential to do this for two reasons. Opinion there was inflamed against the Government because of its inability to secure a greater measure of help for Warsaw. It was also wrought up because of recent mass arrests by the Soviet authorities of Polish underground military and civilian personnel.

The latter question was acute. He planned shortly to send to United States and the British a confidential memorandum on the subject. On this point the Government was confronted with a dilemma. He referred to the orders to the underground to disclose themselves to the Russian troops when they should enter Poland and to cooperate with them. They had been told that if arrested the Polish Government would bring the matter before public opinion. To do so now however would end the possibility of any Polish-Soviet arrangement.

Mikolajczyk said the Polish Government's proposals sought to meet most of the points which the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the National Council had raised when he was in Moscow. But he had attempted to preserve the legal thread (as described in my 73 August 18¹⁶) and to assure that the new government which should be formed in Poland should be appointed by the President. He thought the proposals were framed in such a way that the problem of personalities would not be a hindrance.

Mikolajczyk thought there was a chance of Soviet acceptance of the proposals. He did not think that members of the National Council

¹⁵ The text of the final Polish proposals to the Soviet Government is contained in Polish Series telegram 88, August 30, from Moscow, p. 1315.

¹⁶ Not printed.

would of themselves do so. But he thought there was just a chance that Stalin would. He had three reasons for believing in this possibility. The first was his belief that Stalin desired good relations with the United States and Britain. He would be influenced by their attitude toward the legal Polish Government and by British and American public opinion. Secondly, in his opinion Stalin desired to assure peaceful conditions in the rear of the Soviet forces. Thirdly, he thought Stalin feared the rising of a new Germany in time and desired a stable relationship with Poland.

Mikolajczyk said the Socialists in the Cabinet had opposed the counter proposals. They felt the Russians would not keep their word. The Government would be the prisoner of the Soviets. Mikolajczyk had said to them "This was possible, indeed very possible" but the Polish Government could not prevent the communizing of Poland from outside. He felt that if Stalin were "not quite determined" to communize Poland, they could accomplish more from inside than outside. He recognized all the risks, both personal and political. He felt that the Government's proposals which sought to preserve the legal position and to assure at least equal strength of the Democratic Parties with the Communist Party in the Government offered some possibility of preventing communization of the country. He was sure, on the other hand, that if the situation were left exclusively to the Soviet-sponsored National Council backed by Russia and the Red Army, a Communist system in Poland was a distinct possibility.

Mikolajczyk said that two of the three Socialist members of the Cabinet (Stanczyk¹⁷ and Grosfeld¹⁸) had been inclined to agree with his reasoning but had been obliged to vote with the Vice Premier (Kwapinski¹⁹) against the proposals because the executive committee of the Socialist Party had so decided. The difficulties were consequently many.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/8-2444 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 24, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received August 24—2:55 p. m.]

Poles 83. Premier Mikolajczyk asks me to transmit message given below dated Warsaw August 23 which was addressed to him by

¹⁷ Jan Stanczyk, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet.

¹⁸ Ludwik Grosfeld, Minister of Finance.

¹⁹ Jan Kwapinski, Vice Premier and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Shipping.

delegate of Polish Government in Poland and President of Council of National Unity with the request that it be conveyed to the President and Mr. Churchill:

“For the second time we are appealing to you. It is already for 3 weeks that we are carrying on our bloody struggle left to rely upon our own strength only, insufficiently supplied with weapons and ammunition and without air support. At the same time reports from all Polish territories occupied by the Soviets, whether disputed or not, show that the civil administration and home forces coming out into the open, are being interned, arrested or imprisoned by the Soviets in the illfamed concentration camp of Majdanek.²⁰ This applies to the same home forces which have so effectively assisted in fighting the Germans. In this way after 5 years of unrelenting resistance against the Germans, for which we pay with our blood, the Polish nation is coming under the no less cruel slavery of one of the Allies. Can the great peoples of the United States of America and of Great Britain watch passively this new hecatomb of friendly Poland? Is not even the Polish Air Force allowed to come to assistance of succumbing Warsaw? Is Poland to become victim to some division of spheres of interest?

We solemnly declare that we are fighting on the ruins of Warsaw ablaze, that we shall go on fighting for independence and that we shall continue to defend the latter against any kind of imperialism. The peasants, the workers and the intelligentsia stand united in this struggle.

The Polish nation cannot understand either the passiveness of the great Allies in face of succumbing Warsaw or the silent toleration of oppression and violence under Soviet occupation. Their reaction cannot be but one of bitter disappointment.”

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.20/8-2844

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²¹

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1944.

Late yesterday afternoon the British Ambassador²² took up with us urgently the request of the Polish Government that the British Government issue a statement to the effect that the Polish Underground Forces, a part of which are now actively fighting in Warsaw, are recognized as members of the Armed Forces of the United Nations and should therefore be treated by the German military authorities in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

²⁰ Maydanek (Maidenek), originally a huge German concentration camp near Lublin, where over 1,500,000 persons were reputed to have been destroyed in various ways during the war.

²¹ The following notation is written at the top of this memorandum: “Approved by the President.”

²² Viscount Halifax.

The British are most anxious that this Government should join with them in making this declaration, and we have, through the Polish Ambassador here, received a similar request from the Polish Government. The British Government was most anxious to have our decision in the matter yesterday as Mr. Eden was seeing Mikolajczyk this morning and wished to be able to tell him the attitude of this Government on the suggested declaration. In view of the impossibility of reaching you yesterday, the British Ambassador was told that the matter was being considered, and that we hoped to have a reply for them today.

I am attaching a draft of the declaration²³ which the British wish to issue as soon as possible.

The British have come to the conclusion that, despite the obvious difficulties, some such statement should be issued in order to maintain the morale of the Polish Underground Army at Warsaw and the Polish Armed Forces at present fighting with the Allies in Italy, Normandy, and elsewhere, and also to strengthen Mikolajczyk's position against the increasing opposition to him inside his own Government.

The Poles have based their request in large measure on the declaration of General Eisenhower concerning the French Underground Forces, and although the British have pointed out to them that no real parallel exists, since our troops are not operating in Poland, which is a Soviet operational theater, nevertheless, for the considerations advanced above, they have decided to issue the declaration. The British apparently are prepared to issue the statement alone but are most anxious that we join with them or at least associate ourselves with the statement following its issuance in London.

It will be difficult for us to refuse to accede to this request which, as you will note, is directed entirely against the Germans, since to do so would expose this Government to the charge of drawing a distinction between the Underground Forces in Poland actively engaged in fighting the enemy and those in other countries solely because of the Soviet attitude towards the Polish Underground uprising in Warsaw.

However, in view of the Soviet attitude with which you are familiar, we must anticipate Soviet resentment of the proposed statement which would take direct issue with the Soviet propaganda thesis that the Polish Underground in Warsaw is a gang of adventurist criminals. The proposed statement is of course directed solely to the Germans and the Soviet Government therefore could hardly take public issue with it.

²³ Not printed.

If you consider it advisable to join with the British in some such announcement I will have prepared for simultaneous issuance by this Government a statement along the lines of the British draft but in our own words.²⁴ We should also agree with the British on the necessity of informing the Soviet Government that we propose to issue such a statement.

860C.01/9-244 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 2, 1944.

[Received September 2—10:52 p. m.]

Poles 92. Premier Mikolajczyk in a broadcast message yesterday to the Polish people on the fifth anniversary of the German attack on Poland made reference to the struggle in Warsaw and addressed a direct appeal for aid to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Defending the decision of the Polish forces in Warsaw to fight in the open Mikolajczyk said:

“You acted in the same way as your brothers did everywhere east of Warsaw from March, 1944, and as they continue to do, at the same time helping the heroic and victorious Soviet armies in their fight with the enemy—you have the right to assistance. No one has the right to lower the value of your struggle, undertaken with the purest intentions, for the sake of some opportunist motive or political intrigue.

You did not receive such help as was due to you in spite of all the devotion of the British, South African, and Polish airmen. Lately the latter were the only ones who helped you. We do all we can to obtain help for you in adequate time and measure. I have not lost hope that it will be obtained. Would this help not be given I will notify you of it.

I address myself once again in public to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Mr. Churchill: Leaders of great powers, commanders of powerful and victorious land and air armies, Warsaw is waiting, the whole Polish nation in waiting, public opinion throughout the world is waiting. Do all you can to provide means for further fighting and to liberate this city and the population fighting in her ruins, drenched with blood. These people fight and die for Poland, but their desire to live for Poland is equally strong.[”]

[SCHOENFELD]

²⁴ The declaration concerning the Polish Home Army was released to the press on August 29; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1944, p. 246.

740.0011 European War 1939/9-1044: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 10, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received September 10—10:47 a. m.]

3413. For the President and the Secretary. The British Ambassador has shown me a message from the Soviet Government which he has been asked to transmit to his Government in answer to the War Cabinet's message regarding aid to Warsaw. You will undoubtedly receive this in full. Briefly, however, after a lengthy recital of the circumstances and a statement that the really effective aid will come from the advance of the Red Army, the message states in paraphrase as follows:

“In addition there is the form of assistance to the people in Warsaw which can hardly be considered effective; namely, the dropping by airplane of weapons, food and medical supplies. We have dropped both weapons and food for the insurgents in Warsaw on several occasions, but each time we have received information that these supplies have fallen into German hands. If you are so firmly convinced, however, of the efficacy of this form of assistance and if you insist that the Soviet Command organize jointly with the Americans and British such aid, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to it. It will be necessary, however, to render this aid in accordance with a prearranged plan.”

The message ends by implying that the British were partly to blame for the fact that the Soviet Command was not informed in advance of the Warsaw uprising. Reference is also made to British failure to prevent the Poles from their action in connection with the Katyn incident.²⁵

This message is obviously an extremely shrewd statement for the record, and places the responsibility now on the British and us for the decision whether the dropping of supplies should be attempted at this late date. I have no recent information as to the size of the area still held by the Insurgents in Warsaw and whether it is practicable to parachute supplies from a sufficiently high altitude to avoid unconscionable losses to our flyers. I assume urgent instructions will be given General Deane or myself on what our position now is and whether or not negotiations with the Red Army staff are to be entered into to render aid.

HARRIMAN

²⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 374-404, *passim*, and *ante*, pp. 1238-1243, *passim*.

740.0011 E. W. 1939/9-2544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 25, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 25—9:40 p. m.]

3664. The British Ambassador and I had a most satisfactory talk with Marshal Stalin on September 23 when we delivered to him a message from the President and the Prime Minister regarding the Quebec meeting.²⁶

During the course of the conversation I asked him about the situation in Warsaw. For the first time Stalin spoke of the insurgents with sympathy and understanding. He explained that after the capture of Praha²⁷ it was possible to judge the situation more clearly and that the reason why the insurrection had started prematurely was now clear. The Germans had threatened to deport the entire male population from Warsaw upon the approach of the Red Army and it therefore became necessary for all men to fight—they faced death either way. Stalin made no mention of the Polish Government in London but spoke somewhat slightly of General Bor who he said could not be found within the city. It was presumed therefore that he had left and was now evidently “commanding a radio station” at some unknown place. Stalin said that the insurgents were still fighting in Warsaw but were causing more difficulty to the Red Army than assistance. German positions could not be shelled or bombed because the insurgents were intermingled with the Germans. They were located in different isolated parts of the city where they were attempting to defend themselves. They had no offensive power. In all there were some 3000 with light arms only as well as many sympathizers who rendered such assistance as possible under the circumstances. Marshal Stalin said that the Red Army had recently dropped arms and ammunition as well as food and medical supplies to the insurgents. Receipt of these supplies had been acknowledged. (This is contrary to a statement made by a Red Army staff officer in an official conversation with General Deane that only food was being dropped, no arms.) Stalin observed that our planes had parachuted supplies from such a high altitude that the wind had taken much of them away from the targets. He said that the Red Army was in contact with each of the insurgent groups in Warsaw both by radio and by men going back and forth. Some of General Berling’s units had crossed the river but losses had been great and they could not remain.

²⁶ The Second Quebec Conference between September 11 and 16, 1944, was attended by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, with their civilian and military advisers; Premier Stalin did not attend. Correspondence on this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

²⁷ Praga, a town on the right bank of the Vistula River opposite Warsaw, captured by the Soviet armies on September 14, 1944.

Stalin observed that when Praga was liberated the Red Army found the people starving and that the Germans had used police dogs to hunt out the male population there for deportation.

Stalin showed none of the vindictiveness towards the Poles in Warsaw previously evidenced.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/9-2844

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1944.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request and referred to the recent urgent appeal from Prime Minister Mikolajczyk for additional help for the Warsaw garrison. I informed the Ambassador that the substance of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's appeal had been sent to the President but we had as yet had no reply as to the possibility of additional air operations to aid Warsaw. The Ambassador then handed me the latest messages from the Warsaw garrison which his Government in London had received regarding the desperate situation there.²⁸ The Ambassador said in sending these telegrams Prime Minister Mikolajczyk had particularly requested that they be sent to the President. I promised the Ambassador that this would be done.

C. E. BOHLEN

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET-SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT IN POLAND AND TOWARD SOVIET POLICIES IN LIBERATED AREAS OF POLAND

860C.01/674a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1944—7 p. m.

141. The three persons from the United States named by Molotov²⁹ as possible candidates for posts in a reconstituted Polish Government³⁰

²⁸ These telegrams, not printed, were sent from Warsaw to the Polish Government in Exile at London, which repeated them immediately to the Polish Ambassador in Washington. They covered the period of September 18-26, and were variously dispatched by an officer of the British Royal Air Force, by the head of the Polish Department of the Interior, by General Bor (on September 26), and by the Polish Government's delegate in Poland. The plight of Warsaw and its population was portrayed as one of famine, exhaustion, lack of medical supplies, and tremendous destruction and loss of life. Despite the city's heroism and some dropping of supplies by British, American, and Soviet aircraft, by September 26 Warsaw faced capitulation. The resistance did end on October 3, after 63 days of incessant struggle.

²⁹ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

³⁰ See telegram 183, January 18, from Moscow, p. 1230.

are apparently Professor Oscar Lange, Leo Krzycki and the Reverend Stanislaus Orlemanski. These three persons have been very active in recent months in connection with the setting up in Detroit of the Kosciuszko League³¹ whose program is distinctly pro-Soviet. This organization has received prominent, favorable criticism in the *Daily Worker*³² and other left-wing periodicals here and it has been particularly outspoken in its criticism of the Polish Government-in-exile.

The Department has obtained the following biographic information on these persons:

1. Oscar Lange was born in Poland in 1904 and was a lecturer at Krakow University for a short time before proceeding to the United States in 1937. Since that time he has been teaching economics at the University of Chicago and was naturalized as an American citizen on October 6, 1943.

2. Leo Krzycki was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1881; is Vice President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (CIO)³³ and National Chairman of the American Slav Congress.

3. Reverend Stanislaus Orlemanski was born at Erie, Pennsylvania, in 1889 and is at present pastor of a Roman Catholic Church in Springfield, Massachusetts. He recently made an extensive speaking tour in the Middle West and Canada appealing for support in Polish communities for closer collaboration with the Soviet Union.

HULL

860C.01/679 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, undated.

[Received February 17, 1944—2:30 p. m.]

532. *Wolna Polska*³⁴ for February 8 which has just appeared contains the following announcement at the top of page 1.

FORMATION OF NATIONAL PEOPLE'S COUNCIL³⁵

The Kosciuszko radio station³⁶ broadcast on January 30, 1944:

"As is known, in December 1943 there was formed on our territory a National People's Council. The National Council was chosen by

³¹ The Kosciuszko Polish Patriotic League was organized on November 6, 1943. It was named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817), a participant in the American Revolution, and leader of the Polish uprising in 1794, culminating in the third partition of Poland in 1795.

³² Communist Party newspaper published in New York City.

³³ Congress for Industrial Organization.

³⁴ Official newspaper of the Union of Polish Patriots, an organization of Poles sympathetic to Communism, supported by the Soviet Union; the paper was first published in Moscow in 1943.

³⁵ Also called the National Council of the Homeland (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*).

³⁶ A Polish language station operating inside the Soviet Union.

People's Oblast,³⁷ raion³⁸ and local councils which in turn were chosen from the patriotic organizations which comprises them. The National People's Council was established in the most democratic way; representatives of all influential political parties and groups carrying on active struggle with the German invader are included in its makeup. In the National People's Council there are Populists, Polish Socialists, representatives of the Polish Labor Party, Democrats of all shades, leaders of the Committee of National Initiative and others. Representatives of all strata of the People: Peasants, workers, intellectual workers, artisans as well as progressive, industrial and commercial circles.

The National People's Council has addressed to the Polish people a manifesto calling upon it to close its ranks without regard for old party and political differences and to struggle against the German invader who is torturing Poland. The manifesto calls on the Polish people for closest cooperation with troops of our ally; urges the establishment of the most cordial friendly relations with our closest neighbor the Soviet Union and with Great Britain and the United States and points the way to the establishment for free, independent, strong and democratic Poland.

The political parties and groups which have entered into the National People's Council enjoy widespread influence among all strata [of] the people because they have performed great services in the sphere of organizing the struggle against the German invader and of creating Polish armed units. With them is linked the heroic struggle of the People's Guard, the Peasants' Battalions and all the other armed organizations carrying on active struggle with the Hitlerite invader. The members of the National People's Council are people who stand in the firing line of daily direct battle with the Hitlerite invader; people bound by unbreakable ties with the struggle and sufferings of our nation.

For this reason the National People's Council has every right to act in the name of the people and represent its interests. Organizing the popular forces for the struggle for independence it is fulfilling a task of great historic significance for our people.

We did not doubt that in Poland there were people who would greet with recognition this step which is of enormous political significance for our national life, a step which strengthens tenfold the power of our people in its unswerving struggle for the freedom of the fatherland and for the creation of a strong and independent Poland. And we were not mistaken. All those who preserved patriotic feelings in their hearts greet with great joy the creation of a National People's Council and are expressing readiness to participate in its self-sacrificing patriotic activity. This is the thought of all honorable Populists, Socialists, Nationalists; this is the thought of all

³⁷ Region, or province.

³⁸ A district.

people of various strata and inclinations in whose breasts beat upright Polish hearts.

It is quite understandable that the appearance of the National People's Council aroused the fury of the German invaders. They know that the creation of the National People's Council and its activity is a potent step forward on the path of our people to final reckoning with the foe on the path to liberty.

At the same time we knew in advance that in reactionary emigrant circles whose egotistical group interests stand higher than the interests of the people the popular initiative expressed in the creation of the National Council would meet with a hostile reception. And here again we were not in error.

'Swit' the radio station of the Fascist emigrant clique has come out with attacks against the National People's Council endeavoring to defame it in the eyes of Poles and suggest that it was created on 'orders from above' or 'on orders from abroad' and in this also there is nothing surprising for the interests of the people are foreign to the Fascist clique in emigration and its so-called government and the 'National Council' which was duly established in emigration³⁹ consists exclusively of politicians of yesterday elected by no one [not?] isolated from the people, appointees of the former Minister⁴⁰ and present so-called [President?] Raczkiwicz. The creation of the National People's Council chosen by the broad masses of the people is a crushing blow to the emigrant Fascist clique and all its efforts at dragging Poland into the mire of Fascism and into imperialistic adventures; efforts calculated to prolong the sufferings of the Polish people under the yoke of Hitlerite occupation.

But the Polish people are not falling into the trap [of] those who seek still to deceive it; those who bearing the entire responsibility for the September catastrophe⁴¹ are preparing to plunge Poland into eternal Hitlerite slavery in order to safeguard their own egotistical group interest. The country and the people do not wish to have anything in common with reactionary elements of the ilk of Sosnkowski,⁴² Raczkiwicz and their henchmen. The country and the people has its own representation, announces its own leadership, gathers and organizes its forces for the decisive battle for the expulsion of the Hitlerite invader. And the people will undoubtedly follow this path and will win a Poland free and independent, strong and democratic. ["]

HARRIMAN

³⁹ A decree issued on December 9, 1939, by the President of Poland, Wladyslaw Raczkiwicz, created a National Council to serve in an advisory capacity to the Polish Government in Exile at London. Although this was dissolved on September 3, 1941, the President again signed a decree on February 3, 1942, summoning some 32 representative Poles to become members of the National Council.

⁴⁰ Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski was Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile from September 30, 1939, until he was killed in an airplane crash near Gibraltar on July 4, 1943.

⁴¹ The rapid defeat of Poland in September 1939 by the German attack beginning the Second World War.

⁴² Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces.

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to
President Roosevelt*⁴³

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1944.

The request of Marshal Stalin that Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski be permitted to go to Moscow⁴⁴ for the purpose of discussing with a group of Poles in Moscow the future Government of Poland raises a very serious question.

These two men represent a specific and heavily slanted view on the Polish-Soviet question which is not shared by American citizens of Polish descent nor by American public opinion as a whole.

If they go to the Soviet Union with the tacit consent and assistance of this Government, we may become directly involved in the dispute between the Polish and the Soviet Governments. Their visit will be widely interpreted as the first step in the abandonment by this Government of the Polish Government-in-exile. In addition, inasmuch as we recognize the Polish Government-in-exile as the legal Government of Poland, it is possible that their activities in Moscow would bring them within the purview of the Logan Act⁴⁵ which prohibits American citizens from having any dealings with a foreign government or agents thereof "to defeat the measures of the Government of the United States".

On the other hand, it may be undesirable, if not impossible to refuse these two American citizens permission to accept the invitation tendered by the Soviet Government.

If they go, some form of public statement on our part may be necessary, making it clear that they are proceeding as private citizens with no connection whatsoever with the Government of the United States. I believe, therefore, that it would be desirable for you to inform Marshal Stalin of the possible necessity for such a statement, and I attach for your consideration a draft cable⁴⁶ to him.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

⁴³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁴ There is no written request from Stalin for aid in facilitating the issuance of passports for Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski which can be found either in the files of the Department or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Ambassador Gromyko called on the President between 12:45 and 1:00 p. m., on February 21, 1944, at which time he presumably made the request orally. The President directed his military aide and secretary, Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, in a memorandum of March 6, to see the Ambassador and to inquire whether Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski had applied for their passports; also to say that the President thought the applications would be put through quickly, but that the two gentlemen would have to apply in person.

⁴⁵ Concerning private correspondence with foreign governments, approved January 30, 1799; 1 Stat. 613.

⁴⁶ *Infra*.

760C.61/2255 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—2 p. m.

690. Please transmit to Marshal Stalin the following secret and personal message from the President :

"In accordance with your suggestion Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski will be given passports in order to accept your invitation to proceed to the Soviet Union. Due, however, to military movements our transportation facilities are greatly overcrowded at the present time, and transportation, therefore, from the United States to the Soviet Union will have to be furnished by Soviet facilities. I know you will realize that Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski are proceeding in their individual capacity as private citizens and this Government can assume no responsibility whatsoever for their activities or views, and should their trip become the subject of public comment it might be necessary for this Government to make this point clear."

HULL

760C.61/2254a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1944.

With reference to the instructions which you gave Mr. Stettinius on March 8 that passports should be issued to Professor Oscar Lange and the Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski in order that they might proceed to the Soviet Union, a passport is now being issued to Professor Lange, and one will be issued to Reverend Orlemanski as soon as he completes his application.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding as to the conditions under which passports are being issued to these men particularly in view of possible repercussions which may arise under the "Logan Act", it is proposed to inform them at the time the passports are issued that they must clearly understand that in proceeding to the Soviet Union they are acting in their own individual capacity and that this Government can take no responsibility for their actions.

Should their trip become the subject of public comment it is proposed to issue the following explanatory statement :

The Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski and Professor Oscar Lange are proceeding to the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet Government. They are making this trip as private American citizens acting in their own individual capacity. They have no official status and therefore are not in any sense representatives or spokesmen of the United States Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

860C.01/690 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 27, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received March 28—7:40 p. m.]

1078. A member of the Embassy has been advised by a reliable source that General Berling⁴⁷ called a preliminary conference in his apartment at the Hotel Moskva on March 21 to which 16 leading members of the Union of Polish Patriots⁴⁸ and of the Polish Army were invited. Wanda Wasilewska⁴⁹ was not present. The informant stated that General Berling informed the gathering that in view of the rapidity of military developments in the south, where Polish troops were active, the time had come to consider the formation of "organs" which should be prepared to take over the administration of Polish territory. The General is reported to have said that any government of Poland that is formed must be a "narodowe" government, that is, a government of the people and the Army. The Embassy was advised that no concrete decisions or resolutions were adopted at the conference as it was [of] a preliminary character, but that a second conference would be called in the near future. The informant could not state whether it was planned to organize a Polish government in the Soviet Union. There is reason to believe, however, that for the present it is proposed to set up administrative organs which will function as such in Polish areas west of the Curzon line⁵⁰ as they are liberated from the Germans.

The Embassy was also advised that mobilization of additional Polish units and inclusion into the Polish Army of guerrillas in the western Ukraine are progressing satisfactorily. In this connection the Soviet press (*Pravda* March 27) has reported that a large part of the recently organized Third Polish Division is made up of recruits from the western oblasts of the liberated Ukraine and of former participants in the "illegal organizations created by the emigrant Polish Government in London".

HARRIMAN

⁴⁷ Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Berling, commander of the Polish army organized in the Soviet Union.

⁴⁸ This organization of Poles sympathetic to Communism, successor to an earlier "Committee of Polish Patriots", held its first congress in Moscow on June 8, 1943, and exchanged letters with Premier Stalin which were published in *Pravda* for June 17, 1943.

⁴⁹ Wanda Lvovna Wasilewska was chairman of the Union of Polish Patriots.

⁵⁰ See footnote 15, p. 1220.

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁵¹

[Translation]

I have received your message containing information regarding the issuance of passports to Dr. Lange and priest Orlemansky. Although the Soviet transport is considerably overloaded we shall provide Lange and Orlemansky with necessary transport facilities. The Soviet Government is considering the trip of Lange and Orlemansky to the Soviet Union as that of private citizens.

[Moscow,] March 28, 1944.

760C.61/2282 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 28, 1944.

[Received April 28—3:15 p. m.]

1477. *Wolna Polska* for April 16 contains an interview with Andrzej Witos⁵² in which he is quoted as stating that the recent banquet at the Kremlin in honor of the establishment of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union had been followed by political talks from which the Union of Polish Patriots obtained a clear impression of Soviet views on Polish affairs which are based on lasting friendship between the two countries during and after the war. These talks confirmed his view that the Soviet leaders had no intention of interfering in internal Polish affairs. It is contrary to the principles of Soviet policy to force their form of Government on other peoples. This was evidenced by Molotov's recent statement on Rumania.⁵³ Witos stated that the Union of Polish Patriots was not endeavoring to set up a Communist or Soviet Poland, but a democratic parliamentary Poland, and asserted that the Soviet Union entirely respected that point of view.

HAMILTON

⁵¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Notations indicate that this message was received from Ambassador Gromyko at 4:15 p. m., and that a copy was sent to the Department of State on the 29th with the President's statement, "no reply necessary".

⁵² Vice Chairman of the Union of Polish Patriots; later in the year, Vice President of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and Director of the Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Reform.

⁵³ For statement of April 2, 1944, by Molotov on the occasion of the Soviet forces entering Rumania, see vol. IV, section under Rumania entitled "Negotiations leading to signing of armistice . . ."

760C.61/2305

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1944.

The Polish Ambassador⁵⁴ came in this afternoon and left a memorandum, a copy of which is hereto attached,⁵⁵ on the subject of the visit of Professor Oscar Lange and the Rev. Stanislaw Orlemanski to Moscow.⁵⁶

The Ambassador stated that he was also instructed by his Government to ask the Department whether the United States Government considered it proper for these two American citizens to proceed to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Government to discuss matters which involved the relationship between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Poland, and stated that the Polish Government felt deeply grieved to see the role that was being played by these American citizens in Polish-Soviet relationship to the detriment of the Polish Government.

I informed the Ambassador that Professor Lange and Rev. Orlemanski had, as private American citizens, obtained passports for travel abroad in the usual manner, that there were no special restrictions against the travel of American citizens to points abroad where it was possible to obtain transportation, and that these American citizens proceeded abroad entirely within their character as private American citizens without any power or authority of representation of the Government of the United States.

Mr. Ciechanowski asked whether it was true that they had made the visit to Moscow on the invitation of the Soviet Government for the purpose of dealing with the matter of Polish-Soviet relations. I said that it was true that the Soviet Government had extended an invitation to these two citizens to visit Moscow but that no representation or information had come to us as to the purpose of their visit.

The Ambassador asked whether it was usual for the American Government to permit American citizens to proceed abroad to engage in a discussion of matters which involved the relationship of governments friendly to the United States with other governments when it was quite evident from the purpose and basis of such a visit that the results would be inimical to the interests of a government friendly to

⁵⁴ Jan Ciechanowski.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ The Soviet press had reported the arrival in Moscow on April 23 of Professor Lange "to visit units of the Polish Army and to study its character and aims". The arrival of the Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski and his reception by Stalin on April 28 was also said to be in order "to study the situation of the Poles and the Polish Army in the USSR".

the United States, such as was the case with Poland in the present circumstances. I replied that as long as American citizens proceeding abroad remain strictly within the character of private citizens and did not assume to represent themselves as having any authority from the Government of the United States to deal with matters which concerned the foreign relations of other states, it was the privilege of American citizens to express their views and extend their knowledge of affairs in other countries without being interfered with in such a course by this Government. Mr. Ciechanowski said that his Government would prevent any Polish citizens from proceeding abroad for the purpose of intervening in the affairs of a foreign state which might even possibly have results inimical to the interests of a friendly government, and asked whether this Government did not usually in such cases act similarly. I said that as far as the practice and usage in this country was concerned, the American Government gave the widest possible latitude to the rights of American citizens to inform themselves and express their opinions without interference by the Government provided they did not become involved in acts which were contrary to the laws of the United States.

The Ambassador showed very distinctly that he was deeply disappointed in my statement with regard to the general practice of this Government with respect to the rights and privileges of American citizens, both at home and abroad, and thanked me only perfunctorily for the information I had given him. As he left he stated formally that this was a matter which touched his Government very deeply and was one which gave them the greatest concern and disappointment in the action of the American Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

760C.61/2291 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, undated.

[Received May 7, 1944—3 :25 p. m.]

1594. Moscow papers for May 6 publish the following account of a radio address by Father Orlemanski :

“May 5. The Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski made the following speech from Moscow to the people of Poland by radio in Polish.

‘Dear Compatriots, I left home on April 17. I travelled across America, then across Canada to Alaska, across all Siberia to Moscow. I travelled in very comfortable conditions. For the first time in my life I flew in an airplane and it was from Chicago to Moscow. I am an American of Polish origin. I am a Roman Catholic priest. More

than that we are four brothers who are priests working on American soil.

As soon as I had learned of the formation of the first Polish division named after Kosciuszko, I immediately organized T. Kosciuszko League in order to render assistance. Thereafter I visited all Polish groups in Canada. I must say that it was a tremendous success. Thousands of Polish Canadians filled the halls. A similar success was obtained in America, especially in Detroit where on November 6, 1943 I organized the Kosciuszko League.

Since my activity had attained such a scale I considered that I ought to be better informed concerning the basic aims of plans of emigrants living on Soviet soil. I requested Secretary of State Hull to issue me a passport for the trip to Moscow. I arrived here without mishap.

First I went to Zagstrsk⁵⁷ where Polish children are living. At the school I was present at lessons in the Polish language and in Polish history. Permit me as a neutral observer and a practical American to inform you that under present conditions things could not be better than they are. We Poles should be grateful to the Soviet Government for its good attitude and put forth our efforts to maintain this condition. I was also told that such establishments exist throughout Russia.

Then I went on to be with the Polish Army. I felt as if it [I?] were at home. During my stay there about 8,000 new soldiers arrived from Tarnopol and other regions which have already been freed by the Soviet Army. In an address to the soldiers I emphasized that arms in hand are the keys to a free Poland. I had an intimate conversation with Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin. The conversation lasted for more than 2 hours. Obviously it is impossible to recount everything that was said. However, I should say that Stalin is a friend of the Poles. He emphasized that Poland can no longer be a corridor across which the enemy can pass in order to destroy Soviet lands. He wished to see a great strong independent and democratic Poland which will know how to defend its borders effectively. Stalin does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish state. He wants to see a friendly Poland collaborating harmoniously with the Soviet Republics.

With reference to religion: The religion was in⁵⁸ and will continue to be the religion of our fathers. The affable reception of a Roman Catholic priest by Marshal Stalin should convince you.⁵⁹

A few words about my own basic objectives. I have written an article: "The Future of the Polish Worker." In this article I pointed out the necessity for improving the living conditions of the Polish worker. If throughout the world, the worker is organizing and is improving his lot every day, it is also necessary that the Polish worker keep in step with the times; otherwise need and isolation await him.

⁵⁷ Presumably the city of Zagorsk, northeast of Moscow, is intended.

⁵⁸ Some groups are here obviously missing.

⁵⁹ On May 5, 1944, Stalin had replied by a letter to some questions by Orlemanski about freedom of conscience in the Soviet Union and on the possibility of cooperation with Pope Pius XII to prevent persecution of the Catholic church; see telegram 1618, May 9, from Moscow, vol. iv, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Reports on developments of significance . . ."

I have written an article "The Polish Clergy". I pointed out that precisely at this time it should show its maturity in relation to world problems. In this critical moment [the] Polish clergy is even obligated to come to the assistance of the troubled Polish people which is walking in despair. I published a pamphlet "Poland, Russia and Germany" in which I pointed out that any friendship whatever with Germany is excluded. Our closest neighbor is Russia. Let us therefore extend our hand to each other. Let us live in friendship and good will. We are Slavs. Allied Poland and Russia will become a very great force in the east. This alliance will bring great advantage to both Poland and to Russia. We will guarantee ourselves peace for centuries.

Dear Compatriots, the dawn of freedom is at hand. In the near future after difficult days—days of suffering, woe and anguish—the day of joy and freedom is approaching.

Long live the United States of America! Long live the Union of Soviet Republics! Long live a free, strong, independent and democratic Poland.'"

HAMILTON

760C.61/2318 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 19, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 20—8 a. m.]

1786. Professor Lange came in to see me yesterday afternoon and told me of a talk he had had with Stalin for an hour and a half on the evening of May 17. Molotov was present. Lange said that the talk covered many subjects and a good deal of ground. Stalin had asked him what opinion he had formed as to the sincerity of Soviet statements of policy toward Poland. To this Lange had replied that he based his judgment on what he had seen of the members of the Polish army in the Soviet Union, that these men obviously looked forward to and believed in an independent Poland, and that they were not puppets of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ Marshal Stalin told Lange that he favored not only an independent Poland but also a strong Poland. As to territorial adjustments, Stalin favored Poland being accorded East Prussia and territory to the west as far as and including Stettin, as well as parts of Silesia. When Lange asked a direct question about

⁶⁰ The Chargé in the Soviet Union, in telegram 1597, May 8, 1944, had already reported on the trip made by Lange to inspect Polish army units in the Soviet Union. It seemed to be that most of these troops "were appreciative of Soviet efforts to free Poland but were insistent on Polish independence with no interference from the Soviet Union or any other country in the internal affairs of Poland." They opposed the Curzon Line as a boundary settlement and demanded Lvov and Vilna for Poland. The troops were mostly peasants and hoped for the breaking up of the large estates, but were opposed to collectivization. Relatively few were Communists, and all "made it clear that they were looking to America for guidance". (760C.61/2292)

Lwow, mentioning that the Poles seemed to feel strongly about its retention, Stalin had replied that this would have to be studied and that it would raise the question of Ukrainian nationalism, to which Stalin apparently felt that because of the sacrifices of the Ukraine during the war special attention should be given.

Lange said that Stalin raised the question whether it might not be a good idea for Professor Lange to make a trip to London to talk with members of the Polish Government there and tell them what he had seen in the Soviet Union, the views of members of Polish armed forces here and the statements which Marshal Stalin had made to Lange. Stalin mentioned that his only means of getting his views to the Polish Government in London was through the British Government, that he never knew exactly how these views were presented and that it might be useful if a private American citizen who was not directly party to the matter and who did not represent a government would himself talk to the Polish leaders in London and tell them of his visit to the Soviet Union.⁶¹ Possibly Lange as a private citizen might do some good; at least he could make the trip without commitment. Stalin suggested that Lange talk also to Sosnkowski and find out what he had in mind. Stalin did not think it a good idea for Lange to go to London directly from the Soviet Union as that might carry an implication that Lange was carrying some message from the Soviet Government. Stalin thought Lange should first return to the United States. He should take up with the State Department the question of his making the trip to London for the purpose of talking with members of the Polish Government there.

Lange said that Stalin is disappointed at a recent speech made by Mikolajczyk,⁶² as Mikolajczyk had displayed in it a very anti-Soviet attitude.

Marshal Stalin told Lange that a few leaders of the Polish underground⁶³ had gotten in touch across the lines with the Red Army to offer and discuss cooperation; that the Soviet reply had been that the Soviets welcomed cooperation but that the Polish underground should function under the military leadership and direction of the Red Army; that the underground leaders had then left and that nothing further had been heard from them but that individual members of the Polish underground, men in ranks, had come over and joined the Red Army. This had been done in small groups. Stalin was supremely confident that the Red Army would be welcomed by

⁶¹ For correspondence on the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 1216 ff.

⁶² Stanislaw Mikolajczyk became Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London on July 14, 1943, and resigned on November 24, 1944.

⁶³ For correspondence concerning U.S. support of the Polish Underground organizations and attempts to secure the cooperation of the Soviet Union with them, see pp. 1354 ff.

the Polish people when it entered Polish territory and drove the Germans out. Stalin had said that he would not set up an AMGOT⁶⁴ in Poland.

During the conversation Stalin had commented that cooperation between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain was not a matter of expediency but was being established on a solid foundation.

Lange said he was considering sending a message to the Polish Minister of Labor⁶⁵ who is now in the United States where he has been attending the ILO conference in Philadelphia.⁶⁶ Lange would like to have a talk with him and thought he would remain in the United States if he knew Lange were returning soon. He was considering sending a message through normal channels but was somewhat afraid that such a message might become known to the press in the United States. He thought that possibly present British restrictions on entry might cause the Polish Minister of Labor to remain in the United States for the time being.

Lange said that he was leaving Moscow on May 22 to return to the United States and that on his return trip he was to visit a Polish community near Novosibirsk.

Stalin's suggestion that Lange might go to London to talk as a private American citizen with members of the Polish Government is an interesting one I believe and warrants careful thought. I made no comment on the matter to Lange.

Lange has called at the Embassy several times and has told me what he has been doing. He is not a supporter of the Polish Government in London but is a supporter of the ideas of the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish army in the Soviet Union. He came here with that belief and still has it and I have found him in what he has said to me to be thoughtful, reasoning and temperate. He himself favors working toward a Polish Government composed of 50% of Polish leaders of opposition to Germany who are now in Poland with the remainder of the government made up of representatives of the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish Government in London.

Copies of memoranda of conversations with Lange are being forwarded by air.⁶⁷

HAMILTON

⁶⁴ Allied Military Government in Occupied Territory.

⁶⁵ Jan Stanczyk was Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet.

⁶⁶ The International Labor Organization held its 26th conference in Philadelphia between April 20 and May 12, 1944.

⁶⁷ Four despatches from Moscow: Nos. 420, May 4; 453, May 13; 475, May 18; and 484, May 20; none printed.

860C.01/725 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 24, 1944.

[Received May 25—11:30 a. m.]

1867. Moscow newspapers for May 24th published communiqué of Union of Polish Patriots regarding arrival in Moscow of plenipotentiaries of National People's Council reading in translation as follows:

"A few days ago there arrived in Moscow, after crossing the front line from German occupied Poland, plenipotentiaries of the National People's Council of Poland. The National Council of Poland was organized in January 1944 in Warsaw by Democratic partisan groups fighting the German invader. There entered into the personnel of the National Council of Poland representatives of the following political parties and social groups: The oppositional wing of the Peasants Party 'Stronnictwo Ludowe', the Polish Workers Socialist Party, the Polish Liberal Party, the Committee of National Initiative, the group of non party Democrats, the underground trade union movement, the Union of Struggle of Youth (Walkimłodych⁶⁸), groups of writers, groups of cooperatives, groups of intellectual workers, groups of artisans, and also representatives of the underground military organizations: The People's Guard, the People's Militia, the Peasants' Battalions, number of representatives of local military formations of the territorial army (the Army of Sosnkowski) and various others.

In the circumstances which developed in Poland under the bloody yoke of the German usurpers, it became necessary to establish a center organizing the struggle with the Germans and coordinating all the efforts of the Polish people in the cause of liberating the homeland from the invaders. All the hopes which the Polish people placed in the Emigrant Government in London proved to be vain. The Emigrant Government not only did not carry on the struggle with the occupants, not only urged the people to inactivity, but even attacked those Polish patriots who struggled with the Hitlerites not even stopping at bestial killing of partisan detachments and treacherous murders of individual leaders and activists fighting for the national liberation of Poland. In the final analysis the activity of the Emigrant Government and its 'delegates' in the country went hand in hand with the invaders and weakened the political position of Poland, undermining her alliance relations with the United Nations.

Events at the end of 1943 aroused in the Polish people high hopes for speedy liberation especially in connection with the victorious offensive of the Red Army to the west. At the same time the raging Hitlerite terror threatening the Polish people with final extinction was intensified.

Thus the formation of the National Council of Poland as the guiding center of struggle for the liberation of Poland from the German occupants answered the urgent requirements of the fighting Polish

⁶⁸ Związek Walki Młodych, the Union of Young Fighters.

people. The National Council at its first session took a most important decision regarding the unification of all partisan groups, armed detachments and military formations fighting the invaders, into one People's Army (Ludowa Armja). There entered into the personnel of this Army the People's Guard, the People's Militia, a substantial portion of the Peasants' Battalions and other military organizations. The establishment of the National Council and the formation of the People's Army as a most important step on the path of struggle for a free and Democratic Poland was greeted by the Polish people with joy and enthusiasm. During the several months of its work the National Council has been able to establish in the country a whole network of local organizations (village, town, and provincial) and also considerably intensified the armed struggle of the people against the invaders. The plenipotentiaries of the National Council of Poland have arrived in Moscow, firstly, in order to acquaint themselves with the activities of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR and the condition of the First Polish Army and, secondly, for the establishment of contact with the Allied Governments, including the Government of the USSR.⁶⁹

For understandable reasons the names of the members of the National Council of Poland as well as the names of the plenipotentiaries who have arrived cannot be published at the present time.[?]

HAMILTON

860C.01/723 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1944—5 p. m.

1319. Your 1860 May 24.⁷⁰ In the event that representatives of the National Council of Poland should call at the Embassy the Department perceives no objection to your receiving them and accepting from them any written document which they may desire to present to you. If they should request you to communicate the document to the Department, you should reply that you will of course communicate anything of interest to the Department for its information. It is not felt that you should encourage this group in any way to the belief that they can establish a direct official line of communication to the United States Government through the Embassy.

HULL

⁶⁹ The Chargé in the Soviet Union further reported in telegram 1883, May 25, 1944, that Premier Stalin, in the presence of Molotov and Wanda Wasilewska, received these plenipotentiaries in a meeting on May 22 which "lasted more than two hours in a cordial atmosphere". The plenipotentiaries, who were headed by Edward Boleslaw Osobka-Morawski, "acquainted Comrade Stalin in detail with the situation in Poland and with the activity of the National Council of Poland and the Polish People's Army". (860C.01/726)

⁷⁰ Not printed, but see telegram 1867, May 24, *supra*.

860C.01/723 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1944—9 p. m.

1381. The Soviet Ambassador ⁷¹ called on me on May 27, to discuss the question referred to in your 1860 May 24.⁷²

The Ambassador stated he had instructions from his government to inform the American Government that a group of representatives of the National Council of Poland had recently arrived in Moscow from Warsaw. The Ambassador indicated that representatives of the Council had stated that they were fighting Germans and that they therefore needed arms to continue the struggle, that they would be willing to work with the Polish officials in London although they did not like some of them, and that they desired to establish relations with the Soviet Government, Great Britain and the United States. I replied that as regards furnishing arms, it is our general policy to help anyone who is fighting Germans.

I then inquired as to what kind of relations this group intended to enter into. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but assumed that it meant some sort of political relations short of diplomatic relations. I stated that in contrast to the question of arms, it would be a very difficult, complicated matter for this Government to enter into political relations with this group.

HULL

860C.01/739 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, June 12, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 13—9:15 a. m.]

2107. For the President and the Secretary. The four delegates from the Polish National Council who are now visiting the Soviet Union called on me at the Embassy last night at their request. The group were intensely earnest, of simple background, and anxious to persuade me that their Council was representative of the Polish people. I am satisfied they are not Soviet agents and are anxious to get assistance and backing of ourselves and the British as well as the Soviet Government. The group consisted of Morawski, Vice President of the Council, a zealous Polish patriot and bitter critic of Sosnkowski, who served as principal spokesman for the group; Colonel Turski of the

⁷¹ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

⁷² Not printed, but see telegram 1319, May 26, *supra*.

staff of the People's Army, a professional soldier who said he was a Communist and gave the impression of being an opportunist; Hagecki, former director of a silk factory at Lodz who appeared to be the most balanced member of the delegation; and Hardy,⁷³ a university graduate who has been an active partisan leader for the past 4 years.

During a conversation lasting more than 3 hours the delegation gave me a mass of interesting information concerning present conditions in Poland and the objectives of the National Council. The highlights of their statements are:

1. More than 3 million Jews and 3 million Poles have perished during the German occupation. Perhaps 30,000 Jews remain in Poland, most of whom are underground.

2. The principal aim of the National Council is to carry on resistance against the Germans.

3. The delegates said that Sosnkowski's underground numbered about 30,000 and was losing supporters. The National Council is strongly opposed to Sosnkowski and his supporters whom it accuses of having pursued a waiting policy in resistance and of opposing the active struggle of the Polish popular movement against the Germans. In so doing they have killed Soviet partisans and have collaborated with the German Gestapo.⁷⁴ The delegates gave examples of action by Sosnkowski's forces in which members of the People's Army had been treacherously killed. They stated that there was no future for the Sanacja Party⁷⁵ in Poland and alleged that Sosnkowski's followers were saying that they were striving to build up a strong Poland to assist the United States and Britain in their future war against the Soviet Union.

4. The National Council views the former democratic members of the London Government such as Mikolajczyk, Kwapinski,⁷⁶ Stanczyk, Adamczyk and Koch⁷⁷ as misguided and out of touch with conditions in Poland and believes that they could be persuaded to cooperate with the Council if contact could be established. The delegates would like to get in touch with these members of the London Government anywhere, suggesting either here or in Washington.

5. The Council takes a realistic attitude toward the boundary dispute and believes that in view of the strength of the Soviet Union it can make a better deal by cooperation with the Soviets than by

⁷³ Kazimierz Hardy, member of the Peasants' Party, contributor to the *Wolna Polska* of the Union of Polish Patriots, published in Moscow.

⁷⁴ The secret political police.

⁷⁵ The pre-war ruling party in Poland from about 1926, often called the party of the Colonels.

⁷⁶ Jan Kwapinski, Polish socialist politician, Vice Premier in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet and Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Shipping.

⁷⁷ Stanislaw Kot, member of the Peasants' Party, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Minister of Information in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet.

adopting an adamant position. It hopes to retain Lwow and the Galician oil fields and to expand Polish territory to the Baltic in the west. It also desires to retain Wilno ⁷⁸ but fears that in view of its unfavorable geographical position there is little possibility of doing so.

6. The Council at present consists of some 60 members representing several parties of the left and center. It hopes to expand to several hundred and become a general Polish Parliament representative of all democratic elements fighting against the Germans. Its presidium consists of five members including representatives of the peasants, democratic, socialist and labor parties and General Rolla ⁷⁹ in his capacity as commander of the People's Army.

7. The Council has devoted little attention to post war plans. As territory is liberated it envisages the election of town, district and provincial committees to exercise authority pending the establishment of a central government. It is expected that at the appropriate time a representative parliament will be elected which will develop a constitution and a permanent government. The Council expects to give leadership during the formative period. The delegates placed great stress on the desire of the Council to avoid at all costs civil strife in Poland.

8. The Council believes that Polish post war policy can only be formulated by a parliament chosen in a free election. The delegates agreed that the Peasants' Party would be the dominant element. It advocates the grant of land to the peasants and government control over the principal branches of economy, but favors private ownership. It recognizes however that the state must be prepared to operate many enterprises which were confiscated or established by the Nazis during the period of occupation.

9. Cordial relations and agreement have been established with the Union of Polish Patriots and General Berling's army in the Soviet Union. The delegates asserted that there had been no previous contact between these organizations and the National Council.

10. The Council on January 1 addressed a message by radio to the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States requesting that arms be supplied to the People's Army to enable them to prosecute the struggle against the Germans.

Tommy guns, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, explosives and grenades are needed. The Council hopes to equip two hundred and fifty thousand men to go into action when the Russians cross the Bug. It desires financial assistance from the Allied powers to permit the acquisition of these arms. The delegates further suggest that an American military observer be sent to Poland to learn the facts first hand of

⁷⁸ Vilna.

⁷⁹ Col. Gen. Michal Rola-Zymierski, who became in July the Director of Defence in the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

the requirements and in order that the Allied Powers may determine whether the London Government or the National Council actually enjoys the support of the Polish people.

11. The delegates have been cordially received by Marshal Stalin and Molotov and have submitted a request for arms but have not as yet been given a definite reply. The delegates expressed their intention of remaining in Moscow until they received a favorable reply, and again stressed their hope for assistance also from the United States and Great Britain.

I informed the delegation that our conversation was entirely unofficial and requested that it be given no publicity, to which they agreed. I gave them no indication that I intended to report the conversation to you.

The Soviet Government appears to attach considerable weight to the reports brought by the delegates concerning the situation in Poland. The fact that they have extended an invitation to an American military observer to visit Poland to study the situation there appears to be an indication of their good faith.

Since it is likely that the delegation will approach me again before leaving Moscow I should appreciate any views or instructions which you may have concerning the attitude to be taken toward their request for military aid and for the despatch of an American observer to Poland. The Council that these men represent may well play an important role in the future of Poland, either because they do represent the feelings of the majority of the Poles or because of future support from the Soviet Government. They want our help now and I believe that serious consideration should be given to sending in a military observer if the Soviet Government agrees. If this is considered inadvisable, I recommend that we keep alive some contact with them.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/747 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 13, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received June 14—2:30 a. m.]

2114. For the President and the Secretary. I told Molotov today the substance of my conversation with the four delegates from the Polish National Council (Embassy's 2107, June 12, midnight) and asked him for his views on the group. Molotov said that in his opinion they were real representatives of the people in Poland and that he had no doubt as to their sincerity but of course he had no way of confirming everything they said.

We discussed briefly the advisability and possibility of sending supplies to Poland. Molotov said the Soviet Government was studying the question of the feasibility of getting supplies through and maintained that the sending of supplies from the United States and Great Britain as well as the Soviet Union would have a great morale effect on the Polish people and would tend to unite them. I have no doubt that the Soviets not only have the morale effect in mind but also the political considerations. I asked whether, in the event my Government should decide it wished to send supplies, the Soviet Government would cooperate in any feasible way in forwarding them. Molotov replied that, "we can easily come to an agreement on that question". I explained that as he already knew the President might feel it was not opportune to take any steps at the present time.

With respect to the sending of a military observer, Molotov said that the Polish delegates had suggested that a Soviet military mission be attached to the Polish National Council. He said that the Soviet Government was studying the question of whether it would be physically practicable to send such a mission. I said I would appreciate being kept informed as to any decision the Soviet Government might reach on the question and he indicated that he would do so.

HARRIMAN

760C.61/6-2744

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1944.

The attached comprehensive and interesting report⁸⁰ by Oscar Lange on his recent trip to the Soviet Union should in fact be read in full in order to appreciate the "atmosphere" which he found in his discussions with various Polish groups as well as Soviet officials.

While there is not a great deal of completely new information in the report, he does confirm information from other sources which tends to show that the time is perhaps now propitious to bring about some sort of reconciliation between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

Besides his interview with Stalin, Lange had two interviews with Molotov, many talks with officials of the Union of Polish Patriots, particularly its head, Wanda Wasilewska, whom he has known since 1923, as well as extended conversations with Polish troops in the Polish Divisions fighting with the Red Army.

⁸⁰ Not attached to file copy.

The following is a summary and analysis of the principal points brought out by Dr. Lange in his report:

1. *Political.* Stalin informed Lange that "the door to an understanding with the Polish Government in London is never closed" and from his general conversation, Stalin gave Lange the impression that he would like to work out a coalition government which would include several members of the present Polish cabinet, and he mentioned Mikolajczyk and Romer⁸¹ as being acceptable to him. While Stalin apparently would prefer that a collaboration arrangement between the Polish Government in London and the Polish groups in the country be worked out, he would, in the event that this should prove impossible, permit a provisional government to be formed in Poland composed of members of the so-called National Council of Poland (pro-Soviet) and perhaps certain members of the Union of Polish Patriots (Moscow-sponsored Polish group). Stalin emphasized that he would not establish a Red Army AMG in Poland. Moreover, Stalin indicated that he did not plan to use the Union of Polish Patriots as the provisional government of Poland but did indicate that perhaps some of its members might join in any coalition government which might be formed.

In connection with his expressed desire to reach an agreement with the moderate elements in the Polish Government-in-exile, Stalin suggested that Lange should proceed to London to talk to Premier Mikolajczyk and even suggested that Lange should talk to General Sosnkowski to find out exactly what he wants. Lange has the definite impression that Stalin would prefer to have a new Polish Government which would include moderate elements of the London-exiled Government rather than set up what would appear to be a Soviet puppet organization in Poland.

Dr. Lange, just before his departure, had a long talk with the delegates from the so-called Polish National Council who had just arrived in Moscow from Poland. The delegates, while admitting that their organization was smaller than that of the Polish Government-in-exile, claimed that it was growing rapidly and would eventually surpass the strength of the Polish Government's underground government apparatus as well as the strength of its underground army. According to the delegates, their organization is composed of members of the Polish socialist party, the peasant party, and the Polish Workers Party (communists). The delegates claimed that, although the Polish underground government plans to take over the administration as soon as the Germans are driven out, the Polish National Council is going to make every effort to prevent this and plans itself to take over the administration of the country as soon as possible.

⁸¹ Tadeusz Romer, Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1942-43, and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet, 1943-44.

Furthermore, they allege that the Polish Government organization refuses to carry on active resistance against the Germans, and in certain instances, collaborates with them, and denounces members of the National Council to the Germans in order that the latter may take reprisals against them. It is interesting to note in this connection that over a year ago a member of the Polish Government's underground organization came to the United States and was carefully questioned by officials of the Department. At that time he made almost exactly similar accusations against the pro-Soviet organizations in Poland and accused them of denouncing members of his organization to the Germans in order that they could take reprisals against them. In discussing this question with Dr. Lange, he stated that it was difficult to ascertain the truth of the various allegations since each side accused the other of collaborating with the Germans, etc.

2. *Polish Divisions in the Red Army.* Professor Lange spent considerable time discussing Polish questions with members of the Polish Divisions in the Red Army. According to Dr. Lange, most of these men are Polish citizens who were deported to the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940 and held in concentration camps until the Polish-Soviet agreement was concluded in July, 1941.⁸² While the Soviet authorities have indicated in their propaganda that all of these men volunteered for service with the Red Army, Dr. Lange reported that most of them had been conscripted. While most of the Poles were conscripted, Polish Jews were accepted only on a voluntary basis which accounts for the fact that only 6% of these Divisions are Jews. Dr. Lange stated that the explanation given for this was that the Polish Government-in-exile has alleged in its propaganda that the Polish Divisions were not composed of pure Poles but were made up of "Jews and Bolsheviks" and the Soviet Government, in order to counteract these allegations, did not conscript Jews for the Polish Divisions in order to prove to the outside world that they were composed primarily of pure Poles.

In regard to the Poles from eastern Poland who, according to Soviet propaganda, have since the entry of the Red Army into that area joined the Polish Red Army Divisions in great numbers, Dr. Lange indicated that most of them had not joined voluntarily but had been drafted into the Red Army.

Perhaps one of the most interesting things learned by Dr. Lange in talking to the rank and file of the Polish Divisions was their attitude on the various political differences between Poland and the

⁸² Agreement for Mutual Aid, with a Protocol, signed at London on July 30, 1941. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 869. See also telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from London, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 243, and footnote 92, p. 244.

Soviet Union. While most of them were against the Polish Government-in-exile except for certain members such as Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk, they all expressed strong feelings on the territorial question and insisted that the Curzon Line did not constitute an equitable frontier and all demanded that Lwow should remain in Poland. They also were most emphatic in stating that they did not wish to have Poland "Sovietized", did not wish to have the land collectivized, and insisted that small industry should remain in private hands but felt that large industries and banking should be nationalized. They all felt, moreover, that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of Poland.

3. *Underground Armies.* Delegates of the National Council of Poland admitted to Dr. Lange that the Polish Government underground army was stronger than their own. They stated that the Polish Government's underground army had a strength of approximately 60,000 men, mostly in reserve, while for their own forces, they claimed 15,000 active members and 30,000 reservists.

It is interesting to note that Stalin, despite Molotov's previous statements to Ambassador Harriman that the Polish Government had no real underground organization in Poland, admitted that the Polish underground had been in touch with the Red Army and had suggested that the two forces collaborate in fighting the Germans. According to Stalin, the Red Army indicated its acceptance of this offer on the one condition that the Polish Underground Army would be under the military control of the Red Army Commander. Stalin added that after this offer had been made and accepted, the Underground Army delegates departed to discuss the question with their superiors but had never returned.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note that Stalin's version of this Polish offer of collaboration is similar to that given by Premier Mikolajczyk who explained that the reasons why the Polish Underground representatives did not return to work out the details for collaboration was due to the fact that a German counterattack surrounded the Polish forces and annihilated many of them before they were able to extricate themselves. This German maneuver has since prevented the Polish group from making contact with the Red Army.

4. *Territorial question.* According to Dr. Lange many of the members of the Polish Divisions in the Red Army, apart from insisting that Lwow be Polish, also demanded in conformity with the expressed wishes of the Union of Polish Patriots that German territory as far as the Oder be included in the future Poland.

In discussing the territorial question with Stalin, Dr. Lange made a strong plea for the inclusion of Lwow in Poland. He told Stalin that there is an almost unanimous demand by the Poles in the Soviet Divisions for Lwow and reminded Molotov, who was present at the meeting, that the Soviet censors had prevented the American cor-

respondents, who had accompanied Lange, from sending this part of his story to the United States. Stalin did not commit himself on this question but stated that "this problem must be studied further" and added that although he knew that the Poles wanted Lwow, he was afraid if he gave it to them he might have to "make war on the Ukrainians" who also wanted Lwow.

Stalin strongly favored giving Poland not only East Prussia and Silesia but also German territory up to the Oder including the city of Stettin. In this connection, he stated that he could understand the position of the Polish Government-in-exile in not wanting to make a settlement regarding the Polish eastern frontier until the frontier in the west was settled. He suggested, therefore, that the Western frontiers of Poland should be settled first which would make it easier to discuss the eastern frontier.

860C.01/7-344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 3, 1944.

[Received July 3—6:40 p. m.]

2408. All papers for July 1 published a resolution adopted June 23 by the Board of Directors of the Union of Polish Patriots regarding the National Council of Poland. The resolution states that the Union of Polish Patriots welcomes the declaration of the National Council of Poland and the High Command of the People's Army. It states that the Union, uniting Poles of different social groups and political opinions, has worked in the direction of resistance to the Germans and a struggle for an independent and democratic parliamentary Poland. The article states that the reactionary command of Sosnkowski's territorial army not only fails to take part in the struggle of the Polish people but tries to paralyze the struggle by urging the people to remain inactive.

The Union does not recognize the "so-called emigrant Polish Government, based on the illegal Constitution of 1935".⁸³ The Polish people formed its own center in Poland, the National Council of Poland. "The Union of Polish Patriots recognizes in the National Council of Poland a true representative of our people and is confident that having been created by the most devoted patriotic elements of the Polish people the National Council of Poland will unite around itself all Poles and will mobilize them for struggle in close alliance with the peoples of the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States." The

⁸³ This constitution had been forced through the Polish Sejm (parliament) on April 23, 1935, after previous attempts had failed, and made possible an authoritarian system of government which has been called a "conducted democracy".

resolution concluded by expressing confidence that the National Council will create the conditions for the formation of a provisional national government enjoying the confidence of the people.

Full text of resolution follows by dispatch.⁸⁴

HARRIMAN

860C.01/7-544: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 5, 1944—noon.

[Received July 5—10:30 a. m.]

2424. For the President and the Secretary. At lunch yesterday I asked Molotov for his further impressions regarding the four delegates and the Polish National Council they represent. He said that he did not believe the Council had so far developed a large organization throughout Poland but that he believed that it represented the majority of the Polish people. The delegates during their visit to Russia had found that they talked the same language as the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish Army here and had come to an understanding with them. He realized that the traditional suspicion of Russia by Poles was a factor that would have to be taken into account but he believed that when Poland was liberated and the Polish Army came into Poland the overwhelming majority of the Poles would be convinced of the Soviet Union's friendly intents.

Molotov told me that they intended to supply the Partisans of the Council with arms in so far as they were able to get them through considering all the difficulties.

In discussing the personalities in the Government in London he thought that if Mikolajczyk and the democratic members of the Government returned to Poland they would be welcomed by the Poles to take part in the development of a government. He said again that he hoped some Poles from the United States would return to assist as well. I asked him whether Dr. Lange had been persuaded to do this. In reply he said that was entirely Dr. Lange's personal affair but that he thought Dr. Lange was a Polish patriot at heart.

I asked him if the aristocrats were eliminated and with most of the Jews who had conducted the business affairs of Poland massacred by the Germans whether he considered the remaining Polish population could conduct orderly governmental and the economic affairs of the country. He replied that he did not see why the aristocrats should not play their part. He thought that many of them were true patriots and would adjust themselves to the new democratic order of things.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

in Poland. Romer's name was mentioned without antagonism. Molotov said the Polish people had a strong national spirit and he firmly believed that they could establish a democratic government and sound economy.

I found nothing in Molotov's comments to substantiate Mikolajczyk's hope as expressed in Department's 1512 June 17, 10 p. m.,⁸⁵ that "the possibilities of reestablishing relations with the Soviet Government were more propitious today than heretofore" based upon "the fact that the Soviet Government having tried by various methods to build up without success strong pro-Soviet support inside Poland was more disposed to consider the resumption of relations with the Polish Government in exile as the first step".

Throughout the conversation Molotov talked with less of the usual Soviet reserve. He made it clear that he was reserving judgment as to just how things would develop and that the Soviet Government was not at present time committed to the final support of any particular group. He gave me the impression that the Soviet Government was hopeful that by bringing all democratic minded Poles together and allowing them a free hand the situation would be worked out satisfactorily. It appeared his present feeling that the Council might well form the nucleus of the future Government of Poland.

HARRIMAN

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁸⁶

[Translation]

I have received your message of July 20. I am writing now only on the Polish question.

The events at our front are proceeding at an exceedingly rapid rate. Lublin, one of the big cities of Poland was occupied today by our troops which continue to advance.

Under these circumstances we are confronted in practice with the question of administration on Polish territory. We do not want and we will not establish our administration on the territory of Poland as we do not want to interfere with the internal matters of Poland. This should be done by the Poles themselves. Therefore, we deemed it necessary to establish contact with the Polish Committee of National Liberation,⁸⁷ recently created by the National Council of Poland, which has been formed in Warsaw at the end of last year from

⁸⁵ *Ante*, p. 1285.

⁸⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The text of this message was sent by Stalin to President Roosevelt for his information on the same day.

⁸⁷ The Polish Committee of National Liberation had been established in Kholm (Chelm) by a decree of July 21, 1944, by the National People's Council of Poland. It soon transferred its activities to Lublin. See also *infra*.

among representatives of democratic parties and groups, about which you must already have been informed by your Ambassador from Moscow.⁸⁸ The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to take up the creation of an administration on Polish territory, and this will, I hope, be realized. In Poland we did not find any other forces which could create the Polish administration. The so-called underground organizations guided by the Polish Government in London, proved themselves ephemeral, deprived of influence. I cannot consider the Polish Committee as Government of Poland, but it is possible that in the future it will serve as kernel for the formation of a provisional Polish government from democratic forces.

As regards Mikolajczyk, I, of course, shall not refuse to accept [*receive*] him. It would, however, be better if he would get in touch with the Polish National Committee which regards Mikolajczyk favorably.

JULY 23, 1944.

861.9111RR/7-2444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 24, 1944.

[Received July 25—8:52 a. m.]

2736. As the Department is doubtless aware from the press, the press section of the Soviet Foreign Office released this evening four Tass⁸⁹ documents dealing with the establishment of a new Polish Committee of National Liberation.

The first of these documents is a decree of the Polish National Council dated Warsaw July 21 setting up a Polish Committee of National Liberation as a provisional authority for the leadership of the battle for liberation, for the assuring of national independence and for the restoration of the Polish State. The personal composition of this body comprising 14 offices is made known. It consists of 12 persons, 5 of whom are understood to be still in German-occupied Poland.

The second document is a long manifesto of the new Committee of National Liberation datelined Kholm July 22. It states among other things that the Polish Army has crossed the Bug River together with the Red Army. It outlines the international policy of the provisional regime. This includes the granting of democratic rights and privileges with a reservation concerning all manifestations of Fascism. Properties now held by the German Government or by

⁸⁸ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

⁸⁹ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications agency of the Soviet Government.

German capitalists, such as industrial property, banks, transportation facilities, etc., as well as forests are to be taken over provisionally by the state pending their return to private owners. A land reform is outlined, which will bring about the confiscation of all estates of over 100 hectares in the territories which have been attached to the German Empire, and of over 50 hectares elsewhere. Measures of social and economic improvement are promised. Private property, and private trade and economic initiative are given recognition. Steps are to be taken to effect repatriation of Poles in emigration, with exception of "Hitlerite agents and those who betrayed Poland in September 1939"; the Soviet Polish frontier is to be fixed by mutual agreement according to the principle: Polish lands to Poland, Ukrainian, Byelo Russian and Lithuanian lands to Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelo Russia and Soviet Lithuania respectively. Alliance with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia is to be the basic principle of foreign policy, and confidence is expressed in a strengthened friendship and alliance with England, the United States and France.

The third document is a decree of the Polish National Council taking under its authority the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish Army in the USSR.

The fourth document appoints Rolya Zhimersky,⁹⁰ Commander in Chief of the Combined Polish Forces. It names as his assistants Berling and Zavadsky,⁹¹ and as members of the Army command Colonel Mariana Marek-Spykhalski⁹² and Mr. Chekha-Chekhovski.⁹³

[The telegram concludes with the composition of the Polish Committee of National Liberation as set forth in the first document. The names and positions are, however, frequently garbled or distorted in transliteration in the telegram. The correct list follows:

Chairman and Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Edward Boleslaw Osobka-Morawski; Vice Chairman and Director of the Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Reform, Andrzej Witos; Vice Chairman, Wanda Wasilewska; Director of the Department of National Defence, Colonel General Michal Rola-Zymierski; Vice Director of the Department of National Defence, Lieutenant General Zygmunt Berling; Director of the Department of Civil Administration, Stanislaw Kotek-Agroszewski; Director of the Department of National Economy and Finance, Jan Stefan Haneman; Director of the Department of Justice, Jan Czechowski; Director of the Department of Public Security, Stanislaw Radkiewicz; Director of the Department of Labor Welfare, Social Security, and Health, Dr. Boleslaw Drobner; Director of the Department of Education,

⁹⁰ Col. Gen. Michal Rola-Zymierski.

⁹¹ Brig. Gen. Alexander Zawadski.

⁹² Col. Marjan Marek-Spykhalski; Marek was the name by which he was known in the underground.

⁹³ Col. Jan Czechowski.

Dr. Stanislaw Skrzyszewski; Director of the Department of Culture and Art, Wincenty Rzymowski; Director of the Department of Information and Propaganda, Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski; Director of the Department of Communications, Post, and Telegraph, Jan Michal Grubecki; and Director of the Department of War Reparations, Dr. Emil Sommerstein.]

HARRIMAN

760C.61/7-2644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 26, 1944.

[Received July 26—9:38 p. m.]

2756. There follows Embassy's translation of Soviet Foreign Office statement regarding relations of Soviet Union to Poland, as published in Moscow newspapers for July 26. Text of statement was issued to foreign correspondents evening of July 25:

"The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has been authorized by the Soviet Government to make the following statement:

The Red Army, successfully going forward, has reached the state frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland. Pursuing the retreating German armies, Soviet troops together with the Polish Army operating on the Soviet-German front have crossed the Western Bug River, have crossed the Soviet-Polish frontier and have entered the boundaries of Poland. Thus a beginning has been made of the liberation of the long-suffering brother Polish people from German occupation.

The Soviet forces have entered Polish territory inspired solely by determination to smash the enemy German armies and help the Polish people in the cause of its emancipation from the yoke of the German invaders, and the reestablishment of an independent, strong and democratic Poland.

The Soviet Government declares that it considers the military operations of the Red Army on the territory of Poland as operations on the territory of a sovereign, friendly Allied state. In connection with this the Soviet Government does not intend to establish organs of its administration on the territory of Poland, regarding this as the affair of the Polish people. It has decided in view of this to conclude with the Polish Committee of National Liberation an agreement regarding relations between the Soviet Command and the Polish Administration.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ An agreement concerning relations between the High Command of the Soviet Union and the Polish Administration following the entrance of Soviet troops into Polish territory was signed in Moscow on July 26, 1944, by Foreign Commissar Molotov for the Soviet Union and Osobka-Morawski for the Polish Committee of National Liberation. For text, see Louise W. Holborn (ed.), *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, vol. II, 1943-1945 (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1948), pp. 770-771.

The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any portion whatsoever of Polish territory or of changing the social order in Poland, and the military activities of the Red Army on the territory of Poland are determined solely by military necessity and the desire to give aid to the friendly Polish people in liberation from the German occupation.

The Soviet Government expressed firm confidence that the fraternal people of the USSR and Poland will together carry through to the end the war of liberation against the German invaders and will lay firm foundations for friendly Soviet-Polish collaboration."

HARRIMAN

860C.01/7-3144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 31, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received July 31—3 p. m.]

2818. The Embassy has received a communication datelined Chelm July 25 from the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The communication is signed by Morawski in his capacity as head of the Division of Foreign Affairs. It communicates the list of officials of the provisional executive body and informs the Embassy that Committee has selected as its temporary seat the city of Chelm, recently freed from German occupation and has commenced its activities there. The Committee describes as its first aim the strengthening of the struggle of the Polish people against the invaders in cooperation with the Allied Nations under the leadership of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA and the maintenance of relations with the Allied powers in the spirit of friendship and close cooperation.

The communication called for no reply, and I am making none.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-344 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

Moscow, August 3, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 4—8:55 a. m.]

2856. Press for August 2 reported the appointment of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin⁹⁵ as representative of USSR Supreme Soviet to Polish Committee of National Liberation.

HARRIMAN

⁹⁵ Nikolay Alexandrovich Bulganin (Lieutenant General; Colonel General, July 1944; Army General, November 1944) acted as a chief political officer on several fronts during the war.

860C.01/8-644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 6, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

2873. As Department is doubtless aware from press reports, a group of members of the Polish National Council and Committee of Liberation, including Berut,⁹⁶ President of the National Council (a new name to us), Moravski, Vitos, and Rolaecuf⁹⁷ arrived in Moscow yesterday by air and were given a conspicuously official reception at the airport by Vyshinski⁹⁸ and other officials of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, General Evstigneyev, Chief of the Liaison Section of the Commissariat for Defense, and General Sinilov, Military Commander of Moscow. There was a guard of honor, and the Soviet and Polish national anthems were played. Berut and Moravski made speeches at the airport.

In the report of this event which appeared in the morning press, no mention was made that the purpose of this visit was to meet with Mikolajczyk; and indeed the latter's presence in Moscow has not yet been made known to the Soviet public.

I understand that Mikolajczyk and his colleagues met this afternoon at 4 o'clock with those who had arrived from Poland. As far as I know, this meeting was still in session at 7:30 this evening, and I will report on its results tomorrow.⁹⁹ An interesting detail is that the members of the London Government were received by the members of the Committee of Liberation in the building of the former Polish Embassy in Moscow.

The Moscow *Pravda* this morning carried an article included in the general section entitled "International Review" on the Polish situation. This article pointed out the historic significance of the present moment for Poland, stressed the enthusiasm with which the Red Army was being welcomed by the Polish people, and went on to say that in the short period of its existence, the Polish Committee of Liberation had become the "decisive and active factor of unity" of the entire Polish people. In the flames of war a new Poland was being born. Among the Polish emigration, there was no unity. Life had demonstrated the extent to which the exiled Polish Government had lost contact with the people. True Polish patriots the article concluded

⁹⁶ Boleslaw Bierut, Chairman of the National People's Council of Poland (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*).

⁹⁷ Col. Gen. Michal Rola-Zymierski is intended.

⁹⁸ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinski, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁹ Ambassador Harriman reported on these meetings of the Polish representatives in telegrams 2885, August 7; 2923, August 10; and 2972, August 12, pp. 1306, 1308, and 1313, respectively.

would know what road they had to follow, and this was the road of battle under the banner and leadership of the National Committee of Liberation.

The Embassy is informed by members of Mikolajczyk's staff that the Polish Government in London has appealed to London and Washington for aid to the Polish patriots allegedly members of the Polish underground subservient to the London Government who are understood to have seized sections of the city of Warsaw and to be holding them against the Germans.¹ According to this same source, the British in response to this appeal had undertaken to arrange the dropping of message to Mikolajczyk and explaining that the abandonment of this plan was caused by technical difficulties and not by political considerations. I would appreciate any enlightenment the Department may be able to give me on our attitude toward this matter.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 8, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received August 8—7:05 a. m.]

2886. Press for August 2 published a despatch from Chelm announcing appointment of Wincenty Rzymowski as representative of Polish Committee for National Liberation to Soviet Government. Rzymowski was listed as head of Division for Culture and Art in this Committee. It is understood from members of the staff of the Polish Prime Minister now in Moscow that Rzymowski had some reputation in Poland as a writer before the war.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/8-1044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 10, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3:30 p. m.]

2922. For the Secretary and the President. I received at midnight last night a note from the Polish Committee of National Liberation dated August 9 and signed by S. Verrlovski,² delegate of the Com-

¹ For correspondence in regard to the 63 days of bitter fighting carried on inside Warsaw against the German occupying army between August 1 and October 3, by the Polish Home Army forces and the population of the city under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski (General Bor), see pp. 1372-1398, *passim*.

² Stefan Wirblowski, Vice Director of the Department of Information in the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

mittee, requesting me to transmit to the President a letter from the Committee. I am not acknowledging the Committee's note and shall not do so unless instructed to do so by the Department.

The letter to the President is dated August 8 and reads in paraphrased translation from the Russian as follows:

"To The President of The United States, Mr. Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Dear Mr. President: Animated by a strong desire to strengthen unity and common understanding between the United Nations, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which is directing the civil administration in the liberated regions of Poland, is organizing a section for Foreign Affairs from which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the future government of Poland will be formed. In view of the danger that the Polish situation may lead to discord and misunderstanding among the United Nations, we wish that the section of Foreign Affairs be headed by a man who enjoys the sympathy of all the United Nations and whose authority is recognized in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and Poland. Mr. Oscar Lange is such a man. He is a professor at the University of Chicago. He was a lecturer at one time at the Polish University at Cracow. He has a unique international position and his services are irreplaceable not only for Poland but for friendly relations between the United Nations.

Professor Lange, so far as we are aware, is a citizen of the United States at the present time. We, therefore, are of the opinion that we should not approach him directly until we have spoken to you in advance concerning our desires in this respect. We know that American citizens highly prize the great privilege of American citizenship. Professor Lange's participation in the Polish Committee of Liberation would therefore entail very heavy sacrifices for him. However, we believe that he would be prepared to undergo these sacrifices in the interests of United Nations unity.

We would deeply appreciate it, in view of the present situation, if you would support us in our desires and help us dispel any doubts which might arise in Professor Lange's mind in connection with the compatibility toward the United States his second fatherland. We would also be grateful if you would assist in facilitating Professor Lange's trip to Poland.

It is our opinion that the fact that the Foreign Affairs of the Polish Committee of National Liberation should be headed by a man who has lived in the United States for a long time and who has decided to take out American citizenship should be a guarantee of the permanent friendship between Poland and the United States and should make Poland a binding link in the friendship among the United Nations.

Respectfully yours, the Polish Committee of National Liberation"
(Signed by President E. B. Osobka-Morawski, Vice President W. Wasilewskaya, Vice President A. Witos).

True reading of Embassy's translation by airmail.³

HARRIMAN

³ Not printed.

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)**

[WASHINGTON,] 12 August, 1944.

42. I am most grateful for your telegram of August 9⁵ in which you were good enough to give me a résumé of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's conversations in Moscow both with you and with the Polish Committee.

As you know it is my earnest hope that some solution satisfactory to all concerned will emerge out of these conversations and which will permit the formation of an interim legal and truly representative Polish Government.

In regard to Lange, I am sure you will recognize the difficulty of this Government taking official action at this stage. Of course he as a private citizen has every right under our law to do what he sees fit, including the renunciation of his American citizenship. You will, I am sure, understand why, under the circumstances and particularly pending the outcome of the conversations between Premier Mikolajczyk, whose Government we still recognize officially, and the Polish Committee, the Government of the United States does not want to become involved in nor express any opinion concerning the request of the Polish Committee that Professor Lange join it as head of the section on Foreign Affairs.

ROOSEVELT

760C.6115/9-1444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1944.

[Received September 15—5:30 p. m.]

3484. Signature of agreements between Polish Committee of National Liberation and governments of Ukrainian SSR and White Russian SSR regarding evacuation of Ukrainian and White Russian population from territory of Poland and of Polish citizens from territory of Ukrainian and White Russian Republics was reported in newspapers for September 14.

Communiqué on agreements stated that they were signed in Lublin on September 9 after conversations which took place in atmosphere

* Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. In a memorandum of August 11 with recommendations to the President for his reply, the Department expressed the following viewpoint: "The desire to have Professor Lange is obviously a tactical move designed to strengthen the claims of the Polish Committee to be recognized as the legal government of Poland, since until Poland is liberated and some government set up, questions of foreign affairs do not arise." (860C.01/8-944)

⁵ *Ante*, p. 1307.

of friendly, mutual understanding. They cover evacuation of Polish citizens who held Polish citizenship up to September 17, 1939 and of Ukrainian and White Russian population being evacuated from territory of Poland to Ukraine and White Russia.⁶

Announcement states

"The agreements provide that evacuation will be carried out on a completely voluntary basis. The population will be informed of time and conditions of evacuation by special plenipotentiaries of Polish Committee of National Liberation and of Soviet of People's Commissars of White Russia SSR assigned for effectuating the evacuation both of territory of Poland and of territory of Ukraine and White Russia. The settlement and finding of employment for evacuees on the territory of Poland will be the responsibility of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, and on the territory of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics, that of the governments of the Ukrainian and White Russian SSR. Persons evacuated from Poland to the territory of the Ukraine and White Russia will in accordance with their wishes be assigned to collective farms or be allotted a piece of land to carry on individual farming. Persons evacuated from Ukraine or White Russia to territory of Poland also will receive land in amounts provided for by the law concerning land reform in Poland. Both in Poland and in the Ukraine and White Russia resettled landless peasants if they so desire will also receive land on the basis of equal treatment.

"The agreements provide for various relief measures for the evacuees. They will be relieved of all arrears charged against them in payments in kind, taxes in money and insurance payments. All resettled households both on the territory of Poland and on the territory of the Ukrainian and White Russian SSR are relieved of all state financial imposts and insurance payments for a period of 2 years. Evacuees in places of resettlement will be granted monetary aid in the amount of 5,000 zlotys or rubles per farm for providing farm equipment and other needs, this loan to be repaid in a period of 5 years. The evacuees are also permitted to take with them various objects of household and farm equipment up to two tons of weight for each family and the livestock and fowl belonging to them. If the evacuee at his point of departure surrenders his harvest to the State the agreements provide full repayment to him of this amount of harvest at the point where he resettled. Those evacuees who at the point of de-

⁶ In regard to the intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland beginning on September 17, 1939, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 428 ff. The text of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union on the acquisition of citizenship of the Soviet Union by the inhabitants of the western districts (oblasts) of the Ukrainian and White Russian (Byelorussian) Soviet Socialist Republics, issued in Moscow, November 29, 1939, is in Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents* (Washington, n.d.), pp. 104-105. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 210, footnote 16.

Note further the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union of June 22 and July 14, 1944, permitting certain other persons of Polish nationality inside the Soviet Union to take on Polish citizenship, as reported by Ambassador Harriman in his telegrams 2452, July 6, and 2763, July 26, pp. 1291 and 1299, respectively.

parture sow winter crops will receive winter sowings at the point of settlement, if possible in the same amount. The value of the movable and immovable property left behind after evacuation will be made good to the evacuees according to the laws existing in Poland and correspondingly in the Ukraine and White Russian SSR.”

Concluding paragraph of communiqué states that agreements were signed on behalf of Polish Committee by Osubka Morawski and on behalf of Ukrainian SSR and White Russian SSR by Khrushchev ⁷ and Ponomarenko.⁸

Repeated to London as No. 179 for Schoenfeld.⁹

HARRIMAN

860C.01/9-2244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 22, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11 :30 p. m.]

3633. The Embassy has received a third person note from the Delegation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Moscow requesting it to transmit to the President a message of which the following is a translation in paraphrase.

“To Mr. Roosevelt, President of The United States.

To you Mr. President, as the organizer of the great common effort, the representatives of the Polish Socialist Party of the liberated territories assembled in first conference of the party at Lublin send their fighting cordial salutations.

The Polish Socialist Party will adhere to democracy and in the decisive struggle against the enemy, will use all its forces in mobilizing the entire population.

The success of the heroic American Army on the continent of Europe is greeted by the conference with joy. We send to the American soldiers our fraternal salutations.

We are convinced that American democracy will aid the Polish people in decisively defeating the enemy, in rehabilitating Polish economic life and in reconstructing an independent and great Polish state.

(Signed) Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, President of the General Council of the Polish Socialist Party; Mgr. Stefan Matuszewski, Secretary

⁷ Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee (1938-49), Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1944-47), and a wartime Lieutenant General (February 1943) in connection with service as a political officer on various fronts.

⁸ Panteleimon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko, First Secretary of the Byelorussian (White Russian) Communist Party Central Committee (1938-47), Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (1944-48), and a wartime Lieutenant General (March 1943) in connection with service as a political officer on various fronts.

⁹ Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile at London.

of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party; Edward Osubka-Morawski, President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party.”

HARRIMAN

860C.01/10-744 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 7, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

3843. ReEmbs 3842, October 7, 7 p. m.¹⁰ In my talk with Molotov October 4, regarding Morawski's call on me, he asked me for my impression of Morawski. I dodged this question but explained that Morawski had indicated satisfaction over the support that the committee was obtaining from the democratic groups in liberated Poland but that I personally was much concerned over the bitterness which was increasing not only between the Committee and the London Government but within Poland itself. I explained to Molotov that I had told Morawski that we placed the highest importance on the bringing of all Polish factions together and an agreement being worked out between Mikolajczyk and the Committee.

Molotov answered rather curiously, "But what about the Curzon Line."

I replied that I had understood that last winter the Government in London had indicated through Prime Minister Churchill that it was ready to accept the Curzon Line as a basis for settlement.

I cannot understand why Molotov brought this subject up as it was not pressed in Mikolajczyk's conversations in Moscow¹¹ and I had assumed that the formula which had been worked out by the Polish Committee of using the Curzon Line as a basis for administrative purposes and leaving the settlement of the definite boundary till after Poland was liberated had been agreed upon.

There is no doubt that the Committee itself expects some adjustment including a fond hope for the retention by Poland of Lwow. Whether Molotov reintroduced the boundary question at this time as a

¹⁰ Not printed; Ambassador Harriman reported that Osubka-Morawski had called on British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr on October 1, and that they had discussed the political situation in Poland. Morawski had indicated his belief that the value of cooperation with Mikolajczyk was now much diminished. He also had made a bitter attack on Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski (Bor) as the successor to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski on September 29 as Commander in Chief of the Polish Army (860C.01/10-944).

¹¹ For correspondence relating to the visit of Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to Moscow in August 1944, to discuss Polish problems, see pp. 1304-1315, *passim*.

possible new basis for coming to a settlement with Mikolajczyk providing he reaffirms the position taken last winter or what his reason was in mentioning it is not at all clear to me.

Molotov took no exception to my statements and certainly left me with the impression that he agreed to the importance of there being a settlement between the Polish factions.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/11-2944 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 29, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received November 29—11:41 a. m.]

4550. Department's attention is invited to Embassy's 4541, November 28,¹² summarizing *Izvestiya* report on Osubka-Morawski's speech before Congress of Polish Cooperative Workers on November 25. Following points of the speech warrant attention in connection with present developments in the Polish Government-in-exile.

1. The Lublin Committee¹³ apparently places Mikolajczyk and Kwapinski¹⁴ in same category.

2. Osubka-Morawski indicates that Lublin Committee is still prepared to "unite with" Mikolajczyk but as always "only on our platform".

3. As far as Embassy has noted, this is first occasion on which Soviet press has contained a reference to Lublin Committee as a "government".

Sent to Department; repeated to London as 274.

KENNAN

860C.01/12-344 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 3, 1944.

[Received December 4—5:46 a. m.]

4623. Moscow papers for December 3rd publish following Polish items:

1. Lublin despatch headed "Polish people demand transformation of Polish Committee of National Liberation into Provisional National

¹² Not printed.

¹³ Lublin had been captured by the Soviet armies on July 23. The Polish Committee of National Liberation moved from Chelm (Kholm) to Lublin at the beginning of August, and was frequently thereafter called the Lublin Committee.

¹⁴ Jan Kwapinski was a Polish Socialist politician, Vice Premier and Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Shipping in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet. After the resignation of Mikolajczyk on November 24, he failed in his efforts to form a Cabinet.

Government" reporting meetings of inhabitants of Praga Council of Trade Unions in Lublin Province and other public meetings in Lublin all of which adopted resolutions demanding that the Committee be transformed into a Provisional National Government on the basis of the record of its accomplishments. Resolution adopted at Praga meeting as reported in *Rzeczpospolita* for November 26 reads in translation:

"We inhabitants of Warsaw assembled in a meeting and having become acquainted with the situation existing in Poland consider that the results of the activities of the Polish Committee of National Liberation achieved over a period of several months indicate that the time has come for its transformation into a temporary government. Therefore those assembled here appeal to the Polish National Council to raise this question in the immediate future at its meeting and guided by the wishes of the inhabitants of Warsaw and most likely the inhabitants of all Poland to create a Provisional Government as the executive power of Poland and the Polish people."

2. Lublin despatch reporting public meeting at Lublin addressed by representatives of various parties to enlist volunteers from workers, peasants and intelligentsia to enter recently opened officers school of Polish Army. Item reports that similar resolutions were adopted at meetings in various industrial enterprises.

3. New York despatch quoting statements of radio commentator Gilmore¹⁵ to effect that Polish Emigrant Government is completely bankrupt and that people who lived 5 years under Nazi domination in Poland will not agree to the return of Polish reactionaries to replace the Nazi masters.

4. Long section in *Pravda's* international review bitterly attacking new Arciszewski Government¹⁶ in London. Article identifies Arciszewski with Pilsudski¹⁷ clique and characterizes him as one of most malicious enemies of Soviet Union. Concerning other members of new government article describes Kwapinski as bitter enemy of Soviet Union, Folkerski¹⁸ as "extreme nationalist and anti-Semite", Berezowski¹⁹ as anti-Soviet and an adherent to Nazi racial theories and Kukel²⁰ as "right hand man of Sosnkowski" and one of the principal organizers of Katyn forest²¹ provocation.

¹⁵ Eddy L. K. Gilmore, Associated Press correspondent in the Moscow Bureau.

¹⁶ The cabinet formed by Tomasz Arciszewski on November 30, 1944, succeeding the Mikolajczyk Cabinet.

¹⁷ Jozef Pilsudski, Marshal of Poland; Chief of State (Provisional President), 1918-22; Prime Minister, 1926-28, 1930; and quasi-dictator until his death in 1935.

¹⁸ Wladyslaw Folkierski, Minister of Preparatory Work concerning the Peace Conference, and Minister of Education and Religious Affairs in the Arciszewski Cabinet.

¹⁹ Zygmunt Berezowski, Minister of Interior in the Arciszewski Cabinet.

²⁰ Lt. Gen. Marjan Kukiel, Minister of National Defence in both the Mikolajczyk and Arciszewski Cabinets.

²¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 374-404, *passim*, and *ante*, pp. 1238-1240, and 1243.

Formation of Arciszewski "Government", continues article, fully reveals whole dirty game of Polish reactionary emigration. It is clear that Polish reactionary clique in London has decided to take offensive and break completely with policy which Mikolajczyk tried to follow. Agents of emigrant government are circulating malicious anti-Soviet documents among members of British Parliament and American Senate. These documents are challenge not only to Soviet Union but to British and American Governments which are accused of unwillingness to support territorial pretensions of Polish imperialists. New York *Post* is quoted to effect that aspirations of these elements envisage greater Poland extending from Baltic [to] Black Seas. Associated with them is group of Social Democrats whose deeply rooted [hatred?] for Soviet Union has led them to dangerous accord with Aristocrats, large land owners, and militarists.

Article then quotes British journalist Montgomery to effect that these questions are of vital importance not only for achievement of victory but for guarantee of future peace of Europe. If there is in Poland a government openly or covertly hostile to Russia a difficult situation will be created not only for Soviet Union but for all Allied governments sharing responsibility for effective control over Germany in postwar period. Montgomery, comments article in conclusion, exaggerates role and position of Polish emigrant clique. These political bankrupts cannot alter course of history, cannot force Polish people from course which it has taken. Formation of Arciszewski Cabinet does not solve either the Government crisis or crisis of Polish reactionary emigration, "collection of political bankrupts".

Sent Department as 4623 ; repeated to London as 283.

KENNAN

860C.01/12-344 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 3, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received December 4—2:35 a. m.]

4624. The reports mentioned in my 4623, December 3, of appeals addressed by various gatherings in Poland to the National Committee of Liberation begging the latter to assume the position of the Provisional Government of Poland may be taken as strong evidence that this step has already been decided upon by the real sources of power in that area and may be expected to be put into effect and announced in the near future. The meetings and the appeals should be regarded as a pre-arranged build-up for the final act.

It may be noted that the proposed Provisional Government of Poland would be not dissimilar in form to that of France.

Representatives of the Polish Committee of Liberation were noted among those present at the station yesterday to greet de Gaulle²² upon his arrival in Moscow.

KENNAN

860C.01/12-944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 9, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received December 9—9:45 a. m.]

4715. An American correspondent who had an interview today with Bierut, President of the Polish National Council, was told by the latter that the Polish National Council [would] meet in Lublin on December 16²³ in order to consider the question of declaring the National Committee of Liberation to be the provisional government of Poland.

Bierut said that the Lublin Poles considered that there was no longer any chance of an agreement with the London government. Mikolajczyk could come back personally, if he so wished, as a leader of the Peasant Party; but he would of course have to be prepared to recognize and abide by the provisions of the 1921 constitution.²⁴

Sent to Department as No. 4715, repeated to London for Schoenfeld as No. 295.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/12-1244 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 12, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 12—8:32 p. m.]

4795. ReEmbs 4777, December 11, 10 p. m.²⁵ The French Minister²⁶ yesterday informed me that Stalin had told de Gaulle that the Polish Lublin Committee would shortly declare itself the Provisional Government of Poland. I assume that the Soviet Government will, of course, then recognize them as such. I have received no information on this from the Soviet Government.

HARRIMAN

²² The Government of the Soviet Union had decided to recognize the Provisional Government of the French Republic on October 23, 1944. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, as head of the Provisional Government, journeyed to Moscow, December 2-10, and while there signed a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance on December 10. See vol. iv, section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Reports on developments of significance . . ."

²³ This meeting was postponed to December 30, 1944.

²⁴ The democratic constitution of March 17, 1921.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ Roger Garreau.

860C.01/12-544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1944—8 p. m.

2828. Your 4656, December 5.²⁷ In view of the apparent impossibility of the present Polish Cabinet to work out any agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the future of Poland, the Department does not contemplate that relations will be more than "correct". Ambassador Lane²⁸ is remaining until January but we do not wish to have his remaining here for the present given any political significance.

In any discussions you might have with Soviet officials, you should be guided by the fact that this Government has continued recognition of the Polish Government in London. While it is realized that the Soviet Government can and may accord full recognition to the Lublin Committee, you may, if you feel it would be helpful, indicate that we would not look favorably on such a step by the Soviet Government.

It is possible that the present Polish Government will be unable to make any headway in solving Polish problems and therefore may fall. Mikolajczyk may then be induced to form a new Cabinet composed of persons who fully support his policies, which eventuality might make it possible for us to take a more positive attitude in favor of the Polish Government in London.

STETTINIUS

860C.01/12-2344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, December 23, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 8:50 p. m.]

4973. ReEmbs 4777, December 11, 10 p. m.²⁹ The Military Mission³⁰ was requested last night to obtain immediate approval for the clearance of a Soviet transport plane to Paris via Italy in order to take Mr. Jedrychowsky, official of the Polish National Committee, his wife, daughter, and Mr. Kolilie, secretary. Previously the Lublin Committee representative in Moscow, Jedrychowsky, is to be the agent of the

²⁷ Not printed; in this telegram Ambassador Harriman had asked for information about the Department's reactions to the Polish Government in Exile after Mikolajczyk's resignation (860C.01/12-544).

²⁸ Arthur Bliss Lane was appointed Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile on September 20, 1944, and was confirmed by the Senate on September 24.

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union, Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Commanding General.

Committee whom General de Gaulle agreed the French Government would receive and in exchange for whom would send a major, now Second Secretary of the French Mission in Moscow, to Lublin. I understand from other sources than CPS sources³¹ that the Polish Committee will proclaim itself the Provisional Government of Poland before the end of the year, probably December 31. The Soviets are evidently anxious to have Jedrychowsky arrive in Paris at the time of the above action. I understand further that the Soviets plan to induce the Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments to recognize the Polish Provisional Government and pressure will be put on other small countries to do likewise.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/12-2744

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1944.

Various reports have been received indicating that, within the next few days, it is possible the Polish Committee of National Liberation will declare itself to be the provisional government of Poland and that it might be recognized as such by the Soviet, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments.

The British Government has indicated that, if such action does take place, it will continue for the present at least to recognize the Polish Government in London (last paragraph of the Prime Minister's telegram to you, no. 854, December 16).³²

In view of the possible action by the Committee as indicated above, it is suggested that it might be advisable for me to discuss this question with Lord Halifax³³ in order to assure that we and the British act in harmony in this matter prior to the meeting.³⁴ We have no information indicating that the Committee is representative of the wishes of the Polish people and have some positive information that it is definitely not representative and therefore we feel that there would appear to be no justification for us to transfer now our recognition from the London Government to the Committee. It is suggested, in the circumstances, that despite any action taken by the Committee, we should be prepared to make it clear, in conjunction with the British, that at least until the meeting we continue to recognize the Polish Government in London.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

³¹ The phrase "than CPS sources" does not appear in the Moscow Embassy file copy of this telegram.

³² Not printed, but see footnote 26, p. 1345.

³³ British Ambassador in the United States.

³⁴ The reference is to the forthcoming meeting of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin which was held at Yalta in the Crimea from February 4 to 11, 1945.

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*³⁵

[Translation³⁶]

I have received your message on Polish matters on December 20.³⁷

As regards Mr. Stettinius' statement of December 18,³⁸ I would prefer to express myself about this during our personal meeting. In any case, the events in Poland have moved considerably further ahead than it is reflected in the said statement.

A number of facts which took place during the time after the last visit of Mr. Mikolajczyk to Moscow and, in particular, the radio-communications with Mikolajczyk's government seized by us from terrorists arrested in Poland—underground agents of the Polish *émigré* government—with all obviousness proves that the negotiations of Mr. Mikolajczyk with the Polish National Committee served as a screen for those elements who conducted from behind Mikolajczyk's back criminal terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the territory of Poland. We cannot put up with such a situation when terrorists, instigated by Polish emigrants, kill in Poland soldiers and officers of the Red Army, lead a criminal fight against Soviet troops which are liberating Poland, and directly aid our enemies, whose allies they in fact are. The substitution of Mikolajczyk by Arciszewski and, in general, ministerial changes in the Polish *émigré* government have made the situation even worse and have created a gulf between Poland and the *émigré* government.

Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has achieved significant successes in strengthening the Polish state and the apparatus of state power on the territory of Poland, in the expansion and strengthening of the Polish army, in the practical execution of a number of important state measures and, in the first place, of the agrarian reform in favor of the peasants. All this has led to consolidation of democratic powers of Poland and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Committee among the wide masses in Poland and among wide social Polish circles abroad.

It seems to me that now we should be interested in supporting the Polish National Committee and all those who want to work and are capable [of working] together with it, and that is especially important

³⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The President directed that a copy of this message be sent to the "State Department for consideration of reply." For text of the reply, see *infra*.

³⁶ File translation revised by the editors.

³⁷ See the message from President Roosevelt to Stalin dated December 16, p. 1345.

³⁸ See press release of December 18, p. 1346.

for the Allies and for the solution of our common task—the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army which together with the Red Army is fighting against the Germans.

I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National Liberation transforms itself into a Provisional Polish Government then, in view of the above-said, the Soviet Government will not have any serious grounds for postponement of the question of its recognition. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the strengthening of a pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is interested more than any other power not only because the Soviet Union is bearing the main brunt of the battle for liberation of Poland, but also because Poland is a border state with the Soviet Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of security of the Soviet Union. To this it is necessary to add that the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans are to a great degree dependent on the presence of a peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee fully takes into account this circumstance while the *émigré* government and its underground agents by their terroristic actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counteract the successes of the latter. On the other hand, under the conditions which exist in Poland at the present time there are no reasons for the continuation of the policy of support of the *émigré* government, which has lost all confidence of the Polish population in the country and besides creates a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army, violating thus our common interests of a successful fight against the Germans. I think that it would be natural, just and profitable for our common cause if the governments of the Allied powers as the first step agreed on an immediate exchange of representatives with the Polish National Committee so that after a certain time it would be recognized as the lawful government of Poland after the transformation of the National Committee into the provisional government of Poland. Otherwise I am afraid that the confidence of the Polish people in the Allied powers may weaken. I think that we cannot allow the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland in favor of the interests of a handful of Polish emigrants in London.

DECEMBER 27, 1944.

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*³⁹

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1944.

153. I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

³⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk from the Government in London⁴⁰ has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington⁴¹ and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow⁴² that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland. I cannot, from a military angle, see any great objection to a delay of a month.

ROOSEVELT

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁴²

[Translation]

I have received your message of December 31 [30].

I am extremely sorry that I did not succeed in convincing you of the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee has all the time rendered and is continuing to render the Allies, in particular the Red Army, important assistance in the fight against Hitlerite Germany whereas the *émigré* Government in London is bringing disorganization into this struggle and thus is aiding the Germans.

Of course, your suggestion to postpone for a month the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union is perfectly understandable to me. But there is one circumstance which makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. The fact is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an appro-

⁴⁰ Mikolajczyk had resigned as Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London on November 24, 1944.

⁴¹ The visit occurred between June 5 and 14, 1944; see pp. 1272-1289, *passim*.

⁴² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

priate request of the Poles has already informed them that it intends to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon as it is formed. This circumstance makes me powerless to fulfill your wish.

Permit me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you health and success.

JANUARY 1, 1945.

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