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1919

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
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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**



U.S. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAPERS RELATING TO THE  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
OF THE UNITED STATES

1919

RUSSIA



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## PREFATORY NOTE

The present volume is a continuation of *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, volumes I, II, and III.

Brackets, [ ], occurring in the text enclose editorial insertions. These are of two main types: (1) words or phrases, in ordinary type, supplied to fill in omissions; and (2) suggested corrections, in italics, following words or phrases which appear to be incorrect.

Brackets have also been used to show differences in sources in the case of documents emanating from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris. For such documents there are two sources: the files of that commission (now in the Department of State), showing the message as sent; and the files of the Department of State, showing the message as received. The source of the text printed is given by the file number; divergencies brought to light by the other source are noted in brackets. The same use has been made of brackets in the case of telegrams sent from some foreign post both to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris, and to the Department of State.

There has been no attempt in the present volume to harmonize the spelling of Russian proper names.



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- Balfour, Arthur J., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Barclay, Colville A. de R., Counselor of the British Embassy at Washington; Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*.
- Beneš, Eduard, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Bliss, Gen. Tasker H., U.S.A., plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Bogayevsky, Gen. A. P., ataman of the Don Cossacks, succeeding Krasnov.
- Bristol, Admiral Mark L., commanding United States forces in Turkey; High Commissioner to Turkey, August 12, 1919.
- Bullitt, William C., attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; on special mission to Russia.
- Caldwell, John K., Consul at Vladivostok.
- Cecil, Lord Robert, British Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Chaikovski, N. V., President of the Russian Government of the Northern Region (Archangel).
- Chicherin, George V., Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Chinda, Sutemi, Viscount, Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Churchill, Winston, British Secretary of State for War and Aviation; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Clemenceau, Georges E. B., French President of the Council and Minister of War; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference and President of that Conference.
- Cole, Felix, Consul at Archangel.
- Crowe, Sir Eyre, British Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Curzon of Kedleston, Earl, British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 1919; appointed to that office October 1919.
- Davis, John W., Ambassador to Great Britain.
- Deniken, Gen. Anton Ivanovich, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia.
- Dietrichs, Gen. M. K., Russian officer, associated with the Czechoslovak Army and later with the Siberian Army.
- Eliot, Sir Charles, British High Commissioner in Siberia.
- Emerson, Col. George H., in charge of the Russian Railway Service Corps.
- Foch, Ferdinand, Marshal of France and Generalissimo of the Allied forces.
- Francis, David R., Ambassador to Russia.
- Gade, John A., Commissioner of the United States for the Baltic Provinces of Russia.
- Gaida, Gen. G. R., Czechoslovak officer, in command of a division of the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia; later associated with the Siberian Army.

- Girsa, Václav, Czechoslovak commissioner in Siberia.  
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Gough, Gen. Sir Hubert, head of the British mission to the Baltic States.  
Graves, Maj. Gen. William S., commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia.  
Greene, Lt. Col. Warwick, chief of the American mission to the Baltic Provinces.  
Grew, Joseph C., secretary-general of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.  
Grey of Falldon, Viscount, British Appointed Ambassador at Washington.  
Hanihara, Masanao, director of political affairs, Japanese Foreign Office; Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
Hankey, Lt. Col. Sir Maurice, secretary-general of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.  
Hara, Takashi, Japanese Prime Minister.  
Harris, Ernest L., Consul General at Irkutsk.  
Harris, Peter C., The Adjutant General of the U.S. Army.  
Hoover, Herbert C., Director General of Relief, Supreme Economic Council; chairman of the American Relief Administration.  
Horvat, Gen. Dmitri L., Russian Governor and General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway; Russian member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, succeeding Ustrugov.  
House, Col. Edward Mandell, American plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.  
Ironsides, Maj. Gen. William Edmund, of the British Army, commanding the Allied forces in North Russia.  
Ishii, Kikujiro, Viscount, Japanese Ambassador to the United States.  
Jack, Col. Archibald, British member of the Technical Board for the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways.  
Janin, Gen. Maurice, of the French Army; supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army.  
Jenkins, Douglas, Consul at Harbin.  
Jenkins, William L., Consul at Odessa.  
Kappel, Gen. Vladimir Oskarovich, commanding one of the Siberian armies under Kolchak.  
Kerensky, Alexander F., Prime Minister of Russia, July to November 1917.  
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Klyuchnikov, Yuri Veniaminovich, Acting Foreign Minister of the Kolchak government, Omsk.  
Knox, Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F., in command of the British forces in Siberia.  
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Krasnov, Gen. Peter Nikolaevich, ataman of the Don Cossacks.  
Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.  
Lenin, N. (Vladimir Ulyanov), President of the Soviet of People's Commissars.  
Lindley, Francis O., British Commissioner in Russia (Archangel).  
Litvinov, M. M., Assistant Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.  
Lloyd George, David, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.  
Macgowan, David B., Consul at Vladivostok.

- Makino, Nobuaki, Baron, former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Maklakov, V. A., appointed by the Russian Provisional Government Ambassador to France.
- Mannerheim, Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil, Baron, Regent of Finland, December 12, 1918.
- Martel, Damien J. A. C., Count de, French High Commissioner *ad interim* in Siberia, January to September 1919.
- Masaryk, Thomas G., President of the Czechoslovak National Council.
- Matsudaira, Tsuneo, Japanese member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee.
- Maugras, François Emile Roger, French diplomatic agent near the Kolchak government, Omsk.
- Miles, Basil, Acting Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs, Department of State.
- Miller, Gen. Eugeni Ludwig Karlovich, Military Governor at Archangel.
- Morris, Roland S., Ambassador to Japan.
- Moser, Charles K., Consul at Harbin.
- Nansen, Fridtjof, Commissioner of the League of Nations to repatriate war prisoners.
- Noulens, Joseph, French Ambassador to Russia.
- Oi, Gen. Narimoto, in command of the Japanese Siberian expedition, succeeding General Otani.
- Orlando, V. E., President of the Italian Council of Ministers; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Otani, Gen. Kikuzo, of the Japanese Army; in command of the Japanese Siberian expedition.
- Oustrougoff. *See* Ustrugov.
- Pepelyaev, Gen. Anatoli Nikolaevich, commanding one of the Siberian armies under Kolchak.
- Pepelyaev, Victor Nikolaevich, member of the cabinet of the Kolchak government, Omsk.
- Petlyura, Simon, leader of the nationalists in the Ukraine.
- Phillips, William, Assistant Secretary of State.
- Pichon, Stephen, French Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Polk, Frank Lyon, Acting Secretary of State, December 4, 1918, to July 18, 1919; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference, July 28 to December 9, 1919.
- Poole, DeWitt C., Chargé d'Affaires in Russia (Archangel).
- Reading, Earl of, British Ambassador on Special Mission to the United States.
- Reinsch, Paul S., Minister in China.
- Richardson, Brig. Gen. Wilds P., commanding the American forces in North Russia, succeeding Colonel Stewart.
- Riggs, Lt. Col. E. F., chief of the American mission to South Russia.
- Rodgers, Admiral William L., U.S.N., commanding the Asiatic Fleet.
- Salonji, Marquis, former Japanese Prime Minister; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Sazonov, Sergei D., Tsarist Foreign Minister; in 1918, at Paris, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Denikin's forces in South Russia and, in 1919, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Kolchak.
- Semenov, Gen. Gregory, ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks.
- Shidehara, Kijuro, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador to the United States.



- Smith, Charles H., American representative on the Inter-Allied Committee for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways.
- Sonnino, S., Baron, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Sookine, John, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kolchak government, Omsk.
- Stevens, John F., president of the Technical Board for the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways.
- Stewart, Col. George Evans, commanding the American forces in North Russia.
- Syrovoy, Gen. Jan, commander in chief of the Czechoslovak forces, August 28, 1918.
- Tanaka, Lt. Gen. Giichi, Baron, Japanese Minister of War.
- Tchaykovsky. *See* Chaikovski.
- Tchitcherine. *See* Chicherin.
- Trotsky, L. D. (Bronstein), Soviet Commissar for Military Affairs.
- Tschaikowski. *See* Chaikovski.
- Uchida, Yasuya, Viscount, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Ughet, Serge, Russian Financial Attaché and Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.
- Ustrugov, L. A., Minister of Ways of Communication of the Kolchak government, Omsk; Russian member and chairman of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee.
- Wallace, Hugh Campbell, Ambassador to France.
- White, Henry, American plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.
- Yudenich, Gen. Nicholas N., commander in chief of the White Russian forces in the Baltic Provinces.

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[Unless otherwise specified, the correspondence is *from* or *to* the Secretary of State or the Department.]

### CHAPTER I

#### THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

##### PROJECT FOR A CONFERENCE AT PRINKIPO BETWEEN DELEGATES OF THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND OF ALL GROUPS EXERCISING AUTHORITY IN RUSSIA

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## MISSION OF WILLIAM C. BULLITT TO RUSSIA

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Feb. 26 (914)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Information that Minister at Stockholm has been requested to initiate unofficial negotiations, through private channels, with Moscow government to secure permission for Bullitt and party to proceed to destination.	75
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[Mar. 25 (?)	<i>Memorandum by Mr. William C. Bullitt for the President and the Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace</i> Detailed report on economic and political situation in Russia, social conditions, morale of Army, etc.; his conclusions and recommendations.	85
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Nov. 19	<i>Mr. Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss, Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace, to the Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Desire to record in archives of American peace delegation that Bullitt's mission to Russia was not authorized by American delegation, as certified in letter from Grew; inquiry as to warrant for such certificate and Grew's explanation.	97

## PROPOSAL OF DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN FOR RELIEF IN RUSSIA UNDER SUPERVISION OF NORTHERN NEUTRALS

1919 Mar. 11 (1067)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report from Vice Consul at Viborg (text printed) regarding distressing conditions in Petrograd and Moscow. Proposals for immediate action by Red Cross leaders of all countries. Swedish Red Cross offer.	98
Mar. 24 (1316)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opinion that Russian relief should be undertaken not by Red Cross but as part of a definite inter-Allied program; information that Hoover's opinion is being sought.	100
Mar. 28	<i>The Director General of Relief, Supreme Economic Council, to President Wilson</i> Suggestions that Bolshevik tyranny be not even remotely recognized; that some neutral organize relief for Russia similar to Belgian Relief Commission with collaboration of Associated Powers and neutrals, and upon Bolshevik assurances that fighting cease; and that President Wilson reassert his spiritual leadership of democracy in the world as opposed to all tyrannies.	100
Apr. 3	<i>Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to President Wilson</i> Inquiry as to conditions under which President Wilson would approve purely humanitarian commission of neutrals for provisioning Russia and whether U. S. support in money and supplies could be expected. Information that similar notes have been sent to Orlando, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George.	102
[Apr.3-4]	<i>Draft by Mr. David Hunter Miller and Mr. Gordon Auchincloss of a Proposed Letter to be Signed by President Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in Reply to Dr. Nansen's Letter of April 3</i> Concurrence by Associated Powers in proposal of humanitarian commission for relief of Russia, which should be free from political difficulties, but should involve cessation of hostilities by Russian troops.	103
Apr. 4	<i>Draft by Mr. William C. Bullitt of a Proposed Letter to be Signed by President Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in Reply to Dr. Nansen's Letter of April 3</i> Proposal of armistice and conference at Christiania with Russian and ex-Russian governments to discuss peace and provisioning of Russia upon basis of certain principles enumerated.	104

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1919 Apr. 5	<i>Redraft by Mr. William C. Bullitt of a Proposed Letter to be Signed by President Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in Reply to Dr. Nansen's Letter of April 3</i> Revision of draft prepared by Mr. Miller and Mr. Auchincloss, April 3-4.	106
Apr. 17	<i>Messrs. Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen</i> Reply to Nansen's letter of April 3 following lines suggested by Miller and Auchincloss and redrafted by Bullitt.	108
May 3 (269)	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Finnish request that Associated Governments wait until military decision has been reached before sending food into Soviet Russia.	109
May 7	<i>From the Russian Ambassador to the United States, temporarily at Paris</i> Statement, May 4, by the Russian Political Conference (text printed) expressing appreciation of relief offer, but warning that food supply for Russia should not be delivered into Bolshevik hands.	109
May 9 (284)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> From McCormick, for War Trade Board also: Nansen's letter, April 17, to Lenin (text printed) transmitting texts of his note of April 3 to Associated Governments and their reply, and stating that proposed organization offers its services without remuneration but that expense for food and transportation must be borne by Soviet Government.	111
May 14 (104)	<i>The Representative at Copenhagen of the American Relief Administration to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Hoover: Telegram from Chicherin to Nansen (text printed) expressing appreciation of humanitarian offer, but pointing out objectionable character of conditions imposed, and suggesting conference for discussion of question. Nansen's proposal to meet Soviet delegates and request for Hoover's views.	111
May 16	<i>Appendix III to C. F. 20.—Feeding of Russia—Copy of Letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey</i> Conclusion of Council of Four that Nansen be advised by Hoover not to meet Bolshevik representatives pending further consideration by Governments. Memorandum (text printed) interpreting Lenin's reply and discussing policies that Associated Governments might follow.	115
June 21	<i>The Director General of Relief, Supreme Economic Council, to President Wilson</i> Necessity for economic reorganization in Russia, primarily in currency and transportation, and for establishment of economic mandatory with support of Associated Powers.	117

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## REFUSAL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO COUNTENANCE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITY IN RUSSIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
— 1919 Sept. 9	<i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Excerpts (texts printed) from President Wilson's speeches at Kansas City and Des Moines, September 6, in which he condemns minority rule and deploras control in Russia by group without constitutional authority and spread of its propaganda. (Instructions to repeat to Harbin and Omsk. Sent also to Commission to Negotiate Peace to be repeated to Archangel, and to Constantinople for repetition to Vice Consul at Ekaterinodar.)	119
Sept. 22	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Publication of President Wilson's speeches on Bolshevism creating favorable impression.	120
Nov. 4 (6149)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Press report of proposal by British Government of conference between Soviet Russia and Entente Allies, on lines similar to Prinkipo. Request for information.	121
Nov. 14 (3383)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> No foundation for report of British participation in Dorpat conference; British representatives to Copenhagen conference instructed to confine discussions to exchange of prisoners.	121
Nov. 15 (3390)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Departure of O'Grady for Copenhagen to enter negotiations with Litvinov for exchange of war prisoners.	121
Nov. 15 (3394)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Lloyd George's statement in House of Commons of policy regarding Russia; his apparent willingness to parley with all Russian factions. Impossibility of predicting future policy because of apparent inconsistencies between statements by Lloyd George and other members of Government.	122
Nov. 18 (4238)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Publication of telegram from London containing announcement by Department of State (text printed) that no compromise is contemplated with Soviet Government, that United States does not intend to participate in any conference with Bolshevik representatives, and that Department will continue to encourage arrangements for relief in non-Bolshevik territory. Inquiry as to authenticity.	123
Nov. 20 (6194)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Denial that any formal announcement of policy has been made; explanation that telegram from London was probably based upon informal talks with newspaper representatives. (Instructions to repeat to Stockholm.)	123
Nov. 21 (269)	<i>From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> Interview with O'Grady concerning status of his negotiations with Litvinov and the limitation of his powers to negotiations for prisoners, with privilege of reporting any other proposals.	123

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1919 Nov. 24 (6209)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Press and consular reports of imminent fall of Soviet Government, unless recognition can be obtained from Allies and neutrals. Instructions to intimate that moral support derived from British negotiations with Bolsheviks at this time would be unfortunate. (Instructions to repeat to Paris.)	124
Nov. 28 (3464)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Foreign Office statement that British representatives at Copenhagen conference are emphatically instructed to refuse to listen to Bolshevik peace proposals.	125
Nov. 29 (5468)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Conversation with Lloyd George who sees menace to Europe in unified Russia; favors independence of Finland, Baltic Provinces, Ukraine, Siberia, etc.; and considers possibility of conference with Soviets.	126
Nov. 30 (279)	<i>From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> For President Wilson: Summary of situation in Russia, advancing four possible policies, prevailing opinion being that Associated Powers should treat situation as civil war and favor no faction. View that Bolsheviks will be strengthened by war but will disappear with peace and prosperity.	126
Dec. 2 (288)	<i>From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> Full powers given Litvinov to conclude peace with any country. O'Grady's request for greater powers. Litvinov's wish to include in negotiations Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria.	127
Dec. 2 (289)	<i>From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> Negotiations between O'Grady and Litvinov regarding trade; views of O'Grady that normal free trade and consular service will tend to put an end to communism.	127
Dec. 2 (3481)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Information from Foreign Office and elsewhere that so far negotiations with Litvinov have been confined to exchange of prisoners; no reports regarding Bolshevik peace offer.	128
Dec. 3 (3486)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Discussion of Siberian situation with Curzon; his disavowal of British intention to displace Kolchak or to call a second Prinkipo conference; his favorable attitude toward chain of independent buffer states. Lloyd George's willingness to treat with Bolsheviks and favorable attitude toward division of Russia into group of small states.	128
Dec. 4 (6243)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> U. S. views, to be presented at Ambassador's discretion, regarding futility of an understanding with Bolshevik Government; possibility of its evolution into a regime with which relations may be established; dangers attending recognition of present leaders; refusal to support plan for dismemberment of Russia. (Instructions to repeat to Ambassador in France.)	129

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1919 Dec. 6 (3500)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Information that O'Grady has received reiterated instructions to confine his discussions to exchange of prisoners and to refuse to listen to representations on other subjects.	130
Dec. 10 (301)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Note from Litvinov enclosing resolution on peace with Allies passed by Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets (text printed). Information that note was sent to all Allied and Associated Governments and should be considered formal peace offer.	131
Dec. 10 (302)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Return of Litvinov's note, in conformity with action of British, French, and Italian Legations, on ground that peace negotiations violate ruling under which he was allowed to come to Denmark.	132
Dec. 13 (307)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Semiofficial press announcement of return of Litvinov's note by Legations of Associated Governments and explanation that action was in conformity with engagements that his sojourn in Denmark is for nonpolitical purposes.	132

## REFUSAL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO RECOGNIZE THE MISSION OF L. MARTENS, RUSSIAN SOVIET AGENT IN THE UNITED STATES

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1919 Mar. 18 (1/a)	<i>From Mr. L. Martens</i> Submission of credentials (text printed) of appointment as representative in the United States of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic; memorandum (text printed) of present political and economic conditions of Soviet Russia, and of proposals for opening commercial relations; also copy of Soviet Constitution.	133
Mar. 25 (1270)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing: Transmittal of Martens' communication and memorandum; comments and request for instructions.	141
Apr. 15 (1594)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Inquiry as to information to be furnished National City Bank, which has been notified by Martens that all Russian funds are subject to his order only.	142
— Apr. 17 (1656)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Instructions to give no credence to Martens' claim, Bakhmeteff being the only Russian representative recognized by the United States.	143

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Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Apr. 20	<i>From Mr. J. H. Fulton of the National City Bank of New York</i> Urgent request that, in case of any recognition of present Soviet administration, it apply only to future relations and transactions to avoid retroactive effect.	143
May 21 (644)	<i>To the Chargé in Russia (tel.)</i> Official statements issued to press (text printed) warning business men that any concessions from Bolshevik authorities would probably not be recognized as binding on future Russian governments, and that as Bolshevik regime has not been recognized by the United States, extreme caution should be exercised as to representations made by anyone purporting to represent Bolshevik Government.	144
June 5 (2197)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing: Information that Martens is German subject, born in Russia, that he has been conducting propaganda and offering business men attractive opportunities, specific cases being cited, and that warnings have been issued by Department. Request for authorization for his deportation.	144
June 18 (2635)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> President Wilson's statement that no objections will be raised to deportation of Martens, if evidence is complete.	146
June 24	<i>To the National City Bank of New York</i> For Fulton: Assurances that Soviet Government will not be recognized at this time, and that any recognition hereafter will not have retroactive effect prejudicial to U. S. interests.	146
June 24	<i>Memorandum by Mr. Basil Miles, in Charge of Russian Affairs, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State</i> Proposal to intern Martens, evidence warranting deportation being inadequate; evidence of German nationality and reasons why he should be interned. (Footnote: Decision in Cabinet meeting to do nothing until further evidence or legislation is obtained.)	146
June 24 (3957)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Telegram from Chicherin through Sweden (text printed) protesting arrest of Martens, demanding his release, reminding of courtesies accorded U. S. citizens in Russia, and threatening reprisals.	148
July 1 (1663)	<i>To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Statement for Swedish authorities denying that Martens has been arrested or that any action is contemplated against law-abiding Russian citizens; citation of illegal and unjustifiable treatment to which Americans have been submitted in Russia, adding that so-called reprisals would arouse U. S. indignation.	149

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CONTINUANCE OF RESTRICTIONS UPON TRADE WITH SOVIET RUSSIA BY THE  
PRINCIPAL ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

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1919 June 20 (2659)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Note from Supreme Economic Council (text printed) regarding obstacles in way of blockade of Hungary and Bolshevik Russia after peace is made with Germany and in absence of a declaration of war with Russia. Decision that no announcement will be made regarding resumption of trade and efforts will be made to prevent war material from reaching Bolshevik Russia.	149
July 15 (3152)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> White to the President: Sweden's inquiry regarding restrictions on munitions of war for Bolshevik Russia. Arguments in Council in favor of blockade; White's dissenting views; postponement of decision by Council pending receipt of President Wilson's views.	151
July 18 (2594)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For White: The President's approval of stand taken by White and view that a blockade before a state of war exists could not receive U. S. recognition.	153
July 26 (3323)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> White to the President: Conclusion of Council of Five to appeal to the President for reconsideration of his decision.	153
July 27 (3354)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> White to the President: Message from Council of Five (text printed) requesting reconsideration of President's decision.	154
Aug. 2 (2714)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> The President's reply to Council of Five (text printed) affirming that he is without constitutional right to enforce blockade without declaration of war by Congress; counter-proposal of a joint note to neutrals requesting that traffic in arms with Bolsheviks be prohibited, and of policy of nonintercourse by Associated Powers.	155
Aug. 15 (4027)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Swedish communiqué (text printed) containing information that the United States and Great Britain still restrict trade with Russia and that mines laid make it impossible to travel by Petrograd route.	157
Sept. 9 (3067)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Inquiry regarding progress in preventing trade with Soviet Russia. Department's policy of refusing licenses for shipments, which will lapse with proclamation of peace; recourse then to refusal of passports and clearance to vessels.	157
Sept. 13	<i>To Senator Irvine L. Lenroot</i> Reply to inquiry regarding issuance of licenses for exportation of commodities to Soviet Russia, citing title VII of Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 (excerpt printed) as authority and calling attention to fact that all foreign trade in Russia has been nationalized and that funds used might prove to be exploitation of resources of Russian people.	158
Oct. 1 (4464)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Meeting of Council in which was discussed draft note to neutrals (text printed) suggesting measures of nonintercourse with Soviet Russia.	159

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PRINCIPAL ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS—Continued

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Nov. 1	<i>To Senator James W. Wadsworth</i> Policy of nonintercourse with Bolshevik Russia, in view of propaganda aimed at overthrow of U. S. Government and of Bolshevik control over and unequal distribution of necessities; U. S. efforts, however, for relief of needy, where supplies do not fall into Bolshevik hands.	161
Nov. 22 (840)	<i>From the British Appointed Ambassador</i> Inquiry as to what steps U. S. Government is taking to prevent banks from doing business with Bolshevik Russia, in accordance with request sent to neutrals.	162
1920 Jan. 10	<i>To the British Chargé</i> Reply that prohibitions are still in force against financial transactions with Bolshevik Russia, but will be weakened with removal of censorship. Reference to Report of Secretary of Treasury to Congress, November 20, 1919.	163

## PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES OF THE TRAFFIC IN RUSSIAN RUBLES

1919 Jan. 28	<i>From the Consul General at Paris (tel.)</i> Ministerial decree prohibiting importation into France of any form of Russian bank notes, coins, etc., without authorization from Ministry of Finance.	163
Feb. 4	<i>From the Director of the Division of Foreign Exchange, Federal Reserve Board</i> Opinion that trading in rubles in the United States should be prohibited and press notice given to that effect; report that vast amounts of rubles are being printed for purposes of propaganda and that individuals are being lured into speculation in them.	164
Feb. 7	<i>From the Secretary of the Treasury</i> Advisability of publicly prohibiting importation of Russian bank notes, coins, etc., into the United States.	166
Feb. 26	<i>To the Federal Reserve Board</i> Receipt of letter containing order issued by Federal Reserve Board (text printed) prohibiting exportation or importation of Russian rubles or transfer of funds for their purchase.	167



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## EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS DETAINED IN RUSSIA

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1919 Jan. 28 (457)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing: Offer of Government of India to exchange Russian hostage for release of Tredwell, U. S. consul at Tashkent; suggestion that Tredwell's release be unconditional preliminary to U. S. participation in Prinkipo conference. Representations sent through Norway (text printed) regarding Kalamatiano, naturalized American, accused as spy for Consul Poole and condemned to death.	167
Feb. 4 (7281)	<i>To the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Instructions to propose cooperation of French, British, and U. S. Governments in efforts for release of their nationals in Soviet Russia. (Similar telegram to Embassy in London.)	169
Feb. 7 (789)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> British intention to propose exchange of prisoners with Bolsheviks and to include demand for U. S. nationals as well. Inquiry as to number and location of American prisoners in Russia.	169
Feb. 8 (660)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Inability to follow suggestion concerning release of Tredwell as unconditional preliminary to U. S. representation at Prinkipo. Assumption that India's offer of hostage exchange will be investigated further.	170
Feb. 10 (1569)	<i>From the Minister in Norway (tel.)</i> Message from Norwegian consul at Moscow of Soviet offer to release Kalamatiano and English mission, provided certain Soviet officials arrested by Allied troops in eastern Siberia are released.	170
Feb. 11 (688)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Recommendation that Department refuse to consider Bolshevik proposal for exchange of prisoners unless it includes Tredwell.	171
Feb. 12 (1572)	<i>From the Minister in Norway (tel.)</i> Soviet request through Norway for immediate reply to proposal of exchange of Russian prisoners at Vladivostok against simultaneous delivery of Kalamatiano.	171
Feb. 14 (7224)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> French willingness to cooperate in release of U. S. prisoners in Russia; however, exchange of French prisoners having been effected, no important Bolsheviks remain in France.	172
Feb. 18 (693)	<i>To the Minister in Norway (tel.)</i> Instructions to request Norway to inform Soviets that offer to exchange Kalamatiano for Bolsheviks in Siberia cannot be considered unless Bolsheviks first release Tredwell, who is held in violation of international law and custom.	172
Feb. 21 (4589)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Appreciation of British offer to include Kalamatiano in demand upon Bolsheviks for exchange of prisoners, number of U. S. prisoners in Russia being unknown. Suggestion also of further intervention by India in case of Tredwell, and request that message to him be forwarded.	173

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1919 Feb. 21 (1443)	<i>To the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Suggestion of intimating informally to Bolshevik representatives in Copenhagen that release of Tredwell prior to Prinkipo conference would be clever move because of importance of his position and prejudice which his arrest has aroused in the United States.	174
Feb. 21 (3652)	<i>From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Message from Petrograd stating that Kalamatiano's sentence for espionage has been commuted to imprisonment.	175
Feb. 24 (3666)	<i>From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Soviet message through Danish Red Cross at Moscow requesting U. S. views on exchange of Kalamatiano and Albers for Soviet officials detained at Vladivostok by U. S. authorities.	175
Feb. 25 (1534)	<i>To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Instructions to send message of assurances to Kalamatiano through Danish Red Cross and to report details concerning Albers.	176
Feb. 26 (41)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> For Bullitt: Instructions to convey to Moscow government U. S. concern and irritation at treatment of Kalamatiano and Tredwell.	176
Mar. 5 (702)	<i>To the Minister in Norway (tel.)</i> Message from U. S. consul at Vladivostok (text printed), denying that any Russians have been detained by U. S. authorities. Instructions to request that this information be conveyed to Soviets.	176
Mar. 7 (1066)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Departure of Bullitt mission from Stockholm for Helsingfors, arrangements having been made unofficially by Minister at Stockholm; Bullitt's intention to secure immediate release of Tredwell and Kalamatiano.	177
Mar. 8 (1556)	<i>To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Instructions to request that Danish Red Cross representative use every effort unofficially to secure release of Tredwell and Kalamatiano.	177
Mar. 10 (3726)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Report on details of Kalamatiano's imprisonment secured through Norwegian consulate at Moscow.	177
Mar. 20 (1241)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Bullitt's message (text printed) regarding Soviet orders for release of Tredwell.	178
Mar. 21 (3755)	<i>From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Bullitt's report of personal interviews with Kalamatiano, Houston, and Albers, securing Soviet official statement of willingness to release Kalamatiano in exchange for U. S. facilities for repatriation of Lomonosov, whose passport Swedish Legation declines to visa. (Footnote: Release of Houston and Albers April 1919.)	178

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## EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, ETC.—Continued

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1919 Mar. 27 (1581)	<i>To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Instructions to make representations to Sweden to allow safe transit for Lomonosov, similar request being made of Finland; U. S. willingness to arrange for his safe transit when Kalamatiano, Houston, and Albers are released.	179
Mar. 31 (3825)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Soviet message, through Danish Red Cross, that all Americans, Italians, Rumanians, and Serbs will be liberated as soon as Russians held at Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok are released; report that orders have been given to liberate Tredwell and send him to Moscow.	180
Apr. 4 (3794)	<i>From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Instructions from Foreign Office to Swedish Legation, Washington, to grant visa to Lomonosov permitting his entry into Sweden.	181
Apr. 8 (229)	<i>From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Gade to Lansing and Naval Intelligence: Scheme to secure release of U. S. and other prisoners in Russia, including Tredwell, in return for Russia's right to purchase medicines in America through Denmark; request for full discretionary power.	181
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Apr. 14 (1555)	<i>To the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Unwillingness to lend good offices in connection with Bolshevik proposal for exchange of prisoners until Tredwell has been delivered to station outside Bolshevik control. Instructions to verify Tredwell's message concerning his release.	182
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Apr. 25 (254)	<i>From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Report of departure of Tredwell and others from Moscow for Finland. (Footnote: Tredwell's entrance into Finland on April 27.)	183
May 3 (173)	<i>From the Consul General at Stockholm (tel.)</i> From Tredwell: Detailed account of arrest and imprisonment.	183
May 15 (3984)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Excerpts from Danish Red Cross reports sent to American Mission (texts printed) urging negotiations for exchange of prisoners in return for right to purchase medicines, adding that Soviets insist there are some of their number with Americans at Vladivostok and Blagoveshchensk.	184
May 27 (1637)	<i>To the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Confirmation of report that Americans have not taken any Bolshevik prisoners in Siberia. Inquiry as to measures to be taken to release Kalamatiano.	185

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1919 June 14 (1675)	<i>To the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Danish Red Cross that U. S. authorities in Siberia hold no Bolshevik prisoners and that the United States has no objections to purchase by Danish Red Cross of medicines in America for needy Russians; also to endeavor, under these circumstances, to secure release of Kalamatiano.	185
June 24 (3955)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Lomonosov's arrival in Sweden; failure to secure passage to Russia for himself and staff; appeals to Moscow and reply refusing to consider his exchange for Kalamatiano (texts printed).	185
June 25 (2416)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Message from Legation at Copenhagen (text printed) regarding Danish Red Cross efforts to include Kalamatiano with French and British in exchange for Russians in France; suggestion that offer of tonnage be made in return for release of Kalamatiano and Americans. Inquiry as to action being taken by France; approval of tonnage offer.	187
June 28	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Soviet telegram to Lomonosov (text printed) denying that any offer had been made to release Kalamatiano and advising Lomonosov to wait in Sweden; telegram by Lomonosov, through Swedish Foreign Office (text printed), inquiring how his passage from America to Russia was conditioned.	187
July 1 (1662)	<i>To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Department's willingness to assist Lomonosov to return to Russia; refusal to assist his staff except under some arrangement which would secure release of Kalamatiano.	188
July 7 (3977)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Transmittal of Department's telegram no. 1662, July 1, to Soviet Government, through Swedish Government, by attorney for Lomonosov.	188
July 13 (3129)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> French intention to repatriate Russian soldiers in France regardless of reciprocal action on part of Soviets.	188
July 14 (3988)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Soviet telegram to Lomonosov (text printed) reiterating refusal to release Kalamatiano, explaining situation regarding Kalamatiano, Martens, and Tredwell. Lomonosov's statement to Legation (text printed) comparing his case with that of Tredwell and requesting U. S. reciprocity of treatment. Request for instructions, since permission for Lomonosov to remain in Sweden expires August 1.	188
July 18 (1668)	<i>To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Instructions to telegraph U. S. Commissioner at Helsingfors of U. S. desire that Lomonosov be allowed passage through Finland to Russia, and to say to Lomonosov that his statement regarding detention in America is contrary to facts.	190

## THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

REJECTION OF BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR FACILITATING THE REPATRIATION OF  
CHINESE COOLIES REMAINING IN RUSSIA

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1919 Jan. 20 (57)	<i>From the British Chargé</i> British request for support of a proposal to China to order home their nationals now serving in Bolshevik armies, and to address summons to Bolshevik Government to release all Chinese from army service and facilitate their return home.	190
Jan. 25	<i>To the British Chargé</i> Request for British views as to advisability of proposed action in view of unsettled state of China and danger of introducing lawless element in large numbers; counter-proposal that coolies be returned gradually and their distribution supervised.	191
Feb. 8	<i>To the British Embassy</i> Opinion of American Minister in China and of his British and Russian colleagues that presence of coolies in China in large numbers would endanger peace of the country. Department's concurrence and instructions accordingly.	192
Feb. 24 (144)	<i>From the British Chargé</i> Request for U. S. views on desire expressed by Union of Chinese Workmen in Russia, conveyed through Bolshevik Government, that facilities be granted for return home of Chinese coolies.	192
Feb. 28	<i>To the British Chargé</i> Reply that reasons have been given as to inadvisability of assisting at this time in repatriation of Chinese workmen and coolies who have been under influence of Bolshevik rule in Russia.	193
Mar. 5 (171)	<i>From the British Ambassador</i> Explanation that movement for repatriation of Union of Chinese Workmen in Russia was at their own request and has no connection with British proposal of January 20. Submission of question to Chinese Government.	193
Mar. 26	<i>To the British Ambassador</i> Opinion of U. S. Minister in China that Bolshevik propaganda will find little encouragement in China and that Government is willing that workmen return. Reports from other sources that movement is part of plan for armed uprising in Siberia and for establishing Soviets in China.	194
Apr. 21 (295)	<i>From the British Ambassador</i> British decision to drop whole question of allowing Chinese Bolsheviks to return to China.	194

## CHAPTER II

## SIBERIA

## CAMPAIGNS IN WESTERN SIBERIA, AND THE FINAL DEFEAT OF KOLCHAK

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Jan. 10 (165)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing also: Report from U. S. military observer at Ekaterinburg (text printed) regarding capture of Perm by Siberian Army; evidence of Bolshevik terrorism among inhabitants. (Instructions to repeat to London.)	195
Undated [Rec'd Jan.11]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Plan of Siberian Army on western front, under command of Generals Gaida and Pepelyaev, to attempt to reach Moscow by spring.	196
Jan. 13	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Kolchak's statement that situation in Orenburg district is serious owing to Social Revolutionary and Bolshevik propaganda; arrangements for dispatch of troops to Ufa.	196
Undated [Rec'd Jan. 24]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Report on frustration of Bolshevik attempt to loot Perm, Kolchak being aided by Cossacks. Fall of Ufa, however, to Bolsheviks counter-balancing any advantage gained.	196
Undated [Rec'd Jan. 25]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Occupation of Orenburg by Bolsheviks, January 22.	197
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Undated [Rec'd Feb. 3]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Japanese offer to support Kolchak in fight against Bolsheviks; Kolchak's refusal of offer, stating that aid should come jointly from all the Allies.	198
Undated [Rec'd Feb. 5]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Improved situation at Kungur and Perm, despite news that Czechs are withdrawing.	199
Undated [Rec'd Feb. 15]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Tomsk: Improved military situation at Omsk, population quiet, regiments on both sides refusing to fight.	199
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1919 Mar. 29 (1367)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Indorsement of optimistic views of Harris (text printed) arrived at after discussions with Graves, Stevens, and others at Vladivostok, describing Kolchak government as stronger and campaign against Bolsheviks as progressing favorably, only needs now being economic and protection in the rear.	200
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May 17 (306)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Activities of Bolsheviks in region between Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk; promise of Czech full military strength to crush movement.	202
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Undated [Rec'd June 7]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Report of victory of Ural Cossacks over Bolsheviks on Orenburg front and advance of Siberian Army on north; its repulse, however, on Kazan front.	203
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Undated [Rec'd July 1]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Serious situation on Ufa and Perm fronts and in trans-Baikal as regards railway, yet considerable improvement in service owing to work of U. S. railway men; influx of refugees.	205
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Dec. 18	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)</i> Request for comment on Stevens' report from Harbin (text printed) stating that attitude of Bolsheviks in Siberia has changed, that they are advancing east establishing order, advising all to go about their business, and arranging for election of delegates for General Constituent Assembly.	229
Dec. 18	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Complaint that Czech seizure of locomotives has prevented U. S. vice consuls and Red Cross from reaching Irkutsk; Government's request for Japanese protection.	230
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Undated [Rec'd Dec. 24]	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Conflict between Poles and Bolsheviks at Taiga; assurance of safety of Americans; friction between Czechs and Siberians; quiet in region of Cheremkovo, work being resumed and traffic unimpeded.	231
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Dec. 28	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris: Indications that Kolchak's mentality is breaking under the strain; opinion that Czech-United States-Japanese forces are sufficient to safeguard tunnels and bridges in trans-Baikal.	235
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## INTER-ALLIED AGREEMENT FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN AND THE SIBERIAN RAILWAYS

1919 Jan. 9	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Submission to Japanese Foreign Minister on January 9 of memorandum of points previously discussed and agreed upon concerning plan for supervision of railways. Foreign Minister's suggestion that Associated Governments be advised of understanding reached and that Ambassador Morris go to Vladivostok to assist in preliminary arrangements.	236
Jan. 11	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> For Stevens: Telegram from Harris at Omsk (text printed) containing appeal of Omsk government that managing control of Siberian Railway be taken over by American Railway Commission; Harris' recommendation for favorable consideration in view of present condition of railroad and facilities needed by relief organizations.	237
Jan. 13 (4037)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Transmittal of Ambassador Morris' telegram of January 9. Information that Department is authorizing Morris to proceed to Vladivostok; that plans can go forward as soon as matter has been formally presented by Japan; and that instructions will then be issued for formal notification to Government. (Instructions to repeat to Paris and Rome.)	238

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Oct. [25] (4825)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Note from Russian Embassy at Paris to French Government (text printed) urging that Associated Powers no longer delay recognition of Russian Provisional Government, in order that credits abroad may be provided for needed supplies.	444
Oct. 31	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Advance of Bolsheviks, threatening Omsk; Kolchak's insistence that Government be removed to Irkutsk; suggestions that time has arrived for action and recognition.	445
Nov. 3	<i>From the Russian Embassy</i> Calling attention to grave situation in northwest and Siberia, due to inadequacy of supplies promised by Associated Powers.	446
Nov. 6 (3686)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Consideration of possibility of recognizing Kolchak in case he survives present crisis.	447
Nov. 18	<i>From the Russian Chargé</i> Note from Kolchak (text printed) regarding relinquishment of Omsk and transfer of Government to Irkutsk; Government's faith in final triumph; appeal to friendly nations not to discontinue their further support and aid.	447
Nov. 26	<i>From the Russian Embassy</i> Necessity for supply of munitions to put down military machine lest Bolshevism sweep westward to Europe.	449
Dec. 2	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Formation of new Cabinet, who consider that America has Bolshevik leanings and whose new policy will be to encourage Japanese influence.	450
Dec. 4	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Harris of U. S. friendly attitude toward Kolchak, in contrast with disposition of Japanese to encourage his elimination. Future policy in Russia as set forth in report to the President (excerpts printed) in which distinction is drawn between Bolsheviks and Bolshevism.	451

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RELEASE TO THE KOLCHAK GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN STATE BANK NOTES  
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1919 Feb. 4	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Instructions to ascertain whether Omsk authorities could arrange to have ruble notes, now held at Manila, surcharged with a legend to indicate obligations of Omsk government and not Russian State Bank; operation to be under supervision of Harris.	453
Undated [Rec'd Feb. 13]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Novo Nikolaevsk: Omsk government's willingness to meet conditions for release of notes.	453
Feb. 24	<i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> For Heid and Morris, to be repeated to Harris: Arrangements for 500,000,000 ruble bank notes to be delivered by Harris to Omsk authorities, after being properly surcharged to show Omsk obligations; balance of shipment to be held in escrow in custody of Heid.	454
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May 4 [14?] (218)	<i>From the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Harbin (tel.)</i> Impossibility of surcharge of notes in question because of lack of presses and labor; recommendation that notes be released at once without surcharge to save financial situation, and some other means be devised to show they are not obligations of Russian State Bank. Concurrence of Stevens.	455
Aug. 8	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> For Morris: Request for views relative to delivery of bank notes to Kolchak representative. Question of U. S. responsibility if notes are released to unrecognized authorities.	456
Aug. 12	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Recommendation that bank notes be released at Vladivostok.	457
Sept. 26	<i>To the Russian Financial Attaché</i> No objection to Embassy's proposal to sell to Kolchak certain unexecuted Russian ruble notes printed in this country, under certain conditions.	457
Sept. 29 (1-5766)	<i>From the Russian Financial Attaché</i> Information that conditions for release of bank notes are acceptable to Russian Government.	458

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1918 Dec. 19	<i>From the French Chargé</i> Announcement of arrangement for General Janin to command all forces west of Lake Baikal, General Knox to be his assistant in charge of services in the rear. Continuance of Japanese command of all forces operating east of Lake Baikal, mixed detachments of U. S. and Japanese troops to be distributed along railway.	459
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1919 Jan. 3	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Report on situation in Trans-Baikal, Semenov having constituted himself commander of eastern Siberian army, presumably counting on Japanese support; his preference for monarchical form of government.	460
Jan. 7 (130)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Transmittal of French note of December 19, 1918, with request for instructions as to reply to be made by Department.	461
Jan. 8 (26)	<i>From the British Chargé</i> Confirmation of agreement reached with France for command of forces west of Lake Baikal.	461
Jan. 16 (46)	<i>From the British Chargé</i> Correspondence with Japan concerning Japan's withdrawal of troops from Siberia and Japan's efforts to bring about reconciliation between Kolchak and Semenov.	462
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Undated [Rec'd Jan. 24]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Circumstances tending to strengthen Omsk government in external affairs; Kolchak's inability to control Cossack Atamans; his adoption of middle course to prevent uprisings.	464
Jan. 30	<i>From the Secretary of War</i> Report from General Graves to the Adjutant General, December 13, 1918 (text printed) on conditions in Siberia, equipping of Russians by British and Japanese, and loss of prestige by the United States.	465
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Feb. 4	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Opinion that Allied representatives should not participate in proposed negotiations between Semenov and Kolchak.	468
Feb. 13	<i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Instructions to advise Harris that U. S. representation in negotiations between Kolchak and Semenov is inadvisable.	468
Feb. 25	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General</i> Unmistakable evidence that Japan is equipping forces of Kalmykov, Semenov, and Ivanov-Rinov; enumeration of outrages committed by these soldiers.	468
Undated [Rec'd Feb. 28]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Omsk government note (text printed) declaring that orders given by military authorities in Zabaikal territory are not valid and are annulled.	472

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1919 Mar. 3 (106)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Appeal of insurrectionists to consulate and local and district Zemstvos for protection. Knox's request that reply indicate plainly U. S. lack of sympathy with insurrectionists; his criticism of policy of U. S. representatives, pointing out unfortunate effect of divergence of views of U. S. and British military authorities as to method of aiding Kolchak.	473
Mar. 6 (998)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Transmission of telegram from Graves to War Department (text printed) reporting bitter feeling of Japanese towards U. S. forces for not joining them in fighting against Bolsheviks.	474
Mar. 8	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Situation caused by General Graves' interpretation of his instructions as preventing him from interfering to protect one faction of Russians against another. Suggestion that in railway area occupied by Allied troops, protection should be afforded population from arbitrary action of any faction.	475
Mar. 8 (4772)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Instructions to read to Foreign Office Caldwell's telegram no. 106, March 3, 3 p.m.	477
Mar. 8	<i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Instructions for Harris (text printed) to make representations to Omsk government against obstruction of public meetings and arrest of Zemstvo leaders as being prejudicial to U. S. public opinion and assistance to Siberia.	477
Mar. 8 (4773)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Transmittal of instructions sent to Harris March 8, for communication to Foreign Office to ascertain whether Government takes same position. (Instructions to repeat to Paris and Rome.)	478
Mar. 8	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)</i> For Harris: Instructions that communication of Department's telegram of March 8 be made orally through consul at Omsk and that Harris proceed to Vladivostok to discuss with U. S. diplomatic and military representatives and with Stevens and Smith general situation in Siberia and advise Department.	478
Undated [Rec'd Mar. 10]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Report from Vladivostok of recognition of Kolchak by Ussuri Cossack assembly; deportation of editors and Zemstvo leaders by Ivanov; Japanese-Bolshevik engagements; further Russian conscription for army.	479
Mar. 11 (1335)	<i>From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Communication of Department's telegrams nos. 4772 and 4773 of March 8 to Foreign Office; concurrence of British in latter.	479
Mar. 13 (1106)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing and McCormick: Graves' telegram, March 5 (text printed) inquiring as to approval of his policy of considering Bolshevik trouble as internal affair, in which he should take no part. Polk's recommendation that Graves be instructed to use good offices to prevent armed conflicts between factions and also to use force where safety of Railway Corps and communications are threatened.	480

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1919 Mar. 18 (1156)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Graves' telegram, March 9 (text printed) reporting protest of Vladivostok Social Revolutionary Party against arrest of Zemstvo officials and establishment of martial law.	481
Undated [Rec'd Mar. 21]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Harbin: Consul Embry's report (text printed) of Kolchak's encouragement of Zemstvos in western Siberia, deploring actions in east of Ivanov, over whom Kolchak has little control.	482
Mar. 21 (7784)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> French support of U. S. attitude toward reactionaries and approval of their repression by Kolchak, though no detailed information regarding subject has been received.	483
Mar. 25 (2729)	<i>From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)</i> Italy's instructions to consul at Vladivostok to make representations to Omsk government similar to those expressed in Department's telegram no. 4773, March 8, to Great Britain, provided other Allied representatives do likewise.	483
Undated [Rec'd Mar. 27]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Vladivostok: Confidential declaration by Omsk government (text printed) of inability to restore order in Far East owing to concentration of energy on western front and to foreign influence in East, particularly Japan's backing of Semenov.	484
Mar. 31	<i>The Intelligence Officer with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to the Director of the Military Intelligence Division in Washington</i> His conclusions concerning Horvat, Ivanov, Semenov, and Kalmykov; relations of Kalmykov to American Expeditionary Forces and to Japanese; the Kalmykov incident.	485
Apr. 17	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Official denial of alleged Japanese brutality toward women and children, given out by press as reason why Graves did not go to assistance of Japanese detachment which was almost annihilated in engagement with Russians at Khabarovsk. (Sent also to Commission to Negotiate Peace.)	488
Apr. 18 (230)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Difference between U. S. and Allied policy on occasions of disorders, causing anti-American propaganda. Case in question: peasants' armed resistance to draft near Suchan mines; Japanese order for Allied troops to intervene; and Graves' refusal to obey.	488
Apr. 21 (239)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Criticism of acts of British cruiser <i>Kent</i> at American Bay where she fired upon persons presumed to be prepared to resist landing of Omsk government troops.	489
Apr. 29 (262)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Possibility of U. S. troops being forced into armed conflict with Russian reactionaries; necessity for adoption of uniform policy by all Allied Governments.	490

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1919 May 3 (273)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Resolution of railway committee that only railway representatives of Technical Board have right to hold trains.	490
May 4 (281)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Sookine's statement that U. S. policy of noninterference is source of danger to Government and furnishes reactionaries and Japanese with occasion for anti-American propaganda. Graves' opinion that U. S. forces in Siberia must use force or be withdrawn.	491
May 9 (1920)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing and McCormick: Comment on complaint of British military authorities of noncooperation on part of Graves; his tactlessness in dealing with Japanese; necessity for reaching agreement with British as to future course in Siberia.	493
May 10	<i>From the Russian Ambassador to the United States, temporarily at Paris.</i> Note of Omsk government, April 24 (text printed) requesting that U. S. forces cooperate with Russian authorities in movement of troops, that definite instructions be given U. S. forces in cases of Bolshevik riots, and that certain element in U. S. forces be replaced by men having no affiliation with Russian political strife.	494
May 14 (C.F. 13)	<i>Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des États-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 14, 1919, at 12:15 p.m.</i> Discussion of cause of friction between U. S. forces in Siberia and Russian troops.	496
May 14 (1965)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Morris' telegram (text printed) reporting the recall of Ivanov-Rinov by Kolchak government.	497
May 16	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)</i> Request for comment on Graves' report of May 10 (text printed) stating that refusal of U. S. forces to engage in active operations against Bolsheviks is causing antagonism on part of Kolchak's adherents.	497
Undated [Rec'd May 18]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Chita: Semenov's acts of violence on section of railway guarded by Japanese; occurrence at Dauriya station where train was stopped and property of consuls and Red Cross broken open and searched.	498
May 19	<i>From Mr. George T. Clerk</i> British note (text printed) pointing out specific cases in which U. S. forces failed to cooperate in support of Kolchak and adding that instructions to General Graves are not adequate in view of policy agreed upon for Siberia.	499



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1919 May 19 (312)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Resolution of Inter-Allied representatives that Allied troops be instructed to prevent Semenov from collecting dues or examining baggage on railways; less obstruction from Japanese; recall of Ivanov-Rinov, leaving Horvat in command.	501
May 21	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Sookine of the unfavorable reaction to his press interview of May 7, adding that it would be advisable for him to adopt course which will foster favorable public opinion in this country, in order to carry out program of relief and restoration of railway.	502
May 21 (2051)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing and McCormick: Transmittal of Associated Press statement of May 7 for attention of Bakhmeteff (text printed) making public Sookine's request that Graves refrain from sending his troops further inland, in view of U. S. undefined stand on Bolshevism and certain anti-American propaganda.	502
May 24 (322)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Adjustment of difficulty as to guarding of railway from Verkhneudinsk to Baikal; change in Russian attitude toward Americans owing to Horvat's influence and better understanding of U. S. position.	503
Undated [Rec'd May 29] (328)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Bolshevik attack upon trains to Suchan mines, repulsed by Americans; Bolshevik threat to destroy railway if denied right of transportation; propaganda among miners.	504
Undated [Rec'd May 30]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Opinion that crisis in anti-American attitude has passed and indications of friendly feeling on part of Romanovsky and Kolchak.	504
May 31	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Report of vice consul at Chita (text printed) regarding Semenov's seizure of car occupied by member of Railway Corps acting in line of duty on U. S. sector of railway. Release of train only by Japanese intervention.	505
June 3 (2182)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing and McCormick: Announcement of Semenov's recognition of Kolchak, submitting unconditionally to his command.	505
June 13 (2297)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing and McCormick: Telegram from consul at Vladivostok (text printed) quoting protest of Chamber of Commerce against one-sided action of U. S. commander in Maritime Province as promoting Bolshevik regime, particularly in Suchan mine district.	506
Undated [Rec'd June 14]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Tomsk: Report of vice consul at Chita (text printed) regarding clash between Colonel Morrow and Semenov near Verkhneudinsk; Semenov's explanation that he had never been notified of Allied control; his assurance that nothing of the kind will occur again.	506

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1919 June 21	<p><i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General</i> Proclamation issued April 21 (text printed) of purpose of U. S. forces to protect railways and insure their operation to benefit of all Russians; request for cooperation, and warning that interference will not be tolerated.</p>	507
June 26 (345)	<p><i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Restriction of railway facilities by government class to inhabitants of certain towns on railways and consequent resentment and antagonism of peasants.</p>	508
June 28	<p><i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Proposal that Governments issue instructions to Inter-Allied Committee and Allied military commanders in Siberia to make joint representations to Semenov against continued interference with operation of railways. (Instructions to repeat to Paris and Rome. Sent also to Ambassador in Japan with instructions to repeat to Legation at Peking.)</p>	509
July 11 (2518)	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> British instructions to representatives in Siberia to protest, in accordance with U. S. request, against Semenov's interference with operation of railways. British desire for consistent Allied policy toward Russia.</p>	510
July 15 (407)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Information that Horvat is to be retired and will be replaced by Rozanov, who is reactionary and who employs terrorism. Measures being taken by Inter-Allied Committee to prevent this change.</p>	510
July 16	<p><i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> For Morris also: Authorization, if deemed advisable, to make informal representations to Omsk authorities favoring retention of Horvat.</p>	511
July 19 (416)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Telegram from Inter-Allied Committee to Omsk government (text printed) making representations against interference with operation of railways by Russian military authorities, especially Semenov, and requiring that certain provisions be fulfilled.</p>	511
Undated [Rec'd July 25]	<p><i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Retirement of Horvat and his replacement by Rozanov.</p>	513
Aug. 5	<p><i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> For Morris: Instructions to state, if deemed advisable, that promotion of Semenov to generalship would militate definitely against purpose of Associated Governments to assist Siberia.</p>	513
Aug. 7 (3086)	<p><i>From the Chargé in Italy (tel.)</i> Italian instructions to consul at Vladivostok to associate himself with colleagues of Inter-Allied Railway Committee in protest to Semenov.</p>	513

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1919 Undated [Rec'd Aug. 8]	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Rozanov's leanings toward a monarchy and acts of terrorism; Semenov's appointment as major general.	514
Aug. 13	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Promotion of Semenov to full generalship; mobilization of Siberian Cossacks by Ivanov-Rinov.	514
Sept. 16 (467)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Cossack leaders' independence of Kolchak's authority and acceptance of Japanese funds; arrest by Kalmykov of U. S. officers and threat to drive Americans from Siberia; Graves' refusal to release rifles for Kolchak.	514
Sept. 18	<i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> For Morris: Opinion that rifles should be delivered to Kolchak in fulfillment of formal obligation and that Kalmykov incident should be taken up with Omsk government. Request for views. (Footnote: Reply September 23, concurring in Department's views and explaining that delivery of rifles was delayed until safe transportation could be secured.)	515
Sept. 22	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Note from Graves to Omsk Foreign Office (text printed) stating that he has refused to deliver rifles, in view of anti-American actions of Cossack leaders and failure to suppress libels of press. Harris' expression of regret at Graves' protest; and also at the unfortunate utterances of Morris at Vladivostok.	516
Undated [Rec'd Sept. 23]	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Displeasure of Sookine over Graves' note and intimation that he wishes Lansing to make decision in the matter. Protest of British military authorities against Graves' action in withholding rifles; favorable situation at front; removal of Ivanov-Rinov from command.	517
Sept. 24	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Sookine's reply to Graves (text printed) explaining Government's inability to cope with Far East situation; importance of securing rifles; and desire to have expression of U. S. views through the State Department.	517
Sept. 26 (385)	<i>The Adjutant General to the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (tel.)</i> Instructions to forward rifles and ammunition to Kolchak, if possible.	519
Sept. 26	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Information that Graves has been instructed to deliver rifles immediately.	519
Sept. 27	<i>From the Russian Embassy</i> Request for U. S. declaration of attitude toward Omsk government, as has been made by British, French, and Japanese Governments, in view of disturbed conditions in Far East, contributed to by Morris' sympathy for new movement under Dr. Girska.	519

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1919 Sept. 27 (481)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Acts of violence in Vladivostok resulting from presence of Rozanov with his troops; demand by Inter-Allied representatives that troops be removed. Graves' recommendation that Rozanov be recalled.	521
Sept. 27	<i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Disturbing activities of Dr. Girsu, representative of Czech National Council at Vladivostok; instructions to inform him of U. S. purpose to support Kolchak and of negotiations for repatriation of Czech troops in Siberia at early date.	522
Sept. 28 (483)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Purpose to deliver rifles to Kolchak representatives, to be accompanied by guard as far as Verkhneudinsk, with understanding that none will be given out east of Irkutsk.	522
Sept. 30 (529)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Demand of Inter-Allied military commanders for evacuation of Rozanov's forces occupying fortress of Vladivostok; Kolchak's order for them to remain; decision of Allied representatives to telegraph Omsk and their Governments explaining necessity for Rozanov's removal to prevent conflict between Allied and Russian troops.	522
Oct. 1	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Sookine's protest (text printed) against demand for evacuation of Rozanov forces from fortress of Vladivostok, holding subject to be outside sphere of jurisdiction of Allied military command.	523
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State</i> Interview with Russian Ambassador, in which Ambassador agreed to communicate to Omsk government situation in Vladivostok and stress necessity of Kolchak's disavowal of acts of Kalmykov.	524
Oct. 3	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Evident lack of information on part of Omsk government as to reasons for detention of rifles by Graves and demand for withdrawal of Rozanov's forces. Enumeration of outrages and offenses committed which threaten open hostilities between Rozanov and Allied forces.	525
Oct. 8	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris: Sookine's note (text printed) expressing regret and condemnation of acts in Far East just learned from Ambassador in Washington, and giving assurance of investigation and adoption of such measures as conditions will allow.	526
Oct. 8 (540)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok</i> Graves' order to concentrate all U. S. troops in view of reported plot to mobilize worst Russian elements and enemy prisoners for attack on Americans and Czechs. Message from Stevens (text printed) of Semenov activities in Manchuria.	527

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1919 Oct. 9	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Stevens' complaint of unwarranted interference by Russian railway officials with Allied inspectors and recommendation for amendment of agreement. Department's reply that specific cases should be reported to Morris, who will make representations to Omsk government.	528
Oct. 11	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Instructions to acquaint Omsk government with reports of an attempt to establish independent Russian authority under Semenov or other Cossack leader east of Lake Baikal.	529
Oct. 13	<i>From the Russian Chargé</i> Telegram from Omsk government, September 30 (text printed) stating Government's version of Vladivostok difficulties and accusing General Graves of being chiefly responsible for Allied demand for Rozanov's withdrawal.	530
Oct. 13	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Japan's refusal of urgent request of Omsk government to guard railway west of Irkutsk; imminence of evacuation of Czechs from Irkutsk-Omsk district. Justification of any Japanese plan to support Semenov, in order to prevent spread eastward of Bolshevism and typhus now prevalent.	531
Oct. 16	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Expression of gratification at repudiation by Omsk government of action of military officers at Khabarovsk in arresting and mistreating U. S. soldiers. Expectation that guilty parties will be punished.	532
Oct. 19 (555)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Report of more satisfactory conditions in eastern Siberia, presenting opportunity for U. S. expression of support of united democratic Russia under Kolchak.	532
Oct. 19	<i>From the President of the Technical Board (tel.)</i> Order for withdrawal of railway inspectors coincident with evacuation of Allies and Czechs, to begin October 20.	533
Undated [Rec'd Oct. 20]	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Irkutsk: Offer to attempt to secure adjustment of railway cases if Stevens will report them; control of railways in Russia by Ustrugov clique, continuing obsolete, unprofitable state of affairs.	533
Oct. 20	<i>From the President of the Technical Board (tel.)</i> Desire of all original members of Service Corps to leave for home, declaring their efforts are useless under existing arrangement.	534
Oct. 21 (518)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Nonconcurrence in Consul Macgowan's optimistic report in telegram of October 19.	535
Oct. 21	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris: Official assurance that every effort will be made to investigate mistreatment of Americans and to punish guilty parties.	535

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Oct. 22	<i>To the Consul at Harbin (tel.)</i> For Stevens: Opinion that to terminate work at this time would be tragic mistake, and that it should be possible to hold the men to their task until situation clarifies.	536
Oct. 23	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Emerson's instructions from Harbin for technical inspectors to withdraw from railway as fast as Czechs evacuate, which is deemed by Harris as productive of unfortunate impression upon Russians.	537
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Oct. 25	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: British purpose to keep British railway officials and men on duty at Omsk, irrespective of removal of Czechs.	538
Oct. 25	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Information that Stevens may not find it necessary to withdraw inspectors immediately upon departure of Czechs; importance of cooperation by Russian officials.	538
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Oct. 25	<i>To the Consul at Harbin (tel.)</i> For Stevens: Information that pressure upon Omsk government will be employed by Harris and Russian Ambassador in Washington to bring about safety on railways.	539
Oct. 26 (568)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Report that Semenov has held up second train of munitions from America for Omsk, demanding 15,000 rifles, with no attempt on part of Japanese to prevent act.	539
Oct. 28	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Recall of Rozanov from Vladivostok to Omsk to explain his actions.	539
Oct. 28	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris at Omsk: Confirmation of Smith's view of improvement in Russian attitude, especially of Ustrugov, who is becoming conciliatory; advisability of requesting Stevens not to withdraw railway inspectors.	540

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1919 Oct. 29 (534)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Japanese statement that rifles will be turned over to Semenov at Irkutsk as soon as guard is removed; their arrival at Verkhneudinsk; seriousness of permitting arms to fall into hands of reactionaries. Anti-American, monarchistic views of Knox.	540
Oct. 29	<i>From the Chargé in China (tel.)</i> From Harris: Graves' telegram (text printed) reporting Semenov's threat to take rifles from train at Chita and Graves' order to resist; report of incident by vice consul at Chita (text printed) and of release of train through Japanese intervention.	541
Oct. 29 (3316)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> British attitude toward Macgowan's report from Vladivostok, discrediting views as to improved conditions.	542
Nov. 1	<i>From the Secretary of War</i> Cable sent to Graves (text printed) regarding State Department's approval of withholding rifles from Semenov. Instructions to send through Harris all representations to Omsk government.	542
Nov. 1	<i>To the Consul General at Irkutsk, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Report from Stevens (text printed) that nothing can be done for improvement of railways because Russian officials ignore advice and instructions of inspectors.	543
Nov. 7 (548)	<i>The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant General (tel.)</i> Rumor of Rozanov's intention to declare himself dictator east of Baikal if Kolchak is forced to leave Omsk, counting on support of Cossacks and Japanese, latter in return to be given control of certain coal and iron mines. Further report of Japanese lack of cooperation.	543
Nov. 11 (587)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Report of failure of Omsk government to cooperate with Railway Corps, and obstructions offered by Russian railway officials; Stevens' order to inspectors to leave when Czechs go.	544
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Nov. 18 (602)	<i>From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Surrender of Gaida; Rozanov's order for executions; identification of Gaida and followers as Czecho-Slovak reserves, having permission to serve in Kolchak's army.	547

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Dec. 3	<i>To the Secretary of War</i> Desirability of requesting departure of political refugees who have claimed asylum in U. S. headquarters at Vladivostok.	549
Dec. 19 (647)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Semenov's change of attitude, now advocating representative government, proposing proclamation to people, declaring that civil authorities must direct affairs and military be used only for protection. His refusal of Japanese scheme to head a government formed by Mongolia, Manchuria, and Eastern Siberia.	550

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF POLICY WITH JAPAN IN  
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1919 Mar. 31	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Conversation with Minister of War, Tanaka, indicating that Japan has abandoned independent action in Siberia and modified policy of support of Cossack leaders, and is prepared to cooperate with Graves in simply guarding railways. Conciliatory attitude of Cossack leaders also. Request for instructions.	551
Apr. 1 (1421)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> The President's proposal of a military zone six miles wide in which Graves, in cooperation with Allied forces, would exercise police powers to secure uninterrupted operation of Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways.	552
Apr. 4 (1431)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Secretary of War, Baker, to the President: Explanation that military zone would require policing of large area, necessitating increased military forces; counter-suggestion of limiting activities to preserving order about railway, its stations, and trains, as those in charge of railway may request.	553
Apr. 4 (1432)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Concurrence in Baker's view that control of 6-mile military zone would be unnecessary and cause criticism and that same purpose might be accomplished by preserving order along railway.	554
Apr. 16	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Note from Mission at Paris (text printed) stating that President approves Tanaka's views and desires that Japan be urged to adopt them, limiting use of military forces to preservation of order only on railway and suppressing local violence only when it interferes with train service. Request for views.	554



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## EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF POLICY WITH JAPAN IN SIBERIA—Continued

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1919 Apr. 19	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Opinion that proposed policy of simply guarding railway is not only adequate and feasible but one which will avoid involving the United States in civil war in Siberia.	555
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Apr. 22 (240)	<i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Location of Allied troops which guard railway.	555
Apr. 25	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Tanaka's opinion that military zone of 10 kilometers on each side of railway should be established. Morris' intention to seek definite understanding with Japan, which would be submitted to Associated Governments for approval.	556
Apr. 26 (5244)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Instructions to state U. S. concurrence in Harris' views as to preeminence of Inter-Allied Committee for supervising railways in Siberia in all matters affecting policy, so that Technical Board and military boards may collaborate along same lines. Information that Japan has been requested to agree to U. S. policy. (Instructions to repeat to Paris for similar action and to American Mission.)	557
Apr. 29	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Tanaka's press statement (text printed) confirming friendly relations between U. S. and Japanese troops in Siberia.	558
Apr. 30	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Government of reasons for abandonment of idea of establishing definite military zone on railways.	558
May 2	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Japanese memorandum (text printed) suggesting a military policy in Siberia for protection of railways, rivers, and waterways in that region, its chief proposal being the creation of a military zone.	559
May 3	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Expression of appreciation of friendly and cordial attitude of Minister of War and hope for success of combined efforts.	560
May 3 (1962)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> British concurrence in U. S. view as to Inter-Allied Committee's preeminence in matters affecting policy.	560
May 6 (827)	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Opinion that military forces are subordinate in importance to working of the railways and should be employed exclusively in assisting Inter-Allied Committee and the boards subordinated to it. British concurrence in opinion. Instructions to impress upon Japan necessity of stopping aggressive activities on part of Japanese military in Siberia.	560

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1919 May 10	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Conversations with Tanaka and Uchida on closer military cooperation in Siberia, neither being willing to give up military zone idea. Extract from Tanaka's speech (text printed), on occasion of entertainment in honor of Morris, in which is stressed necessity for mutual cooperation between the two forces.	561
May 23	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Proposed memorandum to Japan (text printed) expressing doubt as to wisdom of attempting to establish military zone and presenting general policy of limiting activities to immediate vicinity of railways.	562
May 28	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Approval of proposed memorandum to Japan.	563
June 7	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Japanese memoranda (text printed) raising objections to pre-eminence of Inter-Allied Committee in matters affecting policy. Comments.	563
July 17	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Irkutsk (tel.)</i> Report on conditions under which Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are being operated as far as Irkutsk; and of Japanese military scheme for operating through Cossack organization in attempt to take possession of railways and thus to dominate eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria.	565
July 27	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Conclusions, reached in official discussions, as to measures which should be taken for the better operation of the railways. Information that Allied inspectors have been directed to withdraw from division between Manchuria Station and Verkhneudinsk, as Japanese have refused to protect lives and property.	567
July 31	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Inquiries regarding working out of conclusions reached in official discussion.	569
Aug. 14	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Impossibility of putting into force conclusions reached in regard to railway operation. Professed support of Kolchak by Japanese, who at same time give Semenov free hand in mistreating railway employees.	569
Aug. 15	<i>From the President of the Technical Board (tel.)</i> Order for removal of inspectors, since Japanese have given no protection and Semenov's acts are more hostile than ever.	570
Aug. 15	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk (tel.)</i> Japan's overruling of conference's conclusions concerning railway operation, refusing to interfere with any Russian official recognized by Omsk; report from Baikal division (text printed) regarding Semenov outrages and Japanese refusal to protect representatives of Inter-Allied Technical Committee. Request for advice regarding withdrawal of engineers.	570

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1919 Aug. 21 (474)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i></p> <p>Report that all Allied military, except Japan, have complied with Inter-Allied Committee's regulations concerning interference with train movements. General Otani's explanation (text printed) that interference with Cossack leaders recognized by Omek would constitute intervention in Russian internal affairs. Matsudaira's attempt to palliate Otani's excuses.</p>	572
Aug. 21	<p><i>To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i></p> <p>For Smith: Stevens' message (text printed) affirming Oba's refusal to interfere with Semenov, indicating Oba-Semenov combination to prevent railway operation; and order for inspectors to withdraw. Instructions to consult Inter-Allied Committee and report.</p>	572
Aug. 25 (380)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i></p> <p>Withdrawal of inspectors not known by committee; probability committee would have upheld Stevens. Japanese activities which have completely blocked execution of Allied policy and agreement.</p>	573
Aug. 30	<p><i>To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i></p> <p>Note for Uchida (text printed) calling attention to serious developments as result of U. S. efforts to assist Siberia with military forces and through railway plan, in conjunction with other Allies; failure to secure cooperation and unity of policy with Japan, making it necessary to decide whether to withdraw U. S. forces and make public statement as to reasons. (Sent also to Great Britain, France, Italy, China, and to Russian Ambassador at Washington.)</p>	573
Sept. 2 (488)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i></p> <p>Resolution of committee (text printed) that withdrawal of inspectors is matter for decision of Inter-Allied Railway Committee, but, in case of emergency, Technical Board may act, subject to approval of committee. Semenov's statement that he will no longer interfere with railway management.</p>	578
Sept. 3 (494)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i></p> <p>Matsudaira's explanation that Otani's letter will be recalled because of mistake and new one sent, new Japanese forces will replace division at Chita, and clear instructions will be given, which he hopes will settle difficulties.</p>	579
Sept. 4	<p><i>From the President of the Technical Board (tel.)</i></p> <p>Information that Allied inspectors have not been withdrawn from Semenov territory.</p>	579
Sept. 5	<p><i>From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i></p> <p>Report that note was presented September 5, in accordance with Department's telegram of August 30.</p>	580

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1919 Sept. 15	<p><i>From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i> Information that British Chargé has been instructed to support U. S. representations to Japan; British Chargé's desire to be acquainted with text of U. S. note to Japan. Request for instructions. (Footnote: Department's reply raising no objection to showing text of note to British Chargé.)</p>	580
Sept. 16	<p><i>From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i> Japan's resentment at U. S. note; feeling of Foreign Minister that note was not based on underlying principle but on a series of minor disagreements.</p>	580
Sept. 25 (521)	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Conciliatory attitude of Japanese commanders with explanations that Japanese orders had been misunderstood and that further orders would be issued to correct mistakes.</p>	581
Sept. 27	<p><i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Information that U. S. acquiescence in Japan's delay in answering note should not lead to inference United States is indifferent or disposed to evade issue. Instructions to impress urgency of a decision by Japan, so that United States can determine future course of action.</p>	582
Sept. 28 (527)	<p><i>From the American Member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)</i> Statement from General Oi, commander in chief of Japanese forces (text printed), quoting instructions issued to Japanese railway guards. Smith's doubts as to their practicability; further comments.</p>	583
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Oct. 5	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Conference with members of Foreign Office, in which Ambassador reviewed prior negotiations and showed correspondence to prove that matter was not one of specific incidents of misunderstanding but a fundamental difference of interpretation and consequently of policy and practice. Impression that Foreign Office was ignorant of what had been taking place in Siberia and hence bewildered by U. S. note. Responsibility of Japanese General Staff for publicity given negotiations.</p>	585
Oct. 10	<p><i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Note for Foreign Minister (text printed) inquiring when reply to U. S. note of September 5 may be expected. Instructions to use discretion in conveying report that Semenov is occupying stations along Chinese Eastern and is attempting to establish independent authority east of Lake Baikal, supported by Japanese commanders.</p>	586

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Nov. 1	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Characterization of Japanese note as conciliatory in spirit but vague and indirect. Further comment on specific points mentioned in reply to U. S. note. Counseling of patience and continuance of best efforts for cooperation with Japan rather than withdrawal.	592
Nov. 12	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Note for Foreign Office (text printed) expressing satisfaction at Japan's assurance of cooperation in Siberia and hope for success of Kato's mission. Inquiry regarding Associated Press message from Tokyo containing summary, evidently based on full knowledge, of Japanese memorandum of October 30.	594
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Nov. 19	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Transmittal of Smith's telegram no. 594, November 15; comments thereon. Instructions to discuss same informally with Japan, stating U. S. desire that Russians be allowed to work out own political destiny, without interference, reorganizing Government with Kolchak at its head along democratic lines, if acceptable to people.	597
Nov. 24	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Conversation with Uchida on entire Siberian situation in detail, advancing personal views that Kolchak should be supported, that U. S. and Japanese forces be maintained, and economic relief furnished. Japan's fear of spread eastward of Bolshevism and desire for U. S. support in creating safety zone. Subjects suggested for Department's interview with Shidehara.	599

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Dec. 2	<i>From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Foreign Office note (text printed) expressing gratification that Siberian question has reached amicable solution and suggesting that copy of U. S. note of November 12 be sent to Great Britain, France, Italy, China, and to Russian Ambassador at Washington.	603
Dec. 5	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Instructions to state that Japanese suggestion has been complied with.	603

## CHAPTER III

## THE NORTHERN REGION

## WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND AMERICAN SUPPORT OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN RUSSIA

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Jan. 16 (448)	<i>To the Chargé in Russia (tel.)</i> Information that money allotted for Murmansk relief is exhausted; inquiry whether returns on expenditures as reported from London (text printed) could be used as revolving fund.	605
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## CHAPTER IV

## THE BALTIC PROVINCES

CONFLICT OF THE WHITE RUSSIANS AND INHABITANTS OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES  
WITH THE BOLSHEVIK FORCES IN WESTERN RUSSIA

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Aug. 12 (3634)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Report that Hoover has supplied food to civilian population in rear of Yudenitch's army; that supplies from U. S. stocks in France are no longer available; arrival of British military supplies for Yudenitch and his proposed early advance on Petrograd.	700
Aug. 13 (79)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Report that stores belonging to Food Administration have been turned over to Viborg consulate, to be moved subject to consul's approval and not to be used for political or military purposes.	701
Aug. 16 (81)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> British loans to Finland conditional upon Finnish offensive against Petrograd; recognition of independence of Esthonia by Yudenitch in return for military aid. Offensive against Petrograd to be launched by Russians and Esthonians; Finns to cooperate by simultaneous drive from Byeloostrov front.	701
Undated [Rec'd Aug. 17] (1742)	<i>The Latvian Prime Minister and the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Urgent plea for money, arms, food, clothing, and ammunition for Latvian Army.	702
Aug. 19 (3771)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Greene's recommendation (text printed) that Gade be appointed special commissioner, with headquarters at Reval, in view of Greene's departure. London press account of new Russian government set up at Reval.	703
Aug. 22 (3839)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Need for U. S. shipping to transport supplies for Yudenitch promised by British and French. Russian expectation of early fall of Petrograd.	704

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1919 Aug. 25 (9058)	<i>To the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> For Hoover: Advisability of arranging for Yudenitch's forces to be given priority in delivery of flour, in view of importance of their movements. Report of delivery to Esthonians of flour expected by Yudenitch.	705
Aug. 27 (389)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Probability that Esthonia will make peace with Soviets, as result of capture of Pskov by Bolsheviks.	705
Aug. 29	<i>From the Russian Embassy</i> Statement that agreement between Yudenitch and Esthonia for recognition of independence of Esthonia was unauthorized and contrary to Kolchak's policy; that assistance rendered to existing governmental bodies should not be construed as entailing recognition; and that British General's encouragement of agreement was unauthorized by British Government.	705
Aug. 30 (3958)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Hoover's statement (text printed) estimating adequacy of supplies on hand for Yudenitch, whom he believes should be supported in his efforts to occupy Petrograd.	707
Sept. 9 (4060)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Estimate of present situation in Baltic Provinces as regards political, naval, military, economic, financial, and industrial affairs—a situation so desperate that, lacking friendly support, the Bolsheviks are likely to overrun whole Baltic region.	707
Sept. 9 (3074)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk and Hoover: The President's approval of charter for certain U. S. shipping to transport supplies from British and French ports for Yudenitch.	709
Sept. 15 (101)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Position of Russian Whites opposing Bolsheviks in Narva-Pskov district; report that morale and discipline are good and that British munitions have arrived.	710
Sept. 18	<i>From the Russian Embassy</i> Request that United States cease all material and moral support to Esthonia, in view of Esthonia's cessation of hostilities and peace arrangements with Bolsheviks.	710
Sept. 19 (421)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Account of Esthonian fear of recurrence of Bolshevik outrages and desperate, unbearable conditions which are driving Government to make peace with Bolsheviks.	711
Sept. 20 (3184)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Message from vice consul at Viborg (text printed) calling attention to danger that U. S. food sent Esthonia may reach Bolsheviks. Inquiry as to British attitude toward Esthonian-Bolshevik peace, and as to safeguards against U. S. relief reaching Bolsheviks.	712
Sept. 23	<i>The Russian Delegation in Paris to the President of the Peace Conference</i> Urgent request for Associated Powers to intervene to prevent conclusion of peace between Esthonia and Bolsheviks.	712

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Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Sept. 26 (435)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Certainty of Estonian-Latvian peace with Bolsheviks.	713
Sept. 29 (4436)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: <i>Aide-mémoire</i> by Sazonov, Foreign Minister for Omsk and South Russian governments (text printed), making urgent plea for food supplies for Petrograd, should that city be taken. Comments.	714
Sept. 30	<i>The Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference to the Secretariat of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Letter from President <i>pro tem.</i> of Estonian delegation at Paris, dated September 29, to President of Peace Conference (text printed) giving information regarding negotiations with Bolsheviks, which will be carried on in common with other Baltic states; justification of action in view of desperate situation, and assurance that sentiments toward Allies remain same.	714
Oct. 2 (3319)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Reply to appeal of Omsk and South Russian governments for food supply for Petrograd, referring to Hoover's supplies at Viborg and stating that no more funds are available, although the President will be requested to present plan to Congress.	721
Oct. 4 (442)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Decision at Dorpat meeting that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will begin peace negotiations with Bolsheviks about October 25. Finland's decision not yet reached.	721
Oct. 14 (115)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Beginning of offensive by Russian Northwestern Corps; the taking of Pskov and Yamburg.	722
Oct. 14 (6078)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Information for transmission to Paris and Scandinavian missions regarding mission of Gade to Baltic Provinces as special representative to observe conditions, not being accredited to any government.	722
Oct. 15 (6081)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Instructions to discuss informally Baltic situation and ascertain British views and policy. Transmittal of U. S. views.	722
Oct. 15 (3443)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Letter to Lithuanian National Committee (text printed) in line with U. S. policy of maximum autonomy and self-government for Baltic Provinces without commitment as to their independence and with sovereignty of Russia unimpaired. Russian Ambassador's disapproval of British policy. Request for views. (Instructions to repeat to London for information.)	723
Oct. 16 (116)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Attack by Russian Whites on Krasnaya Gorka fort under cover of fire from British Fleet; continued advance of Whites, Bolsheviks retreating.	724

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1919 Oct. 16 (465)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Report of capture of Gatchina by Northwestern Army and likelihood of fall of Petrograd in few days.	724
Oct. 16 (467)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Reported capture of Petrograd and Kronstadt.	725
Oct. 17	<i>To the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Instructions to proceed to Petrograd, if Petrograd falls, and report needs of population, etc.	725
Oct. 18 (119)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Report by Finnish General Staff that White forces have occupied Petrograd, and that White flag flies from Kronstadt.	725
Oct. 20 (122)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Report that Reds intend to defend Petrograd, fighting at Putiloffski works on outskirts of city, and holding Finnish border. Destruction of one railway, sole egress from city being toward Vologda.	725
Oct. 22 (125)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Untruth of statement that Kronstadt had been captured by Whites, statement having been made for political reasons. Soviet call for reinforcements to defend Petrograd and convention at Moscow to discuss plans for saving Soviet Government.	726
Oct. 22 (124)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Continued fighting on outskirts of Petrograd, Whites being unable to advance and Bolsheviks bringing up reinforcements.	726
Oct. 22	<i>President Wilson to the United States Wheat Director and President of the United States Grain Corporation</i> Authorization to sell to Russian Embassy, on credit or otherwise, wheat flour for relief of civilian population of Petrograd and such adjoining regions as may be freed from Bolshevik control.	726
Oct. 23 (6116)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Kolchak's refusal to follow British proposal that he recognize the independence of the Baltic Provinces, as a deterrent against the Bolshevik bargain to recognize their independence as peace price. Russian Ambassador's suggestion that it be pointed out to the Baltic Governments that Allied support was predicated on resistance to Bolsheviks and would be withdrawn if they made peace. Department's suggestion that representations be made to Great Britain, as United States had not supported Baltic Provinces. (Instructions to repeat to American Mission for Polk's information.)	727
Oct. 23 (3287)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Informal discussion on subject of independence of Baltic nationalities, Great Britain having refused <i>de jure</i> recognition to them on ground it was matter for Peace Conference or League of Nations. Consideration of recognition of Kolchak also.	728

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1919 Oct. 23 (4789)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Reported imminence of fall of Petrograd. Preparations for rushing food to starving citizens. Further plans to secure food from various other sources immediately, in view of early freezing of waterways and because of destruction of railways.	729
Oct. 24 (4159)	<i>From the Ambassador in Sweden (tel.)</i> Information that Yudenitch has requested no help from Finland, as he and Denikin are opposed to possible capture of Petrograd by Finnish troops.	731
Oct. 25 (127)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Proximity of Whites to Petrograd, still in control of Nikolaevsk railroad and attempting to isolate Petrograd by destroying bridges. Trotsky's control in Petrograd.	732
Oct. 25 (4162)	<i>From the Ambassador in Sweden (tel.)</i> Status of peace negotiations between Baltic Provinces, Finland, and Soviet Russia. Dorpat conference of Baltic Provinces and Finland to decide on conditions upon acceptance of which by Bolsheviks negotiations might begin. Postponement of negotiations because of military activities on both sides.	732
Oct. 25 (3564)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Further preparations for relief of Petrograd in case city falls. Advisability of using South Russian grain as far as possible.	733
Oct. 28 (132)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Bolshevik preparations for offensive, with Red Army of 100,000 available for defending Petrograd. Bombardment of Kronstadt by British monitor.	733
Oct. 28 (243)	<i>From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> Report from military attaché at Riga (text printed) giving summary of Prime Minister's account of Latvia's struggle against Germans and Bolsheviks, requesting aid of Associated Powers and specifying that Latvia's future actions depend upon reply.	734
Oct. 29 (3315)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> British concurrence in U. S. views regarding recognition of independence of Baltic nationalities.	735
Nov. 3 (487)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> French and British pressure upon Finland to intervene in Russia. Finland's reply that, in absence of guaranties by Entente or future Russian Government, it declines to assist in military deliverance of Petrograd.	735
Nov. 3 (489)	<i>From the Commissioner at Helsingfors (tel.)</i> Official report of retreat of Yudenitch from Gatchina and Luga and their occupation by Bolsheviks.	736
Nov. 4 (4211)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Scheme of Baltic barons and German industrialists and private bankers to finance efforts of Von der Goltz and Bermondts to crush Soviet Government, gain ascendancy, and open Russian market to Germany. Latvia's refusal of right of passage to German troops under Bermondts and his attack on Latvia. Yudenitch's refusal to join Bermondts's forces.	736

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1919 Nov. 5 (1722)	<i>To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Finnish cooperation in attacks on Petrograd is matter for Finland alone to decide. Caution against other than non-committal attitude. (Instructions to repeat to Commissioner at Helsingfors.)	737
Nov. 11 (6171)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Bakhmeteff's repetition of request that efforts be made to restrain Baltic Governments from making peace with Soviets; no change in U. S. attitude. Inquiry whether British Baltic policy is regarded as unsuccessful and whether there is again a disposition to negotiate with Soviets.	738
Nov. 13 (5156)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Gade on board U. S. S. <i>Chattanooga</i> : Summary of campaign against Petrograd and resulting disaster to Russian forces. British pessimism and preparations to withdraw naval forces when gulf freezes.	738
Undated [Rec'd Nov. 13] (5158)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Gade on board U. S. S. <i>Chattanooga</i> : Terms of armistice which Esthonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian delegates intend to present to Soviet Government. Note from delegates to America and Peace Conference (text printed) proposing neutral zone between Soviets and Baltic States to be controlled by power nominated by Peace Conference.	740
Nov. 18 (4236)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Yudenitch's appeal to British and French missions to exert pressure on Esthonia to the end that his army be permitted to retreat on Esthonian soil without disarming.	741
Undated [Rec'd Nov. 19] (5280)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Gade at Riga: Defeat of Bermondts by Latvians; their victory over Bolsheviks on eastern front. Latvia's statement that peace with Bolsheviks will not be concluded if Allies disapprove; their inquiry as to U. S. attitude.	741
Nov. 19 (4240)	<i>From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)</i> Report of satisfactory agreement between Yudenitch and Esthonia, and that troops are not to be interned.	742
Nov. 21 (5334)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Gade at Riga: Report that portion of Yudenitch's troops have been disarmed in Esthonia; grave danger of such measures. Inquiry as to steps to be taken regarding probable refusal of entry into Esthonia to Bermondts's Russians, wishing to join Northwestern Army.	742
Nov. 21 (3844)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Gade: Instructions to make no formal representations to Latvia regarding proposed peace with Bolsheviks; however, informal personal advice may be given against any compromise with them.	742
Nov. 22 (5361)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Gade at Riga: Message from Eberhardt, German commander, to Latvia (text printed) stating that Russian west army has placed itself under German protection and proposing cessation of hostilities. Stiffening of Bolshevik demands on Baltic Provinces.	743



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1919 Nov. 25 (3882)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Gade: Unwisdom of interfering in any formal way with problem of Bermondts's Russians; no objections, however, to unofficial advice given in line with U. S. policy.	743
Nov. 26	<i>From the Commissioner at Riga (tel.)</i> Indecision of delegates at Dorpat, hoping for favorable action on part of Associated Governments. Agreement for joint Polish, Latvian, and Lithuanian offensive against Bolsheviks. Esthonia's separate negotiations with Moscow. Bolshevik demand for free passage through Reval.	744
Nov. 27 (5437)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Message from Hoover's Child Fund representative (text printed) calling attention to movement to disband remainder of Russian Army and turn over supplies to Esthonian command. Suggestion that steps be taken to protect these and Viborg stocks from being misappropriated.	744
Nov. 28 (154)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Bitter feeling among White Russians against British, their indifference toward French, and a turning to Americans as only friends. Proposal of official statement of friendliness to White cause, for without U. S. support they will be forced to accept assistance from Germany.	745
Nov. 29 (5467)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Gade at Riga: Responsibility of Yudenitch for provisioning of Northwestern Army; his indecision as to next step because of insufficiency of supplies.	746
Dec. 3 (5537)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Consideration by Council of Heads of Delegations at Paris of relations between Yudenitch and Esthonia and decision to take steps to bring about agreement between them.	746
Dec. 13	<i>To the Commissioner at Riga (tel.)</i> Instructions informally to warn Esthonia that accession to Bolshevik proposal for free transit through Esthonia and use of Esthonian port would tend to nullify independence which Bolsheviks pretend to be willing to grant to Esthonia.	747
Dec. 13 (40)	<i>From the Consul at Reval (tel.)</i> From Gade: Esthonian reply to Paris stating Esthonia can not risk danger of not disarming Yudenitch's army, unless Associated Powers are willing to recognize Esthonian independence and give considerable support.	747
Dec. 15 (165)	<i>From the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Request for instructions regarding Yudenitch's appeal that Viborg stores, with exception of one week's supply for Petrograd, be sent to Reval for his army and for refugees.	748
Dec. 15	<i>To the Commissioner at Riga (tel.)</i> Instructions to cooperate with Imbrie and Miller in using Viborg and Reval stores for assisting Yudenitch's army and refugees in Esthonia.	748
Dec. 19	<i>To the Vice Consul at Viborg (tel.)</i> Instructions that Viborg stores should be sent to Reval for relief of Yudenitch's army and refugees.	749

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1919 Dec. 31	<i>To the Commissioner at Riga (tel.)</i> No objections to use of food supplies now at Reval for general and army relief; Miller to be so instructed.	749
1920 Jan. 1 (55)	<i>From the Commissioner at Riga (tel.)</i> Reported armistice between Esthonia and Bolsheviks to take effect January 3.	749

## CHAPTER V

## SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA AS REPORTED BY  
AMERICAN OBSERVERS

1919 Jan. 25 (461)	<i>To the Chargé in Russia (tel.)</i> Information that Consul Jenkins, with Randolph, Doolittle, Lehrs, and Burri, is being sent to Odessa to open consulate.	750
Feb. 14 (730)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Departure of field party for Odessa to report on political, economic, and military conditions in Southern Russia. Personnel and instructions; Lt. Col. E. F. Riggs, chief of mission.	750
Mar. 1 (21)	<i>Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Riggs to Tyler: Report of arrival of field party at Constantinople; separation into three parties going direct to Odessa, Ekaterinodar, and Tiflis.	751
Mar. 15	<i>The Chief of the Mission to Southern Russia to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Serious situation at Odessa; recommendations for Allied assistance in food supplies and for settlement of conflicting authorities, as French are backing Petlyura and British, Denikin. British opinion that weak Petlyura government is advance guard of Bolshevism.	751
Mar. 17 (1189)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Jenkins at Odessa: Report on various portions of South Russia as controlled by French, Greek, and Rumanian troops, by Volunteer Army of Denikin, by Petlyura, by Don Cossacks, and by Bolsheviks.	752
Mar. 26 (1329)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Jenkins at Odessa: Report on serious economic and financial situation, due mainly to speculation; information as to unsatisfactory military situation.	753
Mar. 28 (12)	<i>The Chief of the Mission to Southern Russia to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Churchill: Opinion that Russia cannot be occupied militarily by Allies and cannot be conquered by Cossacks or Siberians if peasants remain neutral. Suggestion that moral support of peasants be gained by Allied guaranty of land reforms in Russia; and that speculation be checked by Allied arrangements for supplies and their distribution.	755

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1919 Apr. 2 (12)	<i>From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)</i> News of evacuation of Odessa. Arrangements for Americans to board British warship pending arrival of U. S. ship.	757
Apr. 11 (1560)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Jenkins at Odessa: Withdrawal of Allied forces to Bessarabia and control of Odessa by local Bolsheviks; general mismanagement and poor morale of insufficient French forces; closing of consulate and placing of U. S. interests in hands of Swiss vice consul.	757
Apr. 11 (171)	<i>Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Berry to Churchill: Report on situation along various fronts: French evacuation of Odessa on April 5 without warning, deserting Greek and Volunteer Forces; evacuation of Crimea by Volunteer Forces, in consequence of French action.	758
Apr. 21 (172)	<i>Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Riggs to Tyler: Arrival at Ekaterinodar via Sevastopol, Yalta, and Novorossiisk. Evacuation of remainder of party to Constantinople.	759
Undated [Rec'd Apr. 22] (1729)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Jenkins' message (text printed) regarding evacuation from Crimea of former Russian Imperial family by British. Bolshevik occupation of practically all of Crimea and north coast of Azov including coal port of Donets Basin.	759
May 2	<i>The Consul General at Constantinople to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Burri's report (text printed) regarding situation in Kuban region, Denikin's army being strengthened by British supplies; Denikin's military plans and Bolshevik plans; complex political situation.	760
Undated [Rec'd May 3] (1939)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Jenkins' message (text printed) containing declaration by Volunteer Army (text printed) of purpose to overthrow Bolshevik anarchy and restore law and order in Russia with universal suffrage, local self-government, land reforms, etc., under united Russia.	761
Undated [Rec'd May 7] (2026)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Jenkins' message (text printed) reporting complete evacuation of Sevastopol, leaving Bolsheviks in control.	762
May 6 [??] (2027)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Jenkins' message (text printed) containing appeal for Red Cross assistance for Volunteer Army of North Caucasus.	762
June 7 (384)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Naval Station at Constantinople (tel.)</i> For Berry at Ekaterinodar: Inquiry regarding report of extermination at Novorossiisk of mutinous Russians repatriated from France; inquiries also regarding attitude of Volunteer Army and Kuban government toward Allied note to Kolchak.	762

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1919 June 23 (2735)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Return of Riggs to Paris, strongly recommending recognition of Kolchak. Reports of various sections of the field party.	763
Undated [Rec'd June 26] (2777)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Naval Station: Message from Ekaterinodar (text printed) containing Denikin's declaration of fealty to Kolchak as Supreme Governor of Russia and commander in chief of Army (text printed).	764
June 27 (943)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Telegram from Burri at Ekaterinodar (text printed) stating Volunteer Army government requests monthly supply of flour for industrial workers of Don Basin, payment in raw materials.	764
June 28 (963)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Departure of Bolsheviks from Crimea. Growing confidence of Volunteer Army, supported by British tanks.	764
June 30 (971)	<i>Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Berry at Ekaterinodar: Denial that Russian repatriates from France mutinied at Novorossiisk or were exterminated. Account of mutiny of Russian detachment on French front. Attitude of South Russia toward Allies' note to Kolchak and his acceptance of it.	765
July 12	<i>The Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference to the Secretariat of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note dated June 28 from delegations of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuanian Poles, Georgia, Republic of North Caucasus, Azerbaïdzhân and Poland at Paris (text printed) protesting intervention by Associated Governments in assisting Denikin as contrary to professed policy of right to self-determination of nations.	765
Aug. 20 (360)	<i>From the Commissioner at Constantinople (tel.)</i> Account of chaos and Red terror in Odessa as result of Bolshevik rule, and increasing opposition of peasants in neighboring villages to Bolshevik regime.	768
Aug. 20 (2886)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Request to be informed whether officers of U. S. military mission are operating with Denikin or elsewhere in South Russia; desire to know conditions they report.	769
Aug. 30 (3955)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Information that U. S. officers were part of field party sent out by Commission to observe conditions in South Russia, and that reports were of technical military nature.	769
Sept. 1 (6)	<i>From the High Commissioner at Constantinople (tel.)</i> From Ravndal: Capture of Odessa and Kiev from Bolsheviks; bitterness in Denikin circles because United States lends no aid; recommendation of appointment of U. S. economic commission for South Russia and exchange of goods for raw material.	770

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1919 Sept. 18 (4266)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Denikin's message to President Wilson (text printed) deploring withdrawal of South Russian field mission and requesting U. S. moral and material assistance in fight against Bolshevism.	771
Oct. 10 (4609)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Summary of telegram from Denikin dated September 26 (text printed) reporting the arrest and execution by the Bolsheviks of large numbers of persons in consequence of Denikin's advance north; and requesting Allies to take measures to prevent wholesale massacre.	772
Oct. 13 (229)	<i>To the Commissioner at Constantinople (tel.)</i> For Burri: Instructions to proceed to certain points in South Russia to report on political and economic conditions.	773
Oct. 20 (1805)	<i>To the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Government of Denikin's telegram concerning Bolshevik arrests and executions and to request Government to appeal to Bolsheviks through Danish Red Cross, or otherwise, with the hope of preventing additional acts of terror and barbarity. Information that Denikin has also been cautioned to prevent similar acts of barbarity by his followers.	773
Undated [Rec'd Oct. 26] (4835)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Ravndal at Constantinople: Progress of Volunteer Army, which is attracting widespread attention. Denikin's purpose to reconstitute Black Sea Fleet and undertake naval program. Advocacy of U. S. acceptance of mandate for Transcaucasia.	774
Nov. 12	<i>To the Secretary of War</i> Recommendation that shipments of surplus materials to South Russia be encouraged because of great need and because their exchange for raw products will assist rehabilitation of Russia.	775
Nov. 20 (265)	<i>From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)</i> Danish transmission of Bolshevik note (text printed) refusing to reply to question contained in appeal of Danish Red Cross, as beneath dignity, and calling attention to acts of ferocity committed by followers of Denikin, Kolchak, etc.	775
Nov. 24	<i>From the Secretary of War</i> Desire to cooperate in furnishing surplus stocks to inhabitants of Russia, as requested; information that contracts on favorable credit terms have already been made with cooperative societies and sales being made through Russian Embassy.	776
Undated [Rec'd Dec. 12] (1742)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> From Bristol at Constantinople: Recommendation that U. S. consul be sent to Odessa to assist in establishing regular trade. Report of sufficient food, but lack of clothing and manufactured articles.	776
Dec. 11 (108)	<i>From the High Commissioner at Constantinople (tel.)</i> Precarious position of Denikin. Bolshevik drive against Kharkov and peasant menace in rear. Denikin's chance to recover dependent upon military assistance from Poles; his refusal to promise them eastern Galicia as reward for such assistance.	777

## SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

REMONSTRANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AGAINST CREDIT SALES TO THE  
UKRAINE OF SURPLUS AMERICAN STOCKS IN FRANCE

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 June 11 (2515)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of Major Martin, U. S. A., on political and economic conditions in Galician Ukraine, expressing opinion that government under Petlyura is competent and effective and that sections of Ukraine under Petlyura and Holubowitz are non-Bolshevik. Opinion that this report should be accepted with considerable reserve.	778
Oct. 8 (3370)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Red Cross cablegram from Paris (text printed) announcing the sending of Red Cross mission to Ukraine to investigate conditions, and commenting on purchase of U. S. Army supplies by Ukrainian mission in Paris for Petlyura government. Inquiry as to what is Ukrainian mission and whether Red Cross mission has Polk's approval.	778
Oct. 17 (4700)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: No objections to Red Cross mission to Ukrain, whose report will be useful. Unrecognized status of Ukrainian mission to Paris. Opinion that sale of U. S. Army supplies to Ukrainian mission without asking views of Department was extraordinary action.	779
Oct. 21 (3512)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Polk: Inquiry as to details of supposed transaction between Ukrainian mission and U. S. military authorities. Request for Red Cross report on condition of Jews in Ukraine and practicability of relief.	780
Oct. 26 (4828)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Details of Liquidation Commission sale of U. S. surplus supplies to Ukrainian Republic; amount delivered; cancellation of delivery of motor equipment, due to French objection. Comment that Peace Commission was not consulted on transaction.	780
[Oct. 26] (4829)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Summary of Jadwin's report (text printed) relating Petlyura's loss of area, his relations with Germans, and declaration of war on Denikin; expansion of Denikin's area, repulsion of Bolsheviks at Kiev and Kursk, welcome extended him after reign of Red terror, and steps taken by him to protect Jews.	781
Oct. 29 (3595)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Inquiry whether Ukrainian Republic paid cash for U. S. surplus supplies, and, if not, what terms and securities were offered.	783
Oct. 29 (3596)	<i>To the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> U. S. general policy in respect to Ukraine, believing separatist movement to be result of Austrian and German propaganda, and favoring local autonomy under modern democratic government in Russia. Request for Jadwin's opinion of above views and of role Petlyura is playing.	783

## SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

REMONSTRANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AGAINST CREDIT SALES TO THE  
UKRAINE OF SURPLUS AMERICAN STOCKS IN FRANCE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Nov. 17	<i>From the Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Letter from chairman of Liquidation Commission dated November 12 (text printed) explaining details of sale of U. S. surplus supplies to Ukrainian Republic, action having been taken under suggestion of President Wilson in letter of March 24 (text printed), urgent representations by Hoover, and commission's own judgment after careful investigation.	78
Dec. 5 (5558)	<i>From the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From Polk: Report that bulk of U. S. surplus supplies sold to Ukrainian Republic is still stored in France; possibility that Ukrainians may liquidate such supplies and use funds for other purposes. Possible courses of action in order to prevent misuse of the supplies in view of the collapse of Petlyura movement and its anti-Polish and anti-Denikin trend.	78
Dec. 23 (9404)	<i>To the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Expression of regret over sale of U. S. supplies to Ukrainians and undesirability of their obtaining funds in France through sale of these supplies; suggestion that medical material be distributed in Russia by Red Cross; inquiry concerning method to prevent Ukrainian use of other supplies.	78
1920 Jan. 20 (196)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Summary of note from Ukrainian mission protesting the annulment of the contract for sale of U. S. surplus supplies to Ukrainian Republic, on assumption that the <i>de facto</i> government no longer existed. Request for advice as to reply.	78
Jan. 28 (207)	<i>To the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Ukrainian mission informally that matter rests in hands of Liquidation Commission and that Department can take no action.	79

RUSSIA





## CHAPTER I

### THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

#### Project for a Conference at Prinkipo between Delegates of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of all Groups Exercising Authority in Russia

861.00/3526: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, *December 24, 1918, 5 p.m.*

[Received 9.06 p.m.]

3394. The British, Italian, French Ministers and myself have received the following letter dated Stockholm December 23 signed: "Maxim Litvinoff, Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federative Republic of Soviets." Each of us is repeating this letter by cable to our respective governments with the request that we be instructed what, if any, reply shall be made to this communication which reads:

"The Sixth All Russian Congress of Soviets of November last reflecting the sincere desire of the Russian toiling masses to live in undisturbed peace and friendship with all the people of the world addressed to the governments of the Allied powers a formal offer of peace.<sup>1</sup> This offer has been repeated by the Soviets Hassock [*sic*] wireless a few days ago.<sup>2</sup>

I am told to inform you that I have been authorized by the Soviet Government to enter into preliminary peace negotiations with representative[s] of the Allied countries should their Governments reciprocate the desire of the Russian Republic of a peaceful settlement of all the outstanding questions which may give rise to a continuation of hostilities between the countries concerned.

I shall be glad if you will kindly bring the above declaration to the notice of your Government and also of the President of the United States now in France."

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<sup>1</sup> In *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supp. 1, vol. I, p. 484, is printed a note from the Soviet Foreign Commissariat based on the peace proposal of the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Nov. 6, 1918, above cited. The minutes of this congress may be found in *Shesti Vserossiiskii Chrezvychainyi S'ezd Sovetov . . . Stenographicheski Otchet* (Moscow, 1919). The peace proposal of the congress is also printed under date of Nov. 8 in *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika Novoishego Vremeni v Dogovorakh, Notakh i Deklaratsiyakh* (Moscow, 1926), pt. II, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in the Department files.

Litvinoff who has been in Stockholm about three weeks was prior to that time Bolshevik representative in London. Repeated to Paris. Copy to London.

MORRIS

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861.00/3526 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1918, 8 p.m.

14. For Secretary Lansing. Referring telegram 24th from Legation Stockholm regarding peace proposal of the Russian Federative Republic of Soviets. The Department believes it to be a matter for consideration by the Associated Governments and therefore, requests instructions as to what action, if any, should be taken by the Department here.

POLK

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861.00/3643

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 10

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to suggest to the United States Government the propriety of transmitting the following message to the Soviet Government at Moscow, to General Kolchak at Omsk, to General Denikin at Ekaterinburg, to Mons. Tschaikowsky at Archangel, and to the Governments of ex-Russian States:

"The Great Friendly Powers are about to assemble in Paris to work for a solution of problems arising out of the war and to bring about a settlement of international and national controversies that still survive it.

"One of their first tasks will be an endeavour to bring about peace in Russia, to reconcile conflicting national parties and peoples both in Russia and in adjacent states and territories and to bring succour to suffering populations.

"Pending decisions that will be taken in this sense the Great Friendly Powers call upon all the Governments, parties and peoples in states and territories in question to abstain from further aggressions hostilities and reprisals, and require them to keep the peace both at home and with their neighbours.

"If the aforesaid Governments and parties will immediately suspend hostilities on all fronts for the duration of the Peace Negotiations, even [*then*<sup>a</sup>] if they or any of them should desire to send

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<sup>a</sup> Correction on basis of further note from the British Chargé, no. 16, Jan. 4 (file no. 861.00/3607), not printed.

representatives to Paris to discuss with the Great Powers conditions of a permanent settlement, the Great Powers would be prepared to enter on such a discussion with them.

Message ends."

Some immediate action of this kind would appear to be necessary without awaiting the meeting of the Powers at Paris owing to the urgency of the appeals which are being received by His Majesty's Government from Lithuanians, Esthonians, etc., and the danger of their extermination within the next few weeks.

WASHINGTON, *January 3, 1919.*

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763.72119/3260 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *January 4, 1919, 4 a.m.*

[Received 8:43 a.m.]

145. Under date of December 24, 5 p.m., Legation Stockholm informed the Mission that the British, Italian, French Ministers and himself had received letters dated Stockholm, December 23, from Litvinoff, a plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation of Soviets, expressing a desire to enter upon preliminary peace negotiations.

For your information. This matter is receiving consideration.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/3622a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1919, 5 p.m.*

110. For the Secretary of State:

Before you left Washington, you discussed with the President a declaration by him of the attitude of this Government towards the Bolshevik authorities in Russia, and found that the President preferred to withhold any separate statement by himself until he could discuss the matter with the leaders of the Associated Governments. The reports we receive and which are repeated to you by our Embassies and Legations, show the growing menace of Bolshevism outside of Russia. I believe no one can take the lead so well as the President in defining the attitude of the Associated Governments on this question and would be glad to know what steps, if any, in that direction have been taken.

POLK

Paris Peace Conference 184.1—Buckler, W. H.

*The Diplomatic Secretary, Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harri-  
son), to the Secretary-General, Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Grew)*

[PARIS,] *January 9, 1919.*

In accordance with directions given orally by Colonel House last evening, January 8th, 7:00 P.M., I telephoned to the Embassy in London to Mr. Butler Wright, Counsellor of the Embassy, informing him that it was the desire of the President that Mr. Buckler<sup>4</sup> proceed at the earliest possible moment to Stockholm, in conformity with the instructions given him during his recent visit to Paris.

I informed Mr. Wright of the desire of the Commissioners that Mr. Buckler in leaving Sweden proceed either through Germany or through Holland to Lausanne where he should arrive, if possible, by the 20th instant.

L. H.

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/2

B. C.—A 1

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at  
the Quai d'Orsay on Sunday, January 12, [1919,] at 4 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Bearn, Capt. Portier.—*Great Britain*: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lt.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey.—*Italy*: Signor Orlando, Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, Major A. Jones.—*United States*: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier.—*Interpreter*: M. Mantoux.

(NOTE: This meeting was a continuation of a meeting of the Supreme War Council commenced earlier in the afternoon, *procès-verbal* of which has been prepared separately<sup>5</sup>)

. . . . .

The representation of Russia at the Conference.

M. SONNINO said that the whole question of Bolshevism was involved.

M. PICHON did not agree. He pointed out that there were various representatives of Russian opinion in Paris—for example, M.

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<sup>4</sup> William H. Buckler, special assistant in the Embassy in Great Britain.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

Sazonoff,<sup>6</sup> Prince Lvoff<sup>6</sup> and others, including Socialists, who represented every shade of opinion. These asked to be represented. His opinion was that this could not be done. We should first have to acknowledge the Omsk Government, whom they came to represent. At present it seemed impossible to recognise this Government as the Government of Russia. It was not strong enough to be regarded as representative of Russia as a whole. But this was no reason why these personalities should not be allowed to put their views unofficially. His suggestion, then, was that Russia as a State should have no representation, but that the Conference should be allowed to hear such persons as he had mentioned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this had to be dealt with in one way or another, because at present the Allies had got themselves in a fix for the reason that they had no definite policy in Russia. They ought to decide whether to withdraw their troops or to reinforce them. Unless reinforced, they were of no use whatsoever. He had nothing to say against these people, Prince Lvoff, &c. We were told they represented every shade of opinion. As a matter of fact, they represented every opinion except the prevalent opinion in Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out it was prevalent in some respects.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he feared the fact that it was prevalent must be accepted. The peasants accepted Bolshevism for the same reason as the peasants had accepted it in the French Revolution, namely, that it gave them land. The Bolsheviks were the *de facto* Government. We had formally recognised the Czar's Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason had been that it was the *de facto* Government. We recognised the Don Government, the Archangel Government and the Omsk Government, although none of them were good, but we refused to recognise the Bolsheviks. To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people was contrary to every principle for which we had fought. It was possible that the Bolsheviks did not represent Russia. But certainly Prince Lvoff did not: neither did Savinkoff, although he was a good man. The British Government made exactly the same mistake when they said that the emigrés represented France. This led them into a war which lasted about twenty-five years. The Russian peasants probably felt towards Trotsky much as the French peasants did towards Robespierre. This question must now be settled. He hoped that the Allies would not separate and announce that they

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<sup>6</sup> S. D. Sazonov, who had been Tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-1916, served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Volunteer Army of Denikin and later for Kolchak. Prince George E. Lvov, from March to May 1917 Russian Prime Minister, was at this time head of the Russian Political Bureau in Paris, of which Sazonov was a member.

had made perpetual peace when Siberia, which formed about half Asia, and Russia, which formed about half Europe, were still at war. He, himself, would make proposals in due course, but, in the meantime, he wishes to protest against an attempt to select representatives for some hundred million people.

M. PICHON quite agreed that the persons he had named should not be admitted as representatives of Russia. He only wished to take advantage of their presence to hear what they had to bring forward.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that to do so would give the public the impression that we considered they represented Russia. The fact that they had been seen by the Conference would be known. If we wished to hear their views, we could obtain a memorandum from them or have a private conversation.

M. PICHON agreed.

Conclusion: It was agreed that Russia should not be represented at the Conference, but that the persons named by M. Pichon and others could be interviewed personally or asked to supply memoranda.

. . . . .  
VILLA MAJESTIC,  
PARIS, *January 12, 1919.*

861.00/3628b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1919, 8 p.m.*

200. For the Secretary of State: The following memorandum was presented to me by the British Chargé d'Affaires on January 3d:

[Here follows text of memorandum printed *ante*, page 2.]

This message I regret I did not forward at once as I expected that the same proposal would be presented to the President or the Commission in Paris, as I understood the whole question was being considered there. See your cable concerning consideration of Bolshevik peace proposals.<sup>7</sup>

The newspaper men asked me Saturday afternoon January 11th about Pichon's answer,<sup>8</sup> which I had not then seen and did not know of, and whether we had received any proposal regarding Bolshevik delegates being sent to Paris. As their question was not clear, I

<sup>7</sup> Dated Jan. 4 (no. 145), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> See memorandum from the British Chargé, no. 38, Jan. 13, *infra*.

did not connect their inquiry with the British memorandum and accordingly replied we had received no proposal for the Bolsheviks to be allowed to send delegates to Paris. After seeing Mr. Pichon's statement in the morning papers, I have now announced that we have the memorandum from the British Embassy and that it was not sent to Paris and am assuming full responsibility for the misunderstanding. My announcement<sup>9</sup> is being repeated to you.

I told the British Chargé d'Affaires at the time that personally I did not think the statement would have any effect on the Bolsheviks and would only discourage the Omsk Government and others and that I thought it would be better for the Allies and the United States to try first to settle on some policy before making any statement.

Confidentially, I would be interested to know how Mr. Pichon's statement was made without, apparently, discussing question with you.

POLK

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861.00/3659

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 38

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and, with reference to the Embassy's memorandum No. 10 of January 3rd with regard to a message to be sent to the various Governments in Russia, has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government have received a communication from the French Government stating that they cannot agree to the proposal, as by doing so it would necessitate the recognition of the Russian Soviet Government which would be contrary to the principles which have previously controlled the action of the Allied Governments in Russia and which would also help the Bolshevik propaganda. In the opinion of the French Government the Allied Governments should continue to furnish the different Governments fighting against the Bolsheviks, with money and arms and such military support as may be practicable. The French Government consider that the Soviet Government will ultimately collapse if the Allied Governments continue to refuse to treat with them.

WASHINGTON, *January 13, 1919.*

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<sup>9</sup> Not printed.



861.00/3638 : Telegram

*The Danish Chargé in Russia (Nordlien) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PETROGRAD, undated.

[Received January 16, 1919, 10:45 a.m.]

Tchitcherin begs to transmit following.<sup>10</sup>

[“]Radiotelegram received from Lyons on January 12th communicates declaration made by Senator Hitchcock, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, concerning the reason of American troops being sent to Russia.<sup>11</sup> The first reason given is that American troops were to prevent the establishment of a German submarine base at Archangel. Whether previously justified or not at any rate at present this reason exists no more. As to the second, **guarding Allied stores, already in the spring of last year we entered into negotiations with the view guaranteeing the interests of the Entente Governments in this respect and we are ready now to give every reasonable satisfaction upon this question.** As to the alleged danger of these stores falling into the hands of Germany, whether previously justified or not, this fear is now without object. The third reason given, **maintaining a gateway for the arrival and departure of diplomats and others, we think that the best way to attain that end is to enter into an agreement with our Government.** The American Ambassador, Mr. Francis, at the time when he left our country could fully unprevented depart or arrive, we had only asked him not to **remain in Vologda for the sole reason that his residence there was accompanied with great danger for his personal safety and we offered him as a most appropriate residence some villa in Moscow or in its suburbs.** For the fourth reason, the **guaranteeing of the safety of the Tcheck Slovacks; there is nothing to prevent this being attained in full by an agreement with our own Government.** We have officially proposed to the Tchecho Slovacks their passage home through Russia under conditions securing their safety [and] ours and having [*we have*] come to a complete agreement with the President of the Tchecho Slovak National Council in Russia, Professor Maxa. He has now gone to Bohemia to communicate our proposals to the Checho Slovak Government. Last reason given by Senator Hitchcock is the preventing of the formation of an army composed of German and Austrian prisoners. At present the only thing preventing all confined Austrians returning home is the presence of Entente troops or of White Guards protected by them passing [*blocking?*] the way to the prisoners. We are therefore at a loss to understand how the maintenance of American troops in Russia

<sup>10</sup> The Russian text of Chicherin's note in *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika*, pt. II, p. 212, is dated Jan. 12.

<sup>11</sup> *Congressional Record*, Jan. 9, 1919, vol. 57, pt. 2, pp. 1161 ff.

can be justified. As we can see from this same radiotelegram received from Lyons our perplexity is shared by prominent leaders of the principal political parties of America. They expressed the desire that American troops should be withdrawn from Russia as soon as possible. We share their desire of normal relations between our two countries being reconstituted and we are ready to remove all what can be of hindrance to such normal relations. It is not the first time that we made such a declaration. We sent a communication to that effect through the Norwegian Minister in Russia.<sup>12</sup> When a week later the Norwegian Attaché, Mr. Christensen, left Moscow we made through him verbal overture in order to put an end to bloodshed. On November 3d we invited all the neutral representatives then in Moscow and communicated through their medium written proposals to the powers of the Entente<sup>13</sup> with view to open negotiations to prevent any further bloodshed between our armies. In November, Congress of the Soviet of Russia declared before the face of the world to the powers of the Entente that it proposed to them the opening of peace negotiations and this declaration was spread by radio to all stations.<sup>14</sup> On December 23d our representative Litvinoff informed the Entente Ministers in Stockholm once more the desire of the Russian Government of settling all outstanding questions.<sup>15</sup> In addition to this circular letter he wired to President Wilson in London suggesting a peaceful issue.<sup>16</sup> It lies therefore with you, not with us, if such a settlement has not yet been arranged. The perplexity about the presence of American troops in Russia has also been shared by the American officers and soldiers themselves and we have even had opportunities of hearing from some of them directly expressions of this perplexity. When we pointed out to them that in fact their presence aimed at an attempt to put the Russian people under the yoke of the oppressors which it had cast off, the result of this disclosure was not unfavorable to the personal relation of these American citizens to ourselves. We hope that the peaceful views of the able owned [*sic*] Senators will be shared by all Americans and we request the American Government kindly to make known the place and date for opening peace negotiations with our representatives. The Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs, Tchitcherin.["]

This telegram sent to Foreign Office, Copenhagen, and Washington.

V. NORDLIEN

<sup>12</sup> See telegrams nos. 1290 and 1297 from the Minister in Norway, Oct. 29 and Nov. 2, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 448-455.

<sup>13</sup> See telegram of Nov. 5, 1918, from the Minister in Norway, *ibid.*, p. 471.

<sup>14</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Transmitted in telegram no. 3394 from the Minister in Sweden, Dec. 24, 1918, *ante*, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Not found in the Department files. See quotation by L. Martens, p. 138.

763.72119/3457

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>17</sup>

No. 43

## MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government have received from the Russian representative in London a copy of a telegram from the Omsk Government, urging that when the Russian question is discussed at the Peace Conference, their representatives should be permitted to be present. The telegram states that the list of the representatives of the Omsk Government is being prepared, and urges that the discussion of the Russian question should be delayed until they are able to arrive at Paris. It is understood that the situation in Russia and the policy of the Allies in regard thereto will be discussed at an early meeting of the Conference, and no doubt a decision will then be taken as to the recognition of the Omsk Government. A decision in favour of recognition would grant the principle of representation at the Conference, and the delegates would thereby be placed on a different footing to their present one. His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris has been directed to inform the French Government of the request from the Government of Omsk and of the views of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1919.*

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/7

B. C.-3

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, January 16, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.*

## [Extracts]

PRESENT.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, Captain A. Portier.—*Great Britain*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Captain E. Abraham.—*Italy*: Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, Major A. Jones.—*United States of America*: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier.—*Japan*: M. Matsui, Viscount Chinda.—*Interpreter*: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

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<sup>17</sup> Repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in telegram no. 316, Jan. 20, 1919, 2 p.m.

## 3. Russia

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the plan put forward by the British Government<sup>18</sup> had been misunderstood in many quarters. It had never been suggested that the Bolshevik Government should be recognized to the extent of offering them a seat at the Peace Conference. It was only proposed that a truce among the various warring factions in Russia should be suggested. When this truce had been made, representatives of the various Governments should be invited to come to Paris to explain their position and receive from the Allies, if possible, some suggestions for the accommodation of their differences. The British Government was in complete accord with the French Government that the Russians could not be put on the same footing as Belgium, for instance, and M. Pichon had been misled if he thought that the British Government meant to offer them membership in the Conference. He made this proposal for the following reasons:

(a) We did not know the facts about Russia. Differing reports were received from our representatives in Russia, and often reports from the same representative varied from day to day. It was clear that, unless we knew the facts, we should not be in a position to form a correct judgment.

(b) On one subject there could certainly be complete agreement, to wit, that the condition of Russia was extremely bad. There was misgovernment and starvation, and all the suffering resulting from both. It was impossible to know which party was gaining the upper hand, but our hopes that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had certainly been disappointed. Bolshevism appeared to be stronger than ever. Mr. Lloyd George quoted a report from the British Military Authorities in Russia, who could not be suspected of leanings towards Bolshevism, to the effect that the Bolshevik Government was stronger now than it had been some months previously. The peasants feared that all other parties would, if successful, restore the ancient regime and deprive them of the land which the Revolution had put into their hands.

(c) As to the Ukraine, where we had supposed a firm Government had been established, our information was that an adventurer with a few thousand men had overturned it with the greatest ease. This insurrection had a Bolshevik character, and its success made it clear that the Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism that we had imagined. The same movement was therefore beginning in the Ukraine which had been completed in Great Russia. The former Government of the Ukraine had been a Government of big

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<sup>18</sup> In note from the British Chargé, no. 10, Jan. 3, p. 2.

landlords only maintained in power by German help. Now that the Germans had withdrawn, the peasants had seized their opportunity. Were we going to spend our resources in order to back a minority of big landlords against an immense majority of peasants? There were three policies from which to choose.

(i) We could say that Bolshevism was a movement as dangerous to civilization as German militarism had been, and that we must therefore destroy it. Did anyone seriously put forward this policy? Was anyone prepared to carry it out? He believed that no one could be found to do so. The Germans, at the time when they needed every available man to reinforce their attack on the Western front, had been forced to keep about a million men to garrison a few provinces of Russia which were a mere fringe of the whole country; and, moreover, at that moment Bolshevism was weak and disorganized. Now it was strong and had a formidable army. Was anyone of the Western Allies prepared to send a million men into Russia? He doubted whether a thousand would be willing to go. All reports tended to show that the Allied troops in Siberia and in Northern Russia were most unwilling to continue the campaign and determined to return to their homes. To set Russia in order by force was a task which he for one would not undertake on behalf of Great Britain, and he questioned whether any other Power would undertake it.

(ii) The second policy was a policy of insulation, the policy known as "cordon sanitaire." This policy meant the siege of Bolshevik Russia, that is to say, the Russia that had no corn, but a large famished population. These people were dying by thousands, if not by hundreds of thousands, of famine. Petrograd had been reduced from the proportions of a great city to those of a moderate town. Our blockade of Russia would lead to the killing, not of the ruffians enlisted by the Bolsheviks, but of the ordinary population, with whom we wish to be friends. This was a policy which, if only on grounds of humanity, we could not support. It might be suggested that the continuance of this policy in Russia would lead to the overthrow of the Bolsheviks; but who in Russia was able to overthrow them? General Knox<sup>19</sup> reported that the Czecho-Slovaks were tainted with Bolshevism and could not be trusted neither could the Russian troops of Kolchak. He had just seen a map revealing the area held by Denikin. He occupied with an effective force of perhaps 40,000 men what might be described as a little backyard near the Black Sea. Denikin was said to have recognized Kolchak, but he was quite unable to get into touch with him, as an

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<sup>19</sup> Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F. Knox, in command of the British forces in Siberia.

immense Bolshevik area intervened between them. Kolchak, moreover, appeared to pursue the revival of the old regime in Russia; hence the lukewarmness of the Czecho-Slovaks in his cause. They were unwilling to fight in order to set up another Tzarist regime. So also were the British. This would not be helping to create a new world.

(*iii*) The only other way he could think of was the plan he had proposed—that of asking representatives of the various Russian Governments to meet in Paris after a truce among themselves. The name of M. Sazonoff had been mentioned as representing the Government at Omsk. M. Sazonoff had been long out of Great Russia. It was questionable whether he knew anything of the conditions at Omsk. He was a strong partisan, and might as well be consulted on the present temper of Russia as the "New York Tribune" on the opinions of Mr. Wilson. We could not leave Paris at the conclusion of the Peace Conference congratulating ourselves on having made a better world, if at that moment half of Europe and half of Asia were in flames. It had been alleged that if Bolshevik emissaries came to France and England they would proselytise the French and British peoples. It was possible that Bolshevism might gain ground in these countries, but it would not be as a consequence of the visit of a few Russian emissaries. He himself had no fears on this score. Moreover, conditions could be imposed on the delegates, and if they failed to observe them they could be sent back to Russia. With this threat over them it was most likely that they would avoid giving offense as they would be anxious to explain their case.

M. PICHON asked whether the meeting would care to hear M. Noulens, the French Ambassador in Russia, who had just returned from Archangel. If so, Mr. Noulens could attend the meeting on the following day, and would be able to give very interesting information concerning Bolshevism.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his mind there was no possible answer to the view expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. This view corresponded exactly with the information received from Russia by the United States Government. There was certainly a latent force behind Bolshevism which attracted as much sympathy as its more brutal aspects caused general disgust. There was throughout the world a feeling of revolt against the large vested interests which influenced the world both in the economic and in the political sphere. The way to cure this domination was in his opinion, constant discussion and a slow process of reform; but the world at large had grown impatient of delay. There were men in the United States of the finest temper, if not of the finest judgment, who were

in sympathy with Bolshevism, because it appeared to them to offer that regime of opportunity to the individual which they desired to bring about. In America considerable progress had been made in checking the control of capital over the lives of men and over Government; yet, even there, labor and capital were not friends. The vast majority who worked and produced were convinced that the privileged minority would never yield them their rights. Unless some sort of partnership between these two interests could be obtained society would crumble. Bolshevism was therefore vital because of these genuine grievances. The seeds of Bolshevism could not flourish without a soil ready to receive them. If this soil did not exist, Bolshevism could be neglected. British and American troops were unwilling to fight in Russia because they feared their efforts might lead to the restoration of the old order, which was even more disastrous than the present one. He recollected making a casual reference of sympathy to the distressed people in Russia, in a speech mainly dealing with other topics, to a wealthy audience in America. The enthusiasm evinced by this remark had surprised him, especially as coming from such an audience, and this incident remained in his mind as an index of the world's sympathies. These sympathies were against any restoration of the old regime. We should be fighting against the current of the times if we tried to prevent Russia from finding her own path in freedom. Part of the strength of the Bolshevik leaders was doubtless the threat of foreign intervention. With the help of this threat they gathered the people round them. The reports of the American representatives in Russia were to this effect. He thought, therefore, that the British proposal contained the only suggestion that led anywhere. If the Bolsheviks refrained from invading Lithuania, Poland, Finland, &c., he thought we should be well advised to allow as many groups as desired to do so to send representatives to Paris. We should then try to reconcile them, both mutually and with the rest of the world.

M. PICHON again suggested that before coming to a decision the meeting should hear M. Noulens, whose news from Russia was fresh.

BARON SONNINO suggested that M. de Scavenius, who had been Danish Minister in Petrograd and was now in Paris, could also give very valuable information.

(It was decided that M. Noulens and M. de Scavenius should be invited to attend the meeting on the following day at 10.30 a.m.)

VILLA MAJESTIC,

PARIS, *January 16, 1919.*

861.00/3664 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 6:34 p.m.]

330. Your 200, January 12, 8 p.m. Replying to your confidential inquiry contained in last sentence, can only say that explanation of publicity here is to be found in internal political situation.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 861.00/136 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, January 18, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received in Paris January 19, 4:45 p.m.]

116. From Buckler for Secretary Lansing, to be decoded by or under the supervision of Grew or Harrison:

As [I leave] today for Paris via Basle, and as my journey across Germany may be delayed, the following summary is submitted pending full report:

I saw Litvinoff on January 14th, 15th and 16th, explaining I was merely a private telephone without authority to make proposals of any kind. He agreed that our talk should be confidential.

The Soviet Government, he declared, is anxious for permanent peace and fully indorses his telegram to the President of December 24.<sup>20</sup> They detest the military preparations and costly campaigns now forced upon Russia after four years of exhausting war and wish to ascertain whether the Allies and the United States desire peace. If they do, it can easily be negotiated, for the Soviet Government is prepared to compromise on all points, including the Russian foreign debt, protection to existing foreign enterprises and the granting of new concessions in Russia. Details as to possible compromises cannot now be given because Litvinoff has no idea of what claims the Allies will present nor of what resources Russia will have wherewith to satisfy those claims. As stated, these data are available, the particulars can be worked out by experts and on all points. The conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Government is unquestionable.

He showed me an open wireless telegram just received from Tchitcherine affirming the willingness of the government to conciliate on the question of the foreign debt. Litvinoff and his associates fully

<sup>20</sup> Not found in the Department files. See quotation by L. Martens, p. 138.



realize that for a long time Russia will need expert assistance and advice especially in technical and financial matters and that she cannot get on without foreign machinery and manufactured imports. If peace were once made, Russian Bolshevik propaganda in foreign countries would cease at once. The war declared on Russia by the Allies called forth that revolutionary propaganda as a measure of retaliation just as it has produced violence and terror in other (apparent omission). These [activities?] will all cease as soon as the war stops. Against Germany propaganda has been freely used but militarist Germany was till recently Russia's most dangerous enemy and was really at war with her notwithstanding the nominal peace of Brest Litovsk. During the eight months in which Litvinoff was Russian representative he conducted [no?] political propaganda except defense of his government against attack and everything issued by him was printed in England. This the Foreign Office which seized all his papers can confirm. Russians realize that in certain western countries conditions are not favorable for a revolution of the Russian type. No amount of propaganda can produce such conditions. If Russia could make peace with the Allies these results would immediately follow:

1st. An amnesty would be extended to Russians who have been hostile to the Soviet Government and bitterness against them would soon disappear. Such persons being few in number would be allowed to leave Russia if they chose.

2nd. The intrinsic weakness of the forces opposed to the Soviet Government, South Russia, Siberia, and Archangel, would at once be revealed. These represent only a minority in each district and have owed their local successes solely to Allied support.

3rd. The present hostility toward Russia of Finland and other countries needing Russian products would speedily vanish. Russians have no imperialistic designs on Finland, Poland or Ukraine and wish only to give them full rights of self-determination, but so long as foreign powers support the capitalist classes there Russia feels justified in supporting the working classes in these countries.

Litvinoff does not deny the many Soviet blunders but says that the system has worked well considering the enormous difficulties faced during the past year and that its efficiency is constantly improving. The peasant cooperatives now working with the Soviet are managing well the distribution of food. If this new system were now overthrown by force, more anarchy and starvation must ensue. Insofar as the League of Nations can prevent war without encouraging reaction, it can count on the support of the Soviet Government.

So much for Litvinoff. The following information was given to me by Arthur Ransome, *Daily News* correspondent, who left Moscow last August but has kept constant contact with Bolsheviks

in Stockholm and knows their views intimately. He believes they would compromise as to the Ural and other frontiers, a point on which I pressed L. but got no definite answer beyond a claim that all Siberia must be Russian. Ransome also believes that continued intervention by the Entente can in time smash the Soviet power. When however this has been accomplished intervention on a still larger scale must continue in an indefinite period in order to cure the inevitable anarchy. The Soviet Government is the only one showing capacity to hold the Russian people and no successor to it could exist without military support. This fact and the discontent certain to be caused in Entente countries by such prolonged military effort are fully appreciated by a large class of Bolsheviks, who oppose Tchitcherin's and Litvinoff's plans for compromise and hope for more active Allied intervention. The continuance of such intervention plays into the hands of these extremists whereas a policy of agreement with the Soviet Government will counteract their influence, will strengthen the moderates and by reviving trade and industry will procure prosperity, the best of all antidotes to Bolshevism.

If you care to bring Ransome to Paris he could inform you almost as well as Litvinoff respecting the Soviet Government attitude on any question.

Since L. has for a month been deprived of mail and of wireless cipher, no effective negotiation can begin until the Allies arrange with Sweden and Finland so that he may communicate confidentially with his government; and since he fears expulsion at any moment from Sweden this can be arranged without delay if negotiation is contemplated. As Litvinoff is the only possible channel for such negotiation, as the Legation at Stockholm may not appear to you a suitable intermediary and as the journey from here to Paris takes three and a half days, I await your instructions here in case you should wish me to return to Stockholm. If you wish me to come to Paris please instruct me as promptly as possible.

OSBORNE

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/137: Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, *January 19, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received in Paris January 20, 10:25 a.m.]

118. From Buckler for Colonel House.

Supplementing Legation's 116 of yesterday, the following is an estimate of the situation based on information gathered at Stockholm

and here. Military intervention and occupation of Russia even if ultimately successful can only succeed at an indefinite date in the future, meanwhile war conditions fostering Bolshevism there and elsewhere will continue.

Agreement with Russia can take place at once, obviating conquest and policing and reviving normal conditions as disinfectant against Bolshevism.

Despite guarded language of my Stockholm friend, I am convinced that if we do not greatly curtail Russian territory, we can make a fair bargain regarding foreign debt and foreign interests. If Russia loses Siberia and coal and oil fields, the terms granted as to debt will be proportionately less good.

If the Allies boldly say, "We are now convinced that the Soviet Government has a firm hold on the Russian people and will recognize it upon conditions, but we shall not drive a Brest Litovsk bargain, we contemplate generous treatment and expect the same in return," such an attitude will pay both in the long run and at once, by strengthening the moderates like Tchitcherine and Litvinoff, it will drag the Soviet movement to the right, and keep in power men who see that foreign capital and industry must be fairly treated.

To embitter Russia by a repetition of German territorial rapacity would mean worse terms for Allied interests there.

Doctor Davidson, Major Wardwell's<sup>21</sup> former assistant, who left Moscow only last November, fully confirms the account in the *Times*, January 10th, page 9, of the increasing strength and efficiency of the Soviet Government.

OSBORNE

Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/11

B. C.-6

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 21, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*America, United States of:* President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Col. U. S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison.—*British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lieut.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Secretary, War Cabinet, Mr. H. Norman, Capt. E. Abraham.—*France:* M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister for War, M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, Capt. A. Portier.—*Italy:* Signor Orlando, President of the Council, His Excellency Baron Sonnino,

<sup>21</sup> Maj. Allen Wardwell in May 1918 succeeded Col. Raymond Robins as head of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Aldrovandi, Major A. Jones.—  
*Japan*: Baron Makino, His Excellency M. Matsui, M. Saburi.—  
*Interpreter*: Professor P. J. Mantoux

### 13. Bolshevik overtures

PRESIDENT WILSON read to the meeting the telegraphic report annexed (Annex "A") from Mr. Butler [*Buckler*], who had interviewed Litvinoff in Stockholm.<sup>22</sup>

(It was agreed that this letter should also be translated and discussed at the afternoon meeting.)

14. . . .

VILLA MAJESTIC,  
 PARIS, *January 21, 1919.*

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/12

B. C. 6 A

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 21, 1919, at 3 p.m.*

[Extract]

PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Colonel U. S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Mr. E. Phipps, Major A. M. Caccia, M.V.O.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, Captain A. Portier.—*Italy*: Signor Orlando, His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, Major A. Jones.—*Japan*: Baron Makino, His Excellency M. Matsui, M. Saburi.—*Interpreter*: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

#### 1. Situation in Russia

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had met together to decide what could be done in Russia under present circumstances.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in order to have something definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George and to propose a modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest that the various organised groups in Russia should be asked to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some

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<sup>22</sup>The report (not here printed) consisted of Mr. Buckler's two telegrams transmitted by the Chargé in Denmark, nos. 116 and 118, Jan. 18 and Jan. 19, *ante*, pp. 15, 17.

other place, such as Salonica, convenient of approach, there to meet such representatives as might be appointed by the Allies, in order to see whether they could draw up a programme upon which agreement could be reached.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the advantage of this would be that they could be brought straight there from Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other countries.

M. SONNINO said that some of the representatives of the various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, M. Sazonoff. Why should these not be heard?

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the various parties should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable to get all these representatives in one place, and still better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close comparison of views.

Mr. BALFOUR said that a further objection to M. Sonnino's plan was that if M. Sazonoff was heard in Paris, it would be difficult to refuse to hear the others in Paris also, and M. Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these representatives in Paris.

M. SONNINO explained that all the Russian parties had some representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not wish to hear.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that the Bolsheviki were the very people some of them wished to hear.

M. SONNINO continuing, said that they had heard M. Litvinoff's statements that morning. The Allies were now fighting against the Bolsheviki, who were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to hear them with the others.

Mr. BALFOUR remarked that the essence of President Wilson's proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and the same time.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the acceptance of M. Sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear the people who at the present moment were actually controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau's views, they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevik representatives to Salonica, or perhaps to Lemnos. It was absolutely necessary to endeavour to make peace. The report read by President Wilson that morning went to show that the Bolsheviki were not convinced of the error of their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to terms.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men in opposition

to them. One of the things that was clear in the Russian situation was that by opposing Bolshevism with arms they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. The Allies were making it possible for Bolsheviks to argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and so bring about a reaction. If it could be shown that this was not true and that the Allies were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the moral forces of this argument would disappear. The allegation that the Allies were against the people and wanted to control their affairs provided the argument which enabled them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which they felt for the Bolsheviks, and see the representatives of all organised groups in one place, he thought it would bring about a marked reaction against Bolshevism.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in principle, he did not favour conversation with the Bolsheviks; not because they were criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level by saying that they were worthy of entering into conversation with us. The Bolshevik danger was very great at the present moment. Bolshevism was spreading. It had invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and that very morning they had received very bad news regarding its spread to Budapest and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and Hungary and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the cleverness with which the Bolsheviks were attempting to lay a trap for the Allies. When the Bolsheviks first came into power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Governments on questions of principle, but now they offered funds and concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not say how valueless their promises were, but if they were listened to, the Bolsheviks would go back to their people and say: "We offered them great principles of justice, and the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer money, and they are ready to make peace."

He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy solution. After four years of war, and the losses and sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world peace could not await Russia's final avatar. Had time been available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually

sound men representing common sense would come to the top. But when would that be? He would make no forecast. Therefore they must press for an early solution.

To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporise and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he felt compelled to make some concessions, as it was essential that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement amongst them. The concession came easier after having heard President Wilson's suggestion. He thought that they should make a clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and especially that they had no intention of restoring Czardom. The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a strong Government, they proposed to call together representatives of all parties to a conference. He would beg President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the position of the Allies to the whole world, including the Russians and the Germans.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and gave notice that he wished to withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson's.

Mr. BALFOUR said that he understood that all these people were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought the Bolsheviks would refuse, and by their refusal they would be put themselves in a very bad position.

M. SONNINO said that he did not agree that the Bolsheviks would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolsheviks promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect together all the anti-Bolshevik parties and help them to make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves not to serve the forces of reaction and especially not to touch the land question thereby depriving the Bolsheviks of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges he would be prepared to help them.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE enquired how this help would be given.

M. SONNINO replied that help would be given with soldiers to a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. For instance, Poland asked for weapons and munitions; the Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong Government at present existed was that no party could risk taking the offensive against

Bolshevism without the assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties of order could possibly succeed without the help of the Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside all pride in the matter. He would point out that, for Italy, and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought that even a partial recognition of the Bolsheviks would strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his country.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to put one or two practical questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some 15,000 to 20,000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be required, in order to keep the anti-Bolshevik Governments from dissolution. And General Franchet d'Esperey also insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the British tried to send any more troops there, there would be mutiny.

M. SONNINO suggested that volunteers might be called for.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it would be impossible to raise 150,000 men in that way. He asked, however, what contributions America, Italy and France would make towards the raising of this army.

PRESIDENT WILSON and M. CLEMENCEAU each said none.

M. ORLANDO agreed that Italy could make no further contributions.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Bolsheviks had an army of 300,000 men and would, before long, be good soldiers, and to fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be required. Who would feed, equip and pay them? Would Italy, or America, or France, do so? If they were unable to do that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that they would accept President Wilson's proposal as it now stood.

M. ORLANDO agreed that the question was a very difficult one for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading the sanitarians set up a *cordon sanitaire*. If similar measures could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of depression, due to war weariness. But Bolsheviks could never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, such as might



be produced either by profound patriotic disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, he would insist that all possible measures should be taken to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration of repressive measures. He thought two methods were possible—either the use of physical force or the use of moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's objection to the use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could continue in anarchy, and that an end must eventually come; but they could not wait; they could not proceed to make peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a possible solution. It did not involve entering into negotiations with the Bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a view of finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was prepared, therefore, to support it.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked for the views of his Japanese colleagues.

BARON MAKINO said that, after carefully considering the various points of view put forward, he had no objections to make regarding the conclusion reached. He thought that was the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the representatives of the Allied Powers if the Bolsheviks accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted upon their principles. He thought they should under no circumstances countenance Bolshevik ideas. The conditions in Siberia east of the Baikal had greatly improved. The objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the emissaries of the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely report back to their Governments the conditions found.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE asked that that question be further considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers should be able to establish an agreement if they were able to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in reaching an agreement on the subject of the organisation of a Constituent Assembly, they should be au-

thorised to accept such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the emissaries might be furnished with a body of instructions.

Mr. BALFOUR expressed the view that abstention from hostile action against their neighbours should be made a condition of their sending representatives to this meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the manifesto to the Russian parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They should say to the Russians: "You are threatened by famine. We are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see what can be done to remove the menace of starvation." He thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears and be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that the representatives of all parties would merely be brought together for purely humane reasons.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this connection he wished to invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there would be enough food and credit to go round should an attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied countries and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at present existed in the Ukraine.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his information was that enough food existed in Russia, but, either on account of its being hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it could not be made available.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organised parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place, such as Salonica or Lemnos in order to discuss with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.)

VILLA MAJESTIC,  
PARIS, *January 21, 1919.*

Paris Peace Conference 861.00/143: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

STOCKHOLM, *January 21, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received in Paris January 22, 3:50 p.m.]

54. Doctor Davidson reports the substance of a conversation with Litvinoff, representative of Soviet Russia. He seems well informed of airing that Russian affairs have had in United States Senate and knows of Senator Hitchcock's report and thinks that laborers not only in England and France but in United States are strong allies of Soviet Government. His previous steps to secure peace through Allied representatives in Stockholm not having been acknowledged he cabled two days ago to Lansing directly. He has reasons to believe that Wilson is sorry he has consented to intervene on basis of Creel's<sup>23</sup> information, on which he is well posted. He thought isolation of Russia will be less effective weapon against them since Ukraine and Baltic provinces are accessible to them. Substance of concessions which he was understood to have sent to Lansing consisted in willingness to compromise on all matters involving foreigners such as foreign debts and external business relations. He considered Soviet Government quite as legal as any of counter-revolutionary Governments which Allies are supporting, and if recognition of Soviet Government should involve recognition of counter-revolutionary governments in their respective territories, he thought it would not be difficult task for Soviet Government to dispose of these counter-revolutionary governments. As to what would result if the world revolution should fail, he thought they could hold out one or two years with of course accompanying sufferings of millions of people. Should socialism prove itself a failure then he saw possibility for Bolshevik Party to give way to government in which Bolsheviks are simply opposition party. He said he was against Red terror and that he spoke against it while in Moscow but Peters, head of the Exportation [*Extraordinary*] Commission for Combating Counter Revolution, etc., argued that many plotters expecting Soviet Russia to be occupied in brief order by Allies seemed unconcerned about staying in jail until released by Allies. He thought it would be difficult to guarantee safety of foreigners now in Russia, even Red Cross workers. While no foreign government is represented in Russia (apparent omission) could not be protected against people who may object to discrimination in distributing relief. He was apparently not sure himself of situation in Russia at present, saying that conditions change very rapidly. He thought that economic bounds [*blockade* ?] of Soviet Russia by Allies

<sup>23</sup> George Creel, chairman of the Committee on Public Information.

will probably be more responsible for spread of discontent and Bolshevism in Scandinavia, especially where normal relations with Russia would provide work for great deal of labor.

MORRIS

861.00/3691 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, *January 22, 1919, 10 a.m.*

[Received 4:36 p.m.]

469. From Ambassador Francis.<sup>24</sup>

"19, January 21, 7 p.m. Your 4157, January 20, 4 p.m.,<sup>25</sup> through American Embassy, London, just received. Chicherin message<sup>26</sup> from Government never recognized by us or any Allied Government nor any neutral except possibly Persia, is based on fallacy that it represented Russian people, which it never did. I refused recommending recognition notwithstanding importunities of Robins<sup>27</sup> and some other Americans. As records show, I always maintain that Soviet Government's object was world-wide social revolution and all their efforts directed to that end as subsequent developments confirm. That Lenin accepted German money which used as German agent to corrupt Russia was clearly established but he would likewise have taken American, British, or French money to accomplish the same end. Lenin is fanatic, openly avowing was trying experiment in government on Russia. Trotsky is an adventurer, saturated with personal ambition and wholly without conviction. I encouraged Soviet opposition to Central Empires until Brest peace when issued address endeavoring to arouse Russian spirit and saying America would not recognize such peace but still considered herself ally of the Russian people.<sup>28</sup> For this, also for address to Russians July 4,<sup>29</sup> German Government demanded of Central Soviet Government that I be sent out of Russia. In the meantime had left St. Petersburg February 27 on account of threatened German approach, stopped at Vologda where remained five months being subsequently joined [by] French, Italian, Belgian, Serbian Missions. My requests that American officers be sent to aid Trotsky in organizing army and that railroad engineers be sent from Vladivostok to me at

<sup>24</sup> David R. Francis, Ambassador in Russia, temporarily in London.

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Transmitted by the Danish Chargé in Russia, *ante*, p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> Lt. Col. Raymond Robins, in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia, December 1917 to May 1918.

<sup>28</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, pp. 440-441.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 569-571.

Vologda had ulterior objects as records show.<sup>30</sup> Copy sent to American Mission.

Answering Chicherin message, while first reason dissipated, it unquestionably existed when Allied troops sent into North Russia.

Second reason, while Soviet Government negotiating for retention supplies at Archangel it was removing such supplies at rate hundred cars daily and British and French assured me was breaking faith by doing so in addition to having repudiated obligations given for purchase of such supplies.

I refrained from participation in such negotiations as America had little if any supplies there. Undoubtedly Soviet Government would not negotiate for retention such supplies at Archangel or make any other promises for recognition.

Third reason, a few days after Mirbach's assassination<sup>31</sup> the Soviet Government wired Allied diplomats, Vologda, inviting or ordering them to Moscow and saying Radek sent Vologda to "execute" removal.<sup>32</sup> Allied chiefs unanimously declined invitation or order saying if order was meant considered it offensive; furthermore, German press was charging Mirbach death to Allied instigation and demanding of Soviet Government that German and Austrian troops be permitted to come to Moscow for protection of their Embassies and Consulates. Ten days later, after midnight, July 23rd, I received, as dean of diplomatic corps, telegram from Chicherin urging Allied diplomats quit Vologda and saying another day might be too late. To this we replied had concluded to accept advice and leave Vologda requesting locomotive to convey special train on track Vologda to Archangel. When Chicherin heard we contemplated going Archangel, he wired going there meant leaving Russia. I replied repeating request stating would not leave Russia unless compelled by force and then absence would be temporary. Locomotive furnished after twenty-four hours' delay and diplomatic corps arrived Archangel July 26th. When told by local Soviet and representative Central Soviet that it was waiting to convey us where we elected we replied refusing to embark before communicating with our Governments with which communication had been severed for three weeks or more. After some colloquy our decision was wired Soviet Government, Moscow, who replied communication impossible. We decided to go Kandalaksha, which occupied by Allied troops, if furnished additional steamer because one inadequate, additional steamer provided July 28th but many useless obstacles prevented

<sup>30</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol 1, pp. 487-488, 493, and 519-521.

<sup>31</sup> Wilhelm, Count von Mirbach, German Ambassador to the Soviet Republic, was assassinated at Moscow July 6, 1918.

<sup>32</sup> Correspondence between Soviet officials and Ambassador Francis relative to the removal of the embassies from Vologda to Archangel is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, pp. 618 ff.

clearing until 4 a.m., July 29th. Meantime we heard from credible sources that while Central and local Soviet professed willingness for our departure that Central Soviet was secretly urging local Soviet to detain us as possible hostages to prevent landing of Allied troops, which have heard since was their object in insisting on our removing to Moscow rather than regard for our safety. Local Soviet, however, was afraid to detain us as local anti-Bolshevik revolution was impending. This was not first evidence we had of Chicherin hypocrisy. Anti-Bolshevik revolution occurred August 2nd, Allied troops landed four hours later and Allied Missions returned to Archangel August 9th.

Fourth reason, while Czecho-Slovak detention no longer obtains, it was burning issue when Allied troops landed Archangel. Permitting Czecho-Slovaks to depart now no reason why Soviet Government be recognized and it should be remembered that when Czecho-Slovaks started leaving Russia they were promised safe-conduct with their arms and all Czechs' trouble caused by treachery of Trotsky who issued secret order that they should not be permitted to leave without giving up their arms and when given up they should be detained notwithstanding.

Answering last reason, Allied missions had positive evidence that German-Austrian war prisoners were being armed and German officers were instructing Bolshevik forces. While German-Austrian prisoners may now be free to return home, fact remains that Bolsheviks are propagandizing among prisoners and offering every inducement to join Red Army. Probably Soviet Government did send communication written and verbal to us through Norwegian representatives that if American troops were withdrawn they would establish diplomatic relations, but that involved recognition of Bolshevik Government which neither we nor any other well-ordered Government could afford, as Bolshevik orators not only charged our Government with being capitalistic but openly advocated opposition to all organized government everywhere. I was compelled to leave Archangel for surgical operation November 6th but Soviet Government had already instituted reign of terror to maintain themselves in power. They were pillaging and murdering inoffensive civilians without trial and when could not find men were arresting wives, mothers, and sisters as hostages for appearance of men to serve in Red Army. I recommended weeks before leaving Archangel armed Allied intervention for restoration of order knowing that same would involve extinction of Bolshevism, which I consider not only irreparably injurious to Russia but disgrace to civilization and reflection on Allies. I consider Bolshevism as practiced in Russia means a return of the race to barbarism if it should prevail throughout society, that is why I studiously avoided encouraging the Soviet

Government, refused going Moscow and failed to establish even a *modus vivendi* with it. Have never doubted its willingness to make any arrangement that would secure our recognition as Chicherin message demonstrates. Heard through Radek after Robins' departure that latter was messenger from Soviet to extend to our Government all privileges and concessions granted Germany in Brest treaty but Radek said that did not include England and France. Never heard that Robins was permitted to present this proposition to our Government.

I think furthermore that if peace consummated with disorder prevailing in Russia or if Bolsheviks permitted to dominate there that Russia will be exploited by Germany so completely as to effectually recoup her losses by war and become again a menace to civilization."

Repeated to Am[erican] mission, Paris, as number 23, January 22, 10 a.m.

DAVIS

Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/14

B. C. 7

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, January 22, 1919, at 3:15 p.m.*

[Extract]

PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Colonel U. S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Mr. E. Phipps, Major A. M. Caccia, M.V.O.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, Captain A. Portier.—*Italy*: His Excellency M. Orlando, His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, Major A. Jones.—*Japan*: Baron Makino, His Excellency M. Matsui, M. Saburi.—*Interpreter*: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Situation in Russia. Issue of Proclamation to Russian Groups

PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft proclamation which he had prepared for the consideration of his colleagues, in accordance with the decision reached at yesterday's meeting.

After a discussion the following text was adopted, to be publicly transmitted to parties invited:

The single object the representatives of the associated Powers have had in mind in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere in any manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. They regard the Russian people as their friends not their enemies, and are willing to help them in

any way they are willing to be helped. It is clear to them that the troubles and distresses of the Russian people will steadily increase, hunger and privation of every kind become more and more acute, more and more widespread, and more and more impossible to relieve, unless order is restored, and normal conditions of labour, trade and transportation once more created, and they are seeking some way in which to assist the Russian people to establish order.

They recognise the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit or make use of Russia in any way. They recognise the revolution without reservation, and will in no way, and in no circumstances, aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution. It is not their wish or purpose to favour or assist any one of those organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia as against the others. Their sole and sincere purpose is to do what they can to bring Russia peace and an opportunity to find her way out of her present troubles.

The associated Powers are now engaged in the solemn and responsible work of establishing the peace of Europe and of the world, and they are keenly alive to the fact that Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not. They recognise and accept it as their duty, therefore, to serve Russia in this matter as generously, as unselfishly, as thoughtfully, as ungrudgingly as they would serve every other friend and ally. And they are ready to render this service in the way that is most acceptable to the Russian people.

In this spirit and with this purpose, they have taken the following action: They invite every organised group that is now exercising, or attempting to exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Princes Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the associated Powers, provided, in the meantime, there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people or territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease. These representatives are invited to confer with the representatives of the associated Powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people, and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy co-operative relations be established between her people and the other peoples of the world.

A prompt reply to this invitation is requested. Every facility for the journey of the representatives, including transport across the Black Sea, will be given by the Allies, and all the parties concerned are expected to give the same facilities. The representative[s] will be expected at the place appointed by the 15th February, 1919.



861.00/3702 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 23, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received January 24, 10:25 a.m.]

779. The following is respectfully submitted in connection with the discussions of Russian policy now in progress at Paris.

Under number 681, June 29th, 6 p.m.<sup>33</sup> I telegraphed from Moscow—

“intervention in Siberia, like that in northern Russia, will fail if undertaken as a purely military enterprise. . . . The people of the Allied countries must not permit themselves illusions regarding intervention. The bulk of the Russians are densely ignorant and moved only by immediate and material considerations, the educated policy leaders are party men lacking in the western conception of patriotism. No class has developed self-reliance and all dislike hard work. They look to others for guidance and support and delude themselves with the thought that foreign intervention will forthwith bring order and comfort without special privation or effort on their part. It is certain therefore that even with the good will of the Russian people we can count upon very little serious help from them. We must also foresee that following a possibly enthusiastic initial reception there will be a reaction of disillusion and discontent.”

I venture to repeat these sentences because the history of the North Russian expedition shows so clearly the importance of the two points made; namely, first, that the direction of any Allied enterprise in Russia must be committed primarily to political and not military guidance, the history of the September *coup d'état* at Archangel and subsequent events reveal the failures of the British and French military at least to grasp the political essentials of the Russian situation; second, no reliance should be placed upon help from the Russians. Help from them will be forthcoming at different times in varying measures but not steadily enough to be relied upon. The Russians are not to be disparaged for this; it is the outgrowth of their environment and history and any policy based upon a different conception will be as unfair to the Russians as to ourselves producing eventual disappointment and disgust on both sides.

I ask the privilege of recommending most earnestly that no active Russian policy be entered upon unless we are ourselves willing and able to put it through vigorously and generously. Please read in this connection Embassy's 748, January 16th, 5 p.m.<sup>34</sup> Foregoing sent to Paris under number 14, dated January 23rd, 7 p.m.

POOLE

<sup>33</sup> Probably telegram no. 683, June 30, 1918, 10 p.m., is intended, *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, vol. II, pp. 236-239.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

Paris Peace Conference 861.00/161: Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, *January 24, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received in Paris January 25, 11:40 p.m.]

131. Following is substance of letter dated January 22nd, received for Buckler from Litvinoff after former's departure: Hope expressed that Buckler's detailed report will be very soon laid before the President; meanwhile Noulens<sup>35</sup> and Scavenius,<sup>35</sup> two of the most prejudiced and bitter enemies of the Soviets, will have been heard by the Paris Conference. A new note from Tchitcherine cabled to Washington last Saturday<sup>36</sup> was, Litvinoff believes, superfluous in view of his conversations with Buckler.

Doctor Davidson, believing that it would help to solve the Russian problem, had come with the proposal to allow a Red Cross mission to distribute food to the Bourgeois, fourth group of citizens in Petrograd. Litvinoff cannot see how any problem can be solved through feeding a few hundred people while millions starve.

Doctor Davidson intimates that Americans consequential [*consider?*] unequal rationing by groups very unjust. Litvinoff assured him that this system did not aim at punishing certain sections of the population to the advantage of the other side, but as there is not enough food to supply all sufficiently, it is necessary to give some preference to producers of goods. The insufficient supply of foodstuffs is due to Allied policy, which through its support of Kolchak, Denikin, Krasnoff, *et al.*, has cut off Siberia, the rich harvest district, and other important sources of supply; the Soviet régime is not to blame. Productiveness of the land has largely decreased on account of the absence of agricultural implements, scarcity of these and other badly needed commodities renders it impossible to give anything in exchange to the peasants who still have untouched supplies of cereals with which they consequently refuse to part. The Allied blockade and the opposition of Finland have rendered impossible the export from Sweden of large quantities of agricultural implements and other tools purchased by the Soviet Government to meet the situation. British naval forces recently captured near Reval and took to British ports four Russian steamships laden with timber and flax which had been sent to Sweden by the Russian Government to pay for goods purchased in Sweden. By direct or indirect Allied pressure, Denmark has been induced to prevent the export of some 30,000,000 roubles worth of vegetable seeds paid for in cash. In

<sup>35</sup> In 1918 respectively French Ambassador and Danish Minister in Russia.

<sup>36</sup> Jan. 18; not found in the Department files.

consequence, Russia next summer will be without vegetables, beet roots and sugar. Above few examples could be multiplied *ad infinitum*; there are sufficient indications of how the defects and "injustices" of the system, likewise the sufferings of Russia's whole population, are inextricably connected with the blockade and Allied intervention. It is hoped that these facts may be laid before the President and others, who may be complaining of the "character of" state of Russian affairs. It is feared that a decision may have been reached before Buckler's arrival in Paris.

Another short letter of same date, written subsequently states, "what has also been reported in the press", that Litvinoff must leave with Bolshevik legation on the 25th, thanks to Allied pressure; if Litvinoff is allowed to go to Christiania his address will be care of Lawyer Ludwig Meyer.

OSBORNE

Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/18

B. C. 11

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, January 27th, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Mr. L. Harrison, Col. R. H. Williams.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P., The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P., Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Captain E. Abraham, Mr. H. [E.] Phipps.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, Capt. Portier.—*Italy*: M. Orlando, Baron Sonnino, Major Jones.—*Japan*: Baron Makino, H. E. M. Matsui, M. Saburi.—*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Representation at Prince's Island of the small States in formation, whose territories previously belonged to the Russian Empire

9. Mr. BALFOUR said that he wished to raise a point which he thought had been settled, but of which he could find no record in the Minutes. He wished to know whether those elements of Old Russia which, we hoped, would succeed in forming se[parate states?] such as Esthonia, Georgia, possibly Russian Armenia and Daghestan, were invited to the meeting on Prince's Island.

(It was decided . . . that all such elements, unless expressly excluded, were invited to attend.)

27 January, 1919.

861.00/3724 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 27, 1919, noon.

[Received 10:39 p.m.]

449. For Polk.

The action taken in regard to the Russian factions was the direct consequence of a recognition of the impossibility of military intervention. The evidence showed that there was no substantial hope of building up a Russian army and that even as auxiliaries they could not be relied on for continued efforts. Even those most insistent on intervention were doubtful as to whether Russian aid could be depended upon. The military authorities agreed that it would take at least 150,000 troops and probably many more. When the question was put to the powers represented in the Supreme War Council all declared that they could not send the necessary troops. . . . The President said that he did not believe that the American people would consent to sending our men there as no one could tell how long they would have to remain. Clemenceau and Orlando said the same thing. It is rumored on fairly good authority, though the story has not been published, that several thousand French troops threatened to revolt and raised the red flag on hearing that they were to be ordered to Russia.

In these circumstances the best and humane thing to do seemed to be to make an appeal of some sort to the warring elements to cease violence while the Peace Conference is in session. To dispose of [*To do*] this required some action looking toward a conference for mediation between the factions, otherwise the appeal would have no effect. It very probably will not accomplish anything but we could not do less than make an attempt to stay the slaughter and horror which the Russians are enduring. The only alternative since force was out of the question was to remain silent and let things take their course. That would have satisfied no one.

I am sending you this so you will understand the predicament we were in. You can use the information discreetly where you think it would do good and correct wrong impression.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/3754 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 28, 1919.

[Received January 29, 3:45 a.m.]

804. The following is being sent to Paris.

Number 26, January 28, 5 p.m. I received last night from the Provisional Government a six hundred [*six?*] page note, to the effect

that it is both practically and morally impossible to accept the proposition of a conference of Russian factions which would include the Bolsheviki. The British Commissioner is telegraphing a complete English translation<sup>37</sup> to the British peace mission in Paris and asking that a copy be furnished to you. The French Embassy has telegraphed a summary to the Foreign Office.

POOLE

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861.00/3923 b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1919, 3 p.m.

475. For the Secretary of State from Polk:

Nuorteva, who claims to be representative of the Bolshevik Government in this country was brought in to see me the other day by McFarland. Both of these men are known to Colonel House and Bullitt. Nuorteva came here originally as representative of the Finnish Red Guard. Later assumed to act for the Russian Bolshevik Government. We do not know whether he has any authority whatever as this is supposed to be headquarters of Bolshevik propaganda. He is considered dangerous agitator, but has so far kept within the law. Apparently he is being very well advised. Nuorteva and McFarland were anxious that a message should be sent through to Lenine urging that he consent to the proposed conference. As to this telegram, I said I would send it to Paris, and if the Mission thought it desirable they would send it on. Nuorteva also asked that a reply be obtained from Lenine to him indicating Lenine's attitude, and asking for statement of points regarding American attitude. I refused to send any such message and said I would not let him receive any message from the Bolshevik Government. The message which follows might in Nuorteva's opinion be of use in influencing the Bolshevik leaders, but I send it without any recommendation.

"Am convinced that however strong your position is internally, you would gain internationally by accepting this opportunity to let the world compare your strength, aims and accomplishments with those of various Russian pretenders. Public opinion here is more open-minded and sympathetic than ever and would not regard acceptance as admission of weakness on your part. On the contrary, your willingness to place your cause before eyes of world as compared with obvious disinclination of your opponents so to do would make a favorable impression. Proceedings must, of course, be open and less remote place of meeting desirable. Public sentiment here as elsewhere would, however, under all circumstances demand and get full publicity. Therefore urge you to accept invitation. Signed S. Nuorteva."

POLK

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<sup>37</sup> Not printed (Paris Peace Conference 861.00/174).

861.00/3768 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 30, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received January 31, 2:55 a.m.]

812. The following telegram has been sent to Paris as number 28 same date, continuing 804, January 28, 5 p.m.

Public opinion so far manifested concurs Government in rejecting proposal for Princes Island Conference as morally if not practically impossible. There is a deep and wide-spread feeling of injury and resentment, that so-called patriotic elements should be dealt with by the Peace Conference on the same basis as the Bolsheviks. In connection with the Department's unnumbered telegram January 24, 2 p. m.,<sup>38</sup> I had a long talk this morning with Ivanoff, Social Revolutionary, overwhelmingly elected to the Constitutional Assembly a year ago and now one of the more prominent spokesmen of the local radicals. As to Allied intervention, he said critical moment already exists at Archangel in fact. It should not be given up but the control [*to the contrary?*] extended by the use of more considerable forces. Peaceful settlement with the Bolsheviks is impossible. The Social Revolutionists support the Provisional Government in this, though a bare majority at a meeting last night resolved that it would have been better to accept the Princes Island invitation for the purpose of demonstrating this impossibility before foreign public opinion. Ivanoff and the minority hold that in addition to moral considerations, practical difficulties are too great, especially in respect to the proposed truce. There may be further discussion in conjunction with the Social Democrats but both these parties, the most radical elements of the population, seemed convinced that the conference could in any case serve only to reveal its own futility. In asking Allied intervention on a more generous scale Ivanoff said that to succeed it must be carried out under conditions of less interference by the agents of intervention with the interior life of the country than has so far prevailed in the Archangel enterprise. His complaints relate to matters of British and French interference, especially by the military, upon which I have already had occasion to comment.

President Tchaykowski left here *en route* to Paris before the receipt of the press despatch concerning the Princes Island invitation and learned of it on arriving at Murmansk. In reply to an inquiry on the part of the Embassy, Admiral McCully has telegraphed from Murmansk the following, based on an informal conversation with him:

"Tchaykowski is of decided opposition to the proposal for a conference of Russian factions on Princes Island. He said to me that

<sup>38</sup> *Post*, p. 607.

this invitation was offensive from his point of view. Unsparingly he was against any conciliation or participation with the Bolshevik Government."

POOLE

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/190

*Memorandum by Mr. William H. Buckler*

*January 31, 1919.*

According to the wish expressed by the Commission yesterday, I went with Mr. Bullitt to see Mr. Philip Kerr, private secretary to Mr. Lloyd George. I gave him an outline of the information gained from Litvinoff. We learned from Kerr:

- (1) that the British are extremely anxious to evacuate their troops from Archangel as soon as possible. They intend to bring them out anyhow on May 1;
- (2) that they are prepared to meet at Prinkipo, or anywhere else, the Soviet Government's representatives, even if no other Russian representatives should accept the recent Peace Conference invitation;
- (3) that in view of Ransome's well-known Bolshevik sympathies the British would not care to bring him to Paris, and if the Prinkipo conference takes place, his coming here would serve no useful purpose;
- (4) that the British think one main object of the proposed Prinkipo meeting should be to stop Russian civil war, and to induce the various Russian governments to send delegates for this purpose to an All-Russia convention.

I could not tell Kerr whether the Soviet Government would agree to such a proposal, but said I believed that they might do so, provided it did not involve the abolition of their Soviet constitution, which to them was an almost sacred possession.

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861.00/3724 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1919, noon.*

519. For the Secretary of State:

Referring to your 449 January 27th. Have you considered recognition of the Omsk Government. The call for a conference will probably destroy morale of all parties opposing Bolsheviks. Recognition of that Government would make it possible to give it some assistance and would undoubtedly strengthen it so it could withstand the crisis created by the recent action of the Peace Conference. I realize that Kolchak is probably a reactionary and there is some question as to how he forced himself into power. I am not recommending recogni-

tion, but merely suggesting it for your consideration. If that is not deemed wise, it seems to me that some statement should be made in order not to entirely discourage the Omsk Government and the followers of Denikin. It might be possible to use suggestion of recognition of these groups as a bait to tempt them to attend the conference.

POLK

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/217: Telegram

*The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments*<sup>39</sup>

[Translation]

Moscow, February 4, 1919.

To the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of North America.

The Russian Soviet Government has had cognisance, by means of press wireless, of an invitation purporting to be issued by the Entente Powers to all existing Governments in Russia, to send delegates to a Conference at the Island of Prinkipo.

Having received no invitation addressed to itself, and learning (again by means of press communications) that the absence of any reply on its part has been interpreted as a refusal of such invitation, the Russian Soviet Government wishes to prevent any misapprehension regarding its line of action.

In view, also, of the false interpretation systematically given to its actions by the foreign press, the Russian Soviet Government takes this opportunity of outlining its attitude clearly and frankly.

Notwithstanding its increasingly favourable position from both the military and the internal points of view, the Russian Soviet Government attaches such great value to the conclusion of an agreement which would bring hostilities to an end, that it is ready immediately to enter into negotiations for this purpose, and even—as it has often said—to purchase such agreement at the price of important sacrifices, with the express reservation that the future development of the Soviet Republic [will not be menaced. In view of the fact that the power of resistance of the enemies which Soviet Russia has to fight depends exclusively on the aid which they receive from the Entente Powers, and that these are, therefore, its only real adversaries, the Russian Soviet Government] sets forth below,

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<sup>39</sup> The English text in the files has a notation indicating that it is a translation of a text printed in *Le Matin*, Feb. 7, 1919. The bracketed passages have been added from the text printed in the *Nation*, Jan. 17, 1920, vol. 110, p. 88. A footnote in the *Nation* states: "The peace offers of the Russian Soviet Government published in this issue are an official compilation made by the Russian Soviet Bureau in New York."



for the benefit of the Entente Powers, the points regarding which it might consider such sacrifices possible, with the object of settling all differences with them.

In view of the special importance which not only the press, but also the representatives of the Entente Governments, attach in their oft-repeated statements to the question of loans, the Soviet Government declares itself, in the first place, willing to meet the demands of the Entente Powers on this point. It does not refuse [to recognize its financial obligations to its creditors who are subjects of the Entente Powers, leaving the precise formulation of the manner in which this point is to be enforced to the special treaties, the elaboration of which is to be one of the tasks of the proposed negotiations.

Secondly, in view of the difficult financial position of the Russian Soviet Republic and the unsatisfactory condition of its credit abroad, the Russian Soviet Government offers to guarantee the payment of interest on its loans by a certain amount of raw materials, which should be determined through a special agreement.]

[Thirdly,] in view of the great inclination which foreign capital has always displayed to exploit Russia's natural resources for its own advantage, the Russian Soviet Government is disposed to grant mining, timber, and other concessions to nationals of the Entente Powers in accordance with strictly regulated conditions, so that no economic or social hardship might be inflicted on Soviet Russia by reason of the stipulations of such concessions.

The fourth point regarding which negotiations might, in the opinion of the Russian Soviet Government, take place with the Entente Powers, is that of cession of territory, the Russian Soviet Government not having determined to exclude from such negotiations at all costs the consideration of the possible annexation of Russian territory by the Entente Powers.

The Russian Soviet Government adds that it would consider as annexation the maintenance within the regions in question—forming part of the territory of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Poland and Finland—of armed forces of the Entente, or maintained at the expense of the Entente, or enjoying the military, technical, financial, or other support of the said Powers.

As regards points 2 to 4, the importance of the concessions referred to by the Russian Soviet Government will depend on its military situation with regard to the Entente Powers—which situation is at present improving from day to day.

On the northern front, the Soviet troops have just re-taken the town of Shenkursk.

On the eastern front, having temporarily lost Perm, they have recovered Perufa [*sic*], Ufa, Sterlitamak, Belebey, Orenburg and

Uralsk. The railway connections with Central Asia are now in their hands.

On the southern front, they have recently taken the important railway stations of Povorino, Alexikovo, Uriupino, Talovaya, Kalach, and Boguchar, which have brought the railway lines of that region into their power. On the south-west, the Ukrainian Soviet troops, debouching from Lugansk, are threatening the rear of Krasnoff's armies.

In the Ukraine, the national Soviet troops have taken Harkoff [*Khar'kov*], Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Kremenchug, Chernigoff, Ovruch, as well as [many other less important cities. White Russia, Lithuania and Lettonia are almost entirely in the hands of] the Soviet [troops] of these republics, with the large towns of Minsk, Vilna, Riga, Dvinsk, Mitau, Vindau and others. The remarkable consolidation of the internal situation of Soviet Russia has been demonstrated by the negotiations begun with the Soviet Government by the members of the former Constituent Assembly, whose representatives Rakitnikoff (Chairman of Congress), Sviatitsky (Secretary), Volsky, Shmeleff, Burevoff [*Burevoi?*] Chernenkoff, and Antonoff, all members of the Central Committee of the [Social] Revolutionary Party, arrived in Moscow yesterday, 3rd February.

These well-known Social Revolutionists declared most strongly against Entente intervention in Russia. The improved relations between the Soviet Government and those elements of Russian society hitherto hostile to it are characterised by the changed attitude of the Mensheviks, a meeting of which party likewise protested against Entente intervention, and whose organ "Vpered" appears freely in Moscow.

The general relaxation of tension in the interior shows itself in the abolition of special District Commissions.

Finally, the lies in the foreign press concerning alleged disturbances in Petrograd and elsewhere are pure inventions.

While repeating once more that the situation in which it now finds itself must necessarily influence the extent of the sacrifices it is prepared to make, the Russian Soviet Government still adheres to its proposal to negotiate on the basis of the points enumerated above.

As regards the frequent complaints in the press of Entente countries concerning its international revolutionary propaganda, the Russian Soviet Government, whilst pointing out that it cannot limit the freedom of the revolutionary press, declares its readiness to include in a general agreement with the Entente Powers the undertaking not to intervene in their internal affairs.

On these general lines, the Russian Soviet Government is prepared to open negotiations immediately on the Island of Prinkipo

or elsewhere, either with all the Entente Powers or with any of them separately, or with any political groups in Russia, in accordance with the request of the Entente Powers.

The [Soviet] Government [requests the] Entente Powers to inform it without delay of the place to which its representatives shall betake themselves, also the date of the meeting and the proposed route.

CHICHERIN

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861.00/3804 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, *February 4, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received February 5, 3:31 a.m.]

829. It is my duty to explain frankly to the Department the moral perplexity into which I have been thrown by the statement of Russian policy adopted by the Peace Conference, January 22, on the motion of the President.<sup>40</sup> The announcement very happily recognizes the revolution and confirms again that entire absence of sympathy for any form of counter-revolution which has always been a keynote of American policy in Russia; but it contains not one word of condemnation for the other enemy of the revolution—the Bolshevik Government. On the contrary this government is accepted apparently on the same footing for the purpose of the invitation to Princes Island as those other groups which, however weak they may be, have acted with reasonable decency and patriotism and have been loyal in the fight against German imperialism. Having reread within the last few days practically every pronouncement of the President on foreign policy and having remarked especially his statement at Mobile October 27th, 1913, that we dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so, I feel that some further utterance of the Conference must follow which will reveal the United States and its associates as the outspoken champions of right, aligning our Russian policy of the future with that of the past as exemplified in the note of September 20th<sup>41</sup> to the neutral powers. The Department knows by my telegram 770, January 22, 6 p.m.,<sup>42</sup> that I am not a stubborn or captious advocate of any specific course of action against the Bolshevik Government. I had thought only that unceasing condemnation of its evil methods had been accepted beyond all

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<sup>40</sup> *Ante*, p. 30.

<sup>41</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 687-688.

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

changing as a part of our policy. I have given all there is in me to reveal, and possibly thereby slightly to abate, the utter wickedness of much the Bolsheviki have done and are still doing, in the thought that I might be contributing in some slight way to better the world's affairs. Knowing as I do, possibly better than any other American, the complete unmorality of the Bolshevik leaders—though the aspirations of a few be sincere—and the demoralization which their cynicism and cruelty work upon those whom they lead, I can not in honesty or self-respect do other than protest against any course of action which does not take unmistakable account of these facts. If I have misconstrued the Paris announcement, or any subsequent action taken is to give it a different color, I know that the Department will set me right with the same understanding and indulgence which it has invariably shown to me. Affairs at Archangel are critical. I should be loath to evade responsibility and my departure would add uncertainty and conjecture to a situation already overwrought. In tendering my resignation, therefore, I desire not only to express the sorrow which the necessity for this action causes me and my deep appreciation of the kindness which I have always met at the hands of my superiors, but, also, my readiness to wait here the Department's determination of the moment when it will be opportune to let me go. My only purpose is to avow honestly to the Department my state of mind, in order that it may determine the possible future value of my services, and, secondly to assure my early disassociation from any Russian policy which does not include, regardless of its other components, unremitting public denunciation of or in any other way seems to condone the methods by which the Bolsheviki have come into power, which they have continued to employ and are still today employing in order to maintain themselves.

POOLE

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Paris Peace Conference 861 K.00/15

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

BERNE, February 5, 1919.

[Received in Paris February 8.]

SIRS: With reference to my Despatch No. 108 of January 21st,<sup>43</sup> I have the honor to report that Mr. Haidar Bammate<sup>44</sup> called again at the Legation and informed me that he was still waiting with anxiety the reply of the President as to whether his country was

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<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

<sup>44</sup> "Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Union of the Peoples of Circassia and Daghestan".

included among those parts of Russia invited to attend the meeting at Prince's Island. He explained that his Government was thoroughly willing and happy to accept this invitation and that he and other representatives of his Government would immediately proceed to Prince's Island, provided he were assured that it really was the President's desire that they should be included in the invitation. He throws himself, in the name of his Government, entirely in the hands of the President and declares that they are willing to converse with Bolsheviks, Ukrainians, or any other Government in Russia, if it is the President's desire.

After making this statement he informed me conversationally that his country hoped to be placed under the protection of the Society of Nations as an independent country and that their earnest wish was that the United States should be appointed by the Society of Nations as the mandatory power.

I am [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

861.00/3810 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received February 6, 1919, 4:35 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"92. February 4th, 9 p.m. Subject, Siberian opinion concerning Paris Conference proposal for delegates All-Russian Congress to meet at Princes Island. And Omsk Government while willing to comply is unquestionably opposed to proposition. Assent to send delegate does not mean conviction, but merely a desire to comply with wishes of Allies. This Government is quite satisfied that no truce or agreement with Bolsheviks is possible. I have sounded all sections of Siberia through consular officers except Vladivostok and following is résumé which clearly sets forth attitude of press and people regarding this question.

The first impression in Ekaterinburg of the Allied resolution to invite all Russian Parties in Siberia and European Russia, either in power or striving for it, to a conference in the Sea of Marmora undoubtedly one of incredulity and perplexity followed by intense discouragements. It seemed at first the abandonment of Russia, that the Allies washed their hand of the Russian situation conceding therefore cold indictment [*sic*] in empty words of friendship which made their action only more brutal. The greatest difficulty in understanding the resolution was the word party. It is asked what parties are striving for power in Russia now that all groups are united in the fight against the Bolsheviks and all factions in Siberia

have declared their allegiance to the Omsk Government and Denikin has declared his support of it and Sazonoff has been appointed Foreign Minister of both Governments. The recognition of and acceptance of the plain implications of the note, namely, that the Bolsheviks and those fighting against them are meant by the term parties, deepens and intensifies the discouragement and resentment. Russians cannot understand how the Allies can consider the Bolsheviks as a party. They say that the Allies must know that they are a class group holding power for their lives. To receive them on any equality with the constructive elements of Russia is felt to be a deep insult. That the Allies want the constructive and organized elements of Russia to come to a compromise with the Bolsheviks as with a political foe seems almost incredible. The resolution is regarded here as showing an astonishing lack of comprehension of the character of the civil war in Russia. Some reservation in expression of opinion in view to incompleteness of news and a tendency to try to explain the resolution as some kind subtle diplomatic move perhaps intended to focus world attention on true character of Bolsheviks and create public opinion in Allied countries against them, without [apparent omission] Allies could not undertake great campaign in Russia is noticeable. General feeling however is one of being deliberately deserted and betrayed.

People in Novonikolaevsk believe not only impossible but undiscernible [*sic*] compromise or disgraceful agreement with Bolsheviks. All three daily papers representing Social Revolutionists, Cadets and military circles unanimously oppose Princes Island plan. Assert Bolsheviks, same as Germans, do not abide by any agreement. Therefore, why try to make agreement with them? But go further and say impossible any compromise be made. Bolsheviks' idea must be stamped out effectually, that it would be disgrace loyal Russian patriots even to meet Bolsheviks, makers of Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany, and who further insist that international law is only bourgeois law.

In Tomsk, majority seems to believe that if all parties from Russia are represented that nothing would result from such a conference. They refuse to entertain the idea of treating with Bolsheviks, stating that Bolsheviks destroying fundamental part of Russian national life and therefore a compromise would not bring about a solution present question.

In Krasnoyarsk, there is lively, powerful comment on decision Allies and all expressed surprise and disappointment at their action. A compromise with Bolsheviks cannot be considered. By not taking same stand Allies show total lack of understanding of nature of Bolsheviks and fail to pay debt which they owe Russia in this war

with disregard their own interest and obligation to civilization. If Allies will cooperate Russians still able multiply sacrifices overthrow Bolsheviki.

In Irkutsk, Cadet newspaper *Svobodny Krai* perverting [*sic*] American Press Bureau telegrams about any Paris announcement and denounces Allied proposal as blow to the dignity of Russia saying Lenin's army not a revolutionary army but consists of Germans, Malgars [*sic*], Letts and criminals and believe Allies not informed of internal conditions in Russia. Irkutsk merchants have held meeting protestations. Socialist newspapers understand Allied programmes but point out that armistice only useful if Bolsheviks will leave their irreconcilable position because democrats will never forgive Bolsheviks for usurping the people's power from Constituent Assembly. Impression is that men [*Mensheviks?*] and Cadets bitterly disapprove Allied suggestion but other parties are acquiescing. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3780 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1919, 5 p.m.

607. Russian Embassy here has received telegrams from Omsk Government dated January 28 and January 29 stating that while that Government had not on the dates mentioned, reached a decision about conference at Princes Island, it had, nevertheless, taken measures to deny emphatically any rumor of an agreement reached by that Government with the Bolsheviks and explained to its followers that hostilities against the Bolsheviks will be continued.

POLK

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861.00/3804 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1919, 4 p.m.

620. For the Secretary of State: Following telegram received today from De Witt C. Poole, Chargé d'Affaires at Archangel:

[Here follows text of telegram No. 829, February 4, 4 p.m., printed *ante*, p. 42.]

In reply the following telegram was sent to Mr. Poole today:

"[480.] The Department thoroughly appreciates the difficulties you have found in such comparative isolation from adequate sources of regular information. I want you to appreciate, however, the trust reposed in you and the grave responsibilities which you

have as the chief representative of this government in a part of Russia where a state of actual war prevails. First of all it is urgently requested that until a decision and adjustment is reached you will maintain absolute reticence regarding your desire to resign. Secondly, I hope you will bear in mind that in case you wish your resignation accepted it will be necessary to replace you in a natural and normal manner in order to prevent grave, and perhaps disastrous effect upon the morale of American troops in the Archangel district which might lead to loss of American lives.

I have repeated your telegram in full to the Secretary of State together with the text of these instructions to yourself. Please acknowledge these instructions promptly."

I should be grateful if you will give this matter your serious consideration and advise me what further instructions should be issued to Mr. Poole.

I think any publicity at this time in connection with Poole's resignation would have a very unfortunate effect both here and in Russia, unless President would wish to take this opportunity to issue some reassuring message to the Russian factions opposed to the Bolsheviks.

POLK

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Paris Peace Conference 861 G.00/10

*The Georgian Delegation at Paris to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Translation <sup>45</sup>]

No. 47

PARIS, February 8, 1919.

No reply has reached us from the Great Allied and Associated Powers concerning the questions outlined in our preceding notes and connected with the independence of Georgia. It seems that the governments of the above-mentioned powers reserve to themselves the right of discussing the Georgian problem in connection with all questions concerning the former Russian Empire.

However, this method of procedure cannot fail to present certain very serious inconveniences, for it complicates for the Conference the solution of the Russian problems, by multiplying in a quite artificial manner the elements composing it, in place of simplifying it by the natural division of the questions.

Like Poland and Finland, and more so than Bessarabia, Georgia is in truth outside of the Russian problem. But Georgia has some claims, which she wishes to emphasize, and which are peculiar to her. Never conquered by the Russian armed force (as were the other countries above mentioned), Georgia became a part of the

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<sup>45</sup> File translation revised.



Russian Empire as a result of certain bilateral political arrangements, which were soon abolished by Russia. After the crumbling of this Empire, the Georgian people, liberated from the century-old yoke, declared itself free, proclaimed its independence, and created a political organization based on its own will and sovereignty. Notification was given of this to all the Powers, and it is the international consecration of an existing situation of fact that Georgia expects from the Peace Conference.

The territories which the Georgian people claims as its patrimony already belonged to it in very remote times, when neither Russia, nor any of the powers playing now a principal role in European politics, yet existed. In its historical frontiers, the Georgian people, rejuvenated by its profoundly democratic aspirations, still remains the dominating element, and its purpose is to organize its political independence in full harmony with the neighboring peoples.

Separated from Russia by the Caucasus range, Georgia, formerly the principal base for Russian aggressions in Asia, has no vital importance for the peaceful Russia of tomorrow, and it cannot be seen by what reasons one can justify the refusal to recognize the independence of a country which, from a geographical, ethnological, and historical point of view, fulfills all the conditions required for an independent political existence.

Under these circumstances, how can the solution of a problem as simple, concise, and mature as the Georgian be made to depend on the settlement of the Russian chaos, in which already the restoration of a certain political unity of the Great Russians alone presents enormous difficulties, and in which the question of the Ukraine, and of White Russia, not to mention others, is full of complications of an international bearing?

It is evident that, in order to begin a regular existence, Georgia cannot wait for the end of an evolution, of which even the principal phases cannot yet be clearly seen.

Georgia must enter into economic relations with foreign countries, notably with the Western Powers, and organize its life without delay and without having to wait for the outcome of the political convulsions which we are witnessing now in the countries situated between the Baltic Sea and the shores of the Pacific.

Georgia can no longer be considered as a dependency of another state; it must find its own and assured place in hither Asia, and for this it is necessary that the Georgian cause be now studied and discussed by the great powers, whose will and suffrage will be at the basis of the international public order which is now being organized.

These powers are not unaware of the events which, for a time, removed Georgia from contact with their policy, on account of her geographical isolation. However, very many are the Georgian offi-

cers and soldiers who have gloriously fallen for the common cause of the Allies on the different fronts from Riga to Mesopotamia. The country which has shed this blood did not take part in the political adventure which later ended in the treaty of Brest Litovsk; this document and its authors were never recognized by Georgia.

Having fought for the Allies, and later, alone, against the Bolsheviks and the Turks, Georgia, it seems, ought to have the right of counting on the sympathy of the Allied Powers, not to mention the principles enunciated by these powers, which form, as it were, the unshakeable foundation of the political claims of a people as old, as organized, and as distinct as the Georgian people.

In view of the preceding, the undersigned, delegates of the Government of the Georgian Republic, have the honor of making the following requests:

The Georgian question must be isolated from all other Russian problems; it must be immediately submitted to the Peace Conference.

The Inter-Allied Conference, first of all, should give its decision on the principle of the independence of Georgia and on the regulation of its frontiers, as well as on other questions resulting from the recognition of Georgia as an independent republic.

It would be of great advantage to form a special commission for the thorough study of the Georgian question. Having heard the delegates of Georgia and those of the other parties concerned, this commission would submit its report to the Inter-Allied Conference, whose function it is to prepare the constitutional elements of the definitive settlement, which will be the crowning of the work of the Peace Conference.

Georgian Delegates:

C. GVARJALADZE

Z. AVÁLU

D. GHAMBASHIDZE

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Paris Peace Conference 861 C.00/12

*The President of the Lettish Delegation at Paris (Tschakste) to  
President Wilson*

[Translation <sup>46</sup>]

PARIS, *February 10, 1919.*

[Received in Paris February 15.]

MR. PRESIDENT: The great Allied Powers assembled in the Peace Conference issued an invitation on January 22, 1919,<sup>47</sup> by wireless to

<sup>46</sup> File translation revised.

<sup>47</sup> *Ante*, p. 30.

the representatives of every organized group which exercises, or which attempts to exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia or within the boundaries of European Russia as they existed before the war just ended (except in Finland and Poland) to go to Princes Island February 15, 1919, to confer with the representatives of the great Allied Powers. Although from a political point of view the Provisional Government of Latvia is in a situation identical with that of Poland and Finland, it nevertheless considers itself invited, in accordance with an official statement made by the Secretary General of the Peace Conference on February 10, 1919.

In the name of the Lettish Provisional Government the Lettish Delegation has the honor to bring to the attention of the Paris Peace Conference the following declaration:

The Lettish Provisional Government will send three delegates to Princes Island "provided that in the meantime a truce is established between Latvia and Russia, and that all the armed forces sent or directed by Russia against the Lettish nation be in the meantime withdrawn from Latvia and that all offensive action cease."

WHEREAS,

(1) Latvia proclaimed its separation from Russia and announced in the month of January, 1918, in the Constituent Assembly of Russia the constitution of an independent and sovereign Lettish state,

(2) The Lettish Provisional Government has addressed to all the great Allied Powers and to the Peace Conference in Paris its request that they recognize Latvia as an independent and sovereign state,

The Lettish Delegation sent to the Peace Conference will take part in the Prinkipo Conference in order to

(1) Conclude peace with Russia which will be recognized by the great Allied Powers,

(2) Settle, under the auspices of the great Allied Powers, the political and economic affairs that arise from the separation of Latvia and Russia, and

(3) Conclude treaties and take appropriate measures with a view to establishing normal relations between the two states.

Kindly accept [etc.]

J. TSCHAKSTE

*President of the Council of the State of Latvia*  
*President of the Lettish Delegation*

861.00/3827 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 10, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 7:17 p.m.]

668. I have sent the following telegram to American Embassy, Archangel, in reply to their February 4th, 4 p.m.:<sup>48</sup>

“As I feel that the decision which you communicated to the Mission in your telegram number 31, February 4th, 4 p.m.,<sup>48</sup> was possibly reached under a mistaken idea of the scope and purposes of the decision of the Government of the United States and the Allies in regard to the proposed meeting at Princes Island, I desire to state that it is not the intention of the American Government in agreeing to this meeting to barter in matters of principle with the Bolshevist Government. The purpose of the meeting is rather that of investigation in order that this Government may be in a position intelligently to direct its future policy in regard to all factions in Russia.

I appreciate the value of the work which you have done and I hope you may find it possible to continue in this work as heretofore.”

Subsequently I have noted your 480 to Archangel<sup>49</sup> and Poole's report of 844 [*reply, 842*].<sup>50</sup>

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/3833 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, February 11, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received February 12, 1 a.m.]

849. It is interesting to read the last message of the Moscow government concerning the Princes Island invitation in parallel with the call for the Workmen's International<sup>51</sup> broadcasted in French from Petrograd January 23, 7 p.m. The condition made in the first message that “the future development of the Soviet Republic will not be endangered” is interpreted by the program for an “international revolution” which the second sets forth. The call for the Workmen's International is a sincere utterance, while the message on the Princes Island invitation discloses again the shrewd policy which Lenine has summarized in the words, “Draw in and wait, veer and tack”. With that just appreciation of

<sup>48</sup> A duplicate of the telegram from Archangel to the Acting Secretary of State, no. 329, Feb. 4, p. 42.

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 620, Feb. 7, p. 46.

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> The first congress of the Communist International met in Moscow Mar. 2, 1919.

realities which distinguishes him so conspicuously from his fellow Russians and makes him master among the alien genius surrounding him at Moscow, Lenine has seen from the beginning, and has never ceased to impress upon his followers, the fact that the dictatorship of the Russian proletariat cannot long subsist without a similar social revolution abroad. His policy in its ultimate aim, therefore, is not a Russian but a world policy; and he has made it the immediate purpose of domestic and foreign policy alike to gain time, to keep at work a little longer the facilities for world propaganda which the Russian governmental machinery affords. In August last when the Soviet power was tottering the cry was to keep going just a week, just a fortnight longer. Now, in order to gain a further respite in which to prepare the destruction of existing governments, and with an abiding faith in bourgeois venality, Lenine offers to the Entente in the Princes Island message the bait of territory and concessions which was earlier offered to Germany and taken.

Sent to Paris under number 37 same date.

POOLE

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Paris Peace Conference 861 E.00/30

*The Chief of the Esthonian Delegation at Paris (Poska) to the President of the Paris Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*<sup>52</sup>

[Translation]

PARIS, *undated*.

MR. PRESIDENT: On January 22<sup>53</sup> last the Peace Conference adopted a resolution by which the representatives of the Governments established within the limits of Russia as it was before the war were called to a conference with the representatives of the Allied Powers on the Island of Prinkipo the coming 15th of February. The resolution closed with a request for a reply to this invitation from the interested parties.

Therefore, the Esthonian Delegation, in the name of the Esthonian Government, considers it a duty to bring the attention of the Peace Conference the following:

The Esthonian people, by the intermediary of its National Council, which springs from universal suffrage, has determined to separate from Russia and has proclaimed its country an independent republic. Its Government has been provisionally recognized by the English, French, and Italian Governments. Not only does it govern the country independently of any Russian Government, but after

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<sup>52</sup>A copy, in French, of this note was transmitted by the chief of the Esthonian Delegation to the Secretary of State accompanying a letter dated at Paris, Feb. 12, 1919 (Paris Peace Conference 861E.00/36, 26, and 27 A).

<sup>53</sup> *Ante*, p. 30.

having organized a regular army it has for three months been at war with the Communist Republic of Soviet Russia.

We in no wise consider ourselves, therefore, a part of Russia and in accepting the invitation of the Allied Powers and of the United States to go to the Island of Prinkipo we consider that the participation of the representatives of Esthonia in that conference will only have for its purpose the conclusion of peace between Esthonia and the Communist Republic of Soviet Russia and to confer on the future relations between Russia and the Esthonian Republic.

However, in order to avoid any future misunderstanding, our Government wishes to state now that if any decision is taken regarding the independence of Esthonia by the Conference, it will not consider itself as bound by it.

It considers that it is exclusively within the jurisdiction and competence of the Peace Conference to recognize the independence of Esthonia and it insists upon this point before the Conference at Paris in order that its Delegation here present may be received and heard.

In the name of the Esthonian Delegation :

*Chief of the Delegation and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs:*

J. POSKA

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/242

*The Russian Embassy in France to the Secretariat-General of the  
Paris Peace Conference* <sup>54</sup>

[Translation]

The unified governments of Siberia, Archangel and Southern Russia believe it their duty to make the following statement to the Peace Conference :

Appreciating highly the motives which have inspired the Allies to make their proposition of Jan. 22,<sup>55</sup> the said governments note with satisfaction that the conference considers the reestablishment of order in Russia an essential condition to enduring peace in Europe, and they accept willingly the offer of the Allies to collaborate in the internal pacification of Russia. After three years of struggle in which she has loyally kept her pledges and borne a considerable part of the common burden, Russia, rendered helpless to continue the war, cannot bind up her wounds except by peace. Now this work of reconstruction is made impossible by the civil war which is preached and carried on by usurpers, criminals without

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<sup>54</sup> Copy received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Feb. 16.

<sup>55</sup> *Ante*, p. 30.

faith or law, whose despotism is weighing heavily upon a large portion of Russian soil.

Desiring above all to put an end to the bloody Bolshevik tyranny, the Russian political groups who have undertaken the task of relieving the country and restoring the State upon a truly democratic basis, will be very grateful to the Peace Conference for the help which it desires to afford them in this necessary labor of national reconstruction. They hold as certain that everything done to give Russia back her place among the family of nations and her internal order will serve at the same time with great effectiveness the aims of human justice and international peace which the conference has set before it.

The unified governments of Russia are therefore ready to place themselves at the disposal of the Allied Powers to acquaint them with the present situation in Russia and with them seek the means of remedying this situation.

However, under no circumstances whatever, would there be any question of an exchange of ideas on this matter with the participation of the Bolsheviks, in whom the conscience of the Russian people sees only traitors. For in making a pact with the common enemy, they have betrayed the causes of both Russia and the Allies. They have fomented anarchy and trodden underfoot the democratic principles which guide civilized states, and they maintain themselves in power only by terrorism.

Between them and the national Russian groups no conciliation is possible. Any meeting would not only be without effect but would risk causing both the Russian patriots and the Allied nations an irreparable moral harm.

SAZONOV  
TCHAYKOVSKY

PARIS, *February 12, 1919.*

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861.00/3858 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received February 15, 1919, 9:50 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"111. February 13, noon. Weekly summary press opinion in Siberia. Press continues give paramount importance to Princes Island proposition. Press is very antagonistic to idea of the Conference. Even moderate newspapers in leading articles state that

decision of Allies makes it clear that members of Peace Conference do not yet fully understand the Russian situation, despite the well-known suffering of Russia, statements of well-informed resident foreigners. If from them the Allies do not yet know the terrible condition of Russia, it is very doubtful if the representatives will succeed in convincing them. Princes Island inquiry in Russian anarchy therefore becomes superfluous. The many foreign missions and official representatives in Siberia, for example, can verify the ruin of industry and the decay of transportation, to discover the underlying reason for which it seems unnecessary for Allies to debate. We do not wish to believe, these papers state, that commercial interests only given [*prompt?*] the decision of Allies and that this indifferent attitude comes from idea of waiting until Russia is absolutely in ruin when they can do as they please. We have, they state, not finally lost all belief in our friends, but we hope time is close when they will understand the danger to world in development of Bolshevism.

In discussing situation with individual Russians of practically all classes I find they no longer expect large numbers of Allied troops to fight here. They have now become accustomed to this fact. On the other hand, there is a small party which favors Japanese because Japan has expressed willingness to send large numbers of troops to western Siberia front.

Senator Longworth's speeches in Senate [*sic*] have been largely circulated in Siberian press. Owing to Russian ignorance of our party politicians they are considerably confused as to the real attitude of American public opinion as concerns Russian affairs.

It is apparent that one of three things will eventually become policy of Allies towards Russia; namely, first, leave Russia entirely to herself to carve out her own destiny without foreign assistance to operate; second, directly intervene and with large armed forces crush Bolshevism beyond hope of recovery; third, afford Russia material support to operate by supplying money, arms, and ammunition, thus enabling the forces opposed to Bolshevism for a considerable time to suppress Bolsheviks.

The first is out of the question, as it spells Bolshevik [*mis*]rule and anarchy for years to come. In a [*any?*] case it is advisable for the Allies to make a quick and definite decision in order that present conditions in Russia may be liquidated within some reasonable length of time. Harris."

REINSCH



Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/39

B.C.—32

*Minutes of the 14th Session of the Supreme War Council held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 14, 1919, at 6:30 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing; Secretaries, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Mr. L. Harrison.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.; Secretaries, Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Sir P. Loraine, Bt.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; Secretaries, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot.—*Italy*: H. E. Baron Sonnino; Secretary, Count Aldrovandi.—*Japan*: H. E. M. Matsui.

JOINT SECRETARIAT.—*America, United States of*: Col. U. S. Grant.—*British Empire*: Captain E. Abraham.—*France*: Captain A. Portier.—*Italy*: Major A. Jones.—*Japan*: M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: General Bliss.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., General Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O., Maj. General W. T. Thwaites, C.G.—*France*: General Belin, General Alby, General Le Rond.—*Italy*: General Cavallero.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

### Meeting of the Russian Representatives at Prinkipo

2. MR. BALFOUR said that the second point to which he wished to draw the attention of the Council was that of the proposed Meeting with the various Russian Governments at Prinkipo. He only wished to introduce the subject, and he asked Mr. Winston Churchill, who had come over for the purpose, to explain the present views of the British Cabinet.

MR. CHURCHILL said that on the previous day there had been a Cabinet Meeting in London, at which great anxiety had been manifested concerning the Russian situation, particularly in respect to the policy of the Prinkipo meeting. In view of the imminent departure of President Wilson, the Cabinet had asked him to go over and obtain some decision as to the policy on this matter. Mr. Lloyd George had expressed a wish to know whether the Allied policy which had led to the suggestion of the meeting at Prinkipo was to be pursued or, if not, what policy was to be substituted for it. If it were possible to go on with the original policy, so much the better; but if only the Bolsheviki were to attend the Conference, it was thought that little good would come of the meeting. The military aspect of the case must be con-

sidered. Great Britain had soldiers in Russia who were being killed in action. Their families wished to know what purpose these men were serving. Were they just marking time until the Allies had decided on policy, or were they fighting in a campaign representing some common aim? The longer the delay continued, the worse would be the situation of the troops on all the Russian fronts. The Russian elements in those forces were deteriorating rapidly because of the uncertainty of the support they might expect from the victorious Allies. The Allied troops were intermingled with these Russian troops, which were weakening and quavering, and they were themselves becoming affected. If the Prinkipo meeting were not going to procure a cessation of arms, this unsatisfactory condition might last an indefinite time.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that a matter of such importance could not be settled at a short and unexpected meeting.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that since Mr. Churchill had come over specially to anticipate his departure, he felt that he should express what his personal thoughts on the subject were. Among the many uncertainties connected with Russia, he had a very clear opinion about two points. The first was that the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers were doing no sort of good in Russia. They did not know for whom or for what they were fighting. They were not assisting any promising common effort to establish order throughout Russia. They were assisting local movements, like, for instance, that of the Cossacks, who could not be induced to move outside their own sphere. His conclusion, therefore, was that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to withdraw their troops from all parts of Russian territory.

The second related to Prinkipo. The policy tending to a meeting at Prinkipo had been instituted in order to find out what the people in Russia were thinking and purposing to do. As far as he was concerned, he would be quite content that informal American representatives should meet representatives of the Bolsheviks. In their reply the Bolsheviks offered a number of things which had not been asked for, such as repayment of debts, concessions and territorial compensations. This answer was not only uncalled for, but might be thought insulting. What the Allies had in mind was the establishment of peace in Russia as an element of the world's peace. The first condition of the meeting asked for by the Allies was the cessation of attacks by Russian troops on the communities outside their borders. If the other Russian Govts. would not come to Prinkipo to meet the Allies, why should the Allies not imitate Mahomet, and go to them? What we were seeking was not a *rapprochement* with the Bolsheviks, but clear information. The reports received from Russia

from various official and unofficial sources were so conflicting that it was impossible to form a coherent picture of the state of the country. Some light on the situation might be obtained by meeting the Russian representatives.

Mr. CHURCHILL said that complete withdrawal of all Allied troops was logical and clear policy, but its consequence would be the destruction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia. These numbered at the present time about 500,000 men and though their quality was not of the best, their numbers were nevertheless increasing. Such a policy would be equivalent to pulling out the linch-pin from the whole machine. There would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia, and an interminable vista of violence and misery was all that remained for the whole of Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the existing forces of the Allies could not stop the Bolsheviks, and that not one of the Allies was prepared to reinforce its troops.

M. SONNINO asked whether the Allies might not continue to supply arms to the non-Bolshevik elements?

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that they made very little use of them when they had them.

Mr. CHURCHILL agreed that none of the Allies could send conscript troops to Russia. He thought, however, that volunteers, technical experts, arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. might be furnished.

PRESIDENT WILSON understood the problem was to know what use would be made of these forces and supplies. In some areas they would certainly be assisting reactionaries. Consequently, if the Allies were asked what they were supporting in Russia they would be compelled to reply that they did not know. Conscripts could not be sent and volunteers probably could not be obtained. He himself felt guilty in that the United States had in Russia insufficient forces, but it was not possible to increase them. It was certainly a cruel dilemma. At present our soldiers were being killed in Russia, if they were removed many Russians might lose their lives. But some day or other the Allied troops would have to be withdrawn; they could not be maintained there for ever and the consequences to the Russians would only be deferred.

LORD MILNER pointed out that the only troops that could at present be removed were those in Siberia. The troops on the Archangel Front were ice-bound and could not, for the time being, be removed. Should the Allies proceed to remove their troops immediately from Siberia there might be an overwhelming concentration of Bolsheviks on the Archangel Front.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that there were no considerable Bolshevik forces in Siberia.

Mr. LANSING observed that the Bolsheviks had a large army in Eastern Russia at the point of contact with the Anti-Bolshevik Siberian Forces.

Mr. CHURCHILL said that he would like to know whether the Council would approve of arming the Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a failure.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he hesitated to express any definite opinion on this question. He had explained to the Council how he would act if alone. He would, however, cast in his lot with the rest.

(The meeting adjourned and it was agreed that the subject should be considered again at the conversation to be held the following afternoon.)

VILLA MAJESTIC,  
February 15th, 1919.

Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/40

B. C.—32

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 15, 1919, at 3 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. House; Secretary, Mr. L. Harrison.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., The Rt. Hon. W. C. Churchill, M.P.; Secretaries, Lt.Col. M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Mr. Norman.—*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; Secretaries, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Bearn.—*Italy*: M. Sonnino, M. Crespi; Secretaries, Count Aldrovandi, M. Bertele.—*Japan*: H. E. Baron Makino, H. E. M. Matsui.

JOINT SECRETARIAT.—*America, United States of*: Lieut. Burden.—*British Empire*: Major A. M. Caccia, M.V.O.—*France*: Captain Portier.—*Italy*: Major Jones.—*Japan*: M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT.—*America, United States of*: Gen. T. H. Bliss.—*British Empire*: Gen. Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O.—*France*: M. Alby, M. Bertin, Major Aublet.—*Italy*: General Cavallero.

Interpreter.—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

3 (b) Prinkipo Conference

Mr. CHURCHILL said that everyone there present knew the reasons which had led the Conference to adopt the policy of Prinkipo. Since then a month had passed and no decision which made any effect on

the forces of the Allies had yet been reached. On the other hand, as General Alby's statement had shown, very disastrous events had been taking place in Russia during that period. In his opinion, it was essential to try and bring the faction war in Russia to an end, and Great Britain adhered entirely to the position previously taken up. But if Prinkipo was not going to come to anything, the sooner it could be got out of the way the better. At the present moment all military action was paralysed by suspense, and there was very grave danger that as a result, the Allied and friendly armies would gradually melt away. The British Government held the view that that process of disintegration was proceeding very rapidly, and that the existing friendly armies would probably be the last, which it would be possible to raise against Bolshevism. Consequently, it was essential, either to carry Prinkipo through to a definite result, or to get it out of the way. With this object in view he had drafted a wireless message which he submitted for discussion. This telegram would, he thought, have the desired effect of settling affairs within a certain limit of time. The effect hoped for would be either to bring about a discussion at Prinkipo and a cessation of fighting in Russia, or the field would be left clear for such action as the Allies might wish to take.

Mr. CHURCHILL then read the following text of the draft telegram:

"The Princes Island proposal of the Allied Powers has now been made public for more than a month. The Bolsheviks have replied by wireless on the 6th instant offering to meet the wishes of the Allied Powers as regards the re-payment of loans, the grant of concessions for mineral and forest rights, and to examine the rights of eventual annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers.

"The Allies repudiate the suggestion that such objects have influenced their intervention in Russia. The supreme desire of the Allies is to see peace restored in Russia and the establishment of a Government based upon the will of the broad mass of the Russian people.

"It is solely with this object that the Princes Island proposal has been made. It is not essential to that proposal that any conference should be held or that representatives of the various Russian forces in the field should meet around a common table. But what is imperative is that fighting should stop and stop forthwith. The Bolshevik Government while verbally accepting the invitation to Princes Island have, so far from observing a truce of arms, taken the offensive in many directions and are at the present time attacking on several fronts. In addition they have called up new classes and expedited and expanded their military preparations.

"It is therefore necessary to fix a precise time within which the Princes Island proposal must be disposed of. Unless within 10 days from the 15th instant the Bolshevik forces on all fronts have ceased to attack and have withdrawn a distance of not less than 5 miles from the present position of their adversaries' outpost lines, the Princes

Island proposal will be deemed to have lapsed. If, however, within 5 days a wireless notification is received from the Bolshevik Government that they have so ceased attacking, so ceased firing and so withdrawn, and if this is confirmed by the reports received from the various fronts, a similar request will be addressed by the Allies to the forces confronting them.

“It is in these circumstances only that a discussion at Princes Island can take place.”

Mr. CHURCHILL, continuing, said that simultaneously with the above message, or something like it, he would propose the immediate setting up of an Allied Council for Russian affairs. This Council should have political, economic and military sections, with executive powers within limits to be laid down by the present Conference. In that way continuity of policy, unity of purpose and control would be obtained. He thought the Council should get to work during the period before the Prinkipo proposal could be disposed of one way or another, for the proposed Council would be useful whatever happened in regard to Prinkipo. The Council would receive general directions from the Allied Governments in the light of what happened at Prinkipo, so that there would be no delay. But he laid stress on the fact that the military section should be formed and should get to work at once. If the Bolsheviks continued to attack and to drive back the Allied and friendly forces, a definite military policy would be required and it would then be necessary to know what action was possible with the available resources. The military section of the proposed Council should, therefore, be asked at once to draw up a plan for concerted action against the Bolsheviks. The details in regard to the organization of the Council could naturally be worked out in a variety of different ways: but it was essential to have a body whose duty it would be to study the situation and to estimate the forces the Allies disposed of for the purpose of waging war against the Bolsheviks. Then, if the Prinkipo proposal gave no results, the Supreme War Council would be in possession of a definite war scheme, together with an appreciation of the situation and an estimate of the chances of being able to carry through to success the suggested plans. The Supreme War Council could then make their choice: either to act, or to withdraw their troops and leave everyone in Russia to stew in their own juice. But in any case, the Supreme War Council would have been placed in a position to enable it to arrive at a decision. His proposal, therefore, contained two definite lines of action. Firstly, that a wireless message be issued with the object of bringing the Prinkipo proposal to an issue. Secondly, that a scientific and careful study of the situation be carried out in order to be ready with a plan of action in the event of the Prinkipo proposal falling through.

In conclusion he wished earnestly to bring the following facts to the notice of the Conference. A month ago a meeting had been held in London at which it had been decided that the Russian situation was so serious as to demand the immediate acceptance of a policy. A month had passed, and no decision had been reached. The situation in Russia did not brook delay. It was essential that some policy should be laid down. The alternatives were these—either to prepare some plan of military action in Russia, consistent with the resources available, or to withdraw the armies and to face the consequences of abandoning Russia to her fate. Before the war Russia was the counterpoise of Europe. Now the balance was maintained by large British and American armies. The British forces were being demobilised and the American forces were going home. He himself did not believe that Germany could resume war at the present moment, but he begged his hearers to consider what the position would be in five or ten years' time. The population of Germany was twice that of France. The number of conscripts annually available would be almost three times as great. If, in addition, the Allies abandoned Russia to her fate, would it be possible to make sure that Germany would do the same? Would it be possible to make certain that Germany, either by alliance with the Bolsheviks or with the other parties at present friendly to the Allies would not in the near future become the supreme influence in Russia? It was only from Russia that Germany could derive those resources which she had lost through the loss of her colonies and through her defeat on the Western front. But should Russia fall into her clutches, Germany would thereby become stronger than ever. In his opinion Russia was the key to the whole situation, and unless she formed a living part of Europe, unless she became a living partner in the League of Nations and a friend of the Allied Powers, there would be neither peace nor victory. He would therefore implore the Conference to take up the Russian question and to pursue it unceasingly until a policy was agreed on. The terrible situation which faced the Allies in Russia compelled him to speak in very direct terms.

Mr. LANSING agreed that with a few changes in the text the message could be sent, but as regards anything like the formation of a policy or the creation of a Council, he thought no action should be taken until an opportunity for consultation had been given.

Mr. CHURCHILL expressed the view that the creation of the Council might be postponed, but he considered it essential that the military section should forthwith be constituted.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that the Supreme War Council could, without any inconvenience, call upon its military advisers to study the question.

COLONEL HOUSE proposed that a decision in regard to the creation of a Council should be postponed until Monday next. He was willing to agree, however, to the immediate despatch of the proposed wireless.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that there were two questions to be decided. A military question and a question which entailed negotiations. As regards the military question he agreed that it was most urgent; that a policy was essential and that delay would be very dangerous. In his opinion it was not a question of what would happen in five or ten years' time. The danger to be faced would have immediate reaction in all Allied countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the military question should be considered at once as being most urgent.

Mr. HOUSE proposed that the military question should be adjourned until Monday, and that the Conference should confine itself to a consideration of the cable.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been completely opposed to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but he had accepted it in order to avoid the introduction of elements of discord into that Conference. But the fact must now be recognised that the original wireless message had not been a great success, either in Europe or elsewhere. The people whose greatest interest it would have been to support the proposals therein contained (he was now speaking of the Russian political refugees of all kinds who continually visited their offices, with petitions for guns, munitions and money)—those people had gone off in a bad temper, instead of taking the unique opportunity offered them by the Conference of indicting Bolshevism and its abuses before the whole world. These people had refused to go to Prinkipo, whilst the Bolsheviks had offered the Allies money. When people got into an awkward situation, they usually made an effort to get out of it. The Conference should not attempt to deceive itself, for that was what it was now trying to do. He thought that it should get out of its troubles as discreetly and as simply as possible. No further reference should be made to Prinkipo. He was not altogether opposed to Mr. Churchill's draft message, but what was said in two pages could be put in ten lines. It would be very simple to summarise it. Personally, he would prefer to say nothing, but if the Conference insisted upon sending a message, it should be as simple as possible. Why should the whole world be told that this plan had failed. That was already known. Mr. Churchill had described the Allied situation in Russia as cruel and terrible, but he had described it truly. He himself agreed with all that Mr. Churchill had said; and he attached a great importance to the creation of the proposed Council. He did not favour the policy of leaving Russia to her own devices, because she would rapidly fall a prey



to the Germans. He favoured the policy of encirclement: the policy of setting up a barrier around Russia. The results of such a policy would be that in the end the Russians would ask the Allies to intervene.

That very moment a telegram had been received to the effect that the Germans had, in spite of the orders issued, attacked the Poles on a wide front, and had already taken two towns. The Germans were endeavouring to meet Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact. He would speak of this matter again presently, because a decision would have to be taken. But he wished to mention it at once, because the Russian policy must be examined in its entirety and Poland was concerned in that policy.

He did not oppose the sending of a new message about Prinkipo. But he foresaw grave troubles, and a decision in regard to military policy in Russia should be reached without further delay. He himself was ready to make new sacrifices, but he did not court defeat in Russia, after having been victorious on the Rhine.

Mr. HOUSE thought the question to be decided was how to finesse the situation against the Bolsheviks. In England and America the Russian question has created a very serious situation and the Prinkipo proposal has produced a good effect in circles hostile to the Government. The point to be decided was how best to defeat the Bolsheviks and the German purpose. Unless tact were used, all people east of the Rhine might be thrown against England, the United States of America, and France. It was already being said that England and America were using France as an instrument for obtaining Anglo-Saxon supremacy throughout the world.

Mr. BALFOUR thought it was necessary to take steps to put the Bolsheviks in the wrong, not only before public opinion, but before those who held the view that Bolshevism was democracy gone astray with large elements of good in it. Personally, he thought Bolshevism was the worst form of class tyranny. M. Clemenceau held the view that public opinion in France was unanimous against Bolshevism, and that any truck with it meant trafficking with the powers of darkness. But other views existed and could not wholly be ignored. He himself had never been sanguine about the issue of the discussions at Prinkipo; but he had perceived certain benefits arising out of the Allies' declaration of an endeavour to secure peace in Russia. In any case, the Allies had embarked on the Prinkipo proposal, and, if abandoned as M. Clemenceau had proposed, all the advantages gained by the original proposal would be thrown away. Therefore, it would merely be worldly wisdom, having once invested money in Prinkipo, to extract all that was possible from the debacle. He thought, therefore, some sort of message should be sent to the Bolsheviks, which would compel them either to cease hostilities or to

refuse negotiations. Such a message would put the Bolsheviks on the horns of a dilemma, and at the same time place the Allies in a better position in regard to public opinion.

Mr. HOUSE said that he had never been in favour of the Prinkipo proposal, but it had been embarked upon, and therefore they must go along with it and, if eventually the Allies were compelled to embark on military operations, they would do so in a stronger and better position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he knew quite well that his proposal to take no further action in regard to Prinkipo would not be accepted. For that reason he had suggested shortening and simplifying Mr. Churchill's draft. He thought it right to mention that French opinion had throughout been unanimously opposed to the Prinkipo policy, and the protests had not been limited to France. A violent protest had been received from Admiral Kolchak, who had accused the Allies of having thereby practically disarmed his troops. Were not the Allies responsible to some degree for the recent failures in Russia? The soldiers in the line did not know whether they ought to fight or to await the next armistice. The Allies should not lose sight of that. He (M. Clemenceau) was not reproaching them, but it was nevertheless a fact.

As Colonel House and Mr. Balfour had remarked, the Allies had got into this Prinkipo business, and now they had to get out of it. He merely asked them to get out of it in as simple a manner as possible. He had no objections to offer to Mr. Churchill's draft, but he would like it to be made simpler and shorter.

M. SONNINO agreed that the Allies would have to get out of the Prinkipo business. He himself had been opposed to it from the commencement, and he had then expressed the opinion that the Bolsheviks would be the only ones to accept the Allies' invitation, as it gave the Bolsheviks the means of enhancing their prestige. His predictions had come true, and today the Allies possessed good grounds for abandoning the whole project. It could truthfully be said that the Bolsheviks had ignored the Allies' requests and had not ceased hostilities, and that the other Governments had not accepted the Allies' invitation. The matter should therefore be ended. It was proposed to send another message, with a short time limit for reply, say ten or fifteen days. It was said that procedure would lead to no harm. But it would do harm, if by enhancing still more the prestige of the Bolsheviks, the Allies increased still further the state of demoralisation of the friendly Russian forces, and of the Entente troops operating in Russia. Mr. Balfour had said "We must compel the Bolsheviks to acknowledge their errors". The Bolsheviks would never do that, and ten days hence the Allies would find themselves assailed by new and innumerable difficulties. The Bolsheviks would put forward

many excellent reasons to prove that they had been compelled to attack in self-defence, and meanwhile the situation would have become worse, the Allies would have gained no benefits whatever, and the Allied troops would have become even more demoralised.

The Conference wished to create a Council to draw up a military plan of action for these troops, and at the same time measures were proposed which would still further demoralise these same troops. Prinkipo had failed: there was no doubt whatever about that. Prinkipo had, however, proved to the world the friendly desire of the Allies to be at peace with Russia. The Prinkipo policy had been a failure, and the less said about it the better: and the proposed Council should now be asked to suggest other solutions.

He would accept the proposal to send another message, but the offer to meet at Prinkipo should not be renewed.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed his desire to support Baron Sonnino's proposal.

Mr. CHURCHILL said that Mr. Lloyd George was very anxious, should the Prinkipo policy fail, for the Allies to be ready with another policy. But the British Cabinet would never agree, having gone so far, to break off the Prinkipo policy without making it quite clear to the world that that proposal had been sincerely put forward and sincerely pressed, as long as any chance of its succeeding existed. He thought the dignity of the Conference demanded the acceptance of that procedure. The Conference had unanimously adopted the proposal which had been put forward by President Wilson himself. No one should be able to say "You made a false movement, and you abandoned it. The Bolsheviks were about to accept, and you withdrew". The British Government wished it to appear that they had acted fairly by the Bolsheviks. He had put forward proposals for a military enquiry to be held, but he did not pre-judge the decision. It might be that as a result of that enquiry, no action might be found possible. But, in any case, until the military experts had reported, it would not be wise brutally to brush aside the Prinkipo proposal until alternative plans were ready.

M. SONNINO enquired what would be the result if the Bolsheviks stated that they would stop all hostilities and come to Prinkipo. In ten days' time it would be impossible to ascertain whether hostilities had really been stopped. On the other hand, the effect would have been to disorganise still further the Allied forces in Russia. His thesis was this: The Bolsheviks had been given a period of time up to the 15th February in which to comply with the conditions contained in the original wireless. The Bolsheviks had not complied with those terms and conditions (the Bolsheviks had continued their offensive). Why, therefore, prolong by ten days the period already

granted? The Bolsheviki could not do more than fail to comply, as they had done, with the conditions of the Allies, and in ten days' time the Allies would be faced with the same situation; but with the additional disadvantage that their own forces would have become further disorganised. He begged the members of the Conference to realise what effect this policy would have, not only in Russia but in Allied countries. The prestige given to Bolshevism was a real disaster in its effect on Allied countries. Consequently, no good effect could be obtained by granting the Bolsheviki this added prestige. The Bolsheviki had been given a chance; why should they be given a second and a third and a fourth chance? He strongly opposed the sending of the proposed message.

BARON MAKINO said that he also had received messages from Siberia bearing out the statements made by M. Clemenceau as to the disastrous effect the original wireless had created in the minds of all friendly groups in Siberia. At the time that the invitation had been issued to the various groups in Russia, no such consequence had been anticipated. If now a second telegram were sent, it was most important that its intent and purpose should not be misunderstood by the friendly forces in Siberia.

Mr. BALFOUR wished to ask the military authorities a question of fact. It was being said that the Bolsheviki had pretended to accept, but they had not in reality done so, because they had not complied with the fundamental condition in regard to the cessation of hostilities. But had the Allied troops abstained from hostilities? Or, to put his question in another way: had all the Allied military operations been defensive in their character?

Mr. CHURCHILL pointed out that during the interval between the dispatch of the invitation and the present moment, the Bolshevik forces had made the most heavy attacks on all fronts.

Mr. BALFOUR expressed the view that a good many points of great difficulty had been raised that afternoon. He proposed therefore that the further consideration of the two questions: the dispatch of the message and the creation of a Council on Russian Affairs, should be adjourned till Monday afternoon.

(It was agreed to adjourn until Monday, 17th February, at 3 p.m., the further consideration of the two questions relating to the situation in Russia, namely:

- (1) The wireless message in regard to Prinkipo, and
- (2) The creation of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs.)

(The Conference adjourned to Monday afternoon, February 17th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

*February 16th, 1919.*

861.00/3855 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk  
(Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1919, 4 p.m.

Following message from the Am[erican] mission dated February 14:

“No. 741, February 14, 12 p.m. Department’s 519 February 1, noon<sup>56</sup> and Department’s 627 [629], February 8, 2 p.m.<sup>57</sup> It is the opinion of the Commission that the Prinkipo invitation implied that the United States and the Allied Governments would treat all Russian Governments on a plane of equality pending the outcome of the investigating at Prinkipo. Recognition of the Kolchak Government might follow but could not precede that meeting. I suggest that the Consul General at Omsk might give [*explain*] informally that while no specific invitations are issued it would seem highly desirable for the Kolchak Government to send a delegation to Prinkipo since the future action of the United States may depend on information obtained at that investigation.”

Please take action suggested by the Secretary of State and report to Department. You are to bear in mind that the invitation to admit Bolshevik delegates to the Prinkipo Conference did not imply any willingness to barter principles with the Bolsheviki but has for its sole purpose investigation and obtaining complete information.

POLK

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763.72119/3797 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extract]

PARIS, February 17, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received February 18, 10:21 a.m.]

797. The following telegram has been sent to the President.

“The discussion of the Russian question was continued at the meeting this afternoon at the Quai d’Orsay.

Mr. Winston Churchill submitted a resolution directing the military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom might be associated as required representatives of the General Staffs of the Navies of the Allied and Associated Powers, to examine and report at an early date as to the practical possibilities of landing [*joint*] military action by the Associated Powers to enable the Russian armies called into being by these powers during the war with Germany to maintain themselves against Bolshevik

<sup>56</sup> *Ante*, p. 38.

<sup>57</sup> See footnote 52, *post*, p. 328.

coercion, and as to what measures and precautions might be necessary or possible to safeguard Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Poland and Roumania. The American representatives opposed the adoption of this resolution, and after considerable discussion it was agreed particularly to ensure secrecy at this stage of the discussion, that each delegate [*delegation*] would consult its military representatives at Versailles on the points mentioned in Mr. Churchill's resolution, that the military representatives would talk the matter over in confidence with each other, and that they would then report to their respective delegations as soon as possible. The matter would then come up again for discussion with a view to determining upon a policy. . . ." <sup>58</sup>

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 860 C.00/46

*The Head of the Ukrainian Delegation at Paris (Sydorenko) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

PARIS, February 18 [17], 1919.

[Received in Paris February 20.]

SIR: I beg to call your kind attention to the copies of the three notes,<sup>59</sup> here enclosed and which I have addressed to the President of the Peace Conference at Paris.

I am [etc.]

G. SYDORENKO

*Minister of Roads and Communications,  
Head of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Republic at Paris*

[Enclosure]

*The Head of the Ukrainian Delegation at Paris (Sydorenko) to the President of the Paris Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*<sup>60</sup>

SIR: The Delegation of the Ukrainian Republic with full authority from its Government, has the honour to ask you to transmit the following note on the subject of the Conference of the Ile des Princes, to the Peace Conference at Paris:

"The Ukrainian Republic, independant and supreme by the will of the people and who have just asked to be admitted by their repre-

<sup>58</sup> In the minutes of the meeting of the Supreme War Council, Paris, Feb. 17, 1919, 3 p.m. (Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/41), a single short paragraph relating to Russia reads as follows:

"7. A discussion on the policy to be pursued in Russia ensued, and after an exchange of views, it was decided to postpone the resumption of the discussion until later in the week."

<sup>59</sup> Two notes not printed.

<sup>60</sup> English text printed as received.

sentants to the Peace Conference, are at the present moment in a state of war with the bolchevik Government of Russia, who have sent their troops against Ukraine and broken the Ukrainian front near the frontier of the Ukrainian Republic.—Now they are advancing into the heart of our country and the Bolchevik Government has not only no intention of fulfilling the conditions laid down by the Peace Conference at Paris to establish a truce, to retire its forces and to cease all military action;—but on the contrary, it has just developed its military offensive to destroy the Independence of the Ukrainian Republic.

It is for this reason that the Ukrainian Government cannot take part in the Conference of the Ile des Princes unless the Bolchevik Government of Russia cease its military operations against the Republic of Ukraine (which has already been recognised as an Independent and sovereign State) and also that the Bolchevik Government of Russia remove all its military forces from the Ukrainian front.

The Government of the Ukrainian Republic can take part in the Conference of the Ile des Princes with the Representatives of the Allies and the United States of America as it is a free and independent and sovereign state by the wish of the people, who desire a complete separation from Russia whether that country be democratic or monarchial.—One knows that the traditional history of Russia was always, until now, an imperial policy and now she wishes to pass over the body of Independent Ukraine to put one hand on the Dardanelles and Suez and the other on the Persian Gulf.

Ukraine can and must live as a free State independent and sovereign! [”]

I remain [etc.]

G. SYDORENKO

*Minister of Roads and Communications*

*Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Ukraine*

PARIS, February 10, 1919.

861.00/3927

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to transmit herewith paraphrases of two cables<sup>61</sup> received by the Russian Embassy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Omsk, and the Russian Ambassador, Paris.

I have [etc.]

S. UGHET

<sup>61</sup> One of the enclosures, which is not printed, is a paraphrase of the note from the Russian Embassy in France to the Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference, Feb. 12, 1919, p. 53.

[Enclosure]

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Omsk to the Russian Embassy  
at Washington*

News of the decision of the Peace Conference which has proposed the meeting on Prince's Islands was received by the Omsk Government on January 24. We entertained no doubts as to the entire unacceptability of this proposal. The Government immediately rejected any possibility of an agreement with the Bolsheviks as well as any negotiations with them. Respective instructions were transmitted by us to Paris and at the same time considered it necessary, in conformity with the request of our Paris Committee, to withhold from hasty public declarations until the causes and motives of the Allied powers had been elucidated. Henceforth, the Government made only one statement aiming to tranquilize the public anxiety in Russia. Simultaneously, the commander in chief issued an order to the troops in which he, in the most decisive terms, denied the possibility of an armistice. At the same time, Sazonoff, in Paris, made a number of declarations in which he pointed to the impossibility of our participation in negotiations at which the Bolsheviks would be present. Meanwhile, public opinion in Russia had the opportunity of expressing itself—the Government, on behalf of socialistic, non-socialistic, cooperative, commercial and industrial as well as other groups sent abroad a number of statements expressing the unanimous and decisive condemnation of any negotiations with the Bolsheviks. The Russian universities made respective appeals to the scientific bodies of Europe and America. The temporary supreme ecclesiastical body sent messages to all the Christian bishops emphasizing the religious persecutions by the Bolsheviks and the necessity for help.

The moment has now arrived when the official reply of the Government will be transmitted by Sazonoff, in Paris, such reply being formulated in consideration of existing conditions and in accordance with Ekaterinodar and Archangel.

There will also be issued a special declaration for wide publicity in Russia which explains the very essence of our irreconcilable struggle against Bolshevism.

. February 19, 1919.

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/274 : Telegram

*President Wilson to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

U. S. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON, February 19, 1919, (?) a.m.

[Received in Paris February 20, 11 p.m.]

W-6. Greatly surprised by Churchill's Russian suggestion. I distinctly understood Lloyd George to say that there could be no



thought of military action there and what I said at the hurried meeting Friday afternoon was meant only to convey the idea that I would not take any hasty separate action myself, but would not be in favor of any course [contrary to that which ?] may mean the earliest practicable withdrawal of military forces. It would be fatal to be led further into the Russian chaos.

WOODROW WILSON

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Paris Peace Conference 861 L.00/40

*Memorandum by Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., of the Russian Section,  
Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[PARIS,] *February 22, 1919.*

MEMORANDUM: Luncheon with S. E. Morison, J. V. Fuller, and myself,<sup>62</sup> and Mr. Mostowski, Prof. Waldemar, Mr. Ycas and Mgr. Olsauskis-Olsevski.<sup>63</sup>

At luncheon to-day I attempted to persuade the four Lithuanians who were present that it would be desirable for them to accept the Prinkipo Conference. Monsignor Olsauskis-Olsevski was violently opposed.

Prof. Waldemar said that their position was that they had neither accepted nor refused this invitation and that their only objection to refusing was that in its present form the invitation would seem to involve the compromise by this acceptance of their aspirations towards independence. I said that in my opinion no such implication could be given, or in any event would be made. He also said that he did not believe it was possible that the Bolsheviks would consent to an armistice which would make easier the position of the Baltic States. I said that, speaking personally, I could not see how the United States Government could request an armistice for, or favorable to, governments which did not accept that invitation, but that I was strongly of the belief that in case the Baltic Governments did accept, the United States would endeavor immediately to secure an armistice and if possible, withdrawal of Bolshevik forces from these countries. Waldemar left the subject by saying that the question was by no means decided, and that he hoped some solution could be reached.

Mr. Ycas, I found flatly favorable to the Prinkipo Conference. When the invitation was issued he telegraphed from Switzerland in favor of acceptance and he offered to bring me a copy of the telegram on his return from his projected visit to Switzerland.

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<sup>62</sup> Members of the Russian Section, Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>63</sup> Members of the Lithuanian delegation at Paris.

He further said that the Lithuanian delegates had been empowered to accept such an invitation, and as proof showed me his mandate, which I examined. It certainly gives power to conduct negotiations at Prinkipo. He added that he hoped to persuade Waldemar; and also that there were three delegates from Berlin, Dr. Runickis, Prof. Capinkas, and Dr. Bizauskas, who are at the Lithuanian Embassy in Berlin, 69 Augsburg Str., who could be reached by telegraph in care of Adlon, General Harries. He said that he would telegraph for their immediate return to Paris to consider this question, saying that when they arrived, the majority of the Lithuanian government would be in favor of accepting the invitation, and he asked me to telegraph on our side. I said that I could not speak for the Commission, but that it was possible that the Government might see fit to make a statement to the Lithuanian Government on this question, and I said that we should perhaps be able to secure as preliminary to the Prinkipo Conference some sort of armistice, possibly providing for withdrawal from the Baltic States, and that, in any event, I could not see that they had anything to lose by accepting.

Ycas was Minister of Finance [*sic*] in the ministry of Prince Lvov and Kerensky, and he was of the Duma Committee, which visited the French, British, and Italian fronts in 1916. Next to Mgr. Olsaukis-Olsevski, I should say that he was the strongest member of the Lithuanian party.

Waldemar told me that the withdrawal of the Germans through within their own limits left the country substantially at the mercy of the Bolshevik troops. He thought that three thousand men from the Allies would be sufficient to relieve the country. He said that they had 12,000 men but needed money.

A. A. B[ERLE], Jr.

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/274 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 23, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received February 23, 3:09 p.m.]

876. For the President.

Your telegram February 19. Churchill's project is dead and there is little danger that it will be revived again by the Conference. General Bliss explained to Churchill that he must have misunderstood your views since you could not have made the statement which he attributed to you regarding military action in Russia.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 184.00101/25

*Minutes of the Meetings of the American Commissioners Plenipotentiary, March 1, 1919*

[Extracts]

PRESENT: Mr. Lansing, Mr. White, General Bliss, Mr. H. R. Wilson.

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Mr. Wilson introduced Memorandum No. 121<sup>64</sup> concerning Prof. Herron and Mr. White.<sup>65</sup> The Commissioners decided that Prof. Herron and Mr. White should not remain attached to the Commission in view of the present situation concerning Prinkipo, nor should they proceed with the organization of their delegation.

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Mission of William C. Bullitt to Russia

861.00/3913 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 24, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received February 25, 1:50 a.m.]

893. William C. Bullitt, W. W. Pettit and R. E. Lynch have proceeded to London *en route* Copenhagen. Lincoln Steffens<sup>66</sup> is traveling with them though not of the party. Bullitt will endeavor to enter into unofficial relations with some representative of the Soviet Government for the purpose of obtaining permission to proceed to Petrograd. His mission is entirely unofficial and for information purposes solely.<sup>67</sup> He will so inform the Soviet representative with whom he deals and endeavor to obtain necessary assurances relative to facilities for communication and guarantees of personal safety for his party.

Bullitt will inform the Embassy at London and the Legation at Copenhagen of the purpose and character of his mission. He will furnish similar information confidentially to the British Government.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

<sup>65</sup> George D. Herron and William Allen White had been selected to represent the United States at the Prinkipo Conference.

<sup>66</sup> American journalist.

<sup>67</sup> No copy of the letter of instructions from Secretary of State Lansing to Mr. Bullitt nor of the letter of credentials from the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace to Mr. Bullitt, both dated Feb. 18, 1919, printed in S. Doc. 106 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1234, has been found in Department files.

861.00/3928 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*PARIS, *February 26, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received February 27, 12:15 a.m.]

914. Bullitt and party expected to arrive Christiania 28th and at Stockholm following day. I have asked facilitation for him from both Legations and requested Minister at Stockholm to initiate unofficial negotiations through his private channels with Moscow Government with a view to obtaining permission for Bullitt and party to proceed to their destination.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/3929 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*WASHINGTON, *February 27, 1919, 7 p.m.*

900. For the Secretary of State. Your 914, February 26. I take the liberty of suggesting that you impress on our Minister in Stockholm the necessity of his keeping out of all negotiations that are carried on for the purpose of obtaining permission for Bullitt to proceed to his destination. I think we can be reasonably certain that if the Minister moves in the matter and the Bolshevik Government has any suspicion as to who is making the move, they will make the matter public at once, as, in our opinion, it will be a very valuable bit of propaganda for them.

POLK

861.00/3980 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*PARIS, *March 1, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received 6:37 p.m.]

986. Your 900, February 27th, 7 p.m. Stockholm advised.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/4039 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*VIBORG, *March 8, 1919.*

[Received March 9, 2:45 p.m.]

6. William Bullitt and party from American Mission Paris crossed border into Russia today at 1 p.m.

IMBRIE

861.00/4049 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*PARIS, *March 10, 1919, 10 p.m.*

[Received March 10, 9:10 p.m.]

1099. My 893, February 24th, 10 p.m. Telegram from Bullitt states he expects to reach Petrograd 9th instant. He adds: "I have reason to feel certain that I shall have definite propositions from the Soviet Government to transmit within a week or ten days." To avoid any misapprehension I handed brief memorandum to Balfour and Pichon this afternoon informing them that Bullitt is proceeding to Petrograd for information purposes solely.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/4 : Telegram

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*HELSINGFORS, *March 11, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received in Paris March 12, 6:30 p.m.]

15. Pettit just arrived with the following message:

"Bull 4. For Secretary Lansing and Colonel House only.

Petrograd, March 10th. Arrived Petrograd Saturday afternoon. Arrangements perfected in Finland and here to cross boundary at will and for communication with you, via American Consul, Helsingfors. Journey easy. Reports of frightful conditions here ridiculously exaggerated. Discussion yesterday with Tchicherin and Litvinov. Leave today for Moscow for discussion with Lenine. Both Tchicherin and Litvinov, speaking with authority, stated that the Soviet Government is most favorably disposed towards the cessation of hostilities and a peace conference, but pointed out the difficulty which may arise in controlling the various forces now operating against the Soviet Government and the necessity of making it certain that the period of the conference will not be employed to increase the forces against the Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Lettonian, and Esthonian Soviet Governments.

Tchicherin and Litvinov express full confidence in the good will of the American Government but have the greatest distrust of the French Government and fear that it will employ the period of the armistice to send large supplies to anti-Bolshevik armies and to raise forces to operate against the various Soviet Governments. Incidentally, Tchicherin and Litvinov state positively that in principle the Soviet Government is willing to pay its foreign debt; the only

question being how to meet immediate payments because of the present difficult financial position of the Government.

Am assured that after conversation in Moscow I shall be able to come out to Helsingfors and cable you by Thursday or Friday of this week an exact detailed statement of the position of the Soviet Government on all points.

Suspend judgment on any action until then. I am certain from conversation already held that the Soviet Government is disposed to be reasonable and that I shall have a communication of the utmost importance to transmit. Bullitt."

HAYNES

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Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/5 : Telegram

*Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

HELSINGFORS, March 16, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received in Paris March 17, 10:50 p.m.]

Bull 5. For the President, Secretary Lansing, and Colonel House only.

After daily conversations in Moscow with Tchitcherin and Litvinov, and conference with Lenine, I received from Tchitcherin on March 14th the statement which follows. He explained that the statement had been formally considered and adopted by the Executive Council of the Soviet Government and that the Soviet Government considered itself bound to accept the proposals contained therein, if they should be made by the Allied and Associated Governments on April 10th. I replied that although I had no authority to accept a formal note from the Soviet Government since my visit of inquiry was entirely informal and unofficial, nevertheless, I should be glad to carry the statement of the Soviet Government with me. It was understood that the statement should be regarded as absolutely secret, and that no publicity whatever should be given to it or to the fact of its existence.

Throughout our conversations, I found Lenine, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov full of a sense of Russia's need for peace, and therefore, disposed to be most conciliatory; and I feel certain that details of their statement may be modified without it being unacceptable to them. For example, the clause under article 5, "and to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia", is certainly not of any vital importance. On the other hand, as a result of a week of day and night discussions with the leaders of the Soviet Government, I am convinced that in the

main their statement represents the minimum terms which the Soviet Government will accept.

The statement runs as follows:<sup>88</sup>

"The Allied and Associated Governments to propose that hostilities shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland on (see footnote one<sup>a</sup>) and that no new hostilities shall begin after this date, pending a conference to be held at (see footnote two<sup>b</sup>) on (footnote three<sup>c</sup>).

The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material to the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference:

1. All existing *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to remain in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except insofar as the conference may agree upon the transfer of territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories controlled by these *de facto* Governments shall themselves determine to change their Governments. The Russian Soviet Government, the other Soviet Governments [and all other Governments] which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the Allied and Associated Governments, and the other Governments which are operating against the Soviet Governments, including Finland, Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Afghanistan, to agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and the other governments signatory to this agreement (footnote four<sup>d</sup>).

2. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations between Soviet Russia and the Allied and Associated countries to be reestablished under conditions which will ensure that supplies from the Allied and Associated countries are made available on equal terms to all classes of the Russian people.

<sup>88</sup> Bracketed corrections have been made upon comparison with the text handed William C. Bullitt in Moscow Mar. 14, 1919, by Chicherin and Litvinov (Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/11; printed in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Doc. 106, 66th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1248-1250).

<sup>a</sup> Footnote one: The date of the armistice to be set at least a week after the date when the Allied and Associated Governments make this proposal. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>b</sup> Footnote two: The Soviet Government greatly prefers that the conference should be held in a neutral country and also that either the radio, or direct telegraph wire to Moscow should be put at its disposal. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>c</sup> Footnote three: The Conference to begin not later than a week after the armistice takes effect, and the Soviet Government greatly prefers that the period between the date of the armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be only three days duration if possible. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>d</sup> Footnote four: The Allied and Associated Governments to undertake to see to it that the *de facto* government[s] of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the *de facto* governments of Russia. The *de facto* governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force the *de facto* governments of Germany. [Footnote in the original.]

3. The Soviet Government[s] of Russia to have the right of unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports which belong to the former Russian Empire and to Finland and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation of passengers and goods between their territories and the sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this provision to be agreed upon at the conference.

4. The citizens of the Soviet Republics of Russia to have the right of free entry into the Allied and Associated countries as well as into all countries which have been formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of those countries (footnote five<sup>o</sup>).

Nationals of the Allied and Associated countries and of the other countries above named to have the right of free entry into the Soviet Republics of Russia; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of the Soviet Republics.

The Allied and Associated Governments and other Governments whenever [*which have been*] set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into the various Russian Soviet republics. The Soviet Governments of Russia to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all the Allied and Associated countries and into the non-Soviet countries which have been formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland.

5. The Soviet Governments, the other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political opponents, offenders and prisoners. The Allied and Associated Governments to give a general amnesty to all Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and to assist<sup>69</sup> their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have fought in, or otherwise aided the armed forces opposed to the Soviet Government[s], and those opposed to the other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to be included in this amnesty.

All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia, to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, likewise all Russian [nationals, including the Russian] soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation.

6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement, all troops of the Allied and Associated Governments and other non-Russian governments to be withdrawn from Russia and military assistance to cease to be given to anti-Soviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire.

<sup>o</sup> Footnote five: It is considered essential by the Soviet Government that the Allied and Associated Governments should see to it that Poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as the Allied and Associated countries. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>69</sup> The word "assist" does not appear in the text described in footnote 68.



The Soviet Governments and the anti-Soviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing immediately after the signing of this agreement. The conference to determine the most effective and just method of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous demobilization, and also the withdrawal of the troops and the cessation of military assistance to the anti-Soviet Governments.

7. The Allied and Associated Governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the Soviet Government [of Russia], in its note of February 4th<sup>70</sup> in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the Soviet Governments and the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold seized by the Czechoslovaks in Kazan, or taken from Germany by the Allies, to be regarded as partial payment of the [portion of the] debt due from the Soviet Republics of Russia.

The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April 10th, 1919<sup>71</sup>.

It was understood, in regard to article number 2, that Allied and Associated countries should have the right to send inspectors into Soviet Russia to see to it that distribution of supplies is equitable.

It was specifically understood that the phrase in regard to "official representatives" in article number 4, does not include diplomatic representatives.

In regard to footnote two,<sup>71</sup> the Soviet Government hopes that conference may be held in Norway. Its preferences thereafter are: 1st, some point on the frontier between Russia and Finland; 2d, on a large ocean liner anchored off Moon Island; 3d, on a large ocean liner anchored off the Aaland Islands; 4th, Prinkipos, to which the Soviet Government objects greatly.

Lenine, Tchitcherin, Litvinov and all other leaders of the Soviet Government with whom I talked expressed in the most straightforward, unequivocal manner the determination of the Soviet Government to pay its foreign debts, and I am convinced that there will be no dispute on this point.

There is no doubt whatever of the desire of the Soviet Government for a just and reasonable peace, or of the sincerity of this proposal, and I pray you will consider it with the deepest seriousness.

BULLITT

<sup>70</sup> *Ante*, p. 39.

<sup>71</sup> Footnote b, p. 78.

Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/6 : Telegram

*Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

HELSINGFORS, *undated.*

[Received in Paris March 18, 1919, 6:10 p.m.]

Bull 6. For the President, Secretary Lansing, and Colonel House only. Supplementing my Bull 5.

As a result of personal observation in Petrograd and Moscow and discussions not only with Communists, but also with leaders of opposition parties and other observers, I submit for your consideration the following conclusions upon which there is general agreement:

1. The Soviet Government is firmly established and the Communist Party is strong politically and morally. There is order in Petrograd and Moscow. There have been no riots and no uprisings for many weeks. Prostitution has disappeared. Robberies have almost ceased. One feels as safe as in Paris. The opera, theaters and ballet are performing as in peace, except that they are managed under the department of education, which prefers classics and sees that the common people and children attend, fully instructed.

2. The Soviet Army is growing, high-spirited and well-equipped. The soldiers, 12,000 of whom we saw in Petrograd, and the common people no longer have the beaten, doglike look which marked them under the Tsar. They carry themselves like free men and very like Americans. Recruiting for the army and for the Communist Party is said to be easiest in those regions which, having once lived under the Soviet, have been overrun by anti-Soviet forces, Russian or foreign, and then been retaken by the Soviet Government.

3. The chief opposition parties, the Mensheviks and the right Social Revolutionary Party, are now supporting the Government. Their opposition ceased largely because Russia was being attacked from outside and threatened by more drastic intervention. They have published formal declarations against foreign intervention, against foreign help to anti-Soviet Government and against the blockade as the true cause of the miseries of Russia.

I have with me a formal statement written in my presence by Volsky, leader of the right Social Revolutionary [Party] and late president of the Assembly of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, denouncing the campaign for intervention which Breshkovskaya, a member of his party, is making in America, saying that his party will oppose intervention arms in hand to the last man and the last woman, and desires nothing from a foreign government except the lifting of the blockade, and a chance to dispute peaceably for control of Russia with the Communists, after the normal economic life of the country has been restored. I have a similar statement from Martov, leader of the Mensheviks. My dis-

cussions with men like these have convinced me that by intervention in Russia, by support of anti-Soviet Government and by the blockade we are working against the will and the needs of the united, common mass of the Russian people, to help whom is our one desire.

There is no constructive opposition to the Communists. The Cadets have abandoned the country. The left Social Revolutionary Party occupies the destructive position commonly attributed to the Communist by the outside. This party demands the extermination of the Bourgeoisie. It rages against the employment by the Communists of administrators, army officers and upper-class experts and managers who have offered their services to the Soviet Government and been accepted at salaries higher than Lenine, Trotsky or any other Communist is allowed by law to receive. The left Social Revolutionary Party opposes particularly all the compromises which experience has forced upon the more practical and responsible Communists. The first, extreme clique of the left Social Revolutionary Party is for a declaration of war on the Allied and Associated Governments and all other non-revolutionary governments and the spread by force of the revolution over the world. They are at present a small group of fanatical leaders, without mass support, who exist only because they are able to play upon the hunger which seizes all Russia.

5. If the position of the Soviet Government is strong politically and morally, the economic conditions of Soviet Russia are tragic. And this is due to the blockade.

The inhabitants of Petrograd and Moscow get but half a pound of bread a day; no butter, no sugar and very little meat. Everyone, including the people's commissaries, is pitifully under nourished. Only the children, who are fed at school, get enough to eat once a day. This food shortage is due in part to the prevention of shipments to Petrograd by the blockade, but primarily to the desperate transport situation. There is food in Russia but it cannot be sent to the great centers.

Before the war Russia used 22,000 locomotives. To-day there are but 5,500 in running order and most of these are engaged in army work, as are the most expert engineers and organizers. Furthermore, the locomotives must be fed with wood instead of coal, because Soviet Russia is cut off from the coal of Perm, and because Krasnoff<sup>72</sup> and Denikin destroyed the mines of the Donetz Basin before evacuating that region. Such locomotives as the Soviet Government possesses are used skillfully. On both our trips we made the run between Petrograd and Moscow in thirteen hours.

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<sup>72</sup> Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov, ataman of the Don Cossacks.

In addition to the lack of locomotives and the total absence of coal, transportation is made more hopeless for want of gasoline and oil, due to the British occupation of Baku. Because of this, transportation by automobile and by the great fleet of oil-burning boats on the Volga and the inland canals is impossible, and will continue to be impossible when the waterways open in the spring.

There are no medicines; men, women and children die by hundreds who might otherwise be saved.

6. That the masses of Russia, not only the Communists but also the Mensheviks, the right Social Revolutionary Party and members of other parties, stand by the Soviet Government in spite of these privations, shows vividly the hold the Soviets have upon the hopes of the Russian people. As one man put (it) to me, "we are ready to add another phase of starvation to our revolution."

It is the conviction of all the men with whom I have talked, and it is my conviction that the Soviet Government is the only constructive force in Russia to-day. It is generally agreed that enough expert administrators, who formerly opposed the Soviet, are now working with the government to conduct successfully the economic life of the country, if only they had the material things with which to conduct it. I was particularly struck by Lenine, who is a straightforward man of the quickest intelligence, and a certain serenity, humor and broad-minded views.

We can overthrow the Communists if we are considering to continue the blockade and intervention indefinitely, we can produce such famine, such hunger riots and battles for bread that the Anarchists and left Social Revolutionary Party will rule for a moment over the mind of Russia, for starvation will drive Russia to the left, not to the right. We can destroy the Communists only by producing anarchy. Then we shall finally have to intervene over the dead bodies and dead hopes of the simple Russian people to set up a form of government they do not want and against which they will revolt whenever strength returns to them.

The other course, which is open to us, is to make an offer of peace along the lines of the proposal of the Soviet Government transmitted in my foregoing cable. The Communists are ready to meet us half way and to assist compromise, not because they fear the ascendancy of any other party in Russia, but because they know that if they do not compromise and if the blockade is not lifted, they will go down with the rest of the Russian people into anarchy.

But they do not despair yet. They are hopeful. They received me because they had gathered the impression that President Wilson was beginning to see through the lies against them to the very simple

truth that a dull, inexperienced, a young people were trying rudely but conscientiously and at the cost of great suffering to themselves to find a better way to live for the common good than the old way.

BULLITT

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Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/8 : Telegram

*Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

HELSINGFORS, *undated.*

[Received in Paris March 18, 1919, 5:50 p.m.]

Bull 8. Attention Mr. Grew.<sup>73</sup>

Expect to send Pettit back to Petrograd Tuesday to investigate conditions in detail and maintain communications. Have planned unofficial but reliable courier service between Consul Helsingfors and Petrograd. Pettit requests that Sergeant Krause, from his office, be sent immediately to Helsingfors with \$200 worth of army commissary supplies in sealed packages, nothing to be had here, and that Krause be given courier passport and civilian clothing, and asked to bring Pettit's mail. He will assist Pettit and help him keep in touch with Helsingfors. I fully endorse this request. Please answer by telegraph at either Stockholm or Christiania if you approve. Personally will return to Paris via Stockholm, Bergen, Newcastle, London, as quickly as possible to explain matters in detail. Expect to leave Helsingfors Tuesday and be in Paris in less than ten days. Lynch and Steffens return with me. All our party well and most courteously treated.

BULLITT

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Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/9 : Telegram

*Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

HELSINGFORS, *undated.*

[Received in Paris March 18, 1919, 9:30 p.m.]

Bull 9. For Colonel House.

Please show my Bull 5 and Bull 6 to Philip Kerr.<sup>74</sup> I would greatly appreciate it if you would wire in time to catch me either at Stockholm or Christiania your personal view as to the possibility of acceptance of the Soviet Government's proposal. You must do your utmost for it, for if you had seen the things I have seen during the past week and talked with the men I have talked with, I know that you would not rest until you had put through this peace.

BULLITT

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<sup>73</sup> Joseph C. Grew, secretary-general of the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>74</sup> Private secretary to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George.

Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/8: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Consul at Helsingfors  
(Haynes)*

PARIS, *March 22, 1919.*

3. Inform Pettit that he should withdraw from Russia immediately and return to Paris as soon as possible. It is not desired to maintain communication office in Russia or courier service between Helsingfors and Petrograd at present.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/11

*Memorandum by Mr. William C. Bullitt for the President and the  
Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace*

[*March 25 (?) , 1919.*]

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Russia today is in a condition of acute economic distress. The blockade by land and sea is the cause of this distress and lack of the essentials of transportation is its gravest symptom. Only one fourth of the locomotives which ran on Russian lines before the war are now available for use. Furthermore, Soviet Russia is cut off entirely from all supplies of coal and gasoline. In consequence, transportation by all steam and electric vehicles is greatly hampered; and transportation by automobile and by the fleet of gasoline-using Volga steamers and canal boats is impossible. (Appendix Page 10<sup>75</sup>)

As a result of these hindrances to transportation it is possible to bring from the grain centres to Moscow only 25 carloads of food a day, instead of the 100 carloads which are essential, and to Petrograd only 15 carloads, instead of the essential 50. In consequence, every man, woman and child in Moscow and Petrograd is suffering from slow starvation. (App. P. 11)

Mortality is particularly high among new-born children, whose mothers cannot suckle them, among newly-delivered mothers, and among the aged. The entire population, in addition, is exceptionally susceptible to disease; and a slight illness is apt to result fatally because of the total lack of medicines. Typhoid, typhus and small-pox are epidemic in both Petrograd and Moscow.

Industry, except the production of munitions of war, is largely at a standstill. Nearly all means of transport which are not employed

<sup>75</sup> The Appendix follows on p. 89. The page numbers used in this document refer to the original manuscript.

in carrying food are used to supply the army, and there is scarcely any surplus transport to carry materials essential to normal industry. Furthermore, the army has absorbed the best executive brains and physical vigor of the nation. In addition, Soviet Russia is cut off from most of its sources of iron and of cotton. Only the flax, hemp, wood and lumber industries have an adequate supply of raw material.

On the other hand, such essentials of economic life as are available are being utilized to the utmost by the Soviet Government. Such trains as there are, run on time. The distribution of food is well-controlled. Many industrial experts of the old regime are again managing their plants and sabotage by such managers has ceased. Loafing by the workmen during work-hours has been overcome. (App. P. 12)

### SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The destructive phase of the revolution is over and all the energy of the Government is turned to constructive work. The terror has ceased. All power of judgment has been taken away from the Extraordinary Commission for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution, which now merely accuses suspected counter-revolutionaries who are tried by the regular, established, legal tribunals. Executions are extremely rare. Good order has been established. The streets are safe. Shooting has ceased. There are few robberies. Prostitution has disappeared from sight. Family life has been unchanged by the revolution—the canard in regard to “nationalization of women” notwithstanding. (App. P. 13)

The theatres, opera and ballet are performing as in peace. Thousands of new schools have been opened in all parts of Russia and the Soviet Government seems to have done more for the education of the Russian people in a year and a half than Czardom did in fifty years. (App. P. 14)

### POLITICAL SITUATION

The Soviet form of Government is firmly established. Perhaps the most striking fact in Russia today is the general support which is given the Government by the people in spite of their starvation. Indeed, the people lay the blame for their distress wholly on the blockade and on the Governments which maintain it. The Soviet form of government seems to have become to the Russian people the symbol of their revolution. Unquestionably it is a form of Government which lends itself to gross abuse and tyranny but it meets the demand of the moment in Russia and it has acquired so great a hold on the imagination of the common people that the women are ready to starve and the young men to die for it. (App. P. 15)

The position of the Communist Party, (formerly Bolsheviks) is also very strong. Blockade and intervention have caused the chief opposition parties, the Right Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, to give temporary support to the Communists. These opposition parties have both made formal statements against the blockade, intervention and the support of Anti-Soviet Governments by the Allied and Associated Governments. Their leaders, Volsky and Martov, are most vigorous in their demands for the immediate raising of the blockade and peace. (App. P. 16)

Indeed, the only ponderable opposition to the Communists today comes from *more radical* parties—the Left Social Revolutionaries and the Anarchists. These parties, in published statements, call the Communists, and particularly Lenin and Tchitcherin, “the paid bourgeois gendarmes of the Entente”! They attack the Communists because the Communists have encouraged scientists, engineers and industrial experts of the bourgeois class to take important posts under the Soviet Government at high pay. They rage against the employment of bourgeois officers in the army and against the efforts of the Communists to obtain peace. They demand the immediate massacre of all the bourgeoisie and an immediate declaration of war on all non-revolutionary governments. They argue that the Entente Governments should be forced to intervene more deeply in Russia, asserting that such action would surely provoke the proletariat of all European countries to immediate revolution.

Within the Communist Party itself, there is a distinct division of opinion in regard to foreign policy; but this disagreement has not developed personal hostility or open breach in the ranks of the Party. Trotsky, the Generals and many theorists believe the Red Army should go forward everywhere until more vigorous intervention by the Entente is provoked, which they, too, count upon to bring revolution in France and England. Their attitude is not a little colored by pride in the spirited young army. (App. P. 18) Lenin, Tchitcherin and the bulk of the Communist Party, on the other hand, insist that the essential problem at present is to save the proletariat of Russia, in particular, and the proletariat of Europe, in general, from starvation, and assert that it will benefit the revolution but little to conquer all Europe if the Government of the United States replies by starving all Europe. They advocate, therefore, the conciliation of the United States even at the cost of compromising with many of the principles they hold most dear. And Lenin's prestige in Russia at present is so overwhelming that the Trotsky group is forced reluctantly to follow him. (App. P. 19)

Lenin, indeed, as a practical matter, stands well to the right in the existing political life of Russia. He recognizes the undesirability,



from the Socialist viewpoint, of the compromises he feels compelled to make; but he is ready to make the compromises. Among the more notable concessions he has already made are: the abandonment of his plan to nationalize the land and the adoption of the policy of dividing it among the peasants, the establishment of savings banks paying three percent interest, the decision to pay all foreign debts, and the decision to give concessions if that shall prove to be necessary to obtain credit abroad. (App. P. 20)

In a word, Lenin feels compelled to retreat from his theoretical position all along the line. He is ready to meet the western Governments half-way.

#### PEACE PROPOSAL

Lenin seized upon the opportunity presented by my trip of investigation to make a definite statement of the position of the Soviet Government. He was opposed by Trotsky and the Generals, but without much difficulty got the support of the majority of the Executive Council and the statement of the position of the Soviet Government which was handed to me was finally adopted unanimously. (App. P.)<sup>76</sup>

My discussion of this proposal with the leaders of the Soviet Government was so detailed that I feel sure of my ground in saying that it does not represent the minimum terms of the Soviet Government and that I can point out in detail wherein it may be modified without making it unacceptable to the Soviet Government. For example, the clause under Article 5—"and to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia"—is certainly not of vital importance. And the clause under Article 4, in regard to admission of citizens of the Soviet Republics of Russia into the Allied and Associated countries, may certainly be changed in such a way as to reserve all necessary rights to control such immigration to the Allied and Associated Countries, and to confine it to persons who come on legitimate and necessary business, and to exclude definitely all possibility of an influx of propagandists.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are respectfully submitted:

1. No Government save a Socialist Government can be set up in Russia today except by foreign bayonets and any government so set up will fall the moment such support is withdrawn. The Lenin wing of the Communist Party is today as moderate as any Socialist Government which can control Russia.

<sup>76</sup>This appendix not printed. The text of the Soviet peace proposal as telegraphed by Mr. Bullitt on Mar. 16, 1919, is printed *ante*, p. 78.

2. No real peace can be established in Europe or the world until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis—perhaps a unique opportunity.

3. If the blockade is lifted and supplies begin to be delivered regularly to Soviet Russia, a more powerful hold over the Russian people will be established than that given by the blockade itself—the hold given by fear that this delivery of supplies may be stopped. Furthermore, the parties which oppose the Communists in principle but are supporting them at present will be able to begin to fight against them.

4. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a proposal following the general lines of the suggestion of the Soviet Government should be made at the earliest possible moment, such changes being made, particularly in Article 4 and Article 5, as will make the proposal acceptable to conservative opinion in the Allied and Associated Countries.

Very respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT

[Enclosure]

*Appendix to Memorandum by Mr. William C. Bullitt*

#### TRANSPORT

*Locomotives.*—Before the war Russia had 22,000 locomotives. Destruction by war and ordinary wear and tear have reduced the number of locomotives in good order to 5,500. Russia is entirely cut off from supplies of spare parts and materials for repair, facilities for the manufacture of which do not exist in Russia. And the Soviet Government is able only with the greatest difficulty to keep in running order the few locomotives at its disposal.

*Coal.*—Soviet Russia is entirely cut off from supplies of coal. Kolchak holds the Perm mining district, although Soviet troops are now on the edge of it. Denikin still holds the larger part of the Donetz coal district and has destroyed the mines in the portion of the district which he has evacuated. As a result of this, locomotives, electrical power plants, etc., must be fed with wood, which is enormously expensive and laborious and comparatively ineffectual.

*Gasoline.*—There is a total lack of gasoline due to the British occupation of Baku. The few automobiles in the cities which are kept running for vital Government business are fed with a substitute mixture which causes them to break down with great frequency and to miss continually. Almost the entire fleet on the great inland waterway system of Russia was propelled by gasoline. As a result

the Volga and the canals which are so vital a part of Russia's system of transportation are useless.

### Food

Everyone is hungry in Moscow and Petrograd, including the People's Commissaries themselves. The daily ration of Lenin and the other Commissaries is the same as that of a soldier in the army or of a workman at hard labor. In the hotel which is reserved for Government officials the menu is the following: Breakfast: a quarter to half a pound of black bread, which must last all day, and tea, without sugar. Dinner: a good soup, a small piece of fish, for which occasionally a diminutive piece of meat is substituted, a vegetable, either a potato or a bit of cabbage, more tea without sugar. Supper: what remains of the morning ration of bread and more tea without sugar.

Occasionally sugar, butter and chickens slip through from the Ukraine and are sold secretly at atrocious prices—butter, for example, at 140 roubles a pound. Whenever the Government is able to get its hands on any such "luxuries" it turns them over to the schools, where an attempt is made to give every child a good dinner every day.

The food situation has been slightly improved by the rejoining of Ukraine to Great Russia, for food is relatively plentiful in the South; but no great improvement in the situation is possible because of the lack of transport.

### MANAGEMENT

Such supplies as are available in Soviet Russia are being utilized with considerable skill. For example, in spite of the necessity of firing with wood, the Moscow-Petrograd express keeps up to its schedule and on both occasions when I made the trip it took but thirteen hours, compared to the twelve hours of pre-war days.

The food control works well so that there is no abundance alongside of famine. Powerful and weak alike endure about the same degree of starvation.

The Soviet Government has made great efforts to persuade industrial managers and technical experts of the old regime to enter its service. Many very prominent men have done so. And the Soviet Government pays them as high as \$45,000 a year for their services, although Lenin gets but \$1,800 a year. This very anomalous situation arises from the principle that any believing Communist must adhere to the scale of wages established by the Government, but if the Government considers it necessary to have the

assistance of any anti-Communist, it is permitted to pay him as much as he demands.

All meetings of workmen during work hours have been prohibited with the result that the loafing which was so fatal during the Kerensky regime has been overcome and discipline has been restored in the factories as in the army.

#### SOCIAL CONDITIONS

*Terror.*—The Red Terror is over. During the period of its power the Extraordinary Commission for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution, which was the instrument of the Terror, executed about 1,500 persons in Petrograd, 500 in Moscow and 3,000 in the remainder of the country—5,000 in all Russia. These figures agree with those which were brought back from Russia by Major Wardwell<sup>77</sup> and inasmuch as I have checked them from Soviet, anti-Soviet and neutral sources, I believe them to be approximately correct. It is worthy of note in this connection that in the White Terror in Southern Finland alone, according to official figures, General Mannerheim executed without trial 12,000 working men and women.

*Order.*—One feels as safe in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as in the streets of Paris or New York. On the other hand the streets of these cities are dismal because of the closing of retail shops whose functions are now concentrated in a few large nationalized "department stores". Petrograd, furthermore, has been deserted by half its population; but Moscow teems with twice the number of inhabitants it contained before the war. The only noticeable difference in the theatres, opera and ballet is that they are now run under the direction of the Department of Education which prefers classics and sees to it that working men and women and children are given an opportunity to attend the performances and that they are instructed beforehand in the significance and beauties of the productions.

*Morals.*—Prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic reasons for their career having ceased to exist. Family life has been absolutely unchanged by the revolution. I have never heard more genuinely mirthful laughter than when I told Lenin, Tchitcherin and Litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been "nationalized". This lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not even take the trouble to deny it. Respect for womanhood was never greater than in Russia today. Indeed, the day I reached Petrograd was a holiday in honor of wives and mothers!

<sup>77</sup> Maj: Allen Wardwell, from May to October 1918 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

*Education.*—The achievements of the Department of Education under Lunacharsky have been very great. Not only have all the Russian classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools for men, women and children have been opened in all parts of Russia. Furthermore, working men's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in many of the palaces of yesteryear where the people are instructed by means of moving pictures and lectures. In the art galleries one meets classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of the pictures. The children's schools have been entirely reorganized and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at school every day. Furthermore, very remarkable schools have been opened for defective and over-nervous children. On the theory that genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculp and write poetry and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved, not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring the nervous systems of the children.

#### MORALE

The belief of the convinced Communists in their cause is almost religious. Never in any religious service have I seen higher emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet in celebration of the foundation of the Third Socialist Internationale. The remark of one young man to me when I questioned him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. He replied very simply: "I am ready to give another year of starvation to our revolution."

#### STATEMENTS BY LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

The following statement was made to me by Volsky, leader of the Right Social Revolutionaries, the largest opposition party:

"Intervention of any kind will prolong the regime of the Bolsheviki by compelling us, like all honourable Russians, to drop opposition and rally round the Soviet Government in defence of the revolution. With regard to help to individual groups or Governments fighting against Soviet Russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the sending of troops. If the Allies come to an agreement with the Soviet Government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviki.

"If by any chance Kolchak and Denikin were to win, they would have to kill in tens of thousands where the Bolsheviki have had to kill in hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of Russia into anarchy. Has not the Ukraine been enough to teach the Allies that occupation by non-Bolshevik troops merely

turns into Bolsheviks those of the population who were not Bolsheviks before! It is clear to us that the Bolsheviks are really fighting against bourgeois dictatorship. We are, therefore, prepared to help them in every possible way.

“Grandmother Ekaterina Constantinovna Breshkovskaya has no sort of authority, either from the Assembly of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly or from the party of Social Revolutionaries. Her utterances in America, if she is preaching intervention, represent her personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of Social Revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect.”

Volsky signed this latter statement: “V. Volsky, Late President of the Assembly of members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.”

Martov, leader of the Mensheviks, stated:

“The Mensheviks are against every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least desirable qualities of the revolution. Further the needs of the army overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic reconstruction. Agreement with the Soviet Government would lessen the tension of defence and would unmuzzle the opposition, who while the Soviet Government is attacked are prepared to help in its defence, while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the Bolshevik regime.

“The forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared temporarily to sink their differences with the Bolsheviks in order to defend the revolution as a whole.”

Martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he desires.

#### ARMY

The Soviet Army now numbers between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 troops of the line. Nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-seven. The morale of regiments varies greatly. The convinced Communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading enthusiasm. Other regiments, composed of patriots but non-Communists, are less spirited, other regiments composed of men who have entered the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly untrustworthy. Great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but are under control of convinced Communist supervisors. Nearly all the lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools. Dis-

cipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army appears to be very high particularly since its recent successes. The soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished them under the Czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously like Americans. They are popular with the people.

I witnessed a review of 15,000 troops in Petrograd. The men marched well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles and machine guns and light artillery was excellent. On the other hand they have no big guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire nor indeed, any of the more refined instruments of destruction.

The testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in the districts which having once lived under the Soviet were overrun by anti-Soviet forces and then reoccupied by the Red Army.

Trotsky is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country.

#### LENIN'S PRESTIGE

The hold which Lenin has gained on the imagination of the Russian people makes his position almost that of a dictator. There is already a Lenin legend. He is regarded as almost a prophet. His picture, usually accompanied by that of Karl Marx, hangs everywhere. In Russia one never hears Lenin and Trotsky spoken of in the same breath as is usual in the Western world. Lenin is regarded as in a class by himself. Trotsky is but one of the lower order of mortals.

When I called on Lenin at the Kremlin I had to wait a few minutes until a delegation of peasants left his room. They had heard in their village that Comrade Lenin was hungry. And they had come hundreds of miles carrying 800 puds of bread as the gift of the village to Lenin. Just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report had come that Comrade Lenin was working in an unheated room. They came bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. Lenin is the only leader who receives such gifts. And he turns them into the common fund.

Face to face Lenin is a very striking man—straightforward and direct, but also genial and with a large humor and serenity.

#### CONCESSIONS

The Soviet Government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because of necessity: The members of the Government realize that the lifting of the blockade will be illusory unless the Soviet Government

is able to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the United States and England, so that goods may be bought in those countries. For Russia today is in a position to export only a little gold, a little platinum, a little hemp, flax and wood. These exports will be utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which Russia needs. Russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. The members of the Soviet Government realize fully that as a preliminary step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. But even though these debts are paid the members of the Soviet Government believe that they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere promise to pay. They believe, therefore, that they will have to grant concessions in Russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate credit. They desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country.

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Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/10 : Telegram

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

HELSINGFORS, *March 29, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received in Paris March 30, 10:20 a.m.]

27. From Pettit.

In accordance with instructions which could not be delivered in full by Consul Haynes until my arrival, I have come to Helsingfors. As my return to Petrograd is necessary to secure the rest of my baggage, I will be back through Helsingfors about April 1st and trust to have a message from Mission sent to Helsingfors in case situation is in any way changed.

Am firmly convinced that though a majority of the population of Petrograd may not be Communist, most of the intelligent citizens realize that there is no other government which can preserve order. They believe Allied intervention or a revolution would result in chaos. The population wants peace with the Allies and food; then they believe the present administration will respond to whatever demands the majority of the population may make. Some of the Soviet officials understand this, as is shown by the changes already introduced. The presence of some one in touch with the outside world in Petrograd appears advisable. The friendship that the Soviet Government has for the United States dictates that such a person should be an American. If the American Mission is not in



a position to retain a representative in Petrograd, cannot General Churchill send an intelligence officer here? Pettit.

HAYNES

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Paris Peace Conference 184.02202/13: Telegram

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

HELSINGFORS, March 29, 1919, 5 p. m.

[Received in Paris March 31, 11 a.m.]

28. From Pettit to American Mission.

The Director of Sanitation and Health of Petrograd and his corps of doctors are not Communists, but are cooperating with the Soviet Government on condition that there shall be no political interference in their work. The population of Petrograd, the Director estimates as 1,000,000. Between 30,000 and 40,000 are in hospitals; 70,000 are seriously ill at home, to whom it is possible to give but one tenth the necessary food. In addition there are 100,000 who are sick but able to go to city kitchens. Most of these have swollen limbs and other ailments brought on by lack of food. The death rate in Petrograd is 125 a day. There are 4,300 cases of spotted typhus and 18 deaths daily from this disease. The number of smallpox cases is less. Enteric typhus is increasing and cholera and bubonic plague are also expected this spring. Thirty-five hundred houses have broken sewer and water pipes and are a menace to health.

The food question is the chief concern of the population. In one month 105 deaths from starvation were reported. The only part of the population not actually hungry is the children who are fed in schools or in homes. In the last nine months 30,000 have been placed in small groups in requisitioned homes and arrangements are made to take 10,000 more in the next three months. I have visited these homes and have enjoyed the meals furnished these children. A wonderful family spirit has been developed among them. Milk is difficult to secure and there is no canned milk in the city. Seven seriously ill children in a hospital I visited yesterday were without milk of any kind, and the nurses and officials in charge of social work begged me to secure a little tinned milk for sick babies. The government has discontinued all passenger traffic until April 10th and is succeeding in bringing to Petrograd from 60 to 100 cars of food a day. Fats, however, are difficult to secure. Pettit.

HAYNES

Paris Peace Conference 184.022/29

*Mr. Henry White and General Tasker H. Bliss, Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace, to the Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

PARIS, November 19, 1919.

DEAR MR. GREW: On the 16th inst. our attention was called to a letter, which we then saw for the first time, signed by you and dated February 18th, 1919,<sup>78</sup> which appeared in print at the foot of pages 1, 2, 3 and 4 [*page 1234*] of Volume 2 of the Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate (the Bullitt testimony).<sup>79</sup>

In that letter you "certify that Mr. William C. Bullitt has been authorized by the American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace, to proceed to Russia for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the Commission, etc., etc."

As we neither had nor could find any record, official or otherwise, showing that the subject of Mr. Bullitt's trip to Russia had ever been discussed or in any way considered at a meeting of the American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace, we asked you on the morning of the following day (the 17th inst.) what record you had which warranted the certificate given to Mr. Bullitt in your letter of February 18th, 1919, and which certificate is quoted in paragraph 2 above.

Later in that same day, after making a careful search, you informed us that there was no record of any action having been taken by the American Delegates. You further stated that, to the best of your recollection, you were directed to write the letter by Mr. Lansing and that, in doing so, you employed the form habitually used in furnishing a letter of credentials to anyone dispatched on a mission by the American Plenipotentiaries.

We, the undersigned, desire now to make of record in the archives of the American Peace Delegation the fact that at no time was the mission of Mr. Bullitt discussed—much less acted upon—in our presence, either at any meeting of the American Delegation or elsewhere; nor did we know anything of Mr. Bullitt's intended journey until after his departure.

In writing the above, we beg you to understand that we do not, in the slightest degree, criticise your action in writing the above men-

<sup>78</sup> Not found in the Department files.

<sup>79</sup> On the treaty of peace with Germany (66th Cong., 1st sess.); also published in one volume with the same page numbers as S. Doc. 106 (66th Cong., 1st sess.).

tioned letter; because, in the light of all the facts known to us your action, as the American Secretary-General, was natural and proper.

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY WHITE  
TASKER H. BLISS

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**Proposal of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen for Relief in Russia under Supervision of Northern Neutrals**

861.00/4020 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1919, 6 p.m.*

1067. Following from Vice Consul Imbrie at Viborg.

"Number 5, 4th. . . . Facts following were gathered from refugees, border guards, a messenger whom I (interviewed?), Russ papers and captured Bolshevik courier.

On February 1st population of Petrograd as shown by police records had fallen to 991,000. During past thirty days deaths are estimated at 113,000 and probably half this number have left the city so that the population now approximates 800,000.

For purpose food distribution population is three classes: Class 1 consisting of Red Guard, receives seven herring per day; class 2, Bolshevik clerical employees five herring per day; remainder population receive nothing. No other supplies are distributed or available.

There is no coal Petrograd or Moscow, no kerosene, no gasoline; wood was nationalized in September and since official decree has [not?] been available private use. Estimated remaining supply which is devoted exclusively to operation munitions factory will be exhausted by middle of present month. Sewerage and water systems still functioning, though cessation expected daily.

It is estimated that within three months unless relief comes Petrograd will be depopulated.

Most schools remain closed, streets are deserted, save for soldiers and beggars who cry for bread and refuse money. Epidemic of smallpox and typhoid with famine, account for the 4,000 daily deaths and it has now become impossible to bury the bodies.

Reported that Swedish, Danish, Swiss, Dutch and English Embassies have been looted, no report on American and French. Complete gutting of Winter Palace occurred in January and all art treasures have been stolen from Hermitage.

Moscow conditions are slightly better. There, a few of the military factories are operating. What little food reaches these cities is brought in by peasants. Sugar now 120 roubles pound, horse meat 21, dog 7. Chinese soldiers have been arrested for selling human flesh.

Of the public utility the trams are operating intermittently, electric light forces for two hours. All houses converted into barracks, asylums or soup kitchens. All restaurants closed, all stores save a

few apothecaries, practically without drugs, and those stores which have still cloth, this sold on card. All markets closed, but Jew and thieves markets are still operating. Few smaller theatres are running and cinemas. Churches are forbidden to celebrate mass. Two newspapers appear daily, two others once a week. These contain little but misstatements and new decrees. Banks and [apparent omission].

Railroad reported operating: Petrograd to Moscow, Petrograd to Vologda, Petrograd to Dwinsk, Finland to Levashevo and Okhta railroad running. Other railroads not running.

If Department wishes can send military and naval report. In general it may be said that the Bolsheviks are stronger now than six months ago, though their ammunition, especially for large field guns, is becoming scarce.

Politically, Bolsheviks are weaker because of hate engendered in peasantry and because of inter-party dissension. Breach between Trotsky, who represents terrorist policy, and Lenine, representing so-called party of evolution, is widening and as result, position of the Jew, Zinovieff, chief of Department of North, is strengthened. Though this man has support of Executive Committee his extreme terrorist measures render him much hated by all classes."

Department is impressed with question of how long the Allied Governments can properly delay some organized attempt to remedy conditions of distress such as those described in this report. Department understands British Red Cross representative now proceeding to Petrograd. It also appears that a Red Cross committee of Scandinavian and other neutral countries now has some representation at Petrograd which, however, is neither powerful nor effective.

My personal opinion is that this question should receive immediate consideration from Red Cross leaders of all countries and should be considered with a view to action by the Conference which I understand is shortly to be held at Geneva under the presidency of Mr. H. B. Davison.

I believe that time presses. We have discouraged the American Red Cross here from undertaking formal measures because it seemed inadvisable for the Red Cross of any one country to assume that close association with Bolshevik authorities which would be inevitable if only one country were involved. The situation would be quite different in the case of a powerful organization of Red Cross societies of leading countries.

In this connection telegram from Legation at Stockholm, 3654, February 22, 11 a.m.,<sup>80</sup> states that Swedish Red Cross offers initial help in resuming relief through experienced personnel already in Petrograd and also the following supplies: 100,000 barrels herring, 2,000 tons flour, 10,000 tons wheat, which are in whole or in part subject to demands relief work in Germany, which is being under-

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<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

taken by Swedish Red Cross, but are also available for relief in Russia.

Swedish Red Cross suggests that initial financing be by United States or Allies, while Swedes will furnish personnel. Swedes state organization can be self-supporting because recipients of relief will be able to pay and believes Finland would offer no difficulty in the way of transportation. Moreover, navigation to Petrograd should be open in April.

I hope you will let me have your views, also what practical steps you believe, if any, can be taken now.

POLK

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861.00/4142 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, March 24, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received March 24, 10:03 p.m.]

1316. Your 1067, March 11th, 6 p.m. Commission has given careful consideration to Vice Consul Imbrie's report, but feels that the relief of Petrograd and other cities of Russia is too large an undertaking for any Red Cross organization or group of organizations. Commission doubts whether at present time the American Government should take the initiative and also if it has funds available to undertake measures on an adequate scale and feels further that any relief for Russia should be part of a definite inter-Allied program. Since Commission favors in theory and practice [*any practicable*] humanitarian measures for the Russian civilian population in all sections, Mr. Hoover's opinion is being sought and Commission will welcome any further suggestions which may occur to the Department.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/435

*The Director General of Relief, Supreme Economic Council  
(Hoover), to President Wilson*

[Extracts]

[PARIS,] March 28, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As the result of Bolshevik economic conceptions, the people of Russia are dying of hunger and disease at the rate of some hundreds of thousands monthly in a country that formerly supplied food to a large part of the world.

. . . . .

In all these lights I have the following three suggestions:

1st: We cannot even remotely recognize this murderous tyranny without stimulating actionist radicalism in every country in Europe and without transgressing on every National ideal of our own.

2d: That some Neutral of international reputation for probity and ability should be allowed to create a second Belgian Relief Commission for Russia. He should ask the Northern Neutrals who are especially interested both politically and financially in the restoration of better conditions in Russia, to give to him diplomatic, financial and transportation support; that he should open negotiations with the Allied governments on the ground of desire to enter upon the humane work of saving life, and ask the conditions upon which ships carrying food and other necessaries will be allowed to pass. He should be told that we will raise no obstructions and would even help in his humanitarian task if he gets assurances that the Bolsheviki will cease all militant action across certain defined boundaries and cease their subsidizing of disturbances abroad; under these conditions that he could raise money, ships and food, either from inside or outside Russia; that he must secure an agreement covering equitable distribution, and he might even demand that Germany help pay for this. This plan does not involve any recognition or relationship by the Allies of the Bolshevik murderers now in control any more than England recognized Germany in its deals with the Belgian Relief. It would appear to me that such a proposal would at least test out whether this is a militant force engrossed upon world domination. If such an arrangement could be accomplished it might at least give a period of rest along the frontiers of Europe and would give some hope of stabilization. Time can thus be taken to determine whether or not this whole system is a world danger, and whether the Russian people will not themselves swing back to moderation and themselves bankrupt these ideas. This plan, if successful, would save an immensity of helpless human life and would save our country from further entanglements which today threaten to pull us from our National ideals.

3d: I feel strongly the time has arrived for you again to reassert your spiritual leadership of democracy in the world as opposed to tyrannies of all kinds. Could you not take an early opportunity to analyze, as only you can, Bolshevism from its political, economic, humane and its criminal points of view, and, while yielding its aspirations, sympathetically to show its utter foolishness as a basis of economic development; show its true social ends; rap your own reactionaries for their destruction of social betterment and thereby their stimulation of Bolshevism; point, however, to the steady progress of real democracy in these roads of social betterment. I believe

you would again align the hearts of the suffering for orderly progress against anarchy, not alone in Russia but in every Allied country.

If the militant features of Bolshevism were drawn in colors with their true parallel with Prussianism as an attempt at world domination that we do not stand for it would check the fears that today haunt all men's minds.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

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Paris Peace Conference 861.5018/9

*Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to President Wilson*

PARIS, April 3, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present food situation in Russia, where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now uppermost in all men's minds. As it appears that no solution of this food and disease question has so far been reached in any direction, I would like to make a suggestion from a neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic misery, on purely humanitarian grounds.

It would appear to me possible to organize a purely humanitarian Commission for the provisioning of Russia, the foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for perhaps to some considerable extent by Russia itself, the justice of distribution to be guaranteed by such a Commission, the membership of the Commission to be comprised of Norwegian, Swedish, and possibly Dutch, Danish and Swiss nationalities. It does not appear that the existing authorities in Russia would refuse the intervention of such a Commission of wholly non-political order, devoted solely to the humanitarian purpose of saving life. If thus organized upon the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission, it would raise no question of political recognition or negotiations between the Allies with the existing authorities in Russia.

I recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and I would be glad to know under what conditions you would approve such an enterprise and whether such Commission could look for actual support in finance, shipping and food and medical supplies from the United States Government.

I am addressing a similar note to Messrs. Orlando, Clemenceau and Lloyd-George.

Believe me [etc.]

FRIDTJOF NANSEN

Paris Peace Conference 861.5018/9

*Draft by Mr. David Hunter Miller and Mr. Gordon Auchincloss of a proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in reply to Dr. Nansen's letter of April 3*<sup>81</sup>

[April 3-4, 1919.]

DEAR SIR: The situation of misery and suffering in Russia which is described in your letter of April 3rd is one which appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world. Regardless of political differences or shades of thought, the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men, and above all of women and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable is one which is shocking to humanity.

The governments and the peoples whom we represent, without thought of political, military or financial advantage, would be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the existing situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the beneficent results which you have in view and could not either in its conception or its operation be considered as having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose of saving life".

It is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing *de facto* governments of Russia are all willing as the governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto.

There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a Commission as you propose. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral governments.

The difficulties of transport in Russia can in large degree only be overcome in Russia itself. So far as possible, we would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation; but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of relief that control of transportation in Russia, so far as was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should be placed wholly under such a Commission as is described in your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from any governmental or private control whatsoever.

<sup>81</sup>The file copies of this and the two following drafts have no statements of authorship. They have been identified by comparison with those printed in S. Doc. 106, 66th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1265, 1266, and 1268.



The real human element in the situation, even supposing all these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the naked. Subject to the supervision of such a Commission, this is a problem which should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible to put it under their control. It is not a question of class or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in need, and these human beings in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise the Commission upon the method and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not political, and still more important, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. That such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by Russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all hostilities on the Russian fronts. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider.

Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we should be prepared to give it our full support.

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Paris Peace Conference 861.5018/9

*Draft by Mr. William C. Bullitt of a proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in reply to Dr. Nansen's letter of April 3*

PARIS, April 4, 1919.

DEAR DR. NANSEN: It is the earnest desire of the Allied and Associated Governments, and of the peoples for whom they speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men, women and children who are suffering in Russia. The Associated Powers have solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in Northern France during the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the Dalmatian Coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be continued until nations are once more able to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce.

The associated peoples desire and deem it their duty similarly to assist in relieving the people of Russia from the misery, famine and disease which oppress them. In view of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken by the Associated Governments they welcome the suggestion that the neutral States should take the initiative in the matter of Russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to state in accordance with your request, the conditions under which they will approve and assist a neutral Commission for the provisioning of Russia:

The Allied and Associated Governments and all governments now exercising political authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one another shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April 20th at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent.

The Allied and Associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this armistice, shall send not more than three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, to Christiania, where they shall meet on April 25th with representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in conference to discuss peace and the provisioning of Russia, upon the basis of the following principles:

1. All signatory governments shall remain, as against each other, in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, subject only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the Conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change their government.

2. The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation and full security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons comply with the laws of the country to which they seek admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics of that country.

3. The right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several signatories to one another.

4. A general amnesty shall be granted by the various signatories to all political or military opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so treated because of their association or affiliation with another

signatory, provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of the land.

5. Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the country of another shall be given all possible facilities for repatriation.

6. The Allied and Associated Governments will immediately withdraw their armed forces and further military support from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland and the various governments within that territory shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be agreed upon by the Conference.

7. Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be established, subject to a program of equitable distribution of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be agreed upon by the Conference in consultation with representatives of those neutral States which are prepared to assume the responsibility for the provisioning of Russia.

8. Provision shall be made by the Conference for a mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among the several signatories.

9. The Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. Detailed arrangements for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by the Conference, regard being had to the present financial situation of Russia.

10. The Conference shall be competent to discuss and determine any other matter which bears upon the provisioning of Russia, the problem of establishing peace within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of international relations among the signatories.

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Paris Peace Conference 861.5018/9

*Redraft by Mr. William C. Bullitt of a proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in reply to Dr. Nansen's letter of April 3<sup>82</sup>*

*5 April 1919.*

DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in your letter of April 3rd appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women and children lack the food and the necessities, which make life endurable.

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<sup>82</sup>This is apparently a redraft of the draft prepared by Mr. Miller and Mr. Auchincloss, *supra*.

The governments and peoples whom we represent, would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve the situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a Commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life".

There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing *de facto* governments of Russia are as willing as the governments and the peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves safely hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a Commission as you propose. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral governments. The problems of transport in Russia and of distribution can only be solved by the people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice and supervision of your Commission.

Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your Commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.

That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, of course, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider.

Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support.

Paris Peace Conference 861.48/15

*Messrs. Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen*

*April 17, 1919.*

DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in your letter of April 3rd appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable.

The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a Commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life."

There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as willing as the Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, finance and transport which we have mentioned, and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a Commission as you propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other Neutral Governments whose interest should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far less. The problems of transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice and supervision of your Commission.

Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your Commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.

That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within definite lines in the territory of Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider.

Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support.

V. E. ORLANDO  
D. LLOYD GEORGE  
WOODROW WILSON  
G. CLEMENCEAU

Paris Peace Conference 861.48/31 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

STOCKHOLM, May 3, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received in Paris May 5, 2 a.m.]

269. A [*The*] Finnish Chargé d'Affaires called at the Legation this afternoon and stated that he had been instructed by his Government to inform us that the Finnish Government hoped that the United States and Associated Governments would not at present juncture send food to the portions of Russia controlled by Bolshevik authorities. The Finnish Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that it would seem particularly undesirable that food should be supplied just at the present moment when the Bolsheviks are being so vigorously pressed by their enemies on every side, and that it would be better to wait until a military decision had been reached before allowing food to go to Soviet Russia.

MORRIS

Paris Peace Conference 861.48/42

*The Russian Ambassador to the United States (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 7, 1919.

[Received in Paris May 8.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith a statement signed by the representatives of the unified

National Governments of Russia, with regard to the proposal made by Dr. Nansen to relieve famine stricken districts of Russia.

Accept [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>52a</sup>]

*Statement by the Russian Political Conference*

Referring to the project of Dr. Nansen concerning the food supply of the famine-stricken regions of Russia, the undersigned, in the name of the Russian Political Conference, believe it to be their duty to make the following statement:

The desire of the Allies to aid the Russian people, dying of famine and disease as a result of the Bolshevik régime, can be received only with profound gratitude. It constitutes not only an act of humanity, but gives expression to that solidarity of nations without which humanity could not bear the consequences of this war.

The undersigned believe, however, that this generous idea will end in a quite opposite result unless efficient precautions are taken to prevent the food supply of Russia from falling into the hands of the Bolshevik authorities; if it does, this act of humanity to the Russian nation will serve only to favor those who are profiting by the Bolshevik régime and to prolong their domination.

The task of the national Russian movement is to save Russia from those who have reduced her to the present state of impotence and to the necessity of seeking her food from abroad. The feeding of the starving population is not a solution of the Russian question. Consequently, the struggle for the liberation of Russia from her oppressors, with the object of making her capable of existing by her own means and of governing herself according to her own will, must not for any reason be halted.

As to the means of paying for the food, the undersigned declare that Russia will pay her debts and repay the services which have been rendered her under this head, but she hopes that the Allies no more than she herself will recognize that the Bolshevik usurpers have the right to dispose of the national patrimony under any pretext whatever.

Prince LVOFF  
SAZONOV  
N. W. TCHAYKOVSKY  
N. MAKHLAKOFF

PARIS, *May 4, 1919.*

<sup>52a</sup> File translation revised.

840.48/2102 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 9, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received May 10, 11:56 a.m.]

284. [From McCormick:]

Department's 1889, May 7, 3 [5] p.m. for McCormick.<sup>83</sup>

["I set out below the letter which Dr. Nansen wrote to Lenin on April 17 and which it is understood has not yet been delivered owing to the delay of courier by military operations in Finland. Doctor Nansen himself is leaving today for Petrograd to present the proposal to Lenin."<sup>84</sup>

'Mr. Nikolai Lenin, President of the Russian Soviet Government, Moscow. Sir: On April 3rd I sent the following letter to President Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando:

[Here follows text of letter printed *ante*, p. 102.]

Today, April 17th, I have received the following answer:

[Here follows text of letter printed *ante*, p. 108.]

I would be glad to hear from you in this matter at your earliest convenience.

I may add that the neutral organization which I propose offers its services in this cause without any remuneration whatever, but of course its expenditures in the purchase and transportation of supplies must be met by the Soviet Government.

Believe me, Sir, Yours most respectfully, (signed) Fridtjof Nansen'.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the War Trade Board. McCormick."

WALLACE

Paris Peace Conference 861.48/48 : Telegram

*The Representative at Copenhagen of the American Relief Administration (Swenson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, May 14, 1919.

[Received in Paris May 15, 10 a.m.]

Crab 104. For Hoover.

Following telegram<sup>85</sup> was received by wireless through Swedish station to Mr. Fridtjof Nansen:

"Sir: Your very kind message of April 17th<sup>86</sup> containing your exchange of letters with the Council of Four reached us only on May

<sup>83</sup> Not printed.<sup>84</sup> According to Soviet reply forwarded through Copenhagen, Crab 104, May 14, *infra*, the proposal was received by the Soviet authorities by wireless on May 4.<sup>85</sup> The Russian text in *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika* is dated May 7.<sup>86</sup> Quoted in telegram from the Ambassador in France, no. 284, May 9, *supra*.



the 4th by way of the Nas Wireless Station and was at once given to the People's Commissariat of Social Welfare for thorough examination. Wish in the name of the Russian Soviet Government to convey to you our heartiest thanks for the warm interest you manifest in the well-being of the Russian people. Great are indeed the suffering and privations inflicted upon the Russian people by the inhuman blockade of the Associated and so-called Neutral Powers and by the incessant wars forced upon it against its will. If left in peace and allowed free development Soviet Russia would soon be able to restore her national production, to regain her economic strength, to provide for her own needs and to be helpful to other countries. But in the present situation in which she has been put by the implacable policy of the Associated Powers help in food-stuffs from abroad would be most welcome to Russia, and the Russian Soviet Government appreciates most thankfully your humane and heartfelt response to her sufferings, and considering the universal respect surrounding your person will be especially glad to enter into communication with you for the realization of your schemes of help which you emphasize as being purely humanitarian. On this basis of humanitarian work or help to suffering people we would be disposed to do everything in [our] power to further the realization of your project. Unfortunately your benevolent intentions which you indicate yourself as being based upon purely humanitarian grounds and which according to your letter must be realized by a commission of fully non-political character have been mixed up by others with political purposes. In the letter addressed to you by the four powers your scheme is represented as involving cessation of hostilities and of transfer of troops and war material. We regret very much that your original intentions have thus been fundamentally disfigured by the government[s] of the Associated Powers. We need not explain to you that military operations which obviously have in view to change external or internal conditions of the involved countries belong wholly to the domain of politics and that likewise cessation of hostilities which means preventing the belligerent who has every reason to expect successes from the obtaining them is also a purely political act. Thus your sincerely charitable intentions have been misused by others in order to cover such purposes which are obviously political with the semblance of as [*an*] action originally humanitarian only. Being ready to lend every assistance to your scheme so far as it bears the character you have ascribed to it in your letter we at the same time do not wish to be the objects of foul play, and knowing that you like ourselves mean business and wish really to attain the proposed, we would like to ask whether this incantation [*intermixture*?] of heterogeneous purposes has been finally adopted by yourself. We expect that we will be able to make it clear to you that in order to realize your intentions this interpretation must be carefully avoided. You are no doubt aware that the cessation of the wars upon the Russian people is likewise the object of our most warm desires and it must be known to you that we have many times proposed to the Associated Governments to enter into negotiations in order to put an end to the present bloodshed and that we have even agreed to take part at the Conference at Prinkipo notwithstanding the extremely unfavorable conditions proposed to us

and also that we were the only party to accept it. [We] responded in the same peace-loving sense to overtures made by one of the Great Powers. The Prinkipo Conference was frustrated not by us but by our adversaries, the protégés of the Associated Powers, the counter-revolutionary governments of Koltchak, Denikin and the others. These are the tools with the help of which the Entente Governments are making war upon us and are endeavoring to obtain our destruction and wherever they are victorious their victory means the triumph of the most extreme barbarity and bestiality, streams of blood and untold sufferings for the laboring masses, domination of the wildest reaction. Koltchak from the east, Denikin from the south, the Roumanian Feudris [*feudals*], the Polish and Finnish most reactionary militarists, the German Barons and Esthonian White Guards from the west and Russian White Guard bands from the north, these are the enemies whom the Entente Governments mob [*move*] against Soviet Russia and against whom as against Entente troops we are carrying on a desperate struggle with ever growing success. The so-called governments of Koltchak and Denikin are purely monarchical, all power belongs there to the wildest adherents of Tzarism, extreme Tzarist papers are in every way imported [*supported?*] by them. Tzarist hymns are constantly sung [*at*] their ceremonies. The so-called constitution of Koltchak as [*is*] in reality monarchical; among their soldiers they distribute only Tzarist literature; under the domination of Denikin the adherents of constitutional government of the people are persecuted and under the domination of Koltchak the adherents of the Constituent Assembly are imprisoned or shot. Program [*Pogrom-*]making literature is being widely distributed by these so-called governments and whenever Jews come under their domination they are the object of the most horrible bestialities. In the west the Polish legionaries and the troops of the Ukrainian counter-revolutionary Petliura who are both supported and even directed by Entente officers have perpetrated such massacres of Jews which by far surpass the most horrible misdeeds of the Black Hundred of old Tzarism. As the Russian Red Cross in its appeal to the International Red Cross on April the 28 states whole villages, whole towns were turned the Russian [*to ruins*]. Neither sex nor age was spared and in numerous places the whole Jewish population was literally wiped out by these troops headed by Entente generals and officers. In realm of Koltchak and Denikin everything that was gained by the peasants through the revolution is being taken back from them. Koltchak declares solemn manifestoes that peasants must not have possession land taken by force from the nobility. He orders in his decrees that the seizure of the land of the gentry by the peasants should be prosecuted as a serious crime and crushes the resistance of the peasants by wholesale massacres during which [*in*] some parts of Siberia many thousands of peasants were killed *en masse*. For the workers this domination means every possible persecution, oppression, wholesale arrests, and [*in*] many cases wholesale shootings, so that in some towns the workers were simply wiped out by the enraged ex-Tzarist officers who are the hear [*at the head*] of Koltchak's troops. The horrors perpetrated by these Koltchak officers defy description

and their victims are innumerable including all that is progressive, all that is free-thinking in Siberia. Inebriated officers are torturing, flogging, tormenting in every way the unfortunate laboring population under their domination and to be a worker is to be predestined to be the object of their brutalities. These are the adversaries owing to [against] whom we are engaged in desperate struggle and whom the Associated Governments are in every way supporting, providing them with war material, foodstuffs, financial help, military commanders, and political advisers and on the north and east fronts sending their own troops to help them. In the hands of these barbarous bandits Entente rifles and Entente cannons are sending death to the Russian workers and peasants struggling for their life and liberty. The same Entente Governments are the real source of the military supplies with the help of which our Polish, Roumanian, Finnish, and other adversaries from the west are uninterrupted by [uninterruptedly?] attacking us and it was officially declared in the French Chamber of Deputies and in the British House of Commons that the policy of the Entente is now to send against Soviet Russia the armies of these nationalities. An American radio of May 6th sent from Lyons says most emphatically that the Entente encourages the movement of the troops raised by the Russian counter-revolutionary General Youdenitch which presumably threatens Petrograd, that the Entente expects that the Bolsheviki will be forced to withdraw to Moscow and that the Associated Governments intend [in] connection herewith to bind [abandon] your plan of revictualling Russia. While declaring they have abandoned the idea of intervention the Associated Governments are in reality carrying on the most reckless intervention policy and even the American Government, despite all the statements to the contrary published in the American press, seems at present to be wholly dominated by implacable hostility of the Clemenceau Ministry against Soviet Russia. This being the case we are [in a] position to discuss cessation of hostilities only if we discuss the whole problem of our relations to our adversaries, that is, in the first place, to the Associated Governments. That means to discuss peace and to open real negotiations bearing upon the true reasons of the war waged upon us and upon those conditions that can bring us lasting peace. We were always ready to enter into peace negotiations and we are ready to do it now an [as] before and we will be glad to begin discussing these questions, but of course directly with the other belligerents, that is with the Associated Governments or else with the persons empowered by the latter. But it is of course impossible for us to make any concessions referring to these fundamental problems of our existence under the disguise of a presumably humanitarian work. This latter must remain purely humanitarian an[d] non-political and we will welcome every proposal from your side made to us in the spirit of your letter sent by you to the Council of Four on April 3rd.<sup>87</sup> [To] these wholly nonpolitical proposals we respond most gladly. We thank you most heartily for your good intentions. We are ready to give you every possibility of controlling the realization such humanitarian scheme, we will of course cover all the expenses of this work and the cost of the foodstuffs and we can pay if

<sup>87</sup> Ante, p. 102.

you desire by Russian goods. But seeing that your original plan has been so unfortunately disfigured and considering that the most complete and difficult questions that have been created must first be thoroughly elucidated, we would suggest that you take the necessary steps to enable delegates of our government to meet you and your collaborators abroad and to discuss these questions and we ask you kindly to indicate the time and the place for this conference between our delegates and the leaders of your commission and what guarantees can be obtained for the free passage of our delegates through countries influenced by the Entente. Signed, Peoples Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Tchitcherin.[”]

Nansen adds, “Please tell Hoover that I intend to meet Lenin’s delegates perhaps Stockholm but shall be glad hear Hoover’s opinion soon as possible.”

SWENSON

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/20

M. 163

*Appendix III to C. F. 20.*<sup>88</sup>—*Feeding of Russia—Copy of letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey*

BRITISH DELEGATION,

PARIS, May 16, 1919.

MY DEAR HANKEY: When the Nansen scheme was first started, I understand that Hoover, Clémentel, an Italian and I were appointed as a Committee to advise the Supreme Council as to the steps to be taken in connection therewith.

Yesterday Mr. Hoover brought to me the reply that Lenin has sent to the Nansen letter, and suggested that we should take some action upon it. I enclose a copy of Lenin’s reply.<sup>89</sup>

Accordingly, a meeting was held today in the Astoria, attended by Mr. Hoover, Professor Attolico and myself. Monsieur Clémentel was invited but was prevented from coming. At that meeting it was agreed that Mr. Hoover should send immediately the following reply to Nansen’s question at the end of the Lenin telegram:

“Please inform Nansen that until whole matter has been given further consideration by the Governments here we consider it extremely inadvisable to arrange any meeting with Bolshevik representatives.”

We further agreed upon the memorandum of which I also send you a copy. Will you please inform the Supreme Council.

Yours very sincerely,

ROBERT CECIL

<sup>88</sup> The minutes of the meeting of the Council of Four (C. F. 20) of May 20, 1919, 11 a. m., are printed in part, p. 351.

<sup>89</sup> The Soviet reply (signed by Chicherin) was transmitted from Copenhagen in telegram no. Crab 104, May 14, *supra*.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on the Nansen Proposal*

Lenin's reply to Nansen really amounts to this:

"I shall be very glad to accept supplies but not to cease from fighting, though I would be prepared to enter into negotiations for a general Russian peace."

It is now for the Associated Governments to take the next step, and before deciding what that step should be they must make up their minds what is to be their policy in Russia.

It seems to me they have two courses open to them: They may either decide that so long as the Bolshevik Government is in power there is no hope for Russian peace, and that therefore the first thing to do is to smash the Bolsheviks. If this is to be their line they must strain every nerve to support Koltchak, Denikin, the Letts, the Esthonians, the Poles, and even the Finns in attacking Russia. They must furnish them with supplies and money and instructors, and do everything to make their coming campaign against the Bolsheviks successful. They must also break off all relations direct and indirect with the Bolsheviks, and advise Nansen to say that in view of Lenin's response his scheme for relief is at an end, and that nothing further of that sort can be looked for by the Russian Government. That is one policy. It may be the right one, but it undoubtedly involves much further bloodshed and destruction of material wealth.

The other policy would be to ask the military authorities to define as nearly as they can what is the position of the various forces fighting in Russia. As soon as the line dividing the combatants has thus been determined, each and all of them should be admonished to retire, say, 10 kilometres on their own side of the line, and to refrain from all future hostilities. They would be told that international commissaries would be sent to the various fronts to see that these directions were obeyed. If, and so far as, they were obeyed, the Associated Powers would do their utmost to supply to the various Governments concerned food and clothing and other necessaries. If some refuse and some accept, those who accept should be supported. Those who refused would be deprived of all assistance. The Governments should further be informed that the Associated Powers or the Council of the League of Nations would immediately take into consideration the whole Russian problem. Their first step would be to call upon all sections of the Russian people, or any part of them who express their adherence to this policy, to elect by free and universal suffrage, under the supervision of the League of Nations, a constituent assembly for the purpose of determining the future constitution of the Russian Govern-

ment. In the meantime Nansen would be advised to say that so long as the Soviet Government declined to abstain from fighting he was powerless to help them.

This policy is in accordance with the general principle underlying the Covenant of the League of Nations—namely, that national grievances must not be settled by resort to arms unless every other possible means of settling them has been first tried. It does not in any way prejudge the rights of any Russian quarrels, but it proceeds upon the principle that in any case peace is to the interest of all concerned.

I believe that either of these policies has a fair chance of success, and may be defended by powerful arguments. What is not defensible is a combination of the two: a suggestion that Lenin must cease fighting while we are supplying arms and equipment to Denikin and Koltchak; or, conversely, that Koltchak and Denikin should be encouraged to wage war against Lenin while we are negotiating with the latter to give him economic assistance. Compromises of this kind can only lead to a prolongation of hostilities in Russia, and the spreading in that country of the belief that the Associated Powers cannot be trusted.

*May 16, 1919.*

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[For the report of the discussion by the Council of Four of the Soviet reply to the Nansen proposal, see Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20, 1919, at 11 a.m., p. 351.]

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/786

*The Director General of Relief, Supreme Economic Council  
(Hoover), to President Wilson*

PARIS, June 21, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Before the present Joint Councils of the Heads of States dissolve by your departure, I wish to lay before you earnestly what appears to me (after Peace) the greatest outstanding situation in the world insistent for solution, and that is Russia. Nor do I wish to approach it from any point of view other than purely its economic phases.

Sooner or later the Bolshevik Government will fall of its own weight or it will have swung sufficiently right to be absorbed in a properly representative government. Already about one-half of the area of the old Russian Empire is under non-Bolshevik influ-

ences. No government of any character can stand in this country without an economic reorganization. Such reorganization primarily revolves on two positive factors, first, currency, and second, transportation. Even the governments of Koltchak and Denikin are both likely to fail at any moment, due to the practical break-down in the distribution of commodities. There is in both of these areas not only ample foodstuffs for their populations but an actual surplus and yet there is here actual starvation.

I attach one single telegram<sup>90</sup> out of a host as indicating the character of the situation, and in this special case of the Donetz Basin there is ample wheat not 500 miles distant if there were some form of currency in which the population could have confidence, and transportation with which to expect exchange of coal for wheat. This is only typical of many other instances.

By and large, there can be no hope of any form of stable government unless these two primary things can be solved. It is already the defeat of Bolshevism and will be the defeat of any government that takes its place. The re-establishment of currency, transportation, the stimulation of production, and the normal flow of distribution, is sheerly a matter of some sort of economic dictatorship, backed by sufficiently large financial and moral support of the Allied Governments. These appropriations would need to be expended fundamentally in commodities and railway rolling stock for import into Russia and for the establishment of a currency. I do not believe that the sum involved is extraordinarily large if such an economic dictatorship could have command of the resources already in Russia.

Furthermore, it appears to me that some such an economic commission, if placed upon an economic and not a political basis, could if conducted with wisdom, keep itself free from conflicting political currents and allow a rational development of self-government in Russia. I have no idea that such self-government can develop over night in a nation totally inexperienced and without tradition, but there can be no foundation on which such government can emerge so long as populations are mad from starvation and unemployment and the lack of the very necessities of life.

This matter becomes of immediate importance if America is to have any hand in the matter, as the resources and organization at our disposal come to an end either upon the signing of Peace with Germany, or, alternatively, on the first of July with the expiration of the Acts with which you are familiar.

I wish to add one suggestion to you in organization of such a commission. It is utterly impossible that it could be organized on

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<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

the basis of any Inter-Allied Commission with all the conflicting financial and trade interest that lies therein. It is necessary to set up one government as the economic mandatory, with the support of the other governments, and to set up some one man as the head of such a commission, who should choose his own staff for the great administration that will be involved. Such a staff could with judgment be composed of representatives of each nationality, but they must be definitely responsible to the head of such a commission and not independently responsible to different governments.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

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**Refusal by the Government of the United States to Countenance Further Attempts to Establish Relations with the Soviet Authority in Russia**

861.00/5243b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*<sup>91</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1919, 6 p.m.

In a speech at Kansas City Saturday, September 6, urging the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the President made the following allusion to the situation in Russia and the character of the Bolshevik régime :

“ My fellow citizens, it does not make any difference what kind of a minority governs you, if it is a minority. And the thing we must see to is that no minority anywhere masters the majority.

That is at the heart, my fellow citizens, of the tragical things that are happening in that great country which we long to help and can find no way that is effective to help—I mean the great realm of Russia. The men who now are measurably in control of the affairs of Russia represent nobody but themselves. They have again and again been challenged to call a constitutional convention. They have again and again been challenged to prove that they had some kind of a mandate, even from a single class of their fellow citizens. And they dared not attempt it; they have no mandate from anybody.

There are only thirty-four of them, I am told, and there were more than thirty-four men who used to control the destinies of Europe from Wilhelmstrasse. There is a closer monopoly of power in Petrograd and Moscow than there ever was in Berlin, and the thing that is intolerable is not that the Russian people are having their way but that another group of men more cruel than the Czar himself is controlling the destinies of that great people.

And I want to say here and now that I am against the control of any minority anywhere.”

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<sup>91</sup> The same to the Commission to Negotiate Peace as no. 3071 (file no. 763.72119/6830c) to be repeated to Archangel, and to Constantinople for repetition to Vice Consul Burri at Ekaterinodar.



Following passage, same topic, from speech delivered at Des Moines also on September 6:

"What happened in Russia was not a sudden and accidental thing. The people of Russia were maddened with the suppression of Czarism. When at last the chance came to throw off those chains, they threw them off at first, with hearts full of confidence and hope and then they found out that they had been again deceived. There was no assembly chosen to frame a constitution for them, or rather there was an assembly chosen to choose a constitution for them and it was suppressed and dispersed, and a little group of men just as selfish, just as ruthless, just as pitiless as the Czar himself assumed control and exercised their power, by terror and not by right.

And in other parts of Europe the poison spread. The poison of disorder, the poison of revolt, the poison of chaos. And do you honestly think, my fellow citizens, that none of that poison has got in the veins of this free people? Do you know that the world is all now one single whispering gallery. These antennae of the wireless telegraph are the symbols of our age.

All the impulses of mankind are thrown out upon the air and reach to the ends of the earth. With the tongue of the wireless and the tongue of the telegraph all the suggestions of disorder are spread through the world. And money coming from nobody knows where is deposited in capitals like Stockholm to be used for the propaganda of disorder and discontent and dissolution throughout the world, and men look you calmly in the face in America and say they are for that sort of revolution, when that sort of revolution means government by terror, government by force, not government by vote.

It is the negation of everything that is American, but it is spreading and so long as disorder continues, so long as the world is kept waiting for the answer of the kind of peace we are going to have and what kind of guarantees there are to be behind that peace, that poison will steadily spread, more and more rapidly until it may be that even this beloved land of ours will be distracted and distorted by it."

Repeat to Harbin and Omsk.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5252 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, September 22, 1919.

[Received 8:20 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"389, September 20, 1 p.m. Have had President's Kansas City and Des Moines speeches on Bolshevism published in Omsk papers. Same has created very favorable impression. Harris."

TENNEY

861.00/5591a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1919, noon.

6149. An Associated Press despatch from London November 2 credits the *Daily Herald*, a labor organ, with hearing on good authority that the British Government is considering favorably a proposal for a conference of Soviet Russia with the Entente Allies. It is said that the conference would take place in a neutral country and would be on the lines proposed for Prinkipo. Please comment.

LANSING

861.00/5648 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received November 14, 4:18 p.m.]

3383. Your very urgent November 13, 6 p.m., to American Mission, Paris,<sup>92</sup> regarding conference of Baltic States at Dorpat repeated here this morning as its number 426. Foreign Office states no foundation in report contained therein regarding British participation in Dorpat conference, that a British officer happens to be at Dorpat but he is under strict instructions not to discuss politics.

Foreign Office also states that British representatives to Copenhagen conference shortly to take place regarding exchange of prisoners between British and Soviet Governments are similarly instructed.

DAVIS

861.00/5670 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

LONDON, November 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 6:22 p.m.]

3390. . . .

Press announces this morning departure for Copenhagen today of James O'Grady, Labor Member of Parliament for South of [South-East] Leeds and Secretary of National Federation of General Workers, to enter into negotiations with Litvinoff representing Soviet Government Russia for exchange of war prisoners, military and civil.

DAVIS

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<sup>92</sup> Not printed.

861.00/5666 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, *November 15, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received November 15, 6 p.m.]

3394. Your No. 6171, November 11,<sup>98</sup> was delayed in decoding. According to a probably well-founded rumor Lloyd George's Guildhall speech was delivered without previous notice to his Cabinet colleagues. I am confirmed in this belief by Churchill's attitude while speech was being delivered. Three days later in answer to a direct question as to what Lloyd George meant Churchill replied that he presumed the Prime Minister meant that one must either fight or parley. On November 13 in the Commons Lloyd George answered questions. His replies, however, were characteristic in their lack of precision. He made four statements of policy:

1. The Commons should assume responsibility for any additional expenditure in support of Russian forces and determine what extra taxes should be levied for that purpose.

2. The British Government has always been prepared to take any responsible opportunity presenting itself to bring about a settlement of the Russian problem on conditions which would in fact bring to Russia peace, good order and constitutional government on terms which the people of Russia themselves are willing to accept.

3. An international conference is proposed at which the several serious outstanding problems which so far the Paris Conference has been unable to settle will be considered by the Ministers of the Allied and Associated Powers. Among these problems will be that of Russia.

4. No new policy will be inaugurated nor will the country be committed to any fresh action without the Commons having complete opportunity to discuss it.

I do not get any meaning out of the Guildhall speech other than an indication that the Prime Minister is willing to parley with all Russian factions. The speech has not removed this impression. It is impossible to predict future policy because of apparent inconsistencies between statements by Lloyd George and other members of the Government.

DAVIS

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<sup>98</sup> *Post*, p. 738.

861.01/169 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 7:08 p.m.]

4238. All papers here print telegram from London to the effect that the State Department has made the following announcement in Washington:

"No plan contemplating a compromise with the Russian Bolshevik Government has been approved by the Government of the United States. The United States does not intend to take part in any conference to which Bolshevik representatives whether from the Baltic States or from Russia are admitted. The policy of the State Department is to continue to encourage arrangements made [with] Russian cooperative societies in [non-]Bolshevik territory by American exporters of foodstuffs and clothing."

This statement has attracted much attention here and I beg to ask whether it is authentic.

WHEELER

861.01/169 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1919, 4 p.m.

6194. Please note and repeat to Stockholm as Depts 1732. Your 4238, November 18, 5 p.m. No formal announcement of the kind indicated has been made. The telegram from London may be based upon informal talks with newspaper representatives in which the Department has, in fact, made it known that no compromise is contemplated with the Russian Bolshevik Government, that the United States does not intend to participate in the Baltic conference, and that everything practicable will be done in the way of economic relief for Russia.

LANSING

861.00/5719 : Telegram

*The Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, November 21, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 10:40 p.m.]

269. British Chargé d'Affaires brought delegate O'Grady for a long talk last night. Gist of O'Grady's remarks follows:

Expects negotiations about prisoners to last a week after they begin. If Litvinov brings any armistice proposal, it will take at

least another week after that. Probably O'Grady will go to London to report orally and return before final answer is given. He expressed particular interest in neutral zone to prevent propaganda. His personal opinion is that if decision is taken to stop furnishing help to Denikin and Kolchak, it would logically imply raising blockade. Also said he believed it to be a fact that Bolshevik power has been strengthened by existence of war. These are merely his personal views. Outside arrangement for prisoners, he has power only to examine proposal and report.

HAPGOOD

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861.01/172 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

6209. Copenhagen has been asked to repeat to you its telegrams relating to O'Grady's mission which suggest that the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners may become the forerunner of more general discussion with the Bolsheviki. The Minister at Copenhagen has been instructed to hold entirely aloof from the negotiations with the Bolsheviki and in no circumstances to come in contact with Litvinoff.

A *New York Times* Correspondent telegraphs from Dorpat November 20 the substance of an interview supposed to have taken place between Litvinoff and Vandenbosch, described as the Dutch Consul at Reval. Litvinoff's attitude is interpreted in this despatch as indicating that the Bolshevik domestic situation is precarious and recognition by the Entente necessary to their continued existence. The *Times* Correspondent sums up as follows: "As the upshot of the whole conversation Vandenbosch was left with the impression that the Soviet was now making a supreme effort to throw dust in the eyes of the world and make peace that would guarantee its position before enough of the truth (about the situation in Bolshevik Russia) was known to render it impossible."

Information reaches Imbrie at Viborg that the Commissar of the Interior at Petrograd has reported to the Council of People's Commissars at Moscow that because of lack of cooperation among the workmen and their failure to grasp communistic principles, the early fall of the Soviet Government is inevitable unless recognition can be obtained from the Allied and neutral countries.

Further light is thrown upon the situation by a press report from Warsaw which seems to have been sent originally to the London *Times*. According to this Lenin and Trotsky are considering the idea of holding elections for a Constituent Assembly and are court-

ing an alliance with the more moderate revolutionary parties. The Extraordinary Commissions would be abolished and peace proposals made to Kolchak and Denikin. The Department is inclined to believe that this despatch has been inspired by the Bolsheviki for the purpose of creating public sentiment abroad favorable to a composition with them.

It would seem most unfortunate if the Government of Great Britain should give to the Bolsheviki at this critical juncture the moral support they would derive from negotiations of a general nature with Great Britain or an expectation of recognition. It would not alter the situation if the Bolsheviki were actually making overtures to other socialist parties, as any movement toward really democratic reformation would be halted rather than encouraged by developments which might give the Bolsheviki ground for hoping that they could still maintain themselves without fundamental concessions to other political elements in Russia. Please keep closely in touch with the situation in London and as the opportunity presents intimate to the British authorities the point of view outlined above.

Repeat foregoing to Paris.

Your 3423, November 21, 6 p.m.<sup>94</sup> Department's 1732 to Stockholm<sup>95</sup> was forwarded through you in order that you might be advised of the Department's attitude in the Russian situation. If you have not repeated the message to Stockholm please do so at once. If Stockholm's 3248<sup>96</sup> is necessary to your understanding of the matter you should ask Stockholm to repeat it to you.

LANSING

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861.01/176 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 28, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received November 28, 2:12 p.m.]

3464. Your 6209, November 24, 4 p.m. Department's point of view outlined in paragraph 5 expressed to Foreign Office in the course of an informal interview and Foreign Office very earnestly stated that British representatives at Copenhagen conference most emphatically instructed not even to listen to any peace proposals from Bolsheviks and added that above statements could be cabled to the Department.

American Mission informed Number 326.

DAVIS

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<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

<sup>95</sup> See telegram no. 6194 of Nov. 20 to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 123.

<sup>96</sup> Telegram no. 4238 of Nov. 18 is intended, p. 123.

763.72119/8055 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase—Extracts]

PARIS, November 29, 1919, 3 a.m.

[Received 5:58 a.m.]

5468. From Polk for Lansing. I take the liberty of reporting points mentioned by Lloyd George in a long and interesting conversation I had with him Monday at his request. I have repeated to Ambassador Davis all that was said.

Lloyd George told me that the British would give no further aid to Kolchak or Denikin after the supplies already set aside for them had been taken. Apparently he considered their situation menaced and could not see what further assistance could be given them. His view is that the time has arrived to see whether it is not possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet Government. He strongly feels that Europe will be menaced by a unified Russia. On this account he thinks that [Georgia], Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and Finland, and possibly even Siberia, should be independent. He told me that according to his information the Bolsheviki were gaining, that they were anxious for peace, and that they were prepared to recognize their international obligations. Although he did not mention an inter-Allied conference, he seems to have it in mind that a proposal may be made for a conference of that kind.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5789 : Telegram

*The Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, November 30, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received December 1, 12:41 a.m.]

279. President Wilson personal from Hapgood.

"On eve of sailing for home, I think it my duty to sum up Russian situation as seen from here. Practically everybody who arrives from any front tells the same story now. Yesterday an army officer after giving his opinion added: 'But they have gone so crazy over Bolshevism in the United States that there is small hope of their seeing the situation'. Such remarks, putting on our Government the responsibility for continued warfare, are made constantly, though less often than remarks putting it on England. France is less discussed because although warlike regarding Russia she is not taken to be able to swing the situation. It is always the remote civilians

who are fiercest. Within a few days I have seen several officers recently back from Baltic provinces and one after six months with Denikin and very favorably inclined to him. All agree that only four courses are possible: one is to give Germany a free hand. Of course that is politically beyond serious discussion. Another is to go with a really big Entente army prepared to stay two years. Personally, I think that is politically equally impossible. The third is to treat Russian situation honestly as a civil war, favoring no faction and blockading none. This is overwhelmingly the prevailing opinion. A fourth held by some, even among the military, is that the collapse of Judenitch and Kolchak is so complete and the prospects of Denikin so poor that there is no civil war left with foreign aid withdrawn and that we should actually recognize the Moscow Government. I make no comment on that view as requiring more patient philosophy than can be expected of Americans or most Governments but I do feel that not to go as far as number three is to take a very solemn and dangerous responsibility. Lloyd George's success or failure may depend on our attitude. I need not repeat my familiar views that Bolshevism must inevitably be increased, strengthened and spread by war and must inevitably disappear in peace and prosperity.["]

HAPGOOD

861.00/5799 : Telegram

*The Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, December 2, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 8:25 p.m.]

288. My number 269<sup>97</sup> and 275.<sup>98</sup> Litvinov's credentials turn out to be extremely sweeping. They give him full power to conclude peace with any country on general terms indicated and also to alter such terms. Credentials signed by Lenin and Chicherin. O'Grady has applied London greater powers. Difficulties in the negotiations about prisoners caused by Litvinov's wish to include Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria.

HAPGOOD

861.00/5800 : Telegram

*The Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, December 2, 1919, noon.

[Received 8:40 p.m.]

289. O'Grady's negotiations with Litvinov now centering in large part on foreign trade. Litvinov emphasizes communistic doc-

<sup>97</sup> Dated Nov. 21, p. 123.

<sup>98</sup> Not printed.



trine of right of government to control any industry it wishes including import and export. Litvinov, however, calls attention to his right under his credentials to change conditions, provided he knows just what is desired by England or other countries involved. O'Grady considering the implications with great caution but inclined to think monopoly by Soviet Government not important in postulating as if blockade is lifted private traders in England, for instance Swedish trade, will insist making own terms and this steady pressure from freedom trade and ability to examine and follow up trade most (more?) likely than anything else to put end to communism.

Also Litvinov assuming that end of intervention, including lifting of blockade, will mean presence of consuls which O'Grady thinks would also tend strongly toward ending or transforming [omission?] present régime. O'Grady represents only trade interests but as he is member of British Labor Party his opinion will have a strong influence on future events in England whatever the outcome here.

HAPGOOD

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861.01/179 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 2, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received December 2, 2:27 p.m.]

3481. Your 6209, November 24, 4 p.m. Information received from Foreign Office and outside sources indicates that officially negotiations with Litvinoff have so far been confined entirely to the proposed exchange of prisoners. No reports have been received from British representative regarding a Bolshevik peace offer.

DAVIS

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861.00/5811 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 3, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 4:56 p.m.]

3486. Your 6222, November 28, 4 p.m.<sup>99</sup> Have discussed with Lord Curzon as directed the Siberian situation. There is no change at present in British policy in that region and their representatives have been instructed to countenance no movement intended to overthrow or displace Admiral Kolchack, nevertheless he believes that

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<sup>99</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. III, p. 481.

Kolchack has failed and will ultimately fall. Notwithstanding Prime Minister's speech<sup>1</sup> no new policy has been decided on as to Russia. Prime Minister's utterance was made without previous knowledge of Curzon and international conference suggested in the Guildhall speech was not intended as preface to another Prinkipo proposal nor the calling of a special inter-Allied conference. What the Prime Minister had in mind was the coming together at the Turkish conference when a consultation might be had on the Russian situation. Savinkoff<sup>2</sup> now in London is urging on Foreign Office recognition of chain independent states from Esthonia to the Caucasus and creating of an anti-Bolshevist alliance between them. Curzon speaks of this as policy worth consideration but not ripe for decision. Speaking of a second Prinkipo Curzon states that it would not be acceptable to public opinion in England, would be bitterly opposed in France, and he presumed America's attitude towards it would be doubtful. I told him in my judgment that present industrial unrest in America had increased the feeling against the Bolsheviks. Notwithstanding the above the Prime Minister himself tells me that in order to bring peace in Russia he is not averse to treating with the Bolshevik Government and is utterly opposed to further military ventures. He favors encouraging the ultimate division of Russia into a number of independent states leaving none of sufficient size to threaten the genuine peace.

DAVIS

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861.00/5828 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *December 4, 1919, 6 p.m.*

6243. For your information and guidance the following comments are submitted with respect to the oral statements made on November 24 by Lloyd George to Polk.<sup>3</sup> At your discretion you may inform appropriate members of the British Government concerning the substance of these observations as occasion may make it desirable to do so.

The uselessness of reaching a satisfactory understanding with the Bolsheviks has been demonstrated by past experience. The ultimate aims of the Bolsheviks are hostile to all existing governments and any apparent compromise which they may make with these governments is vitiated by their avowed opportunism.

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<sup>1</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 3394, Nov. 15, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> Boris V. Savinkov, formerly Assistant Secretary of War under Kerensky.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 126.

There is the possibility, however, that the Bolshevik faction never will be forcibly driven from Russia, but will gradually yield to new leaders and change into a régime with which it will be possible to establish relations. It will be necessary to use the greatest care in this eventuality to determine the exact time at which the process of change has so far developed that countenance or recognition of the resulting government by foreign states will help to quicken rather than retard its evolution along rational lines. To grant premature recognition would check such development, it is believed, by giving aid and encouragement to ultra-radical and uncompromising elements which still remained.

It is my conviction that neither Lenin nor his immediate followers will ever give up permanently the dream of a world-wide revolution and loyally enter into friendly relations with governments which are not communistic.

Clearly even if evolution of the nature suggested has begun it is not sufficiently advanced to render it desirable or possible to try to reach an understanding with those now in control of the Soviet régime. In this connection see our telegram No. 6209 of November 24, 4 p.m. It is my belief that if Lloyd George seeks to reach such an understanding he will incur serious moral responsibility as well as make a great tactical mistake.

The American Government will give no support to the view that the dismemberment of Russia should be encouraged because a united Russia will be a menace to Europe. To take advantage of the present misfortune of the Russian people to interfere intentionally in the manner suggested with their future political rehabilitation would be a moral wrong and would pave the way for conflicts in the future. Granting that it is permissible to revert to such pre-war diplomatic methods, it is believed that a divided Russia not able to cope with existing Japanese territorial ambition or a possible revival of German imperialism would be by far a greater menace to the British Empire than would be an united, democratic Russia, well able to defend itself, but not disposed to attack.

Repeat confidentially to Ambassador in France.

LANSING

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861.00/5823 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 6, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received December 6, 12:40 p.m.]

3500. My 3481, December 2, 4 p.m. I am informally advised by Foreign Office that O'Grady has received not only reiterated instruc-

tions to confine his discussions to matters concerning exchange of prisoners but also to refuse even to listen to any representations on any other whatsoever.

DAVIS

861.00/5870 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, December 10, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received December 11, 4:45 a.m.]

301. I have received from Maxim Litvinoff now here who styles himself "member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs" a note under yesterday's date enclosing copy of the resolution on peace with the Allies passed by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets which he states has been sent out by him to all the Allied and Associated Governments and which he adds "should be regarded as a formal offer of peace on the part of the Russian Government."

Litvinoff further states, that it is with a view of obtaining greater security for the offer reaching its destination that he transmits it to the Legation for transmission to you.

Text [follows]:<sup>2a</sup>

"The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets wishes to live in peace with all nations and to direct its efforts towards the constructive work of improving production, transport and the administration of the country on the basis of the Soviet régime. This work has been hampered and obstructed up to the present by the pressure of German imperialism, then by the intervention of the Entente and the enemy [*famine*]-causing blockade.

["The Workers' and Peasants' Government has many times offered peace to the Entente Powers, namely, on August the 5th 1918 by a note of the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs to the American Consul-General, Mr. Poole,<sup>4</sup> on October 24th by a note to President Wilson,<sup>5</sup> on November the 3rd to all the governments of the Entente through representatives of neutral countries,<sup>6</sup> on November the 7th in the name of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets,<sup>7</sup> on December 23rd by a note of Citizen Litvinoff to the representatives of the Entente in Sweden,<sup>8</sup> then by radiograms of January 12th<sup>9</sup> and 17th,<sup>10</sup> 1919, by a note to the Governments of the Entente of February the

<sup>2a</sup> Bracketed corrections from a despatch from the Chargé in Denmark, dated Dec. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, pp. 659-660.

<sup>5</sup> Transmitted in telegrams nos. 1290 and 1297 from the Minister in Norway, Oct. 29 and Nov. 2, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 448-455.

<sup>6</sup> See telegram of Nov. 5, 1918, from the Minister in Norway, *ibid.*, p. 471.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Transmitted in telegram no. 3394 from the Minister in Sweden, Dec. 24, 1918, *ante*, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Forwarded in undated telegram from the Danish Chargé in Russia, *ante*, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> Not found in the Department files.

4th,<sup>11</sup> by the draft scheme worked out on March the 12th in conjunction with the delegate of President Wilson, Mr. Bullitt,<sup>12</sup> and finally by the statement made on May the 7th to Mr. Nansen.<sup>13</sup> Fully approving of the steps taken in this direction by the Central Executive Committee, by the Council of People's Commissaries and by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Seventh Congress of Soviets confirms one after the other [*once more*] its unalterable desire for peace and proposes once more to all the powers of the Entente, to Great Britain, to France, to the United States of America, to Italy, to Japan jointly and to each of these separately to enter immediately into peace negotiations and instructs the Central Executive Committee, the Council of the People's Commissaries and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to continue [systematically] this policy of peace in taking all the necessary measures for its success. Signed M. Kalinin, Chairman of the Congress, V. Avanesov, Secretary.

"I certify this to be a true translation of the resolution passed by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Signed M. Litvinoff."

SCHOENFELD

861.00/5865 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, December 10, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received December 11, 12:27 a.m.]

302. My telegram number 301, December 10, 11 [10] a.m. In conformity with action of British, French and Italian Legations, I am returning Litvinoff's note with a statement that I am not authorized to receive communications of this character from him. This decision was based on the ground that Litvinoff's mission here was directing [*sic*] in connection with exchange of prisoners and that his attempt to open peace negotiations [is a?] violation of ruling under which he was allowed to come to Denmark.

SCHOENFELD

861.00/5893 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, December 13, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 7:11 p.m.]

307. Today's newspapers publish semiofficial announcement reporting return by British, French, Italian, American Legations of Litvinoff's peace note. Announcement adds that inasmuch as Litvinoff came with British safe-conduct for humanitarian and non-political reasons and Denmark consented to his coming on that understanding only, it would have been breach of faith toward

<sup>11</sup> Ante, p. 39.

<sup>12</sup> Ante, p. 78.

<sup>13</sup> Forwarded by the American Relief Administration at Copenhagen on May 14, ante, p. 111.

Denmark to permit his sojourn here to be used for political purposes. Announcement concludes by stating that this diplomatic action merely means that Allied Powers have taken no official cognizance of Litvinoff's *démarche* and that their action is in conformity with Great Britain's engagements toward Denmark.

SCHOENFELD

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[For further information concerning the Soviet régime and the attitude of the Department toward it, see "Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia", Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. This memorandum was transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations under cover of a letter dated October 27, 1919, and reprinted as Senate Document No. 172, 66th Congress, 2d session.]

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**Refusal by the Government of the United States to Recognize the Mission of L. Martens, Russian Soviet Agent in the United States**

701.6111/296

*Mr. L. Martens to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 1/a

NEW YORK, *March 18, 1919.*

[Received March 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to hand you herewith original credentials of my appointment as representative of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic in the United States of North America, together with an English translation of the same.

I also have the honor to submit a Memorandum of the present political and economic conditions of Soviet Russia based upon information supplied to me by my Government, and, furthermore, I enclose a translation of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.<sup>14</sup>

Holding myself entirely at the disposal of the United States Government for any additional information or for any conference, official or unofficial,

I am [etc.]

L. MARTENS

*Representative of the Russian Socialist  
Federal Soviet Republic  
in the United States of North America*

S. NUORTEVA

*Secretary of the Bureau*

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<sup>14</sup> A translation of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 587-597.

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

*Credentials presented by Mr. L. Martens*

No. 9/k

Moscow, *January 2, 1919.*

Be it known that the Russian citizen Ludwig Christian Alexander Carlovitch Martens, now living in the United States of North America, is hereby appointed Representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the United States of North America.

*People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs*

GEORGE CHICHERIN

*Secretary of the Bureau*

F. SHENKIN

Seal of the Commissariat  
 "People's Commissariat  
 of Foreign Affairs"

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum enclosed by Mr. L. Martens*

No. 1/b

NEW YORK, *March 18, 1919.*

The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic was established on the 6th of November by a spontaneous uprising of the toiling masses of Russia. Its Government, the Council of the People's Commissars, is a government controlled by and responsible to all such members of the population of Russia who are willing to perform useful work, physical or mental. Those who, while not being unable to work, deliberately refuse to exercise their productive abilities, choosing to live on the fruits of the labor of other people, are eliminated from participation in the control of my Government.

Under present conditions those who are willing to work for the common good, number at least 90 per cent of the adult population in the area controlled by the Soviets. All such people have full political and civic rights.

The basis for citizenship in Russia being industrial and economic rather than political, and the social system being of such a nature that every person engaged in useful social labor is bound to participate in public affairs, the percentage of people directly participating in the management of society in Soviet Russia is higher than has been the case 'till now anywhere in the world. The Russian Soviet Republic affords thereby the widest possible field for a real expression of a conscious popular will. While the Soviet Government is a Government of the working class, the abolition of exploitation of labor and the elimination thereby of class divisions creates a productive community in which all able inhabitants are bound to become useful workers who have full political rights. My govern-

ment thus becomes the expression of fully 100 per cent of the people. It should also be noted that political rights are granted in Russia to every inhabitant engaged in useful work, though he be not a citizen of Russia but only temporarily working there.

The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic was rapidly acclaimed by the vast majority of the laboring people throughout the former empire of Russia. It has maintained itself in the face of manifold plots and opposition on the part of small groups of the former ruling classes who in many cases enlisted foreign help and who employed the most unscrupulous methods in their fight against the Soviet institutions. Yet, nowhere in Russia could such elements on their own accord organize any noticeable resistance to the popular will, as expressed by the Soviet Government. Only in sparsely populated outlying districts and in such of those districts only where our opponents had access to foreign military help, has it been possible for them to maintain any organized opposition and to wrest from the control of Soviet Russia some territory. Today, after sixteen months of existence the Russian Soviet Republic finds itself more securely established than at any previous time.

During the current year the Soviet Government has been particularly successful in retaking vast territories wrestled from its control during the preceding months. By February, 1919, the Soviet troops on the northern front had retaken the city of Shenkursk and adjoining territory. On the Eastern front they have lost Perm, but they have regained Pereufa, Ufa, Sterlitamak, Bellbey, Orenburg and Uralsk. The railroad connection with Central Asia is at present in the hands of the Soviet Government. On the Southern front they have taken the railroad stations of Pavorino, Alexikovo, Uriovpino, Polovaya, Kalatsk and Bogutchar, which have assured them of a control over the railroads of that region, while on the southeastern front the Ukrainian Soviet troops threaten the army of Krasnov from Lugansk in the rear. In the Ukraine the Soviet troops have acquired Kharkow, Yekaterinoslaw, Poltava, Kremenchug, Tchernigow, and Obrutch. In the Baltic provinces and in Lithuania the Soviet power has been extended to a great part of the territory formerly occupied by Germans, with the large cities of Minsk, Vilna, Riga, Mitau, Dvinsk, Windau and others in the control of adherents of the Soviet.

These last mentioned successes are largely due to the fact that after the evacuation by the German armies of the territories wrested from Russia during the war and by the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk, which the Soviet Republic was forced to sign under duress, the workers in such territories everywhere are rising to support the ideals and the social order represented by the Soviet Republic.



The resentment against former ruling classes, who did not hesitate at inviting foreign military help against their own people has evinced itself by an ever increasing popular support of the Soviet Government, even among such people who at first were either hostile or indifferent to the Soviet rule. Men and women of literary or technical training and of other intellectual accomplishments are now in great numbers rallying to the support of the Soviet Government and cooperate with it in all administrative branches. The peasantry of Russia, the great majority of which from the very outset was supporting the workers revolution, has become more consciously attached to our social system, realizing that in the support of the workers republic lies the only guarantee for their remaining in control of the land which they have taken from their former oppressors. The economic isolation of Russia which so far has prevented the Soviet Government from adequately supplying the peasants with implements that they need so badly, is of course causing hardship among the peasantry, yet the peasants generally do not place the blame for this privation at the door of the Soviet Government, well realizing that it is due to the deliberate interference in the affairs of the Russian people by hostile groups and that a remedy for this privation is not a weakening but a strengthening of the Soviet power. They fully realized—and their experience in such instances where counter-revolutionary forces temporarily succeeded to overthrow Soviet institutions clearly demonstrated it—that an overthrow of the Soviet rule, if possible at all, would lead to the establishment of a tyrannical, reactionary bloody autocracy.

The remarkable improvement in the internal situation of Soviet Russia appears from the negotiations which the members of the former Constituent Assembly have begun with the Soviet Government. Representatives of the former Constituent Assembly, as Tchernow, Rakitnikow, Sivatitzki, Volski, Bourevoy, Tchernenkow, Antonov, all of whom are also members of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionary Party, recently arrived in Moscow to participate in a conference with the Soviet Government with the view of giving support to our republic. This conference has led to an understanding whereby these well known Social Revolutionists and former bitter opponents have ceased their opposition and declared themselves with great emphasis against the Entente intervention in Russia.

An improvement of the Soviet Government's relations with the elements formerly hostile to it in Russian society is also indicated by the change of the attitude of the Mensheviki, whose conference has likewise protested against the Entente intervention.

The army of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic has been successfully organized and numbers today over a million men.

A system of universal military training has been inaugurated which steadily supplies the army with enforcements, with the view of creating a force numbering by the end of the current year three million men. The forces of the Government are led partly by officers of the former Russian armies who have proved their allegiance to the Soviet Government, and partly by officers developed from the rank and file by the military educational institutions established by my Government. The Commissariat of War has been successful in establishing and maintaining a strict discipline within the ranks of the army, a discipline not based on fear of punishment or on docile submission, but on the ardent conviction of the workers from whose ranks the army is recruited that it is their privilege as well as their duty to defend their social achievements against encroachments from any sources. This same conviction of the necessity of the defence of our revolutionary achievements has made it possible for us, in spite of all economic obstacles, efficiently to organize the production of military supplies.

The Soviet Government inherited a legacy of utter financial disruption created by four years of war and a year of revolution. This state of affairs, and also the necessity of coordinating the financial system of Russia with the new industrial and economic system represented by my Government, necessitated a complete reorganization of the financial institutions on the basis of common property rights. This reorganization which aims at exchanging the money system for a system representing labor value is still in the state of formation. Regardless hereof the Soviet Government, in as far as financial relations with and obligations to other countries are concerned, is prepared to offer modes of financial transactions suitable for the financial systems of other countries.

The period up till the establishment of the Soviet Government also badly disrupted the machinery for production and distribution. The Soviet Government inaugurated a system of public control and ownership of industries. It has actually taken over many important branches of industry, and has established the control of the Supreme Council of National Economy over all industries. Great handicaps have been faced because of the obstructionist methods of our opponents, lack of raw material and machinery, and because of the general confusion unavoidably coincident with the gigantic reorganization of the industrial life. In spite of these great handicaps, various branches of industry have been reestablished, even with an increase of productive efficiency. Many branches of industry, however, have not so far been able to recuperate, because of lack of raw material and lack of machinery. The needs of such industries offer a wide field for business transactions with Russia by other countries.

The state of railroad communications at the outset of the Soviet regime was very unsatisfactory. The demands first of the demobilization of the old army and later of military operations against counter-revolutionary attacks taxed the capacity of our railroads and left little opportunity for reconstruction work in this field. The Soviet Government during the past year nevertheless has managed to build and to complete the building of about 2000 versts of new railroads. It has also paid great attention to the construction of other means of communication, such as canals, roads, etc., and is at the present time planning work along these lines on a large scale, which also will offer great opportunities for foreign trade.

The people of Russia, kept for hundreds of years away from sources of popular education, have made it one of the main tasks of my Government to reorganize the school system with the view of the greatest possible achievements in the field of popular education. In this respect extensive work has been carried on throughout Russia during the past year. Tens of thousands of new primary schools, vocational schools, workers universities and lecture courses, especially courses offering agricultural instruction, have been established and maintained at great expense on the part of the Soviet Government and the field of the educational activities has been extended to include the making of the treasures of the arts and sciences as easily accessible to the people as possible.

All these efforts, incomplete as they still are, however have given the Russian people sufficient evidence of the earnestness of the desire and of the ability of the Soviet Government to fill the needs of the population and they have largely contributed to the abatement of opposition. Inasmuch as opposition has ceased in the form of active resistance to the Soviet Government it has become possible to assuage extraordinary measures such as censorship, martial law, etc.

Much prejudice has been created against the Soviet Government by the circulation of false reports about the nature of the institutions of and the measures undertaken by Soviet Russia. One of the most frequent allegations has been that the rule of the Soviets is one of violence and murder. In this connection I want to call your attention to the following passages in the note sent to the President of the United States on the 24th of December 1918 by Maxim Litvinoff, on behalf of the Soviet Government in Russia.<sup>14a</sup>

. . . "The chief aim of the Soviets is to secure for the toiling majority of Russian people economic liberty without which political liberty is of no avail to them. For eight months the Soviets endeavored to realize their aims by peaceful methods without resorting to violence, adhering to the abolition of capital punishment which abolition had been part of their program. It was only when their

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<sup>14a</sup> Not found in the Department files.

adversaries, the minority of the Russian people, took to terroristic acts against popular members of the Government and invoked the help of foreign troops, that the laboring masses were driven to acts of exasperation and gave vent to their wrath and bitter feelings against their former oppressors. For allied invasion of Russian territory not only compelled the Soviets against their own will to militarize the country anew and to divert their energies and resources so necessary to the economic reconstruction of Russia, exhausted by four years of war, to the defence of the country, but also cut off the vital source of foodstuffs and raw material exposing the population to most terrible privation bordering on starvation.

“I wish to emphasize that the so-called red terror, which is so grossly exaggerated and misrepresented abroad, was not the cause but the direct outcome and result of allied intervention. The Russian workers and peasants fail to understand how foreign countries, which never dreamt of interfering with Russian affairs when Czarist barbarism and militarism ruled supreme, and which even supported that regime, felt justified in intervening in Russia now when the working people themselves, after decades of strenuous struggling and countless sacrifices, succeeded in taking power and destiny of their country into their own hands, aiming at nothing but their own happiness and international brotherhood, constituting no menace to other nations.”

In another passage of the same note Mr. Litvinoff states as follows :

“The best means for the termination of violence in Russia would be to reach a settlement which would include the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Russia and the cessation of direct or indirect assistance to such groups in Russia who still indulge in futile hopes of an armed revolt against the Workers Government but who even themselves would not think of such a possibility if they could not reckon on assistance from abroad.”

The great work of social reconstruction inaugurated by the Soviet Government as the executors of the people's will has been hampered by the necessity of military defence against opponents to our republic, and by the economic isolation of Soviet Russia which has been one of the weapons of their attacks, together with deliberate disrupting of our means of communications with important food centers, as well as destruction of food stores,—and all this has greatly increased the sufferings of our people. By tremendous efforts and by efficient consolidation of all economic means at its disposal, my Government has been able to stave off the worst features of this situation. The fact that economic disruption together with starvation and lack of all bare necessities of life prevails as poignantly, and more so, in such parts of the former Russian empire which have been for some time in the hands of the opponents of our republic and which have had contact with the outside world, clearly testifies that the Soviet rule is much more capable of insuring means of existence to the people than any pretenders to the power in Russia.

In view of all the above stated, I venture to say that the Soviet Government has given all such proofs of stability, permanence, popular support and constructive ability as ever have been required from any Government in the world as a basis for political recognition and commercial intercourse. I am confident that the people outside of Russia are becoming as convinced as the Russian people themselves of the futility of efforts to overthrow the Soviet Government. Such efforts lead only to unnecessary bloodshed and if successful in any part of Russia lead to temporary establishment of bloody, monarchical autocracy which cannot maintain itself and even the temporary existence of which will lead to bloodshed and misery.

Fully realizing that economic prosperity of the world at large, including Soviet Russia, depends on uninterrupted interchange of products between various countries, the Soviet Government of Russia desires to establish commercial relations with other countries, and especially with the United States. The Soviet Government is prepared at once to buy from the United States vast amounts of finished products, on terms of payment fully satisfactory to parties concerned. My Government also desires to reach an agreement in respect to exports from Russia of raw material needed by other countries and of which considerable surpluses exist in Russia. In order to reestablish the economic integrity of Russia and to insure uninterrupted commercial relations, the Russian workers and peasants, as Mr. Litvinoff stated in the above quoted note, "are prepared to go to any length of concessions as far as the real interests of other countries are concerned,"—of course with the understanding that no agreements entered into should impair the sovereignty of the Russian people, as expressed by the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

On the part of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic there thus exist no obstacles to the establishment of proper relations with other countries, especially with the United States. The Soviet Government of Russia is willing to open its doors to citizens of other countries for peaceful pursuit of opportunity, and it invites any scrutiny and investigation of its conditions which I feel sure will prove that peace and prosperity in Russia,—and elsewhere, in as far as the prosperity of Russia affects other countries—may be attained by the cessation of the present policy of nonintercourse with the Soviet Russia, and by the establishment of material and intellectual intercourse.

Russia is now prepared to purchase in the American market great quantities of the following commodities, commensurate with the needs of 150,000,000 people: Railroad supplies, agricultural implements and machinery, factory machinery, tools, mining machinery

and supplies, electrical supplies, printing machinery, textile manufactures, shoes and clothing, fats and canned meats, rubber goods, typewriters and office supplies, automobiles and trucks, chemicals, medical supplies, etc.

Russia is prepared to sell the following commodities: Flax, hemp, hides, bristles, furs, lumber, grain, platinum, metals and minerals.

The Russian Government, in the event of trade being opened with the United States, is prepared to place at once in banks in Europe and America, gold to the amount of two hundred million dollars (\$200,000,000) to cover the price of initial purchases.

To insure a basis for credits for additional Russian purchases in the United States, I suggest that detailed negotiations with my Government will evolve propositions fully acceptable for this purpose.

I am empowered by my Government to negotiate for the speedy opening of commercial relations for the mutual benefit of Russia and America, and I shall be glad to discuss details at the earliest opportunity.

Respectfully,

L. MARTENS

*Representative of the Russian Socialist  
Federal Soviet Republic  
in the United States of North America*

S. NUORTEVA

*Secretary of the Bureau*

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701.6111/296 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1919, 1 p.m.*

1270. For the Secretary of State: Department has received following communication dated March 18, 1919:

[Here follows text of letter from Mr. L. Martens, printed *supra*.]

You will recall that Nuorteva, Secretary of the Bureau, announced himself as official representative of the Red Guard early last year and has since claimed to represent the Bolsheviki. The memorandum referred to which covers eleven pages of fool's cap describing the success of the Bolshevik régime, concludes with the following passage:

[Here follows text of memorandum of March 18 from Mr. Martens from the paragraph beginning, "Fully realizing that economic prosperity", to the close of the memorandum, *ante*, pages 140 to 141. The phrase, "as Mr. Litvinoff stated in the above quoted note", is omitted.]

I assume you have official text of Soviet Constitution<sup>15</sup> and would refer to Division 1, Chapter 2, Section 3 and Division 2, Chapter 5, Sections 9 and 10 as apparently summarizing the purpose of the Soviet Government.

It is interesting to note that Division 3, Chapter 6, Section 25 provides that the representatives to the city Soviets are elected on the basis of one deputy for 25,000 electors while the representatives of the Provincial Soviets, where the population is agricultural, are elected on one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants. If you have no official text of the Constitution let me know if you wish me to transmit by cable. I am sending copies of all enclosures mentioned above by next mail.

The fact that these credentials and proposals have been presented to the Department is being widely circulated in the press. The credentials themselves also seem to present more clearly than heretofore the question of the attitude which this government should assume towards a régime whose Constitution, as officially communicated, stipulates that among its fundamental tasks are the securing of the victory of Socialism in all countries, the abolition of private property, the repudiation of foreign obligations, and the complete elimination of whole classes from all share in Government.

In this connection you will note the ingeniousness of the proposal of the Bolshevik representative to deposit \$200,000,000 in gold in the United States and Allied countries, when the government he represents has repudiated the enormous foreign debts of Russia, including \$187,000,000 advanced by the United States to the Provisional Government.

Please instruct me what action you desire to take in regard to the communication quoted above.

PHILLIPS

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861.51/549 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1919, 7 p.m.

1594. Referring Department's 1270, March 25, 1 p.m., to which I am awaiting an answer, Martens has notified the National City Bank that all Russian funds in this country now on deposit or hereafter received, are to be disbursed only on his order and has deposited with Bank credentials from Bolshevik authorities in confirmation of his contention. Unless Department takes strong stand and full responsibility to support National City Bank, this incident will fur-

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<sup>15</sup> A translation is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 587-597.

ther impede any solution of problems conveyed in Department's 1232, March 21, 8 p.m.<sup>16</sup>

City Bank is asking formally what action should be taken. What reply am I authorized to make?

POLK

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701.6111/309: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, April 17, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 2:29 p.m.]

1656. Your 1594, April 15, 7 p.m. Martens has never been recognized as a representative. The only Russian representative recognized by the United States is Bakhmeteff and therefore I do not see that Department or National City Bank can give credence to the claims put forth by Martens.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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701.6111/349

*Mr. J. H. Fulton of the National City Bank of New York to the Acting Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 20, 1919.

DEAR SIR: We beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 18th instant,<sup>16</sup> referring to the demand of L. A. Martens on the Russian Ambassador to the United States.

We understand that Mr. Martens is requesting recognition from you as the representative of the Russian Soviet Republic. Transactions of such great magnitude have been entered into with the representatives of the Provisional Government since December, 1917, and in disregard of the Soviet regime, by reason of the continued recognition of the Provisional Government by the United States, that we wish to urge upon your attention the very great importance, in case his request for recognition should receive any consideration from you, of making any recognition of the present Soviet Administration or its successor apply only to future relations and transactions, so as certainly to avoid the possibility that the recognition may have a retroactive effect within the principle laid down in *Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.*, (246 U.S., 297, 303).

Yours very truly,

J. H. FULTON  
*General Executive Manager*

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<sup>16</sup> Not printed.



861.602/15 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*WASHINGTON, *May 21, 1919, 1 p.m.*

644. Your 1181, May 14, 4 p.m.<sup>17</sup> Following official statements issued press under dates April 26, and May 6, 1919.     .

“Rumors that American interests have been seeking concessions from the Bolshevik authorities have been brought to the attention of the Department of State. As the Government of the United States has never recognized the Bolshevik regime at Moscow it is deemed proper to warn American business men that any concessions from the Bolshevik authorities probably would not be recognized as binding on future Russian Governments.”

“The Department of State has received numerous inquiries regarding Mr. L. A. Martens claiming to be a representative of a Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. The Department feels it to be its duty to inform the public that Mr. Martens has not been received or recognized as the representative of the Government of Russia or of any other Government. As the United States Government has not recognized the Bolshevik regime at Moscow as a Government, extreme caution should be exercised as to representations made by anyone purporting to represent the Bolshevik Government.”

POLK

701.6111/363 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*WASHINGTON, *June 5, 1919, 4 p.m.*

2197. For the Secretary of State:

In response to my inquiries, London police have just ascertained that L. A. Martens, Bolshevik representative at New York, registered on August 9, 1914 as a German subject, born in Russia of German parents, and that he left England for the United States about December 21, 1915. If this report is properly and adequately confirmed I would like authority to secure deportation of Martens as an undesirable alien and enemy citizen, authority for deportation to include other alien assistants, including Santeri Nuorteva, head of Soviet Information and Propaganda Bureau under Martens. Matter is especially brought to your attention because Martens and his associates are conducting energetic propaganda. Martens has made speeches in New York, Chicago and other places urging trade rela-

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<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

tions with Soviet Russia. His offices in the World's Tower Building, New York, are circularizing American business men offering attractive opportunities. I am told the plan is that the Bolshevik representatives at New York upon signing of proposed contracts, are prepared to deposit full amount of contract price in New York banks and will make payment on shipment of 10% or other comparatively small proportion of goods called for by the contract. For example, in the last few days Congressman Porter, Republican Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, brought one of his constituents to me who had received an attractive offer along lines above described. Both Mr. Porter and his constituent, a shoe manufacturer of Pittsburgh agreed fully with explanation of the situation I gave them. We discussed freely the clever and insidious character of such offers and the effect they are naturally having among American business men who may be without full information of actual situation. The purpose of such offers is obviously to bring pressure to bear on the administration to be drawn into trade relations with and ultimately recognition of the Soviet Government.

I am also informed by the Editor of the *Russkoe Slovo*, the leading liberal Russian paper in New York, that Martens' office is responsible for an indirect boycott of his publication by intimidating proprietors of news stands who sell his paper in various parts of the country.

No doubt under expert advice of Morris Hillquit, whom Martens has engaged as legal adviser, his activities thus far appear to be within the law.

I have issued two press statements: One on April 26th warning American business men that any concessions secured in Russia from the Bolshevik authorities would probably not be recognized as binding on future Russian Governments; and a second May 6th, stating that extreme caution should be exercised as to representations made by any one purporting to represent the Bolshevik Government, in view of the fact that the United States has not recognized either Mr. Martens or the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic he claims to represent.

It might be well to authorize the deportation of Martens under conditions I have suggested and also to issue a statement to the press that this Government is convinced by its experience of the last twelve months that it is impracticable to carry out its frequently declared purpose of assisting the Russian people to control their own affairs, by dealing with the Bolshevik régime at Moscow and that, consequently it is not only impossible to recognize that Government but also now to sanction commercial transactions with the representatives of the Bolsheviki.

701.6111/373 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 18, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received 10:07 p.m.]

2635. Further referring to your 2294, June 13, 4 p.m.<sup>18</sup> President states:

"Of course, if Martens is a German subject and can be legitimately deported, I have no objection because such grounds would be abundant, but I hope the evidence is in fact complete."

AMERICAN MISSION

701.6111/374

*The Acting Secretary of State to the National City Bank of New York*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1919.

GENTLEMEN: Attention of Mr. J. H. Fulton.

The Department begs to refer to your communication of April 20, 1919, relative to certain demands made upon the Russian Ambassador by L. A. Martens.

In reply you are informed that there is no question at this time of the so-called Soviet Government of Russia being recognized by the United States. The Department begs to inform you further that the Government of the United States does not contemplate recognizing any Government in Russia not based on democratic principles and will try to provide that any recognition hereafter accorded will not have any retroactive effect which will be prejudicial to American interests.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

701.6111/648

*Memorandum by Mr. Basil Miles, in Charge of Russian Affairs, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State*<sup>19</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1919.

Internment of L. A. Martens,  
Bolshevik Representative at New York

*Evidence of German nationality:*

1. Registered as a German in August 1914 in England, voluntarily. Applied as a German to leave England for U. S. in November 1915;

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.<sup>19</sup> Notation on memorandum: "Mr. Polk discussed this at Cabinet today and it was decided to do nothing until further evidence or legislation is obtained. B[reckinridge] L[ong]. 6/24".

received British permit to depart as German in December 1915; registered as a German on arrival at New York in SS. *St. Louis*, January 2, 1916.

This evidence based on official records of London Metropolitan Police and our own Customs and Immigration records at New York.

2. Military Intelligence reports press statements in New York papers, based on interviews with Martens, and other evidence which show that Martens was born of German parents in Bachmut, Russia; that Russian Government refused to naturalize him; that he was subsequently arrested as a revolutionary and when released was brought to Germany where he served his time in the German army; that he was subsequently mixed up in the Russian Revolution of 1905-1906 and escaped to England late in 1906; that he is an engineer by profession and engaged in the manufacture in England of a machine gun which he invented; that he came to the U. S. in 1916 as a representative of the Demidoffs—big munitions makers in Russia; that he was at that time Vice President of the wealthy engineering firm of Weinberg & Posner or else subsequently was given that position in this country.

3. Upon his appointment as representative in America of the Bolshevik Government, he opened an office in New York; among his assistants was included Santeri Nuorteva, a well known radical agitator. The credentials he sent State Department—and which were not acknowledged—were dated at Moscow, January 2, 1919, signed "Chicherin".

4. Military Intelligence regard work of office established by Martens, although ostensibly economic, as "in reality the largest and most dangerous propaganda undertaking thus far started by Lenine's party in any country outside of Russia."

*Reasons for Internment:*

He is an alien enemy; he is vigorously representing a so-called Government with which the President of the U. S. has said he cannot deal (see Inter-Allied proposal to Kolchak<sup>20</sup>); Military Intelligence report he is camouflaging what is in reality a dangerous propaganda; the Government he claims to represent has openly advocated world-wide revolution.

His internment would clearly define this Government's attitude towards his undertaking; it would give us a hostage in our hands if the Bolsheviks, in fact, start the reprisals they are reported to contemplate because of the raid on his N. Y. office by the local authorities.

<sup>20</sup> *Post*, p. 367.

*Conclusions:*

He should be interned.

The Immigration Bureau of the Department of Labor has informed the Department of State, informally, that the evidence now available is inadequate as yet to warrant his deportation under existing law. It is suggested that this latter question be considered further, either when additional evidence is obtained, or when Congress may provide new legislation.

BASIL MILES

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701.6111/377 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 24, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received June 25, 8:27 p.m.]

3957. The Legation is in receipt through Swedish official wireless of the following telegram:

"The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Republic requests that the following be transmitted to the State Department, Washington:

The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has learned with indignation of the arrest of Mr. Martens, its representative in New York. The Commissariat wishes to point out that all the diplomatic and consular representatives of the American Government in Russia up to their departure in September last have been treated by the Soviet authorities with the utmost courtesy in spite of the fact that since June of last year the American Government openly sided with all the Russian and foreign dark forces ranged against the workers and peasants of Russia with the sole object of crushing the great revolution and restoring Tzardom and bureaucratic capitalist rule. Even after American troops had landed on Russian territory and actually partook in military operations against the Russian laboring people not a single American citizen has been molested in Russia. Moreover American officials and journalists have been allowed admittance into Russia and accorded every courtesy and all possible facilities and privileges. The arrest of Mr. Martens is the more surprising and unjustified as he acted openly as the representative of Soviet Russia without calling forth any objection or protestation on the part of the American Government. The Russian Government fears that this arrest may not be an isolated case, but form part of a general persecution of Russian citizens loyal to their peoples government and demands the cessation of such persecutions and the immediate release of Mr. Martens. The Soviet Government expects to be accordingly informed at an early date and not to be compelled reluctantly to take reprisals against American citizens to be found on Russian territory. Signed Peoples Commissary for Foreign Affairs. Tchitcherin."

WHEELER

701.6111/377 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1919.

1663. Your 3957, June 24. Please inform proper Swedish authorities at once as follows: The statement purporting to emanate from Moscow is wholly untrue. Mr. Martens has not been arrested nor does this Government contemplate any action against law abiding Russian citizens in this country. It is understood that Mr. Martens claims official status as the representative of a regime at Moscow which the United States has not recognized as a Government. At the same time he is a German citizen, having voluntarily so declared himself when he entered this country in 1916.

This Government has not forgotten the unwarrantable arrest and detention for months of Consul Tredwell and the illegal and unjustifiable imprisonment under severe hardships of Vice Consuls Burri and Leonard, contrary to the fundamental practice of civilized nations. Nor has it forgotten that an American citizen, Kalamatiano, has been held in prison at Moscow for months under sentence of death, without proper trial, and without opportunity for his Government to assist him. The Government of the United States now views with grave concern the reported threat of the authorities at Moscow to take further illegal measures in the form of reprisals against American citizens in Russia. Such a course, if adopted, would be certain to arouse in the United States an overwhelming public sentiment of indignation against the authorities at Moscow responsible for such acts.

PHILLIPS

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**Continuance of Restrictions upon Trade with Soviet Russia by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers**

763.72119/5407 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 20, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received June 21, 6:28 a.m.]

2659. The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at their meeting on June 7 [17] considered the following [note] from the Supreme Economic Council on the subject of the blockade of Hungary and Bolshevik Russia.

"1. The Supreme Economic Council submit the question as to whether after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary.

"2. As regards Hungary, the Council were unanimously of opinion that no special difficulty arose. It has already been decided by the Council of Four that commercial relations shall be resumed with Hungary as soon as a settled government is brought into existence in that country. Should this not occur before the final acceptance of the terms of peace by Germany, (at which date it has also been decided that the blockade of Germany shall be completely raised,) then there will be no legal or technical difficulties which would prevent the Associated Powers, if so minded, from [maintaining] a 'Blockade' against Hungary with which they continue to be in a state of war. On this point the Council beg to refer to their note which is being placed before the Council of Heads of States regarding the undertaking proposed to be secured from Austria prior to the conclusion of peace with that country.

"3. The Council consider that in the absence of the legal declaration of a state of war between the Associated Powers and the Bolshevik Government there are grave legal and technical obstacles to the maintenance of restrictions upon commercial intercourse with Bolshevik Russia after the acceptance of the peace terms by Germany.

"4. At present such restrictions are in fact maintained—

(a) as regards subjects of the Associated Powers, by legislation under the war powers laws of the various governments. These will lapse, unless especially extended, with the termination of the state of war, and it is felt that there would be great difficulty in securing from the respective legislative bodies the special legislation necessary to enable theoretical [*the*] restrictions to be continued in force solely against Bolshevik Russia.

(b) as regards neutral countries, by the various agreements together with subsidiary undertakings which have been secured, with special reference to Bolshevik Russia, from the respective neutral governments. These agreements determine upon the termination of a state of war with the Central Powers and indeed it is felt that the Associated Powers would be morally bound to regard them as being determined upon the acceptance of the peace terms, though no doubt legally it could be contended that they continue until the actual proclamation of the end of a state [of] war.

"5. The Council are unanimous in calling attention to the fact that, assuming the desire and intention on the part of the states bordering upon Western Russia, e.g., Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Roumania, to continue to preserve restrictions upon commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia, and assuming a similar announced [*desire and*] intention on the part of the Governments of the northern territories, Admiral Kolchak, and General Denikin, there only remain in fact two possible points of entry for commodities into Bolshevik Russia—(a) Petrograd, and (b) certain Black Sea ports, notably Odessa. If Petrograd falls at an early date only the Black Sea problem remains.

"6. Until, however, the Black Sea littoral passes from the control of the Bolsheviks, this problem will present very grave and technical difficulties. In the absence of existence of a state of war, there would be great difficulty in arresting the passage of vessels to [and] from ports in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The suggestion

has been made that, e.g., the Roumanian Government might be induced to proclaim a formal blockade of such ports, but it would seem probable that other powers would have difficulty in recognizing such a blockade as effective within canons of international law.

"7. The Council consider that it is very desirable to avoid any measure which might give rise to an understanding either in Russia or in the countries surrounding it that the Associated Powers would be disposed to propose [*favor*] the resumption of trade with the Bolshevik in the meantime [*régime*—] the only intermediary through which it is possible for trade to be carried on with the population under the régime. The Council accordingly recommend that [*the*] abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption such trade. The French and Belgian delegates are of opinion that a notice might be published indicating that commercial relations would be resumed with Russia when a sufficiently free and stable government should be established. There would be no question however of the raising of a blockade which does not technically exist. An unofficial hint in the same sense could be given the [neutral countries.]

"8. The Council recognizing that serious political issues are involved, submit the question for the earnest and immediate consideration of the Council of the Heads of States."

The Council decided that after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary. In addition the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. It was further decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to examine as to whether, consistent with the above decisions, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevik Russia.

LANSING AMERICAN MISSION

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661.119/433 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 15, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received July 16, 3:11 a.m.]

3152. For the President.

The question of the attitude of the Allies toward trade with Bolshevik Russia has been reopened through a formal request by Sweden to be advised as to whether any restrictions will be attempted to be imposed by the Allies upon exports from Sweden to Bolshevik Russia. A particular instance in question involves shipment of munitions of war.



The British and French now propose that the Allies notify neutrals that traffic into and out of ports in the Gulf of Finland can only be conducted under permit from the local [*Allied*] naval command.

You will perhaps recall that the question of commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia was considered by the Supreme Council, which decided in substance that there would be no legal basis for a continuation of restrictions after the termination of the blockade of Germany. Hankey<sup>21</sup> under date of June 17th advised McCormick<sup>22</sup> that the Supreme Council had "decided that after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary". At the meeting of Supreme Council held today Mr. Balfour urged a modification of this decision to the extent of giving the notification above referred to on the following grounds:

1. The decision of June 17 was taken in expectation of an early fall of Petrograd, which would automatically have prevented Bolshevik Russia from receiving aid through the Gulf of Finland. This expectation has not been fulfilled.

2. Military and naval operations are active in and about the Gulf of Finland and the Allies are making naval dispositions to prevent the Bolsheviks taking the anti-Bolsheviks in the rear through naval operations. The Allies cannot permit neutral shipping to proceed to Bolshevik territory as this would be the means whereby naval dispositions of the Allies would become known.

3. The decision of the Supreme Council of June 17 related to both Bolshevik Russia and Hungary. The Supreme Council itself modified the decision in respect to Hungary prior to your departure, which it was urged indicated that the decision as a whole should not be regarded as final.

Mr. Clemenceau actively supported Mr. Balfour and urged particularly the moral obligation which the Allies were under by virtue of their promises of aid and assistance to Koltchak. Mr. Tittoni is prepared to concur with the British and French. I secured postponement today at Council of Five of decision for at least forty-eight hours in the hope that by that time I would be able to ascertain your wishes.

While fully appreciating the force of the arguments raised by Mr. Balfour and the practical advantages of taking the course suggested, I am impressed and so expressed myself with the danger of admitting the right of one group of nations to control the high seas unless by virtue of recognized belligerent rights. This dis-

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<sup>21</sup> Lt. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, British member of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council.

<sup>22</sup> Vance McCormick, chairman of the Section on Blockade of the Supreme Economic Council.

tinguishes the case of Hungary from that of Bolshevik Russia, with which latter we are not belligerent. I am also inclined to feel that the British and French over estimate the aid Bolsheviks will receive in the absence of the proposed notification. Navigation is exceedingly hazardous by present [*reason of the*] naval operations in progress and above all by reason of the presence of great numbers of mines. Furthermore, the Bolshevik ports will normally be closed for the winter by the latter part of November.

I recognize, however, that it is desirable that we should go as far as possible with our associates in assisting Koltchak and preventing aid from reaching the Bolsheviks and accordingly I shall take no action here until advised of your wishes.

It is also proposed that Koltchak shall declare a formal blockade of about 90 miles of the Black Sea littoral and that if this blockade is effective it be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers. I shall accept this proposal unless you indicate otherwise. Please answer as soon as possible.

WHITE AMERICAN MISSION

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661.119/433 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1919, noon.

2594. For White. Your 3152, July 15. President directs me to say that he approves of the stand taken by you in connection with the proposals made by Mr. Balfour. A blockade before a state of war exists is out of the question. It could not be recognized by this Government. Personally, I agree with you that the Allies exaggerate danger of trade with the Bolsheviks in Russia.

POLK

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661.119/444 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 26, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 8:54 p.m.]

3323. For the President.

Referring to your number 2594, July 18, noon. I communicated yesterday afternoon to the Council of Five the President's decision which caused considerable disappointment. An informal conversation, entirely friendly in tone, thereupon ensued in the course of which Balfour created a distinction between belligerency and warfare, which latter, he said, is now going on to a considerable extent in those parts and British soldiers are being killed. He and Cle-

menceau finally decided that the latter should make an appeal to the President by telegraph for reconsideration his decision on grounds to be set forth in the telegram, which I understand is to be drafted by Balfour and despatched by Clemenceau this evening.

WHITE AMERICAN MISSION

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763.72112/12393 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 27, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received July 28, 7:40 p.m.]

3354. For the President.

Mr. Clemenceau requests me to transmit to you the following message from my British, French, Italian, and Japanese colleagues relative to the proposed blockade of Soviet Russia:

"British, French, Italian, Japanese members of the Council of Five, respectfully offer the following on the President's message relating to neutral trade in the Gulf of Finland. They do not desire to express any opinion upon the statement of international law laid down in the telegram. It may well be true that where there is no state of belligerency there can be no legal blockade; but they would point out that the situation in Russia and in the Gulf of Finland is at the present moment such as hardly to permit rigid application of rules which in ordinary cases are quite uncontested. Language in which international law is expressed is fitted to describe the relations between organized states but it is not so well fitted to deal with relations between the organized states on the one hand and unorganized chaos on the other hand. Russia during this period of transition is not a state but a collection of 'de facto' governments at war with each other and though it is quite true to say that the Allied and Associated Powers are not in a state of belligerency with Russia it is also true they are involved [in] military operations with one of these 'de facto' governments and that they are supplying arms and ammunition to the others.

It may not be proper to describe this condition of things as war but it cannot be right to treat it as peace, nor can the international rules applicable to a state of peace be applied to it without qualification. The case is a special one and must be specially treated.

We would venture to point out some of the ill consequences which in the present case would follow from neglecting this consideration.

Allied and Associated troops are defending themselves in circumstances of very great difficulty against Bolshevik attacks in Archangel. Yet we permit the Bolshevik troops, who are making these attacks, to receive supplies which we could easily cut off.

We are furnishing the Siberian army of Koltchak with military equipment, and at the same time we are permitting military equipment to go to his enemy. We have gone far in the direction of recognizing the Estonians, and other non-Russian people, who are struggling to resist Bolshevik attacks: yet we leave neutral traders

free to strengthen the Bolshevist armies, and to convey unhindered information to a hostile navy as to the number and disposition of our own ships of war.

It may be urged, indeed, that to interfere with neutral commerce will not so much have the effect of hampering the military operations of those who are engaged in attacking us and our friends, as in aggravating the misery under which the innocent civil population is already suffering. So far as our information goes, however, this will not be the result. Every cargo successfully brought through the Gulf of Finland to Petrograd supplies a new instrument to the Bolshevists for adding recruits to their army. None of it will reach anyone but soldiers and officials. Its distribution will be determined by considerations which are military and not philanthropic. It will not diminish the sufferings of humanity; it will add to them.

It has been suggested that it might [be] possible for the four other Great Powers to maintain the control of imports into the Gulf of Finland without the participation of the United States. We feel however the strongest objection to adopting any policy not accepted by our [*all the*] Principal Allied and Associated Powers and even apart from this overwhelming consideration we cannot ignore the fact that if in such circumstances an American ship were to enter the Gulf an incident might easily occur where consequences would be well-nigh intolerable.

It is for these reasons that we would most earnestly request the United States Government to [re]consider their decision and to concur in a policy which as it seems to us is of so special and exceptional a character as to be quite outside the ordinary rules laid down by international law for the conduct of maritime blockade.["]

#### WHITE AMERICAN MISSION

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763.72112/12393 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1919, 10 p.m.

2714. Your 3354, July 27, 12 p.m. The President desires me to send the following answer to the message of your British, French, Italian and Japanese colleagues relative to the blockade of Soviet Russia.

"The President is not unmindful of the serious situation which exists in relation to neutral trade in the Baltic with the Russian ports controlled by the Bolsheviks. He has given careful consideration to the arguments advanced in the message transmitted at the request of M. Clemenceau and is not unmindful of their force in support of the proposed interruption of commerce with the ports mentioned. However, while he fully understands the reasons for employing war measures to prevent the importation of munitions and food supplies into the portion of Russia now in the hands of the Bolsheviks, he labors under the difficulty of being without con-

stitutional right to prosecute an act of war such as a blockade affecting neutrals unless there has been a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States against the nation so blockaded.

The landing of troops at Archangel and Murmansk was done to protect the property and supplies of the American and Allied Governments until they could be removed. The sending of troops to Siberia was to keep open the railway for the protection of Americans engaged in its operation and to make safe from possible German and Austrian attack the retiring Czechoslovaks. The furnishing of supplies to the Russians in Siberia, while indicating a sympathy with the efforts to restore order and safety of life and property, cannot be construed as a belligerent act.

The President is convinced that, if proper representations are made to the countries neutral during the war, they can be induced to prohibit traffic in arms and munitions with the portions of Russia controlled by the Bolsheviks. The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks to all governments and the announced program of international revolution make them as great a menace to the national safety of neutral countries as to Allied countries. For any government to permit them to increase their power through commercial intercourse with its nationals would be to encourage a movement which is frankly directed against all governments and would certainly invite the condemnation of all peoples desirous of restoring peace and social order.

The President cannot believe that any government, whose people might be in a position to carry on commerce with the Russian ports referred to, would be so indifferent to the opinion of the civilized world as to permit [military] supplies to be exported to those ports directly or indirectly.

The President, therefore, suggests that the so-called neutral government be approached by the Allied and Associated Governments in a joint note setting forth the facts of the case and the menace to such countries and to the world of any increase of the Bolshevik power, and requesting the neutral governments to take immediate steps to prevent trade and commerce with Bolshevik Russia and to give assurances that such policy will be rigorously enforced in conjunction with other governments which are equally menaced."

Confidentially, I believe that the action proposed by your colleagues, of which the approval of the President is urged, would arouse serious criticism by Congress if the President acted accordingly on the legal ground of having exceeded his constitutional powers and on the politic ground of interference in the domestic affairs of Russia. With the present partisan feeling in Congress, while the ratification of the Treaty of Peace is undecided, any action which would bring about a new controversy or a new excuse for criticism would be manifestly unwise.

In carrying out a general policy of non-intercourse with the Bolshevik territory this Government could deny clearance to all American vessels for the Baltic ports referred to as well as passports to

persons seeking to visit those regions, and the same action by other governments would accomplish the same purpose as a hostile blockade.

You may discreetly use the foregoing arguments in explanation of the President's unwillingness to reverse the decision as to instituting a blockade of Russian ports in the Baltic.

LANSING

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661.119/452: Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received August 16, 10 a.m.]

4027. The Swedish Foreign Office issues the following *communiqué*:

"Some time ago the Foreign Office took steps to ascertain specifically the attitude of the American and British authorities with regard to shipments to Russia. From American sources information has been supplied that obstacles are still maintained to shipments to Soviet Russia and that the rumor of the arrival of American food ships in Petrograd is without foundation. From England no definite answer has yet been received but information received indicates that all traffic with Russia is in fact still barred and that in addition the mines laid make it practically impossible for any ship to travel by the Petrograd route."

WHEELER

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763.72112/12393: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1919, 5 p.m.

3067. For Polk. Referring to Department's No. 2714, August 2, 10 p.m.

What progress on problem of trade with Bolshevik Russia? Department is continuing to refuse licenses for shipments to Soviet Russia. I understand that Broderick of the British Embassy here has informally expressed the opinion that Great Britain is going to resume trade with Soviet Russia before very long.

My understanding is that the President's power to require licenses for export, which he holds under the Espionage Act and which he delegated to the War Trade Board, will lapse with the proclamation of peace. The only recourse then will be measures suggested in next to last paragraph in Department's 2714, August 2, 10 p.m., referred to above.

Would be grateful if you will let me know how this whole question of preventing trade with Soviet Russia is developing in Paris.

PHILLIPS

661.119/468 a

*The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Irvine L. Lenroot*

WASHINGTON, *September 13, 1919.*

DEAR SENATOR LENROOT: A letter addressed by you to the Chief, Bureau of Exports, War Trade Board, Washington, dated August 18, 1919,<sup>24</sup> with reference to the question of the issuance of licenses for the exportation of commodities to Soviet Russia, has been called to my attention.

In reply allow me first to call your attention to the authority upon which this refusal to license exports to Soviet Russia is based, which is Title VII of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917,<sup>25</sup> which makes certain exports in time of war unlawful, and I beg to advise you that the President has delegated this power to control exports as contemplated by the section of the Espionage Act referred to herein, to the War Trade Board, which became on July 1st, 1919, a Section of the Department of State.

The following is quoted from the act:

“Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the public safety shall so require and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export from or ship from or take out of the United States to any country named in such proclamation, any article or articles mentioned in such proclamation except at such time or times or under such regulation and orders and subject to such regulations and exceptions as the President shall designate.”

I beg to inform you further that this restriction is being maintained not alone by the Government of the United States but by the Allied and Associated Governments as well as various neutral Governments.

I also beg to call your attention to the fact that a statement issued by the leaders of the so-called Bolshevik Government shows that practically all business as well as manufacturing has been nationalized, and the only applications which have been made for export licenses have been made for the so-called Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. There is no evidence available to show that the fund with which the self-styled representatives of this so-called Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic had hoped to pay for the merchandise which they intended to purchase is not the gold reserve of the Russian people, or of various banks which have been seized and nationalized, and during the present unsettled conditions of Russia, it is believed by the Department that it would be

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> 40 Stat. 217.

most unwise for the Government of the United States to sanction or permit what might prove to be the exploitation of the resources of the Russian people.

I am [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

763.72119/7112: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

PARIS, *October 1, 1919, 10 p.m.*

[Received October 2, 3 p.m.]

4464. The [Council] of the Heads of Delegations met Monday morning, September 29th.

The Council heard the comments of the Drafting Committee on the draft note to the neutrals in regard to the blockade of Soviet Russia. The Drafting Committee proposed in the third paragraph the addition of the words "in conformity with the measures contemplated by article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations". This reference was suggested inasmuch as in article 16 a rupture of commercial and economic relations was provided for when war [was not to be] employed. Mr. Polk [did not see how] he could accept this suggestion nor could he accept the suggestion of a pacific blockade. He thought that the best plan would be to wait until after the winter and see how the situation was by that time. Mr. Seydoux read two communications from [the French] Legation at Stockholm from which it was evident that the Swedish Government not only considered that a blockade existed but that they had notified their own nationals that navigation was prohibited in the Gulf of Finland. Sir Eyre Crowe observed that these communications tended to show that the reply impending [*of the Swedish Government*] would be favorable. It was also suggested that a verbal communication should be made to the neutral governments to say that British and French warships would continue to act in respect to ships entering the Gulf of Finland as they had been acting up to the present. The Council approved this suggestion and also the following communication to be transmitted to the neutral governments in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

"The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviki toward all governments and the international program of revolution which they are spreading abroad constitute a grave danger for the national security of all the powers. Every increase of the strength of the Bolsheviki would [increase] the danger and would be contrary to the desire of all peoples who are seeking to reestablish peace and social order.



It is in this spirit that the Allied and Associated Governments after raising the blockade of Germany have not authorized their nationals to take commercial relations with Bolsheviki Russia; these relations indeed could only be effected through the agency of the chiefs of the Bolsheviki Government who disposing at their will of the products and resources which commercial liberty would bring them would thereby achieve a considerable increase of their strength and of the tyranny which they are exercising [over the Russian] population.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Governments request the Government to be good enough to take immediately in agreement with them the measures indicated below to prevent its nationals from engaging in any commerce with Bolsheviki Russia and to be sure that it will rigorously execute this policy.

- (a) The refusal of clearance papers to every ship going to Russian ports in the hands of Bolsheviki or coming from said ports.
- (b) Establishment of a similar measure for all merchandise destined to be sent to Bolsheviki Russia by any other way.
- (c) Refusal of passports to all persons going to Bolsheviki Russia or coming from it (except through understanding with the Allied and Associated Governments for special cases).
- (d) Disposition with a view of preventing banks from doing business with Bolsheviki Russia.
- (e) As far as possible, refusal by each government to its own nationals of facilities of correspondence with Bolsheviki Russia by post, telegraph, or radio.[?]

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

763.72119/7137 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

PARIS, October 3, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received October 4, 3:35 p.m.]

4503. Council of the Heads of Delegations met Thursday morning, October 2d.

6. With regard to the method of communicating the decision of the Council regarding the blockade of Soviet Russia to neutral governments, the Council decided that Mr. Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference should address a note to the diplomatic representatives of the neutral powers at Paris.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

861.48/977

*The Acting Secretary of State to Senator James W. Wadsworth*

WASHINGTON, *November 1, 1919.*

MY DEAR SENATOR WADSWORTH: In reply to your letter of October 20, 1919,<sup>26</sup> concerning the so-called blockade of Petrograd, I beg to inform you that, so far as the United States is concerned, no blockade exists. It is the present policy of this Government, however, to refuse export licenses for shipments to Russian territory under Bolshevik control and to refuse clearance papers to American vessels seeking to depart for Petrograd, the only remaining Bolshevik port. As you are aware, these measures cannot be continued after the ratification of peace, unless there is new legislation.

The policy of non-intercourse with territory under Bolshevik control is based chiefly on two considerations. It is the declared purpose of the Bolsheviks in Russia to carry revolution throughout the world. They have availed themselves of every opportunity to initiate in the United States a propaganda aimed to bring about the forcible overthrow of our present form of Government. They have at their disposition in Russia a large quantity of gold, being partly a residue of the former Russian gold reserve and partly a reserve of gold belonging to the Roumanian Government which was stored in Moscow for safe keeping at the time of the German advance into Roumania. It is considered important that the Bolsheviks should not be given the means through commercial transactions to bring this gold into the United States where it could be used to sustain their propaganda of violence and unreason.

The second consideration relates to the control which the Bolsheviks exercise over the distribution of necessities. All foreign trade has been "nationalized." This means that there can be no dealing except with the Bolshevik authorities. Moreover, since the fall of 1918 the Bolsheviks have maintained a system of discrimination in the distribution of food. The population is divided into categories along occupational and class lines, and receives food, so far as food may be available, in accordance with a scale which is adjusted with a view to the maintenance of the Bolsheviks in power and the fulfilment of their program for the extinction of the middle classes. The ration given to members of the Red Army is estimated, in the official Bolshevik gazette of February 6, 1919, to be three times the average for the several categories of the civil population. It has seemed altogether inadmissible that food and other necessities of American origin should be allowed to become the means of sustaining such a program of political oppression.

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<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

The Government has not been unmindful of the material distress of many innocent people within the Bolshevik lines. An attempt was made last spring to provide for the relief of these people through the cooperation of a neutral commission to be headed by Dr. Nansen. The project failed because the Bolsheviks declined to agree to the cessation of hostilities which was considered an indispensable prerequisite. The Department of State has subsequently studied other means by which necessities might be provided for the people of Central Russia without being used for purposes of political constraint and wholesale class destruction. No feasible project has yet been found but the problem continues to receive attention.

In the meantime provision has been made for the immediate relief of the people in any areas which may be freed from Bolshevik control as a result of current military operations. Stores of food estimated to be adequate for the relief of Petrograd for nearly one month were delivered to Russians by the American Relief Administration and are now at Viborg, Finland, whence they can be transported to Petrograd whenever that city may come under the control of authorities with whom it is possible to deal. Definite arrangements have, moreover, been made with the United States Grain Corporation to provide further shipments of flour for this region, in the event of its liberation, and for the people in the north of Russia, which is under the control of a democratic government.

I am [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

861.00/5735

*The British Appointed Ambassador (Grey) to the Secretary of State*

No. 840

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1919.

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that I have received a communication from my Government stating that the note recently addressed by the Supreme Council to Neutral and German Governments, as to the exercise of economic pressure on Bolshevik Russia, asks those Governments to cooperate with the Allied Governments in taking steps, among other of which, to prevent the banks from doing business with Bolshevik Russia.

In view of the abolition of censorship it is not clear what steps on the part of His Majesty's Government can achieve the desired object. It does not seem possible in the present circumstances to introduce a new regulation under the Defence of the Realm Act which in any case would be open to evasion.

I am directed to enquire what steps the United States Government are taking under this head.

I have [etc.]

(For H. M. Ambassador)

H. G. CHILTON

861.00/5735

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Lindsay)*WASHINGTON, *January 10, 1920.*

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's communication of November 22, 1919, No. 840, in which you inform me that your Government desires to ascertain the steps now being taken by the Government of the United States to prevent financial transactions between this country and Bolshevik Russia.

I have the honor to inform you that, under the authority conferred on the President by Section 5, subsection (b), of the Trading with the Enemy Act,<sup>27</sup> there is still in force a prohibition against the shipment of coin, bullion and currency to that part of Russia under the control of the so-called Bolshevik Government and any and all dealings or exchange transactions in Russian rubles, or transfers or credit or exchange transactions with that part of Russia under the control of the so-called Bolshevik Government, except that the exportation from the United States of Russian rubles is permitted, provided that notice of such exportation be given to the Customs Division of the Treasury Department, and to the Division of Foreign Exchange of the Federal Reserve Board. It is of course obvious that with the removal of the censorship the means of enforcing the above prohibitions are very much weakened.

In connection with this inquiry, I beg leave to draw your attention to page 15, of the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury to the Congress, dated November 20, 1919,<sup>28</sup> which deals with the prohibitions thus still in force. There has been no change since that date.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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**Prohibition in the United States of the Traffic in Russian Rubles**

861.51/475 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Paris (Thackara) to the Acting Secretary of State*PARIS, *January 28, 1919.*

[Received January 29, 6:52 a.m.]

Ministerial decree 22nd published 25th prohibits without written authorization from Ministry Finance importation into France in any form of Russian bank notes, coins, and other monetary instruments.

THACKARA

<sup>27</sup> 40 Stat. 411.<sup>28</sup> Annual report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1919.

861.51/478

*The Director of the Division of Foreign Exchange, Federal Reserve Board (Kent), to the Acting Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, February 4, 1919.

[Received February 5.]

DEAR MR. POLK: It is understood that the Bolsheviki are printing somewhere around 70,000,000 Rubles per day or were doing so some time ago from plates that were used by the old Czar and over the signatures that were in force at that time.

As there is a large demand outside of Russia for Russian Rubles due to a variety of causes the Bolsheviki are in a position with their printing press to obtain foreign exchange without any cost to them which they can use for propaganda work. The situation is an extremely serious one to my mind as the amount of foreign exchange which they can obtain is only limited by the Russian Rubles which can be absorbed. I have been watching the situation for some months and to my positive knowledge individuals in the United States are being induced to buy Russian Rubles at the low rates now prevailing and store them away with the expectation that the Ruble will later assume its former value of 50¢ and that their speculation may net them three and a half or four times their investment, based on the price which they are paying for Rubles which has been running from 12 to 19¢. The fact that the Bolsheviki only receive their foreign exchange on the basis of 12 to 19¢ need not concern them as they are in position to print all that the world will take.

All dealers which have made it their business to trade in Rubles have been advised by me that they cannot import them into the United States and the Customs officials have been instructed not to allow travelers to bring them to this country. Even so, large amounts of Rubles running into the millions, have been smuggled across the Canadian border, as the Canadian Government has not proper regulations to protect the situation. Have had the matter up with Sir Thomas White<sup>29</sup> however, and understand that he is personally in full accord with any arrangement that might be undertaken between the governments of Great Britain, France, Canada, and the United States for the purpose of stopping the traffic in Rubles.

It was my desire to issue a prohibition in connection with the importation of Rubles over the ticker and through the newspapers at the time that I began to take it up individually with dealers operating in Rubles but I was advised that the State Department at that time, which was I believe in March 1918, preferred that it be handled quietly without notice. The situation now however is

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<sup>29</sup> Canadian Minister of Finance.

such that unless notice can be issued it is going to be impossible to control it, as through intentional propaganda or otherwise great numbers of individuals are becoming interested in importing Rubles who are unknown to me as dealers in Rubles as they have never undertaken to trade in them before, and I have therefore no means of notifying them of the attitude of the Government except through the press. Unless such individuals receive notice through the press there is a good deal of doubt in my mind as to whether we are justified in confiscating such Rubles as they may bring in until I have succeeded in finding out who they are and have notified them individually.

In addition to the hoarding of Rubles for the purpose of profit which is going on now, a large demand is being created by exporters in the United States who for their protection when exporting are endeavoring to have Rubles deposited in Vladivostock and Harbin for their account as a guaranty. The situation may be taken care of by the War Trade Corporation with the new Ruble which they expect to issue provided they get into operation immediately and also provided it is handled properly.

Besides the individual speculation in Rubles to be held in safe deposit boxes for an unlimited time, there is the larger speculation by dealers who are handling them in lots of many millions with the expectation of turning them over at a profit quickly as they fluctuate in value. The situation at the moment therefore means that the Bolsheviki have a tremendous outlet for Rubles which they can ship to other countries. Last week I stopped payment on two drafts drawn by Swedish banks on New York banks which were sent to this country to be used to spread Bolsheviki propaganda. The amounts in the Swedish banks were unquestionably built up by the Bolsheviki through the sale of Ruble notes in Sweden. If a few million people in the United States get the idea that they can buy a hundred to a few thousand Rubles a piece and later obtain a tremendous profit upon them the ability of the Bolsheviki to injure the world through their villainous propaganda will be almost unlimited.

I have talked the matter over with Sir Hardman Lever<sup>30</sup> and he fully agrees with me that means ought to be taken at once to kill the value of the Ruble and I believe he would be willing to make representation to his Government along these lines, if our Government would co-operate. The French as you undoubtedly know have already issued a decree prohibiting the importation into France in any form of Russian bank notes, coins, and other monetary instruments. It is my belief that trading in Rubles in the United States should also be prohibited.

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<sup>30</sup> British Assistant Commissioner for Finance in the United States.

It is very possible that you may not realize fully the seriousness of the Bolsheviki propaganda in this country. For instance in New York there are papers being published in Yiddish and other foreign languages advertising the Bolsheviki in a most alluring way and in a manner which is extremely difficult to meet because it shows up only the pretensions and not the facts. They are also having nightly meetings in many of the cafés where speeches are being made along the same lines and the places are simply jammed full of people. What is true on the East Side of New York is proportionately true all over the country as far as I can hear. I have been told that the administration is not fully aware of the seriousness of the situation. While to my mind it is very probable that you do know more about it than people imagine, yet under the circumstances, and in connection with the control of the Russian Ruble which I feel should be undertaken, thought it best to mention the matter to you.

Very truly yours,

FRED I. KENT

P. S. Have just received an intercepted letter from a firm in Yokohama to one in Seattle, Washington, stating that the writer was arranging to carry over 300,000 Rubles with him when he sailed the end of the month. Mention this as an instance of the way the transactions are being handled. F. I. Kent.

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861.51/482

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Glass) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1919.

DEAR MR. POLK: I have received your communication of January 30, 1919<sup>31</sup> with a copy of a telegram from Paris transmitted therewith, and dated January 28, 1919, advising of the issuance of the ministerial decree prohibiting the importation into France in any form of Russian bank notes, coins and other monetary instruments. I have also read a copy of Mr. Kent's letter to you of February 4, dealing with the same subject.

It is the view of the Treasury that unless political considerations require a different course, it would be most advisable to effectively and publicly put into operation in the United States a prohibition similar to that which has now been put into effect in France.

I am [etc.]

CARTER GLASS

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<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

861.51/487

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Federal Reserve Board*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1919.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 10, 1919,<sup>32</sup> stating that unless the Department of State recommended such action adversely, the following order would be issued by the Federal Reserve Board on Friday, February 14:

“Until otherwise instructed, the exportation or importation of Russian rubles, or the transfer of funds for their purchase by persons and dealers in the United States as described under the Executive Order of the President of January 26, 1918 is prohibited.”

This order, I am informed by your office was duly issued on February 14.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

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**Efforts to Obtain the Release of American Citizens Detained in Russia**

861.00/3650: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1919, 6 p.m.

457. For the Secretary of State:

No doubt you have in mind in connection with the public statement in which the Allies offered to confer with all Russian factions,<sup>33</sup> including the Bolshevik authorities, that the American Consul, Tredwell, at Tashkend is under arrest and confined in his house by action of the local soviet, apparently upon instructions from Moscow. You will recall that our efforts to secure his release began before you left Washington and have continued unremittingly without success. The Government of India which is holding three hostages until assured of the safety of a British subject has, on the suggestion of our Legation at Teheran, offered to release one hostage if the Tashkend authorities will release Tredwell, but the offer has not yet been accepted. I would suggest that you may wish to consider whether Tredwell's release and restoration to complete freedom should not be an unconditional preliminary to American representatives being authorized to take part in any conference which will include representatives of the Bolsheviks.

In this same connection you will no doubt wish also to recall the case of Kalamatiano, a naturalized American, formerly in the employ of the American Consul at Moscow. Last October we were ad-

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<sup>32</sup> Not printed.

<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, p. 30.



vised by Consul Poole that he had word that the Bolsheviks were trying to implicate Kalamatiano in the alleged conspiracy of the British and French. December 6th we received a formal notification through the Norwegian Government that Kalamatiano was accused as a spy for Consul Poole and condemned to death, and that the Bolshevik authorities were willing to let Kalamatiano go free only on condition that MacLean<sup>34</sup> of England and Debs<sup>35</sup> of America were released at the same time. Under date of December 7 we replied through the Norwegian Government as follows:

“This Government views with grave apprehension the threatened execution of Kalamatiano and must reply that if Kalamatiano is executed for reasons stated and investigation shows execution unlawful, this Government will insist that persons responsible for execution, shall be adequately punished for his assassination.”

Under date of October 5th<sup>36</sup> Consul Poole had already advised us that he had tried to suspend Kalamatiano's relatively innocent activities as early as September last. It would appear that this man was assisting the Consul in securing information regarding conditions in different parts of Russia, which were summarized by the Consul General at Moscow and telegraphed to the Department.

When Vice Consuls, Leonard and Burri were finally released after 72 days in prison<sup>37</sup> and returned to Washington at the end of November, they reported they had left Kalamatiano in prison at Moscow, and that he had assured them that he was going to fight his own case as he was perfectly innocent of the counter revolutionary plots of which he was accused, and had confined his efforts to securing legitimate information for the Consul General; that he had been arrested on his way to the Consulate General at a time when he had certain papers and information regarding conditions in Russia, but was not engaged in any interference in the internal affairs of Russia.

I think the case of Tredwell is one of special importance because of his official position, and also because of the futility of our energetic and unremitting efforts to secure his release.

I have explained Kalamatiano's case at greater length because he has no official status which might in some sense serve to shield him.

POLK

<sup>34</sup> John MacLean, convicted of obstructing recruiting for the British Army.

<sup>35</sup> Eugene V. Debs, convicted Sept. 14, 1918, of violation of the Espionage Act.

<sup>36</sup> Telegram not printed.

<sup>37</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 673-674.

123 T 71/122c : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1919, 5 p.m.*

7281. Roger C. Tredwell, American Consul, Tashkent, Turkestan, has been under arrest there from October 20, 1918. The Department, with the aid of the British Government, has labored unremittingly for his release but without success. The Consul General at Irkutsk telegraphs that from an intercepted radio message from Tashkent to Moscow, dated January 25th, it appears that Tredwell and certain French and British subjects were arrested and delivered to the Commissary for Foreign Affairs of Tashkent. In addition to Tredwell a naturalized American citizen named Kalamatiano, formerly in the employ of the American Consul General at Moscow, is imprisoned in Moscow under sentence of death for alleged activities as a spy. There is strong reason to believe that this charge is untrue. This Government has already notified the Bolshivik authorities that if Kalamatiano should be executed and that investigation should show that the execution was unlawful the United States will insist upon the adequate punishment of the persons responsible therefor. In view of the reported arrest of French nationals you will informally convey the foregoing information to the French Government and endeavor to learn to what extent it is believed that cooperative action on the part of Great Britain, France and United States might be effective in obtaining the release of subjects or nationals of the three Governments. A similar telegram has been sent to the Embassy in London.

POLK

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123 T 71/123 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, *February 7, 1919, 8 p.m.*

[Received 9:08 p.m.]

789. Your 4386, February 4, 4 p.m.<sup>88</sup> The Foreign Office informs me that a proposal has been made to the Bolsheviki looking to an exchange of prisoners. It is not thought that it will be accepted but that a counter proposal will be made in reply to which the British Government would like to make a demand which would include our nationals who are imprisoned, as well as their own. The

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<sup>88</sup> Not printed. See telegram to the Ambassador in France, no. 7281, Feb. 4, *supra*.

Foreign Office would, therefore, like to be informed as soon as possible the number of American citizens imprisoned in Russia and where they are supposed to be located. The authorities here are now led to believe there is but one British civilian prisoner at Petrograd and 50 or 60 military officers and men at Moscow. During the past few weeks the treatment of these prisoners has steadily improved and the Foreign Office has just been informed that within the last few days all prisoners have been given their freedom on parole.

DAVIS

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123 T 71/124 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 8, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received February 9, 3:34 p.m.]

660. Department's 457, January 28, 6 p.m. and 563, February 4, 5 p.m.<sup>59</sup> Detention of Tredwell and Kalamatiano has received careful consideration by Commission. The Prinkipo proposal has been made to various factions in Russia and could not be consequent upon [considered] a communication to Soviet Government alone. I believe American delegates should be advised to make informal representations. If any further method of bringing influence to bear is discovered all possible steps will be taken. I assume that you will further investigate possibility of exchange against three hostages held by Government of India. Their reluctance to return to Bolshevik territory seems irrelevant.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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811.20261/15 : Telegram

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Acting Secretary of State*

CHRISTIANIA, February 10, 1919, noon.

[Received 2:50 p.m.]

1569. I have received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 8th instant advising me that, according to a report dated December 31st last from the Norwegian Consul at Moscow, the Russian Foreign Office at Moscow in a note dated December 28th requested the Norwegian Foreign Office to inform the interested Governments that the Government of the Russian People's Republic

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<sup>59</sup> Not printed.

agrees to release American citizen Kalamatiano and the English Missionary [*mission*] which is under arrest at Vladikavkaz, provided that the commissaries and other representative men of the Russian People's Republic and authorities arrested at Baku, Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok by the Allied troops are also released. It is added that the exchange can be effected over the lines.

Am[erican] mission Paris advised.

Copy to London.

SCHMEDEMAN

811.20261/16 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 11, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received February 12, 12:40 a.m.]

688. Department's telegram 563, February 4, 5 p.m.<sup>40</sup>

Please see telegram of February 10th, 1569, from the Minister at Christiania proposing the release of Kalamatiano and English mission against the Soviet authorities arrested at Blagovestchensk. Suggest we cannot consider proposal unless it includes Tredwell. Please advise action taken.

LANSING AMERICAN MISSION

811.20261/17 : Telegram

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Acting Secretary of State*

CHRISTIANIA, February 12, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 5:48 p.m.]

1572. My telegram number 1569, February 10, noon. I have received a note dated yesterday from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he advises me that according to report from the Norwegian Consul at Moscow dated January 25th last the Russian Foreign Office has requested immediate reply as to how far the United States Government agree upon the proposal long since made by the Bolshevik Government for the exchange of Russian prisoners at Vladivostok against simultaneous delivery of Kalamatiano at [Moscow]. Repeated to Am[erican] mission Paris as number 24 to-day.

Copy to London.

SCHMEDEMAN

<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

861.00/3862 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extract]

PARIS, *February 14, 1919, midnight.*

[Received February 15, 4:40 a.m.]

7224. . . .

. . . Although this note is not in direct response to the representations made by this Embassy in compliance with the Department's 7281, February 4, 4 [5] p.m., yet [it] reflects the views expressed at the interview which was had by a member of the Embassy when presenting the Department's views in accordance with the said telegram.

At that time the Foreign Office said that the French Government would be most happy to cooperate in every way possible with the United States in obtaining the release of the citizens of the two nations and to this end would be glad to receive any suggestion for action from the Government of the United States.

It was clearly intimated, however, that the only effective manner of dealing with the situation was the exchange of imprisoned citizens and that unfortunately the French have just effected such an exchange with Russia. There were no important Bolshevik persons remaining in France who could serve to the Consulate.

SHARP

123 T 71/127d : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Schmedeman)*WASHINGTON, *February 18, 1919, 5 p.m.*

693. Your 1572, February 12th. Proposal from Bolshevik Foreign Office to which immediate reply is requested appears to have been made on December 28 but not sent to you until February 8 and transmitted here in your 1569, February 10th.

Request the Norwegian Government to inform the Bolshevik authorities that the United States cannot consider the Bolshevik proposal to exchange Kalamatiano for the Bolshevik representatives arrested by the Allied troops at Baku, Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok unless the Bolsheviks first release Roger Culver Tredwell, the American Consul at Tashkent, who has been held there under arrest since October 20th in violation of international law and the long accepted principles governing foreign intercourse, and grant him safe

conduct out of territory under Bolshevik control. The United States wishes the Bolshevik authorities clearly to understand that it will hold personally accountable the individuals responsible for delay in releasing Tredwell and giving him safe conduct out of Bolshevik territory.

This Govt. is informing the British Government of the foregoing and conferring with it in regard to its attitude with reference to British subjects that may be concerned.

POLK

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123 T 71/123 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, *February 21, 1919, 4 p.m.*

4589. Your 789, February 7th, 8 p.m. The offer of the British Government to include imprisoned American citizens in its demand upon the Bolsheviki for release of British nationals is greatly appreciated. The United States has already received through the Norwegian Government a proposal made on December 28th by the Bolsheviki Foreign Office at Moscow to release over the lines the American citizen Kalamatiano now at Moscow and a British Missionary [*mission*] under arrest at Vladikavkaz provided the Commissaries and other representative men of the Bolsheviki arrested by Allied troops at Baku, Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok be also released. A later telegram through the same channel communicates the request of the Bolsheviki Foreign Office, dated January 25th, for an immediate reply. The Department has replied through the Norwegian Government that until the Bolshevik authorities shall have released Tredwell, the American Consul at Tashkent who has been held there under arrest since October in violation of international law and the long accepted principles governing foreign intercourse, and given him safe conduct out of territory in control of the Bolsheviki, the United States will not consider lending its good offices in connection with the proposal to exchange Kalamatiano for the Bolshevik representatives mentioned. It has been added that the United States wishes the Bolshevik authorities clearly to understand that it will hold personally accountable the individuals responsible for delay in releasing Tredwell and giving him safe conduct out of Bolshevik territory.

If the action taken should not be inconsistent with that which the British Government proposes to take, the Department would be very glad to have included in the proposed demand for exchange

the American citizen Kalamatiano, who is under arrest at Moscow and sentence of death for espionage. The number of American military prisoners in Russia, if any, is not yet definitely known.

Inquire whether the British Government, through the Government of India, would be willing to make another effort by wireless to obtain the release of Tredwell in return for the release of one or more of the Bolshevik hostages. Also ask that if there be no objection the following message be despatched by wireless through the Indian Government.

“Tredwell, American Consul, Tashkent. Letter October 9 has been received. Mother and sister are well and send love. Telegraph how you are and why not released. Polk, Acting.”

POLK

123 T 71/127 c : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith)*

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1919, 5 p.m.

1443. Roger C. Tredwell, Consul at Tashkent was arrested by the Bolsheviks October 20, 1918. All effort to secure his release through official channels, including intervention by the Government of India at the instance of the British Foreign Office, has thus far failed. Americans returning from Russia suggest the possibility of doing something informally and indirectly by interesting Bolshevik representatives in Copenhagen and pointing out to them that it would be a clever move on their part to release Tredwell prior to the Prinkipo Conference. Such action might be construed as demonstrating their reasonableness and would forestall any efforts American representatives at Prinkipo might make to bring pressure upon them because of their action in detaining Tredwell in violation of international law and custom. It might also be pointed out that their situation in regard to Tredwell is most unfortunate, not only because his conduct was scrupulously correct, but also because his important official position and prominence in his service have caused a great deal of attention to be given his arrest, and a great deal of prejudice against the Bolsheviks to be aroused in this country by his detention. In view of the situation thus created some Bolshevik representative in Copenhagen might be interested to take up Tredwell's case personally in order to endeavor, by effecting Tredwell's release, to remedy a tactical mistake on the part of the Bolshevik authorities which would otherwise prove most embarrassing and even costly.

Advise Department what you think can be done, having in mind the necessity of not involving this Government directly with the

Bolshevik representative at Copenhagen. If you find the Department's suggestion feasible you will be authorized to draw for any reasonable expenditure involved and to make every effort within the scope of your available resources.

POLK

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811.20261/20 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, February 21, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received February 22, 12:35 p.m.]

3652. I am informed by Danish Red Cross that American citizen named Kalamatiano, who was sentenced to death in Russia for espionage, has had sentence commuted to imprisonment and is at present detained at the Kremlin in Moscow. In this connection the Foreign Office has just delivered me telegram addressed to me by Gruzenberg, formerly Bolshevik financial representative in Norway, who is now in Petrograd, stating that Kalamatiano's sentence for espionage had not been executed. This telegram from Gruzenberg was transmitted by wireless from Moscow to Berlin, thence to the German Legation in Stockholm, which delivered it to the Foreign Office.

MORRIS

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811.20261/21 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, February 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received February 25, 3:29 a.m.]

3666. Referring to my 3652, February 21. A representative of the Danish Red Cross, Mr. Hermod Larsen, chief associate to the Director of the Danish Red Cross at Moscow, called on me this morning with a memorandum from the Commissary of Foreign Affairs Tchitcherin, asking me to inquire from my government their view on exchanging the American prisoners Xenophon Kalamatiano and George Albers, now in prison in Moscow, against members of the Russian Soviets now under arrest and detention in Vladivostok by the American authorities. Mr. Larsen states that these prisoners are in tolerable health and conditions now are that there is no immediate danger of execution for Kalamatiano, although he is under sentence of death. If you wish to make a reply to Tchitcherin's proposal, cable me and I will see Mr. Larsen who expects to return to Russia shortly.

MORRIS



811.20261/21 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1919, 6 p.m.

1534. Your 3666, February 24, 4 p.m. Ask Larsen to tell Kalamatiano that the Government of the United States at once protested energetically upon learning of his arrest and has since tried every possible means to secure his release; that his wife is well at Irkutsk, Siberia, and will be taken care of; that he can be confident his Government is apprised of his circumstances and will continue efforts in his behalf until successful. Bolshevik proposal for exchange only reached Christiania February 8th and Washington February 11th and negotiations now under consideration.

Department has no knowledge of George Albers. Is he American citizen? Please report details available.

POLK

Paris Peace Conference 861.00/292b : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

PARIS, February 26, 1919, 9 p.m.

41. For Bullitt. Please bear in mind that the unjust imprisonment of Kalamatiano in Moscow and the detention of Tredwell in Tashkent cause deep concern and serve as constant source of irritation to American Government. Choose the best opportunity to convey to the representatives of the Moscow Government that this is a matter which will not be dropped or forgotten.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

811.20261/15 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Schmedeman)*

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1919, 4 p.m.

702. Your 1569 February 10th, noon. American Consul Vladivostok cables following:

"102, February 28, 6 P.M. American authorities here have not detained anyone and neither Ambassador Morris, General Graves nor myself can think of any incident which could be distorted into such an absurd rumor by any stretch of imagination unless it might be due to Kalmikoff's Cossacks taking refuge with American detachment while assuming [*sic*] Khabarovsk as reported, but these men have not been arrested or detained, they have been free to leave at any time."

Please ask Norwegian Government to convey this information to Bolshevik authorities.

POLK

861.00/4030 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, March 7, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received March 7, 6:13 p.m.]

1066. Bullitt and party have left Stockholm for Helsingfors. Expect arrive Petrograd 10th. Reports that Minister Stockholm has made satisfactory arrangements without involving himself in relations with Soviet Government. Bullitt will endeavor to obtain immediate release Tredwell and Kalamatiano and hopes to cable first report on general situation by 12th instant.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

811.20261/27 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1919, 5 p.m.

1556. Your 3699, March 5, 5 p.m.<sup>42</sup> Have Larsen use every unofficial effort to secure release of Tredwell and Kalamatiano.

POLK

811.20261/28 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, March 10, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 9:03 p.m.]

3726. I received yesterday from the American division of the Norwegian Consulate at Moscow copies of correspondence with the Soviet Government on the most important current matters including the case of the American citizen Kalamatiano. By request these papers are being forwarded to Poole at Archangel but copies will be sent to the Department by pouch. It appears that Kalamatiano, who was head of the Consulate General's intelligence service and arrested on a charge of military espionage, was still in prison and presumably alive on February 10th. His case was brought up before the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal of the All-Russian Executive Committee on November 25th. He was permitted two lawyers to defend his case but the latter were given only three days for preparation notwithstanding protests of Holmbo, the Norwegian consul. Kalamatiano was condemned to death but the execution was postponed by order of the Central Executive Committee. On De-

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

ember 4th the Soviets proposed to expel him in exchange for the liberation of Debs and Maklin [*MacLean*] and this proposal was followed on December 28th by another to exchange him, together with the British military mission seized in Vladikavkaz, for a number of Russian citizens in territories occupied by the Allies. After great difficulties Holmbo was permitted to visit Kalamatiano on December 26th, having applied for permission on December 5th. Holmbo states that while Kalamatiano is well supplied with food and is receiving good treatment, he is confined in a cell in the Kremlin specially intended for prisoners shortly to be executed. Knowledge of efforts to save him does not reach him and he is, therefore, always under the apprehension that he may be executed at any time. His mental state is desperate and he is in great danger of going mad.

A report on the other matters will be forwarded to the Department by the next pouch. Repeated to Christiania.

GRANT-SMITH

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123 T 71/138 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, March 20, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received March 20, 3:25 p.m.]

1241. Following from Helsingfors from Bullitt:

“Soviet Government has given explicit orders of which I have a copy for the immediate release of Tredwell by the local Soviet of Tashkent. Due to the breaking in telegraphic communication between Moscow and Turkestan Soviet Government had not received notification of the carrying out of these orders when I left. Unless Tredwell prefers to go to Persia he will be sent to Moscow and thence home via Friedland [*Finland ?*].”

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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811.20261/29 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 21, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received March 22, 5:21 a.m.]

3755. Referring Department's 1524 [*1534*], February 25, 6 p. m. and my 3699 March 5, 5 p.m.<sup>43</sup> William C. Bullitt has just returned to Stockholm from Russia where he went on a mission for the American Peace Commission in Paris. While in Russia Bullitt saw Kala-

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<sup>43</sup> Latter not printed.

matiano, who he states is well and is being well treated. Bullitt brought out a memorandum<sup>44</sup> signed by M. Gruzenberg of the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, stating that in order to facilitate the return to Russia of Professor Lomonosoff<sup>45</sup> (see my 3580, February 3, 6 p. m.<sup>45a</sup> the Bolsheviks proposed to release Kalamatiano and accord him safe passage to the Russo-Finnish border on condition that Lomonosoff be given similar facilities to reach the Russo-Finnish border. Gruzenberg further states that our Government had issued Lomonosoff a permit to leave the United States, but that he was unable to do so as the Swedish Legation declined to visa his passport. If our Government is willing to permit Professor Lomonosoff to depart in exchange for the release of Kalamatiano, I am reasonably sure that I can arrange with the Foreign Office here to have instructions sent to the Swedish Legation at Washington to visa Lomonosoff's passport to permit him to travel through Sweden. Please cable me on this point.

While in Russia Bullitt saw two other Americans who were taken prisoners by the Bolsheviks at Archangel. Their names are Vili Huston [*Walter Houston*], address care of Mrs. Pearl Cotton, Walkerville, Michigan, and George Albers, whom I previously reported as a prisoner in Moscow.<sup>46</sup> His address is care of Mrs. George Albers, 72 South Terrace Street, Muskegon, Michigan. Allowed complete liberties during the day, they are well treated and in good health, and while they are underfed they are allowed the same ration as that given to Russians. Bullitt brought out letters from Albers to his wife and from Huston [*Houston*] to his sister. These letters I am forwarding to the Department in the next pouch.

MORRIS

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811.20261/29 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, *March 27, 1919, noon.*

1581. Your 3755, March 21, 5 p.m. You may make urgent representations to the Swedish Foreign Office to allow safe transit through Sweden for Professor Lomonosoff. If reply is favorable

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<sup>44</sup> Not found in the Department files.

<sup>45</sup> Prof. George V. Lomonosov, who represented the Russian Ministry of Ways of Communication in the Bakhmeteff Mission to the United States in June 1917, and who continued to represent the Russian Provisional Government in the matter of railway supplies, was relieved of his duties by Ambassador Bakhmeteff June 12, 1918.

<sup>45a</sup> Not printed.

<sup>46</sup> Houston and Albers were members of the 339th U. S. Infantry stationed in northern Russia and were released by the Bolsheviks in April 1919.

Department will arrange at once for the safe departure of Professor Lomonosoff from the United States upon learning that Messrs. Kalamatiano, Houston and Albers are safely in Finland. Department is requesting Consul at Helsingfors to obtain assurances from Finnish authorities for safe transit of Professor Lomonosoff through Finland.

This Government has never offered any obstacle to the departure of Professor Lomonosoff from this country but believes that in intervening with other governments for safe transit of an individual who appears to be objectionable to them, it is doing more than is requisite in order to secure the release of American citizens whose detention in Russia by the Bolshevik authorities has been arbitrary and also has made an extremely unfavorable impression upon public opinion in this country.

PHILLIPS

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123 T 71/142: Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, *March 31, 1919, 1 p.m.*

[Received April 1, 2:47 a.m.]

3825. Your 1443, February 21, 5 p.m. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicates the following received from Danish Red Cross representatives in Russia.

According to telegram received from Russian Commissioner Karasu Khan [*Karakhan*], all civilian and military Americans (among them Tredwell and Kalamatiano, Americans) Italians, Roumanians and Serbs now arrested in Russia will be liberated as soon as the Russian subjects now arrested at Blagoveshchensk [and] Vladivostok are liberated. All Americans, Italians, Roumanians and Serbs who might desire to leave Russia will be exchanged with the previously mentioned Russian subjects and will be able to cross the Russian frontier at the proper place simultaneously with the return to their own country of the Russian subjects. Information has likewise been received from the Red Cross representatives Satto and Doctor Martiny that the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Moscow has given orders to liberate Tredwell and to send him to Moscow.

Repeated Am[erican] Mission. 284.

GRANT-SMITH

811.20261/35 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extract]

STOCKHOLM, April 4, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received April 5, 11:55 a.m.]

3794. Referring to your 1581, March 27th. I have seen the Swedish Foreign Office in regard to Lomonosoff and they have cabled the Swedish Legation in Washington instructions to grant him a visé to permit his entry into Sweden. . . .

MORRIS

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123 T 71/146 : Telegram

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Acting Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, April 8, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 6:33 p.m.]

229. From Gade<sup>47</sup> to Nav[al] intel[ligence].

"Urgent for the Secretary of State. Believe I have found basis for obtaining delivery of Tredwell to me. I am sending emissary to Petrograd tonight empowering him to inform Bolshevik they can purchase from America at current prices for about \$260,000 of drugs, namely typhus and cholera serum, quinine, camphor, etc., which Denmark will deliver at once by our permitting Danish export and guaranteeing immediate payment in kind. Bolshevik will be required in return to deliver to me on border about one hundred American, British and French prisoners, including Tredwell and three recent American prisoners taken at Archangel, Kalamaya (Kalamatiano?) and two others. Please reply by telegraph to me through Haynes, Helsingfors, full discretionary power to make bargain. ["]

HAYNES

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123 T 71/152 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Persia (White) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TEHERAN, April 10, 1919, 9 a.m.

[Received April 13, 10 p.m.]

125. Russian diplomatic officer Askhabad telegraphs that the Bolsheviks state that Consul Tredwell desires following message dated Tashkent March 27th be transmitted to you:

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<sup>47</sup>Lt. Comdr. John A. Gade, Naval Attaché at Copenhagen.

"I am leaving today for Moscow with the Danish and Swedish Missions, having been released by the local authorities. Health good. Hope to see my family soon again, please greet them for me."

WHITE

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123 T 71/142 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

1555. Referring to your 3825, March 31st in regard to the reported willingness of Bolshevik authorities to liberate all civilian and military Americans, Italians, Roumanians and Serbs now arrested in Russia as soon as the Russian subjects now arrested at Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok are liberated, inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the United States cannot consider lending its good offices in connection with the Bolsheviki proposal unless the Bolsheviki first release Roger Tredwell, American Consul at Tashkent. This Government is willing to use its good offices to effect the release of Russian subjects referred to in exchange for the Italian, Roumanian, Serbian and American nationals, including Kalamatiano, Houston and Albers, provided that Tredwell is well treated and escorted in safety to a convenient frontier station outside Bolshevik control.

What purports to be a message from Tredwell has been received today announcing his release and departure from Tashkent for Moscow, on March 27, with the Danish and Swedish Missions. Endeavor to verify this report through Danish Government.

POLK

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123 T 71/146 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1919, 7 p.m.

Your 229, April 8th, 11 a.m. Inform Gade that inasmuch as the detention of Tredwell, a Consul of this Government, is a gross violation of the generally accepted principles international law, his release and safe delivery outside the territory under Bolshevik control must be insisted upon as a condition precedent to entertaining proposals for negotiations with the Bolsheviki for the release of other prisoners. Gade's plan cannot, therefore, be approved. You may inform Gade that his proposal has not been communicated to Nav[al] intel[ligence] and that so far as the Department of State

is concerned no proposal to effect the release of American prisoners, including civilians improperly detained, in return for right to purchase drugs in this country would be approved.

POLK

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123 T 71/155 : Telegram

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Acting Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, April 25, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 8:52 p.m.]

254. Tredwell with twenty-one others leaving Moscow. Expected to arrive Finland few days.<sup>48</sup> I will either go to border or ask Imbrie meet him and facilitate journey to Helsingfors. Not sent Paris.

HAYNES

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123 T 71/164 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Stockholm (Halstead) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 3, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 9:54 (p.m.?)]

173. From Tredwell.

“I was arrested on March 15th, 1918, but released after five hours through the intervention of the Foreign Commissar and Chief of Police. Upon demand secured apology from Chief Commissar and Foreign Commissar and on following day also release of Colonel F. Bailey and Secretary, British, Van Dusen Edwards, English, and Cap [Captain?] Deville, French. I was arrested again on October 26th by order from Moscow as it [I?] was at the Foreign Office and was under guard with the exception of four days early this year until March 27th. On February 4th although then under restraint I was seized by Captain Togolchov and an armed Red soldier and taken to prison where with intimations of early execution I was in a cell for five hours. My release was secured by Chief of Police and President Local Soviet who said it was an error. No explanation was ever offered and after Foreign Commissar returned my passport he always replied that he did not know who had arrested me. Danish Delegate Brun also arrested this time and Foreign Commissar is quoted as having said that our lives were saved only with greatest difficulty. The commander who made the arrest is known to have

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<sup>48</sup> Consul Tredwell crossed the frontier into Finland Apr. 27.



killed twelve men in one night at prison and is responsible for some two or three hundred lives. The Chief of Police frankly stated that Commandant was abnormal but the authorities were powerless to check his actions. With this exception, which the Bolshevik authorities were unable to prevent, no criticism of their treatment can be made. My guards were at all times correct, many of them expressing their shame that an American Consul should be arrested. Against [*During?*] the troubles in January the Swedish and Danish delegates were arrested for eight days and the Swedish Red [*Cross?*] representative Kliber arrested with them is believed to have been shot. [Tredwell.]”

HALSTEAD

811.20261/49 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, May 15, 1919.

[Received May 16, 4:55 a.m.]

3984. Following despatched American Mission.

[“] 372, May 15, 7 p.m. The Danish Red Cross informs me a report from their office in Moscow dated April 4th reads in part as follows:<sup>49</sup>

‘Contrary to the reports of the American State Department [it is asserted by] the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs that there are beyond dispute arrested Bolshevik Russians with the Americans at Vladivostok and Blagoveshchensk and that remaining Americans, Roumanians and Serbians will not be released before these arrested Russians have been released. Karakhan mentions that his sister-in-law is among the arrested. I therefore request you once more to inquire of America concerning this question.’

[“]A further report dated April 26th from the same source states:

‘The chances for exchange and departure are growing worse and worse, so that the Allies ought to accept present proposals as soon as possible. It is almost too late even now concerning Kalamatiano and the other arrested Americans. They will probably be released if the American Government inform us [by telegram] that we may offer the Soviet Government the following terms: in exchange for Kalamatiano and all other arrested Americans American Government will exchange all Russians arrested for political offenses in east Asia, Vladivostok, and Blagoveshchensk et cetera. If the Soviet Government accept this proposal and immediately release Americans without awaiting arrival of arrested Russians from east Asia, American Government will permit Russia to buy and import American

<sup>49</sup> Bracketed corrections from a despatch from the Chargé in Denmark, dated May 15.

medicine through the Danish Red Cross. If such proposal be forthcoming from the American Government in the very near future there is probability that it will be accepted.' ["]]

GRANT-SMITH

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811.20261/49 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith)*

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1919, noon.

1637. Your 3984, 15th. Department has positive report from American Consul, Vladivostok, confirmed by General Graves, that Americans have not taken any Bolshevik prisoners in Siberia either at Blagovestchensk or elsewhere.

What can be done to release Kalamatiano?

POLK

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811.20261/53 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith)*

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1919, 5 p.m.

1675. Your despatch 3254, May 15.<sup>50</sup> Please reiterate to Danish Red Cross that American authorities in Siberia hold no Bolshevik prisoners whatever. United States Government has no objection to Danish Red Cross purchasing in this country medicines for needy population in European Russia. In humanitarian matter of this kind this Government could not properly object to action proposed through neutral agency such as Danish Red Cross. In these circumstances endeavor to secure release of Kalamatiano.

POLK

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811.20261/59 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 24, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received June 25, 7:52 p.m.]

3955. Referring to Department's 1581 of March 27, noon, and 1603 of April 16, 4 p.m.<sup>50</sup> Since arrival from Russia of Houston and Albers, Legation has received no direct news from Kalamatiano. Lomonosoff arrived in Stockholm about June 5th bearing passport issued by the Russian Consulate General at New York visaed at the

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<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

Foreign Office in Stockholm good to remain in Sweden till July 1st. He was accompanied by Royal R. Keely who bears Department passport 65889 good for Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy and British Isles and return to the United States on commercial business visaed by the Swedish Consulate General in New York. In Stockholm Lomonossoff was joined [by] Peter Travin who carries a seaman's identification document issued by the Russian Consulate in Philadelphia which bears the stamp of the United States Customs at Baltimore dated December 21st 1918 with the number I 7559. Lomonossoff represents Keely and Travin as his "staff". The Legation informed him that it had no knowledge of Keely and could not in any way assist the latter to enter Russia in connection with Kalamatiano's exchange. On June 7th Lomonossoff telegraphed through the Swedish Foreign Office to Tchitcherin at Moscow stating:

"In Hunt's telegram from Moscow to Chicago it was specifically stated that Professor Lomonossoff would be permitted to go with his staff. I consider it absolutely necessary to insist on my two secretaries going with me."

The Legation presumes this reference to be to Mr. Frazier Hunt. Reply received by Lomonossoff through Foreign Office dated Petrograd, June 19th, was as follows:

"Cannot trace any offer on part Soviet government regarding your exchange of Kalamatiano who has been tried by revolutionary tribunal and found guilty of greatest offense and who can on no account be released. Please inform whether your departure prevented by Swedish authorities and on what grounds. On behalf of Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Signed Litvinoff."

On June 21st Lomonossoff wired the People's Commissary of the Foreign Office at Moscow stating that this Legation was prepared to arrange his safe-conduct through Finland immediately his exchange for Kalamatiano was arranged but making no mention of his two associates. His telegram stated:

"Grouzenberg's letter from Moscow of March 4th to American Minister Morris in Stockholm<sup>52</sup> and his memorandum to Lincoln Steffens<sup>52</sup> of Bullitt mission, both of which documents I have seen here at the Legation, repeat proposal of my exchange for Kalamatiano and urgently request that the exchange be carried out.["]

WHEELER

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<sup>52</sup> Copy has not been found in the Department files.

811.20261/54 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1919, 4 p.m.

2416. From Am[erican] Legation, Copenhagen:

"Your 1660 of June 6th, 2 p.m.<sup>53</sup> Danish Red Cross will endeavor to include Kalamatiano in the group British and French for whose release negotiations are in progress in return for repatriation Russian soldiers now in France. Colonel Phillipsen suggests that he be authorized to offer a certain quantity of tonnage for this service in return for release of not only Kalamatiano but also all Americans in Russia who may desire to leave. Prompt reply requested."

Department would like to be informed as to what action is being taken by the French Government for the repatriation of these soldiers. I am inclined to opinion that a certain quantity of tonnage might well be allotted for the purpose indicated by Colonel Phillipsen.

POLK

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811.20261/61 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 28, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received June 29, 3:03 a.m.]

My telegram 3955, June 24th, 5 p.m. Lomonossoff has received the following telegram.

"No offer regarding release of Kalamatiano ever made by Tchitcherin or any representative of Soviet Government either direct to Lansing, American Legation, Stockholm, or through Steffens. Grouzenberg left Moscow, his whereabouts unknown, cannot therefore inquire of him but, anyhow, having no connection with any commissariat and no authority negotiate this matter he could give Steffens only his personal opinion. Fail understand on what grounds your movements could be conditioned upon release of a most dangerous spy, found guilty and sentenced to capital punishment. Advise you not proceed through Finland or Archangel but wait for possibility of safer passage. On behalf Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Litvinoff."

Lomonossoff has telegraphed today through the Swedish Foreign Office as follows:

"Swedish authorities here permitted me stay in Sweden only until August 1st. In order to enable me to continue negotiations kindly advise how my passage from America [to] Russia was actually conditioned".

WHEELER

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<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

811.20261/60 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1919, 4 p.m.

1662. Your 3964, June 27, 3 p.m.<sup>54</sup> and 3955, June 24, 5 p.m. Department was glad to assist Lomonosoff to return to Russia in view of fact he came here first on an official mission from the Provisional Government. It is not willing to alter its attitude but cannot assist his staff except possibly under some arrangement which would secure the release of Kalamatiano.

PHILLIPS

811.20261/64 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 7, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 10:37 p.m.]

3977. Your 1662 of July 1st was on July 5th communicated textually to the Soviet Government through the Swedish Government wireless by Mr. Emanuele Stang of Christiania, attorney for Lomonosoff.

WHEELER

811.20261/67 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 13, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 6:30 p.m.]

3129. Your 2516 [2416], June 25th, 4 p.m. Understand French Foreign Office considers that negotiations for the exchange of the French subjects now prisoners in Russia have come to a standstill and that nothing is to be expected from the Bolsheviks. For their own sake they intend to repatriate the Russian soldiers in France as soon as possible, regardless any reciprocal action on the part of the Bolshevik Government.

AMERICAN MISSION

811.20261/68 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 14, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received July 15, 8:55 a.m.]

3988. My telegram 3977 of July 7, 4 p.m. Following telegram has been received here by Lomonosoff from Soviet Government.

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<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

“Referring radio of July 6, we have nothing to add to what we repeatedly stated to Lomonosoff. Kalamatiano committed highest crime against Soviet state, was properly tried according to Russian revolutionary law, is still regarded dangerous to Soviet Russia and cannot be set free unpunished. His exchange against Lomonosoff never formed subject of any note to the American Government or of conversation between you and Mr. Tchicherin or Litvinov. Gruzenberg had no authority whatever negotiate or make proposals on behalf of Commissariat Foreign Affairs. We were not aware that Lomonosoff ever wished to leave America and was prevented therefrom, on contrary Krassin<sup>55</sup> desired him to stay in America.

We noted with satisfaction assurance of American Government that statement of Martens' arrest is untrue.<sup>56</sup> Although technically a German, Martens spent most of his life and was educated in Russia, took active part in Russian politics, regarded himself and was regarded by others as Russian. The Soviet Government is glad to be relieved of the necessity of making reprisals against American citizens. We have no record Burri or Leonard mentioned in your radio. As to Consul Tredwell, he was arrested by the Turkistan Soviet in consequence of imprisonment of Soviet Commissariat on [*in*] the Caucasus by the Allies and the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did its best to have him released immediately after the way from Turkistan to Moscow was reopened. We would observe in conclusion that the American Government having now officially associated itself with Koltchak, Denikin, and thereby made itself responsible for their unheard of atrocities, wholesale massacres, burning alive of prisoners on barges, public flogging of women, should hardly feel qualified to reproach the Soviet Government for hardship caused to a few individuals. (signed) The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.”

Lomonosoff has handed Legation written statement which is in part as follows:

“Regarding myself in the same position as that of Mr. Tredwell, I am again appealing to you to grant me the opportunity to proceed to Moscow to my Government, or to return to the United States to my family. Mr. Tredwell was Consul in Russian Turkistan. After some trouble he was permitted to return to America. I was representing the Russian Ministry of Ways of Communication in America with the power of Minister. After the United States Government had ceased to regard me as such, I was for a whole year denied the credentials that would make it possible for me to leave Sweden for Soviet Russia. I am appealing to the traditional American spirit of fair play and justice. Mr. Tredwell's departure from Russia was not conditioned, therefore as a matter of reciprocity, I take the liberty to insist upon your granting me unconditional opportunity for a safe passage to Soviet Russia.”

<sup>55</sup> Leonid Borisovich Krassin, Soviet Commissar for Trade and Industry and for Ways of Communication.

<sup>56</sup> See telegram to the Chargé in Sweden, no. 1663, July 1, *ante*, p. 149.

The Legation does not believe Finland will grant Lomonosoff visa except at our official request. As the permission given him to remain in Sweden expires August 1st, and in view of Department's telegram 1581 of March 27 noon, I have the honor to request instructions.

WHEELER

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811.20261/68 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler)*

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1919, 6 p.m.

1668. Your 3988, July 14, 5 p.m. You may inform Professor Lomonosoff his statement that he was denied for a whole year the credentials necessary to make it possible for him to leave the United States for Soviet Russia is contrary to fact. As soon as this Government learned that Professor Lomonosoff was unwilling to return via Vladivostok and, consequently, desired to return via Sweden, it went out of its way to ask for his passage through Sweden. You may telegraph the American Commissioner at Helsingfors that this Government would be glad if Lomonosoff were allowed transit through Finland to Russia. As Lomonosoff is returning to Russia in an unofficial capacity, the Department will not intervene for any secretary or other assistant to accompany him, except as suggested in my 1581, March 27, noon.

You may say to Professor Lomonosoff that Department is surprised at his reference to Tredwell who, while on official duty for this Government, was arrested and subsequently interned under guard for months.

POLK

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[For papers relating to the continued imprisonment of Kalamati-ano and his release in 1921 see *Foreign Relations*, 1920, volume III, and 1921, volume II.]

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**Rejection of British Proposals for Facilitating the Repatriation of Chinese Coolies Remaining in Russia**

861.00/3674

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 57

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government that they propose to send the following telegram to His Majesty's Representatives in China :

“At the time Russia went out of the war there were a great quantity of Chinese Coolies working in Labour Battalions behind the Russian Lines. The Bolshevist Government have enlisted a considerable number of these Chinese, estimated at from 10 to 12,000 as soldiers in their Armies and are using them for the special object of devastation and extermination in the adjoining territory and also at the chief Bolshevist Centre to torture and put to death prisoners and political opponents. I am convinced the Chinese Government entirely disapproves of such proceedings and you should urge them to address an immediate summons to the Bolshevist Government either by wireless or through the Danish Red Cross, which appear to be the only means of communication still open, to release all Chinese from their service and to facilitate their repatriation to China. An order should also be issued to the Chinese in the Bolshevist Armies to cease serving with the Bolsheviks and to return home as soon as possible. The Allied authorities will do all that lies in their power to see that this order is disseminated and reaches the Chinese concerned.”

In informing the United States Government of this proposed representation, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to express the hope that if they agree they will be so good as to instruct their representatives in China to support it.

WASHINGTON, *January 20, 1919.*

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861.00/3674

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

#### MEMORANDUM

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and in reply to the suggestion presented in the latter's Memorandum No. 57 of January 20, 1919, desires to raise a question as to the advisability of the proposed action at this time, for the following reasons:

China is now in an unsettled condition and banditry is prevalent in many quarters, the Government being apparently unable to give ordinary protection either to its own people or to foreigners residing in the interior. The Chinese coolies whom it is now proposed to repatriate have become accustomed to the use of force in its most bestial form and the introduction of this element in large numbers into the present disturbed state of China might lead to a dangerous situation. It is suggested that it would be preferable that the coolies be returned gradually and that the Chinese Government supervise their distribution to different parts of China so that they will not in force endanger the peace of any locality.



The Acting Secretary of State would be glad, before reaching a decision, to have the views of His Britannic Majesty's Government on the above question.

WASHINGTON, *January 25, 1919.*

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861.00/3783

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

The question of the repatriation of Chinese coolies now in Russia, as presented in the memorandum of His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of January 20, 1919, was referred to the American Minister in Peking for comment and a reply has now been received to the following effect:

The Minister considers the repatriation of the Chinese coolies from Russia is not practicable because the Chinese Government has no means of taking action there and because the presence of these coolies in China in large numbers would endanger the peace of that country at this time. The coolies probably consist in a large measure of Manchurian brigands and Black Guards besides about fifty thousand labor coolies. The British and Russian Ministers at Peking agree with the American Minister that it is inadvisable to return the coolies to China at present.

In view of the unanimity of opinion in Peking adverse to the proposal the Department of State believes there is no alternative but to concur in that opinion and it has accordingly so instructed Mr. Reinsch today.

WASHINGTON, *February 8, 1919.*

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861.00/3920

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 144

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that a request has been made to His Majesty's Government from the Bolshevik Government to the effect that a desire has been expressed by members of the Union of Chinese Workmen in Russia to return home and that about three hundred men, which constitutes the first party of Chinese, are shortly to start for Siberia through Samara and Ufa. The Union have requested that facilities to return should be granted to these men by the Government of Siberia and

the Allied Governments. It is stated that Tchaninguy, the Chairman of the Moscow Committee of Chinese Workmen, is in a position to negotiate for the return of the workmen in question.

His Majesty's Government propose, should the United States Government agree, to reply that they would be glad to afford all possible facilities, and they would therefore be glad to learn the views of the United States Government in the matter at an early date.

WASHINGTON, *February 24th, 1919.*

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861.00/3920

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

MEMORANDUM

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and has the honor to state that, for the reasons given in the Department's memoranda of January 25 and February 6 [8], 1919, the Government of the United States seriously questions the advisability of assisting at this time the return to China of Chinese workmen and coolies who have been under the influence of the Bolshevik rule in Russia.

WASHINGTON, *February 28, 1919.*

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861.00/4019

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 171

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that the proposal referred to in the Memorandum from this Embassy No. 144 of February 24th, was the result of a request from the Union of Chinese Workmen in Russia, which was transmitted in a wireless communiqué from the Bolshevik authorities, and has no connection with that contained in the Embassy's memorandum No. 57 of January 20th.

His Majesty's Government have communicated the proposal mentioned in the Embassy's memorandum No. 144 to their representative at Peking, for the observations of the Chinese Government, and they are awaiting a reply from Sir John Jordan.

WASHINGTON, *March 5th, 1919.*

861.00/4019

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Reading)*

## MEMORANDUM

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador and in reply to the Embassy's Memorandum No. 171 of March 5, 1919, has the honor to state that Minister Reinsch was informed of the reference of the matter in question to the British Minister at Peking and was instructed to consult with the latter concerning the request received by the British Government from the Union of Chinese Workmen in Russia and to telegraph his views.

Minister Reinsch has replied that it is felt that Bolshevik propaganda would find little material in China to work on as no social or class distinctions exist. He states that the Chinese Government is willing to have the workmen in question return but wants to know when and where they will enter China, for it is felt that among them are Manchurian bandits who might cause local trouble unless supervised.

Advices received by the Department of State from other sources indicate that the request from the Union of Chinese Workmen now under consideration is part of a plan for promoting an armed uprising of Bolsheviks in Siberia and for carrying on revolutionary propaganda and establishing soviets in China.

WASHINGTON, *March 26, 1919.*

861.00/4346

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 295

## MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, with reference to the memorandum from the State Department of March 26th, that His Majesty's Government have telegraphed to their representative in Peking informing them that it has been decided to drop the whole question of allowing Chinese Bolsheviks to return to China, as this proposal seems to have found little favour on the part of the Governments who have been consulted.

WASHINGTON, *April 21st, 1919.*

## CHAPTER II

### SIBERIA

#### Campaigns in Western Siberia, and the Final Defeat of Kolchak

861.00/3577 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *January 3, 1919.*

[Received January 4, 12:49 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"6. 3rd. Ufa has been evacuated by Siberian troops and small detachment Allied troops stationed there. While it is claimed that relinquishing Ufa has no great military signification, yet the moral effect on general situation is not good. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3622b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *January 10, 1919, 1 p.m.*

165. For your information, for Secretary of State and repeat to London. Following is summary of report from American Military Observer at Ekaterinburg in the Urals.

"I have just returned from Perm having left here December 27 and returning January 3rd. In the capture of Perm, the Siberian Army took 20,000 prisoners who were a poor lot of men, badly fed, most of them young and forced to fight. Perm itself appears deserted. The population are still cowed and stay indoors or else have been taken away by the Bolsheviki. Could find no evidence of actual atrocities. Very few appear to have been executed. Population for most part being terrorized by threats into submission. The city has been governed wholly without reference to Moscow or the will of the population but absolutely at dictation of the Bolshevik Commissaire. The Siberian Army captured about 20,000 prisoners, a large number of railway cars and 260 locomotives, 100 of which are in bad order. Very great problem is presented by this large number of prisoners who will probably be sent into Siberia. Russian prisoners of war coming through Ekaterinburg apparently from Germany and Austria, are telling of a big revolution in Europe and making a serious impression on the laboring classes."

The Department regards the last sentence as another indication of the unrest which is being created by the Bolshevik movement.

POLK

861.00/3626 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received January 11, 1919, 11:06 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"14. 10th. General Gaida informed me today that he has resigned his command of the Czech troops and joined the Siberian Army as Lieutenant General. He, together with General Pepelyaev, will have charge of the operations on the western front. The plan is to concentrate troops in the direction of Viake [*Viatka?*] and Vologda in an attempt to reach Moscow by spring. Harris.["]

REINSCH

861.00/3631 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *January 13, 1919.*

[Received January 14, 10:30 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"24. 13th. Admiral Kolchak [has] informed me today that the situation in the Orenburg district was serious owing to the Social Revolutionary and Bolshevik propaganda. General Dutov<sup>1</sup> has informed him that many of the British [*Cossack?*] soldiers were refusing to fight. Kolchak further stated that the situation on the Perm front was very good and that arrangements are being made to despatch troops south to checkmate the operations of Bolsheviks at Ufa. The Semenoff situation continued serious owing to the fact that railway communications, especially as concerned supplies, were being constantly threatened. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/3699 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received January 24, 1919, 12:15 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"36, January 19th, 8 p.m. Vice Consul Palmer under instructions from me visited Perm and reports in substance:

<sup>1</sup>Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.

The capture of Perm is of considerable importance, but since the fall of Ufa it is evident that the exchange was in favor of the Bolsheviks. Am informed that out of 260 railway engines only about 40 are available for use. Of the 5,000 cars captured at Perm undoubtedly the greater part are in good rolling condition. Judging from the goods seen at the station it would appear that the Bolsheviks had practically looted the city and packed their plunder in these 5,000 cars with the intention of evacuating, but plan was frustrated by rapid movement of Cossacks who took part to cut off retreat in the rear.

The Bolsheviks apparently were not guilty of wholesale murder in Perm, but it is certain that they had begun to operate a plan of systematic starvation at the time city was relieved. On a triumphant arch they had built were the words, 'Only those who fight shall eat'.

General Pepelyaev has expressed himself as not being entirely satisfied with the military situation, deeming it necessary to have reinforcements if he is to make his position absolutely secure in the Perm section. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3707 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated*.

[Received January 25, 1919, 9:29 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk:

"54. 24th. Orenburg was occupied by Bolsheviks on January 22d. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3771 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *January 30, 1919*.

[Received January 31, 1:55 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"66. January 30, noon. Situation today's date in Omsk.

Siberian troops have suffered reverse at Kungur which endangers Perm front. It is thought Siberian troops in Perm may possibly be cut off. Considerable disaffection brewing among soldiers owing to news from Paris Conference concerning attitude towards Bolsheviks in attempt arrange compromise between all Russian groups.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See papers relating to proposed conference at Prinkipo, pp. 1 ff.

Press here growing unfriendly to Allies. Strong undercurrent unrest in political and military circles caused by grave situation on Orenburg and Perm fronts, together with serious congestion railway traffic with no sign of early solution in evidence. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/3770: Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, January 30, 1919.

[Received January 31, 2:23 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"69, January 30, 6 p.m. Concerning Perm front Vice Consul Palmer reports in substance.

Bolsheviks are within ten miles of Kungur. Seventh Czech regiment reported to have been badly entrapped. Soldiers suffering intensely from cold weather. Cause of reverse at Kungur attributed to refusal of both Czechs and [Siberian?] soldiers to obey orders. This especially true of twenty-seventh Slardinsk Regiment from Ekaterinburg. The military authorities took drastic action and shot ten officers and 250 soldiers. Five officers and 50 soldiers brought Ekaterinburg for trial and execution. Russians claim reverse caused by Czechs leaving front without giving notice, this opening way for Bolsheviks. Probable bad example for [of] Czechs not willing fight influenced Russians. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/3795: Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received February 3, 1919, 1:15 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"82. February 2, 1 p.m. Foreign Office Omsk informs me that on January 28 Japanese Minister of War Tanaka again<sup>3</sup> offered services his Government at furnishing all necessary arms and ammunition to Siberian Army. Japanese Government declared its intention to form new divisions in east, together with Russians, to fight against Bolsheviki. Kolchak government is declining this offer, stating that whatever action taken should be done jointly and harmoniously by all Allies. Japanese Government is sending two gen-

<sup>3</sup> The earlier offer referred to may be that reported in a despatch from General Graves, Dec. 13, 1918, p. 466.

erals and one Admiral to Omsk to confer with Kolchak. Foreign Office also states that it has received telegram from General Yudenich, commanding Esthonian and other [omission]. He states that he could take Petrograd but cannot provision the city. He is asking Allies to occupy Russian Baltic ports with a view of affording relief to city after its capture. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3806: Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received February 5, 1919, 1:25 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"90, February 4, 11 a.m. Situation at Kungur. General Gaida now commanding section Russian theater has issued statement which shows that this front decidedly better. Claims they have entirely broken up the two Bolshevik divisions threatening this point, capturing guns, machine guns, and prisoners. General Pepelyaev is holding firm at Perm. Feeling in Ekaterinburg apparently much better. First shock of definite news that Czechs were leaving is wearing off and this, taken together with better news from various fronts, seems to have stimulated population. Belief is gaining strength that Russians may hold even if Czechs withdraw. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3861: Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received February 15, 1919, 5:15 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Tomsk.

"112. February 14, 7 p.m. General Staff Omsk states today's date that military situation much improved during past three days' fighting. Siberians have taken many prisoners and guns. Fifteen Bolshevik regiments have refused to fight. However as an offset to this four regiments of Dutoff's Cossacks have also refused to fight. Population Omsk quiet.

Considerable enthusiasm over improved military situation. Harris."

REINSCH



861.00/4109 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received March 20, 1919, 11:31 a.m.]

Following repeated from [Harris at] Harbin.<sup>4</sup>

"192. March 19, 2 p.m. It is officially announced that the operations against Ufa have been successful and the city was captured by Siberian Army March 13. Junction point of Chishmy was also captured a little later. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4170 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *March 29, 1919, 4 p.m.*

1367. Referring Department's 1346, March 28, 6 p.m.<sup>5</sup> Department fully endorses views expressed in following from Consul General Harris now at Vladivostok:

"201. March 26, 11 A. M. Since coming to Vladivostok, I have gone over the situation thoroughly with Rodgers, Graves and Smith and also with Stevens at Harbin. Following is brief résumé of discussions.

As I fully expected, practically every one in Harbin and Vladivostok knows but little about the true state of affairs in Central and Western Siberia. They are continually misled by false rumors and misstatements in the press. I have attempted to explain exact condition of affairs. I have stated to them that I have never been enthusiastically optimistic or unduly pessimistic concerning affairs in Siberia. At present I view things brighter than ever before. The railway of future [*is about*] to be taken over by the Allies. The campaign of the Siberian army against the Bolsheviks is progressing favorably. Kolchak government is stronger than ever before and growing in power. This power is now practically absolute in Central and Western Siberia and that while Kolchak is not a strong man he is at least a good man and a Russian patriot of the best type. He is supported by the Zemstvo in Central and Western Siberia, and cities and villages are beginning to pay taxes regularly to Omsk Government. Kolchak is not surrounded by monarchists and reactionists as is generally supposed. His chief advisers in all civil matters are right Social Revolutionists. This is reassured by the fact that Vologodski is Chairman Council of Ministers, Michailof is Minister of Finance and Ustrougof is Minister of Ways and Communications. Other ministers with important portfolios are of the same political creed. Only the treacherous Cossack Atamans now in

<sup>4</sup>This telegram was sent by Consul General Harris while on his way east for conferences at Vladivostok and Tokyo.

<sup>5</sup>Not printed.

Eastern Siberia have devised every possible difficulty by their intrigues with Japan and their treatment of Zemstvo members and people.

In June 1918 when the Czechs forced their way through Manchuria, the Allies had the option of either sending troops into Siberia or not at their discretion. Today they have no choice and no policy of independency can be followed. Kolchak today does not ask for foreign soldiers to assist him in fighting Bolsheviks. He can do that himself and is doing it successfully. He does want clothes and munitions of war and Siberia needs economic assistance, but what he wants above all things is protection in his rear against Semenoff Iralgy [Orlov?], Kalmikoff and Japanese intrigue. He can do nothing towards this of his own accord. He depends upon the Allies to do it. Japan must play fair with Allied and Omsk Governments. The disturbing influence of Cossack Atamans murderers [must?] be completely eliminated. Now is the time for plain talk, honest methods and firm decision. Russia is now in a fair way to master Bolshevism with her own resources, but at this moment success practically depends upon our decisive policy as adopted right here in Eastern Siberia. [Harris.]”

PHILLIPS

861.00/4329 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, April 18, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received April 20, 4:10 a.m.]

236. Referring to Department's telegram of April 1, 3 p.m. and my 203, April 5, 6 p.m.<sup>6</sup>

General Graves has received telegram from his representative at Omsk dated yesterday stating that there is as yet no evidence of any combined British and Japanese action, and that present success of the Omsk army causes feeling of confidence and of less dependence on foreign military assistance. He states most of the anti-Government agitation has stopped, and that Government's demands are well responded, power of Government growing as questions are handled sensibly.

This contradicts rumors prevalent here last few days that Omsk Government has resigned and does not agree with report from Irkutsk, which is, with others, summarized below.

Thomson telegraphed yesterday from Irkutsk:

“March 25th. Government troops near Irkutsk deserted to Bolshevik or peasants and 300 miles west of Irkutsk disturbances caused several train wrecks and interrupted trains and telegrams, since which there has been unrest in Irkutsk, and April 2 Russian staff

<sup>6</sup> Neither printed.

in Irkutsk admitted fear of *coup d'état* in near future which was referred to by staff as Bolsheviki but which Thomson considers really movement of the peasants and Social Revolutionists for a constituent assembly. Since February it has been evident that Social Revolutionists, Irkutsk and Omsk, while unwilling to decide for reconciling with Bolsheviki, consider Omsk Government reactionary, suppressing not only Bolsheviki but also all Left parties as well as popularly elected bodies like Zemstvos and that, like Bolsheviki, Omsk Government will not authorize constituent assembly desired by democratic masses of Russia.

Irkutsk Zemstvo has petitioned Omsk for legalization Zemstvo union, early meeting at Irkutsk of delegates from Zemstvos from all Siberia and immediate preparation for election for all-Russian constituent assembly.

Unless Government grants some of these requests it is believed *coup d'état* is imminent, preparation for which is being made even in army and among some of the officers."

Williams telegraphed from Omsk 16th.

"Russian Army advanced rapidly last four days, taking Sarapul on the Kama and moving along railway toward Kazan. They recaptured at Sarapul 2,500 prisoners, war supplies, 6 steamers and 32 barges. Bugulma-Simbiorsk line has been taken and on Samara railroad advance was 70 miles in six days while fight is now on for Boguslav, 120 east of Samara. Army is being welcomed as deliverers of population."

CALDWELL

861.00/4520 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, May 17, 1919.

[Received May 18, 2:23 p.m.]

306. Following from Harris repeated.<sup>7</sup>

"228, 16th. Uprising along railway continues serious. Most dangerous point is the Taishet district. Trains are being cannonaded every day. Estimated strength of rebels between Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk 6,000, but number increasing as Bolsheviki are recruiting from local population. Czech General Syrovy informed me today that in future would throw full military strength of Czechs against movement and would shortly crush it. There would be some delay owing to lack of locomotives.

Railway and telegraphic communication with west have been interrupted since yesterday and I am unable to proceed at present.<sup>8</sup> Harris.["]

CALDWELL

<sup>7</sup> Apparently from Irkutsk.

<sup>8</sup> On May 23 Consul General Harris telegraphed from Omsk: "Arrived Omsk."

861.00/4618 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*PEKING, *undated.*

[Received June 4, 1919, 2:54 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Novonikolaievsk.

"249. June 2d, 4 p.m. Military conditions on Ufa front reported bad. Possible Ufa may be evacuated soon.

Stevens now Omsk. Situation on railway between Kansk and Krasnoyarsk unchanged. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4651 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extract]

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received June 7, 1919, 2:15 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"252. June 6, 10 a.m. On the Orenburg front Ural Cossacks won a victory defeating 6,000 Bolsheviki and taking 113 of them prisoners. The result of battle Ufa front in doubt but found that [*sic*] hopes to hold the city. Siberian Army is being badly pushed back on the Kazan front but on the northern front Gaida's troops are advancing and have retaken Glazov from which they were pushed back some weeks ago. [Harris.]"

REINSCH

861.00/4689 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*PEKING, *undated.*

[Received June 14, 1919, 5:47 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Tomsk.

"262, June 13, 5 p.m. Vice Consul [omission] has interviewed General Gaida at Perm. Gaida is in command of both so-called Siberian northern army and so-called western or middle army. Gaida has had satisfactory conferences with Kolchak and it appears that Kolchak is convinced of his sincerity. Gaida's policy of moderation based on democratic principles had won the approval of the Council of Ministers. Gaida himself states that if there were any deflection of the Government's policy in the direction of absolutism the whole of the army would oppose it and desertion would naturally follow. Owing to the defeats suffered by the western army extend-

ing from Ufa to Birsk the left flank of the Siberian Army may have to be retired some distance in order to straighten out the lines. Energetic steps are being taken to restore the fighting qualities and morale of the western army and one of these steps is to establish really good friendly relations between officers and men. Most responsible step is that of intensive propaganda by means of lectures, speeches, popular pamphlets and newspapers for the soldiers in order to counteract Bolshevik propaganda. The reverses of the last few weeks have prompted the Government at Omsk to follow Gaida's suggestions and organize these new institutions. Although general situation not bright and Gaida states that they would possibly not reach Tjeluga this autumn, confidence has been restored and there is no threat to Perm, which will be held without any trouble. Understand the Siberian Army to be 200,000 strong and the total forces fighting against the Bolsheviki on the whole front from Glazoff to Ufa to be approximately half a million. The sanitary arrangements are poor and medicines available at northern front very meager. Machine guns and artillery considerably below actual needs. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/4728 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received June 21, 1919, 12:24 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"270, June 20, 9 a.m. General Gaida returned suddenly and unexpectedly to Omsk yesterday. I had interview with him. Gaida is despondent, has aged in appearance, and is discouraged as to future of military situation. Informed me that in all probability he would retire and eventually go to France. He said Kolchak was surrounded by a clique of Russian officers who were intriguing against him. Gaida believes Bolsheviki will not be defeated by Siberian Army and that overthrow of Bolshevism is not yet in sight. Bolsheviki are larger in number and now are [better?] equipped with guns than Siberian forces. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4732 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received June 23, 1919, 11:15 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"279, June 21, noon. Gaida has been superseded by General Dietrichs as commander in chief Siberian armies. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/4786 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 2, 1919, 2:05 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"290. June 29, noon. Perm is being evacuated by Siberian Army. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/4780 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 1, 1919, 3:48 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk:

"291. June 30, 3 p.m. Situation on both Ufa and Perm fronts extremely serious. Russians hope that signing of peace will now enable Allies to render Russia all possible assistance. Railroad situation still aggravated by Semenoff in trans-Baikal. Danger of clash between American troops that section and Cossacks and Japanese not entirely removed. American railroad men now fairly well distributed as far as Omsk. Considerable improvements noticeable in passenger and freight service. One weekly express from Omsk to Vladivostok. Cooperative Societies are beginning to move hides and furs east to establish credits. American Red Cross doing good work in both hospital and refugee departments. Y.M.C.A. civilian program not yet fully arranged with Omsk Government. Cost of living still rising and no private quarters obtainable in any western Siberian town owing to influx refugees. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4828 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*PEKING, *undated.*

[Received July 10, 1919, 11:45 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"312, July 8, 5 p.m. Owing critical and uncertain military situation at front, as a precautionary measure I have advised American Red Cross to be prepared to evacuate hospitals at Cheliabinsk and Tiumen. A battle is now in progress at Zlatoust upon which depends the fate of Cheliabinsk. Similar fight is on at Kungur which will decide fate of Ekaterinburg. Vice Consul Glaman left Perm day before town occupied by Bolsheviks. He is now at Ekaterinburg. Vice Consul Palmer is leaving Ekaterinburg with wife and children. Glaman replaces him. Have sent Vice Consul Thomas to Cheliabinsk to assist American Red Cross in case of need. All Americans west of Omsk have been notified to be prepared to retire to Omsk if Bolsheviks advance. Situation at Ekaterinburg reported serious owing to discontent of certain elements in rear of front and near Ekaterinburg. Sir Charles Eliot<sup>9</sup> has just returned from front and is pessimistic. Kolchak is still at front. Depression among all official circles Omsk. Doubtful if Bolsheviks succeed in advancing as far as Cheliabinsk and Ekaterinburg, but I feel precautions should be taken as above mentioned. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4898 : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>10</sup>VLADIVOSTOK, *July 10, 1919.*Number 372. Following from Slaughter,<sup>11</sup> Omsk:

"July 6th. Returned from front July 3rd. Red Guards took Perm and Kungur July 1st. Kama bridge cut and military now blames workmen. Thirty-five hundred tons of kerosene in stationary tanks Perm emptied into Kama fired by unknown party burned entire Kama River fleet of 38 ships standing tied together ready to beach Chusovaya River. Perm shops, factories, materials and city partially evacuated. Six hundred freight cars remain. Immediate cause of evacuation two divisions of Osa front left front refused to

<sup>9</sup> British High Commissioner in Siberia.<sup>10</sup> Copy transmitted by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State in letter dated July 15, 1919.<sup>11</sup> Maj. Homer H. Slaughter, U.S.A., on duty at Omsk.

fight more without rest. Heavy columns of Red guards from Osa cut lines at Ergach 11 miles west of Kungur June 29th, same time strong attacks along Perm railroad took all reserves from Perm to prevent disaster. Dietrichs afraid risk finish fight knowing victory at Perm only means delay of few days then forced to retreat.

Retreat Gaida army began by order staff Omsk, secures straight front on Perm without fighting. Troops still fair morale but slightly out of hand, require collecting. Only five to ten officers regiment. Men better morale than officers who greatly fear torture certain death hands Bolsheviks. Few good officers and a rest would restore confidence in men but army lacks training and cohesion. Men will fight if led. Afraid further retreat will be ordered in order to avoid fight until Dietrichs can rearrange army and receive reserves.

Gaida made peace with Dietrichs and retains Siberian Army spite politics.

Reds operating no reserves at all, no rail supply more than 200 versts rear whole front. Perm line cut at Lekma and Cheptsa. Kazan line at the Viatka and Sarapul. Simbirsk line at the rivers Ik and Samara lines at Kinel all crossings.

Reds operating by columns Perm railroad and Hiukosa and Kazan railroad and through Birsk against Zlatoust. One defeat and the Reds retreat confusion, they similar soldiers [*sic*].

Majority males evacuated with Siberian Army bringing horses cattle and often families in carts. From Tiumen west all disorder and panic, no one in charge. Officers and men leaving front every train by hundreds, no apparent control, no arms, some equipment, few slightly wounded on hand probably self-inflicted.

Actual strength army at the front unknown to any one. But Gaida states he has 28,000 bayonets in lines no reserves, with 32,000 auxiliary cavalry artillery engineers, evacuation and communication troops. Reds opposing with 60,000 bayonets. Dietrichs' staff state western army 30,000 bayonets in line. Reds oppose with 45,000 no reserves but better officered and directed. Also Reds have 2,000 machine guns, Siberians only 400.

On June 20th Gaida was drawing 270 thousand rations. Now investigating for whom. Ekaterinburg evacuation commencing due to the threat Reds take Zlatoust, Berdyaoush."

Above is in reply to your Number 284.

GRAVES



861.00/4839 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 12, 1919, 8:20 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"317. July 10, noon. From reliable source have learned that on June 14th Japanese proposed to Omsk Government plan of sending Japanese troops to front. Omsk Government apparently favorable to plan. Negotiations being carried on at present which provides that a Japanese division of 40,000 men shall be sent in Siberia under guise of protecting railway when Czechs evacuate. Japanese troops however are to be sent immediately to Ural front to participate in fighting. [Harris.]"

REINSCH

861.00/4847 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 14, 1919, 12:45 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

["]319, July 11, 4 p.m. Situation at front. Since July 8th Ekaterinburg being officially evacuated. Plan of Russian Army is to withdraw behind Tiumen. Have advised American Red Cross to evacuate Cheliabinsk and Tiumen. Russian Red Cross evacuating all patients from Ekaterinburg to Omsk, Kolchak has returned from front. Have not yet interviewed him. Gaida's services with Siberian Army terminated on 8th. Bolsheviki apparently using Hindenburg tactics of concentrating all available forces on Kolchak's front with object of taking Ekaterinburg and Cheliabinsk thus occupying whole of Urals and farming and industrial districts. Thereafter Bolsheviki may throw bulk of forces against Denekine or continue to Omsk. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4856 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 16, 1919, 6:41 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"327, July 15, 3 p.m. Vice Consul in Tomsk reports:

Friday and Saturday 46th Siberian Rifles mutinied here. Refused to go to front. Threatened to kill officers. One hundred and twelve men arrested. Seventy have been court-martialed and sentenced to be shot. City under heavy guard. Day previous to mutiny Bolshevik printed propaganda was distributed amongst men. It is reported here today 13th and 20th Siberian Rifles at station near Taiga mutinied and refused to go to front. Attempted join band at station Enomskia. Were stopped by Czechs and 200 of 20th reported killed and wounded. Remainder of 20th arrested and sent to Tomsk.'

Harris["]  
REINSCH

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861.00/4862 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 17, 1919, 11:04 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"329, July 16, 3 p.m. Ekaterinburg occupied by Bolsheviki this morning. Vice Consul Glaman has retired to Tiumen. Vice Consul Palmer and family arrived Omsk yesterday. All terminal trains succeeded in leaving Ekaterinburg. Cheliabinsk still occupied by Siberian troops, but American Red Cross interests evacuating.

A committee of evacuation has been formed in Omsk today. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/4868 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 19, 1919, 10:44 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"July 17, noon. 330. Red Cross American and Russian personnel completely evacuated Cheliabinsk. Apparently all Russian patients were also evacuated. Most valuable medical supplies and stores saved. Am taking every precaution prevent any American being left behind. Vice Consul Thomas probably leaving Cheliabinsk today. No further telegrams received here for Cheliabinsk. Bolsheviki have occupied Zlatoust and are now at Miassi not far from Cheliabinsk. Bolsheviki have cut railway between Cheliabinsk and Ekaterinburg. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4975

*Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) of conversation with the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires (Debuchi)*

July 24, 1919.

Mr. Debuchi told me this afternoon that the Omsk Government had approached the Government of Japan with the proposal to send two divisions of Japanese troops to Lake Baikal; that the Japanese Government had considered the proposal on the 22nd of this month and declined it. He said that he had only received half of the cable, and could not give me all of the reasons, but that he would later.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

861.00/4930 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 29, 1919, 4:40 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"July 28, 10 a. m. Vice Consuls Glaman and Thomas have arrived Omsk. No Americans now west of Omsk. Front now wavering on line running straight from point 50 versts east of Ekaterinburg on north and Cheliabinsk on south. Fate of Cheliabinsk still uncertain. Remaining Red Cross nurses in Omsk will be evacuated with me if such step deemed necessary and no anxiety need be felt that account. I am still of the opinion Bolsheviki will not penetrate east beyond Tobol River for the present and there are chances Siberian Army may have time to rest and recuperate.

Majority Red Cross nurses evacuated owing to statement of Colonel Emerson that railroad to east might be blocked by congestion. Movement of traffic easier today. There are 300 Czech and 800 British troops in Omsk which guarantees safety of city. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/5009 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 6, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 9, 6 p.m.]

Supplementing my August 4, 12 p.m.<sup>12</sup> I submit the following report.

1st. *Military*: I estimate the Siberian Army consists of not more than 100,000 men divided into three armies. The first consisting of

<sup>12</sup> Post, p. 403.

about 20,000 men is under the command of General Pepelaieff, the second of about 30,000 under General Lokhvitsky, the third of about 50,000 under General Sakharoff, and General Dietrichs nominally in command of all three armies has established headquarters at Ishim and has announced his intention to reform his lines east of the Tobol River and attempt to hold the Red Army at that point. The first army is probably now evacuating Tiumen, the second has been driven out of Shadrinsk and is now retreating to Kurgan, the third is retreating east from Cheliabinsk, which is evacuated as a result of a popular revolution in support of the approaching Bolsheviks.

It is almost impossible to obtain any accurate estimate of the size of the Red Army on the Siberian front but it probably does not exceed 80,000. All reports indicate that the Siberian Army is completely disorganized, demoralized and in panic. There is jealousy and intrigue among the commanding officers. I am reliably informed that a large number of the line officers are abandoning their units and fleeing to the rear, that a great many have been shot by their men and that no less than 4,000 officers have taken their refuge in Omsk.

Last night Admiral Kolchak left for Ishim. He and Sukine dined with General Graves and me before he left. The Admiral, who sees few people and seldom leaves his residence, does not fully realize how much he has lost in public estimation and confidence but does however appreciate the necessity of drastic changes among the officers. He has decided, perhaps too late, to punish the more flagrant cases of cowardice, dismiss some of the line officers and select substitutions from among the private soldiers. It is the opinion of all the military representatives here that it will be impossible for General Dietrichs to reorganize his armies east of the Tobol River if the Bolsheviks continue their advance. It is contended the advance of Denekin is giving great concern to the Bolshevik authorities and that already they are prepared to withdraw from the Siberian front to reenforce their southern army. On the other hand, it is pointed out that Denekin in no way seriously threatens the Bolshevik power and that the Red Army will continue its advance to Omsk in an effort to deal a final blow to the Kolchak government. All the evidence indicates that in discipline, morale, leadership and equipment the Red Army is superior to the Siberian Army. I can get no satisfactory information as to conditions behind the Bolshevik lines. I have personally confirmed the fact that captured Bolshevik soldiers are well fed and on the whole well clothed; they are arrogant in their confidence and profess their communistic faith with almost religious zeal.

It is reported that the Bolshevik authorities are exhibiting in the territory recently taken a more tolerant spirit. By contrast, reliable

reports indicate that the Kolchak soldiers, freed from all restraint, are looting the district through which they are retreating.

2d. *Political*: with each advance of the Red Army the Bolshevik sentiment in Siberia is more openly expressed. This was to be expected. Discontent with the inactivity of the Government is increasing; but it is an apathetic discontent which finds no hope elsewhere. Such intrigues as exist lack vigor and enthusiasm. It is alleged by other foreign representatives that there is actual treachery in Government circles. Personally, I have seen nothing to confirm this allegation.

In conclusion, I hazard the opinion that unless there is some serious weakness not yet revealed in the Bolshevik ranks repulsing their continued advance, Kolchak and his colleagues will be compelled to leave Omsk in the near future.

I will remain here, if possible, until Admiral Kolchak returns from the front next week. Should he and his generals fail in their last attempt to reform and reorganize the Army, General Graves and I will assist in the evacuation of the remaining Americans and follow out, making our way eastward as best we can under the conditions of panic which are likely to prevail.

MORRIS

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861.00/5063 a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1919, 1 p.m.

2829. Referring to telegram from Ambassador Morris<sup>13</sup> repeated to you today, following No. 417, August 10, from Vladivostok to War Department.

“August 7. General Graves [at Omsk] reports the Kolchak forces are still retreating and it looks as if the demoralization is such that the hope of reforming the line and renewing the offensive must be based upon the weakness of the Bolsheviks and lack of their desire to come to Omsk, which I cannot assume to be the case. Well authenticated reports justify the statement that officers are leaving the troops and fleeing to the rear, staff officers preceding line officers in this flight, enlisted men are throwing away their arms and ammunition and in some cases their heavy clothing so as to enable them to move more rapidly to the rear. Many men when fighting on the front shot themselves in the left hand or foot so as to be evacuated to the rear. This became so common that hospitals refuse to take such cases in hospitals. I have been unable to discover any enthusiasm for the Kolchak Government and therefore believe that it will not be possible to reorganize this completely demoralized army so as to hold the Bolsheviks if they have any strength, which I believe

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<sup>13</sup> From Omsk, Aug. 8, 5 p.m., p. 407.

they have. I am unable to get any reliable information as to the Bolsheviks, except their treatment of inhabitants of towns taken is not as bad as expected, judging from reports as to conduct in European Russia. Admiral Kolchak has now gone to the front with the object of settling differences between commanders and probably making some changes in higher commanders. I believe this is a faint hope he has that this course might stem the tide which is now running so strong against him. There is undoubtedly intrigue in some government officials, and lack of harmony and cooperation between the line and staff at the front and staff at Omsk. Present contemplates reforming line on Tobol river and starting offensive from there. Tiumen is evacuated today and it seems likely the Bolsheviks are pressing too closely to permit reorganization of forces contemplated, so probably an effort will be made hold on Ishim. First army commanded by General Pepelaieff, consisting of 1st, 2d and 3d Siberian Divisions and one storming brigade, is on line from 20 miles south of Tiumen-Ekaterinburg railroad to north, headquarters at Yalutorovsk on Tobol river. Second army, commanded by General Lochvitsky recently arrived from Paris, consists of 15th, 16th and 17th and 18th Divisions, 4th storming division and 57th, 58th and 59th regiments, total 31,000 men, extending from first army left to include Shadrinsk headquarters at Petropavlovsk. Third army, commanded by General Sakharoff, consisting of General Valioff's independent cavalry division, 6,000 men, General Vaitsnovsky group consisting of 11th, 12th and 13th Siberian divisions and the Ural Mountains and Ufimsk divisions, and General Pel's group consisting of two Volga divisions, Red Guard deserters, total of Sakharoff's command 51,000 whose line extends from Shadrinsk to Troitsk exclusive. Headquarters on train. General Bielloff commands section from Troitsk inclusive to include Orenburg district west of Orenburg 100 miles, this command consists of former 5th Siberian Corps approximately 20,000 men and Orenburg Cossacks, number unknown. West of Bielloff's command are groups operating independently."

["Paragraph 2. General Gaida arrived in Vladivostok from Omsk August 8th. In an interview he stated substantially as follows:

["Kolchak Government cannot possibly stand and if Allies support him they will make greatest mistake in history. Government divided two distinct parts, one issues proclamations and propaganda foreign consumption stating that the Government favors and would introduce constituent assemblies, other part secretly plan and plot restoration of Monarchy. This is perceptible only to those who are part of the Government. It is hypocritical Government which attempts to convince peasants their cause being fostered and yet looks for the psychological moment to restore a Monarchy. The people once blinded by this hypocritical work are awakened. They are using protective measures against Government which is attempting to give them that which they have fought against many years.

Kolchak has surrounded himself with old régime officers whose only salvation future existence depends upon restoration of Monarchy. Government must fall and be replaced. All hope restore law and order Russia and Siberia is lost.]" Sargent."

LANSING

861.77/1024 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, August 15, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received August 16, 11:45 p.m.]

Reliable information Siberian Army demoralized; no longer active factor, unable to hold limits of Tobolsk. All Allied representatives opinion Omsk evacuated in a month, probable collapse Government. Reds attacking along Tomsk Railway, situation of affairs tense those towns, nothing can be done improve railways there present conditions. My opinion is that unless miracle, before winter Reds will have control as far as Irkutsk if they want to. Only salvation strong Allied army exclusive of Japanese, otherwise Reds and Japanese will divide Siberia and north Manchuria and the Baikal. Until the situation clears I advise holding service men not sailed, chances look to me that none of us can stay here very long. Think if real Allies want to keep Chinese Eastern out of Japanese hands they must strike quickly and decisively. All the above my carefully considered judgment.

STEVENS

861.51/658 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received August 29, 1919, 3:52 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"370, August 27, 6 p.m. Today Eliot,<sup>14</sup> Martel<sup>15</sup> and myself advised Kolchak immediately remove gold reserve amounting (only two?) hundred million roubles to Vladivostok. All foreign military experts here agree this should be done as precaution. Kolchak refused, stating he felt able to evacuate gold later if necessary. Harris.[""]

REINSCH

861.51/658 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Jenkins)*

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1919, 6 p.m.

You will please forward the following message to Harris without decoding it. It is confidential for Mr. Harris only, and is sent

<sup>14</sup> Sir Charles Eliot, British High Commissioner in Siberia.

<sup>15</sup> Damien J. A. C., Count de Martel, French High Commissioner *ad interim* in Siberia.

to you because Department does not know whether Mr. Harris has left Omsk and if so, at what point he may be reached. The message follows:

Your August 27, 6 p.m.<sup>15a</sup>

Adverting to the gold bullion under the control of Kolchak you will please advise Department first, whether in your opinion Kolchak would consider under certain circumstances its withdrawal from Siberia to the American Legation at Peking or to some other point under the assurance which will be authorized that the honor and faith of the United States Government will be pledged to preserve intact and to return it to such Russian authorities as may succeed hereafter in establishing a stable political organization over Russian territory. The disposition of this gold is a source of considerable concern to this Government because it is felt that with it will go a large part of the authority over matters in Russia, and that the United States Government will disinterestedly help the Russian people. Second, with Bolshevik aggression from the west and operations against the Railroad by bandits to the eastward, it would appear that transportation of the gold will be jeopardized. Will you report as to what forces are necessary and available to protect it to the Manchurian border and with what certainty of success it could be transported out of Siberia. Your confidential report at the earliest moment at whatever length may be necessary will be expectantly awaited.

This message has been sent to Harbin for transmission to you and with instructions that it is not to be deciphered except by you. In answering advise at what point you may be reached five days after your message is sent. Newspaper reports state Omsk already evacuated.

LANSING

861.51/664 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Acting Secretary of State*

OMSK, September 8, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received September 9, 3:43 a.m.]

377. Referring to Department's September 3, 6 p.m.

Kolchak now at front. It is my personal opinion, arrived at from former interview with Kolchak in this subject, that he will refuse to transfer gold to any Allied power. He has stated that he will keep gold, if necessary, to pay soldiers to fight Bolsheviks until the last moment. He believes, however, that he will be able to protect gold.

<sup>15a</sup> Transmitted in undated telegram from the Minister in China received Aug. 29, 3:52 p.m., *supra*.



I believe Kolchak is guided in his attitude by personal possible suspicion of the ultimate use Allies might make of the money. If pushed to the extreme, Kolchak might possibly be induced to transfer gold to American protection under guarantees stated by Department. Should gold be removed it can, in my judgment, only be done if convoyed by strong Czech detachments, as it is probable that Semenoff and his bands would attempt possess themselves of same.

Present military operations west of Omsk not unfavorable to Siberia forces. Eastward along Siberian Railway to Irkutsk spasmodic raids are being made at various places of railway, but there is apparently no organized force and vice consuls at Novo Nikolaievsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk report quiet. I apprehend no revived disturbances from this source. Bolsheviki operating in Altai, south of Novo Nikolaievsk, apparently being dispersed by Czech troops.

I expect to remain in Omsk indefinitely as situation at present moment is better than it has been at any time during the past three months. Reports that Omsk has fallen are untrue. Please communicate with me as heretofore through the Legation at Peking. Please acknowledge receipt.

HARRIS

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861.00/5190 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received September 11, 1919, 4:50 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"379. September 10, 10 a.m. Situation front continues favorable for Siberian Army. It is generally believed that Omsk is now out of danger. Retreat of northern Siberian Army has stopped and forces are entrenched west of Ishim River. Central army, supported by Cossacks, slowly advancing. Southern army has defeated Bolshevik forces on railroad line and re-capture of Kurgan is expected. On extreme north Tobolsk has been captured by Bolsheviks. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/5194 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received September 12, 1919, 6:43 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"381. September 11, 2 p.m. General Siberian advance apparently

now beginning. Northern army has advanced thirty kilometres. Central army has inflicted heavy losses on Bolsheviki. Southern army is within sixty versts of Kurgan. Last few days fighting resulted in Siberian Army capturing 2,200 prisoners, 80 machine guns and 19 heavy guns. Bolsheviki southern army are in flight. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/5254 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, September 22, 1919.

[Received 12:40 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

388. September 19, 9 p.m. During a thirty-six hour visit to Omsk from front Kolchak decreed in substance the following:

"After the successes attained by our soldiers in the stubborn fighting of the last weeks they are going forward with increased determination and confidence in speedy establishment of peace and freedom. It is vital that the whole people should merge in cooperation with the Government and Army. The wide circles of peasants and Cossacks have suffered most in the unavoidable hardships imposed by destructive civil war, which has absorbed the whole wealth of the state. These people must unite with the Government in strengthening the common weal for the conclusion of this struggle for the State Zemstvo Council must aid the Government in passing from the severe conditions of military government to the new conditions of peaceful life founded on zealous protection of lawfulness and firm guarantees of civil freedom and benefits both of person and property. In convening a State Zemstvo Council I appeal to the whole population to unite with the Government and remember that national aims stand above personal ambitions which have brought Russia to verge of ruin. Above council is to co-operate with the Government with legal right of [questioning] representative ministers and suggesting legal and administrative measures.["]

Harris  
TENNEY

861.00/5253 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, September 22, 1919.

[Received 9:24 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

393, September 20, noon. General Siberian advance along whole front still continues. Uprisings in European Russia at Tambov and Kozlov assuming large proportions. It appears that it will shortly

unite with Denekine front cutting off many Bolsheviki and advancing Denekine half way to Moscow from its [*his*] present position. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5257: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, *September 23, 1919, 6 p.m.*

Department has cable from headquarters Vladivostok transmitting message from Slaughter <sup>16</sup> saying Kolchak forces making no progress except possibly third army; that British officers just back from front report bad morale and many desertions. These reports in direct conflict with your 393 September 20 noon, 381 September 11, 2 P.M. and 388 September 19, 9 P.M.<sup>17</sup> Please confer with Slaughter and advise result. This Government has not modified its policy to assist Russia. Negotiations for supplies for Kolchak forces have made substantial and favorable progress towards early realization.

Upon receipt of this cable please immediately advise Department fully and authoritatively of actual situation of Kolchak forces and of progress of Kolchak measures for Zemstvo Council.

Your September 21st, 4 P.M.<sup>18</sup> reporting extraordinary action of General Graves received. You will be advised promptly of action taken which is now under consideration.

As further illustration of reports Department is receiving from other sources press here this morning quotes Russian wireless reporting that Kolchak has notified Allies he has resigned in favor of General Denikine and that new government east of Lake Baikal is being formed under General Semenov. Department has also instructed Tokio to repeat cable from Chargé d'Affaires there quoting character of reports current in Japan. It is evident that propaganda is rife. For example Department has no knowledge of Statements of Ambassador Morris to which you refer <sup>19</sup> and which it therefore cannot regard as true, especially in view of opinions he has expressed in the past.

PHILLIPS

<sup>16</sup> Maj. Homer H. Slaughter, U.S.A., stationed at Omsk.

<sup>17</sup> Transmitted in telegrams from the Chargé in China, *supra*.

<sup>18</sup> Transmitted in telegram of Sept. 22 from the Chargé in China, p. 516.

<sup>19</sup> See telegram no. 383 transmitted in undated telegram from the Chargé in China received Sept. 15, 12:30 p.m., p. 424.

861.00/5304 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received September 30, 1919, 11:39 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"402. September 28, 6 p.m. Referring to Department's September 23, 6 p.m. Have consulted with Slaughter. He claims that his reports as well as mine were true at the time they were sent. In any case I have no reason to modify mine in the slightest degree.

In addition to Russian, Czech and British staff reports, I have yesterday and today consulted with British General Knox and Dietrichs, commander-in-chief Siberian Army. Knox said he considers, in view of the retreat of Siberian forces during past four months, that the stand the army has finally taken and the advance and results achieved are extremely good under the circumstances. Knox explained to me on war map situation today's date and showed how all three Siberian armies had advanced to the extent of 130 versts since offensive begun, states he considers outlook good.

General Dietrichs informed me officially that during four weeks of his advance he has captured on all fronts 15,000 prisoners, 21 heavy guns and more than 100 machine guns. He stated further that he intends upon reaching the Tobol River to rest his army for a short time at that place. He believes the outlook good but pointed out that if Denekin should take Moscow the whole of the Bolshevik forces might be thrown against him as the only place of refuge left to the Bolsheviki would be western Siberia and Turkistan. Asked what effect possible evacuation of Czech forces from guarding railway line to the east would have upon his operations, he stated that same would be serious inasmuch as he could not replace them at present, and in such an eventuality he might withdraw his army to some point east of Omsk in order to place him in a position to effectively guard railway. Certain sections of his army have already reached the Tobol River in two places.

Major Slaughter advises me that on September 25th Kolchak's forces consisted of 79,150 bayonets, 13,564 sabers.

As concerns Zemstvo Council Denekin<sup>20</sup> informed me today that five Omsk Government ministers are working with representatives of different interests, namely Zemstvos and Municipalities, Cooperatives, commerce and industries, Cossacks and universities. Denekin stated that in about one week's time this committee would have a law worked out which would be the basis for elections. He also

<sup>20</sup> Probably error for Sookine, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Omsk Government.

stated that the publication of Kolchak's program in this connection had been received with widespread satisfaction and had been a decisive factor in clearing situation in Vladivostok.

These statements conform with my own judgment and knowledge of the situation and may be looked upon as authoritative acceptance. Copy of this telegram has been sent Ambassador Morris Harris."

TENNEY

861.00/5460

*Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) of conversation with the Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1919.

The Russian Ambassador asked me if we would send additional troops into Siberia. I told him we would not, and that we would not send our troops farther west of where they are at present stationed. He said that he had heard from Omsk that Ambassador Morris had advised the Japanese not to proceed west of Baikal. I told him that this had been an independent decision by the Japanese, and that as far as I had been advised Mr. Morris had nothing to do with it. I also told him that the situations at Petrograd and Moscow might simplify the situation, and that the slow repatriation of the Czechs would help to the end that the railroad would not be so deserted of troops that it would be necessary to call Russian regiments from the front to guard the railroad.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

861.00/5444 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 21, 1919.

[Received 5:32 p.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk:

430, October 20th, 10 a.m. Kolchak has returned from Tobolsk. Japanese Ambassador Kato has arrived at Omsk. Mr. Tuck<sup>21</sup> who is in Altai region south of Semipalatinsk telegraphs that everything is quiet in that sector. Doctor Teusler<sup>22</sup> just arrived Irkutsk telegraphs me that conditions satisfactory there and disturbances along railway lines less. Teusler considers it safe for American nurses to return to Omsk.

<sup>21</sup> Charles H. Tuck, agricultural expert sent to Siberia by the Ambassador in Japan.

<sup>22</sup> Dr. Rudolf B. Teusler, of Tokyo, American Red Cross Commissioner in Siberia.

During the past week there have been heavy Bolshevik attacks against Siberian third army. Siberian Army has retreated about forty versts to eastward under Bolshevik pressure in that particular sector. General Dietrichs expects to liquidate this and begin a general advance November 1st after he has rested his troops. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5520 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 29, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received October 30, 12:36 p.m.]

[From Harris:]

451. Soukine has just informed me that General Dietrichs has given instructions for the Siberian Army to retreat behind the Ishim River and there make a stand. Preparations are also being made in Omsk to defend the city if necessary. The Government has decided transfer all the assailant [*sic*] ministers and personnel of the various departments to Irkutsk. Kolchak, heads of the departments and ministers and the gold bullion remain in Omsk. These are precautionary measures and I will keep the Department promptly informed of further action. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5548 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 1, 1919.

[Received 1:05 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

" 454. October 31, 1 p.m. Siberian Army continuing retreat in good order. Entire army now appears to be east of Ishim River. Petropavlovsk probably occupied by Bolsheviki but no official confirmation.

American Red Cross Omsk hospital ordered to evacuate. All patients, hospital equipment and personnel will go to Irkutsk. This evacuation now going forward.

Railway traffic towards east as far as Novo Nikolaievsk getting badly congested, and present cold weather may aggravate same, no immediate trouble, however, is anticipated providing sufficient locomotives going east of [omission] are returned at Omsk. Today thermometer 10° below zero with falling snow. I have no present intention of leaving Omsk.

Bolshevik radio reports victories on all fronts. Apparently Bolsheviki have dismantled wireless station at Tsarskoe Selo and re-

moving same to Perm. This perhaps an indication that Bolsheviki intend to make local district their permanent headquarters. Bolsheviki also report great strikes are going on in America, which they interpret as being favorable to and in sympathy with them. Harris.[""]

TENNEY

861.00/5558 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1919, 6 p.m.

3658. Following telegram received from Harris at Omsk is repeated for your information:

"455, November 2, 2 p.m. Held long conference with Kolchak today. He informed me definitely that the Czech soldiers would not participate in the fighting at the front and they would be evacuated from Siberia according to the plan outlined by the Paris Conference and Czech. He informed me further that there was a lull in operations during the past two days at the front and that both sides were preparing for a battle which would shortly be fought at some point yet to be determined between Petropavlovsk and Omsk. Kolchak stated that no matter what happened he was determined to fight on to the last. He desired me to thank the American Government for the present great material assistance being given in the shape of [omission] and rifles, and especially point out the magnificent services being rendered by the American Red Cross without which it would have been impossible for him to have continued operations until now.

Petropavlovsk is in the hands of the Bolsheviki. It has been arranged by mutual agreement that all foreign missions at present in Omsk will leave the city on the evening of Wednesday the 5th. This is done in accordance with the wishes of the Government as it is felt that the large number of trains occupied by all foreigners should be moved out in order to give greater facilities for the movement of troops and also to relieve congestion in the yards. It is my intention to leave on that date, together with Generals Knox and Janin<sup>23</sup> and Ambassador Kato, the personnel of all the various staffs and the last of the Czech contingent amounting to 600 soldiers. It is my intention to proceed as far as Novo Nikolaievsk and there await developments. I shall be accompanied by Colonel Johnson and the corps railway engineers, as well as Major Slaughter and the personnel of the American Hospital. There is absolutely no panic in the city and everything is going forward as planned. Copy of this telegram sent to Tokyo for the information of Morris and Teusler. Harris."

LANSING

<sup>23</sup> Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army, supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army.

861.00/5581 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 5, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received November 6, 7:45 a.m.]

[From Harris at Omsk:]

457. General Dietrichs has resigned as commander of Siberian Army and has been succeeded by General Sakharoff. General Kappel has been placed in charge of third army.

Weather has turned extremely cold. To-day thermometer registers 15° below zero Reaumur. Since occupation of Petropavlovsk by Bolsheviki practically no change in military operations. Preparations for evacuation of Omsk by diplomatic and military missions now actively progressing.

TENNEY

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861.00/5597 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received November 7, 1919, 9:43 a.m.]

[From Harris at] Omsk:

460. November 6, 12 a.m. Military situation direction Petropavlovsk unchanged. In the direction of Ishim Bolsheviki have crossed River Ishim about forty versts.

Am leaving Omsk to-day as planned taking on my train in addition to all Americans some thirty Russian nurses connected with the American hospital. All American Red Cross trains and personnel evacuating in advance of me.

Please advise International Harvester Company, Chicago, that I am taking with me all important documents from their Omsk office. Please advise Singer Sewing Machine Company, New York, that I have with me all important documents and records of their Omsk office.

Ambassador Kato announces that he will remain a few days longer. I am leaving in Omsk Vice Consul Hansen who will keep me thoroughly informed from day to day by direct telegraphic wire the latest news concerning military and political conditions. Am leaving with Hansen a trusted Russian lieutenant. I anticipate no personal danger to Hansen and every preparation has been made for him to meet all contingencies and get out of Omsk in proper time.

I am proceeding Novo Nikolaievsk where the nurses and other Red Cross personnel will be transferred via Red Cross train arriving from the east. I shall be in a position to keep the Department



thoroughly informed on the general situation as heretofore and the Department's telegrams should be sent to Peking for transmission as usual. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5644 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 11, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received November 14, 10 a.m.]

[From Harris:]

464. Arrived Novo Nikolaievsk today from Omsk after four days' journey. Evacuation went forward without incident in spite of traffic congestion. This confirms my judgment that American nurses should have remained in Omsk until now thus giving Omsk hospital three months of their services.

Vice Consul Hansen reports from Omsk in substance as follows:

["] Siberian Army still retreating and now 140 versts of (from?) Omsk.

It is probable that the Bolsheviki will approach Omsk within the next day. Weather has turned warm and Irtish River no longer frozen thus frustrating plans of General Roxaroff [*Sakharoff?*] for defending Omsk. It is feared that Siberian Army will lose most of their supplies when crossing Irtish River.

Local population in Omsk quiet and confident Omsk will not fall. All men in the city have been ordered to defend it.

Present conditions do not indicate fall of Kolchak and his government. To the contrary it seems he is gaining in support, neither is there indication that the army will totally collapse.

The whole Omsk Government, Council of Ministers including Vologodsky evacuating to Irkutsk. Kolchak remaining in Omsk until fate of city decided. Gold reserve is being sent east but have not yet learned to what point. Government expects to resume administrative work in Irkutsk on 16th."

Notifying Hansen, Omsk, today. Remaining several days in Novo Nikolaievsk, I expect to proceed direct to Irkutsk. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5676 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 12, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received November 17, 9:32 a.m.]

[From Harris at Novo Nikolaievsk?]

468. Vice Consul Hansen advised me from Omsk November 11th as follows:

"Kolchak left for Irkutsk this morning. Siberian retreat orderly and no resistance offered enemy. Many refugees, peasants and workmen passing through Omsk in open carts from Petropavlovsk and Ishim districts. Many refugees stated to me that they may die this winter fleeing from Bolshevik but they prefer death to Bolshevik rule. Cavalry, infantry and artillery concentrating in Omsk. Troops marching through the city north and south whole day. Opinion is divided concerning fall of Omsk.

Very little rolling stock left, apparently rich valuable property already evacuated. Weather continues cold; local papers still being published and space being devoted mostly to support of Kolchak and army.

Will leave Omsk with the British railroads mission attached to the last general staff train."

TENNEY

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861.00/5681 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 17, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received November 18, 3:05 a.m.]

[From Harris at Novo Nikolaievsk:]

Omsk fell 7 o'clock evening November 15th. Bolsheviks now thirteen versts east of Omsk. Great bridge over Irtysh River at Omsk destroyed by retreating Siberian Army. Kolchak at Barabinsk. Gold still safe. Japanese mission with Ambassador Kato approaching Novo Nikolaievsk. General Janin leaving Novo Nikolaievsk for Irkutsk morning of 18th. I am also leaving for Irkutsk at the same time. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5721 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 22, 1919.

[Received 10:45 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Tomsk.

477, November 18, 12 a.m. Omsk has been chiefly destroyed by shell gunfire as well as explosion of magazines. Town was scene of severe street fighting and the wealthier inhabitants fled into the country with the object of seeking refuge or losing themselves in the country villages. During the process of evacuation fifteen trains filled with wives and children of Siberian officers or about 8,000 persons were captured by Bolsheviks. It is not known what their fate will be, but thousands of people are without shelter and food which means that there will be indescribable suffering. The temperature averages 12° below Reaumur.

General Staff is approaching Novo Nikolaievsk. Ambassador Kato and Japanese mission have arrived Novo Nikolaievsk. There is a panic in Tatarskaia. Polish troops are evacuating whole region extending from Tatarskaia to Novo Nikolaievsk. Process of evacuation and the movement troops greatly impeded by lack of locomotives and much wreckage. Vice Consul Hansen has left Tatarskaia and is probably now approaching Barabinsk. I am proceeding Irkutsk but moving slowly. Latest news indicates that Bolsheviki have halted their rapid advance. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5728 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, November 24, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received 6:11 a.m.]

Information previous cables confirmed Reds at Omsk captured 35,000 soldiers, 10 generals, 1,000 officers, 2,000 machine guns, 3,000,000 shells, 1,000,000 rifles, shells, uniforms and equipment for 30,000 men, 16 armored trains. Kolchak army is entirely demoralized and scattered. Czechs have all left Novo Nicholas [*Novo Nikolaievsk*] and foreigners with them. It is probable that Reds will capture 157 trains now on the way east. I see no chance for the Government.

STEVENS

861.00/5766 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 25, 1919, noon.

[Received November 26, 11:25 a.m.]

[From Harris:]

483. [Kolchak] Ministry has resigned. Pepelyaev, Minister of Interior, has been charged with forming new ministry. He will attempt to fuse a ministry from representatives of the Social Revolutionaries [and] Cossacks and attempt to retain several members of present ministry.

Soukine informs me that his resignation will stand for the reason that he cannot work with Atamans of [*or*] the strong left Social Revolutionaries tendencies as represented in Czech contingent by Doctor Girska. Minister of Finance Hoyer and his assistant Novitsky will also go. The elimination of these three is a distinct loss to America as they were decidedly pro-Americans. Soukine is to go abroad, probably to the United States, and Novitsky will join Denekine.

The Czechs in Irkutsk have issued an appeal, copy of which has been forwarded to the Department by Macgowan,<sup>24</sup> which does not tend to improve the situation. Analyzed this appeal means three things: first, it is a decided attack on the Kolchak government; second, it is announcement of their determination to return home; and third, if they cannot get home otherwise it is clear that the left Social Revolutionary element among the Czechs headed by Doctor Girska will even go so far as to open negotiations with the Bolsheviki in order to attain their object. This is my opinion of this appeal. It is estimated that 60 per cent of the Czech soldiers are Bolsheviki.

At the present moment everything is quiet from Vladivostok to Novo Nikolaievsk. Kolchak is in Novo Nikolaievsk with the gold. Semenoff is also quiet for the moment. While there is considerable traffic congestion in the neighborhood of Novo Nikolaievsk and Taiga, railroad is in good condition and my recent journey was rapid and without mishap. There is a great want of locomotives. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5790 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated*.

[Received December 1, 1919, 12:04 p.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk:

486. November 28, 8 p.m. Following report received from Vice Consul Ray, Novo Nikolaievsk, in substance:

Interviewed General Ivanoff-Rinoff November 26th. He frankly discussed present situation stating that in the course of two or three weeks Novo Nikolaievsk would be evacuated; that the final front will be somewhere between Marinsk and Krasnoyarsk. The Altai district will not be evacuated as it is the intention to hold Barnaul and Semipalatinsk. Dutoff's army along with Siberian Cossacks has been ordered to reinforce the armies now there. Dutoff's troops already arriving Semipalatinsk. This move will create a new front to be known as the southern front. Rinoff believes that all valuable materials will be evacuated from Novo Nikolaievsk. He further advised me to begin a complete evacuation of the Red Cross to Krasnoyarsk and work from there with the front. Bolsheviki have occupied Tatarskaia and are now about 400 versts west this city. According to the general belief the Bolshevik army in [*is*] suffering a good deal morally inasmuch as the commissars when urging them to capture Omsk stated that the civil war would end when Omsk was captured thereby eliminating Kolchak. As this is not the case and

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<sup>24</sup> In his telegram no. 596, Nov. 16, *post*, p. 313.

the opposition continues they are creating several minor difficulties in the rear and may develop into more serious outbreaks.

I learn from reliable source that Kolchak is calm and while confident is prepared for the worst. Railway authorities state that they will successfully evacuate all rolling stock from here. Kolchak, Sakharoff and army staff here and from what I can learn they will be here for some time. Situation here far from hopeless but very serious. Interviewed General Sakharoff on 27th who informed me that the army of General Kappel, operating south of railroad, had been ordered to check advance Bolshevik army for the next few days. The Siberian Army now occupies line on railroad from Slavgorod to Tatarskaia, while the second army under General Voitzechovski is operating to north of railroad. Retreat this far continues orderly and general condition of troops fair, but very poorly clad. I personally believe that Novo Nikolaievsk will fall in the course of the next two weeks and are [am] taking measures for the complete evacuation of all personnel and all American interests during the next few days.

Everything is quiet on Siberian Railway line from Novo Nikolaievsk eastward. New Ministry has not yet been formed. Kolchak sent angry reply to Czech appeal which is being withheld from Czechs by Soukine who fears same might lead to complications. Social Revolutionaries have not yet found bases upon which to work with Kolchak government. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5801 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, December 3, 1919.

[Received 9:32 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Irkutsk.

492, December 2, 3 p.m. Vice Consul Ray reports from Novo Nikolaievsk that he is evacuating. Barabinsk now in hands of Bolsheviks. General evacuation of Novo Nikolaievsk begun.

Vice Consul Dille reports from Taiga that General Pepelaiev intends making stand Krasnoyarsk. Many soldiers in Taiga from front and in bad condition for want of food. Typhus very bad there and getting worse. Czechs leave that whole neighborhood with all forces in ten days. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5814 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, December 3, 1919, noon.

[Received December 4, 10:12 a.m.]

[From Harris at Irkutsk:]

494. Bolshevik now thirty versts east of Barabinsk. Kolchak still in Novo Nikolaievsk. Considerable difficulty in evacuation caused by Czechs seizing all locomotives in order to concentrate all their troops in direction Irkutsk. Kolchak apparently now depending chiefly upon Polish troops to secure retreat of himself and army.

Reported here that Bolsheviki have concluded peace with Esthonia and the Yudenitch army no longer exists. Also reported that Denekine still retreating.

Reported here that Bolsheviki have committed no atrocities in Omsk but on contrary are treating population with kindness. Siberian soldiers and officers have been given option of serving in Bolshevik army or being employed in civil capacity. Those who are irreconcilable are being placed in internment camps.

Everything quiet in Irkutsk as well as along railway east and west. Shortage of coal and locomotives continues. Prices of all foodstuffs rising enormously. It is feared that the Chinese Government is taking decided action to prohibit exportation of Manchurian foodstuffs into Siberia. Should this step materialize it will cause great famine here because Bolsheviki now occupy granaries western Siberia.

Interesting and important events may transpire in Irkutsk during the next two or three months. This will not be in the nature of uprisings and bloodshed but may be some decided action on the part of Social Revolutionaries to secure compromise with Bolsheviki, and that is [*sic*] both Bolsheviki and Kolchak forces, as well as entire population are completely exhausted and all classes of population are getting heartily sick of internecine strife. I am watching situation carefully. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5911 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

Please comment on the following report which the Department has just received :<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> From John F. Stevens, president of the Technical Board, by telegram of Dec. 15, 2 p.m., from Harbin (not printed).

“There is not the least hope that the Kolchak Government can be sustained. The attitude of Bolshevik[s in] Siberia has completely changed. They are committing no excesses and are gradually advancing eastward from Omsk establishing order. They have practically all the people with them and are exhibiting moderation and good sense. There is nothing to prevent them from coming as far as they want. They have not executed anybody, or even held prisoners of war. Have advised all parties regardless of former affiliations to go about their business and they would not be molested, on the contrary would be provided with food. Trotsky is at Omsk and they are proceeding with arrangements for election delegates to General Constituent Assembly. There is reason to believe that they have an understanding with Czechs and as the latter retire as they are doing, they will follow peacefully. I believe that now conditions will shortly be such as will permit constructive work to be done providing that the policy of the United States is to be such as will permit of dealings with these people.”

LANSING

861.00/5933 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, December 18, 1919.

[Received December 19, 6:43 p.m.]

[From Harris at Irkutsk:]

“513. December 18th, 5 p.m. Admiral Kolchak now at Krasnoyarsk has addressed telegram to all foreign representatives in Irkutsk stating in substance that the Czech commandant at Krasnoyarsk station has seized the locomotives of his four or five trains and is preventing his movement to Irkutsk. Kolchak accuses the Czechs of cruelty in leaving women and children to suffer and in doing other deeds of violence which completely hamper movements of his army. The Czechs are taking this action in order to insure their own evacuation.

Foreign representatives here are informally asking General Syrový<sup>26</sup> now in Irkutsk to use his good offices in assisting the rapid movement of Admiral Kolchak and his staff to Irkutsk.

From my conversation with Tretiakoff<sup>27</sup> this morning it was evident that he is apprehensive as to the future conduct of the Czechs and he asked the Japanese to send at least 2,000 soldiers to this city to keep the peace in case of disturbance. He is of the opinion that their mere presence here would have beneficial effect.

I would respectfully point out that this action of the Czechs in Krasnoyarsk is preventing the evacuation of three American Red

<sup>26</sup> Gen. Jan Syrový, commander of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia.

<sup>27</sup> Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs during the last weeks of Kolchak's government.

Cross trains which are stuck some place between Krasnoyarsk and Novo Nikolaievsk. A week has passed since I have heard from either Vice Consuls Ray or Hansen who are on two divisions of American Red Cross trains some place between Novo Nikolaievsk and Taiga. Telegraphic communication with them has been broken. If anything happens in this respect the Czechs will be to blame for it, for the reason that they are apparently seeking their own evacuation without thought to other foreigners who may still be to their rear. There are 30,000 Czech troops concentrated between Krasnoyarsk and Taiga and this represents a force amply sufficient to thoroughly organize and protect the evacuation of all foreigners in that whole district. The trouble does not lie with the officers and officials but plainly with the soldiers whose morale and discipline have so deteriorated that the commands of their superiors are disregarded. As General Gaida by his own acts succeeded in thoroughly disgracing himself before leaving Siberia the feeling is gaining ground that the whole Czech Army may yet by some untoward act thoroughly undo all the good work which they accomplished last year. I have hopes that the Allied representatives here will be able to smooth out the situation.

Kolchak has the [apparent omission] with the consul. Harris.”  
TENNEY

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861.00/5952 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, December 23, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received December 23, 9 a.m.]

Capture Tomsk and 6,000 soldiers with a general by the anti-Kolchak forces officially confirmed. Nothing evacuated from the city. Rumor not yet confirmed capture of Taiga with some American Red Cross people cut off.

STEVENS

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861.00/5974 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received December 24, 1919, 7:34 a.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk, December 23:

Following telegram sent to Vladivostok, Harbin and Tokio:

December 23, 3 a.m. Poles now fighting Bolsheviki at Taiga. Vice Consuls Hansen and Ray together with last American Red



Cross trains safely past Taiga. I now have no further fear for their welfare.

Kolchak has left Krasnoyarsk and is slowly approaching Irkutsk. Owing to high-handed performances of Czechs, 120 trains have been caught by the Bolsheviki. General Kappel who is now in command of what is left of the Siberian forces has sent a challenge to Czech General Syrový to fight a duel. This is mentioned only in order to show existing friction between Czechs and Siberians.

Social Revolutionary government has been formed at Cheremkhovo. Everything is quiet however in that region and coal miners continue work and railway traffic unimpeded. No disturbances reported east or west. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5975 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, December 24, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received December 25, 12:25 a.m.]

Following reported to me by Czechs although not officially confirmed. Kolchak telegraphed to Seminoff asking him to stop Czechs from coming out even if he had blow up tunnels. In return he will be appointed Commander all forces east of Irkutsk. Kolchak telegraphed to General Oi<sup>28</sup> asking if he would support Seminoff and Oi replied that he would. Seminoff has telegraphed Czech Commanders that he will force them to support Kolchak and conflict is probable if he undertakes to carry out threat. I am just advised that Seminoff has been appointed as above. Bolsheviki have all territory west of Achinsk including coal mines. I expect any moment to hear they have Krasnoyarsk.

STEVENS

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861.00/5985 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received December 26, 1919, 8:23 a.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk:

[“] 520, December 24, 4 p.m. Situation between Czechs and Semenoff acute. Semenoff had addressed telegram to Czechs demanding they desist from disorganizing railway traffic in the district between Krasnoyarsk and Bogotol by seizing locomotives and freight cars

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<sup>28</sup> Gen. Narimoto Oi, commander of the Japanese expeditionary forces in Siberia.

for the purpose furthering their rapid evacuation, otherwise he, Semenoff, will resist their passage through his territory by force. Whole situation surrounding relations between Czechs and Russians greatly aggravated by the fact that Czech soldiers stationed in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk, and practically amounting to 30,000 men, have completely got out of control and their officers apparently now have little influence over them. They hold meetings and decide things for themselves and at the present moment they are fully determined upon rapid evacuation as they have heard that a large number of steamships have arrived at Vladivostok for them.

Foreign representatives in Irkutsk are doing everything in their power to get both Semenoff and Czech soldiers to be reasonable and not precipitate a conflict which may have very serious results. I have hopes that things will pass off smoothly.

There is no change in the situation. Harris."

TENNEY

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861.00/5987 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, December 26, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received December 26, 11:53 a.m.]

Following from Harris [at Irkutsk] in substance.

"25th. Social Revolutionary uprising. Irkutsk station across the river held by Social Revolutionaries, but Irkutsk city still held by Kolchak troops. There is a possibility no fighting and I expect that Czech troops are guaranteeing peace. Conference of Allied representatives today decided that gold which is in possession of Kolchak, who is nearest Achinsk, should be taken in charge and guarded by the Czechs. Allied representatives are remaining here for the present American Red Cross nurses and personnel safe. I expect peace to be concluded in a few days. A few arrests have been made of ministers. Social Revolutionaries claim that they are in possession from Polovidi to Irkutsk station while latest reports show that Kolchak is slowly approaching Irkutsk. Communication interrupted between Irkutsk station and city and passage of river difficult as only small Czech boat in operation at present. Every effort will be made to keep the Department informed."

TENNEY

861.00/5995 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, December 27, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received December 27, 9:50 a.m.]

Telegrams from Irkutsk dated December 24th and 25th sent to the Japanese General Staff state that the Fifty-third Regiment of the Siberian Army which was guarding the railway station at Irkutsk has mutinied and taken control of the station and the railway yards abroad [*sic*]. Harris and other Allied representatives are living in trains. In addition local Bolshevik bands are reported to be marching on Irkutsk from both north and south and are now within thirty kilometres of the city. The Japanese General Staff is also advised that Kolchak has reached Irkutsk but that he is without any reliable troops and that a condition of serious unrest prevails throughout the entire district. General Oi has sent from the Baikal region approximately a thousand men, infantry, artillery and cavalry, to insure the protection of the Baikal tunnels. The Japanese General Staff is still eager to send at least two battalions of infantry to Irkutsk to keep order there, and if necessary to protect the evacuation of the foreign representatives and agencies, but hesitates to act without our concurrence and support. Under date of December 21, Harris telegraphed that American Red Cross trains had passed Taiga and were expected in Irkutsk in the near future but he makes no mention of any disturbance at Irkutsk. I have had no word from the Foreign Office in regard to these recent developments but the Military Attaché tells me that General Tanaka and the officers of the General Staff appear greatly concerned and have urged him to impress upon me the necessity of sending to Irkutsk both American and Japanese troops at the earliest moment possible. I understand that Ambassador Shidehara is making further representations to you.

MORRIS

861.00/6003 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, December 27, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 6:05 p.m.]

Reliable information through our inspectors Kolchak government completely overthrown. Irkutsk and several smaller cities west of there in the possession of Social Revolutionists. Czech commander-in-chief replying Semenoff very defiant straightforward [*sic*] and it

is reliably reported that fighting has taken place. Americans apparently in no danger in disturbed districts as the Czechs will provide protection. Telegraphic communication is interrupted Chita and Irkutsk but the Czechs will not permit Semenov to stop operation railway. Disregard criticism of Czechs, they are fully justified in their acts. The situation in and around Vladivostok is serious. Russian soldiers on the coal branch guarded by Americans revolted. I expect political overthrow at Vladivostok.

STEVENS

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861.00/6027 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, December 28, 1919.

[Received December 30, 9:37 a.m.]

[From Harris:]

["] 523, December 28, 8 a.m. Kolchak has sent telegram to Horvat and Semenov to oppose passage of Czechs and if necessary blow up bridges.

It is felt by Allied representatives here that Kolchak's mentality is breaking up under the tremendous strain of the past two months. The tone of the telegrams which he has forwarded to Czechs and the foreign representatives here would almost indicate this.

It is felt here that Czech-American-Japanese forces are sufficient in the trans-Baikal to safeguard tunnels [and] bridges. Harris."

TENNEY

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861.00/6029 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received December 30, 1919, 12:05 p.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk:

["] 424, December 28, 9 a.m. Referring to Department's telegram December 18, 5 p.m. Kolchak's government is finished. Attitude the Bolsheviki in general has not changed. Attitude toward Cossacks and peasants western Siberia technically lenient in order to procure food supplies. Bolshevism exists today from Lake Baikal westward to Moscow. Bolsheviki power still held by terrorism. Trotsky has been at Omsk. Not the slightest arrangements have thus far been made for election of delegates to general constituent assembly on the part of Bolsheviki. Unfortunately Czecho soldiers have assisted in breaking up the Kolchak government thus helping the Bolsheviki. It is impossible to do constructive work with Bolshevism, as now constituted, for reason that sound economics and

finance can not exist under their rule. Social Revolutionaries now in charge of Irkutsk station are exploiting [*exactly?*] the same band of Bolsheviks which I knew one year and adopted [*a half?*] ago when I was shut up in Irkutsk under the Bolshevik regime. Harris."

TENNEY

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**Inter-Allied Agreement for Supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Siberian Railways**

861.77/611 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, January 9, 1919, 12 midnight.

[Received January 10, 7:10 p.m.]

As reported in my January 9, 7 p.m.,<sup>31</sup> immediately upon receipt of a copy of Stevens' telegram to the Department accepting plan for operation of the railways,<sup>32</sup> I called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and informed him that the plan would be approved by our Government. I acted quickly because two days ago my British colleague received instructions to submit [a] plan and urge its acceptance. Fortunately the instructions were so garbled that he was compelled to ask for a repetition, and thus I was enabled to counsel with the Minister for Foreign Affairs before my British colleague was in a position to carry out his instructions. I have just notified him that the matter is concluded and he tells me that he will not act upon the repeated telegram when received, and he assumes that you will now cordially endorse the agreement which we have reached with Japan.

I submitted to Viscount Uchida and obtained his approval of following memorandum of points which we had previously discussed and agreed on:

"1st. That Viscount Uchida will forward the amended plan to Viscount Ishii with instructions to present it to the Department of State, and to explain that it is submitted with the understanding that Mr. Stevens be named as President.

2d. That the Inter-Allied Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the following Governments: China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States, leaving question of Czecho-Slovaks to be discussed.

3d. That each of the above named Governments shall select one technical railway expert for membership on the Technical Board.

[4th.] That Mr. Stevens' selection as President shall not prevent his selection as a member of the Technical Board.

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<sup>31</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 306.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

5th. That the Governments of Japan and the United States shall at once advise the above named Associated Governments of agreed plan, including the understanding in reference to the selection of Mr. Stevens, and request their adherence and cordial cooperation.

6th. That this plan shall be interpreted as a sincere effort to join [*temporarily to operate*] the Chinese-Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways in the interest of the Russian people with a view to their ultimate return to those in interest without the impairing of any existing rights.

7th. That in trusting to Mr. Stevens as President the technical operation of these railways, it is understood the Governments of Japan and the United States are both prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective."

Viscount Uchida suggested that our two Governments might agree to instruct their Ambassadors to join in advising the Associated Governments of the understanding reached. He further expressed the hope that I would go to Vladivostock to assist in the preliminary arrangement. Stevens also telegraphed as follows:

"Presume matter should be closed up at Vladivostock and you should be there by all means."

I would appreciate the Department's judgment as to the wisdom of my leaving for Vladivostok in the near future. In the event of my going I would request authorization to take with me Thomas Smith, one of the coding clerks who speaks Russian, and Ballantine, who speaks Japanese.

MORRIS

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861.77/609 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1919, 6 p.m.*

Unless you prefer other action Department suggests you forward following to Stevens:

"For your information following telegram received from Consul General Harris at Omsk dated 8th. Suggest you may consider it advisable, if you have not already done so, to communicate to him result of railway negotiations and relations which you may wish to establish with Omsk railway authorities:

'The Omsk Government has appealed to me to place before the Department the immediate and imperative necessity that the managing control of the Siberian Railway be taken over by the American Railway Commission. It is admitted without reserve that the Russians do not possess either the technical ability or administrative qualities for organization that are necessary at this critical time to keep the railway running, and if present conditions last for a space

of two months longer the congestion will be such that the entire line will be hopelessly disrupted, bringing with it all possible attendant consequences. The Omsk Government asking no conditions, it will comply with every request; it simply appeals for help.

I strongly and sincerely urge the Department to give this matter immediate attention. Without the railway operating under fairly favorable circumstances there can be no relief offered the people of Siberia and Russia by our Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and War Trade Board. Our efforts along these lines will simply amount to nothing. I am aware of the difficulties which probably surround the Department in its efforts to help the situation here, but I express the hope that the obstacles may be speedily overcome. I would further caution the Department in treating this railway situation, not to entirely ignore the wishes of the Omsk Government by treating it as a negligent [*sic*] question. After all, it is what the people of central and western Siberia have produced, and I only suggest that everything be done to avoid offending the people here. They are very sensitive on the point that apparently the development of their railway is being decided in the Far East, in an atmosphere they detest on account of the intrigues going on there. [Harris.]’”

POLK

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861.77/611 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, *January 13, 1919, 4 p.m.*

4037. Repeat to Paris and Rome. Am[erican] mission being advised direct. Referring to Department's No. 3991, Jan. 10 [9], 7 p.m.<sup>33</sup> Following telegram from Ambassador Morris at Tokio, January 9, 12 midnight, gives final status of railway negotiations. The Department is authorizing Mr. Morris to proceed to Vladivostok in the near future to settle preliminary arrangements and has told him that he and Stevens can go ahead with the plan as soon as we notify him that Japanese Ambassador at Washington has presented the matter formally to this Government, at which time we will also instruct you to give formal notification to the government to which you are accredited. In the meanwhile please keep the government to which you are accredited fully advised, orally, of the status of the situation to date.

[Here follows text of telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, January 9, 12 midnight, with final sentence omitted, printed *ante*, p. 236.]

POLK

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<sup>33</sup> Not printed; it communicated the text of telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Dec. 27, 1918, 10 p.m. (*Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 301), which telegram contained the text of railway plan printed *infra*.

861.77/673

*The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1919.*

SIR: I have the honor to present to you, under instructions, a plan for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways in the zone in which the Allied forces are now operating and to request that you will be good enough to let me know whether it is acceptable to the Government of the United States.

Accept [etc.]

K. ISHII

[Enclosure]

*Plan for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways in the zone in which the Allied military forces are now operating*

(1) The general supervision of the railways in the zone in which the allied forces are now operating shall be exercised in a special inter-allied committee which shall consist of representatives from each allied power having military forces in Siberia including Russia and the chairman of which shall be a Russian.

The following boards shall be created to be placed under the control of the inter-allied committee.

(a) A technical board consisting of railway experts of the nations having military forces in Siberia for the purpose of administering the technical and economic management of all railways in the said zone.

(b) An allied military transportation board for the purpose of co-ordinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities.

(2) The protection of the railways shall be placed under the allied military forces. At the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager or director with the powers conferred by the existing Russian law.

(3) The technical board shall elect a President to whom shall be intrusted the technical operation of railways. In matters of such technical operation the President may issue instructions to the Russian officials mentioned in the preceding clause. He may appoint assistants and inspectors in the service of the board chosen from among nationals of powers having military forces in Siberia to be attached to the central office of the board and define their duties. He may assign, if necessary, corps of railway experts to more important stations. In his assigning railway experts to any of the stations, interests of respective allied powers in charge of [military protection of <sup>34</sup>] such stations shall be taken into due consideration.

<sup>34</sup> See telegram to the Ambassador in Great Britain, Apr. 15, 7 p.m., p. 260.



He shall distribute work among the clerical staff of the board whom he may appoint at his discretion.

(4) The clerical staff of the Inter-allied Committee shall be appointed by the chairman of the committee who shall have the right of distributing work among such employes as well as of dismissing them.

(5) The present arrangement shall cease to be operative upon the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Siberia and all the foreign railway experts appointed under this arrangement shall then be recalled forthwith.

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861.77/816 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 16, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 8 p.m.]

371. The Foreign Office has informally and orally been acquainted with the pertinent portions of the following telegrams from you: 3990, January 10, 6 p.m.,<sup>35</sup> 3991, January 10 [9], 7 p.m.,<sup>35</sup> 3989 (received via Paris)<sup>35</sup> and 4037 of January 13, 4 p.m. with the understanding that immediately upon notification from you that the Japanese Ambassador at Washington has presented the matter officially to the Department, formal notification will be given to the British Government as to the plan, now agreed upon by the Governments of Japan and the United States. Even before the discussion of the last-mentioned telegram, gratification was expressed by the Foreign Office that the instructions of the British Government to their Ambassador at Tokyo had reached him in so unintelligible a form as to prevent his action thereon, and the most cordial interest is now displayed in, and support promised to, the final plan which appears to meet with the enthusiastic approval of this Government. The frank personal discussions that have taken place have been fortunate in not only clearing away the apparent misunderstanding, which as I have previously reported, was due solely to the disinclination of this Government to press that of Japan to the acceptance of a plan distasteful to her, but has also resulted in the discussion of important relevant matters. I learn that this Government believes that Japan's attitude was not wholly unreasonably assumed in view of the fact that the Governments associated with her had as yet determined upon no definite Russian policy, and the hope was earnestly expressed that early discussions in Paris might result in the establishment thereof. Notwithstanding the fact that Semenoff was

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<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

at one time supported by Japan with at least the tacit acquiescence of other powers, it is now agreed that his activities are a serious block to the operation of the railroad which should be removed if possible by endeavoring now to secure his cooperation with the Associated Governments or with Koltchak. In reply to a query as to the opportuneness of now enlarging the scheme of economic and financial assistance to Russia principally through Vladivostock via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the British Government explain that British advocate the submission of the question to the Inter-Allied Committee in Siberia now contemplated with the request that its recommendations be immediately formulated. The hope was expressed that we might take similar action. Paris informed.

DAVIS

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861.77/617 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received January 17, 1919, 3:50 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"26. January 15, 2 p.m. On evening of January 13, the Council of Ministers, Provisional Government, invited the representatives of Foreign Powers to be present at the meeting, in order to make a statement concerning the Siberian Railway. The object of the meeting was not to discuss the question itself but merely to state the decision the Government had arrived at. Substance of this decision was as follows.

The Council of the Ministers recognized that the situation of the railway management has become threatening and exceptional measures must be taken. The management of the railway cannot be undertaken by the Government on account of impossibility to sustain budget expense, absence of telegraph equipment. The cooperation of a foreign affairs specialist is a necessity. If the railway is left in its present fashion, task will become precarious and Bolshevism strengthened. The Russian Government applies to the Allies because it feels that they are interested in the destruction of Bolshevism, and because of the avowed intentions of the Allies to assist in the economic regeneration of Russia. I am informed the Government has decided in favor of the project agreed upon by most of the Allied Governments, which provides that their railways shall be regulated and controlled by a special Inter-Allied Committee and that the general management shall be confined to Mr. Stevens. The Council of Ministers charges the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and [of] Ways and Communications with the task of taking necessary

measures for the conclusion of negotiations with representatives of the Allied nations for the management of the railways on the basis of the project already agreed upon.

My opinion of this meeting is that the Council of Ministers desire to forestall any attempt to divide the railways into zones or districts, thus dividing the management of the railway among groups interested powers. Somehow the Government here has the feeling that this railway project is being decided, possibly at the present moment, without taking into consideration the wishes of the people here. Both the Government and all foreign representatives here are entirely ignorant of what is going on in the cabinet of the Allied Powers concerning the Siberian Railway.

The project referred to by Council of Ministers is the one agreed upon by [omission] and Stevens last October <sup>86</sup> and which the Japanese evidently refused to agree to.

Present at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, by special invitation, on evening 13th, were Regnault,<sup>87</sup> Eliot, Generals Janin, Knox, a Japanese officer, Schuyler <sup>88</sup> and myself. Harris."

REINSCH

861.77/672

*The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Debuchè) to the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. LONG: Following up the conversation which I had the pleasure of having with you yesterday evening, in regard to the proposed plan for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian railways, I hasten to inform you, in the absence of my Chief, that the seven points enumerated in the memorandum handed by the American Ambassador at Tokio to Viscount Uchida on the 9th of January are well understood by the latter.

I beg to enclose for your information a copy of the above mentioned memorandum as cabled to this Embassy from Tokio.

Yours very sincerely,

K. DEBUCHI

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

As the result of informal conversation with Viscount Uchida, it is understood:

First, that Viscount Uchida forwarded the friendly solution plan to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington with instructions to

<sup>86</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 275.

<sup>87</sup> Eugène L. G. Regnault, French High Commissioner in Siberia.

<sup>88</sup> Capt. Montgomery Schuyler, U.S.A., on duty at Omsk.

present it to the Acting Secretary of State and to explain that it is submitted with the understanding that Mr. Stevens be named as President.

Second, that the Japanese Government have proposed that the inter-allied committee shall consist of one representative of each of the following governments: China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States, leaving the question of Czecho-Slovaks.

Third, that each of the above named governments shall select one technical railway expert for membership of the technical board.

Fourth, that Mr. Stevens' selection as President shall not prevent his selection as a member of the technical board.

Fifth, that the Governments of Japan and the United States shall at once advise the above-named associated governments of the plan agreed upon including the understanding in reference to the selection of Mr. Stevens and request their adherence and cordial cooperation.

Sixth, that this plan shall be interpreted as a sincere effort temporarily to operate the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian railways in the interest of the Russian people with a view to the ultimate return to those in interest without the impairing of any existing rights.

Seventh, that in intrusting to Mr. Stevens as President the technical operation of these railways, it is understood that the Governments of Japan and the United States are both prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective.

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861.77/634 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *January 21, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received January 22, 4:54 a.m.]

376. Your 304, January 18, 8 p.m.<sup>39</sup> The President in a letter received today approves of the plan as the best that can be obtained and desires you to inform the War Department of his concurrence and his willingness that General Graves be instructed accordingly.

Concerning needed funds, Mr. McCormick<sup>40</sup> and I feel that it is important that comprehensive financial plan be worked out by the several governments interested and that the burden of financing shall be equally distributed. In the meantime to strengthen Stevens' position upon his taking office Mr. McCormick is cabling recommendation that the War Trade Board Russian Bureau, Incorpo-

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

<sup>40</sup> Vance McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board and technical adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

rated, make a temporary advance to Stevens, provided the Japanese Government does not dissent, of say \$1,000,000 which will be applicable to pay wages coming due and in arrears and for needed equipment. It should be clearly understood that this advance is to be repaid as soon as general plans of financing are worked out and that it does not convey any implication of peculiar American responsibility in respect to such financing. Suggest you confer with Japanese Ambassador on the points mentioned.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.77/844 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received January 25, 1919, 1:34 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

[“]50. January 24, noon. Have sent following self-explanatory telegram to Stevens:

‘January 23, 6 p.m. Have communicated your cipher telegram dated January 20<sup>41</sup> to Ustrugoff and for your confidential information Department Foreign Office here informs me today that word has been received that Ambassador Morris was proceeding to Harbin in order to carry on negotiations with General Horvat<sup>42</sup> concerning railroad. I was informed that any arrangements reached with Horvat would not be acceptable to Government here.

If it is at all possible, I believe it would be good policy not to entirely ignore the existence of said Government. In making this statement I only have in mind possible future trouble, and hope it may be avoided. Kindly inform Ambassador Morris upon his arrival.[’]

I would respectfully suggest that the Omsk Government at least be kept informed concerning the nature of, and with whom, the railroad negotiations are being conducted in Harbin and Vladivostok. And Omsk Government does not recognize the right of Horvat to represent the interest of the Siberian Railroad in any capacity or in anything which might have a bearing on the railroad question, in any manner, shape, or form. This Government is fearful that recognizing any claims of Horvat would but encourage separatist ideas and interests and strengthen him in position which would enable future construction [*obstruction?*]. The case of Sem-enoff is cited as an example of what signification [*sic*] self-interest may accomplish in delaying the reconstruction of Russian unity.

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<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

<sup>42</sup> Gen. Dmitri L. Horvat, Russian Governor and General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Foreign Office here informs me that Ambassador Morris has telegraphed Sir Charles Eliot, now Omsk, to come to Harbin for a conference. Sir Charles Eliot replied that he would be pleased to see Ambassador Morris in Tokio. I mention this to show how ignorant every one here is concerning the railway situation and the entire Tokio [*Omsk?*] Government is greatly irritated by what is considered unnecessary and unjust treatment. As I have mentioned in former despatches I trust some steps may be taken to conciliate the Government here. This is necessary for the sake of present and future harmony. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.77/634: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *January 24, 1919, 3 p.m.*

391. For the Secretary of State.

Referring to my answer<sup>43</sup> to your 376 January 21st, regarding Siberian railway plan, I take the liberty of calling your attention to the political situation here. Critical spirit in Congress is being clearly manifested in regard to Russia: 1st, by attacks on War Trade Board Russian Bureau; 2d, by attacks on personal conduct of Ambassador Francis by LaGuardia, who apparently got his information from Consul Winship now at Milan and Lieutenant Commander Crosley, formerly at Petrograd, now Naval Attaché at Madrid; 3d, by Senator Johnson's continually attacking Administration for keeping troops in Russia and Siberia.

There is no question but that the Republicans are trying to force an extra session, and leading Democrats seem to feel that the extra session is inevitable. If successful, Republicans through control of various committees will make attacks on every phase of policy of Administration in Russia. We are committed now to a plan for operation of railways in Siberia and the need is as urgent as ever, but I wish to lay stress on the fact that money must be supplied in large sums in order to carry through the plan. In view of the attitude of Congress on the Food Bill, I should doubt the possibility of securing money for the purpose by an appropriation. The Russian Ambassador has no funds for any real railway reorganization, and has already exhausted sums set aside for maintaining Railway Service Corps.

I am taking the liberty of stating the case baldly so the President and yourself may have all the facts before you before he commits himself to supply the money for this purpose from his private fund.

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<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

I have asked Woolley<sup>44</sup> to express his views on the situation, and as soon as I hear from him will cable you again.

I have not communicated with the Japanese Government our formal acceptance, and for this reason would like to have your views as soon as possible.

POLK

861.77/655 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 31, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received February 1, 6:30 p.m.]

521. Department's 391, dated January 24th, 3 p.m. and Department's 392, January 24th, 4 p.m.<sup>45</sup>

The substance of these cables has received the careful consideration of Secretary Lansing and McCormick and the latter has discussed the matter generally [*fully*] with the President who approves and authorizes the following procedure:

You are requested to ask for a second [*secret*] hearing before such committee or committees in Congress as you think best. At this hearing you will state that it is the President's wish that the Siberian situation and the activities of the administration in relation thereto be made known fully and frankly, though in strict confidence, to the members of these committees. You will then develop the strategic importance both from the point of view of Russia and of the United States of the Trans-Siberian Railway as being a principal means of access to and from the Russian people and as affording an opportunity for economic aid to Siberia where the people are relatively friendly and resistant to Bolshevik influence and where there are large bodies of Czech-Slovaks who rely upon our support as well as large numbers of enemy prisoners of war whose activities must be watched and in all cases [*if necessary*] controlled. The potential value of this railroad as a means for developing American commerce particularly from the west coast of the United States to Russia might be mentioned. You may then narrate in considerable detail the difficulties which we have had with Japan with reference to this railway and in particular the action of Japan in practically seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, thereby in effect controlling all intercourse to and from Russia via the Pacific. You might mention the number of troops sent by Japan for the purpose and point out that such number was far in excess of that contemplated by the arrangement under which troops of the Associated Governments were landed in Siberia. The nature of the activities of Japan

<sup>44</sup> Clarence M. Woolley, acting chairman of the War Trade Board.

<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

including disposition of their troops and Japanese commercial activities should then be referred to [followed by] a statement of the efforts of the Government of the United States to restore the railroad to a condition where it would not be exclusively dominated by any one power. . . . The conversations of the President and Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the negotiations of Ambassador Morris under instructions from the Department and the economic pressure applied by the War Trade Board <sup>46</sup> may be referred to. You should then describe the successful conclusion of these efforts of the United States as evidenced by the arrangements for administration of the railway by Stevens as a Russian employee and the withdrawal of substantial numbers of Japanese troops. We feel that these proceedings and their conclusion can properly be described as a very important and constructive achievement which may be of inestimable value to the people of Russia and to the United States as well as the world in general, provided they are followed through, thereby giving practical effect to the principle of the open door. You will then point out that in order to give substance and permanence to the arrangement which has been reached, it will be necessary to devise a plan for the financing of the railway and that it is the view of the President that this financing should be regarded as a joint obligation of the interested Governments and that the President is prepared to propose [and endeavor] to secure agreement on such a plan [provided] it seems probable that Congress will be prepared to appropriate the funds necessary to permit the Government of the United States to deposit [*carry out*] its proportional share of any financing agreed to. You may add that if the disposition of the committees whom you will be addressing is favorable to such a plan, the President will as a provisional measure and as (indicated?) in Am[erican] mission 376, January 21st, arrange through the Russian Bureau, Incorporated, or through his special fund, for a limited temporary advance to support Stevens, pending the submission to Congress of a definite financial plan provided one can be agreed to. The consequence of failure to support Stevens, as indicated by Department's 130 [113] January 6th,<sup>47</sup> should be developed and the responsibility of Congress in connection therewith made clear. It is felt that it may be desirable that Woolley appear with you and state to the members of the committees the purposes and activities of the War Trade Board Russian Bureau, Incorporated, pointing out that these purposes and activities have from time to time been publicly announced and that the corporation does not constitute a secret instrumentality.

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<sup>46</sup> By restrictions laid upon licenses for the export of cotton and the import of silk in November 1918 (file no. 694.119/245).

<sup>47</sup> Not printed.



The foregoing is designed to indicate the spirit in which the President wishes the Siberian situation to be handled and you should not consider yourself bound to follow literally the suggestions made. It is desired that you treat the matter with the utmost frankness, giving all information at your disposal under, of course, a pledge of confidence.

It is desired that you cable as promptly as possible the attitude of the Congressional Committees and pending our hearing from you on this subject you are requested to hold in abeyance the giving of instructions to General Graves and the advance of money by the War Trade Board Corporation as suggested by Am[erican] mission 376, January 21.

We feel that it may be a wise practice to take Congress more into confidence on such matters and we at least desire to make the experiment in this case.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.77/655 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1919, 6 p.m.

568. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Your 521 January 31st, 8 p.m. I have given the suggestion made by you most careful consideration, have taken advice of the men in the Department, and then brought the question up at Cabinet today. Everyone is of the same mind that it would be very inadvisable for me to go to Congress at this time with any plan, one, of acquiring money to be expended abroad, or two, having anything to do with Russia. In regard to the first objection, having just been through the fight to obtain the money for the \$100,000,000 fund for feeding Europe, I am convinced that I would not be given any consideration whatever, in view of the fact our plans in regard to the railroad—as to who are to contribute and how much it would cost—are so absolutely indefinite. In the Committee on Appropriations the whole fight made on the Food Bill by the opponents and the criticisms made even by our friends was that they did not have information enough. The information in the case of the Food Bill was so much more than anything I could offer at present, I am advised by everyone that an attempt to get any agreement from committee would be hopeless.

In regard to the second objection, the first question to be asked would be what is the Russian policy. If no answer could be given, the reasons for not being able to give an answer would have no weight. Senator Johnson is demanding that troops be withdrawn

from Archangel, and there is considerable support of his position on the ground that our men are being killed and no one knows why they are still there. Of course these criticisms are unjust, but they carry more or less weight. Any attempt to commit Congress to a definite policy on the Siberian railroad, which is only a part of the whole Russian problem, would be hopeless unless some definite information could be given them on the whole subject. The Vice President said that if the Russian question were thrown into Congress at this time, it would probably jeopardize all the appropriation bills.

In view of the unanimous opinion of all who have been consulted, I think it would be wiser for me not to approach them for money for this purpose. It seems to me that it has to be settled now whether we will accept the compromise arrangement for operating railroad and then take our chance later on of being able to get Congress to assume the responsibility. If Congress then refuses to accept a carefully worked out plan that shows how much money will be required and how much each Government will contribute, then the responsibility will be on Congress, but to get Congress to commit itself to any proposal for financing the railroad—in its present mood when it is badly frightened over the amount of money we are spending and when it is so completely at sea as to what should be done in Russia—would be hopeless.

Shall I give formal approval. Japanese pressing for answer.

POLK

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861.77/661 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, February 6, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received February 7, 1:08 a.m.]

Your February 1, 2 p.m.<sup>48</sup> While waiting further advices and in pursuance of the authorization in your January 13, 6 p.m.,<sup>49</sup> Mr. Stevens and I are proceeding as far as possible with the preliminary railway arrangements. Considerable pressure has been exerted to center the administration of the railways at Omsk but Mr. Stevens and I are clear that this would be a mistake under present conditions and that organization should be effected here. We have telegraphed Ostrougoff<sup>49</sup> suggesting that he come to Vladivostok at once. The French and British High Commissioners have both left Omsk and are on their way here. Almost all of the technical representatives

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<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

<sup>49</sup> L. A. Ustrugov, Minister of Ways of Communication of the Omsk Government.

are on the spot and we believe that we can arrange for a meeting of the Technical Committee and the selection of Mr. Stevens just as soon as the agreement is approved by the Associated Governments and without waiting for the formal orders of the Allied Committee.

I have discussed with Mr. Stevens the question of our representative on the Allied Committee and I heartily join with him in recommending the appointment of Mr. Charles H. Smith who is now in Vladivostok and has been acting temporarily as business manager for the Siberian Red Cross. Mr. Smith has had extended railway experience in the United States particularly in financial and economic problems and was for three years a member of the Railway Commission appointed to confer with the Interstate Commerce Commission in the valuation of American railway properties. In 1916 he came to Russia as a transportation expert representing American interests to report on certain industrial enterprises. The revolution interrupted this work and in August 1917 he was appointed on the recommendation of the American Railway Commission Foreign Adviser to Mr. Ostrougoff with whom he remained until April 1918, when he came to Vladivostok and volunteered as a worker with the Red Cross.

Mr. Stevens has the utmost confidence in his experience, loyalty and judgement, and believes that Mr. Smith's excellent knowledge of the Russian language as well as his deep interest in the Russian people will make him a most helpful member of the Committee.

MORRIS

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861.77/665 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 9, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 11:10 p.m.]

658. From Lansing and McCormick.

Department's 568, February 4, 6 p.m. In view of situation which you report the President withdraws the suggestion with reference to presenting to congressional committees our proposed action with reference to Siberian railways. The President further authorizes the following:

1. That you formally accept the plan on behalf of the United States, with reservation as to financial responsibility which shall be the subject of further discussion, and that you notify the Japanese in this sense.
2. That you request Secretary Baker to see that instructions are given General Graves as contemplated by plan.

3. That the War Trade Board Russian Bureau, Incorporated, advance such funds as it can spare in amounts approved by the Department for the temporary support of Stevens as proposed in Mission 521, January 31st, 8 p.m.
4. That you give immediate instructions to Ambassador Morris to inaugurate negotiations for a definite plan for operating the railroad.

While in deference to your views and those of the Cabinet, the President withdraws his suggestion as to placing this matter frankly before Congress, it is desired that you keep this possibility in mind and avail of any opportunity which may seem to you to be appropriate to keep Congress advised as to our policy with reference to the Siberian railroad. It is felt that this matter can be treated entirely apart from the general Russian problem, as, irrespective of what our policy may be toward Russia, and irrespective of further [future] Russian developments, it is essential that we maintain the policy of the open door with reference to the Siberian and particularly the Chinese Eastern Railway. This cable has been seen and approved by the President.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.77/735g

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Ishii)*

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1919.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 15, 1919, with which you presented to me January 16, 1919, under instruction from your Government, the plan of supervision of railways in the zone in which the Allied forces are now operating in Siberia. I beg also to inform you that the memorandum handed by the American Ambassador at Tokio to Viscount Uchida,<sup>50</sup> covering seven separate questions relating to the plan upon which the Ambassador and Viscount Uchida have reached a thorough understanding, as you mentioned to me, confirms the understanding which the Department had already received from Ambassador Morris.

In notifying you of the acceptance by this Government of the general plan which you have presented, with due reservation as to any financial responsibility which may be involved and which, it is suggested, shall be the subject of further discussion, I wish to express my gratification that our two Governments have reached a cordial and clear understanding upon a matter which so much con-

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<sup>50</sup> *Ante*, p. 242.

cerns the welfare of Russia. I wish also to inform you that this Government approves the memorandum agreed to by your Government with the American Ambassador at Tokio.

At the same time allow me to point out the clear understanding which this Government has as to the interpretation to be placed upon the word "interests" in the next to the last sentence of Section three of the plan for the supervision of the railways. The United States understands that the word "interests" in this case, is used as referring to the convenience of the respective Allied powers and the United States, and not as implying any political or territorial rights or spheres of influence. As is so clearly stated in the memorandum to which I have referred above, the plan is to be interpreted as a sincere effort to operate the Siberian railway system in the interest of the Russian people, and I am already aware of the sincere and friendly purpose which your Government has in furthering this intention.

I may add that the American diplomatic representatives at London, Rome, Paris and Peking are being instructed today to communicate formally to the Governments to which they are accredited, our approval of the plan for the supervision of the railways, and of the memorandum relating to the plan which have resulted from the negotiations between Viscount Uchida and the American Ambassador at Tokio; and to secure the approval and support of the respective Governments concerned. They have also been instructed to communicate their action to their Japanese colleagues.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

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861.77/616 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*<sup>52</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1919, 4 p.m.

4496. Department has notified Japanese Ambassador here today, officially that United States accepts the plan for the supervision of the Siberian railways, including the Chinese Eastern, in the zone where the military forces of the Allies are now operating in Siberia, on the understanding set forth in a memorandum handed to Viscount Uchida by the American Ambassador at Tokio and agreed to by former and with due reservation as to any financial responsibility which may be involved and which it is suggested shall be the subject of further discussion. The memorandum in question

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<sup>52</sup> The portion of telegram here printed was sent also to the Ambassador in France as no. 7355 and to the Ambassador in Italy as no. 1992 (file no. 861.77/675 d).

was quoted in Department's telegram January 13 to Embassy at London to repeat to Rome and Paris. The text of memorandum as presented now by Japanese Embassy in second caption omits words "to be discussed" in reference to Czecho-Slovaks which Department considers does not modify meaning. In note of acceptance to Viscount Ishii attention was called to financial reservation and to the interpretation to be placed on the word "interest" as used in next to last sentence of section 3 of the plan and statement made that United States understands the word in this case is used as meaning the convenience of the respective Allied Governments and the United States and not as implying any political or territorial rights or spheres of influence and that, as is stated so clearly in the memorandum the plan is to be interpreted as a sincere effort to operate the railways in the interest of the Russian people. Please notify Government to which you are accredited formally of action taken and communicate copy of plan and memorandum including in your communication reference to financial reservation and to this Government's interpretation of the word "interests" as described above. Notify your Japanese colleague of these instructions and of action you propose to take. In communicating plan to Government to which you are accredited please say that this Government hopes very much to learn that the plan is approved and will be supported by the cordial cooperation on the part of the Governments concerned which is necessary for its success.

POLK

861.77/675 : Telegram

*The Chief of Staff (March) to the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves)*<sup>53</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1919.

Reference your 172,<sup>54</sup> the question of use of American troops in connection with Siberian Railroad has been submitted to the President who has directed by cable that the American troops be used as may be necessary to give authority and support to Mr. Stevens as President of the Technical Board to operate the railways. The movement of one battalion of troops to Harbin is approved, and you will use your forces in cooperation with Mr. Stevens, reporting in each case to the Department any movements which are a variation from your previous instructions.

MARCH

<sup>53</sup> Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State in letter of the same date.

<sup>54</sup> Not found in the files of the Department of State.

861.77/685 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 19, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received February 19, 5:41 p.m.]

7314. Your undated telegram 7355.<sup>55</sup> The instructions of the Department have been carried out and Embassy is now in receipt of an acknowledgment from the Foreign Office stating that it can only give its full and complete approval to the plan submitted and assures the Government of the United States of the most cordial cooperation of the French authorities in Siberia with the certitude that they will collaborate with the greatest good will towards a solution in any questions of a military or technical nature which may arise in the application of the plan.

SHARP

861.77/689 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 25, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 3:40 p.m.<sup>56</sup>]

1107. Your 4454 [4496] February 10th, 4 p.m. and my 911, February 13, 6 p.m.<sup>57</sup> Note from Foreign Office dated 22nd just received after stating that it is understood from their Japanese Chargé d'Affaires that the reservation as to the financial responsibility involved has been accepted by the Japanese Government, continues.

"In conveying to Your Excellency the concurrence of His Majesty's Government I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the great satisfaction with which I have received the information of the conclusion of the negotiations. I should be glad if Your Excellency would inform the United States Government accordingly, stating at the same time that they can rely on His Majesty's Government doing all in their power to assist in facilitating the application of the scheme with a view to remedying the dangerous situation which has arisen as a result of the disorganization of the railway services.

I presume that the necessary instructions will now be despatched to the United States representatives at Vladivostok to arrange for an early meeting of the boards to be set up under the scheme, and I venture to draw the attention of Your Excellency to the fact that one of the most urgent problems to be discussed is that of the finance of the railway. From a recent telegram from His Majesty's Chargé

<sup>55</sup> See footnote 52, p. 252.<sup>56</sup> In two sections.<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

d’Affaires at Washington, I understand that the United States Government concur in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government that this issue comes properly within the competence of the Boards and should be considered by them at the earliest moment with a view to the necessary recommendations being made to the Allied Governments for dealing with it.”

DAVIS

861.77/690 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, *February 27, 1919, 4 p.m.*

For Morris.

Your February 24, 10 a.m. Please transmit following message to Smith<sup>58</sup> from Department:

“You are hereby appointed American representative on the Inter-Allied Committee organized to undertake the supervision of the Siberian Railways . . .”

POLK

861.77/714 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ROME, *March 5, 1919, noon.*

[Received March 6, 2:20 a.m.]

2673. Department’s 2022, March 3, 5 p.m.<sup>59</sup> Embassy has received today note signed by Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accepting Siberian Railway plan. Note dated March 4th reads:

“In reply to the note of February 12th ultimo I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Royal Government has adhered to the plan of the Imperial Government of Japan for the control of the Eastern Chinese and Trans-Siberian Railways in the zone of operation of the Allied Military forces with the financial reservations made by the Government of the United States and with the same interpretation of the word ‘interests’ desired by the American Government.”

NELSON PAGE

<sup>58</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Feb. 6, 1919, 4 p.m., p. 249.

<sup>59</sup> Not printed.



861.77/732 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok,  
to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *March 5, 1919, 10 p.m.*

[Received March 9, 5:19 p.m.]

The Technical Board with a full attendance met at 11 o'clock this morning for the purpose of formal organization. Colonel Jack, the British representative, acted as temporary chairman and on motion of the Japanese representative, Stevens was unanimously elected president under the railway agreement.

At 3 o'clock this afternoon the Inter-Allied Committee met, all seven representatives being present. The British High Commissioner acted as temporary chairman; and on motion of Matsudaira,<sup>60</sup> Mr. Ostrougoff<sup>60a</sup> was unanimously elected chairman. Mr. Stevens reported the organization of the Technical Board including his election as president which was duly approved. Ostrougoff was directed to prepare a draft of the statement to the Russian people which will be submitted to the Inter-Allied Committee for approval on Friday and be issued forthwith. The Technical Board is planning move to Harbin and for the present to occupy offices in the Administration Building of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The members of the Military Committee have been named with the exception of the Chinese representative. Subject to the approval of our Government, General Graves has named Colonel Gallagher as the American representative. Horvath has stated to me that he will accept notice on behalf of the Chinese Eastern of the Inter-Allied supervision and Stevens' operation and will immediately issue instructions to all his subordinates asking their support and cooperation. Ostrougoff has been authorized by the Council of Ministers to express the cordial approval of the Omsk Government. This completes the formal organization and also the object of my visit.

May I take this occasion to express my very great appreciation of the prompt and more than generous support which I have consistently received from the Department during these tedious negotiations and which I hope future developments will justify.

In the absence of a reply to the suggestion in my February 24, 10 a.m.<sup>61</sup> I have abandoned the trip to Peking, and expect to sail for Nagasaki on March 7 arriving Tokyo March 11. I have suggested to Smith that hereafter he communicate directly with you through Consulate General.

MORRIS

<sup>60</sup> Tsuneo Matsudaira, Japanese representative on the Inter-Allied Committee.

<sup>60a</sup> L. A. Ustrugov, Minister of Ways of Communication of the Omsk Government, Russian representative.

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.

861.77/750 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, *March 17, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received March 18, 5:46 a.m.]

148. [From Smith.] *Résumé of Inter-Allied Committee.*

English official language. March 7th, passed resolution to frame declaration to Russian people and before publication to permit Oustrakjha [*Ustrugov?*] to send text to Khorvat and Omsk Government so that they can issue their own statement. Committee granted this courtesy but made it plain that Committee declaration was in no way connected with other declarations. Declaration and letter to Khorvat accepted by Stevens, passed by Committee and transmitted to Omsk 10th. Omsk reply received 14th, stating their declaration based on inter-Allied and ready to publish same. Committee ordered immediate publication of declaration dated 14th. Document handed Vladivostok papers too late for publication morning 15th and appeared 16th. Declaration, strictly following sense of agreement, states desire to help Russian people, decision to rehabilitate and to reestablish efficient transport and asks them to cooperate with Allied Powers. Copy mailed Department.<sup>62</sup> General principle adopted that no discrimination in favor of any nation shall be made in forwarding of freight and passenger traffic. Financial requirements discussed by Technical Board ordinary budget. This requires time and nation[s] will be asked to advance initial sum, probably \$20,000,000. Question who shall apportion railway to the different nationalities for guarding under discussion. Matsudaira claims that the military commanders only have the right to decide as this is strategic question. Consensus of opinion seems to be to ask commands for decision but that Inter-Allied Committee, after consulting Technical Board, shall decide finally. China especially holds this view. British indifferent. On all other questions there has been complete accord. Military board organizes 18th. Repeated to Tokio. Smith.

CALDWELL

<sup>62</sup> Not printed (file no. 861.77/3304).

861.77/752 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Extract]

VLADIVOSTOK, *March 19, 1919, noon.*

[Received 6:40 p.m.]

159. [From Smith:]

Czecho-Slovaks unanimously invited by Inter-Allied Committee to join Committee, Technical and Military Boards. Military Transportation Board organized 18th. General Takeouchi, Japanese, Chairman.

Smith  
CALDWELL

861.77/781½

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 2628

PEKING, *March 21, 1919.*

[Received April 21.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a note, dated March 18th,<sup>68</sup> from the Foreign Office dealing further with the Chinese Eastern Railway. The note reiterates the special interest which China has in this railway and informs me of the appointment of General Chia Tseng-hsia to the post of Representative on the Military Transportation Board. It is apparent therefore that the Chinese Government accepts the arrangements made by the American Government with a reservation as to its special interest in the Chinese-Eastern Railway.

I have [etc.]

PAUL S. REINSCH

861.77/747 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, *March 21, 1919, 7 p.m.*

The Department learns from the British Embassy here that the question has been raised at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee and the Technical Committee [*Board*], as to whether the Committee decisions must be unanimous to be effective or whether a majority of both will be sufficient.

It has been reported that the only members of the Committee who insist upon unanimity were the Japanese and Chinese who state

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

that they must refer to their committees [*Governments?*]. The following are arguments reported in favor of the majority vote:

*First:* It may often be necessary to take immediate action. It can hardly be expected to obtain unanimity in all cases and if the majority cannot act the Committee will be powerless.

*Second:* If unanimity is necessary the work might be held up indefinitely by one member; for example, difficulties might be made by the Chinese representative about the Chinese Eastern Railway.

*Third:* There is really no danger in decision by majority for in questions of importance the Committee can only make recommendations and cannot commit the Governments concerned.

In this connection if the Japanese or Chinese Governments maintain the objection of their representative the effect would be that each individual representative would be able to block even measures of detail upon which the Committee as a whole had agreed.

You may point this out to the Government to which you are accredited and urge it most strongly to accept the procedure recommended by the majority of the Committee.

Repeat to Peking for information and action, and to Smith for his information.

POLK

861.77/761

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: Referring to my letter of March 14th,<sup>64</sup> with which I transmitted to you the Ambassador's views relative to your note of February 28th,<sup>65</sup> I have the honor to inform you that I am at present in receipt of a cable from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Omsk, stating that on March 14th an agreement<sup>66</sup> had been concluded concerning the Inter-Allied supervision of Railways and expressing its complete satisfaction with the results achieved, and especially emphasising its satisfaction that the Allied supervision bears the character of technical aid and cooperation with the Russian Railway personnel and that it in no way infringes upon any of the sovereign rights of the Russian people.

Believe me [etc.]

UGHET

<sup>64</sup> Not found in the Department files.

<sup>65</sup> Not printed.

<sup>66</sup> Apparently refers to statement of Mar. 14; see p. 257.

861.77/765 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, *March 27, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received March 27, 4:45 p.m.]

Your March 21, 7 p.m. I presume the question was submitted by Sir Charles Eliot to his Government when it first arose. It was settled before my departure from Vladivostok on the understanding that question within the scope of the authority of the Committees should be decided by majority vote although of course questions involving any doubt of the competency of any of the national representatives would have to be referred to the interested Governments for decision. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs confirms my recollection of this understanding and states that he knows of no question having been subsequently raised in regard to it.

MORRIS

861.77/790 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)* <sup>67</sup>

WASHINGTON, *April 15, 1919, 7 p.m.*

Referring to Department's written instructions March 5,<sup>68</sup> transmitting official text of plan and memorandum regarding operation of Siberian railways, Department adopted text of memorandum submitted by Ambassador Morris as official text of memorandum and text of plan submitted by Japanese Government as official text of plan. The Department is now advised through the Japanese Embassy that in section 3 of the plan the words "military protection of" are to be inserted immediately before the words "such stations." As the text of plan originated with the Japanese Government the Department accepts this modification and you are directed to inform the government to which you are accredited accordingly.

Repeat to Rome and Paris.

POLK

**International Financial Assistance to the Chinese Eastern and the Siberian Railways**

861.77/735d

*The Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1919.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Lansing told me last Fall he had a conversation with you August 30, 1918 on the subject of Siberia

<sup>67</sup> The same to the Minister in China.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed (file no. 861.77/735c).

and you then said you would provide funds for the maintenance of the Russian Railway Service Corps when the Russian funds set aside for that purpose were exhausted.

The Russian funds in question are now altogether expended and the need for additional funds presses. I have an urgent telegram from Mr. Stevens<sup>69</sup> asking for \$75,000 for the maintenance and upkeep of the Corps in Siberia and am also informed by the Russian Embassy that the salary payroll due March 1st and monthly thereafter—on the existing basis of organization—will amount to \$42,000.

I shall be glad to know what measures you wish to be taken in order to make the above funds immediately available to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires so that he can provide for the payment of salaries due March 1st and also forward at once to Mr. Stevens the \$75,000 necessary to meet expenses in Siberia.

Until other arrangements may be made by the inter-Allied Committee, which will supervise the Siberian Railways, I shall also be grateful to know how you would like further calls for funds for this purpose to be met.

The actual expenses of the Russian Railway Service Corps during the seventeen months of its existence have averaged about \$80,000 a month, about equally divided between monthly salaries and occasional allocations of \$75,000 every few months for maintenance and upkeep in Siberia.

You will recall that when we asked the Secretary to confer with you in Paris as to the necessity of securing an emergency fund for Mr. Stevens to start operations under the plan to supervise the Siberian Railways, it was pointed out that the two purposes for which such a fund would be imperatively needed were, first, to pay Russian railway employees arrears of wages now long over due and to provide for payment of wages and salaries in the immediate future; and second, to purchase needed equipment. You then authorized Mr. McCormick to have the War Trade Board, Russian Bureau, Incorporated, advance for that purpose a sum up to \$1,000,000 to Mr. Stevens, provided Japan did not object;<sup>70</sup> but this authorization would not cover the maintenance of the Russian Railway Service Corps. Advances for the Corps from the current National Security and Defense Fund will be available only up to to July 1, 1919.

Faithfully yours,

FRANK L. POLK

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<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> See telegram from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 376, Jan. 21, 6 p.m., p. 243.

861.77/835

*President Wilson to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1919.

MY DEAR POLK: I must admit that I do not see where we can get any money to pay these expenses after the 30th of June next, but until then I am willing to pay out of the fund for National Security and Defence the necessary amounts for the actual maintenance of our American railway corps in Siberia. I understand from the enclosed letter that the present need is for \$117,000 dollars. I hope that you will use this letter as an authorization for that amount and will keep me in touch with these things from month to month.

In haste,

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

861.77/726 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, March 6, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received March 8, 7:15 a.m.]

Matsudaira has just advised me that the Japanese Government have no objection to the proposal that the sum of one million American dollars shall be provided at once for Mr. Stevens' use on the Siberian Railways with the understanding that this is a temporary measure without any security and that the sum will be redeemed from the general funds to be provided by the special Inter-Allied Committee.

Please advise Stevens what method he should adopt in drawing for this money as required.

MORRIS

861.77/761 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Stevens. War Trade Board advises as follows:

You may draw drafts against the War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau, Incorporated, for sums not to exceed a total of \$1,000,000 for use in connection with Siberian railways, with the understanding that this is a temporary measure without any security and that any sums so drawn will be redeemed from the

general funds of the railways to be hereafter provided.<sup>71</sup> No responsibility to provide funds as part of a more complete financial scheme is hereby implied, nor is any responsibility therefor assumed by the War Trade Board or any other Department of this Government. It is suggested that you maintain close contact with Heid<sup>72</sup> in the disposal of these drafts, one reason being to encash certain funds which Heid will receive from the sale of merchandise sent him, another, in order to establish dollar credits in the United States for deserving individuals or associations whom you or Mr. Heid may know will use this money for the purchase of American commodities for export to Siberia. It may not be possible to strictly follow this suggestion, and it is not made to hamper you in any way in securing the funds which you require from the sale of these drafts, but believe this to be one way of assisting economic situation.

POLK

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861.77/784 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, April 8, 1919, 6 p. m.

[Received 9:11 p.m.]

205. [From Smith:]

That for the present and until financial condition can be definitely studied the members of the Inter-Allied Committee make the following recommendations.

1st. Those Allied powers who decide to offer financial aid for the purpose of improving the transportation on the Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, shall, as far as possible, limit their financial aid to the purchase of those materials, supplies and equipment which must be obtained in foreign countries, and to the payment of the expenses of Allied supervision.

2d. The cost of the above-mentioned purchases of materials and equipment shall be apportioned equally among the said Allied powers and paid from the general funds which shall be from time to time requested by the Inter-Allied Committee and advanced by the Governments interested.

3d. The expense of the Allied supervision which shall include the salaries of the members of the Technical Board, the foreign Allied

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<sup>71</sup> The sum of \$584,216.34 drawn from this deposit was repaid by transfer from a later \$4,000,000 of American credit on instructions from the Department of State to the Riggs National Bank, Mar. 11, 1920 (file no. 861.77/133).

<sup>72</sup> August Heid, representative at Vladivostok of the War Trade Board.



inspectors, assistant inspectors and other foreign assistants shall be fixed and paid for by the particular nation to which the said persons belong.

4th. The salaries and wages of any employees specially engaged in the service for a purpose common to all members of the Technical Board shall be fixed by the Board and shall be paid from the general fund advanced by the Allied Powers.

5th. All other expenses, such as the payments of the salaries and wages of the Russian officials and employees of the said railways, et cetera, and the cost of additions and improvements, except those purchases named in section 1, shall be financed from Russian resources, provided such resources are found to be sufficient. If the Technical Board finds that the Russian resources are insufficient for the above expenses, then the Allied financial assistance can be utilized to the extent necessary to meet any emergency which would seriously imperil the successful operation of the railways. But in each emergency such aid shall be strictly limited to sums to be ascertained by the Technical Board and approved by the Inter-Allied Committee.

This expenditure, if found necessary, shall be paid from the general funds provided by the Allied powers and shall be equally borne by the said powers.

6th. All expenses, as above outlined which will be paid by the Allied powers shall be debited to the Russian people who are obligated to repay same.

Resolution regarding advance of money: Resolved, that in accord with the financial recommendations made by the Inter-Allied Committee an advance of dollars 20 million gold is requested by the Committee from the Governments participating in the financing of the Russian railways. Of this sum dollars 4 million shall without delay be placed in the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Harbin, to the credit of the Technical Board. The remaining dollars 16 million will be held by the Governments subject to the order of the Inter-Allied Committee. End of resolutions.

The above resolutions were unanimously passed by Committee after a consultation with Technical Board who are fully in accord. Committee has requested Military Commanders to decide questions of location of railway guards. The French Commander now consents to participate in this meeting. Repeated to Tokyo. Smith.

CALDWELL

103.96/2458 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, May 28, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received May 29, 7:22 a.m.]

327. [From Smith:]

Your May 21, 4 p.m.<sup>73</sup> Committee April 8 passed resolution asking advance 20 million. At that time did not know what governments would participate. Resolution was telegraphed immediately to all governments. France, Japan have not replied. England very recently replied, each government should advance money for materials purchased in its own country. Italy replied, she will not participate. Nothing definite from China but she will not unless money loaned by some other power.

English and French representatives have again cabled asking immediate action. Members believe that only England, France, Japan, and America will participate and have asked that each government advance one million deposit as requested. Now that Committee know what governments will participate, definite steps will be taken to adjust matters in future for prompt action. Smith.

CALDWELL

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*Executive Order No. 3094-A, June 5, 1919, providing funds for the maintenance or improvement of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways*

Whereas it has become expedient to dissolve and to liquidate the affairs of the War Trade Board of United States Russian Bureau Incorporated, whereof the entire capital stock was purchased with the sum of \$5,000,000 allotted by the President to the War Trade Board by Executive Order, of October 5, 1918,<sup>74</sup> by virtue of the authority vested in him by "An act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, and for other purposes", approved July 1, 1918, appropriating the sum of \$50,000,000, "For the national security and defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith to be expended at the discretion of the President":

I hereby order that any and all sums of money which upon or pursuant to such dissolution shall accrue or be distributed to the

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

<sup>74</sup> For the establishment of this fund, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 147 ff.

War Trade Board or to the stockholders of said corporation shall be by said board or stockholders paid into the United States Treasury and returned to the appropriation aforesaid.

I hereby further order that any and all moneys so paid into the United States Treasury and returned to the aforementioned appropriation be, and they hereby are, allotted to the Secretary of State to be by him expended for purposes connected with the maintenance or improvement of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways and, for such purposes, the Secretary of State may, if he deems advisable, advance all or any portion of the moneys hereby allotted to the Inter-Allied committee, which is exercising supervision over said railways, or to its nominees, upon such terms as may be specified by the Secretary of State.

The foregoing does not affect in any way the special allotment of \$5,000,000 made to the Secretary of State by the President's letter of September 19, 1918,<sup>75</sup> from the appropriation for "National Security and Defense" for the provision of winter supplies for the civilian population of the Archangel district of Russia, which allotment was transferred to the War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau, Incorporated, on November 27, 1918, by direction of the President.

WOODROW WILSON

103.96/2504d : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France  
(Wallace)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1919, 6 p.m.

8722. For McCormick No. 1258.

On June 20th the House passed the Sundry Civil Bill, including an appropriation of \$200,000 for the Department of State to wind up the affairs of the Board. The House also discussed and approved the proposal to use the capital of the Russian Bureau to pay the United States share of the Russian Railway loan. As a result of its operations, the Russian Bureau will close its existence with a clear surplus of approximately \$400,000 arising out of operation of ships and on June 24th we will return to the President's Fund \$4,000,000 which, under the Executive Order of June 5th, will be immediately available to the Department of State for the Russian Railway loan. This \$4,000,000 is entirely separate from the loan of \$1,000,000 to Stevens which is already taken care of.

We congratulate you on this happy outcome. Bon Voyage.  
Woolley.

POLK

<sup>75</sup> Not printed.

861.77/920 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser)*

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1919, 4 p.m.

For Stevens: One million dollars deposited today for transfer to branch of National City Bank at Vladivostok to your credit as follows, "Inter-Allied Committee for Supervising Siberian Railways, John F. Stevens, President Technical Board". Three million dollars deposited to your credit in same way with Riggs National Bank in this city, as balance of American quota of \$20,000,000 for purchase of supplies in this country and maintenance of American personnel connected with operation of railway plan. Inform Smith at once. Department will cable further details as to drawing on funds in this country. Unless you have serious objections Department would prefer that all your orders be placed through Director General of Military Railways and transmitted through Department. Director General of Military Railways as result of war procedure is equipped with adequate personnel and in close touch with all manufacturers and can act promptly. Hope to answer your June 22, 4 P.M.<sup>76</sup> concerning your own salary satisfactorily in a few days.

PHILLIPS

861.77/915 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Stevens:

Your June 28, 3 p.m.<sup>76</sup> and Department's June 28, 4 p.m. Charge 100,000 advanced to Emerson against last million dollars deposited Vladivostok. Commencing July 1st charge maintenance of Russian Railway Service Corps and other American personnel against same account, including salary and expenses for Smith. Referring your June 22, 4 P.M.<sup>76</sup> draw against same fund for your salary at rate of 25,000 per annum commencing April 15, 1919 date when you asked such compensation which was referred to Paris and approved in principle.

As your services are devoted to carrying out this Government's purpose to assist Russia, Department will approve such arrangement to cover your expenses as you may arrange with your Board or with Inter-Allied Committee, having in mind that only funds available at present to carry out our part of railway plan are 1,000,000 deposited Vladivostok as per Department's June 28, 4 P.M. and 3,000,000 deposited to your order in Riggs National Bank here. Department understands the President expects to take up with

<sup>76</sup> Not printed.

Congress whole question to provide support for our effort in Siberia. He returns next week.

Referring your June 19, 10 P.M.<sup>77</sup> Department is asking Director General of Military Railways to procure air brakes for locomotives. He will advise you cost of purchase and shipment which you will then authorize him to pay from \$3,000,000 fund in Riggs Bank here. Suggest same procedure be followed in all other orders. Hereafter Director General of Military Railways will advise you through Department amount each month necessary for payment of salaries to families in this country of Russian Railway Service Corps as heretofore done by Russian Railway Mission in the United States. You will then authorize him through Department to make payment from \$3,000,000 fund here. In this connection 105 additional personnel have been recruited from returning army engineers and other first class men. Hope to equip and transport them in next two weeks in spite of shortage of space on Pacific steamers. Several hundred applications received with full knowledge of conditions including present lack of insurance.

Department hopes foregoing is clear and and that it will give you the power and support to carry on.

PHILLIPS

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861.77/978a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Ambassador Morris.

"Especially with regard to the restoration of the railways, please furnish at the earliest possible date, your views as to a comprehensive plan for economic reconstruction in Siberia and ultimately for European Russia. Please elaborate plan on basis of the purpose of the United States to assist Russia as formulated so clearly by the President from time to time. The Department would like you to consult Stevens and Smith, having in mind also that time is an important factor. Department desires your views on the spot and in consultation with others in close touch with the situation to form a comprehensive plan to assist Russia for which it is hoped the President will ask Congress for adequate appropriation in order to translate into action the genuine desire to assist Russia, which he has expressed on the behalf of the Government of this country.

Please have in mind that plan contemplates participation on the part of the Allied Governments."

Communicate to Smith and Stevens for their information.

POLK

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<sup>77</sup> Not printed.

861.77/989 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, July 31, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received August 4, 10:09 p.m.]

Our informal conference,<sup>78</sup> including as in previous cases, Russian and Allied representatives and experts, met on July 26th to discuss the financial needs of the Russian railways, to reach an agreement if possible on a comprehensive plan to be submitted to our Governments. The conference unanimously adopted in Russian following conclusions:

1st, that it would be unwise and impracticable for the Associated Powers to undertake any direct control of, or responsibility for the internal financial arrangements of the Chinese Eastern or Trans-Siberian Systems. It was stated by the Minister of Ways and Communications that the receipts of the Chinese Eastern were probably sufficient to meet the expense of one, but that the Trans-Siberian roads would show a very large deficit which would have to be considered in the financial estimates of the Russian Government.

2d, that no reliable data was [*were*] at present available even to equalize [*estimate?*] the financial needs of the railways in European Russia.

3d, that for the present we should leave out of consideration all proposals for construction or both [*sic*] extensions.

The adoption of these general conclusions limited the investigation to the amount and character of the materials and supplies which it will be necessary to import in order to continue the operation of the main line from Vladivostok to the Ural Mountains.

The discussion revealed much confusion in regard to details: supplies already shipped, contracts already executed or partly executed, and additional materials required. It was decided therefore to appoint a committee consisting of Colonel Emerson, General Jack of the British Railway Mission, and Mr. Ostrougoff, to examine and report on the details. This committee is now sitting daily and as soon as the report is completed and approved by the conference I will submit the conclusion to the Department with my comments.

MORRIS

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<sup>78</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk, July 24, 4 p.m., pp. 396 ff.

861.77/1006 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 9, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 11, 10:15 a.m.]

Supplementing my July 31, 6 [11?] p.m. I submit herewith summary of the financial requirements of the Siberian railways as compiled by Gilford Rogoff [*Ustrugov?*], Jackson [*Jack?*] and Emerson: they find that no additional rolling stock beyond that already contracted for will be required on the portion from Vladivostok to Omsk during the coming year. The following, however, will be needed; value estimated in American dollars: technical and mechanical improvement and enlargements of water system, \$1,020,000; materials absolutely necessary for operation and not obtainable here \$5,510,000; expenses incident to operation of coal mines \$470,000; ocean freight for shipments \$600,000; supplying employees and families with winter clothing \$10,400,000; miscellaneous requirements of Chinese-Eastern \$1,000,000. Total \$20,000,000. This is the amount previously estimated by the Inter-Allied Committee. It will be observed that it does not include expenses for salaries and maintenance of Railway Service Corps.

The Committee authentically reported that they could not submit any accurate estimates for the section between Omsk and the Volga River, but were of opinion that not less than \$10,000,000 would be required.

From the very scant knowledge available they estimated that the needs of the railways in European Russia for equipment and rehabilitation would exceed \$200,000,000.

MORRIS

861.77/1211b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1919, 1 p.m.

For Smith.

Please consult Stevens and telegraph urgently:

- 1st, amounts contributed to date to the support of the Inter-Allied Railway plan by Japan and other associated powers.
- 2d, estimated money needs for continuing operations on present basis during the calendar year 1920.
- 3d, portion of this amount which you think United States should equitably furnish.

Please add any recommendations concerning the future of the work which you may care to make.

LANSING

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861.77/1218 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 25, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received November 26, 2 p.m.]

612. Following from Smith:

“Replying to your November 18, 1 p.m.

1st. Following amounts paid: China, \$500,000; Japan and America, \$4,000,000 each;<sup>80</sup> total, \$8,500,000. Other countries have refused to contribute.

2d. Depends entirely on life railway under Allied control next year. For all lines Vladivostok to the Ural Mountains \$30,000,000 is estimated.

3d. Difficult to say, I feel however that the United States should not hesitate to furnish entire amount if necessary. Russians want American goods and buy Japanese because they are the only ones obtainable. Japan does not manufacture most of the machinery needed in Siberia, a large quantity of which will be needed when a liberal government is established. Siberia will develop very rapidly, America's commercial interests in the Far East require liberal attitude at present. There will be no market for American goods until the railway is opened up.

As to our future work I cite you to many of my past telegrams. The Russian masses have been misunderstood. They only want three cardinal principles fixed, the right to own and enjoy property, free religious worship, and representative government. This is not Bolshevism, but it is just what the old regimists do not want. As long as old regimists are in control railroad improvement cannot succeed, they do not wish it to succeed for that will aid the people; and the people they do not wish [it] to succeed under present conditions for it aids the old regimists to sink their talons deeper into the people. Hence the old regimists must go. To eliminate them the following should be done:

1. Eliminate the Allied military from politics. They have supported the Russian military who are the old regimists.

2. Let them know that their only business is to protect the railway as the American military has done.

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<sup>80</sup> For the temporary War Trade Board loan, see telegram to the consul at Vladivostok, Mar. 14, 6 p.m., p. 262, and footnote 71, p. 263.



3. Give the Inter-Allied Committee the power to decide the policy for all Allied organizations including the military. If the present men are of insufficient calibre, appoint men who are [*sic*]. Every man on this Committee should speak Russian. There have been many occasions where the policies of the various Allied organizations have been at cross purposes and the Russians have noted it.

4. Show the Russians that the Allies are united and that they believe civilian authority stands superior to military force. Under the Kolchak régime the military alone have ruled Siberia, and more incapable dishonest class of men could not be found.

5. Make the Russians understand that economic uplift of their country is paramount to the military. The Russian masses are tired of fighting and will gladly welcome a chance to desert. Economic aid will destroy Bolshevism much more quickly than military and will also defeat the international situation created here. Militarism has almost driven Siberia to Bolshevism and unless subordinated to civil authority will entirely succeed.

6. Keep the Czechs here if possible to guard a part of the railroad. They speak Russian, understand the people and are the most dreaded enemies of the Bolsheviki. Where the Czechs and Americans have guarded the line there has been only about 10 per cent of the trouble that the Japanese have had. The Amur line can not operate where the Japanese are, yet on the Chinese and American sectors on the same line there is but little disturbance. The reason is plain. The people look to [*blame*] them for their support of Semenoff and Kalmikoff.

7. Make the Japanese subordinate their military to the civilian authority. They have been playing a double game here that is a disgrace. Since the Gaida affair<sup>81</sup> most of the Russians have turned against them. Many Russian supporters of Kolchak say the Japanese interfered in the fight and a Russian soldier told me that a Japanese officer came to tell them that the Japanese would support them. The Japanese military have continually worked against the Americans

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.... Not repeated elsewhere. Smith.

MACGOWAN

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<sup>81</sup> See pp. 546 ff.

Decision by the Allies to Begin Evacuation of the Czechoslovak Forces, and  
Commitments by the United States to Assist in Their Repatriation

861.24/116 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of  
State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *January 17, 1919, noon.*

[Received January 19, 3 p.m.]

8. War supplies are arriving here for Czecho-Slovaks in such quantity that they certainly will not use them in Russia as they are no longer fighting on large scale and may soon cease all war operations in Russia and return home, in which case they would not be able to take war supplies with them. It is very doubtful whether Czecho-Slovaks will ever move some of their war supplies from here. Result will be that some Russian aristocratic force will ultimately receive large part these supplies; and this condition is brought to Department's attention because I am not certain whether such a final disposition of supplies would be regarded favorably by the Department and because any unnecessary supplies which are allowed to lie here add to congestion of this port which is again becoming bad owing to inability of railroad to move freight and to occupation of warehouses and storage spaces by the various Allied military forces. Russian Volunteer Fleet state they contemplate stopping their regular service to Japan and Shanghai because there is no place here to deposit cargo and they cannot afford to run for passengers only. It would be helpful if we could be informed of source from which Czecho-Slovaks obtained money for purchase these supplies. It is reported that the President made Czecho-Slovaks a gift of \$5,000,000 from his special fund and that Crimea [*Czechs?*] received loan of \$7,000,000 from the United States. Can I be authorized to deny or confirm either report?

CALDWELL

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861.00/3803 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, *January 25, 1919, 8 p.m.*

7147. For Am[erican] mission and McCormick<sup>82</sup> to note last sentence. Following cable received by War Department from General Graves at Vladivostok.

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<sup>82</sup> Vance McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board and technical adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

"141. January 20. There are indications that Czech situation in Siberia is serious. General Stefanik now *en route* home. Czech officers here deny that there is any serious trouble. Information from American sources in Western Siberia and from those returning from Urals cause me to think the Czechs can not be held in Siberia much longer. Property recently received from the United States for Czechs is not being shipped west."

POLK

861.00/3746 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated*.

[Received January 27, 1919, 10:40 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"52, January 25, 5 p.m. Suggest [*Summary*] position Czechs in Siberia today's date. The Czechs are Social Revolutionary in their tendencies and practically all wish to return to Bohemia now, irrespective of what consequences might follow such action. In their attitude toward their home country, Bohemia, they desire republic and do not anticipate internal troubles there. Believe therefore party accounts [*sic*] in Bohemia will be divided between commercial and industrial interests, but will not include class struggle. However, as Czechs now in Siberia hold extreme leaning to the Left, it is probable there will be a discordant element for some time after their return to Bohemia.

In Siberia the Czechs have the best of every thing while the Russians are poorly clothed and fed. They have the best buildings for hospitals and barracks. According to figure furnished by railroad in Omsk Czech officers now hold and live in 485 salon and first-class railroad carriages which are badly needed in the service. This is an unnecessarily large number. Recently in Cheliabinsk Czechs delayed, and appropriated for their own use, two sanitary trains for weeks and refused permit Russians send them to the front stating that they were being held for American Red Cross. According to Doctor Teusler Czechs were not telling truth. Apparently Czechs in various parts of Siberia have been implicated in speculation and utilizing their special privilege for personal profit.

In Ekaterinburg Czechs are being quartered in villages all over district and only small number in each place. This is done in order to prevent political agitation. Since Siberian troops captured Perm they are held in somewhat better esteem by Czechs although generally speaking their attitude is still one of contempt. Siberian General Pepelyaev was very bitter against Czechs for not properly supporting him in actions succeeding capture of Perm.

General trend of opinion among Czechs now is more favorable towards Kolchak, but as a rule they believe that Allies must assist in deciding fate of Russia. Among enlightened Czechs the opinion prevails that a liberal constitutional monarchy may unfortunately be necessary as the great illiterate mass of fanatical people in Russia makes a republic untimely.

The Czech soldiers are agitating and pressing their leaders to arrange their passage home via Vladivostok. Evident that few are now willing to fight. They are peevish because the Allies did not hasten to their assistance on the western Siberian and Volga fronts. It was this spirit of dissatisfaction that caused them to evacuate Samara when in all probabilities such a step was not fully necessary if Czechs had remained in a mood to do their duty. While it was true that they have borne the brunt of this fighting, yet it must not be forgotten that the Allied soldiers in France at that time, in defeating Germany, [were] accomplishing more for Bohemian freedom than the Czechs in Siberia. A soldier means to do his duty at all times, but the Czech is not doing his at present in Siberia. His behavior only encourages the Bolsheviks who, through their spies, are kept fully informed. As the Czechs apparently decided not to participate further in the campaign against the Bolsheviks it would be extremely desirable if they could be entirely eliminated from the situation, but this is impracticable owing to the disastrous moral effect it would have on Russian troops, and on the contrary, like degree, stimulate the efforts of the Bolsheviks. There after [*Therefore*] it would be unwise to remove Czech troops from Siberia, but if they are to remain as spectators the Allies should impress upon them the necessity of setting a better example. Although the officers may wish to fight at the front, the soldiers have practically taken matters into their own hands and make their own decision, all of which has a demoralizing effect on the situation at large. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/3739 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated*.

[Received January 28, 1919, 7:08 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

" 58, January 27, 11 a.m. Referring my January 25th, 5 p.m.<sup>88</sup> It appears now definitely arranged that Czech troops are to be withdrawn and placed at strategic points from Ekaterinburg and Chelia-

<sup>88</sup> *Supra*.

binsk to Irkutsk to guard railroad and prevent Bolsheviks uprising. The plan is excellent providing Czech soldiers agree to it. Harris.”

REINSCH

861.24/121 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1919, 1 p.m.

Your 8, January 17, 12 noon, was referred to Am[erican] mission Paris which replies as follows under date of January 25:

“Secretary Lansing and McCormick recommend American Consulate Vladivostok be advised as follows:

[“] The Czecho-Slovaks National Council, after its recognition by the United States as a *de facto* belligerent government, received a loan from the United States Government of \$7,000,000 to be employed in the purchase of war supplies in the United States. It is primarily with the credit thus created that the shipments to which you refer have been made although presumably some portion of cargoes have been contributed by British Government and by Russian Embassy Washington, D. C. You are authorized if you see fit, to confirm the report of the \$7,000,000 loan and to deny the report of a gift of \$5,000,000 which report doubtless arose from the fact of setting aside \$5,000,000 to constitute capital of War Trade Board Russian Bureau Incorporated. Heid, representative of Russian Bureau Incorporated of War Trade Board and who is at Vladivostok, is fully informed as to all of these matters including data as to all shipments made or to be made from United States to Vladivostok and you should confer with him on these subjects. Department suggests you also confer with Heid relative to port congestion and if further shipments to Vladivostok are in contemplation which in view of conditions you report may be deemed inadvisable, War Trade Board would doubtless stop such shipments upon receipt of recommendation from Heid. The question of disposition of Czecho-Slovak material in Siberia is primarily one for the Czecho-Slovak Government as it is the owner of the properties in question. If the Czecho-Slovak Government does not desire to utilize this property itself, it will doubtless consult with the Associated Governments before disposing of the same to any Russian Government or Russian armed forces. In this event, and at that time, the matter will be considered in the light of the then situation in Russia. Please keep Department informed if you become aware of any specific intention to transfer Czecho-Slovak war material to Russian forces.’

We are under impression that a considerable part of Czecho-Slovak material was consigned to Heid. If this is the case, it might be desirable to instruct Heid not to permit delivery of same without satisfying himself as to intention of Czecho-Slovak authorities relative to ultimate disposition thereof.”

Please confer with Heid and also furnish Harris at Omsk at once with full statement of whole question and of instructions you have received.

POLK

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861.00/3805: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1919, 5 p.m.

7343. Possibly you will see an opportunity to discuss with Mr. Beneš, the Czecho-Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, the situation described in the following telegram from the American Consul-General at Omsk. Deliver copy also to the Secretary of State:

"February 3rd, 9 a.m. Attitude of Czechs at Western Siberia daily becoming more aggravating. Not fighting themselves, they are creating a physical condition which is preventing any one else from fighting. Am informed by military men that 30,000 Czechs, for example, occupy as much space as 1,000,000 men ordinarily. Hundreds of the best class rail carriages are occupied by petty officers who refuse to release them to Russians. They are spread over the best buildings without the least consideration for space or the wishes of others, who also have sick and wounded, for this is being felt at Imperial Palace by American Red Cross.

The Russians and Allies owe Czechs very much for what they have accomplished in Siberia, but their present behavior rapidly undoing whatever good results may have been achieved in the past. At some place it is reported that they actually block military operations by refusing right of railway. Such action was part which rapidly brought them into disfavor with all Allied representatives here and unless policy is changed eliminating friction caused by them they will soon be strongly disliked, all of which may bring unpleasant political consequence. Harris."

POLK

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861.00/3842

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In reply to your letter of February 1st NE-M. 861.00/3762,<sup>85</sup> in which you request the War Department to secure from General Graves a report as to the morale of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia, I have the honor to inform you that the following message has been received from General Graves:

"Number 167. February 7th. Reference your number 140. From reports received from officers and others who have come in contact with the Czechs I am convinced their morale has been grow-

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<sup>85</sup> Not printed.

ing worse since signing of the armistice. Many are not in sympathy with the kind of government they believe Kolchak is trying to establish in Siberia and a feeling has developed in the ranks that by fighting against the Bolsheviks they are helping to maintain a government with ideas directly opposed to Czechs idea of a democratic form of government. The morale in the first division is very bad. There exists in this division committees in companies, battalions, regiments and divisions. The commanders of these units are often handicapped in that their action depends to a great extent on the sanction of these committees. There is also a belief among the Czech soldiers that it is not just to keep them on the fighting line where they continually suffer losses unless other allies send their troops to fight the Bolsheviks with them. I consider the morale bad and the Czechs do not constitute a dependable force for use against the Bolsheviks. Stefanik apparently failed in effort to improve morale of Czechs and has left Siberia probably for Prague. Czech representative here officially informed me Czechs are now withdrawing from the front and taking the following positions with a view to reorganizing and awaiting developments and being in a position to return home by the most direct route either through Russia or through Vladivostok: Corps Headquarters, Irkutsk; First Division, vicinity Irkutsk; Second Division, Tomsk and vicinity; Third Division, Krasnoyarsk and vicinity. Graves."

Very sincerely yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

861.00/3837 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 12, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received 11:10 p.m.]

7183. Your 7343, February 8, 5 p.m., has been discussed with Mr. Beneš this morning who stated that he would telegraph to the Czech representative at Omsk requesting a full report regarding the situation among the Czech troops and directing him to take measures to ameliorate the situation complained of, that it was his natural desire to avoid all possible cause of friction or complaint. He further said that the situation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia had become a difficult one as a certain proportion of the soldiers were unwilling to continue their campaign against the Bolsheviks because the armistice having been signed between the contending powers they did not see the reason why they themselves should continue the fight against the Bolsheviks while the Allies were doing no fighting on their side, that the troops of the Allied powers having ceased hostilities the Czechs were desirous themselves of returning home. On the other hand there was still a considerable element of the army willing to continue the campaign against the Bolsheviks. He said that the failure of the

Allies in not sending ammunition and clothing and supplies to the Czech troops in Siberia tended to aggravate the situation, but that he would be glad, as already stated, to communicate at once with his Government's representative at Omsk.

SHARP

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861.00/3837 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1919, 8 p.m.

7435. Your 7183, February 12, 11 p.m. Please inform Mr. Beneš his attitude much appreciated. In this connection it seems too little understood that this Government made a loan of \$7,000,000 to the Czecho-Slovak National Council before Professor Masaryk<sup>88</sup> left here, and that the purchase and shipment of military supplies and equipment for the Czech troops in Siberia was begun at once.

Department was surprised to ascertain only recently that the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Siberia still had only very little knowledge of this transaction, in spite of the fact that the military equipment purchased from the American loan had been accumulating at Vladivostok. Any difficulty connected with this question has now passed but the Department will be glad to have Mr. Beneš understand that the extraordinary and gallant efforts which were made by the Czech troops in Siberia were appreciated.

POLK

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861.00/4193a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1919, 3 p.m.

1363. General Graves telegraphs the following information received from Major Slaughter at Omsk dated March 23.

"Czech staff and all leaders badly worried at attitude of Czech Army toward remaining in Russia. Officers desire to remain as long as needed and be guided by the Allies and their needs but the Army desires only to go home regardless of all other considerations. Unless steps be taken to meet this situation the Czechs are likely to prove a menace rather than a help in Siberia. Should Allies require Czechs to guard railroad lines I think they will be disappointed in results. Czech Army filled with Bolshevik propagandists. Officers themselves do not agree. Resistance to abolition of soldier committee only a subterfuge for agitation and revolt. Soldiers blame Allies for not sending them home. If asked to guard the lines they may be expected to passively obstruct traffic and countenance local disorder. Czechs say: 'If we could be given official assurance that

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<sup>88</sup> Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak National Council.



we would be sent home as ships become available agitation would stop and order and assistance on railroads might be expected.'

To send them all out in month or two without replacing them would be disastrous to this government which would collapse and Bolshevism return worse than before. To send them out slowly would permit this government to assume control and take over their duties. Unless Czechs change their attitude towards Russians many combats are likely to result. Allies can only restrain Czechs by promise to send them home. Every event would seem to confirm this."

The Department is inclined to think that measures to commence to repatriate the Czechs should be taken promptly and a public statement issued to that effect. The difficulties, however, are great. The tonnage situation renders transportation by sea from Vladivostok to Trieste certainly slow if not impracticable. To have them retrace their steps through European Russia would require some definite understanding with the Bolsheviki which might be difficult to obtain even if the Omsk authorities would consent to open the Volga front for that purpose. I shall be glad to know if the Mission can discuss this matter with the Czecho-Slovak representatives at Paris and advise the Department of the result.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/4193b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1919, 5 p.m.

1393. Referring Department's telegram March 29 concerning repatriation Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia, the Secretary of War asks me to say that he feels some definite action is extremely important.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/4203 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, April 3, 1919, 1 a.m.

[Received 2:20 a.m.]

1444. Department's 1363, March 29, 3 p.m. Discussed with Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs. He states that Major Slaughter's report confirms his own impression as to the situation. He is opposed to repatriation of troops through Russia on two grounds: (1) That they are now ripe for Bolshevism and might be infected during

journey; (2) that any arrangement made with Bolshevik authorities would injure relations with the Omsk Government.

He suggests as most practical solution that: (1) Troops be informed that they are to be repatriated by way of Vladivostok as rapidly as transportation can be made available, and (2) that some troops at least be started eastward to Vladivostok and some to Irkutsk. He added that gradual repatriation by this means would have the advantage of enabling the "digestion" of these troops as they arrive.

The foregoing appears to be the only practical solution of question. You may, therefore, if you deem it advisable, communicate in this sense with the military authorities.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/4694: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1919, 3 p.m.

2314. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Following just received from Stevens:

"June 13, 5 p.m. Just returned from Omsk, no change in the situation. Bolshevik activities Tomsk show that constant attacks on railway and trains continue to the very utmost, at times (murdering?). Situation regarding Czech troops 60,000 in number, extremely serious, they are thoroughly dissatisfied, want to go home and Commanding General tells me they cannot be held under discipline longer than three months. Four regiments have already refused duty, in other words, will fight Bolshevik no longer. There is very grave danger that they will defy their officers and by arrangements with Bolsheviki try to go home through Russia. This would mean war with Siberian Army with defeat of latter and overthrow of Government and consequent anarchy under Bolsheviki. Allies should quickly send force of 50,000 to 76,000 troops to relieve Czechs and send latter home. It will be fatal to ignore situation, it must be met or all Allied work here will go to naught and we may as well give up our efforts and leave Russians to whatever might come. I am not unduly alarmed but I tell you frankly that the situation is an impossible one and cannot continue and I have no hopes of ultimate success unless the Allies realize exactly what the situation is and take necessary steps without delay to remedy it. [Stevens.]"

PHILLIPS

861.00/4717 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1919, 4 p.m.

2354. For the Secretary of State and McCormick. Following received from Peking June 19th. Is anything being done at Paris? See recent cable, same subject.

"The Consul at Irkutsk telegraphs as follows in substance referring to his previous telegrams regarding clash between military authorities and conflict with Czech soldiers. To avert grave consequences there is urgent necessity for sending Czechs home as soon as possible as they have been tried to the breaking point and are demoralized by various causes. Among these causes may be mentioned:

1. The conditions in which they have to live and fight:
2. The limit has been reached beyond which no nation is willing to fight the battles of another:
3. They are needed at home for the protection of their new republic:
4. The absence of news from home:
5. Their long demoralizing experience in the same camps and their present Bolshevik surrounding:
6. Failure of the Allies to take decisive measures in Russia:
7. American and other troops being sent home although they have not seen nearly as much fighting as the Czechs.

The present crisis has passed but the causes of the crisis remain and will remain until the Czechs are entirely removed from Siberia which should be done before the next cold weather sets in at the latest. The Bolshevik are on an active propaganda amongst them which should be allayed by immediate assurance of their withdrawal at no distant date."

Further reports as follows:

"Following from Novo Nicolaevsk 265, June 12, 6 p.m. Reports received Omsk state that the division of Czechs left in Irawady [*Irkutsk?*] turned Bolsheviki, June 13th, deposed its officers and organized a Soviet. General Janin<sup>87</sup> has left for Irkutsk.

Consul Thomson telegraphs that when Stevens passed through Irkutsk, June 9th, General Syrovy, Czech Commander, stated that in their desire to return home Czech soldiers had reached a point where he could no longer exercise control over them and if Czechs were not removed before autumn there was grave danger that Czech Army would take their cars and force their way to Bohemia through territory of Bolsheviki who would actually give all possible assistance to get Czechs out of Siberia. Harris."

POLK

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<sup>87</sup> Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army, supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army.

861.00/4786 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received June 23, 1919, 6:53 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk:

"278, June 21, 11 a.m. Consul Thomson, Irkutsk, gives the following reason for Czech disturbances that city: five years' absence from home including experiences in prison camps; lack of communication with home Government and folks during that period; demoralizing effect of environment in Russia necessitating their organizing and fighting in the midst of anarchy disorder and Bolshevism; disappointment at failure of Allies to take declarative attitude in Russian affairs; the attainment of Czecho-Slovakian freedom has deprived them of great cause which induced them to fight last year in Russia; soldiers feel that they are needed at home to protect new state.

I respectfully point out to the Department that if Czech soldiers are not sent home before cold weather there is almost a certainty that very serious trouble will arise. It appears to me that Allies must very seriously consider question of replacing Czech soldiers by their own troops if the railway is to be properly guarded in the future. I consider it an impossibility that the Russians themselves will be able to spare sufficient soldiers from the front in order to effectively protect railway in its operation. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4748 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 24, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received June 25, 8:06 p.m.]

2744. Your 2314, June 16, 1 [3] p.m. Mr. McCormick and I are of the opinion that everything possible must be done to repatriate Czech troops in Siberia either through Russia or by sea. Russian Political Conference and Kramarz<sup>88</sup> are very anxious to have the troops go overland not with the consent of the Bolsheviks, but by fighting their way out. Kramarz thinks that if they could be collected at Perm and told that by fighting their way out through [*way to the*] Viatka and Vologda they would be enabled to leave the country, their morale would be still sufficient to enable them to do so. Kramarz informs me that a Czech delegation composed of two politicians and some doctors have already left Paris for Siberia. They

<sup>88</sup> Karel Kramář, President of the Czechoslovak Council of Ministers.

intend to repatriate by sea all invalid Czechs and are already negotiating for a Japanese ship for this purpose. As to the remainder, they intend to encourage and advise them to fight their way out as indicated above. If Admiral Koltchak and the Czech Commander consider this plan possible it would seem the quickest and easiest way of sending them home. Kramarz is particularly anxious to have the Czechs render this last service to Russia, thereby securing the gratitude of Russia, while if they leave by sea he fears that their previous services will be forgotten.

LANSING AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/4748 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1919, 7 p.m.

2542. For Whitehouse<sup>89</sup> from Miles.<sup>90</sup>

Referring your 2744, June 24, 1 p.m. Consul General at Omsk states that the French General Janin, commander of the Czechs, refuses consent to permit Czech troops to fight way out as suggested. He states Czech troops must be evacuated by sea. Foreign Office at Omsk informs Harris that when the Czechs are removed the Omsk Government must look to America and Japan to supply troops to guard railways. It is understood Japan is favorable to this proposal.

Stevens cables he would like to be advised whether Czechs are to leave or not and states that unless they are replaced by Allied troops we will have to withdraw American Engineers to [*from?*] west of Lake Baikal.

Before referring this to the President I would be grateful to know if you have any further information or suggestion.

POLK

861.77/934 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 14, 1919, 1:45 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

323. July 13, 3 p.m. Foreign Office has handed me following for Department which is literal translation of the French text.

"In view of the projected evacuation of the Czech troops and sending to the front of a Russian detachment commanded by Gen-

<sup>89</sup> Sheldon Whitehouse, First Secretary of Embassy at Paris.

<sup>90</sup> Basil Miles, in charge of Russian Affairs, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

eral Rosanoff, the question of guarding the Trans-Siberian and maintaining order along the line is actively occupying the Russian Government. It would seem to indicate that it is impossible to dispense with the assistance of foreign forces for the protection of the line for some time longer which has already been provided for by Inter-Allied Agreement relating to the operating of the Trans-Siberian.<sup>91</sup>

In referring to the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers, which was transmitted to the Supreme Ruler in a telegram from Mr. Clemenceau dated July 2d, 1919,<sup>92</sup> the Russian Government is pleased to believe that the Government of the United States of America will not refuse to consider the urgency of this question and notably the possibility of Russian-Japanese troops together with an American detachment, to guarantee safety of railway. This would allow eventually the reenforcement of the Japanese contingents by new [omission]. As to the American forces it would seem possible to advance them [*sic*] further than Irkutsk one of the detachments operating at the present time in the region of Verchniudinsk or Vladivostok.

The method of accepting in practice this plan might be studied by competent military authorities. Signed Soukine.<sup>[93]</sup>

HARRIS  
REINSCH

861.00/4859 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 16, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received July 17, 5:25 a.m.]

3177. Your 2542, July 10, 7 p.m. for Miles from Whitehouse.  
General Bliss states:

“ July 14.

1. Before the President left Paris, a plan prepared by the British Minister of War, Winston Churchill, for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks was submitted to the Council of the powers and was referred by the latter for report to the military representatives with the Supreme War Council. This plan provided that 30,000 Czecho-Slovaks would fight their way out via Viatka, Kotlas, and Archangel. The remaining 30,000 would be repatriated via Vladivostok. After the President's departure, the military representatives reported to the Council of Five that they were informed by the Czecho-Slovakian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would refuse to assent to this plan unless the British Government guaranteed that Allied expedition now operating from Archangel would remain in North Russia until the arrival of the

<sup>91</sup> See section (2) of plan for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways, p. 239.

<sup>92</sup> See telegram from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 3177, July 16, 10 p.m., *infra*.

Czecho-Slovaks. It is understood that the British Government has pledged itself to withdraw this expedition before ice prevents in November next. It will be impossible for the Czecho-Slovaks to reach Archangel in time. The military representatives asked the Council of Five to officially ascertain the British Government's intentions as to the withdrawal of the Archangel expedition. The military representatives also telegraphed nearly two weeks ago to Admiral Koltchak, to General Janin and to General Knox, whether in their opinion the plan was practicable. No reply received to any of these requests for information and the delay now makes the plan impracticable.

2. If the entire Czecho-Slovak force must be evacuated by sea via Vladivostok doubtful whether they can be repatriated at all.

3. Nothing known here as to whether the United States will send troops to replace the Czecho-Slovaks if the latter are repatriated.

4. To sum up, I think that Mr. Stevens will have to be informed that there is no likelihood that the Czecho-Slovaks can be repatriated this year."

#### AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/4873 b: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*<sup>93</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1919.

The following is the address the President made to the detachment of 1,050 Czecho-Slovak troops which he reviewed to-day in Washington. Troops have been invalided out of Vladivostok and are *en route* to their native land. You will please release for publication and forward to Omsk with instructions to release.

"It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to review this detachment of your valiant army and to extend to you, its officers, and the brave men associated with you a most cordial welcome. Though we have been far away, we have watched your actions and have been moved by admiration of the services you have rendered under the most adverse circumstances. Having been subjected to an alien control, you were fired by a love of your former independence and for the institutions of your native land, and gallantly aligned yourselves with those who fought in opposition to all despotism and military autocracy. At the moment when adversity came to the armies with which you were fighting, and when darkness and discouragement cast a shadow upon your cause, you declined to be daunted by circumstances and retained your gallant hope. Your steadfastness in purpose, your unshaken belief in high ideals, your

<sup>93</sup> The same in substance to the Minister in Czechoslovakia.

valor of mind, of body, and of heart have evoked the admiration of the world. In the midst of a disorganized people and subject to influences which worked for ruin, you consistently maintained order within your ranks, and by your example helped those with whom you came in contact to reestablish their lives. I cannot say too much in praise of the demeanor of your brave army in these trying circumstances. Future generations will happily record the influence for good which you were privileged to exercise upon a large part of the population of the world, and will accord you the place which you have so courageously won. There is perhaps nowhere recorded a more brilliant record than the withdrawal of your forces in opposition to the armies of Germany and Austria, through a population at first hostile, or the march of your armies for thousands of miles across the great stretches of Siberia, all the while keeping in mind the necessity for order and organization.

You are returning now to your native land which is today, we all rejoice to say, again a free and independent country. May you contribute to her life that stamina which you so conspicuously manifested through all your trying experiences in Russia and Siberia, and may you keep in mind after your return, as you have kept in mind hitherto, that the laws of God, the laws of man and the laws of nature require systematic order and cool counsel for their proper application and development, and for the welfare and happiness of the human race."

Furnish copy to Czecho-Slovak representative and ask Harris to do likewise.

POLK

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861.00/4867 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 18, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received July 19, 5:22 a.m.]

3222 [3212]. For transmission to the President and for your information.

Following is text of telegram in translation from French Diplomatic Agent at Omsk to French Foreign Office received July 14 in which is transmitted communication to M. Clemenceau from Admiral Koltchak relative to Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia:

"Numbers 458 and 459. Admiral Koltchak asked me to transmit to M. Clemenceau the following telegram:

'In answer to the message which you were kind enough to send me in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers concerning the repatriation to [of] Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, I have the honor to inform you that the plan suggested by the powers is (in) full conformity with the views of the Russian Government.

However, its practical execution seems to be in opposition with a state of affairs which must be taken into consideration. The



morale of the Czecho-Slovak troops unfortunately does not allow us to hope that there will be a sufficient number of men willing to make their way to Archangel even with the assurance of an immediate repatriation as the reward of their success. Such an appreciation of the Czech state of mind was not presented by General Janin because the Russian Government wished to abstain from any initiative and interference in this matter.

It feels, nevertheless, obliged to express its deep conviction that the Czech troops could not be maintained in Siberia for another winter without incurring grave danger for their morale as well as for the security of the Trans-Siberian along which they are now stationed.

Consequently, the Russian Government considers that their gradual evacuation by way of Vladivostok should be immediately begun. That is why I believe it my duty to ask the Allied and Associated Powers: (1) to furnish the necessary tonnage to enable a regular and urgent evacuation of the Czecho-Slovaks by Vladivostok in spite of all the difficulties and inconveniences of such a procedure; (2) to consider the eventuality of insuring the guard of the part of the Trans-Siberian which are [*is*] entrusted to the Czechs [by American] and Japanese troops.

In bringing the foregoing to Your Excellency's attention I beg to state once more that the attitude of the Russian Government in the question of the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops is determined only by sentiments of deep friendship and gratitude towards those who lent their help to the Russian national movement and by the conviction that their quick evacuation is imposed by circumstances. Signed Koltchak.' Maugras."

The document quoted above is an illustration of countless others which are presented to the Peace Delegation seriously retarding work of completion of terms with enemy powers by imposing on us consideration of questions which concern heads of governments alone and in respect to which we have no power of intervention. Suggest your seeing General Bliss' telegram to Secretary of War, number 341, July 14,<sup>94</sup> relative to American troops relieving Czecho-Slovaks.

BLISS WHITE AMERICAN MISSION

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763.72119/5751 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

PARIS, July 21, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received July 22, 1:13 p.m.]

3251. The Council of the Heads of Delegations met July 18 in the afternoon, Clemenceau in the chair.

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<sup>94</sup> Not printed; cf. *ante*, p. 285.

The Council had before it the draft despatch prepared by the military representatives regarding repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia, in accordance with the decision taken at the meeting of July 9. Baron Makino observed that it had been decided some time back by the Supreme Council that the Czecho-Slovaks should be evacuated through Omsk to Archangel and that the Japanese Government should then be asked to protect the railway. He had telegraphed to his Government in that sense. Their reports tended to show that since the Czecho-Slovaks did not accept the proposal the Japanese Government had suspended its decision. The question now was of repatriation by Vladivostok. This was a new proposal which must be submitted to the Japanese Government. It was probable that it would wish to obtain all the information possible and possibly would desire to consult the local authorities. The examination would take several days during which it would be impossible for him to reply to the Supreme Council.

The Council decided that Mr. Clemenceau should send the following telegram to the American Government, and that Baron Makino should send similar telegram to the Japanese Government:

“In view of the condition and wishes of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers consider it urgently necessary that arrangements should be made for the systematic repatriation of the troops from Vladivostok.

“This involves the replacement of these troops along that portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway which is at present guarded by them. Information is therefore requested as to whether the American Government will furnish the necessary effectives or will cooperate with the Japanese Government to this end. A similar telegram has been addressed to the Japanese.”

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/4877 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 21, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received July 22, 3:08 a.m.]

3248. Following is text in translation of note dated July 17th, 1919, from Secretary General of Peace Conference to American delegation, summarizing conclusions arrived at by French High Commissioner in Siberia in conjunction [*conference*] with General Janin and Mr. Soukine<sup>95</sup> with respect to the repatriation of Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia.

<sup>95</sup> John Sookine, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Omsk Government.

“The French High Commissioner in Siberia has just informed the French Government of the conclusions adopted in the course of the conferences in which he examined the question of the repatriation of Czecho-Slovak troops with General Janin and Mr. Soukine. The result of this exchange of views is:

1. That under the present situation it is doubtful whether the Czech troops will consent to go to the front in order to make a way for themselves either by the north (Archangel) or by the south (Black Sea). The soldiers have only one desire: to return home. Following recent incidents they are furthermore in no way disposed to consent to being replaced [*placed*] under a Russian command.

2. That in case a call for volunteers should be made it seems that only one or two thousand would be obtained.

3. That under these conditions the evacuation by sea via Vladivostok is imperative. If the principle were proclaimed General Janin believes it would be possible to have the Czech soldiers accept the idea of a gradual repatriation without confusion. If the repatriation were effected progressively it would become easier to replace as needed the Czecho-Slovak troops assigned to guard the Trans-Siberian.

4. The first contingents should embark before winter.

5. A solution is urgent. If a decision is not promptly made, new disorders are to be feared.

The Government of Omsk places itself at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers to organize the repatriation.

The French High Commissioner furthermore drew attention to the 11,000 Polish soldiers incompletely organized who are in concentration camp [*are in Siberia*]. The Poles are in complete disagreement with the Russians and sending them to the front would be difficult at this date; there could be no question of it in any case without the consent of and an order from the Government of Warsaw.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Omsk Government requests on his side either the sending of these troops to the front or their repatriation or, if neither of these, their disarmament.

The telegram from Mr. de Martel<sup>96</sup> sent on July 5 has probably crossed the telegram sent on July 2<sup>97</sup> by the President of the Council to Admiral Kolchak in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

#### AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/4972b: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Heid.<sup>98</sup> War Trade Board's 189 June 25, 7 p.m.<sup>99</sup> Impression received here based on a report from General Cecek<sup>1</sup> is that expenses

<sup>96</sup> French High Commissioner in Siberia.

<sup>97</sup> Texts of the telegrams apparently not transmitted to the Department.

<sup>98</sup> August Heid, representative at Vladivostok of the War Trade Board.

<sup>99</sup> Not printed.

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Stanislav Čeček, Czechoslovak Commander at Vladivostok.

in connection with repatriation wounded Czechoslovak soldiers are being borne by United States, and it is also reported that this misapprehension has been spread throughout Siberia. For your information, and kindly inform General Cecek and Dr. Girska,<sup>2</sup> all expenses connected with repatriation of these soldiers are being paid by Czechoslovak Legation here from funds loaned to Czechoslovak Republic by United States Government.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/4877 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris),  
temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Morris.

Apparently about July 14 after much consideration by Supreme War Council at Paris, conclusions were reached as follows:

1. That Czecho-Slovak Government would not consent to Czecho-Slovak armies in Siberia fighting their way out Eastwards unless British Government would guarantee that the Allied expedition operating from Archangel would remain in North Russia until the arrival of the Czechoslovaks.

On this point no reply received from British Government or from Kolchak, Janin or Knox, to all of whom telegrams were apparently sent from Paris.

2. If the Czecho-Slovak forces were to be evacuated via Vladivostok it was considered doubtful whether they could be repatriated at all.

3. Obvious conclusion that there is no likelihood that the Czecho-Slovaks can be repatriated this year. Since that time Kolchak has sent telegrams to the French Foreign Office and also to French High Commissioner in Siberia, after conference with General Janin, which seem to indicate that the alternatives are as follows:

1. Return of Czecho-Slovaks to the front by volunteering which is expected to produce very small results.
2. Gradual repatriation to be commenced at once and apparently completed by next Summer.
3. Disarmament.

The Department appreciates the extreme gravity of this question and will be glad to have any conclusion you reach.

LANSING

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<sup>2</sup> Václav Girska, Czechoslovak Commissioner in Siberia.

861.00/4954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, July 30, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 1, 8:55 p.m.]

Our second conference<sup>4</sup> met on July 27th and included military as well as diplomatic representatives. General Graves accompanied me. We confined our discussion to the present condition of the Czech forces in Siberia and finally agreed on the following statement of the essential facts.

1. According to the information which the members of the conference could secure as to the state of the Czech troops in Siberia, they are prepared to take as decisive, and confirmed by their own observations, the opinion of General Janin that, except a small number of soldiers who may eventually volunteer, the Czech Army is not in a position to proceed to the front or to continue the permanent guard of the railway, and will have to be evacuated gradually via Vladivostok. This conclusion has been reached viewing the situation from the standpoint of the actual morale of the Czech troops. It is believed that they will not fight their way to Archangel or to the Black Sea, irrespective of whether such will be the decision of the Czech Government or whether British troops would be maintained at Archangel to secure the junction. As to the possible consequences that would follow if the Czech troops could not be evacuated from Siberia in the course of the coming winter, the Russian Government has expressed its conviction that considerable danger has to be anticipated both for the Czech Army itself and for the Russian situation.

2. The Russian Government has not at its disposal at present the contingents necessary for the protection of the line, the whole of its army having to be concentrated on the Ural front.

3. As there is no possibility of having Russian troops to defend the railway, it may be, if no foreign detachments were sent to take charge of the guard after the evacuation of the Czechs, a most critical situation would arise endangering the security of the line of communication between Vladivostok and Omsk, and practically cutting the Ural front from the Pacific.

4. The quantity of troops necessary for such a guard is estimated to be of three divisions of infantry, 36,000 men, one division of cavalry, 3,000 men, and three batteries of artillery, total about 40,000 men. The guard of the line cannot be limited to a defense against possible attacks, but involves also eventual expeditions inside the

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<sup>4</sup> See telegrams from the Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Omsk, July 27, 4 p.m., and July 31, 11 p.m., pp. 396 and 269.

country to pursue and disperse the elements of disorder wherever they concentrate with a view to attacking the railway. The region and necessity of such expeditions should be determined by the commanding officer in charge of the guard.

5. The Russian Government will provide for the necessary barracks to be ready about first of October.

6. Competent military authorities could determine the subdivision of the line to be guarded into portions and will elaborate regulations for the guard. It is stated in general that three zones have to be contemplated requiring about one division each: Irkutsk to Krasnoyarsk, name used above to the Taiga, name used above to Omsk.

I believe that this is a fair and moderate statement of the facts and they lead me to but one conclusion: The Kolchak movement cannot be effectively forwarded during the coming winter, and the Allied operation of the railways will not be possible beyond Irkutsk, unless the Associated Governments are prepared to supply additional troops to replace the Czechs.

Assuming the accuracy of the statements of the Allied representatives here, it would appear that, as a result of the war, the only countries that are in a position even to consider sending troops for the present are the United States and Japan. If the Department finds the assumption to be correct, I submit for the consideration of the Department my earnest conviction that no arrangement with Japan will prove satisfactory which does not provide that the United States shall contribute at least one half of the additional troops. I state my reasons for this conviction:

1. There is a fundamental difference in purpose governing the Siberian policy of the two Governments. The Terauchi ministry, which was military, clearly planned to use the joint expedition to Vladivostok last summer as an excuse to take possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway and thus dominate northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. The direct method of accomplishing the purpose failed, but the purpose remains. There is in Japan a group which recognizes the inconsistency of such a purpose with the present condition of the world. With this group Hara sympathizes in principle, but is hampered in action by the still powerful military control. All the evidence convinces me that Japan is pursuing in Siberia the same methods which have produced such tragic results in China . . . . The Seminoff controversy is, as I see it, simply a sordid conspiracy to practice extortion upon the people of Siberia through control of the customs service at Manchuria Station and of distribution at Chita. We cannot meet this conspiracy and enforce the "Open Door", necessary for the economic salvation of Russia, merely by frank discussions and formal protests in Tokyo. We must

speak our determined purpose in the only language the Japanese military clique can understand. This will not lead to friction; on the contrary it will bring about a better understanding. We shall not only help the liberals in Russia; we shall render an even greater service to the liberal and progressive movement in Japan.

2. The presence of a substantial number of American troops will serve to impress upon the Cossack leaders and other reactionaries . . . the character and extent of the protection we are prepared to give to American agencies.

3. If our Government decides to adopt a comprehensive plan of help for Russia, including the further supervision of the railways, control over the distribution of supplies, Red Cross work, educational and agricultural assistance, we must have an adequate military police to protect these agencies until better order prevails. Experience has shown that we cannot rely on Japanese support or protection, for the obvious reason that the majority opinion in Japan is at present jealous of and antagonistic to such efforts.

4. Such aid as we have given to Siberia in the past year has been possible only because of the presence of the Czechs. In my judgment it is not fair to ask them to remain longer; they are rapidly breaking under the mental and physical strain put upon them by years of separation from home and family, continuous exertion, and unwholesome conditions of living.

I submit that we should assume our full share of the protection which any further effort to help Russia necessarily involves et cetera.

MORRIS

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861.00/6700 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 7, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 4:14 p.m.]

3546. For the Secretary of State from Polk.

A communication from French Embassy, Washington, presented to Conference yesterday stated that United States could not assist in repatriation of Czechs owing to lack of shipping and suggested that they go out in the direction of General Denikine's forces. Allied military authorities say suggestion out of the question. Would it not be possible to do something, as I understand we are to be reimbursed for any expense and it would seem that we were under an obligation to do everything in our power.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5016b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1919, 5 p.m.

2759. In reply to Mr. Clemenceau's recent telegram to the President<sup>5</sup> as to whether this Government is disposed to furnish the needed number of troops to replace Czecho-Slovaks when the latter are withdrawn from Siberia please say that, with the utmost regret, the President finds it impracticable to furnish additional American troops for this purpose.

LANSING

861.00/6700 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1919, 4 p.m.

2776. For Polk. Your 3546 August 7, 3 p.m. As regards repatriation of Czechs by sea I understand considerable suitable tonnage may be freed by the Army after August 30th but neither this Department nor the War Department has any funds of its own which could be used. I do not see how it is feasible at all for Czechs to join Denikine at present.

Rough estimate of repatriation by sea is about \$250 or \$300 per man. How are we to be reimbursed? If your understanding is correct on this point I suggest we may possibly find that Treasury has additional funds to loan the Czechs which could be used for immediate financial requirements. If you will let me know whether the Conference has any proposals for financing either through loans to the Czechs or otherwise, I will urge the President to direct the Shipping Board to provide at least some of the necessary tonnage for an early start.

The Department thoroughly agrees with you that the Allies share a moral obligation to assist in the repatriation of the Czechs. Reports from Morris further emphasize the absolute necessity of doing something to get them home.

LANSING

861.00/6712 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, September 13, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received September 14, 9:18 a.m.]

4204. Department's 2776, August 9, 3 [4] p.m., and 2916, August 22, 4 p.m.<sup>6</sup> Memorandum of French Foreign Office states that Anglo-

<sup>5</sup> See telegram from the Commission to Negotiate Peace no. 3251, July 21, 9 p.m., p. 288.

<sup>6</sup> Latter not printed.



French agreement of July 2d, 1918, provides for division of all expenses between Great Britain and France, Great Britain to advance transportation and other charges of Czecho-Slovak troops beginning with [the date of] their departure, while France would furnish necessary amounts to pay for these troops during their stay in Italy [*Russia*]. Great Britain, in addition, was to request the United States to contribute one third of the total expense as finally determined. The memorandum further states that the question of reimbursement of expenses paid for the Czech-Slovak troops was also taken up with the Czecho-Slovak Government which agreed to repay all expenses incurred for the formation and support of the Czecho armies in Europe, the new Republic being desirous of bearing all expenses connected with its war of independence.

Repayment of expenses incurred in Siberia was not, as stated in memorandum, formerly [*formally*] conceded. The Czecho-Slovak Government considers that as the Czecho troops in Russia were put at the disposition of the Allies for the benefit of the common cause, it would be unreasonable to expect the [new] Government to bear such heavy burdens. The Czecho-Slovak Government, however, [would] be willing to bear reasonable part of the same.

The French and English Governments which have hitherto made advances for these troops in Siberia and continue to be responsible for their support and their repatriation ask whether the Government of the United States is willing to accept the obligation of paying one third of the expense pending final arrangement with the Czechs.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5229 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, September 17, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received September 18, 12:57 a.m.]

4253. American Mission's 4204, September 13, 11 p.m. and Department's 2776, August 9, 4 p.m. Beneš, Czecho-Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, had made urgent representations to American Mission on subject of Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, stating that the situation has now become exceedingly grave from two points of view:

1st. The condition of these 60,000 troops is pitiful as to morale as they look with despair on another possible winter in Siberia. Their retention might be an actual source of danger rather than protection.

2d. Return of these troops has become a burning political question. Beneš states that if he cannot give any hope to the hundreds of thousands of persons interested at home in the return of these troops

an overthrow of the Government is possible if not probable. The Powers have every interest in preventing this.

Beneš points out that the important matter is that the movement should begin at once so that he can inform his people that it is proceeding under a definite promise of the Powers. American Mission is strongly of opinion that all possible effort should be made on our part to provide transportation and such financial assistance as may be practicable which Beneš agrees reimburse in due time.

Please reply at earliest possible moment stating definitely what can be done on these two points. On receiving Department's reply the matter will at once be brought up again before the Supreme Council.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/6712 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *September 20, 1919, 6 p.m.*

3189. For Polk.

Referring to your 4204, September 13, 11 p.m.

On September 27, 1918, in response to two notes from the French Embassy dated July 16<sup>8</sup> and 28<sup>9</sup> respectively, relative to willingness of the United States to assume one third of a total sum of 5,000,000 roubles as financial aid to further the movement of the Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia, Department replied<sup>10</sup> that this Government was considering with Professor Masaryk separate financial aid on the part of the United States especially in regard to military supplies for the Czech armies in Siberia. As you recall, President accordingly set aside \$5,000,000 for purchase of supplies for the Czech armies, to be disbursed under supervision of a special informal committee, consisting of McCormick, Baruch and Hurley.

The Department has no other funds for defraying any share of further expenses by Czech armies, aside from question of repatriation raised in your 4253, September 17, 11 p.m., which was referred at once to the President with recommendations for immediate action as a distinct and separate matter. Department hopes to send you answer on Monday.

PHILLIPS

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<sup>8</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 284-285.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 308.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 395.

861.00/5229 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *September 22, 1919, 4 p.m.*

3198. For Polk. Your 4253, September 17, 11 p.m. and Department's 3189, September 20, 6 p.m. I have today obtained the approval of the President to allocation by the Treasury of funds up to \$12,000,000 as loans to the Czecho-Slovak Republic to cover estimated cost of repatriating 50,000 Czechs from Siberia. Have asked Treasury whether funds are available.

The President has also approved the allocation by the U. S. Shipping Board of sufficient tonnage for this movement and believing that this repatriation should be handled by one competent head and owing to the great part being taken in this transaction by the United States Government, we are prepared to ask the War Department to detail Brigadier-General Frank L. Hines, Chief of War Department Transportation Service, with such assistants as he may require to handle this movement for the Czecho-Slovak Government.

If Council approves, please have proper Czecho-Slovak government authority given to Czecho-Slovak representative here to execute obligations for sums which the Treasury may allocate for this purpose. The loan to Czecho-Slovak Government would be deposited in New York bank and drawn subject to countersignature of authorized representative of the Department as done in regard to munitions and movement of Czech wounded from Siberia.

Suggest you insist on Great Britain and France agreeing to make loans to Czechs Government equal in each case to one-quarter of total cost which Czechs may use to reimburse us. This participation seems proper, first, because total tonnage will be furnished by United States Shipping Board; second, major part played by United States in the general relief work in Europe; third, immediate interest of France and Great Britain to stabilize conditions in Czechoslovakia. Also suggest you ascertain first, best Mediterranean port to which these Czechs may be sent; second, whether Czecho-Slovak Government is prepared to handle men from port of debarkation to their homes or concentration camp.

We are withholding further communication with the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the U. S. Shipping Board and Secretary of War pending your reply to this telegram which should convey approval or disapproval of the Supreme Council.

PHILLIPS

861.00/5235 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *September 24, 1919, 5 p.m.*

3228. For Polk. Following telegram from Am[erican] mission, Belgrade:

“107, September 16, 9 a.m. Note from Minister of Foreign Affairs states Supreme Council has requested American and Japanese Governments to take measures for repatriation Yugo-Slav and Czech forces in Siberia. Note requests assistance of the Government of the United States in order that the Yugo-Slav soldiers to be repatriated may be assured of necessary ships.”

Department's recent telegram gave proposed plan for repatriation Czech troops from Siberia. Suggest you ascertain whether Yugo-Slav and Polish governments have necessary funds to defray expenses repatriation of their troops from Siberia, having in mind that, if satisfactory financial arrangements can be completed, we might be able to get necessary tonnage for repatriation of these men in conjunction with that of the Czechs. Department has no accurate nor adequate data regarding numbers or condition of Poles and Yugo-Slavs in Siberia.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5281 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *September 25, 1919, 6 p.m.*

3238. For Polk from Treasury Department.

“In view of strong representations made by the American Mission and Department of State as to the importance of repatriating Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, I am prepared, with the approval of the President, to establish credits in favor of the Government of Czecho-Slovakia, and to make advances thereunder for expenditures necessary for transporting these troops to Czecho-Slovakia, on the understanding that the total expenditure involved would not exceed \$12,000,000. As however stability in Czecho-Slovakia, from a material standpoint, concerns England and France more than United States, and as the British can supply a large part, if not all, of the tonnage required for purpose, I do not feel that United States should bear all of this expenditure. I suggest, therefore, that you take matter up with British and French on basis that British furnish the tonnage, that we furnish the funds required for their keep in United States and railroad transportation therein, and that French supply the funds for their transportation home after reach-

ing Europe. As expenditures in Europe can be paid in francs there will be no undue burden to the French Treasury. As United States has supplied almost all funds required for European relief during the armistice, I am satisfied that England and France will realize that they should bear a large portion of expense. Please advise disposition of British and French Governments so that Treasury may determine exact amount of credit to be established by it."

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5229 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1919.

3259. For Polk.

Department's 3198, September 22. We have been advised that Treasury has funds available provided plan for withdrawal of Czecho-Slovak troops is approved. Early decision urgent or it will be too late to move the men before winter.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5295 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1919, 3 p.m.

3284. For Polk. Our telegram 3238, September 25, 6 p.m. was sent at the request of the Treasury Department. Inadvertently no comment was made by the State Department. Our telegraphic instruction 3198, September 22, 4 p.m. is not superseded by that of September 25, 6 p.m. Secure best plan you can for the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks. The President has given his approval to the allotment of the necessary tonnage and to the granting of a loan up to \$12,000,000. The War Department is in a position to handle the whole movement. The Department believes, however, that the British and French may find that their own ends will be served by supplying the tonnage in part, or even entirely, since the charges for the use of their ships could be considered as their share of the necessary loans. This would make it unnecessary for them to buy American dollars as would be the case should all or more than half of the tonnage used be American.

Department considers that repatriation should be started at once and feels confident that you will be able to obtain the consent of the British and French to share 50 percent of the loans to Czechoslo-

vakia for this cause. The Department feels at the same time that in this case the moral obligation takes priority over commercial and other ends, and that for this reason we should be ready in the last resort to begin the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks alone. Then if the movement stops the responsibility will rest upon France and Great Britain. The President has given his direct approval to the general principle of repatriating the Czechoslovaks in the manner indicated in our September 22, 4 p.m.

LANSING

861.00/5334 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 4, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received October 5, 3:50 a.m.]

4522. Department's 3198,<sup>11</sup> 3228<sup>12</sup> and 3250.<sup>13</sup> Supreme Council at its meeting October 1st decided that a Commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia. Supreme Council also decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovakian, Polish, Yugo-Slavian and Roumanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners. Prior repatriation, Allied forces of course naturally essential for sentimental and political reasons. Japanese representative Supreme Council requested to ask his Government to delay providing Japanese ships for German repatriation until after repatriation friendly troops had been effected. This meets with Department's desires as expressed in last sentence of its cable 3250.<sup>13</sup> Colonel Logan<sup>14</sup> designated as American member Paris Allied Commission established by Supreme Council. First meeting this commission will be held in Paris within a few days and plan outlined by Treasury Department (in ?) Department's 3238<sup>15</sup> will guide Logan in his presentation. We understand Treasury Department's proposal will also cover Polish, Yugo-Slavian and Roumanian contingents and that proper charges to these latter Governments on this account will be raised by Treasury Department. Is this correct? In entire accord with proposal contained in Department's 3198<sup>11</sup> to ask War Department to detail Brigadier General Frank L. Hines, Chief of War Department transportation service, with such assistance as he may require to handle

<sup>11</sup> Sept. 22, *ante*, p. 298.

<sup>12</sup> Sept. 24, *ante*, p. 299.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

<sup>14</sup> Col. James A. Logan, Jr.

<sup>15</sup> Sept. 25, *ante*, p. 299.

movement. In view of principle enunciated by Treasury Department as communicated in Department's cable 3238,<sup>16</sup> for time being at least, Hines' supervision of this movement should only contemplate journey from port debarkation American Pacific ports to port embarkation American Atlantic ports. On account of Hines' well-known ability would prefer his handling movement clear through but until final determination financial arrangements as between other Allied Powers suggest that his activities be restricted within the limits of movement indicated. Presume that ocean Atlantic ports [*ocean tonnage*] will be only limiting factor in movement this relatively small number of troops across United States and that so far as the United States is concerned movement can commence [at once]. Is this correct? Request you ascertain from Hines names of ports of debarkation and embarkation through which this movement will be handled so that this information may be communicated to British through their representatives here; also approximate time required from Pacific this [*to*] Atlantic ports. Will advise Department promptly results negotiations carried on under its 3238.<sup>16</sup>

AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5334 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1919, 11 a.m.

3378. For Polk.

Your 4522 October 4, 8 P.M. much garbled and also apparently at variance with understanding of Department.

1st: Department proposed to repatriate Czechs from Vladivostok or other port in Far East direct to Trieste or other Mediterranean port, via Suez and asked your advice as to what port would be most advantageous. See Department's 3198, September 22, 4 P.M.

2d: President has approved and Treasury has authority to advance loans to Czecho-Slovakia for repatriation of Czechs only and we desire to know what arrangements are to be made to finance Poles, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs. See Department's 3228 September 24, 5 p.m.

3d: Transportation across United States complicated by decreased personnel of army and necessity of holding men in camps at ports of debarkation and re-embarkation and is not considered advisable if it can possibly be avoided.

4th: The American ships now being turned back by War Department are all fitted for troop movement and we are afraid that if we have to wait for a commission to get organized in Paris to

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<sup>16</sup> Sept. 25, *ante*, p. 299.

allocate tonnage here ships will have been allocated to other routes and expense as well as delay of refitting would be very great and we would be unable to take advantage of General Hines' knowledge of suitable boats.

5th: When is Commission to which you refer going to begin to put ships into Vladivostok to take men, that is, how soon will commission get down to work?

6th: Regardless of whether inter-Allied commission such as you suggest takes final charge, the Department is convinced that without unity of control in the hands of one responsible representative of the Commission there will be confusion, delay and serious dissatisfaction and trouble.

As Department has authority for funds and tonnage to move the Czechs it occurs to me it would be advisable to start their repatriation direct from Siberia to Trieste as a wholly separate movement under the control of General Hines and this might simplify the whole problem and break down the many barriers that seem still to obstruct the actual movement of the men.

LANSING

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861.00/5366 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 9, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received October 10, 4:50 p.m.]

4598. Reference your 3238. Meeting Allied representatives held October 6th. It developed this meeting that final adjustment, as regards distribution of expense for proposed movement, would take some days. Allies in entire accord with principle of immediate return of troops from Siberia but not enthusiastic about advancing their proportionate share of credit. In view Department's desire to expedite movement, Logan made following proposal, viz: that repatriation Czecho-Slovakian, Yugo-Slavian, Polish and Roumanian troops in Siberia be commenced at once by the American Government who would handle movement up to total amount of tonnage it had available for this purpose and up to amount of credits our Government was prepared to advance to different Governments concerned. Logan gave no information as to total amount of finance our Government was prepared to advance as he considered it best to leave this to later negotiations. He, however, said that we would provide our share. Logan pointed out that the proposed movement would be understood to be [purely] an American effort and would be in entire charge of General Hines from port of embarkation, Vladivostok, to port of debarkation at Trieste for Czecho-Slovakian and Yugo-Slavian troops, Danzig for Polish troops and Constanza for Roumanian



troops. General shortage railway equipment in Europe requires water movement these troops up to these ports. Logan said he would propose to his Government that it should fix the proportionate number of troops of each nationality which America would finance and that the American Government would officially advise Governments of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Servia and Roumania of the proportion of the movement the American Government was individually prepared to finance and that these latter governments must look to the English and French for their credits and shipping for the balance of the movement. Logan said that the expense of the return movement of these troops, in the view of the American Government, involved a distinct and separate financial question wholly disassociated with [from] any other outstanding financial question, as for example, America's share, if any, in cost of past maintenance these troops in Siberia, etc.

French and British suggest cheapest movement would be all water via Panama Canal. Logan replied that so far as British and French share of movement, America of course had nothing to do with route selected, but so far as America was concerned in the movement which she was exclusively financing, that routing, whether by Panama Canal or by rail across the United States, was technical matter for our own authorities to determine in the best interest of our Government. This was agreed to.

It was also agreed that General Janin, French commander in Siberia, would arrange movement these forces to Vladivostok for embarkation in consultation with agent of General Hines stationed at Vladivostok. In view of political importance in assuring same treatment to all friendly nationals who have military forces in Siberia, Logan specifically reserved for Hines' agent at Vladivostok final determination as to number of troops of the various nationals which should be brought out of Siberia in this American movement. This was agreed to and French wrote [will instruct] Janin accordingly. British representative stated that following ships now engaged in movement American troops were already earmarked for repatriation British forces in various parts of the world and would not be available for handling any troops whatsoever from Siberia, viz: *Cap Finisterre*, *Great Waldeisce* [*Graf Waldersee*], *Imperator*, *Cleveland*, *Kaiserin Aug[uste]* *Victoria*, *Patricia*, *Pretoria*, *Prinz Friedrich*, *Wilhelm*, *Santa Elena*, and *Zeppelin*. We do not know what, if any, effect this will have on Hines' plans and simply give list for what it is worth.

In accordance with foregoing proposal there is no reason in our minds why repatriation these troops from Siberia by America should not be immediately started as the problem is now purely a technical shipping one from America's point of view with only limiting factors

as to number of each nationality to be transported dependent upon availability of tonnage and proportionate burden of credits America is to carry. French and British estimate that following figures are approximate number of troops of various nationals now in Siberia to be repatriated: Czecho-Slovaks 55,000, Poles 11,000, Yugo-Slavs 4,000 and Roumanians 2,000.

For use in further financial negotiations thereafter would like to [*request you*] ascertain from Hines and cable approximate per capita cost for return these troops from Vladivostok to Danzig, Trieste and Constanza by both Panama Canal route and rail movement [*route*] across the United States, also approximate number of troops that can be embarked per week at Vladivostok by America with her own shipping. Proposed plan has distinct advantage in providing for immediate starting of this movement without waiting final financial adjustment and in no way prejudices our position that appropriate share of expense for complete movement must be borne by England and France. If foregoing plan is adopted we will officially inform governments of Czecho-Slovak, Poland, Italy,<sup>17</sup> Serbia and Roumania that the movement is to be started at once under exclusively American auspices and with exclusively American credits which will provide at least for the repatriation by American credits of one third of their respective forces. We will request them at same time to use their influence directly with England and France to secure credits and shipping for the balance of the movement, the burden of which should be properly carried by these latter countries. In all probability we will be forced into contributing a larger share of credit than that indicated. However this can only be determined after further notice [*negotiation*]. The effect of the proposed arrangement will be distinctly advantageous to American prestige.

Reference your 3303<sup>18</sup> and 3317.<sup>18</sup> We fully appreciate importance repatriation enemy prisoners of war of all [*now in*] Siberia but for political and sentimental reasons already given upon which action of Supreme Council reported our cable 4522<sup>19</sup> was based, believe that no enemy prisoners should be repatriated until after repatriation friendly troops has commenced. If these views are in accord with Department's we will not suggest any modification in Supreme Council decision until after Hines has made some movement [*friendly*] troops.

Request early advice from Department as to approval or modification proposed plan. If Department approves it will be understood

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<sup>17</sup> "Italy" does not appear on the telegram in the files of the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> Dated Oct. 4, *ante*, p. 301.

that movement on this basis is to be commenced at once. In this latter event request quick advice from Department as to probable date first embarkation troops at Vladivostok and approximate weekly figures thereafter from this same port as this information should be communicated to interested nationals and as this information will also have splendid effect in these latter countries. The foregoing modifies somewhat our views expressed in our 4522 of October 4th. Request however replies to questions contained in our 4522.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5366 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1919, 1 p.m.

3427. For Polk: the following is for Rathbone<sup>20</sup> from Glass.

"Refer to cable No. 4598, October 9, 12 p.m., from American Mission to Secretary of State relative to repatriation of Czecho-Slovak, Polish and other troops in Siberia.

As you recall, upon the initiative of State Department, the President authorized me to establish credits up to \$12,000,000 in favor of Czecho-Slovakia for repatriation Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia. The State Department did not request that credits be established in favor of any other governments for this purpose. Our first knowledge that there are also Polish and Jugo-Slav troops in Siberia was obtained from above-mentioned cable. You are aware of our difficulties in establishing credits in favor of Poland, and as the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops is essentially an inter-allied undertaking which, if anything, concerns England and France more than the United States, I consider it illogical and inadvisable for the United States Government to assume the entire burden of this undertaking. Although the situation apparently requires immediate action, it seems inadvisable for the United States to begin without a previous specific agreement with France and England as to what portion of the service or credits they will supply. It appears that Supreme Council on October 1 decided that a commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia, and also the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Jugo-Slav and Roumanian troops in Siberia. Logan was designated as the American member. In view of this official inter-allied action, it makes it all the more important that the other countries concerned should join in supplying a share of the services or credits required, and that the United States should not undertake this alone, or proceed without a definite agreement as to the respective participations of the other governments. As the principal expenditure involved will be for tonnage, it may be difficult for France

<sup>20</sup> Albert Rathbone, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and financial adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

to supply any tonnage, but certainly England must have at least as much available tonnage for that purpose as the United States. Our suggestion to the State Department was that the United States would establish credits up to half of the amount required to cover the expenditures of the entire undertaking, provided France and England would supply the balance. If it is found that France cannot supply anything, then it would seem that England should supply at least as much tonnage as we do and Japan might also assist. Instead of obtaining any prestige from the undertaking, as indicated in the cable above referred to, I am afraid we would distinctly lose prestige if we show any preference in favor of one nationality over another, and if we start this movement without a distinct satisfactory understanding with the other governments concerned as to what they will do we would most probably have to complete the job or lose more prestige. I suggest that you discuss matter with Polk and Mission and with their approval or in cooperation with them, take the matter up with the governments concerned. As we cannot establish credits in favor of Poland you can probably arrange with the other governments that this shall be a joint undertaking, but that each government will handle its share in its own way and that we will take Czecho-Slovak obligations for our proportionate share of services rendered or expenditures incurred. This question evidently requires immediate settlement, and I authorize you to make such agreement or arrangement as you think advisable under the circumstances. I am prepared to establish in favor of Czecho-Slovakia a credit for such portion of the \$12,000,000 credit authorized by the President as you may recommend. If you think it advisable you might allow the Servian and Roumanian governments to use for the expense of repatriating their subjects a portion of the unexpended balances of loans made to them for relief. Carter Glass, Secretary of the Treasury."

Following is for Polk and Logan from Secretary of State :

The Secretary of the Treasury informs me that he has empowered Rathbone directly to act for him in order to facilitate the negotiations being brought to a definite issue at an early date.

In this same connection Department begs to submit following answers to your 4598 October 9, 12 p.m.:

1st. Your assumption that Poles, Jugo-Slavs and Roumanians can be financed from American credits does not appear practicable as a direct measure in view of foregoing instructions to Rathbone although apparently it may be overcome as a practical difficulty if in accepting only Czecho-Slovak obligations we nevertheless under arrangements made by the Inter-Allied Commission at Paris include Roumanian, Polish and Jugo-Slav troops in the quota allocated to us for transportation or make arrangement for Servia and Roumania to use unexpended balance of loans made to them for relief.

2d. From Department's experience in repatriating about 4000 wounded from Vladivostok to Trieste cost apparently should not exceed \$250 per man. Will confirm this after further conference with Hines.

3d. The Secretary of War has approved the designation of General Hines who will consequently have entire charge of the actual

operations in connection with our share of the movement. We are obtaining from the Shipping Board actual names of ships to be used and shall then in conference with Hines be able to give you approximate date when first troops could be embarked from Vladivostok together with weekly embarkations thereafter.

4th. Your telegram would indicate you are not quite clear as to route to be used. We intend to send them from Vladivostok to Trieste by way of Suez Canal and not by Panama Canal or United States. However the route is a detail which will be handled for this Government by General Hines.

5th. Your reference to our 3303<sup>22</sup> and 3317<sup>22</sup> regarding enemy prisoners of war has been noted and we will defer asking decision in this matter until movement of friendly troops is well under way.

6th. Your 4522 October 24th[4], was answered by our 3378 October 9, 11 A.M.

7th. From the foregoing you will see that this Government has taken all preliminary steps and is willing to act at once but in deference to views of the Treasury which is responsible for the use made of loans, and furthermore because the total funds available, namely \$12,000,000, are inadequate for the whole movement of 72,000 men, the Department must insist upon an explicit statement from the other governments concerned that they will see the movement through to completion by contributing their quota. Unless such assurance is given I see no alternative except to abandon all attempts to get the men out this winter and advise the governments concerned of the reasons which forced such a decision. The necessity for an early decision remains and I hope you can let me hear as soon as possible what is finally settled.

LANSING

861.00/5414 b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *October 15, 1919, 3 p.m.*

3431. From Miles and Long personally for Polk's guidance. Reference Department's telegram 3427 today transmitting message from Secretary Glass to Rathbone. Following Treasury message certain specific questions are answered. In the concluding paragraph of telegram under reference, especially the last part, it is proposed that in case certain other governments do not share expense we will abandon the repatriation of these troops. You are confidentially advised that this is not the policy which will be followed by this Department. The money allotted is sufficient to repatriate all the Czechoslovaks and whether others share in the work or not we are committed irrevocably and unalterably to move these soldiers. The statement referred to should be used to its fullest extent, however,

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

in order if possible to compel cooperation. We are going to transport the Czechoslovaks anyway in case this fails, but it is necessary that a definite decision be quickly reached over there.

LANSING

861.00/5507 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *October 30, 1919, 7 p.m.*

3608. Following telegrams from Harris at Omsk repeated for your information:

"No. 447, October 28, 4 p.m. Am informed that Kolchak has just recalled Rozanoff from Vladivostok to Omsk to explain himself. This probably means definite elimination of Rozanoff from Far East situation."

"No. 449, October 28, 5 p.m. Soukine informs me that Omsk Government is carrying on unofficial negotiations with Czechs to return to front and save situation here. While nothing definite has been decided yet, there are large numbers of Czech soldiers willing to return.

I respectfully suggest that the Department use its influence, possibly with the Czech Government at Prague, in order to bring about this arrangement. It seems to me if Czechs were to do this their chances of returning home would be much earlier than by the sea route. With the assistance of a few thousand Czechs on this front the Bolsheviki can be definitely defeated."

LANSING

861.00/5556 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, *October 31, 1919, 11 p.m.*

[Received November 1, 8:35 p.m.]

4937. R-27 to Secretary of Treasury.

1st. Reference your unnumbered 3427, October 15th, 1 p.m., regarding repatriation of troops in Siberia. If as I understand these troops are to be moved by all water route doubt if France can supply tonnage. Polk tells me useless to endeavor to secure help from Japan or Italy. Accordingly British have been informed (a) if they agree to move one half [troops United States Treasury will provide movement of other one half] which will not require greater credit than that mentioned in paragraph two, (b) any assistance in movement by other countries to equally reduce burden undertaken by United States and British, (c) our finance will have to be provided by advances to Czecho-Slovakia only, except as small amounts

might be available from unexpended balances of loans to Serbia and possibly Roumania.

2d. As I understand (see Mission's 4598, October 9, midnight, to State Department) that total number of troops to be moved is approximately 72,000, the cost of moving 36,000 at figure mentioned your despatch of R-20 which seems high would be well within the \$12,000,000 credit the President has authorized for Czecho-Slovakia.

3d. Expect British reply in day or so.

4th. Osusky, representative of Czecho-Slovakia, called on me this morning as requested by telegram from Czecho-Slovak Commissioner in Washington. I explained to him Treasury attitude and proposition made to British. Took occasion also to insist that Czecho-Slovaks should fulfill their existing contract to supply certain coal to Austria as the situation in Austria, owing to shortage of coal and food is likely to become desperate within thirty or sixty days unless relief measures can be devised.

[5th.] Though British have not yet referred to it in connection with repatriation of troops in Siberia, I fear attitude of our Shipping Board may make it impossible to induce British to accept the proposition mentioned in paragraph 1st of this cable. See second section State Department's confidential cable to Polk 3532, October 22, 8 p.m.<sup>23</sup> If Shipping Board is to use what is in effect British tonnage to repatriate troops in Siberia for our one half share movement, can we insist British should also supply balance of tonnage required? While I am not familiar with financial arrangement of Shipping Board regarding use of ships, fear that its attitude may result either in our being saddled with entire cost movement of troops from Siberia or being forced to abandon project. Would appreciate advices from you on this phase of matter. Rathbone.

AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5543 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1919, 1 p.m.

3635. For Polk.

Your 4928, October 31.<sup>24</sup>

Harris telegraphs from Omsk<sup>25</sup> that Bolsheviks are advancing rapidly eastward and that the situation is becoming critical. On the morning of October 28th they were 83 versts from Petropavlovsk

<sup>23</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. II, p. 554.

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> By telegram no. 452 transmitted by the Chargé in China Oct. 31, 3 p.m., p. 445.

on the railway line. The Government has practically decided upon a general evacuation of Omsk. The Siberian Army is fighting well, but Harris believes that unless the Bolshevik advance is checked Omsk will fall in four weeks' time. He says that Bolshevism will then extend at least to Lake Baikal.

Harris believes that at least 50% of the Czech soldiers are willing to fight the Bolsheviks again and thus secure their return home across European Russia. He believes that the situation will be saved if 25,000 of them would join at once with Kolchak in an anti-Bolshevik offensive.

It seems necessary to face the issue squarely that some such arrangement must be made at once or there will be a great addition to the Bolshevik strength and prestige. I am convinced in these circumstances that we cannot longer wait upon the British and French Governments respecting the movements of the Czechs but should propose to the Government at Prague that the United States will, itself, begin immediately the movement of a portion of the Czechs from Vladivostok by sea upon the clear understanding that not less than 25,000 of them will at once cooperate with Admiral Kolchak in a counter-offensive against the Bolsheviks and with a view to opening a way home. From our point of view this is practical. The President has approved of the extension of credits and the allocation of shipping for the repatriation of the Czechs on the ground chiefly that there will be interior political difficulties in Czechoslovakia otherwise. This aspect of the situation will be met by the repatriation of a portion of the Czechoslovaks. If you concur I am sure that the necessary specific authorization of the President can be obtained so that the first American ships will be at Vladivostok within sixty days ready to load Czech troops.

Please acknowledge this at once stating your views and what action you will take with the Czecho-Slovak representatives as I should like to communicate with Harris without delay.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5558 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1919.

3660. Read Dep[artmen]ts 3658, November 3, 6 p.m.<sup>26</sup> in connection with Dep[artmen]ts 3635, November 1, 1 p.m.<sup>27</sup>

LANSING

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<sup>26</sup> *Ante*, p. 222.

<sup>27</sup> *Supra*.



861.00/5612 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 11, 1919, 1 a.m.

[Received 4:14 a.m.]

5106. Reference your 3608, October 13th[30th], 3635, November 1st, 3658, November 3d,<sup>28</sup> and 3660, November 4th.

We have discussed the question with Osusky, chief of the Czecho-Slovak Peace Delegation in Paris. We will also further discuss the matter with Beneš who we understand is to return to Paris shortly. We believe, however, that Beneš will entirely approve Osusky's views.

Osusky states that public opinion in Czecho-Slovakia has for some time past been stirred up by what it considers bad faith on the part of the Allies in regard to the position of the Czecho-Slovakian troops in Siberia and that on this account the Czecho-Slovakian Government could not afford to even advance this proposal to their troops in Siberia. The present feeling of bad faith according to Osusky results from the fact that prior to the signing of the armistice the French proposed to return the Czecho-Slovakian contingent from Siberia to the western front. [This] movement was deferred, according to Osusky, upon urgent Allied [re]presentation that general military action was necessary against Russia and that the Allies for this purpose contemplated directing simultaneously military pressure south from Archangel and north from Black Sea and that Czecho-Slovakian cooperation in this joint military action was necessary west from Siberia. Osusky states that Czecho-Slovakian people have felt very keenly that notwithstanding the foregoing general understanding the Czecho-Slovakian people have first seen the French troops withdrawn from Odessa and finally the Allied military representation in north Russia withdrawn leaving the Czecho-Slovakian and other smaller central European contingents alone on the Siberian front with the Russians. In view of this situation Osusky believes that an effort today on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers to force the Czecho-Slovakian Government into maintaining its troops on the Siberian front against the Bolsheviks might lead to disastrous results. Osusky further advises that reported low state of morale of Czecho-Slovakian and other central European military contingents now in Siberia due to firm conviction on the part of these troops that Principal Allied and Associated Powers are pursuing no definite policy with respect to Russia and that this opinion of these troops is reflected in the home countries.

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<sup>28</sup> *Ante*, p. 222.

Rathbone has already advised Treasury Department of his efforts to get definite agreement from British for them to advance half the total credits necessary for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovakian, Polish, Serbian and Roumanian troops from Siberia. Rathbone hopes for an early decision in these matters which will be communicated to the Department.

With the limited knowledge we have of the actual state of affairs in Siberia it is difficult for us to suggest the best line of action to be taken in Siberia. . . . From the purely political aspect of the case, we are of the opinion that it would be highly inadvisable in view of the temper of the Czecho-Slovakian people, which [admittedly] has some basis of reason, to further endeavor to apply pressure outlined in your 3635 of October [November] 1st. Physical reasons will make it impossible to accomplish very prompt evacuation of friendly troops from Siberia and it is believed that better results would be accomplished by actually commencing repatriation of central European troops from Siberia in accordance with announced decision of the Supreme Council and to leave the augmentation of the troops on the Siberian Bolshevik front to recruitment of volunteers from these contingents now in Siberia.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5678 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 16, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received November 17, 10:19 a.m.]

596. Acting Commissioner of Czech Republic Brozz, Saturday handed me French text of an appeal of the departing plenipotentiary Pavlu and Dr. Girska, a translation of which follows.

“Intolerable situation of our army files [*forces?*] us to request Allied Powers to advise us how Czech army can [assure?] its safety and secure its return to its country which was decided with the assent of the Allied Powers.

Army was willing to protect railway and transportation in the sector assigned to it and has preferred [*performed?*] this task conscientiously. But now presence of our army on the railway and the protection of the latter is becoming impossible because its action is contrary to its aspirations and likewise to the elementary demands of humanity and justice.

In protecting railway and keeping order in the country our army is forced to act against its convictions and support and maintain the state of absolute tyranny and [lawlessness?] that now prevails.

Under the protection of Czech bayonets local military move [*do?*] things that stupefy the whole civilized world.

Burning villages, murders by hundreds of peaceable Russian inhabitants, [shooting?] without trial of democratic men merely suspected of disaffection are daily events and the [responsibility] for them before the court of the nations of the world falls on us because, having armed forces, we have not prevented these iniquities.

This ransacking [*sic*] is direct result of our neutrality and non-intervention in Russian domestic affairs and thanks thereto, in preserving absolute good faith, we become in spite of ourselves accomplices in crime.

In communicating this to the representatives of the Allied Powers of which Czech nation was, is and always will be faithful ally, we consider it is necessary to take all measures to inform nations of the world in what tragic moral position Czech Army is placed and the causes of this situation. As to us, we do not see any other issue from this situation but immediately to depart for home from the territory which was intrusted to us for protection and that we be given, until our repatriation, liberty to prevent iniquities and crimes no matter by whom committed."

Gaida last week told interviewer his job was to establish democratic government here but General [Čeček?] issued order to Czech friends declaring any Czech that joined Gaida would be treated as deserter. Repeated Tokyo, Harris, Stevens. MACGOWAN

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861.00/5556 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1919, 3 p.m.

3856. For Polk.

Your 5106, November 11, 11 [1] a.m. It is agreed that the homeward movement of the Czecho-Slovak troops must be begun at once and the Treasury has been asked accordingly to open a credit for moving one-half of the Czecho-Slovaks without awaiting the action of Great Britain and the other Allies. The Treasury has been very unwilling to do this. The telegram for Rathbone which is being sent through the Mission as No. R-70,<sup>29</sup> represents the most for which it has been possible to obtain concurrence. Please discuss the message with Rathbone and make clear to him the urgent need of beginning the movement without further delay.

The Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia are becoming more and more restless. They have recently published a proclamation attacking Kolchak's régime and venting their disappointment with the treatment which they have received at the hands of the Allies. On the 15th General Gaida, a Czech, organized a revolt in Vladivostok which has been put down only after severe loss of life.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>30</sup> See pp. 546 ff.

The first and second sections of the telegram for Rathbone set forth fairly enough the attitude of this Department. The fifth paragraph deals with a matter which need not concern the Treasury especially, but in view of the great need for expedition in the matter it has not been thought expedient to insist upon this point of view. It is not considered, in fact, that a delicate situation will be created with respect to the other nationalities mentioned.

Please let me know at the earliest possible date the outcome of your conference with Rathbone, as there must be taken up at once the question of ships. It is possible that the movement can be handled with troop ships which are still under the direction of the Secretary of War.

LANSING

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861.00/5556 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1919, 3 p.m.

3857. For Rathbone from Glass. Treasury R-70. Reference my unnumbered October 15,<sup>31</sup> concerning Czecho-Slovaks and Mission's 4937, October 31, 11 p.m., your R-27.

1st: State Department advises that it is of unusual importance from political point of view that movement homeward of the Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia should be begun without further delay and states that question of their return is now occasion for great popular concern in Czecho-Slovakia. States further we have a distinct obligation to these troops growing out of resistance which they set up at various times to Central Powers and the contribution which they made to our victory. Secretary of State advises it seems to him proper and necessary that we should discharge this obligation as a part of the general liquidation of war measures.

2d: State Department therefore urges that without waiting for agreement of Great Britain or other Allies credit be established immediately in favor of Czecho-Slovaks up to \$12,000,000 to be used so far as necessary for moving one-half of the Czecho-Slovaks now in Siberia reported to number 55,000 in all and states that it is desirable that the question of the repatriation of the Jugo-Slavs and other nationalities be treated as a separate problem. State Department takes position that in beginning the repatriation we do not incur any obligation, either moral or legal, to continue the movement beyond one-half of the Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia and that obligation of taking care of the remainder must be made to rest clearly and unequivocally upon Great Britain and other Allies,

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<sup>31</sup> Transmitted in Department's no. 3427, Oct. 15, p. 306.

especially as Supreme Council has already recommended and directed the movement. State Department believes this can be accomplished by advising principal Allied Governments, the Government of Czecho-Slovakia and the Czecho-Slovak Commander in Siberia substantially as follows:

“ Being impressed with the need for beginning at once the movement homeward of the Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia and in order to avoid the delay inevitably involved in the arrangements for which the consent of several Governments is required, the Government of the United States has agreed to open for the Government of Czecho-Slovakia a credit not to exceed \$12,000,000, or such less part thereof as may be sufficient to repatriate one-half of the Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia, reported to number 55,000 in all. In undertaking to move one-half of these troops, the United States considers that it is discharging all or more than its share of any moral obligation which may rest in this respect upon the Allied and Associated Governments, and it must leave to the Government of Czecho-Slovakia in connection with the other Allied and Associated Governments the arrangements respecting the repatriation of the remainder.”

3d: In view of urgency stated by Department of State to exist, I am prepared, if you think it advisable, to establish credit up to \$12,000,000 for the purpose of repatriating one-half of the Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia upon the understandings above set out and upon the further understanding that so much of said credit as is not required for that purpose shall be withdrawn.

4th: Am inclined to believe that if we begin repatriation of Czecho-Slovak troops without first obtaining express agreement from British as to share which they will undertake, we cannot be certain that they will move the remaining half and that we shall then be subject to great pressure to induce us to move remaining Czecho-Slovaks, at least to extent of balance of \$12,000,000 credit not required for movement of first half of the troops, and may even be subjected to demands equally urgent to establish further credit.

5th: See also possibility of creating delicate situation by reason of our discriminating in favor of Czecho-Slovaks and refusing to move even part of Poles, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs. Have received, however, from Secretary of State letter advising that circumstances under which Poles, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs were in Russia were different from those under which Czecho-Slovaks went into Russia and that consequently we are not under any obligation to them.

6th: I am willing to be guided by your judgment as to whether importance of immediate repatriation of Czecho-Slovak troops in

Siberia outweighs these considerations and if you so advise shall establish credit as above mentioned leaving it to you in case you consider it desirable to do so upon receipt hereof to advise Polk that we are prepared to comply with State Department's request in order that repatriation may begin without waiting for agreement of British as to their share. Carter Glass, Secretary of the Treasury.

LANSING

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861.00/5740 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 24, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received 10:22 p.m.]

5384. [From Rathbone.] R-82. To Secretary of the Treasury. Department's 3857, November 22, 3 p.m., your R-70.

1st. Beneš told me November 20th that consortium Czecho-Slovak banks had obtained 250,000,000 francs credit from French banks for purchases here. He was leaving for London to endeavor to obtain similar credit from British banks for British purchases. He is to see me on his return to Paris and expects to make effort to obtain similar credit from American banks for United States purchases.

2d. Informed Beneš that Treasury was prepared to furnish credit up to \$12,000,000 for reparation (repatriation?) one half troops if British would agree to provide for other there [*half*]. Explained on lines of your unnumbered despatch [*cable*] of October 15,<sup>33</sup> why we were unwilling to proceed until British agreement was obtained. Beneš seemed on the whole satisfied with our position and intended to press British while in London.

3d. I am not prepared to advise establishment of credit or making further comment [*commitment*]. Will cable again after seeing Beneš on his return from London and when Polk returns from London will confer with him on political situation.

4th. I entirely agree with probable consequences of commencing movement of troops without British agreement pointed out in paragraphs 4 and 5 your R-70. Do not understand that obligation to repatriation Czecho-Slovak troops rests upon us more than [upon] Allied Governments and feel that we have met our obligation by offer which we have already made. Am most reluctant to recede from position already taken by Treasury. Rathbone.

AMERICAN MISSION

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<sup>33</sup> Transmitted in Department's no. 3427, Oct. 15, *ante*, p. 306.

861.00/5860 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 9, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received December 10, 8:56 p.m.]

1719. Your 3978, December 5th.<sup>34</sup> We have no information about this matter. Present situation repatriation friendly troops from Siberia is set forth in following letter sent with Rathbone's approval to the British representative McFadyean<sup>35</sup> dated November 8, 1919.

"I understood from our conversation today that you are about to represent your Government in the financial arrangements relative to the repatriation of the friendly troops from Siberia. If I am mistaken in this understanding, can I request you to be good enough to have this letter forwarded very promptly to the proper agent of your Government for his consideration.

The situation regarding the friendly troops in Siberia is the following: the Supreme Council at its meeting about October 1st passed a resolution providing that the repatriation of Czecho-Slovakian, Polish, Yugo-Slavic and Roumanian contingents at present in Siberia, should be repatriated [*sic*] before the enemy prisoners of war now in that same territory. The Supreme Council also gave its approval to the immediate repatriation of these friendly troops. From my information it appears that the strength of the various contingents are approximately the following, viz: Czecho-Slovaks 54,000, Poles 12,000, Yugo-Slavs 4,000, Roumanians 2,000, total 72,000.

Our understanding of the British position in this matter is that you are under obligations to effect the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovakian contingent but that your Government does not consider itself obligated in any way to the repatriation of the other contingents. This was my understanding from various conversations with Colonel Kisch but so as to give us a solid basis for these negotiations, I request that you ask Colonel Kisch to confirm this.

The French position is that they claim that they have borne all expense of the maintenance of these friendly troops in Siberia since their organization and that on this account they consider their financial responsibility in the premises terminates upon the departure from Siberian ports of embarkation of these contingents and they claim that they are not therefore obligated in any way to provide credits or transportation to European ports. The Italian and Japanese positions are not clear but it is presumed that no help will be forthcoming from these quarters.

Our position is that we desire to help in the present situation and that based on this desire alone we are willing to share in the expense.

The question of repatriation of these troops from Siberia has been brought to a head by representations on the part of the Czecho-

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.<sup>35</sup> Andrew McFadyean, British Treasury representative at Paris.

Slovakian Government that further retention of their contingents in Siberia might lead to serious internal results in Czecho-Slovakia. Our feeling on the other hand is that the same difficulties would present themselves in Poland, Yugo-Slavia and Roumania were the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to give consideration alone to the Czecho-Slovakian representation and we therefore are of the opinion that the repatriation of all friendly troops from Siberia should be considered at one and the same time.

Subject to the foregoing with the authority of our Treasury Department I made the following proposal to Colonel Kisch viz.: that Great Britain and America agree to the repatriation by each of their governments of 50 per cent of the entire contingent of 72,000 troops, or in other words that if the British Government will undertake the repatriation of 36,000 we in turn will undertake the repatriation of an equal number.

The foregoing proposal was made subject to the following reservations, viz.: that the American Treasury is not in a position to make advance to the governments concerned other than Czecho-Slovakia, though some small amounts may be available for use for Serbia and possibly Roumania from advances heretofore made for relief purposes and not fully expended. Therefore in payment of the expenses of the repatriation of these troops the United States Treasury would have to look exclusively to funds provided by the credit to Czecho-Slovakia and the small cash balances available to Serbia and Roumania. I understand that your Treasury has not the same legal restrictions as our Treasury in these particulars.

As the strength of the Czecho-Slovak contingent exceeds by much more than one-half the strength of all the contingents together, and in view of my understanding of your position with regard to the Czecho-Slovak contingent, it would appear that the proposed arrangement is entirely equitable and, if I may say so, from a purely financial point of view somewhat in your favor.

Colonel Kisch informs me that he has been endeavoring to get a response from your government as to these proposals but without avail. In view of the urgency of the situation in Siberia could I venture to ask you to be so kind as to press for the earliest possible action on this proposal.

I do not believe your government will accept the French, Italian and Japanese positions and I am quite sure that our government's position is that they should carry their proper share in this burden. Could I hear from you as soon as possible? "

Situation somewhat complicated by matter referred to in our R-93<sup>36</sup> but straightened out by your 3944, December 2nd,<sup>36</sup> copy of which was furnished British. Copy of letter above quoted presented officially at Allied Repatriation meeting December 2nd and is therefore on record with all Principal Allied and Associated Governments. We are furnishing Czecho-Slovak, Polish and Servian Governments with copies for their information so they may be properly informed.

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<sup>36</sup> Not printed.



As previously reported our whole policy has been directed with view to once and for all definitely settling financially responsibility for repatriation entire block friendly troops in Siberia. We have not agreed with British on any financial plan of piecemeal repatriation these troops, and we are opposed to any such arrangement . . .

Suggest Department furnish interested Embassies and Legations Washington with information our position and that copy be cabled by War Department to commander United States troops in Siberia.

WALLACE

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861.00/8005 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 27, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received December 27, 3:35 p.m.]

1928. R-174 from Rathbone for Davis.

Further reference paragraph 6, Treasury Department's R-70 and State Department's 3857, November 22nd. Acting under authority contained in paragraph 6 to [of] Treasury Department's cable above referred to I made a concrete and definite proposal to British representative McFadyean under date of November 8th, complete text of which proposal was cabled Secretary of State by American Embassy, Paris, in its 1719 of December 9th. My proposal was drafted in accordance with your instructions with a view to covering once for all the financial program and financial responsibility for the repatriation of all friendly contingents now in Siberia by water from Asiatic ports to European ports.

I am just in receipt of the following letter dated December 22nd from British representative McFadyean as follows:

"I have now heard from the Treasury that they accept the offer contained in your letter of the 8th ultimo respecting the repatriation of troops from Siberia, the French being told at the same time that our acceptance is without prejudice to our contention that they should share the cost of our responsibility under it. I most certainly regret the unconscionable time it has taken to transmit an answer to your Government. We fully appreciate the spirit in which it was put forward."

We replied to British representative McFadyean on December 23rd as follows:

"I have your letter of December 22nd advising me that you have now heard from the British Treasury and that they accept offer contained in my letter to you of November 8th, 1919, respecting the repatriation of friendly troops from Siberia and that your Treasury has informed the French at the same time that your acceptance is without prejudice to our mutual contention that they should share with British the cost of our mutual responsibility under it. We are

directing a similar letter to the French supporting the British views, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. We have transmitted to our State and Treasury Departments by cable a complete copy of your letter of December 22nd, requesting that the necessary credits be immediately extended to Czecho-Slovakia for the repatriation on our account of the Czecho-Slovak contingents equaling 50 per cent of the total strength of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian contingents available for repatriation in Siberia. In accordance with our last information from Washington, General Hines, Director of Transportation of United States War Department, will be in charge of the repatriation of our contingent and we have requested that he be instructed to dispatch forthwith the necessary shipping to handle the repatriation of our contingent."

I have furnished the French with copies of our reply of November 8th, McFadyean's letter, December 22d, and our letter to McFadyean, December 23d, above referred to, in which we support the British contention that the French should participate this movement and have requested advice as to extent of French participation. I will of course insist upon prorating as between ourselves and British any benefits evolving from French participation.

It will be noted in my letter to McFadyean of December 22nd [23d?] that I have specially reserved that if the total number of troops repatriated be less than 72,000 that our maximum advances extended to Czecho-Slovakia will only be based upon 50 per cent of the total repatriation valuations. I made this reservation as it occurred to me that due to rapid advances of Bolsheviks in Siberia that they may have perhaps captured large contingents of the friendly troops with the result that the total number now available for repatriation would be much less than 72,000.

As the financial negotiations have now been successfully completed I venture to hope that the Treasury Department will immediately arrange for the extension of the necessary credits on account of Czecho-Slovakia and that the State Department and General Hines of the War Department will be informed that there are no questions of a financial character which further prevent the United States Government despatching at once the necessary shipping to Vladivostok for the purpose of effecting without delay our share of this repatriation. From copies of reports furnished through French sources it is apparent that the situation Siberia is such as to necessitate the promptest work on the part of General Hines. In order that I may inform the representatives of the Associated Powers it is important that I be advised at the earliest possible moment the date on which our first ships will arrive at Vladivostok and the approximate number of Czecho-Slovakian troops we will be able to repatriate per month thereafter. Rathbone.

WALLACE

861.00/6005 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Wallace)*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1920, 7 p.m.

41. For Rathbone from Davis. Treasury R-148.

Reference your R-174, December 27,<sup>39</sup> and supplementing my R-141,<sup>40</sup> paragraph three.

General Hines advises under date January 3, that repairs on the two transports allotted for this movement, namely, the *America* and *President Grant*, will consume approximately fifteen days. If resurvey confirms this, these vessels will be unable to arrive Vladivostok before February 10, although every effort being made to expedite arrival at Vladivostok by working day and night on repairs. As soon as vessels sail from New York shall advise you definite date arrival first ship Vladivostok. Norman H. Davis, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

LANSING

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**Decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to Support Admiral Kolchak**

861.00/3551 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1919, 8 p.m.

72. Department transmits for comment a telegram number 260 dated December 27th transmitted from the American Consul at Omsk through the American Legation at Peking in a telegram of the same date reading as follows:

“Referring to Department’s December 12, 6 P.M.<sup>40</sup> Respectfully suggest to Department to carefully weigh and consider with Allies advisability of adopting similar plan towards present Omsk Provisional Government as apparently is now being persuaded [*pursued*] in Ukraine, merely as a general policy of lending friendly support and assistance to an authority which is attempting to restore law and order. Such action should not assume character of rebuilding [*recognition?*] or even presume such to be an eventual consideration. Such declaration on the part of Allies would tend to clear situation in Western Siberia. It would have good effect upon workmen, Siberian soldiers, Czech, Semenoff and Japanese generally. Such measure by Allies might be accompanied by statement that such declaration was inspired by desire to simply assist Omsk Provisional Government temporarily until such time as all Russia may become united under another central government in which the whole country is represented. Harris. Reinsch.”

POLK

<sup>39</sup> *Supra.*<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

861.00/3566 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received January 3, 1919, 9:40 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"2. 2d. Foreign Office here states that it has received telegram from former Minister for Foreign Affairs Sazonoff that Denikin has recognized the Kolchak government. Harris."

REINSCH

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/93 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 8, 1919 [January 9, noon.]

[Received January 10, 6:09 a.m.]

209. Your 72, January 2nd, 8 p.m. If Harris is recommending issuance of a Declaration regarding the Omsk Government similar to that which the French Consul, in the name of the Allies, issued regarding the late Ukrainian Government<sup>41</sup> the proposal does not seem acceptable.

On the other hand although it may not be expedient to recognize Admiral Kolchak's government at this time or to commit ourselves to any extensive military undertaking, it might be useful to put forth a declaration to the effect that the Associated Governments, while refraining from interference in the internal affairs of Siberia, desire to assist the existing government until such time as all Russia may become united under a central government in which the whole country is represented; this assistance to comprise economic and financial aid and the furnishing of military supplies.

I shall be glad to receive the views of the Department on the advisability of issuing such a declaration before submitting the matter to the President.

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/3628 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

188. For the Secretary of State:

There has been considerable discussion in the Senate in regard to the Russian situation. Some Senators are demanding that the troops should be withdrawn; others are asking what policy should

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<sup>41</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 701.*

be pursued in Russia, and some are disposed to urge that Russia be allowed to work out its own salvation, in other words, that the Bolsheviks be let alone. I think the Hearst papers and Chicago *Daily News*, and others, are going to take the line last mentioned. Frankly, I am disturbed over the situation. It is obvious that great difficulty would be encountered at home by any of the Allied governments sending troops to Russia. It is also obvious that without support the present Expedition at Archangel ought to be withdrawn.

Personally, I feel that if some arrangement could be made to protect the Russians in the Archangel district, this Expedition should be withdrawn.

In regard to Siberia, the situation is difficult. We have for some time been insisting that the railways should be turned over to Stevens.<sup>44</sup> Stevens has now signified his willingness to go ahead immediately with the plan evolved by Mr. Morris with the Japanese Government, and as I telegraphed you yesterday, Mr. Morris has informed the Japanese Government that we approved the arrangement he has secured. By forcing these negotiations, we have prevented the adoption of any other plan for more than two months and have recently blocked the counter proposal made by Colonel Jack.<sup>45</sup> During this period the organization of the railroads have [*has*] steadily gone from bad to worse. If we withdraw the troops from Siberia, it would, in my opinion, be impossible to keep Stevens and his people there. Moreover, the plan upon which we have been working, and which is now approved, contemplates that at least some American troops shall remain in Siberia. If we withdraw Stevens too, we would be open to the charge that we had blocked the British and Japanese from putting through some plan for the improvement of railroad communications. I am not arguing in favor of staying in Siberia, but merely putting up the questions as I see them.

It has been impossible to get any concerted action in Siberia thus far, as the British have felt we have been playing hot and cold. As you know the Japanese are now withdrawing about half their troops, leaving apparently from thirty to fifty thousand in Northern Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Charles Crane who has just returned from Russia said there is no possibility of accomplishing anything through Siberia as the distances are too great. I do not agree with him entirely. There is no free access through the Black Sea or the Baltic as yet to European Russia, consequently the Siberian Rail-

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<sup>44</sup> See section on the Inter-Allied Agreement for Supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Siberian Railways, *ante*, pp. 236 ff. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 239 ff.

<sup>45</sup> Col. Archibald Jack, in charge of the British Railway Mission in Siberia.

way is the only line of communication to European Russia as well as to Siberia. Of course we have an absolute obligation to the Czechs and some obligation to the Russians who have sided with the Czechs. If the decision is to withdraw, it seems to me imperative to have some agreement with the Bolsheviks in order to protect those who have assisted us in these operations. Without an agreement, there is no question as to the fate of these people; even with an agreement, which would mean we would have to deal with the Bolsheviks, the result is doubtful.

I am merely putting up these suggestions for your consideration as I am sure careful discussion of Russia must be imminent.

In your discussions, has it been suggested that one of the solutions of the supply problems in Europe lies with the restoration of normal conditions in Russia, especially in regard to the export of grain, sugar, flax, oil and dairy products?

POLK

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861.00/3617 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1919, 6 p.m.

189. For Secretary of State.

Your 209 January 9, noon. I agree thoroughly with your views, but believe it is essential; first, to define our attitude towards the Bolsheviks; second, then to state how far the associated governments are prepared and able to go in supporting elements of law and order; third, what funds for military supplies have you in mind from which this government could supply financial aid.

I know you appreciate that the whole Russian situation requires a clear definition by the associated governments and that time presses. The first step is the railways and I am waiting to hear whether Stevens can have any cooperation from General Graves before I instruct him and Ambassador Morris to put plan in operation.<sup>46</sup>

POLK

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861.48/744 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received January 16, 1919, 5:23 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

[“] Number 25, [January] 14, 8 p.m. Subject progress of the American work in Siberia. Views Omsk Government and public

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<sup>46</sup> See section on the Inter-Allied Agreement for Supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Siberian Railways, pp. 236 ff.

opinion Siberia have practically adapted themselves to the form in which American relief is to become effective. The question American troops coming to western Siberia now no longer discussed and people have accustomed themselves to fact that they are not coming. The expected operation of Red Cross, Y.M.C.A. and War Trade Board now assuming large proportions in the public mind and press of the country, and it is expected that this work will be carried on with energy.

The consular service is co-operating with these three institutions as far as possible. The consular officers in Siberia have reported to me concerning the various articles which should be imported and those which might conveniently be expected [*exported?*], and all these reports I have handed the War Trade Board in Vladivostok. I have instructed all consular officers to correspond freely with War Trade Board Vladivostok without any reference to medium of Consul General.

In order to be of assistance to Red Cross, I have accepted from Doctor Teusler chairmanship of committee of western Siberian division of Red Cross at Omsk. Meetings are weekly and will not interfere with my consular duties.

I am assisting with local authorities and have instructed all consular officers to render every assistance. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.24/122

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *January 21, 1919.*

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to transmit to you paraphrase of cable received from Omsk <sup>47</sup> describing the terrible conditions existing among the Siberian troops, owing to the severe frost and lack of necessary equipment and warm clothing.

It appears that Dr. Teusler, representative of the American Red Cross in Siberia is fully aware of these conditions and favors the extending of every possible relief to the suffering soldiers. This however, cannot be accomplished without respective instructions being given by the authorities in Washington.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you that I would appreciate any action which you would find possible to take in this matter, so as to alleviate the sufferings of the Siberian troops.

Believe me [etc.]

S. UGHET

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

033.1140/212 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Japan (MacMurray) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, January 23, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received January 24, 4:11 p.m.]

For Colonel House from Bullard.<sup>48</sup>

"Still in hospital but hope to sail soon to join you. Very sorry for delay.

I hope no formal recognition will be extended to Kolchack. His personality is of small significance. He is surrounded and dependent on the support of reactionary elements whose principal idea of government is the reconquest of former grafts. His army is being organized on old lines of Tsarist discipline. Several units have already revolted against brutality of officers. The vengeance of his [omission] against Bolsheviks we have helped to disable is as red as the Bolshevik terror in Moscow. After allowing the Siberian Government and the Directorate which were both sincere attempts at liberation to collapse from lack of recognition, the Allied support of Kolchack's experiment in reaction is a feature regrettable.

Please communicate to Creel."<sup>49</sup>

MACMURRAY

861.01/29 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received January 24, 1919, 12:44 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"51. January 24, 8 p.m. Sir Charles Eliot<sup>50</sup> has officially stated to the Foreign Office here on behalf of his Government that, inasmuch as the Omsk Government now represents the highest Russian power, Great Britain expresses its warmest sympathy with Kolchak endeavors to create a free Russian Government on the basis of public confidence as only under such conditions can Russia return to its former place among the nations and partake in the upbuilding of civilization.

On January 21 Ambassador Regnault<sup>51</sup> handed Kolchak a communication from the French Government in which it expressed its pleasure at the union which has been attained between the Denikin and Kolchak governments. At the same time the French Government

<sup>48</sup> Arthur Bullard, director of Russian division, Committee on Public Information.

<sup>49</sup> George Creel, chairman, Committee on Public Information.

<sup>50</sup> British High Commissioner in Siberia.

<sup>51</sup> Eugène Louis Georges Regnault, French High Commissioner in Siberia.



expressed satisfaction at the choice of Sazonoff as the common Minister of Foreign Affairs of both. They point out way for the recognition of Admiral Kolchak. Harris.”

REINSCH

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861.00/3791 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>52</sup>

PEKING, undated.

[Received February 3, 1919, 10:15 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

“76. February 1, 3 a.m.

On January 29th Kolchak took oath of office before the Senate in Omsk and solemnly declared that the high power conferred upon him by the Council of Ministers would be relinquished to the All-Russian Government which would be created by a properly constituted constituent assembly. Harris.”

REINSCH

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861.24/122

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé (Ughet)*

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I have your letter of January 21 but do not see how there is anything that we can possibly do for the Russian troops in Siberia, at this time, outside of that which has already been undertaken by the Red Cross and, as I understand it, also by the Y.M.C.A. I appreciate the severe hardships which the men must be enduring and would be glad if there were anything which this Government could do to relieve their suffering.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

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861.00/4134

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 342

LONDON, March 1, 1919.

[Received March 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed a copy of a Note from the Foreign Office setting forth the factors which seem to the British Government to govern the Siberian problem as it presents itself to-day.

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<sup>52</sup> Repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace as Department's no. 629, Feb. 8, 2 p.m.

A résumé of the Note was transmitted to the Department by my telegram No. 1203 of to-day, 12 noon,<sup>53</sup> and a copy of the Note has been forwarded to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace under cover of despatch No. 83 of March 1st.

I have [etc.]

JOHN W. DAVIS

[Enclosure]

*The British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Curzon)  
to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

No. 29173/W/57

LONDON, February 26, 1919.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Now that the negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement for the re-organization of the Siberian Railway have been satisfactorily concluded,<sup>54</sup> and that the settlement of this long disputed question is in prospect, His Majesty's Government feel it incumbent upon them to set forth, for the information of the United States Government, the factors which seem to them to govern the Siberian problem as it presents itself to day.

The conclusion of the Armistice in November last may be regarded as having justified the policy which prompted the Allied Governments originally to decide upon the despatch of forces to the Far East. The danger of the extension of enemy activities to Siberia was definitely averted and Siberia was saved from the dangers which threatened it from that direction.

Unfortunately this happy consummation did not dispose of the difficult situation in which the Allied Governments found themselves as a result of their action. If the German danger had been disposed of, a state of affairs had arisen which involved no less watchfulness on the part of the Allied Governments. The Armistice did not in any way affect the activities of the Soviet Government of Russia which continued their efforts to overwhelm the friendly Russian forces opposed to them and to bring the whole country under their disastrous sway, and it was with the situation thus created that the Allied Governments were called upon to cope.

This situation has been complicated firstly by the lack of any decision on the part of the Allied Governments as to the attitude to be adopted to the Russian Soviet Government, and secondly, by the divergent interests of the various Russian groups in Siberia. Both these factors have contributed to complicate the task of those who have been dealing with the Siberian problem on the spot with the consequent disorganization which all competent observers agree has been reached in practically every branch of Siberian affairs.

<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

<sup>54</sup> See section on the Inter-Allied Agreement for Supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Siberian Railways, pp. 236 ff.

In the view of His Majesty's Government the paramount consideration has been the commitment to the Russian forces opposing the Bolsheviks which has resulted from co-operation with them, from the moment when troops were first despatched to Siberia, and the impossibility of withdrawing support from those forces at the critical stage in their operations, simply for the reason that the objects, in which the Allied Governments were primarily interested, had been achieved.

For this reason, without entering into the merits of the disputes between the various Russian groups in Siberia, they have, without of course according formal recognition, consistently supported the Government of Admiral Kolchak which is established west of Lake Baikal, feeling that one of the first essentials necessary for the establishment of confidence among the troops operating at the front was that there should be an ordered form of Government in their immediate rear, on which reliance could be placed, and His Majesty's Government have correspondingly discouraged any action which to them seemed likely to interfere with this end. The activities of General Semenov at Chita, and other Russian leaders elsewhere, have in particular been regarded by His Majesty's Government with especial disfavour, and they have done everything possible to avert the dangers arising from their action.

It seemed to His Majesty's Government essential, that whatever the eventual outcome of the deliberations in Paris as to the ultimate policy to be adopted in respect of the Russian Soviet Government might be, nothing should be done by the Allied Governments in Siberia in the meanwhile, to allow the situation to develop adversely from the point of view of the friendly Russian forces and that everything should be done to maintain their efficiency.

If the United States Government agree in the foregoing estimate of the present situation in Siberia, His Majesty's Government feel that they can rely on them to co-operate in taking all measures which may be necessary to secure the immediate objects in view, and as support of the Government of Admiral Kolchak as a temporary measure seems to His Majesty's Government a vital condition of maintaining matters on a relatively secure basis, they hope the United States Government will agree that it is necessary to prevent any steps being taken by Russian elements hostile to that Government, which may impair its usefulness.

I have [etc.]

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

861.00/4128 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*PARIS, *March 23, 1919, 3 a.m.*

[Received March 23, 2:43 a.m.]

1285. According to your 4773, March 8th, 6 p.m.<sup>55</sup> to London, Harris has been instructed to say to Omsk Government that the conduct of military groups in maritime district if not corrected will seriously embarrass the support which the United States is now lending the authorities in Siberia in the shipment of supplies including military equipment and railway materials. The Commission desires to know what sort of military equipment is being sent to the authorities in Siberia and for what purpose it is being used.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/4128 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*WASHINGTON, *March 27, 1919, 4 p.m.*

1315. Your 1285 March 23rd, 3 am. Since American troops entered Vladivostok this Government has been lending good offices to Russian Embassy in shipping Russian rifles and boots, consigned to General Ivanoff-Rinoff for use of Russian forces on Volga front and in Siberia. As you are aware, in our efforts to aid the Czecho-Slovak armies it seemed proper to cooperate in measures to strengthen the Russians who were acting with them.

PHILLIPS

861.00/4266 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*TOKYO, *April 12, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received April 13, 1:44 a.m.]

After extended conferences with Consul General Harris, and at his suggestion, I submit the following comments.

Although my experience has been wholly in eastern Siberia and that of Harris largely in western Siberia we find ourselves in substantial agreement on the observations and conclusions which he submitted to the Department in his telegram from Vladivostok of April 2nd, 10 [11] p.m.<sup>56</sup> and which I consider a valuable summary of the present situation.

<sup>55</sup> *Post*, p. 478.<sup>56</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Apr. 19, p. 333.

Referring to the numerical suggestions in his telegram :

1st. I would hesitate at present to suggest even a *de facto* recognition of the Kolchak government although I fully concur in a policy of encouragement and friendliness provided Kolchak's attitude continues to justify it. I still entertain serious doubts as to the permanency of the Kolchak régime.

2d. I am constrained to dissent from the second suggestion. I believe that an Allied loan to assist railway operation is essential, but I feel that any loan to the Kolchak government at this time would be both unwise and inexpedient.

I am in complete accord with the four remaining suggestions.

I believe that Harris is entitled to great credit for the zeal and energy he has shown during the past year under extremely difficult conditions but he is greatly in need of additional men. If he could have ten additional men assigned to him for consular work it would be of immense value to our interests in Siberia. We have at present in addition to Vladivostok and Irkutsk temporary consulates at Chita, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Novo Nikolaievsk, Ekaterinburg, and Cheliabinsk.

We should have additional consulates at Gusrovs<sup>k</sup> [*Khabarovsk?*], Blagoveschensk, Semipalatinsk, Barnaul, Penn [*Perm?*], and Kurgan. Only in this way can we be kept in close touch with local movements and assist Americans engaged in varied activities in Siberia.

MORRIS

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/512

*The Russian Political Conference to the President of the Paris Peace Conference* <sup>57</sup>

[Translation]

PARIS, April 15, 1919.

It appears that the purpose of the national movement in Russia, which is embodied in the Unified Governments, is not sufficiently clear to all. Consequently, and in order to eliminate every possible misunderstanding, the agents of the said Governments, charged with representing and defending the interests of national Russia before the Allies in Paris, believe they should make, in the name of the Russian Political Conference, the following declaration:

The purpose of the national movement and the task which the Unified Governments have undertaken do not consist in placing power in the hands of a chosen group. The national movement is

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<sup>57</sup> A copy of this statement was given by the Russian Political Conference to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. The translation in the files has been revised.

free from any secret intention of restoration. The Governments protest categorically against any suspicion of wishing to reestablish the old regime and to take away the land from the peasants. The sole purpose of the movement is to reestablish national unity and to found the regeneration of Russia upon the solid basis of a democratic organization. It is for the Russian people themselves to decide their destiny by means of a Constituent Assembly elected freely and under legal conditions. As soon as the Bolshevik tyranny is crushed and the Russian people can freely express their will, we will proceed with the elections and the present governments will turn over their power into the hands of the National Assembly.

The Governments believe it their duty to fight for the principles of national unity and sovereignty of the people against those who trample them under foot. Forced into civil war by the Bolsheviks, who have had recourse to armed force to impose their domination, the Governments will not prolong the struggle for a single hour once their task has been accomplished. However, they will not cease to fight until the day when right and liberty shall be reestablished in Russia and the Russian people can freely express their will.

The Governments are sure of the final victory of the national movement. No temporary trial or check will shake this conviction. If, in the struggle against Bolshevism, the Russian people expect the aid of the Allies, it is solely because their help would permit the more rapid termination of civil war. The Allies have recognized it themselves; the pacification of Russia is the necessary condition for general peace. But this pacification will only be possible when Bolshevism is struck to the heart at Petrograd and Moscow. The national movement in Russia is the more entitled to aid from the Allies, since it is struggling for the realization of the same principles of true democracy and social equality in the name of which the Peace Conference has assembled.

Prince LVOFF  
SAZONOW  
N. TCHAIKOVSKY  
B. MAKHLAKOFF

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861.00/4332 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, April 19, 1919.

[Received April 20, 3:13 a.m.]

Your April 16 [14<sup>h</sup>], midnight,<sup>58</sup> our April 16, 11 a.m.<sup>58</sup> Harris message follows. . .

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<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

"April 2nd, 11 p.m. Pursuant to instructions from the Department Consul General Harris has been in conference with Admiral Rodgers, General Graves, Mr. Smith of Railroad Commission and Consul Caldwell of Vladivostok.

We are in accord and of opinion as follows: that the liberal movement as headed by Kolchak is increasing in strength. Indications are that Kolchak is inclined to approach the center parties to make concessions to them and to unite with them in a comparatively liberal form of government. His influence would be extended were he to promise a constitutional assembly to the peoples but sees at present as a chief necessity only the subdual of Bolsheviki and although well disposed to civic institutions regards a pledge to them as of less immediate importance. Kolchak seems sincerely committed to the good of Russia reorganizing policies of liberal character with possible personal preference for constitutional monarchy rather than for republic, but not at all in favor of old type of government. Kolchak probably represents the most acceptable type of men Russia has available but we do not believe him a great national leader.

The really reactionary associates immediately about Kolchak are not of primary importance although it is perhaps not advisable for him to seek an immediate break with them. He has recently disavowed the actions of some of the more important reactionary leaders who claim his countenancing in eastern Siberia. The Zemstvos are not so favorably disposed towards Kolchak government, for the Cossacks under Semenovff and Kalmikoff are reactionary and violent, and the people are not sure that Kolchak himself is sufficiently liberal. Zemstvo representatives eastern Siberia say that Kolchak has reduced their authority.

The betterment of the whole people is essentially dependent on economic prosperity induced through operation of railroads and elimination of Bolsheviks, who seek to rule for their own profit by terror, violence, and destruction, and through the prevention of arbitrary acts of violence by reactionary Cossacks in the name of order. The Siberian situation would be improved,

1st, if after enunciation of satisfactory liberal policies, some form of encouragement yet not reaching formal recognition as *de facto* government could be given by Allied Powers to the liberal movement now headed by Kolchak. We are now actually dealing with Kolchak on railway business and must continue to do so.

2d, some form of financial and material support is necessary. A loan is preferable to a gift, although there is some chance of losing it. If arms and supplies are given it should be done openly and by agreement of the powers. Japan's secret gift of arms of Semenovff and Kalmikoff promoted reactionary discord and tended to drive

peasantry into control of opposite party and violence when they only asked be free from oppression.

3d, agreement on part of Allies to refrain from assisting or supporting any of the Cossack factions now embarrassing Kolchak.

4th, adoption of every means, short of force, to weaken strength and influence of reactionary Cossack leaders. The Cossack people generally of Siberia are essentially the same as the rest of peasantry and desire stable government and personal security.

5th, development of industrial and civic prosperity by prompt and efficient operation of railroads.

6th, stabilization of currency.

Japanese military authorities have been fomenting trouble in various directions as set forth in recent reports by General Graves to Department and the conduct of the Japanese troops in Siberia has not been in accord with policies of the United States but within past few days Japanese command has expressed its intention to conform more to American policy and [to combat?] Bolshevism by creation of economic prosperity and to use physical force against any Russian party only when such party interferes with railroad or attacks Japanese troops or for [*sic*] cantonments.<sup>59</sup>

The Inter-Allied Railway Committee has been acting harmoniously and the best promise of success in pacifying Siberia is through smooth working of railway protected by Allied forces against lawless attacks of any minority party of violence. Not only is there divergence of views between the Japanese military party and the present Japanese Government but it seems probable that both the English and French Military representatives in Siberia personally hold very reactionary views as to Russian politics and are not in harmony with the representatives of their own Governments on the Inter-Allied Committee, consequently the Government[s] of England and France have not had clear-cut view as to the situation here. Indications are that the representatives of England and France, especially France, on the Inter-Allied Committee wish to delay action by the military committee until their home governments are as well informed and both powers have granted authority of [*to?*] the civil representatives on the railway committee to require their members of the military committee to conform to the general policy as expressed by the Inter-Allied Railway Committee.

The matter is one to be settled in its broad lines of policy by agreement between the Allied powers party to the railroad agreement.

Apparently if the powers will unify the expression of views by their respective representatives, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee

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<sup>59</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Mar. 31, 12 p.m., p. 551.



will be able to arrive at harmonious decisions promotive of their law, order, good feeling, and prosperity in Siberia. Harris.”

MORRIS

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861.00/4543 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1919, noon.

1716. For the Secretary of State.

Since the time when American troops were ordered to Siberia to assist the Czechs and to “to steady any efforts at self-government or self defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance” this government has taken various steps to support the Russian forces in Siberia who were cooperating with the Czechs and the Allies and the Government at Omsk under which these forces were operating. For example, the British authorities were assisted in facilitating shipment of Russian rifles held by Russian Embassy here and understood to have been purchased with British credits; similar action taken regarding locomotives. The Embassy has also been assisted in securing licenses and necessary tonnage space either in commercial vessels or in army transports for shipment of rouble notes, shoes, rifles and railway material, including cars and locomotives purchased in this country by Russia from American credits and controlled here by the Embassy. This Government has also approved appointment as Chairman of Inter-Allied Committee for Siberian Railways, Oustrougoff, who incidentally is Minister of Ways of Communication of Omsk Government. While not dealing officially with Omsk Government, Consul General Harris and Consular officers under him have perforce been in more or less close touch, informally and unofficially, with Omsk authorities. The forces of General Graves are understood to have taken part in conjunction with Japanese and Czechs in engagements with Bolshevik forces operating with prisoners of war in their ranks. In these and other ways, this Government has manifested a friendly disposition towards the Omsk authorities which must have had a direct result in strengthening the Omsk Government. The British and French have sent forces to the Urals to take active part with the Russian forces of the Omsk Government operating against the Bolshevik armies.

While conditions in Eastern Siberia are reported to be still unsatisfactory, I believe that the situation will be relieved first: by the operation of the railways under Stevens and second; by our present efforts to secure a unity of policy on the part of Japan and ourselves and also the other Governments concerned, in regard to the employ-

ment of military forces now in Siberia. On the other hand, the reports of Consul-General Harris regarding conditions west of Lake Baikal show steady improvement of conditions and a constant accession of support and strength to the Omsk Government. I have sent you yesterday in separate cables the most recent opinions on this subject of Mr. Harris and Mr. Morris.

This information is sent you in connection with press reports here stating that recognition of the Omsk Government is contemplated upon initiative of American delegates at Paris and that Department of State is in cable communication with Allied Governments as to time and mode of procedure in making recognition effective.

POLK

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861.00/4379: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1919, 7 p.m.

Mission requests you be informed it has been carefully considering the advisability of a provisional recognition of the Kolchak Government and desires to know whether, in view of the success attending the arms of the Omsk Government during the past month, you are disposed to modify your views regarding such recognition as expressed in your telegram to Department April 12, 4 p.m.

POLK

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/598

*Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Alexander Kerenski [at Paris], May 4, 1919*<sup>61</sup>

1. Kerenski is convinced that the Bolshevists are just about at the end of their rope, and that their complete overthrow is only a matter of a few months now. He believes that Admiral Kolchak will succeed them as master of Russia, and his greatest fear is that Kolchak will inaugurate a regime hardly less sanguinary and repressive than that of the Bolshevists. He feels that the only solution of the Russian question that lies in the true interests of Russia and of the world is the restoration of a genuinely democratic government, based upon a coalition of all parties who stand for the principles of the March Revolution of 1917, (i. e. excluding the Bolshevists at one extreme and the monarchical reactionaries on the other).

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<sup>61</sup> The authorship of this memorandum is not indicated on the file copy.

2. Kerenski affirms that the French and British governments, or at least their representatives in Siberia, have constantly been aiding and abetting the reactionary elements around Kolchak. He believes that the Allied and Associated Governments ought to have a united policy towards Russia, a policy in accordance with the principles laid down in the invitation to the Prinkipo conference, a policy of supporting a democratic coalition and of working against the extremists on either side. He suggests that it is only the United States that can take the lead in establishing such a united Russian policy.

3. As the chief feature of the Russian policy which he would like to see followed by the Entente and ourselves, he suggests the following:

- (a) That we should inform Kolchak that we were disposed to recognize his government as the government of Russia, but only on condition that he give proof of his democratic principles by the following measures:
- 1) Restoring the civic liberties, the Zemstvo and municipal organizations and the Siberian parliament.
  - 2) By reorganizing his cabinet on a coalition basis.
  - 3) By promising to call a Constituent Assembly for all Russia as soon as that becomes at all feasible.
  - 4) By publicly guaranteeing that, until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the peasants are to remain in possession of the land they now hold, and the workingmen are not to be deprived of those liberties (association, strike, etc.), which they won through the March Revolution.
- (b) If Kolchak, when sounded through diplomatic channels, declares himself ready to accept such conditions, Kerenski thinks the Allied Governments ought at once to recognize him and his friends as "the Provisional Government of Russia until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly."

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861.00/4430: Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, *May 4, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received May 5, 2:43 a.m.]

1141. 106 to Paris. The Embassy has received a circular note from the Provisional Government announcing its decision on April 30, "to recognize officially the supreme and exclusive authority of the present Government of Omsk as the Provisional National Government of all Russia, while reserving independence of action until a direct junction between the two Governments shall have taken place." Resting upon this basic decision the Provisional Govern-

ment will continue as heretofore until it has obtained from the National Government detailed instructions and the chief dispositions of the two Governments have been coordinated.

POOLE

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861.24/145 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Harbin, to the Acting Secretary of State*

HARBIN, May 4, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received May 12, 5:03 a.m.]

217. I understand that the Omsk Government desires 150,000 rifles ordered in America should be sent to Russians for new recruits. I understand General Graves is favorably considering this matter, and I recommend that it be done. Believe it would be good policy.

HARRIS

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861.00/4425 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 4, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received May 4, 4:55 p.m.]

1890 [1980]. There is a feeling here among some that it would be unworthy [*unwise*] to recognize the Omsk Government even provisionally because it seems to be a military dictatorship. If Koltchak were to take steps at once to summon a Constituent Assembly it might lessen opposition to some form of recognition. What are your views as to the possibility of inducing such action by Koltchak?

AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/4435 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1919, 8 p.m.

1877. In response to inquiry for his views as to recognition of Omsk Government, Ambassador Morris replies as follows:

"May 3, noon. If Great Britain and France decide to recognize the Kolchak Government I think we should do likewise and urge similar action by Japan. Unity of action in Siberia is more important than the character of the action. Frankly I would prefer to see recognition postponed until the Kolchak Government shows more willingness to define its purposes and policy and less subserviency to reactionary influence. If, however, the Associated Governments decide that the general situation in Russia as a whole calls for recognition of a Siberian Government, important that a statement will be first obtained

from Kolchak and his colleagues defining their own position on the fundamental issues of the revolution, the land problem, the state of self-government, freedom of speech and uncensored communication and the calling as soon as practicable of a constituent assembly."

In this connection Stevens at Harbin reports as follows.

"April 30, 4 p.m. Reports from Technical Board, Irkutsk. Anti-Siberian Government has threatened (?) plan to stop transportation, weaken government railway men. I believe now is the psychological moment to extend some measures recognition Siberian Government, strengthen hands. Whatever it is there is nothing other than it in sight that gives promise of maintenance of order, failing which, unrestrained anarchy. Such action would greatly assist in restoration of American prestige, which is badly damaged."

The following telegram from Consul Caldwell bears further on the necessity for a united policy on the part of the Governments represented in Siberia.

"278, May 5, 7 p.m. Referring to my telegram 262 April 24 [29], 5 p.m.,<sup>62</sup> and to General Graves' 281, May 4,<sup>63</sup> Contention of Omsk Government that if we are not actively assisting them we are hindering and I am convinced that American troops in Siberia acting under present policy are not only accomplishing no useful purpose but are doing actual harm in tending to prolong the disturbed conditions. The time has come for us to either withdraw our troops or to actively support the Omsk Government, preferably the latter. If troops are withdrawn all foreign troops should go together, but it would be better to leave the field to the Japanese military . . . than to continue as we are now. Support to Omsk Government should be given by all the Allies acting in unison and should not involve any use of military force beyond that which is already provided for in the railway agreement but in so doing it should be understood that we are supporting the Omsk Government which in its turn should be made to issue a definite statement as to calling a constituent assembly and certain other reforms. At the same time we should see that the various trouble making military leaders claiming to support Omsk Government in this district receive orders from that Government prescribing proper conduct for forces and we should see that these orders are obeyed. This would also ensure all support to these various factions being given with the knowledge and consent of all the Allies and through the Omsk Government.

This of course necessitates a new declaration from all the foreign nationalities having troops in Russia which can be brought into line. This declaration should show that Allies support the Omsk Government in its endeavors to build up a real Government through the methods set forth in the declaration of that Government regarding constituent assembly referred to above. This telegram has been written after consultation with and has the full approval of General Graves as well as Captain Watts."<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> *Post*, p. 490.

<sup>63</sup> *Post*, p. 491.

<sup>64</sup> Capt. William C. Watts, commanding the U.S.S. *Albany*.

To my mind these telegrams bear out my own opinion that all the Governments concerned in the railway plan should recognize the Omsk Government as a *de facto* government in Siberia and in such other parts of Russia as may now or hereafter be under its actual control.

Upon taking the oath of office Admiral Kolchak solemnly declared that the power conferred on him would be relinquished to the All-Russian Government which would be created by a properly constituted Constituent Assembly. Referring to your 1890 [1980], May 4, 6 p.m., I am confident that if the Omsk Government were aware that recognition was at hand they would willingly issue a satisfactory statement providing for the convening of a Constituent Assembly or other constitutional means for ascertaining the will of the people at the earliest date when such a meeting would be practicable, and also make adequate recommendations regarding the freedom of the press, of speech, and of meeting, and the safeguarding of private life and property and the observance of foreign obligations and undertakings. The recognition would, of course, be provisional upon such a declaration being made.

POLK

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/147

I. C. 181. E

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 7th, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America:* President Wilson.—*British Empire:* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France:* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy:* M. Orlando.—*Secretaries*—Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.; Count Aldrovandi.—*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

#### Russia

4. Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said the situation in Russia was developing in a very remarkable manner, and would have to be dealt with soon. There had been a curious collapse of the Bolsheviki, and the British Cabinet were pressing for a decision. It seemed that Koltchak had made such progress that he might soon be in a position to join hands with the forces based on Archangel. On the other hand, it was possible that he might march direct on Moscow. This was M. Paderewski's<sup>65</sup> view. Hence, in a short time, the Allied and Associated Powers might be faced with a Koltchak Government in Moscow.

<sup>65</sup> Ignace J. Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers of Poland.

According to information furnished by M. Tchaikowski<sup>66</sup> and M. Paderewski, Koltchak was simply a soldier and nothing more. Denekin was said to be pro-German or at any rate in the hands of a pro-German Chief of Staff. All this pointed to the desirability of imposing some conditions on Koltchak and Denekin before further supplies were furnished. Koltchak's political programme was vague and indefinite, containing such items as "there must be land reform."

M. Paderewski was afraid of a very powerful military Russia developing under Koltchak.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that M. Paderewski, like all Poles, was anti-Russian.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that we should demand a programme of reforms and insist that our continued support depended on its being adopted.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he and General Wilson had both formed a very high opinion of M. Tchaikowski. He thought that his colleagues ought to see him. He was sent to Siberia by the Czarist Government owing to his liberal views, and was urging that the Allies should prevent Russia from becoming Imperial again. He himself feared that more than he did Bolshevism.

M. CLEMENCEAU was afraid of both.

PRESIDENT WILSON said Bolshevism must collapse, whereas an Imperial Russia might remain. There was nothing in the Treaty with Germany to prevent the Germans from forming a powerful industrial and commercial union with Russia. He asked what the assistance given to Russia consisted in.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said arms and supplies.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if they had been able to build up stocks.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE thought not. Koltchak's success was probably due to the fact that the Bolsheviks had no coal or oil.

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861.00/4452 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, May 7, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received May 9, 3:55 a.m.]

1162. 106 [112] to Paris. The British Commissioner tells me that among despatches of Sir Charles Eliot forwarded to him by the Foreign Office is one dated about a month ago recommending that the Allies recognize the government of Kolchak as the Provisional Gov-

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<sup>66</sup> N. V. Chaikovski, President of the Russian Provisional Government of the Northern Region and member of the Russian Political Conference at Paris.

ernment of Siberia. He has taken the occasion of the note of the Archangel government reported in my 1141 May 4, 3 p.m. to support this recommendation with the addition that the provisional authority of the Kolchak government be recognized to extend also to the parts of European Russia controlled by governments subordinating themselves to that of Omsk.

The situation at Archangel has improved during the last two months to an extent which was hardly to be foreseen. The conditions reported from this Embassy and described with some accuracy and a good deal of sensationalism by Frazier Hunt in the *Chicago Tribune* of February 10th have changed radically. The substantial success of the local mobilization, reflecting certainly a considerable measure of political contentment, is already known to the Department. As shown by the message contained in the Embassy's 1052, April 9, 6 p.m.<sup>67</sup> the general trend of the Government policy is fairly democratic even in the view of its most radical member. This has been emphasized by the addition of Fedorov to the Ministry (Embassy's 1067, April 12, 10 p.m. [*a.m.*?]<sup>67</sup> and there are other favorable symptoms, see 1048, April 9, 3 p.m.<sup>67</sup> Bolshevik agitation among the laborers of Archangel has sunk to little or nothing. The peasants continue as heretofore thoroughly anti-Bolshevik. In sum, the position of the Government is incomparably stronger than it was at the beginning of the year or even in February. If there has been an analogous development in Siberia, as one may suppose from such information as reaches here, the consideration of provisional recognition may be in order, though without adequate knowledge of Siberian affairs I would not make a recommendation.

Recognition would be more important morally than practically, it would work little difference for instance in the projected [*actual?*] relations between the Archangel government and that of Great Britain. Its main effects would be to give clear definition and therefore strength to Allied policy in Russia and to deal a heavy moral blow to the Bolsheviki. These aspects of the matter move me deeply; quite apart from the question of the recognition at this time of the anti-Bolshevik government, I beg to urge once more the importance of attaining these ends in any case by clear pronouncement against the Bolsheviki. The great vice of Allied policy in Russia has been equivocation. It has tried to run with the hare while hunting with the hounds. The story of last summer in Central Russia is filled with this. The Archangel expedition has been discredited throughout by being engaged actually in doing something different from what it was said to be entering upon. The same sort of thing will

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<sup>67</sup> Not printed.



continue to vitiate our efforts for Russia until the realities of the situation are accepted and clearly stated. Of these the most fundamental is the impossibility of compromise with the Bolsheviks. With the best will in the world we could never have more than a paper peace with them. Mutual antagonism is instituted [*inherent?*] in the fundamentals of their program and in the duplicity of their methods. The Bolsheviks are not completely bad just as no one is completely good but a balance cast up with every allowance in their favor, shows incontrovertibly a preponderance of wickedness which corrupts intercourse and challenges the fighting spirit of all right-thinking men. Inevitably we shall continue to oppose them whether we say so or not.

The importance of saying so is in this, that the conflict in Russia is above all a moral conflict. Because the Bolsheviks rely immediately upon force it is necessary to employ force against them. But as has been shown time and time again the battle is moral. The Bolsheviks have had the moral audacity to cheat and lie and betray and murder and then to defy the world with the sophistry, "we represent the working people, hands off." They have succeeded so far because no one sufficiently powerful has yet had the courage to reply, "they do not represent the working people—they must and shall be put down." It cannot be answered that it is an affair for the Russians alone. The early and continued interference of the German Imperial Government as well as the aggressive internationalism of the Bolsheviks makes it distinctly an affair also for the Allies and America. To endeavor to escape the responsibility it could shirk the full task of the war, defaulting on our obligation for the three years of essential contribution to victory which was made not by the Czar's government but by the Russian people. The hesitancy of the United States has long been a reliance of the Bolsheviks—compare my number 1 from Moscow relayed from the Consulate General at Christiania September 14, 1918.<sup>69</sup> Possibly it is well that we have waited but surely it is long enough. A clear verdict now will be a mark of moral leadership in the world's affairs. It will sweep away the sophistries and equivocations which have degraded the gallant work our troops have already done for Russia. It will disclose the truth now obscured that every blow struck at the Moscow government is a blow as necessary and as potent for decency, justice and liberty in the world as those which have been struck on the western front.

POOLE

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<sup>69</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, pp. 662-663.*

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/4

C. F. 4

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 9th, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America*, President Wilson.—*British Empire*, The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P., Prime Minister.—*France*, M. Clemenceau.—*Italy*, M. Orlando.—*Secretaries*—Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.; Count Aldrovandi.—*Interpreter*,—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

### Policy in Russia

3. PRESIDENT WILSON presented a military problem to his colleagues. The United States, he said, as agreed between the Allied and Associated Powers some time back, had been trying to send supplies to the Civilian population of Siberia from Vladivostock. By agreement between the Allies and a Mr. Stevens, who, long ago in the days of the old regime had been in Siberia, had become the head of a somewhat inconvenient Commission to run the railroads of Siberia. The United States had agreed to police the railroads as far west as Irkutsk.<sup>70</sup> The position was that the United States Government did not believe in Koltchak. The British and French military representatives in Siberia, however, were supporting him. Koltchak had become irritated by the presence on the railway of United States soldiers, whom he regarded as neutrals. Moreover, the impression had got abroad among the peasants of Siberia that the United States was the standard of a free Government which they ought to imitate. When they saw the attitude of neutrality taken up by the United States soldiers, they thought there must be something wrong with the Government of Koltchak. Further, the Cossacks were out of sympathy with the United States soldiers and he suspected that the Japanese would be glad to have a collision between the Cossacks and American soldiers. As a consequence of this state of affairs the United States Government found itself faced with the two following alternatives:

1. To take sides with Koltchak and send much stronger forces to Siberia.
2. To withdraw.

If the former alternative were adopted and the United States increased their forces it was certain that the Japanese would increase

<sup>70</sup> For assignment of sections of the Siberian railways to be guarded by American and Allied troops see telegram from the consul at Vladivostok, no. 240, Apr. 22, 2 p.m., p. 555.

theirs still more. The original agreement had been that the Japanese and the United States should send roughly equivalent forces. When the United States sent 9,000 men the Japanese sent 12,000 men. He had not objected to this slight discrepancy, but the numbers of Japanese had subsequently gone up to 70,000, which had afterwards been reduced to a nominal 30,000. This, however, left a great disproportion. If the United States troops continued merely to guard the railway and to maintain, as it were, a neutral position, he was advised that collisions were bound to occur. If United States soldiers were attacked, it could not be expected that they would do nothing. If they were withdrawn, the field would be left to the Japanese and Koltchak, who was supported by the Allies.

He then read a series of telegrams from General Graves commanding the United States forces in Siberia, bearing out the above summary of the position, and pointing out that if the present policy were continued, there would almost certainly be a collision between the United States troops and Russian troops.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that this strengthened his view as to the need of arriving at a policy in regard to Russia. Koltchak was advancing Eastward [*Westward*] at a very remarkable rate. He was in a position either to move Northwards and join hands with the forces based on Archangel, or to march on Moscow.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had always been of opinion that the proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE asked that before a decision should be taken, the Council should hear M. Tchaikowsky.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that President Wilson should send a reply to General Graves asking him to take no action for the moment, as the whole problem was being considered by the Allied and Associated Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the risk of this was that there might be a collision between the United States and Russian troops. He suggested that the Allied and Associated Powers should simultaneously ask Koltchak what his programme was.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested he might be asked two definite questions:

- (1) Will you allow the peasants to retain the land or do you propose to restore the old seigneurial rights?
- (2) Are you prepared to revive the Constituent Assembly?

PRESIDENT WILSON in regard to the first point, said that a few days ago he had asked a very Russophile friend whether the peasants had

really got the land out of all the chaos in Russia. His friend had replied that they had only got it in a very inequitable way, each man having seized the land nearest to him. The difficulty would not only be to distribute the land to the peasants, but to systematise the existing distribution involving in some cases dispossession of individuals and groups.

(After some further discussion during which Mr. Lloyd George produced a map showing the great advance that Koltchak's troops had made, it was agreed that M. Tchaikowsky should be heard on the following day at noon.<sup>71</sup>)

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE undertook that Mr. Philip Kerr, who knew his address, should summon him.

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861.00/4452 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *May 12, 1919, 9 p.m.*

1946. Referring my 1920, May 9, 8 p.m.<sup>72</sup> and Poole's 106, May 7 to Mission, from Archangel,<sup>73</sup> following extracts from various cables furnished Department from time to time by Russian Embassy may prove of interest. Kolchak's oath of office January 29, 1919 contains following passage:

"I vow and swear to administer the supreme power vested in me by the Council of Ministers in accordance with the laws of the country until the establishment of a form of government by the freely expressed will of the people."

On his return from a tour of the front in March, 1919, Kolchak addressed an assembly of the members of the Municipalities, the Zemstvos and the social organizations. His speech contained the following passage:

"During this tour I have frequently met representatives of the Zemstvos, Municipalities and social organizations. I can affirm with great satisfaction that there is no divergency between the Government's and my own opinions and those expressed by the people in the country. The time has passed, never to return, when state authority places itself in opposition to public opinion as a force to which it was distant and even hostile. New free Russia must repose on the principles of a union between the government and the people. . . . .<sup>74</sup> I consider that in free Russia, there can only be a democratic rule. The principal aims pursued by the Govern-

<sup>71</sup> The report of this hearing is not printed.

<sup>72</sup> *Post*, p. 493.

<sup>73</sup> The same telegram as that from the Chargé in Russia, no. 1162, May 7, p. 342.

<sup>74</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

ment are universal suffrage and in questions of local autonomy the expansion of this autonomy on broad democratic lines; social legislation regarding the labor and land questions; the Government bases its reform on the principles of state necessity and of social impartiality. As to international relations, the Government is endeavoring to continue the relations established at the moment of Russia's entry into the war and to strengthen the old ties of friendship. . . .<sup>75</sup> The Government penetrated by the idea of the regeneration of our country considers the Russian people the sole masters of their destiny and when the people, freed from the oppressing yoke of Bolshevism will have expressed, through representatives freely elected to the National Constituent Assembly, their free will concerning the principles upon which shall be based the political, national and social structure of the state, then my Government and myself will esteem it as our duty to transfer to the Government chosen by the National Constituent Assembly the full power now lodged in our hands."

The following concluding passage is taken from the declaration of the Omsk Government, published February 10, in regard to the land question:

"Laws governing the questions of land and property, its utilization and the temporary possession of seized lands, the equitable repartition of the land as well as indemnities to the former proprietors, will be enacted in the near future. These laws will tend to transfer the land which formerly was cultivated by third persons, remunerated by the proprietors, to the population which cultivates it, and to contribute to the development of small rural properties whether they belong to individuals or to communities. In arranging for the transfer of the land to the tilling peasants, the Government will endeavor to give them the possibility of acquiring the land in entire ownership. The Government assumes the responsibility of this act of historical importance, fully convinced that such decisive measures will alone lead to re-establishment; and will secure and guarantee the prosperity of the Russian rural population numbering tens of millions; this prosperity acting as a strong and solid foundation on which will be built a free, regenerated and prosperous Russia."

The Embassy has furnished me with statements showing that during March and April declarations of allegiance to the Omsk Government were presented by Municipalities, Political and Social Organizations, the Union of Cooperative Credit Societies and the Council of the Cooperative Societies of all Siberia, also numerous Zemstvos organizations and the Cossacks of the Amur.

I bring this to your attention to illustrate my belief that adequate assurances which will require prompt observance in practise will be furnished by the Omsk authorities as soon as the Allies indicate that we are prepared to give them definite support.

POLK

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<sup>75</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

861.00/4536b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1919, 6 p.m.

The President has cabled me to instruct you to proceed to Vladivostok and after learning all you care to know from Graves to proceed westward, if you can with safety, to the headquarters of the Kolchak Government for the following purposes: To obtain from that Government, official and definite assurances as to the objects that they have in view with regard to the future Governmental regime in Russia and the methods by which they mean to set a new regime up, asking particular assurances with regard to the reform in land tenure, and the extension and security of the suffrage, and the choice and projected action of a constituent assembly, and also learn as definitely as possible the influences that Kolchak is under. The President states his object is to satisfy himself as to whether the Kolchak Government deserves the recognition, or at least the countenance, if not the support, of our Government; and suggests that there are two persons whom it might be worth your while to consult, both of them Englishmen, namely, Colonel R. A. Johnson of the Fifth Hants, and Colonel John Ward, commanding Middlesex Unit, the latter having been formerly a representative spokesman of labor in Great Britain and believed to have genuine popular principles and sympathies.

POLK

861.00/4539 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1919, 8 p.m.

My May 15th, 6 p.m. President directs me to request that you particularly inquire as to the kind of men and influences surrounding Kolchak and ask whether in your opinion Kolchak is strong enough and liberal enough to control them in the right direction.

POLK

861.24/145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1919, 6 p.m.

Your 217, May 4, 4 p.m. from Harbin, received May 11 [12]. Department understands 150,000 rifles to which you refer were contracted for with Remington Arms Company. Through the instrumentality of Department the Embassy has been able to secure the

release of apparently about 30,000 of these rifles. Balance would have to be paid for and the Department is now in communication with the Embassy as to what means, if any, can be devised. As you are aware, this Government has no funds for such purpose. Embassy funds are also extremely short. Subject has been matter of much conference but no adequate solution yet obtained.

POLK

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/19

C.F.19

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 19th, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* M. Sonnino.

Count Aldrovandi

*Secretaries*

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.

"

Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

*Interpreter*

Russia

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had ordered an enquiry to be sent to Koltchak, direct from the State Department, asking him to specify his programme and policy.<sup>17</sup> He said he had also received information from M. Kerenski. He would not regard this as a good source of information unless it happened to tally with information he had received elsewhere. Kerenski and his friends hoped that there would be no recognition of Koltchak or anyone else as representative of all the Russias and that as a condition of further assistance, certain agreements should be exacted from all the parties opposed to the Bolsheviks, by which they would pledge themselves to a certain progressive policy. They should be informed that a departure from this would cause them to lose the support of the Allied and Associated Powers. This seemed to provide the rudiments of a policy.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was important to impose conditions.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that these Russian groups could be broken down at any time by our failure to support them.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said he was amazed at the amount of material that had been supplied. They had received something like £50,000,000 of armaments and munitions.

<sup>17</sup> See telegram to the Ambassador in Japan, May 15, 6 p.m., p. 349.

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/20

C. F. 20

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	}	<i>Secretaries</i>
Count Aldrovandi		
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.		<i>Interpreter</i>

The Bolshevist's reply to Dr. Nansen

7. The Council had before them a copy of the reply by the Bolshevists<sup>78</sup> to Dr. Nansen's letter,<sup>79</sup> together with a Memorandum agreed to by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M. Clementel, and Professor Attolico, with a covering letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey.<sup>80</sup> (Appendix 3.).

After a prolonged perusal of this document

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not see how any change could be made in what the Council had tried to do. There was no doubt that the Bolshevists were now going down hill. Dr. Nansen had suggested a humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it into a political course.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Lenin's argument was that the price the Allied and Associated Powers were trying to exact for food was that their enemies should beat the Bolshevists by compelling the latter to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop aggressive fighting by the Bolshevists, because this was inconsistent with food distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the Allies were supporting Koltchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure on them to stop fighting. Lenin's argument was that for him to stop fighting was to sign his death warrant.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Lenin was not in the hands of the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that if supplies were stopped, Koltchak and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was impossible to stop Lenin fighting, and his word could not be trusted.

<sup>78</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the A.R.A. representative at Copenhagen, no. Crab 104, May 14, p. 111.

<sup>79</sup> Quoted in telegram from the Ambassador in France, no. 284, May 9, 10 p.m., p. 111.

<sup>80</sup> *Ante*, pp. 115 ff.



PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not feel the same chagrin that he had formerly felt at having no policy in regard to Russia. It had been impossible to have a policy hitherto.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said there had been very little choice. There had been a lunatic revolution which certain persons, in whom little confidence was felt, were trying to squash. The only reason why the Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany from getting supplies. They were, however, now entitled to say, having supported us so far "you cannot leave us in the lurch."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Americans had only gone to Siberia to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had refused to go.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that his Government's object had been to reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in doing this, though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to establish it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent the Germans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible now to leave these people in the lurch.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that at least pledges could be exacted for further support.

M. CLEMENCEAU fully agreed.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and said it could be done in either of two ways:

- (1) By a formal dispatch;
- (2) By summoning the representatives of the various Russian groups now in Paris and putting the conditions to them.

PRESIDENT WILSON preferred the first proposal. The second would be contrary to the idea that had been at the basis of the Prinkipo scheme, namely, that it would not be fair to hear one party without hearing the other. His view was that a formal demand and notice ought to be sent to the various Russian groups. He had himself sent something that was almost equivalent to this, as he felt he was entitled to do.

(After some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Philip Kerr should be asked to prepare a draft for the consideration of the Council.)

Mr. Kerr was sent for. While awaiting Mr. Kerr

PRESIDENT WILSON read extracts from a document which had been alluded to at a discussion on the previous day, signed by M. Kerensky and some of his friends,<sup>81</sup> and which contained a number of proposals, including the following:

- (i) That the Powers should only help the various Russian groups on certain fundamental conditions for the establishing of Russia on a democratic basis with a consti-

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

- uent assembly, and Governments which declined to agree should not be supported.
- (ii) That as a Constituent Assembly could clearly not be called at the present time, Regional Assemblies should be elected on a democratic basis for the re-establishment of Local Government.
  - (iii) That a representative mission should be sent by the Great Powers to Russia to give assurance of sympathy and assistance.
  - (iv) That proposals for supplying food were harmful.

These proposals in short, PRESIDENT WILSON continued, were that the Powers should obtain an assurance from each group that it would be united with the other groups to form an all Russian Government on a constituent basis, and that in the meanwhile each group should do what it could in its own area.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE was afraid of splitting up Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was merely proposing to substitute a democratic for an autocratic basis.

(After some further discussion Mr. Kerr entered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON informed Mr. Kerr that the Council desired to make a further effort with Russia along the lines of definite assurance to the several groups as to what they were aiming at. They had been reading a document prepared by certain Russian groups in Paris who, though anti-Bolshevist, were suspicious of reactionary tendencies among the groups fighting the Bolsheviks. These suggested that pledges should be demanded from the various groups fighting the Bolsheviks to establish a government on a democratic basis. In the meanwhile it was proposed to establish a democratic Government in these Regions by setting up Provincial Central Assemblies. The idea of the Council was to embody these demands in a message to the several Governments, and they hoped Mr. Kerr would prepare a draft for their consideration.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the question of the Baltic Provinces had not been discussed. All the other Russian groups fighting the Bolsheviks were violently opposed to any recognition of Esthonia and Latvia and the other Baltic provinces. They alleged that to recognise them would be to tear up Russia and to bar access to the sea.

Mr. KERR asked what promise was to be given to the various Russian groups to encourage them to give these undertakings.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not a question of promising more, but of continuing the assistance which was now given.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the dispatch should intimate that without satisfactory guarantees no further help would be given.

Mr. KERR asked if they were to accept the frontiers laid down by the League of Nations.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said they must.

PRESIDENT WILSON said there was no other solution. He then produced a letter from Mr. Hoover on the subject of the Baltic Provinces,<sup>82</sup> where there was an appalling shortage of food. This was due, according to Mr. Hoover, not to lack of financial or shipping facilities, but to the absence of order. He suggested that enough naval force should be given to provide for the protection of relief in the coast towns, and for its distribution along the coast. In this way the established governments should be helped to preserve order. The situation was so appalling from the humanitarian point of view, that he hoped the Council would be willing to hear a deputation composed of the British and United States Naval authorities and himself.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that in the first instance, Mr. Hoover should discuss the matter with the Admirals.

(This was agreed to.)

(Mr. Kerr withdrew with instructions to draft a letter of [for] consideration.)

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/26

C. F. 26

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 23rd, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	} <i>Secretaries</i>
Count Aldrovandi.	
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.	<i>Interpreter</i>

Russia

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had reason to believe that the Japanese Government were about to propose to the Allied and Associated Governments the recognition of the Omsk Government. He thought that these Governments ought to anticipate them. He did not like to leave it to Japan to take the initiative.

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<sup>82</sup> Not printed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether it was proposed to recognise this Government as representing all Russia, or merely as a local Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied as representing all Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not do that.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said he also was opposed to that. Mr. Kerr's draft despatch to the Russian *de facto* Government was ready, and he thought that it ought at once to be considered.

(It was agreed :

To discuss Mr. Kerr's draft letter in the afternoon.)

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/28

C. F. 28

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 23rd, [1919,] at 4 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT:—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	<i>Secretary</i>
Count Aldrovandi	<i>Secretary</i>
Professor P. J. Mantoux	<i>Interpreter</i>

. . . . .

#### Russia

5. (Mr. Phillip Kerr entered).

PRESIDENT WILSON, at the request of his colleagues, read the attached draft despatch to Admiral Koltchak, prepared by Mr. Kerr, at the request of the Council. (Appendix II). President Wilson expressed doubts as to whether the memorandum would be acceptable to General Denekin and M. Tchaikowsky.

Mr. KERR said that both these *de facto* Governments had recognised Admiral Koltchak as the central Government of Russia.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a copy of the despatch might be sent to General Deniken and to the Archangel Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU objected to the proposed abolition of conscription as one of the conditions.

M. ORLANDO agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that although he had been in favour of it, he regretted that the Covenant of the League of Nations had not abolished conscription.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not wish to press the use of these particular words in this document, but he was convinced that somehow or other, conscription must be got rid of in Russia. Otherwise, he was apprehensive lest Russia might raise six millions of soldiers and, sooner or later, Russia might come into the German orbit.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Mr. Kerr was sure about the alleged declaration by Admiral Koltchak, recognising Russia's debt as an obligation.

Mr. KERR then read the following telegram from Mr. Klioutchnikoff<sup>84</sup> to the Ambassador in Paris:

November 27th, 1918. Please communicate the following to the Government to which you are accredited.

"The Russian Government at the head of which stands Admiral Koltchak remembering that Russia always kept all her obligations towards her own people as well as other nations to which it was bound by conventions, presumes it necessary to announce in a special declaration that it accepts all obligations incumbent to the Treasury and will fulfill them in due time when Russia's unity will be again achieved. These obligations are the following: Payments of interests, redemption of inner [and foreign<sup>85</sup>] State debts, payments for contracts, wages, pensions and other payments due by law, and other conventions. The Government declares at the same time all financial acts promoted by the Soviet Powers as nul and void, being acts edicted by mutineers."

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that Lenin's suggestion, that the Russian debt was our principal pre-occupation, had been resented.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in this draft, it was only mentioned that Koltchak had made this statement, but it was not made a condition.

M. CLEMENCEAU again earnestly asked that the reference to the abolition of conscription might be removed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if recognition of Admiral Koltchak depended on the conditions laid down in the despatch.

Mr. KERR replied that it did not. Acceptance of these proposals was a condition of the continuation of assistance and no mention was made of recognition.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the versions which had previously been suggested, insisted not only on the free election of the Central Legislature, but also of regional bodies, for example, in

<sup>84</sup> Y. V. Klyuchnikov, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Omsk Government.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 447, in which text the words "and foreign" appear. In the Russian text in *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*, no. 6, of Nov. 24, 1918, published by the Omsk Government, the phrase translated reads, "redemption of internal and foreign state debts".

the territory administered by Koltchak, Denekin and the Archangel Government.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that para. 2 went as far in this direction as was now possible. To ask the Russian groups to hold elections in the middle of a war, when great confusion must prevail, would be to ask too much.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the substitution of the words "to promote elections" instead of "to permit elections."

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this was fair. Koltchak had latterly made a very big advance and there must be considerable confusion in his rear. In these circumstances, he could not fairly be asked to promote an election. It had not been found possible to hold an election even in the United Kingdom during the war. Much less was it possible in France or in Italy. In Russia a Constituent Assembly had been elected within the last two years or so by universal suffrage, and had only been got rid of by the Bolshevists, because it was not sufficiently extreme. Nevertheless, it had been a thoroughly democratic body.

M. CLEMENCEAU said Russia should be allowed to choose.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the memorandum permitted this. It provided that if an election could not be held, the Constituent Assembly, should be summoned when Koltchak reached Moscow.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the memorandum could only with complete truth be applied to the British Government, which, he believed, alone had supplied Russia with munitions etc. The United States had only supplied the Czechs, but this supply had stopped. They had not furnished supplies to Koltchak.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that France had sent very little, mainly because Great Britain had to supply the shipping. He would like to make enquiries on this.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the declaration might be made by the British Government only, since they alone were literally in a position to make this declaration, but it should be made with the avowed approval of the Associated Powers.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the difficulty might be surmounted by stating in the text that it was the British Government that had supplied more than £50,000,000 worth of munitions.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that he was in an awkward situation. The British and French Governments had both dealt with Koltchak as a *de facto*, though not as a *de jure* Government. Meanwhile, the United States had looked on, and had only helped to guard the railway which was under an International Commission, of which an American engineer was President. His position,

therefore, was very anomalous. He would like to consult Mr. Lansing on the subject of how the United States could associate themselves in this declaration without getting into a still more anomalous position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would like time to consult M. Pichon. He again raised the question of the inclusion of the abolition of conscription among the conditions which he asked should be removed.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the phrase "limitation of armaments and of military organization".

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would accept that.

M. ORLANDO also accepted.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE agreed to make this alteration in Mr. Kerr's draft.

(The subject was adjourned for further consideration).

[Enclosure]

## Appendix II

*Draft Despatch to Admiral Koltchak: Prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr for consideration at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, 23rd May, 1919*

The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russian affairs.

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces. Since the signature of the armistice on November 11th 1918 they have kept forces in various parts of Russia and the British Government have sent munitions and supplies to assist those associated with them to maintain their position to a total value of more than £50,000,000(?). No sooner, however, did the Peace Conference assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all the warring Governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent settlement of Russian problems. This proposal and a later offer to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while

negotiations or the work of relief was proceeding. They are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement of the Russian problem. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will help the Russian people to recover control of their own affairs and to enter into peaceful relations with the rest of the world.

The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected Constituent Assembly and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian state and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.

They are convinced by their experiences of the last year that it is not possible to secure self-government or peace for Russia by dealings with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies, food and the help of such as may volunteer for their service, to establish themselves as the government of All Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same end in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers. With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his Associates whether they will agree to the following as the conditions upon which they accept the continued assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the first place, that, as soon as they reach Moscow they will summon a Constituent Assembly elected by a free, secret and democratic franchise as the Supreme Legislature for Russia to which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or if at that time order is not sufficiently restored they will summon the Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time as new elections are possible.

Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course for all local and legally constituted assemblies such as municipalities, Zemstvos, etc.

Thirdly, they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privileges of any class or order in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declarations made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to the free decision of the Russian Constituent Assembly; but



they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to reintroduce the regime which the revolution has destroyed.

Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognised, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.

Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations.

Sixthly, that as soon as a government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League of Nations and co-operate with the other members in the limitation of armaments and of military organisation throughout the world.

Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27th 1918 in regard to Russia's national debts.

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/29

C. F. 29

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday May 24th, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.*—The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	} <i>Secretaries</i>
Count Aldrovandi	
Prof. P. J. Mantoux	} <i>Interpreter</i>

Russia

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had sent a copy of Mr. Philip Kerr's draft despatch to Mr. Lansing, who had replied that he considered the statement right, and that the United States were justified in joining in it. Mr. Lansing would have preferred to withhold the despatch until a reply had been received from Mr. Morris, who had

been sent to Omsk. He himself, however, did not agree in this. He agreed, however, to the following addition to the paragraph numbered "fifthly", at the top of page 5, which Mr. Lansing had proposed:

"and that until such settlement is made, the Government of Russia agrees to recognise those territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between the Allied and Associated Governments and the de facto Governments of those territories."

(This was accepted.)

(It was agreed to discuss the question in the afternoon.)

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/31

C. F. 31.

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 24th, 1919, at 4 p.m.*

[Extract]

PRESENT:—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* M. Orlando.—*Japan.* Viscount Chinda.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	} <i>Secretaries</i>
Count Aldrovandi.	
M. Saburi.	
Prof. P. J. Mantoux—	<i>Interpreter</i>

#### Policy toward Russia.

1. The Council had under consideration a draft despatch for Admiral Koltchak prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. (Appendix I).<sup>88</sup>

PRESIDENT WILSON explained to Viscount Chinda that he and his colleagues had felt some misgivings lest Admiral Koltchak might be under reactionary influences which might result in a reversal of the popular revolution in Russia. They also feared a Military Dictatorship based on reactionary principles, which would not be popular in Russia and might lead to further bloodshed and revolution. This despatch had been prepared for consideration in order to lay down the conditions of support for Admiral Koltchak and the groups working with him at Archangel and in South Russia. Should Admiral Koltchak accept the conditions, he would continue to receive the countenance and support of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, otherwise he would not. The substance of the

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<sup>88</sup> Not printed. The original draft of despatch to Admiral Kolchak is printed *ante*, p. 358.

document was contained in the six conditions laid down in the last half.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had only received the document a short time before leaving the Embassy, and consequently had not been able to study it in detail. Unfortunately, Baron Makino was on a visit to the devastated regions, and would not be back until the following day. He would be very much obliged if he could be allowed time to discuss the despatch with his colleagues before giving a final reply. Nevertheless, speaking personally, he felt that in all probability his Government would be prepared to associate themselves in this despatch. His reason for this belief was a despatch which had recently been addressed by his Government to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, London, Paris and Rome, which he proceeded to read not as a proposal, but only as a matter of information. The gist of this despatch was somewhat as follows: More than six months have elapsed since the provisional Government under Admiral Koltchak was organised at Omsk to restore order in Siberia. It has so far accomplished its extremely difficult task with admirable tact and determination. Its position had lately been strengthened by its recognition by other anti-Bolshevist groups in Russia as the central organisation in Russia. Having regard to the general desire to see the restoration of an orderly and efficient Government in Russia, and believing that official recognition will materially conduce to this end, the Japanese Government feels that the time has come for a provisional recognition to be accorded, on condition of a promise by the Omsk Government to safeguard the legitimate interests of the Allied and Associated Powers, and that it will assume responsibility for the debts and financial obligations of the former Russian Government.

The message concluded with an instruction to bring this declaration to the notice of the Governments to which the Ambassadors were respectively accredited, and to suggest to them that the question might conveniently be discussed among their delegates at Paris. On concluding the reading of this despatch VISCOUNT CHINDA remarked that the policy in the draft despatch which had been handed to him seemed to be a preliminary step towards the policy proposed by the Japanese Government. This was the reason for his confidence that the Japanese Government would accept it. Nevertheless, he would like to discuss the matter with his colleagues.

One point of detail in the dispatch to which he wished to draw attention was the following statement:

“ Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27th, 1918, in regard to Russia's national debts.”

He asked what the declaration was to which this referred.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE, who had sent for the document containing the declaration, read the following:

[Here follows telegram from Mr. Klyuchnikov to the Ambassador in Paris, dated November 27, 1918, quoted *ante*, p. 356.]

(Sir Maurice Hankey undertook to send a copy to Viscount Chinda.)

VISCOUNT CHINDA supposed that the responsibility for sending supplies to Russia would be divided between the various Governments according to their respective capacity.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that up to now Great Britain had supplied the great bulk of the war material. He would be very glad to adopt Viscount Chinda's proposal, as then the United States of America would have to supply the greater part.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he had only mentioned it because of the limited resources of Japan for such supplies.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was a matter for Congress. He hoped, however, he might induce Congress to take a share when the whole matter was explained to them.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that substantially the conditions in this dispatch had been read to the British Trades Unionists, who had been satisfied on the whole.

VISCOUNT CHINDA then drew attention to the following passage in the despatch:

"They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies, food, and the help of such as may volunteer for their service, to establish themselves as the Government of All Russia," etc.

He thought that Japan, having a standing army, might find it difficult strictly to conform to the letter of this proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not understand this phrase to mean Government help. It had not been in contemplation to send formed troops. His interpretation of the words was that it meant such individuals as might volunteer.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said the phrase had been inserted to meet the case of Great Britain. There was a very strong feeling against sending forces to Russia, and it was necessary to give guarantees to the soldiers that they would not be sent. Nevertheless, a good many men in the British Army had volunteered to go to Russia to take part in the operations; indeed, sufficient numbers had volunteered to supply the Archangel force. That was the reason for this provision.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said it would be very difficult for the Japanese Government to undertake their help in that sense. There were technical difficulties in the way of employing Japanese forces as volunteers. They could only send regular troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON said Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation showed that he had not read it aright. He understood it had been agreed that the Allied and Associated forces should be withdrawn from Archangel.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the difficulty in withdrawing the men who had volunteered from England was that they were mostly men in technical services, such as artillery and aircraft, who could not well be spared. If they were withdrawn, it would place both the Archangel forces and Denekin in great difficulties.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the Japanese forces in Siberia were regulars, and they could not be converted into volunteers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the answer was that the United States and Japanese troops who were in the rearward services were not affected. This phrase only concerned the troops taking part in regular operations. The United States and Japanese forces were on the lines of communication. He suggested that the difficulty should be met by the substitution of some such words as the following:

"Such other help as may prove feasible."

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought the phrase had better be left out rather than amended.

(It was agreed that the words: "and the help of such as may volunteer for their service", should be omitted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he learnt that the Japanese had furnished a considerable amount of munitions to Admiral Koltchak, but he could not specify the exact amount.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the whole he thought it would be better to omit the following words from the second paragraph of the letter:

"The total cost of which exceeds £100,000,000."

(It was agreed to omit the above words, and to substitute the following:

"at a very considerable cost".)

*Conclusion:* (It was agreed that the draft despatch should be provisionally approved, subject to the above corrections, but that no action should be taken until it had received the formal approval of the Japanese Delegation.)

Viscount Chinda undertook to notify Sir Maurice Hankey if the despatch was approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed in that event to submit a copy for signature by the representatives of the Five Powers, after which it would be dispatched in their name to Admiral Koltchak by M. Clemenceau.)

## The Military Situation in Siberia

2. (Colonel Kisch was introduced.)

COLONEL KISCH gave a description with a map of the military situation in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Koltchak's main operations were on his northern wing with the immediate object of effecting a junction at Kotlas with the forces based on Archangel. His subsequent objective would be Viatka. The Bolsheviks had been forced back in this district, and, in order to meet the menace, had withdrawn 20,000 men from opposite the forces at Archangel. With these reinforcements they would be able to oppose Koltchak's 36,000 men on his northern wing with about double strength, though the morale of the Bolshevik troops, who had been severely handled, was low. The Bolsheviks had countered this attack by Admiral Koltchak by a counter-attack against his southern wing, where they had made a total advance in the region of Samara, which had been threatened by Koltchak, of some 60 miles. Denekin was creating a diversion to check this counter-attack by an advance towards Tzaritzin, and Admiral Koltchak was putting in his last reserves to check this Bolshevik advance, and meanwhile was pressing on in the north. On the west the Esthonians had made a considerable advance, and, if aided by a rising in Petrograd, might even hope to capture that city. The inhabitants in the districts recently overrun by Admiral Koltchak had received him favourably. In the northern part of Russia there was close affinity between the population west of the Urals and the Siberian population, but before long Koltchak, if he continued his successes, would be entering the really Bolshevik regions of Russia.

(Colonel Kisch then withdrew.)

## The next stage in Russian Policy

3. Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that if a satisfactory answer was received from Koltchak, the following decisions would have to be taken:

- (1) Whether the Allied and Associated Powers should confine themselves to rendering him assistance.
- (2) Whether they should recognise the Omsk Government as the Government for the area occupied by Koltchak's troops.
- (3) Whether the Omsk Government should be recognised as representing the whole of Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he hoped, before Koltchak's reply was received, to have Mr. Morris's report.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that someone ought to be sent to see Denekin.

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/32

C. F. 32

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 26th, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	} <i>Secretaries.</i>
Count Aldrovandi.	
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.	<i>Interpreter.</i>

#### Russia: Policy of Allied & Associated Powers

3. With reference to C. F. 31, Minute 1, SIR MAURICE HANKEY stated that the Japanese Delegation had agreed to the draft despatch to Admiral Koltchak (Appendix III),<sup>89</sup> subject to two very small amendments, namely, in paragraph 2 instead of the words "they are now being pressed to withdraw etc.," was substituted the following: "some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw etc.," and paragraph 4 instead of the words "the last year" was substituted "the last 12 months."

(These alterations were approved and the letter was signed by the Four Heads of States. The letter was then taken by Mr. Philip Kerr to the Japanese Embassy, where it was signed by the Marquis Saionji. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate the letter to the Secretary-General with instructions to despatch it, in the name of the Conference to Admiral Koltchak.)

NOTE. The Marquis Saionji, when appending his signature, particularly asked that the letter should not be published until a reply was received. Sir Maurice Hankey made a communication in this sense to the Secretary-General.)

<sup>89</sup> Not printed. For final draft, see p. 367.

861.00/4573 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received May 26, 1919, 6:23 p.m.]

Following repeated from [Harris at] Omsk.

"232. May 21st, 1 p.m. Had conference with Kolchak to-day. He laid stress upon the great necessity for economic aid and thought America was in best position to render same. Financial aid was also pressing. He stated that of all the Allies England had thus far done the most, but he hoped America would soon give more assistance. He expressed best sentiments of good will towards America and stated that the anti-American propoganda was not shared by him or his colleagues in the Government, and that same was now practically over.

As concerns the friction in Far East he stated that he had recalled Ivanoff-Rinoff in order to clear situation and [latter] had been succeeded by Horvath. Also stated that Horvath had announced the submission of Semenoff, but he did not believe Semenoff would cease. On the question of recognition Kolchak said that he was not asking such a step on the part of Russian Governments but was leaving this important matter entirely to their best judgment uninfluenced by any statement from him. Harris."

REINSCH

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/37

M. 190 (Final Revise)

*Appendix I to C. F. 37—Despatch to Admiral Kolchak*<sup>90</sup>

PARIS, *26th May, 1919.*

The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russia.

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces. Since the signa-

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<sup>90</sup>The minutes of the meeting of the Council of Four (C. F. 37) of May 27, 1919, 4 p.m., are not printed.



ture of the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, they have kept forces in various parts of Russia. Munitions and supplies have been sent to assist those associated with them at a very considerable cost. No sooner, however, did the Peace Conference assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all the warring Governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent solution of Russian problems. This proposal and a later offer to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while negotiations or the work of relief was proceeding. Some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and peace.

The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected Constituent Assembly and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian state and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.

They are convinced by their experiences of the last twelve months that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealings with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same objects in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers. With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his Associates whether they will agree to the following as the conditions upon which they accept continued assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the first place, that, as soon as they reach Moscow they will summon a Constituent Assembly elected by a free, secret and democratic franchise as the Supreme Legislature for Russia to which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or if at that time order is not sufficiently restored they will summon the Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time as new elections are possible.

Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course for all local and legally constituted assemblies such as municipalities, Zemstvos, etc.

Thirdly, that they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privileges of any class or order in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declaration made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to the free decision of the Russian Constituent Assembly; but they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to reintroduce the régime which the revolution has destroyed.

Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognised, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.

Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *defacto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.

Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia, be recognised.<sup>91</sup>

Seventhly, that as soon as a Government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League of Nations and co-operate with the other members in the limitation of armaments and of military organisation throughout the world.

Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27th, 1918, in regard to Russia's national debts.<sup>92</sup>

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single

<sup>91</sup> The insertion of the foregoing clause was approved at the meeting of May 27, 4 p.m.

<sup>92</sup> *Ante*, p. 356; cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 447.

government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

G. CLEMENCEAU  
D. LLOYD GEORGE  
V. E. ORLANDO  
WOODROW WILSON  
SAIONJI

361.01/53 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, May 29, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received May 30, 4:22 a.m.]

1235. 126 to Paris. Pursuant to instructions of his Government, received today the French Chargé d'Affaires has communicated to General Miller<sup>94</sup> the message which has been addressed by Clemenceau to Kolchak in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers. He brought to me Miller's comments which, made without consultation with his colleagues or even reflection on his own part, are interesting nevertheless as the first impressions of an intelligent and able Russian who was considered Liberal under the old regime and is now representative of the Right, being almost certainly Monarchist in his personal views. Miller expressed ready acceptance of the conditions stipulated except those relating to the dependent nationalities. He said that neither Kolchak nor any other can be recognized as competent at this time to alienate the patrimony of Russia in the way required by points 5 and 6. There is no question about Poland. Its independence exists legally and in fact; that of Finland in fact only. In giving legal recognition to the latter, Russia will have to obtain assurances for the military security of Petrograd. The permanent and complete separation from Russia of small units such as Esthonia is economically impossible and the conditions imposed need not therefore give Russians inquietude, but the provision respecting Lithuania seems quite impossible. Lithuanian claims to national individuality are most attenuated. Its separation would cut vitally into the very body of Russia. Combined with the other provisional alienations, it would reduce Russia to the territorial inadequacy in which Peter the Great found her. If Kolchak should have the foolish temerity to attempt to give up in this way Russia's gains of the past 200 years, the protest of Russian public opinion would sweep him out of power.

With regard to point 1, Miller drew attention to a practical difficulty in the way of the 1917 Constitutional Assembly functioning

<sup>94</sup> Gen. Eugen Ludvig Karlovich Miller, Military Governor of Archangel.

under the circumstances indicated as provisional mandatory of the people. Two-fifths of its members are Bolsheviki and would no doubt embark at once upon the same obstreperous filibustering which broke up the Assembly at its first meeting. He also referred to the subsequent record of its president, Chernoff.

POOLE

861.00/4616 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received June 3, 1919, 2:45 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"244. May 31, 10 a.m. Military situation on Perm and Ufa front quiet and stationary. A quarrel has broken out between Gaida and Lebedev, chief of staff, and Kolchak left suddenly last night for Perm front in order to settle this quarrel.

The question of recognition is keeping spirit of people here in high state of expectancy. If recognition should not be forthcoming I trust America will not get the blame. Opinion concerning us is now changing and a set-back would be fatal.

Kolchak intends issuing following proclamation very soon :

Citizens of Russia! Our army, which I lead, continuing its struggle for the freedom of Russia, each day draws nearer to the desired end.

At this fateful hour I solemnly decree ceaseless war, not with the Russian people, but only with the criminal and lawless organizations of the Bolsheviks. And my object is neither persecution nor vengeance; those who have perpetrated no atrocity and have committed no crime have nothing to fear from me; and all who, against their will, have been forced to take part in the struggle on the side of the Bolsheviki, will receive a full pardon and amnesty from the Government.

I accepted office only in order to establish order, liberty, and justice, and to give food and personal safety to the harassed and starving people of Russia. As our victorious armies advance I direct that courts of justice shall be opened, that the law shall be enforced, and that local administration shall begin to function. I stand for the protection of the law-abiding and the punishment of the law-breaker with equal justice for all.

The office which I hold is a heavy burden and I have no intention of retaining office for a single day longer than the interests of the country absolutely demand. After crushing Bolshevism my first call will be to call a general election of the whole people for a Constituent Assembly. A commission is at this moment engaged in the preliminary work of outlining a law under which this election shall be held. This election shall be a general election and shall be conducted on the basis of universal suffrage.

To the Constituent Assembly which will result from this election, I shall hand over all of my power in order that it may decide fully and freely, without outside interference, the future form of government of the Russian state.

For the current year I have already signed a law which guarantees to the workers and tillers of the soil the produce of the fields which they sow and cultivate.

Further I desire to assist the small peasant land holders by transferring to them the lands of the large land owners, who in their turn, will receive a just compensation. I am absolutely convinced Russia will be united, prosperous, and strong, only when the many millions of her peasantry have a proper share in the ownership of the land.

I am equally convinced that the law must provide protection and assistance for the workmen in order to organize themselves on lines similar to those adopted in the democracies of the west. A special labor department of my government is preparing data for future legislation on this subject.

The people of Russia are reminded that the day of our victory is approaching, and with it, the final expulsion of the Bolsheviki and the end of internal strife, when the free citizens of Russia may resume their peaceful occupation.

Harris ["]  
REINSCH

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861.01/55 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, June 3, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 11 p.m.]

1247. 128 to Paris. Continuing 1235, May 29, 11 p.m. The French Chargé d'Affaires telegraphed yesterday the substance of a note of the Provisional Government on the Kolchak proposal.<sup>95</sup> I presume you will receive this.

I have just talked with General Miller<sup>96</sup> on the subject. He is, of course, profoundly gratified at the turn events have taken. He understands better now the spirit of the conditions respecting the dependent nationalities. He seems to feel that the provisional arrangements suggested are acceptable on the understanding that final adjustment on the Russian side remains exclusively within the competence of the constituent assembly or its mandatory. He spoke again of the practical and moral difficulties in the way of re-convoing the 1917 Constituent Assembly.

POOLE

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<sup>95</sup> Not found in the Department files.

<sup>96</sup> Military Governor of Archangel.

123 M 832/26 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 4, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received June 5, 3:32 a.m.]

2413. For Polk.

Your 2139, May 29, 4 p.m.<sup>97</sup> The President states that since it does not appear that Mr. Morris has even started for Omsk, no advantage can be derived from his going at all and accordingly the original instructions to proceed to Omsk should be cancelled.

LANSING AMERICAN MISSION

861.01/63 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

2269. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Referring to your 2471, June 8, 7 p.m.<sup>98</sup> Consul General Harris reports the Omsk Government disagrees on only one point namely, question of convening the old Constituent Assembly, because it is not willing that the majority of the members of that Assembly, who are now in the ranks of the Bolsheviki and who do not fully represent the Russian people, should be able to seize upon and resume control of Russia. Harris comments further as follows:

“My personal opinion is that one might as well keep Lenine and Trotsky in power as to turn the one [*sic*] over to the Left Wing of Social Revolutionary Party. Chernoff and his associates would have undoubtedly delivered Siberia to the Bolsheviki if the Ufa Directorate had been permitted to remain in power at Omsk, and I fully believe such would have been the trend of affairs if the issue had not been forced last November and Kolchak invited to assume charge of affairs. In this matter I fully agree with the attitude of the Omsk Government that an entirely new Constituent Assembly should be convened and the one which elected Chernoff President in 1917 completely ignored.”

My recollection is that of the 800 members elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1917 only 200 were Bolsheviks, in spite of the perfectly open measures taken by the Bolsheviki to influence voting, especially with all polls open to returning soldiers, many of whom voted several times. When the Assembly actually convened at Petrograd Ambassador Francis telegraphed as follows:<sup>99</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

<sup>98</sup> Not printed; it transmitted text of reply from Admiral Kolchak, printed p. 375.

<sup>99</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 351.

“Members attending something over four hundred, of which two-thirds Social Revolutionary, one-third Bolsheviks and extreme left of Social Revolutionary.”

Chernoff, Social Revolutionary, was elected President of Assembly. The career of Chernoff has been one of constant opportunism. When the Root Mission was in Russia, members of the Cabinet of the Provisional Government were perfectly frank in conversation regarding Chernoff's suspected relations with Germany. I can readily see that grave embarrassments and complications might result from reviving the first Constituent Assembly. Elections to it were held under the Bolshevik régime. The Assembly itself never met as a whole. The subsequent career of its Chairman and of many of the members has been such as to have become the subject of bitter controversy. Moreover, since the elections of 1917 the situation in Russia has changed radically and completely in all parts of the enormous territory of that country.

POLK

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/60

C. F. 60

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, June 11th, 1919, at 5.45 p.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	}	<i>Secretaries</i>
Count Aldrovandi		
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.		

. . . . .

Russia: The Reply from Admiral Koltchak

10. PRESIDENT WILSON read the reply from Admiral Koltchak which had been repeated and was now practically complete. (Appendix II.)<sup>1</sup>

It was particularly noted that Admiral Koltchak had given satisfactory assurances that there would be no return to the regime which existed in February, 1917.

(It was agreed that, subject to the consent of the Japanese Delegation, the telegram to Admiral Koltchak and the reply should be published. Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to communicate a copy to the Japanese Delegation.

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

NOTE.—Sir Maurice Hankey handed a copy to M. Saburi, the Secretary of the Japanese Delegation, at the Villa Majestic immediately after the meeting.)

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/61

C. F. 61

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, June 12th, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.— *United States of America.* President Wilson.—*British Empire.* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France.* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy.* H. E. M. Orlando.—*Japan.* H. E. Baron Makino.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	}	<i>Secretaries.</i>
Count Aldrovandi.		
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.		<i>Interpreter.</i>

#### Russia: Admiral Koltchak's Reply

4. BARON MAKINO said he was willing to have the despatch of the Allied and Associated Powers published, together with Admiral Koltchak's reply. He suggested, however, that some indication should be given to the press that Admiral Koltchak's reply was considered satisfactory.

M. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a reply in this sense should be sent to Admiral Koltchak, which could be published.

(Mr. Phillip Kerr was instructed to draft a reply, but no final decision was taken as to publication.)

[Enclosure—Translation \*]

Appendix II to C. F. 60.

*The French Chargé at Omsk (De Martel) to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

OMSK, June 4, 1919.

[Received at Paris June 5.]

Admiral Koltchak, to whom I handed at the station of Tiumen the telegram of Mr. Clemenceau requests me to communicate the following reply to Mr. Clemenceau:

“The Government over which I preside has been happy to learn that the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to

\* Noted on Ms.: Translation from French (as finally amended in the light of a repetition of the telegram).



Russia is in perfect accord with the task which the Russian Government itself has undertaken, that Government being anxious above all things to re-establish peace in the country and to assure to the Russian people the right to decide their own destiny in freedom by means of a Constituent Assembly. I appreciate highly the interest shown by the Powers as regards the national movement and consider their wish to make certain of the political convictions with which we are inspired as legitimate; I am therefore ready to confirm once more my previous declarations which I have always regarded as irrevocable.

1. On November 18, 1918, I assumed power and I shall not retain that power one day longer than is required by the interest of the country; my first thought at the moment when the Bolsheviki are definitely crushed will be to fix the date for the elections of the Constituent Assembly. A Commission is now at work on direct preparation for them on the basis of universal suffrage. Considering myself as responsible before that Constituent Assembly I shall hand over to it all my powers in order that it may freely determine the system of Government; I have, moreover, taken the oath to do this before the Supreme Russian Tribunal, the guardian of legality. All my efforts are aimed at concluding the civil war as soon as possible by crushing Bolshevism in order to put the Russian people effectively in a position to express its free will. Any prolongation of this struggle would only postpone that moment: the Government, however, does not consider itself authorised to substitute for the inalienable right of free and legal elections the mere re-establishment of the Assembly of 1917, which was elected under a régime of Bolshevik violence and the majority of whose members are now in the Sovietist ranks. It is to the legally elected Constituent Assembly alone, which my Government will do its utmost to convoke promptly, that there will belong the sovereign rights of deciding the problems of the Russian State both in the internal and external affairs of the country.

2. We gladly consent to discuss at once with the Powers all international questions, and in doing so shall aim at the free and peaceful development of peoples, the limitation of armaments, and the measures calculated to prevent new wars, of which the League of Nations is the highest expression.

The Russian Government thinks, however, that it should recall the fact that the final sanction of the decisions which may be taken in the name of Russia, will belong to the Constituent Assembly. Russia cannot now and cannot in future ever be anything but a democratic State where all questions involving modifications of the territorial frontiers and of external relations must be ratified by a representative body which is the natural expression of the people's sovereignty.

3. Considering the creation of a unified Polish State to be one of the chief of the normal and just consequences of the world war, the Government thinks itself justified in confirming the independence of Poland, proclaimed by the Provisional Russian Government of 1917, all the pledges and decrees of which we have accepted. The final solution of the question of delimiting the frontiers between Russia and Poland must, however, in conformity with the principles set forth above, be postponed till the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. We are disposed at once to recognise the *de facto* Government of Finland, but the final solution of the Finnish Question must belong to the Constituent Assembly.

4. We are fully disposed at once to prepare for the solution of the questions concerning the fate of the national groups in Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and of the Caucasian and Transcaspian countries, and we have every reason to believe that a prompt settlement will be made, seeing that the Government is assuring as from the present time, the autonomy of the various nationalities. It goes without saying that the limits and conditions of these autonomous institutions will be settled separately as regards each of the nationalities concerned.

And even in case difficulties should arise in regard to the solution of these various questions, the Government is ready to have recourse to the collaboration and good offices of the League of Nations with a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement.

5. The above principle, implying the ratification of the agreements by the Constituent Assembly should obviously be applied to the question of Bessarabia.

6. The Russian Government once more repeats its declaration of the 27th November, 1918, by which it accepted the burden of the national debt of Russia.

7. As regards the question of internal politics which can only interest the Powers in so far as they reflect the political tendencies of the Russian Government, I make a point of repeating that there cannot be a return to the régime which existed in Russia before February 1917. The provisional solution which my Government has adopted in regard to the agrarian question aims at satisfying the interests of the great mass of the population and is inspired by the conviction that Russia can only be flourishing and strong when the millions of Russian peasants receive all guarantees for the possession of the land. Similarly as regards the régime to be applied to the liberated territories, the Government, far from placing obstacles in the way of the free election of local assemblies, municipalities and zemstvos, regards the activities of these bodies and also the development of the principle of self-government as the necessary conditions

for the reconstruction of the country, and is (already) actually giving them its support and help by all the means (at its) disposal.

8. Having set ourselves the task of re-establishing order and justice and of ensuring individual security to the persecuted population, which is tired of trials and exactions, the Government affirms the equality before the law of all classes and all citizens without any special privilege; all shall receive, without distinction of origin or of religion, the protection of the State and of the Law.

The Government whose Head I am is concentrating all the forces and all the resources at its disposal in order to accomplish the task which it has set itself; at this decisive hour I speak in the name of all National Russia. I am confident that, Bolshevism once crushed, satisfactory solutions will be found for all questions which equally concern all those populations whose existence is bound up with that of Russia. Koltchak.[”]

Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/62

C. F. 62

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's house in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, June 12th [, 1919,] at 4 p.m.*

[Extract]

PRESENT:—*United States of America*: President Wilson.—*British Empire*: The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France*: M. Clemenceau.—*Italy*: M. Orlando.—*Japan*: Baron Makino.

Lt. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	} Secretaries.
Count Aldrovandi	
Professor P. J. Mantoux— <i>Interpreter</i> .	

Russia. Further telegram to Admiral Koltchak

1. With reference to C. F. 61, Minute 4, the attached telegram prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr to Admiral Koltchak was approved and signed.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it immediately to the Secretary-General to be telegraphed, on behalf of the Conference, to Admiral Koltchak (Appendix I).

It was further agreed:

That the whole of the telegrams interchanged between the Allied and Associated Powers and Admiral Koltchak should be published in the newspapers the following day.

BARON MAKINO while assenting with his Colleagues to the above telegram said he would like to have gone further and to have recognised Admiral Koltchak. Nevertheless it was a step in the right direction.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Allied and Associated Governments could not yet recognise Admiral Koltchak for the whole of Russia.

[Enclosure]

Appendix I to C. F. 62.

*Reply to Admiral Kolchak*

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to acknowledge receipt of Admiral Koltchak's reply to their note of May 26th. They welcome the tone of that reply, which seems to them to be in substantial agreement with the propositions which they had made, and to contain satisfactory assurances for the freedom, self-government, and peace of the Russian people and their neighbours. They are therefore willing to extend to Admiral Koltchak and his associates the support set forth in their original letter.

D. LLOYD GEORGE  
WOODROW WILSON  
G. CLEMENCEAU  
V. E. ORLANDO  
N. MAKINO

*June 12th 1919.*

861.00/4694 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1919, 4 p.m.

2315. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Have suggested to Russian Chargé d'Affaires that he ascertain from Kolchak just what supplies and support are needed and what can best be furnished by each of the Powers who have undertaken to support him. The telegram sent you today from Mr. J. F. Stevens<sup>3</sup> discloses a very serious situation regarding the Czech army. Cannot some measures be formulated, with the assistance of the Russian Conference at Paris or through the representatives of the Allies at Omsk, for the early repatriation of the Czechs? Whatever is done it seems to us vital that the support which is to be given to Kolchak should be formulated now and given promptly.

One of the difficulties in Siberia seems to be that of morale among the Czech and Russian troops. Some kind of tangible statement of the exact support to be given and the amount of it, financial, military and economic, followed by prompt and direct action, would be very helpful. There is great difficulty in formulating any such concrete proposition in correspondence from here. As the heads

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Department's telegram no. 2314 of June 16, p. 281.

of Governments concerned are now in Paris it occurs to me they may be already taking steps in Paris in the directions I have indicated. The situation is so important that I would very much appreciate if you would let me know just what is being done to meet it.

PHILLIPS

Paris Peace Conference 861.00/763

*The President of the Lettish Delegation at Paris (Meierovics) to President Wilson*

[Translation]

PARIS, June 18, 1919.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed by the Delegations of the Republics of Azerbaidjan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasus, White Russia, and the Ukraine to present to your Excellency the appended Declaration.

Accept [etc.]

Z. A. MEIEROVICS

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Declaration by the Delegations at Paris of the Republics of Azerbaidjan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasus, White Russia, and the Ukraine*

The undersigned plenipotentiary delegates of the states created within the limits of the former Russian Empire, that is:

The Republic of Azerbaidjan,  
 The Republic of Esthonia,  
 The Republic of Georgia,  
 The Republic of Latvia,  
 The Republic of North Caucasus,  
 The Republic of White Russia,  
 The Republic of the Ukraine,

having noted the contents of the correspondence between the Council of the Great Allied and Associated Powers and Admiral Koltchak, concerning the conditions for the assistance to be given by the said powers to the Omsk Government, have the honor to declare, in the name of their respective governments, the following:

1. The Republics: [of] Azerbaidjan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasia, White Russia and Ukraine were created and exist by the free will of the populations of these states. The Constitutions of these Republics are being elaborated and their reciprocal relations with the neighboring states are being fixed and will be determined by their respective constituent assemblies, which have already been elected or will be elected on the basis of universal suffrage. The decisions of the organs of the Governmental Power of Russia, what-

ever they may be, can, therefore, in no way concern the sovereign states of: Azerbaidjan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasia, White Russia and Ukraine, and the reciprocal relations between these states and Russia can only be regulated as between states, equal in all their rights, independent and sovereign, whereas the above mentioned correspondence can be interpreted as the negation of such a right.

2. The Republics mentioned in the preamble, reiterate, before the Peace Conference and the Great Powers, their request to have their political independence recognized without delay.

PARIS, June 17, 1919.

A. M. TOPTCHIBACHEFF

*President of the Delegation of the Republic  
of Azerbaidjan*

J. POSKA

*President of the Esthonian Delegation*

N. TCHEIDZE

*President of the Delegation of the Georgian  
Republic*

Z. A. MEIEROVICS

*President of the Delegation of Latvia*

A. M. TCHERMoeff

*President of the Delegation of the North  
Caucasian Republic*

ANTOINE DE LOUTCHEVITCH

*President of the Delegation of the Democratic  
White Ruthenian Republic*

G. SYDORENKO

*President of the Delegation of the Ukrainian  
Republic*

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**Efforts by the United States to Carry out the Decision to Support Kolchak**

861.01/69a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1919, 5 p.m.

2343. For the Secretary of State.

Is Department to understand that acceptance of Kolchak's reply<sup>6</sup> merely means continuation of present relations with Kolchak Government or does it convey *de facto* recognition and further and open extension of support along all lines available?

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<sup>6</sup> Appendix I to C. F. 62, enclosure to Notes of Meeting on June 12, 4 p.m., p. 379.

Press reports from Paris leave public in doubt on this question. Secretary of War anxious to know whether he should change instructions to General Graves.<sup>7</sup>

POLK

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861.24/138 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1919, 6 p.m.

2346. For the Secretary of State.

Referring to Department's 2315, June 16, 4 p.m.<sup>8</sup> Mr. Znamensky, who states he is Assistant Minister of Food and Supplies for the Russian Government at Omsk, desires to purchase uniforms and overcoats or cloth for manufacture thereof; underwear, stockings, shoes, caps, et cetera; machinery, tools, rations, motor vehicles and other supplies, excepting munitions of war.

Russian Embassy here inform me his credentials authentic. He proposes payment upon credit basis or by a loan or such other method of payment and security as may prove acceptable.

What attitude is Department to assume? . . .

POLK

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861.00/4722 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1919, 4 p.m.

2355. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:<sup>9</sup>

Referring my 2343 and 2346 yesterday's date, Consul General Harris reports Omsk Government is very anxious to learn what the nature of Allied assistance is to be and, in view of another possible winter campaign against Bolsheviki, if such help may be expected soon. In this connection he reports June 18 officially announced Ufa abandoned and now occupied by Bolsheviki. Fighting still in progress around city. I shall be relieved to know measures are under way for prompt and tangible support.

POLK

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<sup>7</sup> For reply see telegram from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 2794, June 25, 12 p.m., p. 386.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 379.

<sup>9</sup> Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board and technical adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

861.51/638 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1919, 8 p.m.

2363. For the Secretary of State:

An Act to amend the Liberty Bond Acts and the War Finance Corporation Act and for other purposes, approved March 3, 1919 provides, as you are aware, in section 7, that until the expiration of eighteen months after the termination of the war between the United States and Germany, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to establish credits with the United States for foreign governments engaged in war with the enemies of the United States, to purchase available property, owned directly or indirectly by the United States.

Does this offer any prospect of extending credit to Kolchak Government which repudiated treaty of Brest-Litovsk and now holds German and Austrian soldiers as prisoners of war? I understand the Omsk Government hopes to purchase in the United States materials, other than munitions, amounting to \$164,000,000. I also have a proposal from Mr. Vauclain<sup>10</sup> to devise means to turn over to Russia 200 locomotives taken over by the War Department, which can now be returned and easily changed to Russian gauge, provided means of payment or credit be devised.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has also a cablegram from Omsk urging him to emphasize the extreme necessity of providing the Inter-Allied Committee at Vladivostok with funds adequate to purchase railway material which is so urgently needed.

I hope you can let me have an early reply to this telegram and also to telegrams 2343, June 19, 5 p.m., and 2346, June 19, 6 p.m.

POLK

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*Executive Order No. 3099-A, June 24, 1919, providing funds for the relief of the civilian population of Russia and Siberia, including the restoration of railway traffic in Siberia*

WHEREAS, on September 19, 1918, the President allotted to the Department of State from the appropriation "For the National Security and Defense," provided for in the Sundry Civil Act approved July 1, 1918, the sum of five million (\$5,000,000) dollars for the purpose of providing winter supplies for the civilian population of the Archangel district of Russia; and

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<sup>10</sup> Samuel M. Vauclain, president of the Baldwin Locomotive Works.



WHEREAS, on November 27, 1918, the President transferred the allotment aforesaid to the War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau, Incorporated, as a special fund with directions that said corporation should take charge of purchases under said allotment, and of the sale or other distribution of the supplies acquired by its use; and

WHEREAS, it has become expedient to dissolve and to liquidate the affairs of the War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau, Incorporated,

*I hereby order and direct* that any portion of the above mentioned allotment which has not been expended shall be forthwith transferred to the Secretary of State to be by him used for purposes of providing relief to the civilian population of Russia and Siberia in such manner as he may see fit.

*I hereby order and direct* that any and all moneys, credits, or other assets which have accrued or shall accrue to the War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau, Incorporated, on account of the sale or other disposition of any commodities purchased or acquired by the use of the allotments aforesaid, shall likewise be transferred to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State shall set aside as a special fund all such moneys, credits, or the like assets, and shall use the same to provide relief to the civilian population of Russia or Siberia so long as he may deem advisable and in such manner as he may see fit including the necessary restoration of the railway traffic in Siberia.

WOODROW WILSON

861.01/78

*The Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)  
to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 25, 1919.

[Received July 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Bakmatieff requested Mr. McCormick to obtain for him answers to the following questions:

1. Does the condition, which has resulted from the exchange of cables between the Big Five and Admiral Koltchak, amount to a *de facto* recognition of a Russian Government with which the U. S. Government will enter into regular relations?

2. Will the U. S. Government accredit agents at Omsk? If so of what character and in what capacities?

3. Will the U. S. Government be prepared to accept the signature of the representatives of the Russian Government on obligations of financial character?

4. Will the U. S. Government be prepared to permit the disposal of credits, opened in time to the Russian Government, but closed after the fall of the Government in November 1917?

5. Will the American troops in Siberia cooperate with the Russian authorities in their purpose of restoring law and orderly conditions of life? Will instructions be given to the American command to this effect?

6. The Powers having expressed their decision to render assistance to the Government of Koltchak and his associates so that it may establish itself as the Government of all Russia, by what means and through which instrumentalities will this purpose be achieved?

Mr. Bakmatieff [*McCormick?*] took the matter up with the President, who replied as follows:

No. 1. No.

No. 2. Not at present.

No. 3. No.

No. 4. No.

No. 5. Probably.

No. 6. No decision having been arrived at no answer was given.

Mr. McCormick did not inform Mr. Bakmatieff of the specific answers to these questions but merely gave him a general reply as to the American interpretation of the telegrams to Koltchak.

I have [etc.]

J. C. GREW

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861.00/4849

*The Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)  
to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 25, 1919.

[Received July 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Bakmetieff came to see Mr. McCormick to inquire as to the interpretation of certain clauses of the Associated Governments' telegram of May 27th [26th] to Admiral Koltchak, specifically in regard to the question of nationalities. Mr. Bakmetieff said that his interpretation of these clauses was the following and desired to know if the American Government interpreted them in the same manner.

"Point 4 of these clauses treats of the independence of Poland and Finland.

"Point 5 covers the general question of other nationalities on the territory of the former Russian Empire. In full concurrence with the views of the Russian Government, the Powers are contemplating the future of these nationalities established on just and firm foundations of autonomous development. At the same time the

wording of the document appears to confirm the principle of Russian unity as a whole. Autonomous development is to be assured within the boundaries of the reconstituted Russian State with proper arrangements guaranteeing the rights of the nationalities but without prejudice to the sovereignty and unity of Russia."

Mr. McCormick consulted the President, who replied that such was his interpretation of the clauses in question.

I have [etc.]

J. C. GREW

861.01/71 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 25, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received June 26, 4:32 a.m.]

2794. For Polk from Lansing and McCormick.

Your 2343, June 19, 5 p.m. McCormick has spoken to the President regarding Russian situation. He stated that the telegram to Kolchak does not imply political recognition at the present time by any of the Associated Governments but merely offers of assistance in so far as each government's policy and legislation may permit. The absence of formal recognition will in our case prevent [us from] extending credit as suggested in your 2363, June 20, 8 p.m. but anything for which they can devise means of payment may now be furnished the Kolchak forces. On his return the President intends to take up with Congress the entire question of economic support for Russia and particularly that pertaining to the Siberian railroad. He expects to send further military instructions to General Graves.

The President expressed his regret at the interpretation given by the press to the telegram sent by the Associated Governments to Admiral Kolchak as he feared that such interpretation might give rise to false hopes.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.01/71 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1919, 3 p.m.

2441. For the Secretary of State and McCormick: I understand your 2794, June 25, 6 [12] P.M. to mean that we can deal openly with representatives of Kolchak who are now here and desire to purchase supplies. However, I fear that even this will lead nowhere unless we can work on credit basis with 10 percent initial cash payment. Can I assure Secretary of War and any others concerned that this is what the Mission understands to be the President's purpose. Please let me know as soon as you possibly can do so.

POLK

811.24/406a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1919, 4 p.m.

For Heid: <sup>12</sup> The Secretary of War has now signed three contracts with Russian Cooperatives for purchase on credit basis of surplus material in hands of War Department, shoes, clothing, etc., namely Siberian Creameries, Union of Siberian Cooperative Unions and All-Russian Central Union of Consumers. He is willing to sign additional contracts with other societies. Contracts all identical and provide that disposal and delivery of materials in Siberia shall be supervised by a representative of the Secretary of War appointed by him for that purpose, expenses to be borne by contractors not to exceed \$25,000 on each contract. The Secretary of War at suggestion of this Department desires to know if you will accept position as his representative and if so what assistance you will require.

For your information, Secretary of War has announced willingness to sell to cooperatives on credit basis \$25,000,000 worth of materials. Three contracts thus far signed are each for \$5,000,000. Action of the Secretary of War is prompted not by business considerations but on desire to carry out this Government's purpose to assist Russian people. In each case, contracts provide that shipments shall go forward only to those parts of European Russia and Siberia which this Government shall approve.

POLK

861.51/021 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received June 28, 1919, 2:15 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"288. June 27, 4 p.m. Referring to Department's June 23, 2 p.m.<sup>13</sup> For financial and political reasons Omsk Government desires American Government loan: \$325,000,000 desired, \$125,000,000 to cancel earlier loans made in United States and \$200,000,000 for establishing credit wherewith to facilitate purchase of commercial commodities in the United States. Harris."<sup>14</sup>

REINSCH

<sup>13</sup> August Heid, representative at Vladivostok of the War Trade Board.<sup>14</sup> Not printed.<sup>14</sup> Notation on telegram: "Conferred with Ughet and explained no loans to unrecognized government. 7/14 B[reckinridge] L[ong]."

123 M 832/29a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1919, 4 p.m.

The following message has just been received from the President:

"In view of the fact that the joint action taken here by the Supreme Council with reference to Kolchak still leaves open the question of his formal [recognition?] and the extent and nature of support which should be given him, I believe it will be useful to have Ambassador Morris proceed to Omsk as had earlier been planned.<sup>16</sup> I, therefore, request that you direct him to proceed to Omsk at the earliest practicable date.

The purposes which I desire to have accomplished by his visit, and which you may communicate to him, are in the first instance to secure such first-hand information and personal impressions as will aid us in the formulation of our Siberian policy. I also feel that the personal contact of Morris at this time with Kolchak and especially with those who surround him will afford an excellent opportunity to get a first-hand impression of their spirit and purposes and to impress these persons with the policy and view point of the Administration which I am confident Morris can admirably express.

I am also desirous that Ambassador Morris should so utilize his visit to Omsk as to impress upon the Japanese Government our great interest in the Siberian situation and our intention to adopt a definite policy which will include the 'open door' to Russia free from Japanese domination.

You will please instruct Morris in his dealings with the Omsk Government to be guided by the spirit of the communication of the Supreme Council to Kolchak.<sup>17</sup> This, while not involving any present recognition of Kolchak, leaves us free to take a sympathetic interest in Kolchak's organization and activities."

I have telegraphed to Consul General Harris the general nature of your instructions and told him he will hear from you the date of your departure. The situation requires quick action. You may take with you such personnel as you deem necessary. Confidential. Would it assist you to have General Graves accompany you?

PHILLIPS

861.01/77 : Telegram

*The Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick) to the Acting Secretary of State*

U.S.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON, undated.

[Received July 2, 1919, 4:20 p.m.]

Have shown your cable<sup>18</sup> to the President. He sees no objection to his [Secretary of War] dealing openly with Kolchak representa-

<sup>16</sup> See telegrams to the Ambassador in Japan, May 15, 6 p.m., p. 349, and from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 2413, June 4, 12 p.m., p. 373.

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, p. 367.

<sup>18</sup> No. 2441, June 27, 3 p.m., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 386.

tives for the purpose of selling supplies, and no objection to proposed financial plan, provided in both cases there is no formal or diplomatic recognition of the Kolchak government in accordance with our former cable. [Navy] 2614.

McCORMICK

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861.24/155 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received July 10, 1919, 10:05 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"314, July 9, 5 p.m. Referring to Department's July 3, 5 p.m.<sup>19</sup> Concerning rifles and equipment, Omsk Government desires American Government to adopt same benevolent attitude as England and France in these matters. England has furnished 300,000 uniforms to Denekine and 200,000 uniforms to Kolchak and about 500,000,000 rounds of cartridges and 2,000 machine guns and some tanks on the understanding that same were to be paid for by future All-Russian Government. France has supplied 400 heavy guns and is sending 135 aeroplanes on same principle.

Payment for rifles might be arranged on basis of 10 per cent deposit with 40 per cent payment upon January 15, 1920, and 50 per cent upon July 15, 1920.

Omsk Government is investing \$50,000,000 loan with consortium consisting of Equitable Trust, National City Bank and Baring Brothers. Harris."

REINSCH

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123.M832/32 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *July 10, 1919, 8 p.m.*

[Received 11:50 p.m.]

I arrived Vladivostok this morning and have arranged to proceed to Omsk tomorrow, July 11. General Graves will accompany me. Until further notice please send message through Caldwell, who will be advised of my movements.

MORRIS

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<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

861.77/978 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Ambassador Morris.

“Especially with regard to the restoration of the railways, please furnish at the earliest possible date, your views as to a comprehensive plan for economic reconstruction in Siberia and ultimately for European Russia. Please elaborate plan on basis of the purpose of the United States to assist Russia as formulated so clearly by the President from time to time. The Department would like you to consult Stevens<sup>20</sup> and Smith,<sup>21</sup> having in mind also that time is an important factor. Department desires your views on the spot and in consultation with others in close touch with the situation to form a comprehensive plan to assist Russia for which it is hoped the President will ask Congress for adequate appropriation in order to translate into action the genuine desire to assist Russia, which he has expressed on the behalf of the Government of this country.

Please have in mind that plan contemplates participation on the part of the Allied Governments.”

Communicate to Smith and Stevens for their information.

POLK

861.00/4850 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 15, 1919, 11:09 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

“324, July 14, 6 p.m. General situation. Unquestionably serious at present moment and created largely by Russian psychology. The people and government have evidently misunderstood just the nature and extent of the assistance which the Allies were willing to afford. They depended too much upon this as a factor in their struggle with Bolshevism. The Russians as well as the Czechs today lament the fact that the Allies did not send 50,000 troops to their assistance when Czechs were in possession of Samara and Kazan, claiming that Bolshevism could not [*sic*] have been crushed last October. They also still criticise the Princes Island proposition as something which

<sup>20</sup> John F. Stevens, president of the Technical Board for the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian railways.

<sup>21</sup> Charles H. Smith, American representative on the Inter-Allied Committee for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian railways.

greatly encouraged the Bolsheviks and in like degree discouraged the Russians. The Omsk Government and people in general have also been hoping for recognition and as same has not been forthcoming the reaction has been depressing. There has been no enthusiasm among people for recruiting, morale of soldiers has deteriorated until they are now completely demoralized at the front. An order has been issued to retreat 500 versts from last week. This probably means sacrificing Ekaterinburg, Cheliabinsk and Tiumen, even threatening Omsk. I am satisfied if Bolsheviks march on Omsk the capital will not be evacuated but Kolchak overthrown and all Siberia will turn Bolshevik. This is the seriousness of the situation and this is real reason why Government is appealing for American and Japanese assistance to guard railway in central and western Siberia. Government has no financial resources but man power now becoming exhausted. Harris."

REINSCH

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*President Wilson to the President of the Senate (Marshall)*<sup>22</sup>

WASHINGTON, 22 July, 1919.

SIR: For the information of the Senate, and in response to the resolution adopted June 23 [27], 1919,<sup>23</sup> requesting the President to inform the Senate, if not incompatible with the public interest, of the reasons for sending United States soldiers to Siberia, the duties that are to be performed by these soldiers, how long they are to remain, and generally to advise the Senate of the policy of the United States Government in respect to Siberia and the maintenance of United States soldiers there, I have the honor to say that the decision to send American troops to Siberia was announced to the press on August 5, 1918, in a statement from the Acting Secretary of State, of which a copy is enclosed.<sup>24</sup>

This measure was taken in conjunction with Japan and in concert of purpose with the other allied powers, first of all to save the Czecho-Slovak armies, which were threatened with destruction by hostile armies apparently organized by and often largely composed of enemy prisoners of war. The second purpose in view was to steady any efforts of the Russians at self-defense, or the establishment of law and order in which they might be willing to accept assistance.

Two regiments of infantry, with auxiliary troops—about 8,000 effectives—comprising a total of approximately 10,000 men, were

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<sup>22</sup> Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, July 25, 1919, vol. 58, pt. 3, p. 3140.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, June 27, 1919, vol. 58, pt. 2, p. 1864.

<sup>24</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 328.



sent under the command of Major General William S. Graves. The troops began to arrive at Vladivostok in September, 1918. Considerably larger forces were dispatched by Japan at about the same time, and much smaller forces by others of the allied powers. The net result was the successful reunion of the separated Czecho-Slovak armies and the substantial elimination in eastern Siberia of the active efforts of enemy prisoners of war. A period of relative quiet then ensued.

In February, 1919, as a conclusion of negotiations begun early in the summer of 1918, the United States accepted a plan proposed by Japan for the supervision of the Siberian railways by an international committee, under which committee Mr. John F. Stevens would assume the operation of the Russian Railway Service Corps. In this connection it is to be recalled that Mr. John F. Stevens, in response to a request of the provisional government of Russia, went to Russia in the spring of 1917. A few months later he was made official adviser to the minister of ways of communication at Petrograd under the provisional government. At the request of the provisional government, and with the support of Mr. John F. Stevens, there was organized the so-called Russian Railway Service Corps, composed of American engineers. As originally organized, the personnel of this corps constituted 14 skeleton division units as known in this country, the idea being that these skeleton units would serve as practical advisers and assistants on 14 different sections of the Siberian Railway and assist the Russians by their knowledge of long-haul problems as known in this country, and which are the rule and not the exceptions in Siberia.

Owing to the Bolshevik uprising and the general chaotic conditions, neither Mr. Stevens nor the Russian Railway Service Corps was able to begin work in Siberia until March, 1918. They have been able to operate effectively only since the railway plan was adopted in February, 1919.

The most recent report from Mr. Stevens shows that on parts of the Chinese-Eastern and Trans-Baikal Railway he is now running six trains a day each way, while only a little while ago they were only able to run that many trains a week.

In accepting the railway plan it was provided that some protection should be given by the allied forces. Mr. Stevens stated frankly that he would not undertake the arduous task before him unless he could rely upon support from American troops in an emergency. Accordingly, as provided in the railway plan and with the approval of the interallied committee, the military commanders in Siberia have established troops where it is necessary to maintain order at

different parts of the line. The American forces under Gen. Graves are understood to be protecting parts of the line near Vladivostok, and also on the section around Verchne Udinsk. There is also understood to be a small body of American troops at Harbin. The exact location from time to time of American troops is, however, subject to change by the direction of Gen. Graves.

The instructions to Gen. Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens wherever necessary. The Siberian Railway is not only the main artery for transportation in Siberia, but is the only open access to European Russia to-day. The population of Siberia, whose resources have been almost exhausted by the long years of war and the chaotic conditions which have existed there, can be protected from a further period of chaos and anarchy only by the restoration and maintenance of traffic on the Siberian Railway.

Partisan bands under leaders having no settled connection with any organized government, and bands under leaders whose allegiance to any settled authority is apparently temporary and transitory, are constantly menacing the operation of the railway and the safety of its permanent structures.

The situation of the people of Siberia meantime is that they have no shoes or warm clothing; they are pleading for agricultural machinery and for many of the simpler articles of commerce upon which their own domestic economy depends and which are necessary to fruitful and productive industry among them. Having contributed their quota to the Russian armies which fought the Central Empires for three and one-half years, they now look to the Allies and the United States for economic assistance.

The population of western Siberia and the forces of Admiral Kolchak are entirely dependent upon these railways.

The Russian authorities in this country have succeeded in shipping large quantities of Russian supplies to Siberia, and the Secretary of War is now contracting with the great cooperative societies which operate throughout European and Asiatic Russia to ship further supplies to meet the needs of the civilian population. The Kolchak Government is also endeavoring to arrange for the purchase of medical and other Red Cross supplies from the War Department, and the American Red Cross is itself attempting the forms of relief for which it is organized. All elements of the population in Siberia look to the United States for assistance. This assistance can not be given to the population of Siberia, and ultimately to Russia, if the purpose entertained for two years to restore railway traffic is abandoned. The presence of American troops is a vital element in this effort. The services

of Mr. Stevens depend upon it, and, a point of serious moment, the plan proposed by Japan expressly provides that Mr. Stevens and all foreign railway experts shall be withdrawn when the troops are withdrawn.

From these observations it will be seen that the purpose of the continuance of American troops in Siberia is that we, with the concurrence of the great allied powers, may keep open a necessary artery of trade and extend to the vast population of Siberia the economic aid essential to it in peace time, but indispensable under the conditions which have followed the prolonged and exhausting participation by Russia in the war against the Central Powers. This participation was obviously of incalculable value to the allied cause, and in a very particular way commends the exhausted people who suffered from it to such assistance as we can render to bring about their industrial and economic rehabilitation.

Very respectfully, yours,

WOODROW WILSON

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861.00/4899 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Acting Secretary of State*

OMSK, July 22, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received July 24, 6:03 a.m.]

I find the situation here extremely critical. Complete demoralization of Kolchack's Siberian Army. It is estimated that there are 35,000 cars filled with refugees proceeding east from Ekaterinburg, Cheliabinsk and the surrounding country. Railway east of Omsk already badly congested and any additional burden may tie up the entire system. After conferring with Colonel Emerson, Major Slaughter, Harris and Doctor Manget of the Red Cross I have directed that the fifty or more American nurses in this district be sent east as soon as cars can be obtained for them. It is possible that the Siberian Army may be reorganized on a line running through Kurgan and Tiumen but while I regret the abandonment of the Red Cross work here I thought it unwise to run the risk of having all these American women stranded in western Siberia.

I had a brief and purely formal interview with Kolchack yesterday but have arranged for a more extended conversation tomorrow. I have also consented to attend a conference of the foreign representatives which Kolchack has requested.

MORRIS

861.00/4905 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>26</sup>

OMSK, July 22, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received July 25, 12 noon.]

Supplementing my July 17, 7 p.m.<sup>27</sup> The Siberian Railway from Irkutsk to Tomsk is dominated by the Czech forces. I have been unable to ascertain their exact number, but 50,000 is a fair estimate. They are living in trains of box cars at various points along the railway. The first division is at Irkutsk, the third at Krasnoyarsk, the second at Tomsk. Since their retirement from the front, they have been guarding efficiently their part of the railway and are fairly well equipped, but they are apparently determined not to spend another winter in Siberia. In spite of war weariness, homesickness, and disgust with both the Bolshevik and Kolchack parties, they are well disciplined and, except for a recent outbreak, self-controlled. They are now waiting the arrival of a commission from Prague which has promised to arrange their return home. If this commission should disappoint them, it is likely that the men will take matters into their own hands and possibly negotiate with the Bolsheviks for a safe-conduct through European Russia. In any event, I am convinced that they cannot be relied upon for assistance after next November. Without the Czechs or other military guard, the railway cannot be operated beyond Irkutsk.

I had expected to find on approaching Omsk a considerable sentiment in favor of Kolchack, or at least an anti-Bolshevik sentiment. I must report, however, that the Kolchack government has failed to command the confidence of anybody in Siberia except a small discredited group of reactionaries, Monarchists, and former military officials. It is the judgement of all with whom I have conferred,—representative Czechs, British and French military officers, our own railway-service men, Allied Consuls, and even thoughtful and moderate Russians such as the Orthodox Bishop at Krasnoyarsk and Kolchack's appointed governor of the Province of Tomsk,—that the withdrawal of the Czechs would be a signal for a formidable anti-Kolchak if not pro-Bolshevik uprising in every town on the railway from Irkutsk to Omsk. Putting aside for further information the situation as I find it here, and the influences surrounding Kolchak, and considering only the conditions I have found on my jour-

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<sup>26</sup> Repeated by the Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in no. 2653, July 26, 4 p.m., with instruction to communicate the substance orally to their British and French colleagues.

<sup>27</sup> *Post*, p. 565.

ney from Vladivostok to Omsk, I submit the following as the chief causes Kolchak's failure to win any substantial popular support:

1st; distrust of Cossack leaders who have represented him in eastern Siberia.

2d; inability of the Russian military and civil officials, trained under the old regime, to realize the change in popular feeling since the war and the revolution. All careful observers of Russian affairs testify that there has been no improvement in the point of view, the conduct, or the methods of former officials, temporarily returned to power by the Kolchack movement.

3d; absence of constructive measures to meet the serious financial and economic conditions. On the contrary I hear everywhere well-authenticated instances of speculation and corruption.

4th; resentment, particularly among the peasants, against the system of conscription which has taken mere boys from the towns and villages, placed them under inefficient and criminal officers, and led them, untrained, unequipped and ill-fed, to mutilation and death at the front.

5th; suppression of all attempts at local self-government in larger towns and cities.

I will postpone, until I have studied and reported upon conditions here, any comments or suggestions for the consideration of the Department concerning the general situation created by the increasing pressure of Japan in eastern Siberia; the almost certain retirement of the Czechs in the near future; and the threatened collapse of the Kolchack government in western Siberia.

MORRIS

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861.00/4920 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, July 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received July 28, 7:56 a.m.]

Yesterday afternoon I was in conference with Sukine, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. He reviewed with apparent frankness the history of the Kolchak movement and the difficulties with which it is struggling; and admitted the extreme seriousness of the present military situation, which he hoped would improve but which he realized might change the whole outlook. He referred to the "persistent scare" of Japan and to the efforts of Japanese officials to discredit American activities. He expressed his personal conviction that the future of Russia must be worked out in harmony with the progressive forces represented today by Great Britain and the United

States. But he added there was bitter resentment among all classes of Russians against the American policy of neutrality toward the civil war in Siberia, and that this resentment made it inexpedient if not impossible for him to give any public emphasis to his purely private convictions. He believed however that he had succeeded in persuading Admiral Kolchak, with whom his relations, he said, were of the closest personal character, not to allow his mind or actions to be influenced by anti-American feeling. In the course of the conversation, he touched briefly on the question of Semenov and frankly acknowledged that Semenov was under Japanese control; that Kolchak had only nominal authority over him; that at that moment Japanese representatives were urging Semenov's promotion to a full generalship and that this "request" would be granted immediately. In conclusion he referred to the difficulty created by the determination of the Czechs to withdraw from Siberia.

In reply I explained in the words of the President the action of the Supreme Council at Paris, which left open the question of formal recognition and the nature of the assistance to be rendered to Russia. I told him that I had no authority to commit our Government to any course of action but suggested full and free discussions of the problems and needs of the present Government, with a view to determining what help the United States might give in association with the Allied Governments. I suggested that such discussions should include plans for the continued Allied operation and guarding of the railways, and the problem of the Czechs; for the establishment of a better order of things in eastern Siberia and the Baikal region; and for the strengthening and broadening of the Admiral's Government so as to make a stronger and wider appeal for popular support; and for furnishing the Siberian Army and people with necessary supplies. When asked how he thought we might best proceed to the formulation of such a comprehensive plan, he begged for time to confer with Admiral Kolchak. My only reference to his criticism of Japan was a statement that we must of course recognize Japan's deep interest in Siberia and endeavor to work in full cooperation with her representatives.

My plan is to proceed on the assumption that the Government will survive the present crisis and to begin these discussions at once with the various Government officials, and at the same time to confer regularly with Sir Charles Eliot and Count Martel, in the hope that we can agree upon definite recommendations to be submitted to our Governments. For the present I will also confer with General Takayanagi, chief of the Japanese military mission, with whom I have very cordial relations and who is the only helpful Japanese representative here.

This discussion of plans will give something constructive to work on, will prevent our becoming involved in the gossip and intrigue so prevalent here and will afford me an immediate opportunity to test the spirit and purpose of those around the Admiral. I would greatly appreciate the criticism of this procedure. To be continued.

MORRIS

861.01/121a

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to previous correspondence and more especially to an oral inquiry made today by Colonel Pierson on behalf of the Director of Sales, I am writing to say that the Department of State recognizes Mr. Boris Bakhmeteff as Ambassador of Russia and was informed by Mr. Bakhmeteff that during his absence at Paris the Russian Embassy here would be in charge of Mr. Serge Ughet, who would act as Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Russia.

This Department has not ceased to regard Russia legally as a cobelligerent. Moreover, as you are already aware, this Department has favored making available to Russia such supplies as it may prove possible to ship. Consequently, I trust there may be no difficulty in coming to some arrangement with Mr. Serge Ughet, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Russia, or with such other agencies as may seem to you proper, for selling or otherwise disposing of such surplus war materials as may prove available.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/4905: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*<sup>28</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1919, 4 p.m.

For Morris.

Your July 22, 12 p.m. Department attaches greatest importance to your comments and will be glad if you can clear up definite misapprehensions it has received from reports by Harris, Hadley, Embry, Dr. Teusler, Major Emerson and other returning Americans, especially as to basis and extent of popular support of Kolchak West of Irkutsk. Department has received no report of suppression of

<sup>28</sup> Repeated by the Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in no. 2653, July 26, 4 p.m., with instruction to communicate the substance orally to their British and French colleagues.

attempts at local self government except at Vladivostok and in area controlled by Cossack leaders Semenoff and Kalmikoff.

The Department has had the opinion that Kolchak reverses were result of over-extension and that present weakness is due to Kolchak supporters having placed almost entire emphasis on military effort. It would seem that no Government in Russia can survive except by demonstrating its power to give better conditions of general welfare than the Bolsheviki are affording.

These points are suggested in hope that they may serve to assist you in making situation clear to the Department.

LANSING

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861.00/4931 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, July 27 (?), 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received July 29, 7:04 p.m.]

My conversations with Admiral Kolchak have failed to bring out any points not already familiar to the Allied Governments. He emphasized the provisional nature of his Government, which did not aspire to reconstruct the political life of Russia except so far as that might be necessary in order to obtain his single object, the overthrow of the Bolshevik tyranny in European Russia. He expressed his conviction that this object must be accomplished by the Russian people themselves and said that he did not desire or request the aid of foreign troops to fight Bolshevism. But he did need Allied assistance. Such need arose from two causes: 1st, the great length of the line of communication from the present front to the Port of Vladivostock and the complications already created along the railway by the presence of Czechs and other foreign troops, for reasons now a matter of history and in no way connected with Russia's internal affairs; 2d, the control by the Bolsheviks of that part of European Russia which contained all developed resources and all the industrial plants, so that he and his associates elsewhere were without means to supply the manufactured materials necessary to continue the struggle. He therefore asked for two kinds of aid,—sufficient Allied troops adequately to guard the line of communication; and credits which would enable his Government to purchase supplies and equipment.

He fully recognized the demoralization of the Russian people, due to the sufferings of war and revolution, and was not opposed in principle to any plan of Allied supervision which would assure an honest distribution of the supplies which might be furnished.



He approved heartily of my suggestion that in cooperation with Allied representatives I should discuss all details with his experts and endeavor to formulate a comprehensive plan to give the aid required. He took occasion in my second interview to pay a lasting tribute to the work of the Red Cross, "A service", he said, "which the Russian people would never forget".

Sukine and I have agreed to discuss the situation under the following heads: 1st, Railway supervision, which is subdivided into (a) operation, chiefly the question of enforcing and protecting the authority of the Inter-Allied Committee and its agents, and (b) guarding, which includes the question of the Czechs, and the financing for the coming winter period. [2d], Required military supplies. 3d, Credits. 4th, Commercial relief. 5th, Red Cross relief. 6th, German and Austrian prisoners of war. 7th, A bill of rights.

The last requires a word of explanation. By it I mean a carefully prepared statement issued by Kolchak guaranteeing certain fundamental individual rights. Much of the discontent with the present Government, the demoralization and panic, is in my judgment due to the utter insecurity of person and property. All over Siberia there is an orgy of arrest without charges; of execution without even the pretense of trial; and of confiscation without color of authority. Fear—panic fear—has seized everyone. Men suspect each other and live in constant terror that some spy or enemy will cry "Bolshevik" and condemn them to instant death. A definite assurance, however bare in its terms, that [omission] will try to protect them is imperative. Fortunately the courts continue their functions and the habit of respect for them still exists. So here is an instrument for enforcing such a statement if the Government will make an honest effort to use it.

I am proceeding on three assumptions: 1st, that the action of the Supreme Council definitely and finally places our Government and its associates in opposition to the cruel tyranny of the Bolshevik regime in European Russia; 2d, that there is still a reasonable hope that the Kolchak movement will survive the present military crisis; 3d, that in such event we are prepared to give it help and support if practicable means can be devised.

I repeat these assumptions as I am more anxious not to embarrass our Government in its policy toward this dark, complex, and difficult situation by going a step beyond the instructions received.

MORRIS

861.00/4920 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Morris.

Your July 24, 4 p.m. thoroughly approved.

For your comment: Department has regarded Kolchak's public announcements as a genuine expression of purpose and has believed that the reactionary elements, especially among the officers, have been the most serious difficulty with which he has had to contend and which possibly may even now prove too strong for him, especially if such elements can count further upon the support of Japan.

LANSING

861.24/163 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

OMSK [July 31, 1919, 6 p.m.?<sup>2</sup>]

[Received August 4, 9:20 a.m.]

On July 29 our informal conference took up the question of the military supplies which will be required by the Kolchak government. Generals Janin<sup>30</sup> and Knox<sup>31</sup> were present and stated with almost brutal frankness the difficulties which they had met in delivering supplies to the Kolchak army during the past eight months. They reported that the army staff and supply departments were completely disorganized, inefficient, corrupt and unsettled; that personal ambition, jealousy and intrigue prevailed; and that repeated appeals to the Admiral to correct the abuses had been without result because in their judgment he was powerless to act. They also expressed their judgment that it would be useless to continue further shipment of supplies unless the Allied Governments were prepared to exercise supervision and control not only over the distribution but also over the organization of the army itself. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and his colleagues, while believing that the Generals had overstated the existing conditions, admitted that in substance the criticisms were just; and stated that they were not opposed in principle to the adoption of some plan for the supervision of distribution. . . .

<sup>30</sup> Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army, supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army.

<sup>31</sup> Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F. Knox, in command of the British forces in Siberia.

All the experts present, including General Graves, . . . agreed also that some plan of supervision should be made an essential condition of furnishing these supplies. We differed only in the nature and extent of the supervision. I cannot agree with Generals Janin and Knox that Allied military representatives should assume any responsibility for the organization, operation or strategy of the Siberian Army. Such responsibility would involve far-reaching obligations and create difficulties which in my judgment would be fatal to the success of the Kolchak movement.

I have, however, suggested a plan of limited supervision over the distribution of supplies. This plan is now under consideration and as soon as I have obtained the views of Allied representatives and the Kolchak government I will submit it for the consideration of the Department.<sup>32</sup>

MORRIS

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861.51/646 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 4, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received August 6, 10:04 a.m.]

Unless the Department should request it I will not at this time telegraph the very long statement concerning the chaotic monetary and financial conditions in Siberia which has been prepared by the Ministry of Finance and reported to our conference on July 30. I will merely state the conclusions on which the conference was able to agree and certain practical steps suggested. Following are the conclusions:

1st. If the Kolchak government is to receive Allied support there must be a complete severance of such other currency of the liberated regions of Russia from the Bolshevik monetary system.

2d. The Kolchak government should, as one of the conditions of any recognition or assistance from the Allied governments, issue some form of interest-bearing scrip to cover unpaid coupons on the Russian bonds held by private individuals, in France and Great Britain, and also include in any credit which might be granted a sum sufficient to pay the \$36,000,000 worth of bonds held by individuals in the United States and which have matured.

3d. That the needs of the government for the purchase of war material and railway supplies can only be met by substantial credits allowed the Kolchak government by the Associated Powers.

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<sup>32</sup> *Post*, p. 408.

The immediate practical measures suggested are:

1st. Release of the bank notes now stored at Vladivostok.

2d. Approval of the contracts now being negotiated with the American Bank Note Company for the printing of additional bank notes. The object of these measures is to exchange as soon as possible a standard form of bank notes good technical quality for the various kinds of monetary tokens now circulating.

3d. An understanding among the Associated Governments to buy at the prevailing rate of exchange such rubles as they may require for the maintenance of their troops and for other activities in Russia. This is already being done by the French and British Governments, seemingly forced to make a grant of credits by the Associated Governments. I will discuss this last suggestion in a separate telegram, when I have completed my estimates of the minimum credits which would be required for railway supplies, for military supplies and for economic assistance, et cetera.

MORRIS

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861.00/4990 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 4, 1919, midnight.

[Received August 7, 7:09 p.m.]

On August 3rd, I finished my informal conferences with Allied and Chinese Government representatives and will forward reports on the subjects discussed as soon as detailed figures are prepared. I now submit the following report on the personnel, the spirit and purposes, the efficiency and the present strength of the Kolchak government as far as I have been able to observe it after two weeks of intimate contact.

1st. The personnel. Admiral Kolchak is, in my judgment, an honest and courageous man of very limited experience in public affairs, of narrow views and small administrative ability. He is dictator in name but exercises little influence on the Council of Ministers. His intentions are good, but he seems to have had no appreciation until recently of the political and economic dangers which threaten the Government. He has no military knowledge or experience.

The Council of Ministers may be as representative as any Siberia could produce, but the civilian members are all young and inexperienced men. Sukine is probably the ablest; Michailoff, the Minister of Finance, the son of an exile, is the best informed on Siberian affairs but knows nothing about finance. I believe the civilian mem-

bers of the Council are all earnest men, moderate in their political views and honest, but inefficient. Of the military members and the officers of the General Staff, nothing favorable can be said. As a body they have shown themselves intolerant, reactionary, and corrupt. They have dominated the Government for the last six months because, as suggested in your July 26, 4 p.m., every one considered the problem of the Government wholly military.

2d. The spirit and purposes of the Kolchak government are, I believe, moderately liberal and progressive. If one excepts the military officials of the old regime who compose a majority of the General Staff, the men around Kolchak could not be classed as reactionary in their aims. Some are monarchists, some republicans, and a few socialists. I am confident that Kolchak and his associates would, if retained in power, redeem their promise to call a constituent assembly. Their weakness does not lie in spirit or purposes, it lies in their utter lack of experience and efficiency.

3d. Efficiency. The ministers, handicapped by inexperience and an astonishing ignorance of conditions and needs, seem quite incapable of conducting a government. They are clever in devising plans which have little or no contact with actual facts but are unable to act in the simplest matters of detail. Nothing like civil administration exists. Their predicament is in part due to the unrepresentative character of the Government. They have lost all touch, if they ever had any, with those groups in the population, the Co-operatives, the Zemstvos, the existing party organizations,—which know the conditions and might suggest practicable measures. The result has been inaction in every department, and this has offered to the military leaders the opportunity they have sought. On the ground that the only object of the Government was the destruction of Bolshevism by force, they have seized the power in every locality and have wielded it with a ruthlessness which has antagonized the population and with a disregard of vital economic and financial problems which now endanger the success of the whole movement. In their zeal to raise a large army for the front, they have not considered any necessary measure to support that army in the rear. The result is now a total collapse—financial, economic and sanitary; the transportation system alone survives under the protection of Czech and Allied troops and the supervision of Allied engineers. But even this arrangement cannot long survive the present financial and economic chaos. To mistakes of military policy must be added an incredible amount of corruption among individual officials which Kolchak has not seriously attempted to correct or punish.

4th. The present strength of the Kolchak government. The Government has failed in administration; has failed in the organiza-

tion of the army; has failed to retain the confidence of the moderate groups. Still it has elements of strength. In the first place, I can find no one who doubts the Admiral's honesty of purpose or his patriotic motives. In spite of all the intrigue around him, he, personally, still commands a large measure of sympathy and respect. In the second place, however helpless this Government has proved, no alternative is offered around which those opposed to Bolshevism might rally. The choice which confronts every moderate in Siberia is between Kolchak and Bolshevism.

Finally, the Admiral has had during the last winter the active support of France and Great Britain. It is true that the French and British representatives are now thoroughly disgusted with the use he has made of this support and the lack of cooperation, the ingratitude and inefficiency displayed. But the help has been substantial and has created a certain amount of confidence and strength. Just now this confidence has been greatly increased by the hope that our Government will not only give Kolchak material assistance but will take a more direct interest in his policies.

At this moment it appears doubtful whether the Government can survive the present crisis. Kolchak and his colleagues have learned a great deal from the mistakes which they now recognize they have made during the last eight months. The military leaders have lost much of their influence because of their obvious failure in army organization and in civil administration. I find myself hoping that Kolchak will hold out long enough to permit the Allied Governments to give him the support and assistance which he will need and thus enable him to build on broader and sounder foundations. In my telegrams I will submit my observations on the crisis and hazard an opinion as to its outcome et cetera.

MORRIS

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661a.119/3 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 8, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 10, 5:33 p.m.]

I submit the following report on commercial assistance: The commercial needs of Siberia do not differ from those reported by me last fall; only more urgent. In a series of conferences with Government officials and Allied representatives the Minister of Supplies submitted a list of the absolutely essential commodities required for immediate consumption, of the implements and materials required to continue the three main occupations of the people, agri-

culture, hunting and fishing. The following is the list of minimum requirements with their value estimated in American dollars.

Consumption—1st, clothes. Cotton goods 30,000,000, woolen goods 8,000,000, thread 1,000,000, shoes 9,000,000, galoshes 2,000,000, sole leather 1,500,000, fixings, two [*sic*]. 2d, Sugar 4,500,000; 3d, paper 45,000,000; 4th, stationery supplies 2,000,000; 5th, typewriters 300,000; 6th, sewing machines 1,000,000; 7th, tobacco 450,000; 8th, pepper, cocoa, chocolate and coffee 200,000; 9th, paints and varnishes 1,000,000; 10th, drugs, medicines and pharmacy supplies 10,000,000; 11th, kerosene oil 9,000,000; 12th, petroleum products 1,500,000; 13th, lubricating oils 4,000,000; 14th, candles, lamps and wicks 200,000. Agriculture—implements 58,000,000, spare parts 800,000, binding twine 3,400,000, machinery oil 5,250,000, tractors, excavators, etc., 1,000,000, outfit for agricultural repair shops 600,000, hardware 4,000,000, fishing supplies 1,250,000, hunting goods 1,500,000: total 206,850,000.

The above list has been carefully compiled by commercial representatives from different parts of Siberia who have gathered here to urge some action by the Government. I have checked it up with the British and French commercial agents and have also had the benefit of Doctor Tuck's<sup>34</sup> advice. Doctor Tuck during his investigation in peasant villages has gathered some valuable data in regard to agriculture needs and conditions. He reports that the unrest and discontent of the peasants is due to the failure of the Government to make any provision for supplying their needs and has been accentuated by the consideration [*sic*] of the Government in conscripting the young men and requisitioning livestock. It is certain that if some means are not devalued [*devised?*] to meet these requirements the population of Siberia will be largely without clothes, shoes, paper, light, drugs and the implements of production during the coming winter and spring. Neither the Kolchak nor any other government can hope to succeed unless the importation these articles is begun at once. I am convinced that we cannot rely on private enterprise and the normal operations of trade, because the ruble has lost all exchange value, and direct barter has been tried and has been proved impracticable. The primitive conditions of the productivity in Siberia are such that even the raw materials, wool, hides, bristles et cetera, are not sufficiently graded or classified to permit any direct exchange of commodities except to a very limited extent.

The only solution offered by the Council of Ministers is the establishment of an Allied credit. The amount suggested is \$75,000,000

<sup>34</sup> Charles H. Tuck, agricultural expert sent to Siberia by the Ambassador in Japan.

(seventy-five million dollars). It is proposed that a commission of Russian and Allied representatives should be created with authority to allot credit among responsible firms and organizations in Siberia who have negotiated contracts in the Allied countries; that the commodities delivered under these contracts should be consigned directly to the Siberian firms and organizations selected; but that the joint commission should supervise, through a corps of Allied inspectors, the sale and distribution of the commodities. The Russian Government will guarantee the repayment of the credits thus advanced. It will be observed that the amount of the credit suggested is about one third of the total value of the imported articles required. It is not intended by this plan to create any government monopoly over imports or to exclude private or even speculative operations; on the contrary the government will undertake to remove all existing restrictions on imports or exports to encourage private enterprise. It believes however that credit of the amount suggested is essential to begin the movement of goods, strengthen the value of the ruble and thus open the way for private transactions. I recognize that the operation of such a plan will involve difficulties and complications but after extended discussions with the Ministers of Supplies, Finance, and Agriculture, as well as representatives of the Co-operative Societies, I am unable to suggest any better one. I [submit?] it to the criticism of those at Washington who have been studying the problem.

MORRIS

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861.00/5012 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 8, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 10, 6:45 p.m.]

I do not feel competent to express any opinion on the general question whether our Government or the Allied Governments should in view of recent developments continue the policy of sympathy and assistance to Kolchak which was adopted by the Supreme Council at Paris. I fully realize that the members of Supreme Council had before them aspects of the situation far beyond the ranking [*range?*] of my observation. I can only submit my views on two [questions?] which I believe are relevant to the larger issue.

1st. Is the Kolchak government, as it now exists, sufficiently strong to rescue Russia from the grip of Bolshevism? I regret to report that in my opinion it is not. Only drastic changes in its personnel and methods would render it equal to such a task, no matter how



much support the Allied Governments might give it. As pointed out in my August 4, 12 p.m. neither Kolchak nor his civilian colleagues have been able to modify or control the forces of reaction and corruption which have surrounded them from the very beginning of the movement. I have discussed with Government officials, who I believe are earnest and well meaning men, the feasibility of the adopting certain immediate measures to win back popular support and confidence. These included some guarantees of personal security; an effort at least to punish military officials who are speculating in army supplies while the soldiers are without food, are commandeering railway cars and selling them at enormous prices; the creation of some provisional council of peasants and Zemstvo representatives with whom Kolchak could occasionally confer. But it is quite evident that they are powerless even to attempt such measures.

2d. Would it be possible with the assistance of the Allies to effect changes in personnel and methods? I have [confidence?] the Kolchak government might, with the exercise of tact and judgement and above all patience, be shaped into an instrument with which to combat Bolshevism. But it would be a long and at times a most discouraging task. For the moment we can only await the outcome of the present crisis. Should the Government survive, it can continue only provided it receives immediate help from the Allies.

I will summarize in my next and final report the specific help which will be required.

MORRIS

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861.01/106 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 11, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received August 12, 10:50 p.m.]

Having expressed in my August 8th, 5 p.m., the belief that it will be possible with Allied assistance and counsel, so to strengthen the Kolchak government that it will be able ultimately to rescue the Russian people from Bolshevik tyranny, I now submit for the Department's consideration a summary of my conclusions on the specific measures of assistance which will be required.

First, in order to furnish the military supplies and the credits which Admiral Kolchak has so earnestly requested (see my July 27th, 4 p.m.<sup>35</sup>), it will be necessary for the United States and the Allies:

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<sup>35</sup> *Ante*, p. 399.

1, To extend, if the present critical situation is successfully met within the next month, formal recognition to Kolchak and his associates, as the Provisional Government of Russia. Without this recognition and the substantial assistance which it implies, the Kolchak government, even though it should survive the present military crisis, could not, in my judgment, continue to function much longer.

2, To grant to the Provisional Government the following credits: for military supplies, as reported in my July 31st, 6 p.m., \$90,000,000; for commercial help (see my telegram August 8th, 5 p.m.), \$70,000,000 [*\$75,000,000*]; for the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (August 9th, 5 p.m.<sup>36</sup>), \$20,000,000; making total credits required of \$185,000,000. To this total I would suggest adding \$15,000,000 to cover expenses and salaries of Inter-Allied railway inspectors and the experts and commissions hereinafter referred to, making a final total of \$200,000,000.

3, To agree to and cooperate with the plan whereby all monetary tokens, estimated at 13,500,000,000 rubles, now circulating in Siberia and other non-Bolshevik territory of Russia, shall be exchanged for standard Russian State Bank notes. This plan contemplates the immediate release of the notes now at Vladivostok and the placing of a contract with the American Bank Note Company for the immediate printing of additional notes to the amount of about 9,000,000,000 rubles (see my telegram August 4th, 11 a.m.).

Second, in order to keep open the line of communication from Vladivostok to Omsk and thus permit the prompt transportation of the supplies and materials imported under the credits stated above, it will be necessary:

1, To continue the inter-Allied railway agreement and increase the number of Allied inspectors (see my telegram July 27th, 5 [4<sup>2</sup>] p.m.<sup>37</sup>).

2, To supply at least 40,000 additional troops to take the place of the Czechs (see my July 22nd, midnight,<sup>38</sup> and July 30th, 5 p.m.<sup>39</sup>).

3, To place to the credit of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, to be expended by it as conditions might require, the sum of \$20,000,000 in addition to the amount already [omission] and treat the total as a portion of the credits granted to the Kolchak government (see my telegram of August 5th, 10 p.m.<sup>40</sup>).

<sup>36</sup> *Ante*, p. 270.

<sup>37</sup> *Post*, p. 567.

<sup>38</sup> *Ante*, p. 395.

<sup>39</sup> *Ante*, p. 292.

<sup>40</sup> Apparently an incorrect reference; telegram from Omsk, Aug. 9, 5 p.m., p. 270, may be intended.

Third, in order to ensure an honest and efficient use of credits and distribution of supplies it will be necessary in my judgment:

1, To organize in Siberia an Allied military supply committee and authorize it to appoint not less than 300 military inspectors for the purpose of supervising the delivery and use of the military supplies furnished (see my telegram July 31st, 6 p.m.).

2, To organize in Siberia a committee of commercial experts and authorize them to appoint [omission] agent and to supervise the delivery and distribution of goods purchased under the commercial credit (see my August 8th, 5 p.m.).

Fourth, in addition to the above measures and in order to give to the Russian people the help and advice which they believe the United States is peculiarly fitted to give them, our Government should in my judgment:

1, Appoint a diplomatic representative at the seat [of] the Kolchak government; 2, associate with the representative a commercial expert, a financial expert, a labor expert and an agricultural expert; and 3, continue the Red Cross activities at the present strength during the coming winter.

In submitting this plan for the consideration of the Department may I emphasize again what appear to me in the limited field of my observation the three absolutely essential requirements: the formal recognition of the Kolchak government, the grant of credits and the despatch of at least 25,000 American troops to assist in guarding the railway. Unless our policy includes all of these measures we can do little if anything to help Russia by way of Siberia and we will be forced to abandon eastern Siberia to Japanese domination.

MORRIS

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861.00/5021 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 12, 1919, 5 a.m.

[Received August 13, 7:34 p.m.]

Supplementing my August 11, 11 a.m.:

Kolchak returned from his visit to the northern army yesterday, brought Dietrichs back with him and made him Secretary of War and Chief of Staff in place of Lebedeff, appointed the Cossack leader Ivanoff-Rinoff Lieutenant General in the Siberian Army and then immediately left for the southern army. During his stay he met the Allied representatives and told us that the Siberian Army was not sufficiently organized to make a stand at the Tobol River and

would therefore continue to retreat to the Ishim River which is only 170 miles west of Omsk; that Dietrichs urged as a military measure the immediate evacuation of Omsk, but that he himself feared that the Government would fall if this were done. He had decided therefore not to evacuate Omsk, not to remove the gold reserve which is stored here, and not to accede, as long as the crisis lasts, to the demands of liberals on one side or Cossacks on the other who desired to change the structure of his Government. As emergency measures he was trying to gather from various sources 20,000 soldiers to [on] whose personal loyalty he could depend; he had ordered all civil employees of the Government between the ages of eighteen and forty to report at once for military duty at the front; and he also proposed to consolidate the Government departments in one building and thus release for military purposes the many large buildings they now occupy.

From the Allied Governments he requested the following assistance: 1, Their confidence and sympathy for three or four weeks longer by which time he believed the future of his Government would be decided. 2, Not to stop shipment of materials already arranged for—the rifles from America, donated equipment from Great Britain—and not to discontinue the discussions (being made?) with our War Department for additional equipment. 3, Not to postpone the discussion among the Allied Governments of any comprehensive plan of assistance which as a result of the conferences here we have submitted to our Governments. In this connection I am glad to report that Sir Charles Eliot, Count Martel, and General Takayana Gito [*Takayanagi?*] heartily in agreement with the conclusions summarized in my August 11, 11 a.m. and have so reported to their respective Governments.

Finally he requested as imperative the following concrete measures: release of the ruble notes in the possession of Heid at Vladivostok;<sup>42</sup> acceptance by the Japanese, French, and British banks at Harbin and Vladivostok of the Government's proposal to guarantee them against loss by a deposit of gold if they would consent to purchase Siberian notes and so keep the notes in circulation a few weeks longer; despatch of sufficient troops to guard the Chinese Eastern which has been deserted by the Chinese troops who undertook to guard it.

I submit the following comments on these requests: In view of the action of the Supreme Council (at Paris?) I think we should do everything possible to encourage Kolchak at this time. Would the

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<sup>42</sup> See section on Release to the Kolchak Government of the Russian State Bank Notes Printed in the United States, *post*, pp. 453 ff.; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 72 ff.

Department consider favorably suggesting a purely personal message from the President to Admiral Kolchak expressing confidence in his motives and purposes, appreciation of the serious difficulties which confront him, and the hope that he may meet them successfully and thus permit our Government to assist the Russian people in a larger way to establish the liberal institutions for which they are struggling? I believe that such a message would give him great encouragement.

I hope the Government will feel justified in continuing the shipment of rifles. I agree with Admiral Kolchak that the Allies should not postpone the discussion of plans for greater assistance as the question of time is of utmost importance.

I recommend the release of the notes at Vladivostok although I appreciate the difficulties suggested in your August 8, 7 p.m.<sup>43</sup> I doubt whether the Kolchak government can or will use them under present conditions; but if requested I think Heid should be instructed to deliver them. The establishment of the yen in eastern Siberia and Manchuria would in my judgment be most unfortunate. We have no American banks interested in the proposal to buy rubles; the French and British banks will, I think, accept the proposal; and the Japanese banks will, of course, refuse.

In reference to guarding the Chinese Eastern, Great Britain has already consented to use the Hampshire regiment which has left Omsk, France will supply a small contingent and General Graves has telegraphed Stevens that he has 2,000 men available.

All preparations have been made to evacuate the few Americans who are still [here?]. In view of the decision not to move the Government from Omsk conditions will probably remain unchanged for several weeks, and I shall be free to start eastward unless the Department desires me to stay longer. I will await further instructions.

MORRIS

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861.00/4954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Morris.

Referring to your July 30, 5 p.m.<sup>44</sup> President informed Mission at Paris August 8, 5 p.m.,<sup>45</sup> in response to direct inquiry from Mr. Clemenceau that United States with utmost regret will be unable to

<sup>43</sup> *Post*, p. 456.

<sup>44</sup> *Ante*, p. 292.

<sup>45</sup> *Ante*, p. 295.

furnish additional troops in Siberia to replace Czechs in guarding the railways.

LANSING

861.01/107 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received August 13, 1919, 1 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"334, August 11th, 8 a.m. I wish to inform Department that I agree with what Ambassador Morris has said in his August 11th, 11 a.m. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/5052 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 14, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 17, 7:50 a.m.]

Your July 24 [26], 6 [4] p.m.<sup>46</sup> I do not know the extent of the popular support given to Kolchak west of Irkutsk two or three months ago. I can only report that the policy adopted from the military service [*moment?*] Kolchak became Supreme Ruler was the substitution of military for civil administration throughout Siberia. Conditions at Krasnoyarsk, for instance, under Rosanoff were worse if possible than at Chita and Vladivostok under Seminoff and Rinoff; the same conditions prevailed at Tomsk and even here at Omsk. The following is a translation of a resolution pointing out the effect of this policy, unanimously adopted on July 7th in a self-government [*sic*] of the Zemstvo of Irkutsk province and confidentially transmitted to me:

"As the measures taken by the Government at Omsk which have for their object the revival of government privileges existing under the old regime tend simply to further the economic deterioration and political ruin of the country, the people are loudly expressing their dissatisfaction, disappointment and enmity towards stricter measures as the curtailment of the rights of local organs of administration, the systematic and organized fight with every form of social development, the suppression of all citizen rights, the employing of force in fighting the press and freedom of speech, the interference of military authorities with civilian life, the self-assumed authority of many individual

<sup>46</sup> Transmitted in telegram of the same date to the Consul General at Omsk, p. 393.

agents of government and the refusal [*sic*] in the name of free trade to the ever increasing speculation."

This point of view was supported by the Japanese and tolerated by the British and French representatives and opposed only by General Graves in eastern Siberia who clearly saw from the beginning what the result of such point of view would be, and waged against it whenever possible. He was rewarded by the bitter hatred and antagonism of all the reactionary elements and also, I regret to say, with the severe criticism of some Americans who do not understand the interest.

The present reverses are not due to over-extension; but to the fact that the soldiers of the Siberian Army are demoralized by the conditions which I have pointed out in my previous telegrams and therefore will not fight. Generals Janin and Knox have returned and report conditions like those on the eastern front two years ago. General Graves, at my request, has gone to Ishim to see for himself the conditions there and to find out whether there is any chance of reorganizing the army.

As I have explained in previous telegrams, Admiral Kolchak and his colleagues now realize their mistake. I was greatly surprised to learn from Sukine today that some of the immediate reforms which were discussed in our conferences have been adopted: a committee consisting of the Minister of Justice to Oran [*sic*], the Minister of the Interior and General Dietrichs has been organized with power to hear and summarily to dispose of any complaints of abuse of military power extraterritorial [*sic*] courts. Better still the economic conference which has been sitting here and has asked for some part in framing the policies of the Government has been created as a consulting beyond that [*body?*] to whom the ministers will report proposed measures for discussion and suggestion; and finally the provincial Zemstvos are to be revived and recognized. I fear these reforms may be too late but they give promise of a united [omission].

MORRIS

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861.01/116 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 16, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received August 17, 10:35 a.m.]

Because in my observations upon the Kolchak government I may seem to have emphasized strongly its weakness and mistakes and failed to express fully my appreciation of the difficulties it has

faced, I would again emphasize strongly my conviction that after its instructive experiences of the last two months it is the best, perhaps the only available agency, through which we can give our promised aid to Russia.

I even wish that our Government were immediately in a position to announce definite action when the issue is still in doubt, and so give to Admiral Kolchak the strength he so sorely needs.

Perhaps I am too close to see the Russian situation clearly in its true proportions, but I am sure that whatever the outcome of this crisis may be the Kolchak government cannot continue without the open support of our Government. To come to its aid in the hour of discouragement and defeat is, I admit, to take a great risk; but it is also to take advantage of a great opportunity. If the Kolchak government should collapse we could not be worse off than if we stood and waited for the event. On the other hand, if by our timely and active service Kolchak should survive, we should be in a preeminent position to assist and even to lead in the reconstruction of Russia, to maintain the "open door" now in imminent peril of being closed, and to preserve the integrity of Siberia.

With the withdrawal of the French and British, and of the Czech Army, . . . endeavor to bring about establishment of peace in Russia will be put off indefinitely.

MORRIS

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861.00/5084 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received August 21, 1:32 a.m.]

On Admiral Kolchak's return from his second visit to the army he sent for me and I was with him the greater part of the afternoon. He believes that the failure of the Bolshevik to continue their advance beyond the Tobol River significant and indicates some weakness. The remnant of his army is resting between the Tobol and Ishim Rivers but is still disorganized and disinclined to fight. He attributed the present collapse to a mistaken estimate of the Bolshevik strength: his Government had made its plans on the assumption, which events proved to be false, that the Bolshevik Government would not survive an aggressive military campaign this spring; he had therefore concentrated his attention on the military situation to the exclusion of pressing financial and economic problems. He still believed Bolshevism was rapidly losing ground in European Russia, but he admitted that in view of the social and economic



conditions in Siberia his Government could not be continued unless it received from the Allies and particularly from the United States assistance, character discussed in our conferences.

I asked him what he thought would happen in Siberia if he failed. He replied that in his judgment the struggle against Bolshevism would become localized; that a number of military leaders mostly but not entirely Cossack Atamans would operate independently in different parts of Siberia; that Semionoff would lead because of the support and assistance he would at once receive from Japan, whose interests he pointed out would be better served by a divided rather than a united Siberia.

I was glad to learn from him that he had decided to call a conference of the head men of the peasant communities in Siberia. I have long wished that such an arrangement would be tried for I have believed such a conference would release forces of primary value in the reconstruction of Russia. I agreed with him however that he could not act in the matter until he was in a position to state definitely whether any Allied assistance could be expected.

He then pressed earnestly for my personal opinion as to whether our Government would consider favorably the comprehensive plan agreed on by the Allied representatives; I told him that I was not in a position to express an opinion; I had been absent from the United States for two years, was out of touch with public opinion there, and had no advices indicating whether the conclusions which we had reached would be deemed either wise or practicable.

This answer indicates the position which I have taken since my arrival. The local newspapers have been both [omission] and bitter in commenting on my unconcerned neutrality. Perhaps I have been too reserved but I have feared lest by some word or action I might hold out hopes which would be disappointed.

Changes all for the good have been made in the ministry: Michailoff, the Minister of Finance, has resigned and De Hoyer, for some years manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Peking, has been named in his stead; Telberg has been relieved of his position as Secretary of the Council but remains as Minister of Justice. Sukine resigned in the face of attacks by a small reactionary group who are in favor of a German-Japanese alliance and have received encouragement from Colonel Fukuda, permanent head of Japanese Military Mission. Kolchak has declined to accept the resignation and Sukine's [status?] is dependent on the success of his negotiations for Allied assistance. He is accused by the reactionaries of being pro-American, which in their view is the most serious charge that can be preferred.

I am still awaiting further suggestions or instructions from the Department. General Graves has returned from Ishim where all

that he was able see confirms previous reports of military disorganization; for details I refer to his report to the War Department.

MORRIS

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861.01/106 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1919, 11 a.m.

For Morris:

Your August 11 receiving very careful consideration. Department is awaiting an expression of your views now that the situation is modified by the fact that we can send no more American troops.

Department understands that shipment of rifles is proceeding but President has decided it is impossible to arrange for sale of clothing et cetera, from surplus War Department stocks. You will be further advised upon the other points you have raised. I am asking the President's authority to release bank notes.

In the meanwhile the Department relies upon your judgment as to your further movements, having in mind that the safety of yourself and General Graves must be a paramount consideration. Subject to this Department believes it would be advantageous for you to continue in close touch with Admiral Kolchak a little while longer.

LANSING

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861.00/5079½ : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received August 21, 7:37 a.m.]

Supplementing my August 18, 5 p.m. Contrary to the expectations of Admiral Kolchak reports received this morning indicate that the Bolsheviks have crossed the Tobol River at three places and are driving the remnant of the Siberian Army back toward the Ishim.

General Graves, because of conditions in Vladivostok and eastern Siberia generally, is most anxious to return as soon as possible and is therefore making arrangements to leave on Monday the 25th. Not yet having received instructions from the Department I have concluded that unless I hear in the meantime to the contrary I will accompany Graves.

If, for any reason, the Department desires me to remain longer we can easily divide our party and I will continue here until Harris and the French and British representatives leave.

In answering please bear in mind my previous requests as to code (see my August 20, 1 p.m.<sup>50</sup>).

MORRIS

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861.01/140 a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Morris.

Smith<sup>51</sup> reports movement on foot to call assembly of Zemstvos and Municipalities; that representatives have called upon him who state that if allowed by Omsk authorities to meet they will ask Omsk Government to assist. They claim to have the backing of the army and the people generally. Smith states they have already prepared a coalition ministry but it is not their intention to overthrow the Omsk Government. Quite aside from the motives or purposes of the particular representatives who have called upon Smith, the President desires you to say to the Omsk authorities that he hopes they will encourage the assembly of the Zemstvos and Municipalities.

LANSING

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861.00/5107 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 22, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received August 24, 1:08 p.m.]

In the absence of further advices from the Department and as stated in my August 20, 3 p.m. I am preparing to leave with General Graves. Harris will forward any delayed telegrams to Irkutsk, which I hope to reach about September 1st. There is no change for the better here. In spite of many unconfirmed rumors of serious conditions in European Russia the Red Army is continuing its Siberian advance and preparations are going on for the evacuation of Omsk. Reports just received of labor troubles in the United States and England have had a depressing effect on local government circles and have tended to strengthen the views of those who

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<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Charles H. Smith, American representative on the Inter-Allied Committee for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian railways.

maintain that it is hopeless to look for assistance from Great Britain and the United States and who advocate a close alliance with Germany and Japan. Recent advices indicate increase of disturbances and panic conditions at various points along the railway. The attitude of the Japanese military and the growing discourtesy of Russian officials have made the work of the Railway Service Corps less and less effective and the men are greatly discouraged. Stevens seems to have reached the limit of his patience. The weakness of the Kolchak government prevents the enforcement of any railway agreements for the present. I will confer with Stevens at Harbin and advise the Department fully. The Czechs are more restless and General Janin fears that they may suddenly decide to move eastward. In my opinion all signs point to a general breakdown which might possibly be avoided by immediate Allied recognition and support of Kolchak, enabling him to reconcile opposing elements, to continue [apparent omission] at Irkutsk; or by the prior collapse of the Bolshevik.

The Red Cross has distributed its stores accumulated here to the Czechs who are in great need, to such of the military units as still remain and to reform [*refugees?*] who are pouring in from all sections. The conditions here this winter will be appalling unless further aid comes from somewhere.

MORRIS

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861.51/656 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 23, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 10:10 p.m.]

3859. For Miles<sup>52</sup> from Polk.

Understand Koltchak government arranged through Baring Brothers in London for credits of £10,000,000 covered by deposit of gold in Hongkong bank. Under this agreement Great Britain to advance £3,000,000, United States to advance £6,000,000. Please let me know immediately all you can in regard to this transaction, what banks are handling it in United States, and how the matter stands. Have the bankers asked approval of the State Department? If so, was approval given?

AMERICAN MISSION

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<sup>52</sup> Basil Miles, Acting Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs, Department of State.

123M832/34 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, August 24, 1919.

[Received 8:22 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

" 356, August 23, 1 p.m. Morris and Graves leave for Vladivostok today. I am remaining Omsk for the purpose of evacuating Red Cross and other American interests if necessary. Harris.[""]

REINSCH

861.51/656 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1919, 4 p.m.

2940. For Polk from Miles:

Answering your 3859, August 23, 2 p.m. July 21 Messrs. Kidder, Peabody and Company informed Department that a group of American bankers were considering the participation with Baring Brothers in a loan of £10,000,000 or the equivalent in dollars to the Kolchak Government based upon a deposit of 105% of the amount of the loan in gold with the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank.

After exhaustive consideration the Department informed Messrs. Kidder, Peabody and its associates as follows:

*First:* That the United States has not recognized the Kolchak Government.

*Second:* Attention was called to the exchange of notes between Kolchak and the four heads of Governments at Paris which indicated that the United States was convinced it could not assist Russia through dealings with the Bolsheviki and, consequently, was prepared to render assistance through Admiral Kolchak.

*Third:* That in view of grave conditions in Siberia reported in generally accurate terms in the press, the Department did not feel it could assume the responsibility of encouraging such negotiations but that, nevertheless, there seemed to be no objection to the loan provided the bankers deemed it advisable to make it.

The Department is advised informally through the Russian Embassy that the loan is going through. The Department understands that the British banks are taking two-fifths and the American banks three-fifths of the loan. It is to be noted that American banks are not subordinated to Baring Brothers but appear to be a separate third party to the negotiations. The Department has an unconfirmed statement that the terms of the loan provide that two-thirds of the amounts advanced respectively by British and American banks are to be ex-

pended in Great Britain and the United States, the balance of one-third in each case being free for expenditure wherever the Kolchak Government may desire.

LANSING

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861.00/5127 a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Morris: Following conclusions now evident in response to your various recommendations:

1. Recognition of Kolchak is unfortunately impracticable because of the fact that the support which you regard as necessary for Kolchak's success cannot be given by the United States for the following reasons:

*First:* No additional American troops can be sent.

*Second:* This Government cannot assist with credits for military supplies unless Kolchak be recognized as a co-belligerent against the Central Powers which he is not or through specific authorization from Congress.

*Third:* Commercial credits cannot be granted without authorization by Congress.

*Fourth:* Any action by Congress will depend upon whether the President will present plan for assistance which is now being prepared with the help of Mr. McCormick on the basis of your reports.

*Fifth:* No action by Congress can be urged until the ratification of the Peace Treaty is out of the way.

2. As against these unfavorable considerations shipment of rifles will continue. Secretary of War is understood still to be prepared to increase contracts with Cooperatives from \$15,000,000 to \$25,000,000 as originally announced. Release of bank notes will follow conclusion of formalities for a \$50,000,000 loan from British and American banks which will make possible the purchase by Kolchak Government and reimbursement of American credits for expense of printing bank notes.

3. Please inform Kolchak Government of these results and at the same time make quite clear that our own limitations are due solely to existing legislation in so far as military and commercial supplies are concerned and to state of public opinion as well as to lack of appropriations.

4. The Department has referred all your cables to Paris for the information of and discussion by the American Mission but has received no reply stating attitude of other Governments. What word

have British and French representatives received from their Governments?

5. I hope the plan for assistance which is being prepared for consideration by the President may possibly assist in building up a social and economic structure which has been lacking hitherto and which may enable further developments to be planned on a sounder foundation.

6. Please say to Admiral Kolchak personally that the inability of this Government to render more tangible assistance at this time, while due to facts beyond its control is, nevertheless, sincerely regretted and must not be construed as in any way suggesting lack of appreciation of his own extraordinary efforts in overcoming great obstacles or of any change of our hope to assist Russia. He must realize that we are not free as other Governments are in respect to control of appropriations for expenditures abroad nor have we any long established machinery for effective assistance outside the United States such as has been available in the past to those governments whose colonies or other influences in foreign affairs have called for overseas effort.

Please inform Admiral Kolchak that very urgent matters affecting the relations of Japan and the United States seriously require your early return to Tokyo.

Before leaving him you may say that your recommendations have received most sympathetic consideration here and that you hope his efforts to fortify his Government by adding to it the support of elements representative of the Zemstvos and Municipalities, may succeed.

LANSING

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861.01/126 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Irkutsk, to the Secretary of State*

IRKUTSK, August 27, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received August 27, 11:40 a.m.]

Your August 20th, 11 a.m., reached me on my arrival at Irkutsk and I will therefore remain here until receipt of the longer telegram referred to. Our inability to send any additional troops as stated in your August 12th, 5 p.m., which I did not receive until August 23rd, in my judgment renders the entire plan submitted in my August 11th impracticable. Under these circumstances I think that any immediate recognition of Kolchak would be unwise as it would seem to promise more than we can perform. It would be better to await

the outcome of the present crisis when I will submit further suggestions for the consideration of the Department after consulting Stevens and Smith.

MORRIS

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861.00/5130 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Irkutsk, to the Secretary of State*

IRKUTSK, August 30, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received August 30, 1:17 p.m.]

Your May [August] 25, 6 p.m. reached me here at Irkutsk. I have fully realized that the plan set forth in my telegram of August 11th would probably be impracticable and in my last interview with Sukine<sup>53</sup> I indicated to him very clearly my belief that our Government would not be in a position to send additional troops to Siberia. I also stated that any plan for economic assistance would require Congressional sanction and therefore involve considerable delay.

In view of the critical situation at Omsk, Government officers ask leave to withhold from the Kolchak government further definite statement of our attitude until the future of that Government is determined. I fear that any formal statement at this moment, if followed by the fall of Kolchak, might place on our Government responsibility for a result due to entirely different causes.

I leave Irkutsk today; will stop for a short time at Verkhniudinsk and Chita to study details of the Semionoff situation, and then proceed to Harbin to confer with Stevens. Please send messages for me in care consul at Harbin.

MORRIS

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861.00/5130 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Jenkins)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Morris.

Department approves withholding final statement to Kolchak Government for the present as suggested in your August 30, 10 P.M. Before President returns to Washington October 1st Department hopes you will also be able to present comprehensive recommendations based on conference with Stevens and Smith as suggested in Department's July 11, 6 P.M.<sup>54</sup>

PHILLIPS

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<sup>53</sup> John Sookine, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Omsk Government.

<sup>54</sup> *Ante*, p. 390.



861.00/5207 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*PEKING, *undated.*

[Received September 15, 1919, 12:30 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"383. September 12, noon. Soukine expressed to me today his bitter disappointment over the delay of our Government in sending all promised supplies. He also mentioned unfortunate impression the Department's note to Japan<sup>55</sup> had created here inasmuch as the forwarding of these supplies would probably thereby be delayed. The crushing blow of Bolsheviki is regarded here as paramount to any controversy with Japan at the present moment.

Soukine informs me that it is reported that Ambassador Morris has stated in Vladivostok that the fall of Kolchak is only matter of few days and that a Government formed from the various revolutionary parties is pending. If it is true that Morris has made this statement our relations here are very critical. Kindly keep me informed. Harris."

TENNEY

861.00/5207 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*WASHINGTON, *September 19, 1919, 5 p.m.*

Your 383, September 12, noon.<sup>56</sup> Rifles and ammunition are being shipped to Kolchak representatives, also clothing and so forth to Cooperatives and railway materials to Stevens. Note to Japan written only because action of Japanese commanders have been making effective shipments westwards quite impossible and thus making failure of this Government to assist Kolchak absolutely certain, if persisted in by Japan.

Only statement of Ambassador Morris noted by Department is press report from Vladivostok crediting him with urging all help to Kolchak. Department believes contrary report must be ascribed to hostile propaganda. In this connection this Government must point out regrettable attitude of Kalmikoff and Semenoff which, regardless of question whether such attitude may properly be

<sup>55</sup> Telegram to the Chargé in Japan, Aug. 30, 4 p.m., p. 573.<sup>56</sup> Transmitted in undated telegram from the Chargé in China, received Sept. 15, 12:30 p.m., *supra*.

ascribed in part to Japanese, is nevertheless apparently beyond control of Omsk authorities. You may assure Soukine, that this Government appreciates the situation which confronts Kolchak and within the limits of its legal powers to do so hopes to continue its assistance. Negotiations for sale of clothing hampered by existing legislation but have nevertheless been re-opened with Russian Embassy here. General Hermonius representing Russian Conference at Paris has just arrived to take part in such negotiations.

PHILLIPS

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861.24/181 B : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson at San Diego*

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1919, 5 p.m.

Referring to the exchange of notes between yourself and the other heads of governments at Paris and Admiral Kolchak at Omsk, the British are reported to be supplying all clothing and equipment necessary for Denikin, the French for Czechs and anti-Bolshevik forces in Western border countries, while Kolchak relies for similar equipment upon the United States. Latest reports show that unless Kolchak's forces are provided with clothing at an early date they will face the rigors of a Siberian winter un-equipped and will scarcely survive the ordeal.

As the United States has joined in undertaking to do its share in supplying Kolchak and his associates with munitions, food and supplies to the best of its ability, I urgently recommend that you authorize the Secretary of War to sell to the Russian Ambassador or other Russian representative in this country for shipment to Kolchak, on a credit basis, shoes, under-clothing, cloth, surplus over coats, especially such materials as may not find an advantageous or ready market in this country. I would not urge this upon your attention at such a time did I not believe it one of pressing importance. I am much impressed with the fact that our failure to render this assistance will not be understood in Russia and will not only weaken Kolchak but also affect unfavorably our own position, to the immediate and, possibly permanent, advantage of Japan.

The latest reports we have from Siberia, dated September 11, indicate Kolchak's forces have resumed the offensive and are driving the Bolsheviki back towards the Urals.

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

861.00/5245 : Telegram

*President Wilson to the Acting Secretary of State*LOS ANGELES, *September 20, 1919.*

[Received September 21, 12:44 a.m.]

I fully approve of your proposals with regard to the Czechoslovak forces in Siberia and with regard to furnishing such supplies as are available to the forces under Kolchak, and authorize you to show this telegram to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War and the Chairman of the Shipping Board.

WOODROW WILSON

861.00/5248 : Telegram

*The Representative at Vladivostok of the War Trade Board (Heid) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 20, 1919, 10 a.m.*

[Received 3:50 p.m.]

511. Following from Heid.

“On September 1st all office furniture, fixtures, files, records etc., were transferred to the consulate. Work here is finished. Political, financial, military and railway transportation situation too unsettled to undertake now with assurance of success the economic relief mentioned your urgent cable June 27th, 4 p.m.<sup>58</sup> Indications are that conditions will not improve within very near future. The Kolchak government is waning and will no doubt fall, but will continue in power long enough to obstruct any plans calculated to afford economic aid during the fall and winter of 1919 and 1920. It would be worse than useless to ship in even moderate quantities of commodities now unless definite provision be made to guard the goods from the time of arrival to final distribution to peasants and needy population. Conditions are worse now than at any time since Kolchak has been in power. The Omsk Government has conceded military control of the territory from Irkutsk to Vladivostok to the Cossack leaders who, aided and supported morally and materially by another foreign power, insult, beat and even kill peasants and civilians, obstruct and delay transportation, requisition and pilfer goods in transit, in fact generally pursue a policy calculated to prohibit relief reaching the masses, especially if such relief be attempted by Americans. Long delays occur in passing commodities through the Vladivostok customs and large quantities of merchandise disappear. Unpunished graft on the part of officials and profiteering

<sup>58</sup> *Ante*, p. 387.

by speculators continue unabated. The financial situation grows more hopeless; Siberian rubles are quoted at from 85 to 100 for one dollar. Rubles are a medium of trade only for petty and retail sales. In some localities Siberian rubles are not accepted. Large transactions property sales and often house rent and wages are payable in yen or dollars. Exports are small and threaten to cease entirely during autumn and winter. There is no prospect of early rehabilitation, on the contrary the large issues of new Siberian currency to meet the expenses of military railroads and general government budget accelerate and increase devaluation. Credits are impossible, the Cooperatives can not safely accept rubles in payment for commodities. The entire machinery of commerce is wrecked. In view of the above will the Department please authorize me to proceed to Washington for conference with War Department necessary to effect close and harmonious cooperation when distribution of commodities sold to Cooperatives becomes feasible. Can arrange transportation on Army transport sailing from Vladivostok first half of October if you grant authorization. Please arrange that compensation for July, August and September be made to me at Vladivostok and cable early answer. Heid.[""]

CALDWELL

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861.01/134 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, September 22, 1919.

[Received September 23, 8:27 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

386, September 19, 5 p.m. Referring to my September 12, 4 p.m. [noon?].<sup>59</sup> I have held to the opinion that Mr. Morris has been greatly misquoted in this matter but the following telegrams received from O'Reilly, British Deputy Commissioner and successor to Sir Charles Eliot, to British Consul Hodgson in Omsk lead me to believe that the Ambassador has changed his mind since leaving Omsk. On September 11th O'Reilly telegraphed Hodgson concerning the new revolutionary movement in the Far East in substance as follows:

Ambassador Morris, recently arrived here, has received encouraging impression as to the new movement. He states that to make Kolchak government effective barrier to Bolshevism would require impracticable amount of assistance. He therefore regards new movement as preferable and is prepared to recommend that if securely

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<sup>59</sup> Transmitted in undated telegram from the Chargé in China received Sept. 15, 12:30 p.m., p. 424.

established it should at once be recognized and assisted economically. Morris says that he has advised his visitors that in the event of their success they should retain men of capacity who have been serving Russia capably in present administration. Morris evidently expects and hopes that the new movement will succeed.

On September 14th O'Reilly again telegraphs Hodgson as follows:

Morris has stated that his favorable inclination to the movement should not be understood as final, as he is still making inquiry as to its strength and influence. He is convinced, however, that the present government has not got a friend from Omsk to Vladivostok and if it falls, as it apparently must, it would be well that it should be succeeded by a regime well organized in advance and capable of taking over the power without [*sic*] the least possible disturbances.

I am informed that O'Reilly has forwarded these two telegrams to London Foreign Office.

If this represents Ambassador Morris' true views the change is incomprehensible to me. On August 11th, 8 a.m., I telegraphed Secretary of State<sup>60</sup> that I was fully in accord with the views and recommendations of the Ambassador as expressed in his August 11, 11 a.m.<sup>61</sup> and August 12, 5 a.m.<sup>62</sup> As sincerely as I favored his recommendations in these two telegrams, I desire to go on record as being absolutely and unalterably opposed to the views set forth in Mr. O'Reilly's communications to Mr. Hodgson if such represent the Ambassador's present view of the situation.

I suggest in this connection that the Department refer to my March 5, 8 p.m.,<sup>63</sup> wherein I have fully set forth my views concerning the Social Revolutionary parties in Siberia and especially what I thought of the Left wing which at the present time, together with all the disgruntled elements in eastern Siberia, is attempting to form a government which may eventually receive support of the Allies. In my judgement this movement can have but one result, namely, to undermine and overthrow by its machinations in the rear of the Kolchak government and army the influence and prestige of this government and army at most crucial moment of its history, when they are fighting a life and death battle with Bolshevism not very far from the city of Omsk. In my judgement no such party formed in eastern Siberia can exist, and should it come into power for a short time, it will only exist long enough to open the floodgates of Bolshevism which will immediately spread from Omsk eastward to Vladivostok. There is no difference in fundamental principles between the Left

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<sup>60</sup> Transmitted in undated telegram from the Minister in China received Aug. 13, 1 p.m., p. 413.

<sup>61</sup> *Ante*, p. 408.

<sup>62</sup> *Ante*, p. 410.

<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

Social Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviki. While Kolchak and his government are sadly lacking in many things which make for perfection, yet I assure the Department that we are standing today face to face with but one solution of this question, namely, it is Kolchak or Bolshevism. If Kolchak falls the political intrigues which will follow this will offer opportunities and advantages that both Germany and Japan are looking for.

In my best judgement, substantiated by the experience of two years on the spot, and having been in the closest touch with all the political parties and governments which have come and gone in Siberia, I recommend that the United States Government together with our Allies meet this question fairly and squarely by recognizing Kolchak before the whole world as a *de facto* Government and give him all possible support which lies in our power.

In his darkest hour of need I recommend that President Wilson act upon Ambassador Morris' suggestion in his August 12, 5 a.m.,<sup>64</sup> and send a purely personal message to Admiral Kolchak expressing confidence in his motives and purposes and appreciation of the serious difficulties which confront him and the hope that he may meet them successfully thereby permitting our Government to assist the Russian people in a larger way to establish the liberal institutions for which these people are struggling.

The attention and encouragement which the foreign representatives in Vladivostok appear to be giving this new movement is [*are*] creating a deplorable impression in Omsk and no more unfortunate moment could have been chosen for this than at the time when Kolchak is at the front successfully opposing the Bolsheviki.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs Pichon has telegraphed Billmeri [*De Martel?*] that the French representatives in Siberia should not countenance any opposition to Kolchak and should give him loyal support.

Russian, Czech, and British military staffs inform me that the situation at the front is favorable and that the Siberian Army on the whole is making progress and doing something more than holding its own. The first army on the north is improving its situation and even advancing while the central and southern armies are also advancing. As much as it is possible to judge of the present situation I am inclined to the belief that Omsk will not be captured and that the city and the front will be held through the winter. This would certainly be the case if this government could but receive the promised military supplies which it is anxiously awaiting from abroad.

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<sup>64</sup> *Ante*, p. 410.

I desire to state further that I have been opposed from the beginning to the evacuation of the American Red Cross nurses from Omsk. I gave a passive consent to their evacuation from this city upon the representations of Colonel Emerson that in all probability the railway fleet passing through Omsk from the west would so congest traffic that it would be impossible for them to move. I was not convinced at the time that this would be the case but was not in a position to refute it. The evacuation of our Red Cross nurses from Novonikolaievsk and Tomsk was done contrary to my instructions. It was always my plan to keep these Red Cross nurses in our hospitals where they could render the maximum service to the Russian wounded, taking upon myself the responsibility of getting them out at the proper time. I have had every facility for doing this and it would succeed equally as well as the precautionary measures which I took which rendered it possible for these nurses to get out of Cheliabinsk, Kurgan, Ekaterinburg and Tiumen at the proper time. For two months now these hospitals and especially the ones in Omsk, Novonikolaievsk, Tomsk have lost the services of these trained nurses and the medicines and equipment which the Red Cross trains were weekly bringing to this front. Frankly stated, such action is paramount to criminality, and the impression created against us here, in this particular respect, is something akin to contempt. A copy of this telegram sent Ambassador Morris. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.51/675 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *September 22, 1919.*

[Received 12:14 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

September 20, 10 a.m. I am informed by financial department here that negotiations with American and British financial group for \$50,000,000 have become abortive in view of the attitude assumed in this question by the United States Government. Apparently the British banks were prepared to intervene, but the American banks, considering the military and political situation in Siberia, could not encourage cooperation.

I am informed that the Omsk Government was prepared to guarantee the American banks by actually depositing in Manila or San Francisco sufficient gold to cover the amount advanced.

Upon the receipt of this news the Omsk Government sold 12,000 kilograms of gold to France, amounting in value to 50,000,000

francs. This sale was outright and the gold is now *en route* to Vladivostok, leaves today.

In view of changed conditions in Omsk I recommend that our banks reopen negotiations as concerns this loan and permit sufficient gold to be deposited in San Francisco as a guarantee. Harris.

TENNEY

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/1039

*The Russian Delegation in Paris to the President of the Paris Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*<sup>65</sup>

PARIS, September 23, 1919.

On May 26th last, the Allied and Associated Powers notified their intention of lending their help to Admiral Koltchak to enable his Government to establish itself as Government of all Russia. A fortnight later they again confirmed that intention, stating that the assurances given by Admiral Koltchak in his reply to their communication were recognized as satisfactory.

National Russia received these declarations with the greatest satisfaction; in them they saw the hope of prompt and efficacious help from the Allies.

In the conception of those awaiting this help with great impatience, it would be of a moral and material order and would admit in the first place the official recognition of the Omsk Provisional Government. Failing this recognition, Russia, struggling under painful conditions for her regeneration, is greatly hindered from using her resources. On the other hand, the Allies themselves cannot put forth all the means at their disposal to assure them keeping their promise.

However three months have elapsed without bringing the hoped-for recognition. In the meantime different groups fighting in Russia for the common cause are still closer united. Since General Denikin's clear and explicit declaration recognizing Admiral Koltchak's Supreme Power over all Russia, all the local Governments are at one with Omsk and the success of each is due to the energies of all of them.

The official recognition of Admiral Koltchak's Government should be no longer postponed, the least delay causing serious prejudice to the regeneration of Russia.

Consequently the undersigned feel it their duty once more to draw the attention of the Allied and Associate Powers to the importance

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<sup>65</sup> Copy (in English) received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Sept. 23.



of giving, without further delay, a manifest proof of their good will towards new Russia by officially recognizing Admiral Koltchak's Government.

Prince LVOFF  
 SAZONOW  
 N. W. TCHAIKOVSKY  
 MAKLAKOFF  
 B. SAVINKOFF

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861.00/5264 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok,  
 to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 23, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received September 24, 8:23 a.m.]

Your July 11th, 3 [6] p.m.<sup>66</sup> and September 5, 5 p.m.<sup>67</sup> Although the military situation at Omsk appears for the moment less acute, the general conditions as I view them remain unchanged. The Czechs are increasingly restless and more openly antagonistic to the Kolchak government. Recently they have been encouraging disaffected groups to take over local administration, call some form of representative assembly and organize a new government. The activities of the Zemstvos in Vladivostok as reported to the Department by Smith are illustrative of this general movement. Such a movement has little prospect of success and it is more likely that the Czechs will move eastward in which event Kolchak will probably lose control of the region from Irkutsk to Omsk. The faction [*action?*] of the Czechs will be the determining factor in western Siberia.

The outstanding fact in eastern Siberia is the formal recognition by Kolchak of both Kalmikoff and Semenoff. As it is impossible for our agencies to cooperate with these Atamans we now find ourselves in disagreement not only with the Japanese policy but also with the official representatives of the Kolchak government in Eastern Siberia. We thus have the doubly anomalous situation that the Czechs by their presence are responsible for the continued existence of a Government against which they are now intriguing while we are endeavoring to find means of cooperation with a Government many of whose representatives are openly hostile. The Japanese Government apparently fears increasing disorder and is sending troops to strengthen its forces in the Usuri and Amur districts. I am still of the opinion that Kolchak has not sufficient strength or popular support to control these conditions without Allied assistance

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<sup>66</sup> *Ante*, p. 390.

<sup>67</sup> *Ante*, p. 423.

of the character suggested in my reports from Omsk. As such assistance is impracticable I now submit for the consideration of the Department my conclusions as to our immediate policy. The political conditions continue so uncertain and unsettled that for the time being it would seem necessary to treat them as of secondary importance and concentrate our efforts toward the economic relief of the population. We cannot afford to remain in Siberia this winter without some attempt to relieve the terrible want and suffering which is inevitable.

The essential conditions of this relief are;

1. An agreement with the Japanese Government on the method of guarding the operation of the railways and in regard to the treatment of Semenoff and Kalmikoff. I am conferring upon these questions with Matsudaira and the Japanese military authorities here. General Oi, the new commander, professes concurrence in our Government's views and willingness to issue an order modifying Otani's instructions. I have asked Stevens to join me and it is possible that he and Oi may be able to reach a practicable working agreement. Such results would greatly simplify the issue raised by the Department's recent note<sup>68</sup> which I am informed has created considerable irritation and the answer to which is being delayed until my return to Tokyo.

2. If this agreement can be reached we should continue the Railway Service Corps with such changes in personnel and organization as Mr. Stevens may suggest. An additional emergency Allied credit of \$20,000,000 would in my judgment more than cover all the financial requirements. This would not be needed before January the first.

3. An Allied credit of \$75,000,000 for the purchase of commodities required. As the Allies are not in a position to give Kolchak the military support necessary to strengthen his government and release it from the military authorities now controlling it, I do not see how we can give it recognition and grant the credits to it. Would it be feasible temporarily to place the port of Vladivostok under an Allied economic commission, grant the credits directly to this commission for allotment and give it authority to supervise distribution in Siberia of the goods purchased? Such a suggestion may seem extreme but we must face the facts that no government now exercises any real authority in Siberia. The population is exhausted, local administration is corrupt and inefficient, pestilence threatens. I think that we should make every effort to revive economic life and render it possible for the population to go to work.

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<sup>68</sup> Telegram to the Chargé in Japan, Aug. 30, 4 p.m., p. 573.

Otherwise I fear that the country will fall into political chaos and become a field of international intrigue if not conflict.

4. This or any economic plan would require that we continue our military forces at their present strength to be used not only in guarding sections of the railway but also in protecting economic and Red Cross activities. In addition I hope that our Government will approve General Graves' request in his telegram to the War Department, number 468, for one battalion of field or mountain artillery. These are needed if our forces are to be secure against possible attacks by Cossack armored trams [*trains?*]. I also believe that it would be an advantage if the War Department would assign on General Graves' staff a brigadier general, perhaps one of the younger men who has had foreign service and could assist General Graves in his contacts with Allied military representatives.

5. I submit that we should in any event continue as long as possible the Red Cross work. Compared to the need its budget is inadequate and its activity consequently limited but it still remains our most valuable constructive work. I understand from Doctor Teusler that the War Department is asking Congressional authority to transfer to the Red Cross for work in Siberia the material, supplies, and instruments no longer required by our own army. It would be difficult to overstate the need of such supplies.

6. In regard to military supplies to the Kolchak government I refer to General Graves' telegram to the War Department, number 467,<sup>69</sup> reporting his action in reference to rifles, and to your September 18, 6 p.m.,<sup>70</sup> just received. General Graves has simply delayed delivery until he can devise some method of guarding the rifles and ammunition as far as Irkutsk so that they will not fall into hostile hands. I entirely concur in the Department's conclusions that the contract should be carried out.

Replying to your September 19, 5 p.m.<sup>71</sup> I am planning to leave for Tokyo this week. I have remained longer than I expected in order to attend the conferences between Oi and Stevens.

MORRIS

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861.01/142: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *September 26, 1919, midnight.*

[Received September 27, 4:05 a.m.]

4370. Secretary of State from Polk.

Please let me know whether the Department is considering recognizing Kolchak. Matter is being urged here by the Russians. I

<sup>69</sup> From Vladivostok, Sept. 16, *post*, p. 514.

<sup>70</sup> To the Consul at Vladivostok, *post*, p. 515.

<sup>71</sup> Not printed.

have told them all that this matter must be taken up in Washington. I would like to know, if recognition is not to be granted, whether the Department is withdrawing support.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5283 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received September 27, 1919, 6:03 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"400. September 26, 10 a.m. Department's September 19, 5 p.m.<sup>72</sup> has created very favorable impression with Omsk Government. Harris."

TENNEY

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861.01/142 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1919, 7 p.m.

3270. For Polk.

Your 4370, September 26, midnight.

No change in policy. We are not withdrawing support of Kolchak. On the contrary we are continuing to ship rifles and President has just approved application of Russian Ambassador to buy on a credit basis surplus cloth and clothing for Kolchak forces. After submitting question to the President we have also approved purchase by Kolchak Government of Russian rouble notes<sup>73</sup> concerning which you will recall much discussion in the past. I am taking up with President question of Kolchak's recognition.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5288 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 28, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 3:13 p.m.]

3130. [For] Winslow.<sup>74</sup>

Churchill<sup>75</sup> calls on me and shows me dispatch addressed to himself by Admiral Kolchak dated 17th in which after declaring the

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<sup>72</sup> *Ante*, p. 424.

<sup>73</sup> See section on Release to the Kolchak Government of the Russian State Bank Notes Printed in the United States, pp. 453 ff.; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 72 ff.

<sup>74</sup> L. Lanier Winslow in the Office of the Counselor of the Department of State.

<sup>75</sup> Winston Churchill, British Secretary of State for War.

unshaken purpose of himself and his troops, Kolchak announces decree summoning legislative assembly and says "our external relations remain extremely difficult and have become additionally complicated in the last few days through a misunderstanding that has arisen between certain powers in the Far East". He complains of Allied hesitation in arriving at plan for military financial and economic assistance and delay in dealing with question of international status of Russian Government and invokes British aid toward an early decision. Churchill says British Government is definitely withdrawing from all theaters in Russia save that of Denikin and is concentrating its efforts in aiding him. He expects to induce Cabinet at once to authorize a further grant to Denikin of 14,000,000 pounds out of military supplies on hand and is hopeful of Denikin's ultimate success. He inquired whether it will not be possible for us to extend immediate aid to Denikin [*Kolchak?*] in winter clothing for his troops and other supplies fearing that otherwise he may collapse and chaos reign in Siberia outside of region controlled by Semenoff or Japanese. I gave him of course no assurances but transmit his views. Repeated American Mission, Paris.

DAVIS

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861.51/675 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1919, 5 p.m.

Your September 20, 10 a.m.<sup>76</sup> Loan has since gone through in regular course.

Department did everything possible in circumstances and told bankers we were committed to support Kolchak.

LANSING

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861.01/163a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1919, 5 p.m.

3296. For Polk.

You are confidentially informed that as soon as President Wilson is able to attend to business the Secretary is seriously considering recommending to him that formal recognition be granted to the Omsk Government. It is, however, the wish of the Secretary that you submit whatever information you can give as to the attitude

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<sup>76</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Chargé in China, Sept. 22, p. 430.

on this subject of the other members of the Council. The Department naturally wishes that the United States should take the lead if Kolchak is to be recognized, but I desire your opinion as to whether a simultaneous recognition by the five Powers which collectively agreed last May and June to aid the Omsk Government with food, supplies, and munitions would not be better.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5355a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1919, 6 p. m.

Please show to all other American representatives and give such publicity as you may deem advisable, informing Harris via Peking of your action:

The purpose of the United States to support the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates, as expressed in an exchange of notes in May and June, 1919 between the heads of the principal Allied and Associated Governments at Paris and Admiral Kolchak at Omsk, remains unchanged. In continuing its efforts to carry out this purpose, the Government of the United States is confident of the cooperation of all elements in Russia which are devoted to the establishment of democratic institutions among the Russian people.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5330 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 3, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received October 5, 7:45 p.m.]

[From Harris:]

The following telegram has been sent Ambassador Morris today:

“The situation at front is continually improving in favor of Kolchak forces. Tobolsk has been retaken and fall of Kurgan daily expected. Whole of third army rests on Tobol River. Whole of second army on an average not eight versts from Tobol. First army has frustrated flank movement of Reds on Ishim and are rapidly approaching Tobol River with no resistance. Position of Kolchak decidedly strengthened and all opposition to him in Omsk felt when you were here now disappeared. All reports received by me from Vice Consuls located along the railway line to the east indicate everything quiet. Counter-Kolchak movement in the Far East now apparently definitely exploded. Kolchak's convoking Zemstvo Council, committee of which now in session Omsk working out practical election plans has had decided influence in uniting all parties on Kolchak.

I consider this most favorable moment for you and me to again lay before Department your recommendations for assistance to Kolchak as set forth in your telegrams to the Department August 11, 11 a.m.,<sup>77</sup> and August 12, 5 a.m.,<sup>78</sup> upon which you and I were so thoroughly in accord when you left Omsk. What Kolchak now needs above all things is equipment and clothing for his army. As you know the speedy delivery of all rifles, the release of all bank notes and lottery bonds, and the final negotiations of Omsk Government with consortium, English and American bankers for a \$50,000,000 loan is very materially assisting Kolchak and is creating a better feeling here. While it may be impossible for our Government to comply with all the recommendations set forth in your August 11, 11 a.m., and August 12, 5 a.m., yet I am of the opinion that it is within the power of our Government to render sufficient assistance as shall be the crowning feature in saving Kolchak and holding this barrier against Bolshevism, which in my judgment, is now the only scrupulous [*sic*] and sound alternative. I am particularly anxious to have the Red Cross renew its work in Siberia and I believe that the time has come when this institution should again take up its work with redoubled efforts and carry to a successful consummation what has already been so splendidly and efficiently begun.

I feel sure that I can rely upon you to ably second me in this attempt and thus bring to the Russians the material help which so easily lies in our power to give and which is so badly needed by them."

I have been notified that an early evacuation of Czech soldiers from Siberia will shortly be commenced and that ten ships have been provided by American Government for this purpose. If this is true about 15,000 Czech soldiers will shortly be sent home leaving about 30,000 still in Siberia. This decision, if true, will create an excellent impression among Czechs here. In this connection, however, I respectfully suggest pursuing a policy of retaining as many Czech soldiers as possible during approaching winter to guard railway. When Czechs actually see that something tangible is really being done towards their home coming, in all likelihood the majority would be willing to guard railway until spring. Such an arrangement would obviate the necessity of sending further American soldiers to Siberia even though such a plan were under consideration, and it would enable Omsk Government to concentrate all available forces on the Bolshevik front.

During the next few months many items embodied in the \$200,000,000 loan mentioned by Ambassador Morris<sup>79</sup> might be approached from different angles, at least they are open questions which may be further considered and modified in the light of new and changing conditions. I have not yet lost faith in the possibility

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<sup>77</sup> *Ante*, p. 408.

<sup>78</sup> *Ante*, p. 410.

<sup>79</sup> In his telegram of Aug. 11, 11 a.m., *ante*, p. 408.

of the Russian people being able to do much in their own behalf to extricate themselves from their present difficulties, especially so if a full measure of moral support be afforded them on the part of the Allies as for example in the shape of recognition. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5248 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1919, 2 p.m.

For Heid. Consulate's 511, September 20, 10 a.m.

Suggest you read reference in Consul's 518, September 24, 4 p.m.<sup>80</sup> His recommendations for rendering economic aid differ somewhat from yours. Considerable of the material to be sold to the Cooperative Societies is in process of shipment by rail to the coast by the War Department and the Department is willing to have this material go forward believing it better to do this than to allow promises in the contracts which have been signed to be broken.

After full consideration of your own and other similar reports from Vladivostok and vicinity, this Government, in fulfillment of undertaking of the President and his associates at Paris, will continue nevertheless to assist Admiral Kolchak and to relieve to whatever extent possible the economic distress of the people of Siberia. The Department appreciates thoroughly the existing difficulties but feels that these only make more imperative the continuance, with whatever promise of success, of efforts to bring about more normal conditions of life among the people.

Copies of contract between Cooperatives and War Department<sup>80</sup> have been mailed to you, and owing to shipments of material being under way the Department believes you should defer proceeding to Washington. We have endeavored without result to date to obtain from the War Department full particulars of your appointment as well as instructions as to how you should draw salary for the three months mentioned in your telegram. Hope to advise you shortly.

LANSING

861.00/5377 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, October 11, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received 11:22 p.m.]

Your October 7, 1 p.m.<sup>80</sup> I heartily concur in Harris's conclusion<sup>81</sup> that now is the time to give Kolchak every practicable sup-

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

<sup>81</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Chargé in China, Oct. 3, 3 p.m., p. 437.



port. My difficulty is in suggesting how this can be done effectively. The three things which he needs are troops to take the place of the Czechs, credits for supplies, economic and military, and inspectors to organize and supervise distribution.

As to the first it is clear that we cannot send additional troops.

As to the second I assumed that this question is involved in the larger problem of international credits, on which I understand McCormick and his colleagues are now working and which will require congressional action following the ratification of the peace treaty.

As to the third, I realize that it is difficult if not impossible to obtain competent American[s] to volunteer for inspection service in Siberia. In addition, our experience under the railway agreement has demonstrated not only how greatly Russians resent and oppose any system of foreign inspection but also how ill-prepared we are to undertake such a task among people of different language and different custom.

It has been suggested that it would be practicable to ask Japan to supply all the troops, Great Britain to supply the necessary inspectors and the United States to supply the credits. The essential difficulty of such a plan is that in the first place it presumes a spirit of cooperation from Japan which our recent experiences in eastern Siberia hardly justify. In the second place it would appear to me impractical to ask Congressional action for authority to extend credits whose distribution would be supervised by British inspectors. It is of course possible to grant Kolchak recognition of his government as a *de facto* Siberian Government (he could hardly ask it under present conditions) and then extend to his government a blanket credit to be allotted entirely under Russian supervision. This would be in effect a repetition by us of the experiment made by France and Great Britain last winter. I do not know how much Great Britain put into this experiment but I have been informed by French representatives that the cost to France, including the maintenance of the Czechs, was approximately 700,000,000 francs. I do know that British and French representatives were emphatic in their statement that the experiment had demonstrated to them the utter futility of trying to give assistance without adequate supervision.

These were the considerations which led me to submit the compromise plan suggested in my Sept. 23, 5 p.m.<sup>84</sup> from Vladivostok and which recommended continued supervision of railway operation provided we could reach an understanding with Japan; an Allied committee for economic relief which would require some supervision of the port of Vladivostok; limited credits for military supplies to Kolchak; and vigorous prosecution of Red Cross work. To this

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<sup>84</sup>Ante, p. 432.

might be added a *de facto* recognition of Kolchak's government but I did not then suggest recognition and do not now because of my personal conviction that mere recognition without immediate and substantial assistance would not in itself give the Kolchak government the strength necessary better to control the general situation, but would on the contrary only add to the difficulties we are now facing in eastern Siberia.

MORRIS

861.00/5378

*The British Appointed Ambassador on Special Mission (Grey) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 13th October, 1919.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I cabled to the Foreign Office on Friday, giving the information and asking the question which you had desired me to ask about possible Naval co-operation at Vladivostock. To this cable I have not yet received any reply, but I received this morning a cable from the Foreign Office expressing great apprehension at the possibility of American support to Koltchak being withdrawn or suspended. Lord Curzon says that all his information agrees that Admiral Koltchak's fall would involve the extension of Bolshevism throughout Siberia and that without the necessary supplies it is a practical certainty that he will not be able to maintain himself. This refers more particularly to a loan of \$7,000,000 promised by American bankers to Koltchak for the purchase of military supplies, the withdrawal of which seems to have been threatened, and the immediate handing over of 14,000 rifles purchased in America which are now at Vladivostock.

In the meanwhile the British representative at Omsk has been instructed to exercise a moderating influence with Admiral Koltchak as regards the internal administration of the country, but Lord Curzon's information is to the effect that the Admiral's control over Semenoff and Kalmikoff is at present very imperfect owing to lack of strength.

Yours sincerely,

GREY OF F[ALLODON]

861.01/134: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1919, 4 p.m.

The President's serious illness precludes for the time being the possibility of a decision as to the matters discussed in your 386,

September 19, 5 p.m.,<sup>86</sup> but they will be taken up at the earliest possible moment.

LANSING

861.01/153 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

VLADIVOSTOK, October 16, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received October 17, 1:45 a.m.]

550. [From Smith:]

[“]English Acting High Commissioner, showed me copy of telegram sent by English Secretary of State to British Ambassador at Washington to tell American Department of State that all English authorities in Siberia agree that it is either Kolchak or the spread of Bolshevism over Siberia. He has sent reply to the Foreign Office and at the same time forwarded a copy to the British Ambassador at Washington, in which he asked that his name be excluded from this list. I know that he has not sent telegram of this import to London,<sup>87</sup> for none of the English here seem to hold that idea and I have talked to many of the English officers in Siberia and none of them have ever said to me such statements, and those who have been to Omsk have been more condemnatory of the Government than these here. General Knox told me then nothing could be done here without the confidence of the people behind the Government. This telegram has been shown to the Acting High Commissioner and has his sanction. Smith.”

Repeated to Tokyo.

MACGOWAN

861.01/155 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received October 17, 1919, 4:45 p.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk:

424. October 16, 8 p.m. Soukine informs me that [Churchill] has telegraphed to Kolchak October 14th informing him that British Parliament has granted a further £14,000,000 to Denikin. He also stated that England is not in a position to further support Kolchak with money or equipment.

<sup>86</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Chargé in China, Sept. 22, p. 427.

<sup>87</sup> i.e., that English representatives in Siberia favor support of Kolchak?

Soukine stated that Kolchak is now entirely dependent upon American support.

I cannot urge upon the Department too strongly the necessity of hastening by every available means the equipment, and especially clothing for the Siberian soldiers. In another month this country will be in grip of Siberian winter and the soldiers face to face with extremely cold weather. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5378

*The Secretary of State to the British Appointed Ambassador on Special Mission (Grey)*

WASHINGTON, *October 21, 1919.*

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your note of the 13th concerning the situation in Siberia.

The Russian Embassy at Washington informs me that the loan with private bankers, to which you refer, has been consummated.

The delay in the delivery of the 14,000 rifles which you mention was due chiefly to the difficulty of assuring their safe transit through the territory east of Lake Baikal which, as you are aware, is the theatre of operations by Cossack leaders yielding hardly more than a nominal obedience to the Government at Omsk. The rifles are now in the course of delivery or may have already been delivered.

I have been pleased to observe from the most recent reports that the situation in eastern Siberia is greatly improved. The energetic measures which were taken seem to have removed for the present the causes of our earlier anxiety.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/5445 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *October 21, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received 6:25 p.m.]

558. O'Reilly, Acting British High Commissioner, today informed me he had been recalled urgently on account of his attitude toward Kolchak, which I was criticising. Repeated to Tokyo and Omsk.

MACGOWAN

861.01/160: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 24, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 3:20 p.m.]

4796. For the Secretary of State from Polk.

Your telegram[s] in regard to recognition of Kolchak received. I spoke to the British as I reported but Eyre Crowe<sup>89</sup> apparently has no instructions. Pichon seems to be entirely in favor of it being done and thinks now is the time to do so. I suggest that if you are in favor of recognition of Kolchak, the United States should take the lead as Great Britain and France are merely waiting for an opportunity to follow. In view of all the help given Denikin by England, I think it would help our prestige to take the lead in recognition. As Petrograd may be taken soon it would be better to grant recognition now, if you intend ultimately to grant recognition, rather than to wait.

I had a conversation with Lvoff<sup>90</sup> and he begged earnestly for recognition of Kolchak at the earliest possible moment. He said that, in his opinion, it would help in keeping in check the reactionary army people, also he stated that the Russians were having a great deal of trouble with Secretary Baker in regard to Russian supplies. He said that the British had done a great deal, not only for Denikin but for Kolchak but apparently we had not been able to deliver supplies we expected to deliver owing to the opposition of the Secretary of War.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

861.01/162: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 22 [25], 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received October 26, 7:42 a.m.]

4825. Following translation of note transmitted on the 18th instant to the French Government by the Russian Embassy at Paris is communicated for the Department's information.

"Besides reasons of a political nature favoring the immediate recognition of the government of Admiral Kolchak as the national government of Russia, this recognition for financial and economic reasons can no longer be delayed without gravely injuring the vital interests of Russia.

The economic recovery of Russia and the consolidation of public order in the interior of the country necessitates from now on the importation on a large scale of instruments of production, manu-

<sup>89</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe, member of the British delegation at the Peace Conference.

<sup>90</sup> Prince George E. Lvov, former premier of the Russian Provisional Government.

factured goods, and war material. Especially concerning the war material, credits which were opened in this respect to Russia by the Allied and Associated Powers, are much inferior to the real needs of the national armies. Russia is therefore obliged to undertake direct purchases on foreign markets. The exportation of raw materials, in virtue of which Russia soon [ordinarily] paid for her purchases abroad being necessarily limited at the present time owing to the lack of means of transport and to the complete domestic [economic] disorganization, the Provisional Government is obliged to have recourse to gold exportation as a means of payment.

It is needless to add that the Provisional Government cannot continue this without causing an irreparable prejudice to the economic and financial future of Russia. The gradual exhaustion of gold reserves would make the improvement of the monetary system of Russia impossible and at the same time jeopardize the means of reimbursement of its foreign debt, the liquidation of which the Provisional Government has deemed as its first duty to assume.

Under these circumstances the only way to provide for the most urgent needs of Russia without jeopardizing its economic and financial future consists in opening credits abroad for the payment of purchases. Now it is impossible for Russia to procure credits abroad to an extent corresponding with these needs as long as she does not possess an officially recognized government. Consequently considering the declaration of May 27th [26th] of this year by which the Allied and Associated Governments promised their assistance to Admiral Kolchak<sup>21</sup> it would be especially urgent that the Allied and Associated Powers no longer delay the recognition of the Russian Provisional Government".

#### AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5545 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 31, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 9:20 p.m.]

[From Harris at Omsk:]

452. Bolsheviki continue to advance rapidly with superior forces. By flank movement they are now about 30 versts south of Petropavlovsk and approaching through open country away from railway. On morning of 28th they were 83 versts [northwest?] of Petropavlovsk on railway line. Situation is critical.

The Government has practically decided upon a general evacuation of Omsk. Kolchak also insists that all heads of departments should retire Irkutsk and establish Government there. The gold is now being loaded but will not be sent away from Omsk until Kolchak himself leaves. The foreign missions will remain as long as the Government.

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<sup>21</sup> Ante, p. 367.

With the rapid developments of the past ten days on this front, because of the reported defeat of Yudenitch near Petrograd and the checkmating of Denekine, it appears the Bolsheviki have scored on all fronts and are gaining a new lease of life. At this critical stage I again place before the Department the extreme seriousness of the situation. While there is nothing immediately alarming yet it may shortly become so. I reiterate that if Kolchak falls Bolshevism will extend at least to Lake Baikal. I respectfully suggest that the Department take the initiative [in urging?] Prague government to issue an order for 25,000 Czechs to advance to this front and save the situation. At the same time I respectfully suggest that the Allies recognize Kolchak. Such a step would strengthen Kolchak in the same degree as it would dishearten the Bolsheviki. The time has now arrived to make the issue clean cut. Any delay simply encourages and spreads Bolshevism and all that it stands for. All other governments in Russia opposed to Bolshevism have recognized Kolchak. Why do the Allies delay longer? I am now satisfied that Kolchak cannot last much longer unaided and the above suggestions appear the only way out. The Siberian Army is fighting well, yet if the Bolsheviki continue to advance as rapidly as at present Omsk will fall in four weeks' time. It is believed that at least 50 percent of the Czech soldiers are willing to fight the Bolsheviki again, and thus secure their return home across European Russia. The situation is extremely serious and urgent. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.24/214

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

On June 12<sup>92</sup> of this year, the Allied and Associated Powers informed Admiral Kolchak that they are disposed to assist Admiral Kolchak's Government and his associates with munitions, supplies and food in order that they may establish themselves as the Government of All-Russia.

This solemn announcement not only gave new hopes to the Russian National Movement but encouraged the patriotic forces to a decisive offensive against the Bolsheviki canker.

In this connection attention should be drawn to the situation as it has developed at present with regard to the different fronts of the United Russian National Army.

While General Denikin's front is still being sufficiently supplied with munitions by Great Britain, the situation is far from satisfactory in the Northwest and Siberia.

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<sup>92</sup> *Ante*, p. 379.

It is inadequate supply which is causing delay in the Petrograd operation and jeopardising the heroic efforts of General Yudenich's army.

A still more dangerous situation is developing in Siberia. Heretofore the Siberian Army has been dependent mostly on supplies from Great Britain. Recently the Russians have been advised that hereafter Great Britain will not be able to supply both General Denikin's and the Siberian army and consequently the Siberian front will have to depend on other, if any, sources.

Conditions are thus created which not only hamper the final crushing of Bolshevism to the great detriment of all the civilized nations and to the Russian people, whose sufferings are thus prolonged, but will undoubtedly lead to further confusion in the minds of the Russian people and to doubts as to the earnestness of the purpose of the Powers and their readiness to fulfill the promise of support, the moral right to which the Russian patriots keenly feel on account of the enormous sacrifices of the Russian people in the world war.

It is the extreme seriousness of the approaching moment and grave concern for the irreparable consequences, which may follow, which prompts the Russian Embassy to bring with all sincerity the situation to the attention of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, *November 3, 1919.*

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861.01/160 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *November 6, 1919, 4 p.m.*

3686. For Polk.

Your 4796, October 24, 11 a.m.

In spite of recent untoward events in Siberia, consideration is still being given to the possibility of recognizing Kolchak in case he survives the present crisis.

I shall keep you currently informed.

LANSING

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861.00/5869

*The Russian Chargé (De Bach) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *November 18, 1919.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the absence of the Ambassador, I have the honor to submit to you the translation of a note which the Russian Embassy is instructed to transmit to the United States Government.

I avail [etc.]

HENRY DE BACH



[Enclosure]

*Admiral Kolchak to the American Government*

Extreme difficulties in supplying the troops on the Siberian front and the superiority in numbers of the Bolsheviks, obliged the Siberian troops to retreat and temporarily to relinquish Omsk—the seat of the Russian Government. Similar to the conditions on the front which forced the French Government in 1914, to leave Paris, the Russian Government temporarily transfers its seat to Irkutsk. The Russian Government makes this sacrifice in order to preserve the army for further struggle against the Bolsheviks. The high morale revealed by the troops in the heavy fighting of the last few months sustains in the Government the unshaken faith that after a rest and strengthening of the Siberian troops with men and equipment, the army will again acquire a powerful offensive impetus. The awakening of the national spirit in the Russian people in their struggle with the Bolshevik-internationalists, usurpers of power, and the strengthening in the population of hatred for the terrorists, permit the Government to regard with confidence the future with entire faith in the final triumph. The flight of the masses of the population before the advancing Bolsheviks is a striking proof of the popular hatred for them. The workmen of the Votkinsk, Ijevsk, and Zlatoust works, practically without exception, fled from the Bolsheviks; the peasants of the Volga region, Ural and of part of Western Siberia, the Cossacks of Orenbourg and of Siberia left their homes with their wives and children to evade the violence of the Bolshevik bands. Reconciliation with the Bolsheviks, hatred for whom has so deeply rooted itself in the people, is impossible. There remains only a merciless fight until the Soviet power is absolutely destroyed.

Russia calls the attention of the Allied powers to the fact that in making innumerable sacrifices in her fight with the Bolsheviks, she is thereby carrying out not only her own national aims, but is struggling against a world danger—Bolshevism, which to a certain extent threatens all the nations of the universe; in particular, Bolshevism in Siberia is a serious menace to all countries in Asia. The Russian Government which has always been unshakenly loyal to its Allies during the great war, appeals to the Governments of the friendly nations of America, England, France, Japan, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and China, with the confidence that they will not discontinue their further support and aid. Under such circumstances the Russian Government which heads all the Russian forces fighting against the Bolsheviks, will be firmly assured that it will bring the struggle to a victorious end.

**ADMIRAL KOLCHAK**

861.00/5818

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

1. The supply of munitions to the national forces in Russia is an indispensable element to any program of assistance. This is conditioned by the fact that the Bolsheviki rule has developed into a purely military organization where a handful of politicians are ruling the country through and by means of a military machine.

This machine cannot be destroyed within any reasonable period of time except by force.

2. These conditions will govern in so far as time is considered of essence in the case. Left alone Russia would certainly free herself but this process would undoubtedly be extremely lengthy and in its development reveal social decomposition and decay, contaminating adjacent bodies or leading to a seizure of a destitute Russia by reviving imperialistic forces.

The process of contamination may not be passive altogether. The military machine of the Russian Bolshevik, if freed from internal entanglements, would sweep westward imposing Soviet rule on a prostrated Europe.

3. One can appreciate that certain American opinion resents the shipment of munitions which appears as supporting the continuation of civil war. This however is but an appearance. The facts as they really stand are that pacification in Russia is possible only with the downfall of the Bolsheviks and sending munitions does not increase the number of victims but reduces them.

4. Paramount however is this: whether the whole of the Russian situation is to be considered from a sentimental point of view, i.e., as assistance to a people in distress or the problem of restitution of Russia will be dealt with in the light of general international and primarily American interests, economic and political.

As soon as the Russian problem is viewed as an indispensable element of *consolidation of victory*, outside of which the aims of the war cannot be attained and all the sacrifice of manpower and material may be rendered futile, Russia appears to be a problem to be judged not only by sentiment or abstract political standards but as an issue imperatively demanding a rational foreseen solution of a certain practical conjuncture.

5. The struggle going on in Russia is the most important and far-reaching element of the greater contest embracing the whole of the world. It is a part of the fight between *national democracy* and *international class rule*, which meanwhile is revealing itself in social disruption and economic anarchy and which later will unavoidably lead to the restitution of autocracy and economic imperialism.

This contest is uncompromising in its very nature. There is and can be no place for neutrality. The Russian situation can be properly met only if viewed from the standpoint of this struggle.

[WASHINGTON,] *November 26, 1919.*

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861.00/5798 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, *December 2, 1919.*

[Received 3:34 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Irkutsk has been sent to Tokyo, Vladivostok.

"490, December 1, 6 p.m. New Cabinet just formed seeking scapegoats for recent failures. In all probability some general will be held responsible for military defeat. Soukine apparently will be made answerable for failure of Allies to recognize Kolchak, as it is thought America has been and is friendly to Bolsheviki. Soukine is to be criticised for his strong American orientation, which has brought no definite results. He is also being criticised for his anti-Japanese policy.

Hoyer and Novitsky will be held accountable to [*for*] financial muddle as well as for their pro-American sympathy.

It seems that new Cabinet ministers are laboring under impression that America has Bolshevik leanings and I am informed that the immediate new policy will be to nurse Japanese influence.

Held long conference today with Tretiakoff, new Minister of Foreign Affairs. He desired me to thank the American Government for splendid assistance given by Red Cross units and railway engineers, and hopes that our Government will not change its attitude but continue this support and assistance as heretofore. Tretiakoff [stated] that new Cabinet would make its struggle with Bolshevism the main thing and would continue to fight with all the means at its disposal.

I would respectfully point out to the Department that this present moment is a very serious one for the reason that as matters now actually stand Bolshevism has triumphed in western Siberia and Japanese influence has penetrated to Lake Baikal. Owing to the grip of Japanese on Cossack atamans in Trans-Baikal, Japan is now the dominant factor in the Pacific section.

Just at this moment the [pro-]Japanese members apparently feel that Japan is in a position to help them. I am not prepared to state that they are ready to make any definite proposals or to ask assistance of the Japanese, but it is not unlikely that Japanese orientation is under headway. I shall do all in my power to cultivate good relations with this new Cabinet and trust that my efforts [to convince?] them that our Government is still greatly interested in Russian affairs

will not be unsuccessful. On the other hand I would respectfully request the Department to carefully consider what may still be done to give economic and material help to Siberia and to assist if possible in suggesting some way out of the present financial difficulty.

Every one here is particularly interested in knowing what attitude the American Government will adopt in view of recent Bolshevik successes. Harris.[""]

TENNEY

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861.00/5798 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1919, 5 p.m.

Harris informs me that he has repeated to you his 490, December 1, 6 p.m.<sup>94</sup> concerning the attitude of the new Siberian Cabinet towards the United States and Japan respectively.

Pursuant to the last paragraph of my November 19, 3 p.m.<sup>95</sup> I shall leave it to you to inform Harris of the attitude of this Government. I think that he should know first, that in contrast with what appeared to be a disposition on the part of the Japanese to encourage the elimination of Kolchak, our attitude has been favorable to Kolchak, in the sense of the telegram just cited; and, second, that definite measures of economic assistance to Russia are in preparation, although the recommendations mentioned in the next to last paragraph of the message of November 19th have not yet come to the President's attention and cannot be more than hinted at in any conversations which you may have with the Japanese or Harris with the Russians.

In view of the foregoing it is obvious that the Kolchak Government will make a very serious mistake, from the point of view solely of its own interests, if it should adopt toward the United States a disgruntled or unfriendly attitude.

The Japanese Ambassador has not yet spoken to me concerning the situation in Siberia. If he does so I shall speak to him along the lines laid down in my November 19, 3 p. m. to you, and I may also emphasize one or two points respecting future policy in Russia which I have incorporated in a report to the President.

The following excerpts from that report are repeated to you for your information:

"The issue of the struggle cannot be foretold but I am confident that the cynical and unmoral opportunism of Lenin and his followers will not in the end prevail. It may fall before military successes of

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<sup>94</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Chargé in China, Dec. 2, *supra*.

<sup>95</sup> *Post*, p. 597.

organized anti-Bolshevik movements operating openly in the field, or it may fall before less obvious forces working within the territory which the Bolsheviki now control and among those who have heretofore willingly or unwillingly accepted their domination. Events must take their course; but it lies within the right and interest, if not within the duty, of the United States and the other enlightened nations of the earth, to encourage by all available means the creation of a situation favorable to the rapid movement of events through the natural channels marked out for them by the interplay of purely Russian factors toward the establishment of a Russian government resting on the collective will of the Russian people and concerning itself with Russian affairs.

In considering the more precise nature of our future course, a clear distinction must be made between the Bolsheviki and what has come to be known by somewhat fortuitous association of events as Bolshevism. The Bolsheviki in the proper sense of the term are one wing of the Russian Social Democratic party. In 1903 differences arose in this party on the question of tactics. The other wing, known as the Mensheviki, have supported the view that they should arrive at the fulfilment of their party program by the accepted means of convincing the majority. They have advocated in this respect the principles of democracy. The Bolsheviki, led by Lenin, have stood, on the contrary, for a small, centralized and highly disciplined group of active workers who should bring about a minority revolution and establish thereby 'the dictatorship of the proletariat', or forceful control of the state by a small, militant section of the unpropertied elements of the population. Such has been the history of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. In practical application of this doctrine the Bolshevik government has developed into a military dictatorship controlled by the small group immediately surrounding Lenin. Although two years have elapsed since this group came into power, there has been no important change, except by death, in its personnel. With the aid of their immediate and devoted followers they have built up the Red Army, the man-power for which is chiefly supplied by the conscription of peasants, and the military leadership in part by the enrollment of officers of the old régime, whose families are held as hostages for their loyal behavior. Against this machine it may be that only force will prevail.

What is commonly known as Bolshevism, on the other hand, is a popular state of mind growing out of the war and past abuses. It is compounded of demoralization and protest. It furnishes many misguided recruits to the ranks of the Bolsheviki and imparts to their movement the recurrent flushes of popular vitality which help to sustain it against the military attacks of its enemies. Bolshevism, thus conceived, is obviously not to be conquered by force. It is pre-eminently an economic and moral phenomenon against which economic and moral remedies alone will prevail. While recognizing the practical necessity, in certain contingencies, of supporting with military supplies the forces which seek to oust the Bolsheviki from the seat of government, I desire to emphasize above all the vital need for relieving as soon as possible the economic distress which fomented and perpetuates the popular state of mind called Bolshevism."

It is felt that the foregoing is especially applicable to the situation in Siberia where the apparent discomfiture of the Japanese military has been due chiefly it seems to a failure on their part to grasp the true nature of Bolshevism, as apart from the activities of the group at Moscow, and the need for combating it by pacific rather than by military means.

LANSING

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Release to the Kolchak Government of the Russian State Bank Notes Printed in the United States

861.51/472 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1919, 7 p.m.

Referring to your 49, January 23, 10 p.m.<sup>2</sup> regarding Russian rouble notes shipped to Vladivostok and now held in Manila, please ascertain tentatively and report to Department whether Omsk authorities can arrange to have these notes surcharged with a legend which will indicate clearly that they are obligations of the Omsk government and not of the Russian State Bank. If this can be done it is also important that they should consent to operation being under your supervision so that you can deliver the notes to the Omsk Government only when they had been properly surcharged.

POLK

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861.51/489 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received February 13, 1919, 11:06 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Novo Nikolajevsk.

"109. February 12, 8 p.m. Referring Department's February 4, 7 p.m. Omsk Government states unequivocally that it is willing to have notes surcharged at any time desired and to indicate clearly on notes that they are liability solely of Omsk Government. Also willing consent operation being under my supervision. I await Department's further instructions this matter. Harris."

REINSCH

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 96 ff.

861.51/495 g : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1919, 6 p. m.

For Heid,<sup>3</sup> also for Morris and repeat to Consul-General Harris:

The consignment of Russian rouble notes diverted to Manila is being returned to Vladivostok by the next transport and will be delivered by General Graves to Heid. The notes are being returned on the understanding that a portion of them amounting to 500,000,000 roubles will be delivered to the Omsk authorities after first being properly surcharged under the supervision of American authorities with a legend which will show unmistakably that they are obligations of the Omsk Government and not of the Russian State Bank. Please arrange, therefore, to forward to Consul General Harris at Omsk a portion of these rouble notes, amounting to 500,000,000 roubles.

The contract between the Provisional Government of Russia, which ordered these rouble notes printed in 1917, and the American Banknote Company, apparently provides that a representative of the company shall be present when the shipment is delivered. Consequently it may be necessary for the company's representative to accompany the shipment of 500,000,000 roubles to Omsk; balance of shipment should be held in your custody in escrow.

Please advise Department what arrangements you make for carrying out these instructions.

War Department not yet advised when transport will sail from Manila to Vladivostok.

PHILLIPS

861.51/532 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1919, 5 p. m.

For Harris:

You are hereby authorized to effect, by arrangement with the authorities at Omsk, the surcharging of the Russian rouble notes now held at Vladivostok by Heid. Heid may consider this cable as authority to deliver notes in order to enable you to carry out these instructions.

<sup>3</sup> August Heid, representative at Vladivostok of the War Trade Board.

The notes are to be surcharged in the Russian language with the following legend: "Issued 1919 by the authority of the Government at Omsk."

In effecting the surcharging of the notes with the above legend you are to obtain formal assurance from the Omsk authorities that this legend is to be interpreted as indicating clearly and without ambiguity, that the Omsk Government alone is the authority pursuant to which the rouble notes in question will have been issued. Upon receiving such formal assurance you will deliver to the Omsk authorities notes duly surcharged to the value of 500,000,000 roubles. You will hold the balance in escrow subject to further instructions from the Department.

POLK

861.51/578 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Harbin, to the Acting Secretary of State*

HARBIN, *May 4 [14<sup>th</sup>], 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received May 14, 9:20 p.m.]

218. Referring to Department's April 18th [15<sup>th</sup>], 5 p.m. I consider it practically impossible to surcharge notes in question. It would take one man with hand press 2,500 days to surcharge same. Impossible to get presses and men for this work. Recommend all the fifty-kopek notes which do not have to be surcharged be immediately released to Omsk Government. Recommend that further twenty-five and hundred notes to the value of 475,000,000 roubles also be immediately handed to me to be released to Omsk Government without surcharging, as the necessity for this money is urgent just now to save financial situation. Please devise some means, by publication or otherwise, to show that these notes are not obligations of Russian State Bank. Let the declarations remain in escrow pending further arrangements by Department.

Before leaving Vladivostok I attended two meetings of Inter-Allied Railway Committee, which discussed finances. In Harbin have thoroughly discussed situation with Stevens<sup>4</sup> and he is in accord with this telegram. On certain sections of Chinese Eastern the workmen are on strike because they cannot be paid. There is grave danger of a catastrophe unless something is immediately done. If these notes are released to me for delivery to Omsk Government along the lines indicated, I will work on basis of thorough understanding with Omsk Government which is ready to give every

<sup>4</sup> John F. Stevens, president of the Technical Board for the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian railways.



[apparent omission]. I will also work in close harmony with Inter-Allied Railway Committee and with Stevens in this matter.

HARRIS

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861.51/648: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1919, 7 p.m.

For Morris.

Consul's 346 [347], August 6, noon.<sup>4a</sup> Department would like your views as to delivery of bank notes to representatives of Kolchak. Department's December 27, 7 p.m.<sup>5</sup> to Vladivostok, repeated to Harris, explains.

At the time the bank notes were refused delivery Treasury Department took position that these bank notes were ordered by the recognized Kerensky Government for issue by the State Bank of that Government and were purchased from American loans to that Government; consequently, if the United States having assisted in the licensing of export and transportation by army transport of these notes, were to be a party to their delivery to unrecognized authorities for circulation by a bank which was not the State Bank of Russia that, then, the United States would necessarily be implicated in an improper use of the notes in question unless they could first be surcharged to show their changed character.

The matter was also referred to the French, British and Japanese Governments for comment. The British Government took the position that the notes should certainly not be delivered without being first surcharged. The French Government believed that the political situation was so urgent that the notes should be delivered forthwith. No reply received from Japan, to inquiries through their Embassy here.

In discussing this matter later at Paris American representatives with the Mission took a contrary view, namely, that until the notes should be countersigned they were merely pieces of paper of no value or standing and that, consequently, if this Government prevented their delivery it would be gratuitously assuming an obligation in a transaction in which, otherwise, it would have no responsibility at all.

This matter has been discussed further since the return of Mr. McCormick and Mr. Norman Davis from Paris. The present view seems to be that while in retrospect it might possibly have been better to have taken no cognizance at all of the shipment or delivery of these

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<sup>4a</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 96-97.

notes, it would, nevertheless, seem that, having actually taken a definite stand the Government cannot readily divest itself of some responsibility if the notes are released to unrecognized authorities. A suggestion has been made by the Russian Embassy here that possibly the Embassy could reimburse the Treasury Department for the American credits used to have these notes printed, the idea being that such action would render the notes Russian property in which the United States had no interest or responsibility.

Department hopes this will make the situation clear and would be glad to have any suggestions which occur to you from your observations in Siberia, and having in mind the favorable attitude toward the Government of Admiral Kolchak which has been announced by the President.

LANSING

861.00/5021 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

[Extract \*]

OMSK, August 12, 1919, 5 a.m.

[Received August 13, 7:34 p.m.]

. . . . .

I recommend the release of the notes at Vladivostok although I appreciate the difficulties suggested in your August 8, 7 p.m. I doubt whether the Kolchak Government can or will use them under present conditions; but if requested I think Heid should be instructed to deliver them. The establishment of the yen in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria would in my judgment be most unfortunate. We have no American banks interested in the proposal to buy rubles; the French and British banks will, I think, accept the proposal; and the Japanese banks will, of course, refuse.

. . . . .

MORRIS

861.51/703

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Russian Financial Attaché (Ughet)*

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. UGHET: In response to your letter of September 22nd,<sup>7</sup> I beg to inform you that there would seem to be no objection to the

\* Complete text, *ante*, p. 410.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

Embassy's proposal to sell to Admiral Kolchak's Government certain unexecuted Russian ruble notes which were printed in this country. I understand that part of the notes in question is now lying at Vladivostok, and that the balance, or such portion of the notes as may not be under direct control of the Embassy, is in the custody of the Sub-Treasurer of the United States at San Francisco.

In compliance with the request of the Embassy, Mr. Heid, at Vladivostok, has accordingly been instructed to deliver to the duly authorized representative of the Government of Admiral Kolchak such ruble notes as may be in his custody, and at the same time I am informing the Treasury that the notes held at San Francisco are to be delivered to such representative of the Embassy as the Ambassador may designate, and assume that you will inform the Treasury Department who is to receive the notes under the circumstances.

I should add that the Department offers no objection to this transaction on the understanding that there has now been paid to the accounts of the Russian Embassy, arising from American funds advanced to Russia and which have heretofore been disbursed only with the acquiescence of the Treasury Department, the sum of \$650,000, representing fifty percent of the cost of manufacture of the bank notes in question, and that the balance of the total cost of \$1,239,000, namely, \$589,000, will be deposited to the same accounts on or before January 1, 1920, in completion of the purchase price which you tell me has been agreed to by the Government of Admiral Kolchak.

I understand furthermore that in the event that the Government of Admiral Kolchak fails to fulfill the terms of payment as indicated above, the Embassy will then withhold from shipment to Russia an equal quantity of ruble notes of the same series and denominations from the supply which you state is now being printed by the American Bank Note Company under contract with Admiral Kolchak's Government.

I am [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

861.51/680

*The Russian Financial Attaché (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

1-5766

NEW YORK, *September 29, 1919.*

[Received September 30.]

MY DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 26th inst., in which you state that the Department of State would have no objection to sell to Admiral Kolchak's Government bank notes which were printed in this country.

I consider that the conditions stated in your letter concerning the release of the bank notes are quite acceptable and I take this oppor-

tunity to thank you most sincerely for the help rendered by you to the Russian Government in this question.

I am [etc.]

S. UGHET

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**American Attempts to Avoid Entanglement in the Factional Strife in Eastern Siberia**

861.00/3587

*The French Chargé (De Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Translation <sup>9</sup>]

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918.

[Received December 26.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to inform you, by direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic, that the French and English Governments have agreed upon the following determination of the relations of Generals Janin<sup>10</sup> and Knox<sup>11</sup> to each other in their respective commands: General Janin would be in chief command of all the Allied, Russian and allogeneous troops in eastern Russia and west of Lake Baikal in Siberia. General Knox, as his assistant, would be in charge of the services in the rear, with the special duty of providing all the contingents at the front with the needed supplies.

In directing me to acquaint you with this arrangement which, it doubts not, will meet with the Federal Government's approval, my Government calls attention to the fact that it does not in any way alter the position previously taken in principle about the recognition of the powers and duties of the Japanese High Command over all the Allied forces operating east of the Baikal.

In my Government's judgment, the splitting of the command in the eastern and western parts of Siberia, which is justified by the requirements of the command itself, should not in any way tend to weaken the homogeneousness of the Russian contingents or prevent their being utilized out of the section in either zone where they may happen to be.

The recent occurrences at Omsk indeed have shown the true advantage there is in asserting the political solidarity of the two Siberian regions by a physical support of western Siberia by eastern Siberia. To keep the communications over the Trans-Siberian open and to carry, if the necessity arises, Russian forces organized in

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<sup>9</sup> File translation revised.

<sup>10</sup> Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army, supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army.

<sup>11</sup> Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F. Knox, commanding the British troops in Siberia.

eastern Siberia to the Ural front, are two conditions that must be fulfilled if that support is to be efficacious.

The Government of the Republic suggests to that end, that in order to insure the safekeeping of the Trans-Siberian, mixed detachments be formed with American and Japanese contingents in equal numbers which would be distributed at the main points of the line. Beside the military advantage to be derived from placing at General Janin's disposal Russian contingents raised or maintained by the Japanese Government, the suggested utilization of those detachments would likely bring to an end the grave difficulties brought upon eastern Siberia by the dissenting and turbulent elements which operate there far from the base of their autonomous action and may at any time stir up fresh trouble.

My Government would be glad if the foregoing suggestions were favorably entertained by the Federal Government and if instructions in that sense were sent to the American military authorities in Russia.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

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861.00/3580 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[PEKING,] *January 3, 1919.*

[Received January 4, 10:42 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"5. 3d. For Department. Situation in Trans-Baikal according résumé of report by Vice Consul Thomas, Chita.

Semenoff has constituted himself commander of the eastern Siberian Army. He suggests no [other] reason for this than [that] Kolchak is personally unacceptable to him. Semenoff could have scarcely taken such action without hope of Japanese support. His policy is largely determined by self-interest of those surrounding him. Semenoff has established his own shops in various towns Trans-Baikal and sells food, which he buys for 18 roubles, for 34 roubles a pood. His officers also engage in trade and they greatly misuse car space for personal profit. Semenoff and large majority of officers openly state that only monarchy is acceptable to them. The majority of peasants and middle class Trans-Baikal are against monarchy, but many liberal-minded people consider restoration unavoidable. Impression prevails there that extreme Right is preferable to extreme Left. Harris."

REINSCH

861.77/611 c : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1919, 5 p.m.

130. Referring my 113 dated January 6, 6 p.m.,<sup>12</sup> the French Chargé d'Affaires has presented the following note, (translation) which presents in another form the question of using American Troops to insure the protection of the Trans-Siberian railways. Public sentiment is extremely restive on the whole subject of Russia as I telegraphed you last night. I gather from informal conversation with General March<sup>13</sup> that unless the President issues instructions to the contrary, he will proceed with measures to withdraw the American forces now in Siberia at the earliest possible opportunity:

[Here follows translation of note from the French Chargé of December 19, 1918, printed *ante*, page 459.]

Please instruct me what reply you desire me to make to this note. Copy has been referred to the Secretary of War for his comment on the military situation which is involved.

POLK

861.00/3613

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 26

## MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that General Janin and General Knox have come to an agreement dealing with their respective sphere[s] of activities in Siberia. All the Allied troops, Russian as well as foreign, west of Lake Baikal, will henceforth be controlled by General Janin, subject to any orders which he may wish to give to British troops and to the concurrence of His Majesty's Government as advised by General Knox.

General Knox will be associated with General Janin as Director of Communications, charged with the special duty of dealing with all questions of arrangements for sending contingents to the Front and the supply of materials. The agreement does not modify the understanding that the Japanese enjoy special powers East of Lake Baikal, in regard to all troops operating in that area.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.<sup>13</sup> Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff.

In bringing the above to the notice of the United States Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to explain that the arrangement is merely intended to coordinate communication between Eastern and Western Siberia, and to secure to the best possible advantage the utilization of available resources.

His Majesty's Government understand that an arrangement satisfactory to both parties has already been come to between General Janin and Admiral Kolchak in regard to this agreement.

WASHINGTON, *January 8, 1919.*

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861.00/3658

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 46

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of His Majesty's Government that on January 3rd a memorandum and telegram from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs were communicated to the Foreign Office by the Japanese Ambassador in London reporting that in addition to the 13,000 men who had already been withdrawn from Siberia, the Japanese Government intended to withdraw a further 34,000 men, and stating that they had sent instructions to their representatives at Omsk and Vladivostok to use their best endeavours to bring about a reconciliation between General Semenov and Admiral Kolchak in cooperation with their French and British colleagues.

His Majesty's Government have communicated to the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum in reply explaining their attitude with regard to the dispute between General Semenov and Admiral Kolchak. In this memorandum His Majesty's Government point out that their sole interest is the safety of the forces operating in Western Siberia and while they have no wish to enter into the merits of the dispute as between the two above mentioned officers, the fact remains that the inability of those two gentlemen to arrive at an understanding has practically resulted in the suspension of communication on the Siberian Railways and His Majesty's Government cannot but contemplate such a state of affairs with the gravest misgiving in view of the aggressive attitude adopted by the Bolshevik forces. Reports received from His Majesty's Representatives in the Far East attributing this interference to General Semenov are too circumstantial to permit of His Majesty's Government doubting their authenticity and in the circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that a risk of disaster is involved, the consequences of which they do

not care to contemplate, unless General Semenov is immediately compelled to cease his present activities and to assist to the utmost of his power in facilitating communication with the forces at the front. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the Japanese Government will realize the vital issues involved and it is felt that the Japanese Government can be relied on to take such further measures as they alone are in a position to do to bring further pressure to bear on General Semenov.

In the memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador His Majesty's Government have expressed their high appreciation of the effort already made by the Japanese Government and have stated that in order to bring about a reconciliation between the two leaders the British representatives on the spot are doing and will do everything in their power to assist.

WASHINGTON, *January 16, 1919.*

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861.00/3613 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *January 16, 1919, 7 p.m.*

273. For the Secretary of State:

Referring my 130, January 7, 5 PM., the Secretary of War comments as follows upon arrangements reported to have been reached for sphere of military authority in Siberia between General Janin and General Knox:

"With reference to your letter of January 8th,<sup>14</sup> transmitting a note from the French Embassy, dated December 19, 1918, I would advise you that the War Department intends to adhere rigidly to the policy of the President as laid down in his memorandum upon the use of our troops in Siberia,<sup>15</sup> and does not approve organizing mixed detachments formed of American and Japanese contingents in equal numbers distributed at main points on the railroad lines. In connection with the matter of the command of Allied troops in Siberia, it is, of course, known to you that the American forces are not placed under the command of General Knox or General Janin. The American expedition is a joint expedition with the Japanese force with definite purposes laid down by the President, and no other."

Department has received a similar memorandum from the British Embassy<sup>16</sup> in which it is stated that General Knox will be associated with General Janin as director of communications, and that arrangements agreeable to both parties have already been come to

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<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

<sup>15</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 287-290.

<sup>16</sup> *Supra.*



between General Janin and Admiral Kolchak in regard to this agreement.

POLK

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861.00/3708 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received January 24, 1919, 2:35 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"40. January 20, 9 p.m. The week ending January 18 was a good one for the Kolchak government. Prospects of settling the Semenoff affair, definite decision concerning high command of all Allied troops on the western front, the adjustment of the railroad matters, and the acceptance by Sazonov of [office?] of Minister of Foreign Affairs all tend to greatly strengthen the Omsk Government, especially as regards external affairs. The Government in interior affairs, however, is still weak and it just has not the power to enforce its will in the administration of many vital matters; for example, Kolchak is powerless to control the action of the Cossack Atamans such as Ivanoff[-Rinoff], Dutoff, and Semenoff as [has been] demonstrated on many occasions and these Cossack generals have left no room for doubt as to what their attitude would be if their personal and selfish interests were not given due consideration. Generally speaking, a Cossack Ataman has no conception of any policy which would contribute towards the restoration of a great united Russia. His chief ambition is to remain all powerful in some Cossack districts and owe only a nominal allegiance to a Czar. This is how it has worked out in actual practice in past years and this is why each Ataman is at heart a monarchist. It does not suit him to encourage a policy which would enlighten a Cossack peasant to think [for] himself. The [omission] will not possibly look for guidance to some member of an all-Russian constituent assembly whom he has assisted to elect from his districts. They are the secret motives which control the actions of such men as Semenoff and the issue is with such problems as these that Admiral Kolchak is confronted. Were he to antagonize the Cossacks openly he would but jeopardize the existence of the whole Government which would lead immediately to a monarchial uprising and such a step would be fatal at this time because it would simply mean that [Siberia?] would pass to Bolshevism.

Another instance of weakness in Kolchak government. On morning of December 23 nine Social Revolutionary members of the All-

Russian Constituent Assembly were secretly taken from prison in Omsk and executed under circumstances akin to an atrocity. The Kolchak government is blameless in these matters, but it has not sufficient strength to bring the murderers to justice, for reason it might implicate some one who has a large political following.

There is much talk of a monarchy among a certain set of officers, but I am still of opinion that any such test at this time would be fatal. Although a large percentage of population may favor constitutional monarch, yet it would be ill-advised to launch such a programme before European Russia is entirely freed of Bolsheviks. If Kolchak falls and a monarchy is proclaimed it would have the immediate effect of throwing all the Social Revolutionary and other kindred parties into the Bolshevik camp and I doubt if there are sufficient Czech and foreign [troops?] in western Siberia to stem the tide of Bolsheviks which would sweep east over Siberia and join up with the Bolsheviks who are still in revolt near Omsk, Tomsaub [*Tomsk?*], Orsk [?], Irkutsk and Blagovesdomesk [*Blagoveshchensk?*].

A sound and conservative analysis of the present situation dictates that Kolchak should be supported at the moment because he has adopted a middle course and hopes to hold to it until such time as a real all-Russian constituent assembly may decide the fate of the country. By this I do not mean that the Allies should recognize the Kolchak government but I do believe that the situation demands that it should receive whatever moral support the Allies might consistently give under existing circumstances. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/3829

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Acting Secretary of State*

O.C.S.

WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1919.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith for your information copies of a letter <sup>18</sup> signed by the representatives of the All-Russian Government, arrested in Omsk on November 18, 1918;<sup>19</sup> of a translation of the same,<sup>18</sup> and of a letter of transmittal from Major-General Wm. S. Graves, the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Force, Siberia. Your attention is invited especially to the views of General Graves as expressed in his letter.

Respectfully,

NEWTON D. BAKER

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<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 435.

[Enclosure]

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces  
in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*

VLADIVOSTOK, December 13, 1918.

Subject: Conditions in Siberia.

1. I inclose translation of letter<sup>20</sup> signed by the representatives of the All-Russian Government, arrested in Omsk on November 18, 1918.

2. All information that I am able to obtain leads me to the conclusion that the government headed by Admiral Kolchak cannot last. Representatives of the democratic class all state that the act at Omsk on November 18th has resulted in cementing and bringing together all elements who have been opposed to the old Russian Government. I am informed that many of these people are inclined to attach blame to General Knox of the British service for bringing about this condition. They have also informed me that some of the people are beginning to suspect General Janin of being favorable to the change. General Knox showed me a communication from his government, in which the British Government approved the proposition submitted by him, to the effect that General Janin would command all forces, Russian and Allies, operating against the Bolsheviks, and that General Knox would command the line of communications and have charge of the training troops of the rear. The approval of the British Government, however, was given only on condition that the Russian Govt agreed to this proposition. General Knox was in to see me this morning and stated that he had equipment and material coming from England for the equipment and arming of 100,000 Russians. I presume from this that Admiral Kolchak has consented to the proposition.

3. I have also been informed by representatives of the democratic class of people that the same methods are being pursued by Admiral Kolchak that prevailed in the time of the Czar. Russian troops in Siberia are arresting and murdering people and basing their action on the authority of Admiral Kolchak that everyone opposing the government should be punished. Major General Khrestatitski, Inspector General of the Russian Forces in the Far East, appealed to me a couple days ago for some assistance from the United States in arming, clothing and equipping the Russian troops in the Far East. He also informed me that the Japanese had agreed to supply new equipment for 10,000 men for duty in the Far East. I asked him what the Japanese demanded in return for this, and he replied,

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<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

in effect, that they had no demand to make at this time, but the matter would be settled when a new Russian Government was formed. He said they suggested that probably they would want the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway from General Horvat. However, this was not a condition. General Khrestatitski stated that it was their desire, if possible, to avoid asking any one Ally to help them, and they hoped to get help from all the Allies, but they may be forced, in the absence of getting this help, to accept what they could get. Later the same day, General Romanoffsky informed me that a Japanese representative had come from Japanese headquarters here and informed General Horvat, in effect, that it was evident to the Japanese that their efforts to help the Russian people were not only not appreciated but were actually misrepresented to the Allies, and he gave General Horvat notice that all offers of assistance were withdrawn. Russians continue to inform me that because of our presence here, and on account of that presence the autocratic class are enabled to try to re-establish an autocratic form of government, the United States is losing prestige and the people are not sure as to our belief in a representative form of government for other countries. I do not attach much importance to this idea, but I do believe that the prestige of the United States is falling. The feeling between the two classes is becoming so bitter that it is almost impossible to stand on the side line and not be accused by both classes. Whatever feeling against the United States is engendered by this situation, will, however, disappear in time.

WM. S. GRAVES

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861.00/3800 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received February 4, 1919, 8:35 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

"83, February 3, 2 p.m. Government has asked that an American officer be attached to commission which is proceeding Chita to inquire into Semenov conduct. French and English representatives here will comply providing other interested powers do so. I have referred request to General Graves through Captain Schuyler.<sup>21</sup> I understand this whole commission is to sit [under?] Japanese protection. Harris."

REINSCH

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<sup>21</sup> Capt. Montgomery Schuyler, U.S.A., on duty at Omsk.

861.00/3802 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *February 4, 1919, 1 p.m.*

[Received 2:45 p.m.]

I am advised that Consul General Harris has telegraphed the Department submitting the suggestion that representatives of Allied Governments should take part in the proposed negotiations between Semenoff and Kolchack. The British representative yesterday discussed this suggestion with General Graves and me and we were all of the opinion that no such action should be taken. To participate even informally in these negotiations would be misinterpreted by many Russians and might seriously embarrass our railway plans.

MORRIS

861.00/3802 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, *February 13, 1919, 4 p.m.*

Your February 4, 1 p.m. Department believes inadvisable that this Government should be represented in negotiations between Kolchak and Semenoff. Advise Consul General, Omsk.

PHILLIPS

861.00/4255

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>22</sup>

VLADIVOSTOK, *February 25, 1919.*

Subject: Situation in Siberia.

1. Conditions in Siberia are, in my judgment, becoming worse instead of better. Japanese are furnishing arms and munitions to certain factions located in various sections of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. This fact is established by the following information:

(a) They have admitted to me that the "horses, arms, and equipment" surrendered by Kalmikoff's men at Habarovsk to Colonel Styer<sup>23</sup> belonged to Japan and they verbally asked that they be returned to Japan, but, when their written request was received it

<sup>22</sup> Copy transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State Apr. 2.

<sup>23</sup> See report of Intelligence Officer with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, Mar. 31, par. 5 (b), p. 485.

asked me to turn them over to Kalmikoff. I told the Japanese officer, who made the request to me, that I must have a written request.

(b) It is not only generally understood, but I believe officially admitted by Japan, that Semeonof is being armed, equipped, and financed by Japan. General Yuhi, Chief of Staff, I was informed by General Knox, British Mission, informed General Knox and General Janin that Japan had financed Semeonof in the past, was financing him at present, and expected to continue financing him. This was in December, 1918.

(c) It is generally understood that Japan had agreed to arm, equip, and finance 10,000 men to operate under Ivanoff-Rinoff. In support of the truth of this general belief, Col. Baron Korff, Russian Forces, who, at the request of General Ivanoff-Rinoff, comes to American Headquarters in the capacity of liaison officer, stated specifically to Major Eichelberger, General Staff, that Japan was supporting 10,000 men operating under Ivanoff-Rinoff's orders. On February 20th, I told General Inagaki, Imperial Japanese Army, that I had this information, believed it, and called his attention to the action of these Russians armed by Japan and told him, in my judgment, it was having just the opposite effect from that the United States and Japan announced they desired to accomplish when they came to Siberia; and there was no use for me to try to reconcile my ideas with their actions and I proposed to make a full statement of these matters to the United States. He, General Inagaki, replied that the United States and Japan had the same purpose in Siberia, but the two Governments had very different ideas as to the best way to accomplish this purpose. He said Japan's policy in aiding the Russian people in regaining control of their own affairs was to help them organize a strong army which could and would keep order, and in pursuance of this policy Japan was backing the Cossacks. While he did not specifically admit that Japan was financing Ivanoff-Rinoff, he did not deny it, and as Ivanoff-Rinoff is a Cossack, General Inagaki's remark was to my mind an admission that Japan was backing Ivanoff-Rinoff. Kalmikoff is stationed with Japanese troops at Habarovsk, Semeonoff with Japanese troops at Chita and vicinity, and Ivanoff-Rinoff is at Vladivostok.

2. As to the results of Japan's policy in arming, equipping and financing these troops, the following extract of report (marked A) will show. In addition to these written reports, the following verbal reports have a direct bearing on this matter.

(A) A Mr. Parker, an American mining engineer, who lives at and near Blagovestchensk, recently informed me that the attitude of the Japanese soldiers toward the Russian people in the neighborhood of Blagovestchensk was such as to inevitably result in conflict.

Mr. Parker said the Japanese soldiers would push people off the sidewalk, go in the cars and force people out of their seats, and other similar acts which had caused the people to have an intense hatred for the Japanese. Mr. Parker is not a rabid anti-Japanese; in fact he would welcome any force which would enable him to work his mining property.

The accompanying extracts from reports of Captain Straus (marked B<sup>24</sup>) who was stationed at Blagovestchensk show the conduct of one of Semeonoff's Cossack officers stationed in Blagovestchensk. This man belongs to the force supported by Japan. There is now going on a conflict between Russians and Japanese troops in the vicinity of Blagovestchensk. The Japanese reports say they are fighting Bolsheviki. I have no one at Blagovestchensk and am unable to determine definitely the cause of the conflict.

(B) About ten days ago, a committee composed of six peasants from the Olga District came to the Zemstvo at Vladivostok and asked the Vice-President of the Zemstvo to take them to American Headquarters so they could report facts to the American Commander. These peasants informed me that Russian troops were going from village to village and asking for certain men and when these men were not produced they whipped, with ramrods, the women related to the men wanted. They informed me that it was not necessary to take their word for accuracy of statements made, but they wished I would send officers to these villages to make an investigation and they would produce several women who had been brutally beaten over their backs with ramrods. These peasants also complained that when Allies came to Eastern Siberia they were informed that arms were not necessary for their protection as the Allies would protect them, and they complied with instructions to give up their arms and now they were almost defenseless. They said if we, United States and Japan, would not protect them they proposed to protect themselves as best they could, and asked us not to interfere when the Russian troops called for help stating there was a Bolshevik uprising. The truth of these statements made by these peasants is shown by copies of accompanying official reports (marked C, D & E<sup>24</sup>). Villages mentioned in these written reports are not far from villages in Olga District. These Russian troops committing these acts are part of Ivanoff-Rinoff's troops and, for reasons above stated, I believe to be armed, equipped, and paid in part or entirely by Japan.

(C) On January 23rd, Ivanoff-Rinoff ordered the arrest, for political reasons, of four citizens living in Vladivostok. I say political reasons because no charges were made against three of

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

these people and the fourth was said to be a Bolshevik. Two of these men have been sent to Japan, the so-called Bolshevik is to be tried by military court, and the fourth was confined in jail until February 20th, when he was put on a train and started West. This man had been a Russian General Staff officer, but has openly advocated a liberal representative form of government. In addition to this, Colonel Butenko, Russian Fortress Commander at Vladivostok, who was in charge of this former Russian officer while imprisoned here, told me that this man was held for political reasons as he advocated a too liberal form of government. During his confinement here for nearly one month, his wife was not permitted to see him and his friends and relatives could not learn why he was arrested. He was clandestinely shipped out of Vladivostok and his wife could not learn from Russian authorities where he was; she finally got the information from a telegram her husband got a chance to send her.

3. On the night of February 19th, Colonel Butenko, the officer above mentioned, came to my office and informed me that he had orders from General Ivanoff-Rinoff to arrest the executive committee of the Zemstvo, the Mayor, and a similar committee of the town administration of Vladivostok. Colonel Butenko said unless the Allies could do something he would have to resign as he could not disobey an order nor could he be a party to making these arrests. On the 20th I informed General Inagaki what General Ivanoff-Rinoff had ordered and he said the Japanese military could not interfere in the matter but he thought it was a question for their diplomatic representatives here to take up with Mr. Morris, who is now here. This course was followed and Mr. Morris said Mr. Matsudaira thought I was unnecessarily concerned about these reports. I did not think so, as Colonel Butenko, the officer charged with making the arrests, had himself told me he had the order to make the arrests, and any action taken would have to be taken before the arrests were made. These men were to be arrested with as little commotion as possible, taken at once to a waiting car and immediately to start West, destined for Irkutsk. The only charge against these men is they are in favor of a liberal democratic form of government and not adherents of the Kolchak Government. Ivanoff-Rinoff, the man who gave these orders, is one of the Cossacks backed by Japan.

4. According to our standards, it is not unjust to characterize Kalmikoff as a robber and murderer without any desire or inclination to follow the conceptions of civilized people as to what constitutes right and wrong.



If reports are true, and I believe them, Semeonoff believes in brute force and has no more regard for the life of a human being than he has for the life of an animal.

Ivanoff-Rinoff was formerly a Russian police officer at Tashkent and is reported to possess all the qualities possessed by the typical Russian police officers who operated under the Czar's Government in oppressing the people.

5. The facts above stated indicate very clearly to my mind that the arming of these Cossack troops and the backing of such unscrupulous leaders as I have mentioned above, will not aid the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny, but will create such terror among the people of Eastern Siberia that they in sheer desperation will temporarily submit to these atrocities or it will result in an uprising which may possibly extend against all the Allies. Everyone here, I believe, knows the representatives in Vladivostok of the various Governments are not working together in the spirit of non-interference. Sir Charles Eliot and General Knox, British representatives, are giving Kolchak all the moral support possible and the few English troops in Western Siberia are being used for same purpose. The Canadians, apparently, do not take part in this support. General Janin is also supporting Kolchak.

There is no doubt in my mind that as long as Japan continues the policy of arming, equipping, and financing unscrupulous Cossack leaders, there can be no such thing as security of life and property in Eastern Siberia.

WM. S. GRAVES

861.00/3955: Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received February 28, 1919, 10:45 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Irkutsk.

"141. February 26, 8 p.m. I have received following from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Omsk.

'Owing to the fact that cases of arbitrary and unlawful actions on the part of military authorities in the Zabaikal territory are being repeated, and in view of the special situation that has resulted in the said territory, which situation [does not?] allow the Government to use its power within the said area, the Council of Ministers in its meeting held on the 21 January last, has decided that all the orders given by the authorities acting there, concerning the state and /private property, also concerning the transportation and supply, shall be considered juridically not valid and to consider the consequences of such orders as annulled.

In order to avoid all misunderstandings in future and the possibility of advancing claims to the Russian Government on the basis of the situation actually existing in the Zabaikal, the ministry undertakes the duty of bringing to the knowledge of all the countries which might have interest in the said territory.'

Harris "  
REINSCH

861.00/4027 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *March 3, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received March 7, 2 a.m.]

106. Referring General Graves' telegraphic reports of mistreatment of peasants this district by soldiers of Horvath and Ivanoff-Rinoff, who partly support Kolchak, in effort to prevent by force any agitation against themselves. February 27th, I have received telegram from such a band of insurrectionists stating they could not longer endure treatment accorded by the dark forces supporting Kolchak and had therefore revolted. They asked that no punitive expedition be allowed to pass without cooperation of American command who they believe would prevent violence to their wives and children and to peaceful population. I have not replied but gave copy of telegram to General Graves. The telegram was sent to three addresses: consulate, local and district Zemstvo.

March 1st, General Knox, commanding British troops in Siberia, called on me regarding this telegram which he said had been brought to his attention by Colonel Butenko commander Russian troops here. General Knox pointed out bad effect of such telegram on efforts of Kolchak government to maintain control and on work General Knox is doing in giving military support to Kolchak. He asked that I send reply indicating plainly that America has no sympathy with these insurrectionists, which I shall not do unless Department so instructs. General Knox criticised Ambassador Morris, General Graves and Admiral Rodgers as being ignorant of real situation outside this district, unsympathetic with all efforts of Kolchak Government and of British Government (as conducted by General Knox). He attempted to minimize importance of cases of mistreatment of peasants investigated and reported by General Graves stating peasants deserved some punishment and that General Graves is "hypnotized" by cases brought to his immediate attention into sympathy with them forgetting what Bolsheviks are doing in the west. General Knox emphasized unfortunate effect of divergence of views of British and American military authorities, Siberia, stating that this is giving the

Japanese a free hand to do as they please; upon this he remarked that he had advised the Russians (and I think also the Japanese) to make an agreement with the Japanese by which the latter would furnish the troops to clear Siberia of Bolsheviks as far as the Urals, the Japanese to receive commercial advantages in return, saying the Japanese are the only people who can and will do this if given the chance and that the Japanese know that the United States would object to this but believe that the United States would not fight on account of it. He spoke with much feeling and somewhat irrationally.

This shows attitude of British military in Siberia as long as General Knox is in command. General Graves states that Canadian commander does not share views and attitudes of General Knox.

Owing to poor code in use Consul General Harris, I shall not send him copy of this telegram unless Department specially instructs.

CALDWELL

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861.00/4044 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1919, 5 p.m.

998. Following received by the War Department from General Graves.

"Japanese headquarters inform me of the following losses suffered in fighting against Bolsheviks in the vicinity of Blagovestchensk. February 11th two officers 18 soldiers killed near Zabetaya. February 15 one officer and from 10 to 20 soldiers killed near Andreskaya. February 16, a reconnoitering patrol of one officer and 50 men encountered a Bolshevik force of about 2,500 near Skranskoy about 30 kilometers northwest of Alexeyensk, the entire Japanese patrol killed. On the same day two peace strength companies of infantry total about 250 men, one company of artillery and one section of infantry met the same Bolshevik force at different times and only three Japanese escaped, all others being killed. The Japanese say they are inaugurating a vigorous campaign and are now pursuing the enemy.

In this connection on February 12th General Oi<sup>26</sup> at Khabarovsk called on Colonel Styer for one company of American soldiers to be sent to Japanese assistance. Colonel Styer asked for instructions. I sent Colonel Robinson to Japanese Chief of Staff to tell him that before I could take part in this trouble I must know that the so-called Bolsheviks were not Russians resisting unjust treatment by troops. Japanese Chief of Staff had not heard of this trouble and told Robinson not to do anything unless he heard further from him. Nothing more on the subject.

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<sup>26</sup> Gen. Narimoto Oi, in command of Japanese troops.

I understand that feeling of Japanese is rather bitter against Americans for not joining them and reports are being spread that Americans are Bolshevik sympathizers. Relations with Japanese are rather strained and this will intensify this feeling. I have received reports that the Russians had been outrageously treated by troops in vicinity of Blagovestchensk. No more arrests in Vladivostok. I was informed today by two members of Liberal Party that if any more arrests were attempted it would be resisted by force, that they knew these arrests were backed by the Japanese and they would resist the Japanese troops. The Ambassador<sup>27</sup> has just told me Japanese legal adviser says no more arrests will be made. In the absence of attempts to make more arrests I do not anticipate trouble here."

POLK

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861.77/736 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok,  
to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, March 8, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received March 11, 10:30 a.m.]

Supplementing my March 7, 4 p.m.<sup>28</sup> and connected with the Allied plans for protecting the railways is a question which I feel should be submitted for the consideration of the Department. The facts are:

1st, one result of the military expedition in support of the Czechs and the actions of the Czechs themselves was to suppress more or less, [in] towns and villages along the railway, popular uprisings and disorders which had previously occurred. In addition relying on statement of the Czechs and others that the order would be maintained by the Allied forces large numbers of the city and peasant population surrendered their arms and ammunition and thus rendered themselves defenseless against aggression from any source.

2d, another immediate result of expedition was the renewed vigor given to various reactionary groups in their efforts to regain political power. They fully expected help from the Allies and in many instances received it. The French, the British have been fairly consistent in their support first of the Omsk Government and more recently of the Kolchack dictatorship. The Japanese have at various times supported Horvath, Semenoff, Kalmikoff and are generally reputed to sympathize with the present reactionary rule of Horvath and Ivanoff-Rinoff in the maritime district.

3d, all of these groups, relieved by the presence of foreign troops from the fear of any popular uprising, are growing daily more re-

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<sup>27</sup> Roland S. Morris, Ambassador in Japan, temporarily at Vladivostok.

<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

actionary and aggressive. The campaigns of the Japanese and Czechs drove the Bolshevik elements into hiding. Thus the way was opened for the Cossack military leaders and groups of former officials to inaugurate a campaign of their own against the more moderate liberal parties and organizations in Siberia. The Kolchack government may not actually support this campaign although carried on in its name but is too weak to prevent it even if it desires to do so.

4th, the campaign consists of attacks on peasant villages, beating of women, arbitrary arrests of officials whose chief fault is that they are trying to build up a form of local representative government, and the killing of workmen and peasants whenever any irresponsible officer alleges that they have Bolshevik tendencies. Specific instances to support this general statement have been reported in full by General Graves to the War Department.

5th, General Graves has been appealed to by Zemstvo representatives, individuals of liberal views and groups of peasants asking either for protection or for assurances from the Allied commanders that if they resist these outrages Allied troops would not interfere on the ground of suppressing Bolshevism.

6th, recently when four well-behaved citizens of Vladivostok were arbitrarily arrested by Horvath's soldiers General Graves asked the Japanese military authorities to agree to a plan approved by all the other Allied representatives except France to regulate arbitrary arrests within the limits of Vladivostok. The Japanese military authorities refused assent on the ground that they could not intervene local affairs.

7th, on the order of Kolchack's local representatives four of the Vladivostok Zemstvo representatives, one Zemstvo representative from Za-Baikal and the editor of the *Dalekaya Okraina* were arrested Saturday and five were started Sunday for the west. These men are reported to be men of moderate views and earnest purpose. If Ivanoff-Rinoff is not notified by the Allies that force will be used to prevent such arbitrary arrests, it is believed other Zemstvo officials as well as other moderate liberals throughout eastern Siberia will be arrested. General Graves interprets his instructions as preventing him from taking any steps to protect these men or to prevent further arbitrary arrests.

The situation thus created raises the question whether we can remain in Siberia and at the same time permit these reactionary groups to inaugurate a campaign of this character, the apparent purpose of which is to suppress all local representative institutions. Graves, Rodgers, Caldwell and I have discussed this question at great length. We all feel that for the present our troops should remain as long as other Allied troops remain in Siberia. Apart from the obligations recently assumed to assist in the protection of

the railways is the further consideration that our Government initiated the expedition on strict compliance [*sic*] with the Czechs, invited the cooperation of Japan, acquiesced in the action of both the Czechs and Japanese in restoring order along the railways and in a few cases our troops actually assisted. We have thus had a substantial part in creating the conditions which have made possible the emergence of these reactionary groups. We cannot therefore avoid the responsibility of seeing to it that while we are assisting in protection and operation of the railways, reactionary groups do not use this opportunity to suppress ruthlessly the efforts of the masses of Siberia who are struggling for some measure of local self-government.

I suggest for the consideration of the Department that in carrying out the agreement for the military protection of the railroad our Government should insist that in the protected area and in the cities and towns along the railway where Allied troops are quartered the population should be protected from the arbitrary action of any group. I believe that this position will be supported by our European associates but I fear it will not be acceptable to the Japanese military authorities. I feel however that now is the time frankly to discuss the question with our associates and reach a clear understanding in regard to it.

MORRIS

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861.00/4027 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1919, 5 p.m.

4772. In connection with instructions to Consul-General Harris in Siberia, the text of which was telegraphed to you today, if you see no objection, please read to Foreign Office following cable from American Consul at Vladivostok. You should now have received a personal letter from me <sup>29</sup> which also bears on this subject and should throw additional light on it.

[Here follows text of telegram 106, March 3, 3 p.m., from the Consul at Vladivostok, printed *ante*, page 473.]

POLK

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861.00/4080a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1919, 6 p.m.

Please note and bring to the attention of Ambassador Morris. General Graves, Admiral Rodgers, and forward following instruc-

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<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

tions to Consul-General Harris to present orally and informally to Omsk authorities.

“The Government of the United States has noted that apparently General Ivanof-Rinof, commanding Russian forces in maritime district, and who acknowledges the authority of the Omsk Government, has prevented public meetings to be held by orderly elements of the population for the purpose of discussing public questions and has now arrested and deported, without trial or process of law, several prominent Zemstvo leaders and in general seems inclined to adopt autocratic and reactionary methods. Similar reports have been received regarding action in one or two instances, taken at Omsk by military groups there, who apparently have acted in some cases without authority. Please say quite frankly to the Omsk Government that if it cannot arrange for these representatives to conduct themselves with greater restraint the result will have a most unfortunate effect upon public opinion in this country and very seriously embarrass the support which the United States is now lending the authorities in Siberia in the shipment of supplies, including military equipment, bank notes and railway materials, and will, furthermore, complicate the situation as regards the services of Mr. Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps.”

POLK

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861.00/4042a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1919, 6 p.m.

4773. Following instructions sent to Consul-General Harris to communicate to Omsk authorities orally and informally.

[Here follows text of second paragraph of telegram of March 8, 6 p.m., to the Consul at Vladivostok, printed *supra*.]

Please inform the Government to which you are accredited of this action and ascertain if it is inclined to take the same position.

Repeat these instructions to Paris and Rome.

POLK

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861.00/4027 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk  
(Harris)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1919, 7 p.m.

For Harris.

Referring to Department's instructions to you to be transmitted via Vladivostok for the information of American diplomatic and military representatives, suggest communication to Omsk authorities be made orally through Consul at Omsk and that you may, in the meanwhile, consider it advisable to proceed to Vladivostok to discuss

the general situation in all parts of Siberia fully with Ambassador Morris, General Graves, Admiral Rodgers, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Charles H. Smith, who are now there. Mr. Smith has just consented to serve as American representative on the inter-Allied Committee to supervise railways. Advise Department of your decision.

POLK

861.00/4043 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received March 10, 1919, 12:42 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Irkutsk.

"167. March 6th, 11 a.m. Consul Caldwell reports in substance. Ussuri Cossacks assembly voted to recognize Kolchak and requested him to come to speedy agreement with Semenoff.

General Ivanoff now in Vladivostok has caused the arrest and deportation to the Mongolian frontier six editors and Zemstvo leaders. They appear to have been implicated in political activities.

Japanese Chargé d'Affaires states Japanese attacked Bolsheviks south of Blagoveshchensk February 28th, losing 300 killed and killing 500 Bolsheviks. Prior to this, namely on February 17th, there had been sharp fighting at this point, Japanese having 48 killed and about 24 wounded. The Bolsheviks had over 100 killed and 180 wounded. Two hundred Bolsheviks were captured. Recently there have been several minor engagements in adjoining province.

In Vladivostok men born 1898 and '99, not yet performed military duty, are called to report March 1st. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/4063 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Wright) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received March 11, 3:32 p.m.]

1335. I read your 4772, March 8th, 5 p.m. and 4773 March 8th, 6 p.m. at Foreign Office to-day. The intimacy of relations fortunately established there permitted discussion of the former which I hope may later produce advantageous results. As to the latter I was at once informed that this Government is decidedly of the same opinion.

WRIGHT



861.77/736 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *March 13, 1919, 5 p.m.*

1106. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Mr. Morris reports that a somewhat acute situation is arising as between General Graves and the Japanese military authorities because of radical divergence of policy. General Graves is holding absolutely aloof from internal conflicts between Russian factions. On this subject he telegraphs as follows:

"No. 200, March 5. As I construed my original instructions which are still in force, I was to take no part in differences between different Russian factions. Before Armistice I permitted United States troops to be used in co-operation with Japanese along the Usuri Railroad against a force composed of Germans, Austrians and Russians. Since the Armistice there has been no menace from Germans and Austrians but there is danger of serious trouble between different Russian factions which may develop at any time.

The feeling is now becoming so bitter that each faction claims if you are not with them you are against them. The Japanese have started campaign to put down an uprising in Amur Province as reported in my 197, and my refusal to permit the use of United States troops in the trouble between Russian factions has enabled Reactionary Party to claim that Americans are Bolsheviks and enabled the other parties to claim we are favorable to Reactionary Party, because by our presence Reactionary Party is enabled to commit excesses on the people which they could not do if Allied troops were not present. No one doubts the truth of this latter contention. Japan and the United States are in Siberia with the same announced purposes and following opposite courses relative to taking part in internal troubles. This has made it seem advisable to me to ask if my policy in considering the Bolshevik trouble in Siberia entirely an internal trouble in which I should take no part is the policy the Department desires me to continue to follow. Graves."

In this connection I refer to the Department's instructions to Consul-General Harris<sup>81</sup> which have been repeated to London, Paris and Rome to ascertain whether those governments are inclined to take the same position, and to you for your information. You will recall that the firm stand taken by Ambassador Francis at Archangel under somewhat similar circumstances did much to clarify the situation there. My own opinion is that General Graves should be authorized to make quite clear to the Russian military authorities at Vladivostok and in the Primorskaya and Amur Provinces that the power of this government to assist Russia in Eastern Siberia will be paralyzed if any group in control reverts to arbitrary or reactionary methods, and furthermore, that such a course will create public

<sup>81</sup> Transmitted in telegram to the Consul at Vladivostok, Mar. 8, 6 p.m., p. 477.

sentiment in America which may have a far-reaching effect. In other words, I think that General Graves, without employing his forces to assist one Russian faction as against another, should be authorized definitely to throw the weight of such influence as he may have through the presence of American forces, to insist upon a policy of moderation and, at the same time, should make perfectly clear that this government cannot lend itself to any measures which savor of counter-revolution or reaction. Let me also point out the advisability of taking measures to prevent civil war in the rear of the Czechs, who are now in Central Siberia. I think it also necessary to emphasize again the fact that the support which General Graves is to lend Mr. Stevens as provided by the plan, will require him not only to use his good offices to prevent armed conflicts between factions, but also to interfere by force where the question of communications or the safety of our own men are threatened. In the cities and towns along the railways the population should be protected from arbitrary acts and encouraged in any orderly efforts to manage their own local affairs.

In my opinion the situation is somewhat beyond General Graves and I think he will be required to be told specifically how far he can go, as his inclination is to interpret his instructions very conservatively. This will no doubt require your discussing the question with the President. If you do so, please let me know directions he will issue to the Secretary of War. I feel confident the French and British will approve but believe we may have some difficulty in securing the cooperation of the Japanese. I would like to be in a position to place the situation strongly before them, to secure unity of action.

As you have no doubt been informed through General Churchill,<sup>32</sup> last month General Graves after conferring with Mr. Stevens asked for authority first, to move one battalion of American troops to Harbin, and subsequently, two companies to Irkutsk. In compliance with the President's authorization for General Graves to lend Mr. Stevens the support necessary to make the railway plan effective, the War Department approved General Graves' request.

POLK

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861.77/736 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1919, noon.

1156. Referring to Department's No. 1106, March 13, 5 p.m.<sup>33</sup>

Following telegram from General Graves further illustrates necessity of acting upon situation in Eastern Siberia.

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<sup>32</sup> Gen. Marlborough Churchill, U.S.A., attached to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>33</sup> *Supra.*

"No. 203, March 9. On March 3, Vladivostok Social Revolutionary Party passed resolution protesting against arrest of Zemstvo officials and demanding their immediate release; against establishment of martial law which, resolution states, has for its object punishment of political opponents and democratic representatives elected by the people and states that consciously or unconsciously presence of Allied troops is aiding reactionary group.

Lieutenant Hood, Railroad Service Corps, cabled from Pogranitchnaia, 'Political prisoners arrested at Vladivostok are held under guard of Japanese.'

In my judgment any action taken with reference to Eastern Siberia should be taken on assumption that the Japanese and organized Russian Cossack troops operating east of Baikal constitute one force.

Ivanoff-Rinoff has forbidden discussion or mention in press the arrest of political prisoners. The object of these arrests is to terrorize the people and prevent any discussion of a liberal form of government."

POLK

861.00/4122 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received March 21, 1919, 10:35 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Harbin.

"194, March 20, 11 a.m. Referring Government's March 8th, 6 p.m.<sup>34</sup> Consul Embry informs me as follows:

'Have discussed matter frankly with Mr. Soukine<sup>35</sup> who was equally frank in his replies. He states that actions of Ivanov well known to this Government and that they have been necessitated by the regrettable fact that while Bolsheviki in western Siberia with exception of certain small localities have been suppressed, such is far from being the case in eastern Siberia where even the Zemstvos are honeycombed with Bolsheviki. I am certain American Military Intelligence at Vladivostok can corroborate this statement for I have often heard Captain Schuyler make same remark. Mr. Soukine declared that Omsk Government is not in any manner whatsoever persecuting Zemstvos as such and that on the contrary it is following a definite policy of [encouragement?]. The good relations existing between Zemstvos in western Siberia and Omsk Government are best proof of this policy. To my question about alleged similar measures taken by the authorities here he declared that such was not the case. He stated that Bolshevism must be suppressed wherever it is found and believed that a true picture of conditions prevailing in Siberia and the attempts being made by Omsk Government to restore and maintain order be originally presented to State Department.'

<sup>34</sup> To the Consul at Vladivostok, *ante*, p. 477.

<sup>35</sup> John Soukine, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Omsk Government.

Would respectfully call Department's attention to fact that Kolchak has not the power to curb the actions of Ivanov by force any more [than] he can control the actions of Semenov. At a time when he is not [*sic*] exerting all his strength on the western front against the Bolsheviks he is not free to deal with the Cossacks leaders in the East as he would undoubtedly wish to. The actions of Ivanov do not meet with the approval of the Kolchak government. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/4120 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, March 21, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received March 21, 10:46 p.m.]

7784. Your 4773, March 8, 6 p.m. to London and repeated to Embassy. In reply to the Embassy's note, based on Department's instruction, Foreign Office states that it has received no information concerning the incidents mentioned in eastern Siberia between General Ivanoff-Rinof and certain elements of the population and therefore cannot come to any decision thereon with regard to the incidents which certain military groups have caused at Omsk. The information which has come to the knowledge of the French Government tends to show that these groups had acted in a purely reactionary manner and the French Government can only approve Admiral Kolchak's having repressed them without going into the details of the way in which this repression was executed. The French Government considers that every idea of reaction and of a return to the old regime should be abolished in Russia and can only support every step of the American Government in this direction.

SHARP

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861.00/4169 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ROME, March 25, 1919, 1 a.m.

[Received 7:57 p.m.]

2729. Department's circular of March 8, 7 [6] p.m.<sup>80</sup> Foreign Office informs me Italian Consul at Vladivostok has been authorized to make similar representations to Omsk Government, provided other Allied representatives receive like instructions.

NELSON PAGE

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<sup>80</sup> See telegram to the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 4773, Mar. 8, 6 p.m., p. 478.

861.00/4165 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received March 27, 1919, 4:25 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Vladivostok:

“200. March 25, 5 p.m. I have received following from Omsk Government which begs that contents their declaration be considered extremely confidential as no such statement has been given other Allies regarding this matter:

‘Regarding the last events in the Far East the Russian Government considers it necessary to inform the Government of the United States of the following: The political, the military and particularly the international situation in the Far East are such that the Russian Government although having its administration in that region [is] practically unable to exercise its power and authority over this part of the country. It seems obvious that the successes obtained in western Siberia in the line of establishing regular administration and restoring legal order has [*sic*] not been extended in an equal measure to the region lying east of the Baikal Lake where reigns disorder and acts separate noncoordinated military appear reactionary character and where defence of public safety still relies mostly on foreign troops.

Such conditions are due first of all to the fact that the government's attention and [*is*] perhaps absorbed by the creation of the fighting army on the western front. Up to now it was embarrassed to direct its efforts for the organization in the Far East of a similar and disciplined army. But independent of the above statement a serious obstacle which necessarily must be taken into consideration are certain foreign influences and particularly the work of Japanese agents, who footed [*sic*] among military circles of east Siberia currents which become an impediment, hampering establishment in that part of the country of the governmental authority based on principals of democracy and legality. In that respect special attention must be paid to Ataman Semenov, who is backed by Japan. His presence in the Trans-Baikal has singularly impeded the extension of our influence on the Far East as well. In Vladivostok the Japanese are disallowed energetic activity, which creates unsound conditions of political untrustworthy and corruption [*sic*]. In these circumstances of which we consider it our duty to inform the Government of United States, we can not take upon us fully the responsibility for what is taking place in the Far East.

Insomuch as the Government is being informed of arbitrary and lawless acts perpetrated by local representatives of the Government it takes urgent measures to examine the character of such acts which might injure the precepts of legality and political impartiality of the observation welcomed [*sic*] throughout the country. The Government will insist that one must equally have in view that the central government considers the development of land and town local self-administration as vitally essential for the democratic develop-

ment State Council. The Government has enacted new law concerning municipal elections and shortly will be prompted another edict concerning the *Zemstvos*, land self-administration, all these new regulations are based on the principal of universal suffrage and only certain causal additional inheritances of the Bolshevik system will be dispensed with. The issue is significant that the *Zemstvos* and Municipalities of western Siberia not only manifest complete loyalty and allegiance to the Government, but are a serious support to its activity.

But unfortunately the same can not be said about the Far East, where Bolshevik ideas have not died out and this evidently on account of the mentioned reasons is the total absence of a [apparent omission] and democratic Russian administration.

Such a state of affairs requires the adoption of severe measures but this Government will nevertheless insist that these should be based on proper inquiry and legal process.

As to the cases of illegal prosecutions against separate political personalities no unofficial parties at Omsk itself, if such sorrowful happenings have occurred, they all were a cause of deep regret to the Government who has ordered strict investigation to be performed by a special governmental inquest committee.<sup>7</sup>

Harris ”  
REINSCH

861.00/4967

*The Intelligence Officer with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Lieutenant Colonel Eichelberger) to the Director of the Military Intelligence Division in Washington*<sup>37</sup>

[Extract]

[VLADIVOSTOK,] *March 31, 1919.*

4. In Eastern Siberia the situation is much more complex. We find here for instance, in the city of Vladivostok at the present time: (a) General Horvat, Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway, called the “Supreme Representative of the Kolchak Government in the Far East”; (b) Major General Ivanoff-Rinoff, who under Admiral Kolchak is Commander of all the Russian troops in Eastern Siberia; (c) Ataman Semenoff with headquarters at Chita, who is, in effect, a dictator for the Chita district; (d) Ataman Kalmikoff; (e) Colonel Butenko, Commandant of the Fortress of Vladivostok—recognized last fall by the Allies as the *de facto* head of the Russian troops in this city.

(a) *General Horvat*: He is in many ways, a better type than General Ivanoff-Rinoff, Ataman Semenoff or Ataman Kalmikoff. He is a man of education and refinement; but has no control over Ivanoff-

<sup>37</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State May 19.

Rinoff. He will possibly be made the figurehead of any government that may be established in Eastern Siberia. Some months ago General Horvat was ordered by Admiral Kolchak to proceed with his troops to Chita, and to arrest Ataman Semenoff and although this order has never been countermanded, we find him last week, in Harbin, in conference with Semenoff.

(b) *Major General Ivanoff-Rinoff*: This officer is the most important Russian leader in Eastern Siberia. I believe him to be absolutely unscrupulous and to be dominated completely by the Japanese.

(c) *Ataman Semenoff*: He has refused up to the present time to recognize the authority of Admiral Kolchak and has ruled practically as dictator at Chita. He robs the Chita banks, the custom house at Manchuria Station, and ships in supplies to Chita, in military trains, without payment of freight or duty and later sells these goods to the civilian population in Chita in "Semenoff Stores". His officers go further, and when in need of funds, rob the Chinese merchants and obtain money in other illegal ways. He is a man of about 29 years of age. He is accustomed to carrying his hand thrust in his coat in the manner supposed to be characteristic of Napoleon Bonaparte, and is said to always carry Napoleon's "Maxims" in his pocket. He is dominated to a large extent by his mistress, upon whom he spends hundreds of thousands of roubles.

(d) *Ataman Kalmikoff*: in his relations to the American Expeditionary Forces is important enough to warrant treatment in a separate paragraph below.

5. I wish here to cover briefly, in a general way our relations with Ataman Kalmikoff.

(a) Since last fall he has been in charge of the Russian troops at Habarovsk. His actions there would have been considered disgraceful in the middle ages. He has murdered, robbed and executed without trial. His actions last fall, became so bad that General Graves recommended to General Otani that Kalmikoff be warned that if he did not cease his illegal arrests and executions, that American and Japanese troops would hunt him down and turn him over to the civil authorities in Vladivostok for trial. General Otani replied, at that time, that Kalmikoff had promised to cease these illegal arrests and executions, and the matter was dropped.

(b) Kalmikoff's actions towards the men under him were almost as bad as his conduct towards the civil population. There were floggings and executions among his own men and this finally culminated, on January 28, 1919, in about 400 of his men marching around the city of Habarovsk for some time, and then surrendering themselves to Colonel Styer, in command of the 27th Infantry at

Habarovsk, by whom they were disarmed. About 200 scattered in all directions, and about 200 apparently, remained loyal to him. Kalmikoff at once demanded that these 400 men be turned over to him; and the Japanese Commander, General Oi, submitted a questionnaire to Colonel Styer asking what we intended to do with these men.

(c) A representative of the Japanese Headquarters, called on General Graves and stated that the arms surrendered by the Kalmikoff troops belonged to the Japanese and requested that these be returned to them. General Graves answered that he would turn these arms over to the Japanese provided, they would put this request in writing, which has since been done. The arms will probably be returned to the Japanese.

(d) This affair created a storm of protest in the reactionary papers throughout Eastern Siberia and in the Japanese press. (The reactionary papers are the only type that can be printed in Eastern Siberia at this time). At the same time, delegations and proclamations came to American Headquarters from Cossacks, imploring that these Cossacks who had surrendered to Colonel Styer, be protected by the Americans, and not turned over to Ataman Kalmikoff to be shot.

(e) The "Kalmikoff Incident" has been closed by the fact that all but about a dozen of the deserters under charge of Colonel Styer, have returned individually to their homes. These men were at no time considered by the Commanding General as prisoners, but were only disarmed and protected from murder by Kalmikoff.

(f) In addition to the great amount of proof which had previously been gathered concerning the operations of Ataman Kalmikoff, I am in constant communication with a Cossack officer, belonging to the Judge Advocate's Department of Kalmikoff's Detachment, who is nearly dead of tuberculosis and syphilis in our Evacuation Hospital No. 17, at Ulysses Bay, near Vladivostok. I am obtaining from him piecemeal, statements of the murders committed by the Kalmikoff Detachment, most of which he was personally mixed up in, and have even obtained the names of the officers who personally committed these murders.

(g) The principal murders committed by this detachment, such as that of the Swedish Red Cross representatives, are being committed to writing, and sworn to by this officer, in the presence of the Expeditionary Judge Advocate. This statement will eventually be forwarded to the War Department by the Commanding General, and it will only be after reading this account, that one can appreciate the full significance of the open support of a man of Kalmikoff's type by the Japanese Government.



(h) In speeches and letters containing expressions of mutual respect and esteem, which passed back and forth between the various Japanese commanders and Ataman Kalmikoff, the Japanese openly acknowledge him as their friend. When they believe the time fitting, they acknowledge him as an ally, but when called upon by Colonel Styer to restrain the murderous remnant that Kalmikoff has left in Habarovsk, they state that they have nothing to do with his actions.

R. L. EICHELBERGER

861.00/4324a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan  
(Morris)*<sup>88</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1919, 7 p.m.

*New York Times* and other papers published on April 16 statements to the effect that General Graves, Commanding the American forces in Siberia, had reported that the reason he did not go to the assistance of the Japanese detachment which was almost annihilated in an engagement with Russians at Habarovsk [*Khabarovsk*], Siberia, February 25,<sup>89</sup> was because the Japanese had shot down women and children.

On April 17 Acting Secretary of War Crowell issued an official denial of the report with reference to Japanese brutality towards women and children. It developed that the report may have arisen from the fact that some troops representing a Russian faction had been charged with brutality towards women. Reports to this effect have been received here but no such charges have been made against the Japanese. This was made emphatic by War Department and the Department.

POLK

861.00/4322 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of  
State*

VLADIVOSTOK, April 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received April 19, 6:36 a.m.]

230. Attempts of local military representatives of Omsk Government to draft peasants continue to cause armed resistance which is undoubtedly instigated in many or all cases by actual Bolsheviki.

<sup>88</sup> The same as no. 1623 to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>89</sup> See telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 998, Mar. 6, 5 p.m., p. 474.

Recently such a condition occurred at Shkotovo, about 40 miles from Vladivostok, on railway to Suchan mines where American troops are stationed, which did not interrupt railway communication. Although General Graves had been informed recently by the Japanese Staff that they now saw wisdom of American policy and would not participate in these fights, uprisings, [unless?] railway interference, or themselves attacked or threatened, which General Graves does not consider to have been the case at Shkotovo, nevertheless General Otani on 13th ordered Allied forces to Shkotovo to support Omsk Government troops and all Allies sent small detachments except American, General Graves not admitting authority General Otani to order movements of American troops and consider[ing] purpose in this case inconsistent with policy of the United States War Department. On April 14th Commodore Edwards commanding British cruiser *Kent* notified me in writing and asked me to notify General Graves and Captain Watts that he had been authorized British Admiralty to give active support to the forces of the Kolchak government in case of necessity. The next day the *Kent* sailed for America Bay to protect landing of Omsk troops going to rescue of similar troops surrounded by so-called Bolsheviki at the village Vladimir Alexandrovka near Suchan mines. Commodore Edwards informed Captain Watts verbally that his orders do not permit his landing his forces without communicating with British Admiralty.

Difference between policy of the United States and Allies is misinterpreted and made use of in anti-American propaganda and these disorders as [*this difference is?*] shown by fact that delegates of peasants come to this consulate every few days stating that they intend to resist draft and ask what protection we will give; they are of course informed that we have no concern with such matters, but this shows attitude.

CALDWELL

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861.00/4342: Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, April 21, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received April 22, 7:26 a.m.]

239. Supplementing my cipher telegram number 230, April 17th [18th], 5 p.m. British cruiser *Kent* has returned from America Bay where she fired about 60 shells, 6-inch, at persons presumed to be prepared to resist landing of Omsk Government troops going to

rescue of comrades Vladimir Alexandroffka. Hostility against Allies caused by such action by Great Britain will be felt not by Great Britain but by others as she cannot be attacked on sea and apparently will not have troops guarding railway.

CALDWELL

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861.00/4400 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, April 29, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received April 30, 1:24 a.m.]

262. Referring to my telegram of General Graves dated yesterday <sup>40</sup> regarding relations between American, Russian and Japanese military here and to [from] Harris 212 dated today.<sup>41</sup> There is imminent possibility of American troops being forced into armed conflict with Russians, troops of Ivanoff-Rinoff or peasant Bolshevik bands or even both. Situation cannot be permanently improved without adoption of uniform policy by all Allied Governments. Support of Ivanoff-Rinoff, Semenoff, and Kalmikoff with arms, military supplies and money by . . . any one country without knowledge definite assent of other associated countries must be stopped and this cannot be effected here.

CALDWELL

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861.77/829 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, May 3, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received May 4, 4:54 p.m.]

273. [From Smith:]

May 2d Committee unanimously passed resolution that only railway representatives Technical Board have right to hold trains except where no representatives present. Others may hold train if conditions ahead dangerous but Technical Board must immediately be notified. General Khorvat agreed. Resolution passed because General Ivanoff-Rinoff has been searching trains claiming contents may be Bolsheviki munitions.

CALDWELL

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<sup>40</sup> Not found in the Department files.

<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

861.00/4481a : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces  
in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*

VLADIVOSTOK, May 4, 1919.

[Received at the War Department May 7.]

281. Paragraph 1. Slaughter<sup>42</sup> telegraphs that Soukin, Foreign Minister, has just told him in substance as follows: That reports as to conduct of American soldiers places the Government in a very delicate position on account of the railroad guards in which American soldiers are coming toward Irkutsk; that contact and cooperation with American soldiers is impossible because America is not yet convinced of the right and justice of our cause and so fails to sympathize with us; that American troops, who do not sympathize with the Russian Government, coming so close to the seat of government would weaken this Government without in any way assisting it; that it might promote a feeling that America in her position of spectator is passive against the Government and so encourages resistance to our authority which is now making itself felt in this region; that small incidents so close to them would be more easily seized by Japanese propagandists to still further antagonize Russian people and create a feeling between Russia and America; that we are sincere in this statement and unless the American troops can come as the open and avowed enemy of Bolshevism we believe that their coming constitutes a real danger for the Government and for the traditional friendship of Russia and America. In pursuance of these beliefs General Romanoffsky has been instructed to protest to the railroad committee as to the distribution of foreign troops as guards. The British and French have been instructed to sustain his objections and belief that American troops should not come to Irkutsk. End of statement.

Paragraph 2. Colonel Morrow has just telegraphed from Verkhneudinsk that the Russian General, citing authority of Kolchak, states Russian guard in Baikal sector assigned to Americans must not be changed and the Russians are increasing their guard, and will not vacate railroad and guard barracks in our sector.

Paragraph 3. This action of Kolchak shown by these two telegrams might indicate that object mentioned in my telegram 238<sup>43</sup> has been accomplished. I am inclined to think, however, that the Kolchak adherents believe they are able to handle the situation without our military, and by our policy of non-interference we are a

<sup>42</sup> Maj. Homer H. Slaughter, U.S.A., on duty at Omsk.

<sup>43</sup> To the War Department; not found in the files of the Department of State.

source of weakness to Kolchak. This is probably true as a great percentage of Russians consider the American Government as the ideal government for them. The fact that we are the only foreign power here not supporting Kolchak causes Russians who believe in American form of government to mistrust and oppose him. This creates a situation demanding immediate consideration. The Cossacks are just as opposed to us as they are to peasants and others who will not support them. The Japanese control these armed Cossacks in eastern Siberia and will embroil us with them when it suits their purpose to do so. Ivanoff's troops are now interfering with the operation of eastern section of the railroad under American guard, and General Michaloff is doing the same in Baikal Section. We cannot submit to interference, if we do we fail in our duty to keep trains moving. Russian military claims it is a military necessity. Any trouble with Cossack troops will be used by Japanese for propaganda purposes against the United States.

Paragraph 4. The conduct of American soldiers has been very good, although many false and malicious reports are made against them, such as American soldiers committed some specified offense but never in such detail that falseness of charge can be established. I will not move from Lake Baikal to any other part of the railroad and such a proposition is an insult to the United States.

Paragraph 5. The British and French military here have no troops and are not guarding any part of the railroad but are determined if possible to force the use of American troops to act against all armed forces not supporting Kolchak. My belief is the people in eastern Siberia have no confidence in Kolchak representatives here consequently they lack confidence in his promises. Ivanoff-Rinoff has sent punitive expeditions to various parts of this province and the Japanese have sent such expeditions to various parts of Amur Province. I have absolute proof that Ivanoff's troops have tortured, killed and robbed the people. I also have similar reports with reference to actions of Japanese troops but have no means of establishing the truth of these reports. This has created a situation which I believe will have to be fought out by the Russian factions in eastern Siberia. If we continue our policy here we will almost surely have armed conflict with Russian troops as they are determined we cannot remain in Siberia and continue the policy of non-interference and they claim such policy is impossible under existing conditions. The Bolsheviks call attention to our failure to help Kolchak and this has great influence with the peasants.

Paragraph 6. We are now squarely up against the proposition of using force or getting out as the Russian military are coming our

sector and evidently are not only going to ignore us but practically attempt to take over our duty in guarding railroads.

GRAVES

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861.00/4481a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1919, 8 p.m.

1920. For Secretary of State and McCormick.

Secretary of War has shown me General Graves's telegram number 281 May 4th which he transmitted to President with recommendation that forces in Siberia must cooperate with Kolchak or be withdrawn.

I have told the Russian Chargé d'Affaires here that the Omsk military authorities must continue on friendly terms with the American troops and General Graves in Siberia at all costs and that their failure to do so might well lead to the collapse of the railway plan and seriously weaken the prospects of the Omsk Government itself. I put this very emphatically to the Chargé d'Affaires and suggested he might think it advisable to inform the Omsk Government and the Russian representatives at Paris accordingly.

From previous telegrams you have seen the gradual development of what has become a dangerous situation in Eastern Siberia. This has been due primarily to the character of the instructions issued to General Graves which he has interpreted as requiring a rigid and aloof neutrality on his part. The British are concerned by the claim that General Graves has announced categorically that so far as his troops are concerned in guarding the railway, he is responsible to his Government and to no one else and will not consider orders from the Japanese Commander or the Railroad Committee. I understand confidentially the British military authorities in Siberia have told General Graves that in view of their own specific instructions to support the Kolchak Government they find it difficult to maintain relations with him at all if he considers himself required to keep altogether aloof from the Kolchak commanders.

Secretary of War has been kind enough to show me some of General Graves's written reports to the War Department which to my mind show that he has been, to say the least, tactless in his dealings with the Japanese military commanders, and further that his views of the situation in Siberia seem based entirely upon the opinions he has formed as a result of the arbitrary and stupid conduct of General Ivanoff-Rinoff and the buccaneering tactics of the Cossack leaders, Kalmikoff and Semenoff. I understand one of the results is that the British regard him as apparently sympathizing with the Bolsheviks rather than with the Omsk authorities.

The American command in Siberia has always required a high degree of tact and large experience in affairs. I cannot help thinking that, in spite of the narrow limitations set by his instructions, General Graves has proved lacking in both these qualifications. I am quite confident that if we decide not to recognize the Omsk Government or determine not to give that Government open support, General Graves will be unable to continue in command without open rupture either with the Russians or the Japanese or possibly with both.

I hope you will find it possible to discuss this matter with the President and Mr. Lloyd George and reach some common agreement as to our future course in Siberia. As you know, I am in the meanwhile trying to persuade the Japanese to the idea that the railway plan has altogether changed the situation since we sent our combined forces to rescue the Czechs and steady the Russians; that everybody's business now is to restore the railways and emphasize the economic and constructive character of our undertaking and make the military side of it altogether subordinate.

Even if I succeed with the Japanese, I still think that first, the matter of coming to a common understanding with the British Government is absolutely necessary, and second, that if we do not somehow relieve the situation in which General Graves finds himself, our policy in Siberia will prove a total failure just at the moment when it seems to promise real success.

POLK

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/631

*The Russian Ambassador to the United States (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*<sup>44</sup>

PARIS, May 10, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am forwarding to you herewith a paraphrase of a cable from Omsk relative to the position of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia of which I made mention the other day during our conversation.

I take this opportunity as well to present certain complementary remarks on the same subject, based on different communications from Siberia.

It appears first of all, that, while in Siberia proper, West of Baikal, the general situation is rapidly improving largely due to the undivided support which the Omsk authorities are receiving from the reconstituted democratic Zemstvos and municipalities, the conditions in the Far East are still not entirely satisfactory. This is explainable, to a

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<sup>44</sup> Both temporarily at Paris.

great extent, by the specific conditions prevailing in the Far Eastern territories of Russia with its heterogenous population, the abundance of all kind of migratious unsettled elements, certain foreign influences, etc. These conditions create an atmosphere propitious for activities of undesirable and insubordinate elements, which lead to eventual riots and outbursts generally in the form of Bolshevik uprisings.

As you know, the bolsheviks do not represent a regular political party in the ordinary sense of the word, applying usual peaceful means of propaganda or persuasion. The bolsheviks try to reach their ends by open riot, their immediate and undissimulated aim being the overthrow of the existing authorities and seizure of power by violence. Evidently no Government which means to preserve its authority can afford to tolerate activities deliberately aiming at its overthrowal, and it is an obvious duty of a Government to quell such outbursts with a firm hand.

You may imagine what a precarious situation is created under such circumstances by the very suspicion that troops of a friendly Power which are supposed to pursue the preservance of order remain neutral and inactive towards such direct anti-governmental action, or more so through certain indisciplined elements give the appearance of support.

The most deplorable part of all this is that misunderstanding and alienation is created between the Russians and the Americans, facts which are deeply resented by all responsible Russians.

I earnestly hope that you will appreciate the situation and will find possible means to alleviate it. It seems that this could be done either by giving the American troops suitable instructions or by assigning them to such localities or services where the very occasion for complications might be eliminated. The Omsk authorities on their part have emphasized their most sincere desire to meet any arrangements which could solve these problems on the line of friendly cooperation.

I would greatly appreciate, my dear Mr. Lansing, if you would let me know of the dispositions which you judged best to take, and I remain [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The Omsk Government to the Russian Ambassador to the  
United States (Bakhmeteff)*

*April 24, 1919.*

Bolshevik outbursts have recently taken place in the Amour Province in regions occupied by American troops. The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia does not appear to possess definite instructions with regard to the line of conduct in case of eventual riots.



The American Command apparently treats the Bolsheviks as a political party of ordinary character. Besides, the American troops in Siberia contain a considerable number of Russian immigrants, partly of Jewish extraction, favorising extremist tendencies. All this is helping anti-governmental activities and is creating a situation extremely serious and complicated.

It would be highly important to draw, in the most friendly way, the attention of the United States authorities to these conditions. The Government is extremely anxious to prevent any development of unfriendly feeling towards American contingents. It is endeavouring to create mutual understanding and friendliness. Would it not be possible that General Graves be given instructions which would determine with precision the line of conduct towards Bolshevik riots? Also could not certain elements in the American Force be replaced by men more disciplined and having no affiliation with Russian political strife?

Embarrassment is also caused by the fact that movements of the United States troops and their assignment to that or other duties eventually take place without the cognizance of the Russians. It is extremely desirable that such movements should be effected upon agreement with the Russian authorities.

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Paris Peace Conference 180.03401/13

C.F. 13

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 14th, [1919,] at 12:15 p. m.*

[Extracts]

PRESENT.—*United States of America:* President Wilson.—*British Empire:* Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.—*France:* M. Clemenceau.—*Italy:* M. Orlando.—Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B., *Secretary.*—Count Aldrovandi, *Secretary.*—Professor P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter.*

Russia

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had received from the British Representatives in Siberia reports as to the risk of trouble between the United States forces in Siberia and the Russian troops. The view of the British Representatives, which of course he could not confirm, was that the Russian General Ivanoff had done his best to smooth matters, and that the trouble was largely due to General Graves.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that General Graves was a man of most unprovocative character, and wherever the fault might lie, he felt sure it was not with him. The British representatives were, he would not say partisans of, but at any rate friendly to, Koltchak.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said they might fairly be termed partisans.

VILLA MAJESTIC,

PARIS, 14th May, 1919.

861.00/4478 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1919, 4 p.m.

1965. Following from Ambassador Morris:

"May 13, 1 p.m. Russian Ambassador has informed me that Ivanoff-Rinoff has been recalled by the Kolchak Government, claims, being in my opinion a victory for general fusion [*sic*] which might form one of the grounds for recognition of the Omsk Government."

You will recall that Ivanoff-Rinoff was the Russian Commander in Eastern Siberia who has been responsible for arbitrary and reactionary policies which have been so much complained of by American representatives and liberal Russians.

POLK

861.00/4538 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk  
(Harris)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1919, 5 p.m.

Please comment on following report made by General Graves to War Department May 10:

"General Romanovsky is now here having returned from Omsk and is most bitter against the United States. He says that either we do not understand the situation or that we are enemies of Omsk Government; that he is accused of being a reactionary and admits it. General Graves feels Romanovsky reflects the attitude of the Omsk Government as Romanovsky says he was offered position of Minister of War.

All of Kolchak's adherents to whom Graves talks inquire why we are in Siberia if we do not intend to fight Bolsheviks. Graves is convinced, from a cable sent by Associated Press representative, Whiffen, who was on Romanovsky's train, that Romanovsky has something to do with the propaganda against the United States. Graves believes Kolchak's adherents will be disappointed and extremely antagonistic against the United States if we do not join immediately in active military operations against the Bolsheviks

whenever we may decide to recognize Kolchak. Graves believes we can only expect bitter animosity from Kolchak so long as troops are in Eastern Siberia and not engaged in active operations against the Bolsheviks."

To enable you to make reply with full knowledge of Department's action, Ambassador Morris has been directed to repeat to you instructions dated May 6, 6 p.m.<sup>46</sup>

POLK

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861.00/4524 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received May 18, 1919, 9:52 p.m.]

Following repeated from [Harris at] Chita.

"222. May 10, 4 p.m. I have the following occurrence to report. When I arrived at station Dauria on May 8 in the evening a band of Mongolian troops belonging to Semenoff, about five hundred in number, stopped the train and would not let it proceed further. A few field pieces were stationed on an adjacent elevation commanding the train. The commander of Semenoff's troops stated that he had received a telegram from the Russian military commandant of Manchuria Station, which we had left shortly before, saying that I had refused to permit a customs inspection at that place and that he intended to make such an inspection then and there. I informed him that such an examination had been made at Manchuria with my full knowledge and consent and that the train had proceeded regularly thereafter. I informed him that he could make any further inspection he saw fit but should kindly withdraw his troops as the train was entirely unarmed and such a demonstration of force was unnecessary. The soldiers were withdrawn to the rear of the station. A freight car containing consular food supplies from our quartermaster in Vladivostok and two cars belonging to Mr. Tuck,<sup>47</sup> who is proceeding into Siberia under instructions from Ambassador Morris, were thus examined. A number of trunks belonging to consuls and Red Cross nurses in Siberia to which I had no keys were forced open. A car with supplies for General Knox in charge of a British lieutenant was similarly treated after having been inspected at Manchuria. Nothing was confiscated and we proceeded in direction of Chita after five hours' delay.

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<sup>46</sup> *Post*, p. 560.

<sup>47</sup> Charles H. Tuck, agricultural expert.

While no incident occurred, yet the same is indicative of the high-handed way Semenoff is behaving in a section of the railway guarded by the Japanese. I respectfully point out to the Department that at a time when American troop and supply trains together with Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. trains are passing westward over this route, the chances of a clash are great unless the powers which have agreed to operate this railway take immediate steps to eliminate Semenoff and his band highway robbers. Semenoff's acts of violence on the line extending from Chita to Manchuria Station are numerous and no railway can be operated under such circumstances. Harris."

[REINSCH]

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Paris Peace Conference 861.00/666

*Mr. George T. Clerk to the Secretary of State*

[LONDON], May 19, 1919.

DEAR MR. LANSING: Lord Curzon desires me to express his great regret that you did not get the promised note upon Siberia, which I now enclose, before you left London.

Believe me [etc.]

GEORGE T. CLERK

[Enclosure]

*The British Foreign Office to the Secretary of State*<sup>48</sup>

In a note communicated to the United States Ambassador on February 26th last,<sup>49</sup> His Majesty's Government endeavored to state their views in regard to the policy which they conceived it was the object of the Allies to pursue in Siberia pending a decision by the Allied Powers in Paris in regard to the policy to be adopted towards the Russian problem as a whole.

If the United States Government agree to the views which have been put forward by His Majesty's Government, the feeling of His Majesty's Government is that the instructions with which General Graves has been furnished by the United States Government do not admit of the necessary support being given to Admiral Kolchak, with the result that a serious divergence of views has arisen between the Russian representative of Admiral Kolchak and General Graves, as regards the measures to be adopted for dealing with the situation east of Lake Baikal.

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<sup>48</sup> Copy transmitted by the Secretary of State, at Paris, to the Acting Secretary of State under cover of a personal letter dated May 24, 1919.

<sup>49</sup> *Ante*, p. 329.

The particular instances to which the attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn are as follows:

1. On March 4th it was reported that General Graves refused to assist a Japanese detachment in serious difficulties against several thousand Bolsheviks. This was afterwards confirmed by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tokyo in a conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at that place.

2. On March 8th, it was reported that General Graves declined to send a representative to inquire into Bolshevik atrocities.

3. On March 20th it was reported that the attitude of the United States troops in the Suchan region rendered the suppression of the Bolshevik rising impossible.

4. On March 25th it was reported by His Majesty's High Commissioner at Vladivostock that General Graves declined to acknowledge General Otani's authority, though he had been accepted as Allied Commander in Chief in the Vladivostock area.<sup>50</sup> General Graves stated at the same time that no American troops would be used to suppress a Bolshevik rising which was expected at the time.

5. On April 4th it was reported that General Graves had declared his neutrality, after being sent to assist Czecho-Slovaks against the Bolshevik forces.

6. On April 15th General Graves declined to go to the assistance of a Russian detachment which was pursuing the Bolshevik forces in the Suchan area, and in fact obstructed the operations in such a manner that the Bolsheviks escaped.

7. On April 5th, it was reported from Chita that three incidents had taken place on the line with which the United States troops were involved. On one occasion it was only possible to prevent firing by the train passing out of the station. On another occasion the Russian flag was torn down from a train by the United States soldiers.

9 [*sic*]. On April 11th it was reported that relations between Kalmikoff's troops and United States soldiers were steadily becoming more strained and conflicts occurred daily, between officers as well as between men.

In drawing the attention of the United States Government to this matter, His Majesty's Government are actuated solely by a desire that their representatives in the Far East should act in the closest co-operation with the representatives of the United States Government in pursuance of the policy which they believe the United States Government, in common with themselves, have in view.

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<sup>50</sup> But see note from the British Chargé, no. 26, Jan. 8, p. 461, and comment of the Secretary of War quoted in telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 273, Jan. 16, 7 p. m., p. 463.

861.77/862 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, May 19, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received May 21, 9:45 a.m.]

312. [From Smith:]

General Graves has paid October freight bills incurred by the United States. English will pay immediately. Japanese promised action very soon. Kindly urge them if necessary.

Inter-Allied representatives China, Czecho-Slovakia, England, France, Italy, Japan and the United States unanimously passed the following resolution:

"Ataman Semenoff has no right to examine trains or baggage or collect dues on any part Siberian Railway and that instructions be given to Allied troops guarding the line to prevent him from doing so."

Committee unanimously passed following a few days ago:

"Any infractions of the rules regarding special trains as passed by the committee shall at once be reported by local railway officials to commander of troops guarding that particular section of line and he shall at once act to prevent same."

Both resolutions result actions of Semenoff whom Japanese have been supporting. General Inagaki representing Matsudaira suggested latter resolution. Inagaki also has asked permission to use telegraph line, see my 273.<sup>51</sup> Generally actions of Japanese military are much better past ten days but they still commit numerous petty annoyances which disturb. However, main issues have been squarely presented to them and they have voted to act according to our desires. Omsk Government has recalled General Ivanoff-Rinoff and eastern situation entirely in the hands of General Horvath who is very friendly to Stevens and Americans. Russian military still troublesome but believe with aid of Horvath we can soon adjust this. Military hate to give up opportunity for [getting rich] selling cars et cetera. Omsk Government has been very reluctant to delegate its imagined prerogatives but Committee is ready to handle same as soon as \$20,000,000 is granted.<sup>52</sup> Repeated to Tokyo. Smith.

CALDWELL

<sup>51</sup> May 3, 5 p.m., *ante*, p. 490.

<sup>52</sup> See telegram transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok, no. 327, May 28, 3 p.m., p. 265.

861.00/4598b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk  
(Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, *May 21, 1919, 7 p.m.*

Department has noted interview by Soukine with Associated Press representative telegraphed to this country under date of May 7. If you deem advisable you may say quite informally and unofficially to Mr. Soukine that the reaction from his remarks has been distinctly unfavorable to the Omsk Government and that he, consequently, may consider it advisable to adopt a course which will tend to foster a favorable public opinion in this country and which will enable this Government to carry out the plan in regard to the railways and also to permit the continued shipment to Russia of rifles, bank notes and other supplies including railway materials. The Department is perfectly aware of the difficult situation in Siberia and of the difficulties with which the Omsk Government has to contend, and suggests that you make this statement to Mr. Soukine merely so that he may not further increase those difficulties.

POLK

861.00/4540a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *May 21, 1919, 9 p.m.*

2051. For Secretary of State and McCormick.

The Associated Press on 19th published the following which you may wish to call to attention of Bakhmeteff:<sup>53</sup>

"Omsk, May 7th. The All-Russian Government, through Mr. Soukine, the Acting Foreign Minister, has requested Major General Graves, the American Commander in Siberia, not to send American troops further into the interior of Siberia than they are at present. The request was framed in the most friendly terms. The reason given was the desire to preserve the existing friendly relations with America, which, in view of the American Government's undefined stand on Bolshevism, might otherwise be jeopardized.

The attitude of the Washington Government, Secretary Soukine explained, is being used by certain political groups to create discord among the Russian people, and thus weaken the Government. Up to this time the results of such efforts had been confined to the Far East and constitute an entirely local situation, which, as much as we deplore it, we cannot help. We did not wish the contagion to spread nearer the seat of the Government, and therefore made the request.

<sup>53</sup> Boris A. Bakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador to the United States, temporarily in Paris.

It ought to be said once more that every Russian is concerning himself with the question of the attitude of Americans toward Bolshevism, and it is the most democratic element of the people here who are opposed to the troops advancing further.

In this connection M. Soukine added, a certain Government is seeking to convince the Russians that Great Britain and the United States are so under the influence of Bolshevism that the wisest course for the Omsk Government would be to ally itself with an imperialistic nation which stands rock-like against Bolshevism.

He declared that the Government was not influenced by this in the face of continued assurances of sympathy and support from France and Great Britain."

POLK

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861.77/868 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, May 24, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received May 25, 12:14 p.m.]

322. [From Smith:]

General Graves May 11th notified me Russian commander at Irkutsk refused to allow Americans to guard railway Verkhne-udinsk to Baikal citing authority Kolchak. May 13th I formally protested to Committee stating that this was affront to the United States and in violation of railways agreement. Members all are [have] sustained my views. [Having?] no knowledge of matter, General Horvath asked for permission to consult Omsk, which was granted, and he sent excellent telegram stating that both he and Committee sustained our position. Omsk apologized 23d saying that this was mistake and Americans were to guard this section, have barracks and whatever they desired. After having consulted General Graves we decided to offer Russians a part of our section in case Omsk apologized. Thanking all concerned, I offered to release a part of section if the other Allies consented. If acceptable Russians will take from Baikal eastward approximately hundred miles.

Russian sentiment more favorable to America past fortnight mainly due to Horvath. Have conversed with him very frequently, also others who now understand our position better. Japanese military propaganda less because undoubtedly see that attitude of leading Russians is changing. Committee will probably remove soon to Omsk. Smith.

Repeated to Tokyo.

CALDWELL



861.77/875 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Acting Secretary of State*VLADIVOSTOK, *undated*.

[Received May 29, 1919, 8:27 a.m.]

328. Copy of telegram to Harris May 28, 4 p.m.

Your May 23, 5 p.m.<sup>55</sup> From May 17th to 21[st] trains on railway to Suchan mines were fired upon several times, one Russian officer being killed and several persons wounded. Twenty-one Americans pursued band just after it fired and had three Americans wounded. Bolshevik leaders demand same right to transportation on railway as Kolchak troops stating that if this is not granted within week railway will be destroyed. Bolsheviks have already persuaded Suchan coal miners and railway employees to strike demanding that all Kolchak and foreign troops leave the district.

I visited Suchan mines with General Graves just before Americans fired upon Bolsheviks and a number of the workmen told me they are Bolsheviks. Many of those armed are young boys and none appear to be well armed or to have much ammunition. Nevertheless they can interfere with the railway, by destroying it at various points, for a long time to come.

Recall of Ivanoff-Rinoff has had good effect on general situation.

CALDWELL

861.00/4603 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*PEKING, *undated*.

[Received May 30, 1919, 7:26 a.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

[“]233. May 26th, noon. Referring to Department's May 16th, 5 p.m. I believe that crisis in anti-American propaganda and antagonistic attitude of Omsk Government is passed and much better feeling now prevails. Romanovsky undoubtedly reflected feeling at that time and he was probably also influenced by incident reported by Associated Press representative Whiffen. I had conference with Romanovsky at Harbin and my impression was that he is personally not anti-American. Impression is gaining ground at this moment in Omsk that America is favoring recognition of Kolchak with Allies and if such step is taken America will take prominent part in assisting Russia financially and economically.

<sup>55</sup> Copy has not been found in the Department files.

Yesterday Kolchak spent two hours inspecting American Red Cross hospital and expressed himself as highly pleased. Kolchak's attitude towards me since my return has been most cordial. Harris."

REINSCH

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861.00/4613 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, May 31, 1919.

[Received June 2, 7:55 p.m.]

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

[“] 247. May 31st, 2 p.m. Vice Consul Fowler, Chita, reports following incident:

‘Major Gravis’<sup>56</sup> train held up here Friday and Saturday by Semenoff officials and [who] demanded the car occupied by Major Gravis claiming it as theirs and as having been taken from them at Harbin. I saw Semenoff commandant and was informed that the train would be held indefinitely until car was given up. When asked if he recognized Allied control of the railroad he answered that he has never been officially informed of the fact and therefore as he was not recognized by the Allies he in turn did not recognize their control. Mr. Stevens arrived Saturday morning and saw Semenoff but the train was not released. Finally Colonel Kurasava of the Japanese Military Mission was seen and had the train released immediately and Major Gravis left last night. Mr. Stevens had left previously about noon. Major Gravis asked me to especially mention the prompt and businesslike action taken by Colonel Kurasava’.

Major Gravis, an American, was distributing American railway assistants along Trans-Baikal Railway. [Harris.]”

REINSCH

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861.01/58 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1919, 6 p.m.

2182. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Text of telegram from Semenoff to Admiral Kolchak submitted to Department by Russian Embassy here. Semenoff recognizes Kolchak and submits unconditionally to his command.

POLK

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<sup>56</sup> Member of the Russian Railway Service Corps.

861.00/4682 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1919, 5 p.m.

2297. For the Secretary of State and McCormick:

Referring to my telegram of May 9, 8 p.m. No. 1920, following from Consul at Vladivostok illustrates result of the extremely rigid interpretation of his instructions which has characterized the action of American Commander. The Suchan mines mentioned are understood by the Department to give the coal supply necessary for the operation of the section of the Siberian Railway from Vladivostok to Habarovsk.

“June 11, 6 p. m. Called meeting Vladivostok Chamber of Commerce last night heard special report on policy American Expeditionary Forces particularly in Suchan Mine district and adopted strong protest against it as promoting reestablishment Bolshevik régime in that district. Resolutions in part reading

‘Local American command adopted one sided and fasted [*sic*] idea of maintaining order on section Russian railway trusted to it, on one hand hindering Russian authorities and Russian people from preventing resurgence of Bolshevism, and on other displaying tolerance toward and even indirect protection of anti-governmental elements. As translations from declaration of Colonel Pendleton, American command regards Bolshevik leaders of small Bolshevik band as regular authority and maintains relations with them on a parity with Government of Russia which is not only insulting to feelings of patriotic population but also strengthens position of those elements that by destruction and terrorism disturb and undermine the country. Action of local American Command to our profound regret is accompanied by ignoring of the laws and arbitrary arrests of loyal Russian citizens. Sympathizing with the American people and its democratic institutions and gratefully acknowledging economic assistance rendered by American Government, Vladivostok Chamber of Commerce appeals to whole American people with warm protest against one-sided action of American Command in the Maritime Province which have been condemned by Russian public opinion.’”

POLK

861.77/894 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received June 14, 1919, 6:30 a.m.]

Following from Harris, Tomsk.

“26 [260?]. June 12, 4 p.m. Following from American Vice Consul, Chita:

‘Trouble which threatened to be serious occurred at Verchneudinsk June 9th and 10th between Americans and Semenov forces,

Colonel Morrow demanded removal of Semennoff armoured train and called out troops to enforce demand. Train was finally removed. Semennoff claims trouble was misunderstanding, brought about purposely by Russian-Jewish interpreters with American forces. He adds that he has now been officially notified of Allied control of railroad, will see that nothing of the kind occurs again and will do all in his power to work in accord with Allied forces and railroad engineers. Mr. Stevens called upon Semennoff today and was given assurance.'

Minister Soukine informs me that this whole matter has been amicably settled. [Harris]"

REINSCH

861.00/5137

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>57</sup>

[Extract]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 21, 1919.

1. The situation with reference to guarding the railroad has not materially improved since my last report. During the last ten days we have had more or less trouble in the sector between Spasskoe and Ussuri. I have issued a proclamation (copy hereto attached, marked "A") with reference to our object and duty connected with guarding the railway, and have sent sufficient copies to all commanding officers so that people in the neighboring villages and all anti-Koltchak people have complete information as to our intentions regarding the use of American troops . . .

WM. S. GRAVES

[Enclosure A]

*Proclamation by the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves)*

*To the Russian People:*

WHEREAS, under existing disturbed and distressed conditions in Russia, it appears of general benefit and to the equal advantage of the Russian people, irrespective of political connections or belief, to insure the safe, prompt, and regular movement of freight and passengers over the railroads in Siberia; and

WHEREAS, for such desired accomplishment, agreement has been made between the Allied Powers having military forces in Siberia, including Russia, for the safe-guarding of the operation of the rail-

<sup>57</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State Aug. 5.

roads by means of troops within the territory in which Allied Military Forces are now at work; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to such agreement, the railway from Vladivostok, inclusive, to Nikolsk, exclusive, and including the branch line from Ugolnia to and including Souchian Mines; from Spasskoe, exclusive, to Ussuri, inclusive, and from Verkhnie Udinsk to Baikal City, both inclusive, has been placed under the protection of the troops of the United States of America;

Now, Therefore, the Russian people are notified and advised, that in the performance of such duty, the sole object and purpose of the armed forces of the United States of America, on guard between the railroad points above stated, is to protect the railroad and railway property and insure the operation of passenger and freight trains through such sector without obstruction or interruption. Our aim is to be of real assistance to all Russia in protecting necessary traffic movements within the sectors on the railroads in Siberia assigned to us to safeguard. All will be equally benefited, and all shall be treated alike by our forces irrespective of persons, nationality, religion or politics. Cooperation is requested and warning given to all persons whomsoever, that interference with traffic will not be tolerated.

WM. S. GRAVES

HEADQUARTERS A.E.F., SIBERIA,  
April 21, 1919.

861.00/4783 : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>58</sup>

VLADIVOSTOK, June 26, 1919.

345. While in theory all Russians are treated the same in use of the railroad, in practice the governmental class will not permit supplies to go to localities not under their charge, nor will they permit persons to use the railroad unless they have passports given only at short notice. This restricts the use of the railroad to persons living in certain towns on the railroad and prevents all peasants living off railroad and many living on railroad in towns where there are no troops, from getting food.

Olga and Tethui districts off railroad have been heretofore supplied by boat from Vladivostok. Kolchak representatives have stopped all supplies from going to that district, as they claim this is Bolshevist territory, and there are now 40,000 people without flour and living principally on oats. They sent representatives to inform the consular body of the situation, but Russian military arrested rep-

<sup>58</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State June 30.

representatives and put them in jail where they have kept them for two months. I feel sure of these facts. This oppression and starvation creates a resentment which extends to the Allies, as we are making this condition possible by our presence here, as Kolchak could not exist in Eastern Siberia without Allied troops. The fact of the case is Kolchak territory is a little strip along the railroad guarded by Allied troops.

Bolshevists are assembling in bands from 100 to 1,000. This makes it necessary to call in small detachments and assemble troops where they can be protected themselves. It has now become a bitter guerilla warfare. There is no assistance by Russians, and to carry out obligations imposed by railroad agreement will require more troops. I assume Japan is the only Allied nation willing to put in enough troops to clear up territory. I estimate at least 70 per cent of people are, generally speaking, peasants getting no food and are antagonistic to Kolchak, and as our policy results in helping only Kolchak, these peasants are antagonists to the Allies. I was informed this morning by Colonel Butenko, eastern front commander, that Kolchak had suggested to Horvat either Semenoff or Kreschatinsky to be commander of troops in Baikal and Colonel says Semenoff is to be appointed. In view of their relations to the Japanese, especially Semenoff, this suggestion indicates to me that Kolchak expects to rely on Japan.

GRAVES

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861.00/4752: Circular Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*<sup>59</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1919, 6 p.m.

Continued interference by Semenoff and his representatives with operation of Siberian railways, leads this Government to believe that instructions should be issued to Inter-Allied Committee and to Allied Military Commanders in Siberia that vigorous joint representations be made to Semenoff to discontinue promptly this interference.

Ascertain from the Government to which you are accredited whether it will instruct its representatives in above sense. You may say that this Government regards Semenoff's interference as of special importance as indicating the necessity of limiting the use of military forces along the railways to safeguard the operation of the road and making effective the Inter-Allied plan to restore railway traffic. Answer promptly.

Repeat these instructions to Paris and Rome.

PHILLIPS

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<sup>59</sup> The same to the Ambassador in Japan with instruction to repeat to the Legation at Peking.

861.00/4838 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 11, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 6:40 p.m.]

2518. Your circular telegram June 28, 6 p.m. regarding interference by Semenoff with operation of Siberian railways. Foreign Office states that instructions have been sent to British representatives in Siberia in accordance with the wishes of the Government of the United States and presumes that a similar request has been addressed to the Japanese Government.

The matter was broached to the Foreign Office in informal conversation during which immediate acquiescence in our views was intimated, but it was deemed wiser to await more formal announcement which has just been received. I infer that British representative at Tokyo has been advised. As British Government is becoming more and more directly concerned with the Russian problem which looms larger than ever now that peace negotiations are approaching completion and as it receives repeated requests from the new Baltic states and other nationalities for loans to enable them to continue their opposition to Bolshevism the deplorable effects arising from the lack of consistent Allied policy toward Russia based upon the Allied note to Koltchak and his reply are constantly alluded to by officials here.

While for some reason this Government appears unwilling or unable to take the initiative in the matter I believe that it would welcome a proposal that a conference be held for such purpose.

DAVIS

861.00/4851 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, July 15, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received July 15, 4:53 p.m.]

407. [From Smith:]

British representative sends from Omsk following secret information: Omsk Government has decided to abolish position of Horvath<sup>59a</sup> and retire him to private life. Government claims his rule has been too weak and that he retains here too many officers who should go to the front. General Rozanoff of Krasnoyarsk is to be named to

<sup>59a</sup>As high commissioner of the Kolchak government for the Far East.

command all troops now under Horvath. Rozanoff is very reactionary and employs terrorism.

Have sent Ambassador Morris above information. Inter-Allied Committee is also taking measures to prevent same as such information would be harmful to railways as well as the population generally.

From Russian sources I have news confirming information sent to War Department by General Graves regarding activity of Japanese military with Omsk Government on [omission]. The Japanese have told me that the Czechs should be sent home as soon as possible and that they would guard the railway where the Czechs have been. They have not been meeting with favorable opinion on that subject and have apparently dropped it. Smith.

CALDWELL

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861.00/4851 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Morris and Harris.

Smith informs Department he has telegraphed Ambassador Morris the reported intention of Omsk Government to retire General Horvath, substituting General Rozanoff.

If you deem it advisable you may make informal representations to the Omsk authorities favoring the retention of General Horvath who has manifested a disposition to cooperate with the Allies and whose long established control of the Chinese Eastern Railway would seem to deserve consideration.

Department has considerable knowledge regarding General Horvath which would seem to indicate that any change made might possibly be very much for the worse.

POLK

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861.77/961 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, July 19, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received July 20, 8 a.m.]

416. [From Smith:]

A telegram was sent to the Omsk Government 18th July signed by all members of the Inter-Allied Committee except Horvath<sup>60</sup> who agreed but felt he could not sign, as follows:

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<sup>60</sup> Russian member, acting for Ustrugov upon the withdrawal of the latter to Omsk.



“ Since March 1st the Allied Powers have been endeavoring to restore the Siberian transport system in conformity with the Inter-Allied Agreement to which the Russian Government is a party. Our aim has been to revive Russia and to place her again among leading nations without thought of other reward than that of seeing Russia a united whole and a free, democratic country which her people deserve. And we want no special interests, concessions, territorial advantages, or other selfish emoluments, but desire to have Russia maintain the open door policy to all friendly nations.

To date our efforts have only met with small success. This has been due entirely to the unresponsive actions of certain of the Government's own agents. Russian military authorities, especially Semenoff, and the officers in charge of Russian military transportation have continually hindered and obstructed the movement of trains and the disposition of cars. The transport of Russian military supplies have been seriously diminished by their actions. The military are indispensable for their proper task of defending the railway. Their interference in its operation, however, is nothing but a hindrance to the civil authorities to whose admirable spirit of loyalty and cooperation the Committee can testify. The Committee also appreciates the action of Minister Ustrugov in his telegram of recent date relative to shop management and repairs, and feels that analogous action is required in the other departments of the administration.

In view of the above data we the undersigned members of the Inter-Allied Committee feel it is our duty to require that the following provisions be fulfilled immediately.

1. That Semenoff must at once stop his interference with the operation of the railway and also all other arbitrary and violent acts.
2. That all the military officers in charge of military transportation be required to obey the Committee's resolution of May 27<sup>61</sup> which says that only railway officials shall have the right to operate the railway.
3. That the general supervision, the technical and economic management and the operation of all railways in the zone where the Allied Powers are now operating be trusted to the Inter-Allied Committee and its subordinate board in accordance with the terms of the agreement entered into by the Allied Powers.
4. That no obstacle of whatever kind which would be in contravention to point 3 be imposed by any Russian governmental agency now existing or which may be created during the term of this agreement.
5. That an approval to this telegram is required at the very earliest moment.

The Committee is anxious to aid Russia and has the requisite funds at hand but does not consider that these can be applied to advantage unless the above requirements are fully complied with.”

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<sup>61</sup> Not printed (file no. 861.77/3304).

Copies of the above have been sent to all Allied representatives in Omsk who are asked to present same at once to Government. Ambassador Morris will receive copy. Smith.

CALDWELL

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861.00/4911 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received July 25, 1919, 1:06 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

[“] 336, July 25, 10 a.m. Referring to Department’s July 15, 5 a.m. [July 16, 6 p.m.?] General Horvath has been definitely retired and Rozanoff sent Vladivostok to replace him. Harris.”

REINSCH

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861.00/4920 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1919, 5 p.m.

For Morris.

Your July 24, 4 p.m.<sup>62</sup> Department believes it would be a serious step, militating definitely against the purpose of the Associated Governments to assist Russia in Siberia, were Semenov promoted to a full generalship. If you deem it advisable you may say this emphatically both to Kolchak and to Japanese.

LANSING

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861.77/999 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Italy (Jay) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, August 7, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received August 8, 1:32 p.m.]

3086. Department’s June 28, 6 p.m. regarding interference by Semenov with operation of Siberian Railways. Foreign Office reply to Embassy’s note July 1st marked urgent received only today. Reply states Italian Consul, Vladivostok, has received instructions to associate himself with his colleagues of Inter-Allied Railway Commission in protest to Semenov.

JAY

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<sup>62</sup> Ante, p. 396.

861.00/4980 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received August 8, 1919.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

"349. August 6, 5 p.m. Referring to Department's July 29, 5 p.m.<sup>63</sup> From best obtainable sources Rozanoff has reactionary leanings. While he has not openly declared himself in favor of a monarchy, yet he has stated that the Russian people are at present absolutely incapable of democratic self-government. While at Krasnoyarsk last winter he inaugurated policy of shooting large number of Bolsheviks in retaliation for Bolshevik raids [upon?] railway.

Semenoff who has been made major general by Kolchak at Japanese instigation, is to serve as Rozanoff's [omission] in Far East. Harris."

REINSCH

861.00/5036 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 13, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received August 14, 6:51 p.m.]

Semenoff was promoted to a full generalship before the receipt of your August 5, 5 p.m. Kolchak is compelled to rely more and more on Cossack support in the present crisis because he has no other support left. The Siberian Cossacks whose communal lands lie in the Omsk district are being mobilized by Ivanoff-Rinoff; they are not disposed to fight vigorously for the Kolchak government, but in the event of its fall will take over the local administration and defend their landed and other privileges from Bolshevik aggression.

MORRIS

861.00/5198½ : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*

VLADIVOSTOK, September 16, 1919.

[Received at the War Department September 17, 5:46 a.m.]

467. Paragraph 1. Slaughter telegraphs<sup>64</sup> that Chief Technical Department of War Ministry has orders to buy at least 20 tanks

<sup>63</sup> Not printed.<sup>64</sup> From Omsk.

and number of armored motor cars in United States. Suggested depositing 4,000,000 yen gold in city National Bank, Vladivostok, to cover purchase price. There is no question in my mind that Semenoff and Kalmikoff and probably Rozanoff are practically independent of Kolchak and appear to support him when it suits their purpose to do so. Kalmikoff recently received 30,000 yen from Japan. His Cossacks on September 5th arrested an American Captain and Corporal because they had no Russian passports. His Cossacks released the Captain but took Corporal to Habarovsk and whipped him. The Commanding Officer arrested three Cossacks and held them until return of American Corporal. Kalmikoff ordered the Corporal's release, which was done September 7th. I told Rozanoff that Kalmikoff Cossacks must never touch an American soldier and if they did I would arrest Kalmikoff and hold him as prisoner. Kalmikoff has called upon Cossacks assemble with view to driving Americans out of Siberia. I am told by Rozanoff's assistant that Semenoff is ready to assist Kalmikoff in case of trouble with Americans. In view of this I have told Slaughter I will not recommend the sale of anything to Kolchak until these Cossacks are controlled.

Paragraph 2. Reference your No. 357. The 1,000,000 gold was offered me this morning and delivery of rifles requested. On account of anti-American action of Kolchak agents here, Semenoff, Kalmikoff, Rozanoff, I have refused to take gold and refused to give up rifles. Request approval of this action. Mr. Morris here and approved. I have told Slaughter to inform Omsk Government we will not give them any military supplies as long as Kolchak agents of the East are threatening to use military force against the United States. I believe this anti-American action directed by Japan.

GRAVES

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861.24/179a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1919, 6 p.m.

For Morris.

Graves reports you have approved his withholding delivery of rifles because of Kalmikoff incident. Graves admits Kalmikoff irresponsible . . . This Government has formally undertaken to aid Kolchak with munitions, food and supplies and made rifle contract with Russian authorities here on that premise. Department feels very strongly unless there are adequate reasons to the contrary that rifles should be delivered in fulfilment of formal obligation and that

Kalmikoff incident should be regarded as unwarranted action by unauthorized and irresponsible person, a matter which should be taken up with Omsk Government separately. Please let Department have your views at once.<sup>66</sup>

PHILLIPS

861.00/5257 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, September 22, 1919.

[Received 9:35 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

September 21st, 4 p.m. General Graves through his military representative, Major Slaughter, has presented the following note to the Omsk Foreign Office:

"In view of anti-American declarations of Kalmikoff and actions of General Rozanoff in doing nothing to stop Kalmikoff, and in view of the part [*fact?*] that Semenoff has told Kalmikoff he will assist him in case of trouble against the United States, I have informed the War Department, but have recommended no sale of military supplies to Admiral Kolchak for the Government as long as his agents in the East are threatening to declare war on the United States. Please tell the Foreign Minister the above and say to him I have refused to give up the rifles now here as long as above conditions continue.

The *Golos Rodini* is publishing libellous, insulting and disgusting lies about the Americans and Rozmikoff [*Rozanoff?*] failed to take action. Tell the Foreign Minister that unless action is taken at once I shall close the paper and arrest the editors. This will be done because there is practically no authority here willing to act in protecting American soldiers from these insults.["]

While fully sympathizing with the exasperating conditions which face General Graves and the sole [*whole?*] of our army, yet I trust wiser counsels may prevail before proceeding to any drastic acts of violence which will be fraught with grave consequences for the future. Should the *Golos Rodini* be thus suppressed a storm of anti-American propaganda will spread over Siberia and a hundred *Golos Rodinis* will spring up throughout the length and breadth of this country. The appointment of Rozanoff to succeed Horvath in the Far East is now looked upon as a serious mistake by the Omsk Government. I have been unofficially informed that [apparent omission] will shortly be taken to withdraw him. The unfortunate utterances of Ambassador Morris in Vladivostok,<sup>67</sup> if true, have been received by a storm of indignation by the various members of this Government including Kolchak, and the Ambassador's mission to

<sup>66</sup> Answered by Ambassador Morris in par. 6 of telegram of Sept. 23, 5 p.m., *ante*, p. 432.

<sup>67</sup> See undated telegram from the Chargé in China, received Sept. 15, 12:30 p.m., p. 424.

Omsk, as far as achieving any practical results in connection with this Government, has ended in deplorable failure. I respectfully beg to point out to the Department that at no time have I considered the situation, as far as our relations with the Russians are concerned, so critical as at the present moment. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5261 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, undated.

[Received September 23, 1919, 10:20 a.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk:

"396. September 22, 4 p.m. Referring to my September 21, 4 p.m. Soukine has taken umbrage at what he considers offensive tone of Graves' note and is replying in sense that he wishes Secretary of State to make decision in the matter. Soukine asks Secretary of State in this connection to again consider statement issued by Omsk Government which I telegraphed, number 200, March 15, [25], 5 p.m.<sup>68</sup>

Usually General Graves instructs Major Shulz to hand his notes to me for transmission to Foreign Office, but in this instance I was not consulted. Had the note been handed to me I would have cabled Secretary of State for instructions upon transmitting same.

I understand British military authorities are protesting against action Graves in withholding rifles already paid for by Omsk Government. General Knox has received instructions from the British Government in effect that the English mission here should not encourage factions in the Far East opposed to Kolchak and no government which might succeed Kolchak will receive British support.

Understand Japanese have made similar statement and Ambassador Kato is hastening to Omsk.

Situation at front continues favorable to Siberian forces. Cosack General Ivanoff-Rinoff has been relieved of his command. Harris."

TENNEY

861.00/5273 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, September 24, 1919, noon.

[Received September 25, 5:30 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

["]398. Referring to my despatch. Text of Soukine's reply to Graves as follows:

<sup>68</sup> Transmitted in undated telegram from the Minister in China received Mar. 27, 4:25 a.m., p. 484.

[']We deeply regret that General Graves has not taken into account that the Government is not free in dealing with the Far Eastern situation. It does not possess a sufficient and reliable military force west [*east?*] of the Baikal and does not dispose of an efficient administration to carry out its instructions. Strong orders have been repeatedly issued by the Government requiring a change of conduct by Ataman Semenoff and the suppression of the methods used by Kalmikoff. These instructions are not being carried out. The Government is more anxious than any one to find a solution of the Far Eastern problem and would be glad to consider any suggestion that may put an end to the present intolerable situation. For eight months Admiral Kolchak has asked the powers to help him to regulate the elements tending to disturb the political situation in the Far East. He received no assistance in that respect and was even advised by foreign representatives to accept a compromise of which the present situation is a direct result. The Government does not see any speedy solution of the Far Eastern problem but believing [*believes*] that moderation and patience only will bring a good real improvement of that intricate situation while radical measures have been taken contemplated by General Graves would lead to increased chaotic conditions under which the Far East would be ultimately committed by the elements that possess foreign support and represent the only actual military force in that region, such elements being exactly those against whom the General is so bitter. Russian Government cannot therefore understand why the General is pressing so urgently for measures that are beyond the power of the Government and why submitting to the Far Eastern local trouble a much more important [apparent omission] for the destiny of Russia, that of delivering rifles which are urgently needed for the front and which have been paid for by Russian Government who has deposited for that purpose a part of its gold reserve. This latter question seems to be of such an important nature and to affect such vast political problems that Russian Government would desire to receive from the Department of State through such channels as it may choose the expression of the views of the United States Government. Also the question of suppression of the paper *Golos Rodini* being non-military and involving a consideration of the usual procedure of international intercourse is expected to be dealt with by the State Department. The Government wishes to refrain in the present instance from any recriminations or further comments bearing in mind its profound desire not to impair by any word or action the sympathy which it believes has been awakened in the great mass of the American people for the Russian people in their struggle against Bolshevism.[']

Harris"  
TENNEY

861.00/5198½ : Telegram

*The Adjutant General (Harris) to the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves)*

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1919.

385. (Sec. War) British, French and others here represent Kolchak's urgent need of rifles and ammunition in present offensive which he has undertaken. President feels that his agreement to support Kolchak, made in Paris, ought to be carried out if possible. Morris cables that your withholding of delivery of rifles and ammunition was to enable you to assure yourself of their actual delivery to Kolchak and not falling into hostile hands. If it is possible for you to make delivery of rifles and ammunition so that they can be forwarded to Kolchak, it is highly desirable to do so. If you can not make this delivery, cable at once reasons why. Baker.

HARRIS

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861.00/5273 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1919, 6 p.m.

Your 398, September 24, noon. General Graves has been instructed to deliver rifles immediately in fulfilment of contract.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5373

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

A cable from Omsk received at the Embassy on September 24 indicates that the military successes which are assuming decisive character are contributing to the consolidation of the interior political situation. The cable further refers to certain elements of pessimism and confusion which naturally were gaining ground due to military reverses and which were tried to be made use of by certain revolutionary groups as well as individual political intriguers, which happily did not find serious support and ground with the population.

The situation remains complicated only in the Far East where the political atmosphere has always been rather confused and where a certain group has been formed which is endeavoring to influence the foreign representatives and get them to believe that the Government of Admiral Kolchak is doomed to failure and will be



replaced by a more radical organization reposing on public representation. A certain Czecho-Slovak doctor, Giersa, is connected with this movement and has expressed to the foreign representatives that the Czecho-Slovak Army will support such a movement. The Government at Omsk has received an official statement from General Janin that the activities of Doctor Giersa are entirely irresponsible and in no way represent the opinion of the Czech Command.

The Government at Omsk does not attach much importance to these movements which, in the opinion of the authorities, are not representative of the country. The Government however has been very much aggravated by information which alleges Ambassador Morris' having been influenced by these currents. Reports have reached Omsk that Mr. Morris, who, during his stay in Omsk, has shown so much sympathy and consideration to the Government, is now returning to his previous state of mind.

Responsiveness of certain Americans to the anti-Governmental movement in the Far East and sympathies towards some of the leaders of the Social Revolutionary group around Vladivostok have created a most undesirable impression in Omsk and are contributing again to anti-American propaganda. On the other hand France and England have made at Omsk categorical declarations that both of the Powers support Admiral Kolchak and will not encourage any movements tending to undermine or change the present authorities. These declarations have been widely published. Following the declarations of France and England, Japan has assured the Government at Omsk of its friendly and favorable attitude. The newly appointed diplomatic representative of Japan, Mr. Kato, is leaving Japan for Omsk. He is not supposed to make any stay in Vladivostok; such disposition having been taken to show the attitude of Japan towards the Central Government at Omsk and its disapproval of local Far Eastern intrigues.

The Government at Omsk is extremely embarrassed by talk circulated in this City with regard to the attitude of the Americans in the Far East. The Government has communicated with the Russian Ambassador at Washington requesting him to bring the situation to the attention of the United States Government so that necessary measures be taken which would remove all doubts as to the real attitude of the United States Government towards the situation in the Far East and thwart anti-American propaganda. Similar recommendations have been received from Mr. Sazonoff from Paris.

It is most important that the American representatives in Vladivostok be directed to make declarations which once for all would

eliminate misunderstanding as to the real attitude of the United States and that Mr. Harris be directed to inform the Omsk authorities that such action has been taken.

[WASHINGTON,] *September 27, 1919.*

861.00/5198 1/2 : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>70</sup>

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 27, 1919.*

481. During the past ten days Rozanoff has brought to Vladivostok approximately 4,000 soldiers. This has resulted in disorder of a serious nature. Kalmikoff's officers kidnapped a Russian colonel who is reported to be competitor of Kalmikoff with Usuri Cossacks from the main street in broad daylight, took him to foot of hill where his body was later found. A Russian colonel shot and killed an American soldier. The board detailed to investigate report in part, "that there was no justification for firing said shot by Lieutenant Colonel Sharatoff." Night before last five Russian officers shot and seriously wounded Czech soldier. He is expected to die. These Russian officers insult foreigners by calling them foreign dogs and saying we will run them out of our country. General Rozanoff informed the assistant town major that these acts would continue as long as Allies remain in Siberia.

In view of the conditions above described, military representatives of American, Czech, Japanese, British, French, Chinese and Italians had special meeting afternoon September 26th and decided to send demand to Rozanoff to remove Russian troops from Vladivostok, and in case of failure to do so by noon of September 29th he was told force would be used. The Japanese would not join in saying force would be used. Rozanoff had been previously told that the Russians had agreed not to bring troops to Vladivostok, and requested to remove his troops, but he has failed to do so. I was informed by Navy Intelligence officer that he had been informed at Czech headquarters that the Czechs knew the Japanese had promised Rozanoff support in case of trouble with Americans and Czechs. I can not confirm this.

It seems to me the only way trouble can be avoided is to put pressure on Kolchak to remove these disturbing elements in East. And if Kolchak is not able to remove Semenoff and Kalmikoff, which he says he has [*is*] not, he certainly can remove Rozanoff, who is violent anti-Ally and tries to create sentiment against Allies except the Japanese.

GRAVES

<sup>70</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State Sept. 29.

861.00/5322 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, *September 27, 1919, 5 p.m.*

From various sources Department has noted disturbing activities of Dr. Girska, representative of Czecho-Slovak National Council at Vladivostok. Please inform Dr. Girska that this Government has not modified in any way its hope effectively to support Admiral Kolchak and, furthermore, has initiated negotiations which it is believed will have a favorable result and which will make possible the repatriation of the Czech-Slovak troops in Siberia at an early date.

PHILLIPS

861.24/189 : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces  
in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>71</sup>

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 28, 1919.*

483. Kolchak representatives here will take over rifles with understanding that none will be delivered to any of Kolchak's military representatives east of Irkutsk. I will send troops with rifles at least as far as Verkhnie Udinsk to see that none of these arms fall into the hands of bands now dominating situation east of Lake Baikal.

GRAVES

861.00/5313 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 30, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received 10:55 p.m.]

529. As will be seen by reference to General Graves's telegrams to the War Department conditions in Vladivostok and eastern Siberia have become much worse since the arrival of General Rozanoff, who is plainly hostile toward Allies with the exception of possibly Japan. Kalmikoff and his Cossacks are allowed to come into Vladivostok and two men in Cossack uniforms murdered a Cossack Colonel in broad daylight in the city. There is very bad feeling between the Russian soldiers and Allies resulting in killing of one American and one Czech soldier by Russian officers.

<sup>71</sup> Copy transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State Sept. 29.

Allied military commanders finally demanded that General Rozanoff remove from Vladivostok fortress those troops he has brought. General Rozanoff referred matter to Omsk as [*and?*] he yesterday informed Allied commanders that Kolchak had telegraphed not to remove Russian troops from Vladivostok fortress but to use all possible means to prevent their removal.

Allied commanders met yesterday asking diplomatic representatives to be present and discussed situation, all being agreed that their demands must be complied with. General Inagaki was particularly positive as to this but stated that it would not cause a very serious situation. General Rozanoff's refusal to comply with demand of the Allied military commanders was unexpected as he had indicated compliance when it was first presented. . . .

In any case very serious situation is created which may cause actual battle between Allied and Russian troops in Vladivostok in the near future if immediate steps are not taken in Omsk to settle the matter. It appears certain that General Rozanoff has placed matter before Kolchak in wrong light or he would not have sent such orders as he did without making any inquiries of Allied representatives. After meeting of the Allied military commanders, at which diplomatic representatives were present, the latter met and agreed to telegraph to their respective representatives in Omsk and to their respective governments that they fully agreed as to the necessity for the removal from Vladivostok of the troops recently brought in by General Rozanoff and that the removal of General Rozanoff would gradually ease the situation. Repeat to Tokio and Omsk.

CALDWELL

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861.00/5314: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

[PEKING,] *October 1, 1919.*

[Received 6:56 p.m.]

From [Harris at] Omsk.

403, September 30th, noon. Concerning declaration of inter-Allied military representatives to General Rozanoff in Vladivostok, Soukine has handed me the following which is a literal translation from the Russian text:

[“]Having become cognizant of the declaration made on the 26th of September of this year by the Inter-Allied Committee of Military Representatives to General Rozanoff, commander of the forces of the Priamur military district, demanding the evacuation of the Russian forces from the Fortress of Vladivostok, the Russian Government request you to bring to the notice of Government of the United States of America that the said declaration of the inter-

Allied military command is outside of the sphere of their jurisdiction and is not compatible with that conception of the sovereignty of the Russian Government which the powers solemnly promised to respect when they sent their troops to Russia.

Being unwilling to suppose that the present action of the Allied representatives in the Far East has taken place in accordance with instructions to the Legation from the Allied Powers the Russian Government makes the most categorical protest regarding the line of action of the said representatives and the offensive demands made by them to Russian command.

The Russian command by order of the Supreme Ruler will to the last uphold the rights and dignity of Russia. The attitude assumed by the inter-Allied military committee is in such obvious antagonism with the assurances just received by the Russian Government from the powers regarding their support of Kolchak's government and their antipathy to all elements opposing this Government that it has caused the Committee [*Kolchak?*] Government profound astonishment.

The Russian Government troops concerned were brought to Vladivostok to uphold the authority of the Government against all criminal attempts which threatened the peace of the country and which were treasonable towards the army which has brilliantly fulfilled its duty at the front. In its actions the Russian Government does not consider itself bound by the decisions of the local Allied representatives, inasmuch as the supreme authority in the Vladivostok Fortress region can in no wise be considered as having passed over to foreign hands, whereas [*since*] the functions of the Allied troops, as may be gathered from numerous declarations of the Allied Powers, are limited to the defense of the railway and to affording help. Presuming that the questions arising out of events which have occurred should form the subject of an inquiry by the authorized representatives of the powers at Omsk conjointly with the Russian Government the latter having considered the situation at a session of the Council of Ministers on the 29th of September has approved the measures taken by General Rozanoff."

Being entirely without news concerning the situation in Vladivostok I am not able to offer any comment. [Harris.]

TENNEY

861.00/5329

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)*

*October 2, 1919.*

I sent for the Russian Ambassador today and told him that in view of the publicity which, unfortunately, had been given in Vladivostock to the exchange of notes between General Gray [*Graves?*] and Soukine, the actions of Kalmikoff against American soldiers had become a very serious matter; that the normal course for us would be to make a demand upon the Omsk authorities for apology and repudia-

tion of Kalmikoff's acts, but that I felt confident that such a communication was unnecessary and that Kolchak would, on his own initiative take the necessary steps. I referred to the critical element in this country which was adverse to the use of American soldiers in Siberia and that there could be no distinction in the minds of the people between the action of the Russians in Omsk and the Russians in Vladivostock, though, of course, we here understood that Kalmikoff was acting irresponsibly, but that the situation would become most serious if Kolchak did not at once disassociate himself in this case from Kalmikoff. I thought that the recognition of Kolchak was proceeding in the right direction, but of course all question of recognition of Kolchak was out of the question unless Kolchak made the necessary amends. I pointed out the indignation of the American Army, if, after such insults, we should give recognition to Kolchak without the necessary amends. The Ambassador promised to send a long despatch outlining the situation and would dwell upon the necessity of a disavowal by Kolchak, and asked us, for the sake of speed to send it over through our own channels, which would save about ten days' time. This I promised to do.

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861.00/5314 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*<sup>72</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1919, 4 p.m.

Your 403, September 30, noon, together with your previous telegram giving Soukine's reply to General Graves have led Department to believe authorities at Omsk may possibly have no information of circumstances which led, first, to the temporary detention of the rifles by General Graves and, second, to the demand of the Allied commanders for the withdrawal of Rozanoff's forces from Vladivostok.

*First:* Continued friction with Kalmikoff's forces culminated September 5th in the arrest of an American Captain and Corporal in the neighborhood of Habarovsk on the ground that they had no Russian passports. Upon protest by the American Commanding Officer, the Captain was released but the Corporal was detained and subsequently flogged. Kalmikoff ordered the release of the Corporal on September 7th only after the American commander had arrested three Cossacks in reprisal. The flogging of an American Corporal was very properly regarded by General Graves as an outrage. This Government has been confident that when aware of the facts the Omsk Government would not only disclaim responsibility for the action

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<sup>72</sup> Repeated to the Consul at Vladivostok.

taken by Kalmikoff and repudiate it, but would also apologize officially that such an incident should have occurred with any Russian commander supporting Kolchak. Based on this confidence in the attitude of the Omsk Government, General Graves arranged to release the rifles as soon as he could safeguard their delivery to the forces of Admiral Kolchak west of Irkutsk. This Government is perfectly confident that the failure of the Omsk Government to take the action which was expected has been due wholly and entirely to lack of information.

*Second:* The Government of the United States is most sympathetically concerned in upholding the rights and dignity of Russia and is fully aware of the circumstances which, in principle, led the Omsk Government to desire the presence of some of its forces in Vladivostok. The actual result in practice has been very different to what were doubtless the expectations of the authorities at Omsk. General Rozanoff has manifested an openly hostile attitude towards the Allies and the presence of his forces to date has resulted in the murder of a Russian Colonel by Cossacks, in the killing of one American and one Czech soldier by Russian officers, and in the creation of such strained relations between the Allies and the forces of General Rozanoff that reliable observers fear the outbreak of open hostilities between them in the near future, as a matter which will be difficult to avoid. It has been solely as a result of this situation that the Allied Commanders demanded the withdrawal of General Rozanoff's forces. It is obvious that his presence with troops in Vladivostok has militated against that respect for law and order which it is the announced purpose of the Omsk Government to establish and in which purpose this Government desires to assist.

LANSING

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861.00/5352 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 8, 1919.

[Received October 9, 10 a.m.]

[From Harris:]

415. October 8, 8 p.m. Referring to my telegram October 7, 8 p.m.<sup>73</sup> Soukine handed me the following tonight for transmission to the Department:

"The Russian Government has just learned from its Ambassador in Washington of an incident which took place in Habarovsk on the 5th of September. The revolting facts that are reported to the Government for the first time in this telegram have produced an unani-

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<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

mous indignation of the Council of Ministers who ordered an immediate investigation to be carried out and in case the facts were to be confirmed wishes to express its profound regret and condemnation of the action that apparently must be attributed to irresponsible and local military officers.

As to the general state of affairs in the Far East which causes greatest anxiety to the Russian Government, it is urgently studying the situation and while awaiting the arrival of Calktelbergh [*Telberg?*], Minister of Justice, sent for that purpose to Vladivostok, will proceed to (take) such measures as conditions will allow."

Soukine also informed me that Semenoff was again perpetrating unjustifiable acts of violence on Chinese territory along the line of the railway leading to Harbin. Full facts were not in possession of Omsk Government but undoubtedly official circles here are greatly concerned. I shall keep the Department informed as far as lies in my power. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5360 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

VLADIVOSTOK, October 8, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received October 9, 7:28 p.m.]

540. Following from Smith:

"As the situation was becoming so serious General Graves, two days ago, issued an order to concentrate all American troops on the Amur line at Spaskoe. In consequence of this, at the request of General Graves, I called together my colleagues on the Committee with the exception of the Russian and Japanese members to outline to them why such action was taken. During the past two weeks both General Graves and myself have been receiving from many Russian sources, including Russian officers and members of various political parties and from members of the staff of General Rozanoff, numerous reports that there is a plot on foot to make the position of the Allies untenable in Siberia.

These reports are as follows: Semenoff, Kalmikoff and Rozanoff, all appointees of the Omsk Government, have been mobilizing some of the worst Russian elements and also enemy prisoners. This is not to go to the front but for attacking the Allies, the Americans and Czechs principally. This movement is being secretly supported by the Japanese military. They have tried to buy arms from Allied firms. The Japanese have furnished these heretofore. Their aim is to take advantage of the general discontent to use as a slogan,



'Away with the Allies,' and to attack Americans and Czechs. Such attacks may not be very serious in themselves but the subsidized press will use them as evidence of the hatred of the Russians generally against us. They will not attack the Japanese. The idea is to make the Allies withdraw in disgust. Then the aid of the Japanese will be solicited and in payment for this the Japanese will be given commercial control of the Far East. The ultimate plan is to restore the old régime and it is claimed that the Russian-German, the Japanese monarchists have combined to do this. There are Russians of German origin now working at Omsk to this end. The names of Barons Tisguiche Gausen [*Tisenhausen?*], Menda [*Medem?*], Zacco [?] and Vudberg [*Budberg*] have been given as working there.

The above was given to my colleagues and they confirm it to a great state [*extent?*]. Similar telegram will be sent to all the governments. They all stated that the actions of the Japanese military were very evident and are all agreed that the governments should take quick action.

In addition to the above Stevens has sent the following today to the Committee:

'(Paraphrase) A Russian echelon was sent from Chita to Habarovsk by Semenoff leaving detachments of soldiers at stations between Harbin and Manchuria on the 7th. It was intended to leave the rest at Harbin but as Horvat threatened to disarm them they were taken to Habarovsk. Two other echelons are expected. This placing of Semenoff's men may lead to serious difficulties as, under the Allied agreement, the Chinese are to guard this line. If the Allied commanders did not order this, I urge that this be taken up with them at once with a view to having Semenoff's men removed immediately. (End of paraphrase).'

This has just arrived and the Committee has had no time to take action. The Allied military certainly did not order them there.

It is said that Rozanoff and General Oi are to meet in Habarovsk to arrange everything. Smith".

Repeated to Tokyo.

MACGOWAN

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861.77/1117: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1919, 3 p.m.

Stevens telegraphs October 2<sup>74</sup> that difficulty is being experienced in the enforcement of the Allied railway agreement on account of the interference of Russian railway officials with Allied inspectors.

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<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

Stevens believes this emanates from Minister of Works and is prompted by efforts to force recognition and financial and military assistance. He recommends that that part of Section 2 of the agreement which provides for Russian managers with powers conferred by Russian law should be abrogated, as it is used he avers by the Ministry of Works to thwart the Allied authority.

The Department has replied that the moment is not opportune to endeavor to obtain an amendment of the railway agreement and that considerations of general policy require that the greatest possible measure of participation in management and operation be allowed to the Russians.

The Department adds, however, that with a view to overcoming unwarranted interference by Russian officials specific cases for complaint should be reported to you and that you are being instructed to make urgent representations with respect to them. You may also discuss with the authorities at Omsk, within your discretion, the general situation described above with a view to obtaining any possible abatement of the difficulties which Stevens is encountering.

LANSING

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861.00/5360 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1919, noon.

Vladivostok has been instructed to repeat to you a message from Smith <sup>75</sup> which will acquaint you with the gravity of the situation in Eastern Siberia. Note in connection with the second part of the Department's October 3, 4 p.m., the part reported to be played therein by Rozanoff.

The Department has received other reports in the tenor of that from Smith all tending to indicate that an attempt may be made to establish independent Russian authority under Semenoff or another Cossack leader East of Lake Baikal. The Department is not disposed to accept these reports as final but believes that the authorities at Omsk should be acquainted with the grave possibilities contained in the situation.

You may act within your discretion in discussing the matter informally with the Omsk authorities but nothing approaching formal representations is desired.

Mr. Morris is acquainted with the situation and is discussing with the Japanese authorities the support which irresponsible subordinate

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<sup>75</sup> Transmitted in telegram no. 540, Oct. 8, 1919, from the Consul at Vladivostok, p. 527.

Japanese military leaders are reported to be giving to those unfriendly to the Omsk Government.

LANSING

861.00/5625

*The Russian Chargé (De Bach) to the Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. POOLE: I take pleasure in sending you herewith paraphrase of cable which I promised to transmit to you.

Believe me [etc.]

BACH

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Omsk Government to the Russian Embassy at Washington*

OMSK, September 30, 1919.

There have again arisen difficulties at Vladivostok between our authorities and the Allied Commanders—this time of a more serious character. On September 26 the Inter-Allied Committee of Military Commanders made upon General Rosanoff, Commander of the troops of the Priamour Military District, an offending demand that he withdraw the Russian troops from the Fortress of Vladivostok by noon of September 29, threatening, in case he should not comply with the demand, to employ military force. The Supreme Governor ordered General Rozanoff not to fulfill the demand and to guard the sovereignty and dignity of Russia in the Far East, if necessary even by force.

In consequence thereof the Allied Commanders withdrew their demand and the conflict has already assumed a peaceful character. Minor incidents in Vladivostok during which one American and one Czech soldier suffered brought about the mentioned demand of the Allied Commanders. In each of these cases investigations had already been ordered and the persons causing the disturbances turned over to court martials. Therefore, there did not remain sufficient grounds for issuing the above mentioned demand. Even had this reason been sufficient, the action of the Allied representatives nevertheless cannot be justified, being in direct violation of the solemn assurances of the unviolability of Russia's rights, which had been given by the Powers at the moment of sending their troops. In this sense we made a categorical protest to the commissaries here definitely stating that it was not permissible to regard Vladivostok as an ex-territorial region where the supreme rights had been transferred to foreigners. General Knox

and General Janin, having learned of the action of the local agents in the Far East, in the most categorical form ordered their representatives there to protest against the measure taken by the Allied Military Committee. The American Consul General Harris was equally sincerely indignant by reason of the action of the Allied Military Committee. Unfortunately, all the features of the incident seemed to indicate that one of the chief promoters of the affair was General Graves, whose conduct recently has become entirely incomprehensible. His remaining at Vladivostok will lead to perpetual misunderstandings and to the growing of public discontent with Americans.

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861.00/5380 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOkyo, October 13, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received October 13, 2:15 p.m.]

On October 1st my Russian colleague, acting under instructions from the Omsk Government, made another application to the Japanese Government for Japanese troops to guard the railway from Irkutsk to Omsk; on October 6th he supplemented the request by an earnest plea that at least some of the reinforcements recently sent to Siberia by Japan be detailed for this work, stating that such aid would be required for a period not exceeding six months. Yesterday he received an answer from the Japanese Government that the entire situation had been carefully reconsidered with a full appreciation of the reasons which had impelled the request; but that with sincere regret they had to advise him that no change could be made in their previous decision not to send any troops beyond Irkutsk. My Russian colleague also received a telegram from Omsk dated October 8th, stating that the evacuation of the Czechs from the Irkutsk-Omsk district would begin in ten days.

Referring to your October 9, 5 p. m.<sup>78</sup> I do not believe that the Japanese military are at present supporting the ambitious plans of Semenoff nor that they will support any plan for the independence of eastern Siberia as long as the Omsk Government continues. Should the withdrawal of the Czechs precipitate a crisis at Omsk, which is expected, the one thing I have chiefly feared, then the Japanese Government would undoubtedly sympathize with and perhaps even openly support Semenoff in his efforts to establish a dictatorship in eastern Siberia, on the theory that only thus could they prevent the spread of Bolshevism into Manchuria, Korea, and possibly Japan itself.

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<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

In addition, there is real peril to all adjoining countries in the plague which Doctor Teusler reports is spreading rapidly throughout Siberia. He telegraphs me that typhus alone is increasing at the rate of 1,000 fresh cases daily and will reach enormous proportions by mid-winter. In view of these conditions and in the absence of any adequate plan for Allied assistance (the difficulties of which I fully realize), I do not think that we can justly complain if Japan marks out a zone of safety, takes matters into her own hands, and adopts methods, however deplorable, ruthlessly to suppress disorder and to protect her national interests.

MORRIS

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861.00/5352 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1919, 5 p.m.

Your 4787 [414], October 7, 8 p.m.<sup>77</sup> I am gratified to learn that the Government at Omsk wholly repudiates the action of military officers at Khabarovsk in arresting and mistreating American soldiers.

In advising Russian Embassy at Washington of this message the Department has pointed out however that the incident is not herewith closed. It is expected on the contrary that the promised investigation will be made and those found guilty of this outrage properly punished.

LANSING

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861.50/68 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, October 19, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 5:19 p.m.]

555. . . .

I had opportunity yesterday to confer with all representatives of the United States here and all agreed on the following points.

1. Political conditions eastern Siberia quieter than for months, possibly a year.

2. There is no danger whatever of Cossacks now attacking Americans or seizing Chinese Eastern railway.

3. Anti-American propaganda has been decreased for some time and there is evidence of more critical attention of Japanese [*sic*].

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<sup>77</sup> Not printed; but see telegram from the Chargé in China, Oct. 8, p. 526.

4. Organized opposition and plotting against Kolchak is no longer heard of. I attribute 4 in large measure to the Department telegrams Oct. 2, 6 p.m.<sup>78</sup> and Oct. 8, 6 p.m. [*October 7, 2 p.m.?*].<sup>79</sup>

If I may venture an opinion, the foregoing and favorable news from all fronts afford an opportunity for the United States to express in action its sympathy and support of a united, democratic Russia represented by Kolchak. His failure might result in break up Russia into military states under foreign domination and permanent occupation eastern Siberia by Japan which may be nearer *fait accompli* than is supposed . . . .

MACGOWAN

861.77/1144 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, *October 19, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received October 20, 8:30 p.m.]

I am officially informed that evacuation of all Czech and other Allied forces guarding railway Omsk to Taiga will begin October 20, 4 p.m. I have ordered all of our inspectors to leave that territory. Coincidentally with such a movement all Czechs Omsk to Irkutsk will move to Trans-Baikal and Chinese Eastern territory as fast as possible and our inspectors will be withdrawn at the same time as no dependence can be placed upon Russians safeguarding life and property. Bolshevik will at once inaugurate their usual reign of terror.

STEVENS

861.77/1145 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, *undated.*

[Received October 20, 1919, 5:58 p.m.]

[From Harris at] Irkutsk:

426. October 18, 6 p.m. Referring to Department's October 8 [9], 1 [3] p.m.<sup>80</sup> That part of section 2 of railway agreement referred to by Stevens was temporarily suspended by Omsk Government Council of Ministers on August 12, 1919, and confined by [omission.] If Stevens will report to me all such special cases of complaints I shall attempt to get them adjusted here in Omsk.

<sup>78</sup> *Ante*, p. 437.

<sup>79</sup> *Ante*, p. 439.

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

Mr. Ustrugoff, Minister of Ways and Communications referred to, by [*is*] a graduate of the foremost transportation college in Russia, and a situation has arisen during the past ten or fifteen years in connection with railways in Russia which has enabled practically all of the positions of respectability and direction in the railway to be filled by graduates of this institution. The members of this so-called clique, by careful selection, have surrounded themselves with minor officials who can be trusted and the entire combination composes the directing personnel of the Siberian Railroad today. The perpetuation of control of this clique is only possible by continued observances of older rules and regulations, which means that continuation of the same obsolete, uneconomical and unprofitable state of affairs. I am informed that policy indicates that he is most strenuously working for the continuation of the old conditions under the guise of saving the Russian railways for the Russians. That is, he is afraid of losing his grip on the railway and that too much misled [*Allied?*] control would mean the dismissal and breaking up of the clique in which he is interested.

There is no evidence that Ustrugoff is attempting create difficulties for the Inter-Allied Technical Board and Committee for the purpose of compelling the Allies to grant recognition to this Government or supply it with money. My personal observations of Ustrugoff lead me to believe that he is a man who is attending strictly to the business of the railway according to his own light and is in nowise meddling in politics at all.

The railroad employees of the Siberian Railways consist of two classes: first, the Ustrugoff clique, outlined above, comprising two thirds of the railway official class, plus an insignificant portion of the rank and file of the employees; second, practically all of the railroad officers who clearly see the actual state of affairs but who are helpless to improve matters because of the control the first class has on their positions and livelihood. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.77/1150 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

HARBIN, October 20, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received October 22, 12:06 p.m.]

Practically all original members of Service Corps including Emerson declare that they are done and will leave for the United States and ask to be relieved quickly. They all declare with truth they enlisted for the war and have served a year after close away

from families and at pecuniary loss, that their efforts are useless under existing arrangement, their instructions and orders are in every way ignored by officials of the railways. . . .

STEVENS

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861.00/5440: Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*

VLADIVOSTOK, October 21, 1919.

[Received at the War Department October 22, 4:50 a.m.]

518. With reference to Number 555 to Secretary of State from Consul here <sup>82</sup> I do not agree to the impression conveyed in paragraph 2. As to 1 this has existed only a very few days and is probably temporary.

2: As to attacking American troops I have no immediate concern but this is due to concentrating American troops, not to Kalmikoff's change of heart. There are still Cossack movements on Chinese Eastern. The object not known to me. I believe they would seize Chinese Eastern immediately if they had sufficient force.

3: The decrease is not such as to justify belief that it is permanent.

4: I know nothing of this but I did not agree that plotting is over.

In general when questions are discussed as on 18th, any proposed telegram giving result of discussion is submitted to representatives present before being sent. This was not done by Macgowan. I presided at this discussion. I have shown to Smith, Allied railroad representative, and Phelps, Y.M.C.A. representative, and they concur in my cable. Have not seen any of the other representatives with reference to Macgowan's cable.

GRAVES

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861.00/5448: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 21, 1919.

[Received October 22, 10:55 a.m.]

[From Harris:]

442. October 21st, 10 a.m. Referring to Department's October 16th, 5 p.m. Omsk Government does not consider incident in question is yet closed. Every effort will be made to investigate this matter and punish those guilty of the outrage. Harris.

TENNEY

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<sup>82</sup> Oct. 19, 11 a. m., *ante*, p. 532.



861.77/1144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Jenkins)*

WASHINGTON, *October 21, 1919, 4 p.m.*

For Stevens, and repeat to Am[erican] embassy Tokyo.

Your October 19, 6 p.m. As you may be aware already, the anti-Bolshevik forces in European Russia, have recently had decisive military successes. It is now more probable than at any time in the past that the Bolshevik Government will fall. On this account it is more important than ever that Kolchak be supported. Everything possible is being done to this end in Washington. A withdrawal of the Allied railway inspectors will bring about a most difficult situation for Admiral Kolchak at the very moment when everything else is more favorable to the success of his movement than at any time in the past. It is unfortunate that Allied troops are not available to replace the Czechs West of Lake Baikal. I understand thoroughly that under the conditions which existed a short time ago the absence of Allied troops would have necessitated unquestionably the departure of the Allied inspectors. The reports received during the last two days reveal, however, so radical an improvement in the general situation in Siberia that I feel justified in asking you that the inspectors be retained under Russian guard at least until the culmination of the critical events now taking place in European Russia. It would seem the more practicable to do this as the anti-Bolshevik successes in the West will certainly have a deterrent effect on Bolshevik agitators in Siberia.

LANPING

861.77/1150 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Jenkins)*

WASHINGTON, *October 22, 1919, 6 p.m.*

For Stevens.

Your October 20, 10 p.m.

I do not under-rate the difficulties with which you and the members of the Railway Service Corps have had to contend, but I am sure that in view of my telegram of yesterday you will be able to hold the men to their task until the situation clarifies.

I would regard it as a tragic mistake to terminate the work at this time when we are on the very threshold, perhaps, of a period of real constructive accomplishment.

Consider especially Smith's 556, October 18, 7 p.m.<sup>83</sup> which will be repeated to you and Harris's 426, October 18, 6 p.m.<sup>84</sup> which you have already received.

LANSING

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861.00/5464 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

PEKING, October 23, 1919.

[Received October 24, 11 : 30 p.m.]

[From Harris at Omsk:]

437, October 23, 6 p.m.

Colonel Johnson here in Omsk has just received the following instruction from Colonel Emerson in Harbin :

“As fast as Czechs evacuate back of railway which they are now patrolling you will withdraw all technical inspectors with them.”

The importance of this instruction and the unfortunate impressions it will undoubtedly make on the Russian people is something which the Department may imagine and upon which it is unnecessary for me to comment. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.77/1160 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, October 24, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received October 25, 5 a.m.]

Your cable October 21, 4 p.m. Withdrawal of inspectors depends entirely on safety, 50,000 Czechs not being able to participate in the protection of railway. Murders, train wrecks almost continually. One Czech soldier equal to dozen Russian who are largely Bolshevik themselves. However withdrawal will depend largely upon men themselves as I do not care to assume all responsibility. They would feel differently if Kolchak government will at least try to enforce agreement instead of handicapping in every way. Soukine tells us Government cannot carry out agreement until foreign recognition military and financial assistance will be extended. I will consult

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<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

<sup>84</sup> Transmitted by the Chargé in China in undated telegram received Oct. 20, p. 533.

with General Graves who knows the situation and controls Russian troops [*sic*] under the circumstances.

STEVENS

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861.77/1165 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 25, 1919.

[Received October 27, 1:56 p.m.]

[From Harris at Omsk:]

441, October 25, 3 p.m. In consequence with [*of*] Colonel Emerson's instructions to the American railway engineers to retire with the Czechs, General Knox has informed me that it [*is*] his intention to keep English railway officials and men here irrespective of the removal of the Czechs to (Atchinsk?), point in their progressive evacuation of Siberia. Harris.

TENNEY

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861.00/5464 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1919, 5 p.m.

Your 437, October 23, 6 p.m. The Department has taken up urgently with Stevens the question of the withdrawal of the Allied railway inspectors. The last message from Stevens indicates that it may not be necessary to withdraw them immediately upon the departure of the Czechs. It remains, however, of the utmost importance that the Russian railway officials assume a conciliatory and compliant attitude.

PHILLIPS

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861.77/1164 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Acting Secretary of State*

HARBIN, October 25, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received October 25, 4:40 p.m.]

Your cable October 22, 6 p.m. Have no anxiety, there will [*be*] no abandonment the work of Service Corps unless the Bolshevik runs some of them out.

STEVENS

861.77/1160 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Jenkins)*WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1919, 7 p.m.*

For Stevens.

Your October 24, 2 p.m. received. The situation has been explained to Harris who will bring all possible pressure to bear upon the Omsk Government. It is also being discussed frankly with the Russian Ambassador here who will communicate with Omsk.

Peking will repeat to you the latest information from Harris regarding withdrawal of the Czechs.

PHILLIPS

861.24/198 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*VLADIVOSTOK, *October 26, 1919, 9 p.m.*

[Received October 26, 4:23 p.m.]

568. For State Department [from Smith?].

"Night of 24th General Graves received report from his officer guarding second train munitions sent from America, destination Omsk, that Semenoff had stopped train and given officer until 11 a.m., 25th, to deliver 15,000 rifles else same would be taken by force, no news yet received as to action taken. As train has been held this constitutes an act against the railway agreement and the Japanese have apparently not endeavored to prevent it although General Oi in letter promised cooperation. Committee will investigate."

Repeated to Tokyo.

MACGOWAN

861.00/5504 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*PEKING, *October 28, 1919.*

[Received October 28, 10:45 a.m.]

[From Harris:]

447. October 28th, 4 p.m. Am informed that Kolchak has just recalled Rozanoff from Vladivostok to Omsk to explain himself. This probably means definite elimination of Rozanoff from Far East situation. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5508 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 28, 1919.

[Received October 29, 10:10 a.m.]

[From Harris at Omsk:]

448. October 28th, 5 p.m.

Referring to Department's two telegrams dated October 25th, 5 p.m., and October 25th, 6 p.m.<sup>86</sup> Soukine informs me that this matter will be taken before the Council of Ministers and he believes it will receive favorable decision.

I can confirm Smith's viewpoint that there is an improvement already in the attitude of the Russians, especially Ustrugoff, who is becoming very conciliatory.

Respectfully urge upon the Department advisability of requesting Stevens not to withdraw railway inspectors just at this time. Harris.

TENNEY

861.24/207 : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)<sup>87</sup>*

VLADIVOSTOK, October 29, 1919.

534. Paragraph 1. Colonel Morrow telegraphs all rifles have reached Verkhnieudinsk. Japanese Headquarters tells me rifles will be turned over to Semenoff at Irkutsk as soon as my guard is removed. American representatives should take every possible measure to prevent these arms from reaching Semenoff. In my judgment if we by inaction or willingly permit American arms to reach Semenoff, Kalmikoff, Rozanoff, we will be helping arm the worst criminals in Siberia; we will be neglectful of the interests of the people, thereby causing resentment of the great majority of the people in Siberia against the United States; and will be helping Japan to delay the settlement of conditions in Siberia because the domination of and exploration [*exploitation*] of over 90 per cent of the people by such criminals as those above named cannot be permanent no matter what assistance is given them. As to your 385 it appears to me the policy of the British is based on report by Knox who is well known to be anti-American and whose ideas as to the rights of the people are very different from what I believe to be the views of the people of the United States as to the rights of citizens generally. Knox told me I was getting the reputation of being the protector of the poor who were only swine. Knox' interests are not the interests of the United States.

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.<sup>87</sup> Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State Nov. 1.

He is a monarchist and is opposed to representative Governments. Unless ordered I will use my judgment as to delivery of rest of arms. If I think they will reach Kolchak I will let them go. I had a definite understanding with Kolchak representatives that these arms were to go to the front.

Paragraph 2. Semenoff has ordered a brigade from Blagovestchensk to Chita now *en route*. I am reliably informed that this is in connection with effort to seize Chinese Eastern.

Paragraph 3. Omsk Government Foreign Affairs representative informed me Rozanoff is thinking of resisting the order relieving him. His action will depend upon support he can get.

Paragraph 4. Romanoffsky is anti-American and pro-Japanese but much better than Rozanoff.

#### GRAVES

861.00/5513 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Tenney) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, October 29, 1919.

[Received 4:20 p.m.]

[From Harris:]

446. October 29, 2 p.m. I have received following telegram from General Graves:

“ Please notify Foreign Minister that Semenoff has held up second train of rifles at Chita and [claiming?] that 1,000 belonged to him, says that he will take by force at 11 this morning. I have ordered officer not to turn them over.”

I have just received following telegram from Vice Consul Fowler at Chita:

“ With 50,000 rifles for Kolchak forces in charge of Lieutenant Ryan and guard of fifty American soldiers held up here by Semenoff who demanded 15,000 rifles, on telegraphic order signed General Beklemisheff. Ryan refused without direct order from General Graves and was given until 11 yesterday morning to comply or rifles would be taken by force. Were given direct wire to Vladivostok and Ryan telegraphed General Graves who answered ‘do not give up.’ Then proceeded to barricade train and at 6 o’clock Semenoff’s armored train was run alongside. At Major Gravis’ and my request the Japanese intervened and train was released after being delayed about forty hours. Japanese took very definite action and also complimented Ryan’s action. General Oi was at Chita at the time. Colonel Morrow was kept informed and [General Oi?] wired Semenoff not to resort to force.”

General Graves’ decision and energetic action in this matter has produced favorable impression in Omsk and the attitude of the Japanese in cooperating with the Americans against Semenoff is

greeted with great satisfaction. I shall keep the [Department?] further informed. Harris.

TENNEY

861.00/5514 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, *October 29, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received October 29, 4:14 p.m.]

3316. Foreign Office, with which only the first portion of your 6112 of October 22, 3 p.m.<sup>88</sup> was informally discussed, has heard nothing recently regarding points 1 and 2. As regards point 3 it has received many confirmations of increasing opposition to Japan and accepts news in point 4 with considerable reservations as to present real strength of Kolchak and persons by whom he is surrounded. The hope was expressed that Consul Hodgson, Vladivostok, of whom British Government has high opinion, was cooperating satisfactorily with our authorities. American Mission informed.

DAVIS

861.24/205

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *November 1, 1919.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 29, 1919, (your File R)<sup>89</sup> with reference to General Graves' telegram No. 521, of October 23, 1919.<sup>89a</sup>

In reply thereto I beg to advise you that a cable, in substance as follows, has been sent to General Graves:

"Reference your No. 521, Secretary War directs that you be informed that State Department has advised War Department that Omsk government warmly approves your action in matter of keeping rifles from Semenoff.

"State Department has requested that in future all representations to Minister of Foreign Affairs at Omsk be made through Consul-General Harris and not direct by military authorities. Secretary War approves this request and directs you take action accordingly.

"State Department advises that specific instructions have been given Mr. Harris to impress upon authorities at Omsk the special necessity which exists at this time for a more respectful and con-

<sup>88</sup> Not printed; quotes that part of telegram from the Consul at Vladivostok, no. 555, Oct. 19, 11 a.m., printed *ante*, p. 532.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89a</sup> To the War Department; not found in the files of the Department of State.

ciliatory attitude toward Americans on the part of their representatives in Eastern Siberia.”

Very respectfully,

NEWTON D. BAKER

861.77/1162 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1919, 5 p.m.

Following message from Stevens repeated for your information in connection with Department's October 25, 6 p. m.<sup>90</sup>

“October 24, 6 p.m. Your cable October 9, 3 p.m.<sup>91</sup> Department may not fully understand the situation of affairs. It is not a question of participation of Russians in the management of the railways but their assumption of entire management regardless of suggestions or all instructions. Allied inspectors laughed at, being ignored by them, and, possibly to their advantage, their presence and assistance are not wanted. In many instances Minister of Works issues orders ostensibly to carry into effect inspector's instructions but officials totally ignore them. My belief is that officials secretly advised to ignore orders of all kinds under any circumstances issued. For political reasons government has abandoned instead of enforcing agreement. Technical Board or I can do nothing of value improving railways in the present situation of affairs and decline all responsibility for results and have so advised Allied Committee.”

PHILLIPS

861.00/5647 : Telegram

*The Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia (Graves) to The Adjutant General (Harris)*<sup>92</sup>

VLADIVOSTOK, November 7, 1919.

548. Paragraph 1. Two prominent members of Social Revolutionist Party informed me last night that Rozanoff had sent emissary to them to tell them that the Cossacks would consider Kolchak government as ceasing to function when Kolchak had to leave Omsk. In view of this decision Rozanoff was considering two propositions. 1st. Declare himself dictator of country east of Baikal, in which case he would have support of Cossacks. 2d. Join with Social Revolutionists and establish a representative form of government, he to be in absolute control until election of assembly. In either case they would have to depend upon Japan for economic and financial assist-

<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

<sup>91</sup> Not printed; see telegram to Omsk on the same date, *ante*, p. 528.

<sup>92</sup> Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State Nov. 10.



ance, which Japan would give in return for control of Souchan coal mines and Tethui iron mines. Rozanoff thought this could be granted. If the second proposition was accepted they would have to fight Semenoff. Rozanoff said he had an agreement with Japanese military, signed September 16th, which would give him support of Japanese troops in case any one used force against him, therefore he warned the Social Revolutionists not to try to overthrow him. The town is full of rumors mostly false but I put some reliance in this report.

Paragraph 2. The economic and financial machinery seems entirely broken down, and great suffering from lack of food and fuel will soon be witnessed.

Paragraph 3. General Haaken with whom I was directed to deal in matters relating to rifles informs me that he asked Omsk if the Government authorized the order to Semenoff to take the rifles from Americans and also asked to be informed if the rifles were sent from Irkutsk to Omsk or were given to Semenoff. This to enable him to answer my question and to know if his agreement with me has been carried out. Omsk had not replied on 6th. Consul General Harris has not stated whether Kolchak government gave Semenoff orders to take rifles. This is important point.

Paragraph 4. Reference to Harris 445<sup>93</sup> to State Department as to cooperation of Japanese, I invite attention to fact that Lieutenant Ryan in charge of fifty men had his train held for 40 hours in the Japanese sector, at a Japanese Division Headquarters. Lieutenant Ryan received no word from Japanese for 30 hours, during which time Semenoff armored car fully manned by Cossacks was on track adjoining his train. During this time Ryan placed barricades on top and under his car so as to defend his train as best he could against a greatly superior force. I do not consider this cooperation with Americans. General Haaken has asked me to keep rest of rifles until he hears from Omsk.

GRAVES

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861.77/1197 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 11, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received November 12, 1 p.m.]

587. Following from Smith:

"Committee passed a resolution May 27th which gave [all] railway operation into hands of railway officials only. This was immediately

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<sup>93</sup> Not printed.

telegraphed to Omsk for publication. Although Committee sent many telegrams of inquiry no answers were received. July 18th Committee sent demand that certain action be taken. See my telegram 416, July 19, 4 p.m.<sup>94</sup> Some of the Allied diplomats reported to us that Omsk ministry agreed to our views. For some time we waited patiently but nothing was done. None of the railway officials had received any notice. Matter was taken up by telegraph several times; still no answer.

Finally October 23rd the Secretary of the Ministry sent us a telegram giving the text of the resolutions passed by the Ministry August 12th.<sup>95</sup> He further stated that the Ministry of Communications had sent order number 6186 on September 17th to all railways citing the resolution for giving instructions relating thereto. On October 10th all railway officials when asked by the Committee's representatives said that they had received no such orders nor had the local manager in Vladivostok received it a few days ago.

This order did not cover the station military commandants who have been a nuisance to every one and have been a great harm to the Omsk Government. Again we inquired and October 31st received from the commander of these military officers the following: 'Necessary instructions given by the chief of the general staff on August 19th number 851 and September 18th number 1085'. To date we do not know the contents of these orders and local officers state they have not received them. Committee feels that these orders were never sent on the dates mentioned. Technical Board has just sent a letter to the Committee citing the futility of its work when Omsk ministry sends out favorable orders openly and follows then with secret orders not to obey open orders. This is a well-established fact.

Due to the machinations of the old regiments [*regimists?*] and of officials who have been enriching themselves by dishonest means, Omsk has never once done anything to aid our efforts. It has always blocked, retarded and procrastinated. Committee will discuss letter of Technical Board at next meeting and will undoubtedly agree to the text thereof. We have repeatedly asked that we be given power over the military, a vote [results]. Militarism has almost driven Siberia back to Bolshevism. During the past ten months the rouble has depreciated from 10 to 300 to the dollar. We have all the time stated that the way to destroy Bolshevism is by economic development and not military force. Not one thing has been done to gain the confidence of the people. I have heard some

<sup>94</sup> *Ante*, p. 511.

<sup>95</sup> *Cf. ante*, p. 533.

Allied military representatives state that the only way cope with these people is with the whip, but that day has passed.

Stevens has ordered the Allied inspectors to leave the line when the Czechs go. The Committee will agree to this for it is dangerous to leave them there longer. Sent Stevens by mail. Repeated to [Tokyo] and Omsk. [Smith.] ”

MACGOWAN

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861.00/5682 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 17, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received November 18, 3 a.m.]

599. Gaida raised on his train and on Russian Volunteer Fleet steamship *Tomsk* alongside, green and white flag of autonomous Siberia at 8 o'clock this morning. Yakusheff, recognized head zemstvo group, and others of this faction, are aboard Gaida's train. Gaida seized all locomotives in central railway yard, and his partisans are patrolling exits of yard while Kalmikoff's armored train is pocketed in blind end of yard. Railway operatives have ceased work, curious groups forming in the streets where automobiles, cavalry, and other military squads of both sides circulating without mutual hindrance. Gaida opened recruiting station at his train and is reported to have 2,000 men under his command. Probably desertions from Rozanoff supplied majority of the recruits. Either through desertions and political defections or through armed collision, issue here will be decided by tomorrow.

*Later.* Battle began near railway station 3 o'clock afternoon. Proclamation extracts in . . . code.

Repeated to Tokyo, Harris, Stevens.

MACGOWAN

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861.00/5686 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 17, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received November 18, 6:20 a.m.]

601. Rozanoff's forces occupied heights commanding railway yard and station and maintained irregular machine-gun and rifle fire until 6 o'clock killing considerable number noncombatants; casualties on both sides unknown, probably few. Gunboat with apparently seven one fired two dozen rounds at close range from harbor toward railway yards. Gaida is reported to have declared intention to arm workmen tonight. Sympathetic strike stopped shipping operations 11

o'clock this morning. British military mission requested master United States Shipping Board ship *Delight* to reload such part of 250,000 rifles and ammunition consigned to mission as had already been discharged into lighters and if approved decision of master to comply. Upon my report Admiral Rodgers placed guard aboard *Delight*. Repeated to Morris, Harris, Stevens.

MACGOWAN

861.00/5699 : Telegram

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 8:50 p.m.]

602. Gaida wounded, surrendered 5:30 morning with about dozen Czecho-Slovak officers of his staff and, I am informed, have been handed over to General Čeček.<sup>96</sup> I am informed Gaida must be deported within three days and that Rozanoff demands trial other Czecho-Slovak officers as deserters. Five torpedo-boat destroyers from the bay gathered together field and machine guns, from commanding heights bombarded railway station greater part night. Rozanoff's forces occupied part of railway station at the beginning of the fighting and were able to crowd Gaida's forces and shoot at close range. At dawn about 250 Gaida men ran from station with hands up and were immediately lined up for execution before fortress headquarters opposite station. They were, however, carried into railway yard and rifle shots indicated their end and Rozanoff's order, dated yesterday, directed immediate execution, without trial, of all taken in arms and field, courts-martial of ringleaders and shots from railway yard during the forenoon indicated order was being obeyed. Other casualties unknown. American Red Cross had 41 wounded at noon. Only known American casualty was sailor wounded aboard deck *New Orleans* by stray bullet. British authorities did not confirm the report two British officers killed or wounded in Red Cross work. Rozanoff's machine-gun firing, against the protest of British Consul, greater part of the night from roof British Consulate, which commands station, attracted Gaida and fire [was returned?] but nobody hurt and town major, Ivan Johnson, American major, finally secured its removal. Johnson four times passed firing line into railway premises during the night and safely removed number noncombatants including General, Madame and Miss Romanoffsky who were in their train near the station. From the best available information Gaida and forces never exceeded

<sup>96</sup> Gen. Stanislav Čeček, commanding Czechoslovak troops in Vladivostok.

1,400 and about a thousand escaped in the dark. Included were two companies deserting from Rozanoff's according to the best information and several hundred workmen tried to join Gaida probably majority being arrested by widespread picket lines. Gaida seemed dazed and loudly blamed Allies for his fiasco though he was urged to leave Russia.

Doctor Geiman and Captain Murmyc, members of government proclaimed in Gaida's train, visited acting British High Commissioner Lampson yesterday to pay respects but Lampson refused to see them and probably this discouraged them, no efforts being made to visit any American official, as far as I am informed. Present whereabouts of members of the defeated government unknown. No Czechs joined Gaida here. Besides *Tomsk* Gaida sent for steamship *Pechenge* and searches are now being made aboard them. Rozanoff's view of Gaida's [apparent omission] seems to have changed after 2:15 this morning when he wrote Čeček requesting disarmament and surrender to him for his disposition of Gaida and Czecho-Slovak staff who had remained with him after his departure from the front. Rozanoff claimed Allied commanders conference yesterday decided that they were not Czecho-Slovak citizens. No such decision was made but acting Czecho-Slovak Commissioner Broz read memorandum reciting well-known facts that Gaida and these officers are Czecho-Slovak citizens enrolled in Czecho-Slovak reserve and received permission to serve in Kolchak's army and never have been dismissed therefrom. Repeated to Morris, Harris, Stevens.

MACGOWAN

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861.01/171 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, November 20, 1919, 9 a.m.

[Received November 20, 7:53 a.m.]

I volunteer the following comment on recent telegrams from Harris, Smith and Macgowan: I think our representatives in Siberia must be extremely careful not to become involved in the political intrigues which will necessarily prevail while the final outcome of the Kolchak movement hangs in the balance. As long as the Kolchak government lasts we are bound, it seems to me, by the pledges of the Supreme Council in Paris, given to Kolchak last spring, to continue our moral support to his government. While I have never been able to share Harris' optimism I have felt that his attitude of unwavering loyalty to Kolchak was the only creditable position for the representatives of our government to take after the Paris decision. I have realized, however, that such an attitude

was easier to maintain in Omsk than in Eastern Siberia where Kolchak's local representatives made cooperation or assistance almost impossible. This distinction must be kept in mind if one would understand the position of Graves and Smith on the one hand and Harris and, in somewhat less degree, Teusler on the other hand. Stevens and his colleagues with rare patience made a sincere effort to cooperate in railway operation with the Kolchak military representatives. The partial failure of this effort was in my judgment chiefly due to the concealed antagonism and intrigue of the Japanese military which placed Kolchak (who I believe earnestly desired cooperation) in an impossible position. The wonder is that under the circumstances Stevens kept the railway going at all.

I hope that our Government will not feel impelled to withdraw our activities from Siberia at this time. If ever the efforts of a people need a steadying influence it is now in Siberia. But I recognize that to remain will impose upon us the duty of undertaking some larger economic relief. All our representatives in Siberia are agreed on that and every consideration of humanity, the promises we have made, our future relation with Japan, our own trade in the Orient, our national interests—emphasize the wisdom of such an enterprise and I hope that some practicable means can be devised. I believe with Smith that Japan would be prepared better now than a year ago to cooperate with us.

MORRIS

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861.00/5835

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your communication of November 25, 1919,<sup>97</sup> enclosing copy of a telegram from Major General Graves, at Vladivostok, number 563, November 18,<sup>97</sup> in which General Graves states that Colonel Krakovetsky, one of the three members of the Vladivostok Zemstvo directorate, together with five others, entered American headquarters building and are now claiming asylum.

Without in any way passing upon the question as to the right of the American military forces to furnish asylum to political refugees in such cases, it would seem that such action might easily be misconstrued by the contending factions to the embarrassment and disadvantage of the American command. It would therefore seem desirable for the Commander to cause these refugees to leave the quar-

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<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

ters as promptly as possible before any question as to their surrender shall arise, having in mind, however, the general dictates of humanity.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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861.00/5945 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

VLADIVOSTOK, December 19, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received December 21, 12:25 a.m.]

647. [From Smith:]

“Semenoff, who I personally know, has recently been sending telegrams to be given General Graves and myself. He states that he is ashamed of his past actions toward Americans for which he was only in part responsible. He says that he has always been opposed to the Omsk Government because it was reactionary and that he only recognized it because the Japanese forced him to do so. Two days ago he sent a telegram outlining a representative form of government proposed by him to Kolchak. It is to be composed of representatives to be elected in proportion to numbers of each from the Cossacks, Zemstvos, Buriats, city population, cooperatives and labor unions. He says that he has presented this to Kolchak who consents. He has asked General Graves and myself to give him our ideas. We simply told him that any government to be successful here must have the consent of the people and that all classes should have representation. To this he [omission], and believed that with such a representation the large masses of the people will consent. He proposes that a general proclamation be issued giving the people a certain time to give consent. He says that the civil authorities must direct affairs hereafter and the military will only be for the protection of the civil. He says that there will be a few bands of criminals who will not consent but that will be all.

The Chinese Commissioner tells me that the Japanese military tried to compel Semenoff to form a government of Mongolia, Manchuria and Eastern Siberia but that he refused. This naturally makes the Chinese look upon him differently than formerly.

The Czechs state that recently Kolchak ordered the arrest of the Pepelaieff Ministry but Semenoff refused to allow this to be done. The only apparent difference between Semenoff and Pepelaieff is that the latter wants only representatives from the Zemstvos and municipalities called while the former wants all existing bodies to have representation.

In his last telegram Semenoff stated that there is no front army at present, that the Bolsheviki have no opposition, that locomotives are frozen and trains cannot move west of Krasnoyarsk. Czechs partly confirm the report. Repeated to Tokyo. Smith."

MACGOWAN

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**Efforts by the United States to Maintain Unity of Policy with Japan in Siberia**

861.00/4191 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOkyo, March 31, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received April 1, 2:15 a.m.]

The discussions in Government circles referred to in the last paragraph of my March 23, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup> have apparently reached a conclusion and the silence of the past two weeks was broken this afternoon when General Tanaka, Minister of War, called upon me. He referred to the conflict of policy between our respective forces in Siberia and the embarrassing position in which he was placed, being held responsible for the activities of the Japanese troops, and yet being without any agreed policy to guide him. He admitted that the Cossack military commanders were oppressing the population, and this oppression had led to unrest and disorder. He stated that the Japanese troops were being changed and new divisions substituted for the old ones, and that now was the time to define our joint policy for the future. He expressed his personal conviction that military activities should be confined hereafter simply to the guarding of the railway. This however was a diplomatic question and his only reason for seeking this confidential talk with me was to urge upon me the importance of a frank exchange of views with Viscount Uchida and obtain a speedy understanding between our Governments.

In reply I briefly reviewed the causes which led to the joint expedition and explained the policy which General Graves had pursued. I concluded by expressing my willingness to discuss the question with the Foreign Minister if he so desired. General Tanaka then explained that he proposed to submit to the Cabinet tomorrow the views which he had expressed to me and that I would probably hear from the Foreign Minister.

This interview indicates to me that the dominant influences in the General Staff have abandoned any plans they may have cherished for independent action in Siberia, are prepared to cooperate with General Graves and to modify their previous policy of supporting

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



local Cossack leaders. This interview is supported by a letter received this morning from General Graves, in which he states that Ivanoff-Rinoff has sought a meeting with him, with a view to a better understanding, and had recently stated that the public abuse of Americans had not succeeded and they were now going to try other tactics; that a Colonel Butenko is showing a more conciliatory spirit; that his only serious difficulty is with the representatives of Japan. . . .

Should the Foreign Minister consult me on this question of policy, would the Department approve of my suggesting, as my personal view the policy I submitted for consideration in the last paragraph of my telegram of March 8, 10 a.m.? <sup>2</sup>

MORRIS

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861.00/4197 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, April 1, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received April 2, 4:10 a.m.]

1421. Your cipher telegram 1346, March 28th, 6 p.m.<sup>3</sup> Our reports do not show telegrams from General Graves number 214, March 17th, and 229, March 26th, nor any telegram from Admiral Rodgers number 216, March 16th.<sup>4</sup>

The President authorizes instruction to General Graves as below provided the Secretary of War concurs. Please consult with him accordingly. General Graves should be instructed that the United States favors economic rehabilitation of the country and feels strongly that a policy of political moderation among the several Russian factions is a necessary condition. In particular General Graves should be told that his mission is to insure, in cooperation with his allies, uninterrupted operation of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways and it is suggested that the movements of his forces be limited to a zone of say three miles on either side of the railways within which zone he should exercise definite police power and prevent any disturbance that might interfere with the operation of the railways. It is suggested further that the Department might say to the Governments having forces in Siberia that in [the] view of the American Government the inter-Allied forces in Siberia have been retained there for the purpose of protecting the railways and the men operating them under the direction of the Inter-Allied Committee, that the American Government suggests the establishment of a zone as proposed above and that the Inter-Allied Committee might issue a statement to this effect and add that they will not permit any

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 475.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> These telegrams not found in the files of the Department of State.

[disorder] within the railway zone and will use the forces at their disposal to preserve beyond question peace without [*within*] that zone.

## AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/4197: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1919, noon.

1431. For the President.<sup>5</sup>

“Reference Mission telegram 1421, April 1, proposed instructions to General Graves. The situation now is that General Graves has been instructed to use his troops as requested by Stevens,<sup>6</sup> to guard the railway. The definite assumption by Inter-Allied agreement of the responsibility for a strip six miles wide, practically to Omsk, would require for effective military control a very large force, perhaps 500,000 men, and any such definite control would inevitably mean either very large additions to the Japanese forces or additions to our own. In any case, it would sanction a very large section under Japanese control, penetrating practically through Siberia. Conflicts between the soldiers and officers of the Inter-Allied forces and with various elements of the native population and forces are of daily occurrence. Would not the establishment of this long zone increase the frequency of such conflicts and so make possible local disturbances which would appear to justify assumption of civil control, and perhaps military repression, which in effect would mean occupation and administration of Siberia by Japan? Would it not be better to have State Department take up with Allied Nations represented in Siberia the formulation of a policy limiting the objectives of our military forces to the preservation of order about the railroad, its stations and trains as those in charge of the railroad may request, and also stating definitely as one of its objects the common desire to bring about the cessation of local violence by conflicting Russian forces merely as such actions affect the dispatch of trains or operation of the railroad? In seeking such an agreement, I think our State Department should be clear in its expression of disinclination on the part of the United States to add to its troops now in Siberia or to see additions made by other nations. This would limit military activity to the railroad and to existing forces, and give no implied sanction to great increases by any nation or extension of its political or military activities. Baker.”

PHILLIPS

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<sup>5</sup> From the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker.

<sup>6</sup> John F. Stevens, president of the Technical Board for the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways.

861.00/4197 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1919, 1 p.m.

1432. Your 1421, April 1st. Please see Secretary of War's message to the President,<sup>7</sup> forwarded today, which was drafted with concurrence of General March. I share Secretary Baker's view and believe that the establishment of a zone six miles in width and of such great length would tend to convey the impression to the people of Siberia that foreign governments had undertaken to control not only for police purposes but also politically and commercially a considerable part of Siberian territory and that the use of the term "zone" would afford the enemies of inter-Allied control a good opportunity for criticizing the altruistic purposes of the United States and its associates. Is not a zone of occupation unnecessary in view of the great distances between stations? It would seem that the same purpose might be accomplished by limiting military activity to preservation of order along the railroad rather than to inject a political character which might readily follow the establishment of a zone of any definite width.

PHILLIPS

861.00/4258 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1919, 6 p.m.

In response to several recommendations for increased liberty of action for General Graves, Mission at Paris replied as follows:

"Now that General Tanaka is convinced that military activities should be confined hereafter to the guarding of the railway,<sup>8</sup> the President desires you to instruct Ambassador Morris to urge upon the Japanese Foreign Office the desirability of adopting General Tanaka's advice. This frank expression of opinion by General Tanaka seems to make Secretary Baker's proposal entirely feasible and it is suggested that the Department take up with the Governments having military forces in Siberia, the formulating of policy which Secretary Baker suggests; that is to say, to limit the use of the military forces to the preservation of order in the immediate vicinity of the railway, its stations and trains, when those in charge so request, and to use Inter-Allied forces to suppress local violence by conflicting Russian forces only when such conflicts affect the despatch of trains or operation of the railway, and even then only to the extent necessary to protect the railway, and those engaged in its operation."

<sup>7</sup> *Supra.*<sup>8</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Mar. 31, 12 p.m., p. 551.

Before taking action would like your views as to adequacy of proposed policy.

POLK

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861.00/4327 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, April 19, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 5:04 p.m.]

Your April 16, 6 p.m. I think the policy is not only adequate and feasible but is also one which will avoid involving us in a civil war in Siberia. The success of such a policy will depend on the measure of support which it receives from the other interested governments. The present conflict of policy is creating a dangerous situation.

I will not discuss the subject with the authorities here until I receive further instructions from you.

MORRIS

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861.77/817 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1919, 6 p.m.

Your April 19, 4 p.m. Please take up the question of policy with Japanese Government as outlined in Department's April 16, 6 p.m. If you see no objection advise Smith and Stevens and Graves of the nature of this policy for the information of their colleagues.

Upon advice from you that it will not conflict with your own efforts, Department will urge acceptance of policy upon other Governments concerned in operation of the railways.

POLK

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861.77/802 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, April 22, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received April 23, 3:40 p.m.]

240. [From Smith:]

Location of Allied troops to guard line as follows: American, Vladivostok inclusive to Nikolsk exclusive, Spaskoe exclusive to Usuri inclusive, Verkhneudinsk inclusive to Baikal inclusive, construct railroad to Suchan coal mines.

Chinese, Usuri exclusive to Guberovo inclusive, Nikolsk exclusive to Manchuria exclusive, Harbin inclusive to Changchun exclusive.

Japanese [, Nikolsk inclusive] to Spaskoe inclusive, Guberovo exclusive to Karimskaya inclusive, Manchuria inclusive to Verkhneudinsk exclusive.

Czechs, Baikal to Omsk.

Chinese representative claims right of the Station Manchuria, as Chinese customhouse is located there. This will probably be granted by commanders. Chinese in charge of the railroad guard not under command General Otani. Japanese staff stated this would be settled with Chinese Government. Have notified Reinsch. Repeated to Tokyo. Smith.

CALDWELL

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861.00/4380 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOkyo, April 25, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received April 26, 5:45 a.m.]

I had a second extended talk with General Tanaka, who called at the Embassy this afternoon. I read to him the substance of my March 31st, 12 p.m. reporting to you our previous talk and also the substance of the President's instructions as contained in your April 16th, 6 p.m. I told him that I now proposed to discuss the question formally with the Japanese Government and would appreciate his cooperation in reaching a definite understanding on the military policy, which he had suggested. He expressed his great satisfaction at the President's approval of his views and explained that in his judgment a railway zone should be established not exceeding ten kilometers on each side of the railway thus placing the railway beyond gun range and that no Allied troops should be allowed to go beyond that zone. He believed that outside such a zone any military operations against Bolsheviks and others should be conducted by Russians themselves. He thought, however, that the right of any Allied Government to supply the Kolchak troops with ammunitions should be reserved. I told him that I had always favored a zone system as a method of limiting the discretion of subordinate commanding officers, but as I had not military experience I asked permission, which was promptly granted, to submit this plan to General Graves for his comment. It is my intention to discuss this question with the Foreign Minister on the 28th. If we can reach a definite understanding, which if approved by the Department might be embodied in an informal memorandum, I would suggest that it then be submitted to the Associated Governments for their approval. This would follow the procedure adopted by the Depart-

ment when the expedition to Siberia was first proposed and which was also adopted in the railway negotiations. Furthermore I believe such a method would be peculiarly acceptable to the Japanese Government just at this time.

In the course of our conversation General Tanaka referred, of his own accord, to the recent newspaper campaigns both in the United States and Japan which tended to disturb the friendly relations of the two countries. He spoke of our Government's recent public statement on the subject<sup>10</sup> and said that as the army seemed to be a particular object of attack he had decided to issue a statement as War Minister, emphasizing the frank and cordial relations now existing between our governments. He is also arranging an entertainment in my honor and it is significant that he requested me to submit to him the names of any American writers or newspaper men to whom he might extend invitations.

MORRIS

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861.77/825 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1919, 5 p.m.

5244. Please read following cable from Consul-General Harris to Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that this Department concurs in the views expressed by Consul-General Harris in allowing the Inter-Allied Committee for supervising the railways in Siberia to take preeminence in all matters affecting policy so that both the Technical Board and the military boards may act along lines consistent with attitude assumed by Inter-Allied Committee. Please repeat to Paris for similar action and to Am[erican] mission, giving the sense of these instructions.

[Here follows text of message from Consul General Harris contained in telegram from the Ambassador in Japan April 19, *ante*, page 333.]

For your information and also Embassy Paris, Department is instructing Ambassador Morris at Tokyo to inquire of the Japanese Government whether it will not agree to limiting use of military forces in Siberia to the preservation of order in the immediate vicinity of the railways and to suppress local violence of conflicting Russian forces only when such conflicts affect the despatch of trains for the operation of the railways and even then only to the extent necessary to protect the railways and those engaged in its operation.

POLK

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<sup>10</sup> See telegram to the Ambassador in Japan, Apr. 17, 7 p.m., p. 488.

861.00/4395 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, April 29, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received April 29, 11:20 a.m.]

Following is translation text of statement delivered by the Minister of War to the Military Attaché today with the understanding that it will be given to the press tomorrow :

“Friendly relations between Japanese and American troops in Siberia. Statement by the Minister of War: There have recently been some rumors of unpleasant relations between Japanese and American troops in Siberia. This is, however, mournful guesswork of those who do not know the true conditions. At present there exist no reasons or facilities liable to harm the friendly relations between the troops of the two nations in Siberia. Although there might have arisen misunderstandings between the troops these should be considered a trivial matter caused by the differences in language and customs of the two nations. Now even such misunderstandings have been cleared away as a result of the lapse of time. It is a fact that the troops of the two nations are cooperating in concord. The report that some hostility between the two will result is a groundless fear.”

MORRIS

861.00/4380 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1919, noon.

Your April 25, 11 p.m. Policy outlined to you was adopted after consultation with Secretary of War and Am[erican] mission in the course of which a plan to establish a definite military zone was considered and abandoned. The Department believes that the establishment of a military zone would lend color to a general suspicion that our joint efforts to restore the railways were actuated by a desire to secure political control over parts of Siberia. In the Department's opinion our common purpose can best be accomplished by the policy communicated to you. Some of the cities of Siberia are set back from the main line and probably other difficulties of detail would accompany the establishment of a definite military and railway zone. I hope you will make it clear to the Japanese Government the reasons which prompt the Department's decision and the definite difficulties and complications which it believes the policy it proposes will avoid.

POLK

861.00/4418 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, May 2, 1919, midnight.

[Received May 3, 8:50 p.m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs today handed me the following memorandum of a suggested military policy in Siberia:

“In order to insure harmony in the operations of the Associated troops in Siberia it is suggested that an understanding be reached among the powers interested on the line of action to be adopted for the protection of railways and of rivers and waterways in that region:

1. The zone for the protection of railways shall cover an area lying within the maximum range of Russian guns plus a further distance to be defined on each side of railway tracks. In the case of urban districts traversed by railways such firing range shall be counted from the outer limits of the towns. (Taking for example eight kilometers as the maximum firing range of Japanese field gun and two kilometers as the further distance required the zone is to extend to ten kilometers on each side of railway tracks.)

2. The maintenance of order within the limits of the said zone shall be undertaken by the Associated troops. No armed Bolshevik bands shall be allowed to exist in that zone and in the event of an invasion by such bands the Associated troops shall forthwith expel them from the zone.

Outside the limits of the zone Russian troops shall be solely responsible for the maintenance of order, it being, however, understood that the Associated troops may in case of necessity assume the protection of their respective nationals residing outside the zone.

3. The limits of the zone shall be defined in common accord by the military authorities of the Associated Powers in Siberia.

4. The foregoing clauses respecting the protection of railways shall be applied to all rivers and waterways available for general traffic.

5. Political bodies formed in Russia to conduct an orderly administration and in particular the Government at Omsk, which is at present the representative organization of this kind, shall be given moral and material support by the Associated Powers in their efforts for the reestablishment of peace and security in Siberia.

6. In case the Russian troops find their strength inadequate to maintain order in regions outside the specified zone and seek the Allied assistance [representatives?] of the Associated Powers may upon consultation extend to them necessary assistance.”

I have repeated the above to General Graves and requested his comment.

In general it appears to me to conform to the policy which the Department approved.

MORRIS



861.00/4395 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*WASHINGTON, *May 3, 1919, 11 a.m.*

Your April 29, 3 p.m.

Department appreciates friendly and cordial attitude assumed by the Minister of War and hopes our combined efforts may prove successful.

POLK

861.77/826 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Extract]

LONDON, *May 3, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received 2:45 p.m.]

1962. Your 5244 of April 26th, 5 p.m., was read to chief of Russian Division of Foreign Office on 28th ultimo and its substance again informally discussed with him on first instant. In the view of the Department, as expressed in the first paragraph thereof, Foreign Office fully concurs and is prepared to accept such an arrangement because it is to be considered as purely a railroad arrangement and because this Government is working along the same line and toward same object, which is the improvement and maintenance of the railroad in order better to serve that district and to assure supplies to Kolchak.

. . . . .

DAVIS

861.77/827 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*WASHINGTON, *May 6, 1919, 6 p.m.*

827. Referring to Department's April 30, noon, and your May 2, midnight, reports from Smith and others of continued aggressive attitude of Japanese military in Siberia, impress me with fact we should make clear to Japan that in our opinion the situation has changed since we cooperated in sending troops to assist Czechs. The adoption of railway plan marks this change. Our efforts should now be directed to restore the railways. This is an economic and peaceable undertaking which calls for military activities only for policing and for protection in cases of actual necessity. In the opinion of this Government our two military forces are subordinate

in importance to the working of the railways and should now be employed exclusively in assisting the Inter-Allied Committee and the boards subordinated to it under the plan proposed by Japan. Such interpretation modifies our previous understanding and presents a new phase of assistance in which we can achieve success best by emphasizing the purely economic and practical character of our purpose. It was for this reason, among others, that the idea of a military zone was abandoned. I hope Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War will both agree upon advisability of now laying stress on the non-political and non-military character of our efforts.

British Government concurs in our view that Inter-Allied Committee should have pre-eminence in all matters affecting policy so that Technical and Military Boards may act along lines consist[ent] with action of Committee. This illustrates in one aspect the character which I believe should now be given to our general efforts and I would be glad if the American and Japanese representatives on the Inter-Allied Committee might make similar statements to this effect to the Committee.

We still have frequent reports that Japanese are supporting independent leaders with obvious result of fomenting disturbances which will require military intervention. These reports are borne out in general attitude of Japanese military in Siberia. Please say I hope Japanese Government will see necessity of stopping such activities on the part of Japanese military which are so at variance with its expressed purpose.

POLK

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861.00/4462 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, May 10, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 8:08 p.m.]

Your May 3, noon [11 a.m.?<sup>?</sup>], and May 6, 6 p.m. I am holding a series of informal conversations on the general question of closer military cooperation in Siberia with both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and General Tanaka and in this connection your May 6, 6 p.m. is pre-eminently helpful and timely. Tanaka holds rather tenaciously to his zone suggestion, but neither willing that it should be omitted from any statement of policy. General Graves, however, in a recent telegram, strongly opposes it as impolitic and impracticable even though it be treated by the military commanders simply as a method of enforcing an agreed policy.

I fear we may meet the usual hesitations and delays in reaching an understanding, but conditions here are somewhat less irritable and

antagonistic since the settlement at Paris of the Shantung question, and there is an evident effort on the part of the general staff to assume a more sympathetic attitude.

The luncheon given by General Tanaka yesterday was attended by the Prime Minister and all the members of the Cabinet, together with Army and Navy chiefs and other representative men. The speech of General Tanaka, though exaggerated in wording, was, I believe, intended as a recognition of the necessity for a changed attitude among the military authorities. His reference to the Siberian situation was as follows:

"The fact is that America and Japan are the nations the most vitally concerned in Siberia. Consequently, in view of the fact that their expeditionary forces are the most numerous, the closest of cooperation between them is especially necessary. Although it is not impossible that differences of opinion may arise at all times, this is constantly the case among allied forces and should not be considered strange. What is essential is that there should be displayed a spirit of mutual cooperation. There exist, however, no causes and no reasons which can create fundamental differences of opinion on Siberian questions between the two armies. Therefore, when questions arise which cause differences of opinion they can be solved forthwith by frank exchanges of opinion. The most conspicuous examples of this can be seen in the conclusion of the agreement pertaining to the Siberian railways."

MORRIS

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861.77/866 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, May 23, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received 4:18 p.m.]

In the matter of the Allied military policy in Siberia I suggest that I be authorized to submit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum to the following effect:

"The Government of the United States agrees with the suggestion contained in the memorandum of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, April [May] 2d,<sup>12</sup> that in order to insure harmony in the operations of the Associated troops in Siberia an understanding should be reached and a policy formulated by the powers interested for the protection of the railways in Manchuria and Siberia now operated under Allied supervision. The Government of the United States seriously doubts, however, the wisdom or expediency of attempting establish any definite zone of military action or of including at present any rivers or waterways. It would appear to

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<sup>12</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, May 2, midnight, p. 559.

the Government of the United States wiser simply to define such a policy in the following terms:

[‘]The Governments interested in the protection of Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways and having military forces in Siberia agree that the use of these military forces shall be limited to the preservation of order in the immediate vicinity of the railway, its stations and trains, when those in charge so request and in the suppression of local violence by conflicting Russian forces only when such conflicts affect the dispatch of troops or operation of the railways and even then only to the extent necessary to protect the railway and those engaged in its operation.’

The Government of the United States believes that such a statement of general policy will be sufficient to guide the military commanders who will be authorized to take the necessary steps to put the policy into effect.[”]

MORRIS

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861.77/866 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1919, 6 p.m.

Your May 23, 1 p.m. approved.

POLK

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861.77/888 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, June 7, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received June 8, 6:15 a.m.]

After several talks with General Tanaka and the Minister for Foreign Affairs I left with the Minister a confidential memorandum dated May 17 embodying the substance of your May 6, 6 p.m. This afternoon the Minister handed me the following reply:

“The Japanese Government have taken note of the decision of the United States Government contained in the memorandum of the American Embassy of May 17 respecting the abandonment of the proposed plan of establishing a zone for the protection of railways and of rivers and waterways in Siberia.

They have no intention of urging the adoption of that plan. The only point on which they place particular importance is that the complete harmony shall be maintained, and the spirit of mutual helpfulness displayed, in the action of the Allied military forces. Sharing as they do with the American Government the belief that the Allied forces are available and should be employed only in cases of actual necessity of policing and protection, and not for any offensive undertakings, they feel that they can confidently look forward to the realization of the desired unity of action and purpose.

They however [fail to?] appreciate clearly the meaning of the suggestion made by the American Government that the Inter-Allied Committee at present sitting at Vladivostok should have preeminence in all matters affecting policies. By the railway arrangement recently concluded, the Inter-Allied Committee is charged only with the general supervision of the railways in the zone in which the Allied troops are now operating. It has practically no authority to deal with any questions of general policy involving issues of a wider significance than those which properly relate to the supervision of the [railways?]. Such political questions falling outside the defined functions of the Inter-Allied Committee might, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, be made the subject of discussion and adjustment among the Governments of the Associated Powers in Siberia, apart from the session of that Committee. Nor is the Committee in a position, consistently with the terms of the existing arrangement, to control measures for the protection of the railway, which is expressly placed under the Allied military forces. In this situation, if it should now be the intention of the American Government to extend in any way the competence of the Inter-Allied Committee beyond what is prescribed in the arrangement, such a modification does not appear to the Japanese Government to be either necessary or appropriate."

At the same time he handed me the following reply to the memorandum which I had submitted, with the approval of the Department, on June 2d:<sup>13</sup>

"The Japanese Government have carefully considered the suggestion embodied in the memorandum of the American Embassy of June 2d on the subject of policy to be followed in the operations of the Allied military forces in Siberia. They fully accept the underlying principles apparently implied in that suggestion that the Allied forces are available only in cases of actual necessity for the preservation of order in the regiments [*regions?*] immediately bordering the main routes of communication in Siberia. Referring, however, to the application of this principle, the Japanese Government desire to offer the following observation:

1. In their opinion, the object of military action should be no more or less than the preservation of order in such regiments [*regions?*], which is essential not only for the protection of the railway and those engaged in its operation, but also for the safety of the military forces themselves, as well as of their own nationals and the Russian population in the localities. All measures necessary for the attainment of this object should be left in the hands of the military authorities.

2. The region to be covered by the Allied military activities should be as far limited as possible, but it should include mines and other establishments which have direct bearing upon the supply of materials needed for the working of the railway. It is equally important to place under military protection the rivers and waterways

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<sup>13</sup> See telegrams from the Ambassador in Japan, May 23, 1 p.m., p. 562, and to the Ambassador in Japan, May 28, 6 p.m., p. 563.

by which the transportation of stores for the use of the Allied troops is actually carried on.

3. The military forces should be authorized to act on their own initiative within the scope of the object above defined. It appears neither wise nor practicable to call upon them to withhold their action until a request for it is made by those in charge of the railways.

The military commanders shall be empowered to work out in common accord the details of the plan of military action to be taken in the discharge of their duties."

I am disappointed in both replies. They reveal vividly the inherent difficulty of any real cooperation with the Japanese military forces in Siberia through civilian control. The two memoranda, read together, indicate that the General Staff insist upon retaining the initiative. They can not understand and will not tolerate any arrangement which would deprive them of independent action and it is this attitude, adopted not only by the General Staff but by every subordinate military official, which is so exasperating to our representatives in Siberia. My conversations have apparently not improved the situation. They have only clarified the issue.

MORRIS

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861.77/945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Irkutsk, to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>14</sup>

IRKUTSK, July 17, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received July 18, 2 p.m.]

I submit the following observations of the conditions under which the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are being operated as far as Irkutsk.

The Allied inspectors in charge of operations are struggling with serious difficulties. On the division between Vladivostok and Pogranichnaya, Stevens and the Allied Technical Board are hampered by the interference of the Cossack military authorities who profess to represent Kolchak in eastern Siberia and refuse to recognize the authority of the Technical Board. I am convinced that the Cossacks get sympathy and support from the Japanese military authorities. While Stevens and his men have won the confidence of the employees and of the railway management the continued military interference and the falling value of the ruble have created discontent and restlessness among the men and have resulted in the recent strikes. There is little, if any, Bolshevism among the rail-

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<sup>14</sup> Repeated by the Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in no. 2653, July 26, 4 p.m., with instruction to communicate the substance orally to their British and French colleagues.

way employees, but there is a deep-seated antagonism to the rule of the Cossacks and suspicion of the Kolchak government which is apparently too weak to challenge the Cossack authority.

On that part of the Chinese Eastern Railway which passes through northern Manchuria, including Harbin and Manchuria Station, there is no Cossack problem, and the situation is somewhat better. The Japanese military authorities no longer interfere as they did when they took possession a year ago. To this extent they are loyal to the railway agreement. But they still maintain troops at all the stations in Manchuria, they are holding all the barracks previously occupied, they have completed the erection of their private telephone and telegraph wires, and are maintaining their own force of despatchers, inspectors, and terminal experts, who, while not attempting for the present to interfere in operation, are quite obviously preparing for the future.

From Manchuria Station to Verkhnieudinsk the railway is dominated by Semenoff with the open support of the Japanese military authorities. His relations with the Kolchak government merely nominal. His strength is wholly Japanese. He has constantly interfered with the Allied inspectors who have again and again sought and have been refused the support of the Japanese military command supposedly guarding the railway in this section. I arrived at Chita just after Semenoff's bandits in one of their armored cars had seized the office car and equipment of Major Gravis, an American engineer, and the Allied divisional inspector.<sup>15</sup> I am using this incident to bring the general question to definite issue. At Chita I saw General Oba, the Japanese divisional commander, and discussed the entire situation for several hours. Later under Japanese pressure Semenoff promised to return the car, but has not yet done so. During our interview, General Oba frankly expressed to me his profound admiration for Semenoff, his confidence in Semenoff's purposes and motives and the close association which existed between them.

Between Verkhnieudinsk and Mysovaya the presence of 2,000 American troops and the determined stand taken by Colonel Morrow under General Graves's instructions have destroyed Semenoff's influence in that sector,<sup>16</sup> while from Mysovaya to the Irkutsk, including the important Baikal tunnel district, the Czechs are still in control.

On this situation I offer the following comment:

From Vladivostok to Irkutsk, excepting only two sectors guarded by American troops, the military control of the railways is in the hands of the Japanese who are using the Cossack organization sub-

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<sup>15</sup> See telegram from the Minister in China, May 31, p. 505.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed (file no. 861.00/4715).

sidized and supported by them to discredit Allied operation. Kolchak is powerless to withstand this influence which has gone so far as to force the appointment of the bandit Kalmikoff as the representative of Dutoff [*Rozanov?*], the Kolchak commander of all military operations in the east.

To my mind the Japanese plan is perfectly clear. Baffled by the railway agreement in their organized attempt to take possession of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways as far as Chita and thus dominate eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria the Japanese Government is countenancing a less obvious, but a more insidious scheme of operating through the Cossack organization which is the only substantial support Kolchak has east of Chita. It will not be difficult for Japan to dispose of the eastern Cossacks when they have served the purpose.

MORRIS

861.77/969 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, July 27, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received July 29, 6 p.m.]

Special discussion, limited to questions that have come up in connection with the operation of the railways, took place this afternoon. There were present the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Ways and Communications, who is also chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee; the Russian general in charge of military transportation; Sir Charles Eliot;<sup>17</sup> Count Martel;<sup>18</sup> and Mr. Matsushima representing Japan. Colonel Emerson<sup>19</sup> accompanied me.

In my previous talks with Stevens, Emerson and others, I found that the questions could be reduced to three main issues: 1, the refusal of the Japanese military authorities to protect, when called upon to do so, the representatives of the Technical Board from interference in the performance of their duties and the enforcement of their orders; 2, the refusal of the Russian military authorities to discontinue their interference with the despatching of trains and other technical details of operation; 3, the refusal of Russian railway managers to obey the directions of the Technical Board, on the ground that such directions were in conflict with Russian laws and regulations which had never been repealed.

<sup>17</sup> British High Commissioner in Siberia.

<sup>18</sup> Damien J. A. C. de Martel, French High Commissioner *ad interim* in Siberia.

<sup>19</sup> George H. Emerson, in charge of the Russian Railway Service Corps.



An extended discussion of these issues revealed many misunderstandings and conflicting instructions, but we were finally able to agree unanimously on the following conclusion, which I submit for the approval of the Department:

1—Strong and immediate measures must be taken to prevent interference of military authorities with the operation of the railway. All requests of the military authorities for transportation of troops and war material have to be addressed to railway officials, who are the only agents in charge of the operation. It is stipulated that all such requests have to be fulfilled by the Railway Administration and military transports to have priority over any other shipments.

2—The Russian Railway Administration being in charge of the management of the railway and taking instructions from the Inter-Allied Technical Committee, a special decree has to be promulgated providing for temporary suspension—for the period of existence of the Inter-Allied Railway agreement—of all Russian laws conflicting with orders previously issued to the railway officials in accord with this agreement.

3—The troops in charge of the railway guard should not limit their activity to the protection of the line against Bolshevik attacks, but shall give armed support to the Railway Administration if requested by it. They shall in no case on their own initiative interfere with the operation of the railway.

4—The Technical [Board] and Military Committee will move to Omsk at the earliest possible date.

All the representatives present agreed to urge their respective Governments to instruct their local civil and military representatives in the spirit of these conclusions. Admiral Kolchak has already issued orders to the Russian military authorities covering number 1, and will immediately promulgate a decree in accordance with number 2. Number 3 covers a very serious issue which has arisen between the Technical Board and the Japanese military, particularly in the Semenoff district. I have discussed the matter with the Japanese Military Mission here, and they now state that they will change their present instructions to bring them into harmony with this third conclusion.

In the meantime Stevens has directed all the Allied inspectors to withdraw from the division between Manchuria Station and Verkhnieudinsk, as General Oba has definitely refused to protect their lives and property. While I appreciate the responsibility Stevens feels for the lives of the inspectors in that district, who are unarmed and unguarded, I regret that he acted so hastily and just as I believed I had reached an understanding with the Japanese authorities. It may, however, stir the Japanese Government to prompt action.

MORRIS

861.77/969 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk*

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1919, 5 p.m.

Referring to four conclusions reached in your July 27, 4 p.m.

1. Does this assure adequate authority for Stevens to keep line open in various sections? In other words can he count on cordial support from Russian railway officials or will they continue to submit to military dictation?

3.<sup>20</sup> How will this affect General Graves in practice? This point will have to be submitted to President to approve new instructions to Graves. Please make quite clear.

4. Department inclined to favor but please state advantages to be gained by moving Technical and Military Boards to Omsk. Is Inter-Allied Committee included in proposal or will it continue to sit at Vladivostok?

Please route your reports through Legation Peking with request to expedite.

LANSING

861.77/1017 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 14, 1919, 9 a.m.

[Received August 15, 9:10 a.m.]

Your July 31, 5 p.m. It has not been possible to put in force conclusions in regard to railway operation reported in my July 27, 4 p.m. I surmise that the Japanese Government has decided not to interfere with Semionoff in his attacks on the railway administration. They evidently intend to assume an entirely correct attitude toward the Kolchak government as long as it exists and at the same time strengthen their influence with Semionoff by giving him a free hand now so that they may continue their control over him should he finally become dictator of eastern Siberia. At all events the Japanese representatives here attend all the conferences and agree to all the conclusions, and assure me of their devotion to the Kolchak cause. Meanwhile General Oba at Chita advises Major Gravis<sup>21</sup> that his troops are not authorized to prevent Semionoff's interference. As a result Semionoff has arrested Gravis' interpreter on a trumped-up charge of being a Bolshevik, has renewed

<sup>20</sup> Numbering as on the original; evidently refers to conclusion 3 in the Ambassador's telegram of July 27, *supra*.

<sup>21</sup> Russian Railway Service Corps.

the whipping of railway employees and is apparently determined to drive the American engineers out of his territory.

MORRIS

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861.77/1020 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, August 15, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received August 15, 1:10 p.m.]

Semenoff hostile acts against our inspectors worse than ever. Japanese giving me absolutely no protection; apparently in sympathy with Semenoff. I have ordered removal of inspectors as perhaps even their lives may be in danger. I have notified Morris.

STEVENS

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861.77/1025 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State*

OMSK, August 15, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received August 17, 1:30 p.m.]

General Takayanagi informed me this morning that he was in receipt of a telegram from his superiors in Tokio overruling the conference's interpretation of the railway agreement (see my July 27, 5 [4] p.m.) and stating that the Japanese were guarding certain sections of the Trans-Siberian Railway from all interference with the operation of the line, and that they were protecting the employees of the line; but that in regard to the operation of the line or the treatment of the railway employees, the Japanese military officials have no authority to interfere with any action taken by any Russian who occupies a recognized official position under the Omsk Government; and that any disagreement between a Russian under the authority of the Omsk Government and a national of any country engaged in operation or the protection of the railway was a matter for discussion between the Omsk Government and the Government of the other person involved.

This interpretation evidently devised to permit Semenoff a free hand on the railway from Manchuria to Verkhnieudinsk would appear to make it impossible for the American railway engineers to remain longer in that section.

Lantry, who has general supervision of the Baikal division, telegraphs:

"August 11th. Gravis called on General Saithe [*Saito?*], commander of Japanese, Manchuria to Olovyannaya, as to protection his territory. Saithe [*Saito?*] told him he could not interfere with Semenoff in any way whatever. Japanese have been withdrawn from Dauria station which gives Semenoff a free hand in examining passenger trains. Commandants of Semenoff's armored trains now insist upon using regular passenger engines to handle their trains instead of armored engines. Some railway employees Olovyannaya and Borzia again whipped by Semenoff's officers. Gravis' interpreter arrested by Semenoff by force charged with being Bolshevik agitator. Do not think we are doing the right thing in asking or permitting our officers to remain in that territory and recommend permanent withdrawal;" and also

"August 13th. Situation between Verkhnieudinsk and Manchuria I consider alarming. Gravis, now at Chita, has a written expression from Oba stating will keep the line free of Reds. No need of protection against Semenoff interference. Gravis considers situation desperate and recommends permanent withdrawal as he feels satisfied will not be given necessary protection by Japanese. If we wait for an example I am afraid we will be sorry."

The Omsk Government admits that at present it is powerless to control Semenoff or prevent his interference with the railway in the territory which he dominates. The Japanese Government now for the first time definitely refuses to protect the representatives of the Inter-Allied Technical Committee in the performance of their duties; Semenoff emboldened by the passive attitude of Japan is apparently defying the authority of the Inter-Allied representatives, terrorizing the railway employees and controlling the operation of the railway to suit his own purposes. The Department will appreciate the fact that the engineers are alone at widely separated stations surrounded by hostile Cossacks and unable to rely on the protection of the Japanese soldiers. Under these circumstances Stevens and Emerson feel they are not justified in risking the lives of the engineers and are preparing to withdraw them from the Semenoff section. I fear the effect of this action on the entire railway operation and have requested Emerson not to accept issue formal order of withdrawal until I could submit the matter for the consideration of the Department.

I would appreciate a prompt answer.

MORRIS

861.77/1033 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, August 21, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received August 22, 3:21 a.m.]

474. Following from Smith.

"Some months ago Committee passed regulation that in case of any infraction of rules regarding train movements, railway officials were to apply to military forces guarding that particular sector to restore order. This was done especially on account of Semenoff. All military have followed rule except Japanese. Committee sent several letters to commanders but Japanese did not reply. Again, July 25th we reiterated request and recently received reply from General Otani as follows:

'In view of the fact that Japanese troops are located in the commonwealth with the aim of maintaining order and political quietness, they must, of course, render assistance to the railways against malefactors tending to harm railway movement in case their duty will require it. However, all misunderstandings arising with regard to railways among Allied troops, including Russians, and Allied agents, which by their character are subject to decision by corresponding governments or diplomatic agencies [and] representatives, as well as small incidents which can be liquidated by Russian authorities or militia, or incidents of a similar character, do not allow Japanese troops to interfere with them.'

When letter was read to the Committee Matsudaira <sup>22</sup> said that he did not understand the first sentence and feared that English translation was wrong. Chairman handed me letter which was written in Russian and translation was correct; then he stated that the letter was probably written in Japanese and wrongly translated into Russian. He will investigate and report. . . . No recent complaints about Semenoff received. Smith.["]

CALDWELL

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861.77/1029 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1919, 4 p.m.

For Smith.

Following from Stevens:

"August 19, 4 p.m. Japanese General Oba, commanding the railway guards Semenoff territory, tells inspectors most decidedly he

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<sup>22</sup> Tsuneo Matsudaira, Japanese member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee.

will not interfere with Semenoff as that would be interference with Russian internal affairs. Everything points to a combination Oba-Semenoff to intimidate and prevent work, and antagonistic spirit more clearly defined than ever. I have just ordered inspectors out of all Semenoff territory as I consider lives in danger."

Department regards such action should not be taken without approval of Inter-Allied Committee and has so advised Stevens. Please take up with Stevens and with Committee and report result. Advise Morris.

LANSING

861.77/1043 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, August 25, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 5:56 p.m.]

380. Following from Smith:

"Your August 21, 4 p.m. Committee did not know inspectors removed but probably would have upheld Stevens. Shall discuss same at the next meeting. See my 474, August 21, 10 a.m. Matsudaira states that Japanese are relieving present generals at Chita and that new orders will probably be issued. I believe they will do nothing to stop Semenoff. They seem to be waiting to see if Kolchak falls and if so may attempt to organize a new government east of Baikal with Semenoff as leader. The Committee has done everything possible to force Japanese to act but can accomplish nothing. Same conditions will exist until we can do more than request military to adopt. In former telegrams I have stated that we desire the military to be made subordinate. We have outlined a complete general policy but the Japanese military and . . . the Russian military, have completely blocked its execution. Through the corrupt Russian press they continually attack England and America. It is rumored through Russian sources that they even hired Bolshevik leaders to attack the American forces guarding Suchan mines. The Russian people generally hate the Japanese. Smith."

CALDWELL

861.77/1056a : Circular Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Atherton)*<sup>23</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1919, 4 p.m.

Following is the text of a note which you will please leave with the Minister of Foreign Affairs at once:

<sup>23</sup> See last paragraph for names of countries to which this telegram was also sent.

“Excellency: Under special instructions from my Government, I am directed to call Your Excellency’s attention to the developments which have attended the joint efforts of Japan and the United States to render assistance to Russia first, through the sending of their military forces and, second, through the adoption of the Siberian railway plan in conjunction with the other Allied Governments.

You will recall the circumstances which attended the joint decision of our two Governments in regard to the sending of military forces. The purpose of the expedition was fully expressed, on the part of the United States, in an Aide Memoire handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington July 17, 1918,<sup>25</sup> and, subsequently, in an official statement given to the press by the Acting Secretary of State.<sup>26</sup> In both of these statements of policy it was made clear first, that military action in Siberia was admissible, as the Government of the United States saw the circumstances at the time, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance.

At the same time, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, on behalf of his Government, submitted to the Secretary of State a declaration of purpose on the part of Japan<sup>27</sup> which was fully consonant with the purpose of this Government and which was based upon a sentiment of sincere friendship towards the Russian people.

As time passed it became more and more evident that the restoration of railway traffic in Siberia was not only a vital element in such military assistance to the Russians and Czechs as had already been afforded, but equally so in connection with any economic assistance in Siberia, such as was contemplated by this Government and expressed in an Aide Memoire to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington August 10 [3?], 1918.<sup>28</sup>

My Government has instructed me to reiterate to Your Excellency the gratification with which, consequently, it received the plan for supervising the Siberian railways, which was proposed by the Government of Japan and which so fully accorded with the purpose of the United States as outlined at some length in a copy of a circular telegram<sup>29</sup> which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington September 14, 1918. As Your Excellency will recall, the plan proposed by Japan<sup>30</sup> was supplemented by a memorandum sub-

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<sup>25</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 287-290.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 328-329.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 323-329.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 249-252 and 253-254.

<sup>30</sup> *Ante*, p. 239.

mitted by Ambassador Morris<sup>21</sup> and fully concurred in by the Japanese Foreign Office.

The plan provides that the general supervision of the railways shall be exercised by a special Inter-Allied Committee—the Committee which is now actually established at Vladivostok. It further stipulates that a Technical Board and an Allied Military Transportation Board shall be placed under the control of the Committee. The duties of these two boards and also of the Committee are outlined quite simply and clearly. Under the plan, the protection of the railways is placed under the Allied military forces.

The memorandum supplementing the plan, in addition to fixing an understanding as to the membership of the Inter-Allied Committee and the two boards under its control, and also giving assurance for effective use of the services of Mr. John F. Stevens, provides that the plan itself shall be interpreted as a sincere effort to operate the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways in the interest of the Russian people with a view to their ultimate return to those in interest without impairing any existing rights. It furthermore stipulates, without any possibility of misinterpretation, that in entrusting to Mr. Stevens as President of the Technical Board, the technical operation of these railways, it is to be understood that the Governments of Japan and the United States are prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective.

The Government of the United States views the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways as the one element most necessary to economic and political prosperity in Siberia today; as the fundamental condition precedent to the restoration of normal economic life and the reestablishment of political stability. Without it, it does not seem possible that there can be the slightest improvement in the present distressing conditions. Clothes, medical supplies and goods cannot be shipped into Siberia nor can the produce of the country itself be shipped out. The railways are the only avenues of communication. Consequently, my Government considers as of the utmost importance any developments which may tend to block them.

The developments to which I am directed to call Your Excellency's attention have to do with the radical difference of interpretation, with its consequent difficulties of friendly cooperation, which have been placed upon the duties required of the Allied military forces in protecting the railways and also in giving to Mr. Stevens the author-

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<sup>21</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Jan. 9, 12 p.m, p. 236.



ity and support necessary to make his efforts effective. As you are aware, the United States understands the Allied military forces are not only obligated to protect the railways, free from interruption, but also wherever they may be in control to forward the operation of the general plan. This is especially true as regards the duties of the United States and Japan in their mutual obligations to give to Mr. Stevens the degree of authority and support necessary to make fully effective the efforts of himself and, consequently, of the Allied Engineers under his direction. The Engineers are to be protected as a vital element in the protection of the railways.

On the other hand the Imperial Government seems to understand that the protection of the railways, so far as it may concern Japanese troops, is limited strictly to safeguarding railway property and keeping the line open and entails no obligation whatever for cooperation on the part of Japanese forces in furthering the general operation of the plan itself. To illustrate one of the phases of this question, allow me to recall to Your Excellency the instructions which the Japanese military representative at Omsk has now received to the effect that any disagreement between a Russian under the authority of the Omsk Government and a National of any country engaged in the operation or protection of the railways, must be a matter for discussion between the Omsk Government and the Government of the other persons involved. In practice this understanding has resulted in a definite refusal on the part of Japanese military commanders to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors in the territory controlled by General Semenov.

Such an understanding seems to the United States to be wholly inadmissible. As Your Excellency is aware, the Omsk Government is not recognized by the United States nor is my Government advised that recognition has been accorded it by Japan. Furthermore, the Omsk Government is not referred to in the plan proposed by Japan and it is only by a later development of circumstance that the Russian Chairman has any connection with Admiral Kolchak. But quite aside from any suggestion to abandon the definite character of the plan by injecting into it new elements of authority, it is as well known to the Government of Japan as to that of the United States that the Government of Admiral Kolchak is wholly favorable to the Allied operation of the railways and has only recently testified to this attitude conclusively by ordering Russian railway authorities to waive all existing Russian legal restrictions or regulations which might otherwise interfere with our present efforts. Hostile actions of Russians acting in the name of the Omsk authorities can, therefore, only be in disobedience to express instructions. Nevertheless,

Japanese military commanders have allowed conditions to arise in sections of the railways guarded by Japan which have threatened the withdrawal of Allied engineers, because of the refusal of these commanders to protect the lives and property of the engineers in the performance of the duties imposed upon them by the plan proposed by Japan.

Consequently, the continued disposition, now apparent as a definite policy, on the part of Japan through its military commanders in Siberia, to refuse the support of its military forces in making effective in practice the declared purposes of the agreement, has been viewed by my Government with grave concern, especially so as the United States has hitherto been confident in the hope that a consistent policy of frankness might lead to a clear and thorough accord on all questions in which the United States and Japan are both obligated to assume responsibilities.

The United States Government feels it can not be held responsible for that for which it is not in fact responsible. The entire plan was predicated on the cooperation of the two governments. With the failure of the Japanese officials to lend their cooperation in such an elemental manner a situation is created which the Government of the United States must immediately consider from the point of view of fixing the responsibility for the failure of the enterprise which has been the cause of so much labor and from which so much of benefit was to be expected for the Russian people.

It is, nevertheless, in a spirit of sincere friendship that the Government of the United States desires me to bring to Your Excellency's attention the fact that it is now confronted with the necessity of deciding, after repeated and frank efforts to arrive at a mutual understanding of purpose as regards an international undertaking which was accepted only after searching discussion and consideration, whether the only course practicable for the United States to pursue is an entire withdrawal from all further efforts to cooperate in Siberia, to be followed, if need be, by a public statement of the reasons for such action, since it might be misunderstood if no explanation is made.

I am directed to add that the Government of the United States has a clear appreciation of the consequences of such action, especially as it is burdened with a deep sense of obligation towards Russia, whose people contributed such a vital share in the triumph of the Allied and Associated Governments over the Central Powers. Moreover, my Government is firmly convinced that the future welfare of all Governments is to be based upon a community of interest which is about to replace permanently the former balances of power

and other bargains of self-interest and aggrandizement on the part of one nation or group of nations at the expense of others. With the deepest regret my Government finds that the attitude of Japan in this matter raises the question as to whether this view of international relations is shared by the Imperial Government.

At the same time, I am to assure you that this perfectly clear and frank statement of the circumstances of the case, as the Government of the United States sees them, and of the only course of action which seems logically to follow, are presented in the firm belief that the traditional friendship of our two countries will assure a thorough understanding on the part of Japan.

In conclusion allow me to add for Your Excellency's information that copies of this note are being communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and China and to the Russian Ambassador at Washington."

LANSING

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861.77/1058 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 2, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received September 5, 7:27 a.m.]

488. The following telegram sent from Smith:

"Your August 21, 4 p.m. regarding the withdrawal of inspectors. The Committee passed the following resolution:

'Any general withdrawal of Allied inspectors from any section of the railway is a matter for the decision of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee. Nevertheless, in case of emergency Technical Board may withdraw inspectors from the line subject to the approval of the Committee'.

The members realize that as telegrams sometime travel very slow quick action may at times be necessary and decided as above. The general opinion of members is that Stevens acted in right manner this time for his action gave the Committee the opportunity to handle this more decisively with the Japanese military.

Semenoff has been here and stated that he would no longer interfere with the railroad management and would prevent his officers and men from doing it. Matsudaira informed me that the Japanese had told Semenoff that he must cease his actions against the railway. Semenoff has returned to Chita via Amur Railway. We shall await results. A young officer of Semenoff, while drinking, stated that if

Omsk Government fell Semenoff would declare himself dictator of territory east of Baikal and would receive support of Japanese. Smith.[<sup>33</sup>]

CALDWELL

861.77/1057 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 3, 1919, 10 a.m.*

[Received September 4, 7:40 p.m.]

494. Following from Smith:

"My 474, August 21, 10 a.m. Committee has been pressing Matsudaira for report on letter of General Otani. At last meeting he reported that letter had been correctly translated and that a mistake had been made regarding *point d'appui* [*sic*]. This letter will be recalled and new one written, second letter not yet received.

Japanese are now sending new division of troops to replace division at Chita which is supposed to return to Japan. Matsudaira claims that these new officers have very clear instructions regarding their duties and hopes there will be no more difficulties. Time will tell. A second time he said that the Americans should take over the guarding of the sector from Manchuria to Verkhneudinsk. His reason is that the Japanese guards and the American inspectors do not understand each other and he wishes to avoid friction. He knows very well that Americans have not enough troops for this and perhaps wishes to hear an offer to replace American inspectors by Japanese which will not do. [Smith.]"

CALDWELL

861.77/1056 : Telegram

*The President of the Technical Board (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

HARBIN, *September 4, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received 12:30 p.m.]

Your cable August 21st, 5 p.m.<sup>33</sup> Allied inspectors have not been withdrawn from Semenoff territory.

STEVENS

<sup>33</sup> Not printed; see telegram to the Consul at Vladivostok, Aug. 21, 4 p.m., p. 572.

861.77/1059 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Japan (Atherton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, September 5, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received September 5, 4:35 p.m.]

Department's circular of August 30th, 4 p.m. was presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and code copy mailed to American Legation Peking for the confidential information of the Chinese Government as cable service is interrupted.

ATHERTON

861.77/1078 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Japan (Atherton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, September 15, 1919, noon.

[Received September 15, 7:06 a.m.]

British Chargé d'Affaires informs me his Government has not specifically advised him of American Government's note contained in the Department's August 30, 4 p.m. but that the British Government has instructed him to support the representations made by American Government regarding Siberian railways. In this connection British Chargé d'Affaires has requested me if possible to show him text. Please instruct.<sup>34</sup>

I understand Italian and French Governments have telegraphed their representatives here purport of American note.

ATHERTON

861.77/1080 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Japan (Atherton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, September 16, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received September 16, 8:17 a.m.]

French Ambassador informs me that the American note, Department's August 30, 4 p.m., was received by the Japanese Government with considerable resentment. The French Ambassador reached the conclusion, after conversation at Foreign Office, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs appears favorable [*apparently?*] saw no underlying principle in the note other than a series of minor disagreements between Semenoff, American engineers, and certain Japanese military commanders. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that these explanations [*disagreements?*] were being investigated but

<sup>34</sup> Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan, Sept. 16, 1919, 6 p.m. (file no. 861.77/1078) "Your Sept. 15, Noon. No objection showing text of note to British Colleague. Phillips."

a long time must elapse before a reply could be given, and further stated that the use of the word "aggrandizement" in the note was without apparent basis.

Vernacular press reports that the Diplomatic Advisory Council has been discussing whether Japan shall take single-handed action in continuing to increase her forces in Siberia or withdraw to the borders of Manchuria and Mongolia for preventing the spread of Bolshevik influence.

Press further reports that the Government has decided not to change its previous decision to make its participation in the consortium conditional upon the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia.

ATHERTON

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861.77/1099 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok,  
to the Acting Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, September 25, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received 9:20 p.m.]

521. At the suggestion of Mr. Matsudaira, Stevens and I discussed with General Oi yesterday the question of policy in guarding the railway. General Oi, in stating his proposal, did not refer to the previous orders of General Otani, but expressed his opinion that the future operation of the railway imperatively required that the representatives of the Technical Board and the railway employees should be protected and supported by the military from all interference in the performance of their duties. He said that all his officers would be so instructed in principle with direction to refer to their senior commandant for action any doubtful or delicate cases which might arise.

In commenting on the letter of General Otani to the Inter-Allied Committee, which was interpreted by the Committee as limiting the duties of Japanese troops simply to the protection of the line from outside attack, Mr. Matsudaira, who was present, stated that in his judgment the letter was unfortunately worded and conveyed a different impression from the one intended. He thought it also possible that the orders issued by General Otani to his subordinate officers may have conveyed the same impression to them and that this would in part explain the statements attributed to Generals Oba and Saito, and the message conveyed to me while at Omsk by General Takayanagi. He believed, however, that Mr. Stevens and the Allied railway inspectors had also misunderstood the Japanese attitude, and had imputed to the Japanese commanders, particularly in the Semenoff district, intentions and sympathies which they did not possess.

We all agreed, however, that the question was one of future policy and practice. General Oi said that he intended to issue at once the instructions to the Japanese commanders in accordance with the views he had expressed and that he would give a copy to Mr. Stevens. He requested Mr. Stevens, after the receipt of these instructions, to bring them to the attention of the railway inspectors and thus avoid misunderstanding in the future. Mr. Stevens expressed willingness to furnish General Oi directly with all general orders of the Technical Committee for the information and guidance of the Japanese command. I understand that Mr. Matsudaira expects to supplement the letter of General Otani to the Inter-Allied Committee by a letter from General Oi which will define the Japanese military policy.

I am unable to determine whether Matsudaira and Oi are acting under instructions from Tokyo or on their own initiative. I informed Matsudaira of our Government's note but he tells me that he had received no advice from Tokyo in reference to it. Stevens believes that if General Oi's instructions correspond with the statement made to us we should of course accept this action in good faith and make a new start.

MORRIS

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861.77/1099 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1919, 5 p.m.

Your 521, September 25, 7 p.m. Your cable is first indication of attitude which may possibly be adopted by Japan regarding note presented in pursuance of the Department's telegram of August 30, 4 p.m. In view of the considerations indicated in the Embassy's September 16, 2 p.m., the delay is perhaps not undue; but the Department is solicitous that the Japanese Government should not, by reason of our acquiescence in delay, be led to infer that this Government is either indifferent or disposed to evade the issue presented by its note. At the same time, this Government would be happy to know that its interpretation of the instructions reported to have been issued to the Japanese commanders in Siberia, and upon which appear to have been based the actions to which this Government took exception, is incorrect.

You may impress upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs the urgency of a decision on the basis of which this Government may determine the course of action to be followed by it in conformity with the actualities of the situation in Siberia. I hope very much that the attitude apparently assumed by General Oi may foreshadow a willingness on the part of Japan to lend that hearty cooperation in

Siberia upon which this Government had originally counted with so much confidence.

You will recall that the note addressed to Japan concerned two fundamental principles concerning which this Government could not afford to have any misunderstanding; namely, first, the wide discrepancy between the written undertakings of the Japanese Government in the railway plan and the actual execution of that plan on the part of the military commanders in Siberia, as evidenced by the reports received from yourself and other American representatives; second, this Government's conviction that the international relations of the future must depend upon a community of interest, a conviction in which it was feared the Government of Japan did not fully share.

The Department relies wholly upon your discretion . . . and will be grateful to receive any convincing evidence that the causes of apprehension which aroused its anxiety in the past now no longer exist.

Please immediately cable full text of General Oi's order.

PHILLIPS

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861.77/1106 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 28, 1919, 9 a.m.*

[Received September 29, 2 a.m.]

527. Following from Smith:

"Just a few minutes before [Ambassador] Morris left for Tokyo, he received a statement from General Oi, Commander-in-Chief of Japanese troops, regarding the guarding of the railway reading as follows:

'INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO THE JAPANESE RAILWAY GUARD BY THE JAPANESE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces and the American Ambassador in their recent interview exchanged views relative to the military guard of the railways as per accompanying memorandum. As often instructed on former occasions the work of improving the Siberian Railway being a matter of deep significance in accomplishing object of aiding Russia you are again instructed to comply with the view in the accompanying memorandum and accordingly engage in the discharge of your duties.

MEMORANDUM

On September 22d General Oi, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, had an interview at the Japanese headquarters with Mr. Morris,



American Ambassador, and Mr. Stevens, the president of the Technical Board, and exchanged views with regard to the duties of the military guard of the Siberian railways. The American Ambassador asked whether the Japanese forces guarding the railway intended to guard only against an outside force attempting destruction of the railways while withholding aid or protection in case of any interference with operation otherwise than referred to above. He said that unless help were rendered it would be impossible to attain objects of improving the railways. The Commander-in-Chief then stated that in pursuance of the spirit in which the Allied Powers had undertaken the general supervision of the Siberian railways the officers in command of railway guards should in principle accord assistance and protection, for the purpose of improving the railways, to the railways and their employees not only against any attack upon railway by an outside force but also against any illegal interference with the railway operations. The General added that in cases however where circumstances are such as to make judgment difficult the officer Commander-in-Chief [*sic*] by referring the matter for instruction to the superior officers to whom [they are] directly responsible should endeavor for an amicable settlement of that matter'.

Ambassador Morris desired me to state to the Department that he would be pleased to receive at Tokyo the Department's comments and instructions relative to the above memorandum.

He also asked me to send to the Department my opinion as to the practicability of the above memorandum. The memorandum is exactly what the Inter-Allied Committee has been contending for with the Japanese military and if carried out in pursuance of the tacit understanding in which the Allied Powers had undertaken the general supervision of the Siberian railways [we shall have] no more difficulty with them. However I do not like the term in principle in next to the last sentence. It would have been better perhaps to have said in practice. I have heretofore noted that the Japanese are inclined to put a peculiar construction on that term when it tends to obviate [*sic*] their real aims. Also farther in the same sentence they use the word illegal which is capable of extension. If they mean to confine it to the Allied agreement and the Russian statutes no objection is possible, but if they interpret it to include orders issued by the present Russian Minister of Communications difficulties will arise. The last sentence may also lead to some difficulties. . . . However the expression first quoted (in my ?) comments will be the saving clause for the Inter-Allied Committee and I feel that we shall be able by a judicious use of that expression to adjust future difficulties if any arise. Smith."

CALDWELL

861.77/1110 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, *October 1, 1919, midnight.*

[Received October 1, 9:41 p.m.]

3158. Your circular August 30th, 4 p.m.<sup>35</sup> regarding relations between Japanese and American forces in Siberia. Foreign Office have replied under date of September 30th as follows:

“His Majesty’s Government view with much anxiety the proposal that United States troops should be withdrawn from Siberia. I would point out that as the result of such a withdrawal the Trans-Siberian Railway would not be adequately guarded and that it would in all probability be impossible to keep the line open. Moreover, the withdrawal of United States troops would leave Japan as the only country maintaining forces in Siberia. This state of things would also indirectly affect the principles which underlie the consortium now being established for dealing with railway and other concessions in China. I would therefore beg Your Excellency to bring these considerations to the notice of the United States Government and I would express an earnest hope that United States troops will be maintained in Siberia.”

DAVIS

861.77/1128 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, *October 5, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received 5:55 p.m.]

I conferred yesterday afternoon with Viscount Uchida, Shidehara<sup>36</sup> and Hanihara<sup>37</sup> on our Government’s note in regard to co-operation in Siberia. I reviewed the developments from the time of my informal talks with General Tanaka last spring, which resulted in the exchange with the Foreign Office of the memoranda of June 2d<sup>38</sup> and June 9th;<sup>39</sup> I stated my personal observations in Siberia and my reports to the Department; I showed them copies of General Takayanagi’s statement to me at Omsk, General Otani’s letter to the Inter-Allied Committee dated August 15,<sup>40</sup> the report of the exchange of views with General Oi and the order subsequently issued by him. I then asked them with these to read over with me

<sup>35</sup> See telegram to the Chargé in Japan on the same date, p. 573.

<sup>36</sup> Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; Nov. 3, 1919, Ambassador to the United States.

<sup>37</sup> Masanao Hanihara, director of political affairs, Japanese Foreign Office.

<sup>38</sup> *Ante*, p. 564, and footnote 13, same page.

<sup>39</sup> Probably June 7 is intended; see the Ambassador’s telegram of that date, p. 563.

<sup>40</sup> See telegram from the Consul at Vladivostok, Aug. 21, 10 a.m., p. 572.

our Government's note so they might more fully appreciate that the question was not one of specific incidents of misunderstanding but as I viewed it a fundamental difference of interpretation and consequently of policy and practice. I concluded by expressing my opinion that such a radical difference made real co-operation impossible and might at any time result in some local incident which would seriously threaten the friendship of our countries.

All three listened intently but made few comments and asked few questions. . . . In leaving I told them I hoped they would compare my statements with their own information, that I would welcome any facts which might indicate that I had been mistaken in my observations or conclusions. I gathered the general impression that the Foreign Office was ignorant of what had been going on in Siberia and that when the note was received they were simply bewildered. I hope that my talk yesterday will clear up meaning and cause of the note.

I have learned since returning that Oi's actions at Vladivostok were inspired by Tanaka after the receipt of our Government's note. I am informed that the Japanese General Staff is also responsible for the publicity just given to the negotiations. This has greatly embarrassed the Foreign Office. Sharkey of the Associated Press also received full information from some confidential source which he is not at liberty to name.

MORRIS

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861.77/1128 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1919, 5 p.m.

With reference to the Department's August 30, 4 p.m. and September 27, 5 p.m. and your October 5, 5 p.m., you are instructed to present the following note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"Excellency: Your excellency will recall a note which was delivered to you by the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* on the 5th of September last.<sup>41</sup> This note dealt with the developments which have attended the joint efforts of Japan and the United States to render assistance to Russia through the despatch of military forces to Siberia and the operation, in conjunction with the other Allied Governments, of the Trans-Siberia and Chinese Eastern Railways. After setting forth the circumstances and conditions under which this plan of common action was adopted and the difficulties which have unfortunately later arisen out of seemingly variant interpretations of the obligations mutually assumed, the note made known to Your Excellency the necessity which these circumstances imposed upon the Government of the United States of seeking to establish,

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<sup>41</sup> Department's Aug. 30, 4 p.m., p. 573.

by frank discussion, that basis of complete cooperation which can alone permit a continuance of the participation of the United States.

The Government of the United States has viewed with satisfaction the deliberate and careful consideration which is being given to the grave matters which the note has brought forward. It has, moreover, been gratified to learn of the issuance at Vladivostok by the Japanese military commander, General Oi, of instructions to the Japanese railway guard, the faithful execution of which should go far to remove the difficulties which have arisen in the practical operation of the railway plan.

As explained in the note of September 5th, the United States is confronted with the necessity of making a decision as to its future course in Siberia. This decision can be based only upon a knowledge of the attitude the forces of Japan will assume under the circumstances suggested. My Government directs, therefore, that I bring to Your Excellency's attention the desire for a reply to the note of September 5th as soon as possible and that I ask to be advised when an answer may be expected."

In this connection the Department wishes to refer to the character of reports it has been receiving from General Graves—(See Department's October 9, 5 p.m.<sup>42</sup>)—and also other sources and of which you are already aware. These reports show a continued disposition on the part of subordinate Japanese commanders in Siberia to support the conflicting activities of Cossack leaders. Today the Department has just received a telegram from Mr. Stevens dated October 10<sup>42</sup> saying that Semenov is moving troops and occupying stations along the Chinese Eastern.

In brief, the substance of these reports is to the effect that an attempt will be made to establish independent Russian authority under Semenov east of Lake Baikal which will be supported by Japanese military commanders. The Department cannot conceive that any such movement is countenanced by the Japanese Government. On the contrary the Department is confident that Japan shares the views of the United States that any division of Russian authority would be most unfortunate not only for the Russians but also in connection with our mutual undertaking in regard to the railways. The Department is not at all inclined to accept as final the reports which it has been receiving from different sources. At the same time it would seem only the part of friendly counsel to advise the Japanese Government fully of the kind of impression which would be received by this Government were these reports not adequately refuted.

The Department relies wholly upon your discretion as to how far you shall discuss this aspect of the situation in connection with the note which you are instructed to present but is anxious that you should be fully advised.

LANSING

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

861.77/1136 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, October 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received October 14, 3:45 p.m.]

I today handed personally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the note transmitted in your October 10, 5 p.m. He stated that he was engaged in the preparation of an answer which he hoped to have ready in a week or ten days and which should be a frank statement of the Japanese position. He said that he had arranged for an early conference with General Takayanagi who had just returned from Siberia.

I emphasized again the necessity of a complete understanding between our Governments on the question of the guarding of the railway and the relation of Semenov to it. I told him the Russian Ambassador had only this morning informed me that Semenov had recently moved on the Chinese Eastern Railway and that the Council of Ministers at Omsk had ordered their immediate removal but that my Russian colleague had not heard whether Semenov had obeyed the order.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed great surprise at this information and I believe that he was entirely ignorant of the recent developments reported by Stevens and Graves. I thought it wise for the present to make no further reference to the matter.

MORRIS

861.77/1173 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, October 31, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 10 p.m.<sup>43</sup>]

The answer to the American note delivered to the Japanese Government September 5th reads as follows.

“October 30, 1919. Monsieur l’Ambassadeur: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Atherton’s note of September 4th last,<sup>44</sup> calling my attention to the difference between the Government of Japan and that of the United States in the interpretation of the duties of the Allied Military Forces in Siberia. It is pointed out in that note that in the opinion of the Government of the United States, one of the important duties required of the Allied Military Forces in Siberia is to facilitate the working of the plan respecting the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways, and that the Japanese military commanders definitely re-

<sup>43</sup> Telegram in four sections.<sup>44</sup> Department’s, Aug. 30, 4 p. m., p. 573.

fused to fulfill such duty. It is stated in conclusion that as such an attitude of the Japanese Government would inevitably lead to the failure of this Allied undertaking in Siberia, the Government of the United States might be compelled to withdraw from all efforts to cooperate in that country. Subsequently your Excellency addressed to this Department a note dated October 13th<sup>45</sup> expressing a desire for an early reply to the above-mentioned note of the American Chargé d'Affaires.

The Japanese Government, in full appreciation of the spirit of frankness and sincerity in which the Government of the United States was good enough to communicate its views on this subject, desire to make their position clear in the same spirit.

According to your note, the Government of the United States apparently believe that the Japanese Government understand that the protection of the railways, so far as it may concern the Japanese troops, is limited to safeguarding the railroad and keeping the line open, and entails no obligation whatever for cooperation on the part of the Japanese troops in furthering the general operation of the railway plan itself. The Japanese Government are not fully aware of the precise meaning of the expression 'The general operation of the railway plan'. If it meant to include, besides the defense of the railway itself against attack from outside, such matters, for instance, as giving succor to the railway operatives in case of emergency, it goes without saying that the Japanese troops, in addition to the discharge of their duties of guarding the railways, are and have been devoting their efforts towards making all possible contribution to the furtherance of the general operation of the railway plan. The primary duty however of the military forces as regards the protection of the railway lies, without doubt, in the defense of the railway itself. The discharge of this duty is a most essential part in the protection of the railway, and the Japanese Government desire to lay special stress upon this important point. While there can be no question as to the importance of assuring the general operation of the railway plan, the defense of the railway itself is a matter of vital necessity to the operation of the railway. Should it be eliminated from the duties required of the military forces, the operation of the railway must 'ipso facto' be stopped from that very moment. The Japanese Government are confident that the Government of the United States would not be slow to recognize the fact that great efforts and sacrifices are being made by the Japanese troops in defense of the railway.

It will be recalled that in the memorandum of the American Embassy dated May 17 last,<sup>46</sup> it was pointed out that the Inter-Allied Committee should have preeminence in all matters affecting policy. In reply to that, it was candidly stated that [*in?*] the Foreign Office memorandum dated June 17 [*?*] last<sup>47</sup> that the Japanese Government were unable to acquiesce in the views of the Government of the United States above alluded to, as they felt per-

<sup>45</sup> See *ante*, pp. 586 and 588.

<sup>46</sup> See telegrams from the Ambassador in Japan, June 7, and to the Ambassador in Japan, May 6, pp. 563 and 560.

<sup>47</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, June 7, p. 563.

sued that although the Inter-Allied Committee was charged by the railway arrangement now in operation with the general supervision [of] the railway it had evidently no competence to go beyond that function. This is the opinion still maintained by the Japanese Government. Should it be the meaning of the American Government that, apart from the case in which the lives and property of the inspectors or engineers serving under the Inter-Allied Committee are in actual danger, whenever a demand for assistance is made by members of the staff of the committee in matters which are not only of little importance as compared with the defense of the railway itself, but are of such a character as to make it doubtful on which side the real responsibility lies, (as for instance may often happen in the case of disputes or differences between persons serving under the committee and the local Russians), the Japanese troops should comply with the requisition regardless of the magnitude or importance of the issues involved, simply because such demand is made on the asserted ground that it is necessary for the operation of the railway plan; in other words, if it were the intention of the American Government that the Allied military forces should be made subordinate to the Inter-Allied Committee or the Technical Board acting made [under] that Committee, the Japanese Government regret to say that they are unable to fall in line with that attitude. The Japanese Government, however, would in no case insist that their military forces are under no obligation to cooperate in forwarding the general operation of the railway plan. While keeping it in mind that the defense of the railway line itself is the most important duty imposed upon the military forces, in safeguarding the railway, the Japanese troops will, at the same time, put forward all possible efforts towards removing anything that stands in the way of the railway's operation, and will by no means shut their eyes to the perpetration of offenses which are calculated to endanger the lives and property of inspectors or engineers.

The American Chargé d'Affaires made allusion in his note under acknowledgement to the instructions given to the Japanese military representative at Omsk, and went so far as to contend that the understanding embodied in these instructions had resulted in the flat refusal on the part of Japanese military commanders to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors in the territory controlled by General Semenov. An inquiry has been made as to the wording of the instructions given to our military representative at Omsk, and it is now found that there occurred the following passage in a telegram sent to the chief of staff of our expeditionary force at Vladivostok from the General Staff Tokyo.

'In the event of the running of trains being obstructed by lawless elements of the population, armed force should be employed, if necessary, to protect the railway. Should the obstruction, however, have any connection with disputes involving Russian military authorities, or should it have been originated in internal political troubles, the attention of the higher Russian authorities should in the first instance be invited thereto with a view to having proper steps taken in the matter, and if need be friendly advice should be given.'

In pursuance of these instructions, a communication couched in the following terms was sent by our expeditionary force to General

Horwat, President of the Allied Railway Committee, while a copy thereof was circulated at the same time to the military authorities of our force concerned. The explanation given to Your Excellency by General Takayanagi appears to have been based entirely upon this.

'The Japanese Army, entrusted as it is with the duty of maintaining order and security in the territory where it is stationed, must as a matter of course take it upon itself to protect the railway even by means of armed force if required, in the event of the running of trains being impeded by lawless elements of the population; but as to any disputes among the officials or military forces of the Allied Powers (including Russian) in regard to the railway, it would be proper that they should be settled by negotiations between the governments concerned or between their representatives. You are therefore to understand that the Japanese troops have no occasion to interfere in minor police matters which are capable of adjustment by the Russian military forces or police, or in questions of a similar character, not to speak of such disputes as those above alluded to. The Japanese forces all along the railway will in due course be notified of the recognition of this injunction with a view to making clear to our military commanders stationed in the various localities the nature of their duties, so that they may on no account have their impartial judgment impaired by intervention in such matters, and that they may avoid the creation of any cause of misunderstanding or ill feeling'.

As will be seen from the above, the intention of the Japanese troops is, in a word, to hold themselves in readiness to take active steps for the security of the railway in case military assistance is indispensable in order to assure an effective protection thereof, while disputes or misunderstanding between the officials or military forces of the Allied Powers (including Russia) the settlement of which could be sought for elsewhere, should be left to such means as are open for their adjustment. There seems to be nothing improper in the stand thus taken by the Japanese troops. On the contrary any uncalled-for intervention on the part of the Japanese troops in disputes between officials or military forces of the Allied Powers is liable to create a grave situation pregnant with most undesirable consequences. The object in view of the above-quoted communication being, as stated in its introduction, to avoid the creation and cause of misunderstanding or ill-feeling, it is abundantly evident what great importance that committee attaches to the furtherance of mutual understanding and cooperation. It would therefore be wide of the mark to allege that in regard to the general operation of the railway plan the Japanese troops accept no obligation for cooperation of any kind. Moreover, as to the contention that the instructions to our military representative at Omsk resulted in the definite refusal on the part of the Japanese military commanders to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors in the zones under the authority of General Semenov, it may be observed that so far as the information in the hand of the Japanese Government goes, there is no instance in which the Japanese troops have refused to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors. It is therefore apprehended the above contention is based upon misunderstanding. It is a matter of no small regret that the information in your possession in regard to misunderstandings and differences of this kind arising between the nationals of the United States and Japan in Siberia seems to be at variance with the infor-



mation reaching the Japanese Government. Should it therefore be possible for Your Excellency to adduce concrete facts of this description, the Japanese Government would be glad to furnish you with materials that might explain their side of the case.

It is presumed that the observations above set forth have gone the length of making the policy of the Japanese Government clear. Further, it has recently been confirmed by an exchange of views which took place on the occasion of Your Excellency's interview with General Oi on the 22d September last,<sup>48</sup> as well as by the instructions issued in a speech by the general to the various detachments under his command. The particulars of the interview as well as of the instructions above referred to are well known to Your Excellency, and I am happy to note that they have met with the expression of your satisfaction. It would therefore be needless to repeat them here.

In conclusion, I permit myself to state that the Japanese Government have recently despatched to Siberia a civil official of ambassadorial rank, it being an important part of his duties to further the economic and political recuperation of that region.<sup>49</sup> He will naturally take or join in such action as may be considered necessary to secure the proper working of the plan. The Japanese Government confidently hope that his efforts to be made in this direction will contribute in a marked degree to the promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation among the Allied nationals in Siberia.

I may add for your information that copies of this note are being communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and China as well as to the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo.

I avail myself [etc.]. Viscount Yasuya Uchida, Minister of Foreign Affairs.["]

MORRIS

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861.77/1175: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, November 1, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received November 2, 10:28 p.m.]

I submit for the consideration of the Department the following comment on the note of the Japanese Government transmitted in my October 31, 3 p.m. In general the note is conciliatory in spirit but vague and indirect. It appears to represent a compromise between the military and civilian groups. Specifically it first reasserts the independence of the Japanese military as stated in the memorandum of June 17.<sup>50</sup> Under present conditions in Japan this was inevitable. The Japanese people still suffer in the grip of an historic

<sup>48</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, no. 521, Sept. 25, 7 p.m., p. 581.

<sup>49</sup> Count Tsunetada Kato.

<sup>50</sup> Probably June 7 is intended; see telegram of that date from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 563.

military tradition which time and the impact of modern forces alone can and will weaken. Even now this position is modified by a more emphatic commitment of the Japanese troops to "removing anything that stands in the way of the railway's operation"; this in my judgement is a distinct gain.

In the second place the note modifies and to that extent repudiates the interpretation placed by the local military authorities on the orders issued by the General Staff. Close cooperation with the Inter-Allied Committee is promised and protection of the lives and property of the Committee's representatives is guaranteed; this I also count as distinct gain.

In the third place the Japanese Government invites formal discussion of specific instances [in which] "Japanese troops have refused to protect the lives and property of Allied inspectors." In my informal talks at the Foreign Office I avoided any detailed discussions of incidents as reported by Gravis, Stevens, Lantry or Graves and confined myself to the question of interpretation and policy using the incidents simply as illustrations. I felt strongly that nothing was gained for future co-operation by trying out the dead issue of the past. I therefore have in them subjects more formal, perhaps interminable discussion [*sic*].

In the fourth place [while] I welcome the Japanese Government's approval of General Oi's revised orders, those orders must still stand the test of their execution. In this connection the recent incident at Chita in regard to the shipment of rifles is enlightening.<sup>51</sup> From the information which I have thus far received the conduct of the Japanese commander appears to have been satisfactory throughout.

Finally the reference to Ambassador Kato's mission is to my mind significant; Kato is a man of liberal view and reputed to be anti-militaristic. I see in this paragraph a call from Hara and his associates for continued efforts toward closer cooperation.

To one noticeable omission in the note—there is no reference to the fear suggested that the Japanese Government does not share our plan's [*own?*] conviction "that the future welfare of all governments is to be based upon a community of interests." With deference to the views of the Department I submit my growing convictions that it is of no value to discuss at this time and in the abstract the views or purposes of the Japanese Government. I see no advantage to better relations between Japan and America in reiterated statements of policy, rather we should put Japan's national purposes,

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<sup>51</sup> See telegram from the Chargé in China, Oct. 29, p. 541.

so far as they touch our own purposes, to the test of action. When we are prepared as a Government and people to support constructive action in the Orient then we should seek Japan's co-operation and at the same time be ready to proceed without it. Mere mutiny [*sic*] and protest simply accentuate differences and may lead to serious complications. In the face of crying needs such as exist in China and Siberia we cannot be placed in the position of seeming to stay the hand of Japan while failing to offer any alternative plan of relief. The policy of the Department in regard to the consortium<sup>52</sup> offers a perfect illustration of the kind of constructive action I have in mind. It appears to me we are so clearly right and just in this matter and apparently so prepared to proceed without Japan's participation that the embarrassment of Japan's territorial claims (if such they prove to be upon further discussion and explanation) is not ours but Japan's.

In Siberia the situation for the moment is different. We are not in a position to do more than we are doing although the conditions call for much more. Under these circumstances we can only make the best of our limitations and with patience continue our efforts to cooperate with Japan. Such a policy may seem unsatisfactory but it is, I submit, far better than entire withdrawal.

MORRIS

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861.77/1172 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1919, 5 p.m.

Your October 31, 3 p.m. It is desired that in reply to the note of the Japanese Foreign Office dated October 30,<sup>53</sup> you should present a note embodying substantially the following:

"The American Government has been happy to note the assurance that the Japanese troops are and have been devoting their efforts towards making all possible contribution to the furtherance of the general operation of the railway plan; and it has learned with great satisfaction that it was not the intention of the Japanese Government that its instructions to its military authorities in Siberia should be construed as withholding from the Allied inspectors the protection of the Japanese forces, but that the Japanese troops will put forward all possible efforts towards removing anything

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<sup>52</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. I, pp. 420 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Oct. 31, 3 p.m., p. 588.

that stands in the way of the railway's operation, and will by no means shut their eyes to the perpetration of offenses which are calculated to endanger the lives and property of inspectors or engineers.

The American Government has also been much gratified by the Japanese Government's confirmation of the instructions issued by General Oi in pursuance of the interview between him and the American Ambassador on September 22d.

The American Embassy is happy to advise the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in conclusion that the Government of the United States shares the confident hope of the Japanese Government that the despatch of Ambassador Kato to Siberia with the purpose of furthering the economic and political recuperation of that region, and of coöperating in such action as may be considered necessary to secure the proper working of the railway plan, will be instrumental in promoting mutual understanding and coöperation among the Allied Nationals in Siberia."

Associated Press message from Tokyo dated November 2d gives a summary evidently based upon a full knowledge of the Japanese memorandum of October 30th. The Department would be glad to receive your comment upon the motives for such publication, and upon the reactions it may have produced in Japan.

Despite the action of the Japanese Government in making public at least the substance of this correspondence the Department has not felt at liberty to give out the texts of the memoranda thus exchanged.

LANSING

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861.77/1202 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, November 14, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received November 14, 2:18 p.m.]

Your November 12, 5 p.m. Sharkey, Associated Press correspondent, advised me on the morning of November 2nd that he had full knowledge of the memorandum of the Japanese Government of October 30th but that as in the case of his knowledge of the American note of September 5th the source of his information was strictly confidential and that he was under obligation not to reveal it. The Japanese Government has not published here the correspondence or any summary of it and as far as I know Sharkey's report to the Associated Press has not been repeated back to Tokyo. It has therefore produced no result in Japan.

MORRIS

861.00/5665 : Telegram

*The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)*

VLADIVOSTOK, *November 15, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received November 16, 10:14 a.m.]

594. Following from Smith:

"During the last few days Matsudaira and I have talked regarding Siberian Railway situation. He stated that the Japanese troops could not guard the line under existing conditions and that something must be done to gain the confidence of the masses; that this could be done through a parliament of the self-governing bodies of Siberia and that he felt that America and Japan should quickly formulate a plan of economic relief else there would be great suffering here this winter. He inferred that it would not be difficult to agree on such a plan.

On 13th . . . Japanese member of Parliament . . . here, told me as follows: That General Oi, who has just returned from a long trip of inspection to Chita and the Amur limits, stated that he now realized the impossibility of getting Russian officers to view situation normally; they only wanted to establish the old regime and hated the common people; that the only salvation was to have a government composed of the Zemstvos and other self-governing organizations; that the Japanese officers had believed Russian officers when told that certain other Russians were Bolsheviki, but now they find they were deceived; that the vast majority of the people are not Bolsheviki, but are merely fighting the old regimists.

. . . himself feels that it will be impossible to succeed with Kolchak as his name is discredited; that his government will fall very soon and that Japan and America should tell the self-governing bodies to meet to form their own government; that the Allies coming under Japan and America should furnish economic aid through the Zemstvos and Cooperatives in return for raw material; that no more arms should be given these people; he believes that it would never be possible to establish a monarchy in Russia or to gain the confidence of the masses through the old regimists; that Semenoff and Kalmikoff can be easily handled; that the Japanese had made a terrible mistake in dealing with such men and that it would be almost impossible for Japan to regain the friendship of the Russians. He thinks that the large majority of the Cossacks are not and never have been pro-Omsk; that Omsk has been surrounded by an unprincipled lot of men who had only self-interest. He stated that Japan and America should at once formulate a joint plan of

economic relief to the Zemstvos and Cooperatives. He thinks that the Japanese military will now follow any plan adopted by the two Governments.

All the above might have seemed like white-washed words had . . . not given me translations of two articles contributed by him. . . . He gives five reasons for the failure of Kolchak's troops and the important and fundamental one is that the troops have no enthusiasm for the war. He says that 98 to 99 percent of the people feel the same; that Siberia wants to bear the same relation towards Russia that Canada does to England; that it will soon have a Government [of] Zemstvos and Cooperatives and that such a government will end 'the greater part of the disorders by the so-called Bolsheviki'. He believes that Russia will eventually become a federated republic. He advocates non-interference in Russian politics.

In view of this apparent attitude of the Japanese civil authorities, the stand of her naval officers here and the apparent change coming over the Army, I feel that an economic plan can be arranged with the Japanese which they will follow but it must be done by representatives who thoroughly understand Siberian conditions else the Russian end will fail. I personally believe . . . is right. Repeated to Tokyo only part by request of Japanese. Smith."

MACGOWAN

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861.00/5665 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

The following message from Smith at Vladivostok is repeated in full for your information:

[Here follows text of telegram 594, November 15, 4 p.m., from the American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, printed *supra*.]

I invite your particular attention to the third paragraph. I am disposed to accept at its face value the seeming new departure in Japanese policy but fear that this paragraph may disclose a disingenuous attempt to obtain our support for the elimination of Kolchak. It is highly desirable that Kolchak remain as the head of any Siberian government. His presence will give continuity to our policy and maintain the force and validity of the democratic assurances given by him in the notes exchanged with the heads of the principal Allied and Associated Governments last May. I still have confidence in his personal integrity and disinterested patriotism. He is favorably disposed toward the United States. He has however yielded to what may have been an unfortunate necessity of accepting

the cooperation and support of corrupt and unenlightened reactionaries and his present failure is to be attributed largely, I believe, to their presence in his government. There is of course on our part the readiest response to the Japanese suggestion that the future government of Siberia include the Zemstvos and other organs of local self-government and be made to rest upon the consent of the masses of the people. Popular contentment is obviously a condition precedent to the development of a capable government and the continuance of the railway operation plan and the other economic assistance in which Japan and the United States are cooperating.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I desire you to discuss informally with the Japanese authorities the grave situation which has arisen in Siberia and to make it clear to them that the United States would welcome a solution by which Kolchak would remain at the head of the Siberian government but would have associated with him elements truly representative of the people instead of the reactionaries whose presence has stultified his efforts up to the present. It is not the purpose of this government to depart in any way from its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Russia. It desires above all that the Russians should be allowed to work out their own political destiny in their own way. If it does not appear that it would be acceptable to the Siberian people to have Admiral Kolchak continue at the head of their government, this government desires that none of its agents should do anything to defeat that will. It is desired only that Japan should know that in view of the relations which have existed in the past between Kolchak and the Allied and Associated Governments and in the interest of securing as orderly a succession of government as possible it would welcome a solution of the present difficulties through a reorganization of the Kolchak government along democratic lines rather than a complete break with the past, and that above all it would be most regrettable in the view of this Government if the Japanese should actively interfere to eliminate Kolchak in favor of some other personality whom they might conceive to be more favorably disposed toward them.

The suggestion of Smith's informants that Japan is prepared to cooperate with the United States for the economic relief of the people of Siberia is very gratifying and any official suggestion of this kind which may be made should meet with encouragement on your part. For your entirely confidential information I may inform you that I shall shortly recommend to the President that he in turn recommend to Congress possibly in a special message first the continuance of American participation in the Inter-Allied Railway plan, second the organization of a so-called Russian Bureau, Incorporated, having a capital fund of \$100,000,000 and an emergency fund of

\$25,000,000, the functions of which would be first to extend emergency relief in appropriate cases and second to revive normal economic life by financing shipments of manufactured necessities to Russia against exports of raw materials.

The situation in eastern Siberia is so unsettled and events are developing so rapidly that I leave it to you to communicate to the Consuls in Siberia, including Harris, to Smith, Stevens and if necessary Graves the attitude of this Government as outlined above and the Japanese attitude so far as it may be known to you and you may consider that it would be safe and helpful to communicate it to the persons mentioned.

LANSING

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861.00/5741 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

ТOKYO, November 24, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received November 25, 1:43 a.m.]

Your November 19, 3 P.M. was most timely and gratifying for yesterday on his return to his office Viscount Uchida sent for me and expressed a desire to discuss the entire Siberian situation with me.

He told me that the Cabinet had recently discussed the critical conditions in Siberia but had reached no conclusion pending a personal and informal exchange of views between us. He explained that the Ministry faced the necessity of formulating a definite Siberian policy and, in particular, referred to Viscount Kato's<sup>55</sup> recent criticism and the determination [*demand?*] which Kato made for the withdrawal from Siberia of a substantial portion of the Japanese troops. I asked him if Kato's statement was not made for political reasons. He thought not, as Kato had then weighed his words carefully because, as a responsible party leader, he might at any time be called upon to form a ministry. He then gave me a detailed description of military conditions in Siberia as reported to the Cabinet by the General Staff which indicated that there were some 20,000 Bolsheviks organized in bands and operating between Omsk and Irmen [*Irkutsk?*]; and that there were some 17,000 east of Baikal, chiefly along the Amur Railway. He then stated that the retirement of Kolchak to Irkutsk had greatly heartened all Bolshevik elements east of Omsk and that Japan could not view the continued eastward advance of the Bolshevik without concern. If the Red Army should reach the Baikal and come in contact with Japanese troops it would be serious; if on the other hand Japan should

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<sup>55</sup> Viscount Takaaki Kato, leader of the Kenseikai Party.



withdraw it would mean the surrender of eastern Siberia to Bolshevism and would create at once a serious menace to Korea, Manchuria, and indirectly to Japan itself. He then outlined the three possible plans of action: 1st, entire withdrawal, which seemed to him impossible; 2d, the sending of reinforcements at once in such quantities as effectively to crush Bolshevism now; 3d, the maintenance of the *status quo* while awaiting developments, only sending such reinforcements as future commercial pursuits [*conditions?*] might imperatively require.

After repeating that I was expressing simply my personal view, I stated that in the first place I thought we should avoid all participation in local intrigues and continue earnestly to support Kolchak. I told him that I had reason to believe that my Government fully shared this view. In the second place, I was personally convinced that Japan and the United States should maintain their present force to protect and continue railway operations, and that I had no reason to believe that the United States contemplated the withdrawal of its troops. Finally, I emphasized my personal conviction that some comprehensive plan of economic relief must be undertaken by our two Governments, acting in the closest cooperation. Without such relief I was certain that the population would become increasingly restless and antagonistic, and that there would be no limit to the number of additional troops required.

I expressed appreciation of Japan's natural fear of the spread of Bolshevism in eastern Siberia and the dangerous propaganda which might follow among the masses of China, Korea and possibly to a limited degree in Japan.

Viscount Uchida expressed satisfaction that our personal views were so fully in accord, and stated that he intended to discuss the subject further in a Cabinet meeting. If the Cabinet approved, he proposed to instruct Ambassador Shidehara to discuss the entire subject with you in the hope that our Governments might be able to agree on a united policy. He suggested that it might be wise for our two Governments to inquire of Great Britain and France what effect their present policy toward Russia would have on the situation in Siberia.

The above statement of our conversation I read to Viscount Uchida and he approved it for transmission to you. I was careful to emphasize the personal character of the views I expressed, as I did not wish to embarrass your talks with Shidehara by commitment here. It is quite clear to me that in the present state of public opinion the ministry would have great difficulty in formulating a Siberian policy without our co-operation. While Minister for Foreign Affairs did not say so, he led me to infer that if the Kolchak

defence should completely break down, the Japanese Government did not wish to run the risk of armed conflict with the advancing Red Army and thus become involved in what would practically be an Asiatic war against Bolshevism, unless we were there to share the moral responsibility and the burden. Hence the desire that some troops of ours should remain. Their presence would represent to the Japanese an assurance of our military and, still more important, of our financial support, in case the Bolsheviki should develop unexpected strength. The problem facing Japan might be summed up thus: the Government has an almost panic fear of the spread of Bolshevism eastward and the effect of Bolshevik propaganda on the restless masses of Asia. On the other hand, the Government does not feel prepared to meet alone the social and financial burdens involved in creating a zone of safety east of Baikal, where world opinion would make it extremely difficult for Japan ultimately to appropriate such a zone as a reward for its efforts.

May I suggest that, if I read the Japanese mind aright, an unusual opportunity is offered in your talks with Shidehara to explain again the kind of cooperation which we have the right to expect from Japan, before we agree to continue it. The jealousy and antagonism of Japanese military policy should be discouraged; the countenance and support given to anti-American propaganda should be stopped; and Stevens should be given the earnest and whole-hearted assistance which was promised but has been only accorded grudgingly.

MORRIS

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861.00/5778 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

Tokyo, November 28, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received November 29, 12:25 a.m.]

I am reliably but not officially informed that after several days of very keen and heated discussion Hara has obtained a sweeping victory over General Tanaka, Minister of War, both in the Cabinet and in the Diplomatic Advisory Council. Tanaka urged the immediate despatch of additional reinforcements to Siberia as part of the military plan of establishing a Japanese zone of safety east of Baikal. Hara, following the advice of Viscount Uchida and having in mind Kato's recent statement which elicited almost unanimous approval from the press, opposed the military policy and advocated the maintenance of the *status quo* pending an understanding with the Allied Governments and particularly the United States. The

following semi-official summary of the discussion appeared in the *Asahi* yesterday:

“The arguments of those who favored sending additional forces were; even if Japan had to act alone she must for her own protection maintain order in the Three Eastern Provinces. This was for the following reasons: Japan’s withdrawal would immediately plunge Siberia into chaos and the lives and property of our residents would be imperiled; the chaotic conditions in Siberia would extend forthwith to the plains of Manchuria and Mongolia with the result that they would suffer from similar dangers and our country, which cannot supply itself with food and material, would suffer a great blow in consequence; the influence of Bolshevik propaganda would extend to Japan proper which is separated by only a narrow strip of water from the mainland and would have an especially great influence in Korea where there is now a great deal of unrest.

The arguments of those who opposed the sending of additional forces were:

1. Attitude of the powers. England and France have already declared that they would suspend assisting Russia, and America has declared that the purpose of her expedition was not to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs but merely to protect the railways. Japan therefore cannot go on with the policy she has hitherto adopted but it would be well for her to station a few troops at Vladivostok, Chita and a few other important points for the protection of our residents.

2. The conditions in Russia. There seems to be practically no hope of the rehabilitation of Russia by the anti-Bolsheviks in the near future. A report has been circulated in parts of Europe that peace will be concluded and so if Japan is going to protect Siberia east of the Baikal against the Bolsheviks she will be busy for a long time. Furthermore it is entirely impossible to secure protection against those by military force.

3. Financial considerations. The military expenditures for our expeditionary force up to August has cost 200,000,000 yen. The amount estimated for the period between September and March next is approximately 80,000,000 yen. Thus it costs too huge sum of yen, the 100,000,000 per year to keep three divisions in Siberia. Our country’s financial resources will not permit us to spend such a large sum for preserving order in Siberia. Nor have we any expectation of deriving any economic benefit therefrom.

4. Psychology of the Russian people. Although we may win the hearts of a section of the Russian people with our present assistance it is impossible to win the hearts of the Russian people as a whole. The greater part of the people who are called Bolsheviks are not really Bolsheviks by conviction but have been compelled through lack of food and supplies to commit acts of pillage. If we attempt to chastise these we shall only be laying up resentment against us in the future.”

I understand that the General Staff was directed to despatch no reinforcements at present but was authorized to send about 1,000 soldiers to replace recent losses occasioned by death, sickness and wounds.

This conclusion of the Government clears the way for Uchida to transmit instructions to Shidehara for his guidance in discussing the entire situation with you.

MORRIS

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861.77/1225 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

Тоkyo, December 2, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received 2:35 p.m.]

Department's November 12, 5 p.m. Following reply today received from Foreign Office.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo,<sup>56</sup> relative to the duties of the Allied forces in Siberia.

I beg leave to state that it is a cause for profound gratification to the Imperial Government as, no doubt, also to that of the United States, not only in the interest of the future relations of the two Powers, but also in that of their common friend Russia, that the present question has reached an amicable solution as the result of mutual good understanding brought about by a frank and straightforward exchange of views.

Further in view of the great interest, which the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and China will unquestionably take in the satisfactory settlement of the present question, I venture to think it desirable that the Government of the United States cause a copy of the aforementioned note of Your Excellency to be sent to each of the four governments and also to the Russian Ambassador at Washington.

Trusting that Your Excellency will be so kind as to take the trouble to advise your government in the above sense". Signed Uchida.

MORRIS

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861.77/1225 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1919, 1 p.m.

Your December 2, 1 p.m. You may inform Japanese Foreign Office that substance of Department's November 12, 5 p.m., was telegraphed for communication to the British, French and Italian Governments on November 22.<sup>57</sup> You were requested to communicate it to Peking for communication to Chinese Government on November 19, 2 p.m.<sup>57</sup>

LANSING

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<sup>56</sup> Department's Nov. 12, 5 p.m., p. 594.

<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

## CHAPTER III

### THE NORTHERN REGION

#### Withdrawal of Allied and American Support of the Provisional Government in Northern Russia

861.00/3575 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, *January 3, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received January 4, 6:21 a.m.]

720. To Paris also. Since my 664, December 17th, 5 p.m.<sup>1</sup> the situation in Archangel has continued quiet and satisfactory to me.

A small military operation was undertaken early this week designed to straighten out the front and drive the Bolsheviki from one or [omission] points whence they had been inflicting desultory losses on the Allied troops. The operation partly miscarried owing to the failure of certain Russian partisan troops, as well as difficulties encountered by other troops, depth [*sic*] of advancing through snow. But an American column attained one of the objectives, inflicting heavy losses upon a greatly superior number of Bolsheviki, the Americans having seven killed and 30 other casualties. General Ironside<sup>2</sup> commends the American action as very gallant and excellently planned.

Russian partisan troops formed spontaneously by peasants from villages which have been outraged by the Bolsheviki number about 1,500 and had seemed one of the more promising features of the situation. The circumstances of their failure as noted above are not yet fully known.

POOLE

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861.00/3619 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, *January 9, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received January 10, 10:34 p.m.]

736. The general impression obtained of the enemy from operations reported Embassy's 720, January 3rd, 3 p.m. is some increase

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 577.

<sup>2</sup> Maj. Gen. Sir William Edmund Ironside, British commander in chief of the Allied forces in northern Russia.

in his number and a certain improvement in discipline, organization, and morale, although his continued marked inferiority to American troops is shown by the success of the latter in driving five times their number from a prepared position. Below is summarized a report of conversations with Bolsheviki prisoners by Doolittle, who accompanied the American column during this attack:

“Prisoners were well fed and clothed, uniform better suited to Russian conditions than that of Allies. Had received 300 roubles monthly pay. Were from a mobilized or conscript regiment officered by about 75 men, for the most part former non-commissioned officers in the imperial armies. Bearing of leaders among men comradely, no marked distinctions of rank and file, but orders emanating from staff strictly carried out and no meetings allowed at the front. One had been attempted a few days previously but was broken up with machine guns. Mobilization being carried out in northern provinces, ages 16 to 48, with a view to forming army of 200,000 of this front. Rumor widespread that a general attack will be made about Easter, which will aim to cut communication between Murman and Archangel forces and crush latter. Prisoners evinced faith in their leaders and had generally confident tone. Bolsheviki carry on strong, well-directed propaganda among own troops as well as endeavoring to influence Allied forces.”

It is understood that former Russian war prisoners returning from Germany are offered large pay serve in Red armies, also being forced in. Only small number have so far been able to elude the Bolsheviki and reach their homes inside of Allied lines in this region.

To Paris as well.

POOLE

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861.48/741 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1919, 7 p.m.

448. Money allotted our share Murmansk work exhausted. Following cable received from Embassy London:

“Foreign Office state that the sum so far encashed from sale of foodstuffs to civilian population at Archangel is 22,238,000 roubles, and that some considerable return on the expenditures already made by the Allies may therefore be expected.”

What are your recommendations regarding use of our share of this amount and other sums thus realized as a revolving fund to be expended for Murmansk relief? Consult Cole. Answer quickly.

POLK

861.48/746 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*ARCHANGEL, *January 18, 1919, 8 p.m.*

[Received January 19, 5 a.m.]

760. In reply to Department's telegram 448, January 16, 7 p.m. In [*If?*] our allotment is \$5,000,000, as I am informed by Lindley,<sup>3</sup> it is impossible that it has been exhausted for Murman alone. It must be for entire North Russian Relief. The 22,000,000 odd roubles collected to date at Archangel have been currently disbursed chiefly to pay customs duty on the food imported and to the British military and naval authorities for current local needs of Allied base expedition. Availability of our one-third share of the credit thereby created depends on the arrangements which have been made with the British Government for the partition of the expenses of North Russian intervention. If this credit need not be applied to our share of such expenses it would be desirable to use it for purchase of further food supplies for Murman and Archangel and it is essential that relief work be kept up. The food is being sold at prices calculated sufficient to cover cost and all expenses stated above supported by voucher. Committee should therefore eventually collect nearly the whole sum spent for food allowing for a small proportion of bad debts et cetera. At Murman no cash has been received to date, the food being issued in lieu of arrears of wages owed by Murman railway port authorities, etc., so that only a book credit against a future Russian government has been created. As back wages have now been obviated in part, cash receipts should begin.

POOLE

861.00/3713 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*ARCHANGEL, *January 23, 1919, 8 p.m.*

[Received January 25, 3:02 a.m.]

781. To Paris as Number 15, same date. In recent actions near Ust Padenga on the Dvina River front, American casualties as officially reported but not yet finally confirmed, 10 killed, 17 wounded, 11 missing. According to today's report Allied position around Shenkursk being attacked from three sides. Evacuation of Ust Padenga has been necessary and the Allied troops to the west and east of Shenkursk are falling back on that point under pressure of greatly superior numbers. The Military Attaché informs me that

<sup>3</sup> Francis O. Lindley, British Commissioner in Russia.

the situation of our forces embracing two companies of Americans, two of Russians, and a small detachment of British is considered serious.

This information adds to uneasiness about the military situation, which has been growing since the effective miscarriage of the offensive operation reported in the Embassy's 720, January 3, 3 p.m. In response to the Embassy's request the Military Attaché has prepared a confidential memorandum on the situation which is commended to the Department's careful consideration. Memorandum follows:

"The military situation of American and Allied troops in northern Russia is considered by most officers to be very unsatisfactory. Our American troops are widely scattered over the entire front from Indus through [*Onega along*] the railroad, Vaga and Dvina river[s] to Pinega, occupying more than a dozen positions. Owing to this extension there is seldom more than one company serving at one position and frequently the companies are broken up and the platoons separated. Communications are slow and difficult, many being separated by several days' travel. The enemy greatly outnumbers us both in men and artillery; his morale, numbers and efficiency have increased (see Embassy's 736, January 9, 6 p.m.). We are more and more put upon the defensive, subjected to more and more frequent attacks and bombardment suffering many casualties. We have no reserves. Our men are often called upon to remain on duty for long periods without relief. There has been much criticism of the commanding officers, almost always British, and in some cases this has been amply justified. Owing to the increasing strength and morale of the enemy and his apparent intention to start a vigorous offensive later on, I am of the opinion that there is considerable danger that we shall be compelled to evacuate most of our advanced positions with grave possibilities of heavy losses both [in] men and supplies. Successful operations westward from Perm would of course tend to relieve the situation here, also possible events in the Petrograd region."

POOLE

861.00/3682 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, *January 24, 1919, 2 p.m.*

Telegraph American Mission Paris and Department at once answers to following:<sup>4</sup> "1st, what is present attitude of the Russians towards Allied intervention? 2d, what is the attitude of the Archangel Government toward Kolchak? 3d, what are plans of Archangel Government for spring campaign? 4th, to what extent is present Government supported in and outside Archangel?"

POLK

<sup>4</sup> For answers see telegrams from the Chargé in Russia, no. 793, Jan. 27, 3 p.m., p. 608, no. 794, Jan. 27, 4 p.m., p. 610, and no. 812, Jan. 30, 5 p.m., p. 37.



861.00/3719 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 24, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received January 24 [25?], 9:30 a.m.]

786. I have delayed supplementing my 720, January 3, 3 p.m., until the return of General Ironside from a personal investigation of the causes of the failure of the offensive reported therein. In a confidential conversation today he confirms what is intimated in my written despatch number 1274 of the 15th instant<sup>5</sup>: that this failure is to be attributed chiefly to the intoxicated condition of the British colonel; also to the failure of a British detachment accompanying Russian partisan troops to advance in the face of the enemy. He exonerates the Russian troops from all blame.

He says that the failure of the offensive in question has made possible the present Bolshevik offensive and confirms the views of the Military Attaché communicated in 781, January 23, 8 p.m. He says that the military situation which has been unsatisfactory since he took command, has now become critical, especially in the region of Shenkursk. He has given orders to evacuate this point but there is still danger that two American infantry companies and 50 engineers may be surrounded there by the Bolsheviks. Shenkursk is second in importance Archangel and its evacuation will have a very bad moral effect.

Ironside attributes the unsatisfactory military situation to over-extension, poor quality of the British officers first sent here whom he is replacing as fast as possible, to the homesickness and general low morale of the French troops, [the inexperience of the American regiment,] the large number of Slavs and other foreigners in its enlistment, and the inadequate leadership of Colonel Stewart.<sup>6</sup> He is urging upon the War Office the need for reinforcements.

Foregoing sent to Washington [*Paris*] under number 786 [17] same day.

POOLE

861.00/3729 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 27, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 9:17 p.m.]

793. The following is reply to the first question in the Department's unnumbered January 24th, 2 p.m.

The present intervention in the north of Russia would be more favorably regarded by the Russians in the affected areas if it were

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.<sup>6</sup> Col. George E. Stewart, commanding American troops in northern Russia.

under American control. As already reported, the British are often tactless and interfering nor always free from suspicion of selfish aggression. As it is, however, active discontent is limited to elements among the sailors and the lowest-grade laborers who were participants in the former Bolshevik regime. I am convinced after careful inquiry that the large majority of the people of this region favor the present intervention.

Since receiving the Department's inquiry I have ascertained the views on general Russian intervention of different members Provisional Government representing every important shade of political opinion. All favor intervention, saying that it is indispensable if there is to be peace in Russia short of the two or three years that it will take the Moscow government to eat up the heritage of accumulated capital upon which it is now living and thereby collapse. The views expressed by Ignatieff, former Chairman of the Petrograd Committee of the People's Socialists and the most radical member of the Provisional Government, accord with those of his colleagues and, as they may be considered representative, are herewith summarizing [*summarized*].

The more democratic elements formerly opposed foreign intervention because they feared that the demand for it was like that of the emigrés of the French Revolution. They perceive now, however, fundamental antagonism between democracy and the Bolshevik program. The latter opposes to the democratic rule of all classes the rule of one class which in Russia represents but a small proportion of the people. This difference cannot be adjusted by agreement; force is alone adequate, and the special circumstances of the Russian revolution have been such that the champions of democracy must seek support abroad. The occupation of Murmansk and Archangel without further advance into the country has been unfortunate; it has lent color to the Bolshevik charge that intervention is selfishly inspired, seaports alone being taken and with a view to permanent occupation. This argument, which is very Russian, is enabling the Bolsheviks, Ignatieff says, to pose on a notionist [*nationalist*] platform as the defenders of the Fatherland against imperialist aggression, thereby gaining lately the cooperation of certain of groups of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists who are not converted to the Moscow government but only wishful to protect Russia. Ignatieff says that he speaks for the great bulk of radicals in saying that peaceful agreement or compromise with the Bolsheviks is by the nature of the situation impossible, and that peace can be had in Russia in less than two or three years only through military operations for which direct foreign support is needed and desired.

Please read my 779, January 23rd, 7 p.m.<sup>7</sup> in this connection. To be quite fair I would add to this telegram that in recent months there has been a perceptible tendency on the part of Russian anti-Bolshevik leaders to rise above party politics into the realm of real patriotism.

For answers to other questions see my telegram 794, January 27th, 4 p.m. The foregoing to Paris as number 20 same date.

POOLE

861.00/3743 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 27, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received January 28, 10:14 a.m.]

794. The following are answers to questions 2, 3 and 4 in the Department's unnumbered January 24, 2 p.m. For answer to first question, see my telegram 793, January 27, 3 p.m.

Second question: Having ascertained that the new Omsk Government is really democratic, Archangel Government including Tchaykowski,<sup>8</sup> who wished at first to protest against Siberian *coup d'état*,<sup>9</sup> professes full sympathy and an earnest desire to effect union and begin active cooperation. Completion of wireless station here next month is considered first step.

Third: Military disasters reported in Embassy's 786, January 24, 7 p.m., place Provisional Government and the Allies in this region distinctly on the defensive, excluding for the present thought of offensive campaign. Military plan of Provisional Government calls for mobilization and training of as many troops as possible. About 6,000 Russian infantry and four batteries now under arms out of a theoretical mobilization able [*mobilizable*] maximum of 15,000 in this region. Ironside expects to have 10,000 end of March. Second feature program, equipment and leading of partisan detachments, which number at present about 2,000. When well led, these detachments do good work. Popular subscriptions now being taken for their maintenance.

Fourth: Cole<sup>10</sup> tells me that there was real enthusiasm for the Archangel Government before the September *coup d'état*, which unfortunate event did much to cool the popular ardor. Mr. Francis'<sup>11</sup> action at this time restored Tchaykowski, who personifies the Government to the people and stands for democracy. His continued

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> Nicholas V. Chaikovski, president of the Provisional Government of the Northern Region.

<sup>9</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 573-574.

<sup>10</sup> Felix Cole, Consul at Archangel.

<sup>11</sup> David R. Francis, Ambassador in Russia.

headship and the restraint exercised upon the reactionary elements by the American and other European nations, have prevented the trend toward reaction noted in 770, January 22, 6 p.m.<sup>12</sup> from developing too markedly. The result is rather lukewarm though real approval of the present Government by the large majority of the people in the region over which it exercises authority, warmth of approval varying directly or indirectly in the measure of the seeming democracy of the Government. The reestablishment of the orderly processes of justice and administration meets as it proceeds an increasing appreciation on the part of this majority. The general development recently has been favorable. Uncertainty now enters momentarily, at least one [or?] two events which from the point of view of the Government are very bad: the evacuation of Shenkursk; despatches [*and the?*] decision of the Peace Conference that it is possible to treat with the Bolsheviki. Members of the Government we observe weathering grave misgivings, but it is too early to feel the popular reaction. Concerning unsatisfactory finances of the Provisional Government, see Embassy's 744, January 15 [12], 7 p.m.<sup>12</sup>

Foregoing to Paris as 201 [21] same date.

POOLE

861.00/3727 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, January 27, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received January 28, 8:40 a.m.]

799. Continuing 786, January 24, 7 p.m. Evacuation of Shenkursk successfully accomplished yesterday. Sick and wounded and greater part of supplies brought out as well as 500 civilian refugees. Behaviour of Russian troops excellent. Refugees arriving later report that Bolsheviki revolutionary forces destroyed part of town and murdered many inhabitants. News having depressing effect on population and the Provisional Government much disturbed. Evacuation continues northward toward Beresnik.

The enemy has attacked so far unsustained [*unsuccessfully?*] at two other points. In response to urgent recommendations of Ironside, British War Office has directed commanding general at Murmansk to be prepared to despatch to Archangel one battalion of infantry, 1,000 ski, snow shoe, and similar troops [*equipment?*], and one machine-gun company. With expedition these certain to be gotten on to the Archangel front at the end of a month.

Foregoing to Paris as number 22 same date.

POOLE

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

861.00/3719: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1919, 7 p.m.*

4278. Following telegrams received from Am[erican] embassy at Archangel:

[Here follows texts of telegrams from the Chargé in Russia, no. 781, January 23, 8 p.m., and no. 786, January 24, 7 p.m., printed *ante*, pp. 606 and 608.]

It occurs to me that an opportunity may offer for a frank discussion of the very serious condition disclosed at Archangel, especially with regard to the perilous situation of certain American contingents which may make it possible for you to suggest to the British what seems to be the present necessity of employing officers of specially sound qualifications and experience. It would seem that the Allied forces are not only very much outnumbered, but are also confronted with extraordinarily difficult physical conditions. For example: Mr. Simmons, a special agent of the Department of Commerce who has just returned from Archangel where he visited the front, says numbers of the Bolshevik troops are equipped with skis and can move over the deep snow with much greater facility than the Allied forces which not only have no skis, but also no skill in their use.

POLK

861.48/746: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1919, 1 p.m.*

467. Referring Embassy's 760, January 18, 8 p.m. Figures quoted as having been expended are furnished by British from London and we understand are for the entire North Russian Relief. While we understand the necessity for continued circulation of currency in your locality, receipts from the sale of these relief supplies should not be credited against expenses of American army of occupation as War Trade Board is responsible to President for original allotment and receipts from sale of materials purchased from it. War Department has been requested to advise plan for financing American expeditionary army at Archangel and also advised of responsibility of the Board for disbursement of this five million. Doubt has been expressed as to advisability of using the present allotment as a revolving fund for the reason that it was given by President from appropriation for national security and defense and we might

possibly be criticised for using this as peace-time measure. We are, however, suggesting to McCormick<sup>14</sup> the advisability of continuing this work and that money appropriated be replaced out of Hoover's<sup>15</sup> funds and this work continued by present committee under Hoover's direction and as part of his relief program. Upon receipt of approval or disapproval of this suggestion you will be advised, but until you are advised of this, receipts from this fund should be held available for return if it is so desired. This has been repeated to London.

POLK

861.00/3774 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, *January 31, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received February 1, 1:15 a.m.]

815. General Ironside informed me last evening on the eve of returning to the front that he considers the military situation critical but hopes to pull through until reinforcements arrive from Murmansk, though definite order for despatch of these not yet received.

The foregoing telegram has been sent to Paris number 209 [29] same date.

POOLE

861.00/3851 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, *February 8, 1919, 6 p.m.*

643. For the Secretary of State:

Secretary of War requests that you will inform the President that War Department, although anxious in regard to the Archangel situation is not giving consideration to the question as to whether the troops there are in any actual danger, nor is it giving consideration to the question as to whether they need reinforcement, as it is his understanding that the American force in Archangel is operating under the command of General Foch, and that the Supreme War Council would therefore be charged with the duty of seeing that it is properly reinforced and in general protecting safety of the various units making up the forces.

POLK

<sup>14</sup> Vance McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board.

<sup>15</sup> Herbert Hoover, chairman of the American Relief Administration.

861.51/485 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*ARCHANGEL, *February 9, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received February 10, 3:40 a.m.]

845. Reference Embassy's 744, January 15 [12], 7 p.m.<sup>16</sup> Provisional Government addressed memorandum yesterday to the American and Allied Embassies. Summary as follows.

Failure of Emission Office to provide full amount of currency promised (see 744) and necessity for prosecuting energetic military operations to bring about the reconstitution of the Russian state, in which all countries of the world have an interest, force Provisional Government to bring once more to the attention of friendly powers its difficult financial situation. Expenses of Provisional Government include expenditures for national purposes, which the northern region assumes temporarily and extraordinary, and purely military expenditures relating to operations at the front and preparation for subsequent operations. None of these can be stopped. Statement is given of expenditures chargeable to the presence of Allied troops, showing total to date 503,000,000 [53,000,000?] roubles or almost the exact amount of Treasury notes so far issued or authorized. Provisional Government asks loan of 300,000,000 roubles, to be guaranteed by the Allies through deposit of security in Allies' banks, loan to be included in the general Russian debt made, and conditions of repayment to be determined by the Peace Conference.

I have carefully refrained from discussing this matter with the Provisional Government, leaving initiative entirely to the British Commission[er]. He has referred memorandum to his Government with adverse recommendation and at the same time renewed his proposal of January 9th, as mentioned in my 744, that in view of necessity of keeping Provisional Government afloat the following be done: Provisional Government to be left to find the means needed for purely local administration while Great Britain or the Allies finance operations of national character or those arising out of intervention. These include budgets of War Ministry, Port and Marine, Transport and Railways. Administration would be left in Russian hands with British or Allies financial control. At the time proposal was first made, monthly outlay under these heads estimated at 6,000,000 roubles but probably now greater, owing especially to recent order for general mobilization.

Repeated to Paris as number 36, February 9th, 6 p.m.

POOLE

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<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

861.00/3843 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 13, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 6:20 p.m.]

899. Your 4278 of January 28, 7 p.m. Several frank conversations have failed to elicit from the Foreign Office any allusions to defective morale of British troops and officers at Archangel but considerable perturbation was expressed as to the present military situation and I understand that the British forces there are to be augmented by from two to three thousand men to be sent from Murmansk.

Rumors which have reached me from various sources regarding apparent errors in military strategy, friction between the British forces and the French and American troops respectively, intoxication among the British forces and deficiencies in the British service of supply as regards food, clothing and ammunition, were recently confidentially confirmed by a wounded American machine-gun sergeant from the American forces at Archangel now in London who, however, quite properly declined to mention specific instances or officers. Am[erican] mission informed, number 53, February 13, 2 p.m.

DAVIS

861.00/3848 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, February 13, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received February 14, 7:03 a.m.]

858. It is probable that the low morale of the American and Allied troops in north Russia will prove in the end to have had only passing importance; it is always possible, however, that it will develop suddenly into something serious. So far as the American troops are concerned a frank statement from high authority would greatly lessen their discontent and end definitely the possibility of serious developments. Being convinced of this I do not feel that I can move [*omit*] to renew very earnestly the recommendation that such a statement be made. The military attaché and I believe that a statement framed something like the following skeleton would be adequate:

“ You were sent to northern Russia for imperative military reasons growing out of the existence of a state of war with Germany. You kept the northern Russian ports from becoming submarine bases. You put an end to the shipment into central Russia, and thence



possibly to Germany for use against our troops in France, of military and other stores lying at Archangel. A considerable part of these stores you saved and are continuing to guard. Furthermore your presence in northern Russia tended to frustrate in some degree German troop concentration on the western front. The conclusion of hostilities with Germany creates a new situation. The end of your task is in sight. You are to be sent back to the United States with the least possible delay. It is not expected that this will be later than (say June 15th or whatever date the military authorities set). The last of the American troops in France will not be home before the following autumn. Expression of praise for good work done under unusually trying conditions and of confidence in readiness as true Americans to carry the task through to a worthy finish."

This is on the assumption that if the decision of the Peace Conference requires the continued presence of American troops in this region, volunteer or professional units will be sent to replace the men drafted to fight against Germany.

May I also suggest that such a statement might tend allay criticism at home? Repeat[ed] to Paris as number 39.

POOLE

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861.00/3860 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, February 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received February 15, 8:40 a.m.]

866. The following summary of a conversation this morning with General Ironside is sent in connection with the Embassy's 815, January 31, 6 p.m. Ill success, so far, of Bolsheviki in following up Shenkursk advantage, due to two very favorable Allied operations within past fortnight, has materially eased situation and General feels reassured. Reenforcements from Murman consisting of one battalion of British infantry and half a machine-gun company now arriving and order issued from London for despatch from Murman of another battalion and remainder of machine-gun company. With these reenforcements General considers Allied position fairly secure for the time being but says there is always an element of danger in Bolshevik numerical superiority. Their forces estimated 8,000 last October 20,000 about New Year now believed to number 40,000. Next critical period expected to come with opening of upper Dwina. Between middle of April and middle of May headwaters will become clear of ice permitting Bolshevik naval forces which are of considerable strength including six-inch guns mounted afloat to operate against our forces at Beresnik and elsewhere in action and

in transportation of troops and supplies. During this time lower Dwina will remain frozen preventing our naval force from cooperating, and transportation over roads will be impracticable owing to thaw. This critical period will extend over probably one month. Admiral McCully, who with Military Attaché has read this telegram, is especially impressed with the difficulties of the river problem.

Sent to Paris as number 40 same date.

POOLE

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861.00/3952: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1919.

507. For your information the following letter addressed by the Secretary of War to Chairmen of Senate and House Military Committees and made public in the press February 18th:

"I have just received a cablegram from General Bliss, sent by the President's direction, in which I am told that the President has approved the sending of two American railway companies to Murmansk for the following objects:

- 1st, to assure greater safety during this winter of the Allied forces both along Murmansk and at Archangel and south of Archangel.
- 2d, the much better supply and, if necessary, the reinforcement from Murmansk of the advance detachments south of Murmansk and Archangel.
- 3d, to facilitate the prompt withdrawal of American and Allied troops in North Russia at the earliest possible moment that weather conditions in the spring will permit.

The President has directed me to communicate the foregoing to the heads of the Allied governments which I have done. The President desires that his action and the reasons for it be communicated to the military committees of the Senate and House for their information.

In addition to the above General Bliss tells me that the British Government is sending a force of about 2,400 men to Murmansk, and that they have requested the cooperation of the President to the extent of two companies of railway troops, above referred to. The desire for the railway troops is based upon the fact that supplies and reinforcements for Archangel during the winter have to go by railroad south from Murmansk to a point near the southern extreme of the White Sea, and that the operation of this railroad is believed by the British to be absolutely necessary to guarantee the prompt movement of reinforcements and supplies to Archangel and the troops south of Archangel.

General Bliss also informs me that the British military authorities do not feel any apprehension as to the military situation at Archangel.

In accordance with the direction of the President, I transmit this information to the Senate committee on military affairs."

PHILLIPS

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861.48/790 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

511. Approval has been obtained for use of Murmansk fund as a revolving fund and food supplies will be furnished in accordance with figures showing monthly requirements for January, February, March less sugar, flour, rice and tea shipped from this country and will include citric fluids and dried vegetables. We are endeavoring to obtain direct sailing from here to Kola and in order to insure full cargo may increase quantities being sent you. Can you obtain return cargo for vessel of 3500 to 4000 tons for shipment to United States?

POLK

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861.00/3848 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1919, 5 p.m.

514. Your 958 [858], February 13, 5 p.m.

Secretary of War believes that notice through press, and letter of Secretary to Senate and House Military Committees<sup>17</sup> make unnecessary statement you propose.

POLK

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861.00/3953 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, February 27, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received February 28, 4:12 a.m.]

908. To Paris as 48. Department's 507, February 24, 11 a.m., much appreciated. Definite promise of withdrawal has improved state of mind of the 339th.<sup>18</sup> Statement quoted in Embassy's telegram 887, February 20, 5 p.m.,<sup>19</sup> has been published in English in the soldiers' newspaper and in the British headquarters communiqué but so far withheld by the Russian censor from the Russian newspapers. What is the precise import of the phrase in Secretary Baker's letter, "Prompt withdrawal of American and Allied troops

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<sup>17</sup> See telegram to the Chargé in Russia, no. 507, Feb. 24, *ante*, p. 617.

<sup>18</sup> 339th Infantry, U.S.A.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

in North Russia at the earliest possible moment that weather conditions in the spring will permit"? Neither the British nor French diplomatic or military authorities have received any information of the withdrawal of their forces. The French commanding officer has advice on the contrary that 250 soldiers will arrive in April to replace demobilized classes in the force already here. It is unthinkable that the Allies ever abandon the people of this region altogether. It would be an act of disloyalty which I am sure no Allied statesman could commit if adequately informed of the facts and the results which would ensue for the local population. Unfortunately what has been considered, since the Princes Island invitation, an uncertainty in the American attitude toward the Bolsheviki has brought us a little under the suspicion of contemplating a disloyalty of this kind. As word spreads of the intended withdrawal of the 339th the feeling will of course intensify. It is therefore now more especially [*important?*] than ever from the local point of view that the Embassy be placed in a position, through early and full advices concerning our attitude toward the Russian problem, to interpret this currently in a true light.

It will be unfortunate if an Allied expedition is continued in northern Russia without American participation. It would leave the Russians, in the estimation of many of them and possibly in fact as well, without a disinterested friend. This is explained more at length in the second paragraph of the Embassy's 572, November 13, 3 p.m.<sup>20</sup> I appreciate thoroughly on the other hand that the maintenance even of regular troops in northern Russia may be undesirable or even impossible from the point of view of renounced [*domestic*] politics—though I cannot believe that the people would insist on withdrawal if the situation were really understood. But in the event of such a dilemma is it possible that we might meet the requirements of the two [*United States*] considerations in some measure by sending a more considerable naval force? Admiral McCully, who returned to Murmansk last week, has telegraphed Admiral Sims recommending that in order to meet possible emergencies, two other vessels be attached to this station—one to be permanently at Archangel, one at Murmansk and the other cruising; vessels should have at least four-inch guns and arrive here before May 1st. For work in the River Dvina, McCully recommends in addition twelve submarine chasers. The interior water system of Russia is such that submarine chasers could proceed in appropriate circumstances from here to Petrograd and other important points in the interior of Russia.

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<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 567-568.

With reference to Secretary Baker's letter I feel obliged to report for the Department's information that the despatch of two railway companies at this time will hardly accomplish the objects enumerated. It is almost certain that by the time these troops can reach Murmansk and begin actually to improve operating conditions the spring thaw will have set off [*in*], making supply, reinforcements, or withdrawal impracticable by land. There will be then a critical period of isolation extending for about a month until the reopening of navigation (see the latter part of Embassy's 866, 14th) after which supply, reinforcements, or withdrawal will be by sea.

POOLE

861.00/3971 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, March 2, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 8 p.m.]

920. I have just received the following note from General Ironside, dated today.

"Yesterday when the moment came for the French battalion to relieve the American battalion in the line one company absolutely refused to go. It is the same company which made the trouble before. Some 113 men are now disarmed and under guard from the cruiser *Gueydon* while instructions are awaited from Paris by the French military attaché.

The French commander on the railway calls my attention to the fact that it is probable than when the moment comes for the American company to go up to the line again, in about three weeks' time, there is likelihood of there being trouble in the same way. There has been talk amongst men, and though this may be [hearsay], still I think that everything should be done during their spell of rest to prevent such a situation arising.

Service on the railway cannot be said to be hard, and casualties have been practically nil for months there, whereas on the Dvina, fighting has been heavy and casualties severe amongst the American troops.

An attack commenced on the Vaga at 3 p.m. yesterday, and the Americans have had some casualties."

The casualties reported to include five killed and one missing. Foregoing sent to Paris as number 502 [52].

POOLE

861.00/3998 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, March 3, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received March 4, 2:22 a.m.]

922. A few days previously to French mutiny reported in my 920, March 2, 4 p.m. British infantry company arriving among reen-

forcements from Murmansk refused to go to the front. Remained recalcitrant until dealt with personally by General Ironside. Several ringleaders now under arrest and may have to be shot. Total of 121 French mutineers under arrest, Ironside insisting upon severe disciplinary action against ringleaders. Colonel Stewart tells me he expects to keep American battalion in hand by drilling them himself during rest period. For the military attaché's report see his number 178 to military staff, Washington, dated March 3, 7 p.m.<sup>21</sup>

To Paris as number 53 same date.

POOLE

861.00/4067: Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, March 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received March 12, 8:10 a.m.]

955. Since action February 28 to March 1st mentioned in my telegram 920, March 8[2], 4 p.m. the enemy has made vigorous and persistent attacks on the Vaga River front. Attacks have been repulsed with heavy losses to enemy but Allies have had to withdraw about five miles. If attacks continue the American troops will probably have to fall back from the Dvina as well as Vaga front to Beresnik at the junction of these two rivers. Enemy has artillery, superior officers; uses gas shells and opposes six [thousand] infantry—of which about 4,000 have been used in attack so far—to an Allied force of about 1,000. The latter includes one company Americans and one company British; Russians who make up remainder of force are reported to be doing remarkably well. American casualties on Vaga front February 28th to March 9th, 5 men killed, 2 officers, 24 men wounded. In addition 5 men killed, 8 wounded and one missing in a patrol action on the Dvina front March 1st. These casualties include those tentatively mentioned in my 920.

Military attaché's telegrams 185, March 8, 7 p.m. and 189, March 11, 3 p.m. to Mil[itary] staf[f] give details of the foregoing. The foregoing to Paris as number 57.

POOLE

861.77/764: Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, March 26, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received March 27, 3:24 a.m.]

1000. The following telegram sent to Paris as 69. One American railway company has arrived at Murmansk. Other expected within a week.

<sup>21</sup> Not found in the files of the Department of State.

Russian troops operating on the Pinega front had a considerable success on the 24th capturing two villages, killing about 100 Bolsheviks.

Russians report their outposts on the Petchora River now in direct contact with Siberian outposts in the North Urals.

POOLE

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861.77/772a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1919, 3 p.m.

563. Two companies railways engineers totalling 720 officers and men proceeding Murmansk. First company left England March 17th. Second company will leave about March 31. Latter company will be accompanied by Brigadier General Wilds P. Richardson who has instructions to take command of all American troops in North Russia.

Withdrawal of American troops has not been passed on formally by Supreme War Council. The President however has approved withdrawal when spring conditions permit and his views have been communicated to British, French and Italian Governments. Will advise you if definite plan of withdrawal is perfected.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/4164 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1919, 5 p.m.

565. Reply from Secretary of State to your telegram number 48, to Mission February 27th, 5 P. M.,<sup>22</sup> second paragraph, reads as follows:

“Navy’s action will closely conform to policy concerning Northern Russia which Government decided to follow. The Navy is sending one gunboat, one cruiser and three torpedo boats and is holding certain smaller vessels for use in case of need. Navy does not contemplate any further action unless developments or change of policy indicate necessity therefor.”

Department understands six submarine chasers may also be ordered to Murmansk.

PHILLIPS

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<sup>22</sup> Same telegram as that to the Secretary of State, no. 908, Feb. 27, p. 618.

861.00/4180 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*ARCHANGEL, *March 31, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received 7:51 p.m.]

1012. Department's telegram number 563, March 29, 3 p.m., received. Dissatisfaction and unrest among the soldiers of the 339th Infantry came to a definite manifestation Saturday night when I Company refused for a time to return to duty at the front. The military attaché gives a detailed report in his 213, March 31, 4 p.m., to Mil[itary] staff and expresses fear that the trouble may not be ended. Colonel Stewart, with whom I have just spoken, seems disposed on the other hand to minimize the affair and says that, while the situation is no doubt serious, he believes that probably the worst has already happened. I have told him frankly that I cannot share this view. The information which comes to the Embassy concerning the men's state of mind is not reassuring. I can hardly emphasize too strongly the immediate need for either, first, a statement from high authority at Washington or Paris somewhat in the sense indicated in the Embassy's 858, March [February] 13, 5 p.m., or, second, authority to Colonel Stewart or the Embassy to announce that the order has been definitely given for the withdrawal of the 339th and will be executed as soon as possible and not later than June 30th. All agree that it is quite out of the question to leave the 339th here after that date at the very latest.

Murmansk reports that General Richardson is due to arrive there April 7th. The earliest he can then reach Archangel is the 17th.

All the French troops are now being withdrawn from the front, those not under guard will be used to construct inner defenses around Archangel.

The foregoing to Paris as 701 [71].

POOLE

861.00/4207 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*ARCHANGEL, *April 2, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received April 3, 7:52 a.m.]

1017. To Paris as 72. General Ironside explains that the contact established with Siberian outposts reported Embassy's 1000, March 26, 3 p.m. may have a strategic as well as moral importance. The expedition from this side consisted of a volunteer detachment of one British officer and ten British and five French soldiers accompanied



by a civilian representative of the Provisional Government. Considerable numbers of partisan troops have cooperated with this nucleus. Contact is with a portion of the First Tobolsk Regiment who are reported to be well fed but poorly equipped. Occasionally rifles and ammunition have been sent from Archangel for their use. Ironside believes that Archangel and Siberian troops may be able to move southwesterly organizing partly [*partisans?*] as they go so as eventually to support the main Siberian movement westward from Perm toward Viatka. According to reports received here the main movement goes on successfully.

The British Commissioner Lindley as well as Ironside places hopes upon the complete union of Archangel region with Siberia this summer by way of Kotlas, Viatka. The importance of this junction in its relation to Allied policy is obvious. It would permit the termination of the present north Russian expedition, if desired, without sacrificing the friendly inhabitants of the northern region to Bolshevik reprisals and without loss of face. It would end the burden we now carry of provisioning northern Russia. The more considerable naval forces which will be here this summer will facilitate British army sent in the [*a movement toward?*] Kotlas to meet the Siberian advance but none of the Allied troops now here are available for offensive action. Ironside has so informed the War Office. I am very [*confidentially?*] informed that in reply they have suggested the possibility of sending a small number of fresh dependable troops with which to bring the Kotlas operation in conjunction with the Navy.

The Siberian junction seems the more possible because of the success which is now attending the organization of the Russian forces in this region. The British staff is making a special effort in this direction and General Marushevski has developed a capacity for leadership which is becoming evident in the bettered morale of the Russian rank and file. He is himself much encouraged by the British [*and told me?*] recently that the results so far achieved exceed what he dared hope for when he arrived last November. The number of formed Russian troops is more than 10,000 of whom three fourths are at the front or in the rear of the front. Mobilization is being carried out with commendable impartiality and mobilized ages [*forces?*] have been withdrawn from all positions not contributing directly to the military effort. A town militia of older men and youths polices Archangel. Women's auxiliary services have been organized. There is in short substantial evidence of a sincere and fructifying effort among the Russians to hasten the Siberian junction and to organize the northern region so as to dispense with Allied support when the junction is perfected.

Although the progress which has been made is encouraging it must be recognized that the northern region can never of itself—never having been self-sufficient economically and having no strategic unity—resist an aggressively central Russian Government except as a salient of a well-drawn Siberian line. If the Allied expedition is withdrawn in the spring the northern government will inevitably collapse and it is Ironside's confidential opinion that in order to cover the departure of the Allied troops it would be necessary first to disarm the Russian forces thereby completely undoing the work of the last six months. It is estimated moreover that in addition to the Allied troops and officials not less than 16,000 Russian civilians would have to be evacuated to prevent their massacre by the Bolsheviks.

POOLE

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861.00/4180 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1919, 3 p.m.

1436. Department desires to call your attention to Archangel's number 39 to you <sup>23</sup> in which Poole and Military Attaché express the opinion that a statement should be issued in order to allay discontent and preserve morale among the American troops in the Archangel region and also to a second telegram dated March 31 relative thereto which has been repeated to you as Poole's number 70 [71] <sup>24</sup> regarding dissatisfaction and unrest among the American soldiers. The Secretary of War has reconsidered the matter and concurs in the opinion that some statement should be issued, especially along the lines of the suggestions contained in number 70 [71]. The Secretary of War, however, thinks that this statement might properly be issued direct by General Pershing. Department would be glad to receive your comments.

PHILLIPS

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861.51/530 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1919, 4 p.m.

1459. For your information and recommendation as to course of action to be taken. Department is in receipt of communication from

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<sup>23</sup> No. 858, Feb. 13, 5 p.m., to the Secretary of State, p. 615.

<sup>24</sup> No. 1012, Mar. 31, 6 p.m., to the Secretary of State, p. 623.

British Embassy dated March 28, enclosing paraphrase of telegram from British Foreign Office dated March 21, reading as follows:

"His Majesty's Government primarily responsible for the support of the Provisional Government in Northern Russia have been carefully considering the financial position of that Government which appears to them very precarious, seeing that their income from taxes and from loans from the fiduciary portion of the new rouble issue from August 1918 to the end of the present year is not likely to exceed 98 million roubles against a probable expenditure of 284 million roubles. As the United States Government are doubtless aware the Provisional Government have requested the representatives of the Associated Governments for a loan of 300 million roubles.

His Majesty's High Commissioner at Archangel has however recommended to His Majesty's Government that the Associated Governments should, instead of making the Provisional Government a loan which they could more or less spend as they liked, assume the responsibility of financing 'The Nation,' e.g., the War, Naval, Post and Telegraph Departments of the Provisional Government for the first six months of 1919 up to a total limit of 10 million roubles a month inasmuch as in normal times the Archangel Government would have received collaterals for these Departments from Central Russian exchange. Mr. Lindley<sup>25</sup> considers that economy and efficiency would thus be better served and that the Provisional Government would, after being relieved of the burden of 'National' services be able to finance the remaining 'Provincial' Services.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to assume themselves one quarter of the proposed expenditure of 10 million roubles a month and another quarter on behalf of the French, under the arrangement concluded in August 1918, whereby His Majesty's Government have to bear in the first instance the French share of the cost of intervention in Northern Russia. They are therefore anxious to authorize Mr. Lindley to inform the Provisional Government that in place of the loan they will receive assistance up to 5 million roubles a month for the first six months of the present year for National Services on condition that they submit monthly estimates and accounts and allow examination of items by the Technical Officers.

You should inform the United States Government accordingly and express the hope that as, in the case of Italy they entirely agreed, and in the case of the United States their Representative was a signatory of the Murmansk agreement of July 1918,<sup>26</sup> Item 12 of which states:

'The Representatives of Great Britain, the United States and France recognize that their Governments must give the necessary financial assistance to the Murmansk Regional Council.'

they also will agree to be responsible for two million five hundred [thousand?] roubles a month."

PHILLIPS

<sup>25</sup> Francis O. Lindley, British Commissioner in Russia.

<sup>26</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, vol. II, pp. 493-495.

861.00/4254 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, April 9, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received April 10, 2:23 a.m.]

1053. To Paris as 79. With reference my telegram 1010, March 31, 5 p.m.<sup>27</sup> If there has been no recent definition of policy can you let me know confidentially your present views respecting the north Russian situation? Has the Provisional Government now, and do you think it will continue to have, your moral support? What is the purpose of sending a larger naval force to these waters? Is it intended to leave the railway troops here after the 339th Infantry goes, or (to send?) any other special troops? Would you object to the railway troops being used while they are here to prepare an anti-Bolshevik offensive by the Allies or Russians? These questions are intended only to suggest the need felt by the Embassy for confidential directive advice if definite instructions are not yet possible. I am faced with a concrete problem in the case of the Y.M.C.A. In connection with shipments of supplies and disposition of personnel they must now determine the policy they will follow after June. In case all or practically all the American forces are to be withdrawn they would not care to continue their activities here unless especially requested by the Embassy to do so on the ground that the Government of the United States desires to give moral, if not material, support to the Russian and any other troops which might be engaged in fighting the Bolsheviki. I am informed that, failing this, but few of their secretaries would be willing to remain simply for the sake of the good which they might do for the Russians in a general humanitarian way. The moral importance of the work of the Y.M.C.A. can hardly be over-emphasized. It would be very undesirable to let them withdraw from this field in case we are to have a continued interest in Russian development along the lines represented by the northern region.

POOLE

861.00/4270 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1919, 6 p.m.

588. In response to inquiry what answer should be made to your No. 1053, April 9, 7 p.m., Am[erican] mission replies as follows:

“In my opinion no military information of the kind requested in Archangel’s No. 79 to Am[erican] mission<sup>28</sup> should be transmitted

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.<sup>28</sup> No. 1053, Apr. 9, 7 p.m., to the Secretary of State, *supra*.

by Department to Poole. All instructions relating to the future of the Archangel expedition are in the possession of Generals Ironside and Maynard,<sup>30</sup> from whom alone such information as can be disclosed should be obtained. When in due course this has been acquired the questions asked as to the Y.M.C.A. will also find their solution."

POLK

861.00/4299 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, April 15, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received April 16, 6:08 a.m.]

1074. 89 to Paris. Continuing my 1017, April 2, 3 p.m. General Ironside is informed that the British replacement forces will arrive at Archangel at the earliest date ice will permit, probably early in May. The British *communiqué* has mentioned two brigades. Ironside says he has not been informed of their composition or strength. Four hundred aviation personnel are coming. The French Government has communicated a definite decision to send one [omission] of infantry to replace the French troops now here and green personnel for three batteries of artillery. It has informed the British Government that it sends these troops in order to demonstrate "complete solidarity."

Ironside insists that he is without definite instructions from London concerning policy but there seems to have been approval of the plan discussed in my 1017 to help troops of the northern government to perfect the union with Siberia. Ironside says that the logical development of this policy will be to advance on Keutishlas [*Kotlas*] as promptly as possible.

The ice up river begins to show signs of breaking. Gunboats are in readiness at Archangel to proceed as soon as possible to the support of the land forces in the region of Beresnik but by reason of the ice break upstream these forces will be exposed to gunboat attack by the Bolsheviki for probably a fortnight before the gunboats from Archangel can arrive.

Improvement in the situation on the railway front reported in the Embassy's 1043, April 8, 3 p.m.,<sup>31</sup> becomes permanent [*apparent*], the thaw making movements on the flanks impracticable. The successful handling of the Bolshevik attacks is reported to have helped the morale of our men.

<sup>30</sup> Maj. Gen. Charles C. M. Maynard, of the British Army, in command of the Allied forces at Murmansk.

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

The Russian forces now number more than 14,000 and continue to earn praise for their conduct in action.

POOLE

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861.00/4314 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*  
 ARCHANGEL, April 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received April 18, 9:49 a.m.]

1086. To Paris as 95. I have received Department's telegram 588, April 15, 6 p.m. quoting the Secretary's answer to my 1053, April 9, 7 p.m. I understand this to mean that there is unity of policy with Great Britain concerning military operations in north Russia and I shall be governed accordingly until further instructions.

With reference to my telegram 1074, April 15, 6 p.m. Ironside yesterday received detailed information respecting the new British contingent from which it appears that it will number not less than 12,000. The first [*final?*] objective will be the occupation of Kotlas.

Ironside informs me that he has power to evacuate the 339th Infantry first of all the troops now here. The ships bringing the new forces will be used and embarkation will occur before June 1st. This will probably obviate further trouble. It will be necessary to retain the American engineers' battalion to the end of evacuation. Y.M.C.A. is recommending to its headquarters New York that its work be continued this summer on substantially the present basis.

POOLE

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861.00/4318 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, April 18, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received April 19, 5:49 a.m.]

1091. General Richardson<sup>32</sup> arrived yesterday. I had a very satisfactory talk with him this morning. There is every reason to anticipate hearty co-operation.

POOLE

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861.51/530 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1919, 2 p.m.

1679. Referring to Department's 1459 dated April 5th 4 p.m. Department does not consider the Murmansk agreement as binding in

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<sup>32</sup> Brig. Gen. Wilds P. Richardson, U.S.A., commanding American troops in northern Russia.

regard to Archangel Government. However, it carries with it a certain degree of moral obligation on the part of this Government. In case it should be decided to participate in the proposed policies submitted by the British Government this Department is unable to determine from what source the necessary funds are to be obtained. Please inform the Department as to your views and the course of action to be followed.

POLK

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861.51/566 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, April 30, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 8:05 p.m.]

1867. Your 1679, April 22nd, 2 p.m. I would suggest that you communicate with the War Department regarding their attitude [plans] in Archangel before coming to any conclusion in regard to further relief. From our advices here this question seems to be one solely of military concern. Any relief work should necessarily be carried on in the closest cooperation with the military authorities McCormick is trying to close up the existing Murmansk agreement<sup>88</sup> entered into by the United States last summer in which our obligation was limited to \$5,000,000.

LANSING AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/4423 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, May 3, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received May 4, 7:45 a. m.]

1137. 104 to Paris. As a result of special measures the ice is now pretty well cleared from the river above Archangel. Two monitors left today for the region of Beresashinik [*Beresnik*] where Bolshevik gunboats have attacked but have been driven off by the Allied artillery. A Bolshevik infantry attack on the Vaga has been repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Unless there are unexpected developments on the river the military situation may now be said to have passed out of its dangerous phase.

It is reported from Murmansk that General Maynard is moving his headquarters about 250 miles south along the Murman Railway to Kem. The purpose of the Finnish operations around Lake Ladoga remains unclear.

POOLE

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<sup>88</sup>*Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 493-495.

861.00/4479 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, May 12, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received May 13, 2:57 a.m.]

1175. 115 to Paris. American consul at Murmansk reports that the presence of American engineering troops in that region is making a very favorable impression among the local workingmen from whom expressions of sympathy and interest are heard. The morale of the troops is excellent and they do their work in an earnest, quiet, and unobtrusive manner. He considers that this may be the chief cause for an improved political atmosphere at Murmansk.

I am informed by Y.M.C.A. workers that there is a good deal of talk among the Russian troops in the Archangel area respecting the departure of the Americans. While insisting upon their hostility to the Bolsheviki they say that they are not certain to what extent they will then be prepared to cooperate with the British who they suspect have ulterior territorial ambitions.

POOLE

861.48/852 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, May 16, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received May 17, 7:21 a.m.]

1191. 118 to Paris. Pursuant to instructions from London, based upon suggestions from here in which this Embassy concurred, the British Commissioner has informed the Provisional Government with respect to the provisioning of the northern region that the Allies will hereafter supply flour only, leaving to the Provisional Government the importation of all other foodstuffs, and that payment for flour must be made by the Provisional Government out of its foreign balances instead of the Allies financing the whole operation on the basis of repayment in the roubles after ultimate distribution as heretofore.

The Foreign Office telegraphs that it is taking up with the appropriate American authorities the question of shipments of flour and that it is hoped there will be no further difficulties in view of the receipts of the Allied Supply Committee from food previously delivered. It would be very desirable to send instead of the refined white flour heretofore received rye flour or coarser wheat flour. It might be cheaper and in any case would be more acceptable to the local population.



It is proposed to supply 4,375 [3,375?] tons flour monthly. Stocks of sugar and tea now in the hands of the supply committee are sufficient for probably a year to come.

The Foreign Office telegraphs that it is arranging to ship to Murmansk enough sugar, tea, and meat to meet civilian requirements to the middle of July; rice and lard are not available. It does not propose after these shipments to make any further arrangements whatever either as regards Murmansk or Archangel except flour.

POOLE

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861.00/4591 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, May 27, 1919, 3 p. m.

[Received May 27, 8:28 a.m.]

1237 [1227]. 122 [123] to Paris. The first contingent of the British expedition, numbering slightly more than 4,000, arrived yesterday. They were formally welcomed today by the local government and passed in review under a triumphal arch.

POOLE

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861.00/4683 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, June 11, 1919, 1 p. m.

[Received June 12, 3:25 p.m.]

1274. 131 to Paris. The following are the more important statements made by General Ironside in an interview published in the local press:

With the local Russian troops and the troops which have just arrived from England, I have all that is needed to carry out plan for this summer, which is to transfer the base of the Russian National Army from Siberia to Archangel. Everything needed will be shipped to Archangel in the course of the summer. As Archangel is only eight days from England there no longer [will] be delays in getting material to Kolchak's front. As soon as the second contingent of volunteers arrives I shall move up the river and take Kotlas. I have everything ready in the rear at Archangel—barracks, warehouses, et cetera, so that what happened at Vladivostok, where there were no freight warehouses at the required moment for storing ammunition, will not happen to me. All that is necessary is to give the Russian National Army the indispensable assistance in American [ammunition,?] clothing, food, and for a short time the support of our soldiers who will remain as a reserve in case of need. The excellent

quality of these reserve elements (that is the British troops) gives me the assurance of carrying out promptly the campaign in the north enabling us in the course of the summer to establish ourselves at Kotlas, Vologda and Petrograd. This is not all of course but the entire northern base will then be in our hands, and we can get busy with the center and south. I cannot speak of the center now because of the complete disorganization of transport in Bolshevik Russia. Much work will be required to reorganize this transport in some way. I do not speak either of the south where all kinds of misunderstandings are taking place and where ethnical variety complicates the situation as well as in western parts of Russia. We have had much work to do and much remains but the main portion is done—a purely Russian force has been created which is our main movement, our only task in the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism and the revival of our ally. We contemplate no other ends political or commercial nor have any selfish aims.

POOLE

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861.00/4731 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, June 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received June 21, 1:32 a.m.]

1291. 133 to Paris. In answer to the telegram sent by Archangel Provisional Government announcing its decision on April 30th to recognize Siberian Government as the Provisional National Government of all Russia, communicated in Embassy's 1141, May 4, 3 p.m.,<sup>34</sup> Siberian Government has telegraphed substantially as follows:

“The Russian Government at Omsk greets the wise patriotic action of the northern government and recognizes your independence in regard to concrete practical measures necessitated by extraordinary circumstances. Direct communication may be had twice a week through the northern detachment of Colonel Bordzikovsky. Detailed instructions follow.

According to the general guiding principles of the All-Russian Government the decrees and orders of the regional governments remain in force until such laws are merged or abolished.”

At a meeting of the Archangel Provisional Government held June 13th it was decided to accept and publish this telegram. It was also decided to issue all judicial decisions, injunctions, etc., in the northern region in the name of the Provisional All-Russian Government.

Prince Kourakin, former Minister of Finance here, whose departure to Siberia was announced in Embassy's 1067, April 12, 10

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<sup>34</sup> *Ante*, p. 338.

p.m.,<sup>85</sup> is to be considered as still a member of the Archangel Government and will act at Omsk as an intermediary between the two Governments.

COLE

861.00/4751 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, June 25, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received June 26, 2:37 a.m.]

1303. 136 to Paris. The Provisional Government has received a telegram from Kolchak appointing Lieutenant General Miller,<sup>86</sup> now Governor General and acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to be "Commander in Chief of Russian land and sea forces operating against the Bolsheviki on the northern front". Local opinion regards this telegram, together with a similar order to General Yudenich on the Petrograd front and the voluntary recognition of Kolchak by General Denikin, as important steps in the unification of Russia. Kolchak can exercise an actual control here by wireless from Omsk to Archangel and by occasional over[land] messages.

COLE

861.77/929

*The British Chargé (Lindsay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 497

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1919.

SIR: By a telegram from Earl Curzon of Kedleston, I am informed that the American Railway troops at Archangel are to be withdrawn about July 15th.

I am instructed to bring this matter to your notice and to urge the United States Government to allow these troops to remain, pointing out that their withdrawal might entail the collapse of the whole Archangel Force.

I venture to express the hope that you will be able to influence the competent authority to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government in this important matter.

I have [etc.]

R. C. LINDSAY

861.77/1133 a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Lindsay)*

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1919.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication dated July 3, 1919 stating that you are in receipt of a telegram from

<sup>85</sup> Not printed.

<sup>86</sup> Eugeni Ludvig Karlovich Miller.

Earl Curzon of Kedleston wherein he states that he has been informed that the American railway troops at Archangel are to be withdrawn about July 15, 1919 and that you have been instructed to bring this matter to the attention of this Department and to urge the United States Government to allow these troops to remain, pointing out that their withdrawal might entail the collapse of the whole Archangel force.

In reply I beg to inform you that this question is one which was settled by the Supreme War Council and I suggest that it again be taken up with General Tasker H. Bliss.

Accept [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

861.51/634

*The British Chargé (Lindsay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 515

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: On March 28th Mr. Barclay addressed a semi-official note to you<sup>87</sup> urging the United States Government, in accordance with instructions which he had received from the Foreign Office, to contribute a sum of 2,500,000 roubles per month towards the support of the Provisional Government in Northern Russia.

From a telegram received from Lord Curzon I understand that the Archangel Government are now in urgent need of financial assistance. Failing this they must either have recourse to methods which will seriously damage their financial position, at present fairly satisfactory; or fail to pay their workmen, which would cause strikes and mutinies and thereby destroy the efficacy and possibly the safety of the Allied Expeditionary Force at Archangel.

His Majesty's Government and the French Government have advanced 2,500,000 roubles each during each of the first six months of this year and they are considering a further subsidy. It is, however, urgently desirable that the United States and Italian Governments should be induced to make a similar contribution and I have the honour to beg that you will cause this matter to be carefully considered and to express the hope that you may be able in a short time to inform me that the United States Government agree to this proposal.

Believe me [etc.]

R. C. LINDSAY

<sup>87</sup> See p. 626.

861.77/932

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: The Russian Embassy is advised by Ambassador Bakhmeteff from Paris that General E. Miller, Acting Chief of the Provisional Government of the Northern Regions, sent a cable to Paris relative to the recall in the near future of two American railway engineer companies, which have been working on the Murmansk Line. These troops are of greatest value in the Northern Region and cannot be replaced at present by any other units.

In view of the above I beg earnestly to request you to communicate with the respective authorities in an effort to have these men retained on the Murmansk Railway at least until they can be replaced by some other engineering troops.

Assuring you that any action on your behalf in this matter so vital to the activities of the Russian authorities in the Northern Region would be deeply appreciated, I am [etc.]

S. UGHET

861.48/905

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President*

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We have \$1,000,000 accruing from the sale of foodstuffs from the \$5,000,000 revolving fund for rationing North Russia, which we can still use for the same purpose. Telegrams from Archangel and Paris show:

1. That Mr. Hoover has no supplies for Archangel and Murmansk.
2. That the present stocks of flour there will be exhausted by August first.
3. That we have a moral obligation to continue the assistance which we have been rendering for the past year.
4. That the rationing of North Russia will, necessarily, have a bearing upon the support which has been promised to Kolchak.
5. That from a political point of view it is obviously unwise to let North Russia revert to Bolshevism through starvation, especially in view of Mr. Hoover's undertaking to supply Petrograd upon the overthrow of the Bolsheviks.

I arranged a contract with the Grain Corporation which will enable us to ship at once about 5000 tons of flour to Archangel, but have not authorized the expenditure until I could get your views.

I believe the shipment should be made and hope that you will let me know that you approve.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

Approved

WOODROW WILSON

12 July, 1919.

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861.00/4842 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, July 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received July 12, 7:10 a.m.]

1315. 140 to Paris. Admiral McCully left July 9 on an eagle boat. The *Yankton*, *Sacramento* and three submarine chasers had left previously. It is understood that the *Crosswell* [cruiser] *Des Moines* and two eagles will remain until the departure of the railway engineers, who will sail from Murmansk soon after the 12th.

I realize that the decision to remove all military units without replacement is final and that the withdrawal of our naval forces is in consonance therewith but I wish to make an urgent plea that one cruiser be allowed to remain at least for some time after the departure of the engineers. It is immaterial whether that cruiser be the *Des Moines* or another or smaller one. I understand the Navy was under strict instructions to take no part in war operations and should the *Des Moines* remain some time longer than is now expected her presence at anchor in the port of Archangel would not imply any such participation.

It was inevitable that the withdrawal of American forces should be used by the Bolsheviks as propaganda in two directions, as is already being done. First, Bolsheviks assert to loyal Russians that their friends are abandoning them and that they should therefore desert across the Bolshevik front or work in Archangel for the Bolshevik cause secretly. Second, it is stated that the withdrawals prove that America, the most liberal and democratic of the Associated Powers, disapproves of the "reactionary and monarchistic" Provisional Government. This propaganda is strengthened by the rapidity with which the withdrawals follow one another. The mere presence of an American cruiser would greatly tend to diminish the force of Bolshevik propaganda.

We have given the Provisional Government in the past extensive support through our military forces, through our food shipments and through the sympathetic interest taken in all its affairs. The members of the Government can not personally and openly bring

it to my attention but through other sources I am fully aware there is in its midst a feeling that it is being "let down" by the United States in an undeserved way. Mr. Poole's telegrams 1017, April 2, 3 p.m.,<sup>39</sup> paragraph three, and 1074, April 15, 6 p.m.,<sup>40</sup> last two paragraphs, have indicated the growth of morale in this region both amongst Russian soldiers and among the populace. It is inevitable that this democratic and regenerating movement should be chilled by the rapidity of American withdrawals as mentioned above. The mere presence of an American cruiser in the harbor would do much to allay criticism and to prevent the rancor of those who consider themselves "let down".

About one thousand French troops are expected to arrive as well as further British detachments. Our absence will again be thrown into relief. Admiral Kolchak's defeat and the consequent probable failure of the military expedition toward Kotlas is likely to make the Government's position extremely difficult. If the *Des Moines* were to remain or be replaced it would be an appreciated reminder of the sympathy we have shown the Archangel Government since the beginning and which I trust still exists.

COLE

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861.77/932 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1919, 7 p.m.

710. Department understands Provisional Government is urging the retention at Archangel of two companies of American Engineers. If so, what are your views.

POLK

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861.77/944 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, July 17, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received July 18, 9:45 a.m.]

1327. 143 to Paris. Your 710, July 12, 7 p.m.

Governor General Miller wrote General Richardson, June 24th, requesting that American engineer troops at Murmansk be allowed to remain. General Richardson transmitted this request to headquarters American Expeditionary Force, France, by telegraph and forwarded original letter. On June 30 American General Headquarters, Paris, telegraphed General Richardson that troops could

<sup>39</sup> *Ante*, p. 623.

<sup>40</sup> *Ante*, p. 628.

remain until August 15, if they were "willing to stay". A telegram was later received specifying that troops could remain if they would "volunteer". General Richardson thereupon immediately proceeded to the Murmansk front and found that the men were "willing to remain, if so ordered" but would not "volunteer." Their reasons were that their positions were being held open for them at home and their unions were paying their dues under the condition that they were engaged in the Army under the draft. Therefore the men were willing to remain but, since to volunteer would have deprived them of these important privileges, opinion among them was practically unanimous, for going home as planned. In view, then, of this telegram of June 30th the mentioned unwillingness to "volunteer" necessarily involved their withdrawal as early as possible. The withdrawal began early in July and concentration at Kokura [*Kola?*] should be already complete. In view of the above, it is my opinion, as well as that of General Richardson, with whom I have consulted, that the retention of the units [*these men?*] is impossible, as their "willingness" to remain cannot longer be counted on.

General Miller understands the above and would like to have engineer replacements for Murmansk, as there has not been and cannot be any increase in the Russian railroad personnel although the line is constantly lengthening. He has understood that the naval forces would be withdrawn completely and has now made a strong request that one naval unit remain. I transmit his request with my own and General Richardson's hearty endorsements. We both suggest that the vessel carry a sizeable complement of marines. I understand that the presence of a naval unit with marines on board or in barracks on shore does not carry the same implication of belligerency as the presence of regular troops and it may, in view of the uncertain future, eventually become highly important that some American force should be here to protect Americans and American institutions.

A large part of the above anxiety of the populace is based on the uncertainty regarding the long-continued presence of British troops, although new arrivals are expected. In his speech made on June 6th General Ironside said: "And when I shall have done my work of creating a Russian army with Russian help, here in the North, we will leave and return to our homes" (not included in summary transmitted in Embassy's 1274, June 21[11], 1 p. m.<sup>41</sup>).

This announcement was made in view of the advance to Kotlas, but since its probable failure no further statement has been made.

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<sup>41</sup> *Ante*, p. 632.



All sorts of rumors and exaggerations are rife among the population and the presence of a cruiser with marines would be reassuring.

If another naval unit replaces the one here it would be advantageous for it to be subject only to the direct orders of the proper American naval authorities. The vessel now here is in an ambiguous position being subordinated to the British senior naval officer, dependent on him for certain supplies and yet at the same time unable to participate in active operations. The situation would be easier were the ship to be subject only to American orders and as little dependent as possible on British supplies. While under instructions to take no part in operations, it should, nevertheless, be free to intervene in case of local rebellion against the Provisional Government or in case of disobedience [*disorder?*].

Please read in connection with the above my telegram number 1315, July 11, 5 p.m., and also number 1321, July 16, 6 p.m.,<sup>42</sup> particularly paragraph number 3.

COLE

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861.51/634

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Lindsay)*

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I have received your letter of July 9, 1919 on the subject of financial assistance to the Provisional Government of Northern Russia.

At the present time we have no funds whatever available for the purpose. I shall be glad to let you know if there arises any prospect of securing the necessary funds and if so, whether we can then see our way clear to using them.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

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861.48/904 a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1919, 4 p.m.

717. Department is purchasing about 5250 tons of rye and mixed wheat flour for early shipment to Archangel on Steamship *Redondo* which will cost about \$1,000,000 and will be sold for new roubles and proceeds returned to Department unless other instructions are received by you prior to the receipt of this material.

Following questions were addressed to Poole at London but he sailed previous to delivery of cable, and as any further funds

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

required for continuation of this work must be obtained from Congress we suggest you answer them if answers are obtainable:

1. Will British and French likewise participate at once with \$1,000,000 each?

2. If so will total sum of \$3,000,000 cover requirements for the winter?

3. If total sum inadequate what additional quantity is necessary?

PHILLIPS

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861.00/4902 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 24, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 12:42 p.m.]

2609. Following telegram from [Cole at] Archangel.

363, July 22nd, 6 p.m. Please transmit the following telegram to the Department as our number 1339 and to American Mission, Paris as our 150, July 22nd, 6 p.m.

Russian troops quartered along the entire line of communication from the city of Onega to Chelenavo 45 miles up the Onega River mutinied at 1 p.m., yesterday July 21st, and went over to the Bolsheviks, the city of Onega itself passing into the hands of the mutineers at 1 a.m. today. British aeroplanes have flown over all parts of this front from Onega to Chelenavo. They were fired on and observed red flags everywhere. Almost simultaneously a similar revolt was attempted on the Vologda railroad front, but British and Polish troops disarmed the mutineers. So far all is quiet at Archangel itself.

General Ironside has advised London that he sees but two eventualities—either immediate heavy reinforcements or early evacuation.

British Chargé d'Affaires believes evacuation, if decided on, should be prompt and should be preceded by strict military dictatorship under Ironside. Accompanying this he thinks all stores, such as those of flour belonging to the Allied Supply Committee, should be put as much as possible into the hands of the actual population to prevent Bolsheviks gaining possession of large amounts undistributed supplies.

It is of paramount importance to the honor of the Allied and Associated Governments to furnish ample tonnage in which to evacuate all Russians who have compromised themselves by friendly relations, personal or official, with those Governments or their representatives. Any Russians who have been in any way connected with the present Government or the Allies and associates are certain to be

shot or imprisoned by the Bolsheviki. No government can be established that could live for an hour after the foreign troops' departure and therefore the Provisional Government will have to leave also.

Refer in this connection my telegram 1327 to the Department, 143 to Paris, July 17, 6 p.m., paragraph 3, last sentence to end of message, especially last sentence of paragraph 6. Also my 1321 to Washington, 141 to Paris, July 16, 6 p.m.,<sup>43</sup> paragraph 3, last sentence, and 1315 to the Department, 140 to Paris, July 11, 5 p.m., paragraph 3. The present critical condition is the natural result of the factors outlined in those telegrams and the withdrawal without replacement of the American troops was the first step. Cole.

DAVIS

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861.00/4910 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 25, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received July 26, 1:25 a.m.]

2623. Following from [Cole at] Archangel:

"1342. July 24, 4 p.m. Referring to my telegram number 1339, July 22, 6 p.m., 144 [150] to Paris.<sup>44</sup> No attempt has been made to attack the mutineer and Bolshevik forces at Chelenvo or Onega. Cordons have been thrown into the area between Archangel and the Onega River. Fronts composed largely of Russian troops are being stiffened by the addition of British troops taken from the Dvina River positions.

This morning's military reports show that a heavy Bolshevik attack on the railroad front was to be made simultaneously with the mutiny planned for 3 a.m., July 21st. Both failed as reported. On the 22d Bolsheviki attacked again and held all our advanced positions which however were retaken on the 23d. Bolsheviki now attacking verst post 455 east of Vologda railroad, 93 miles south of Archangel in an attempt to cut off positions at verst 444, 11 versts to south which [is] strongest position on railroad front.

All the British officers and men in the city of Onega were allowed to go on board the British *Monitor* after the mutiny and by agreement the city was not bombarded. Twenty English officers and 20 men who were inland are still missing. Revolutionary forces affected 4,000 Russian troops and the attempted mutiny on the railroad front from four to five companies and cruiser *Des Moines* and two eagles

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<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

<sup>44</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 2609, July 24, 11 a.m., *supra*.

will arrive from the Murmansk tomorrow. The British staff states that the situation is well in hand and that disabled [*the?*] British troops are in good spirits. An American lieutenant, who was on the railroad front to register graves, reports that the fighting there is heavy and that he and his fit [*five?*] men were requested to assist.

Understand Russian staff is making plans with a view to possible evacuation from Archangel to Murmansk. Cole.”

DAVIS

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861.00/4929 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, undated.

[Received July 29, 1919, 4:58 p.m.]

2645. Following official view of situation in North Russia, which has been confirmed by British War Office, appeared in *Times* of July 26th.

“There is no immediate danger of a military catastrophe befalling our troops in North Russia. Although the water in the Dvina is now so low that vessels cannot pass along the river, we shall be able to get our craft out of it when the water rises again.

We had decided to withdraw from Russia in any case and the reverse in North Russia may cause us to speed up our plans for doing this. It will be necessary for us to send our troops so that the evacuation operations may be carried through in an orderly way and our military stores saved. The French have already dispatched reinforcements to Russia.”

DAVIS

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861.00/4943 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 30, 1919, 5 p. m.

[Received July 31, 5:25 a. m.]

3399. Your 2618, July 23, 8 p.m.<sup>45</sup> American Mission's information is that recent crisis at Archangel has strengthened British determination to evacuate completely and quickly. As this would probably involve complete collapse of Archangel Government, proposed plan for appointment of Governor General for North Russia no longer has much interest. American Mission has taken no action in the matter and in any case does not see what action could be taken by United States Government or American Mission except possibly friendly advice by Cole to local authorities should occasion offer.

AMERICAN MISSION

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

861.00/4929 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1919, 1 p. m.

723. Embassy, London, is repeating substance of recent British statement regarding situation at Archangel.

Department wishes you to prepare for possible Bolshevik control of Archangel, having in mind that it is especially desirable that the safety of yourself and all other Americans, including officials and private citizens, is a matter of prime importance.

LANSING

861.48/915 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, August 2, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received August 3, 3:55 a.m.]

1358. Department's telegram number 717, July 22 [23], 4 p.m. For reasons given in my 1357, August 2, 5 p.m.<sup>46</sup> steamer *Redondo* should not proceed to Archangel. The British have sent flour which is now here and are sending more which will suffice until evacuation.

COLE

861.00/4961 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 3, 1919.

[Received 4:43 p.m.] .

2687. From [Cole at] Archangel.

1357. August 2, 5 p.m. General Ironside informs me that his evacuation of Archangel will begin the last week in August and will be complete by September 30th. He expects to take the Provisional Government with him and to move out as many loyal Russians as would be in danger if left behind. A battalion of troops from England will reach here soon to garrison and patrol this city, as serious local trouble may be expected during withdrawal. As stated in the first paragraph of my 1343, 152, July 24, 5 p.m.,<sup>47</sup> and in third of my 1339, 150, July 22, 6 p.m.,<sup>48</sup> Ironside's authority will be supreme

<sup>46</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 2687, Aug. 3, *infra*.

<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

<sup>48</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 2609, July 24, p. 641.

as soon as he begins to withdraw his front lines. From that moment on, the presence here of the consulates and embassies will be useless and they should then leave taking all nationals with them. The British Chargé already has instructions to evacuate his Embassy whenever he sees fit. No foodstuffs will be removed and therefore the *Richmond* should not proceed to Archangel. It is desirable that the *Des Moines* should remain here until the Embassy departs. Cole.

DAVIS

861.00/4957 : Telegram

*The Consul at Archangel (Strother) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, August 3, 1919, 10 a.m.

[Received 8:20 p.m.]

26. I gather British forces will be withdrawn soon from this front. General Ironside, British commander-in-chief, put two alternatives to London: first, send enough forces to hold the line and advance; or, second, withdraw and in this event supply transportation for 10,000 women and children taken out to safety. Insidious Bolshevik propaganda is working among Russian forces that all Allied forces will withdraw and Russian troops with us should save their skins by deserting. It is effective; some Russian troops have killed their officers and gone over to the Bolsheviks. We have lost recently Onega, by this impairing cable service through that point. We have not secured it again. Disturbance has been avoided elsewhere by drastic measures. When the remaining British forces depart it is obvious this locality will be Bolshevik sooner or later. There are many people here who have been loyal to our efforts made to help Russia help herself. Refugees are here from south Russia, Baltic Provinces and Siberia; all of them dependable [*dependent?*] population. The United States had promised to help Russia, I beg leave to ask the Department whether we may desert them in their peril. Left behind men will be shot, women ruined. Russians here remind Americans daily of our promises; they say the United States will not fail. This consulate asks whether the United States will supply shipping to convey to a refuge its proportionate part of the 10,000 or more. May I grant visas if ships are sent? There are stores at Archangel to stock ships. Brigadier General Richardson, United States Army, entirely approves these recommendations. Please repeat to Ambassador Francis.

STROTHER

861.00/4972

*The Acting Secretary of the Navy (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1919.

SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 29, 1919,<sup>51</sup> attaching a paraphrase of a telegram dated July 11, 1919,<sup>52</sup> from the American Embassy at Archangel, also attaching a copy of a telegram from the Chargé d'Affaires at Archangel, Mr. Poole,<sup>51</sup> urging that one American naval vessel be permitted to remain at Archangel in order to make our withdrawal of land forces in Russia appear less urgent and abrupt.

In reply I am pleased to inform you that on July 18, 1919, the following orders were issued by the Department to Admiral Knapp, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters,

“Direct U.S.S. *Des Moines* remain Archangel and vicinity until further orders 13018”

There are also operating in this vicinity, Eagles 1, 2 and 3, and the U.S.S. *Yankton*.

Respectfully,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

861.00/4961 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1919, 4 p.m.

725. Yours and Strother's telegrams of August 3 No. 2687 and the second unnumbered [26], announcing the evacuation of North Russia.

(1) The Secretary of the Navy has been requested to keep the *Des Moines* at Archangel.

(2) What accommodations will you require for Embassy and Consulate staffs and American citizens? Are British arranging accommodations or could you all go in *Des Moines*?

(3) Regarding the evacuation of loyal Russians. Is Department to understand that British are unable to supply accommodations for the 10,000 you mention and, consequently, ask assistance from the United States? Your telegram not clear on this point. Please furnish clear statement of how many it is proposed to evacuate and who is to provide ships.

(4) Consider this authority to evacuate Embassy and Consulate and American citizens on such date as seems advisable after confer-

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

<sup>52</sup> No. 1315, July 11, 5 p.m., p. 637.

ence with your colleagues. In such event Cole and Lee should proceed Washington, Pierce granted leave and Strother proceed Amsterdam for temporary duty.

LANSING

861.00/5006 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, August 9, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 11:58 p.m.]

1371. Your 725, August 6, 4 p.m. answering your questions paragraph (2) : Embassy personnel will be 24 persons including military attaché, his assistants and employees and the naval attaché, 30 Y.M.C.A., who are mostly now at the front but whom I hope to withdraw soon, and 11 Y.W.C.A. staff, also one unattached citizen. American Red Cross plans to leave soon taking supplies and Baltic Province inhabitants to Libau or Reval. The British are now arranging accommodations and I deem it best to allow them to continue their arrangements. *Des Moines* could not take so many.

Paragraph (3) : This question cannot be finally settled until the arrival of General Rawlinson<sup>58</sup> who is expected tomorrow. Not yet decided whether all Russians who desire will be evacuated or only those indicated by the Allied authorities. None of my telegrams mention any definite number of Russians. Ironside has asked for accommodations for 7,000 but should all who desire be removed the figure will be larger.

Rawlinson is to be in full charge and the British Foreign Office proposes that the British Chargé d'Affaires cease to function as such and should act as the General's diplomatic adviser. I will ascertain from Rawlinson whether American tonnage is desired but it seems to me perhaps advisable that the entire responsibility for and management of the evacuation be left entirely in British hands.

COLE

861.00/5013 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 10, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received August 11, 6 p.m.]

2752. Following from [Cole at] Archangel :

1370, August 8, 4 p.m. Archangel "1370-160." I have received a note dated August 5 from the Provisional Government of which the following are the important passages :

<sup>58</sup> Lt. Gen. Henry Seymour (Baron) Rawlinson, of the British Army.



“The announcement of the withdrawal of the British and Italian troops and the impossibility of counting on the arrival of new French replacement troops cause the Provisional Government of the Northern Region to call the attention of the representatives of the Allied Powers to the resulting situation and to request them to bring the following to the notice of their respective Governments:

Just a year ago the Allied Powers decided on active engagement in support of the Russian elements that had undertaken the reconstruction of their native land. An anti-Bolshevik front was formed in north Russia and extensive material aid was promised to the Russian Government which had come into being under the auspices of the Allies in liberated Archangel.

Thanks to this assistance public order and safety and normal social conditions have been reestablished, a new administrative apparatus has been created and finally, what is now most important, armed forces to resist the enemy have been organized. Nevertheless the northern region has been constantly faced with great difficulty due to the vast extent of its thinly peopled territory, which has hindered the formation of more imposing armed forces, and the extreme poverty of the country's natural resources.

The foregoing proves the absolute necessity that the Allies continue to support north Russia in different forms such as finance, railway supply, and military assistance.

Expenses for military matters are very large so that the activity of the Government if it is not given financial support by the Allies shall be wholly paralyzed.

As regards food supply, technical materials, arms, ammunition, et cetera, the northern region had cause to expect that assistance from the Allies would not cease in the near future. It is desirable however that the interested Allied Governments in this regard should be led by their official representatives.

The Russian Army and the civil port [*population*] have become accustomed to the presence of Allied troops, especially the British units. In these troops they saw assurance of final success and guarantees that their aspirations would be realized. At the same time that the Allied uniform inspires courage in the hearts of the Russian soldiers it also instills respect into the Bolsheviki. What then will be the triumph of the Bolsheviki when they learn that the Allies have left the North! Their departure will be exploited in a fierce campaign of propaganda. The Bolsheviki will boast that they have beaten the Allies and in this belief they will probably spare no effort to capture Archangel.

The moral blow leveled by the withdrawal of the Allied forces against our young soldiers will bring them to a state in which they can not defend the territory now held and they will be forced to fall back on Archangel. And these territories populated by people who have entrusted themselves to the Allies and who took part in the struggle against the Bolsheviki will be exposed to a cruel vengeance and to complete devastation. The evacuation of the city inhabitants is possible but not that of the dwellers in the country districts.

The Provisional Government considers it to be imperiously necessary to maintain in the northern region at least the brigades of English volunteers and the French contingent as well as a certain num-

ber of warships. This is demanded in the interests of the region which from the very moment of the Allies' arrival placed all its confidence and hopes in them to spare its peaceful population suffering and also to prevent the Bolsheviks from entirely liquidating the north Russian front. The capture of Archangel would give Bolsheviks access to the open sea.

The troops mentioned while not taking part in military operations could nevertheless guarantee the exposed [*completion?*] auxiliary services of the rear and the lines of communication. Warships at Archangel would persuade the population of its safety.

In case all the Allied forces withdraw and in case the Bolsheviks eventually advance to the White Sea there might arise a serious crisis in the people's state of mind. This might arouse into auction (action?) permanently unfavorable to the Allies which would probably have a decisive influence on the bonds of friendship which now exist between the Russians and the Allies.

The Provisional Government is responsible for the fate of the region which has confided in it and which has so far borne with patience all the war's burdens and is moreover bound before its own conscience and before its own native land to contribute its utmost to the reconstruction and renaissance of Russia. Therefore the Provisional Government of the Northern Region begs the Allied Powers to weigh all the consequences and again to examine the advisability of abandoning north Russia and leaving it without financial and military support.

The Provisional Government is firm in the belief that the Allied Powers will find an issue from the present situation in accordance with the strong bonds with which they bound themselves to Russia during the titanic struggle for freedom and high human Italian [*humanitarian*] ideals just brought to a successful end by them.["]

The end of the message. Cole.

DAVIS

861.24/181 a

*The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Elanco Forwarding Corporation of New York*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1919.

GENTLEMEN: The ship *Redondo* which carries a cargo of flour and which was consigned to Falmouth for orders, should now proceed to Reval and report to the representative of the American Relief Administration who will issue the necessary instructions for the discharge of this cargo.

I am [etc.]

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

861.00/5006 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

729. Your 1371, August 9, 6 p.m. Last sentence. This Government would not consider providing tonnage unless British Government states cooperation is necessary to save the situation and unless you, yourself, report action necessary.

LANSING

861.01/113 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

LONDON, August 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received August 15, 3 a.m.]

2791. Following from [Cole at] Archangel.

"1375, August 12, 6 p.m. Changes not yet completed are taking place in the personnel of the Provisional Government. Imminent withdrawal of British troops has brought home the necessity of a liberal government in close touch with the people.

. . . . .

These changes are a sincere, though much belated effort, to meet the situation briefly outlined in my 1343, July 24, 5 p.m.,<sup>55</sup> paragraph 4. The military dictatorship which existed in effect after Miller's appointment as commanding officer and governor general and which it was proposed to make permanent and supreme (see my 1321, July 16, 6 p.m.<sup>55</sup>) has been entirely given up and the control over civilian affairs largely concentrated in civilian hands.

The changes are in fact an attempt to organize a resistance to the Bolsheviki after the departure of the British troops. This attempt cannot succeed, however, and it would seem best for the Russians to remove all government institutions and peoples and all valuable supplies simultaneously with the British departure in order to give the Bolsheviki as little cause as possible for proclaiming a victory or reaping advantage from the occupation of Archangel. Cole. ["]

DAVIS

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<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

861.00/5031 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 14, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received 9:38 p.m.]

2798. Following from [Cole at] Archangel:

"1377, August 13, 6 p.m. The entire Bolshevik force on the Dvina River consisting of 6,000 was either captured, killed or scattered by an attack on Sunday carried out by about 3,000 British and 1,000 Russians who moved forward in the forests on both sides of the river completely outflanking all Bolshevik positions. Up to last night 1,840 prisoners have been registered and several hundred more are to come in. Bolshevik casualties were very heavy; 12 field guns, a large number of machine guns, 2,000 rifles and much ammunition was captured. The British intelligence bureau states that there are now no effective Bolshevik forces between our front and Kotka [*Kotlas?*]. Cole.["]

DAVIS

861.00/5032 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 9:55 p.m.]

2797. Following from [Cole at] Archangel:

1378, August 13th, 7 p.m. Reliable information from the Onega district indicates that the entire 5th Northern Rifle Regiment which mutinied and admitted the Bolsheviks in order to "stop the fighting" has been remobilized by the Bolsheviks and given its former name with the addition of the words "of the Soviet Republic". The peasants are apparently being well treated, payment being made for requisitions. No organized atrocities in the district have been reported except a few officers including [one?] British who was murdered during the mutiny. The Russian officers have been sent to Moscow and nothing is known as to their fate there. A few arrests were made in the city and these persons were sent south. The Zemstvo and City Duma are abolished and Soviets reestablished. All non-Bolshevik currency including the British guaranteed roubles is being replaced by Bolshevik money rouble for rouble. Cole.

DAVIS

861.01/110 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 14, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received 9:32 p.m.]

2793. Following from [Cole at] Archangel.

"1379, August 13, 8 p.m. I have received official notification of the changes in the Government reported in my 1375, August 12, 7 [6] p.m.<sup>56</sup> and am replying that I feel assured that the Government of the United States will be favorably impressed by the participation in the Government accorded to representatives from elective bodies such as the Provincial Zemstvos and the Archangel Municipality as well as by the institution of a labor inspector to facilitate peaceful solution of industrial advantages [*problems?*]. Cole.["]

DAVIS

861.01/110 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1919, 4 p.m.

736. For Cole.

Your 1379, August 13th, 8 p.m. approved.<sup>57</sup>

LANSING

861.00/5049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 16, 1919, 12 noon.

[Received 11:25 p.m.]

2808. Following from [Cole at] Archangel.

"1380, August 15th, 2 p.m. One thousand of the 1,200 Italian troops at Murmansk are now embarked for repatriation. Cole."

DAVIS

861.00/5054 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, August 17, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received August 18, 3:20 a. m.]

1381. Further [reference?] to my 1371, August 9, 6 p. m. Answering questions 2 and 3 of your 725, August 6, 4 p.m.

<sup>56</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 2791, Aug. 14, 6 p.m., p. 650.

<sup>57</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 2793, Aug. 14, 6 p.m., *supra*.

2, British Chargé d'Affaires informs me that the British ordered provision for transport for American staffs and citizens; and, 3, that ships have been appropriated for the evacuation of north Russia with passenger accommodations for 18,000 third class comity [*comma?*] 272 second class and 976 first class all to reach Archangel at the end of August or first part of September. Definite figure as to numbers proposed to be evacuated not settled but it is thought tonnage as above will be ample. Announcement has been made that the civilian employees of the military and naval institutions (presumably British institutions) will be removed before the departure of the British troops.

Twelve hundred Poles, Letts, Lithuanians, Esthonians leaving today for Danzig and Reval. Transportation will be provided gratis in all cases of real necessity. Destination of the poor refugees undecided.

COLE

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861.48/931 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, August 18, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received August 19, 3:02 a.m.]

1384. Your 717, July 23rd, 4 p.m. French Chargé d'Affaires informs me his Government states that under present conditions it will not participate in new food shipments and that French Ambassador at London and Washington so instructed.

COLE

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861.00/5090 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 21, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 8 p.m.]

2852. Following from [Cole at] Archangel:

1390, August 20, 3 p.m. The Zemstvo and City Assembly is in session and after accepting the changes in the Government reported in my 1375, August 12, 6 p.m.<sup>58</sup> chose a commission to organize the defense of Archangel after Allied departure and one to consider internal and political affairs with the same object. The City Duma had previously arranged to send a delegation to England to petition the British Government to continue military and other assistance to the region and the Assembly added a member to it. The commis-

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<sup>58</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, no. 2791, Aug. 14, 6 p.m., p. 650.

sion for internal affairs is discussing the amnesty for the radical leaders now undergoing sentence for the speeches in the City Duma reported in number 971, March 18, 3 p.m.<sup>60</sup> and others imprisoned on various political charges.

The Provisional Government yesterday communicated its decision to remain in Archangel and defend the city as long as possible to General Rawlinson and requested that an offensive south along the railroad front and west into the Onega region be made at once by Allied forces. Rawlinson categorically refused to permit the use Allied forces for this purpose and advised strongly against the Russians attempting it alone. The Russians hoped to establish their line as far as possible from Archangel in order to have a longer line on which to retreat gradually, and to regain the entire Onega district. It was also thought to stiffen the men's moral support [*morale?*] by putting them in territory heretofore occupied by the Bolsheviks and in contact with peasants who have just passed through Bolshevik regime. In view of the refusal to allow Allied troops to participate in such an offensive, Miller stated the Provisional Government must reconsider the whole question of its defense.

It seems that the Government is not likely to come now to any other decision except to defend Archangel to the last although this is recognized as suicidal. The opinion of the Zemstvo Assembly is overwhelmingly in favor of such defense and political leaders declare it necessary for its good effect on loyal Russians in Soviet Russia. I believe, however, that the actual movement of British troops from the front which will begin about September 1st and the departure of the Embassy [*Embassies?*] probably between September 1 and 15 will cause the Russians to alter their decision.

The Government now hopes to obtain 4,000 volunteers from men hitherto not mobilized to infuse fighting spirit into the troops by good example and by propaganda. I understand, however, that the first day's recruiting gave 150 and yesterday only four. A delegation from the Russian colonels now at the front has stated that the moment Allied troops depart from any sector all the Russian officers there will at once be killed.

Rawlinson has brought the attention of the Provisional Government strongly to the dilemma with regard to supplies. Either large quantities of food and munitions must be left behind for its use, thus giving Bolsheviks excellent reason for attacking Archangel because rich booty, or the so-called defense must be organized without adequate supplies for the winter. He also called their attention to the extreme danger to all should the Allied troops not disarm the

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<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

Russian troops before departure. It may result in adding the majority of the present Russian forces here, fully equipped, clothed and armed, to the Red Army. Cole.

DAVIS

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861.00/5282 : Telegram

*Representatives of the Northern Region of Russia to President Wilson*

ARCHANGEL, August 25, 1919.

[Received at the White House 1:50 p.m.]

Representatives of the Northern Region of Russia, elected by the entire population of the region and representing the democracy of the region, having assembled here in Archangel at the conference of the Zemstvos and Municipalities have heard with misgiving of the recall of the British troops. In our country's cause and in fulfillment of the destiny imposed upon us by our electors we appeal to you, the allied democracies and governments, as follows. You are aware that Russia, your honest ally in the struggle with Germany and Austria, is now in a state of terrible civil war. The horrors, official disorganization and savagery have reached their climax. The peaceful population are dying out, murdered and robbed. The so-called Bolsheviks having scorned the people's will as expressed by the Constituent Assembly force the people by bayonet and machine gun to acknowledge them as rulers. They do not permit the free expression of the people's will and have again introduced into Russia an autocratic regime with even greater terror and bloodshed. Supported by Germany with the intention to defeat us they have in every way deceived the Russian people. They promised peace and gave us Brest. They promised freedom instead of which each non-Bolshevist thought or word is followed by imprisonment and execution. Instead of the promised bread they gave ruin, unemployment and terrible famine. They promised power of the workers and now none but their partisans are allowed to vote. The sale of Russia to Germany and neutral bankers and agreement with the servants of the old regime complete the picture of Bolshevik tyranny. Institutions expressive of the people's will, such as Municipalities and Zemstvos, even the Constituent Assembly, all were dispersed and scorned as they scorned universal suffrage. The Russian people could not bear this heavy yoke. From the very beginning of their rule insurrections in different parts of Russia took place against the Soviet Government. Siberia, the South, the Volga region, the North and West have closely surrounded central Russia where the Bolshevik rulers still hold their cruel sway over the peaceful population. Unarmed and scattered among the villages this population



is unable to withstand the well-armed Bolshevik Army, even though this army is mobilized by force and terrorized into fighting and thousand[s] of the population go to their death for the happiness of their country, for the people's freedom. Our native North which never has known either nobles or landlords was one [of] the first to rise. During the unequal armed struggle your troops arrived with words of encouragement and with promises of brotherly assistance. We believed you, we agreed unconditionally to the establishment of a front against Germany and her Allies the Bolsheviks. The struggle be equal war [*sic*]. We believed that the work once begun would be carried on to the end. We had no reason to disbelieve the honorable words of our Allies. Our loyalty and the millions of lives given by Russia in your victorious cause were our guarantee. With your help we overcame distances far exceeding the areas of your countries.

With your help we created a Russian force which sustains most of the burden in this struggle. Unfortunately our numbers are few in this region and we who have sacrificed most of our healthy sons for your victory over Germany will be unable to withstand the forcibly mobilized Bolshevik forces who fight under threat of machine guns. The presence of your troops was a moral support to us allowing us to gain time during which the Bolsheviks steadily neared their downfall. We were mistaken. You are recalling those eight or ten thousand men, of whom half are volunteers, who came to our assistance in the name of humanity. Our army young and small in numbers has not yet regained its moral strength after five years of incredible trials and without support loses the strength of will to defend its homes. Old men, peasants, guerillas who took up arms to defend their villages in mortal anguish drop their rifles, hundreds of thousands of the population mostly peasants and workmen deceived in their hopes will upon the arrival here of the Bolsheviks become the victims of their cruel vengeance. And to think only that your volunteers as a reserve could save us from massacre, starvation and ruin. We the representatives of the democracy appeal to you with the request to think of the blow to our unhappy country which your action entails. We appeal to the feeling for human justice and believe in its triumph. Drawn into the present form of struggle we cannot stop half way. The victory of Bolsheviks means death to us and we losing our country cannot find safety beyond the sea.

For the sake of the sanctity of human life you must leave your forces here so that in the last hour of our triumphs you may in humanity save those of us who are still alive. We do not wish for civil war or for its continuation. We wish to be free nation to

work in peace and freedom. This is why we cannot abandon the fight. Disorganization in the centre and ever increasing revolt betoken the end. The dawn is near. And we look into the future with anguish uncertain of our ability to hold out to the end. This is the picture created by the departure of your troops. You plunge us into a multitude of calamities and give new encouragement to the Bolsheviks to mock at the unhappy population. We ask you to believe this cry of despair and pain for the people who elected us which is caused by your decision.

1412

*President of Conference of Zemstvos and Municipalities of Northern Region, SKOMOROMOFF*  
*Vice Presidents, EDOVIN and GRENKOFF*  
*Secretaries, MELEHANSOF and ANTUSHEVITCH*

861.00/5119 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 27, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received 8:29 p.m.]

2903. Following from [Cole at] Archangel.

“ 1398. The Zemstvo and Municipal Assembly has adjourned after accomplishing more to arouse popular ways for the defense of Archangel after the Allies' departure than seemed possible a month ago. Its spontaneity, representative character and democracy have been indisputable throughout. There was a large moderate Socialist majority.

From its first session it was unanimous to continue the struggle. There has been a happy absence of party bickerings due to the Right elements yielding to the inevitable pressure of events with at least a temporary good grace. The Assembly's concrete accomplishments attained with the cooperation of the Government are :

1, A commission of defense to sit permanently consisting of three Socialists and two Cadets.

2, A commission on internal affairs sitting permanently containing four Socialists and one Cadet.

3, An order forbidding all males from 17 to 50 years to leave the state.

4, Mobilization according to districts by law [*chosen?*] by the Russian commander in chief of all males from 17 to 50 into the ranks of the home guards. This also has an appeal as labor mobilization since those not fitted for service in the home guards will labor two eight-hour periods weekly on Government work.

5, Despatch to the front of about 800 men of the home guards and of approximately 200 volunteers hitherto militarily exempt.

6, The reduction to a bare minimum of the men released from service as "essential" to Government or technical service.

7, The sending of a delegation in its name to Europe to obtain the continuance of British volunteer military assistance if possible but in any case to secure financial, food supply, munitions and moral support. The delegates are specially instructed to have the Russian ex-prisoners of war now in Europe returned at once to Archangel, especially those of local origin. This delegation of four contains three Socialists.

8, A telegram also in the Assembly's name to the Allied Governments and peoples protesting against the Allied withdrawal and requesting that troops be left. The Assembly ordered this telegram written with a special eye to its effect on the English laboring classes.

9, An increase of separation allotment to every member of soldiers' families (volunteer or drafted) from 30 to 100 rubles monthly, also 300 to each man entering service and 300 every three months of satisfactory service thereafter.

10, The addition of a second member chosen by Assembly to the one now delegated to the Government. Both men chosen are Socialists. Were they to be recalled it would undoubtedly precipitate a Government crisis.

11, Amnesty to be granted to political offenders, terms thereof to be presented by the Government to the two permanent commissions mentioned.

12, A revision of the military pension system.

13, In accepting present personnel of the military Government the Assembly has practically made the present Government dependent on its approval.

14, A promise from the Government to call a permanent representative body. In the meantime the Assembly has appointed a standing commission to arrange for the election of this body by popular suffrage. This commission of three is wholly Socialist. The new body will be in effect a regional constituent assembly and will have legislative power which the Zemstvo Assembly itself wisely chose not to attempt to exercise.

15, Guarantee that the Assembly itself shall be reconvened at stated intervals and shall study current problems and express its opinion to the Government. The Assembly has thus gone, without opposition from the Government, much farther than was expected even by its warmest advocates. Something like a parliamentary interpellation took place. The Chief of the Province (in practice

Minister of Internal Affairs) replied, whereupon Assembly declared itself satisfied and proceeded to the order of the day.

Points 10, 13, 14, and 15 amount in fact to the establishment of an informal and imperfect parliamentary system. If the changes introduced are maintained and carried out wisely by the Liberals and the moderate Socialist elements it may mark a great step forward in recent Russian political development and be a milestone in the reconstruction of a democratic Russia.

An engineer named Tsaplenko has been made labor inspector. Cole."

DAVIS

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861.00/5145 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, September 3, 1919, 1 p. m.

[Received September 4, 7:34 a.m.]

1403. All American private individuals have now left Archangel except several officers detailed for special work in Archangel by General Richardson.

COLE

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124.61/58 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 3, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received September 3, 2:04 p.m.]

2959. Following from [Cole at] Archangel.

1402, September 2, 7 p.m. Embassy and consulate staffs sailing for London on the steamer *Kildonan Castle* today except Albert, Flack and myself who expect to leave on or about September 7. See no reason for United States Steamship *Des Moines* remaining after my departure.

Japanese and Serbian Chargé d'Affaires leaving today. Chinese Chargé d'Affaires already gone. French Chargé d'Affaires will remain somewhat longer to demobilize Russian-French legion. On September 1st British Chargé d'Affaires ceased functioning as such either here or with Foreign Office, becoming "Diplomatic Adviser" to Commander-in-Chief Rawlinson. Movement of British troops has begun and expected to be completed as planned by September 30th. Cole.

DAVIS

861.00/5282 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1919, 6 p.m.

751. The President has received a telegram from representatives of the Conference of Zemstvos and Municipalities<sup>63</sup> making a fervid appeal for retention of Allied troops. Please consult your British Colleague and if you then deem it advisable inform President of Zemstvos Conference that American troops were sent to Archangel to assist Russians in safeguarding supplies and in such efforts as might be made to restore normal conditions. American troops were withdrawn after cooperating with Allied forces in North Russia for nine months, only because of conditions over which this Government had no control. You may assure the President of the Conference that our action was dictated by stern necessity and only because we had reached the limit of time when our military activities had perforce to cease. This Government understands that every possible effort is being made to offer a refuge for those Russians who are in danger. While this Government regrets most keenly that it cannot render the assistance asked for and which it thoroughly appreciates is very greatly needed, you may say that the Government and people of the United States continue to regard with deep and sympathetic interest the efforts now being made by the Provisional Government of Northern Russia and those other elements associated with Admiral Kolchak, and is hopeful that means will develop by which Russia may be assisted towards a happy outcome of the efforts of her people to regain control of their own affairs.

LANSING

861.00/5184 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, September 9, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received September 10, 5:20 p.m.]

1410. Your 751, September 4, 6 p.m. British colleague absent temporarily at Kem. I have communicated following to the attention of the president, Zemstvo Conference:

American troops were ordered to north Russia in order to guard stores and to support the Russians in whatever efforts they might make to restore normal conditions of life. These troops cooperated with other Allied forces for nine months and were only withdrawn because of condition beyond the control of the United States Government. The Government of the United States now desires to assure the president of the Zemstvo and Municipal Conference that it acted

<sup>63</sup> Dated Aug. 25, ante, p. 655.

under compulsion of necessity arising out of American law and only withdrew its troops because the time had arrived when its military activities had to cease. Although the Government of the United States most keenly regrets its inability to furnish the requested assistance, for which it thoroughly understands there is a very great need, both the Government and the people of the United States continue to feel a deep and sympathetic concern in those efforts now being made by the Provisional Government of north Russia and the other groups assisting Admiral Kolchak. The Government of the United States is also hopeful that means will be found to assist Russia toward a happy outcome of the struggle now being waged by its people again to come into control of their own affairs.

You will note this is paraphrased, since your text was in . . . code. You will note also word necessity has been modified by phrase "American law". This was done in order to give concrete explanation of the circumstances necessitating withdrawal and because the only explanation of the American withdrawal understood or appreciated by Russians of all classes is that 329th [339th] Regiment, 310th Engineers and railroad troops had to be demobilized when the war with Germany was over, since that was the only purpose contemplated by the American selective draft act. It was thought best to omit sentence regarding refugees since the Government of the United States is not actively engaged in the affair of such persons and because it now appears impolitic, after the Russians' decision to defend Archangel to the last and the efforts being made to create enthusiasm and to organize for that purpose, to insist officially on the presumption that it will collapse, also because those most in danger cannot or will not leave. The word hopeful used as corresponding word of the original message undecipherable.

COLE

861.00/5155: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1919, 6 p.m.

5946. Repeat your 2972, September 5, 6 p.m.<sup>64</sup> and 2903, August 27, 3 p.m. containing reports from Archangel, to American Mission with following message for Polk:

"In spite of our own withdrawal and definite evacuation of British, is Council of Four contemplating any measures to steady or support what appears to be genuine popular movement in Archangel district?"

PHILLIPS

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

123 C 673/38 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Russia (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, September 14, 1919, 9 a.m.

[Received 11:55 p.m.]

1417. Leaving this morning to London with Flack and Strother.  
Please inform families.

COLE

861.00/5358

*The Russian Military Attaché (Nikolaieff) to the War Department*<sup>66</sup>

## MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1919.

General Miller, Russian Army, Commander in Chief at Archangel, cabled on September 11th to the Russian Ambassador at Washington to the following effect: The people of Archangel are anxious to send a delegation to the United States with the purpose of finding volunteers among the Russians residing in this country as well as among the American citizens, who would like to go to the Northern Front, which is very much weakened on account of the withdrawal of all the allied troops, and to fight the bolsheviki.

General Miller would like to be informed, whether such a recruiting could be successful and whether the sending of the above mentioned delegation would be advisable.

861.00/5240 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, September 19, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received 11:40 p.m.]

4280. Referring telegrams from Cole, Archangel, repeated to the Department by Embassy, London, under numbers 2903<sup>67</sup> and 2972<sup>68</sup> and to Department's inquiry communicated by Ambassador Davis,<sup>69</sup> the Council of Four is not contemplating any measures to study [*steady?*] or support popular movement in Archangel district. It is unlikely that this subject will be approached by the Peace Conference as I believe this question should be handled by the Foreign Office[s]. Believe it would be well to give publicity to the nature and

<sup>66</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State by the War Department Sept. 24.

<sup>67</sup> Dated Aug. 27, 3 p.m., *ante*, p. 657.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

<sup>69</sup> No. 5946, Sept. 10, 6 p.m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 661.

accomplishment of Zemstvo and Municipal Assembly in Archangel as set forth in Cole's reports.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5358

*The Director of Military Intelligence (Churchill) to the Russian Attaché (Nikolaieff)*<sup>70</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1919.

MY DEAR COLONEL NIKOLAIEFF: Reference to your memorandum dated September 18, giving the purport of a cable from General Miller, Russian Army, Commander in Chief at Archangel, to the Russian Ambassador, Washington, requesting information whether or not a recruiting party of his forces could be successful in the United States and whether the sending of such a party would be advisable, I desire to inform you that this appears to be not so much a military matter as one involving international relations and would suggest that it be taken up with the State Department.

It is, however, perhaps pertinent to invite your attention to the fact that in general it is a violation of the penal laws of the United States for any person within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States to enlist or hire or retain another person to enlist to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, State, colony, district or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman. This prohibition does not include the citizens of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, but even this provision does not make it legal for citizens of the United States to enlist or go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States to enter the service of a foreign country.

In my opinion these laws would have made it legal for Russian citizens to have enlisted in the United States for service in the Russian army against Germany, but I do not think that enlistments such as General Miller suggests would be considered legal. It is especially clear that the enlistment of American citizens with the purpose he suggests is specially forbidden by law. In writing you this I have consulted the statutes of the United States, but I must beg you to consider my opinion as a semi-official one only and having no diplomatic weight.

Very Sincerely,

M. CHURCHILL

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<sup>70</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State by the War Department Sept. 24.



861.00/5411 : Telegram

*The Consul at Murmansk (Pierce) to the Secretary of State*

MURMANSK, October 17, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 3:22 p.m.]

The evacuation Allied forces was carried out to the limit including British consulate and the British signed [*sic*] ship named *Glory*. Quiet restored at Murmansk as well as along the coast, and the morale at the front position between two lakes north of Petrozavodsk is favorable in spite of the fact flank railroad bridges in the rear were destroyed but were repaired in as many days and the bandits caught and punished. Latest information is [*received?*] from Archangel are [*is?*] encouraging although refugees continue to arrive from there. The Russian general commanding informs me that some American citizens have been released from Soviet Russian territory and I have replied requesting they be allowed to proceed here immediately.

PIERCE

861.00/5626 : Telegram

*The Consul at Murmansk (Pierce) to the Secretary of State*

MURMANSK, November 11, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received November 12, 10:55 p.m.]

Quiet has been restored in Teheran [*the town?*] and district of Murmansk even more than usual when occupied by foreign troops. Encouraging advances are being made in the front where the morale is said to be above criticism. I have been reliably informed similar conditions prevail at Archangel. Supplies on hand here are considered sufficient for three or four months. This consulate will be closed November 15th and I will proceed to the United States on duty. Please notify my mother.

PIERCE

861.48/1021

*The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Payne)*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1919.

SIR: This Department is in receipt of your letter of November 14, 1919,<sup>1</sup> concerning the proposed movement of nine thousand tons of flour to Murmansk, ten thousand tons of coal to the same destination, and a possible shipment of twenty thousand tons of flour to Petro-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

grad. You state that the Financial Attaché of the Russian Embassy, Mr. Ughet, proposes to meet the aggregate freight charges of these shipments, amounting to about \$1,750,000, by a series of deferred payments extending over the period to November 1, 1920, with five per cent interest; and further that the Shipping Board is willing to supply this tonnage on receipt of an assurance from the State Department that no future Russian Government will be recognized unless these obligations are assumed by that Government.

You are now informed that it will be the policy of this Department not to recognize any future Russian Government without a recognition by the Government of all its credit obligations assumed on its behalf by the existing unrecognized Russian Governments or their agents.

You may undoubtedly obtain from the United States Grain Corporation the form of obligation accepted by it in making credit sales to the Russian Embassy. It may also interest you to learn that each representative of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Archangel Allied Supply Committee which sold flour and other food stuffs on credit terms in North Russia, took on behalf of his Government an obligation of the Provisional Government of North Russia assuming the debt created by the credit sales, "in its own name and in the name of the future Government of all Russia".

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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861.48/1030

*Commissioner John A. Donald of the United States Shipping Board  
to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1919.

My DEAR SIR: On behalf of the Chairman of this Board I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 21st. I note that it will be the policy of the State Department not to recognize any future Russian Government without the recognition by such Government of all its credit obligations assumed on its behalf by the existing unrecognized Russian Government, or its agents.

I beg to advise you that, in accordance with this statement, the Shipping Board is making arrangements with Mr. Ughet, attaché of the Russian Embassy for the shipment of coal and food supplies to Russian ports under the conditions named in my previous letter to you on this subject.

Very truly yours,

JOHN A. DONALD

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BALTIC PROVINCES

#### Conflict of the White Russians and Inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces with the Bolshevik Forces in Western Russia<sup>1</sup>

861.00/3591 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, *January 6, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received 9:06 p.m.]

3410. British Admiral Sinclair has arrived Copenhagen from Riga. He reported that when he received orders to leave city was defenceless against approaching regular Bolshevik forces few kilometers distant and that Bolshevik elements within the city were beginning uprisings. Some Lettish, from the troops to whom arms had been given by British, had joined these uprisings. It is now believed certain that city is in the hands of Bolsheviks. Repeated American Mission.

OSBORNE

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861.00/3604 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, *January 7, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received 11:15 p.m.]

3419. Legation's 3410, Jan. 6, 5 p.m. I was shown yesterday at British Legation two "secret" reports dated January 1st and 2nd, from Admiral Sinclair, commanding Sixth Light Cruiser Squadron on activities off Esthonian coast. He pictures hopeless ineffectiveness of Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Latvia to deal with present crisis. Populations apathetic towards Governments and afraid to join military organizations against Bolsheviks. Germans to the last apparently did much to prevent development and mobilization of native militia and refused promised supplies of arms and ammunition upon departure; Esthonian Government repeatedly requested British protectorate be declared which Sinclair

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<sup>1</sup> Additional information regarding conditions in the Baltic Provinces will be found in *The Baltic Provinces: Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Situation in the Baltic Provinces*, by Robert Hale (S. Doc. 105, 66th Cong., 1st sess.).

replied was out of the question; he, however, seemed to regard with favor further Esthonian requests for despatch of a British command and staff.

I learned also at British Legation that British War Council is "considering favorably" latter requests. Admiral Sinclair's squadron has left for England and been relieved by other British naval forces, which are still lying in Copenhagen. Delegation of members of Esthonian Government, which recently passed through here *en route* to England, will presumably press their requests for proclamation of British protectorate or military help. Repeated to Am[erican] mission Paris. Copenhagen to London.

OSBORNE

861.00/3704: Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, *January 24, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received January 25, 4:07 a.m.]

3510. Legation's 3410, January 6, 5 p.m. and 3419, January 7, 4 p.m. K. Ulmanis, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Lettish Republic of Latvia, arrived here having fled from Libau with Ministers of Finance and Agriculture. They desire Allied intervention or failing that to be permitted to recruit volunteers in the United States and among the Allied and American forces in France and to be supplied with arms and ammunition, et cetera. Ten thousand men as a nucleus probably sufficient. From February to September next at least forty to fifty thousand tons of bread flour necessary for supplying cities and devastated country districts probably more than this depending upon the extent of Bolshevik ravages in the occupied sections. Loan of the sum of (a million) pounds also requested to be secured by Latvian natural resources such as the forests which are alone valued at 30,000,000 pounds. Presence of a commission believed necessary to superintend carrying out of the armistice terms by the Germans, who refused to allow military organization among the native population before their departure and finally only supplied arms et cetera to the Baltic Germans. Finally despatch of Allied war vessels to Libau is desired to maintain order and to remove the Lettish forces, about 1,000 men, should it be necessary to evacuate Libau.

Ulmanis, who has been six years in the United States, makes a very favorable impression. He leaves shortly for Sweden to recruit volunteers, believing with some outside assistance the Letts would repel the Bolsheviks as successfully as did the Estonians when the Finnish volunteer forces arrived. Repeated American Mission.

OSBORNE

861.00/3704 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Osborne)*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1919, 3 p.m.

1407. Your 3510, January 24, 3 p.m. As recruiting in the United States has been stopped by order of the Secretary of War, the Department does not see how any action such as is urged by the officers of the Lettish Provisional Government can be taken, in order to organize volunteer forces from this country. You should take up as a separate question with the Am[erican] mission at Paris the matter of the proposed loan.

POLK

763.72119/3772 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received February 16, 4:58 a.m.]

768. Constantin Olsauskis has, as President of the Lithuanian Delegation at Paris, transmitted to me a copy of his petition to the President of the Peace Conference to recognize Lithuania as an independent state and to admit its representatives to the conference of peace. It is the opinion of the Commission that sufficient information has not yet been received to determine whether the Provisional Government in Lithuania is stable or whether it represents the bulk of the people. The sending of an [informal] commission for information purposes is now being considered.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/3859 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 15, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received 9:45 p.m.]

769. The Esthonian delegation has addressed a request to me as Secretary of State repeating its petition of May 5 [3] last<sup>2</sup> that the independence of Esthonia be recognized and requesting recognition of the right of Esthonia as a belligerent nation during the war against the Russian Federative Communist Republic.

Attached to above communication was copy of note to President of Peace Conference asserting Esthonia's independence, recognized provisionally by British, French, and Italian Governments, and

<sup>2</sup> Letter from the Esthonian delegation to the Ambassador in Great Britain, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 827-828.

accepting the Prinkipo invitation with the provision that if any decision should be taken there regarding Esthonian independence, Esthonian Government will not consider itself so bound.

Opinion of Commission is same as that expressed with regard to recognition Lithuania (see my telegram number 708 [768] February 15, 9 [3] p.m.).

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/3891 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 20, 1919, noon.

[Received 3:13 p.m.]

834. Esthonian delegation states an arrangement made between Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania for common struggle against Bolsheviks. They add Esthonian troops having cleared own territories have entered Latvia on the whole front to a distance of 50 kilometers while behind this front Lettish Government is organizing Lettish forces and state Sweden, Finland, and Denmark have given permission to enroll volunteers of whom 1,000 already enlisted.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/3897 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, February 20, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received 8:48 p.m.]

3663. Legation's 3652, February 18, 9 p.m.<sup>3</sup> In interview with naval attaché yesterday morning General Mannerheim<sup>4</sup> stated that his army willing to and capable of defeating the Bolsheviks in northern Russia. They need neither men nor ammunition but merely moral support of the Allies. Mannerheim stated that he was willing to commence hostilities immediately if encouraged to do so by the Allies and assured that the United States would hasten sending food supplies to Finland. Repeated to Am[erican] Mission Paris. Number 213.

GRANT-SMITH

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Regent of Finland.

861.00/4005 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VIBORG, March 2, 1919.

[Received March 4, 1:33 a.m.]

3. Have had several conferences with General Boris Gylenbogel, his chief of staff and Ernest Grude, formerly Undersecretary of Finance in the Czar's Government, representing respectively the military and financial heads of the Russian Whites, opposed to the Bolshevik *de facto* Government.

The Whites have, with the knowledge and implied consent of the Finnish Government, perfected a military organization numbering, they state, 10,000 men, volunteers. According to the General, this force is fully supplied with small arms and ammunition and has an adequate supply of machine guns though little artillery; its mobilization can be completed in less than a week; its discipline claimed to be that of the old regime army.

The object of this organization is the capture of Petrograd and afterward Moscow and the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. With the assistance of those Whites in these cities ready to join the movement once it is launched and the Finnish Independents, the leaders assert there is little doubt as to the success of such an attempt. The Whites assert their problem is not a military one but economic: it is a question of food and it is in this connection they ask the assistance of the United States.

The Whites are aware of the fact that it would be impracticable to send food directly for such a force, either to Finland or to the southern Baltic coast, especially as they can't be absolutely sure of the Esthonian loyalty. They have sufficient food for a campaign of ten days and to feed Petrograd for that length of time but if when this is exhausted other food is not forthcoming, they feel that their efforts will have been in vain as anarchy, induced by hunger, will again break out. Whites ask that American Government ship to some port in Scandinavia, by preference Copenhagen, sufficient food to supply Petrograd and Moscow once they are taken, this food to be started from Copenhagen immediately a military success is accomplished.

Estimated food needed: 60,000 tons flour, 10,000 tons meat, 5,000 tons fats, 2,000 tons sugar and other supplies in proportion, delivery to a period of four months after which time it is believed the country will supply its own food.

The Whites express their entire sympathy with the Siberian Government under Kolchak and their desire to cooperate with Allied forces in the North, stating that once Petrograd is taken they will dispatch a force to Vologda to take Red Army in rear. They assure me there will be no looting, no destruction of private property, no pogrom, and that if food is furnished by United States in support of this venture they will be guided by the wishes of our Government both as to their internal policy and their relationship with Germany. Also that the United States will have the preferential interest of the new Government, both politically and economically. They also guarantee me uninterrupted telegraphic cipher communication.

As to the repayment of the money represented by the food supplies, the Whites offer two methods: first, the passage of a law by the Government in Siberia taxing banks 5 per cent on their capital, this fund to be paid over to the United States when the Whites gain control; second, an undertaking of the various White leaders here, in Siberia, in Ukrainia, and in the North to float a bond issue once the Government comes into power, to act as a claim on future state funds.

If the United States Government thinks favorably of sending food in support of the Whites, I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of immediate action; 1st, because the attitude of the Finnish Government towards the project of the Whites may change; 2d, that the lives of the starving people in Petrograd and Moscow may be saved; 3d, if the movement is long deferred the peasants, upon whom the Whites count for support, will be engaged in working their land and will not rise to support the movement. Even a month's delay may be fatal to the project.

I have of course made no statement to the White leaders as to the probable attitude of our Government nor committed myself in any way.

IMBRIE

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861.00/4023 : Telegram

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Acting Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, *March 6, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received 8:10 p.m.]

193. Imbrie informs me of his attitude concerning military forces against Petrograd. Such a move would be the height of folly and do irreparable harm.

HAYNES



861.00/4065a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1919, 6 p.m.*

1020. For Lansing.

Lettish National League of America, which is seeking to promote trade relations between United States and Baltic provinces, has sent representative to London to confer with President Lettish National Council, which has received informal recognition by British Foreign Office. Lettish National League requests this representative be furnished with letter by Department stating that United States is not opposed to activities of League along the lines indicated. I recommend that Department be authorized to issue such letters in appropriate cases in its discretion, as informal recognition of Baltic Governments by other Associated Governments and lack of recognition by United States may otherwise react to our commercial disadvantage by creating in those countries the erroneous impression that our attitude toward them is an unfriendly one.

POLK

861.00/4035 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*COPENHAGEN, *March 8, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received 7:15 p.m.]

3721. I venture to suggest that the attitude of the Associated Governments toward the nascent states on the Baltic littoral should be determined upon with as little delay as possible. Finland and Esthonia have rid themselves of Bolshevik troops; Latvia and Lithuania are campaigning against them. The Germans are moving in from the south ostensibly to aid the populations to expel the terrorists but in fact to reestablish their hold on those lands which they especially coveted. A certain quantity of much-needed war material has been provided the Esthonians and Letts by the British, but foodstuffs must also be sent in to counteract local Bolshevik tendencies if the aid rendered is to be anything but ephemeral. Since these must come from us, and the Provisional Governments are unable to find cash for purchase, I would suggest the advisability of considering the question of credits and sending an expert familiar with the country, and language too if possible, to ascertain the character of guarantees which might with safety be accepted as security for at least the initial shipments should it be deemed wise to adopt such a procedure. The three points relative to which information is desired are: 1st,

military; 2d, political; 3d, the economic situation. The British are partially covering the first two, but might well be seconded by a soldier like Colonel Solbert. The economic question is likewise receiving some attention (see my 3716, March 6, 2 p.m.<sup>6</sup>), but a visit and report by Lehrs, for many years resident in Russia, should be of much practical value.

Repeated Am[erican] Mission Paris number 241.

GRANT-SMITH

861.00/4005 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie)*

WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1919, 5 p.m.*

Your No. 3, March 2. Department has no adequate information regarding Russian Whites referred to. This Government not in a position to offer any support or assistance but wishes to be kept advised developments. You are to exercise extreme caution not to encourage false hopes.

POLK

861.00/4066 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *March 12, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received March 12, 2:36 p.m.]

1131. Department's 1020, March 7th, 6 p.m. My feeling is Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania should receive all proper economic assistance from the United States. I approve your recommendation that in appropriate cases letters should be issued in the sense of your telegram. See my telegram this date with regard to Finland and Esthonia.<sup>7</sup>

LANSING AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/4068 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *March 12, 1919, 8 p.m.*

[Received 11:56 p.m.]

1136. Referring to telegram to Department from Legation Copenhagen number 3721,<sup>8</sup> following message is being despatched by cable to Legation,

<sup>6</sup>Not printed.

<sup>7</sup>Apparently refers to no. 1136, *infra*.

<sup>8</sup>Mar. 8, 3 p.m., *ante*, p. 672.

“Your 241, March 8, 1 [3] p.m.<sup>9</sup> A mission including necessary experts will leave here about week for Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsingfors, Reval to investigate economic military situation and the question of credits. Please prepare useful data, concise form, to hand them on arrival. Chief of this mission is Lieutenant Colonel [Warwick] Greene personally known to you.[”]

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/4073 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, *March 13, 1919, 6 p.m.*

[Received 7:40 p.m.]

3746. The Finnish Minister informs me that he has just learned that the Bolshevik troops are bombarding Narva with nine-inch guns and that the Esthonians are very hard pressed. Repeated Am[erican] Mission number 252 [251].

GRANT-SMITH

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861.00/4086½ : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, *March 18, 1919, 3 p.m.*

7765. Repeat to Mission and to London. Vice Consul Imbrie at Viborg telegraphs March 14<sup>10</sup> that General Tesloff, commander of the Finnish forces on the Russian frontier and personally representing General Mannerheim, assures him that he and General Mannerheim are both of the opinion that it will be necessary to take Petrograd in order to save Finland from the Bolsheviks. General Tesloff believes the problem is not serious from a military standpoint but says the continued occupation of the city will depend wholly on obtaining food supplies. General Tesloff also informed Vice Consul Imbrie that Finland would expect the Murman Peninsula as a reward for taking Petrograd. Vice Consul Imbrie states that in his relations with General Tesloff he will exercise extreme caution not to arouse false hopes or in any way to commit this Government.

POLK

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<sup>9</sup> The same telegram as no. 3721, *ante*, p. 672.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/5 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, *April 17, 1919.*

[Received in Paris April 18, 12:30 a.m.]

319. Following from Greene.

"Greene 8, April 16. By *coup d'état* executed about 4 p.m. Wednesday 16th, Germans overthrew Provisional Government Latvia, imprisoned Premier and other Cabinet ministers, disarmed and confined Lettish troops, seized treasury notes of Latvian Government, and now remain in complete control of situation. Will telegraph full details when known. Pretext for *coup d'état* apparently suppression Bolsheviki. Real motive embarrass Allied powers. Greene".

GRANT-SMITH

861.24/139

*The Acting Secretary of War (Crowell) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *April 30, 1919.*

SIR: I beg leave to attach hereto copy of letter, dated April 17, 1919,<sup>11</sup> in which a request is made for sale of rifles, and other war material to the Finnish, Esthonia and Letland Republics.

In view of the constantly changing international conditions in Europe your approval is desired before entering into negotiations to make this sale.

Very respectfully,

BENEDICT CROWELL

Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/19 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, *May 2, 1919.*

[Received in Paris May 3, 9:15 p.m.]

350. Following from Greene:

"29, May 2nd. Legation's 346, April 29th.<sup>11</sup> Northern Esthonian front still firm despite serious bombardment Narva, entailing destruction 150 houses, and 5,000 homeless. Southern front weak at several points, but temporarily strengthened and firm. Need of food supplies in outlying districts urgent. Important that food ships sail at once for Reval".

GRANT-SMITH

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

861.00/4439 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, May 6, 1919.

[Received 1:14 p.m.]

3946. Following from Greene.

"32. May 4th. Esthonian situation requires immediate affirmative action by Allies [and] America. Unless Government receives prompt help peace with Bolshevists likely. Esthonia will then gradually or quickly but inevitably succumb completely to Bolshevism.["]

GRANT-SMITH

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/19 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) at Libau*

PARIS, May 11, 1919.

Jam 67. Reference your 350 [29] to Am[erican] mission<sup>18</sup> reporting conditions northern Esthonia. Your recommendations adopted and steamer *Dancey* loaded with 2,000 tons foodstuffs, which we advanced on credit as substantial evidence our great sympathy Esthonian people, will arrive Reval Monday 12th. Please see that this information properly disseminated. Colonel John Groome leaving Rotterdam Tuesday via boat for Libau with a relief mission and will have charge our work in Esthonia, Lettland and Lithuania, reporting direct to me. He will be followed by two relief ships. Request you advise him as to best means handling relief situation this territory and particularly method you suggest for handling starving people reported on island near Riga. Hoover.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/27 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Extract]

COPENHAGEN, May 12, 1919.

[Received in Paris, 9:30 p.m.]

366. Following from Greene, Libau.

"Greene, 31, May 11: Actual distribution American food begun under Major Brookings in Libau, May 9, through Municipal Coun-

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<sup>18</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Chargé in Denmark, no. 350, May 2, p. 675.

cil. Flour also *en route* Windau and shortly to Mitau and Tuckum. All distribution through Municipal Councils as no national government. As privation exists mainly in cities this relieves situation.

Greene"  
GRANT-SMITH

Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/35 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, May 23, 1919.

[Received in Paris May 24, 11:10 a.m.]

383. Following from Greene, Libau.

"27. May 22: As foreshadowed my telegram<sup>14</sup> general offensive on against Riga; street fighting now progressing. Military authorities expect to capture city not later than Sunday. Food train for city left yesterday with officers A[merican] R[elief] A[dministration] and also our Mission. Bolsheviki also reported attacking heavily on right flank at Bausk. See Dawley report.<sup>15</sup> Greene."

GRANT-SMITH

Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/38 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

STOCKHOLM, May 30, 1919.

[Received in Paris May 31, 2:40 p.m.]

319. Following received from Colonel Greene dated May 27th, Riga.

"30. May 27th. During past three days I have made close examination Riga and vicinity. By early arrival have secured much valuable information from direct observation and first-hand sources all of which will be forwarded you as soon possible. City taken as I telegraphed you<sup>16</sup> by surprise attack executed by Letts and Russian volunteers center, German Iron Division right. Bolshevik reinforcements from northern Livonian front came too late. Hans Manteuffel, leading Balt attacking battalion, killed and buried yesterday with

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed. Lt. Col. Ernest J. Dawley was a member of the mission to the Baltic Provinces.

<sup>16</sup> Telegram not printed.

large military funeral. Prince Lieven dangerously wounded. All attacking forces were Euger [*under?*] Major Fletcher, a German officer who is chief of Balt territorial defense troops or Landeswehr. Balt, German, Lettish troops now hold city. Present front Livonian River and then across main north road at point about twenty kilometers from Riga water front thence to River Dūna above Dahlern Island. Major Fletcher sole authority military, police, civil. Complete quiet and order now prevail in city in which is administered with a strong hand. City uninjured except for slight shell damage along river front. City waterworks captured intact May 24th. Population has suffered many privations under Bolshevik rule and energetic food distribution is needed immediately. Forty cars American flour at Mitau will come to Riga as soon as railway gauge altered probably May 29th. Story of starving people on island untrue. Before leaving Bolsheviks commenced massacre civilians in prison with machine gun but only thirty-three killed before arrival attacking forces. These include ten women and seven pastors. Mine fields reported to contain over 400 mines, extend ten miles from Dūna mouth. Major Fletcher has commenced sweeping operations which will be completed in three to six days when ships can enter. Needra<sup>17</sup> here. Returning to Libau May 29th to meet Colonel Groome. Greene." 319.

WHEELER

861.24/148

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 30, 1919 with enclosures, raising the question as to the sale of rifles and other war materials to the Finnish, Esthonian and Lettish Republics.

In reply I have the honor to inform you that I have a communication from the American Mission at Paris approving the sale of rifles to Finland, and to those parts of Esthonia and Latvia which are non-Bolshevik. However, it is requested by this Department that any proposals to dispose of rifles and machine guns of Russian type should first be considered in connection with the general question of furnishing arms to the Russian forces of Admiral Kolchak and other non-Bolshevik groups.

I have [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

<sup>17</sup> Andreas Needra, Latvian statesman.

Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/39: Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, June 2, 1919.

[Received in Paris June 3, 10:30 a.m.]

399. Following from Libau:

"Greene 31, June 1st. General critical conditions here and especially after six days in Riga and vicinity I consider it advisable to allow the increase of Russian volunteers serving under Prince Lieven, this increase to come from Russian prisoners in Germany. Lieven's force has already been augmented from this source, but have the Associated Governments any objections to its increase to 5,000 men? I understand British Mission Berlin has limited the number prisoners available for Lieven. I am recommending only from the local viewpoint. Greene."

GRANT-SMITH

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/40: Telegram

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

COPENHAGEN, June 4, 1919.

[Received in Paris 11:40 p.m.]

400. Following from Libau:

"Greene 32, June 3rd: I spent six days in Riga. We arrived while dead still unburied and were able to verify exact condition of city under Bolshevist rule, also to see the White Terror succeed the Red and to realize the need of outside intervention to bring peace and reconciliation into this country. The Red Terror is worse than the White but the latter sufficiently shocking. Soldiers of the attacking forces who took the city, only to find mothers, sisters and pastors murdered in cold blood by the Bolsheviks and wives forced to work in public baths where they had been raped by Bolshevist soldiers, can be expected to show little mercy. In this war power swings alternatively to the extremists of either side and justice is administered by those whose passions are hottest. Consequently, what is called justice is largely reprisals and vengeance. Losses in field actions comparatively light but slaughter by shooting squads is appalling. Bolshevists shoot prisoners and civilians indiscriminately often in the legs and then club out their brains with rifle butts. Whites are generally less barbarous but carry out wholesale executions. Under experienced officers and trained soldiers,



executions are ruthless and cold-blooded but painless, as condemned killed instantly, but it is otherwise under inexperienced or incompetent officers. I am speaking with direct knowledge of above matters as I saw Bolshevist victims as well as White executions. I have heard German soldiers mutter that in four years of war they had not witnessed such scenes. I took up question executions with Fletcher<sup>19</sup> at Riga urging more clemency, more care and delay in trials and presence of pastor and doctor at each execution. He defends necessity for stern measures owing danger anarchy in Riga but said he had taken measures for controlling executions and reprisals including appointment of Lettish officer on each trial board. He also promised to have pastor and doctor at each future execution. For Fletcher it must be said that he has restored order in Riga under most difficult circumstances, that he has prevented looting in the city, and that his iron hand is impartial as we found German officers in common jail for looting along with Bolshevist and civilian criminals. We were also informed that order from Berlin has stopped general Bolshevist executions by German troops not under Fletcher.

2. I wish to emphasize the savage and unrelenting character of this war, where ancient racial hatred between Balt and Lett, resistance to German military domination and struggle of submerged nationalities to free themselves from pan-Slavism are hopelessly interwoven into the fight between Bolshevism and anti-Bolshevism and class warfare and world revolution preached from Moscow. No element or group trusts the other even when temporarily allied for common end and no mercy is shown to the defeated.

3. American food train twice attacked by outlaws while at Mitau en route Riga. Successfully defended by Balt guard. Six killed in first attack. Greene.”

GRANT-SMITH

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/39 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chargé in Denmark  
(Grant-Smith)*

PARIS, June 10, 1919, 11 p.m.

65. For Greene, Libau.

Your 399, 2d, referring to increase of Russian volunteer force. Your telegram has been referred to General Harries<sup>20</sup> now in Paris who believes that Prince Lieven should be allowed all the volunteers

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<sup>19</sup> Major Fletcher, German commander of the Baltic Landwehr.

<sup>20</sup> Brig. Gen. George H. Harries, chief of the American Military Mission at Berlin.

he wants and sees no reason why the number of prisoners available for him should be limited except that policy has been adopted to send a small number of troops from various camps each day in order not to show partiality and on account of difficulties of transportation. General Harries has been requested by Am[erican] mission to act according to his discretion in the matter and the only suggestion made to him is that the prisoners going with Lieven's force shall be genuine volunteers for that service and shall not use their enlistment as a mere pretext to obtain an early release.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/4757: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1919, 6 p.m.

2445. For the Secretary of State and McCormick: Following from Omsk June 24, 2 p.m.

"Omsk Foreign Office makes following request of English, French and American Governments:

It is all important that Petrograd should be captured. The material and moral effect would be great blow to Bolsheviki. Bolsheviki have decided to greatly reinforce Petrograd by soldiers from other fronts. Kolchak has personally addressed telegram to Mannerheim to obtain decision of Finnish Government to attack Petrograd before Bolshevik reinforcement arrive and to aid the offensive of Russian-Esthonian troops. The Omsk Government hopes that all objection which the Powers may have formed against a Finnish advance will be set aside and that the Allied Governments will depart from their old viewpoint which apparently revealed their passive and neutral attitude on the questions of the Finns taking Petrograd.

Kolchak desires to be known that the active assistance of Finland and its eventual advances into this or any other part of Russian territory could not in the future be considered as a claim to any political aspirations. Omsk Government believes all outstanding questions between Finland and Russia may be peacefully settled with the assistance of League of Nations. Kolchak would like to see municipal administration established in Petrograd under General Udenitch.

Kolchak asks American Government to use its good offices with Finnish Government to the end that Petrograd shall be relieved."

I would be grateful if you will advise me at an early date, *First* what action decided upon as to approaching Finnish Government, *Second* what attitude taken regarding capture of Petrograd, *Third* what measures if any will be taken by Allies and especially the United States to render tangible support to Esthonians or Finns or both in this movement. I think it important that we should answer

Kolchak promptly. Please let me know whether answer will be sent through Russian Conference at Paris or through Department.

PHILLIPS

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01502/60

*The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

MEMORANDUM

PARIS, June 28, 1919.

There is attached hereto a memorandum on the Baltic States and Lithuania.<sup>21</sup>

This memorandum may be summarized as follows:

Conditions in the Baltic Provinces are critical, with the military situation paramount. Action on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments is urgently needed.

The Baltic Provinces and Lithuania have an importance out of all proportion to their size and population, due to their geographical position which makes them the western and at present most important key to the Russian problem.

These regions have only recently been recovered from Bolshevism, largely with the help of German troops. They have been saved from this danger, however, only to fall into another: German military occupation with German colonization and complete German dominance imminent.

Failure to take action on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments will abandon these regions either to Bolshevism or Germanism, whichever eventually proves strongest. If Bolshevism acquires them it will threaten Western Europe. The precipitate withdrawal of the German troops before other arrangements are made for the support of the local forces may bring about this result by endangering the internal security of these regions and by inviting a fresh Bolshevik aggression from Russia. On the other hand, the indefinite continuance of the German troops and of German support of the local troops will give Germany a preponderate influence in the future of Russia. Germany cannot be prevented from participating in the commercial regeneration of Russia, nor is it desirable to do so. But her military hold on the Baltic Provinces must be loosened.

Two alternate remedies are suggested, both based on a definite policy of hostility to Bolshevism, and on the establishment of a counterpoise to the Prussian forcible intrusion:

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<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

- (1) That Great Britain and the United States accept complete mandates for these regions. If this is not acceptable, then
- (2) That the local national forces (Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Balts), together with Russian and foreign volunteers, be supported, and that a British Military Mission take charge of the military situation; that the United States supply food and cooperate with Great Britain in munitions and credits; that the Mission of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace be continued subordinated to the British in military, but not in political or economic matters.

WARWICK GREENE

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861.00/4791 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VIBORG, July 2, 1919.

[Received July 3, 11:25 p.m.]

58. The Bolsheviks' forces on the Gatchina front have now been increased to approximately 80,000 men. There are indications that the Reds will attempt an offensive in which event a White retreat seems imminent. Russian Whites have abandoned their contemplated advance schemed for July 15th and now have small hope that Petrograd can be taken from their front.

Negotiations have been in progress between the Russian Whites under General Youdenitch and the Finns with the end in view of inducing the Finns to advance against Petrograd from the Byello-oztrow front. There is every indication that the Finns will undertake the capture of Petrograd, which they are entirely able to accomplish, if they can be assured of Allied approval. In such event the Finns would probably demand an outlet to the Arctic Sea and an ice-free port, a demand which the Russians would be disposed to transmit [*sic*]. If our Government desires the fall of Petrograd and the overthrow of the Bolsheviks such intimation should be conveyed to the Finns together with an approval for their advance.

IMBRIE

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861.00/5259

*General Tasker H. Bliss of the Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Russian Ambassador to the United States (Bakhmeteff), temporarily at Paris*

PARIS, July 4, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR MONSIEUR BAKHMETEFF:

With reference to the conversation between General Bliss and Mr. Bakhmeteff of July 3rd, information is requested as to (a) the

measures the representatives of Admiral Koltchak at Paris would propose in order to finance, organize and support the anti-Bolshevist forces in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, and (b) the assurances they would give as to the future autonomy of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, together with a specific statement as to the nature of the autonomy.

The approaching withdrawal of the German forces and the critical situation in these regions call for a firm military and political policy in order to maintain this anti-Bolshevist front and not to jeopardize the gains that have already been made from the Bolshevists. In view of the urgency of the matter an early reply would be appreciated.

Furthermore, the military situation requiring the immediate support and strengthening of the Russian Volunteer anti-Bolshevist forces in the Baltic Provinces, will General Rodzianko and Prince Lieven be recognized by the representatives of Admiral Koltchak at Paris as the respective leaders of these forces?

TASKER H. BLISS

861.00/5259

*The Russian Ambassador to the United States (Bakhmeteff), temporarily at Paris, to General Tasker H. Bliss of the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

PARIS, July 8, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BLISS, U.S.A.

Replying to the memorandum of General Bliss of July 4th and with reference to the conversation between the General and Mr. Bakhmeteff of July 3rd.

It is noted, that the approaching withdrawal of the German forces from the Baltic Provinces and the critical situation in these regions call, in the opinion of the U.S. military authorities, for a firm military and political policy in order to maintain the anti-bolshevik front. That to this effect, besides financing, organizing and supporting the anti-bolshevist forces in the Baltic provinces and Lithuania, the military situation requires immediate support and strengthening of the Russian Volunteer Forces acting in the Baltic region. It is further understood that while proposing to assist the anti-bolshevist forces in Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia, the United States authorities consider these Provinces as a part of Russia, it being contrary to the intentions of the United States to encourage by any action the dismemberment of Russia.

It is understood as well that it is the intention of the United States Government, while rendering such assistance to proceed in

conformity with the aims and views of Admiral Koltchak's Government.

The following reply, covering the questions referred to in General Bliss's Memorandum, is given upon consultation with Mr. Sazonow, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Admiral Koltchak's Government as well as General Tcherbatcheff, chief Russian military representative in Paris:

(a) The representatives of Admiral Koltchak's Government fully concur with the opinion that the general situation round the Baltic calls for an efficient policy in order to support and develop anti-Bolshevist action in these regions. Especially the Russian authorities are convinced that the most important operation at the present moment consists in the capture of Petrograd and the relief of the city and its vicinity from Bolshevik occupation.

(b) With this in view it is necessary to provide the forces actually combatting Bolshevism or which might possibly be organized for this purpose with munition, clothing and food. Assistance should be given to the Russian Volunteer formations and to the Esthonian, Lithuanian and Leth [*Lett*] forces, in so far as these latter are combatting Bolshevism. It is especially imperative to supply without further delay the forces combatting round Petrograd and more so, to enable the formation of further contingents both on the South littoral and the Gulf of Finland as in Finland itself.

Arrangements are to be made as well which would provide food and other essentials to the population of the regions liberated from the Bolsheviks.

(c) To render military operations efficient it is essential to establish the principle of unity of front on the whole line from the former German frontier to Petrograd. Unity of front would mean coordination of all military operations as well as unified direction of supply and relief. General Youdenitch has been nominated by Admiral Koltchak Commander in Chief of the anti-Bolshevist forces in the North-Western regions of Russia.

General Youdenitch's Head-Quarters at present are in Helsingfors. A special British military Mission is cooperating with General Youdenitch, with General Gough at its head. Practical measures necessary to achieve unity of front and to coordinate activities connected with the assistance within the Baltic regions, can be easily agreed to by establishing direct contact with General Youdenitch, on place.

General Rodzianko and Prince Lieven are operating under General Youdenitch's supreme command. All possible assistance should be given to these military leaders as well as to any others appointed

by General Youdenitch or recognizing his authority. Attention is drawn to the precarious position of General Rodzianko's forces owing to inadequacy of supply and outnumbering Bolshevik forces.

As to Prince Lieven's Detachment, it is imperative that this contingent would rely on sources of supply from Allied or Associated Powers.

The Chief Military Representative of Admiral Koltchak's Government in Paris, General Tcherbatcheff (H.Q., 4 Rue Christophe Colomb) is prepared to submit to the United States military authorities in Paris details as to the military situation and as to the requirements in the regions in question.

(d) Admiral Koltchak's Government will be prepared to assume liabilities towards the U. S. Government resulting from delivery of munitions, materials and food to the anti-bolshevist forces, both Russian Volunteer and eventually Esthonian, Leth or Lithuanian. Representatives of Admiral Koltchak's Government will be pleased to consider any practical proposals emanating from the United States authorities to this effect and will be prepared to execute such documents and sign such obligations as would be considered necessary for this purpose.

(e) The Government of Admiral Koltchak will be gratified with all assistance in munitions and supply which will be given to the anti-bolshevist forces and to the populations of the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, provided it is made clear to all the national authorities in these provinces that this assistance is not to be construed as prejudicing in any way the unity of Russia and will not be used to encourage separatist movements or to foster interracial strife.

(f) As to the assurances regarding the future autonomy of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia, attention is drawn to Admiral Koltchak's reply of July [*June*] 4th to the Allied and Associated Powers<sup>24</sup> in which the chief of the Provisional Russian Government announced the views of this Government relative to autonomous arrangement of the various nationalities as well as reiterated the equality before law in Russia of all classes and citizens without distinction of origin or religion.

The Allied and Associated Powers have thus obtained a solemn pledge with regard to the future autonomous arrangement of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia. These privileges are to be incorporated in the future Constitution of Russia which is to be drawn by a Constituent Assembly freely elected by all citizens of Russia. Before the Constituent is assembled there can be possibly no authority in Russia which could pass final decisions on these matters.

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<sup>24</sup> Transmitted by the French Chargé at Omsk, *ante*, p. 375.

There is no difficulty, however, in outlining, in a general way what is generally understood in Russia under "autonomous arrangement" and what in all certainty will constitute in great lines the substance of self-government which the nationalities will enjoy under the future Russian Constitution.

Under autonomous arrangement is generally understood Provincial Self-Government; exemplified in a Provincial Legislative Assembly and a Provincial Executive. These bodies dealing with the whole field of internal organization and Provincial administration with the exception of such functions which belong to the competency of the State as a whole. As such one may mention: International Relations; State Finance (except Provincial taxation and expenditure); Army and Navy; Customs; General Regulations of Industry, Trade and Labor; Civil and Criminal Code (except local particularities); High Courts of Justice; Post and Telegraph; Main Railways, Waterways, and Port Terminals.

BAKHMETEFF

861.00/4996

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 18

VIBORG, July 11, 1919.

[Received August 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report on the political and military conditions in Soviet Russia, as evidenced by events since April first. . . .

At the beginning of April the Bolshevick tide was at its lowest ebb. In the East Koltchack's advance toward the Volga was causing grave apprehension if not consternation. Trotsky and Lenine were at odds over the proposed removal of the Bolshevick capital from Moscow to Kieff. The Social Revolutionists were conducting a seemingly serious movement, which sometimes found voice in terrorism, against the Bolshevicks. (My telegram No 19 fourth.<sup>25</sup>) The food shortage in the Central Cities had reached a super-crisis. Railroad transportation had almost broken down and navigation had not opened. From the Finnish-Russian border Petrograd was menaced with an advance and in the opening days of the month a volunteer Finnish Force advancing into Carelia took Olonetz and threatened Petrograd from the North. (My telegrams Nos 23 ninth and 30 twentyninth respectively<sup>25</sup>).

That the Bolshevicks were in a state bordering almost upon panic is shown by numerous actions on their part: the summoning of the

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.



International Battalion to Petrograd (my telegram No 27 twentieth<sup>26</sup>): the building of pontoon bridges for retreat across the Neva (my telegram No 26 eighteenth<sup>26</sup>): preparations for the evacuation of Petrograd (my telegram No 44 first<sup>26</sup>): the withdrawal of the fleet from Kronstadt and the issuance of various decrees.

Early in May the Russian White detachment which had originated in Pskoff had attained sufficient numbers to encourage the belief that it might take Petrograd. This detachment accordingly advanced in the direction of Petrograd, meeting little opposition, and finally stopping at Gatchina forty five versts southwest of the City (my telegrams Nos 39 twentysixth, 50 thirteenth and 51 seventeenth respectively<sup>26</sup>). There was no military reason extant why this force could not have at once moved northward and captured the City. They were, however, without food sufficient to supply their own needs, to say nothing of feeding the population of Petrograd. The force therefore ceased its advance, merely taking steps to protect its flanks. In this latter operation Krasnaya Gorka, on the Finnish Gulf, was, with the assistance of the British fleet, captured.

This advance of this Detachment was a mistake. It should never have been made, unless the Whites were prepared to carry it to a conclusion and take Petrograd, which they were not, for the reason just given. The Reds at once began gathering and massing troops against this front. At first the Bolshevick troops were greatly outnumbered, but as the Whites made no attempt to advance, time was given in which to bring up the reserves which the Bolshevicks have continued to do with the result that Krasnaya Gorka has been retaken and at present the Whites are outnumbered about two to one. Many regiments of Soviet soldiers have gone over to the Whites, this constituting the sole means of White recruiting, but the Bolshevicks are in the position of still being able to bring up large reserves. (My telegrams Nos. 34 seventh and 64 ninth<sup>26</sup>).

In the meantime, the menace of an advance from the Olonetz front has been stopped and the Bolshevick troops, by virtue of superior numbers, have been able to push back the Finnish Whites. (My telegrams Nos. 34 seventh and 64 ninth<sup>26</sup>).

With the opening of navigation, the railway transportation has been supplemented by water transportation with the result that, in some slight degree, the food situation has been improved. The successes, which the Bolshevicks have attained on the Volga front, the pushing back of the Finns on the Olonetz front and the retaking of Krasnaya Gorka, have given the Reds a feeling of confidence, which, in view of the forces at present available against them, is

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<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

certainly justified. They have determined on the defence of Petrograd, have mined its approaches, installed machine guns and artillery, placed the fortress of Peter and Paul in a state of defence and have taken numerous hostages from among the so-called bourgeoisie. Numbers of these hostages are executed after every advance of the Whites. (My telegrams Nos. 44 first, 48 tenth and 55 twenty-seventh<sup>27</sup>).

The position of the Bolshevicks on the Baltic-Carelian fronts is now stronger and the capture of Petrograd more remote than at the beginning of April. In fact, it may be safely said that no active force in the field against them has much hope of prevailing.

There remains, however, one way, aside from a campaign by an international expeditionary force, in which the capture of Petrograd and the consequent overthrow of the Bolshevicks, may be accomplished. This way lies through the Finnish army.

The present situation of Finland is critical. Her finances, owing to the greatly disproportional export over import have little back of them. In the past four months the Finnish Mark has suffered a two-fifth decrease in value and indications are that it will experience further depreciation. Because of the Bolshevick menace on her frontier, Finland is obliged to maintain a large—comparatively speaking—standing army and since this army cannot be wholly trusted, she is further obliged to have ready for service a still larger voluntary militia force, the White Guard, to watch the army. Besides this she is keeping in commission, quite uselessly, a considerable navy. In addition her administrative expenses are heavy. The huge budget, requisite for these expenditures, cannot be indefinitely continued. The cost of living is enormous, even on a dollar basis, work is scarce and wages low. The working population is discontented and offers fruitful ground for the sowing of the seed of Bolshevism.

The Finnish Government is aware of these facts. It is aware that its political salvation is dependent upon the overthrow of the Bolshevicks before its own country becomes impregnated with the leprosy of Bolshevism. It is aware that its economic salvation is contingent upon the opening up of Russia so that what is now the closed back door of Finland may become the open front door. And being aware of these facts, it is willing even eager to launch the attack against Petrograd. Every indication points to this. From sources so high that they may almost be considered official, I have been informed that the Finnish Government only awaits the sanction of the Allied Governments to launch its attack.

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<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

An agreement has been reached between the Russian Whites, under General Yudenitch, representing the Koltchack Government and the Finns are willing to attack. What these terms are, I have been unable to ascertain, but in all probability they embrace the granting of an open ice free port to Finland in the White Sea and possibly the cession of the west shore of lake Onega.

The Finnish army is quite capable of taking Petrograd and no time seems as propitious as the present. If the Bolshevicks are not crushed this summer their strength and prestige will be increased not only in Russia but in contiguous countries. Certainly it may be expected that Finland may very well fall under the disease. The population of the central cities cannot endure another winter as the past. Nor would a winter campaign against the Bolshevicks be possible as forage for horses, as well as fuel, will be entirely lacking in the coming winter. During the past month American Food Administration ships have unloaded at this port some ten thousand tons of food destined for Petrograd and at Reval more food is available for delivery to Petrograd, once it is released from the clutches of the Reds. The objection that even if taken, Petrograd could not be fed, therefore, no longer exists.

It has long been apparent that Russia, as an economic factor has, under the Bolshevicks, ceased to exist, at least so far as the United States and the Allied Nations are concerned. Where formerly she produced food in such quantities that it formed a large item of her export, now she is starving, a condition directly attributable to Bolshevik misrule and terrorism. The world is not only shut off from one of the greatest commercial markets, but it is also deprived of one great source of food supply. The agents of Germany, with an eye to the commercial and political future, are taking full advantage of the existing conditions. Already the feeling of Bolshevik Russia is with Germany. (In this connection, I would call attention to the Secret Report of the Bolshevik Reconnaissance Service, as transmitted under my Dispatch No. 16.<sup>29</sup>) Unless the Red regime of anarchy, murder and chaos is terminated before the coming winter, hundreds of thousands, if not millions of lives will be sacrificed to starvation and terrorism. Nor would the sending in of food while the Bolshevicks still remain in power obviate this, since any food so sent in would remain under Bolshevik control and would never reach the population which now stands most in need.

For every reason, therefore, economic, political, humanitarian, should this menace to the world's peace be stamped out.

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<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

I trust the Department may not consider it presumptuous on my part to point out, for I feel it my duty to do so, that the consummation of this condition may be effected, as I have indicated, without the loss of a single American life or the expenditure of a single American dollar, by giving sanction to the advance of the Finnish forces and that I may be permitted to urge that such sanction and approval be communicated by our Government to the Finnish Government.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT W. IMBRIE

861.00/4858 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, July 16, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received 10:54 p.m.]

3167. Your 2445, June 27, 6 p.m.

Supreme Council on July 7th approved the proposal of the Baltic Commission that the Finnish Government should be notified that the Allied Governments had no objections to any assistance the Finnish Government might be able to give to bring about the relief of Petrograd, and on July 9th the French Government sent the following telegram to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Helsingfors:

"The Supreme Council has decided that a joint telegram should be addressed to the British, American, Italian and French Chargé d'Affaires at Helsingfors to ask them to inform the Government of General Mannerheim that in case he thought he ought to follow up the request for action of Admiral Kolchak, the Allied Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to raise against this operation.

I beg you to communicate the text of this decision of the Conference to your British, American and Italian colleagues and thus [to make] to General Mannerheim, in accord with them, the conditions [*communication*] with which you are jointly charged. Signed, Pichon."

Our representative at Helsingfors informed.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.24/160 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VIBORG, July 22, 1919.

[Received 10:27 p.m.]

68. General Youdenitch, commander White forces now operating on Petrograd front, has addressed a communication to this consulate requesting that I communicate to the Government of the United

States the urgent need of the White forces for every sort of military supply and munitions and requesting that the Government of the United States be urged to supply same on terms similar to those under which food is being consigned now for ultimate delivery into Russia.

The list of supplies and munitions needed includes artillery, both field and heavy, airplanes, machine guns, small arms, transport cars, field telephones and telegraph instruments, horses, intrenching tools, 1,500 meters of pontoon bridging, as well as clothing, shoes and personal equipment, the supplies and equipment to be sufficient for army of 100,000 men and later for double that number. The first consignment of the munitions and supplies are desired for delivery at the port of Reval.

There has been an understanding between General Youdenitch and the British by which the latter were to furnish the supplies and munitions above enumerated but the British to date have failed to make deliveries and there is but little indication that they will do so. Nevertheless, Youdenitch desires that his request to the United States Government be treated as confidential and that the British be not advised of same.

Request instructions as to what action I shall take in the premises and what if any answer I shall make to General Youdenitch.

IMBRIE

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861.00/4903 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, July 24, 1919, noon.

[Received 6:56 p.m.]

360. Referring to Department's telegram number 2445, June 27, 6 p.m. to American Mission. On July 22nd accompanied by French, British, and Italian colleagues as dean of the diplomatic corps I delivered verbally to Foreign Minister Holsti the message which on Wednesday was confirmed by note verbale. Foreign Minister replied immediately in writing July 23 that present Government cannot enter into pourparlers regarding this since a new Government will be formed following the presidential election which is taking place this week. This also sent to American Mission.

HAYNES

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861.24/160 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie)*

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1919, 6 p.m.

Your 68, July 22. Department understands that Secretary of War cannot, by law, dispose of surplus munitions, except by sale. Sug-

gest General Yudenitch communicate with Admiral Kolchak who is understood to be obtaining certain supplies for Siberia and also for South Russia both here and in England.

Have advised Russian Embassy here of request of General Yudenitch.

LANSING

861.48/916

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to Mr. Basil Miles in Charge of Russian Affairs, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State*

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. MILES: Referring to our conversation of this morning concerning the agreement made between the American Relief Administration in Paris and Lieutenant-General E. Hermonius, acting on behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia, headed by Admiral Kolchak, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of this agreement as well as a form of obligation <sup>31</sup> to be issued by the Government of Russia as payment for all foodstuffs upon the rendering of a bill based on the statement of account by the American Relief Administration to the Provisional Government of Russia.

I beg to call your attention to Paragraph 4 of the Agreement which specifically mentions that the same Treasury notes would be given for all supplies purchased from the United States Army.

I shall deeply appreciate it if you will find it possible to send copy of the enclosed Agreement and Treasury note, to the Secretary of War in order to facilitate the obtaining of his consent to delivery out of the United States Army surplus stock of different kinds of supplies other than rifles as well as supplies from the Liquidating Committee of the United States Government in Paris on the outlined basis.

Believe me [etc.]

S. UGHET

[Enclosure]

*Special Agreement between the American Relief Administration and the Provisional Government of Russia*

WHEREAS, the Provisional Government of Russia, of which Admiral Koltchak is the head, has appealed to the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy for supplies and foodstuffs in order to prevent starvation among the Russian people and to assist the said Government in the maintenance of order and to stop the spread of anarchy, and

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the United States to assist in this matter by the supply of such foodstuffs as may be available, and the American Relief Administration has been appointed by the United States Government to undertake the administration of this matter, and

WHEREAS, the American Relief Administration has already furnished certain foodstuffs to the Civil Department of the North Western Army Corps Detachment for the people in the territory lying east of the Narova River and Lake Peipus, from the steamers "Lake Strabo" and "Lake Charlotteville", and

WHEREAS, the American Relief Administration is now holding at points in the Gulf of Finland the cargoes of the "Lake Calvenia", "Dio", "Lake Traverse", "Democracy" and "Charlot" and may subsequently ship additional foodstuffs,

*Now, therefore, it is agreed between the aforesaid parties:*

1. That the American Relief Administration will deliver to representatives of the Provisional Government of Russia, in particular to its representatives the Russian North-Western Army Corps Detachment, such portions of the cargoes of the "Lake Strabo", "Lake Charlotteville", "Lake Calvenia", "Dio", "Lake Traverse", "Democracy" and "Charlot", containing approximately 18,471 tons wheat flour, 58 tons cereal flour, 985 tons beans and peas, 1,501 tons bacon, 834 tons lard substitute and 1,548 tons condensed or evaporated milk as may be available from other relief and as have not already been delivered to the Russian North-Western Army Corps Detachment, and the Provisional Government of Russia agrees that it will pay for all of such foodstuffs delivered, including those which have already been delivered to the Russian North-Western Army Corps Detachment and volunteer Russian detachments at Libau or Riga, assuming any obligations that such detachments or its civil detachment may have given, and it agrees that it will further pay for any additional foodstuffs shipped to the Gulf of Finland, or to Libau or Riga for Russian volunteer detachments and delivered during the months of July, August, or September 1919 by the American Relief Administration.

2. The Provisional Government of Russia appoints the staff of the High Commander of the Russian North Western Army as its agent to accept delivery of all foodstuffs hereafter delivered under this contract. Delivery will be accepted on a c.i.f. basis or ex-warehouse at the option of the American Relief Administration at Viborg, Reval or Helsingfors, or if satisfactory to the staff of the High Commander of the Russian North Western Army at any other Baltic port. The provisional Government of Russia further authorizes the delivery of small quantities of foodstuffs required for the

maintenance of the Russian volunteer detachment operating near Riga and will recognize their receipt as conclusive evidence of a delivery under this contract. The Provisional Government of Russia, or its representatives, will give a receipt for such foodstuffs or other supplies on the basis of the loading invoice presented by the American Relief Administration. The agents of the American Relief Administration will furnish the Provisional Government of Russia, or its representatives, with statements of account which shall be accepted by them as final and conclusive as to amount, value and delivery. The Provisional Government of Russia, or its representatives, will pay all expenses subsequent to delivery. The foodstuffs supplied will be delivered at cost, representing the purchase price in the United States plus all transportation and other charges, with a sufficient margin to protect the American Relief Administration against loss.

3. Payment for all foodstuffs delivered shall [be] by special Treasury note of the Provisional Government of Russia in the form attached to this agreement upon the rendering by the American Relief Administration to the Provisional Government of Russia of a bill based on the statements of account, referred to in paragraph 2. Such notes shall mature June 30, 1921, and shall stand on the same basis as to priority and security as notes given by said Government for advances for similar purposes made to such government by any of the Allied or Associated powers since November 11, 1918.

4. The Provisional Government of Russia agrees further that for all supplies purchased from the United States Army it will give to such Army notes of the same character as are given for foodstuffs under this contract. It agrees further that in case the American Relief Administration undertakes the transportation of these supplies from France to Russia the American Relief Administration's bill for such transportation shall be included on the same basis as its bill for foodstuffs.

5. The distribution of the foodstuffs so delivered shall be carried out by the Provisional Government of Russia, or its representatives, subject to the general direction and approval of the American Relief Administration and in accord with the dictates of humanity. In case the Provisional Government of Russia should be unable to use such foodstuffs for the relief of the people for whom it is intended, and it should become necessary to re-sell such foodstuffs, they will re-sell only subject to the approval of the American Relief Administration, and the Provisional Government of Russia will turn over to the American Relief the proceeds of such



re-sale, whether cash or obligations, and if such proceeds are accepted by the American Relief Administration the Provisional Government of Russia will be relieved from its obligation to the extent of such payment.

6. Inasmuch as this agreement is made solely for humanitarian purposes and by an organization which draws its support from private charity and government appropriations alike, it is not intended or considered by either party in any sense as a recognition by the United States Government of the Provisional Government of Russia.

In witness whereof the parties have hereunto set their hands this sixteenth day of July 1919.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA  
by E. HERMONIUS, *Lieut. General R.A.*  
AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION  
by HERBERT HOOVER

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861.48/924

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to bring to your attention the situation as it has lately developed around Petrograd and in the Baltic provinces and which is becoming for Russian Nationalists a cause of greatest anxiety.

As you are aware, anti-Bolshevik action in these regions was primarily concentrated mostly within Esthonia, Esthonian forces being complemented by certain rather small Russian contingents. During the last months, however, the arena of anti-Bolshevik action has very greatly increased and in particular the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces have gained both in size and in importance.

In Latvia, around Libau and Riga, a Russian detachment has been formed under the leadership of Prince Lieven. At the same time General Rodzianko and Colonel Balachovitch have succeeded in greatly developing the so-called Russian Northern Army Corps and have achieved marked results by practically bringing their offensive to the very approaches of Petrograd. Their activities have been considerably handicapped throughout by lack of supplies. A certain amount of munitions have been furnished by the English, while Prince Lieven was obliged, in a critical moment, to accept arms from the Germans.

It is difficult to state precisely the exact number of these forces. A few weeks ago they numbered about twenty-five thousand men.

It has been made clear, however, and in particular from American sources, that with adequate supply of arms and munitions these contingents would substantially increase.

Greatest encouragement to the whole enterprise has been given lately by the generous assistance of the American Relief Organization, while already for some time, food was supplied by the Americans to the liberated regions. Mr. Hoover had ultimately agreed to conclude a formal arrangement with the Russian representatives in Paris, accepting payment for food delivered to the Russian forces in the Baltic in the form of obligations of Admiral Kolchak's Government.

The distribution of victuals being under the control of General Youdenitch, appointed by Admiral Kolchak as Commander in chief of the Russian forces in the Northwest, it is food which has greatly contributed to the success of the national forces and has led to a decomposition of the Bolsheviki lines.

The American military authorities in Paris have been very apprehensive to the whole situation in the Baltic regions, and have been most emphatic in the opinion that a firm military policy is called for and that immediate support and strengthening of the Russian Volunteer and anti-Bolshevik forces is required. An exchange of correspondence between General Bliss and myself is attached hereto.<sup>33</sup>

The question of supplies, in particular, has been discussed with the Chairman of the Liquidation Committee, Judge Parker having stated that, in case the military and political authorities would advise him of the desirability of supplying materials from the stocks in France, he would not foresee an unsurmountable difficulty to making proper business arrangements.

In the last days the whole situation has become very acute, a report from London having reached the Embassy stating that, under present conditions, the British War Office could scarcely extend assistance both to General Denikine's and to General Youdenitch's armies and that for this reason the support proposed in time to General Youdenitch would have to be considerably reduced. A cable from General Hermonius, Chief of Foreign Supply, to the Russian armies, emphasizes the critical position into which the forces around the Baltic are thus placed, and indicates that the only way to solve the difficulty is to obtain the necessary materials from the United States. The General estimates the number of men for which supplies have to be provided as at least fifty thousand. He states that the army is increasing from day to day and with the

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<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, pp. 683-687.

capture of Petrograd might easily reach one hundred and twenty thousand men.

I scarcely need to explain of what paramount importance for the whole cause of the liberation and pacification of Russia would be an eventual capture of Petrograd and successful development of anti-Bolshevik action around the Baltic. There is scarcely at this moment any other feature which would more effectively contribute to the attainment of the ends exposed in the correspondence of the Powers with Admiral Kolchak.

A great deal, if not most, of the military materials required could be supplied from American stocks in France, if only the United States Government would direct that transactions should be passed between Judge Parker and representatives of Admiral Kolchak on relatively liberal conditions.

General Bliss is in direct contact with the Russian representatives in Paris and there could easily be ascertained which materials could be sent from France and which it would be necessary to supply from this side of the water. Besides there would be no difficulty in establishing with the Russian authorities in Paris the whole outline of concrete measures, necessary for the fulfillment of the plan.

I take the liberty, while presenting this case, of emphasising with all earnestness the extreme urgency of the whole matter and hope you will find it possible to give the question your favorable consideration.

Believe me [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

861.48/918 : Telegram

*The Chairman of the American Relief Administration (Hoover) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, *undated.*

[Received August 7, 1919, 1:55 a.m.]

Hash 854. Expect to withdraw all relief personnel from Baltic by August 15th. Have transferred considerable quantities of foodstuffs to Russians, which is now in storage at Viborg, Finland, which will meet needs of Russian population in liberated Russian districts for some months to come. These stocks also available to meet needs Petrograd population where all reports confirm extreme suffering exists, provided order is restored this latter city. In event supply Petrograd becomes necessary existing stocks Viborg would last about a month. As latter contingency rather remote, supplies at Viborg will be transshipped by Russians to south side Gulf of Finland as needed, and used in liberated Russian districts outside of Esthonia. Esthonia, Lettland, and Lithuania amply protected by supplies already

shipped in and by harvests which will carry them over the winter. Finnish attitude Viborg stocks which we have formally transferred to Russians is entirely helpful. However, believe it advisable to instruct American Consul Viborg to keep watchful and benevolent eye on Russian handling of these stocks so as to prevent misuse or waste. Have requested General Gough, chief of British Military Mission in Baltic, to designate British officer to cooperate with American consul this work. If this meets with your approval will you have necessary instructions cabled to our Consul Viborg and advise me action taken.

HOOVER

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861.00/4981 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, August 7, 1919.

[Received August 8, 1:10 a.m.]

73. Three British ships are now unloading artillery, tanks and other munitions at Reval for the use of the Russian White forces in Estonia. September 1st has been set as a tentative date when the Russian Whites, with the support of the British Baltic Fleet, will attempt a drive against Petrograd. If this drive is unsuccessful the Whites have no hope of occupying the city before summer of 1920. At present Bolsheviks have the advantage on this front and have just recaptured [Yamburg?].

IMBRIE

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861.48/918 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Wallace)*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1919, 3 p.m.

9019. For Hoover.

Your 854, undated.<sup>35</sup>

American Commissioner, Helsingfors, directed to issue necessary instructions to American Vice Consul at Viborg regarding Russian supplies, as you request.

LANSING

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861.48/934

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On August 1st you transmitted to me a copy of an agreement between the American Relief Administration

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<sup>35</sup> *Ante*, p. 698.

at Paris and General Hermonius,<sup>80</sup> acting on behalf of Admiral Kolchak, and asked whether the terms of this arrangement could be applied to the Liquidation Commission in Paris.

I have the honor to inform you that the Liquidation Commission in Paris has disposed of the surplus supplies of the American Expeditionary Forces in France to the French Government. Such additional surplus supplies as are in Europe are largely in the occupied area, but of these a substantial portion has been already sold to Belgium, and arrangements are pending for the sale of the residue.

It would seem, therefore, that there are no foodstuffs of a general nature available for disposal to Admiral Kolchak, and it will be unnecessary to consider whether the arrangement made by Mr. Hoover would be acceptable or not.

Respectfully yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

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861.48/925 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 12, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 5:36 p.m.]

3634. Your 2750, August 7.

1. Hoover has furnished 22,200 tons food to the civilian population in the rear of army of General Yudenitch and has taken in exchange securities furnished by Kolchack Government. Esthoni-ans have agreed to divert to area in rear of Yudenitch 5,500 tons of food now on way to Esthonia, provided it is replaced by food commis-sion and this can probably be done. Hoover has accepted securities sufficient to more than cover all food sent for in area behind Yude-nitch army including 5,500 tons in question. Hoover's office reports that food for population in rear of Yudenitch army has always been sent with specific understanding that it was for the civilian population. It is believed that a good deal of it has gotten through [to] the army.

2. General Yudenitch is requesting 18,000 tons food for his army, but has been informed by food commission that latter has no more funds and can furnish no more food.

3. Liquidation Commission furnished 55 three-ton trucks for the purpose of distributing food to civilian population in rear of Yude-nitch army. These trucks, together with 1,000 tons Red Cross sup-ples for the same area, are on board ship in French port ready for transportation. No more food supplies can be furnished anyone from surplus stores of American Army in France, because under

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<sup>80</sup> *Ante*, p. 693.

agreement between Liquidation Commission and French representatives, all these surplus stores have been turned over to French at a lump sum agreed on and it is understood that the latter is taking possession.

4. Your number 2756 dated August 8th.<sup>87</sup> Informed that three British ships are now unloading military supplies for Yudenitch army and that September 1st is the tentative date for advance of Yudenitch against Petrograd. If additional military supplies are required for this expedition, shortness of time makes it desirable that they be supplied by the Allies rather than the United States.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.48/927 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, August 13, 1919.

[Received August 14, 10:55 a.m.]

79. With reference to Department's telegram of August 8th transmitted through the American Commissioner at Helsingfors<sup>87</sup> and quoting Hoover wire number 854<sup>88</sup> I have to report I have noted instructions therein contained and will execute same. In this connection I have to advise the Department that the Viborg office of the American Food Administration has been closed, the personnel have departed and that the affairs of the Food Administration have been formally turned over to me. The Food Administration has notified the Russians that the stores here amounting to some 7,000 tons, valued at \$3,000,000, may only be moved subject to my approval. I shall see that the stores are not dispersed in contravention of the agreement that the food may not be used for political or military purpose.

IMBRIE

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860d.51/9 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, August 16, 1919.

[Received August 17, 1:42 p.m.]

81. I am confidentially informed through Russian General Staff that the recent loans of £6,000,000 made by the British to the Finnish Government had as a condition that the Finns should mobilize and

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<sup>87</sup> Not printed.

<sup>88</sup> *Ante*, p. 698.

start an offensive with Petrograd as the objective, the capitulation to be effected by October 1st.

General Youdenitch has recognized the independence of Esthonia on the condition that the Esthonians will render all possible military aid to the Russian White corps now operating to the east of Esthonia.

The present program calls for an offensive against Petrograd by the Russians and Esthonians and in which the Finns will cooperate by a simultaneous drive from the Byeloostrov front.

IMBRIE

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861.24/168 : Telegram

*The Latvian Prime Minister (Ulmanis) and the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Meierovics) to President Wilson*

LIBAU, undated.

[Received at the White House August 17, 1919.]

After two and a half months interruption <sup>40</sup> the Provisional Government of Latvia with your well-disposed aid and confident of your further support have recovered on July 5th the power of the state in the capital of Latvia, Riga, and has been reconstructed in the form of an coalitional and labour Cabinet where the national minorities are widely represented. In the course of five weeks the coalitional Government under extraordinary difficulties have done their best to organize their army for the struggle with the enemies of the whole civilized world, anarchy and Bolshevism, to supply food for the starving population as well as to secure peace, order and legitimate power within the country. However the Provisional Government of Latvia are powerless to carry out their tasks without your immediate help. Latvia and the Latvian nation which from the very beginning of the war up to the present time have *de facto* been your most faithful associates have sacrificed everything within the limits of their weak forces to contribute to the victory. Even today the Latvian Army without arms without clothing and without boots and shoes hold the front against the Bolsheviks. The devastated country sacrifices her last to the war. But the Government are powerless to continue the struggle without arms, ammunitions, money, food and equipment. The Bolsheviks on the contrary have money, arms and everything they want. The Latvian Army cannot keep the front without rifles against machine guns and artillery. The soldiers cannot be kept in the trenches without clothing and barefooted especially considering the approaching autumn. Without all these means it is impossible to offer efficacious resistance to

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<sup>40</sup> See telegram from the Chargé in Denmark, no. 319, Apr. 17, p. 675.

the increasing propaganda both at the front and in the rear of the Bolsheviks and the Russian and German reactionaries sympathizing to each other. Considering the uttermost urgency of the matter the Provisional Government of Latvia regards it their duty to entreat Your Excellency to supply Latvia with money, arms, food, clothing and ammunition. If Latvia could hope her request which has been specified and tendered to your Government by her representatives five weeks ago being complied with we entreat Your Excellency to the help being sent without delay. Without immediate help everything would be lost, therefore we beg to insist on the situation being extremely critical.

1742.

*Prime Minister* ULMANIS  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs* MEIEROVICS

861.01/119 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 19, 1919, noon.

[Received August 20, 11:27 a.m.]

3771. Referring [to] Department's 2434, June 26, 3 p.m.<sup>41</sup> Following dated Reval August 11th received from Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene, whose commission is being withdrawn from the Baltic.

[“It is highly important that United States maintain contact with this situation. Therefore I recommend that suggestion in former telegram from the Department of State be carried out and John A. Gade<sup>42</sup> appointed special commissioner or diplomatic representative with headquarters at Reval. This is urgent and important in view both of local Esthonian situation and possible developments in north-western Russian province. I am leaving Reval August 11th for Riga where I will wire you date my return Paris.”

The London *Times* of August 16th prints a circumstantial report according to which a new Russian Government under M. Stefan Lianozoff and including General Yudenitch has been set up at Reval and has already signed an agreement recognizing Esthonia on August 12th.

The policy of according Esthonia recognition and obtaining her collaboration in an action against Petrograd appears to have been strongly urged by the British Military Mission and is represented as being a first step towards the reconstruction of north Russia on a federative basis.

<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

<sup>42</sup> Formerly Naval Attaché at Copenhagen and member of the Greene mission. For his appointment as Commissioner at Riga, see telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 6078, Oct. 14, 2 p.m., p. 722.



In view of the withdrawal of Colonel Greene's commission it would seem urgent that American special commissioner be sent to Reval without delay.

## AMERICAN MISSION

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861.48/936 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 22, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received August 23, 12:58 a.m.]

3839. Department's 2750, August 7, 6 p.m. and American Mission's 3634, August 12, 8 [5] p.m. Russian representatives here have obtained from French Government promise of guns, munitions and quartermaster supplies for 40,000 men of Northwestern Army under Yudenitch. Remainder, about 15,000, are being supplied from England. French Government is, however, unable to provide necessary tonnage for transport and no tonnage is stated to be available in England. Russian delegation, therefore, inquires whether in view of extreme importance of continued operations on Petrograd front, shipping now in Europe or in transit across the Atlantic can be furnished by United States to extent of 45,000 tons. Offer [is made to pay for] freight either (1) by credit notes of the Provisional Government of Russia such as were given to A.R.A. for food supplies in the Baltic, or (2) by tonnage replacement out of Russian merchant fleet, of which assembling and reconstruction has been begun as is stated.

The Russian delegation insists on the great urgency of the situation and is confident that if this assistance can be given Petrograd must shortly fall. According to statement of delegation British are keeping Denikine fully supplied and are taking greatest interest in his campaign. Russians also expect continued assistance of the British fleet in the Baltic. In their view if the Yudenitch movement can be carried out successfully the city of Moscow, menaced from the south by Denikine and from the north by Yudenitch, will be unable to defend itself permanently. They also believe that if Petrograd is taken the British Archangel troops can be withdrawn through Petrograd preventing the bad impression which would be created by their evacuating direct from Archangel. General Briggs, the British general, who according to the statement of the Russians has been responsible for much from [of] the success of Denikine, is now on his way to Yudenitch.

Russians state that the upset in Hungary will have extremely favorable effect upon Russian situation. They further state that

Bolshevists have been obliged to withdraw considerable portions of their forces from the Kolchak front in order to try to hold Denikine and they are confident that Kolchak will be able to recover from his defeat.

General Hermonius of the Russian delegation here is shortly sailing for the United States on American transport in accordance with arrangements made by American Embassy.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.24/171 a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Wallace)*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1919, 9 a.m.

9058. For Hoover:

Russian Ambassador at Washington is informed that approximately 6000 tons of flour which General Youdenitch was expecting for his forces has arrived at Reval and has been delivered to the Esthonians.

As General Youdenitch reports that flour for his forces is adequate only until August 15, he urges that priority in delivering the flour should be given to his troops. The Department would be glad to know what arrangements, if any, can be made to supply General Youdenitch whose movement is regarded as of great importance.

LANSING

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861.00/5117 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, August 27, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 7:30 p.m.]

389. Northern Russian Army Corps after receiving its new supply of English tanks has been driven back and Pskov captured by Bolsheviks, the probable result being that Esthonia may make peace with Soviet or be driven into Bolshevikism by the harassing of Gough<sup>48</sup> and Judenitch.

HAYNES

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861.01/129

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

A cable from Stockholm dated August 15th, appearing in the press referred to an alleged agreement between General Youdenich,

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<sup>48</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Hubert Gough, chief of the British mission to the Baltic States.

Commander in Chief of the Russian armed forces in the Northwest, and the Esthonian Government. The agreement was reported to include the recognition of the independence of Esthonia and quoted General Marsh of the British Army as being instrumental in bringing forth the transaction.

Under such circumstances it is incumbent to present to the attention of the State Department the following: Action, if any, taken by General Youdenich relative to recognizing the independence of Esthonia has been entirely of his own initiative and responsibility. No authority to this effect has been given to General Youdenich.

Admiral Kolchak, in his reply to the Allied and Associated Powers dated June 4th,<sup>44</sup> clearly defined the attitude of the Russian Government toward the future status of Esthonia; the status to be an autonomous arrangement within the boundaries of a reconstituted Russian State with the rights of nationalities guaranteed without prejudice to the unity and sovereignty of Russia as a whole.

Moreover, a presentation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Russian delegation in Paris on May 24th clearly defined Russia's attitude toward the different existing governmental formations in the Baltic provinces, while the question of military co-operation with the Esthonians has been treated in an exchange of memorandums between General Bliss and Mr. Bakhmeteff, dated Paris, July 4-8.<sup>45</sup>

It has been clearly established that, while welcoming practical procedure which would assist the Esthonians in their endeavour to combat anarchy and reconstitute law and orderly life, assistance rendered to the existing governmental bodies or relations with such should not be construed in any way as entailing recognition or legalizing definitely the temporary existing formations.

The reports relative to General Youdenich's agreement have been brought in particular to the attention of the British Government. The British Government stated that as far as British military representatives had been concerned in the transaction, they had acted on their own initiative without the knowledge or authority of London.

The British Government has been informed by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London that notice is taken of such statement and it is further expected that England will not support subsequently eventual claims of the Esthonians which might arise from the agreement.

WASHINGTON, *August 29, 1919.*

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<sup>44</sup> *Ante*, p. 375.

<sup>45</sup> *Ante*, pp. 683-687.

861.24/174 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 30, 1919, 9 p.m.

[Received August 31, 3:34 a.m.]

3958. Department's telegram 9058, August 25, to Am[erican] Embassy. Hoover states:

Steamship *Redondo* now arriving Reval for General Yudenitch's adjutant [*administration*] with 5,000 tons flour. Also General Yudenitch has some 10,000 tons of flour and beans stored at Viborg and Narva which [altogether] will supply bread to his present army and civil population for next two or three months. He will however soon be out of bacon. We have no more money nor supplies and have been compelled withdraw our entire staff except children's relief. It appears to our staff that General Yudenitch could at an early date take Petrograd in which event their supplies would last but a few days. My own view is that it is wholly illogical to support Kolchak and not to support Yudenitch with arms and supplies and that no greater relief of human misery could be undertaken than the occupation of Petrograd. Our very recent advices show that situation there is terrible beyond description and that population of city has decreased from 600,000 to 400,000 by starvation, execution and disease since June 1st. Hoover.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5197 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 9, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received September 11, 11:20 p.m.]

4060. Your telegram number 1673 of July 17, 6 p.m.<sup>46</sup> Following is Legation's estimate of the present situation in the Baltic Provinces. A struggle is going on between the more stable elements, morally supported by the Allies, and to some extent assisted by them with men, supplies and ammunition, on the one side and Bolshevism on the other. Finland has thus far overcome Bolshevik tendencies and if Stahlberg<sup>47</sup> proves strong enough to assemble its elements of strength and tactful enough to placate factions it will become stabilized. This seems likely to be brought about but to just such an extent would Finnish cooperation in any campaign in Bolshevik territory, such as the taking of Petrograd, appear less probable. For

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.<sup>47</sup> K. J. Stahlberg, President of Finland.

this reason Finland, though forming such an integral portion of the Baltic region, may be eliminated from the present consideration. Lithuania also from a political, military and financial standpoint is at present almost a negligible quantity, the fighting there on both the Lithuanian and Bolshevik sides having been little more than bushwhacking with troops of the lowest class. The problem of Bolshevism in the Baltic Provinces narrows down, therefore, mainly to the situation in Esthonia and Latvia.

1st. Political: Esthonia has driven out the Bolsheviks, but only by adopting policies of its own which are almost Bolshevist, and the mass of its people are indifferent. The formation of the Russian Northwestern Government seems to have been intended, in great part, to insure the military cooperation of Esthonia against the Bolsheviks in Soviet territory, but even should this object be attained it seems doubtful whether the assistance rendered would be more than half-hearted. In Latvia, since the partial withdrawal of the German forces, which cleared the country of the Bolsheviks, the Government finds the struggle against Bolshevism increasingly difficult as the Lettish forces have poor organization and poor equipment.

2d. Naval and military: The control of the Baltic and the Finnish Gulf is in the hands of the British naval forces assisted by the Finnish and Esthonian navies and several French destroyers and gunboats. Italy recently decided to send a light cruiser to cooperate. The Bolshevik fleet is considered of little value except for defense and there is an effective blockade of Petrograd and the coast of the Finnish Gulf held by the Bolsheviks. The main anti-Bolshevik military force is the Esthonian Army, which is composed of good fighters and is better equipped than the Russian forces of Yudenitch. The latter's Russian northern corps recently reduced by desertions to 13,000 men has heretofore lacked everything but is now being furnished by the British with guns, ammunition and other equipment including tanks and aeroplanes. Prince Lieven<sup>48</sup> has transferred his 3,000 volunteers to Narva to cooperate with the forces there. These, which are well officered and experienced, constitute a force which is anti-Bolshevik but on the other hand pro-German and presumably under control of reactionary elements in Berlin.

3d. Economic and financial: the economic situation could scarcely be worse. While Finland has paid the United States in full for all food by using credits in American banks, practically all Latvia's exports of flax and timber are mortgaged to Great Britain and Denmark for purchases. American food supplies have been delivered

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<sup>48</sup> Prince Anatole Lieven, a Balt, in command of the Russian detachment of volunteers.

on a like promise to pay, security being furnished in the form of natural resources. The situation is as bad in Esthonia which has negotiated loans and credits in the sum of £400,000, nearly half of which has been already covered by exports of flax and timber. It has received, moreover, military supplies from Great Britain aggregating £1,350,000, for which it intends to pay when it is able. It has received American food supplies on the same conditions in all save food, however, which the American administration has supplied, and military supplies. The lack of necessities in both Latvia and Esthonia is enormous. The immediate requirement is clothing, shoes, agricultural implements and dairying machinery. Railroad equipment is bad and there is no coal. The Baltic Provinces are all in desperate need of loans or credits and the nations which supply these should establish their own markets there. Present conditions, however, appear too precarious to justify such a course by American authorities [*bankers?*]. The financial situation seems well nigh hopeless, lacking aid. There is much worthless money with no fund of gold and imports cannot be covered by export balance against which credits can be established.

4th. Industrial: in both Esthonia and Latvia, through German stripping and lack of raw material, industry has been largely paralyzed and there is general non-employment.

Generally speaking the situation in the Baltic region can be summed up as follows: Finland has not yet passed the experimental and hazardous stage and the danger is by no means passed of a revival of Finnish Bolshevism. In Esthonia and Latvia German prestige is far greater than Allied. Military success against the Bolsheviks depends primarily on authority [*on munitions?*] and aid which may be given the Esthonians and Letts by the Allies or the friendly nations [*or the Germans?*]. It is still an open question to which these people will turn for this support. Lacking such support the Bolsheviks, if Denikin meets with serious reverses, are not unlikely to overrun the whole Baltic region. American Mission's 401.

WHEELER

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861.24/174: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1919, 8 p.m.

3074. For Polk; also Hoover. President has approved charter of 45,000 tons of shipping to Russian Embassy here for transporting supplies from British and French ports to forces of General Yudenitch. Embassy now negotiating with Shipping Board.

PHILLIPS

861.00/5222 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*VIBORG, *September 15, 1919.*

[Received September 16, 10:47 a.m.]

101. Present line of Russian Whites opposed to Bolsheviks in Narva-Pskoff district extends from a point on the Finnish Gulf 45 versts southwest of Krasnaya Gorka southward along the lakes to the city of Yamburg. From Yamburg the line follows the Luga River cutting the Petrograd-Warsaw railroad 60 versts northeast of Pskoff thence southwest along railroad joining Esthonian line 25 versts west of Pskoff.

While [*White?*] forces now in field do not exceed 25,000 men; available recruits may reach 10,000 additional. In event of advance these will doubtless [be] augmented by desertions from Bolsheviks voluntarily. Discipline and morale of troops appeared good, equipment insufficient but with prospects of improvement as British are now landing munitions at Reval. Feeling between Russians and Esthonians seems good.

White leaders seem optimistic regarding capture of Petrograd this autumn. While at present the aggression is with Whites, my opinion Petrograd will not be taken before next spring.

Yamburg has just been retaken.

IMBRIE

861.00/5269

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE MEMOIRE

According to official information received at the Russian Embassy, the Representative of Esthonia in Paris has brought to the knowledge of the French Government and the Delegates of the Allied Powers that Esthonia, owing to reasons both of interior policy and of military nature, has been compelled to cease hostilities and come to a peace arrangement with the Bolshevik Government. The Esthonian Representative simultaneously expressed the hope that this new line of policy should not encounter the disapproval of the Allied Governments and that their benevolent attitude towards Esthonia should continue.

In reply to this the French Government has made the Representative of Esthonia understand that the Allies, being on hostile terms with Bolshevik Russia, the French Government could not remain indifferent to the fact of a peaceful settlement between Esthonia and the Soviet authorities and that such a radical change in the Esthonian

orientation would undoubtedly be followed by an adequate alteration of Franco-Esthonian relations.

The Russian Ambassador with reference to the above mentioned is prompted to bring to the Attention of the United States Government the extreme seriousness of the situation created in the rear of General Yudenitch's forces by this unexpected and independent move of the Esthonian Government. It is obvious than an agreement between Esthonia and Bolshevist Russia would strongly handicap the efforts now in progress to secure the development and the strengthening of the Russian anti-Bolshevist volunteer forces and consequently oppose the policy adopted by the United States Military authorities as expressed in General Bliss's memorandum of July 4th,<sup>49</sup> which only a few days ago was once more confirmed by granting the necessary tonnage for military supplies destined for General Yudenitch's front.

The new situation calls for urgent action and the Russian Ambassador earnestly hopes the United States Government will cease all material and moral support of the actual Esthonian Government, in case of its agreement with the Soviet Authorities in Russia.

[WASHINGTON], *September 18, 1919.*

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861.00/5249 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Acting Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, *September 19, 1919, 5 p.m.*

[Received September 20, 3:48 p.m.]

421. Bolsheviki committed so many crimes last January when invading Esthonia within fifteen miles Reval, that Esthonia fears [recurrence?] and especially since the Bolsheviki are now so much stronger. Esthonia after nine months' exhaustive fighting is at the end of its resistance, its people clamoring that the Allies are using them as cats-paw; no conciliation possible with the Russian Northwest Army; a Russian general arrested in Reval streets last Wednesday. The head Russian Red Cross arrested, fined 10,000 marks and expelled from the country. Russian guards transport wagons overpowered and supplies taken. Esthonian authorities afraid cannot restrain people much longer unless peace is made with the Bolsheviki. Esthonians say cannot expect British assistance if Bolsheviki invade country again because Great Britain reiterates it cannot take sides in civil war. Also assert that if their independence is not recognized and guaranteed by the United States and Great

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<sup>49</sup> *Ante*, p. 683.



Britain then Kolchak victory will mean coercing of Esthonia with an end of its independence dream and a restoration of the eternally hated Baltic barons who would exert terrible revenge.

HAYNES

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861.00/5228 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1919, 4 p.m.

3184. For Polk: Following from Vice Consul at Viborg just returned from Reval,

"107, 17th. Proposal Bolsheviks to Esthonians for peace negotiations is now under consideration. Bolsheviks through Zinovieff have announced one object of such peace will be the exchange of goods with Esthonia. May I call to the Department's attention the fact that in the event of the consummation of such peace there is danger that American food sent in to Esthonia may reach the Bolsheviks."

Russian Ambassador informs me that Kolchak government did not authorize reported agreement between Yudenitch and Esthonians recognizing their independence and further that French Government has advised Esthonians that peace with Bolsheviks would require an adequate alteration of Franco-Esthonian relations. What attitude have British assumed regarding peace proposals? As Department understands food was furnished to Esthonia in exchange for obligations of that Government it would seem proper that further supplies excepting for Yudenitch should cease and adequate safeguards obtained that food already furnished shall not reach Bolsheviks. Do you believe Mission should so inform Esthonian representatives at Paris?

PHILLIPS

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Paris Peace Conference 861 E.00/171

*The Russian Delegation in Paris to the President of the Paris Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*

[Translation <sup>21</sup>]

PARIS, September 23, 1919.

The situation in the Baltic Provinces gives rise to serious uneasiness. The Esthonian Authorities are already holding Peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks and it is to be expected that in Esthonia's present situation, once relations renewed with Soviet Moscow, the

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<sup>21</sup> Translation transmitted Sept. 23 by the Russian Delegation to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Copy of the French original is dated Sept. 21.

Esthonian Authorities will not be able to resist the tide of the **Maximalists**. The Bolchevisation of the country then seems imminent, if the Allied and Associated Governments do not intervene energetically to put an end to negotiations already begun. The Russian Delegation believe that if such an intervention is not forthcoming, or if it is unsuccessful, General Yudenitch's troops will be in a most dangerous position and the liberation of Petrograd in the autumn impossible.

Besides, Esthonia's Peace with the Moscow Bolcheviks would compromise the success of the policy of encircling Bolchevism, seemingly upheld by the Allied and Associated Governments.

It is still more urgent in order to reach the goal in view, that help and assistance be given to General Yudenitch's troops, alone continuing the struggle against the Bolsheviks threatening to invade the regions of the Baltic Sea. The triumph of Bolchevism in Esthonia and Livonia cannot fail to have regrettable influence on the general situation in Eastern Europe, as it will create a common frontier between Russian Bolsheviks and Germany. In view of these dangers, the Russian Delegation in Paris have the honour of begging the Allied and Associate Powers to do all that lies in their power to prevent the Esthonians from making Peace with the Bolsheviks.

At the same time the Delegation renews its demands that efficacious help in the form of armaments and equipment be furnished as soon as possible to the Russian Army under General Yudenitch's command.

PRINCE LVOFF  
SAZONOW  
MAKLAKOFF  
N. TCHAIKOVSKY  
B. SAVINKOFF

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861.00/5285 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, *September 26, 1919, 11 p.m.*

[Received September 27, 9:08 a.m.]

435. It is certain Esthonia and Latvia will conclude peace with the Bolsheviks. Lithuania and Finland unlikely but Finland may if the Socialists succeed in their efforts to have Diet called to decide the matter.

HAYNES

861.00/5308 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, September 29, 1919, noon.

[Received September 30, 10:04 p.m.]

4436. Sazonoff<sup>52</sup> saw me and left the following *aide-mémoire*:

"The latest information that has reached the Russian Embassy in Paris refers again to the possibility of the fall of Petrograd in a short time. But on the other hand the same source of information is very alarming about the food situation. In fact all military operations might be stopped by the lack of food supplies for the famine-stricken population of Petrograd. The food stocks imported by the Hoover organization [to relieve the population of] Petrograd are nearly exhausted; what remains is hardly sufficient for two weeks. There is no hope of obtaining the necessary food from the Baltic Provinces as these provinces have no more supplies than they themselves need. Therefore it is most urgent that at least 30,000 tons of food supplies be held ready for the immediate use of the Petrograd population. The Russian Government hopes that the United States Government will not refuse to undertake this humanitarian task. The Russian Government is ready to assume responsibility for the expense entailed."

I told him that I would forward it to the Department but that I did not see the pressing necessity of supplying food on the chance that Petrograd might be taken. I also pointed out that there would be serious difficulties in connection with our Government financing any such plan.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 861 E.00/180

*The Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference to the Secretariat of the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Translation]

PARIS, September 30, 1919.

The Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to transmit herewith to the Secretariat of the Delegation of the United States of America a copy of a letter addressed by the President of the Esthonian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference relative to the negotiations of the Baltic States with the Soviet Republic.

<sup>52</sup> S. D. Sazonov, Minister for Foreign Affairs for the South Russian and for the Omsk Governments.

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>63</sup>]

*The President pro tem. of the Esthonian Delegation at Paris (Pusta)  
to the President of the Paris Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*

PARIS, September 29, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: Following the letter sent to you on September 4, 1919,<sup>64</sup> by the Esthonian Delegation, I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency the following declaration concerning the opening of peace negotiations proposed to the Esthonian Republic by the Russian Federative Republic of Soviets and to inform you of the point of view of the Esthonian Government, and of the state of those negotiations at the present date.

The Government of the Esthonian Republic, having agreed to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Russian Federative Republic of Soviets concerning a suspension of hostilities, informed the Constituent Assembly of Esthonia of the proposal made by the latter. The Assembly unanimously adopted the decision taken by the Government and the date for the opening of the negotiations was fixed at September 16. Now, the Esthonian Government stipulated as a first condition to the Russian Bolshevists that they offer at the same time a suspension of hostilities to the Governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Finland.

That demand is the logical consequence of the policy followed by Esthonia and of the common struggle which it has carried on heretofore with its neighbors against Bolshevism.

The Conference of the Baltic States met at Reval on September 14 and it appears from information which has reached us that the Government of the Republic of Soviets sent a proposal of peace on September 11 to the Governments of Finland, Latvia and Lithuania.

The Assembly of the Prime Ministers and of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Baltic States adopted the following resolutions in the meetings of September 14 and 15:

1. Before beginning the actual discussion of the principles of peace it is necessary to lay down as a condition *sine qua non* that all the States who have received the proposal of peace from the Bolshevists and who have accepted it or will accept it, shall negotiate with the Government of the Soviets in common and not separately;

2. If this condition, which the Esthonian Government will communicate to the Bolshevists, is not accepted by the latter, the negotiations shall be stopped; in case of acceptance, the States acting together shall designate the place and the time of the negotiations within 15 days;

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<sup>63</sup> File translation revised.

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

3. The special conditions which each State will have to make to the Bolsheviks before entering into the discussion of principles shall be settled in preliminary meetings;

4. The States which will take part in the peace negotiations shall send their representatives within 15 days to the Conference at Tartu (Dorpat);

5. The Governments of the Entente must be notified of all steps concerning the peace negotiations until the convocation of the Tartu Conference by each Baltic Government separately and after the Conference meets by the organs created by it;

6. It is impossible, of course, to conclude with Russia a peace within the usual meaning of the word. Under present conditions, it is possible only to speak of a suspension of hostilities.

The principles of this suspension of hostilities, as stated above, were unanimously adopted by the representatives of the Baltic States at the Conference of Reval and the Esthonian Delegation was charged to communicate them to the representatives of the Government of the Soviets at Pskov. All the news spread by certain newspapers announcing that Esthonia intended to conclude a separate peace with the Bolsheviks is therefore without foundation.

Esthonia took the initiative in the negotiations with the Government of the Soviets because the peace proposals made by that Government were first sent to her and because the Esthonian Army represents the largest fighting force of the Baltic States.

The Esthonian Government has several times proclaimed that Esthonia had gone into war against the Government of the Soviets because the latter had shown annexionist tendencies and had ordered an offensive against Esthonia. The Esthonians have made a defensive war; their purpose has been to repel the enemy, and by assuring the tranquillity of their frontiers, to re-establish order in the country.

That aim has been reached thanks to the efforts of the Esthonian Army. The Bolsheviks have been completely expelled beyond the frontiers of the country with considerable losses, a democratic order has been established and a Constituent Assembly has been called to give a definitive form to the law of the country.

The Esthonian Army, after having fought continuously against a superior enemy for ten months, has finally been overcome by fatigue in spite of its energy. To that fatigue has been added a profound disappointment caused by the delay of the Peace Conference in taking up the question of Esthonia's independence.

It is for that reason that last spring the Supreme Commander of the Esthonian forces had already created an army composed principally of Russian prisoners captured in the course of our operations against the Bolshevik Army. In placing that army between the

Esthonian Army and the Bolsheviks, on the territories conquered by the Esthonians in the governments of Petrograd and Pskov and which are not claimed by them, he was trying to create a kind of a buffer state to give to the tired Esthonian Army a little rest which was so necessary to it.

This strategic move made it possible for him to take from the Narva front a considerable force to repulse the attacks of the Landeswehr of the Baltic Barons and of the German divisions of Von der Goltz.

That operation began by the Esthonian Army with a splendid dash could not be carried through completely, that is to say to the complete expulsion of the German forces from Latvia and Lithuania, because of the intervention of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers who imposed an armistice upon the Esthonians and the Letts. The German troops have remained in Latvia and continue to recruit new forces in Germany.

To the Esthonian Government it was evident that those German forces estimated lately at 100,000 men represented for Esthonia a serious danger and a growing menace. The Esthonian Government could not have any doubt as to the intentions of the Landeswehr and of the army of Von der Goltz after the very clear way in which they manifested themselves in the month of July last.

Moreover, signs of demoralization and a beginning of dislocation were being felt in the Russian Army of the Northwest in face of the violent attacks of the Bolshevik troops. Differences had arisen between the commanders of that army, Yudenich and Balakhovich, following which they had been obliged to abandon the city of Pskov conquered by the Esthonian Army. The fate of the Russian detachments on the Narva front seemed finally settled. Those detachments consisted altogether of 15,000 men but amounted in reality to only 5,000 armed men with 4,000 officers from various headquarters. A new clash between the Esthonians and the armies of the Soviets seemed inevitable, and, as the Bolsheviks had concentrated considerable forces (a force of 75,000 men was mentioned) the Esthonians were to expect new and hard struggles.

To meet those two dangers, the menace of the Germans from the south and that of the Bolsheviks from the east, the Esthonian Army, although animated with a good spirit and well disciplined, remained with munitions quite insufficient to carry on wider and prolonged operations, for, since the month of May, in spite of reiterated requests, the Esthonian Government has received no war materials from the Allies.

The financial difficulties were felt more and more every day and weighed heavily on the internal situation as well as on the external

situation. War debts had already reached several hundreds of millions; it was hardly possible to contemplate the continuation of such enormous expenditures and the Esthonian Government found itself unable to improve its condition, since the Allied Powers left unanswered its request regarding a loan.

In face of all these difficulties Chicherin's offer could not be rejected without a previous examination. Taking into account the state of mind of the population and the opinion of the majority of the Constituent Assembly, it was impossible for the Esthonian Government not to accept overtures for negotiations which, by all evidence, seemed well founded and promised at least to give a moment of respite to the country.

Through its delegation in Paris, the Esthonian Government communicated immediately Chicherin's offer to the Allied Powers. It did not wish to act alone and immediately entered into relations with the other neighboring Governments to whom the Government of the Soviets had also made similar offers. We can affirm, with certainty, that no important decision will be taken by Esthonia without the consent and the approval of those neighboring Governments.

No decisions also will be taken without the knowledge of the Allied and Associated Governments with whom Esthonia, since the very beginning of its independent existence, has tried to act in accord and with whom it is endeavoring to strengthen the bonds which unite them.

Nevertheless, the declarations made to the Esthonian Government by the representatives of the Allied Governments do not enable us to be sufficiently informed of the plans of the Allies. Indeed, the representative of the Government of His Britannic Majesty at Reval has just informed the Esthonian Government that the British Government asks that no action be taken with a view to concluding peace with the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the British Government would deplore any individual action and hopes that the Esthonian Government will continue, as it has done heretofore, to follow an external policy which shall be part of the plan adopted by the Allied Governments. The representative of France has also addressed to our Government a note in which he declares that the French Government has no advice to give and that it is for the Esthonian Government to assume the responsibilities which this negotiation might bring about regarding the Allies and eventually the Russian authorities. The French agents in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania are charged to notify the Governments of those countries that the French Government could not consider in any way the participation of French officers and agents in the negotiations with the Bolsheviks.

Now, therefore, the Esthonian Government is replying that it proposes to follow, as it has always tried to do, an external policy in conformity with the desires and the will of the Allies. Unfortunately it must be recognized that that task has not been easy for it and that sometimes it has even seemed impossible for the reason that the Esthonian Government completely lacked exact information regarding the plans adopted by the Allies among themselves as well as the role that they meant to reserve for Esthonia in those plans.

Especially as regards the acceptance by the Esthonian Government of the proposal made by the Government of the Soviets to begin peace negotiations, it was not possible for our country simply to reject those proposals for the reasons mentioned above.

It is evident that the best means of protection against the attacks of the Russian Soviets would have been to overthrow the Bolshevik Government and to replace it by a Government which would recognize our independence. Unfortunately, the Russian forces which have assumed the task of overthrowing the Government of the Soviets, notably those of Kolchak and those which have organized themselves under his direction, with the exception of the Russian Government of the Northwest, oppose the rebirth of the independence of Esthonia and, by that very fact, they take from our people any desire to uphold them in their struggle. Moreover, according to the official communication which was made to us, England, to whom we owe an immense and unforgettable debt of gratitude for all she has done in our favor, can no longer help us in the future. France is willing to give us material assistance but only for cash payment or for goods. But, for the present, we have not enough money to pay cash or enough products to pay in kind.

Therefore, the Government of the Esthonian Republic would be very glad to be told what role Esthonia has to play in the plans conceived already by the Allied Governments. It asks again if it is not possible, by recognizing the independence of Esthonia, to enable it to convince the people and the army that new sacrifices are yet necessary to bring about the failure of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, and to tell her in what measure the Allies could, in that case, procure adequate munitions for our armies.

Will the negotiations begun with the Bolsheviks bring about peace? For the present it is difficult to give an answer to that question.

In the course of an interview which took place on September 16 at Pskov, between the Esthonian Delegation and the representatives of the Russian Federative Republic of Soviets, the Russian Dele-



gates MM. Krassin, Litvinov, and Dimitri Bogolyubov declared that they would accept the first condition made by the Baltic Conference, namely to begin negotiations simultaneously with the other Baltic States, but asked that the negotiations be not interrupted. Although the Esthonian Delegation did not grant that request, the Russians declared themselves ready to resume the negotiations at the time which the Baltic Conference should appoint. That did not prevent the Russians, during that interval, from launching anew violent attacks against our front which were repulsed everywhere with heavy losses for the enemy.

The Conference of the Baltic States met again on September 28 at Tartu (Dorpat) and will take decisions required by the latest events.

While these negotiations did not bring about peace, a prolonged armistice, a state of armed peace between the Baltic States and Russia of the Soviets seems possible, as also the ratification by all the Baltic States of a military convention for the defense of their independence against the Bolshevist attacks. It would be the beginning of the realization of the "cordon sanitaire" which the Allies have sought to create around Bolshevist Russia and against German expansion in Russia. It is certain that in case an armistice is concluded with the Government of the Soviets, Esthonia will never become a zone of infiltration for Bolshevist propaganda and that she will always remain a barrier to the latter. In beginning negotiations with the Bolshevists, Esthonia has not modified the orientation of her policy, and her sentiments toward the Allies remain the same, for she maintains the firm hope that it is only with their support that she will preserve the possibility of realizing her aspirations, namely, to obtain her complete independence.

Esthonia, which has turned to the Allies with entire confidence ever since the beginning, now in such a critical moment still needs to be supported by their advice and to have the collaboration of their military and diplomatic representatives. The Esthonian Government still believes that the Allied and Associated Powers will not refuse to contribute to the strengthening of the Esthonian Army which, whether the armistice is signed or not, will always remain on guard against any new attack of the Bolshevists.

Please accept [etc.]

*The President of the Esthonian  
Delegation pro tem.:*  
C. R. PUSTA

861.00/5308 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*WASHINGTON, *October 2, 1919, 7 p.m.*

3319. For Polk.

Your 4436, September 29, noon. Refer you to Hoover's cable Hash 854, undated at Paris, received August 7th,<sup>56</sup> wherein he informs Department of his intention to withdraw relief personnel of Baltic by August 15th and that he had transferred considerable quantities food to Russians which at that time was in storage at Viborg, Finland, which would meet the needs of Russian population in liberated Russian districts for some months to come. Same cable informs Department that these stocks would be available for the needs of Petrograd population in the event of the fall of that city and should order be restored there. All of these supplies have been placed in charge of the American Consul at Viborg by Hoover.

You are correct in that we have no funds with which to finance any further food supplies and although we anticipate requesting the President to present a general plan to Congress we cannot predict its attitude.

PHILLIPS

861.00/5333 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*HELSINGFORS, *October 4, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received 7:54 p.m.]

442. Dorpat meeting of Baltic Provinces decided that Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia will begin preliminary peace pourparlers with Bolsheviks about October 25th; Bolsheviks have been so informed. On or about that date Finland must inform the other Baltic Provinces what it will do. Finnish Diet meets October 18th or 20th to decide whether Finland will join the other three Baltic Provinces or await the wishes of the great Powers (see my 435, September 26, 11 p.m.). None of the Baltic Provinces will make a separate peace before October 25th; after that date any one or more can make peace but not if all other Baltic Provinces agree to unite military forces with such one or more to fight Bolsheviks. It was decided at this conference to ask the Allied and Associated Powers when may the Baltic Provinces enter into commercial relations with the Bolsheviks, it being realized that peace would mean only an armistice.

Germany has stated her price to Finland for quelling its Red revolution; namely, 80,000,000 rei[ch]smarks. Holsti states since

<sup>56</sup> *Ante*, p. 698.

Clemenceau's declaration that Åland will go to Sweden, Germany is saying to Finland: "Sweden, who refused to help you quell your rebellion, is given part of your territory to reward her." Finland will never forgive the Allies if Åland is taken away. A more peaceful solution could be made after a few years.

HAYNES

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861.00/5383 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, October 14, 1919.

[Received 3:49 p.m.]

115. The Russ Northwestern Corps has started an offensive and the cities, Pskof and Yamburg, have been retaken.

IMBRIE

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123 G 11/10b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1919, 2 p.m.

6078. Following for your information and circulation to Paris and Scandinavian Missions, latter to repeat to Consuls including Helsingfors:

Mr. John A. Gade has been appointed Commissioner of the United States for the Baltic Provinces of Russia and sailed from New York in an Army Transport for Brest October 8. He will proceed from Brest to Riga or Reval in a Naval vessel and will be accompanied by a Chauffeur and Secretary and also Mr. Hurley, American Consul at Reval, and possibly an officer of the Army who will be attached to him as a military observer.

Mr. Gade is commissioned as a special representative of the Department and is not accredited to any Government of Russia but is merely directed to proceed to the Baltic Provinces to observe conditions, without any power whatever to commit this Government or to represent it in any diplomatic capacity. You are directed to lend him such assistance and cooperation as he may require.

LANSING

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861.00/5414a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1919, 4 p.m.

6081. I shall be glad to have you discuss informally with the Foreign Office the situation which has arisen in the Baltic with a view

to ascertaining the British estimate thereof, British policy and what it expects to accomplish.

I am asking the Peace Commission to repeat to you a telegram of even date to Mr. Polk which will acquaint you with the views of this Government.

LANSING

860c.00/31 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1919, 7 p.m.

3443. For Polk and repeat to London for Ambassador's information.

Your 4575, October 8, 3 a.m., last sentence.<sup>57</sup> In connection with the exchange of notes with Admiral Kolchak, the President and the heads of the other principal Allied and Associated Governments, the President informed Mr. McCormick<sup>58</sup> last June in response to an inquiry made by the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Bakhmeteff, at the time that, while he desires the maximum of autonomy and self-government for the Baltic Provinces he does not understand that at this time any commitment has been made as to their independence but that on the contrary the sovereignty of Russia remains unimpaired. On this basis the Department has addressed a letter to the Lithuanian National Council in New York the essential parts of which follow:

"As you are aware, the Government of the United States is traditionally sympathetic with the national aspirations of dependent peoples. On the other hand, it has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly, constitutional government in Russia the principle of Russian unity as a whole.

Accordingly, when the President, in common with the heads of the other principal Allied and Associated Governments, proffered Admiral Kolchak aid in bringing about in Russia a situation conducive to the establishment of orderly, constitutional government, it was especially stipulated, *inter alia*, that failing an immediate agreement between Lithuania and the new Russian Government, an arrangement would be made in consultation and cooperation with the League of Nations and that pending such an arrangement Russia must agree to recognize Lithuania as autonomous and to confirm the relations which might exist between the *de facto* government of Lithuania and the Allied and Associated Governments.

<sup>57</sup> "Although the British Government has already recognized the *de facto* independence of Lithuania and the other Baltic states and has dealt with them as such, I am in doubt whether this is an opportune moment for us to consider such recognition, involving as it does the question of the partitioning of Russia. Polk" (File no. 861c.00/3L.)

<sup>58</sup> Vance McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board.

It is believed that this arrangement assures the autonomous development of Lithuania, together with the other nationalities comprised within the former Russian Empire, and wisely leaves to a future natural adjustment the determination of the relations which shall exist between them and the new Russian Government."

The Russian Ambassador here deprecates the policy of Great Britain which he believes encourages too much the nationalist movements in the Baltic Provinces. He argues that these States cannot be made an effective barrier against German penetration into Russia; the effective barrier is Russia itself and the wisest policy would, therefore, be to protect the integrity of Russia supporting the Russians rather than the separatist movements. In this way he argues that the Baltic problem would be simplified by the recognition of Kolchak and I am disposed to share the Ambassador's views.

You will observe that the above quoted letter is in keeping with the line of policy suggested and is a logical step toward recognition of Kolchak. I should be glad to have your views as promptly as possible.

LANSING

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861.00/5406 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, *October 16, 1919.*

[Received October 17, 1:57 a.m.]

116. Under cover of fire from British fleet, Russian troops are being landed in neighborhood of Krasnaya Gorka with capture of that fort as objective. White advance continues; their troops are within ten versts of Gatchina the capture of which is expected today. Bolsheviks morale [apparent omission] their retreat at times becoming a rout.

IMBRIE

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861.00/5404 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, *October 16, 1919, 3 p.m.*

[Received October 17, 1:43 a.m.]

465. Reported Gatchina taken by Northwestern Army and Petrograd likely to fall in few days.

HAYNES

861.00/5397 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*HELSINGFORS, *October 16, 1919, 4 p.m.*

[Received 11:45 p.m.]

467. Reported Petrograd and Cronstadt taken.

HAYNES

861.00/5414c : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie)*WASHINGTON, *October 17, 1919, 1 p.m.*

In case Petrograd falls it is desired that you proceed there as soon as you safely can and cable the Department at the earliest practicable moment a report upon general conditions especially the material needs of the population. It is expected that a part at least of your report will be given to the press here.

ADEE

861.00/5420 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*VIBORG, *October 18, 1919.*

[Received 9:36 p.m.]

119. Finnish General Staff officially communicates to representative of Northwestern Government here that the White Forces have occupied Petrograd. The White flag is flying from Kronstadt.

IMBRIE

861.00/5427 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*VIBORG, *October 20, 1919.*

[Received 2:22 p.m.]

122. Fighting now in progress at Putiloffski works in outskirts of Petrograd. Bolsheviks evidently intend to defend city. Reported railroad between Petrograd and Moscow is cut leaving Vologda railroad sole egress from city. Newspapers have ceased publication. Red Army still obstruct [on] Finnish border.

IMBRIE

861.00/5454 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, October 22, 1919.

[Received October 23, 9:10 a.m.]

125. The statement of Russian General Staff that Kronstadt has been captured by Whites is untrue and was made for political purposes that Finnish Diet might be influenced against negotiating peace with Bolsheviks. Petrograd has issued an order announcing that Petrograd will be defended and calling for reinforcements. The mining of the Neva bridges has been inspected and machine guns moved to strategic points. If Petrograd is not taken within one week, the probabilities are it will be only taken upon Denikine's advance from south.

There is now in session at Moscow a convention of representatives from all Soviets of Russia, called for purpose discussing plans for saving Soviet Government.

A report just made to the Central Executive Committee by engineers in charge of various factories is to the effect that it will be impossible for the works to function longer than one month and that the evacuation of machinery is impracticable, because railways are wholly occupied with military transport.

IMBRIE

861.00/5452 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, October 22, 1919.

[Received October 23, 5:33 a.m.]

124. Fighting continues outskirts of Petrograd. Whites unable to advance. Bolsheviks bringing up reinforcements.

IMBRIE

861.48/1005a

*President Wilson to the United States Wheat Director and President of the United States Grain Corporation (Barnes)*

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. BARNES: It has been brought to my attention that the Russian Ambassador at Washington, Mr. Boris Bakhmeteff, has made application to the Grain Corporation to purchase, on a partial credit basis, 29,000 tons of wheat flour with a view to shipping 20,000 tons for the relief of the civilian population of Petrograd and such adjoining regions as may be freed from Bolshevik

control, and the remainder to Archangel for the relief, under similar conditions, of the civilian population of northern Russia. I understand that Mr. Bakhmeteff desires to enter into a contract with you on behalf of the Russian Embassy.

I consider it of the utmost importance and urgency that food be made available for the civilian population of the regions in question. It is the announced policy of this Government to relieve in every possible way the material distress of the Russian people. It is considered, moreover, that economic relief of this character is the most effective means of limiting the spread of Bolshevism and of protecting, thereby, the Government of the United States from the dangers of subversive propaganda.

Pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by Act of Congress approved March 4, 1919, I hereby direct and authorize you to sell to the Russian Embassy, on credit or otherwise, the wheat flour mentioned above on such terms as you may, in your discretion, determine.

I am [etc.]

WOODROW WILSON

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861.00/5414a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Davis)*

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1919.*

6116. Referring to Department's 6081, October 15, 4 p.m.<sup>60</sup> Russian Embassy here informs Department that General Knox<sup>61</sup> recently communicated to Kolchak a message from the British Government in which it was pointed out that the Bolsheviki had offered the Baltic nationalities recognition of their independence as the price of peace with them and that as they were about to accede it would be well for Kolchak to recognize their independence with a view to deterring them from the Bolshevik bargain. Kolchak declined the proposal pointing out that he could not outbid the Bolsheviki who had nothing to lose.

The Russian Ambassador suggested as a wiser measure a communication to the Baltic Governments pointing out that Allied support was predicated on resistance to the Bolsheviki and would be withdrawn if they made peace. The Department suggested to him that the Baltic Governments had not had our support, the policy of the United States having been rather to sustain the principle of Russian unity at least until union or separation could be legally decided

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<sup>60</sup> *Ante*, p. 722.

<sup>61</sup> Maj. Gen. Alfred W. F. Knox, in command of the British forces in Siberia.



upon. The practical course would therefore be to make representations in London as Great Britain had been foremost in supporting the Baltic separatist movements and was, therefore, in the best position by threatening to terminate that support to influence their course of action with respect to the Bolsheviki. Repeat to Am[erican] mission Paris for Polk's information.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5457: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 23, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received 2:55 p.m.]

3287. Your 6081, October 15th, 4 p.m.<sup>62</sup> Your 3443, October 15th, 7 p.m.<sup>63</sup> to American Mission and Stockholm's 4147, October 17th, 5 p.m. to Department.<sup>64</sup> In course of informal discussion with Foreign Office on 22nd, I am advised as follows: About a month ago the three Baltic States of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, represented to British Government that they would be obliged to open peace negotiations with Russian Soviet Government unless British Government would recognize them as *de jure* independent with which support however they could continue. On September 26th in identic telegrams British Government replied that it had "already recognized the autonomous existence of the Governments of the Baltic States" and that the question of *de jure* recognition of independence cannot be decided by British Government upon its own responsibility in severance from its Allies and that determination of this question was therefore a matter for the Peace Conference or for the League of Nations as its sequel. The telegram further stated that British Government may give the fullest measure of safeguards to an effort to secure the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic Provinces so far as consistent with a final and peaceful settlement in northeastern Europe.

Foreign Office observes that this enunciation goes further than that contained in Department's note to Lithuanian National Council<sup>65</sup> with which however they express themselves as pleased and in sympathy. Regarding recognition of Kolchak, in which connection the activities of Kolchak, Denikine, and Yudenitch must be con-

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<sup>62</sup> *Ante*, p. 722.

<sup>63</sup> *Ante*, p. 723.

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

<sup>65</sup> Quoted in part in telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, no. 3443, Oct. 15, 7 p.m., p. 723.

sidered as coordinated into one government, the matter is under discussion and if it be deemed advisable make formal representation we shall be duly informed.

As will be seen from the above the British Government lays great stress upon the impossibility of keeping separate the idea of the integrity of the Russian nation with the Baltic States in enjoyment of autonomy and that of the independence of such portions or any other portions of the former Russian Empire. American Mission, Paris, informed.

DAVIS

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861.48/982 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 23, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received October 24, 1:47 a.m.]

4789. Reports from various Allied sources and including Hoover's Child Fund personnel indicate release of Petrograd from Bolsheviks control imminent. All reports indicate that terrible conditions of suffering exist in Petrograd.

Hoover wisely left stocks of foodstuffs at Viborg and these stocks together with State Department's recent delivery of flour at Reval available to carry Petrograd for approximately three weeks. As bridge on railroad line from Viborg to Petrograd destroyed Viborg stocks must be carried by water to Petrograd. Reported these stocks now being loaded on barges at Viborg preparatory to moving to Petrograd. Large railroad bridge on line Reval to Petrograd at Yamburg destroyed, necessitating water movement these supplies to Petrograd. These are problems for local Russian authorities aided by British to handle.

Hoover's Child Fund representatives in Russian liberated territory outside Russia report that number of bread tickets issued by Bolsheviks October 1, 1919 to population Petrograd totaled 750,000 and that all reports confirm additional [population] of 750,000 in vicinity of Petrograd. These reports of population somewhat larger than was previously estimated and must be taken with reserve. The supply of this population after the consumption of the Viborg and Reval stocks is the immediate problem now facing the Russians after liberation Petrograd. The Russians are also faced by impending situation resulting from the freezing of the extreme eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland which closes sea approach to Petrograd. This freezing occurs annually at some date between December 1st and 15th. Under pre-war conditions Petrograd communication with open water and [was] through Reval and Libau. As already indicated these lines

partially destroyed and similar destruction inevitable on Libau communications with Petrograd. In addition almost complete demoralization Russian railroads this territory and shortage railroad equipment reduces the carrying capacity of these Russian railway lines even if in repair to an almost negligible quantity. The same conditions apply to a greater or less extent with the possibility of utilizing the ice-free ports of Finland for the shipping of supplies to Petrograd. The foregoing situation demonstrates the urgent necessity for immediate action on the part of the Russians to push into Petrograd as soon as it falls the very maximum quantity of relief supplies before this freezing of the port of Petrograd. Logan has been in consultation with British and Russian authorities in an endeavor to help them out as much as possible in the recent emergency. We have presented to them very clearly the fact that all appropriations made by Congress for relief are exhausted and that under existing laws no credits can be made available in America for the purchase of food supplies and that it rests squarely upon the Russians through their own means to establish the necessary credits in England and America for this purpose. British have presented the same position to the Russians. It is understood however that the Russians have approximately £3,000,000 in England which was earmarked for munition purchases and Logan has been insisting that the Russians release sufficient of this money so that the English Wheat Executive can guarantee to Sweden the replacement of 20,000 tons of cereal flour which is reported the Swedes have in surplus and which the Swedes will lay down in Petrograd if replacement is guaranteed. It is hoped this arrangement can be effected within the next few days and if it is effected in Petrograd situation will be protected for a few months after the exhaustion of the existing American stocks at Petrograd. Bakhmeteff has cabled Sazonoff that the American Cabinet is considering the possibility of authorizing our Grain Corporation to assume a credit for 20,000 tons of flour for Petrograd and that he will probably be able to obtain the necessary tonnage to move this on American Government credit. We have no advice as to whether or not this information is correct but if it is so, this movement should be started without delay so that deliveries can be effected before Petrograd is blocked by ice.

Denikin has always held that he opposed the export of the large existing wheat surplus in Southern Russia as this surplus would be eventually needed for the supply of the Moscow and Petrograd population. Logan has therefore been emphasizing to the Russians the necessity that as now Petrograd is likely to fall it is incumbent upon the Russians to arrange through Denikin for the immediate

release of wheat in the Black Sea. Logan pointed out to the Russians that it would be foolish for them to use their foreign credits in purchasing double the price foreign cereals when they themselves could meet the Petrograd supply with their own wheat at half the cost. He has been insisting that the Russians start releasing the supply already accumulated at Black Sea ports and has about effected arrangements with the British Wheat Executive that they will arrange to take this wheat f.o.b. Black Sea ports delivering same under the Mediterranean programs and diverting corresponding Atlantic cargoes into Petrograd. Denikin's business manager is now in Paris and it is hoped that an arrangement along these lines can be effected shortly. We have just been informed that Denikin has agreed to delivery of 40,000 tons of wheat to the French in exchange for certain war supplies. We are trying to ascertain if this wheat is immediately available for shipment and if so will use our best endeavors with French for them to defer delivery so that this amount can be immediately applied to the Petrograd situation.

The foregoing is a résumé of the Petrograd situation as we see it and the line of action we are following in regard to the helping the Russians meet it. If Petrograd falls we urgently request the State Department give all possible publicity to the fact of the annual freezing of sea approaches to Petrograd early in month of December of each year and the difficulty of transportation of supplies into Petrograd from open ports as outlined in this cable. We are quite sure that in the event of the fall [of] Petrograd many philanthropic organizations including the American Red Cross will be interested in endeavoring to relieve the sufferings of the Petrograd population and on this account they should have full knowledge of the transportation difficulties.

Whilst all reports confirm the imminent release of Petrograd from Bolshevik control nevertheless in view of past experience we cannot be sure of this until it is a fact accomplished. It is naturally understood that the plan of operations outlined herein will not be put into effect until Petrograd actually falls.

AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5465 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 9:53 p.m.]

4159. Helsingfors advises that no request for help has been made to Finland by Judenitch as he as well as Denikin is opposed to pos-

sible capture of Petrograd by Finnish troops. After fall of Petrograd question of Finland's possible intervention may be discussed. [Repeated to] American Mission. Copy to London.

MORRIS

861.00/5475 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Acting Secretary of State*

VIBORG, October 25, 1919.

[Received 5:49 p.m.]

127. Petrograd still in hands of Bolsheviks. White lines now ten versts from city; latter still control Nikolayevsky railroad and are within five versts of Vologda railroad in vicinity of Kolpino. Attempt will be made to blow up bridge at Zvanka thus isolating Petrograd. Left flank of Whites encircles Kronstadt. Trotsky has come to Petrograd to take charge of operations.

IMBRIE

861.00/5473 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 25, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received October 26, 8:04 a.m.]

4162. The status of the proposed peace negotiations between the Baltic States, Finland and Soviet Russia briefly summarized is as follows, according to the most reliable information I have been able to obtain: Negotiations between Esthonia and Soviet Russia took place at Pskov September 17th. The Esthonian delegation demanded postponement of negotiations until position of Latvia, Lithuania and Finland in this question have been found out. Esthonia not wanting to take separate measures, its delegation returned to Reval on September 19th. On September 29th at the Dorpat Conference Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia and Finland decided to put on trial the sincerity of the Bolshevik peace offer by putting forth of certain conditions, the acceptance of which by the Bolsheviks would guarantee a lasting armistice and guard the countries in question from Bolshevik propaganda. The Dorpat conference accepted, directing provisional recognition for these conditions after the acceptance of which by the Bolsheviks negotiations might be begun. In order to work out in detail the *modus operandi* of negotiations a conference of specialists of the four Entente Cordiale countries was projected to be held in Riga on October 15th, the decisions of which after the ratification by the respective parliaments were to be sent to the Bolsheviks. The Council of Ministers of Latvia ratified the agreement concluded by the four Entente Cor-

diale countries at the Dorpat conference. The further development of the peace problem has been checked by the German-Russian monarchistic attacks on Latvia in Courland and by the advance of the Northwestern Army on Petrograd. The above has been confirmed also by the Esthonian Legation. American Mission's 463.

MORRIS

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861.48/982 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1919, 5 p.m.

3564. Your 4789, October 23, 11 p.m. Your plans for the relief of Petrograd understood and approved.

American Relief Administration has sent its representative from Reval to Viborg to cooperate with Imbrie in helping the Russians move the Viborg supplies into Petrograd if the city falls. The Secretary of the Navy has telegraphed Admiral Knapp at Paris to despatch thither, if practicable and Imbrie so requests, an American naval vessel. Imbrie has been authorized to draw on the Russian Embassy at Washington up to \$10,000, if necessary, for moving the supplies into Petrograd. The Department is insisting that Russians should accomplish movement but considers it important that they have American rather than British cooperation, as in latter case food will be presumed British by the population of Petrograd.

The United States Grain Corporation will sell the Russian Embassy at Washington, on credit, 29,000 tons of wheat [flour?] provided President gives written authority. President's condition has not yet made it possible to obtain this.<sup>65a</sup>

Department concurs in your view that Russians should be made to use South Russian grain as far as possible. Please advise Department of any diversions of grain cargo to Petrograd which may actually occur as it may then be possible to curtail shipments from this country.

Will keep you currently advised of what we are doing here.

PHILLIPS

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861.00/5494 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, October 28, 1919.

[Received 6:50 p.m.]

132. Lines remain as reported my number 127, 25th. Bolsheviks are preparing offensive and have brought up reinforcements both

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<sup>65a</sup> Cf. letter of Oct. 22 from President Wilson to the United States Wheat Director, p. 726.

from Finnish front and from Moscow so that Red Army at present available for defense of Petrograd estimated at 100,000. British monitor now bombarding Kronstadt with fifteen-inch guns.

IMBRIE

861.00/5498 : Telegram

*The Minister in Denmark (Hapgood) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, *October 28, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received October 29, 1:45 a.m.]

243. Following from military attaché.<sup>66</sup>

"Riga, October 27th. Communication from Ulmanis, Prime Minister Latvia, dated October 25th, handed me as military representative of the United States, follows in condensed form:

'Lettish Army has been carrying on fight against Bolshevists for eleven months now attacked by Russo-German troops.

Lettish Army has always fought for ideals for which Allied Powers were combating for five years and has protected whole Europe from Bolshevism. In fighting Russo-German troops Lettish Army prevents union between reactionary Germany and reactionary Russia.

Latvia has been incessantly devastated during five years by German-Russian and Bolshevist armies and has sacrificed more to war against Germany than even Belgium, consequently capabilities very limited and supplying of army possible only with help of Allied Powers. At present army carrying on fight meant [*sic*] for two fronts.

Following asked of each of Allied Governments: governmental support of aid already given by navies to operation of Latvian Army. Give arms, munitions, etc., to Latvian Army; grant Latvia support of £2,000,000 carry on war, supply provisions to inhabitants as heretofore, prevent coming of new [apparent omission] into Latvia; disarm and evacuate without loss of time all foreign troops from Latvia.

Answer requested by November 3d in order take steps dependent on answer. Signed, Ulmanis, Prime Minister.'

Believe it to be in the interest of humanity to make every effort. This fighting which is resulting in loss of the lives including women and children and enormous damage to property. If these conditions continue great suffering will result this winter and much food and clothing will be required."

HAPGOOD

<sup>66</sup> Col. Thomas W. Hollyday, on detail in the Baltic Provinces.

861.00/5510 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 29, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 2:22 p.m.]

3315. Foreign Office, to which was informally communicated substance of your 6116,<sup>67</sup> is under the impression that Knox reported in similar vein in military telegrams to British War Office. Foreign Office expresses full concurrence with reply made by Department to Russian Ambassador and my telegram 3287, October 23, 1 p.m.,<sup>68</sup> which crossed telegram now under acknowledgment, enunciates British Government's present position in the matter. American mission informed.

DAVIS

861.00/5564 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, November 3, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received 10:41 p.m.]

487. Terrific pressure on Finland to intervene brought by French and English. *Le Temps* and *London Times* quoted daily in reactionary press of Helsingfors as Finland's chance lost due to the loss of Entente's respect. Mannerheim's<sup>69</sup> open letter from Paris to President Stahlberg urging intention [*intervention*] given widest publicity as well as Mannerheim's report that Clemenceau had told him Åland would go to Finland if help was rendered Yudenitch. This country is determined, however, on the *status quo*. The Foreign Office will hand General Gulevitch reply to-morrow substance of which is Finland sympathizes and agrees to assist economically, but internal political and financial situation, with no guarantees by Entente or future Russian Government, prevent[s] it from responding favorably concerning military deliverance of Petrograd.

A pro-Russian French diplomat has informally suggested to Enckell, Finnish representative in Paris, that Finland ask France to act as arbitrator between Finland and reactionary Russian governments. This country looks upon such as a joke. France, seeing its newspaper Mannerheim-Enckell-Yudenitch-save-civilization

<sup>67</sup> Dated Oct. 23, *ante*, p. 727.<sup>68</sup> *Ante*, p. 728.<sup>69</sup> Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, former Regent of Finland.



propaganda pressure a failure, now proposes to finance equipment of Finnish volunteers against Petrograd. Such will probably meet the same failure as the secretly Mannerheim-managed Finnish volunteers' expedition into Karelia some months ago. Am informed reliably Esthonia will again begin negotiations with the Bolsheviki November 9th.

HAYNES

861.00/5561 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINGFORS, November 3, 1919, 7 p.m.

[Received 9:27 p.m.]

489. Officially reported Yudenitch has retreated from Gatchina and Luga and both places taken by Bolsheviki.

HAYNES

861.00/5572 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 4, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received November 5, 3 a.m.]

4211. According to latest confidential information reaching this Legation from sources heretofore found trustworthy, the present situation in the Baltic region is as follows: As neither Great Britain nor France is in a position to interfere, the Baltic barons and the Krupp-Essen[-*Thiessen*?] group of German industrials and private bankers which has been financing the operations of Von der Goltz <sup>71</sup> and Bermond <sup>72</sup> consider time now opportune for their forces to crush the Soviet Government and in so doing to assume a paramount position in Russia and open the Russian market which is indispensable for Germany's development. It is considered that the forces under Von der Goltz's control are sufficient to accomplish this without difficulty. It is considered desirable in order to spare Russian sensibilities that the movement against Petrograd, the first step to be taken, be made under the Russian flag and Bermond, of whose 8,000 to 10,000 men 3,000 are Russian, has accordingly been put in nominal charge of the movement although the real director is Von der Goltz who still remains with his force at Janishki on the Let-

<sup>71</sup> General Count Rudiger von der Goltz, commanding German troops in the Baltic Provinces.

<sup>72</sup> Colonel Prince Avalov-Bermond, commanding the Russian Western Army of Volunteers.

tish Lithuanian frontier. Bermond, following instructions, demanded of Latvia the right of passage which was refused and his attack on Latvia followed. The latter asked the aid of Esthonia which at first responded but her demands for compensation made presumably under pressure of Bermond were considered too heavy and were refused whereupon Esthonia withdrew. It is not to Von der Goltz's purpose to crush Latvia and the attempt is now being made to draw Yudenitch into negotiations with Bermond with a view to Bermond's assuming chief command over the Northwestern Army. Yudenitch is likely to refuse this as while well aware that he cannot alone take and hold Petrograd he still reckons on Finland's cooperation. Should these prospective negotiations between Bermond and Yudenitch fail an alternate plan, behind which is believed to be Goutchkoff, former Russian Minister of War at present in Berlin, is to put forward General Gurko now in Berlin as commander in chief on the authority of both Bermond and Yudenitch. Only in case this latter plan is agreed upon the troops of Von der Goltz will at once join the movement. If on the other hand these negotiations entirely fail it is believed that Bermond intends to advance in any case even if this should imply attacking Yudenitch's force. It is not Germany's wish that Finland participate in this campaign which would lessen German credit for the overthrow of the Bolshevik government. American Mission's 501. Copy to London.

WHEELER

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861.00/5574a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler)*

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1919, 3 p.m.

1722. As it is obvious that the question of Finnish cooperation in the attack on Petrograd is becoming acute, I desire to impress upon you that the attitude of the United States in this matter is entirely noncommittal. It is felt that the Finns themselves must decide whether or not they should respond to any demands which the Russians may make for assistance. You will exercise care to avoid creating the impression by your official or personal attitude that the United States would either approve or disapprove of the course eventually decided upon.

Repeat to Commissioner at Helsingfors for his guidance also.

LANSING

861.00/5669A : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1919, 5 p.m.

6171. Ambassador Bakhmeteff has spoken again concerning developments in the Baltic region and has urged that there be an effort to restrain the Baltic Governments from making peace with the Soviets.

The attitude of the Department as stated in its telegram 6116 of October 23, 4 p.m.<sup>73</sup> remains unchanged. You may make this known informally to the Foreign Office. The British Government has actively supported the Baltic nationalities, it is presumed in order to maintain a barrier on the one hand against Bolshevism and on the other against German penetration. It would seem that the British are in the best position to exercise constraint if the Baltic peoples are to be restrained from yielding to German or Soviet influence.

I should like to know confidentially whether it is possible that the British Baltic policy is regarded as unsuccessful and whether there is again a disposition to negotiate with the Soviets.

In this connection I shall be pleased to have your comment as early as possible on my No. 6149 of November 4, noon,<sup>74</sup> and on the statement concerning the prospect of peace with Russia made by the Prime Minister November 8 at the Lord Mayor's banquet.<sup>75</sup>

LANSING

861.00/5636 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 13, 1919.

[Received 10:19 a.m.]

5156. From Gade via radio from S.S. *Chattanooga*.

2. Just returned from Judenitch headquarters. Leaving for Riga about 15th.

1st. Well-informed Finnish sources stated present movement of Mannerheim sympathizers to have [*raise*] volunteer army to support Judenitch would probably fail. Apart from conditions made by, or to, Russians, Finnish Government can not entertain any proposal vouching for financial assistance.

2d. Have conferred with Generals Judenitch, Laidoner, Trenisone [*Tonisone*], and with the Russian civil Government and British Military Mission Narva and staff corps and division commanders northwestern front.

<sup>73</sup> *Ante*, p. 727.<sup>74</sup> *Ante*, p. 121.<sup>75</sup> The Ambassador in Great Britain replied in telegram no. 3394, Nov. 15, 6 p.m., *ante*, p. 122.

3d. Russian and Esthonian armies now preparing to stand Jamburg or western bank of Luga directly back of town attempting local counter-attacks along railroad, Gdoff, Pskoff. Troops much exhausted but morale not bad, while Russian staff and army organization momentarily entirely demoralized. British view situation pessimistically, preparing, when gulf freezes, to withdraw naval forces.

4th. Last month's campaign and resulting disaster to Russian Army may be summarized as follows.

5th. Judenitch attack with merely 12,000 effectives opposed by originally 20,000 Bolsheviks who rapidly retreated, intending to permit Judenitch to advance and ultimately outflank him to the south. When Russians reached Tsarskoe Selo six Bolshevik divisions, numbering some 50,000, defending Petrograd, retreated.<sup>76</sup> These were taken from Finnish, Latvian, Murman and Denikin fronts. Best Bolsheviks were three communist regiments and the student officers and the Tarlanski and Bogunski regiments and the sailors. The combined attack on Krasnaya-Gorka by British naval guns and combined Esthonian-Russian land forces failing as well as great superiority in Bolshevik troops gathered to defend capital and flank attack started by latter required immediately Judenitch's retreat. In advancing he had taken 12,000 prisoners in starving condition. His total loss amounted to 3,000. Bolshevik peasant soldiers surrendered willingly. They lacked cartridges, clothing and discipline severely. Losses estimated at about fifth five hundred [5,500].

6th. Judenitch army now 12,000 effectives, 25,000 unarmed. Esthonian division cooperating or acting as reserves, 8,000.

7th. British severely criticised [by] Italians,<sup>77</sup> Russians and Esthonians who state they practically demanded of Yudenitch he should advance rather than making him see the insufficiency of the supporters [*his force*]. Germans making most of this criticism, furthering anti-British feeling.

8th. Snowy thoroughfares leading to Narva pitiful sight, similar to [northern France] early month of war. Crowded with continuous gathering [*stream*] of homeless starving refugees with cattle and household effects, groups of ashen-faced stupefied Bolshevik prisoners. Some 6,000 refugee peasants already arrived in Narva. Much appreciation of American relief and Red Cross.

9th. Line runs at the present time Pepia, Babino, Kerstovo, Pustomirsha, Imienitzi, Vuoirva, Poretchie, Popkova Gora, Veino.

10th. Lack of hearty cooperation between Esthonian and Russian lower commands evident and Russian civil Government doing

<sup>76</sup>The word "retreated" does not appear on the original telegram as sent from Paris.

<sup>77</sup>The word "Italians" does not appear on the original telegram as sent from Paris.

little to invite greater cooperation and confidence from Esthonian Government. Yudenitch's paper currency refused everywhere.

AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5642: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, *undated*.

[Received November 13, 1919, 9:03 p.m.]

5158. From [Gade from] United States Ship *Chattanooga* [202512].

3. [November 12, 7 p.m.] Delegates of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are meeting at Dorpat to formulate conditions of armistice with Soviet Government. Delegates of Poland, Ukraine, Finland and White Russia of Minsk region are present as observers and having separate pourparlers with delegates of Baltic Provinces. As preliminary condition to negotiations with Bolsheviki, hostages will be exchanged.

2. Bolsheviki delegates will be carefully guarded and hindered from all spreading of propaganda.

3. Baltic Provinces have made following preliminary rough draft of terms for discussion if Soviet Government willing to accede to preliminary conditions:

- A. The recognition of independence of three Baltic Provinces.
- B. Establishment neutral zone from Finnish Bay to Poland between the provinces and Soviet territory.
- C. No Bolsheviki propaganda to be carried out in provinces.
- D. No consular or diplomatic officers at present.
- E. No amnesty for former Baltic citizens fighting for Bolsheviki.
- F. Provisional [*Trade?*] agreement to be determined by commission to be appointed with Allied Powers' participation.
- G. Transit trade from Russia through provinces to or from Allies to be facilitated in every way.
- H. Principles of general demobilization to be discussed at once.

4. Arrangements have been made with [*by*] Baltic Provinces to confer with Soviet Government at Tartu, Jourieff,<sup>78</sup> November 17 to discuss exchange of prisoners of war and return of hostages.

5. I am requested to transmit following official communication to American Government and Peace Commission which I am obliged to paraphrase . . .

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<sup>78</sup>Tartu is the Esthonian name of Dorpat; the Russian name is Jourieff (Yurev).

"The Foreign Minister of Esthonia has been instructed by the assembled delegates of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to inform you, [that] in case an armistice is found possible, they will find it necessary to establish a neutral zone between their republics and Soviet Russia [and] under the administration of a third state. The Peace Conference is hereby requested to nominate such a third state which will charge itself with the organization and control of the zone in question, thus making possible further negotiations."

Gade  
AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5693 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 18, 1919, 11 a.m.

[Received 1:54 p.m.]

4236. The Russian Minister informs me that he has received a personal message to the effect that Yudenitch has appealed to the British mission in Reval and the French mission in Helsingfors to exert pressure on Esthonia to the end that his troops may be permitted to retreat on Esthonian soil without disarmament. American Mission's 519.

WHEELER

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861.00/5702 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, undated.

[Received November 19, 1919, 3:15 a.m.]

5280. From [Gade at] Riga.

7, November 17, 8 p. m. Bermondts defeated and retreating; Bausk reported taken by Lett troops and Bermondts willing to negotiate for withdrawal to Germany. Russian contingent stated willing to join other Russian forces. New German recruits had been constantly joining Bermondts by leaving train before reaching frontier and crossing at unguarded points. Bermondts defeat due partly to loss of morale, as well as well-planned and conducted Lett campaign. Lett losses only 600, Bermondts about 2,000, no prisoners taken except Russians, which were well treated and some 600 sent to Northwestern Corps. Letts have captured considerable war material and greatly elated temporary success eastern Latvia front against Bolsheviks. Foreign Minister stated Latvia would not conclude treaty with Bolsheviks if it is contrary to the wishes of Allies and requested me to inquire America's point of view in this matter. Gade.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5706 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State*STOCKHOLM, *November 19, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received 10:45 p.m.]

4240. The Russian Minister informs me that he is this morning in receipt of a telegram from the Northwestern Army stating that Yudenitch has come to a satisfactory agreement with the Esthonian Government and that all rumors that his troops are to be interned or put under Esthonian command are false. American Mission's 521[A].

WHEELER

861.00/5716 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*PARIS, *November 21, 1919.*

[Received 9:56 a.m.]

5334. From [Gade at] Riga.

"Repeat Secretary of State, 9, November 20, 10 a.m.

I am informed three [*one?*] thousand Judenitch troops obliged to retire to Esthonia, have been disarmed by Esthonians. I am advised [*afraid*] grave menace may result from further disarmament Judenitch's troops, in Bolsheviks either attacking Esthonia and Latvia with resulting decreased opposition or Latvia separately by separate Esthonian peace. Judenitch hoping that Allies may quickly inform Esthonia at least temporarily to desist. What steps shall be taken with Bermond's Russians wishing join Northwestern Army now liable to be refused entry Esthonia? Gade."

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5702 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*WASHINGTON, *November 21, 1919, 4 p.m.*

3844. Your 5280. Please note following and repeat to Gade, in reply to his No. 7, November 17, 8 p.m. :

"Department does not desire you to make known to the Foreign Minister of Latvia in any formal way its point of view with respect to peace with the Bolsheviki as this might imply an obligation on our part to Latvia in case it should shape its policy accordingly. You are aware of the attitude of reserve which we have adopted with respect to the Baltic independence movements.

In discussing the matter informally and personally with the Foreign Minister of Latvia you may, however, make plain to him what should be obvious, namely, that this Government could not do other-

wise than advise against any attempt at a compromise with the Bolsheviks. The experience of this Government has convinced it that it is not practicable for non-Bolshevik governments to deal with the Bolsheviks.

The ultimate purpose of the latter is to overturn all non-Bolshevik governments and seeming compromises which they may make with these are presumably but temporary and tactical expedients."

LANSING

861.00/5725 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 22, 1919.

[Received 11:25 p.m.]

5361. From [Gade at] Riga.

[“]November 19, 2 p.m. Following received by Latvian War Office:

‘ Russian west army has placed itself under German protection. Have taken over command. Request by wireless your assent to complete cessation of hostilities starting from midnight 19th-20th for the purpose of arranging an armistice. Von Eberhardt, Major General, German commander-in-chief in the Baltic [Provinces].’

Bermondts has placed himself and troops under Von Eberhardt who by this cable assent [*evinces*] his acceptance of them. Letts will not reply and are gradually surrounding Mitau. On eastern front Bolshevik pressure has not occurred [*increasing*] against Landeswehr owing to withdrawal of troops from Judenitch front and absence of Letts fighting Bermondts. Owing victory over Judenitch Litvinoff’s attitude at Dorpat considerably changed and his demands on Baltic Provinces considerably stiffened. Gade.”

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5716 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1919, 2 p.m.

3882. Your 5334, November 21. Following for Gade:

“ With reference to the last sentence of your No. 9, November 20, 10 a.m., you are informed that it is considered unwise to interfere in any formal way in matters of this kind which, if determined in accordance with its expressed wish, would place upon this Government moral responsibilities which it is not in a position to discharge. This does not preclude your exercising personal influence, unofficially and informally, in directions known by you to be parallel with



the general purposes of American policy, but your mission is primarily to observe conditions and report thereon to the Department."

LANSING

861.00/5770 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Riga (Gade) to the Secretary of State*

RIGA, November 26, 1919, 10 p.m.

[Received November 27, 11:34 a.m.]

Repeat American Mission.

20. Regarding Dorpat conference.

Baltic States delaying further procedure hoping for some expression from the Allies and America as to their action in discussing terms of peace with the Bolshevik. They hoped such an expression might be made after the request made to [*in*] my telegram number 3, November 12, 7 p.m. to American Mission<sup>80</sup> repeated Secretary of State to consider appointment of third power to control and police proposed neutral zone which Latvian Foreign Minister states still unanswered. Esthonia has informed Latvia she will recommence separate negotiations with Bolshevik, December 1st, if Latvia then still waiting. Bolshevik hoping that disputed points, especially possession of city of Walk, causing difficulties between Esthonia and Latvia, may lead to separate peace with the former, and with Yudenitsch eliminated, allow strong Bolshevik attack on Latvian eastern front. Latvian negotiations with Polish General Prince Radziwill concluded, and agreement reached by which Poland and Lithuania promised to assist Latvia if unable to protect eastern frontier before the movement eastern frontier. Latvian troops now busy with Bermond. On December 15th joint Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian offensive agreed on against the Bolshevik. I am reliably informed that Esthonia has for a month been secretly and separately negotiating in Moscow. Bolshevik demands now stiffened including free passage merchandise and agents through the port of Reval which was refused by Esthonia. England believed to be apathetic. French policy especially desired.

GADE

861.48/1033 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 27, 1919.

[Received 2:18 a.m.]

5437. In further reference our 5267<sup>81</sup> Hoover's Child Fund representative, Miller, telegraphs from Reval, November 21:

<sup>80</sup> Transmitted in telegram from the Commission to Negotiate Peace no. 5158, received Nov. 13, p. 740.

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

“ Russian Army practically no territory left. Movement on foot to dissolve remainder of Russian Army and turn everything over to Esthonian command. In this event remaining stores present problem for immediate decision. There are in Esthonia over 1,000 tons flour. In case of dissolution Russian Army temptation for exploiting foodstuffs very probable. Under contract Russians cannot sell food without consent [American] Relief Administration. American consul not familiar with situation and not yet located here. Therefore feel it my duty to post you on situation and request decision so that when things break we will know how to act.”

Child Fund forwarded this message to Hoover. In view of the situation quoted suggest matter be discussed with Hoover so that appropriate instructions may be communicated to American consul, Viborg, in order that not only may the Reval situation be properly handled but also to protect the Viborg stocks from being misappropriated or otherwise misused pending final determination of their disposition.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5785 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, *November 28, 1919.*

[Received November 30, 7:50 p.m.]

154. Feeling among the White Russians here and in Baltic Provinces is now very bitter against the British: 1st, because of British interference in military and political operations of Northwestern Army; 2d, failure of British Fleet to support Northwestern Army in Kronstadt operations; 3d, because of inferior munitions supplied by British to Yudenitch army; 4th, because of British action in transporting Bolshevik Commissary Litvinov on British warships to Copenhagen.

The attitude of the Russian Whites toward French is one of indifference. The Whites now look to America as their only friend.

If our Government can at this time issue an official statement expressing its friendliness toward the White cause, its intention of supporting their efforts and a denunciation of Bolshevism a feeling will be created for the United States, the benefit and importance of which can not well be exaggerated when taken in consideration with our future political and commercial relations, are [*and?*] that if definite assurance of our support is not soon given the Whites will be forced to accept assistance from Germans, a situation of which the latter are well prepared to take advantage.

If Department announces any policy as indicated, request text be telegraphed me.

IMBRIE

861.00/5774 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 29, 1919.

[Received 1:12 a.m.]

5467. From [Gade at] Riga.

"21, November 27, 11 p.m. Regarding Yudenitsch, best information Russian military circles state Yudenitsch's present indecisive, irresolute frame of mind and lack of requisite future foodstuffs principal danger to Northwestern Army. They advise Yudenitsch's remaining commander in chief partly owing to his holding purse strings London deposit of £700,000. Being called through Allied advice to Paris by Sazonoff for a conference. Yudenitsch has 128,000 mouths to feed including 15,000 active and 13,000 inactive troops, 13,000 Bolshevik prisoners of war, railroad and civilian personnel and large mass Russian fugitives. Four thousand soldiers passed into Narva, condition of remainder pitiful in the extreme, some 400 frozen to death last week. Some 8,000 tons foodstuffs remaining at Viborg will not go far. Situation acute and must be met immediately or army be disarmed and great many people starve. If there is no alternative Russian General Staff and soldiers willing to place themselves under Esthonian General Laidoner's orders. Any Allied demand for nondisarmament Russian Army will imply Allied policy of further military opposition to Bolshevism, a Russian Staff re-organized. Gade."

AMERICAN MISSION

763.72119/8115 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

PARIS, December 3, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received 8:56 p.m.]

5537. The Council of the Heads of Delegations met Monday morning December 1st. No meeting Sunday.

. . . . .

3. The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch with regard to the relations between Esthonian Government and General Yudenich. The Marshal stated that he had just received a telegram of [from] the General setting forth his difficulties and asking in case it was not desired to let him remain in Esthonia that he be transported elsewhere with his troops, for instance to the territories under General Deniken's control. The Marshal proposed, first, that General Niessel, as soon as he had settled matters in Courland, which

would probably be about December 15, should be sent to Esthonia to negotiate an agreement between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenich; and, second, meanwhile the Esthonian Government should be invited by General Niessel's representative on the spot to hold in abeyance until further notice all hasty measures of [*against*] General Yudenich. Mr. Polk accepted the Marshal's second proposal but as regards the first said that he would have to refer it to his Government since it was tantamount to giving General Niessel a political mission. Sir Eyre Crowe accepted also on the understanding that the Esthonian Government should not be told that the Niessel mission was to settle the question. The Council agreed to make the request proposed by the Marshal of the Esthonian Government and to inform it that the Council had taken the question under consideration.

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POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5912 b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Riga (Gade)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1919, 3 p.m.

You may take any practicable means to convey informally to the Esthonian authorities the suggestion that accession on their part to the reported Bolshevik proposal of free transit through Esthonian territory and use of Esthonian ports would tend to place Esthonia in a position of subserviency to Soviet Russia which might make it worse than dependent. Having regard to Esthonia's slight territorial extent and feeble economy, it is not to be supposed that if such an arrangement were once established Esthonia would be able successfully to resist an inevitable tendency to encroach further upon its sovereignty. The proposal opens the way in fact for a practical nullification of the independence which the Bolsheviks pretend to be willing to grant to Esthonia.

LANSING

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861.00/5896 : Telegram

*The Consul at Reval (Hurley) to the Secretary of State*

REVAL, December 13, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received December 14, 8:50 p.m.]

40. [From Gade:]

Esthonian Government reply to communication from Paris Council regarding Yudenitch army will be given tomorrow and states, unless Allied and Associated Governments [are] willing to acknowledge

Esthonian independence, such dangerous internal conditions will arise that Esthonian Government cannot run the risk of not dissolving Yudenitch army. The many reasons for this are given in detail. Although financial aid, flour, and *de facto* recognition from the United States and Denikin and Kolchak might temporarily bridge over difficulties, I believe all future cooperation between North-western Army and Esthonia hopeless unless former reorganized under Allied leaders and considerable support given both Esthonia and Yudenitch. Only alternative to now hinder dissolution Yudenitch armies and retain elements future divisions is to transport soldiers to another front. Coded and sent for Commissioner Gade.

HURLEY

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861.48/1050: Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

VIBORG, *December 15, 1919.*

[Received December 16, 5:51 a.m.]

165. Yudenitch requests that Viborg stores with exception of 4,000 tons, about one week's supply for Petrograd, be sent Reval at once as his army and refugees in great distress. Last of American Relief at Reval confirms need of food and advises sending Viborg stores, also states that no American Relief stores expected at Reval.

Request immediate instructions.

IMBRIE

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861.48/1035: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Riga (Gade)*

WASHINGTON, *December 15, 1919, 5 p.m.*

There are now at Viborg in charge of American Vice Consul Imbrie over 30,000 tons of flour and small quantities other foodstuffs forwarded during Yudenich's drive against Petrograd. Miller reports about thousand tons flour at Reval. Viborg stores are considered property Russians but like Reval stores can only be disposed of by Russians under our control and with our consent. It is the Department's opinion that both Viborg and Reval stores should continue to be used in consonance with the original general intention, namely that of assisting Yudenich.

There are numbers of refugees in Esthonia from the regions temporarily occupied by Yudenich in his recent unsuccessful advance. The remnants of his troops and the sick and wounded of his army are in Esthonia. It is believed, therefore, that the Viborg stocks should be available as needed for the support of all three categories

and it is immaterial whether this support is administered directly by the remaining Yudenich authorities to persons having a moral claim on them or indirectly by Esthonian institutions which have assumed care of such dependents.

As senior representative of State Department in the Baltic you will carry out Department's desires cooperating with Imbrie who is informed and Miller, Hoover's Child Fund representative at Reval.

LANSING

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861.48/1050 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Viborg (Imbrie)*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Your 165, December 15th. Department believes Viborg stores should be sent to Reval at once for relief Yudenitch army and refugees or such other port as Gade may deem best in view of possible Bolshevik advance.

Your 167, 16th,<sup>82</sup> repeated to Gade.

LANSING

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861.48/1061 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Riga (Gade)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1919, 2 p.m.

Your 320, December 25, 10 a.m.<sup>82</sup>

Miller, Reval, telegraphs that due to difficulty transshipping food supplies from Viborg to Reval, he desires to use 1,000 tons now at Reval for general and army relief. Department sees no objection thereto, and if you concur, so instruct Miller.

LANSING

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861.00/6040 : Telegram

*The Commissioner at Riga (Gade) to the Secretary of State*

RIGA, January 1, 1920, 6 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p.m.]

55. Military representatives of Esthonia inform armistice been arranged between Esthonia and Bolsheviks to take effect January 3, 10:30 in the morning.

GADE

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<sup>82</sup> Not printed.

## CHAPTER V

### SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

#### Military and Political Situation in Southern Russia as Reported by American Observers

125.677/5a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1919, 6 p.m.

461. Your 762, January 20.<sup>2</sup> Consul William Jenkins with Randolph, Doolittle, Lehrs and Burri, is proceeding Odessa to open office and keep in touch matters South Russia. Smith to Tiflis. For your confidential information Smith intends resign after arrival Tiflis.

POLK

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861.00/3854 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, February 14, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received February 14, 1:08 p.m.]

730. By direction of Ammission, field party left Paris for Odessa, February 12th, traveling via Rome and Constantinople, with orders to study and report on political, economic and military conditions in such parts of southern Russia and the Caucasus as its members may be able to visit. It is understood that, though every effort will be made to gather trustworthy information on the Bolshevik situation as on all other Russian affairs, no member of the Mission shall attempt to establish official or personal relations with Bolshevik organizations or individuals. Headquarters will be at Odessa and it is proposed that officers acquainted with the languages visit Bessarabia, Ukraine, Crimea, the Don provinces and the Caucasus. Communication will be kept by wireless via Salonica and by such mail facilities as are available through British, French and local authorities and will also be maintained with the United States Military Attaché at Bucharest and with Commissioner at Constantinople. A naval-communication party of five officers and six men

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<sup>1</sup> At Archangel.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

is accompanying the Mission in order to handle wireless and cable telegraphy as well as coding and ciphering. The party will be in charge of Lieutenant Colonel E. F. Riggs, former military attaché, Petrograd, and following are other members of Mission excluding naval-communication party: Captains William R. Berry, James Steinberg, Ulysses M. Bachman, Simon Reisler, First Lieutenants Norman Whitehouse and H. H. Khachadoorian, Second Lieutenants Copley Amory, Jr., Evangelos J. Stamoules, and John H. Honore [*Hynes*], Mr. Benjamin Burgess Moore, Sergeant W. A. English, Corporal L. H. Wolf, Privates Samuel Weiss and Clement C. Cronin, stenographers, and Privates L. E. Boland and Walter Nichols, orderlies.

## AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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Paris Peace Conference 184.016/33: Telegram

*Admiral Bristol*<sup>3</sup> to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 1, 1919, 2:40 p.m.*

[Received in Paris March 3, 3:20 a.m.]

21. "For Captain Royall Tyler<sup>4</sup> [from Riggs].

Whole party arrived Constantinople. Expect to leave here in a few days. Owing to difficulties of transportation have sub-divided into three parties going direct to Odessa, Ekaterinodar and Tiflis. I am accompanying Odessa party and will visit the other two in turn. Lieut. Colonel E. F. Riggs, Chief of Mission."

BRISTOL

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01602/3: Telegram

*The Chief of the Mission to Southern Russia (Riggs) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ODESSA, *March 15, 1919, 2 p.m.*

[Received in Paris March 19, 2:20 a.m.]

Food situation here exceedingly serious in the town of Odessa, now that the Kherson-Nikolaieff grain stores are cut off. Prices very high, money practically worthless, and every sort of speculation being carried on to an extraordinary extent. Only hope for treating bad situation and best possible anti-Bolsheviki propaganda appears to be the speedy assistance Allied food supplies and merchandise together with adequate personnel with authority to

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<sup>3</sup>Adm. Mark L. Bristol, commanding U. S. naval forces in Turkey, was appointed High Commissioner of the United States at Constantinople on Aug. 12, 1919.

<sup>4</sup>Of the Secretariat of the Commission to Negotiate Peace.



prevent speculation. Secondly, the Allied Governments should come to an immediate agreement which will put an end to the present unfortunate position, in which the French authorities [are] backing the Petlioura government who are still on bad terms with the Denikine specially now, while the British Government, who consider perhaps with reason that the former weak Petlioura government is nothing but an advance guard of Bolshevism, are backing the Denikine government. Cases of armed conflict between the Volunteers and Petlioura government have occurred but are apparently now being controlled by the French.

A[MERICAN] M[ISSION] RIGGS

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861.00/4093 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *March 17, 1919, 2 a.m.*

[Received 6:03 a.m.]

1189. Following from [Jenkins at] Odessa.

1. March 14, 5 p.m. General picture southern Russia today portrays the following:

Bessarabia is occupied by Roumanian troops under French command. They have crossed Dniester at Bene [*Bender*] and have taken the town of Tiraspol and Razdelnaia, thus opening railroad from Odessa to Galatz. Thence the line of the Odessa district extends east to the north of Bolshoi Buyalik through Berezovka to the west of Nicolaef and then directly south to the Black Sea. The French general d'Anselme is in supreme command of the district which has been today declared to be in a state of siege. He has at his disposal half a French division as well as nearly two Greek divisions. Reenforcements are arriving and are expected to total one army [corps] of five divisions. The Volunteer Army of Denikine is commanded in this district by General Sannikoff and numbers approximately 7,000, whose operations are restricted by the French to the city of Odessa with the exception of three squadrons at Berezovka. There is also half a French division stationed [at Tabriz,] in the Sebastopol region. Kherson was occupied March 10 and Nicolaef March 12 by Ataman [Grigor]ieff, formerly with Petlyura but now operating independently. He had approximately 2,000 Bolshevik troops and ten [irregular] pillaging bands numbering from 10,000 to 15,000. Bolshevik territory has been extended Kiev southwesterly to Letichef in Podolia, thence southeast through Olgopol to Nicolaef, including the towns of Vinnitza and Voznesensk. The territory to the west of this line and north of Bessarabia is occupied by Petlyura, whose present headquarters are at Zhmerinka.

He has been negotiating with the French here and a convention said [by] d'Anselme to be purely military, cessions of a nature [omission?] only in general, has already or will soon be ratified. The French have made the release of imprisoned Ukrainian ministers one of the conditions of the agreement.

The Don Cossacks under Bogayeffsky have joined forces with the Volunteer Army of Denikine who, roughly speaking, is reported to have control of the whole north Caucasus, southwesterly half of the Don district and the region to the north of the Sea of Azov from a point approximately one hundred miles north of Mariupol to and including Melitopol. Please repeat Department. Jenkins.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

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861.00/4157 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, *March 26, 1919, noon.*

[Received 12:46 p.m.]

1329. Following from [Jenkins at] Odessa.

[3.] March 22nd, 6 p.m.

[1.] Economic situation. The Odessa region suffers from a lack of manufactured articles of all kinds owing to the shortage of raw materials formerly obtained from districts now held by Bolsheviks. Industries are practically at a standstill. Of the 50,000 workmen formerly employed in the town, 40,000 are idle. No tramways are running, electric lights burn intermittently and heating is a luxury. Prime necessities sell at enormously enhanced prices, although a survey of the markets shows an apparent abundance. I have informed the authorities that until the stocks of foodstuffs said to be hoarded by Russia are made available, or at least until a serious attempt to do so has been made, I could not give support requests for foodstuffs from America. An Inter-Allied Commission is being formed by the French to control imports and exports, regulate distribution and combat speculation, which is in practically all organizations. The masses suffer while a few make enormous profits, a combination which inevitably breeds Bolshevism. Refugees from Bolshevik Russia have increased the population to nearly 800,000, or 30 per cent above normal. Single unheated rooms without board rent for 1,000 to 2,000 and small apartments from 5,000 to 15,000 roubles monthly. Congestion, underfeeding, and lack of sanitary supplies are the underlying causes of prevailing typhus epidemic.

2. Financial situation. Notes issued by the defunct Hetman government and the city of Odessa are in circulation, Romanoff and

Kerensky roubles being held for speculation. The currency situation is rendered more complex by the presence of unauthorized Ukrainian notes and counterfeit money, the latter estimate[d] to exceed 50,000 roubles. Each note must therefore be carefully examined and often endorsed by the last holder. Unlimited speculations in gold bullion with consequent violent fluctuations renders it impossible to know real value of cash on hand. Imperial Bank notes sell at a premium of 100 per cent for large and 50 per cent for small amounts, Kerensky's at a premium of 25 to 40 and 15 to 25 per cent respectively. Money changers charge as much as 19 per cent for small change. Banking has largely degenerated to speculation. In German territory the franc varied in two days from 2½ to 5 roubles, pound notes from 75 to 100 roubles. Francs are in greatest demand, being necessary for the essentials and rental. It is evident that steps must be taken to stabilize the currency, possibly along the lines adopted at Athens. The scarcity of exportable goods in this importing district renders exchange of goods impossible except for large organizations having branches in the North Caucasus, where there are surplus supplies.

3. Political and military situation. The military situation is far from satisfactory, although the French have apparently resolved to try to hold Odessa. A large percentage of the workmen of the laboring classes sympathize with the Bolsheviki and should the city be seriously threatened another debacle such as that at Kherson, where French and Greek garrisons well bred [*were*] fired upon from the rear, would probably result. The French and Russian commands do not have sufficient forces to undertake the imperative task of disarming the local population. The relations of the French with the Russians have been frequently unfortunate and number of democratic organizations have become estranged. The French commander-in-chief admitted to me that all classes are dissatisfied. None of his staff has had experience in Russia and unfortunately Chief of Staff Freidenberg is a Jew and particularly successful in antagonizing Russian and even Allied elements. This is the inevitable result military intervention unaccompanied and undirected by experienced political agency. Here and elsewhere in Russia the great lack of co-ordination and efficiency among the Russians themselves emphasizes the need of tact and understanding on the part of outsiders. The French are also handicapped by having troops who are tired of fighting and whose morale is therefore far from good. The Greeks are poorly officered and are a doubtful element away from their native soil. A betterment of the situation depends on the arrival of sufficiently strong reinforcements to assure safety in the rear and to make possible an extension of the zone of operations so as to include and

securely hold the supply districts a short distance [to the?] North and East. Please acknowledge by telegraph. Repeat to Department. Jenkins.["]

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 184.01602/11 : Telegram

*The Chief of the Mission to Southern Russia (Riggs) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ODESSA, *March 28, 1919, 1 a.m.*

[Received in Paris April 5, 7:20 p.m.<sup>6</sup>]

12. For Churchill.<sup>7</sup>

I have been in Odessa since March 10th, and have had many talks with individuals and with committees of all shades of political opinion. It is exceedingly difficult to get anything definite out of Russia here in the shape of a workable plan. A typical Russian solution is as follows: "Allies to immediately occupy all Russia, establish a strong Russian Government and only then will anything begin to work". It is invariably added that if the powers do not do this Bolshevism will be worked triumphantly.

However, if only from a humanitarian point of view, the world is interested in having Russia return to a state of order as soon as possible. This year there is real misery in Soviet Russia and all production is falling pitifully. In the Ukraine the sowing is only a fraction of what it should be.

Governmental. I am personally firmly convinced that there will be order in Russia only when the Russian peasant wants order badly enough. He is as yet undecided, being afraid of siding with the Allies and Cossacks who have not [now?] been driven back in the east and south; also he, as yet, distrusts the Volunteer Army whose reactionary tendencies he probably exaggerates. He has tried land grabbing and now he wants to have land made legally his by paying for it. He wants more land but wants to buy it. Therefore, the force of manner [*sic*], that is, the Allies must convince him of their intention to institute land reform in order to secure his wavering sympathy. They must make a bid for peasant vote so to speak. The bid must take the form of a proclamation on the land question. Certainly Russia [*Certain Russians?*] object that the land question is an economic one which can only be settled properly when there is order over the whole country. This is not exact; the land question is now a political and social question. Whether the

<sup>6</sup> Telegram in two sections.

<sup>7</sup> Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, U.S.A., on special duty with the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

peasant will be happier or richer with more land is not the question; the peasant wants land, and no government will have his support which does not realize this. The immediate redistribution of land in the provinces of eastern Russia or the south would, in my opinion, have an enormous moral effect on the peasants of central Russia. As an example, land reform has been voted and executed in the Don and Kuban, and although the laws are possibly faulty yet the land situation is settled and the owners are anti-Bolsheviki.

The Council of Ten might, therefore, make a solemn announcement that it was concerned with Russia and the Russian people, and that the Council guarantees full and adequate land reform in Russia. Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin should then be prevailed upon to overcome [*sic*] and make a proclamation guaranteeing immediate land reform; in this way can the confidence and support of the peasant be gained.

The next step must be to relieve the present misery by the other means of anti-Bolshevik propaganda, the exchange of goods on a fair basis. Speculation in southern Russia is going on in a shameless and extraordinary scale. In fact, any exchange under present conditions is in itself practically a speculation. The Council of Ten should send textile goods, agricultural machinery and implements, boots, thread and tea and also at first, coal, for there is not sufficient coal in the ports to exploit the coal available in the Donetz Basin, and should arrange for a proper system of distribution in the country on the principle that the greatest possible number of peasants are to receive certain necessities in the shortest possible time. In certain districts where exchange of goods is impracticable there should be arranged a system of loans to be covered by future harvests. This would alleviate economic conditions in southern Russia to a considerable extent, and would therefore do much to persuade the still unconvinced ones that for such an economic battle, however, to be of any value must be on a large scale. One of Mr. Hoover's very best men must be chosen for the southern Russia situation. He must have wide power and be on such terms with the civil authorities as to be able to effectively fight speculation. He must have a large staff of men as inspectors.

To sum up. Russia cannot be occupied militarily by the Allies, and cannot be conquered by the Cossacks or the Siberians if the Russian peasant remains neutral. When the peasant is convinced that the administration of the Siberian Government for all the Southern Federation under the guarantee of the Allies is better than a precarious existence under the Soviet regime, then Bolsheviki on the rapid decline. The moral support of the peasant must be gained

by guaranteeing him land. Kolchak and the Volunteers should understand this guarantee must be given in earnest, and then they should [apparent omission] a moral and material support. Give the Russians, in non-Soviet Russia, manufactured goods at smallest imaginable price; see that the intentions of the Allies are properly advertised, and that material aid reaches Russia promptly and efficiently.

AM[ERICAN] M[ISSION] RIGGS

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861.00/4215 : Telegram

*The Consul at Odessa (Jenkins) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ODESSA, April 2, 1919, [?] a.m.

[Received April 5, 11 a.m.]

12. Official news received tonight from Paris that Odessa is to be evacuated. Have arranged for Americans to go aboard British warship tomorrow pending possible arrival of American ship from Constantinople, for which I sent wireless message tonight.

JENKINS

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125.677/6 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, April 11, 1919.

[Received 3:06 p.m.]

1560. From [Jenkins at] Odessa.

"April 6, 7 p.m. For the Department. Closed consulate yesterday noon. Swiss vice consul in charge of the interests, all Americans safe. Am aboard United States ship *Nahma* accompanied by Randolph, Burri, and clerks Olson, Pollard. Doolittle in the North Caucasus; his report on the Crimea called for [*forecasts*] evacuation from there. Unless he reported favorable conditions in Novorossiisk, which is not likely, there is no other suitable place southern Russia for consulate and therefore I respectfully request further instructions to be repeated [*sent*] to Constantinople.

Last of Allied forces left the city today, which is already in the hands of the local Bolshevik. Allied forces withdrawing by land to Bessarabia. Apart from political considerations the evacuation was inevitable there [*principally*] because of poor morale of the insufficient French forces and general mismanagement, particularly their lack of foresight in handling economic situations. Please notify families of our safety. Jenkins.["]

AM[ERICAN] M[ISSION]

Paris Peace Conference 184.01602/21 : Telegram

*Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 11, 1919, 3 p.m.

[Received in Paris April 22, 2:20 p.m.]

171. For Churchill. [From] Berry 12. Situation report. 6th.

Military. North Caucasus front. Local fighting continues between Volunteer Army and Chechens.<sup>9</sup> General Denikin accompanied by General Briggs of English mission have gone to Groznyi to persuade Chechen lay down arms.

Manich front. Bolsheviki attacking between Lake Manich and Don making considerable progress.

Donetz Basin. General Shakurare [*Shkuro?*] captured entire Yuzovka group of town completely annihilating Soviet regiment. Volunteer Army now within eight miles Mariupol.

Crimea. In consequence French action, the Volunteer Army is evacuating Crimea. Refugees now arriving here. South Crimea was a refuge for all that is left of the best Russian society. Moral and perhaps military effect of losses Crimea was disastrous for Volunteer Army.

Odessa. French evacuated Odessa without warning April 5th, deserted Greeks and Volunteer forces who are reported retreating over land to Roumania. Situation is growing serious here. Colonels Riggs and Whitehouse arrived Novorossisk on [*from*] Odessa. Remainder of Odessa party reported returned to Constantinople. General Denikin absolutely was not informed of contemplated French action. He has telegraphed General d'Esperey asking him to send transports to bring Volunteer troops on [*from*] Akkerman to Novorossisk and asking what measures he proposes taking to safeguard residents on [*from*] Bolsheviki outrages. Also requested that explanation of their actions comes on [*from*] French Government.

General. Above action of French has increased enormously the already serious situation Volunteer Army. It must be expected that tired troops who have been losing ground against overwhelming odds during last three months will come dangerously near collapse when they realize their desertion by an Allied power and seeing their exposed left flank, which they can scarcely afford to defend owing to lack man power. Probability of unrest and hostile demonstration in rear of army is increasing and Bolshevism is omnipresent everywhere all the time. [Berry.]

BRISTOL

<sup>9</sup> The Chechentsi, a mountain tribe of Terek Province.

Paris Peace Conference 184.01602/30½ : Telegram

*Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 21, 1919, 1: 40 p.m.

[Received in Paris April 22, 4: 50 p.m.]

172. For Major Tyler [from Riggs]:

“Number 14. Arrived Ekaterinodar with Whitehouse this morning. Left Odessa March 31st for Sebastopol. Arrived Yalta April 2nd. After this date commercial ships stopped running. In the meantime Bolsheviks attacked in Perekop region April 6 and 7. Panic in Yalta. British sent dreadnought *Marlborough*, destroyers and merchantmen to evacuate Imperial family and bourgeois refugees. We arrived Novorossiisk on refugee ship yesterday. Have had no report from Odessa party but am informed that they were evacuated to Constantinople. I shall use them either here or in the Caucasus. I intend to spend 10 days here. Am sending this to Constantinople by courier. Captain Berry has sent through Admiral Bristol 10 telegrams, including eight situation reports. Please acknowledge. Riggs.”

Received in Constantinople April 21.

BRISTOL

861.00/4344 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, undated.

[Received April 22, 1919, 1 a.m.]

1729. From [Ravndal at] Constantinople.

April 19, 3 p.m. Following from Jenkins now Constantinople.

“The members of the former Russian Imperial family evacuated by British from Crimea left Constantinople April 17th, Dowager Empress going on battleship *Marlborough* to England, Grand Dukes Nicholas and Peter with families going to Italy on battleship *Lord Nelson*. They plan to live quietly at Genoa. Grand Duchess Xenia, sister of Emperor, also her daughter and son-in-law, Princess and Prince Yusupoff, are with party.

With the exception of Sevastopol and possibly Kertch practically all of Crimea as well as all the north coast of Sea of Azof including Mariupol important coal port of Donetz Basin held by Bolsheviks. There is no telegraph communication with Rostoff or any towns in North Caucasus. Novorossiisk reported terribly congested; typhus prevalent. Pending instructions am sending Vice Consul Burri there to obtain first-hand information and to endeavor locate Vice Consul Doolittle from whom nothing has been heard for three weeks.”

Ravndal, *American Consul General*  
AMERICAN MISSION



Paris Peace Conference 861.00/585: Telegram

*The Consul General at Constantinople (Ravndal) to the Commission  
to Negotiate Peace*

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 2, 1919, 5 p.m.

[Received in Paris May 4, 1:10 a.m.]

Jenkins requests that following report from Vice Consul Burri just returned from the Kuban region be repeated to the Department:

"Military situation. Combatant force of Volunteer Army under Denikin numbers 80,000 men. The line of the active front begins immediately west of Mariupol (recently retaken from the Bolsheviks), swings slightly north of Taganrog, then on 40-mile radius around Novochoerkassk down to a point some 13 miles west of Velikokniazheskaia; the Volunteer Army here numbers about 40,000, the pick of their forces. The arrival of British military supplies is making its position stronger and apparently secure. The Bolshevik regular forces on this [front?] are reported numerous, well equipped, well disciplined, and of good morale. In addition the peasants are reported friendly to the Bolsheviks. The Volunteer Army strategy contemplates driving to Yekaterinoslav and thence to Charkov. The Bolshevik strategy is to take Bataisk thus cutting off Mariupol, Rostoff and Novochoerkassk from the base at Yekaterinodar. The British mission under General Milne inspecting situation found Volunteer Army Government poorly organized, especially as regards protection and distribution of military supplies which they should only be [are] sending. Furthermore, request for British soldiers as well as supplies puts British in quandary because inconsistent with representations made previously by Volunteer Army Government and not contemplated in original British plans. Will probably result in their sending garrisons to Novorossiisk organizing and controlling shipment of supplies from Novorossiisk to Yekaterinodar and further furnishing specialists to operate tanks and aeroplanes though unwilling at this time to send troops to the front.

"Political situation. In view of recent French actions, sentiment is strongly against them everywhere, the newspapers openly accusing them of treachery. Denikin being inimical, the French are opening diplomatic offensive to have him replaced by some one more Francophile which would mean a weak man. The internal political situation is complex: Denikin is surrounded by old regimists whereas the Kuban Government is socialistically inclined. The workers are largely Bolshevik and the peasants are unsympathetic to the Volunteer Army mainly because of present mobilization. The financial situation is very bad. The so-called Don Government 100-ruble notes is the money in circulation with Romanoff's and Kerenskie's held for premium. Small money is not obtainable. Food is plentiful. Typhus, though on the decline, is still prevalent; cholera is appearing."

RAVNDAL

861.01/43 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*PARIS, *undated*.

[Received May 3, 1919, 11 a.m.]

1939. From Sta[tion] nav[al], Constantinople.

"May 2, noon. From Jenkins:

'The following is translation of a declaration of the Volunteer Army published April 27th<sup>11</sup> in "Black Sea Newspaper", Nova Rossick [*Novorossiisk*]:

The High Command in southern Russia addresses itself to the president [*representatives*] of the Allied Powers through their official representations [*representatives*] with the following declaration:

I request you to inform your Government of the ends purposed by the High Command of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia in armed strife with the Soviet power and in progress [*process*] of creating a government.

1. The overthrow of the Bolshevik anarchy and the restoration of law and order in the country.
2. The reconstitution of a mighty, united and indivisible Russia.
3. The convocation of the people's assembly on the basis of universal suffrage.
4. The decentralization of power allowing regional autonomy and the greatest amount of local self-government.
5. Guarantee of full civil and religious liberty.
6. The immediate enactment of land reforms to satisfy the land needs of the laboring population.
7. The immediate enactment of labor laws protecting the working classes from the exploitation of their masters and capital.

Signed, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Southern Russia, General Denikin. Chairman of the Special Meeting, General Dragomiroff.[?]

Repeat to Department. Respectfully recommend wide publicity.

Ravndal, *American Consul General*"

AMERICAN MISSION

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<sup>11</sup> Dated Apr. 10/23 in the Apr. 14/27 issue of the *Chernomorskaya Gazeta*.

861.00/4441 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, undated.

[Received May 7, 1919, 11:54 a.m.]

2026. From Sta[tion] Nav[al, Constantinople:]

"May 5, 6 p.m. From Jenkins.

Repeat to Department. Evacuation of Sebastopol completed. Bolsheviki in control. Kertch still held by Volunteer Army.

Ravndal, *American Consul General*"

AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/4443 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 6 [?], 1919.

[Received May 7, 4:16 p.m.]

2027. [From Ravndal at Constantinople:]

"May 6th, 5 p.m. From Jenkins, repeat Washington.

'Aid to Volunteer Army. I respectfully refer to my telegram from Odessa<sup>13</sup> regarding report on [Red Cross] assistance for North Caucasus. The Volunteer Army has usual defects of any purely Russian organization but should be assisted not only because of past achievements but because of the disastrous results which would follow its annihilation. It has throughout been faithful to the Allies. It kept the rich North Caucasus from the Germans and necessitated retention of German and Bolshevik troops on southeast front during crucial periods for Allies both in France, Russia and Siberia. Its defeat would increase prestige of Bolsheviks whose troops could be transferred to other fronts and would render extremely difficult the British task of preventing spread of Bolshevism through Transcaucasia to India. If properly equipped it could unite with Siberian troops thus hastening overthrow of Bolsheviks. Fortunately the British are sending military supplies but there is great need for three Red Cross units which should be sent immediately for both humanitarian and political reasons. The intelligent class is bound to win out eventually in Russia as elsewhere and they who support it now, will have the prestige in the future.'

Ravndal "

AMERICAN MISSION

Paris Peace Conference 184.01602/57a : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Naval Station at Constantinople*

PARIS, June 7, 1919, 10 p.m.

384. For Berry, Ekaterinodar.

Current reports here state 200 Russians repatriated from France mutinied at Novorossiisk and were exterminated. Can you cable

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

facts? Has any word of the Allied note to Kolchak<sup>14</sup> been received at Ekaterinodar and if so what is the attitude of the Volunteer Army and the Kouban Government?

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

861.00/4740 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 23, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received June 24, 8 a.m.]

2737 [2735]. Am[erican] mission's 730, February 13 [14], 2 p.m. Field party for southern Russia arrived Constantinople March 1st in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Riggs. Here the party divided into three echelons which arrived at Odessa, Ekaterinodar and Tiflis respectively early in March.

1. Odessa party under Major Steinberg reported concerning situation in Ukraine and Odessa setting forth unfortunate nature and effect of this evacuation. This sub-mission reported Petlura's Ukrainian government as worthless.

2. Ekaterinodar party uncertain [*under*] Captain Berry is still in Ekaterinodar. This detachment emphasizes fact that British aid is material and the presence of Allied missions practically saved the situation for Denikine's Volunteer Army. It has constantly recommended the recognition of Denikine as commander-in-chief of all anti-Bolshevist forces in southern Russia and the Caucasus as well as political recognition of Kolchak.

3. Tiflis party under B. B. Moore assisted by Lieutenant Norman Whitehouse is still in Tiflis. It has been in a delicate situation from the first owing to the anarchistic conditions prevalent in [Georgia]. Moore has been held up and robbed by bandits and this has also happened to members of other Allied missions [at Tiflis]. Another difficulty has been the arrival of a large Italian mission and the rumors, last February [*later*] confirmed, of the ultimate withdrawal of the British in favor of the Italians.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Riggs returned to Paris in May to report personally, having visited himself all three of these parties and recommended strongly the political recognition of Kolchak. He is now in Klagenfurt as explained in American Mission's 2670, June 20, 7 p.m.<sup>15</sup> but is expected shortly to return to Paris.

AMERICAN MISSION

<sup>14</sup> *Ante*, p. 367.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

861.01/72 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, undated.

[Received June 26, 1919, 4: 12 a.m.]

2777. From Sta[tion] Nav[al].

33. Ekaterinodar, June 17, 6 p.m. Following from important declaration by General Denikin at farewell banquet to English General Briggs June 12:

“In very hour of our victory, treason based on personal ambition is growing in rear. Safety of cause lies in a single high commander-in-chief. Because I believe this, I yield to Admiral Kolchak and recognize him as Supreme Governor Russian state and commander-in-chief Russia Army”.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.48/889 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 27, 1919.

[Received 10: 35 a.m.]

943. Following from [Ravndal at] Constantinople.

“259, June 25, 1 p.m. The following telegram has been received from Vice Consul Burri at Ekaterinodar:

‘1, 13th. Russian Volunteer Army Government requests 9,000 tons flour monthly for needs industrial workers of Don Basin, delivery at Novorossiisk, payment in equivalent raw materials such as tobacco, manganese ore, etc. Coal output dependent on provisioning of workers and Volunteer Army Government dependent on this output. Recommend favorable action.’

Ravndal, *American Commissioner.* [”]

WALLACE

861.00/4763 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 28, 1919.

[Received 11: 52 p.m.]

963. Following from Constantinople as Commissioner’s number 261.

June 26, 5 p.m. Advices from Vice Consul Burri at Ekaterinodar indicate that Bolsheviks are leaving Crimea to escape being cut off

from Kharkov and the north and that great confidence reigns in morale of Volunteer Army and British tanks, foreshadowing utter demoralization of Bolshevik forces. Among Volunteer forces feeling is now growing that any recognition of or guarantee to former parts of Russian Empire without sanction of their representative will not be binding on future Russia and intense emphasis is laid on a single Russian Government for all of former Russia except possibly Poland and Finland, whose independence is accepted in principle but questioned in boundary. Please [apparent omission]. Ravndal, American Commissioner.

WALLACE

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Paris Peace Conference 184.01602/73 : Telegram

*Admiral Bristol to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 30, 1919, 6 p.m.

[Received in Paris July 10, 1:30 p.m.]

971. [From Berry at Ekaterinodar:]

Reference your undated telegram mailed in Constantinople June 12 and received here June 25,<sup>16</sup> can state that no Russian repatriates from France mutinied at Novorossisk or were exterminated. See Berry 22<sup>17</sup> for account of Russian detachment of 600 troops from French west front sent into line about May 13 and immediately attempted to desert to Bolsheviks *en masse* but Volunteer commander had been forewarned and concealed machine guns finished most of them. Presume this to be incident misunderstood in Paris. Kolchak acceptance<sup>18</sup> of Allied note generally applauded in south Russia but text of note criticised on score of several paragraphs dealing with future interior affairs which no person not even Kolchak can truly give assurances at present time while major part of Russia is yet in enemy's hands. The paragraph suggesting survival of National Assembly severely criticised and regarded as evidence of lack of knowledge of Russian affairs in Paris as that assembly was established under Bolshevik regime by Bolsheviks. Berry.

BRISTOL

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Paris Peace Conference 861 K.00/85

*The Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference to the  
Secretariat of the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Translation]

PARIS, July 12, 1919.

The Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to transmit herewith to the Secretariat of the Delegation of the

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<sup>16</sup> See telegram no. 384, June 7, 10 p.m., to the Naval Station at Constantinople, p. 762.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

<sup>18</sup> Transmitted by the French Chargé at Omsk, June 4, 1919, p. 375.

United States of America a copy of a note dated June 26 [28] signed by a certain number of Russian Delegations.

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Delegations of Esthonia, Latvia, the Lithuanian Poles, Georgia, Republic of North Caucasus, Azerbaidzhan and Poland at Paris to the Paris Peace Conference*

June 28, 1919.

The Allied and Associated Powers have proclaimed several times that they were pursuing in Russia a policy tending towards the right of nations to self-determination, in Russia properly so-called, as well as in the countries of alien nationality formerly incorporated in the Russian Empire. This policy is moreover only the immediate consequence of the principles upon which the Powers declare that they [are] erecting the edifice of peace and the sincere application of which can alone give to Europe a status which will preserve it from new troubles and new wars.

Now, the occupation of the Ciscaucasian Republic by the troops of General Denikin and the threatening attitude of these troops towards the Republics of Georgia and Azerbeidjan seem on the contrary to be inspired by the avowed plan of the Russian reactionaries, who wish to bring back under their yoke the independent national states newly formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire; these reactionaries are trying to present to the Peace Conference a *fait accompli* by the military occupation of these states.

The inevitable consequence of such a plan would be to destroy the order in these new states. At the price of incredible efforts, and at the moment when anarchy was reigning over all the rest of the territory of the former Russian Empire, the people of these states were able to escape the horrors of civil war and to insure for themselves a free democratic development.

The success of the plan of the Russian reactionaries would strike a terrible blow at these nationalities. Moreover, it would have serious consequences for Russia herself. It would in fact create new centers of fermentation beside the regions already devastated by civil war. None of these nationalities will submit to power imposed by force of arms. All will continue to struggle by all the means in their power.

The undersigned delegates emphasize the fact that General Denikin is accomplishing this fatal work with the military and financial assistance of the Allied Powers, who can not nevertheless be desirous of destroying order in these states or of depriving these nations of their right to self-determination.

All the delegates of the states within the confines of Russia are unanimous in protesting against this intervention, along with the

delegates of Georgia, of Azerbeidjan and the Republic of North Caucasus, and with all the delegates of the states of the Caucasus. They insist on thus showing that they have a clear consciousness of the solidarity that unites all the nations within the confines of Russia, so that each one of them feels any threat directed against the independence of another as strongly as if it were directed against its own independence. They proclaim that in view of a sincere application of the right to self-determination it is necessary to maintain the territorial integrity of the states at present existing in the Caucasus, while waiting for the establishment of a definitive regime which will be instituted, not by a Russian Constituent [Assembly], but by the Peace Congress, acting according to the will of the populations, expressed by the national assemblies of the new states. Consequently, the undersigned delegates bring their protests to the knowledge of the Allied and Associated Powers. They request them to put an end at once to the aggressive moves of General Denikine against the Republics of Georgia and Azerbeidjan, and to make him evacuate the occupied territory of the Georgian Republic. They request them to take all necessary measures to oblige General Denikine to observe strictly all the rules of international justice.

Signed:

J. POSKA, *Chief of the Esthonian Delegation*

N. KÖSTNER  
C. R. PUSTA } *Members of the Esthonian Delegation*

J. SESKIS  
F. ZEELENS } *Members of the Lettish Delegation*

BR. KRZYŻANOWSKI, *Delegate of the Lithuanian Poles*

TCHÉIDZE, *President of the Georgian Delegation*

TSERITELLI  
GVARJALADZE  
GOBETCHIA } *Members of the Georgian Delegation*

TCHERMoeff, *President of the Delegation of the Republic of North Caucasus*

H. Bammate  
J. Haidar  
H. KHADJAZARAGUE } *Members of the Delegation of the Republic of North Caucasus*

CHEIKH. NL. ISLAMOFF  
M. MAGUERAMOFF } *Delegates of the Republic of Azerbeidjan*

The Polish signatories of this document are conscious of the fact that the independence of the Polish State, recognized by all the Powers, established in advance the severing of all the ties that bound one part of Poland to the former Russian State; they desire to manifest by their signatures that solidarity exists today as in



the past among all the nations subjugated to Former Russia, in their struggle for independence.

Signed:

MÉDARD [?] DOWNAROWICZ, *Former Minister of the Polish Republic*

H [?]. THUGUTT, *Former Minister of the Polish Republic*

DR. H. LIBERMAN, *Deputy to the Polish Diet, Envoy of the Polish Socialist Party in France*

Q. KANTOR, *Deputy to the Polish Diet*

LÉON WASILEWSKI, *Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic*

ANTOINE SUJKOWSKI, *Professor at the University at Warsaw*

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561.00/5086: Telegram

*The Commissioner at Constantinople (Ravndal) to the Secretary of State*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 20, 1919, 2 p.m.

[Received August 21, 10:13 p.m.]

360. Your 388[188], August 15th, 7 p.m.<sup>20</sup> After taking Odessa, Bolsheviks inaugurated a reign of terror against the bourgeoisie, levying a tribute of 500,000,000 rubles to be paid in cash. All personal bank accounts were confiscated. Those who did not pay their share of the tribute were thrown into prison or sent to work to clean streets et cetera. Judges in public courts suffered from kinds of repression.

Hundreds of people including women and children have been shot. For instance the nine-year-old boy of Prince Radziwill was killed to stop the family succession. Escapes from Odessa are made in small boats at night reaching French or Greek ships at sea.

At first the workmen met the Bolsheviks with enthusiasm, thinking life would be cheaper. This expectation has not been realized as bread has passed from 12 rubles a pound to 100 and wood from 18 rubles a pud to 120.

Neighboring villages are anti-Bolshevik hoarding their savings and not bringing their products to town, the consequence being great scarcity in Odessa of bread, fuel and oil. Railroads do a minimum of work. The city's water supply is in danger. Odessa receives her water from Beliavka fifty miles away. The piles of the quays and the woods in the famous Estokade are being taken for the city pumping station.

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<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

Conditions of life are growing constantly worse and opposition to Bolshevik regime is increasing. Mobilization has rendered the workmen disaffected and many railroad hands formerly Bolshevik have been disarmed. As already stated, the peasants are enemies of Bolshevik communists and lately repeated insurrections have occurred in neighboring villages.

Odessa has not been taken by the peasants because they have no organization and no ammunition. The city is governed by the Soviet of Kieff. Gregorieff has never become known in Odessa. Rakowsky, a Roumanian or Hungarian, and Lieutenant Sadoul, who came in with the French, have been amongst the chief commissioners. Thomas Whitmore tells me that a year ago last spring he saw Lieutenant Sadoul constantly with Colonel Raymond Robbins in Moscow. However, these men are said to have left Odessa and the city is in the hands of only second-rate commissioners including "Michael the Japanese", the head of a band of robbers. Robberies and executions come in [omission] of from 20 to 200 daily. Lately about 400 foreigners were exchanged by the Odessa Bolsheviks for 2,000 Russians from France. By this exchange, quite a few Bolshevik agents came out, some of whom are operating in Constantinople. Power in Odessa is wielded by Red terror and supported by Letts and Chinese and Georgians, and a small group of the Red Army. A thousand determined men with proper arms can take Odessa.

RAVNDAL, *American Commissioner*

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861.00/5100a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1919, 2 p.m.

2886. For Polk.

Vice Consul Burri at headquarters of General Denikine in Ekaterinodar in recent report refers to officers of American Military Mission in his district. Are such officers operating with General Denikine or elsewhere in South Russia? and if so Department would be glad to know conditions which they report.

LANSING

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861.00/5134 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, August 30, 1919, 8 p.m.

[Received August 31, 10:32 a.m.]

3955. Your 2886, August 20, 2 p.m. Very clear [*Vice Consul*] Burri's report refers to Captain Berry and party, who were sent

out as observers to Denikin's headquarters by American Mission and General Churchill some months ago. This party has now received instructions to return to Paris in accordance with Commission's general policy of liquidating such missions. It is understood that Captain Berry is now in Constantinople *en route* to Paris.

Captain Berry's reports have been largely of a technical military nature, reporting on the operations of Denikin's forces. It is presumed that General Churchill can give Department information regarding the nature of such reports of Captain Berry as have been forwarded to him. The reports dealing with political affairs are being summarized to the Department by despatch.

Captain Berry in every way [*his reports*] has spoken very highly of Denikin, denies that he is showing reactionary political tendencies, and advocates according him whatever support the Allies feel able to give. In the following telegram received from him he states:

"August 23rd. Emphatically urge Government replace me with similar mission properly accredited to Denikin showing [*period*]. Cannot exaggerate anxiety Volunteer Army and Russian population concerning America's attitude toward Russia and Denikin showing [*period*]. Presence of this mission during six months has somewhat allayed anxiety and suggested America's sympathies, but absence of that American support is influential in to conduce [*in growing*] bitterness against United States. Recall of this mission without replacing will certainly be interpreted to mean Government's course is indifferent or even hostile."

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5140 : Telegram

*The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 1, 1919, 11 a.m.*

[Received September 2, 11:25 p.m.]

6. . . .

Odessa and Kief have been taken from the Bolsheviks. In this connection may I suggest that all Americans returning from south Russia speak of general bitterness in Denikin circles because America lends no aid. The British are assisting with war material for which they get a good price and considerable praise, but we have done nothing beyond sending a shipload of Red Cross supplies. Our military mission, which never amounted to anything because it was headed by a captain instead of a general, has been withdrawn and in all south Russia there remains a solitary vice consul, not of

career, to represent the United States of America. Such are American complaints. It is recommended that the American Government appoint an economic commission for south Russia prepared to ship goods there to the value of perhaps a hundred million dollars during the next few months but only against Russian raw products of equal value. It is essential to set the wheels of commerce going and to give the Russian money a real value, which only can be done by exchange of goods. It is believed that Colonel C. B. Smith and Major Percy Blair, both now at 51 Avenue Montaigne, Paris, may prove useful in an American governmental undertaking of this kind. Both were identified with the recent American Red Cross enterprise at Novorossiisk. It would seem quite possible yet for our country to render a signal service towards the rehabilitation of south Russia. This year's crops in that section are exceptionally abundant. Ravndal, American Commissioner.

BRISTOL

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861.00/5234 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, September 18, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received September 19, 7:32 a.m.]

4266. Upon the withdrawal of the Ekaterinodar section of the South Russian Field Mission the following telegram dated Taganrog, August 23, 1919, addressed to the President was handed personally to Captain William R. Berry, Chief of Ekaterinodar section, by General Denikin.

"To His Excellency, the President of the United States of America: I regret to learn that you are withdrawing your South Russian Mission. This fact might be understood as meaning that the cause for which we are fighting does not meet with sympathy in the United States. You have seen the program of Admiral Kolchak; you also know the aims of the Armed Forces of South Russia; in them there is no hint of return to reaction. We need freedom; we are against any sort of tyranny. Let the people decide their own future. The Bolsheviks will not allow them to do this. They have destroyed everything—religion, family and the idea of possession and they have trampled upon every right except force. Their experiments approach madness. Having seduced this generation they are endeavoring to destroy the ideas of humanity in our children who in some places have been nationalized and then abandoned to their fate. The uneducated, hungry, impoverished and deceived people are in the clutches of a band of madmen. Taking advantage of the ignorance and passiveness of the people they drive them by the bayonets of Chinese and Lettish hirelings to fight against these people, who, understanding the matter, are enrolled under the banner

of the salvation of Russia and of the whole world from a dangerous infection. The crimes of the Bolsheviks against the people of all nations far exceed the crimes of Germany which brought America into the war. With us it is not a civil war or a class war; we are struggling against an artificially produced disease which will without doubt spread far beyond the borders of Russia and across the ocean if action be not taken. If the League of Nations is worthy of its high destiny it should make a stand against Bolshevism which is striving to destroy all moral and material worth and culture in [all] the world.

A formal declaration that the United States are against Bolshevism would confirm to our miserable, ignorant, and deceived people that we are fighting for a just cause and that there is no nation in all the world which believes in the false Utopia of the Bolsheviks. We believe in the justice of our cause, but moral and material assistance is also of great importance to us. South Russia for a long time was cut off from the world and its inhabitants suffer from lack of clothing. Last winter typhus raged and this winter it may spread with [still] greater force. We need mostly linen, boots and overcoats and in this matter the United States might assist us greatly by sending us clothing for the military and civil population from her great military stores. Your assistance would play a great part and would hasten the restoration of a general peace. Signed, General Denikin."

Ekaterinodar section was withdrawn in accordance with your [our] 3211, July 18th, American Mission's 3590, August 9, 1 p.m. and your 2808, August 12, 7 p.m.<sup>22</sup>

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5367 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 10, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received October 10, 10:52 p.m.]

4609. Following is a summary of a telegram from General Denikin dated Taganrog September 26th, 1919, which was handed to the Commission by the Russian Mission at Paris. This is sent to Department for such action as in your opinion may be appropriate.

"According to news from Moscow, the Bolsheviks have arrested, in consequence of the advance of our troops towards the north, about 30,000 persons, chiefly of the intellectual class, and amongst them the Patriarch Tikhon, Mr. Samarin, many scientists, in their number Professor Chaplygin, prominent men like Astroff, Kishkin, Kotlarevsky, many artists. Also [A great] number of these persons have already been executed. The same fate awaits the remaining hostages, judging by what happened in Kiev and other towns during the last days of Bolshevik reign there.

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<sup>22</sup> None printed.

The only means to prevent a wholesale massacre of the intellectual class would be an energetic exterior intervention. This has been done by the Allied Governments at the beginning of the Bolshevik regime; in order to free their subjects they threatened the Bolsheviks that they would imply [*charge?*] the Soviet leaders personally with responsibility for murders.

It is greatly to be hoped that similar measures will be taken in the present case."

## AMERICAN MISSION

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861.00/5353 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Constantinople  
(Ravndal)*

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1919, 3 p.m.

229. For Burri.

Your 1122 [?], October 7.<sup>23</sup> Department authorizes you to proceed to Kharkoff, Odessa and other important points in South Russia with a view to reporting upon political and economic conditions. Your itinerary should be planned so as to afford the Department as soon as possible a general view of the situation in South Russia and as much of the Ukraine as you can readily enter. Due regard must be had for economy of money and time. Keep Department currently advised of your whereabouts. You will be allowed actual and necessary expenses for transportation and same for subsistence but latter may not exceed \$5.00 per diem.

LANSING

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861.00/5448a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Denmark (Hapgood)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1919, 4 p.m.

1805. The American Government is informed by its representatives in Paris that General Denikin has telegraphed from the south of Russia that news reached him from Moscow to the effect that the Bolsheviks have arrested, in consequence of the advance of the anti-Bolshevik forces towards the north, a large number of persons, a number of whom have already been executed. General Denikin predicts on the basis of what occurred at Kiev and other cities during the last days of Bolshevik control that the same fate awaits the remaining hostages. He begs the Allied and Associated Governments to take any measures which may be possible to prevent a wholesale massacre.

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<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

This Government has not had an opportunity to confirm the specific reports transmitted by General Denikin. The knowledge of other horrors proved to have been committed by the Bolsheviki and their followers inspires, however, grave fear that subsequent investigation may go far to establish their accuracy.

It is desired that you bring this to the attention of the Government of Denmark and inquire if it may not still have means of communicating with the Bolshevik leaders, through the Danish Red Cross or otherwise. In the affirmative case you will say that the Government of the United States being aware of the constant solicitude of the Government of Denmark to assist the Russian people in their difficulties, urges that in the present instance it do whatever may be possible to appeal to the Bolshevik leaders on the grounds of humanity with the hope of saving the lives of innocent people and preventing the occurrence of additional acts of terror and barbarity.

You may add for the confidential information of the Government of Denmark that in consulting with the representatives of General Denikin on the foregoing this Government has impressed upon them the necessity of the utmost caution on the part of General Denikin and his officers to prevent the perpetration of similar acts of barbarity by their followers.

LANSING

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861.00/5476 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, *undated.*

[Received October 26, 1919, 7:55 p.m.]

4835. From Sta[tion] nav[al], Commissioner [at Constantinople].

424, October 23, 11 a.m. The progress of the Volunteer Army is attracting widespread attention. General Mangin, accompanied by the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Maklakoff, has arrived in Constantinople *en route* for Denikin's headquarters, also a Japanese military delegation headed by Colonel Takajolochi. General Denikin is reported as having aspired to proceed vigorously to the re-constitution of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and at Sebastopol preparations are being undertaken for the execution of a naval program involving the building of one dreadnought, four cruisers, four destroyers and seven submarines. Romanoff paper money is increasing in exchange value at Odessa but is still painfully cheap at Novorossiisk. To an Armenian delegation Denikin is said to have expressed his appreciation of the loyalty of the Armenians who refused to join a Bolshevik combination of Georgians and Tartars. After capturing Moscow the General is reported as stat-

ing that he would give his attention to the Caucasus. Americans of discrimination in these parts strongly advocate the inclusion of Trans-Caucasia in any scheme of mandates our Government may accept in Turkey. Trans-Caucasia is an exceptionally rich country but can not govern itself without foreign guidance. There are few Russians in that section and the natives have had enough of Russian imperialism and do not cherish Muscovite control. Prominent Russians, encouraged by the French, already ask voice in the settlement of the Constantinople problem. As time goes on Russian demands are likely to grow and gather momentum. Ravndal, American Commissioner.

AMERICAN MISSION

861.48/1019b

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1919.

SIR: I understand that proposals are now being made to you to purchase War Department surplus materials, such as clothing, shoes, cloth, et cetera, for shipment to South Russia, and it seems appropriate to indicate the attitude of this Department towards such sales and shipments.

This Department believes that all proper encouragement should be given to such transactions, first, because the need for clothing and other necessities in South Russia is today as great as anywhere else in the world, so that in furthering shipments to that region a distinct humanitarian purpose is accomplished, and second, because the distribution of such supplies will furnish an incentive for the movement of local raw products out of South Russia. This latter will be a most important factor in establishing normal economic conditions and will considerably assist the rehabilitation of Russia.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/5712 : Telegram

*The Minister in Denmark (Hagood) to the Secretary of State*

COPENHAGEN, November 20, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received 9:57 p.m.]

265. Your 1805, October 20, 4 p.m., my 235, October 22, 3 p.m., 242, October 27, 3 p.m., 246, October 31, 10 a.m.<sup>25</sup>

Danish Foreign Office transmits following reply:

“The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs states that he deems it beneath his dignity to reply to question based on absurd rumor and

<sup>25</sup> Last three not printed.



mendacious and defamatory articles in counter revolutionary newspapers. If the Danish Red Cross really wishes to show its indignation in the name of humanity it can find a rich field in drawing attention to the deeds of ferocity committed by the criminal bands of Denikin, Kolchak, Yudenitch and [others]."<sup>3</sup>

HAPGOOD

861.48/1029

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In reply to your letter of November 12th, in which you refer to proposals being made to purchase from the War Department surplus materials such items as clothing, shoes, cloth, etc., for shipment to South Russia, and in which you state that the State Department recommends encouragement of such transactions, I have the honor to advise you that the War Department will be pleased to cooperate to the extent of its ability in furnishing the inhabitants of Russia with such articles as may be available, and for which a ready market is not found in the United States.

Contracts have already been made with certain cooperative societies in Russia, which will enable the Russian people to secure much needed materials on very favorable credit terms. Sales on credit are also being made thru representatives of the Russian Embassy.

This Department has recently been approached by commercial organizations who desire to purchase from the surplus War Department stocks items of food and clothing on terms even more liberal than those granted the cooperative societies. Because the terms proposed include insecure credits, uncontrolled profits, distribution, etc., it is not thought advisable to grant such requests.

Very truly yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

861.00/5877: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, undated.

[Received December 12, 1919, 10:08 a.m.]

1742. From Constantinople.

"104. From Hicomus,<sup>26</sup> December 8, 11 a.m. From American business man just returned from Odessa learn plenty of food all kinds obtainable. Practically no clothes, woolens and paper all of [*sic*] also all [*no?*] manufactured articles can be obtained. There is merchandise for barter but almost impossible to obtain permits for export-

<sup>26</sup> Code word for the High Commissioner at Constantinople.

tation from Denikin who prohibits export without permits. Without American consul very difficult for American consulate general do business, also about five hundred Americans Kiev with good passports cannot get out without consular aid. Trains now running from Odessa to Kiev. Jews are being well treated. Denikin troops policing city. About half of airplanes, armored cars, uniforms and military supplies sent Odessa and [by] British fell into hands Bolsheviks. Usual plea people, why does not America help us. Regular trade by Americans with Odessa would have greatest assistance in relieving suffering of people. However trade impracticable without consuls and especially without American representative with Denikin to protect our interests. Bristol.["]

WALLACE

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861.00/5887 : Telegram

*The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State*

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 11, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received December 13, 9:35 a.m.]

108. Position of Denikin both military and political increasingly precarious. Present Bolshevik drive against Kharkoff likely succeed. Denikin has on south Russian front of 2,000 kilometres 200,000 men against approximately 500,000 Reds. Peasant menace in rear serious and increases with Bolshevik successes.

Apparent crux of situation is in Denikin's relations with Poles, and that his sole chance to recover lies in receiving aid of well-equipped Polish Army against Bolshevik right flank and rear. [Poland?] Offers this aid provided Denikin will promise her eastern Galicia which he refuses to do. That country not part of former Russia though population predominantly literally [*sic*] Russian with only 15 per cent Poles. Characteristic of Denikin and is weakness that he will come to no decision in this as in other matters, and takes no full responsibility for future of people. Patience of his army declining through discordance and weariness so that British aid in material is largely wasted.

British are increasing force of their High Commissioner War commanding in Trans-Caucasus.

BRISTOL

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[For the appointment of Admiral N. A. McCully as special agent in south Russia and his instructions, see telegram to the Ambassador in France, no. 9370, December 18, 1919, 6 p.m., *Foreign Relations*, 1920, volume III, page 571.]

**Remonstrance by the Department of State against Credit Sales to the Ukraine of Surplus American Stocks in France**

860 E.00/12 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, June 11, 1919, 11 p.m.

[Received June 12, 11:35 a.m.]

2515. Major Lawrence Martin, General Staff, United States Army, who has been traveling through Galician Ukraine and into edge of Volhynia reports as follows on political and economic conditions there up to beginning of Polish offensive May 14th :

“Government under Petlura and Directory of Five is competent, effectual and operating broadly for commercial, agricultural and educational reconstruction. Recent proposal of Rakovsky<sup>28</sup> for coalition of Bolsheviks of Kiev with Galicians against Poles and Roumanians not even considered by Directory. Sufficient food, sugar to spare. Agricultural [*sic*] unusually satisfactory. Epidemics terrible and no facilities for combating them. Poles and Jews in Galicia well treated by Ukrainians. No German officers there and Austrian officers chiefly residents of Galicia. Peasants desire to fight Bolsheviks. All classes wish an independent Ukraine.

Believe Ukrainians distinct enough from Great Russians to make this desirable and am confident Ukraine will make strong stable government as country is unusually rich in soil and minerals and in commercial opening through Odessa. Regard Petlura in Volhynia and Holubowitz in Galicia with their ministers as capable of organizing the country satisfactorily. Convinced that to divide Galician Ukraine between Poland and Roumania would endanger future of both countries and imperil peace of Europe, but that as the portions of Ukraine under Petlura and Holubowitz are absolutely non-Bolshevik we can best drive entering wedge into Russia by helping these Ukrainians against Polish imperialism.”

American Mission believe that foregoing statement should be accepted with considerable reserve as no confirmatory information available at present, and Martin has no opportunity to estimate conditions in greater part of Russian Ukraine.

AMERICAN MISSION

860 E.00/16a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1919, 3 p.m.

3370. For Polk. Red Cross furnishes copy of the following cablegram from Paris:

“12721. Have sent Major Ryden and Captain Irvine, believed to be discreet and conservative, to make investigation conditions

<sup>28</sup> Christian G. Rakovsky, Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.

Ukrainia. Exact sections which they will visit to be left largely their discretion, though probable they will follow general course north and northeast, possibly as far as Kiev. They will interview all leaders various factions both civil and military, but are expressly charged to make absolutely no Am[erican Red] cross commitments. Ryden has had conference Paris with representatives both Denikin and Petlura groups. The recognized Ukrainian Mission, Paris, which has purchased large quantity American Army supplies represents Petlura Government, although since Mission arrived Paris, Poland has taken Eastern Galicia in which one or two members of the Mission reside. This territorial realignment apparently somewhat confuses the status of the Mission. Bicknell. Olds."

Do you approve? What is the "recognized Ukrainian Mission, Paris"?

LANSING

860 E.00/18: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 17, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

4700. Your 3370, October 8th, 3 p.m. Perceive no objection to visit of Major Ryden and Captain Irvine of American Red Cross to Ukrainia on the basis of Bicknell's telegram. General Jadwin<sup>29</sup> met them in Ukrainia and considers their mission a useful one. Believe their reports may be of value both to Department and this Commission. Jadwin is at present preparing a report on his own visit to Petliura and to the headquarters of Denikin, which will be communicated to the Department in due course.

With regard to the "recognized Ukrainian mission" in Paris, there has been for a good many months a Ukrainian mission here which has flooded this delegation with propaganda. We are not aware that it has been recognized by any one and it is dealt with on the same footings as the numerous delegations of other [un]recognized groups. The acting president of the mission is Count Tyszkewyitch and the Vice President is Dr. Paneyko. The latter, who is a Galician, is especially active in opposing Polish claims to Eastern Galicia. Two members of the mission have recently resigned as they supported the policy of federation with Russia, which was opposed by the majority. Paneyko confirms reported purchase by Ukrainian mission of war stocks from American Army but states they have been unable to ship them out of France. Do not know who American army authorities consulted in connection with sale but it would seem to have been an extraordinary action for them to take without getting views of the Department.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

<sup>29</sup> Brig. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, U.S.A., observer in the Ukraine, September, 1919.

860 E.00/18: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

3512. For Polk.

Your 4700, October 17, 4 p.m. Can you ascertain details of supposed transaction between Ukrainian Mission and American military authorities? I believe this matter should be thoroughly investigated.

Department desires to have promptly any information obtained by American Red Cross representatives in the Ukraine concerning the condition of the Jews and the practicability of relief. Jewish relief organization in this country has ample funds.

LANSING

811.24/479: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 26, 1919, 3 a.m.

[Received 4:45 a.m.]

4828. Your 3512, October 21, 3 p.m. Commission is advised that one proposal dated June 6, 1919, was received by Liquidation Commission from Ukrainian Republic. All quartermaster supplies under this proposal have been delivered, as well as medical supplies, the latter amounting to \$1,128,951.24. The total property actually delivered to Ukrainian Republic amounts to \$8,557,771.59. Proposal also contained motor equipment but the delivery of practically all motor equipment was canceled because of objection raised by French Government. France stated it actually needed this motor equipment and the Liquidation Commission therefore decided to cancel undelivered material of this kind contained in all proposals by the liberated states. Commission is mailing Department itemized list of articles in Ukrainian proposal. Peace Commission was not consulted on this transaction.

General Jadwin's report on the situation in the Ukraine, with particular reference to Jewish conditions and the practicability of relief, will be sent by mail immediately and a full résumé telegraphed Department today. Red Cross being requested to instruct its representatives now in the Ukraine to report as fully as possible on this subject.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

861.00/5477 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS [October 26, 1919, 5 a.m.]

[Received 4:11 p.m.]

4829. Commission's [blank], digest General Jadwin's report follows:

In Ukraine September 15 to 30th. Armistice in force between Poles and Petlura. Polish lines held by four divisions. Ukrainian side by nominal force. Three Bolshevik divisions from Odessa passed north through wide no man's land between Petlura and Denikin left by withdrawal Petlura troops from Kiev area. Petlura protests clothing and equipment bought from Liquidation Commission not delivered. Latter reports delivery eight and half million [dollars] worth, non-delivery one million [dollars] worth besides cancellation and [motor] delivery at request French. Petlura requests Ukrainians in America be permitted to join his army. Says army suffering from typhus. Red Cross Committee, two officers, now visiting his area. He resents lack of recognition by Allies. Very bitter because compelled to leave Kiev August 31st by Denikin forces. Claims having aided materially in capture. He has about 70,000 Galician troops, 24,000 Ukrainians. Denikin has about 225,000 men. General Bredow, Denikin's commander, claims Ukrainians not favorably received by populace, the [that] Ukrainians mistreated Volunteer Denikin Army flag and he insisted their withdrawal two days' march from Kiev. Bredow hopes to establish cooperative relation with Poles. Bredow has evidence German intercourse [interest] with Petlura. Severe ten days' attack by Bolsheviks on Kiev ably repulsed by Denikin. Denikin also took Kursk. Bolsheviks took Zhitomir from Petlura. Petlura area reduced to about size Greece. Denikin expanded to about combined size Germany and Austria. Attempts to induce Petlura and Denikin to continue fighting together against Bolsheviks unsuccessful. Petlura declared war against Denikin and fighting commenced. Denikin, however, indirectly trying to promote cordial relations with Petlura's Galician troops. Events developing rapidly south Russia. Denikin utilizing most of his troops on front against Bolsheviks. Has not sufficient men and material to establish thorough *gendarmerie* through large area he has taken but runs trains freely. Crops in excellent condition. Best wheat crop in seventeen years. Railroads good shape except serious shortage rolling stock due to removal north by Bolsheviks as they retreated. Plenty of food for coming year in quantity. However, items such as salt short. Principal problem is distribution. Peasants

distrustful money and dislike let food go without material equivalents. Serious shortage clothing and fuel. Kiev population apparently pleased Denikin occupation. Bolsheviks had removed practically all money from banks and safe-deposit vaults. Had reign of terror. Three extraordinary commissions killed upward one thousand citizens, some frightfully tortured. Most killings probably unjustified. No American, British or French subjects thus killed. Since Denikin's arrival practically no White terror. Three men connected with Bolshevik extraordinary commissions executed after trial by mixed commission. People seem relieved and are endeavoring to make the best of conditions and resume normal occupations as far as practicable. Eleven newspapers, seven Russian, two Ukraine, one Polish and one Jewish in Kiev. Rule by Bolsheviks means end of orderly government. World should unite on position that such methods cannot be tolerated and any future changes in governmental methods must be made without sacrificing individual life except for just cause. If armies Yudenitch, Poland, Kolchak, Denikin, Petlura and others all worked together under common plan Bolsheviks [*Bolshevism*] can be eliminated. Denikin's officers seem mortified by earlier course of Russia [and claim now patriotism such as never before prevailed in Russia.] That while he exerts [*exercises*] strict military control he is permitting comparatively free political discussion and holds when Bolsheviks defeated, form of government for people to determine. Bolsheviks have eight armies on southern front, four on western and four *en route* from Kolchak front to [south?] Russian front.

Jewish situation deplorable but improved. On account divided and frequently changing jurisdiction difficult now to secure exact reliable information. Best information available indicated probably 11,000 and possibly 18,000 more Jewish civilians killed up to September 1st. Committee for Relief Victims of Pogroms charges half of this to Petlura. He denies any. Due to rise and fall various bands probable that many killed in name of well-informed [*known*] leaders, unaware [of] certain instances. Committee charges 400 to Denikin forces to September 1st. His officers have issued proclamation used picked troops with least anti-Semitism to attack important places and punished several cases but feel that a propaganda against the Jews is being worked among their troops by hostile political interests and claim they are doing all they can to counteract this. Old Jewish teachings as to relations Jews with other peoples and alleged connection Jews with Bolshevism have probably furnished principal basis for anti-Semitic propaganda. As far as could be learned percentage of Jews among the Bolsheviks not very different from proportion of Jews in population but prominence certain Jews in move-

ment has aggravated feeling. Twenty thousand Jewish refugees in Kiev. They feel safe in most large cities but not in villages. Society for Relief Victims Pogroms established by Russian Red Cross Society claims to have provided aid as follows: Aid for infants: nourishment, children's asylums and play in open air. Food: free dinners, cheap meals, distribution of provisions. Medical: sanitary aid, ambulances, hospitals for infectious disease, sanitary sets. Clothing: distribution of clothes, shoes, leather, et cetera. They have eleven districts with 178 institutions in 68 places. Secretary of the Society, Doctor Landur and Doctor Leo Bloch well informed and intercede [*interested*] amelioration conditions. Metropolitan at Kiev, Anthony, head Russian church south Russia, promised General Jadwin to issue encyclical letter to bishops, priests and congregations in south Russia enjoining proper treatment of Jews. Bolsheviki took up American and other foreign passports. Jews would like emigration to America reopened at any rate for those who have part of family in America.

[Land] question serious both with relation to peasants and Jews but more hopeful than heretofore. Observations and comparisons made in trip through Poland, south Russia, Bukowina, Transylvania, Hungary have impressed Jadwin strongly with beneficent results Peace Conference and necessity of League of Nations for peace of Eastern Europe.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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811.24/479 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1919, 4 p.m.

3595. Your 4828, October 26, 3 a.m.

Did "Ukrainian Republic" pay cash? If not what terms and security? See in this connection Department's telegram of even date concerning our general policy in respect to the Ukraine.

LANSING

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861.00/5477 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1919, 5 p.m.

3596. On the basis of past investigations the Department is disposed to regard the Ukrainian separatist movement as largely the result of Austrian and German propaganda seeking the disruption of Russia. It is unable to perceive an adequate ethnical basis for



erecting a separate state and is not convinced that there is a real popular demand for anything more than such greater measure of local autonomy as will naturally result from the establishment in Russia of a modern democratic government whether federative or not. The Department feels, accordingly, that the policy of the United States, while leaving to future events the determination of the exact character of the relations to exist between Great and Little Russia, should tend in the meantime, rather to sustain the principle of essential Russian unity than to encourage separatism.

The summary of General Jadwin's report transmitted in your 4829<sup>31</sup> suggests that his findings accord with the foregoing, but the Department would like to have from him, for its information, a definite statement on the points suggested as well as an expression of his opinion concerning the role being played by Petlura. Please express to General Jadwin the Department's appreciation of the information he has gathered and say that it awaits with interest the full text of his report.

LANSING

811.24/509

*The Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Grew) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 17, 1919.

[Received December 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge, on behalf of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, the receipt of your telegram No. 3595, of October 29th, 4 p.m., regarding proposal No. 97, dated June 6, 1919, received by the Liquidation Commission from the so-called Ukrainian Government, and to enclose herewith a copy of a letter of November 12th which the Commission has received from the Chairman of the Liquidation Commission, together with copies of its enclosures.<sup>32</sup> These papers are self-explanatory.

I have [etc.]

J. C. GREW

[Enclosure 1]

*The Chairman of the Liquidation Commission (Parker) to the  
Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

PARIS, November 12, 1919.

DEAR SIR: Replying to your letter of October 31st,<sup>33</sup> pertaining to Proposal No. 97, dated June 6th, 1919, please be advised:

<sup>31</sup> Dated Oct. 26, 5 a.m., *ante*, p. 781.

<sup>32</sup> One enclosure, which is a copy of a Ukrainian treasury note, is not printed.

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

1. When the Liquidation Commission arrived in Europe it found that the American Forces in Europe had large stocks of salvaged clothing, including patched boots and shoes, as well as new clothing and subsistence supplies, much of which had very little commercial value, which could be utilized in relieving the urgent requirements of the so-called "Liberated Nations". Acting under the suggestion made by the President in a letter addressed to me, dated March 24th, copy of which is herewith enclosed, and also in response to urgent representations made by Mr. Hoover and the members of his staff, as well as upon the Commission's own judgment after careful investigation, the conclusion was reached that it was to the interest of the United States to make sales of such clothing and subsistence stocks on a credit basis to the so-called "Liberated Nations" and the peoples of Eastern Europe, and at the same time in a measure relieve their distress and assist Europe in getting back to normal conditions.

2. At a regular meeting of this Commission held on March 24th, a resolution was adopted providing that all questions of sales of clothing and supplies and international credits coming before the Commission be under the immediate supervision of Senator Hollis, who would be in constant communication with General Krauthoff as to the sales proposed, with Mr. Hoover's Mission as to their requirements, and the representatives of the United States Treasury on the question of credits.

In pursuance of this resolution, Senator Hollis, as a member of this Commission, was in close and constant touch with Mr. Hoover and the members of his staff, with Mr. Davis, representing the American Treasury, and with representatives of the Peace Commission, as well as representatives of the purchasing nations, and would from time to time report to the Commission as a whole conditions as developed by him and make recommendations of sales to be made, the terms of credit, etc. Senator Hollis has now returned to the United States and your letter must be answered without the benefit of the first-hand information which he doubtless has concerning this sale to the "Ukrailian" partnership.

3. In April the Commission's representatives were approached by a representative of the so called "Republic of Ukania" for the purchase of supplies. We told them that we were not in a position to sell to Ukania as it had not been recognized by the United States. After conference with Mr. Hoover's organization and others, however, a partnership was formed consisting of Ivan Petrushevich, Voldemar Timoshenko and Simon-Jean Cerf, who made the proposal No. 97, referred to in your letter. This proposal was prepared in May but not acted upon by the Commission until

on or about June 6th, having undergone careful investigation in the meantime. The proposal contemplated the purchase of supplies aggregating in value in excess of \$11,500,000. While the proposal was accepted, deliveries thereunder were stopped by the Commission, and property of the value of approximately \$8,000,000 delivered.

While the sale was made to the "Ukrailian" partnership, that partnership in turn sold to the Republic of Ukrania and took in payment the notes of the Republic of Ukrania, which they passed on to this Commission. A copy of one of these notes you will find enclosed, signed originally by three representatives of the Republic of Ukrania at the Peace Conference, and subsequently reexecuted by Mr. Hyro Sydorenko, a certified copy of whose credentials are now in our files.

4. Incidentally, I beg to advise that a Committee of the Peace Conference who had visited Russia, Esthonia, Ukrania and neighboring Provinces, waited upon this Commission several times, and with great earnestness urged that in the interest of humanity, as well as for business and political reasons, the surplus stocks of the American Army should be sold to these peoples, including the Ukrainians. As before stated, however, a considerable portion of the proposed purchase was cancelled and deliveries never made.

Very truly yours,

EDWIN B. PARKER

[Enclosure 2]

*President Wilson to the Chairman of the Liquidation Commission  
(Parker)*

PARIS, 24 March, 1919.

MY DEAR JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hoover has represented to me the critical clothing conditions in the liberated countries. He has also presented to me the fact that the War Department is possessed of enormous stocks, not only of new clothing but of renovated materials. It must be obvious that these renovated materials can have but little value in the world markets and that the unused materials, purchased and manufactured under war conditions, will soon be heavily depreciated by the return of commerce to more normal prices. It would appear, therefore, that it is desirable to liquidate these stocks at the earliest possible moment.

It would appear that but little market could be found for such large quantities of clothing and shoes and similar articles, except through some such relief agency as that conducted by Mr. Hoover, and, to some extent, this agency may be of value in the distribution

of the unused material. The sympathetic interest which American people must have in the alleviation of misery amongst the liberated people should lead us to entertain the most sympathetic view as to prices and terms upon which this material is disposed of to them. I would be glad, therefore, if the Commission could accept as its guiding principle in these negotiations the fact that it is not only securing a rapid liquidation of materials that may otherwise prove practically unsalable, but also that it has an opportunity to perform a fine human service by approaching the matter in the most sympathetic mind, and I would be glad if the Commission could see its way to very largely accept Mr. Hoover's views as to the terms upon which dealings should be undertaken with the liberated peoples.

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

811.24/512 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 5, 1919, 4 p.m.

[Received 8:20 p.m.]

5558. Department's 3512, October 21, 3 p. m., 3595 October 29, 4 p.m., and 3749 November 13, 2 p.m.<sup>35</sup> Commission's mail despatch November 17 and previous correspondence. I have caused careful investigation of the circumstances and present situation as regards the sale by the Liquidation Board of supplies to a Ukrainian Cooperative Society representing the Petliura government. The Commission's despatch of November 17 gives Judge Parker's statement regarding this sale. At the present time the bulk of the material, comprising [six] and one half million dollars worth of articles of clothing, blankets, etc., \$1,000,000 worth of medical supplies and \$300,000 worth of motor material including 75 Cadillac automobiles, is understood to be still stored in warehouses in France near Bordeaux and Marseilles.

According to a statement of the Ukrainian representatives, 600,000 francs worth have been sold to persons and corporations in France in order to obtain funds to defray the expenses of transportation, storage and handling of the supplies. I understand further at the present time there is in Marseilles a ship chartered to take a cargo of these supplies to Galatz.

From conference with the Liquidation Board I gather that the sale was originally made some months ago at a time when the

<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

forces of Petliura were cooperating against the Bolshevik and when the Board considered the Ukraine [to be in a position] similar to that of the Baltic states [to which] sales were [also] made. I may add confidentially that Judge Parker is frank to admit that in view of events subsequent to the sale, the apparent collapse of the Petliura movement and the anti-Polish and anti-Denikin trend it has taken, it is unfortunate that the sale was ever made but that now it is too late for the Liquidation Board to retract and their chief concern is, if possible, to cover themselves financially unless political considerations should influence the Department of State to take up the matter.

The Liquidation Commission is now considering whether to accept [at this time] further signatures on the Ukrainian [notes] by officers of a cooperative society which purports to have purchased the goods from the Ukrainian Government for sale and distribution to civilian populations.

I may have [see] a number of embarrassing possibilities in the present situation. Notwithstanding French regulations to the contrary, it is very probable that the Ukrainians can succeed in liquidating the marketable supplies in France and realize sums to be used to further their propaganda or to ship other supplies to [forces in] south Russia which we might not particularly desire to assist at the present time especially as we have done so little to assist Denikin. In this connection Kramář, former Czech Premier, who has just returned from Denikin's headquarters, expressed the greatest surprise and astonishment at this reference [sale] to the Ukrainian forces and spoke of the discouraging effect it would have upon Denikin if he knew of it.

The matter is of the most extreme urgency and yet so delicate that I did not feel that I could intervene decisively without instructions. In view of the fact, however, that I learned that a shipload of these supplies was about to be sent from Marseilles to Galatz, I have addressed a confidential note to Clemenceau outlining the situation in case the French authorities might desire to take precautions against the dissipation of the stocks in France or their possible shipment to Ukrainian forces.

A [number] of possibilities present themselves: (1) that no political action should be taken, but the matter left to the Liquidation Board, which should be left free to take such precautions as might be possible to protect itself against financial loss; (2) that the State Department should intervene and request or cooperate with the French authorities in sequestering these supplies; (3) that efforts should be made to arrange for the possible supervision of the distribution of these supplies in Russia by American Red Cross officials.

I have shown this telegram to Judge Parker who leaves Paris today.

In view of early departure of the Commission, I suggest that reply be made to the Embassy which has retained all the necessary papers in the case.

POLK AMERICAN MISSION

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811.24/512: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Wallace)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1919, 4 p.m.

9404. Am[erican] mission's 5558, December 5, 4 p.m.

Department of State regrets sale of supplies to Ukrainians by Liquidation Committee and would welcome any action to annul its effects which would not embarrass American authorities. Department concurs as to undesirability of Ukrainians obtaining funds in France through sale of supplies. See Department's 3749 November 13, 2 p.m. to Am[erican] mission.<sup>86</sup> Distribution of that portion consisting of medical supplies by Red Cross now under consideration and will be discussed with Polk. Can you devise method to prevent Ukrainian use of other supplies?

LANSING

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811.24/547: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 20, 1920, 4 p.m.

[Received January 21, 9:44 a.m.]

196. Referring Embassy's 194, 19th.<sup>86</sup> Following is digest of note received by Embassy from the President of the Ukrainian Mission in Paris dated January 16th:

Twelve million dollars worth of American Army stocks were ceded to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic by contract signed June 1919 through Liquidation Commission. Treasury notes of Ukrainian Government were accepted in payment. Transfer effected November 11th. Exact sum owed [owed?] by Ukrainian Government determined at \$7,844,600.90. By letter dated January 16th Liquidation Commission declared contract annulled and demanded surrender of stocks in return for the Ukrainian notes received. No motive or reason given. Colonel Noble of Liquidation Commission in several interviews indicated that measure was based on assumption that *de facto* Ukrainian Government no longer existed and con-

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

sequently could not fulfill its obligations. President Ukrainian peace delegation earnestly protests and declares that Ukrainian Government has never ceased to exist and is at this moment endeavoring [apparent omission] in close union with Polish and Roumanian Governments to liberate its country from foreign and enemy incursions. Petlura still President and Commander-in-Chief of national Ukrainian Army. Government transferred to Rovno and therefore its scope of activity from a territorial point of view vaster than trade in [*that at*] time of signing of contract when Government was at Kamenetz-Podolsk. States Ukrainian Government continues to consider itself responsible for obligations assumed and insists upon exact execution of contract.

I request instructions as to what reply if any should be made to foregoing note. This is the first correspondence Embassy has had on this subject with Ukrainian Mission.

WALLACE

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811.24/547: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France  
(Wallace)*

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1920, 4 p.m.*

207. Your 196, January 20, 4 p.m.

Although this Department has informed the representatives of the Liquidation Commission in the United States of its belief in the inadvisability of allowing the Ukraine Mission in Paris to obtain large stocks of salvage surplus army supplies, it is not thought best that the Department appear as an active participant in the negotiations. You will, therefore, tell the Ukraine Mission informally, if you consider it advisable to correspond with it, that the matter rests entirely in the hands of the Liquidation Commission and the Department of State can take no action in the matter.

POLK

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