



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Papers relating to the foreign relation of the United States, 1918. Russia. Volume II 1918**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1918

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.


For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.







THE PUBLIC LIBRARY  
OF DES MOINES, IOWA

~~BALCONY~~

For Reference Use

R

327.73

Un31

DEF ANNEX

444568



S 1.1:918 2-2

~~DISCOUNT~~

(REF. ANSWER)

~~DISCOUNT~~







# **FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**





PUBLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAPERS RELATING TO THE  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
OF THE UNITED STATES

1918

RUSSIA  
(IN THREE VOLUMES)  
VOLUME II



WITHDRAWN

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1932



PUBLICATION No. 330

231011 231  
VRA 081 01 0819

# CONTENTS

## VOLUME II

### DISINTEGRATION AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS-----	Page vii
LIST OF PAPERS-----	xlii
CHAPTER	
I. SIBERIA AND MANCHURIA	444568
Discussion of the contemplated dispatch of Japanese troops to Siberia: Russian attitude—Bolshevik activities in Siberia and Manchuria— The formation of local governments—Proposed use of Chinese troops in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway—The dispatch of warships to Vladivostok—French suggestion of Allied and American intervention: attitude of the United States-----	1
Proposed Japanese occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway—The reported activities of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners— British and Japanese support of Semenov-----	33
Declaration of the American Government against intervention, March 5, 1918: further discussion—Further reports concerning enemy prisoners—Japanese offer of support to Horvat-----	67
Landing of Japanese forces at Vladivostok, April 5, 1918; British landing: attitude of the United States—Formation of the autono- mous Siberian government, the Far Eastern Committee, and the Chinese Eastern Railway Governing Board—The Webster-Hicks reports on armed prisoners—Appearance of the Czecho-Slovaks--	99
Attitude of the United States toward Siberian political organizations: relations of diplomatic and consular officers with them—Advance and repulse of Semenov—Appeals, recommendations, and plans for intervention-----	138
Clashes between the Czecho-Slovaks and Soviet forces: good offices of American and French Consuls-----	177
Consideration of intervention by the American Government—De- velopment of the Czecho-Slovaks' conflict with Soviet forces—Pro- test of the Allied and American representatives against the disarm- ament of the Czecho-Slovaks—Good offices of American officials— Formation of the temporary Siberian government at Omsk-----	188
Request of the Czecho-Slovak leaders for aid in establishing a new eastern front—Overthrow of the Vladivostok Soviet by the Czecho- Slovaks—Landing of American marines—Proclamation of the protection of Vladivostok by commanders of Allied and Associated forces—Proclamation of a government by Horvat: controversy with other political organizations-----	224
American proposals for military action, July 17, 1918: discussion with the Japanese and British Governments—Chinese request for participation—Rivalry of local organizations-----	287

## CHAPTER

I. SIBERIA AND MANCHURIA—(*Continued*)

Page

Japanese and American public statements regarding military action, August 2 and 3, 1918—British statement, August 8, 1918-----	324
Proposals for the political direction of intervention and for augmentation of the forces: attitude of the United States—Japanese activities in Manchuria—Arrival of American and Allied troops at Vladivostok—Increase of the Japanese forces—Reply of the Soviet government to American and Japanese statements-----	339
Special mission of Ambassador Morris to Vladivostok: his recommendation that an American force be sent to Omsk—Westward movement of the Czecho-Slovaks from Vladivostok: reverses on the Volga—Formation of a government by Constituent Assembly delegates at Samara: conference at Ufa with other organizations-----	364
Declaration restricting American operations, September 26, 1918—Formation of the all-Russian provisional government at Ufa: fusion with the Siberian government at Omsk—Further increase of Japanese forces-----	392
Representations of the American Government against the size of Japanese forces and the degree of control assumed in Manchuria and Siberia, November 16, 1918—The establishment of Kolchak as Supreme Governor at Omsk, November 18, 1918—Refusal of Semenov to recognize Kolchak's authority-----	433
Representations of the American Government against Japanese support of Semenov, December 16, 1918—Continuance of the conflict—Reduction of the Japanese forces-----	462

## II. THE NORTHERN REGION

Opposition in Archangel to the Soviet régime—German threat through Finland to the Murman Railway—Shipment of arms and stores to the interior of Russia—British requests for the dispatch of American forces to Murmansk—Arrival of a French warship—Landing of armed forces—Allied cooperation with the Murmansk Soviet—Arrival of an American cruiser—German and Soviet demands for withdrawal of Allied and American forces—Agreement of July 6, 1918, with the Murmansk Soviet—Argument of the Consul at Archangel against intervention-----	468
Occupation of Archangel by Allied forces, August 2, 1918—Overthrow of the Soviet and formation of the Supreme government of the northern region—Relations with the Allied and American diplomatic representatives and military authorities—Arrival of American troops, September 4, 1918-----	505
<i>Coup d'état</i> of September 5, 1918: restoration of the deposed government through efforts of the American Ambassador—Protest of the American Government against the conduct of the British commander in chief—Plan of the reinstated ministers to resign in favor of the Samara government: efforts of the American Ambassador to dissuade them-----	521



CHAPTER

Page

II. THE NORTHERN REGION—(Continued)

Proposal for increasing the American forces at Archangel and extending the operations: refusal of the American Government, September 26, 1918—Reorganization of the local government: subordination to the all-Russian government at Omsk—Disapproval of the Ambassador's plan to recruit an American-Slavic legion—Replacement of the commander in chief—Disaffection among the American soldiers and among the local Russian recruits.....	544
Retention of American and Allied troops in north Russia after the armistice with Germany—Local attitude toward the Kolchak government at Omsk.....	567

III. SOUTHEASTERN RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Nationalist and anti-Bolshevik movements: the Don Cossacks under Kaledin, the Southeastern federation, the Trans-Caucasus, the Volunteer Army under Alexeev and Kornilov—Attitude of the American and Allied Governments toward <i>de facto</i> political and military authorities.....	578
Bolshevik, Turkish, and German advances—Formation of the independent states of North Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—The Cossack organization under Krasnov—Revival of the Volunteer Army: succession of Denikin as its commander—Formation of a governmental commission attached to the army—Recognition by it of the supreme authority of Kolchak.....	618

IV. THE UKRAINE AND THE CRIMEA

Establishment of a Ukrainian government—Relations with the Soviet government, the Central powers, and the Allies—The treaty of Brest Litovsk with the Central powers, February 9, 1918.....	648
Capture of Kiev and Odessa by the Bolsheviks and subsequently by the Austro-German forces—Austro-German occupation of the Ukraine and the Crimea—Establishment of the Skoropadski government in the Ukraine, April 29, 1918—The Crimean government of Sulkevich—Exploitation of these regions by the Central powers—Appeal of the Ukrainian National Council to President Wilson, October 15, 1918.....	671
Declaration of the intention of the Allied Governments to maintain order in the Ukraine—Landing of Allied troops at Odessa—Establishment of the Directory by Petlyura.....	699

V. BESSARABIA

The Moldavian Republic: military support by Rumania—Announcement by the Soviet government of a state of war with Rumania: expulsion of the Rumanian Minister and sequestration of Rumanian gold—Agreement between Rumania and the Soviet government, March 9, 1918—Union of Bessarabia with Rumania, April 9, 1918.....	707
---	-----

## CHAPTER

## VI. FINLAND

Page

Indefinite relations with the Russian Provisional Government—Autonomy law passed by the Diet, July 18, 1917—Dissolution of the Diet; elections of October 2, 1917—Labor disturbances in protest against <i>bourgeois</i> control.....	723
Proclamation of independence, December 4-6, 1917: attitude of the American and other governments—Recognition by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France, January 4-10, 1918—Seizure of power by the Red Guards; civil war with the White Guards under Mannerheim—Swedish occupation of the Åland Islands—Request for American recognition by commissioners of the White government: counter-representations by the delegate of the Red government—Appeals for food.....	733
Treaties between Finland and the Soviet government, March 1, 1918, and between Finland and the German Government, March 7, 1918—German military intervention against the Red Guards; victory of the White Guards—Advances into Karelia and toward the Murman Railway—New negotiations with the Soviet government—British, French, and American attitude toward the White government and representatives of the former Red government—Resignation of Mannerheim—Monarchist movement: election of Frederick Carl of Hesse, October 9, 1918.....	777
Withdrawal of German troops—Formation of a new government under Mannerheim—Decision of the American Government to ship food—	811

## VII. THE BALTIC COUNTRIES

Appeals from Esthonia and Latvia for support of independence: attitude of Great Britain—Declaration of the independence of Lithuania and request for recognition: attitude of the United States; recognition by Germany—Movement by the Baltic Germans for a monarchy in personal union with Prussia: qualified response by the German Government—Protests by delegates of the Esthonian Provisional Government: reception of these delegates by the British, French, and Italian Governments—Refusal of visa for an Esthonian delegate to the United States—Protest of the Lettish National Committee against German rule; claim to independence—British project for a Lettish legion: attitude of the United States.....	815
The question of protection of the Baltic countries from Bolshevism upon withdrawal of the German troops: Attempts to enlist the help of the Scandinavian countries—Postponement of German withdrawal in the armistice—Formation of national governments in Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—Reservation of consideration of national claims by the United States until the peace conference—Dispatch of a British naval force to the Baltic Sea—German withdrawal and Bolshevik advance—Yudenich's project of an anti-Bolshevik force to take Petrograd.....	838

## LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS<sup>1</sup>

- Alexeev, Gen. M. V., from March to June 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army; in September 1917 Chief of Staff; after the November revolution took part in the Don in the formation of the Volunteer Army; in August 1918 Chief Director of that army.
- Avksentiev, N. D., a leader of the Socialist-Revolutionist Party and Minister of the Interior in the first cabinet of Kerensky; leading member of the Ufa Directory (later the Directory of the all-Russian government, Omsk).
- Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War.
- Bakhmeteff, Boris A., head of the Extraordinary Embassy from Russia to the United States; July 5, 1917, Russian Ambassador at Washington.
- Baldwin, Capt. (later Maj.) Karl, Military Attaché at Tokyo.
- Balfour, Arthur J., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Barclay, Colville A. de R., Counselor of the British Embassy at Washington.
- Bliss, Gen. Tasker H., Chief of Staff, U.S.A., September 22 to December 31, 1917; member of the Allied Conference, 1917; member of the Supreme War Council in France.
- Brusilov, Gen. A. A., in 1916 Commander of the Russian offensive in Galicia; from June to July 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.
- Buchanan, Sir George W., British Ambassador at Petrograd.
- Caldwell, John K., Consul at Vladivostok.
- Cecil, Robert, Lord, British Minister of Blockade and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Chaikovski, N. V., President of the Supreme government of the northern region; member of the Ufa Directory (later the Directory of the all-Russian government, Omsk).
- Chenkelli, A. I., member of the Fourth Russian Duma; Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Chicherin, George V., Acting Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1918; Commissar for Foreign Affairs, May 30, 1918.
- Clemenceau, Georges E. B., from November 16, 1917, to January 20, 1920, French Premier and Minister for War.
- Cole, Felix, Vice Consul (later Consul) at Archangel.
- Crosby, Oscar T., delegate of the Treasury to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance.
- Crosley, Capt. Walter S., Naval Attaché in Russia.
- Czernin, Ottokar, Graf von und zu Chudenitz, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy.
- Davison, Henry P., Chairman of the War Council of the American Red Cross.
- Denikin, Gen. A. I., from April to June 1917 Chief of Staff of the Russian Army; from June to September 1917 successively commander of the western and southwestern fronts; after the November revolution took part in the Don in the formation of the Volunteer Army; succeeded Kornilov in April 1918 as commander of that army.

<sup>1</sup> Reference has been made to *Khronika Grazhdanskoi Voiny v Sibiri* (V. Maksakov and A. Turunov, compilers, Moscow, 1926) for data concerning Siberian officials.

- Derber, P., succeeded Potanin in authority at Tomsk; February 9, 1918, Prime Minister of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia.
- Diamandi, Constantine J., Count, Rumanian Minister in Russia.
- Drysdale, Lieut. Col. Walter S., Military Attaché at Peking, on special mission in Siberia.
- Dutov, A. I., Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.
- Eliot, Sir Charles, British High Commissioner in Siberia.
- Emerson, Col. George H., in charge of the Russian Railway Service Corps.
- Ferdinand I, King of Rumania.
- Foch, Ferdinand, Marshal of France and Generalissimo of the Allied forces.
- Francis, David R., Ambassador in Russia.
- Frazier, Arthur Hugh, Counselor of Embassy at Paris; Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council.
- Frederick Carl, son of Alexander Frederick, Landgrave of Hesse.
- Gaida, Col. (later Gen.) G. R., of the Czecho-Slovak forces, elected by them to lead the Siberian movement; later general in command of the eastern division of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.
- Gegechkori, Eugene, Prime Minister of Georgia.
- Girsa, Václav, a member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and political representative of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Siberia.
- Goto, Shimpei, Baron, from October 1916 to April 1918 Japanese Minister of the Interior; from April to September 1918 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Graves, Maj. Gen. William S., commanding the American forces in Siberia.
- Hara, Takashi, Japanese Prime Minister, September 30, 1918.
- Harris, Ernest L., Consul General at Irkutsk.
- Haynes, Thornwell, Consul at Helsingfors.
- Horvat, Gen. Dmitri L., Russian Governor and General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- House, Edward Mandell, Special Representative of the United States Government.
- Huntington, William C., Commercial Attaché in Russia.
- Ignatius, Kaarlo B., empowered by the Finnish Senate as representative of Finland in the United States.
- Ironside, Lieut. Col. William Edmund, in October 1918 succeeded Major General Poole in command of the British forces in north Russia.
- Ishii, Kikujiro, Viscount, Japanese Ambassador at Washington.
- Janin, Gen. Maurice, in 1916 chief of the French Military Mission to Russia; in the summer of 1918 supreme commander of the Czecho-Slovak Army.
- Jenkins, Douglas, Consul at Riga; on special detail at Kiev; at Chita; later detailed to Harbin.
- Joffe, A. A., chairman of the delegation of Soviet Russia at the first peace negotiations at Brest Litovsk, December 1918; first Soviet Ambassador to Germany, March 1918.
- Jusserand, Jean Adrien Antoine Jules, French Ambassador at Washington.
- Kaledin, Gen. Alexis M., Ataman of the Don Cossacks until his death, February 11, 1918.
- Kato, Takaaki, Viscount, former Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs; leader of the Kenseikai Party.
- Kerensky, Alexander F., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Justice; from May to September Minister of War and Navy; from July to November Prime Minister.
- Kharlamov, Vasili, President of the Southeastern federation.
- Knight, Admiral Austin M., Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.
- Knox, Brig. Gen. Alfred W. F., in command of the British forces in Siberia.



- Kolchak, Admiral Alexander V., Commander of the Black Sea Fleet; after the November revolution a leader of anti-Soviet forces in Siberia; Minister of War and Navy of the All-Russian Directory; on November 18, 1918, at Omsk, proclaimed Supreme Governor of Russia.
- Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington, Chinese Minister at Washington.
- Kornilov, L. G., Commander of the Russian southwestern front after July 19, 1917; from July 31 to September 11, 1917, Commander in Chief of the Russian Army; after the November revolution took part in the Don in the formation of the Volunteer Army and commanded it until his death April 13, 1918.
- Krasnov, P. N., commanded the Cossack troops which defended Petrograd at the time of the November revolution; succeeded Kaledin as Ataman of the Don Cossacks.
- Kühlmann, Richard von, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State.
- Lenin, N. (Vladimir Ulyanov), President of the Soviet of People's Commissars, November 8, 1917.
- Lindley, Francis O., British Commissioner in Russia.
- Lloyd George, David, British Prime Minister.
- Lockhart, Robert H. B., British Special Representative in Russia.
- Lvov, George E., Prince, from March to July 1917 Russian Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers).
- McAdoo, William Gibbs, Secretary of the Treasury.
- Macchi di Cellere, Vincenzo, Count, Italian Ambassador at Washington.
- Macgowan, David B., Consul at Moscow; on special detail in Siberia; at Vladivostok.
- MacMurray, John Van A., Chargé d'Affaires in China, June 30 to October 11, 1918.
- Mannerheim, Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil, a general in the Russian Imperial Army; in 1918 leader of the Finnish White Guards; in December 1918 Regent of the Finnish republic.
- Martin, Lieut. (later Capt.) Hugh S., Assistant Military Attaché in Russia.
- Masaryk, Thomas G., President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.
- Michael Alexandrovich, Grand Duke, younger brother of Nicholas II.
- Miller, Gen. Eugene K., in 1917 chief of the Russian military mission to Italy; in January 1919 Governor General of the northern region and Commander in Chief of the army.
- Milyukov, Paul N., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Mirbach, Wilhelm, Count von, German Commissioner in Russia; April 26, 1918, German Ambassador to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.
- Morris, Ira Nelson, Minister in Sweden.
- Morris, Roland S., Ambassador in Japan.
- Moser, Charles K., Consul at Harbin.
- Motono, Ichiro, Viscount, from November 1916 to April 1918 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia.
- Noulens, Joseph, French Ambassador in Russia.
- Nuorteva, Santeri, representative of the provisional revolutionary government of the people's republic of Finland.
- Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, Prime Minister of Italy.
- Otani, Gen. Kikuzo, of the Japanese Army, senior officer of the Allied forces in Siberia.

- Page, Thomas Nelson, Ambassador in Italy.
- Page, Walter Hines, Ambassador in Great Britain.
- Pavlu, Bohdan (Pavlov, Bogdan), President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Siberia.
- Petlyura, Simon, leader of the nationalists in the Ukraine.
- Pichon, Stephen, from November 16, 1917, to January 20, 1920, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Piip, Antoine, Esthonian delegate.
- Polk, Frank Lyon, Counselor for the Department of State.
- Poole, DeWitt C., Consul at Moscow; in charge of the Consulate General at Moscow; later detailed to Archangel as Special Assistant to the Ambassador with the diplomatic rank of Counselor of Embassy.
- Poole, Maj. Gen. Frederick C., commanding the British forces in north Russia.
- Potantin, G. N., President of the provisional Siberian government council, Tomsk, August 1917.
- Radoslavoff, Vassil, Prime Minister of Bulgaria.
- Ramishvilli, I. I., member of the first Russian Duma; Prime Minister of Georgia.
- Ray, John A., Consul at Odessa; detailed to Tomsk.
- Reading, Earl of (Rufus Daniel Isaacs), British High Commissioner and Ambassador on Special Mission to the United States.
- Redfield, William C., Secretary of Commerce.
- Regnault, Eugène Louis Georges, French Ambassador in Japan; August 22, 1918, appointed French representative at Vladivostok with the inter-Allied mission; High Commissioner in Siberia.
- Reinsch, Paul S., Minister in China.
- Reuter, Julio N., empowered by the Finnish Senate as representative of Finland in the United States.
- Ribot, Alexandre F., from March 20 to October 23, 1917, French Premier.
- Riggs, Capt. E. Francis, Military Attaché in Russia, December 31, 1915; Assistant Military Attaché, July 17, 1917.
- Robins, Lieut. Col. Raymond, from December 1917 to May 1918 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.
- Ruggles, Lieut. Col. James A., Assistant Military Attaché in Russia, October 25, 1917; Military Attaché, February 8, 1918.
- Sazonov, Sergei D., Russian Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910 to 1916.
- Semenov, Gen. Gregory, Ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks.
- Sharp, William G., Ambassador in France.
- Shcherbachev, Gen. D. G., Commander of the Russian Army on the Rumanian front.
- Sims, Admiral William S., in command of American naval operations in European waters.
- Skoropadski, Pavlo, Hetman of the Ukraine.
- Slaughter, Maj. Homer H., Assistant Military Attaché.
- Smith, F. Willoughby, Consul at Tiflis.
- Sonnino, Sydney, Baron, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Sookine, John, Secretary attached to the Russian Embassy at Washington; later Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kolchak government, Omsk.
- Spencer, Willing, Secretary of Embassy in Japan; Secretary of Legation and Chargé d'Affaires in China.
- Spring Rice, Sir Cecil Arthur, from April 1913 to February 1918 British Ambassador at Washington.
- Štefanik, Gen. Milan Ratislav, Czecho-Slovak Minister of War.
- Stevens, John F., chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.

- Stewart, Col. George E., commanding the American forces in north Russia.
- Stovall, Pleasant A., Minister in Switzerland.
- Summers, Maddin, Consul General at Moscow.
- Svinhufvud, Pehr E., President of the Finnish Senate; Regent of the Finnish republic April 1918 to December 1918.
- Syrový, Gen. Jan, Commander in Chief of the Czecho-Slovak forces, August 28, 1918.
- Talaat Pasha, Turkish Grand Vizier.
- Terauchi, Masakata, Count, Field Marshal, Japanese Prime Minister October 9, 1916, to September 29, 1918.
- Tereshchenko, Michael I., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Finance; from May to November Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Thompson, Lieut. Col. William B., in 1917 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.
- Thomson, Alfred R., Consul at Moscow; later detailed to Irkutsk; to Omsk.
- Torretta, Tomasi della, Italian Ambassador in Russia.
- Trepov, Alexander F., Russian Imperial Minister of Ways of Communication 1915 to 1917; Prime Minister November 1916 to January 1917.
- Trotsky, L. D. (Bronstein), chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, October 8, 1917; Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, November 8, 1917, to March 13, 1918; Commissar for War and Navy, March 13, 1918.
- Ustrugov, L. A., Assistant Minister of Ways of Communication under Kerensky; Minister of Ways of Communication, February 1918, in the provisional Siberian government (Derber, Prime Minister), later holding the same post in the all-Russian government, Omsk, and in the Kolchak government.
- Vasilenko, N. P., Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education.
- Vologodski, Peter V., Minister of Foreign Affairs in the provisional Siberian government (Derber, Prime Minister) February 1918; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs June 1918; member of the Ufa Directory (later the Directory of the all-Russian government, Omsk); and of the Kolchak government.
- Vopicka, Charles J., Minister in Rumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria; after the German occupation of Bucharest, joined the Rumanian Government officials and the Allied representatives at Jassy.
- Wardwell, Maj. Allen, from May to October 1918 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.
- Wheeler, Post, Counselor of Embassy in Japan.
- Whitehouse, Sheldon, Secretary of Embassy in Russia; assigned to Stockholm, January 8, 1918; later Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden.
- Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States.
- Wright, J. Butler, Counselor of Embassy in Russia.
- Yudenich, Gen. Nicholas N., from November 1914 to September 1915, and again from March to July 1917, commander of the Russian Army in the Caucasus; in 1919 leader of anti-Bolshevik forces in a movement against Petrograd.





## LIST OF PAPERS

[The arrangement of this list is by chapters, the papers therein appearing chronologically under date of writing. Unless otherwise specified, the correspondence is *from* or *to* the Secretary of State or the Department.]

### CHAPTER I. SIBERIA AND MANCHURIA

DISCUSSION OF THE CONTEMPLATED DISPATCH OF JAPANESE TROOPS TO SIBERIA: RUSSIAN ATTITUDE—BOLSHEVIK ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA AND MANCHURIA—THE FORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS—PROPOSED USE OF CHINESE TROOPS IN THE ZONE OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY—THE DISPATCH OF WARSHIPS TO VLADIVOSTOK—FRENCH SUGGESTION OF ALLIED AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION: ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
	Undated [Rec'd Nov. 1]	From the British Ambassador	Quotes Prime Minister on the use of Japanese or U. S. troops in Russia and on the reorganiza- tion of the Russian Army.	1
	Nov. 17	From the Consul at Harbin to the Minister in China	Effects of the Bolshevik <i>coup d'état</i> at Petrograd on the administra- tion of General Horvat at Harbin.	2
1729	Nov. 19	From the Minis- ter in China	Discusses an international police force to protect the lives of for- eigners at Harbin.	4
	Dec. 6	From the Minis- ter in China (tel.)	Allied Ministers propose the use of Chinese troops to support the treaty authorities in Manchuria.	5
	Dec. 8	To the Minister in China (tel.)	China is within its rights in pro- tecting its territorial integrity.	5
2073	Dec. 8	From the Amba- sador in Russia (tel.)	Report of landing of Japanese militia at Vladivostok.	6
	Dec. 11	To the Ambassa- dor in Japan (tel.); to China	Inquiry regarding report that Jap- anese forces are protecting Vladi- vostok.	6
	Dec. 11	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Conditions at Vladivostok call for presence of foreign force, prefera- bly American.	6
	Dec. 12	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Inquiry regarding dispatch of Jap- anese troops to Vladivostok.	7
	Dec. 13	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Instructions to avoid discussion of the advisability of the presence of foreign forces at Vladivostok.	7
	Dec. 14	From the Amba- sador in Japan (tel.)	Japan has prepared for emergencies but has no forces at present in Vladivostok.	7
	Dec. 15	From the Amba- sador in Japan (tel.)	Official statement that Japan will send troops to Russia only to protect Japanese interests.	8
	Dec. 15	From the Minis- ter in China (tel.)	Bolsheviks reported in control of railway at Harbin, opposing Gen- eral Horvat.	8

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
	Dec. 16	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Views of Russian Ambassador concerning Japanese intervention.	9
	Dec. 16	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	No Japanese troops have arrived at Vladivostok.	9
	Dec. 18	To the Minister in China (tel.)	The President desires that American representatives withhold direct communication with Bolshevik government.	9
2127	Dec. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Japanese denial of landing at Vladivostok.	10
	Dec. 22	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Bolshevik control in Vladivostok and in Siberia is increasing.	10
	Dec. 24	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Interview of Stevens, chairman of American railway commission, with Japanese Foreign Minister on intervention in Russia.	11
	Dec. 27	Memorandum---	Interview with Japanese Ambassador on Allied intervention in Russia.	13
	Dec. 27	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Friction between Bolsheviks and officials in Vladivostok of Provisional Government.	13
659	Dec. 28	From the British Embassy	Advisability of arrest and deportation by China of Bolshevik leaders and disaffected troops at Harbin.	14
	Dec. 29	To the British Ambassador; to China	Opinion on advisability of the use of force by China at Harbin.	15
[Quoted in tel.]	Dec. 29	From the Consul at Harbin via Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports outrages by Bolsheviks in Irkutsk, including the murder of British and French nationals.	16
	Dec. 30	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes report of Dec. 29 from the Consul at Harbin.	16
	1918			
	Jan. 1	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Better-class Russians request intervention and protection. Consular Corps agrees that foreign war-ships are necessary.	16
	Jan. 2	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reported massacre at Irkutsk is unconfirmed. Zemstvo of Amur region organizes a provisional government.	17
	Jan. 2	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Instructions to keep Department informed of welfare of Americans in Siberia.	18
21	Jan. 4	From the British Embassy	Unofficial recognition of Zemstvo Committee, which has taken over the administration of eastern Siberia, is recommended.	18
	Jan. 5	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Authorization to deal with Zemstvo Committee unofficially.	19

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Jan. 5	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	The <i>Brooklyn</i> has been ordered to Yokohama.	19
	Jan. 5	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	British and Japanese cruisers are sent to Vladivostok.	19
	Jan. 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	British standpoint concerning Japanese protection of military stores at Vladivostok.	20
	Jan. 8	From the French Ambassador	France suggests U. S. cooperation with Allies in intervention in Siberia.	20
	Jan. 8	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Specific inquiries regarding conditions at Vladivostok and in Amur Province.	21
	Jan. 9	From the Minister in China (tel.)	The Consul at Harbin requests authorization for Military Attaché Drysdale to proceed to Siberia.	22
	Jan. 10	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Irkutsk is reported quiet; consuls are protecting foreigners and provisional officials.	22
	Jan. 10	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Interview with Russian Ambassador on possible occupation of eastern Siberia by Japanese.	23
	Jan. 10	To the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Authorization to send Military Attaché Drysdale into Siberia.	24
	Jan. 10	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Instructions concerning an interpreter to accompany Drysdale.	24
	Jan. 11	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Inquires if Japan is preparing to occupy Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.	24
	Jan. 12	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Inquires if the <i>Brooklyn</i> is needed at Vladivostok.	25
	Jan. 12	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Inquires if Japan has sent warship to Vladivostok, as Great Britain has done.	25
	Jan. 13	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports information requested regarding conditions at Vladivostok and in Amur Province.	25
	Jan. 13	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan is thought to have no present intention of occupying points in Siberia.	27
	Jan. 14	From the Japanese Chargé	Japan has decided to dispatch warships to Vladivostok.	27
	Jan. 14	The Consul General at Moscow to the Ambassador in Russia	Reports the general situation in Siberia with respect to Bolshevism.	28
2043	Jan. 16	To the French Ambassador; to Great Britain, Japan, and China	The American Government declines to support the French proposals of intervention in Siberia.	28
[Quoted in tel.]	Jan. 16	From the Consul at Vladivostok via Tokyo (tel.)	Additional Japanese cruiser is considered superfluous. The presence of the <i>Brooklyn</i> is desirable.	30



*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Jan. 17	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Should conditions require the occupation of Vladivostok and the Chinese Eastern and Amur Railways, Japan desires to act alone.	29
	Jan. 17	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	The presence of Japanese vessels at Vladivostok arouses Russian suspicions. Quotes note of Jan. 16 of the Consul at Vladivostok.	30
	Jan. 20	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.); to Great Britain and France	Instructions to inform Foreign Minister that the United States is not in favor of a military expedition in Siberia.	31
3086	Jan. 23	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Foreign Minister's explanation of France's original attitude toward a military expedition in Siberia.	32
8388	Jan. 24	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	British attitude toward a military expedition in Siberia.	33

PROPOSED JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY—THE REPORTED ACTIVITIES OF GERMAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PRISONERS—BRITISH AND JAPANESE SUPPORT OF SEMENOV

	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	Jan. 22	From the Associated Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	The necessity for the immediate sending to Russia of Japanese or American troops.	33
3092	Jan. 24	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Jan. 22 from the Associated Ministers at Jassy.	33
112	Jan. 28	From the British Embassy	Proposes the control of the Trans-Siberian Railway by Japan as mandatory of the Allies.	35
	Jan. 31	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Recommends visit to Vladivostok of Admiral Knight on U.S.S. <i>Brooklyn</i> .	36
3138	Feb. 3	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Views of the Russian Ambassador in France concerning Allied (particularly Japanese) intervention in Russia.	37
	Feb. 4	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports hotel robberies and assaults on Japanese.	37
153	Feb. 6	From the British Embassy	Suggests that Japan be asked concerning the occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway.	38
154	Feb. 6	From the British Chargé	Great Britain is assisting Semenov with funds and supplies and asks U. S. participation.	38
	Feb. 8	To the British Embassy; to French, Italian, Chinese, and Belgian missions	The United States is opposed at present to intervention in Russia but if necessary in future advocates international cooperation.	41

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
2347	Feb. 8	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan advises exchange of views between Allies to effect a uniform policy toward Russia.	42
	Feb. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	A separate government for Siberia will be determined by a convention in March.	43
	Feb. 8	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	French attitude toward Japan's request for a free hand in case of intervention in Siberia.	44
	Feb. 9	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Instructions to send representative to report conditions in eastern Siberia.	44
	Feb. 11	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Reports that Military Attaché Drysdale is investigating conditions in Siberia.	44
6561	Feb. 13	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Requires reports regarding Bolshevik strength and activities of German and Austrian prisoners.	45
	Feb. 13	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to France, Japan, and China	Instructions to lay before the government to which accredited certain reasons opposed to the Japanese plan for intervention in Siberia.	45
	Feb. 15	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Financial aid to Semenov by Great Britain.	46
	Feb. 15	From the Military Attaché in China via Vladivostok (tel.)	Recommends financial assistance to Cossacks to protect Siberian Railway against German activities.	47
	Feb. 16	To the Secretary of the Navy	Purpose of the return of Admiral Knight with the <i>Brooklyn</i> to Vladivostok.	46
8723	Feb. 17	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Instructions to Admiral Knight to visit Vladivostok.	47
	Feb. 17	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Feb. 15 from the Military Attaché in China.	47
	Feb. 18	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	British plan for Japanese occupation of Siberian railways abandoned.	48
	Feb. 19	From the Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (tel.)	Substance of paper submitted by British War Office to French General Staff advocating Japanese intervention in Siberia.	49
	Feb. 19	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Aid to Cossacks by Japan and Great Britain. Discussion in the Japanese Diet on interests in Siberia.	50
3221	Feb. 20	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Discussion with French Foreign Minister of proposed Japanese entrance into Siberia as a means of opposing Germany.	50
	Feb. 21	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Military conditions at Irkutsk, Chita, and Harbin, as reported by the Consul at Harbin.	52
	Feb. 21	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Japan reported preparing military expedition to help Russians restore order in Siberia.	53

[Quoted in tel.]

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Consul at Moscow to Consul General	Plan for occupation of the Siberian Railway by the United States, China, and Japan.	53
198	Feb. 23	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes undated communication from the Consul at Moscow. See <i>supra</i> .	53
	Feb. 23	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Reliance on Semenov as a leader to restore order in Siberia is unwise.	54
	Feb. 23	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Japan proposes cooperation with China to restore order in Siberia. China requests U. S. advice.	55
	Feb. 23	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Instructions to inform China of U. S. attitude toward intervention in Siberia.	55
	Feb. 24	From the Minister in China (tel.)	The Military Attaché reports food shortage caused by Chinese embargo and reaction against Bolsheviks.	55
	Feb. 24	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan is prepared for immediate intervention in Siberia and awaits British and French consent.	56
6683	Feb. 26	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to France	Russia reported to be unfriendly to entry of Japanese troops unless with other Allied forces.	57
	Feb. 27	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Francis requests protection against armed prisoners on proposed trip across Siberia.	57
6705	Feb. 27	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to France	Advice to China concerning that part of the Trans-Siberian Railway which passes through Manchuria.	57
3259	Feb. 28	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Interviews with Foreign Minister and Russian Ambassador to France on Japanese intervention in Siberia.	58
	Feb. 28	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan officially states it awaits Allied approval of military activities in Siberia: French attitude.	60
[Quoted in tel.]	Feb. 28	From the Military Attaché in China via Peking (tel.)	Conditions at Vladivostok, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk and the possibility of Germany's obtaining Siberian supplies.	61
	Mar. 1	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Feb. 28 from Military Attaché.	61
	Mar. 1	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Information received does not confirm report of serious conditions at Irkutsk.	61
[Quoted in tel.]	Mar. 1	From the Consul at Harbin via Peking	Russian activities in support of Semenov and Kolchak; Japanese aid to Semenov.	65
	Mar. 2	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Russian Ambassador's views on Japanese intervention in Siberia and German aggression in Russia.	61
	Mar. 2	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Instructions to report regarding arming of German prisoners at Irkutsk.	63

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Mar. 2	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Reports of consuls desired on arming of war prisoners and other conditions in Siberia.	64
	Mar. 3	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Report from Irkutsk of conditions under Bolsheviks and arming of prisoners.	64
225	Mar. 3	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Attitude of prominent Russians toward Allied and American occupation of the Siberian Railway.	65
	Mar. 3	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes message of Mar. 1 from the Consul at Harbin.	65
	Mar. 4	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Inquiries regarding the arming of German and Austrian prisoners.	66
	Mar. 5	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Moser reports that Bolshevik force against Semenov is increasing.	66

**DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST INTERVENTION, MARCH 5, 1918: FURTHER DISCUSSION—FURTHER REPORTS CONCERNING ENEMY PRISONERS—JAPANESE OFFER OF SUPPORT TO HORVAT**

	1918			
	Mar. 5	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.); to Great Britain, France, and Italy	U. S. statement of confidence in Japan but doubt of wisdom of intervention in Siberia.	67
	Mar. 6	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Report on activity of enemy prisoners in Siberia.	69
	Mar. 6	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports violation by Bolsheviks of person and property, including forced contributions from American firms.	70
	Mar. 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reinforcements from Harbin for Semenov. Attitude of Japanese public men toward intervention.	71
	Mar. 7	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Members of Chamber of Commerce arrested by Soviet were released.	72
3310	Mar. 7	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	British suggestion for joint plan of intervention by Allies. French attitude toward Japanese intervention.	72
	Mar. 8	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	British support of Semenov with military supplies.	73
	Mar. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports concerning Russian attitude toward Japanese intervention and toward peace treaty with Germany.	73
2	Mar. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky complains of consular opposition to Soviet organizations at Vladivostok.	74
	Mar. 12	From the French Ambassador	Points out advantages from Allied viewpoint of Japanese intervention and asks U. S. cooperation.	75
	Mar. 12	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Palmer reports activity of Bolsheviks and war prisoners at Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk.	77

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Mar. 12	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japanese attitude toward British proposal of military occupation in Siberia.	78
	Mar. 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recent events in the Far East.	79
	Mar. 15	From the Counselor for the Department of State	Discussion with Allied representatives in Washington of U. S. position on Japanese intervention in Siberia.	68
	Mar. 15	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Japanese offer of support to Horvat.	79
	Mar. 16	To the French Ambassador	U.S. attitude regarding Japanese intervention in Siberia.	80
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Military Attaché to the Chargé in China	Report on war prisoners at Nikolsk and Spasskoe and strength of Bolshevism.	80
	Undated [Rec'd Mar. 16]	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes undated report of the Military Attaché. See <i>supra</i> .	80
	Mar. 17	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Reports Japanese participation in fighting at Blagoveshchensk.	80
[Quoted in tel.]	Mar. 19	The Japanese Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador	Japan will act in Siberia only in accord with the American and Allied powers.	81
	Mar. 19	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Quotes memorandum of Mar. 19 of the Foreign Minister.	81
	Mar. 20	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reasons for attitude toward Japan's sending expeditionary force into Siberia.	82
15	Mar. 20	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to Summers to inform Department of situation in Russia and in Siberia west of Chita.	82
	Mar. 20	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Instructions to consuls to inform Department of situation east of Chita.	83
25	Mar. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conflicting reports upon the arming of war prisoners.	83
	Mar. 21	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Wright instructed to report on situation in Siberia.	84
84	Mar. 22	From the Ambassador in Japan	Résumé of changes of attitude in Japan toward intervention in Siberia.	84
	Mar. 22	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Instructions to express to Japan appreciation of its candid statement on intervention in Siberia.	88
23	Mar. 25	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inquires regarding provisional government of Siberia and Siberian conference.	88
	Mar. 26	From the Counselor of Embassy in Russia (tel.)	Reports conditions in Siberia as noted during trip from Petrograd to Vladivostok.	89

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Consul at Harbin via Peking	Report of armed prisoners at Chita.	91
	Mar. 26	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes undated report from the Consul at Harbin. See <i>supra</i> .	91
40	Mar. 28	From the Ambassa- dor in Russia (tel.)	Has no news of separate Siberian government or of conference.	92
	Mar. 29	To the Ambassa- dor in Japan (tel.)	Instructions to report views of Masaryk on Russian situation and possible resistance to Central powers.	92
	Mar. 29	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Cooperation of armed Austrian prisoners with Bolsheviks.	92
	Mar. 29	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Moser reports Horvat's organiza- tion of military forces (Japan aid- ing with supplies) and of a cabi- net.	93
	Mar. 30	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes report from Irkutsk that war prisoners are arming.	94
	Mar. 30	To the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Requires reports from Wright and Bailey on specific points.	94
	Apr. 2	From the Minis- ter in China (tel.)	Reports from Harbin of armed pris- oners joining Bolsheviks.	95
61	Apr. 2	From the Ambassa- dor in Russia (tel.)	Views upon Japanese intervention and on proposed conference of railway men at Vologda.	95
67	Apr. 4	From the Ambassa- dor in Russia (tel.)	Bolshevik protests against the activities of Semenov and Allied support.	96
	Apr. 4	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Quotes Japanese note offering sup- port to Horvat. Latter appeals for U. S. support.	97

LANDING OF JAPANESE FORCES AT VLADIVOSTOK, APRIL 5, 1918; BRITISH LAND-  
ING: ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES—FORMATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS  
SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT, THE FAR EASTERN COMMITTEE, AND THE CHINESE  
EASTERN RAILWAY GOVERNING BOARD—THE WEBSTER-HICKS REPORTS ON  
ARMED PRISONERS—APPEARANCE OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS

	1918			
	Apr. 4	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Japanese nationals shot by Russians.	99
	Apr. 5	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Landing of Japanese forces at Vladivostok.	100
45	Apr. 5	To the Ambassa- dor in Russia (tel.)	Assurance that no action will be taken by Japan without under- standing with Allies or the United States.	100
47	Apr. 5	To the Ambassa- dor in Russia (tel.)	Relates murder of Japanese and landing of troops at Vladivostok.	100



*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Apr. 5	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	British renewal of representations to Japan for intervention in Siberia as of strategic value.	101
	Undated [Rec'd Apr. 6]	From the Prime Minister of the Siberian government (tel.)	Organization and aims of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia.	101
	Apr. 6	From the Counselor of Embassy in Russia (tel.)	Report from Harbin on the general situation in Siberia.	102
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Assistant Military Attaché in Russia to the War Department	Interviews with Trotsky on situation at Vladivostok and personal recommendations on intervention in Siberia.	104
329	Apr. 6	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes undated report from the Assistant Military Attaché to the War Department. See <i>supra</i> .	104
	Apr. 6	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Landing of British sailors and additional Japanese force protested by local Soviet.	105
78	Apr. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Soviet statement regarding murder of Japanese and Soviet protest against invasion of Russian territory.	105
79	Apr. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes his message to Robins on the landing of Japanese at Vladivostok and Chicherin's protest, with comments.	106
371	Apr. 8	From the British Ambassador	Forwards four telegrams from the Embassy in Japan and the Foreign Office on the Siberian situation, Semenov's activities, and the landing at Vladivostok.	108
	Apr. 8	From the French Ambassador	Requests reconsideration of Japanese action in Siberia on the basis of fresh information.	109
53	Apr. 8	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Requests full details of Webster's reports on prisoners of war in Siberia.	113
	Apr. 8	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Japanese support of Horvat. Russian attitude toward U. S. assistance on the Chinese Eastern Railway.	113
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Assistant Military Attaché in Russia	Reports conference of military representatives with Soviet government on Allied intervention in Siberia.	114
81	Apr. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes undated report from the Assistant Military Attaché, with comments. See <i>supra</i> .	113
	Apr. 9	To the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Inquires regarding formation of the Siberian Provincial Duma.	115
55	Apr. 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Corrects statement that Japanese landing at Vladivostok was made by agreement with Allies.	115
57	Apr. 10	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inquires what action is proposed to control armed war prisoners in Siberia.	116

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
86	Apr. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes his public statement regarding purpose of Japanese and British landing at Vladivostok.	116
	Apr. 10	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Advocates economic support and railway restoration in Siberia before resort to military intervention.	117
	Apr. 12	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Instructions to verify certain reports regarding situation in Siberia.	118
	Apr. 12	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Data on Siberian Provincial Duma and provisional Siberian government and their relations with Horvat.	119
95	Apr. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Denies having made statement that Japanese landing at Vladivostok was by agreement of Allies.	121
	Apr. 13	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japanese concurrence in British statement that landing at Vladivostok was only for protection of nationals.	121
	Apr. 13	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reports Masaryk's views on situation in Siberia and his recommendations.	122
97	Apr. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Webster-Hicks investigation of the arming of war prisoners. Relations of Robins with Soviet régime.	122
	Apr. 17	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Chinese cruiser arrives at Vladivostok.	124
107	Apr. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes German message to Soviet government insisting upon disbanding of war-prisoners' committees.	124
109	Apr. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes message from Webster on armed prisoners and cites conflicting reports.	125
110	Apr. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reasons for disapproval of separate Japanese action in Siberia as expressed by Allied Ambassadors.	126
	Apr. 19	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Question of maintenance of Czechoslovaks who will arrive at Vladivostok <i>en route</i> to France.	126
	Apr. 20	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Organization of Russian Far Eastern Committee and its interest in Blagoveshchensk refugees.	127
[Enclosure]	Apr. 20	From the Consul at Harbin to the Minister in China	Criticism of Semenov's methods of warfare.	133
	Apr. 21	From the French Ambassador	Japanese hope for U. S. support of intervention in Siberia based on relations of Bolsheviks with Germany.	128
401	Apr. 22	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes German Foreign Office demands on Soviet Russia for discipline of prisoners of war and Soviet reply.	129

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
3600	Apr. 22	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Instructions to inquire of France in regard to maintenance and transportation of Czecho-Slovak troops at Vladivostok.	130
118	Apr. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Statement of Webster and Hicks on armed prisoners in Siberia. Siberian attitude toward Allied intervention.	130
405	Apr. 23	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet protest against German-Ukrainian advance in Crimea and Soviet order respecting war prisoners.	131
	Apr. 23	From the French Ambassador	German advances in Russia, as reported by French Ambassador in Russia, necessitate Japanese and Allied intervention.	132
2002	Apr. 23	From the Minister in China	Forwards despatch of Apr. 20 from the Consul at Harbin and adds comments on Semenov.	133
3663	Apr. 23	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Suggestion that Italian and Belgian troops remain in Far East in case intervention becomes necessary.	134
	Apr. 25	From the British Ambassador	Forwards Balfour's proposal of an Allied front in Russia to oppose Germany.	135
	Apr. 25	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Verifies data of Department regarding grain supply, activities of armed prisoners, etc.	137
	Apr. 25	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Russians organize governing board for the Chinese Eastern Railway. Relations of reactionary forces and Japanese aid.	137

**ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD SIBERIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: RELATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS WITH THEM—ADVANCE AND REPULSE OF SEMENOV—APPEALS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PLANS FOR INTERVENTION**

	1918			
	Apr. 26	To the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Recognition of Far Eastern Committee must not be implied.	138
127	Apr. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes message from Chicherin to Robins protesting against activities of U. S. representatives and requesting recall of the Consul at Vladivostok.	139
	Apr. 27	From the British Embassy	Presents Balfour's note pointing out problems involved in intervention in Russia and Bolshevik attitude.	140
	Apr. 27	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Japan's demands upon Harbin group in return for military support.	140
	Apr. 27	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Petition of provisional Siberian government for U. S. counsel and material support against the Central powers.	141

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
128	Apr. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Summary of papers seized by Bolsheviks purported to involve U. S. and Allied representatives.	142
	Apr. 29	To the President	Interview with Japanese Ambassador designate Ishii on Japan's attitude toward intervention.	144
439	Apr. 29	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet message to France requesting recall of Noulens and protest to Germany against advance into Soviet territory.	145
	Apr. 30	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Formation of board of directors of Chinese Eastern Railway. Financial support from Japan.	147
	Apr. 30	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Conflict between Soviet and Zemstvo to control city. Arrival of Czecho-Slovak troops.	148
	May 1	From the British Ambassador	Presents Balfour's message suggesting that Allies work with Trotsky to prevent domination of Russia by Germany.	148
3770	May 1	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Arrangements for maintenance and transportation of Czecho-Slovak troops arriving at Vladivostok.	149
	May 1	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Inquiries regarding the government reported to be headed by Horvat.	150
	May 3	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Reports Semenov, aided by British and Japanese supplies and reinforced by Cossacks, advancing in Transbaikalia.	150
	May 4	From the Japanese Ambassador	Reasons for the landing of Japanese forces at Vladivostok, at variance with statement of Francis.	151
	May 4	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Instructions to Legation and Consulate to maintain strict neutrality toward Russia.	152
	May 4	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Soviet has dissolved City Council and taken over its functions.	152
	May 6	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Use of Chinese soil as a base for foreign military activities may embarrass China.	152
	May 6	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Instructions to report facts regarding alleged conspiracy against Soviet government.	153
2131	May 7	To the French Ambassador	Views intervention in Siberia now as inopportune.	154
	May 7	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Horvat's aim is a government for Siberia after military success with aid of Allies or Japan.	154
	May 7	From the Vice Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Reports Semenov's advance in Transbaikalia and support by Siberians.	155
	May 8	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Board of directors for Chinese Eastern Railway administer railway zone independently of any government except Chinese.	155
	May 8	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Attitude of strict neutrality toward contending factions in Russia.	157

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	May 9	From the Minister in China (tel.)	No communications for any Russian party have been transmitted by the Legation.	157
24	May 10	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the Secretary of War (tel.)	Movement of Czecho-Slovak and Serbian troops across Russia to France via Murmansk or Vladivostok.	158
	May 10	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Reports Semenov's gains and proposes an Allied and American commission to strengthen local Siberian government.	158
	May 11	To the President.	Interview with British Ambassador on advisability of intervention in Russia, assuming Bolshevik invitation.	160
	May 11	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Semenov's success offers opportunity of securing Siberia, Caucasus, and Ukraine against German efforts.	160
	May 14	From the Minister in China (tel.)	China is concerned over reports of Horvat's activities involving Chinese Eastern Railway.	161
	May 16	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Conditions on the Trans-Siberian Railway. Explanation of rumors concerning Chinese Eastern Railway.	161
524	May 16	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Semenov's advance checked. Bolsheviks reinforced by prisoners.	162
	May 16	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Plan for Allied intervention in Siberia under Japanese command.	162
	May 19	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Requests permission to deny reports of U. S. control of Siberian Railway in agreement with Bolshevik government.	163
539	May 22	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Huntington's report on conditions in Siberia, including popular desire for Allied and American intervention.	164
	May 22	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Instructions to explain to Japan the purpose of the Russian Railway Service Corps.	165
	May 23	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	No messages for private Russian citizens have been transmitted by the Consulate.	166
3966	May 23	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Opinion of the chief of the French Military Mission to Russia on intervention in Siberia.	166
	May 23	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Russian distrust of Emerson's mission to Vologda. Quarrel of Semenov with railway administration and with Kolchak.	168
1657	May 24	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Proposed political and military plan to save Russia from falling into the hands of Germany.	170
1663	May 25	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Russian Ambassador in Italy recommends immediate Allied military intervention in Russia.	171

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
206	May 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Chicherin demands that China cease to harbor Semenov or permit Soviet troops to pursue him on Chinese territory.	172
3999	May 26	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Discussion of French views on intervention in Siberia and northern Russia.	172
	May 27	From Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (tel.)	Résumé of conditions at Vladivostok.	174
1669	May 28	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Views of president of League for Regeneration of Russia in Union with her Allies on measures to oppose Germany.	175
2180	May 28	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Swedish press report that the United States may recognize Soviet régime and assist it against German aggression.	175
	May 28	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Semenov's statement of reluctance to accept Japanese aid, other Allied support having been discontinued.	177

## CLASHES BETWEEN THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS AND SOVIET FORCES: GOOD OFFICES OF AMERICAN AND FRENCH CONSULS

	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	May 26	From the Consul at Omsk via Vologda (tel.)	Clash between Soviet and Czech forces at Omsk.	177
219	May 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes message of May 26 from the Consul at Omsk. Reports that Czech and Polish prisoners desire to fight Germany.	177
	May 29	To the Japanese Ambassador	Francis's statement regarding landing of Japanese forces at Vladivostok will be corrected.	178
	May 29	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Czecho-Slovak troops in conflict with Bolsheviks and armed prisoners of war near Irkutsk.	178
226	May 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied and American Ambassadors advocate immediate intervention. German Ambassador gains in influence with Soviet régime.	179
4033	May 29	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Allied conference at Paris and French mission to the United States will discuss Japanese intervention in Siberia.	180
	May 30	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Urgent appeal for Allied intervention in Siberia to protect common interests.	181
	May 30	From the Chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts (tel.)	Indorses Horvat's statement regarding the menace of armed prisoners and necessity for Allied action in Siberia.	181
	May 31	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Soviet complaint of the concentration of Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok.	182

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
4289	May 31	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	No justification for change of U. S. policy regarding intervention in Siberia.	182
229	May 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department's circular telegram of May 29, expressing sympathy for Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs sent to Chicherin. Soviet order to disarm Czechs.	183
588	May 31	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Further clashes between Soviet and Czecho-Slovaks at Chelyabinsk and elsewhere.	183
6	June 2	From the Consul General at Irkutsk	Good offices of American and French consuls in arbitrating between Czech and Soviet forces after clash near Irkutsk. Enclosure: text of agreement.	184
592	June 2	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet officials demand complete disarmament of Czecho-Slovaks.	187
155	June 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Use of Chinese soil as base for hostile military operations by Russian faction may embarrass China.	188
241	June 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet government to be informed of attitude of Associated Governments towards disarmament of Czecho-Slovaks.	188

CONSIDERATION OF INTERVENTION BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT—DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS' CONFLICT WITH SOVIET FORCES—PROTEST OF THE ALLIED AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES AGAINST THE DISARMAMENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS—GOOD OFFICES OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS—FORMATION OF THE TEMPORARY SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT AT OMSK

	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	June 3	From the Consul at Omsk via Moscow (tel.)	Reports situation of the Czecho-Slovaks at Omsk and at points west.	204
1395	June 4	To the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Requests details of plans of League for Regeneration of Russia.	188
	June 4	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Requests concrete plan of intervention in Siberia and views upon its military advantage.	189
	June 5	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Japanese military assistance to Semenov and compensation promised. Allied intervention vs. German control.	189
	June 5	To the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Inquires views of Cooperative Societies regarding methods of resistance to Germany.	190
	June 6	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Kolchak gathering forces at Pogranichnaya to oppose Bolsheviks. Russian desire for intervention.	190
	June 7	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Russian Ambassador discusses relative strength of opposing forces in Siberia and possible use of Czecho-Slovak army.	192

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
9288	June 7	From the Chargé in Great Britain	Views of a prominent Siberian on Allied military assistance to Siberia.	193
4120	June 7	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Trotsky orders movement of troops against the Czecho-Slovaks.	194
1708	June 7	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Reported that Russian parties hope for Allied intervention but can not ask for it.	194
9	June 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet measures against Czecho-Slovaks said to be dictated by Germans.	195
	June 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Agitation in Japan renewed in favor of armed intervention in Siberia. Semenov's success short-lived.	195
	Undated [Rec'd June 9]	From the Foreign Commissar of the Central Siberian Soviet (tel.)	Assurances that difficulties with Czecho-Slovaks will be settled peacefully.	196
621	June 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes Y.M.C.A. Secretary and others on aims and progress of Czecho-Slovak troops.	197
	Undated [Rec'd June 10]	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Mediation reported to prevent conflict between Czechs and Russians near Mariinsk.	191
	June 10	From the Russian Ambassador	Forwards for the President extract of resolution of Cadet Party regarding Allied intervention in Russia.	198
638	June 10	From the British Ambassador	Memorandum on proposed transportation to France by Japanese ships of Czecho-Slovak troops now at Vladivostok.	199
[Quoted in tel.]	June 10	From the Consul General at Irkutsk via Vladivostok (tel.)	Czecho-Slovak trouble due to detention of Czech troops in Russia by order of Trotsky.	200
	June 10	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes telegram of June 10 from the Consul General at Irkutsk.	200
17	June 10	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Conflict between anti-Bolshevik forces and local Soviet at Irkutsk.	201
170	June 10	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Communications of Moscow Consulate with Soviet should be limited to matters affecting American interests.	201
	June 10	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Railway and telegraph services with Russia and Siberia broken; Semenov and Orlov outnumbered by Bolshevik forces.	201
92	June 10	From the Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (tel.)	Conditions specified by Great Britain, France, and Italy of Japanese and Allied intervention in Russia.	202



*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	June 10	From the Consul General at Irkutsk via Vladivostok	Consular protest to Soviet against measures taken to oppose passage of Czechs through Irkutsk.	205
626	June 11	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet proclamation of June 11 denouncing provisional Siberian government.	203
	June 12	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes message of June 10 from the Consul General at Irkutsk.	205
628	June 12	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Statement of an official of the Cooperative Societies on Allied intervention in Siberia.	205
[Quoted in tel.]	June 12	From the Soviet government to Consul at Moscow	Reply in part to protest of Allied and American Consuls against disarmament of Czecho-Slovaks.	211
	June 13	From the Minister in China (tel.)	Usefulness of Czecho-Slovak troops to control Siberia against German aggression.	206
264	June 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Protest of Allied and American representatives against the disarmament of the Czecho-Slovaks.	207
[Quoted in tel.]	June 13	From the Consul General at Irkutsk via Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports counter-Bolshevik movement throughout central Siberia, encouraged by presence of Czechs.	210
	June 14	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Memorial signed June 14 at Harbin by Consuls, advocating joint Allied intervention in Russia.	208
	June 14	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Local Soviet executive committee seeks friendly relations with the Allied and American consuls.	209
	June 14	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes telegram of June 13 from the Consul General at Irkutsk.	210
637	June 14	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	An official of the Cooperatives invites Allied intervention on condition of U. S. guaranty of territorial integrity of Siberia.	210
269	June 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Soviet note of June 12 in part and reports decisions of Paris conference regarding Murman, Archangel, Czecho-Slovaks.	211
[Quoted in tel.]	June 14	From the Consul General at Irkutsk via Vladivostok	Suggests return of Czechs from Vladivostok to Irkutsk to insure passage of other Czechs.	213
	June 15	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Irkutsk in hands of armed Austrian and German prisoners commanded by prisoner officers.	212
	June 15	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reported that Czech troops at Suslovo agree to armistice with Soviet forces.	212
	June 15	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes telegram of June 14 from the Consul General at Irkutsk.	213

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	June 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Plan of Paris conference for Allied intervention in the north. Attitude of Russians toward intervention.	213
646	June 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Attitude of Czecho-Slovaks at Samara toward Allies and toward Russia, reported by Williams.	214
626 [?]	Undated [Rec'd June 18]	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes telegram of June 3 from the Consul at Omsk.	204
650	June 18	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Opinion of leader of Cooperatives upon offensive of provisional Siberian government with Czechs against Germany.	215
	June 19	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Semenov is defeated by war prisoners. Anti-Bolshevik movement is gaining but needs armed Allied support.	216
	June 20	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Struggle in Irkutsk between White Guard and Red Guard, aided by armed prisoners.	217
	June 20	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Meeting of members of Siberian Duma and Cooperative Societies votes to appeal for intervention.	217
	June 20	To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	No plans yet made to bring Czecho-Slovaks from Vladivostok.	218
	June 20	To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	The Department is not prepared to recognize Bolshevik authorities.	218
	June 20	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Czecho-Slovaks encouraged by British are guarding military stores.	219
	June 22	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan awaits U. S. decision on question of intervention.	219
	June 22	To the Minister in China (tel.)	Disapproval of connection of U. S. representatives with any public statement indorsing military intervention in Siberia.	220
295	June 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Views on conditions in Russia as result of Soviet rule, on German relations, and on intervention.	220
	June 25	To the Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (tel.)	Representations to French Foreign Minister called forth by French statement of Colonel House's views on intervention in Siberia.	223
	June 25	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Report requested on organization of Czecho-Slovak troops at Vladivostok.	224

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

REQUEST OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK LEADERS FOR AID IN ESTABLISHING A NEW EASTERN FRONT—OVERTHROW OF THE VLADIVOSTOK SOVIET BY THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS—LANDING OF AMERICAN MARINES—PROCLAMATION OF THE PROTECTION OF VLADIVOSTOK BY COMMANDERS OF ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED FORCES—PROCLAMATION OF A GOVERNMENT BY HORVAT: CONTROVERSY WITH OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	June 25	The President of the Czecho-Slovak Nat'l Council to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (tel.)	Defense of the Czecho-Slovak attitude toward Soviet Russia.	224
9	June 25	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Allied aid urged for Czecho-Slovak troops to enable them to return westward to assist their fellows.	226
10	June 25	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.): for Military Staff	Increasing strength of armed prisoners. Proposal for a Siberian army with Czecho-Slovaks as nucleus.	227
	June 26	From Mr. Alexandre Konovoff	Views on proposed inter-Allied action in Siberia, Japanese troops predominating, and on use of Czecho-Slovak troops.	227
	June 26	From Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (tel.)	Czecho-Slovak National Council describe the situation of their military forces in Siberia and ask Allied help.	230
	June 26	From the Minister in China (tel.)	China seeks U. S. views on action to be taken regarding Russian forces which crossed Chinese boundary.	231
	June 27	From the Assistant Secretary of State	Sookine plans an Allied and American commission to restore order in Russia.	232
96	June 27	From the Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (tel.)	Source of statement alleged to have been made by Colonel House on Japanese intervention in Siberia.	233
15	June 27	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Partial reply to inquiry regarding Czecho-Slovak troops.	234
	June 28	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	British armed force prevented shipment of copper west.	234
2372	June 29	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Strength of Czecho-Slovak movement. Enclosure: Report of Lieutenant Stines advocating Allied support of Czech army.	234
	June 29	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Overthrow of Vladivostok Soviet by Czecho-Slovaks after presenting ultimatum.	235
683	June 30	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Fears German military support of Bolsheviks in the north and advocates Allied intervention.	236
	July 1	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan's attitude toward French request for loan of munitions to Czech forces at Vladivostok.	239
904	July 2	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Position of Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia and attitude towards Russia and Central powers.	241

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
100	July 2, 3	From the Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (tel.)	Supreme War Council's appeal to President Wilson to support Allied intervention in Russia and Siberia.	241
2407	July 3	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Bolshevik régime in the Urals and Siberia failing and monarchistic party gaining.	246
1	July 4	From the Consul at Omsk	Report of armed conflict of Czecho-Slovaks with Red Guard near Omsk on May 25. Enclosures: Appeal of Magyar communists to war prisoners; Czecho-Slovak official statement.	248
25	Undated [Rec'd July 5]	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Views on conditions under Bolshevik régime in Finland, Russia, Turkestan, and Siberia.	239
30	July 5	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Asks aid for Czechs in struggle against armed prisoners. Reports conditions in Vladivostok after Czech occupation.	261
	July 6	Memorandum...	Conference at White House on Siberian situation: program to aid Czecho-Slovaks.	262
[Quoted in tel.]	July 6	The Secretary of the Navy to Commander of the <i>Brooklyn</i>	Instructions to keep Vladivostok available as a base for the safety of the Czecho-Slovaks.	263
	July 6	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Quotes instructions of July 6 of Secretary of the Navy to flagship <i>Brooklyn</i> .	263
[Quoted in tel.]	July 6	From the Consul at Harbin via Peking (tel.)	Announcement of Horvat's cabinet and nonpartisan government for Siberia.	273
35	July 7	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Czecho-Slovaks take Nikolsk. Allied and American consuls request passage for Czechs through Manchuria.	264
	July 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan will present machine guns and mounted batteries to Czecho-Slovak Army.	265
250	July 8	From the Consul at Vladivostok	Transmits communication to the Allied consuls from the Czecho-Slovak National Council on the position of their troops in Russia.	265
	July 8	Memorandum...	Discussion with the Japanese Ambassador of the Siberian program determined upon by conference at the White House.	267
[Quoted in tel.]	July 8	From the Consul at Harbin via Peking (tel.)	Removal of Horvat to the Maritime Province. Discussion of political activities involving the Chinese Eastern Railway.	274
206 [26?]	Undated [Rec'd July 9]	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Reports armed prisoners proceeding westward to oppose the Czecho-Slovaks.	268
	July 9	To the President.	Interview with British, French, and Italian Ambassadors regarding Allied action in resisting attacks upon Czecho-Slovaks.	269

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
254	July 9	From the Consul at Vladivostok	Forwards text of proclamation of July 6 announcing Vladivostok temporarily under protection of the Allied and Associated powers.	270
	July 9	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Requests instructions on attitude to be taken toward transportation of Czech troops over the Chinese Eastern Railway.	271
4408	July 9	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes appeal to President Wilson of Russian political organizations in Paris for aid in expelling Germans from Russia.	272
	July 9	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes telegram of July 6 from the Consul at Harbin.	273
	July 9	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes telegram of July 8 from the Consul at Harbin.	274
[Quoted in tel.]	July 9	From the Consul at Harbin via Peking (tel.)	Chinese attitude toward Horvat's troops and toward management of railways.	278
[Quoted in tel.]	July 10	From the Harbin Consulate via Peking (tel.)	Formation of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia.	278
	July 11	From the British Ambassador	Presents telegram from British Foreign Secretary regarding increase of British forces at Vladivostok.	274
[Quoted in tel.]	July 11	From the Consul at Harbin via Peking (tel.)	Horvat's plan to establish Grand Duke Michael as constitutional monarch.	279
	July 12	From the British Ambassador	Presents telegram from British Foreign Secretary urging support by the U.S.S. <i>Brooklyn</i> for the Czechs at Vladivostok.	274
	July 12	From the British Ambassador	Presents telegram from British Foreign Secretary stating purpose of steps taken at Vladivostok.	275
	July 12	From the British Ambassador	Presents telegram from British Foreign Secretary quoting his message to France on Allied protection of Vladivostok.	275
	July 12	From the Assistant Secretary of State	Interview with the Italian Ambassador on an inter-Allied expedition in Siberia.	275
2466	July 12	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Members of Social Revolutionary Party appeal through United Press for Allied intervention.	276
	July 12	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Advice of Allied representatives to Horvat on his new government and the passage of Czechs through Manchuria. Message from Harbin Consulate, July 10.	277
	July 12	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes message of July 9 from Harbin.	278
	July 12	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes message of July 11 from Harbin.	279
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Harbin Consulate via Peking (tel.)	Difficulties between Czecho-Slovaks and Horvat in the Maritime Province. Aid to Horvat from Japan.	280

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	July 13	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes undated telegram from Harbin, respecting difficulties between Czecho-Slovaks and Horvat.	280
	July 13	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.): to Moscow	Request for specific information regarding armed forces in Siberia.	281
	July 13	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reports that Japan considers occupying Manchuria and controlling the Chinese Eastern Railway.	281
2194	July 15	To the Ambassador in France	Reply to appeal of Russian political organizations in Paris.	281
45	July 15	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	An estimate of the Siberian government and of relations in Siberia of Czecho-Slovak and Horvat forces.	282
	July 15	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	German and Magyar prisoners in Central Siberia force the issue with the Czecho-Slovak Army.	283
	July 15	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Desires the approval of China for passage of Czecho-Slovak troops over the Chinese Eastern Railway.	283
791	July 16	From the British Ambassador	Seeks U. S. support in request that Japan furnish destroyers to assist in patrol of Vladivostok Harbor.	284
	July 16	From the French Ambassador	U. S. aid sought in credit established for support of Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia.	284
2150	July 16	From the Chargé in China	Effect of Horvat's proclamation of a new Siberian government on the Czecho-Slovak movement westward.	285

AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY ACTION, JULY 17, 1918: DISCUSSION WITH THE JAPANESE AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS—CHINESE REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION—RIVALRY OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

	1918			
	July 17	To the Allied Ambassadors	American plans in respect to military intervention in Russia, assistance to the Czecho-Slovaks, and economic aid.	287
51	July 17	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports strength and movements of various forces in Siberia.	290
	July 17	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Proposed U. S. and Japanese contingents and economic mission to assist Czech troops.	292
	July 18	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Disapproval of China's taking control of Chinese Eastern Railway during Russia's present distress.	292
52	July 18	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Representatives of provisional government of autonomous Siberia favor Allied military intervention.	293

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
262	July 19	From the Consul at Vladivostok	Transmits declaration of July 8 of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia, asking for recognition.	293
	July 19	From the Foreign Minister of the Siberian government (tel.)	Suggests the common establishment of a new front against Austro-German forces in Russia and Siberia.	296
	July 19	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Inquires if Japan wishes to correct Horvat's statement that he has Japanese support.	297
[Quoted in tel.]	July 19	From the Vice Consul at Samara via Moscow	Reports political situation in Volga-Ural region, and urges publication of Allied purposes.	317
	July 20	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Requests instructions regarding attitude toward proposed participation by China in military operations in Siberia.	298
	July 20	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	China decides to participate in military operations at Vladivostok.	299
	July 20	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Official assurance that China has no intention of depriving Russia of its control of Chinese Eastern Railway.	299
	July 23	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Conversation with Chinese Minister: China desires to participate with Allies in action in Siberia.	299
	July 23	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Interview with Foreign Minister on military occupation of Manchuria and support of Horvat.	300
	July 24	To the President	Increase by Japan of its forces to be sent to Vladivostok. Copy of Japanese declaration enclosed.	301
61	July 24	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Jenkins reports on Bolshevik activities at Khabarovsk.	302
	July 24	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	China dissents from Japanese plan to patrol the Chinese Eastern Railway.	303
	July 25	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Conversation with Chinese Minister on Japan's policy in Siberia.	303
	July 26	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	China advised to assume control of that portion of Chinese Eastern Railway within its territory.	304
	July 26	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	China desires to participate in Allied military activities.	305
	July 26	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	China alone should guard the Chinese Eastern Railway.	305
	July 27	From the British Ambassador	Presents Balfour's note enclosing copy of draft proclamation to the Russian people of Allied policy in Russia.	305

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	July 27	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Discussion with the Japanese Ambassador of statement of special position with respect to Siberia.	306
	July 27	From the Chargé in China. (tel.)	Inquires if attitude toward Horvat should be modified in view of his monarchistic tendencies.	307
	July 27	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	China consents that the Czecho-Slovak Army use the Chinese Eastern Railway.	308
	July 28	From the French Ambassador	Financial assistance by France, Great Britain, and the United States for the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia.	308
8	July 29	From the Consul General at Irkutsk	Account of the seizure of Irkutsk from the Bolsheviks by the Czecho-Slovaks, and the latter's control of the Siberian Railway.	309
	July 29	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Attitude toward Chinese control of railroad within Manchuria and contingent of Chinese troops at Vladivostok.	314
65	July 29	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Siberian provisional government requests public declaration of Allied purposes and recall of Allied officers now with Horvat.	315
	July 30	From the British Embassy	Presents Balfour's memorandum of July 29 answering the American statement of July 17 relative to intervention in Russia.	315
	July 30	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Instructions not to modify attitude toward Horvat's political activities.	317
43	July 30	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes report of July 19 from the Vice Consul at Samara.	317
	July 30	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japanese Embassy reports disorders at Khabarovsk and Nikolaevsk and the dispatch of torpedo boats to the latter.	318
	July 31	From the members of the Czecho-Slovak Nat'l Council to its President	Report on condition of the Czecho-Slovak Army and request for supplies and reinforcements.	319
70	July 31	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Strong showing of Bolsheviks in election for Vladivostok city council.	320
71	July 31	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Desires to know Department's attitude toward Czechs, Siberian government, and Horvat.	321
	July 31	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Inquiry regarding Bolshevik control of city election and rivalry of anti-Bolshevik organizations.	321
	Aug. 1	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Attitude of Japan toward U.S. plan of action in Siberia.	321
	Aug. 1	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Serious situation of the Czecho-Slovaks in westward movement and inadequacy of forces at Vladivostok.	322



*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Aug. 1	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Purpose to safeguard Russian interests and territory but not to support any one faction.	323
	Aug. 2	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Department's attitude toward Siberian governmental organizations. Material assistance offered Czechs.	323

JAPANESE AND AMERICAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING MILITARY ACTION,  
AUGUST 2 AND 3, 1918—BRITISH STATEMENT, AUGUST 8, 1918

	1918			
	Undated [Rec'd Aug. 2]	From the Japanese Ambassador	Japan will act with the United States and the Allies in sending troops to Siberia and will respect the territorial integrity of Russia.	324
	Aug. 3	To the President	Japanese Ambassador reported the agreement of his government with U.S. proposals, reserving the question of increase of troops.	325
	Undated [Rec'd Aug. 3]	From Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (tel.)	Czechs on Ussuri front reported outnumbered. British and French troops to be sent to their assistance.	326
76	Aug. 3	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Explanation of Bolshevik vote in recent city election and of request for Japanese war vessels at Nikolaevsk.	327
	Aug. 3	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.); to Great Britain, France, Italy, and China	U.S. public statement of the objects and extent of its military and economic action in Russia.	328
	Aug. 5	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	German force, reported within Manchurian border, will necessitate Chinese action.	329
	Aug. 5	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japan's declaration regarding intervention made public. Official assurance of acceding to U.S. suggestion of limitation of troops.	330
	Aug. 6	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Conversation with Chinese Minister: Chinese troops prevented Bolsheviks from crossing the border in pursuit of Semenov.	330
80	Aug. 6	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	No foreign military officers are with Horvat at present.	331
	Aug. 6	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	China is preparing to dispatch troops to Vladivostok without opposition from Japan.	331
79	Aug. 6	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Arrival of Horvat with cabinet and guard; Siberian government suggests coalition.	332
81	Aug. 7	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Can not report strength of Siberian government without investigation in western Siberia.	332

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
5236	Aug. 7	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	American Red Cross will furnish clothing for Czecho-Slovak troops. Inquires if France contemplates similar assistance.	333
	Aug. 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Suggests wisdom of limiting U.S. troops for Vladivostok to number originally planned.	333
883	Aug. 8	From the British Chargé	Text of British statement to the Russian peoples giving assurance of aid and respect for national sovereignty.	333
	Aug. 8	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Denial of report of German force in Manchuria. Operation of military convention between China and Japan.	334
	Aug. 8	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	The Department has not replied to the request for recognition of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia.	335
	Aug. 9	From the Russian Ambassador	Forwards message from provisional government of autonomous Siberia regarding its origin, policies, and popular support.	335
	Aug. 9	From the British Chargé	Forwards Balfour's message quoting telegram from H. M. S. <i>Suffolk</i> regarding critical situation of the Czechs in Siberia.	337
	Aug. 9	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Denial of rumor that U. S. forces for Vladivostok will be augmented.	337
	Aug. 10	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Misconstruction in translation of U. S. declaration of Aug. 3 of policy in Russia antagonizes Russians.	338

PROPOSALS FOR THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF INTERVENTION AND FOR AUGMENTATION OF THE FORCES: ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES—JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN MANCHURIA—ARRIVAL OF AMERICAN AND ALLIED TROOPS AT VLADIVOSTOK—INCREASE OF THE JAPANESE FORCES—REPLY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO AMERICAN AND JAPANESE STATEMENTS

	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	July 8	From the Consul at Tomsk via Vladivostok (tel.)	Condition of the Siberian government formed at Tomsk.	342
893	Aug. 11	From the British Chargé	Appointment of British High Commissioner in Siberia.	339
	Aug. 12	From the French Ambassador	Suggests inter-Allied civilian board to safeguard unity of action toward Russian people.	340
894	Aug. 12	From the British Embassy	Great Britain desires the United States to request Japan to dispatch military aid to the Czechs.	341
	Aug. 13	From the British Chargé	Presents British consular message on critical condition of Czechs and need of supplies.	342

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
95	Aug. 13	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes report of July 8 from the Consul at Tomsk.	342
	Aug. 13	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Reports Japanese forces joining Czechs at Harbin; war prisoners threatening Manchuria Station.	343
	Aug. 13	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japanese activities in Manchuria, with Chinese consent, to oppose Bolshevik troops and German armed prisoners.	343
[Quoted in tel.]	Aug. 13	From the Consul General at Irkutsk via Peking (tel.)	Czecho-Slovak situation, opposed by armed prisoners, in their advance on Perm.	360
	Aug. 14	To the British Chargé	Disapproval of suggested changes in plan agreed upon to aid the Czecho-Slovaks.	344
	Aug. 14	From the Japanese Ambassador	Statement that Japanese troops will cooperate with Chinese in opposing armed prisoners on Chinese frontiers.	345
	Aug. 15	To the Japanese Ambassador	Strength of American expeditionary force to be sent to Vladivostok.	346
98	Aug. 15	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Recommends extension of plans to aid the Czecho-Slovaks and quotes statements of Girsu and Dietrichs.	346
	Aug. 15	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Strength of American expeditionary forces ordered to Vladivostok.	348
	Aug. 15	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Agreement between Japan and China to send troops to Manchouli. Delay of Chinese contingent for Vladivostok.	348
914	Aug. 16	From the British Chargé	Necessity for definite action on the part of the Allies to restore order in Vladivostok.	349
	Aug. 17	From the Russian Ambassador	Presents letter of Grebenchikov of the Siberian government desiring shipment of army supplies.	350
	Aug. 19	From the British Embassy	Presents report from H. M. S. <i>Suffolk</i> , Vladivostok, on the necessity for martial law.	350
	Aug. 20	Memorandum---	Conference with the President: Delimitations of U. S. military action in Siberia with respect to aid to the Czecho-Slovaks.	351
	Aug. 20	To the British Chargé	Assurance of cooperation of U. S. representatives with the British High Commissioner.	351
107	Aug. 20	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reception accorded Allied troops at Vladivostok.	352
	Aug. 21	To the British Chargé	Judgment is reserved for the present respecting transportation to France of Czecho-Slovak troops.	352

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Aug. 21	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Conversation with the Chinese Minister: Japanese occupy Chinese Eastern Railway zone and obstruct Chinese passage to Vladivostok.	353
109	Aug. 22	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Allied consuls are notified that Siberian governments at Omsk and Vladivostok are parts of the same organization.	354
	Aug. 23	From the British Embassy	Presents message from British Ambassador in France regarding the formation of an Allied police force in Vladivostok.	354
112	Aug. 24	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Differences between Horvat's following and Czech and Allied commanders.	354
	Aug. 26	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Increase of Japanese forces at Vladivostok and in Manchuria.	355
	Aug. 26	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Foreign Minister makes detailed explanation of Japan's movements in Siberia.	356
	Aug. 27	From the Japanese Ambassador.	Encloses his statement of Siberian situation requiring additional troops to aid Czecho-Slovak forces.	357
4278	Aug. 27	From the Minister in Switzerland	Transmits Soviet Foreign Commissioner's reply to U. S. and Japanese statements regarding intervention in Russia.	358
115	Aug. 29	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Requests instructions in regard to acting on commission for settlement of political and economic questions.	360
	Aug. 30	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Aug. 13 from the Consul General at Irkutsk.	360
	Aug. 30	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Instructions not to participate in police operations in Vladivostok.	361
	Aug. 31	To the British Chargé	Consideration will be given to the British proposal to establish order in Vladivostok.	361
2220	Aug. 31	To the French Ambassador	Declines chairmanship of a U. S. representative on inter-Allied civilian board.	362
116	Aug. 31	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Zemstvo turns over powers to provisional government of autonomous Siberia.	363
4196	Aug. 31	From the Chargé in the Netherlands (tel.)	Rumor that the Entente have bargained for Japanese assistance offering Dutch East Indies as compensation.	363
	Sept. 3	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	The U. S. Government deems co-operation in political action unwise and will not appoint a high commissioner.	364

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

SPECIAL MISSION OF AMBASSADOR MORRIS TO VLADIVOSTOK: HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT AN AMERICAN FORCE BE SENT TO OMSK—WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS FROM VLADIVOSTOK: REVERSES ON THE VOLGA—FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT BY CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DELEGATES AT SAMARA: CONFERENCE AT UFA WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Sept. 2	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Czech movement westward threatened by Bolsheviki at Ufa.	364
	Sept. 4	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Further Bolshevik conquests reported along west front; artillery under German direction.	365
	Sept. 4	From the French Ambassador	Explanation of duties of proposed inter-Allied civilian board, disclaiming any interference in Russian political affairs.	365
	Sept. 4	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Special mission of Ambassador Morris to Vladivostok to report best method of assisting the Russian people.	366
124	Sept. 5	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Czechs assisted by Russian forces in western Siberia.	367
	Sept. 5	To the Chargé in China (tel.): to Harris	Report from Irkutsk requested regarding Russian military forces which are cooperating with Czechs.	367
	Sept. 5	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japanese operations to clear Amur region of war prisoners. Movement of Allied forces to Manchouli.	368
2008	Sept. 5	To the Chargé in the Netherlands (tel.)	Rumor denied that Dutch East Indies will be awarded to Japan for her aid to Russia.	368
	Sept. 7 (6?)	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Czechs and Siberians move westward to attempt capture of Perm.	369
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Consulate at Moscow via Irkutsk	Reports the strength of the Red Army and German order to halt the Czech advance.	369
	Sept. 7 (6?)	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes undated report from the Consulate at Moscow. See <i>supra</i> .	369
55	Sept. 7	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Reports general situation improving since entrance of Allies into Siberia.	370
	Sept. 8	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Preparations to sail for Vladivostok on Red Cross mission.	371
128	Sept. 9	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Introduction at Vladivostok of Japanese paper currency resented by Russians.	372
	Sept. 9	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	U. S. policies and their limitations in respect to military and economic action in Siberia.	372
	Sept. 10	To the Russian Ambassador	Approves act of Russian Embassy in furnishing shoes for Czechoslovaks through American Red Cross.	374

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
[Quoted in tel.]	1918			
	Undated	From the Vice Consul at Samara via Irkutsk	Reports military and political situation at Kazan, Simbirsk, and Samara.	374
70	Sept. 10	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes undated report from the Vice Consul at Samara. See <i>supra</i> .	374
78	Sept. 12	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes Czecho-Slovak declaration to All-Russian Assembly at Chelyabinsk in regard to formation of central power in Russia.	375
77	Sept. 12	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Czech and Russian Armies forced to evacuate Kazan.	377
135	Sept. 12	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Red Army and German Army units advancing against Czechs on Volga front, necessitating return of Czech forces.	377
	Sept. 13	From the Chinese Minister	Forwards memorandum on dispatch of Japanese troops to Manchouli.	378
82	Sept. 13	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Omsk government desires Allies to enter Siberia and assist in regaining Russia from Germany.	378
[Quoted in tel.]	Sept. 13	From the Consul General at Irkutsk via Peking (tel.)	Czechs at Samara in desperate need of supplies. Ekaterinburg threatened by Bolsheviks and Austro-German prisoners.	379
	Sept. 13	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Sept. 13 from the Consul General at Irkutsk.	379
	Sept. 13	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Reports strength of Czech and Russian Armies; increasing power of Omsk government; and activities of armed prisoners.	379
85	Sept. 14	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Omsk government seeking recognition. Convention at Ufa attempting to form all-Russian government.	380
91	Sept. 15	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes message from Pavlu, of the Czech National Council, on the situation at the Volga and Ekaterinburg fronts.	381
	Sept. 16	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Conversation with the Italian Ambassador on the appointment of an Italian high commissioner to Siberia.	382
147	Sept. 16	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes Czech commander at Chelyabinsk reporting desperate situation on Volga and seeking Allied reinforcements.	383
	Sept. 17	Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State	Russian Ambassador seeks military supplies and financial help, especially for the government at Omsk.	384
	Sept. 18	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.): for Morris from McCormick	Committee formed to secure and distribute supplies to the Czecho-Slovak forces.	385

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
108	Sept. 21	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Formation of a government by the all-Russian assembly at Ufa and outline of its policies.	385
1051	Sept. 23	From the British Chargé	Suggestion that British general train Russian officers and men.	386
114	Sept. 23	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Résumé of political and military conditions in Siberia.	386
	Sept. 23	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Report on military situation and recommendation that U. S. force under General Graves winter at Omsk.	387
	Sept. 24	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	Official of the Siberian government urges Allied military support even if recognition is withheld.	390
165	Sept. 25	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Agreement of Siberian government with Horvat, latter to be its commissioner for the Far East.	391
	Sept. 25	To the Chargé in China (tel.)	Instructions to request China's consent to the moving of U.S. forces to some point on the Chinese Eastern Railway.	391

**DECLARATION RESTRICTING AMERICAN OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER 26, 1918—  
FORMATION OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AT UFA: FUSION  
WITH THE SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT AT OMSK—FURTHER INCREASE OF JAPANESE FORCES**

	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	Sept. 20–21	From the Consul at Omsk via Irkutsk	Arrest and forced resignation of officials of the Siberian government at Omsk.	392
118	Sept. 25	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes message of Sept. 20–21 from the Consul at Omsk.	392
121	Sept. 25	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Detention by Czecho-Slovaks of men suspected of arresting Siberian government officials.	392
	Sept. 26	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Rejection of proposals to establish U. S. forces at Omsk or create lines from Siberia to Archangel.	392
	Sept. 26	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to France, Italy, Japan, China; to Masaryk	U. S. policies and their limitations in respect to military and economic action in Siberia and north Russia.	394
2243	Sept. 27	To the French Ambassador	Applications through Masaryk for U.S. assistance to Czecho-Slovaks have been received.	395
	Sept. 28	From the Chargé in China (tel.)	China consents to the presence of U. S. troops in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone.	396
[Quoted in tel.]	Sept. 29	From Czech National Council via Vladivostok	Appeal for Allied aid for the Czecho-Slovak Army.	402

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Sept. 30	From the Russian Ambassador	Regrets U. S. decision to restrict military operations to the region east of the Urals.	396
	Sept. 30	From the Italian Ambassador	Italy will not appoint a high commissioner to Siberia.	397
14	Sept. 30	From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Difficulties between the regional Duma and officials of the Siberian government. Dependence on Allied help.	397
134	Undated [Rec'd Sept. 30]	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Czechs and Russians opposing Bolsheviks at Samara need supplies and Allied aid.	398
	Oct. 1	To the British Chargé	Suggests that advice of Czech commander be sought in proposed military training of Russians.	399
1092	Oct. 1	From the British Chargé	Suggestion of convention to deal with economic or political issues of the Associated powers in Siberia.	399
183	Oct. 2	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes letter of Sept. 29 from Girs, of the Czech National Council.	402
5281	Oct. 2	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Suggests that the United States supply clothing to the volunteer Russian, Polish, and Jugo-Slav troops.	403
1099	Oct. 3	From the British Chargé	Forwards Balfour's telegram of Oct. 2, replying to U. S. statement of Sept. 26 and giving British reasons for aiding military forces in Russia.	403
	Oct. 5	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Discussion of financial aid to the Omsk government by France, Great Britain, and the United States.	404
	Oct. 6	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Appeal for at least 100 U. S. soldiers in Urals to encourage Czecho-Slovaks.	405
	Oct. 7	From the Russian Ambassador	Formation by the National Conference at Ufa of an all-Russian government. Enclosure: text of act.	405
	Undated [Rec'd Oct. 8]	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Evacuation of Samara and its consequences to the Allies.	409
	Oct. 9	To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Nature and extent of U. S. military and economic assistance to Russia and the Czecho-Slovak forces.	410
	Oct. 10(?)	From the Consul at Nanking (tel.)	Views upon necessity for U. S. military support of Czecho-Slovak and Russian forces.	411
	Oct. 15	From the French Ambassador	Recommends encouragement to the Ufa Directory. Enclosure: draft of reply to request for recognition.	412
	Oct. 17	To the Russian Ambassador	The United States is not prepared to recognize political movements at Ufa or elsewhere in Russia.	413
	Oct. 18	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Summary of political situation in Siberia and suggested policy.	414



*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Oct. 19	From the Consul at Nanking (tel.)	Renewed recommendations for U.S. troops.	415
1165	Oct. 23	From the British Chargé	Suggests concentration of German and Austrian war prisoners in Manchuria under U. S. guard.	415
	Oct. 23	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Acknowledges receipt of recommendations on policy in Siberia.	416
	Oct. 23	To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Instructions to report on conditions in Siberia and on the Volga front and to authorize consuls to assist local governments.	417
	Oct. 25	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Fusion of provisional Siberian government with all-Russian Directory.	418
	Oct. 27	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Refusal by Japan of British request for additional forces in Siberia.	418
159	Oct. 31	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes Ambassador Francis's appeal to Poles to throw off German yoke. Czecho-Slovak attitude thereto.	419
157	Oct. 31	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Reports activities of Semenov at Chita and of Japanese at Chita and in Manchuria.	419
	Nov. 1	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Views on the vitality of the governments at Omsk and Ufa and on U. S. policy in Siberia.	420
	Nov. 2	From the Russian Ambassador	Forwards message from officials of the Ufa Directory appealing to President Wilson and the Allied powers for aid.	421
164	Nov. 3	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Reports military and political conditions in Irkutsk, Omsk, Ufa, and Chita.	423
	Nov. 4	To the British Chargé	Plans for control by Japan and the United States of war prisoners in the Maritime and Amur Provinces.	424
166	Nov. 4	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Bolshevik uprising in Tomsk quelled by Siberian troops.	424
2280	Nov. 5	To the French Ambassador	U. S. policy of nonrecognition of political groups at Ufa and elsewhere in Russia and plans for economic aid.	425
170	Nov. 6	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes formula governing relations of the British and French high commissioners with the all-Russian Directorate at Omsk.	426
	Nov. 6	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reported occupation by Japanese troops of every entrance into Siberia and Manchuria.	427
	Nov. 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Reported alliance of Japanese General Staff with Cossack leaders independent of Horvat and the Siberian government.	428

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Nov. 11	From the Russian Ambassador	Forwards message from Omsk regarding the fusion of the Siberian government with the all-Russian Directorate.	428
14	Nov. 12	From the Consul at Nanking (tel.)	Report on political conditions and suggestions for reconstructive work in Siberia.	429
	Nov. 12	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Money stringency in Siberia. Military conditions in Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Ekaterinburg, and Perm.	431
275	Nov. 13	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Russians protest against landing of Japanese troops at Possiet Bay and other Russian harbors.	432
352	Nov. 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Requires explanation of his message to Poles regarding advance of Allied and American troops into Russia.	432
185	Nov. 16	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Criticism of Jameson's report in regard to Russian attitude toward the United States.	432

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE SIZE OF JAPANESE FORCES AND THE DEGREE OF CONTROL ASSUMED IN MANCHURIA AND SIBERIA, NOVEMBER 16, 1918—THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KOLCHAK AS SUPREME GOVERNOR AT OMSK NOVEMBER 18, 1918—REFUSAL OF SEMENOV TO RECOGNIZE KOLCHAK'S AUTHORITY

	1918			
2856	Nov. 16	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to France and Italy	Instructions to inquire if Great Britain shares U. S. views regarding Japan's activities in Siberia.	433
	Nov. 16	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Representations against size of Japanese forces and monopoly of control in Manchuria and Siberia.	433
193	Nov. 18	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Arrest by Cossacks of Social Revolutionary members of the all-Russian Directory.	435
194	Nov. 19	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Kolchak is made dictator by the all-Russian government at Omsk.	435
	Nov. 20	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Interview with Foreign Minister on presence of Japanese troops and control of railways in Manchuria and Siberia.	436
282	Nov. 21	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Kolchak as supreme governor replaces Directorate. Far Eastern hostility toward American Y. M. C. A. and Red Cross.	437
	Nov. 22	From the Russian Embassy	Quotes Sookine's message on <i>coup</i> at Omsk, after which Kolchak was made supreme governor.	438
1316	Nov. 22	From the British Chargé	Urges that the United States and Japan undertake to guard all enemy prisoners in Siberia.	439

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
198	Nov. 22	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Release from prison of Social Revolutionary members of the all-Russian Directorate.	440
5955	Nov. 22	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	France's attitude toward Japanese monopoly of control in Siberia.	440
197	Undated [Rec'd Nov. 22]	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Attitude toward Kolchak of Czecho-Slovak and Russian forces in western Siberia.	441
291	Nov. 23	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Refusal of Semenov to recognize Kolchak's authority.	442
201	Nov. 24	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	U. S. policy restricting military aid justified. Effort in west Siberia to join forces with Denikin.	442
	Nov. 24	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Reports opposition at Ekaterinburg to Kolchak government.	443
	Undated [Rec'd Nov. 25]	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Kolchak, his character and plans; opposition of Semenov; support of Gaida.	443
204	Nov. 25	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Policy of Kolchak to effect junction with Allies in western and southern Russia. Ivanov's intercepted telegram.	444
206	Nov. 26	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Political conditions in Irkutsk.	446
296	Nov. 26	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Quotes alleged U. S. official approval of Kolchak's appointment.	446
207	Nov. 27	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Statement of all-Russian provisional government, assuming all financial obligations of Russia.	447
	Nov. 27	From the Consul at Harbin (tel.)	Dependence of Kolchak on American and Allied support. Attitude toward Kolchak of Semenov and Japanese.	447
209	Nov. 28	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Relations of Kolchak with Denikin, Dutov, Semenov, Japan, and the Czech National Council.	448
2422	Nov. 28	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Italy agrees with U. S. views regarding Japanese activities in Siberia and Manchuria.	449
[Quoted intel.]	Undated	From the Vice Consul at Chita via Omsk	Conflicting relations of Kolchak, Horvat, and Semenov.	450
213	Nov. 29	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes undated message of the Vice Consul at Chita. See <i>supra</i> .	449
3	Nov. 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Explanation of his message of encouragement to the Poles.	450
216	Dec. 1	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Future plans of Czecho-Slovak forces. Strength of Bolshevism in Siberian cities.	451
	Dec. 3	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	The U. S. Government has expressed no views on Kolchak's appointment and made no loan to Omsk government.	453

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Dec. 5	From the Russian Embassy	Forwards Sookine's telegram from Omsk regarding Kolchak's efforts to achieve national reconstruction.	453
	Dec. 5	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Semenov agrees to submit to Kolchak.	454
	Dec. 6	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Semenov seeks authority in eastern Siberia; Japanese influence charged.	454
221	Undated [Rec'd Dec. 7]	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Situation in Siberia improving, developments favoring Kolchak.	455
226	Dec. 9	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Japan's policy in supporting Semenov in the Far East.	456
4436	Dec. 9	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.)	Foreign Secretary's observations on U. S. statement of Nov. 16 regarding size of Japanese forces and monopoly of control in Siberia.	456
	Dec. 9	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Relations of Semenov with other Cossack leaders, and activities of Japanese.	457
229	Dec. 10	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Condition of Czecho-Slovak Army. Recommendations for U. S. aid to Russia.	458
337	Dec. 12	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Wireless message of U. S. loan to Liberia was incorrectly reported as to Siberia.	460
	Dec. 13	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Limit set by Japanese for operation of Kolchak troops against Semenov.	460
	Dec. 14	From the Russian Chargé	Forwards telegrams from Omsk: (1) Kolchak's complaint against Semenov and Japanese; (2) Foreign Minister's hope of U.S. aid against Japanese aggression.	461

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST JAPANESE SUPPORT OF SEMENOV, DECEMBER 16, 1918—CONTINUANCE OF THE CONFLICT—REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE FORCES

	1918			
	Dec. 16	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Representations against Japanese policy preventing united Russian government in Siberia.	462
3471	Dec. 17	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.); to France and Italy	Instructions to acquaint Foreign Minister with U. S. representations to Japan regarding activity in Siberia.	463
253	Dec. 24	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Bolshevik uprising near Omsk. Attempt on Semenov's life in Chita.	463
259	Dec. 26	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Perm captured by Siberian troops.	464
	Dec. 28	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Revolt by Semenov against Kolchak's forces at Verkhneudinsk. Bolshevik uprising near Kansk.	464

*Siberia and Manchuria—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
[Quoted n tel.]	1918			
	Dec. 28	The Japanese Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador	Announces withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia as far as preservation of order will permit.	465
	Dec. 28	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Quotes Japanese memorandum of Dec. 28.	464
	Dec. 29	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Modification of Japan's Siberian policy to accord more nearly with that of the United States.	465
	Dec. 30	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Military situation on the Ufa front. Results of the Siberian army's victory at Perm.	466
268				
387	1919			
	Jan. 1	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Reports result of city elections at Vladivostok.	467

## CHAPTER II. THE NORTHERN REGION

OPPOSITION IN ARCHANGEL TO THE SOVIET RÉGIME—GERMAN THREAT THROUGH FINLAND TO THE MURMAN RAILWAY—SHIPMENT OF ARMS AND STORES TO THE INTERIOR OF RUSSIA—BRITISH REQUESTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF AMERICAN FORCES TO MURMANSK—ARRIVAL OF A FRENCH WARSHIP—LANDING OF ARMED FORCES—ALLIED COOPERATION WITH THE MURMANSK SOVIET—ARRIVAL OF AN AMERICAN CRUISER—GERMAN AND SOVIET DEMANDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND AMERICAN FORCES—AGREEMENT OF JULY 6, 1918, WITH THE MURMANSK SOVIET—ARGUMENT OF THE CONSUL AT ARCHANGEL AGAINST INTERVENTION

	1918			
2228	Jan. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Anti-Bolshevik authorities at Archangel. Federation of northeastern provinces favoring semiautonomous policy.	468
232	Mar. 4	From the British Embassy	Necessity for occupation of Murmansk. Dispatch of a British cruiser.	469
2107	Mar. 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Robins requested to report conditions at Murmansk as noted by Wardwell.	469
5	Mar. 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied forces landed at Murman organizing to defend Murman Railway from threatened German attack.	470
	Mar. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports shipments from Archangel to interior of munitions ordered by Red Guard.	470
	Mar. 14	From the First Secretary of the British Embassy	Forwards Balfour's request for dispatch of an American warship to Murmansk.	470
45	Mar. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Cooperation of British and French with Murman Soviet. Presence of U. S. warship recommended.	471

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
49	Mar. 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	French cruiser at Murmansk; German-Finnish threat to Murman railroad; shipment of supplies from Archangel to interior.	471
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. 13	From Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy (tel.)	Instructions which have been issued to Allied and American naval officers in northern Russia.	488
121	Apr. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Arrival at Archangel of food ships from England.	472
492	May 8	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	German ultimatum to Soviet authorities, requiring evacuation of British and French troops from Murman.	472
	May 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Urges Allied intervention in north regardless of Soviet reply to German ultimatum.	473
504	May 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Conditions of German ultimatum to the Soviet government.	473
185	May 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Finnish attack on Murman Railway repulsed with aid of British. Local Soviet cooperating with French forces.	474
192	May 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Destruction of Russian vessels and wireless station by German submarines. Murman Railway cut by Finns.	474
205	May 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Arrival at Murman of U. S. cruiser; importance of maintenance of this region by Allies.	474
	May 26	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Four-cornered struggle for power in northern region.	475
	May 29	From the British Ambassador	Presents Balfour's urgent request for U. S. forces at Murmansk.	476
576	May 29	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes report that the district Soviet desires the Allies to remain in Murman.	476
	June 1	From the Consul at Archangel to the Ambassador in Russia	Argument against Allied intervention in Russia and in favor of economic assistance.	477
	June 3	Memorandum...	Approval of the dispatch of U. S. troops to Murmansk.	484
[Quoted in tel.]	June 3	Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy (tel.)	British plan of operation in north Russia.	488
180	June 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The <i>Olympia</i> is under British orders at Murmansk.	485
269	June 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied plan of campaign in northern Russia.	485
[Quoted in tel.]	June 16(?)	The Soviet Foreign Commissar to the Consul at Moscow	Protest against the presence of war vessels in Russian ports.	486

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	June 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Chicherin's protests of June 16 (?) against the presence of Allied and American war vessels in Russian ports.	486
	June 21	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Soviet statement that arrival of warships at Archangel will be considered the beginning of military operations.	486
C-20-220 Op 36 297	June 22	From the Secretary of the Navy	Forwards communications from Admiral Sims dated Apr. 13 and June 3.	487
	June 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Civil authorities at Archangel arrested by Soviet; Black Sea Fleet ordered back to Sevastopol by Germans.	488
[Enclosure]	June 26	From the Ambassador in Russia to the Consul at Archangel	Draft of statement from consuls at Archangel expressing surprise at prohibition of Allied warships.	503
304	June 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Martial law declared at Archangel. Council of Commissars consider declaration of war against Entente and Japan.	489
1	July 6	The Commander of the U. S. S. <i>Olympia</i> to Admiral Sims	Agreement of July 6 between the Murmansk Soviet and the Allied and American representatives. Resolution of June 30.	489
212	July 6	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet request that U. S. ships leave Russian ports is to be disregarded.	495
324	July 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Crisis precipitated by murder of German Ambassador.	496
	July 9	To the Secretary of the Navy	Approves plan for military operations in northern Russia.	496
329	July 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied and American representatives agree not to comply with Soviet demands for removal to Moscow.	496
76	July 15	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Archangel Soviet orders resistance to British and French and charges violation of Russian sovereignty.	497
77	July 15	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Attitude of Archangel toward arrival of Allied forces.	497
27	July 19	From the Consul at Archangel	Complaint by local authorities of British acts or violence; investigation.	498
28	July 20	From the Consul at Archangel	Agreement for assisting Archangel with food supplies.	499
29	July 22	From the Consul at Archangel	Interview with People's Commissar regarding the capture by Bolsheviks near Archangel of Allied soldiers, sailors, and officer.	500
1120	July 22	From the Ambassador in Russia	Power of local Soviet at Archangel. Enclosure: his letter to Consul, June 26.	502

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	July 30	To the Consul at Archangel: for Francis (tel.)	A small U. S. force will be sent to Murmansk.	504
	July 31	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Foreign Commissariat declares no vessel will be permitted to land on shores of the White Sea.	505

OCCUPATION OF ARCHANGEL BY ALLIED FORCES, AUGUST 2, 1918—OVERTHROW OF THE SOVIET AND FORMATION OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHERN REGION—RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIED AND AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES—ARRIVAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS, SEPTEMBER 4, 1918

	1918			
343	Aug. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ambassador withdraws to Murmansk. Requests that coming of U. S. troops be expedited.	505
344	Aug. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports political situation in Murmansk and Archangel.	505
345	Aug. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Overthrow of local Soviet and unopposed landing of Allied forces at Archangel.	506
83	Aug. 4	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Formation of Supreme government of northern region.	507
864	Aug. 5	From the British Embassy	Notice of occupation of Archangel by British troops and urgent request for U. S. forces.	507
88	Aug. 6	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Text of proclamation of Aug. 3 of the Supreme government of the northern region.	508
89	Aug. 6	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Orders issued by the new government.	509
31	Aug. 6	From the Consul at Archangel	Arrest of Consuls by adventurers. Bolshevik evacuation of Archangel and its occupation by Allied forces.	509
356	Aug. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Northern government claims to represent all parties except Bolsheviks and pro-Germans.	512
	Aug. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia	Northern government uses Zemstvo and city Duma organizations as basis.	512
366	Aug. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied expedition awaiting U. S. reinforcements; opposing troops are apparently under German direction.	513
369	Aug. 25	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Chaikovsky's reply of Aug. 25 to Department's declaration on Russian relations.	514
1207	Aug. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia	Outlines specific undertakings in which he proposes to encourage U. S. troops.	515



*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
374	Aug. 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	U. S. troops needed at Archangel to allay friction between new government and Allied military authorities.	516
379	Sept. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Report on conditions in Archangel under the Supreme government of the northern region.	517
381	Sept. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Arrival of American troops at Archangel.	519
385	Sept. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Difficulties in fulfilling the terms of the Murman agreement of July 6.	519

"COUP D'ÉTAT" OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1918; RESTORATION OF THE DEPOSED GOVERNMENT THROUGH EFFORTS OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR—PROTEST OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE CONDUCT OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF—PLAN OF THE REINSTATED MINISTERS TO RESIGN IN FAVOR OF THE SAMARA GOVERNMENT: EFFORTS OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO DISUADE THEM

	1918			
386	Sept. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Overthrow of new government and arrest of officers; efforts of U. S. Ambassador toward restoration.	521
387	Sept. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied statement disclaiming responsibility for <i>coup d'état</i> .	523
388	Sept. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied and American Ministers and commander assume control until government is restored.	523
253	Sept. 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recites instructions sent to the Ambassador in Japan to proceed to Vladivostok and report conditions.	525
389	Sept. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Return of kidnaped Ministers. Popular support of Supreme government of the northern region.	525
390	Sept. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reinstatement of Ministers.	526
41	Sept. 10	From the Consul at Archangel	Report of political situation in Archangel previous to kidnaping of members of Supreme government.	527
391	Sept. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Activities of U. S. forces in the northern region. Friction between civil and military authorities.	532
1313	Sept. 12	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Instructions to protest to Great Britain against interference by General Poole with the civil authorities at Archangel.	533
396	Sept. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Plan of the reinstated Ministers to resign in favor of the Samara government.	534
397	Sept. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes his speech before the Zemstvos stating Allied plans to remedy the food shortage.	535

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Sept. 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Approval of Ambassador's action and instructions concerning policy.	536
399	Sept. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Efforts to dissuade northern government from abdicating. Recommendation for an American recruiting station.	536
1899	Sept. 15	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): the Secretary of War to the President	Suggests that the United States decline to divert forces from western front to Murmansk.	538
403	Sept. 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Departing government of northern region vests authority in a governor general who must report to Samara government.	539
1214	Sept. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia	Further details regarding kidnaping of Ministers.	531
1982	Sept. 18	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Great Britain will correct the bad impression made at Archangel by military interference with local officials.	540
410	Sept. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Opposition to the northern government. Allied victory on the Dvina.	541
432[?]	Sept. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits appeal of President Chaikovski to President Wilson for military aid. Additional U. S. and Allied troops arrive.	541
267	Sept. 21	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	British commissioner Lindley has been informed of the British and U. S. Governments' views of the friction at Archangel.	542
416	Sept. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Installing of Durov as governor general and departure of Ministers. Arrival of flour from Montreal.	542
420	Sept. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	All-Russian government, Samara, is not yet established, hence Supreme government, Archangel, will not now abdicate.	543

PROPOSAL FOR INCREASING THE AMERICAN FORCES AT ARCHANGEL AND EXTENDING THE OPERATIONS: REFUSAL OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER 26, 1918—REORGANIZATION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT: SUBORDINATION TO THE ALL-RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AT OMSK—DISAPPROVAL OF THE AMBASSADOR'S PLAN TO RECRUIT AN AMERICAN-SLAVIC LEGION—REPLACEMENT OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF—DISAFFECTION AMONG THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND AMONG THE LOCAL RUSSIAN RECRUITS

	1918			
	Sept. 25	From the French Ambassador	French proposal for increasing U. S. forces at Archangel and extending operations.	544
274	Sept. 26	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	U. S. decision to send no additional troops to northern Russia.	546

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
426	Sept. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reorganization of local government with an executive of four, including Durov and Chaikovski.	547
428	Sept. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Representatives of the Siberian government outline its jurisdiction and purposes.	547
276	Sept. 27	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	A state of war does not exist between the U. S. Government and the Bolsheviks.	548
427	Sept. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Amnesty for those implicated in the <i>coup d'état</i> . Formation of an executive council.	548
431	Sept. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Formation of Russian army encouraged. Dependence of northern Russia on the Siberian Railway.	549
430	Sept. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Plan to recruit American-Slavic legion to be transferred to the Russian authorities.	550
284	Oct. 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Disapproval of plan to recruit an American-Slavic legion.	551
444	Oct. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Landing of additional British troops at Murman. Estimate of value of U.S. troops in northern Russia.	551
449	Oct. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Selection of ministry for government of northern region submitted for approval of ambassadors.	552
451	Oct. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Organization of American-Slavic legion deferred; assistance will be given northern government in promoting mobilization.	553
456	Oct. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conference with delegation of commercial interests in respect to support of Supreme government.	553
464	Oct. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recommends presence of U. S. cruiser at Archangel for the winter.	555
465	Oct. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports Bolshevik successes and campaign of terror. Recommends Allied capture of Petrograd and Moscow.	555
	Oct. 14	To the Secretary of the Navy	Approval of signature of the agreement of July 6 between Allied and American representatives and the Murmansk Soviet.	556
478	Oct. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Replacement of commander in chief at Archangel. Results of city elections.	557
308	Oct. 16	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Approval of agreement with the Murmansk Soviet.	558
1230	Oct. 16, 18	From the Ambassador in Russia	Archangel elections. Murmansk Soviet dissolved and governor general appointed.	558
491	Oct. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Disaffection among French and U. S. troops.	559

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
495	Oct. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Assistance in Russian mobilization by British commander Ironside.	560
497	Oct. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Proposed visit of Tereshchenko to the United States. Reported Russo-British organization to settle northern Russia.	560
510	Oct. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recommends appointment of Russian Minister of War, ranking all Allied generals.	561
322	Oct. 24	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Authorizes visas for Tereshchenko and Martyushin to visit the United States.	562
520	Oct. 25	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports cooperation of President Chaikovski and British commander.	562
525	Oct. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Declaration of subordination of Archangel provisional government to all-Russian government at Omsk.	563
331	Oct. 31	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Any change from British command of Allied forces would require consideration of Supreme War Council.	564
532	Oct. 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Mutiny amongst mobilized Russian troops.	564
540	Nov. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Dissatisfaction among Russian recruits allayed by segregation of troops.	564
548	Nov. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Change of officers expected to effect peaceful settlement of difficulties of newly mobilized Russian troops.	565
343	Nov. 6	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions as to policy for Rear Admiral McCully, commander of U. S. naval forces in northern Russia.	565
560	Nov. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ambassador authorizes address to U. S. soldiers pointing out duty of assisting Russia.	566

RETENTION OF AMERICAN AND ALLIED TROOPS IN NORTH RUSSIA AFTER THE ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY—LOCAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE KOLCHAK GOVERNMENT AT OMSK

	1918			
572	Nov. 13	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Obligation of the United States to protect Russia from Bolshevik reprisals and exploitation by creditor nations.	567
582	Nov. 18	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Discussion of Russia's right to representation at coming peace conference.	568
585	Nov. 18	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Appointment of General Ironside as commander in chief in northern Russia.	569

*The Northern Region—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
1302	Nov. 20	From the British Chargé	Statement by British representative of the value of Allied declaration of policy in north Russia.	569
3906	Nov. 21	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.)	Quotes proclamation by President Chaikovski warning of the menace of Bolshevism.	570
	Nov. 27	To the British Chargé	The President and Secretary of State will confer with the Allies in Paris on the Russian question.	571
610	Nov. 29	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Will submit his Thanksgiving Day address to U. S. soldiers.	572
611	Nov. 29	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Text of Thanksgiving Day address to U. S. soldiers giving reasons for service in Russia.	572
625	Dec. 2	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Effect of the Siberian <i>coup d'état</i> upon the northern government. Reactionary tendencies.	573
386	Dec. 4	To the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	The signing of the armistice with the Central powers does not change the Russian situation.	574
648	Dec. 10	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Balfour's statement of British post-war policy in Russia. Additional British troops arrive at Murmansk.	575
654	Dec. 11	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Reports mutiny of Russian regiment when ordered to the front.	575
658	Dec. 12	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Quotes text of declaration of Allied representatives forbidding disturbance of public order in occupied areas.	576
664	Dec. 17	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Reports situation satisfactory at Archangel.	577

## CHAPTER III. SOUTHEASTERN RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS

NATIONALIST AND ANTI-BOLSHEVİK MOVEMENTS: THE DON COSSACKS UNDER KALEDIN, THE SOUTHEASTERN FEDERATION, THE TRANS-CAUCASUS, THE VOLUNTEER ARMY UNDER ALEXEEV AND KORNILOV—ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN AND ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TOWARD "DE FACTO" POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES

	1917			
[Enclosure]	Oct. 19	From the Consul at Tiflis to the Ambassador	Political and military situation in Transcaucasia.	578
69	Oct. 19	From the Consul at Tiflis	Forwards copies of his despatch of Oct. 19 to the Embassy.	578
179	Nov. 8	From the Consul General at Moscow	Conference of the Southeastern federation.	580
	Nov. 9	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Bolshevik movement gaining ground in the Caucasus. Financial aid requested for resistance.	580
	Nov. 18	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Urges immediate credit to defeat Bolsheviks and separate peace, and to withhold grain and coal region from Germany.	581

*Southeastern Russia and the Caucasus—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
	Nov. 23	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Asks financial support for Trans-Caucasus government, which will unite with Southeastern federation.	582
[Quoted in tel.]	Nov. 25	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Recommends recognition of government of Trans-Caucasus.	582
	Nov. 26	To the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Department can not encourage tendencies to sectionalism in Russia by financial support.	582
2864	Nov. 27	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): for Colonel House	Quotes telegram from Consul, Tiflis, recommending recognition of government of Trans-Caucasus.	582
2870	Nov. 28	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): for Colonel House	Inquires general attitude toward recognition of <i>de facto</i> government of Trans-Caucasus.	583
	Dec. 2	From the Special Representative (tel.)	Discusses policy to be pursued by the United States in regard to the Transcaucasian movement.	583
	Dec. 4	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Plea for support of southern governments to prevent resources being utilized by Germany.	584
	Dec. 5	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Government at Tiflis is obliged to accept Turkish proposal of negotiations for armistice.	585
1134	Dec. 6	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Caucasus authorities send mission to British Legation at Teheran to negotiate for funds to continue the war.	586
104	Dec. 6	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Alexeev and Kaledin organize Volunteer Army. U. S. support requested.	587
	Dec. 11	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Conference with chairman of the Southeastern federation in respect to its abilities to control all Russia's supplies.	588
	Dec. 12	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Bolshevik uprising in Rostov reported crushed. National Assembly to be convened.	589
	Dec. 13	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Prime Minister makes urgent appeal for funds for Transcaucasian government to prevent Bolshevik control.	589
125	Dec. 15	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Investigation of Don section authorized, the Don and Ukraine being deciding factors in Russian situation.	590
	Dec. 15	To the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Department hopes shortly to give definite instructions regarding aid to Trans-Caucasus.	590
6051	Dec. 17	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Quotes telegram from Jassy requesting funds to finance organization in defense of Russian and Rumanian fronts.	591
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the U. S. Delegate to Inter-Allied Council via London	Advises against financial aid to governments of southern Russia.	591

*Southeastern Russia and the Caucasus—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
7999	Dec. 18	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Quotes and approves undated statement of U. S. delegate to Inter-Allied Council. <i>See supra.</i>	591
	Dec. 18	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Consul takes steps to check Bolshevik movement and recommends U. S. loan.	592
129	Dec. 18	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Report on Bolshevism at Odessa, Rostov, and Kiev. Importance of movement under Kaledin in the south.	593
[Enclosure]	Dec. 18	The Consul at Tiflis to President of Southeastern federation	Suggests measures for securing order in the Caucasus.	607
	Dec. 19	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Requests that certain instructions be given Consul at Tiflis on the subject of financing southern groups.	594
	Dec. 19	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Reports armistice concluded between Turks and Russians on the Caucasus front.	594
8037	Dec. 21	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Military efforts in southern Russia viewed as the only Russian resistance to Germany. British financial support.	595
2942	Dec. 23	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Summary of resolutions adopted Dec. 23 by the Supreme War Council in regard to Allied policy in Russia.	596
2955	Dec. 27	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): from Crosby	Discussion of general theory of action in Russia and Rumania.	597
	Dec. 28	To the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Instructions to keep Department informed.	600
139	Dec. 29	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Reports political conditions, stating that the only Russian power capable of resisting Germany is in south Russia.	601
140	Dec. 31	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Requests instructions and funds for protection of Americans in case of necessity.	604
	1918			
	Jan. 5	To the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Authorization of funds for sending indigent Americans out of Russia in case of necessity.	604
147	Jan. 7	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Only combined southern forces with Allied support will be able to prevent Germany's controlling resources of Russia.	604
	Jan. 8	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Reports political conditions and increasing military strength in the Caucasus.	605
	Jan. 8	To the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Instructions to keep Department informed of situation.	606
82	Jan. 9	From the Consul at Tiflis	Forwards copy of his letter of Dec. 18, 1917, to the President of the Southeastern federation.	606

*Southeastern Russia and the Caucasus—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
[Enclosure]	Jan. 14	From the Consul at Moscow	Report on the Volunteer Army.	613
	Jan. 15	From the British Embassy	Resistance to Central powers depends upon union of separate factions in Russia, including the Bolsheviks.	608
[Enclosure]	Jan. 26	From the Consul at Moscow via Petrograd	Report on the movement in the Don country in support of order and the continuance of the war.	609
1036	Feb. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia	Forwards report of Jan. 26 from the Consul at Moscow.	609
262	Feb. 7	From the Consul General at Moscow	Forwards text of constitution of the Southeastern federation.	615

BOLSHEVIK, TURKISH, AND GERMAN ADVANCES—FORMATION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF NORTH CAUCASUS, GEORGIA, ARMENIA, AND AZERBAIJAN—THE COSSACK ORGANIZATION UNDER KRASNOV—REVIVAL OF THE VOLUNTEER ARMY: SUCCESSION OF DENIKIN AS ITS COMMANDER—FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ATTACHED TO THE ARMY—RECOGNITION BY IT OF THE SUPREME AUTHORITY OF KOLCHAK

	1918			
	Feb. 12	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Bolshevik, Turkish, and German advance. Lack of support checks development of Southeastern federation.	618
	Feb. 13	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Death of Kaledin. Closing of Persian frontier to Allied forces.	619
8667	Feb. 14	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): from Crosby	Denial of rumor that Great Britain has territorial ambitions in the Caucasus and Persia.	619
	Feb. 15	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Resumption of offensive by Turks against Armenian troops.	620
187	Feb. 16	From the British Embassy	Alleged subsidizing of Georgia by American citizens with view to autonomy.	621
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Consul at Moscow to the Consul General	Reports Bolshevik successes in the Don owing to prevalence of Bolshevism among the younger Cossacks.	621
	Feb. 18	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes undated report of the Consul at Moscow. See <i>supra</i> .	621
	Feb. 18	To the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Department relies on Consuls to take necessary measures to protect U. S. citizens, property, and archives.	622
	Feb. 20	To the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Inquiry regarding report of Americans who propose to subsidize Georgia.	622
301	Mar. 19	From the British Embassy	Information from the Caucasus on the political and military situation.	622
	Mar. 30	To the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	The United States is not in position to support active military operations on the Caucasus front.	623



*Southeastern Russia and the Caucasus—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
7116	Apr. 3	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Armenians in danger of extermination. Plan to equip an army of Armenians and Georgians.	623
372	Apr. 18	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	British report of Mohammedan aggression and massacre of Armenians in the Caucasus, and of German capture of Kharkov.	625
402	Apr. 22	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	German aims in south Russia: requisitioning of supplies; junction with Turkish forces in the Caucasus.	626
454	May 1	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Further report of disorders in the Caucasus and northern Persia.	628
505	May 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Peace negotiations between Turkey and the government of the Caucasus.	629
528	May 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Announcement by Caucasian tribes of their formation of an independent state; protest by Soviet Russia.	629
529	May 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	German absorption of the Caucasus. Peace conference at Batum.	630
52	May 28	To the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Requests plans for defense of Transcaucasus furnished by Smith.	631
593	June 2	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Notice of the fall of the Transcaucasian republic and of the independence of Georgia. Turkish ultimatum.	631
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	From the Consul at Tiflis via Moscow	Reports the fall of Batum and the resolution of the Georgian Diet to continue the war.	631
609	June 7	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes undated report of the Consul at Tiflis. See <i>supra</i> .	631
	June 16	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Turkish occupation of Transcaucasia and the formation of independent states under German or Turkish protectorates.	632
	June 18	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Temporary submission of the Caucasus to Bolshevik control. Report of number of German forces in the Don.	633
	June 26	Statement of the Georgian Information Bureau	The political situation in Georgia and Transcaucasia with relation to the Bolsheviks and Central powers.	634
	July 15	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Military conditions at Baku. Boundaries of Armenia, as reported recognized by Germany and Turkey.	637
	Sept. 11	From the Consul at Tiflis (tel.)	Gains in the Kuban Province by Cossacks and Alexeev. Attempt to unite Russian political parties.	638
[Enclosure]	Sept. 14	From the Georgian Delegate to the Minister in Norway	Announcement of May 26 of the independence of Georgia and memorandum on its relations with Russia and Turkey.	639
978	Sept. 28	From the Chargé in Norway	Transmits note of Sept. 14 and enclosure from the Georgian delegate.	639

*Southeastern Russia and the Caucasus—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
14	Oct. 1	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	German support has preserved the Bolshevik régime. German aid to the Ukraine and to Krasnov.	642
[Quoted in tel.]	Nov. 14	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Communication from the governmental commission attached to the Volunteer Army, requesting Allied intervention.	644
585	Nov. 18	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	Shifting of British military officials in Russia.	643
588	Nov. 19	From the Chargé in Russia (tel.)	British efforts toward Turkish evacuation of the Caucasus and support of Denikin.	644
6238	Dec. 11	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Nov. 14 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	644
[Quoted in tel.]	Dec. 12	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Quote governmental commission of the Volunteer Army on Russian representation at the peace conference.	645
6346	Dec. 18	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Dec. 12 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	645
	Dec. 26	From the Russian Chargé	Forwards telegram from Russian Ambassador in France quoting Sazonov (and Volunteer Army) in support of Kolchak.	647

## CHAPTER IV. THE UKRAINE AND THE CRIMEA

ESTABLISHMENT OF A UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT—RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THE CENTRAL POWERS, AND THE ALLIES—THE TREATY OF BREST LITOVSK WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1918

	1917			
1519	July 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The granting of concessions to the Ukraine led to resignation of Cadet Ministers.	648
	Nov. 14	From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Revolutionary committees of Odessa cooperate to maintain order.	648
	Nov. 20	From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Movement for annexation of Odessa to the Ukraine.	648
2090	Dec. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes message from citizens of Kiev to Allies deploring separate peace.	649
	Dec. 12	To the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Instructions to report conditions as affecting army, food supplies, and sentiment for separate peace.	650
[Quoted in tel.]	Undated	Foreign Secretary of Ukraineto representatives of Associated powers (tel.)	Announces independence of the Ukraine and negotiations for armistice.	650
2094	Dec. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes undated telegram from the Foreign Secretary of the Ukraine. See <i>supra</i> .	650
2104	Dec. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ukrainian policy as stated by the Secretariat of State.	651

*The Ukraine and the Crimea—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
2117	Dec. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	French Ambassador explains to Trotsky the presence of French officers with Ukrainian army.	652
	Dec. 18	From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Conditions at Odessa in respect to the army, food supplies, and separate peace.	653
1200	Dec. 19	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Reports ultimatum from Soviet Russia to the Ukraine, threatening a state of war.	653
	1918			
	Jan. 7	From the French Ambassador	Independence of the Ukraine recognized by France.	655
2041	Jan. 11	To the French Ambassador	<i>Re</i> recognition of the Ukraine and acknowledgment of separate governments in Russia.	655
2227	Jan. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Report by Jenkins on the situation in the Ukraine. Admission of Ukrainian delegation at Brest Litovsk.	656
1992	Jan. 15	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The United States is not yet disposed to recognize independent governments in Russia.	657
248	Jan. 16	From the Consul General at Moscow	<i>Résumé</i> of Jenkins's reports on conditions in the Ukraine with respect to the army, Austrian propaganda, land, etc.	657
[Quoted in tel.]	Jan. 18	From the Ministers of Associated powers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Interchange of statements with Ukrainian delegation regarding the Ukraine's relations with the Allied powers.	660
3074	Jan. 22	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Jan. 18 from Ministers of Associated powers at Jassy.	660
[Quoted in tel.]	Jan. 23	From the Ministers of Associated powers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Ukraine can not resist German pressure for peace and for resumption of economic relations.	663
18	Jan. 24	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Ukraine will sign separate peace with the Central powers.	663
3100	Jan. 26	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Jan. 23 from the Ministers of Associated powers at Jassy.	663
[Quoted in tel.]	Jan. 27	From the Ministers of Associated powers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Interview with General Shecherbachev regarding the Ukrainian peace treaty at Brest Litovsk.	664
3106	Jan. 28	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Jan. 27 from the Ministers of Associated powers at Jassy.	664
432	Apr. 27	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Text (in part) of the treaty of peace of Feb. 9 between the Ukraine and the Central powers.	665
607	June 7	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Continuing text of treaty of peace of Feb. 9 between the Ukraine and the Central powers.	666

*The Ukraine and the Crimea—Continued*

CAPTURE OF KIEV AND ODESSA BY THE BOLSHEVIKS AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE AUSTRO-GERMAN FORCES—AUSTRO-GERMAN OCCUPATION OF THE UKRAINE AND THE CRIMEA—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SKOROPADSKI GOVERNMENT IN THE UKRAINE, APRIL 29, 1918—THE CRIMEAN GOVERNMENT OF SULKEVICH—EXPLOITATION OF THESE REGIONS BY THE CENTRAL POWERS—APPEAL OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL TO PRESIDENT WILSON, OCTOBER 15, 1918

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Feb. 21	From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Bolsheviks, aided by the fleet, control Odessa.	671
	Mar. 1	From the Consul at Kiev	Occupation of Kiev by Bolsheviks and approach of Austro-German forces.	672
260	Mar. 13	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Odessa is occupied by Austro-German troops.	676
1755	Mar. 23	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Establishment of independent Taurida republic in the Crimea.	676
[Quoted in tel.]	Mar. 27	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	German possibilities, political and economic, in the Ukraine. Necessity for Allied military action.	677
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. 2	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Development of Austro-German occupation of southern Russia; quantity of food supplies seized.	678
313	Apr. 4	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	In reply to Soviet demand, Germany prescribes Ukrainian boundaries.	677
3522	Apr. 4	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Mar. 27 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	677
3523	Apr. 4	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Apr. 2 from Allied Ministers at Jassy.	678
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. (?)	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Evidences of transformation of the Ukraine into a German colony.	679
3635	Apr. 16	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Apr. (?) from Allied Ministers at Jassy.	679
1944	Apr. 25	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Protest of Soviet Russia against the advance of German and Ukrainian troops in the Crimea.	679
1991	May 2	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Controversy between the Rada and the German commander in the Ukraine over regulations on tilling of land.	680
2463	May 5	From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)	Press report of German Vice Chancellor's statement on German measures in the Ukraine to effect delivery of wheat.	681
3801	May 5	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	German wireless report on provisions transported from the Ukraine to Austria-Hungary and Germany.	682
493	May 8	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Proclamation of Apr. 29 of Skoropadski, on becoming hetman of the Ukraine.	682

*The Ukraine and the Crimea—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
2514	May 9	From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)	Ukrainian report of Apr. 26, protesting arrest of members of the Rada, read before the German Reichstag.	683
500	May 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	German statement of intentions in the Crimea and protest of Soviet Russia in reply.	684
2059	May 11	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Soviet Russia's order against operations of German-Ukrainian troops on her soil. Peace negotiations.	686
525	May 16	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Pro-German tendency of Ukrainian cabinet owing to lack of Allied support.	687
530	May 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Composition of Ukrainian cabinet.	688
2120	May 18	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Communications between Russian and Ukrainian officials, arranging for peace negotiations at Kiev.	689
541	May 22	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Résumé of speech of Ukrainian Foreign Minister before Cadet Party, Kiev, on relations with Germany. Press criticism.	689
578	Undated [Rec'd June 3]	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Ukrainian demands made in the peace negotiations at Kiev.	691
2243	June 6	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Skoropadski's views on the union of the Ukraine with neighboring territories and on the land question.	692
644	June 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Summary of provisions of truce signed June 12 by Russians and Ukrainians at Kiev.	693
643	June 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Attitude of Ukrainians toward their government and toward German occupation.	694
658	June 19	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	German activity in Crimea. Organization of Sulkevich government.	695
	Aug. 4	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Political conditions in the Crimea. Exhaustion of Crimea's supplies by troops of the Central powers.	696
2615	Aug. 8	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Attitude of Ukrainian peasants toward Germans; increase of German troops of occupation.	697
[Enclosure]	Oct. 15	From the Ukrainian National Council to President Wilson	Appeal for defense of Ukrainian independence.	697
4855	Oct. 17	From the Minister in Switzerland	Transmits note of Oct. 15 from Ukrainian National Council to President Wilson.	697
5558	Nov. 3	From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)	Appeal of Poles in the Ukraine and elsewhere for protection against Bolsheviks upon withdrawal of German troops.	698
5687	Nov. 9	From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)	Appeal of business organizations in the Ukraine to President Wilson to safeguard order.	698

*The Ukraine and the Crimea—Continued*

## DECLARATION OF THE INTENTION OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE UKRAINE—LANDING OF ALLIED TROOPS AT ODESSA—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECTORY BY PETLYURA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	Nov. 21	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Urges sending of Allied troops to Ukraine to protect military stores and preserve order.	699
6008	Nov. 25	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Nov. 21 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	699
6028	Nov. 26	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Ukrainian manifesto to the people to join in the reconstitution of Russia upon a federal basis.	700
[Quoted in tel.]	Nov. 27	From the Allied Ministers [at Jassy] via Paris (tel.)	The Ukrainian government will take part against the Bolsheviks. Requests Allied military aid.	702
243	Dec. 7	To the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	The Czecho-Slovak National Council is recognized as a <i>de facto</i> government.	700
[Quoted in tel.]	Dec. 7	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Declaration of the intention of the Allied Governments to maintain order in Russia.	701
[Quoted in tel.]	Dec. 7	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Further statement concerning the declaration of intention of the Allied Governments to maintain order.	702
6205	Dec. 10	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Dec. 7 from Allied Ministers at Jassy.	701
6218	Dec. 11	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Dec. 7 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	702
6240	Dec. 11	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of November 27 from Allied Ministers [at Jassy].	702
	Dec. 12	To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	British and French troops will assist in restoring order in the Ukraine.	703
3347	Dec. 16	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Siege of Kiev by troops of the Ukrainian National League.	703
17	Dec. 19	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Report on the strength of the Bolshevik army and the military situation at Kiev.	703
23	Dec. 21	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Petlyura heads the republican army fighting for independence of the Ukraine.	705
3377	Undated [Rec'd Dec. 22]	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Reports from Kiev of attempts to restore order.	705
	1919			
3424	Jan. 2	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	The fall of Skoropadski's government; the program of Petlyura.	705

## CHAPTER V. BESSARABIA

THE MOLDAVIAN REPUBLIC: MILITARY SUPPORT BY RUMANIA—ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF A STATE OF WAR WITH RUMANIA: EXPULSION OF THE RUMANIAN MINISTER AND SEQUESTRATION OF RUMANIAN GOLD—AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUMANIA AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, MARCH 9, 1918—UNION OF BESSARABIA WITH RUMANIA, APRIL 9, 1918

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
202	Dec. 28	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	The Moldavian republic of Bessarabia is formed.	707
	1918			
	Jan. 25	From the Rumanian Minister	Rumanian troops are placed at the disposal of the Moldavian republic.	707
2293	Jan. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky announces a state of war with Rumania.	708
2300	Jan. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Expulsion of Rumanian Minister from Russia.	708
[Quoted in tel.]	Jan. 30	From the Ministers of the Associated powers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Rupture of diplomatic relations between Rumania and Soviet Russia and seizure of Rumanian funds.	709
3122	Feb. 1	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Jan. 30 from the Ministers of the Associated powers at Jassy.	709
25	Feb. 1	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Discussion of proposed separate peace between Rumania and the Central powers. Rumanian intervention in Bessarabia.	710
	Feb. 2	From the Rumanian Minister	Conflict in Rumania between Bolshevik and Rumanian troops following military aid by the latter to the Ukrainians.	711
2323	Feb. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet seizure of gold stored by Rumania in the Kremlin at Moscow.	711
	Feb. 5	To the Rumanian Minister	Appreciates difficulty of Rumanian situation in consequence of Bolshevik hostility.	712
2345	Feb. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inquires if Consul, Moscow, may join colleagues in protesting against sequestration of Rumanian gold at Moscow.	712
	Feb. 12	To the Rumanian Minister	Acknowledges note relative to military intervention by Rumania in the Moldavian republic of Bessarabia.	712
2060	Feb. 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions for separate protest against Soviet sequestration of Rumanian funds.	713
[Quoted in tel.]	Feb. 19	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Owing to attitude of Soviet Russia, Rumania will be forced to conclude peace with Germany.	713
3220	Feb. 20	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Feb. 19 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	713

*Bessarabia—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
[Quoted in tel.]	Feb. 22	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Arrest of Rumanians by Bolsheviks in Odessa.	714
3241	Feb. 23	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Feb. 22 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	714
[Enclosure]	Feb. 24	From the Moldavian republic via Paris (tel.)	Announces the proclamation on Feb. 6 of its independence.	715
	Mar. 6	From the French Ambassador	Forwards French telegram quoting message of Feb. 24 from the Moldavian republic.	714
2101	Mar. 19	To the French Ambassador	The question of recognition of the Moldavian republic should be deferred.	715
46	Mar. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): from Robins	Proposed participation by the United States on a commission for mediation between Russia and Rumania.	717
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. 5	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	Discussion of Soviet Foreign Commissar's proposal of Allied aid in mediation with Rumania.	718
3545	Apr. 7	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Apr. 5 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	718
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. 9	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	The union of Bessarabia with Rumania is imminent.	718
3568	Apr. 10	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Apr. 9 from the Allied Ministers at Jassy.	718
68	Apr. 10	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Proclamation of union of Bessarabia with Rumania.	719
337	Apr. 11	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Text of Russo-Rumanian treaty of Mar. 9.	716
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. 12	From the Allied Ministers at Jassy via Paris (tel.)	The union of Bessarabia with Rumania is in agreement with the program of the Entente.	719
3595	Apr. 13	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Apr. 12 from Allied Ministers at Jassy.	719
72	Apr. 18	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	German attitude toward the union of Bessarabia with Rumania.	720
1920	Apr. 20	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	U. S. attitude. Refusal of Ukrainian Central Rada to recognize Bessarabia's union with Rumania.	720
397	Undated [Rec'd Apr. 27]	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet Russia's views on Rumanian treaty with Central powers and annexation of Bessarabia.	721
1999	May 3	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Chicherin's protest to Rumania against the annexation of Bessarabia.	722



## CHAPTER VI. FINLAND

INDEFINITE RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—AUTONOMY LAW PASSED BY THE DIET, JULY 18, 1917—DISSOLUTION OF THE DIET; ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 2, 1917—LABOR DISTURBANCES IN PROTEST AGAINST BOURGEOIS CONTROL

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
314	June 2	From the Consul at Petrograd	Desire of Finland for autonomy; relations with the Russian Provisional Government.	723
480	June 23	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Resolutions of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, demanding independence for Finland.	726
352	July 31	From the Consul at Petrograd	Finnish declaration of the supreme authority of the Seim; its dissolution by the Russian Provisional Government.	726
[Enclosure]	Oct. 5	From the Consul at Helsingfors to the Ambassador in Russia	Report of activity of the old Diet and of pro-German feeling among the Finns.	729
[Enclosure]	Oct. 12	From the Consul at Helsingfors to the Ambassador in Russia	Report of elections in Helsingfors for the new Diet.	730
	Oct. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia	Forwards letters of Oct. 5 and 12 from the Consul at Helsingfors.	728
995	Nov. 16	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Press report of socialist <i>coup d'état</i> in Finland followed by general strike.	731
1003	Nov. 17	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Conditions in Finland under socialist régime; assistance of Russian forces.	731
	Undated [Rec'd Nov. 23]	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Struggle between <i>bourgeois</i> Diet and socialists.	732
1107	Dec. 3	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Finland will accept food from Germany if it is not supplied from America.	732

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE, DECEMBER 4-6, 1917: ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS—RECOGNITION BY SWEDEN, NORWAY, DENMARK, AND FRANCE, JANUARY 4-10, 1918—SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE RED GUARDS; CIVIL WAR WITH THE WHITE GUARDS UNDER MANNERHEIM—SWEDISH OCCUPATION OF THE ÅLAND ISLANDS—REQUEST FOR AMERICAN RECOGNITION BY COMMISSIONERS OF THE WHITE GOVERNMENT; COUNTER-REPRESENTATIONS BY THE DELEGATE OF THE RED GOVERNMENT—APPEALS FOR FOOD

	1917			
	Dec. 4	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Finland is proclaimed a republic. U. S. recognition is desired.	733
1133	Dec. 6	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Press report of Finnish proclamation of independence and need of food.	734
	Dec. 10	From the Finnish Commissioner	Presents Finnish note urging that deputation be received by the United States because of scarcity of provisions.	734

*Finland—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917			
1175	Dec. 13	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Sweden inquires concerning the attitude of the Associated powers toward the recognition of Finland.	735
2102	Dec. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Disapproves recognition of Finland, but not the visit of the delegation, and recommends shipment of food.	735
1899	Dec. 14	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.); to Sweden	Deputation to state Finland's case will be received but no position is assured regarding recognition.	736
1907	Dec. 15	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Department's message to Legation, Stockholm, regarding recognition of Finland.	736
1186	Undated [Rec'd Dec. 15]	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	When a lawful Russian government recognizes Finland, Great Britain will also.	737
1193	Dec. 20	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Report of the situation in Finland by the Consul at Haparanda.	737
1224	Dec. 24	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	A Finnish delegation is sent to Stockholm to secure recognition and military aid.	738
1245	Dec. 29	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes the reply of the King of Sweden to request for recognition of Finland.	739
1251	Dec. 31	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	The Finnish government is sending delegations to all European governments and to Washington.	739
	1918			
1269	Jan. 3	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Sweden will recognize the independence of Finland.	740
	Jan. 5	From the Assistant Secretary of State	French attitude toward the recognition of Finland; reported Bolshevik attitude.	740
451	Jan. 8	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Norway will recognize the independence of Finland.	740
2208	Jan. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Approves French suggestion that the United States and the Allies recognize Finland's independence.	741
1809	Jan. 11	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Finland's independence is recognized by Denmark.	741
	Jan. 11	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Finland's independence is recognized by Norway.	741
1984	Jan. 11	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Doubts advisability of recognizing Finland at present.	742
2217	Jan. 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	France has recognized the independence of Finland.	742
8270	Jan. 15	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Requests instructions regarding attitude to be adopted toward Finnish representative.	742
1992	Jan. 15	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The United States is not disposed to recognize independent governments until the will of Russia is expressed.	743

*Finland*—Continued

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
8360	Jan. 23	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Great Britain hesitates to give formal recognition of Finland's independence.	743
13	Jan. 24	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Presents reasons for U. S. recognition of Finland.	743
1389	Jan. 28	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Spread of Bolshevik control in Finland.	744
1408	Jan. 29	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Red Guard controls Helsingfors; <i>bourgeois</i> guard holds the north country.	744
	Jan. 29	To the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Instructions to use discretion in respect to remaining in Helsingfors.	745
	Jan. 30	Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of State	British formal recognition of Finland is postponed.	745
17	Jan. 30	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Socialists, Red Guards, and Russian soldiers overwhelm the <i>bourgeois</i> government.	746
1410	Jan. 30	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Discussion of assistance by Sweden to Finland in restoring order.	746
19	Jan. 31	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Situation at Helsingfors.	746
5527	Feb. 1	From the Consul General at London	Finnish delegate to proceed to the United States to request recognition of Finland's independence.	747
20	Feb. 2	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	The reinforcement of Finnish Red Guards by Petrograd troops.	747
1455	Feb. 7	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Capture of Torneå by White Guards. Arrival of Rumanian Legation from Petrograd.	748
531	Feb. 8	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Instructions to report on stability of present Finnish government.	748
	Feb. 12	To the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	U. S. position upon the recognition of Finland and assistance in food supplies.	749
1479	Feb. 12	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Views opposing the present recognition of Finland.	749
6559	Feb. 13	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	U. S. Minister at Stockholm recommends shipments of foodstuffs to north Finland.	750
1503	Feb. 15	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Views of S. A. Korff, on the civil war between Finnish Red Guards and White Guards.	750
1504	Feb. 15	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Sweden requests the Soviet representative to induce Russian soldiers to leave the Åland Islands.	751
1523	Feb. 18	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Statement from Finnish Legation that war in Finland is caused by Russian troops and agitators.	752

*Finland—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
1533	Feb. 19	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Activities of Sweden with reference to the occupation of the Åland Islands.	752
536	Feb. 19	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Policy of the Norwegian Government toward Finland.	753
2390	Feb. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Report of the Consul at Haparanda on the control by Mannerheim of northern Finland.	753
1541	Feb. 21	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Agreement of Swedes, Russians, and Finns to leave the Åland Islands, Sweden to take temporary possession.	754
1522	Feb. 22	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	German assistance to Finnish White Guards against Red Guards.	754
	Feb. 27	Memorandum...	Conversation with Commissioners Reuter and Ignatius of the White government relative to the recognition of Finland.	755
571	Feb. 28	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.): for the Finnish Legation	From the Finnish Commissioners to the White government, Finland: U. S. reply to request for recognition.	756
[Enclosure]	Undated [Rec'd Mar. 1]	From the Finnish Commissioner	Sketch of the political history of Finland from 1809 to its present recognition by certain powers.	756
	Undated	From Mr. Santeri Nuorteva to the Food Administrator	Application for leave to purchase and ship food supplies for Finland.	767
	Mar. 9	From Mr. Santeri Nuorteva	Counter-representations by the Red delegate. Enclosures: status of the Red government; application to the Food Administrator, <i>supra</i> .	763
	Mar. 20	To Mr. Santeri Nuorteva	The situation in Finland is receiving consideration.	768

TREATIES BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, MARCH 1, 1918,  
AND BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, MARCH 7, 1918

	1918			
1647	Mar. 8	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Reports some of the terms in the treaty between Finland and Germany.	769
1292	Aug. 10	From the Chargé in Sweden	Discusses important articles in the Finnish-German treaties of Mar. 7.	769
[Quoted in despatch]	Nov. 14	The Chargé in Russia to the Minister in Sweden	Supplying Department with texts of Russian and Finnish treaties made with Germany.	773
1492	Nov. 18	From the Chargé in Sweden	Text of secret agreement of Mar. 7 between Germany and Finland, with accompanying correspondence.	771

*Finland—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1258	1918 Nov. 20	From the Chargé in Russia	Forwards text of treaty between the socialist republics of Russia and Finland. Quotes telegram of Nov. 14 to the Legation at Stockholm.	772
1392	Dec. 21	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Inquires concerning acceptance by Finland of secret agreement with Germany.	777
	Dec. 28	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	German-Finnish agreement was ac- cepted by Finland to remain in force until conclusion of a general peace.	777

GERMAN MILITARY INTERVENTION AGAINST THE RED GUARDS; VICTORY OF THE WHITE GUARDS—ADVANCES INTO KARELIA AND TOWARD THE MURMAN RAILWAY—NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT—BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WHITE GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FORMER RED GOVERNMENT—RESIGNATION OF MANNERHEIM—MONARCHIST MOVEMENT: ELECTION OF FREDERICK CARL OF HESSE, OCTOBER 9, 1918

	1918			
8966	Mar. 8	From the Amba- sador in Great Britain (tel.)	Shipments of grain from America to north Finland stopped because of the presence of Germans.	777
1656	Mar. 9	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Finnish proclamation announcing acceptance of German aid in re- storing order.	778
	Mar. 11	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Passage through Finland refused to American refugees. Landing of Germans at Hangö.	778
1794	Mar. 30	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Press reports the capture of Tam- merfors from the Red Guards by Finnish White troops.	779
1804	Apr. 1	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Report on the Finnish situation by Naval Attaché Crosley.	779
10	Apr. 14	From the Vice Consul at Pet- rograd (tel.)	The occupation of Helsingfors is expected.	780
1902	Apr. 16	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Germans take Helsingfors.	780
1904	Apr. 16	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Finland guarantees, during sojourn of German troops, safety of for- eigners and foreign representa- tives.	781
1914	Apr. 19	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Finnish bands, advancing into Kar- elia and toward the Murman Rail- way, thought to be in German pay.	781
1916	Apr. 19	From the Minis- ter in Sweden (tel.)	Proposed British agreement with Finland for conditional recogni- tion.	781
	Apr. 20	To the British Ambassador	The United States in not yet pre- pared to take action looking to the recognition of Finland.	782

*Finland—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
726	Apr. 22	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	U. S. attitude toward the recognition of Finland.	782
733	Apr. 25	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes alleged statement of Mannerheim welcoming Germans to Finland.	782
[Quoted in tel.]	Apr. 23, 26	From the Consul at Helsingfors via Stockholm (tel.)	Reports the quelling of Finnish Red Guards by Germans and the supremacy of the White Guard régime.	783
1950	Apr. 26	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes telegrams of Apr. 23 and 26 from the Consul at Helsingfors.	783
1959	Apr. 27	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Believes alleged statement of Mannerheim welcoming Germans to Finland is authentic.	783
466	May 3	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet denial of participation by Russian troops in fighting in Finland. Reply to German protest against British troops at Murmansk.	784
468	May 4	From the British Ambassador	Conditions under which Great Britain will recognize the <i>de facto</i> independence of Finland.	784
	May 9	To the British Ambassador	Inquires concerning final decision regarding provisional recognition of the <i>de facto</i> Finnish government.	785
	May 11	To the President	Presents Finnish request for recognition signed by Commissioners Reuter and Ignatius.	785
[Quoted in tel.]	May 13	From the Consul at Helsingfors via Stockholm (tel.)	Advises offer of food and provisional recognition to Finland.	786
2081	May 14	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Forwards telegram of May 13 from the Consul at Helsingfors.	786
	May 15	From the British Ambassador	No reply has been received from Finland regarding the conditions of recognition.	786
	Undated [Rec'd May 17]	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Scarcity of food probable cause of Finnish revolution and consequent aid from Germany.	786
	May 20	From the President	The United States is willing to recognize Finland when it is not controlled by Germany.	788
2134	May 21	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Choice of Svinhufvud as chairman of executive council; motion toward monarchy.	788
565	May 27	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Proposal made by Germany for adjustment of relations between Finland and Russia.	788
209	May 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet inquiry whether U. S. recognition of Finland depends upon severance of relations with Germany.	789
2181	May 28	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Resignation of Mannerheim; German influence in Finland.	789

*Finland—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
570	May 28	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Proposed negotiations between Soviet Russia and Finland on the cession to Finland of western Murman.	790
230	May 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports the preparations of the Finnish White Guard with Germans for an attack on Murman.	790
2211	June 1	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	French Legation, Stockholm, warns Finland that France will not recognize any régime established in an illegal way.	791
831	June 7	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Inquires regarding report that Finnish troops, in cooperation with Germans, contemplate attack on Murman Railway.	791
168	June 8	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	No change in U. S. policy regarding Finland.	791
2256	June 8	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Finnish policy toward Karelia and the Murman Railway: British and French attitude.	792
2293	June 12	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Finnish message to France on the desirability of union of the Finnish and Karelian peoples.	792
2302	June 14	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Mannerheim considers German influence dangerous to Finland's neutrality.	794
	Undated [Rec'd June 15]	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Monarchist <i>coup d'état</i> threatened. German preparations for campaign against Karelia and Murman.	793
2369	June 27	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Finnish protest to Great Britain against violation of territory claimed by Finland. British reply.	794
915	July 6	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	The United States takes no cognizance of agreement between Finland and Soviet Russia.	796
2457	July 11	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Views of Mannerheim on German domination in Finland.	796
24	July 15	From the Consul at Helsingfors	Report on Finland's present political situation as affecting the Allies and the Central powers.	797
962	July 20	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Department's message to London on decision not to send foodstuffs to Finland.	801
887	Aug. 9	From the British Chargé	Declaration of British policy in northern Russia as in no way inimical to Finland.	802
362	Aug. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discusses appeal to Finns to enlist against Germany and encloses draft appeal.	803
70	Aug. 15	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Attempt of monarchists to elect a king.	804
109	Aug. 18	From the Consul at Archangel (tel.)	Discussion of the publication of the proclamation by a Finnish leader to the Finns of all countries.	804

*Finland—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
73	Aug. 20	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Good effect of British declaration of policy in northern Russia is counteracted by German propaganda.	805
74	Aug. 21	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Proposal that the United States and the Allies offer to feed north-west Finland provided the Germans leave.	806
	Aug. 23	To the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Any action relative to recognition of the <i>de facto</i> government should be deferred.	806
76	Aug. 26	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	German training of Finnish army and other activities point to possible hostilities in the Murman.	807
2726	Aug. 27	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Severance of Finnish-Russian peace negotiations.	807
79	Aug. 27	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Evidences of complete German control of the Baltic and of Finland.	807
	Aug. 28	To the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	The proposed plan for feeding Finland should be postponed.	808
2754	Sept. 3(?)	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Publication by U. S. Ambassador of manifesto to Finns might be construed as interference.	809
247	Sept. 5	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inadvisability of publishing any expression of opinion regarding the independence of Finland.	809
1082	Sept. 5	To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Publication of Finnish appeal through U. S. Governmental channels is inadvisable.	810
252	Sept. 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Questions advisability of cooperating with members of the former Finnish Red labor government.	810
90	Sept. 11	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Finnish delegation procures the assent of Frederick Carl of Hesse to accept the throne.	810
101	Oct. 11	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Election of Frederick Carl as king of Finland.	811

WITHDRAWAL OF GERMAN TROOPS—FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER MANNERHEIM—DECISION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO SHIP FOOD

	1918			
104	Oct. 20 [?]	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Partial withdrawal of German troops.	811
117	Nov. 12	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	New republican government under Mannerheim anticipated; Bolshevik menace.	812
118	Nov. 16	From the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Mannerheim is entrusted with the forming of a new government. Consul advises shipment of food.	813
	Nov. 22	To the Consul at Helsingfors (tel.)	Decision of the U. S. Government to ship food to Finland.	814
1410	Dec. 24	From the British Chargé	German forces are withdrawn from Finland.	814



## CHAPTER VII. THE BALTIC COUNTRIES

APPEALS FROM ESTHONIA AND LATVIA FOR SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENCE: ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN—DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF LITHUANIA AND REQUEST FOR RECOGNITION: ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES; RECOGNITION BY GERMANY—MOVEMENT BY THE BALTIC GERMANS FOR A MONARCHY IN PERSONAL UNION WITH PRUSSIA: QUALIFIED RESPONSE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT—PROTESTS BY DELEGATES OF THE ESTHONIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: RECEPTION OF THESE DELEGATES BY THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS—REFUSAL OF VISA FOR AN ESTHONIAN DELEGATE TO THE UNITED STATES—PROTEST OF THE LETTISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST GERMAN RULE; CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE—BRITISH PROJECT FOR A LETTISH LEGION: ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Jan. 28	From the British Chargé	Esthonia and Latvia appeal to Great Britain for support at the peace conference of their independence.	815
[Enclosure]	Feb. 7	From the Lithuanian National Council via Berne	Claim of Lithuania to independence and request for recognition.	818
1017	Feb. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia	Appeals from Esthonia to the United States for support at the peace conference of its independence.	816
2355	Feb. 9	From the Chargé in Switzerland	Transmits Lithuanian note of Feb. 7.	817
220	Feb. 27	From the British Ambassador	British compliance with Esthonian request for provisional recognition pending the peace conference.	819
1772	Mar. 26	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Germany's assent to Lithuanian request for recognition as an independent state.	820
1365	Mar. 27	To the Minister in Switzerland: to British and French Embassies	Decision regarding recognition of Lithuanian independence should be deferred in view of unsettled conditions.	821
1896	Apr. 15	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Berlin report of movement by Baltic Germans for a monarchy in personal union with Prussia.	821
1361	Apr. 20	From the Chargé in Denmark	Transmits memoranda of interviews with Esthonian delegation on the political situation in Esthonia.	822
1931	Apr. 23	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Qualified response of Germany to request of Baltic Germans for monarchy in union with Prussia.	826
[Enclosure]	May 3	From the Esthonian Delegation to the American Ambassador in Great Britain	Protest against German occupation of Esthonia, request for recognition, and for representation at peace conference.	827
9011	May 10	From the Ambassador in Great Britain	Transmits note of May 3 from the Esthonian delegation, also British note granting provisional recognition to Esthonia.	826
596	June 4	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Reports conditions in the Baltic provinces under German military control.	829

*The Baltic Countries—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
2459	July 11	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Esthonian protest to Germany. Authority requested for visit of Esthonian representative to the United States.	831
959	July 19	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	No commitment regarding reception of Esthonian delegate sent to the United States.	831
972	July 24	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Refusal of visa for Ferdinand Kull, Esthonian delegate to the United States.	831
[Enclosure]	Aug. 14	From the Esthonian Representative to the American Ambassador in Great Britain	Esthonian protest against agreement between Russia and Germany for incorporation of Baltic provinces into Germany.	832
9724	Aug. 19	From the Ambassador in Great Britain	Transmits note of Aug. 14 from the Esthonian representative.	831
2748	Aug. 31	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Inquires if Department is disposed to allow some other Esthonian delegate to visit the United States.	832
[Enclosure]	Undated	From the Lettish National Council to the American Ambassador in Russia	Protest against annexation of Latvia to Germany.	833
	Sept. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia	Transmits undated protest of the Lettish National Council. See <i>supra</i> .	833
1076	Sept. 28	From the British Chargé	Inquires U. S. views regarding the formation of a Lettish legion.	836
2935	Oct. 1	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Esthonian views on German outrages and the danger of Red occupation after evacuation of German troops.	836
	Oct. 7	To the British Chargé	The United States will not join in the announcement to promote the formation of a Lettish legion.	837
2977	Oct. 11	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Withdrawal of request for visa for Kull, Esthonian delegate.	837

THE QUESTION OF PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES FROM BOLSHEVISM UPON WITHDRAWAL OF THE GERMAN TROOPS: ATTEMPTS TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES—POSTPONEMENT OF GERMAN WITHDRAWAL IN THE ARMISTICE—FORMATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN ESTHONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA—RESERVATION OF CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL CLAIMS BY THE UNITED STATES UNTIL THE PEACE CONFERENCE—DISPATCH OF A BRITISH NAVAL FORCE TO THE BALTIC SEA—GERMAN WITHDRAWAL AND BOLSHEVIK ADVANCE—YUDENICH'S PROJECT OF AN ANTI-BOLSHEVIK FORCE TO TAKE PETROGRAD

	1918			
2985	Oct. 12	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Departure of German troops from Baltic provinces may be followed by Bolshevik occupation.	838
1215	Oct. 16	To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Germany instigating requests for protection by German troops on pretext of Bolshevik occupation.	838

*The Baltic Countries—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
5415	Oct. 26	From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)	Lithuanian desire for Allied aid in forming a government and for withdrawal of German troops.	839
1204	Oct. 31	From the British Chargé	Proposes enlisting help of Scandinavian countries to protect the Baltic provinces upon German evacuation.	839
1206	Oct. 31	From the British Chargé	Question of recognition of the Estonian National Council. Enclosure: memorandum on German oppression of Esthonia.	841
3090	Nov. 2	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Russian appeal for the retention of German troops in Russian provinces until replaced by Allied forces.	843
3075	Nov. 5	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Proposal of Scandinavian military assistance to Baltic provinces not favorably received in Denmark.	843
7019	Nov. 8	From the Spanish Ambassador	Spain makes representations for retention of German troops in certain Russian territories until order is restored.	844
	Nov. 14	From the Lithuanian National Council	Statement of Lithuanian desire to form an independent nation in union with the Letts and Lettgalls.	845
1056	Nov. 16	From the Minister in Norway	Norway declines to assist in protecting Baltic provinces against Bolshevism.	849
	Nov. 18	To the Lithuanian National Council	Reservation of consideration of national claims until the peace conference.	849
994	Nov. 25	To the Spanish Ambassador	Terms of armistice between the Associated powers and Germany will safeguard order in occupied territory.	850
	Nov. 27	From the Consul General at Copenhagen: from Lehrs	Formation of national governments in Esthonia and Latvia.	850
322	Nov. 27	To the British Chargé	In loyalty to Russia, no premature action will be taken in recognition of the Baltic states.	851
	Nov. 29	From the American Estonian League	Reports the formation of an Estonian government and requests representation at the peace conference.	852
3240	Nov. 29	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Anxiety regarding the spread of Bolshevism in the Baltic countries, Finland, and Scandinavia.	854
3226	Nov. 29	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Dispatch of British naval force to the Baltic in support of Estonian authorities against Bolshevism.	854
3260	Dec. 2	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Form of Estonian government and its attitude toward Russia and Bolshevism.	855

*The Baltic Countries—Continued*

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1918			
	Dec. 3	To the British Chargé	The situation in the Baltic should be considered with the general problem of occupied Russian territory.	856
	Dec. 5	To the Lithuanian National Council	The Department is not yet prepared to recognize any new government in Lithuania.	856
3289	Dec. 6	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Esthonian message reporting advance of Bolsheviks toward Revel.	857
3341	Dec. 14	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	General Yudenich's project of an anti-Bolshevik force to take Petrograd.	857
3347	Dec. 16	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Monarchistic movement under Tre-pov fails. Bolshevik advance into Esthonia is checked by British squadron.	859
3354	Dec. 17	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes Esthonian appeal for Allied troops to check advancing Bolsheviks.	859
3360	Dec. 18	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Lettish representatives appeal for Allied aid, stating that the retiring Germans deliver the territory to Bolsheviks.	860
6260	Dec. 24	From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.): from White-house	For Committee on Public Information: Report of German withdrawal and Bolshevik advance in Lithuania.	861



**RUSSIA**  
**DISINTEGRATION AND FOREIGN**  
**INTERVENTION**



# RUSSIA

## DISINTEGRATION AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

### CHAPTER I

#### SIBERIA AND MANCHURIA

Discussion of the Contemplated Dispatch of Japanese Troops to Siberia:  
Russian Attitude—Bolshevik Activities in Siberia and Manchuria—The  
Formation of Local Governments—Proposed Use of Chinese Troops in the  
Zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway—The Dispatch of Warships to  
Vladivostok—French Suggestion of Allied and American Intervention:  
Attitude of the United States

File No. 763.72/7947

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, *undated*.

[Received November 1, 1917, 9 p. m.]

I received cablegram from the Prime Minister as follows:

With reference to your cablegram of November 1, raising question of the use of Japanese troops, the view of the British Cabinet is that the Japanese authorities would never assent to such a proposal if made. It may be that the United States administration may have some better means of knowledge, and of course if they think that the Japanese could be induced to send an expeditionary force to Russia we would support them in every way possible.

The Cabinet has received an important cablegram from their chief military representative in Russia. It is to the effect that the Quartermaster General in Russia has every reason to anticipate that by the month of January there will be an available Russian Army of at least 400,000 selected men. Many applications are being made to him from various units of the military forces requesting that some steps may be adopted for the purpose of protecting those soldiers in the fighting line who wish to do their duty from the propaganda of the Maximalists. A plan has already been adopted to secure the benefit of this distinct step in advance of the morale. The men themselves have proposed that they should get together all those who wish to continue the fight and thus make separate armies. The whole plan is based upon companies being formed of volunteers who come from the same territorial area or zemstvo.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Note in the margin of MS.: "Handed me by Lord Reading to show Pres[iden]t. Nov. 1/17. (9 p. m.) R[obert] L[ansing]."

<sup>2</sup> See telegram No. 1871 of Nov. 30 to the Ambassador in Russia, and his reply, No. 2062 of Dec. 3, vol. I, pp. 273 and 284.



A number of companies is already in existence. The basis is that the men swear to concern themselves with the war only. The men will be clothed and fed by the zemstvos, who will also take all steps to prevent agitators from getting amongst the soldiers. *Cadres* are being established on the basis of volunteers from soldiers of other regiments, who may choose their own leaders or officers. The plan is to extend from companies eventually to regiments which will all be based upon the territorial principle. The scheme further is to constitute a volunteer committee for the province composed of all the councils or zemstvos in the province in order that there may be effective cooperation among the provinces and the councils. It is anticipated that Petrograd will be opposed to the plan, but it is thought that it has now got so strong a hold that it cannot be prevented.

It is clear, in the opinion of this high Russian authority, that it is of the utmost importance that the morale of the Russian troops should be improved, and that there is ground for hoping that an attempt for this purpose will be successful. If the United States administration would consider whether it would be possible for them to raise a question with the Russian Government of sending United States troops to Russia it might be of the greatest value, more especially having regard to the situation in Italy. The British Government does not know whether it would be possible for the United States administration to send troops if the Russian government were agreeable, or even whether such a scheme could be considered; but the matter is of such importance that we cannot help putting it before you for use if you think right.

[File copy not signed]

---

File No. 861.00/963

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

HARBIN, November 17, 1917.

[Copy received January 16, 1918.<sup>1</sup>]

SIR: Confirming my telegram of November 11, 1 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> in reply to the Legation's telegram of the 9th instant with regard to the public safety and police conditions here, I have the honor to state that the accession to control of the Bolshevik Party at Petrograd on November 5 [*sic*] received a sympathetic support at Harbin, and at first it threatened to overthrow the administration of General Horvat and the Chinese Eastern Railway. On the 7th instant the Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates held a meeting and attempted to oust General Horvat, but the resolution failed to secure the necessary majority. An alternative resolution was then passed to form a Committee of Public Safety, which should undertake to control the lawless population and provide a proper police. Its members were chosen from

---

<sup>1</sup> As enclosure to the Minister's despatch No. 1805 of Dec. 17, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

each of the several parties or institutions here which claim a voice in the popular government, and two of the committee were attached to the railway administration to watch its operations, in the public interests. General Horvat expected at any moment to be arrested, and for a short time the situation looked grave.

By the 10th, however, it became apparent that the Bolshevik Party was going to meet with considerable opposition here, as well as elsewhere, and that the civil population was by no means inclined to permit the soldiers and workmen to carry things all their own way. Its willingness, even eagerness, for foreign intervention as preferable was freely discussed. The British Consul, Mr. Porter, and myself then called together upon General Horvat and asked him for a clear expression of his views. He told us that we were all sitting upon a volcano, but that the opposition the Bolsheviks had stirred up made him much more sanguine. They had begun to realize the gravity of any action that might bring about foreign intervention, and were making an effort to restrain their extreme followers and to avoid any clash with foreign interests. He felt that the crisis had passed, for the time being, at any rate.

Mr. Porter and I then took occasion to impress upon him the importance, from an international point of view, of maintaining order in Harbin. We stated that we were obliged to regard him as the head of the local administration and the one upon whom we had to rely for the protection of our nationals. He could inform the Bolsheviks, or whatever party might pretend to power, that his removal from his place as head of the Russian administration by any individual or body of revolutionists could not be looked upon with indifference; but that any attempt of such a nature would oblige us to ask our Governments to take such measures as they believed advisable for the protection of their nationals in Manchuria.

General Horvat promised to inform us immediately of any serious movements threatening to jeopardize our interests or to take the control of the administration from his hands. (See my letter to General Horvat, enclosed in quadruplicate with despatches dated November 10.<sup>1</sup>)

At this writing the town seems quiet, though sporadic cases of violence and incendiary speech, on the part of the soldiers, still occur. I enclose herewith a copy of an announcement of the Committee of Public Safety, published in the newspapers, which has apparently had a good effect. Also are enclosed copies in translation of other items reporting disturbances at Station Manchouli and an anti-Jewish demonstration here.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosures not printed.

While the Bolsheviks as a party have lost much of their place and sympathy here, and it is not believed that they will excite or be the cause of any immediate serious outbreak, nevertheless some of the soldiers continue to engage in public meetings where inflammatory speeches are indulged in. Also the sympathy of their leaders for the striking waiters and the demands of the shop sales people has led them to close the restaurants and the principal shops until the demands of the strikers are met, which means indefinitely. This causes considerable hardship to both Russian and foreign residents, but has not yet produced violence and is a condition which can only be ameliorated by local representations.

I have [etc.]

C. K. MOSER

---

File No. 861.00/834

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1729

PEKING, November 19, 1917.

[Received December 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that, due to the almost complete breakdown of the police system at Harbin, lawlessness and crime have increased to such an extent as to seriously threaten the lives and property of foreigners resident there. At one time the disorder was so great that my British colleague suggested that it might be considered as justifying the sending of an international police force for the protection of foreigners and their property.

Although the Consul at Harbin does not consider the situation at present as grave enough to warrant the taking of such steps, copies of his reports of November 10 and 12,<sup>1</sup> respectively, in regard thereto, are forwarded to the Department at this time in view of the possibility of its becoming necessary to request the Department's instructions by telegraph should it be necessary later to take steps to protect Americans living at Harbin.

In speaking of this matter with me last week, the British Minister, having in mind international measures of protection, expressed the hope that a detachment of American troops could be sent to Harbin in case of need, stating that the British Indian troops now stationed in Tientsin are not suitable for service in Harbin.

I have [etc.]

PAUL S. REINSCH

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 861.00/769

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, December 6, 1917, 7 p. m.

[Received 9.40 p. m.]

My November 28, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Situation Harbin serious. General Horvat ready to conduct joint administration with Bolsheviks. Consular body informed him it could not recognize such government dependent on Lenin.

Allied Ministers to-day decided to call on Chinese Government to support with troops the authorities established under the treaties in Manchuria. This action was taken after a consultation with the Russian Minister who stated that he had advised Horvat that as Russia had no territorial possessions in Manchuria, the authority of Russian officials was dependent entirely upon treaties with China and Allies. The conclusion is that a hostile government or one not recognized could not exercise authority in north Manchuria. Should Bolsheviks resist Chinese troops a very serious situation might arise. I had no instructions as to how far you desire American participation to go in an eventual international administration and policing of the north Manchuria railway zone. The Consul at Harbin considers international control imperative should Russia make a separate peace. My opinion is that Chinese adjudicators with international support should be first tried but even so the question arises as to how much support the Allied powers could actually give to China should strong opposition be offered by Russia.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/769

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1917, 4 p. m.

Your cipher telegram of December 6, 7 p. m. The American Government supports the view that China is entirely within her right in employing troops to protect her sovereignty and territorial integrity. This Government would not, however, be disposed to encourage an armed conflict.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72/8038

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, December 8, 1917, 9 p. m.

[Received December 11, 12.18 a. m.]

2073. Afternoon papers state thousand Japanese militia landed Vladivostok from transport convoyed by cruiser *Okuma*. Called Japanese Ambassador, read statement to him. He says had no advices and believed report untrue.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/804b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1917, 4 p. m.

It is reported in the press that an announcement has been made by the Japanese Government that Japanese forces are protecting Vladivostok. Please make discreet but extensive inquiry and report by cable.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/788

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 11, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received 8.45 p. m.]

*Brooklyn* left to-day for Nagasaki and Manila. Is still quiet here but conditions are becoming worse. Soldiers' and Workmen's Committee ordering government bank and commercial port to turn over charge to them and railway men refusing to run trains because of interference of soldiers. Stevens<sup>2</sup> and all consuls consider presence foreign force desirable until Allies' attitude decided unanimously. American force is preferred but Japanese better than none despite hostility felt. *Thomas* reached by *Brooklyn* wireless last night, is due to-morrow or next day. Antagonists [anticipate?] fighting here. As to Maximalists, too feeble but see no prospect any improvement in the near future. I think it is impossible for Railway Service

<sup>1</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Minister in China.

<sup>2</sup> John F. Stevens, chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.

Corps to accomplish any good now and recommend that they wait on *Thomas* [in?] Japan. This is also Stevens's opinion. After about December 25 all vessels will be at the mercy of the ice-breaker crews who are not dependable. Is report correct that all cargo specifications [specifically consigned this?] port stopped or recalled?

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/804a

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1917, 7 p. m.

Press to-day reports dispatch of Japanese troops to Vladivostok, which have occupied the railroad works there. Department assumes there is no foundation to these reports. Cable immediate reply.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/788

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1917, 6 p. m.

Your December 11, 6 p. m. In view of importance of avoiding hostility it would seem wise to refrain from discussing or considering in any way the question of the advisability of presence of foreign force in Vladivostok at the present time and you may so advise your colleagues if they bring up the matter again.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/811

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, December 14, 1917, 4 p. m.

[Received 8.15 p. m.]

Referring to the Department's telegram of December 11, 4 p. m. No announcement of any kind has been made by Japanese Government that Japanese forces are protecting Vladivostok. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day characterized all kinds press reports to that effect as "absurd and nonsensical." There are at the present

moment no troops in Vladivostok and there were no Japanese war vessels in harbor up to December 14. Navy Department states officially that arrangements have been made to send men of war in case of emergency but none have been sent and no orders to that effect are anticipated for the present. Confidential advices would indicate that rations have been ordered and that three divisions of the army are ready to leave for Harbin and, if deemed necessary, Vladivostok immediately.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/825

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, December 15, 1917, 4 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

Colonel Ninamiya, secretary of the Minister of War, in his speech to-day with Captain Baldwin<sup>1</sup> made following statement:

Sending troops to Russia will depend upon circumstances entirely. We are making some preparations but troops if sent either Harbin or Vladivostok will be only sufficient number to protect Japanese interests and at present we do not expect to send them.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/822

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, December 15, 1917, 8 p. m.

[Received 11.30 p. m.]

Your December 8, 4 p. m. Consul Harbin reports Bolshevik control of railway, dismissal General Horvat, abolition of Russian Consulates at Hailar and Kwanchengtze.

Three thousand Chinese troops on the ground, the Russian Minister here is still encouraging Horvat to hold out with support of Chinese. Moser believes Horvat weakening. Please instruct concerning attitude of Consul in case revolutionists continue in control.

Major Francis Peabody<sup>2</sup> just arrived from Petrograd reports quiet and order prevails all along railway, foreigners protected, food

<sup>1</sup> Capt. Karl F. Baldwin, Military Attaché at Tokyo.

<sup>2</sup> Maj. Francis Peabody, member of the American Red Cross Commission to Rumania.

situation improved, speculation suppressed, land division will cause trouble. Soldiers desire peace but without concession; socialist propaganda carried into German Army.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/829

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, December 16, 1917, 10 p. m.

[Received December 17, 6.20 a. m.]

Russian Ambassador called to-day to express his suspicion that the persistent press reports of Japanese intervention in Vladivostok may be semiofficial feelers. He asked me to report to the Department his belief that action of that character by Japan would provoke feeling of resentment in Russia and thus antagonize Russian people without in any way serving the cause of the Allies. He expressed the hope that American Government would not give Japanese Government the impression that such action would be approved.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/826

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 16, 1917, 12 p. m.

[Received December 16, 3.45 p. m.]

Japanese troops have not arrived here and none dispatched as far as I can learn although many seem expect and some now even hope for their coming.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/822

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1917, 5 p. m.

Your telegram December 15, 8 p. m. Ambassador and Consuls in Russia advised that President desires all American representatives to withhold direct communication with Bolshevik government.

LANSING



File No. 861.00/854

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, December 21, 1917.

[Received December 23, 7 p. m.]

2127. Japanese Embassy in statement published Petrograd gazette yesterday denies report Japanese landing at Vladivostok and in connection says:

1. All know that the capture of Vladivostok by Japanese could not present the slightest difficulty for them.

2. That Japan has not shown any aggressive tendencies toward Russia, notwithstanding attacks on Japanese for plunder and other cases of the trampling of alien rights judging in Japan the present war is hardly viewed as the final chord of world militarism and the naval forces of Japan are gradually being increased [*sic*].

Concerning secret treaty cabled in my 2118<sup>1</sup> after saying that heading thereof is unauthorized ends:

With regard to this convention the Japanese Embassy declares that there is being attributed to this treaty a character that is entirely foreign to it and that it is in no wise ambiguous as regards England. The unauthorized heading merely shows that the person who composed it had not penetrated the meaning of the fourth article of the said treaty. The purpose of all this is apparently to call forth among the Allies if only a shadow of confusion.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/861

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 22, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received December 23, 1.35 p. m.]

Still quiet here. Bolsheviks have not yet forced their control upon Government institutions but may do so soon. This will cause strike employees, paralyzing port. Since 16th no telegraphic communication west of Chita. The newspapers report all stations west of Irkutsk in hands of Bolsheviks, Irkutsk telegraph and postal clerks having struck in protest.

Returns Priamur district not quite complete but indicate five peasant, one Cossack and one Bolshevik delegates Constituent

<sup>1</sup> Dated Dec. 18, 1917, 11 p. m.; *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 709.

Assembly. Irkutsk, Bolsheviks have 11,000 out of total 30,000 votes, but in Krasnoyarsk they have 12,000 out of total 17,000.

Many prisoners of war reported escaping particularly from Krasnoyarsk. In case of separate treaty of peace believe their acts would necessitate Allied control Vladivostok and Priamur district to protect shipping China and Japan routes. Meantime we should have properly organized military passport controls at five points, Asia[*tic Russia ?*], Vladivostok particularly, as British look for their chief control of much [*omission?*] and local counter-spy organization about to collapse for lack of funds. Latter requests foreign financial assistance, would require about five hundred American dollars monthly. Maintenance this organization is very important to Allied interests as without it or large force of our own agencies we cannot hope to extend proper passport control.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/863

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, December 24, 1917, 11 p. m.

[Received December 24, 2.20 p. m.]

Stevens<sup>1</sup> arrived here to-day having left in Nagasaki the Russian railway unit. He considers it imperative that they be kept available for immediate usefulness in the event of conditions in Russia making possible the resumption of their work on Trans-Siberian system. He anxiously awaits the arrangements of the necessary credits.

At the request of Viscount Motono, I took Stevens to see him. This appears to explain his own views of the Russian situation. He expressed firm conviction that limitations on [*duration of*] particular coterie now exercising power in Russia is doubtless ephemeral, yet it is the fact that power has passed permanently and inalienably to the Maximalist constituency which for the time being they represent and that it would be fatal mistake for the Allied powers to attempt to support or countenance any counter-revolution or any movement by the Cadets, for instance, to obtain control in favor of less radical elements. He also dwells upon the futility and danger of antagonizing what must ultimately be the decisive influence in

---

<sup>1</sup> John F. Stevens, chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.

Russia by attempting any sort of armed intervention even in eastern Siberia. He considers, while there is throughout the people of Russia an earnest desire for peace, yet it may not be too late to bring about some such reconstitution of governmental authority as would defeat the intrigues for a separate peace with Germany. There are strong elements in Russia who perceive that the country must continue faithful to the alliance if it is to escape ultimate commercial and financial domination by Germany and have the opportunity to realize its own political destiny, but these elements are now disorganized and discouraged by the prevailing anarchy. They would give strong support to any administration capable of maintaining order and national unity in the pursuit of the United States ideals but there is urgent danger that the continuance of present chaotic conditions may so discourage them as to destroy their effectiveness.

In reply to Motono's request for his suggestions as to the possibility of constructive action Stevens urged his belief that the only hope lies in sending immediately to Petrograd a large commission jointly representing the Allied powers and composed of men of well-known administrative capacity who would be at least sympathetic with the progressive spirit which in Russia, [spite of] transient personalities, is destined to control the future of Russia; this commission bearing no formal credentials but going prepared to ascertain for itself where the real power lies in Russia and to affiliate itself with those politicians who give most promise of leadership and to seek opportunities to cooperate with them in the actual reorganization and acclimate [to counsel] the government for the period of the war. Stevens considers that although this suggestion is a hazard which might not prove in the event [successful], nevertheless presents the only chance to avoid complete disintegration which would work powerfully in favor of Germany and which could be only partially nullified by treating Russia as an actual enemy.

Minister of Foreign Affairs incidentally stated that the Japanese Government is opposed to using military force even in Siberia lest such action should crystallize Russian feeling against the Allied powers. Although he made no statement to that effect, his inquiries suggested the impression that he had been inclined to consider favorably supporting Cadet Party as against the Maximalist; he appeared much impressed by Stevens's course of action [consideration] that no change of administration can deprive of permanent power the radical masses who are now effectively represented by the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. He proposes to have Stevens in the near future present his views to the Prime Minister.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/877½

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State of an interview with the  
Japanese Ambassador (Sato), December 27, 1917*

The Ambassador called and introduced Baron Megata. After a brief conversation the Baron left and the Ambassador remained.

He first asked in regard to the situation in Russia and I told him that our purpose was to remain quiescent and await developments. He said that that was the view of his Government.

I then spoke to him about the situation at Vladivostok and told him that the view of this Government was that it would be unwise for either the United States or Japan to send troops to Vladivostok as it would undoubtedly result in the unifying of the Russians under the Bolsheviks against foreign interference. He said to me that that was the exact view of his Government and that they have no intention of sending troops to Vladivostok for the same reason that we opposed it. He said that both Great Britain and France had made the suggestion but that the Japanese Government did not consider it wise to adopt the suggestion.

The Ambassador also told me that he had been called home and that he was leaving about January 10. I asked him if it was a recall and he said he did not know except that his Government stated it desired to confer with him.

He then asked me whether there was any prospect of our sending a mission to Japan at this time.

I replied that he must realize that it would only do for us to send distinguished men to Japan, and that they must be representative of the Government; that at the present time every man who was suitable for such a mission was pressed into the service in connection with the war, and that to let any one of them go would be to weaken our war machine; and that of course our supreme object to-day was to win the war and we must devote all our energies to that end. I therefore thought that it was quite out of the question at present to think of sending a mission and I was sure he would understand the situation and could explain it fully to his Government.

File No. 861.00/867

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 27, 1917, 8 p. m.

[Received December 27, 7.25 p. m.]

General commissioner appointed by Provisional Government in the place of governor general maritime region was arrested yester-

day by Bolsheviks because he called a meeting of Zemstvo and city representatives of this region and turned over to them his full power, his reason being inability communicate with Petrograd and critical conditions in this region. Strong protests on arrest are being made [particularly] by Cossacks. Local commissioner is still in office and although without power for some time all the consuls still address communications to him for transmission to persons administering affairs who are Bolsheviks. Local commissioner has requested consuls refer to a committee of Zemstvo and city representatives questions hitherto taken up with general commissioner.

Controller appointed in government bank by Bolsheviks has been withdrawn to prevent strike of all bank employees. Chief of commercial port was removed yesterday and his assistant appointed in his place.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/895

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 659

MEMORANDUM

The Russian Minister recently went to see the British Minister at Peking to ask his advice as to whether it was desirable that the Bolshevik leaders and disaffected troops at Harbin should be arrested and deported by Chinese troops. This action had been recommended to him by the Russian Consul at Harbin with the concurrence of the foreign consuls there. The Chinese troops have the situation well in hand and are in a position to carry out the arrests, according to the British Minister, but the latter states that neither he nor the Russian Minister can predict what effect such drastic action would be likely to have on the Bolshevik government which shows by its telegrams from Petrograd that it considers Manchuria to be Russian territory.

The British Minister considers that the only solution of the present difficulty would be the disbandment of the disaffected troops, but he thinks it desirable that the Chinese should defer action until it is certain that the general in command of the Russian troops is unable to carry out the disbandment himself.

His Majesty's Government have instructed the British Minister that it would not, in their opinion, be wise for the Chinese troops to arrest the Bolshevik troops and leaders in present circumstances. They are consulting their allies and, in the meanwhile, the British Minister is to persuade the Chinese Government not to order action of the kind.

The British Embassy are instructed, in bringing the above to the knowledge of the State Department, to enquire the views of the United States Government which they would be glad to have at as early a date as possible.

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1917.

---

File No. 861.00/895

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Spring Rice)*<sup>1</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has received from his excellency, the British Ambassador, a memorandum (No. 659) dated December 28, 1917, stating that the Russian Minister at Peking recently went to see the British Minister at that capital and asked his advice as to whether it was desirable that the Bolsheviki leaders and disaffected troops at Harbin should be arrested and deported by Chinese troops. It was stated that the Chinese troops have the situation well in hand at Harbin and that they are in position to effect the arrests and deportations above mentioned, but that the effect on the Bolsheviki government is problematical. The British Government states also that, in its opinion, it would be unwise for the Chinese troops to arrest the Bolsheviki troops and leaders under present circumstances. The views of the American Government on this question are requested.

The American Government believes that it would be unwise for the Chinese Government to take any steps at Harbin which might lead to armed conflict. The American Government recognizes, on the other hand, that China is entirely within her right in employing means to protect her sovereignty and territorial integrity. This Government confidently hopes, however, that the Chinese Government will recognize that the conditions which now prevail in Russia may give rise to local disturbances in parts of Manchuria where large numbers of Russians reside and that the wisest course to pursue is to be lenient in dealing with situations such as have arisen at Harbin. The Department of State, therefore, trusts that the Chinese Government will not find it necessary to use force of arms in restoring order at Harbin and that circumstances will soon so adjust themselves as to permit of an orderly and proper administration of affairs at that place.

---

<sup>1</sup> Substance transmitted to the Minister in China by unnumbered telegram, Dec. 29, 2 p. m., concluding: "You are instructed to convey discreetly this information to the Chinese Government."

The American Minister at Peking is being instructed in the sense above mentioned.

WASHINGTON, *December 29, 1917.*

File No. 861.00/888

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *December 30, 1917, noon.*

[Received 8.15 p. m.]

Consul of the United States at Harbin telegraphs:

December 29, 4 p. m. British Consul has telegrams from Petrovski Zavod dated 27th and 28th stating that Irkutsk in flames, Bolsheviks murdering and plundering inhabitants, ravishing women, corpses murdered children cover streets. French and British exterminated, French consular agent and two French officers murdered, help implored. Japanese have been informed. Notify Secretary of State. Moser.

I will consult colleagues and telegraph later any recommendations agreed upon.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/898

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *January 1, 1918, 1 a. m.*

[Received 11.52 a. m.]

Referring to my December 27, 8 p. m., and December 30, noon. Visited with [omission] commander fortress regarding Irkutsk but he is powerless as resignations [*sic*] all troops here [omission] still continues and no Cossacks from this district can be spared.

Soldiers' council proposes to support Zemstvo Committee to which general commissioner delegated his powers if that committee admits soldiers. Representatives local zemstvo agree but Amur zemstvo may refuse; if so fighting certain unless show of force made by Allies here. Red Guard has been formed and armed for looting and rioting. I am receiving numerous requests from better-class Russians for foreign intervention and protection to enable them to organize. Consular Corps agrees foreign warships necessary to preserve any order although mere presence may suffice. Japanese Consul is requesting ships; most desirable they be joined by ships of one or more of the Allies.

Ice breaker working but immediately on arrival ships should arrange to have ice breaker placed their disposal. Ships should have as much as possible, provisions, coal, water. Ships should arrive unannounced entering at dawn because reign of terror is threatened if intervention announced.

Prisoners-of-war menace increasing. German officers were reported attending as guests soldiers' council criticizing seizure political control. They may even attempt to seize munitions of war here for shipment to Germany.

Shall I be authorized to recognize transfer of power from commissioner of Provisional Government to Zemstvo Committee if other consuls similarly authorized?

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.77/261

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, January 2, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 7.35 p. m.]

No credit for Colonel Emerson<sup>1</sup> has been established here. Stevens greatly worried at delay as contingent of engineers compelled to remain on transport until money arrives.

Advices received here indicate that conditions in eastern Siberia are improving. There is no confirmation of reported massacre at Irkutsk. Russian Ambassador informs me that meeting of representatives of the Zemstvo of the Amur region held at Vladivostok December 28 assumed authority province and organized provisional government with temporary headquarters at Blagoveshchensk; issued declaration of loyalty to Allied powers and will move to Khabarovsk in the near future; hopes to keep in touch with Russian representative[s] abroad through Russian Consulate at Aigun.

Japanese Foreign Office watching conditions closely while Government fully prepared to act promptly if intervention is deemed expedient. In conversations with Russian Ambassador December 31, Motono expressed regret that there has been no exchange of views between the Allied powers in regard to the situation in Russia, also expressed a wish that he might know the attitude of American Government.

MORRIS

---

<sup>1</sup> Col. George Emerson, in charge of the Russian Railway Service Corps.



File No. 861.00/888

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 2, 1918, 7 p. m.*

Your urgent telegram December 30 noon received yesterday. Department anxious to keep close touch developments also all available information welfare Americans Siberia. Transmit foregoing to Harbin. Embassy Petrograd already advised by Department.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/907

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 21

## MEMORANDUM

The British Foreign Office are informed by the British Consul at Vladivostok that at a meeting which recently took place at Khabarovsk the powers of the commissioner of the Provisional Government for eastern Siberia were handed over by that official to the representatives of the Zemstvos. In view of the absence of any central control and the condition of chaos now existing in the country this meeting decided to establish a standing committee of six members, one from each Cossack district and one from each province, this committee to administer local affairs pending the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. A conflict of opinion thus arose with the Defense Committee of the Council of Soldiers and Workmen for the district, who claim the sole administrative power, and support the Lenin government: they caused the arrest of the commissioner, but he was shortly afterwards released. The Consul reports that in his opinion the action of the commissioner in delegating his powers was a wise one, and that there is a good chance of the step taken proving successful: there is however also a chance of a struggle with the Bolsheviki element who oppose the action taken.

The local situation is reported as bad, and likely to grow worse for a time owing to the lack of supplies, the shortage of funds, and the scarcity of work. The Consul strongly recommended the recognition of the Zemstvos Committee by the consuls of the Allied powers, as the moral support which the committee would receive would be most important.

In view of these developments, and of the general situation in the Vladivostok district, the British Government have sent instructions

to the Consul to recognise the Zemstvos Committee unofficially as a temporary administrative institution. The British Embassy have been instructed, in bringing the above to the attention of the State Department, to add that in the view of the British Government it is urgently desirable that similar unofficial recognition should be accorded by the consuls of the other powers at war with Germany. The Embassy would therefore be grateful if they could be informed at an early date whether the United States Government feel able to issue similar instructions to their consular representative at Vladivostok.

WASHINGTON, *January 4, 1918.*

[*Received January 5.*]

---

File No. 861.00/898

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 5, 1918, 2 p. m.*

Your January 1, 1 a. m. You are authorized to deal with Zemstvo Committee unofficially as temporary administrative institution.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/898

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 5, 1918, 3 p. m.*

Your January 1, 1 a. m. *Brooklyn* now at Manila has been ordered to proceed immediately to Yokohama for further instructions.

Embassy Tokyo also advised of this.

LANSING

---

File No. 763.72/8405

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *January 5, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[*Received January 5, 9.34 p. m.*]

Russian Ambassador advises me Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon informed him that the Japanese Government yesterday had decided to send to Vladivostok a cruiser which is now coaling

and is expected to arrive there about the 9th and that the British Government has ordered a cruiser to proceed there from Hongkong coaling at Nagasaki on the 8th.

I assume that these arrangements have been made in consultation between the British Government and Japanese although British Ambassador made no mention of them in discussing the situation in Vladivostok with me to-day.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/916

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, January 7, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received January 7, 4.50 p. m.]

Upon my communicating with Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, your telegram of January 5, 3 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> he advised me that 26th Lord Robert Cecil had urged upon Japanese Ambassador in London the inadvisableness of antagonizing Maximalist Party now in control in Russia, but that on the 1st instant he had urged the necessity of taking some steps short of actual military intervention to protect military stores lying at Vladivostok. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs said his Government is waiting further explanation of the apparent change of attitude of the British Government and of its immediate intentions before taking final decision. In reply to inquiry as to his personal feeling, he stated he thought it would be premature to land troops, as he understood British Foreign Office proposes, inasmuch as that might incur anti-Ally feeling.

Stevens announces credit entirely satisfactorily arranged.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/945

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1918.

[Received January 10.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Immediately upon hearing through the French Chargé d'Affaires at Peking of the events that took place at Irkutsk, the Government of the Republic decided that it should take the measures needed to secure the lives of its nationals which

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram to the Consul at Vladivostok, *ante*, p. 19.

might again be threatened on account of the growth of anarchy in Siberia.

Consequently the immediate sending to Harbin and thence to Irkutsk of the largest possible French force, detailed from the corps of occupation in China and placed under the command of Major de la Pornarède, has been considered by the French Government which would desire the cooperation of its allies and a joint arrangement as to the final organization of a military mission in the matter of men, appropriations and supplies.

China should be treated as an ally and therefore asked to detail to the mission a part of the troops that have been operating at Harbin and all available contingents.

Besides, since the mission is to appear as being inspired by the desire of bringing the cooperation and support of the Allies to the Russian elements in Siberia that have remained true to the cause of the Entente, the accession of Russian military elements should also be asked.

As is known to your excellency, the attention of the Allies was already drawn, at the last Paris conference, to the desirability of some joint action tending to protect, if possible, Siberia from Maximalist contagion, to secure the use of the Trans-Siberian and Russian railways for southern Russia to the advantage of the Allies and by isolating Vladivostok, if not too late, to protect the stocks of all kinds that are stored there. This would offer a chance to prevent German influence, which in the event of a separate peace might predominate in northern Russia, from getting a foothold in Vladivostok to the great detriment of the situation of the Allies in the Far East.

By order of my Government I have the honor to make this plan known to your excellency and to say how great a value it would attach to obtaining the adhesion and cooperation of the Federal Government in immediately carrying it out.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

File No. 861.00/953a

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1918, 7 p. m.

Department desires immediate and specific information following points:

- (1) What authorities now control Vladivostok?
- (2) Do same authorities control Amur Province?

- (3) How are authorities constituted?
- (4) What is their attitude towards Bolshevik authorities Petrograd?
- (5) Are they supported unanimously by soldiers and sailors?
- (6) Is port open; is it likely to remain so?
- (7) What is attitude of authorities, of soldiers, and of sailors toward foreign population?
- (8) How many troops at Vladivostok and how many sailors? Ditto in Province?
- (9) What prospect Stevens party landing safely Vladivostok?

No answer telegram December 28, 5 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Department desires full information.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/924

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, January 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received January 9, 4.45 p. m.]

Moser requests authorization Drysdale<sup>2</sup> proceed Siberia to gather the information on conditions there as requested your instructions to him. Please instruct Moser directly.

Naval attaché suggests advisability of sending to assist Drysdale a Serbian Colonel Speskov, now here, available, who has offered his services and is thoroughly familiar with the situation, speaking all necessary languages. Please instruct me whether this and necessary expenses are authorized.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/931

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, January 10, 1918.

[Received 3.23 p. m.]

Reliable telegram dated 9th states Irkutsk quiet under Bolshevik control. Consuls active protecting foreigners and have refused deliver to Bolsheviks high provisional officials who took refuge in Chinese Consulate.

MOSER

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> Lieut. Col. W. S. Drysdale, Military Attaché at Peking.

File No. 861.00/929½

*Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)**January 10, 1918.*

The Russian Ambassador called this morning and read me three telegrams which he had received during yesterday and to-day, one from each of his colleagues, respectively, at Tokyo, Paris and London. Each of them expressed not only the fear but the conviction that the Japanese intended and were making preparations to effectuate an occupation at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. At the latter place there are large supplies of munitions and war materials.

The Ambassador said that it was necessary for the Allies to insist that all decisions made and all actions taken in the Far East be by the Allies combined and not by Japan alone. He suggested that warships be sent to protect the various interests of the United States, Great Britain and Japan at Vladivostok to operate in unison but to be under the command of an American senior officer. He felt that this would effectually checkmate Japan's activities.

He said that he had been slow to take the position he now was forced to take but that he felt convinced, from the telegrams, that there was needed action on the part of the Allies if they would prevent the occupation of eastern Siberia by the Japanese.

He said, confidentially, that the British Ambassador had just told him that he had information to the effect that the Germans were sending submarine parts across the Trans-Siberian to a point of assembly on the Pacific Asiatic coast. I told him that in regard to that matter there was absolutely no foundation for it as it was a physical, military and naval impossibility. He requested that we send telegrams to our Ambassador at Tokyo requesting the Japanese Government to act in unison with us. I told him that I would be very glad to consider his suggestions and that if there was anything to communicate I would do so.

I told him that possibly the Japanese feared that all the German and Austrian prisoners in Russia and Siberia would be reofficered and rearmed and sent eastward through Siberia to direct a blow against Japan and her interests in the Far East. He said that of course they might fear that, but that there was no foundation for that fear; that such a move could not be effected, and that most of the prisoners in Russia were Austrians and not Germans.

I asked him if he had heard the press report that Russia had made a separate peace with Bulgaria. He expressed great surprise and said that he had not heard it, but, that if it was so, it might be advantageous, because (1) it would be additional cause for dissen-

sion in Germany; and (2) it would put Germany in a very bad light as regards Russia.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

---

File No. 861.00/924

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1918, 7 p. m.

Authorization to send Drysdale as requested through Legation is granted. Telegraph approximate expense. Naval attaché Peking suggests advisability of sending to assist Drysdale a Serbian Colonel Speskov now available Peking, who has offered services, is thoroughly familiar with situation and speaks necessary languages. Advise Minister Peking what you recommend.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/924

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1918, 8 p. m.

Your January 9, 5 p. m. Have instructed Moser to send Drysdale. Speskov may accompany if you and Moser consider necessary. If so advise Department approximate expense necessary before taking decision.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1008 b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1918, 7 p. m.

Russian Ambassador to-day informed the Department that he had received yesterday and to-day telegrams from his colleagues at Tokyo, Paris, and London all agreeing in conviction that Japan is preparing to occupy Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Please discreetly ascertain and report what foundation if any for these suspicions of Russian Ambassadors. Repeat to Peking for similar action.

POLK

File No. 861.00/956

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Have any British or Japanese warships reached Vladivostok? Department informed British cruiser *Suffolk* ordered there from Hongkong. Please advise; also report whether you consider situation requires presence of *Brooklyn* which is now at Yokohama.

POLK

File No. 861.00/956

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1918, 7 p. m.*

Your January 5, 10 p. m. British Embassy informs Department British cruiser *Suffolk* ordered to proceed from Hongkong to Vladivostok to watch British interests. Has Japanese Government acted?

POLK

**444568**

File No. 861.00/954

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *January 13, 1918, 8 p. m.*

[Received January 15.]

Referring to your telegram January 8, 7 p. m.

1. This city controlled by provincial Zemstvo Committee working through machinery and minor officials installed before revolution; actual control, however, is in hands of Council Soldiers-Workmen's Deputies who have agreed to work with Zemstvo since latter accepted soldiers' delegate.

2. Zemstvo Committee control Amur Province refusing admit soldiers' delegate.

3. December 24, district general commissioner appointed by Provisional Government, seeing he could not retain office much longer, called a meeting of representatives of Zemstvo of district and organized district Zemstvo Administrative Committee of six to which he turned over his powers; this committee contains one member



from each province and one from each Cossacks' administration in this district. District capital temporarily removed to Blagoveshchensk to avoid conflict with soldiers at Khabarovsk. Each province has provincial Zemstvo Committee, that for Maritime Province sitting at Vladivostok and assuming authority turned over by provincial commissioner appointed by Provisional Government.

4. Zemstvo Committee do not recognize authority Petrograd Bolsheviks. Soldiers' councils recognize their authority and have endeavored execute their orders but have been deterred from executing most radical orders by elements which pointed out serious consequences thereof, possible violation Japanese rights and foreign intervention being always in mind.

5. In Vladivostok soldiers and sailors support primarily their council which now working with Zemstvo Committee. In Khabarovsk they refuse support Zemstvo and have proposed committee of six soldiers, six workmen and six peasants. Amur soldiers have decided to support Zemstvo.

6. Port is open and likely remain so. Trouble with ice-breaker crews does not now seem so likely unless funds for wages become exhausted. Banks here only paying 250 rubles weekly per person claiming even this soon will be impossible unless money received from Petrograd or issued here.

7. Authorities, soldiers and sailors [display] no hostility toward foreigners, being especially friendly toward Americans. The Japanese are mistrusted and feared. Only danger to the foreigners due to lack of any strong authority able furnish protection in case of such disorder as occurred in Irkutsk and which visit of foreign cruisers makes unlikely.

8. There are about 15,000 soldiers and 700 sailors in Vladivostok, and 300 sailors in Khabarovsk, total 35,000 [*sic*] troops in province.

9. Stevens's party can land with entire safety at any time. Departure for Japan was not due to hostility but as explained my telegram January 9, 10 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> because work impossible then. Also *Thomas* had provisions for few days only and impossible replenish here, city being short account of no transportation. Undesirable interpreters could not well be sent back if corps landed because Soldiers-Workmen's Council were clamoring for their release from ship even when entire corps were refused shore leave claiming we were abusing Russian citizens. Undesirable interpreters must be discharged in Japan before corps returns. Three months required complete [locomotive] shops and work stopped awaiting arrival Jaspe dredgers who should come immediately. Remainder of corps

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 216.

may be able begin work within a few weeks if situation at trouble centers along line continues to improve and if money for wages railway and port employees found by Russia or Allies.

No freight left here past week because of block near Omsk.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/948

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *January 13, 1918, 12 p. m.*

[Received *January 14, 10.54 a. m.*]

Your telegram January 11, 7 p. m. Conviction of the three Russian Ambassadors as to Japan's intentions doubtless originated from the reports of Krupenski, Russian Ambassador here, with whom I have conferred daily. He has feared and still fears occupation of places named [omission] this apprehension emanating from conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and with British Ambassador from whom he has gathered they were considering plans of occupation in case of necessity, and also on the reported preparations of Japan. My own impression from numerous conversations is that this Government has no present intention of occupation and informed it may be avoided; but the army is powerful and the general staff, I believe, would welcome and probably exaggerate any occurrence which might afford an excuse.

Conditions in Vladivostok are still reported quiet. Japanese war vessel arrived there yesterday and British cruiser due there tomorrow; Admiral Knight<sup>1</sup> arrived at Yokohama to-day.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/951

*The Japanese Chargé (Tanaka) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *January 14, 1918.*

[Received *January 15.*]

SIR: Under instructions from Viscount Motono I have the honor to acquaint you for your strictly confidential information that the Imperial Government have recently decided upon the dispatch of two warships, *Asahi* and *Iwami*, to Vladivostok for the purpose of affording protection in case of emergency to the resident Japanese

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Austin M. Knight, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

and Allied subjects and citizens and that the *Iwami* was to have arrived there on the 13th instant.

Accept [etc.]

T. TANAKA

File No. 861.00/1213

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Ambassador in Russia*

[Extract <sup>1</sup>]

Moscow, January 14, 1918.

[Copy received March 2.]

. . . . Contests between Maximalist and Siberian federationists have occurred in all the larger cities along the Siberian Railway. A battle raged an entire week at Irkutsk, twelve principal streets being devastated. The Maximalists seem to have had rather the better of the fighting there. The more westerly and southwesterly portions of Siberia are securely federationist. A Siberian republic, designed to bridge over the present period of anarchy and to further the formation of a general Russian federation, is in formation at Omsk [Tomsk?]. The Siberian Railway is operated with more success than the railways of northern and central Russia. Food is abundant. The people are prosperous and self-reliant. . . .

MADDIN SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/945

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*<sup>2</sup>

No. 2043

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: The American Government has not failed to give careful consideration to the plan proposed by the Government of the Republic of France and communicated in your excellency's note of January 8, 1918, having in view the protection of the foreign residents of Irkutsk and eastern Siberia whose lives were reported to be threatened by the growth of anarchy in Siberia.

It is noted that the Government of France has under consideration the immediate sending to Harbin and thence to Irkutsk of the largest

<sup>1</sup> Printed in full, vol. I, p. 338.

<sup>2</sup> Substance transmitted to the Ambassador in Great Britain by telegram No. 6262, and to the Ambassador in Japan and the Minister in China by unnumbered telegrams, Jan. 16, 4 p. m., with instructions to "communicate to the Government to which you are accredited."

possible French force to be detailed from the corps of occupation in China and hopes for the cooperation of the Allies and a joint arrangement for the organization of a military mission. Your excellency's Government further proposes that China, as one of the Allies, should be asked to detail for the proposed mission such contingents of troops as may be available and that the accession of Russian military elements also should be asked since the object of the proposed mission is to support those elements in Siberia which have "remained true to the cause of the Entente."

Your excellency further, in obedience to the instructions of your Government, suggests the adhesion and cooperation of the American Government in the execution of the proposed plan.

In reply I have the honor to state that a telegram dated the 10th instant at Harbin reported the situation at Irkutsk on the 9th as quiet and stated that the consuls were active in protecting foreigners. This would seem to indicate that the earlier reports, which appear to have come from Petrovski Zavod, two hundred miles east of Irkutsk, greatly exaggerated the danger to the foreign residents.

The American Government is disposed to believe that such a military mission as is proposed is not required by the present condition of affairs in Siberia. It is believed that it would be likely to offend those Russians who are now in sympathy with the aims and desires which the United States and its cobelligerents have at heart in making war and might result in uniting all factions in Siberia against them. The American Government regrets, therefore, that it is unable to give its support to the proposals as suggested in your excellency's note.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.11/967

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, January 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 5.35 p. m.]

In order that Admiral Knight might have benefit first-hand information he joined me yesterday in talks with my colleagues, the French, the British, and the Russian Ambassadors. Subsequently I had informal conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs; from these talks and other reliable information we agreed on the following facts:

As a result of requests from the consuls growing out of the fear that serious disorders, reported to have occurred elsewhere, might be repeated at Vladivostok the British Government and the Japanese Government dispatched war vessels to that port. Neither before nor since their arrival have disorders occurred and the messages received to date report everything perfectly quiet. While deeming additional ships unnecessary the Japanese Government would have no objection whatever to the presence of *Brooklyn* at Vladivostok. If, however, conditions should hereafter require occupation of Vladivostok and the lines of the Chinese Eastern and Amur Railways, Japan asks that this task be left to her alone and has definitely requested the British Government to agree to this as evidence of confidence of the Allies in her good faith, and is greatly pleased at reported refusal of our Government to a suggested plan joint occupation if conditions should require more drastic action.

Would suggest for consideration of the Department that the *Brooklyn* be directed to remain at Yokohama to be in readiness to proceed to Vladivostok if conditions there become threatening. This would leave Admiral Knight in a position to act with but little delay, and would also leave the United States free from the appearance of joining in a demonstration to coerce the authorities in control of Vladivostok at a time when no necessity for such coercion is apparent.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/968

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, January 17, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received January 18, 1.55 a. m.]

Supplementing my January 17, 5 p. m. I have just received the following telegram from Caldwell:

January 16, 7 p. m. Is *Brooklyn* at Yokohama? Additional Japanese cruiser *Asahi* is due to-morrow. Considered superfluous and produces situation making presence here of Admiral Knight with the *Brooklyn* most desirable if not imperative. This view has been expressed voluntarily by Russian officials, British consul and commander British cruiser.

Japanese Government confirms statement that the cruiser *Asahi* will arrive Vladivostok to-morrow; also supply ship will follow shortly. Including ice breaker this will total four Japanese naval vessels in port and one English; Admiral Knight doubts whether the addition of *Brooklyn* will allay feeling as reported by Caldwell and

fears it may result in including us in suspicions now entertained by the Russian peoples of Japan's intentions.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/945

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your January 17, 5 p. m. and 10 p. m. You are instructed to call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and in oral conversation remind him of the attitude of this Government towards a military mission to Siberia as set forth in Department's telegram of January 16, 4 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> in which you were informed of the reply made to the French proposals, declining to cooperate in a joint military expedition to Irkutsk and expressing the conviction that a military mission to Siberia would have disastrous results. The American Government has not learned since that France has taken any action in the direction proposed. The American Government feels very strongly that the common interests of all the powers at war with Germany demand from them an attitude of sympathy with the Russian people in their present unhappy struggle and that any movement looking towards the occupation of Russian territory would at once be construed as one hostile to Russia and would be likely to unite all factions in Russia against us thus aiding the German propaganda in Russia. The American Government trusts the Imperial Japanese Government will share this conviction and hopes that no unfortunate occurrence may make necessary the occupation of Vladivostok by a foreign force. The information received by this Government indicates that the situation there is quiet and is not one to cause alarm. You will say to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that in the opinion of the American Government the presence of more than one Japanese war vessel at Vladivostok at present is likely to be misconstrued and create a feeling of mistrust as to the purposes of the Allied Governments which Japan does not desire any more than the United States.

POLK

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated Jan. 21, 7 p. m., to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 6313) and France (No. 3092) "for your information and to be shown informally to Government to whom you are accredited," and to the Minister in China, "for your confidential information and not to be communicated to Chinese Government."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, *ante*, p. 28.

File No. 861.00/993

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 23, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received January 24, 9.58 a. m.]

3086. Department's No. 3092, January 21.<sup>1</sup> On seeing Mr. Pichon at the Foreign Office this afternoon, informally showing him copy of the telegram sent to the American Ambassador at Tokyo, he explained to me at considerable length the original attitude of the French Government toward sending a joint military expedition to Irkutsk. He said that what prompted his Government to send out the circular note to the Allied Governments was the killing of three French citizens at that place by Russians. He had felt that united action on the part of such powers as England, France, Japan, and the United States in sending such a military expedition would have a salutary effect. He informed me that the answer from the British Government was rather evasive and not at all encouraging while the reply he received from Japan was very clear and direct after stating that Government had asked to be allowed to meet the situation by sending its own war vessels exclusively without the cooperation of the other Governments. Mr. Pichon however expressed great respect for the views of the American Government as conveyed in its telegram to Tokyo. Under the circumstances I do not think that the French Government will press the matter further. Nevertheless he said that he had very little confidence in either the strength or the good faith of the Russian government as now constituted. I find that this feeling is quite prevalent in governmental circles. The French press has been for a long time very uncomplimentary in its reference to anything coming out of Petrograd or the conferences being held at Brest Litovsk. I learned to-day from inside and authoritative sources that French troops at the front not only decline to have any comradeship whatever with the Russian soldiers early sent over to the west front—none of whom are now put into the trenches—but that the commanding officers keep them apart from each other so that there will be no danger of hostile encounters between them.

SHARP

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 31.

File No. 861.00/999

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 24, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received January 25, 2.34 a. m.]

8388. Your 6313, January 21, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Balfour informed as instructed. He intimated that as things are at the moment he agreed with your position but events may at any time create a different situation. I discover a growing conviction that the Bolshevik régime will soon end and that southern Russia will come forward as the real Russia but no British diplomatic change in attitude to Russia has taken place. The British Ambassador has arrived from Petrograd. I am to see him to-morrow and will report if I learn anything worth while.

PAGE

Proposed Japanese Occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway—The Reported Activities of German and Austro-Hungarian Prisoners—British and Japanese Support of Semenov

File No. 861.00/1003

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 24, 1918, midnight.

[Received January 25, 10.55 a. m.]

3092. Following joint telegram dated Jassy, January 22, received from Ministers of United States, Italy, France and England:

It is confirmed to us on all sides both from Russian and Rumanian sources that the only remedy for the anarchy reigning in Russia lies in the sending immediately to that country of Japanese or American troops.

1. All Russian or Ukrainian officers assert that if the government of Kiev succeeds in maintaining its independence and in forming an army it will not only not want to fight but will also refuse to occupy the line trenches. The Ukrainian army, like the present Russian army, will not admit the idea that the war can recommence. It is ready for anything rather than to fight. Only an inter-Allied impetus could change this state of affairs.

2. Three or four Japanese or American divisions would suffice to ruin the authority of the Bolsheviks and to rally around them with the defenders of order those who to-day are hiding and dare not voice their opinion. A real army could quickly be formed round

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 31.



this nucleus. All Russians agree in asserting that the soldiers would easily accept a very strict discipline coming from abroad.

3. This statement is still more serious since, if the impetus does not come from the Allies, it will come perforce from our enemies. It is evident that on the one side Russian patriots and on the other landed proprietors and capitalists, for the most part Germanized Jews, desire above all: the former, the preservation of the Russian state, the latter, security of property. If they cannot hope for these essential guarantees from the Allies they will demand them from the Germans.

4. Numerous inter-Allied technical experts declare that to all intents and purposes there is no great difficulty in bringing the Japanese or Americans to Russia and retaining the eastern bases of the Trans-Siberian once occupied by the Allies. Several armored trains would speedily insure control of the [line].

5. The moral effect would be enormous in Russia and again the situation would be accepted by all in the same way as would be the organization of Russia by our enemies if we failed to take the initiative.

6. Already the Maximalist army, however insignificant, endangers the freedom of movement of the Cossacks and Ukrainians and threatens communications with Russia. It is easy to foresee in the near future that this army, thanks to the German command, will undertake the conquest of southern Russia. A few German divisions of cavalry would suffice to break down all resistance and would serve as the nucleus of the organization of German order. On the contrary all the hesitating elements, especially the Ukrainians, declare that they will definitely side with us if we help them from a military point of view in good time. If not [omission] the French commissioner at Kiev, the hands stretched out to Germany grow more numerous and the gesture more suppliant.

7. The sending to Russia of inter-Allied troops even in small numbers would immobilize a much larger number of enemy troops. In fact our military intervention would have the double advantage of permitting the prolongation of resistance of the Rumanian army and at the same time the constitution of a Russian army of mercenaries.

8. The general impression here is that if the question has not yet been settled it is because it has not been presented in a proper light either owing to the fact that the importance of the effort necessary has been exaggerated or that the attention of the Americans and Japanese has not been roused to the extreme gravity of the danger which threatens them more directly than the other Allied powers if we leave the field free to the Germans in Russia.

9. This expeditionary force could be sent without any weakening of the western front if it consisted of Japanese or even Chinese troops who if well stiffened could be used with advantage in such a theater. If the Japanese Government persists in refusing its assistance the means of obtaining it might consist of the sending of a small American corps, seconded by the Chinese, Japan being clearly unable

to disassociate herself from an action having its base in the Far East.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1096

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 112

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy have received a telegram from the Foreign Office stating that recent changes in Russian conditions suggest to His Majesty's Government the necessity for a change in Allied policy.

A few weeks ago there appeared to be no political or military forces in Russia, outside the area ruled by the Bolsheviki, which could or would do anything to aid the cause for which the Allies are fighting. The whole country presented a spectacle of unredeemed chaos.

Now, however, local organisations appear to have sprung up in south and southeast Russia which, with encouragement and assistance, might do something to prevent Russia from falling immediately and completely under the control of Germany. Amongst these the most important are the various Cossack organisations to the north of the Caucasus, and the Armenians to the south. The former control the richest grain-growing districts of the country and almost all the iron and coal. The latter, now that the Russian Army has ceased to count, will supply the chief bulwark against the Turanian movement.

The advantage of assisting them is, therefore, obvious, but the difficulty is how this shall be done. They cannot be reached effectively by the Baltic or Black Sea, nor through Persia and the south. The Siberian Railway is the one remaining line of communication possible. The British General Staff are strongly of opinion that this line ought to be used and that it could be used if the Japanese would give their assistance. At first sight the great length of the line to be guarded might seem to prohibit the scheme, but a different view is taken by the professional advisers of His Majesty's Government.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the scheme is practicable from a military point of view; that the Allies are prepared to invite the Japanese as their mandatories to undertake it; and that the Japanese are ready to accept the invitation; it might perhaps be argued that such a scheme, even if successful, would do more harm

than good to the Allied cause in Russia. It would involve the temporary control by foreigners of many thousands of miles of Russian railway, and those foreigners would be drawn from the very nation by which Russia was defeated within recent memory. It might be thought that Russian susceptibility would be deeply wounded by such a project. All the information, however, which His Majesty's Government have been able to collect, appears to indicate that the Russians would welcome some form of foreign intervention in their affairs, and that it would be more welcome in the shape of the Japanese, engaged as mandatories of the Allies with no thought of annexation or future control, than in the shape of the Germans who would make Russia orderly only by making it German.

The difference from the Allied point of view is very great indeed. While the war continues, a Germanised Russia would provide a source of supply which would go far to neutralise the effects of the Allied blockade. When the war is over a Germanised Russia would be a peril to the world. His Majesty's Government think that the scheme outlined above is the only way of averting these consequences and provides the only machinery by which such militant forces as southeast Russia still possesses, may be effectually aided in their struggle against German influences on the west and Turkish attacks on the south.

His Majesty's Government desire, therefore, to press the scheme on the favourable consideration of the United States Government, and would request an urgent decision as events are moving rapidly in Russia.

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/1037

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *January 31, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received January 31, 1.01 p. m.*]

Have received from Embassy Japan a copy verbal message delivered to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I appreciate Department's attitude but am certain visit of Admiral Knight would not be considered as military expedition against Siberia but as friendly act lending moral support to all Russians in favor law and order and as guaranteeing that Japan will go no further than necessary. Will send full report by next steamer.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1049

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*[Telegram—Extracts<sup>1</sup>]

PARIS, February 3, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received February 4, 3 a. m.]

3138. My 3092, January 24,<sup>2</sup> and 3100, January 26.<sup>3</sup> On account of the importance of the intelligence conveyed in these two telegrams, coming to the Foreign Office from Jassy by wireless, I have thought that an account of a conversation which I have had with my Russian colleague, Mr. Maklakov, apropos thereto might be interesting to the Department. . . .

As to the [intervention] threatened by armed forces of the Allied powers and particularly Japan, he believed such a course would have a disastrous effect not only on his own country but upon the cause of the Allies. He said that he had a personal acquaintance with Mr. Potanin, president of the newly constituted government of Siberia at its capital of Omsk [Tomsk], that he knew by personal knowledge that Siberia was to-day decidedly anti-Maximalist. He believed further that the participation of Japan in any movement to restore order or to interfere in Russian affairs would arouse a unitedly hostile sentiment against the Allied powers as such an act would be looked upon with grave suspicion. . . .

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1048

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, February 4, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received February 4, 4.31 p. m.]

Practically all the guests in the principal hotel here were robbed February 4, 3 a. m., by thirty armed men in militia uniforms, booty estimated 1,000,000 rubles; one American robbed of over 5,000 rubles and passport and one Frenchman lost 53,000 rubles. Rooms occupied at least an hour and half but police officers did not appear. There was no shooting or violence as the robbers secured admittance to rooms as militia inspecting passports, then held up occupants with pistols and bayonets. Robberies becoming more frequent, Japanese

<sup>1</sup> Printed in full, vol. I, p. 366.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 33.<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 663.

being frequently assaulted and robbed on streets and in their shops. Japanese Consul some time ago demanded, and Consular Corps is now jointly demanding, better protection, but we anticipate no improvement as the authorities powerless. Public opinion expressed that this hotel robbery will induce foreign intervention.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/1098

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 153

MEMORANDUM

With reference to their memorandum No. 112 of January 28, the British Embassy have received a further telegram from the Foreign Office directing them to suggest to the United States Government that if it is decided to approach the Japanese Government on the subject, the opinion of the latter should be invited as to the feasibility of the occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway and further as to whether they would be willing to undertake this operation.

His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that, provided the means of transport are available, it would be in the power of the Japanese Army to occupy the whole Trans-Siberian Railway, as they are informed that no organised military opposition is to be expected.

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1918.

[Received February 7.]

---

File No. 861.00/1058

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 154

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have to-day received instructions from the Foreign Office to inform you that the Russian Minister at Peking has suggested to his British colleague that funds and munitions should be furnished to assist the operations of Captain Semenov in the Trans-Baikal Province.

Captain Semenov, as you have perhaps already heard, is in command of various troops on the Manchurian Railway at Hailar and at Dastufya [Dauriya], about 30 miles from Manchuria Station. The operations which Captain Semenov proposes to undertake include a local operation designed to secure the control of the Trans-

Siberian Railway in the Trans-Baikal Province, involving the occupation of Karymskaya at the junction of the Amur and Siberian Railways, which would enable Captain Semenov to control traffic on the former railway, and to stop the entry of munitions for the revolutionary party in the Primorsk and Amur Provinces. The next step would be the occupation of Chita and, later, of Verkhneudinsk, with the disarmament of the local Bolsheviks. This would, in Captain Semenov's opinion, secure order in the Trans-Baikal Province. The British Minister at Peking reports that this operation seems to be a practical one and to have good chances of success.

The principal resistance in the Trans-Baikal Province is anticipated from a small force of some nine hundred railway workmen at Chita who have been organised as Red Guards, but a small well-organised force should find little difficulty in dealing with this resistance. Captain Semenov estimates that enemy prisoners on the line between Dastufya and Baikal are about as follows: 10,000 to 15,000 distributed among the peasants; 1,400 at Dastufya; 10,000 to 15,000 unguarded at Chita; and 800 officers and 4,000 men at Verkhneudinsk. Most of these are Austrians and Turks and he thinks it doubtful whether they would be able or willing to escape in the winter.

Captain Semenov's force is at present only 750 strong, 450 of them being officers, cadets and Cossacks, and 300 Mongols. Of the Cossacks 100 are guarding prisoners at Dastufya. The force is armed mainly with Berdan rifles and Captain Semenov has asked for Allied aid in securing machine guns, rifles, howitzers and other munitions. He believes that he is now strong enough to occupy Karymskaya but fears that he might lose it again and is unwilling to risk starting his undertaking with a failure. If he can be supplied with a proportion of the munitions for which he has asked he is ready to occupy and hold Chita and Karymskaya. He proposes to enlarge his force to a total of 3,000 by the enlistment of officers and Cossacks who are returning from the front, but does not expect that the latter will be ready to fight for approximately a month.

Captain Semenov is a Cossack with some reputation as a practical soldier. He is independent of General Horvat in Manchuria and is in sole charge of operations there. He is anxious to commence his movement as early as possible as he thinks the present situation favourable, and anticipates that it may shortly become more difficult.

Should the scheme sketched above be carried out successfully Captain Semenov proposes, as a second operation, to place himself under some well-known leader and to move westward, capturing Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, where considerable resistance is likely, and

uniting with Dutov's Cossacks with the object of eventually joining Kaledin.<sup>1</sup>

The British Minister further reports that the question of the control of the railway is being taken up by General Horvat and other senior officers at Harbin; if aid is supplied it would be necessary to see that it was not diverted to the new railway force under General Samoilov, which it is intended to use to replace the Chinese troops now on the Chinese Eastern Railway: and none of the officers concerned seem to be so suitable as Captain Semenov for the grant of aid from Allied sources. The cost of assisting Captain Semenov is estimated at about 562,000 roubles a month for a force of 3,000 officers and men. This does not include the initial cost of munitions, clothing, etc., but it is thought that the total expenditure necessary would amount, at the present rate of exchange, and after the initial cost has been provided for, to about 10,000 pounds a month. The latest information which has reached this Embassy as to Captain Semenov's progress, dated the 30th ultimo, was to the effect that his advance along the railway was being successfully continued, that he had occupied Olovyannaya, some 18 hours by rail from Manchuria, and seized the Bolshevik supplies of rifles there, and that there seemed to be grounds for the belief that the occupation of Chita and Irkutsk would present no very great difficulties.

In reply to his communication mentioned above the British Minister at Peking has been informed that the British Government feel that it is of the greatest importance to support any purely Russian movement in Siberia the leaders of which are ready, as Captain Semenov appears to be, to act with energy. Steps are therefore to be taken through the British Consulate at Harbin, to let Captain Semenov's followers know that the British Government propose to support him with money, and also with arms and ammunition, as far as these can be made available. The British Minister is to consult with his Russian colleague as to the most practicable way of giving this assistance, possibly through the Russian Legation or possibly through the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank at Harbin. Enquiries are also being made as to what numbers of the Russian officers now at Vladivostok would be prepared to serve with Captain Semenov.

In informing you of the above I am instructed to add that the British Government feel that it is clearly advantageous to the Allied cause to give encouragement to any movement of purely Russian origin which has indications of being successful. In order to be effective it is necessary that any support given to Captain Semenov should be given at once, and the British Minister at Peking has

---

<sup>1</sup>Ataman of the Don Cossacks.

therefore, as already indicated, been authorised to assure Captain Semenov that financial support will be given, and endeavours are being made to procure for him locally supplies of arms and ammunition. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the United States Government will concur in their views as to supporting Captain Semenov, and that they will be ready, if they agree with the course of action proposed, to participate in this action, and in the expenses which will be necessary to carry it out.

It should be added that, while Captain Semenov has hitherto been successful, it is of course not certain that his success will necessarily continue. The British Government would suggest therefore that his movement should not be allowed to defer urgent consideration of the scheme already suggested under which Japanese occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway would be sought.

I am [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

File No. 861.00/1097

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*<sup>1</sup>

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has given careful consideration to the memoranda of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Nos. 112 and 153, received respectively on January 28 and February 7, 1918, which communicate the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government that recent changes in Russian conditions suggest the need for a change in Allied policy, that certain local organizations appear to have sprung up in south and southeast Russia which, with encouragement and assistance, might do something to prevent Russia from falling immediately and completely under the control of Germany. His Britannic Majesty's Government call attention furthermore to the fact that the only way in which assistance can be given these organizations is over the Siberian Railway and state that the British General Staff are strongly of opinion that this line ought to be used and that it could be used if the Japanese would give their assistance.

The information collected by His Britannic Majesty's Government appears to indicate that the Russians would welcome some form of foreign intervention and that it would be more welcome in the shape of the Japanese engaged as mandatories of the Allies with no thought of annexation or future control than in the shape of the Germans who would make Russia orderly by making it German.

<sup>1</sup> Substance transmitted to the French and Italian Embassies, Feb. 14, and to the Chinese and Belgian Legations, Feb. 18 (File Nos. 861.00/1117a, 1249).



The later memorandum, No. 153, communicates the suggestion of His Britannic Majesty's Government that if it is decided to approach the Japanese Government on the subject, the opinion of the latter should be invited as to the feasibility of the occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and further as to whether they would be willing to undertake the operation. The memorandum states further that His Britannic Majesty's Government are of the opinion that, provided the means of transport are available, it would be in the power of the Japanese Army to occupy the whole Trans-Siberian Railway.

The information in the possession of the American Government does not lead it to share the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government that any form of foreign intervention in the affairs of Russia would be welcomed by the people of that country. It is believed on the contrary by the Government of the United States that any foreign intervention in Russian affairs would, at the present time, be most inopportune.

The American Government is not indifferent to the effect which the unfortunate condition of Russia at the present time is having upon the plans of the Allies, but it has not lost hope of a change for the better to be brought about without foreign intervention. Should such intervention unfortunately become necessary in the future, the American Government is disposed at present to believe that any military expedition to Siberia or the occupation of the whole or of a part of the Trans-Siberian Railway should be undertaken by international cooperation and not by any one power acting as the mandatory of the others.

WASHINGTON, *February 8, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/1074

---

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *February 8, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received *February 9, 4 a. m.*]

Reports from Vladivostok and eastern Siberia generally indicate growing disorder. Stevens, who is in Harbin investigating conditions, telegraphs me, "Prospect dubious. The situation in my opinion grave. The Allies should act vigorously or they may later on be at war to hold north [route] across the Pacific." Japanese Government is seriously discussing some plan of immediate action but desires approval of Allies. In extended conversation February 5, 5 p. m., Viscount Motono explains the reason to me his convictions that there should be a frank exchange of views between the Allies in an effort to reach a uniform policy towards Russia. He feared the

American Government was not fully informed as to actual conditions in eastern Siberia and their possible effect on the peace of the Far East. He was making a careful study of the situation and had sought advise me on the military aspects of the problem.

While not prepared to state any definite conclusion, either personally or officially, he was more inclined to the view that some plan of action ought to be agreed upon by the Allied powers to prevent spread of German influence in Asia by Siberia. He doubted whether it was wise to leave the moderate element in Russia without some support from the Allies which would hearten them in their effort to keep Russia true to the declaration of no separate peace.

He believed that such support would be welcomed by all the moderate element who might otherwise find it impossible resist growing German influence. He realized that America's position was somewhat different from the other Allies, not being a party to the declaration of no separate peace. He also appreciated that the view toward which he inclined seemed inconsistent with the views indicated in the recent oral communication in reference to Vladivostok. When I inquired whether he had considered what action ought to be taken, he replied that he had no definite plans at the moment but he continued, exhibiting map of eastern Siberia showing localities now under Bolshevik influence, that the control up to the junction of the Trans-Siberian and Amur Railways would in his judgment effectively prevent the spread of German influence in the Far East. He concluded by again emphasizing the purely personal character of these tentative views which he submitted for transmission in the hope that they might call forth an equally frank expression of views from our Government. He to-day repeated his views to the British Ambassador for transmission to his Government, likewise requesting exchange of views.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1081

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, February 8, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received February 11, 1.27 p. m.]

2347. Siberia, with population eighteen millions and area twice ours, productive soil, rich in minerals and forests, is planning separate government whose representative called and states constitutional convention elected by people will meet in March and determine character of government and name officials. Expressed a desire to establish close commercial relations with us and welcome American

capital. I promised to recommend loan if government formed on proper lines and could satisfactorily guarantee products not being sold to Germany during war. Sentiment of country is conservatively socialistic, but opposes Bolshevism. Siberia is best hope of Russia and its people are extremely solicitous concerning Japanese domination. Planning to send representative to convention; cannot go myself.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1066

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, February 8, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received February 8, 10.40 a. m.]

French Ambassador has just received instructions from his Government to join his British colleague in acceding to request of the Japanese Government reported my telegram of January 17, 5 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> for free hand in the event of intervention in Siberia. British Ambassador has as yet received no reply from his Government.

MORRIS

File No. 811.20293/15a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

There are conflicting reports received here as to conditions in eastern Siberia. Please have . . . , if possible, visit various places and report to you.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1080

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 11, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received February 11, 10.17 a. m.]

Drysdale already in Siberia to investigate report. Do you desire your instruction of February 9, 6 p. m., carried out?

REINSCH

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 29.

File No. 861.00/1080

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your February 11, 12 a. m. Department wants reports from several observers and would like instruction of February 9, 6 p. m., carried out if possible. This matter is urgent. The Department wants to know as soon as possible the proportion of railway towns east of Irkutsk held by Bolsheviki and what earnest or organized opposition, if any; also whether reports are true that German and Austrian prisoners of war are active in propagandism and what is weight of their influence.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1066

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1918, 7 p. m.

6561. American Ambassador at Tokyo has cabled that his French colleague has received instructions from his Government to join his British colleague in acceding to the request of the Japanese Government that the latter be allowed free hand in the event of intervention in Siberia. He also states his British colleague has as yet received no reply from his Government.

The British Embassy here has presented confidential memoranda suggesting: (1) that Japan, acting as the mandatory of the Allies, be asked to occupy the Chinese Eastern and Amur Railways; and (2) that the Government of the United States consider the practicability of having Japan occupy the whole Trans-Siberian Railroad.

The Government of the United States would be very glad to coincide with the position which may be taken by the Government of Great Britain and which probably has been taken by the Government of France, if the United States Government did not feel that the request made by the Japanese Government, if acceded to, might prove embarrassing to the cause of the powers at war with Germany. There are several elements which contribute to this determination:

- (1) It is considered inadvisable to take any steps which will unnecessarily antagonize at this time any of the various elements of the people which now control the power in Russia;

<sup>1</sup>The same, on the same date, to the Ambassadors in France (No. 3181) and Japan (unnumbered), with instructions to repeat to the Minister in China.

- (2) The necessity for intervention has not in the opinion of this Government arisen and decision concerning it may be postponed in order that it may be further considered in the light of circumstances as they may develop;
- (3) If the necessity for intervention should arise it may become expedient in the circumstances then existing to have military cooperation to that end by the parties at war with Germany, or by such of them as may feel they should be asked to cooperate;
- (4) Unless the matter is broached to the Government of China and consented to by it, this Government may deem it advisable to consider whether harmonious cooperation might not be promoted if such part of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as crosses the territory of China should be guarded and protected by the military forces of China.

The Government of the United States considers that it would be particularly unfortunate to do anything now which would tend to estrange from our common interests any considerable portion of the people of Russia, and that circumstances do not seem to warrant at this time a decision to take steps in Siberia which would, in its opinion, have the effect of arousing Russian opposition and resentment.

You will please make an opportunity to lay the matter orally before the authorities of the Government to which you are accredited. You will express the hope that that Government will in consideration of the views expressed agree with the Government of the United States that it will be for the best interests of the powers at war with Germany and Austria to adopt the course of action suggested and avoid a commitment at the present time.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1093

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 15, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received February 15, 11.07 a. m.]

The British are giving small amount financial support Semenov.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/2336a

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The President informs me that he desires Admiral Knight to return with the *Brooklyn* to Vladivostok

for a visit in order to observe conditions at that port. I shall be glad to have the Admiral's views of the situation, which is somewhat complex, and hope you will issue the necessary instructions for him to proceed. I believe his visit will serve to emphasize the friendly attitude which this Government has manifested consistently towards the Russian people, without regard to parties.

I would appreciate it very much if your instructions to Admiral Knight could include a request for his views as to what measures, if any, it may be advisable to take in order to safeguard from falling into German hands or serving German purposes the large quantities of supplies which have accumulated there. We have reports that German agents are commencing to be active.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo is being instructed to confer with the Admiral on the various questions in regard to Siberia which have arisen since his last visit and I hope that the Consul, who will receive like instructions, may also serve to assist him.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1037

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your telegram January 31.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of Navy is instructing Admiral Knight to visit Vladivostok to observe conditions and to emphasize friendly attitude this Government has manifested consistently toward people of Russia without regard to parties. Lend him every assistance.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1110

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, February 17, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received February 17, 5.45 p. m.]

Peking requests I transmit copy of the following telegram sent Legation by Major Drysdale:

February 15, 2 p. m. Probable German agents inciting Bolsheviks and labor organizations and for purchase supplies for Germans. Prisoners of war being released. Their organization possible menace

---

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 36.

Allied interests. Advise financial assistance to organization of Zabaikal Cossacks under Semenov and Ussuri Cossacks under Mendrin [Kalmykov?] as railway guard with Ustrugov<sup>1</sup> as head. Necessary expenditures to be supervised. These forces if assisted financially will have little difficulty in controlling zone of railway from Vladivostok to Karymskaya thus insuring protection Allied interests. American, British, and French Consuls Vladivostok and Harbin all advise some such effort necessary. I can see no probability of explanation [compromising] our interests by such a move and our interests certainly would be protected thereby. If scheme of financial assistance approved my return Harbin necessary immediately. Please advise me United States Consulate at Vladivostok. Drysdale.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1113

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegrám]

LONDON, *February 18, 1918, 11 p. m.*

[Received February 19, 5.30 a. m.]

8723. Your 6561, February 13, 7 p. m. Mr. Balfour informs me that his Government has not committed itself to any policy or action touching Siberia. The only act that could possibly be regarded as contrary to this sweeping assertion is a request made by a British military commander that the Japanese Army supply arms to Semenov, a Russian leader who wishes to cut the line of possible communication of Germans and Vladivostok, and even this was not a request made by the British of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government has not been approached on the subject of Siberia by the British Government at all. All that the British Government has telegraphed to its representatives at Washington and Tokyo were preliminary inquiries, and the plan once under discussion of asking Japan to occupy the railways was not carried out and has been abandoned.

In the course of a long conversation Mr. Balfour informed me that he is now trying to get his Government to formulate some sort of Siberian policy to be discussed with the American Government and his [the] Allies; but that the Cabinet has not yet taken the subject up. In a recent discussion the French Ambassador here, Cambon, asked Balfour if he would take up the subject with the French without taking it up with the United States and Balfour answered "No." He remarked to me: "You may be assured that I will not recede from that position."

<sup>1</sup> L. A. Ustrugov, formerly Assistant Minister of Ways of Communication under Kerensky; Feb. 9, 1918, Minister of Ways of Communication in the provisional Siberian government.

He remarked during the conversation that in his own opinion the Japanese were afraid of a possible German advance eastward through Russia and that if such an advance should threaten to reach the Pacific the Japanese might oppose it on their own account.

PAGE

File No. 861.00/1155½

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier), to  
the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 19, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received February 20, 11.25 a. m.]

9. For the Secretary of State and Colonel House:

General . . . officer on General Foch's staff, showed me to-day in confidence a paper which had been submitted by the British War Office to the French General Staff for its consideration. The subject of this paper was Japanese intervention in Siberia and it was dated the 15th instant. The substance is as follows:

A resolute Japanese intervention in Siberia by taking possession of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok to Chelyabinsk would: (1) reenforce the national element in Russia and Siberia to the detriment of the forces of anarchy; (2) save Rumania; (3) prevent the Germans from withdrawing their troops to the western front.

The Japanese are ready to act and would require only six and one-half divisions. They only stipulate that they shall be allowed to act alone in order to obtain the consent of the nation to this operation. Great Britain and France have accepted the principle of the operation and are desirous of overcoming the attitude of hesitation on the part of the United States.

The paper opposes the argument that the appearance of Japanese troops in Siberia would unite all Russian elements against the invaders by the statement that according to information from Siberia and Russia described as certain all the orderly elements in these two countries demand an energetic intervention and that all classes of Russian society have appealed for a Japanese intervention, many Russian officers having even asked to serve with the invading Japanese forces.

The paper concludes with the observation that if German domination over Russia and Siberia is a great danger, a German-Japanese domination over the entire world would be a still more formidable peril which could be eliminated by bringing Japan effectively and directly in opposition to Germany, a thing which the Japanese seem to have avoided since the beginning of the war,



As a disadvantage the paper admits that Japanese prestige would be increased at the expense of French, British and American prestige in the Orient by such intervention but that Japan would gain no material benefit as her people are not psychologically constituted to dominate or administer foreign populations as the history of the Japanese occupation of Korea and Formosa demonstrates. In this connection I heard yesterday from a reliable source that France is contemplating sending a special Ambassador to Siberia.

FRAZIER

File No. 861.00/1123

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, February 19, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received February 20, 2.48 a. m.]

Reports received by my colleague from French Consulate at Vladivostok concerning conditions there very disquieting. No confirmation from Caldwell or British Consul. I am reliably informed that both Japanese Government and Great Britain are giving aid to Cossack movement in Siberia. Notwithstanding the strict censorship rumors are current of increased activity in Japanese military circles. I cannot confirm these rumors as the utmost secrecy is maintained as to movement of troops or supplies. The present administration is being severely criticized in the Diet and press for not taking more resolute measures to protect Japanese interests in Siberia and may be forced to take some action or to resign. In conference with Viscount Motono to-day, he showed great reluctance to discuss situation in Siberia. He appeared worried and I thought was disappointed that his request for some definite expression of views from the Allies on their attitude toward Russia had not as yet been answered.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1128

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 20, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received February 21, 6 a. m.]

3221. Referring to the Department's No. 3181 of the 13th instant.<sup>1</sup> Last night I had a long talk with Mr. Pichon concerning the situation to which reference is therein made. Upon explaining fully to him the position of our Government, point by point, he replied that

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 45.

while appreciating its viewpoint and recognizing that the Allies could not with propriety indorse any other position than that agreeable to our wishes, yet the gravity of the situation presented at this moment was very great. He likened it to a house on fire and expressed the hope that our Government would not defer action until it was too late to remedy the evil threatened by German occupation and pacification of Russia. He expressed the firm conviction that once Germany had taken possession of Petrograd, which he believed to be imminent, such order in Russian affairs would be restored by them as will enable them to be placed in an impregnable position.

He further ventured the interesting information that it was only contemplated to have Japan enter Siberia to take possession of the railroad after an amicable understanding had first been made with the Russian authorities. He did not however explain the manner in which such consent would first be obtained nor what particular governmental authority nor how acceptable to the mass of Russians would be such an arrangement even if entered into by the Bolshevik government. He was, however, very emphatic in expressing the belief that events might go to such an extent that Japan would feel called upon in the face of the threatened menace of German progress in Russian territory to undertake the initiative herself without the consent of the Allied powers. He said that Japan had already requested that whatever outside intervention was to be made in Russian affairs, she alone might assume the entire responsibility.

The telegraphic news published this morning to the effect that Trotsky and Lenin had accepted the German conditions of peace, if true, would seem to create a very serious situation which might render imperative the promptest and most united concert of action by all the Allies.

In a conversation this noon with Mr. de Margerie of the Foreign Office he said that it was his opinion that Japan might go so far as to deliver an ultimatum to the other Allied powers in which, on account of the menace to the ultimate security of her own interests, she would demand their consent to enter Siberia with her armies. He predicted the entrance of German troops into Petrograd within the next few days.

A number of the principal afternoon papers comment in leading editorials upon the gravity of the latest news from the East and unite in expressing the belief that the bars being let down, Germany is likely to set no limit to the extent of her advances in Russian territory, even to the occupation of Siberia and Vladivostok. Several of these journals point out the necessity of Japan's active intervention and express the hope that America will no longer advocate further indulgence toward the Russian authorities. The denunciation of Trotsky and Lenin is very bitter in tone.

While I cannot but believe that these views as expressed in the French press as to the danger of Germany's extension of possession very far into the vast stretches of Russian territory are extreme, yet undeniably there would be practically universal satisfaction here if Japanese troops should now enter Siberia with the object of heroically restoring order and opposing her authority against that of Germany in affairs.

As opposing the problem of the added complications and possible dangerous consequences to follow after the war of Japanese occupation of such a vast Russian territory, it would seem fair to consider the [omission] fact that the Central powers, by such action, may come to feel for the first time the full weight of Japan's part in the war. They would also have to face it in such a way as might force them to recognize a greater danger on their eastern front than even a united Russia in the first years of the war was enabled to threaten.

However, more authentic information as to the actual agreement between the Trotsky government and Germany, which should be known within the next forty-eight hours, may be necessary to confirm the wisdom of the position taken by the French Government as above outlined.

SHARP

---

[For recommendations with regard to intervention, see telegrams from the Ambassador in Russia, No. 2400, February 21, 1918, and the Consul General at Moscow, No. 197, February 22, Volume I, pages 384 and 385.]

---

File No. 861.00/1138

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 21, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 5.06 p. m.]

Consul at Harbin reports German prisoners Irkutsk expecting orders from Petrograd to mobilize. Efforts are made to arm more prisoners. Chita again in hands of Bolsheviks. Russians in Harbin have raised large sum and sent first detachment to assist Semenov; other detachment to follow. Semenov has requested Japanese assistance. Russians are growing disgusted with Allied incurable [inaction], conservatives turning to Japan, and Bolsheviks to Germany. General confusion growing. Only 15 per cent of population Bolshevik, but growing.

Consul reiterates his recommendation about the railway and equipment of Russian force to establish military government, turning over [to] provisional government.

Russians, lacking leaders, helpless, discouraged, insist small Allied force is essential nucleus to inspire confidence. There is no opposition whatever among the population to use of such a force. If Allied force is impossible, Semenov at least should be supported. Thus far, Moser.<sup>1</sup>

The effect in Siberia of the resumption of hostilities by Germany against the Bolsheviks is not yet manifest. It would appear to make quick action on the part of the United States and Allies most essential as well as promising of good results. I have the honor to emphasize recommendations in the telegram of February 19, 5 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1131

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received February 21, 3.54 p. m.]

Consul Harbin now telegraphs Japanese Consul there informs him Japan is preparing military expedition to assist Russians to restore order in Siberia. Horvat also approached by agent of Japanese Government with offer of assistance. Horvat, if assured of Allied support, is willing to avail himself of leadership of conservative Russians in Siberia against Bolsheviks. Horvat now on the way to Peking.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1154

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, February 23, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received February 25, 9.33 a. m., and 26, 3.23 p. m.<sup>3</sup>]

198. I transmit the following from Poole<sup>4</sup> with my strong indorsement:

Referring to my No. 4 from Rostov, repeated in Summers's 195, February 22, 6 p. m.<sup>5</sup> I wish again earnestly to invite Department's

<sup>1</sup> Charles K. Moser, Consul at Harbin.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; renewed recommendations concerning railway operation contained in telegram from the Consul at Harbin, Feb. 3, 3 p. m., vol. III, p. 219, and added suggestions for publicity in Russia concerning America.

<sup>3</sup> In two sections.

<sup>4</sup> DeWitt C. Poole, Consul at Moscow, on detail in south Russia.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

attention need for prompt energetic action by the Allies in Siberia. It is most necessary that the operation of the Siberian Railway be at once taken over by the United States and then police of the line kindred [handed] to the Chinese and Japanese. With the Germans now practically in control of European Russia, a line of defense must be established back of the Urals under cover of which a proper provisional government for Russia may be formed which will undertake with the aid of the Allies to turn back the German invasion. This is necessary (1) as a military measure [to] deprive Germany as soon as possible of the natural resources which are now falling into her hands and (2) with a view to carrying out the war aims which have been laid down by the President with respect to Russia. If a strict policy of non-interference in Russian internal political affairs is announced, then with the Siberian Railway operated by Americans and properly policed, representatives of the healthy political elements in Russia will promptly gather at Omsk and form a new provisional government to carry Russia through to a constitutional assembly. This government will form a rallying point for the large number of Russians who still desire to fight and who may be otherwise forced into the same [Soviet?] service.

This government will welcome direct military assistance from the Allies and the odium of an uninvited foreign intervention will thus be avoided. The movement on the Don miscarried (1) because its organization base was insecure and (2) because it had no proper rear-line communication. Under the circumstances stated above a provisional government in Siberia will be free of these weaknesses. At the same time it will have the political respectability of the Don movement commanding the adhesion of all the nationalist and patriotic elements in the population because, like the Don movement, it will be national and not sectional in character. The nationalist patriotic leaders are sincerely desirous of continuing the war against Germany in order that Russia may fulfil her engagements with the Allies and avoid the reestablishment of the autocracy in Russia under German protection. On the basis of my prolonged acquaintance with these men at front I can assure the Department that the occupation of the Siberian Railway by the United States, China and Japan jointly under proper assurances for the future would not be regarded as an aggression but on the contrary as a friendly movement toward initial [united] action against the common danger and the reestablishment of order. Poole.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1136

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received February 23, 10.02 a. m.]

My telegram February 21, 3 p. m. I do not believe in the wisdom of relying on Semenov for leadership in restoring order in Siberia. He is reactionary military autocrat of the old type.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1135

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 23, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received February 23, 10.34 a. m.]

Am confidentially informed that the Japanese Government has proposed to the Chinese Government cooperation between Japan and China in restoring order in Siberia. President Feng has expressed his approval of the principle and has so instructed Chinese Minister at Tokyo. In strict confidence China asks the advice of the American Government. The Japanese have not yet given to China any details as to the form which the action proposed shall take.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1136

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1918, 8 p. m.

Your February 21, 4 p. m., February 23, 4 p. m., and February 23, 5 p. m. The attitude of the American Government is stated in a telegram of February 13, 7 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> to Tokyo which has already been repeated to you. You will communicate orally to the Foreign Office the views expressed therein.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1136½

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, February 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 24, 9.49 a. m.]

Drysdale telegraphs the following from Vladivostok, 21st: that Chinese embargo causing food shortage, also reported advance German troops into Russia creating decided reaction against Bolsheviks. Decided majority of Russian population would welcome Allied intervention to prevent German control in Siberia, even entry of Allied forces would be welcomed. Russian population would be most de-

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, ante, p. 45.

cidedly unfriendly to entry of Japanese troops if not accompanied by other Allied forces. German advance into Russia may make it advisable to send Allied troops into Siberia where economic conditions are serious due chiefly lack of funds, present exchange value of ruble and unwise measures taken by Bolsheviks. Drysdale left for Khabarovsk 22d.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/1147

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, February 24, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received February 25, 2.05 a. m.]

I am reliably informed that French Ambassador, acting under the instructions of his Government, spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday urging cooperation of Japan in buying and storing supplies in Russia to prevent same falling into German hands. Also requested Japan to discontinue all exports to Siberia.

In reply Minister for Foreign Affairs said such steps would be useless and impractical without control of railways and that exports from Japan had already been reduced to only necessities required to provide for people of Vladivostok. He further deplored the decision of the Allies in withholding consent for Japanese intervention, which became every day more imperative. He stated that all preparations had been completed for immediate action. He said that he believed America disliked the idea of intervention, but if only England and France agreed Japan could go ahead and he stated that Japan was prepared to go as far as Irkutsk and that further progress could then be discussed with the Allies. After dwelling on the dangers of delay he said that the time would soon come when Japan would not be able to wait any longer: he felt strongly that the Allies could not ignore the serious breach of faith involved in Russia's separate peace. If ignored it might lead to the defection of other Allied countries.

It might be inferred that Japan will intervene prior to arrival of Japanese Ambassador to Russia who is expected here in about ten days and it is rumored that Ambassador Francis has started for Vladivostok—if this rumor proves true I would welcome any opportunity to be of service to him—and Stevens is completing preparations and hopes railway contingent will leave Nagasaki not later than March 1.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1136

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1918, 3 p. m.

6683. Please inform the Foreign Office orally that the Department is in receipt of a telegram from Vladivostok from a reliable American army officer who has spent some time traveling in eastern Siberia investigating conditions there. He reports that the Russian population would be most decidedly unfriendly to the entry of Japanese troops unless accompanied by other Allied forces.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1165

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, February 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received February 27, 10.33 a. m.]

Ambassador Francis has telegraphed from Petrograd to Harbin, Peking and here advising us of reports of serious conditions at Irkutsk where it is alleged German prisoners are being armed by Bolsheviks to prevent the Allies' opposing Germany. Francis joins with Japanese and Chinese representatives who are planning to leave on the Trans-Siberian Railway with him and asks us to assist the Japanese and Chinese authorities at Harbin in sending sufficient forces to meet them on arrival at Irkutsk. If the reports are confirmed or the safety of the party imperiled, the whole question of intervention in Siberia is raised, as well as plan of action to protect the party. Japan is prepared to act at once, and may at any moment inquire of me the attitude of our Government. I would greatly appreciate immediate advices for my guidance.

Admiral Knight expects to reach Vladivostok March 1. He has only a small landing party. Stevens's men are without even side arms.

MORRIS

File No. 861.77/307

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1918, 8 p. m.

6705. The Japanese Government has proposed joint military occupation in Siberia between Japan and China and of the Trans-

<sup>1</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 3229).<sup>2</sup> *Id.* (No. 3242).



Siberian Railroad. The Chinese Government speaking through the Chinese Minister here has asked this Government for advice in the matter and as to what position the Chinese Government should assume in the premises. This morning in response to the question I told the Chinese Minister it would seem the wisest course, in case Japan deemed military occupation a necessity, for the Chinese Government to take over and guard that part of the Trans-Siberian Railroad system which passes through Manchuria; that it seemed wise at present to go no further than a statement as to the Manchurian portion because conditions do not now necessitate a further statement.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1173

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 28, 1918, 4 a. m.

[Received 11.15 a. m.]

3259. Department's 3229, February 26, 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup> I communicated this evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of the telegram and Mr. Pichon thereupon expressed at considerable length his views upon all the phases of the question involved in the entrance of Japanese troops into Siberia. Reiterating his views as expressed in my No. 3221,<sup>2</sup> he added that the developments of the last two or three days made it all the [more] imperative that the Japanese Army should push forward from Vladivostok.

From advices which he had received from the French Minister at Tokyo, it seemed not improbable that Japan would act independently of the Allied powers unless their consent and approval were soon forthcoming.

He mentioned as one of the ultimate possibilities growing out of such independent action, some sort of an alliance between Germany and Japan, providing for the division of Russia. This seems to me such a bold suggestion, that if any weight could be given to it, one might well question the very integrity of Japan, once she was in occupation of Siberia, whether with or without the sanction of the Allies. It would seem that the position taken by Mr. Pichon in his talk with me, that the effect on the Allied cause would be very much stronger with the entrance of Japanese troops in Siberia with

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 50.

the approval of all of the Allies, [rather] than against it or only with that of a part of them, is entirely reasonable.

He was perfectly free to say, however, that the French Government would not act in the matter unless it was by joint action in which the United States freely participated. At the same time he did not see how it was practicable for the forces of other Allied powers to join the Japanese troops. This brought out the question from me as to what he thought of Japan's request or rather expressed condition, that she be permitted to alone enter Siberia with an army. He replied that he did not know the reason and agreed with me that it would create a much better impression if such a condition had not been imposed by Japan. The Minister was very emphatic in the declaration that a full understanding and agreement would first have to be had with Japan by all the other leading Allied powers, providing for the retirement of Japanese troops from Russian soil after the war, in addition to certain other guarantees illustrating [*sic*] her part in such a campaign. He evinced a keen curiosity as to the reason for the United States Government's opposing exclusive Japanese intervention in Siberia. The same question was raised yesterday by Mr. Cambon, and Mr. Clemenceau, with whom I was talking on another matter, [when they] took occasion to point out the desirability of having a Japanese army enter Siberia as rapidly as possible. Against it all must come the discouraging fact of not only the vast extent of territory to be traversed but the poor facilities for transportation of an army and its equipment. For some months the political effect of such a move would probably outweigh its military advantage. However, the opinion of men prominent in the government is that such a move is not only now necessary, but would result in keeping the German Army not only on its eastern front, but result in keeping away food supplies and other advantages from that country in its occupation of Russian territory.

This morning the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Maklakov, [asked] for an appointment with me and later laid before me his views on the Russian situation which he frankly said had been changed by the events taking place in his country during the past two weeks. His whole talk had to do with the question of Japan's intervention and occupation by her of Siberian territory. He said that the situation in Russia was now so hopeless, though his position was full of embarrassments in so advising, yet he believed if the Japanese Army could now enter Siberia with the approval of the Allied powers including the United States, the mass of his people would feel that such action was taken in the real interest of their country. He [said] however that the United States must necessarily be party to such

a move on the part of Japan or the Russian people would look with suspicion upon the action alone of the latter power.

The known friendship for Russia of the United States and her disinterested[ness] would be a guarantee of the good intention with which such an action would be taken. He seemed to be troubled lest [Japan, after?] seizing Vladivostok, would not push her armies across Siberia by which alone she could be of help to the Allies. When I later raised this question with Mr. Pichon, he said that such a plan of simply holding Vladivostok alone would not be tolerated.

When I asked Mr. Maklakov if he thought in such a great extent of territory the Japanese Army could be of any considerable direct aid against the Germans, he said that while probably not, in so far as even ultimately reaching their present lines, yet they might be able to march into the Caucasus, preventing the resources of that country from aiding either the German or Turkish troops.

He said that he had just been informed by a young man coming from Siberia that Admiral Kolchak, former Russian commander of the Black Sea Fleet, leaving Russia upon the assumption of authority at Petrograd by the Bolsheviks, was now in Tokyo. He said that the Admiral had been one of the big men of Russia and his presence now in Tokyo was significant.

[As] having a possible bearing upon the attitude of France toward Japanese troops' taking possession of the Siberian Railway for military operations, the [Chinese] Minister told me on my interview with him Sunday that Mr. Pichon had informed him that French investors were largely interested in the bonds of that railroad.

SHARP

---

File No. 861.00/1172

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, February 28, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 3.31 p. m.]

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs has in strict confidence advised the Japanese Government that his Government entirely sympathizes with the desire of Japan to take immediate action in Siberia and is exchanging views with other Allies. The following authorized statement was issued to the press this morning:

The Imperial Government of Japan is not yet in a position to commence military activities in Siberia. The situation created by the chaotic conditions in Russia is now being carefully considered. It is believed that it will be some time before any decision will be

reached by the Government. The views of the Allied powers must be ascertained and the fullest understanding reached before a final decision can be made.

The Advisory Council of Foreign Affairs has been called to meet in special session on March 1 to consider Russian crisis.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1180

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 1, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

Drysdale telegraphs as follows from Vladivostok:

February 28. Khabarovsk quiet, feeling intensified against the Germans on account of recently reported German advance and peace demands for which reason prisoners are more strictly guarded. At Irkutsk and Vladivostok decided majority of eastern Siberian Russians and Bolsheviks are opposed to openly accepting German peace proposals. Whether peace proposals are accepted or not it seems probable Germans will finally control and get supplies from Siberia unless Allies interfere. I believe German agents now acquiring supplies for future shipment and I consider it advisable send Allied forces Irkutsk to remain till close of war to protect Allied interests.

SPENCER

---

File No. 861.00/1165

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1918, 7 p. m.

Your February 27, 4 p. m. Information received by the Department does not confirm the report of serious conditions in Irkutsk. The Department is awaiting more definite information as to Ambassador Francis's plans. You will be communicated with later.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1246

*Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

March 2, 1918.

Mr. Sookine, formerly Secretary at the Russian Embassy, called this afternoon. He said that he had come at the urgent request of

his Ambassador who could not come himself because he had gone to New York to lay the same matter before Colonel House.

He opposed the sole intervention by Japan in Siberia on the grounds—

- (1) That it would alienate the people of Siberia and Russia in general, and the population of the districts which were occupied by Japanese in particular, from the Allied cause;
- (2) That the distrust which the people of Russia felt for Japan was greater than the antipathy which they had towards Germany.

He stated that it would facilitate the German economic and political control of Russia—

- (a) By inducing the people to accept German organization and control rather than Japanese;
- (b) By offering an argument for Germany to use against the Allied cause and Japan by holding up the specter of Japanese control of Siberia and, possibly, Russia.

He advocated a military political expedition into Russia to be composed of two Japanese armed corps and such fragmentary military units as the United States, France and England could send, even if the British contingent was composed of Indian troops and the French contingent composed of such soldiers as may now be in Cochin China. He advocated a political head of this expedition to be a committee of the Allies, or an American diplomatic representative, especially designated, which, or who, would be in control of the expedition.

He argued that, while the better element of the Russian people were still opposed to Germany, he feared that Germany would diplomatically proceed in her entrance into Russia by restoring order and by bringing about organization, upon which she would predicate the argument that she desired peace, that she wanted cooperation with Russia, that she desired peaceful economic and industrial intercourse and development and could say that the only objection and obstacle to peace was the ambition of the military powers opposing Germany on the western front. He said that he feared that the Russian people might be seduced into accepting the situation and that he believed, from his interpretation of Hertling's most recent speech, that that would be the German policy.

He argued that Germany's policy in Russia would be not only military but a diplomatic endeavor to influence and control the

social, economic and industrial elements of the country. He argued that the way to offset and counteract the success of this movement would be to establish a political base as close to the eastern side of the Ural Mountains as possible and to conduct from such a base, supported by the military expedition, a campaign against the German campaign of diplomacy and propaganda.

He realized the physical difficulties preventing any military co-operation on the part of the United States and fully realized the danger consequent to the arming, releasing and organizing of the German and Austrian prisoners near Irkutsk and in Trans-Baikal, particularly with regard to destroying the railroad, or sections of the railroad, or bridges. There is one bridge right near the border of Manchuria which is one of the longest and highest bridges in the world and which, if destroyed, would break completely the line of communication and which it would take two years to rebuild.

The impression which I received from him was that he and Mr. Bakhmeteff feared the intervention of Japan as the mandatory of the Allies but were slowly coming to realize the imminence and the necessity for that particular kind of intervention but that they were endeavoring to do everything in their power to subordinate Japan to the actual supervision and control of the Allies while Japan should be in Siberia. Irrespective of this interpretation, there is considerable force to his argument and a great deal of merit in the suggestion that a political base be established in western Siberia or in eastern Russia to combat, as far as possible, the diplomatic and commercial intrigues and the propaganda of Germany. Of course, this political base would have to be supported by a large military force, much greater than two army corps, which should stretch along, protect, guard and hold the only line of communications to the eastward, which is the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

---

File No. 861.00/1180

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Spencer)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1918, 8 p. m.

Repeat to Tokyo your March 1, 1 p. m. Instruct Drysdale to proceed westward toward Irkutsk if he considers it safe to do so and report facts as to situations especially verifying or correcting

rumors of the arming of German prisoners. Repeat to Tokyo for information all future important telegrams relating to situation in Siberia and inform Department when done.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/1344c

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Spencer)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1918, 8 p. m.

Please instruct consuls in your jurisdiction to report actual conditions, facts and occurrences in Siberia and along line of railroad, with particular regard to disturbances, releasing, organizing and arming of prisoners, actions of character hostile to our aims, German or pro-German activities, etc.

The Department wants opinions and prognostications but needs specific instances and real facts in order to properly consider developments and formulate policies.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/1193

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 3, 1918, noon.

[Received 12.16 p. m.]

Palmer<sup>1</sup> in Irkutsk telegraphs as follows:

On account of anarchy regulations all commercial transactions are impossible. War prisoners are armed and organized. Maximalists are showing great discontent at Chinese embargo. They fear intervention by Japan or the Allies but such intervention is desired by almost the entire population and appears to be very urgent. Maximalists have warned consuls and foreigners that the country will make reprisals in case of need.

I have transmitted the above to Admiral Knight in Vladivostok and instructed Consul Moser in Harbin to give the Admiral all possible information from every point of view.

SPENCER

---

<sup>1</sup> William Morgan Palmer, Vice Consul.

File No. 861.00/1220

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, March 3, 1918, noon.

[Received March 4, 8.55 p. m.]

225. The Bolsheviks yesterday<sup>2</sup> signed an ignominious unconditional peace with the Central powers whose last demands embraced great part of Russia, also oil and mineral lands Batum, Kars, and Ardakhan.

Bolshevik press and attitude of authorities continue hostile to the Allies and friendly Central powers.

Prominent Russians have asked me to advise American Government that any delay in occupying Siberian Railway will result in complete domination by Germany of all Russia and control of this line which is now the only communication with outside world. If this is done the prisoners with aid of Bolsheviks will soon control line and keep same open for military purposes.

Joint intervention will be welcomed by the great majority of peaceful Russians who consider such a step as the only escape from anarchy on the one side or the restoration of autocracy under German protection on the other side.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1196

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 3, 1.18 p. m.]

Following received from Consul at Harbin for transmission to you:

March 1, 11 p. m. I am informed by high authority of new organization formed here to support Semenov under leadership of Kudachev, Horvat, Rusanov, provisional commissioner of Priamur district, Lavrov, provisional commissioner of Irkutsk. They are enlisting men and yesterday sent four field guns, fifteen machine guns to Semenov. It is proposed to organize army restoration Far East and popular government Siberia under Admiral Kolchak now in Shanghai. Semenov to advance to Irkutsk and there await support of Japanese whose money and forces already promised. Later telegrams from Semenov report Bolsheviks fighting on railway at west stations Manchuria [Manchuria Station?] and all west-bound trains being held up there. Moser.

SPENCER

<sup>1</sup> Sent Mar. 4 via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. vol. I, pp. 434 and 445.



File No. 861.00/1193

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Spencer)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1918, 7 p. m.

Your March 3, noon. How many prisoners have been released? How many are armed? Where did they get arms? What proportions Austrians and Germans? How are they officered? Send as many other facts as obtainable and please continue so to send.

POLK

File No. 861.00/1229

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 5, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 7.40 p. m.]

Consul at Harbin telegraphs in the following sense:

Railway Manchouli to Chita destroyed. This is officially confirmed. Ambassador Francis is expected arrive Vladivostok 14th via Amur. It is rumored that Bolsheviks are detaining them. Semenov retreated to Manchouli before superior well-organized Bolshevik advance bringing in dead and wounded. Bolshevik accurate fire indicates German prisoners' assistance at the field guns. Semenov's money and munitions exhausted and he must fail unless given immediate support.

Allied officials Harbin agree Siberian situation is growing worse. Russians hopeless. All proposed plans met with opposition or apathy. Fifty per cent railway workmen Manchuria are now Bolshevik, whereas a month ago obeyed chief engineer. Yesterday workmen refused to move gun trains for Semenov and attempted to destroy them but loyal Cossacks prevented. Widespread German Bolshevik propaganda responsible. Reliable observers report constant speeches favoring Germany. Fifteen thousand copies of the President's speech have been distributed in the Russian language but more direct presentation of Allied cause is essential. Political attitude is due to fear of Japanese and belief Allies will not assist Siberia except for selfish purposes. Statements constantly heard from every class that the Germans are preferable to the Japanese. The idea that the Bolsheviks will oppose the Germans is pure illusion.

SPENCER

Declaration of the American Government against Intervention, March 5, 1918: Further Discussion—Further Reports Concerning Enemy Prisoners—Japanese Offer of Support to Horvat

File No. 861.00/1246

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1918, 4 p. m.*

At your earliest opportunity you will please read to the Japanese Government the following message but leave no copy unless they request you to do so:

The Government of the United States has been giving the most careful and anxious consideration to the conditions now prevailing in Siberia and their possible remedy. It realizes the extreme danger of anarchy to which the Siberian provinces are exposed and the imminent risk also of German invasion and domination. It shares with the governments of the Entente the view that, if intervention is deemed wise, the Government of Japan is in the best situation to undertake it and could accomplish it most efficiently. It has, moreover, the utmost confidence in the Japanese Government and would be entirely willing, so far as its own feelings towards that Government are concerned, to intrust the enterprise to it. But it is bound in frankness to say that the wisdom of intervention seems to it most questionable. If it were undertaken the Government of the United States assumes that the most explicit assurances would be given that it was undertaken by Japan as an ally of Russia, in Russia's interest, and with the sole view of holding it safe against Germany and at the absolute disposal of the final peace conference. Otherwise the Central powers could and would make it appear that Japan was doing in the East exactly what Germany is doing in the West and so seek to counter the condemnation which all the world must pronounce against Germany's invasion of Russia, which she attempts to justify on the pretext of restoring order. And it is the judgment of the Government of the United States, uttered with the utmost respect, that, even with such assurances given, they could in the same way be discredited by those whose interest it was to discredit them; that a hot resentment would be generated in Russia itself, and that the whole action might play into the hands of the enemies of Russia, and particularly of the enemies of the Russian revolution, for which the Government of the United States entertains the greatest sympathy, in spite of all the unhappiness and misfortune which has for the time being sprung out of it. The Government of the United States begs once more to express to the Government of Japan its warmest friendship and confidence and once more begs it to accept

<sup>1</sup> Message to the Japanese Government repeated in telegrams Mar. 5, 8 p. m., to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 6774), France (No. 3260), and Italy (No. 1104), "for your information and guidance," with the further statement: "Copies of it were read by me this afternoon to Ambassadors of France, England, and Italy." It was also repeated to the Ambassador in Russia in telegram No. 2108, Mar. 11, 7 p. m., with Mar. 3 given erroneously as the date on which it was dispatched to Tokyo and read to the Ambassadors in Washington.

these expressions of judgment as uttered only in the frankness of friendship.

POLK

File No. 861.00/1285

*The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to the Secretary of State*

March 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The attached memorandum<sup>1</sup> was delivered by you to me on March 1, with instructions to show it to the British, French, and Italians. I showed it to the French Ambassador, and Barclay, of the British Embassy, on March 1. They read it and Barclay took a copy. The French Ambassador said that we need not wait to hear any further, but could send the telegram attached<sup>2</sup> at once, as his Government had practically made the request and was only waiting to confirm it in order to hear that we were satisfied. I told him we would wait until we heard from him and the British. On Saturday, March 2, I showed the message to the Italian Ambassador and let him take a copy. He then told me that the Italian Government had made three conditions in their discussion of this matter:

- (1) That anything done in Siberia should be satisfactory to this Government;
- (2) Action should be *not* by Japan alone;
- (3) Guaranties should be given by Japan that they do not intend to hold territory.

The Japanese Chargé came in on the 2d and asked if we had anything to say against their position. I told him we wished to be perfectly frank with him, and I would let him know in a few days. He wanted to know whether we were waiting for further facts, and I told him I would let him know, and took good care not to commit myself as to whether we had made up our mind, or as to our attitude.

On Sunday, March 3, I saw the President and discussed the situation. He instructed me to communicate with the Japanese in order to be perfectly frank with them. On March 4, I was called up and told to wait before communicating with the Japanese for further instructions. On March 5, I saw the President and went over the statement as to our position on the Siberian question. Certain changes were made, and I was instructed to send it at once to Tokyo and communicate it here.

I saw Barclay, of the British Embassy, in the absence of the Ambassador, and gave him a copy. I also gave Laboulaye, of the French Embassy, a copy, as his Ambassador was away. Barclay read me an

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The foregoing telegram to the Ambassador in Japan sent Mar. 5, after some changes had been made in the original form; see third paragraph below.

instruction that the British had sent to Tokyo based on the draft of the first telegram which I had shown him on March 1. This instruction to Tokyo from the British Government practically requested the Japanese Government to go ahead, but laid stress on the necessity for a frank declaration on the part of Japan that its motive was disinterested. I saw the Italian Ambassador at his house, and he also made a copy. The Italian Ambassador seemed to agree with our position.

On Wednesday, March 6, I sent for the Japanese Chargé and read him the telegram to Tokyo, which I told him had been sent. I talked to him a long time and tried to impress him with the fact that we were merely giving our views as to what was the wise course for the Allies and ourselves to take in this matter; it was not a question of Japan, we would have felt the same whether any other nation had been involved. I said it was just as though we were advising in regard to French action in Greece. We had been asked for our views and frankly stated them. I also reminded him that the Japanese Ambassadors in Paris and London, when this matter had been discussed at the Supreme War Council in December, agreed with Colonel House that it would be a mistake for the Japanese to go in.

He expressed himself as quite satisfied with the way the Department had put it and intimated that he was not looking for any hidden motive. He wanted to know whether we had taken this position because we felt we had not sufficient information, and wanted to know whether we might not change our position if we had further information indicating the necessity for such action. I told him that the information we had all indicated it would be a mistake for any foreign power to enter Siberia, but of course if we had the case differently presented, why we would consider the new facts as they arose, and it might be desirable for us to change our position—if, for instance, after the Germans had been in control of Russia some time, the Russian people should ask for intervention.

The day before, March 5, the Chinese Minister called, and for his information I told him the position of the Government, although he was noncommittal.

[File copy not signed]

---

File No. 861.00/1237

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 6, 5 p. m.]

Your March 4, 7 p. m. It is impossible from present information at hand to state how many prisoners released; 2,000 German prisoners

are known to be armed in Irkutsk. The proportion of Germans and Austrians actively participating with Bolsheviks not known, but Russian Legation here says that Austrians and Turks are not inclined to any activity unless stirred up to [by] Germans, the Germans however very active. It is presumed that Germans are commanded by their own officers, the proportion of officers to men prisoners being very large. Some Bolshevik forces officered by Germans. Have instructed Drysdale to proceed westward toward Irkutsk if safe to do so and to report accurately on all questions giving actual facts.

It is believed here most of the news emanating from French Consul General, Irkutsk, is slightly colored by his desire for immediate intervention on the part of Japanese but it would be impossible for him to exaggerate seriousness of situation. The number of prisoners of war in Priamur district is: officers, 4,846; men, 9,230; proportion three Austrians to one German. In the Trans-Baikal there are about 25,000, in west Siberia about 30,000 prisoners of war; this includes only prisoners in concentration camps. Impossible to estimate prisoners employed as laborers. This telegram together with my March 1, 1 p. m., March 3, noon, March 4, 5 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> March 5, 2 p. m., repeated to Tokyo under your instructions of March 4, 8 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Will continue so to repeat similar telegrams.

SPENCER

---

File No. 861.00/1241

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *March 6, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[Received 11.17 p. m.]

Local business houses declared strike and were closed to-day as protest against controls forced upon them by Soviet. The latter in retaliation last night arrested four most important members Chamber of Commerce and announce that they will be sent to Irkutsk for trial together with ten recently arrested officers of organizations in charge of private cargo in customs and elsewhere and if sent it is very possible they may be killed. Six hundred White Guards plan to prevent by force their removal and to arrest Soviet to-night.

Agents American firms various cities Siberia other than Vladivostok report Soviet demanding contributions as much as 80,000 rubles in some cases. If contributions refused property is seized and agents arrested. Agents telegraph for consular assistance. I am

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

informing them that such illegal demands should be refused but undoubtedly some levies will be paid under protest or taken by force since distances too great for effective protests.

Local Bolshevik newspapers and posters denounce Allies and local Consular Corps as enemies of the revolution charging them with instigating opposition to Bolsheviks, and with stopping food from China, real cause for this being that consuls have notified their nationals they are not liable to illegal taxes levied by Soviet, have protested against violations of property and personal rights, requesting proper protection, and are making possible entry of food from China by giving guarantee to Harbin Consular Corps that food will go to civilian population this district. I do not anticipate violence against consulates or foreigners as war vessels are known to be ready to give them protection.

First express from Petrograd via Amur Railway arrived yesterday and another is due to-morrow.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/1242

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, March 7, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 6 a. m.]

Emerson telegraphs from Harbin under date of March 5 confirming report that Trans-Baikal Railroad between Manchouli and Irkutsk has been cut in several places, that the Cossack Semenov has engaged the Bolsheviks in the vicinity of Chita, that small additional detachments are leaving Harbin daily to join Semenov, that five field guns were loaded on March 4 under charge of Semenov's men and that they have secured fifteen rapid-fire guns. I understand that Emerson's chief sources of information are the leaders of the railway workers with whom he and his associates have established close relations. The Japanese naval authorities credit the persistent rumor that German submarine boats shipped in parts as agricultural implements have reached Vladivostok. I have traced this rumor to French sources and therefore doubt its accuracy as most of the alarming rumors in reference to Siberia during the last two months have same origin. Japanese special consul sent recently Irkutsk reports that German officers have arrived there and that Germans have established there an espionage center. Japan's military preparations are being completed rapidly, reserves

have been notified, troops are concentrating at west coast ports, two divisions already have been sent to Korea but attitude of the Government as well as public opinion has undergone marked change during last week. I am convinced that a majority of the present Ministry have withheld last part Motono's plans for immediate intervention. The majority which includes Goto and the Premier are now urging caution. Goto who called upon me Sunday summarized the majority opinion thus: "The previous Ministry declared war on Germany too soon; in this crisis we must insist not to act too soon again." The special meeting of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs has been indefinitely postponed. Have repeated to Knight and Spencer.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1236

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *March 7, 1918, 10 a. m.*

[Received March 7, 7.54 a. m.]

My cipher telegram March 6, 10 p. m. Four Chamber of Commerce members arrested yesterday were released last night without violence and attempted arrest of Soviet was postponed till to-night.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/1252

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *March 7, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[Received March 8, 2.34 a. m.]

3310. Mr. Pichon, at the Foreign Office this afternoon, told me that he had received a communication yesterday from London to the effect that Balfour had cabled the British Ambassador at Tokyo, instructing him to call his colleagues together to outline a joint proposition, which should embody the views of the Allied Governments with reference to the merits of intervention in Siberia. This proposition was then to be submitted to all the Allied Governments for approval, after which, with whatever modifications might be made, it would be submitted to the Japanese Government.

I was informed that the French Ambassador was instructed at least a fortnight ago that the French Government would expect that if Japan entered Siberia it would be for the purpose of advancing

far enough and with such strength as to be of military aid to the Allied powers and that an understanding should be first had, providing for the evacuation of the territory so occupied by Japan free from any territorial ambitions or plans. During the conversation, Mr. Pichon told me that he believed the Japanese troops would meet with very little resistance in Siberia and that consequently their march would be rapid. He thought in view of recent news received to the effect that Germany was contemplating steps for occupying certain territories beyond the Caucasus threatening Asia, that the Japanese Army might be of service in heading off such a movement.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1253

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 8, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received March 8, 7.40 a. m.]

Four days ago, British and French Legations telegraphed their Governments urgently requesting permission to support Semenov. Yesterday British Legation gave consent of its Government and is dispatching two field howitzers with 800 high explosive shells accompanied by officer and gunner in mufti to instruct Cossacks in use of guns. French Government [Legation] as yet has received no reply.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1264

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 9, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received March 10, 7.30 p. m.]

Since cabling last midnight<sup>2</sup> have seen Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik press. All dwell upon Japanese threatened invasion and agree in expressing violent opposition thereto. Just received confidential telegram from military attaché who, following instructions, has interviewed Trotsky also chief of staff and German [French] Military Mission; says too early to judge what Bolshevik leaders can do but

<sup>1</sup> Substance transmitted to the Ambassador in Japan Mar. 13, 8 p. m., "for your information."

<sup>2</sup> Telegram of Mar. 9, 2 a. m., vol. I, p. 394.



thinks their intention to fight Germans even if peace ratified; urges avoidance of reprisals and [measures? es] saying to repeal treaty, powers [omission?] if position becomes hopeless later; will accompany Russian, French, Italian staffs to Moscow March 11.

Cannot too strongly urge unwisdom of Japanese invasion now. Conference may ratify peace but if I receive assurance from you that Japanese peril baseless think conference will reject humiliating peace terms. Bolshevik is only power able to offer resistance to German advance and [consequently] should be assisted if sincerely antagonistic to [Germany]. In any case the peace ratification [only] gives Russia a breathing spell as terms thereof are fatal to Bolshevism as well as to integrity of Russia.

I still believe Lenin, Trotsky accepted German money to corrupt and demoralize Russia but later attempted like methods in Germany and failed. Germany having accomplished her fiendish ends in Russia has no further use for her tools and none for their methods except against Entente. Trotsky understands this, Lenin also, and may possibly request Allies' assistance having already said [no objection?] Americans controlling Siberian Railway and shipments thereon but all Russians violently opposed to Japanese interference. We must act promptly to prevent German-Russian alliance also possible [Japanese-] German alliance which would be even more deplorable.

Consul went to St. Petersburg with Robins, returns Vologda 11th. Consulate still functioning here.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1270

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 10, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 11, 8.19 p. m.]

2. Trotsky complains that Allied consuls Vladivostok, including American, virtually opposing Soviet government having declined ultimatum regarding Soviet reorganization local organizations, also formation of local Red Guard and have announced reserving themselves freedom of action as well. Have telegraphed to American Consul for information. Have you instructed him? Press states Siberian republic formed with Prince Lvov president, whom Japanese troops preparing to install at Irkutsk.

Vice Consul Cole, Archangel, writes March 6 that Bolsheviks dominating and no prospect for formation independent government

as Martin reported. See my telegram of March 4 unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Cole furthermore thinks landing Allied troops Archangel or Murman exceedingly unwise and would arouse antagonism to Allies. Am therefore not supporting request of Admiral Kemp who is the same alarmist that sent a naval officer from Archangel to Petrograd two or three months ago, came near stampeding all foreigners.

Soviet evacuating Petrograd sending most of departments to Moscow, some Nizhni Novgorod. Conditions in Petrograd almost unbearable, everybody attempting exit.

Mayor gave dinner to diplomats last night. Five chiefs including Brazilian, Japanese, Chinese Chargés attending and missions. Advice concerning occupation of ports was retracted in my telegram of March 5, 5 p. m., unnumbered:<sup>2</sup> was anything done?

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1676

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: By order of my Government I have the honor to impart to your excellency the latest intelligence that has reached it on the question of Japan's intervention in Siberia and to point to the consequences which we deem it proper to draw therefrom in the interest of the common cause.

In a general way, Japan, as your excellency knows, must and will intervene in Asia in defense of her present position and of her future. If she does so without our assent she will do it against us and there is some likelihood of her later arriving at an understanding with Germany. This of itself we would regard as a decisive consideration.

But it must be remarked, in addition, that an agreement of the Allies with Japan affords the only means of obtaining from her declarations expressly stating that she is acting as an ally of the moral person represented by Russia and is resolved not to encroach in the least on Russia's right of self-determination in selecting this or that form of government, that she desires to help Russia out of the political and economic control of Germany and to assist in reconstituting Russia's national unity, which necessarily implies the restoration of order which the Russians, in their present state of anarchy, are no longer able to achieve.

Negotiations with the Japanese Government will, in the second place, make it possible to call on it for public guarantees of terri-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 392.

torial disinterestedness, which will go much farther than a mere reservation that the fate of the countries occupied by Japan shall be determined by the Peace Congress.

Lastly, with respect to the extent and effectiveness of Japan's action, it also depends on us to have its reality clearly defined and to secure pledges in this respect. That is one of the main objects of the pending negotiations in Tokyo. In our opinion that action may be far-reaching.

Japan, a great power with a population of 56,000,000, an active army numbering 600,000 men and a reserve army of equal strength, has largely increased her wealth during the war; she is enjoying full prosperity and at the present time commands considerable financial resources. Even if it were not so, the Allies could if needed furnish the financial means she might need, although Japan did declare that she proposed to act unassisted, assuming the burdens and responsibilities of the undertaking.

Taken as a whole the plan, the adoption of which by Japan we are seeking and the scope of which would justify and effectuate her intervention, embraces the following points: First, occupation of the Trans-Siberian terminals at Vladivostok and Harbin for the preservation of our stocks and the maintenance of the regular ways of communication, both military and economic, with Russia; next, to secure the control of the Trans-Siberian Railway by occupying the Chita Pass, the key to the several railroads of northern Asia; to reinstate at Irkutsk and Tomsk the Siberian governments that have been driven out by the anarchists with the help of the German prisoners; to establish in Siberia a center of resistance and attraction for the sound parts of Russia with which relations may be entered into in southern Russia; to keep out of the reach of the Germans the stores of grain hoarded in Asiatic Russia as the yield of three crops, the furs which are there in large quantities, to prevent the outgoing of Turkestan cotton, that is to say, to bring into play an economic action that can be speedily exerted and the immediate importance of which is almost greater than that of political action.

Furthermore, this action would be complemented by shipping to Russia American and Japanese manufactures that are so urgently needed by our Russian allies.

This is the first part of the program which we believe to be to the interest of the Allies to propose to Japan, which the Russians, if enlightened by means of public declarations and of an explanatory propaganda to be plied on Russian opinion by the Entente and local newspapers, can not but recognize as beneficial and disinterested.

The resistance that may be offered by certain hostile Russian elements that are not qualified to represent the allied nation, or by indifferently trained and armed prisoners, is not likely to check for any length of time the methodical dash of the Japanese troops.

As for a more extensive and direct intervention of Japan against Germany in European Russia, of such a nature as to cause more concern to the Central Empires and compel them entirely to reconstitute their eastern military front, the question presented is obviously more complex and remote. It does not as such appear to be impossible of execution, but while it is advisable to consider it without delay, it would be inexpedient to burden the present negotiations with it.

In the opinion of my Government which hopes that it will be shared by that of the United States, in dealing with a country as sensitive as Japan, it is of great importance to avoid in the pending negotiations any step that might create an impression that there exists a feeling of mistrust, of apprehension that that country will not live up to its engagements or harbors intentions other than those it declares. I know from a remark recently made by your excellency that you fully appreciate the punctiliousness with which Japan strives to keep her promises and abide by her engagements.

I will add in conclusion that the Allies have conscientiously weighed the pros and cons of a Japanese intervention, in the light of all the available information gathered from the most reliable sources. They have come to the conclusion that the advantages outweigh the drawbacks by far and that it is important to act as quickly as possible in the indicated sense and to cast aside any hesitation or regret apt to delay or restrict such action and thereby hamper its effectiveness without in the least lessening the apprehended objectionable contingencies.

Convinced that Japan's cooperation which circumstances make desirable to us may be secured under conditions of security and effectiveness in keeping with the general interests of all the Allies, Russia and the United States included, the Government of the Republic would be particularly glad to hear that the United States Government upon a reexamination of the question will concur in our views and join in our action.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 861.00/1269

---

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 12, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received 10 a. m.]

Palmer<sup>1</sup> telegraphs from Helampo [Taheiho] in the following sense:

Attempt of the Bolsheviks three days ago to seize power in Blagoveshchensk failed owing to the action of militia and Cossacks.

---

<sup>1</sup> William Morgan Palmer, Vice Consul.

Seven hundred Bolsheviks were captured. Bolsheviks have been joined by sailors from Khabarovsk and are trying to occupy the town. About twenty Japanese of the town militia have been killed and wounded. Situation critical. Two thousand Chinese troops await orders on this side of the Amur. In case of the defense of Blagoveshchensk proving success, control over the Amur Railway may be established and offensive against Bolsheviks may be undertaken to the west of Manchuria and to the east toward Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Fifteen thousand German and Austrian prisoners will be isolated thus by prompt action. These prisoners organizing near Khabarovsk. The president of the Amur Province's Zemstvo, and the chief of the Amur Cossacks unanimously solicit you to induce Chinese or other Allies to intervene immediately. Lenin's order concerning new mobilization cannot be applied to eastern Siberia. I consider the situation most serious strategically. I arrived yesterday from Vladivostok, will await your instructions before proceeding any further. Railway communications are cut.

Reports received by Russian Legation confirm Palmer report.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1271

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, March 12, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 2.12 p. m.]

On March 7, I read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of Department's telegram March 5, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and at his request left a copy with him. He expressed his deep appreciation of the frankness and friendly spirit of the communication. He assured me again that his Government had made no formal request and had reached no decision in reference to the situation eastern Siberia but had sought simply an exchange of views. On the evening of March 9, the long-postponed meeting of the Advisory Council of Foreign Affairs was held. The deliberating lasted several hours, but no statement of the matters discussed has been issued.

Late yesterday afternoon in accordance with instructions received from his Government, British Ambassador called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs to suggest informally to him the advisability of Japan's intervention in Siberia. The plans as outlined by the British Ambassador contemplated military occupation as far as the Ural Mountains. If Japanese Government deemed special mission advisable at this time, formal request would be submitted by the Government of Great Britain supported by France and Italy.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 67.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed regret that this suggestion had not been offered earlier, when public sentiment in Japan was far more favorable than now to some form of intervention. Have repeated to Admiral Knight and Peking.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1270

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia  
(Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 13, 1918, 8 p. m.*

Your No. 2, March 10, 6 p. m. No instructions to Vladivostok save to deal with constituted authorities. Press reports concerning Lvov apparently German propaganda.

Semenov with small force of Cossacks in Trans-Baikal between Chita and Manchurian frontier reported fighting force of Bolsheviks and prisoners of war. Has received some support from Horvat and Russian Minister, Peking, Prince Kudachey.

Reports from Blagoveshchensk disturbing. Amur Railway communications temporarily cut. In clash between Bolsheviks and local militia and Cossacks twenty Japanese who had joined militia reported killed or wounded. Two thousand Chinese troops apparently frontier guard at Helampo across the river. Prisoners organizing near Khabarovsk. Macgowan at Irkutsk reports no change in situation.

President's message to Russian people<sup>1</sup> and Department's telegrams of March 11 and 12<sup>2</sup> indicate clear purpose of this Government to assist Russia to restore her integrity and freedom.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/1300

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, *March 15, 1918, 9 p. m.*

[*Received March 16, 5.22 a. m.*]

To-day Horvat informs that Japanese Government have informally requested him to take sole leadership to establish order and independent government Siberia, promising him full support. Your views are requested.

MOSER

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 395.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 397.

File No. 861.00/1676

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 12, 1918, and have carefully considered the points which you have been good enough to advance to me on the question of Japan's intervention in Siberia.

You will, I feel sure, realize that it is with the utmost respect for the views of the French Government and not without the most thorough examination of the issues and principles involved that I have to say that the Government of the United States is unable at the present time to alter its opinion and attitude towards this question, as personally communicated to you by Mr. Polk on March 12.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/1306

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, undated.

[Received March 16, 1918, 8.17 p. m.]

Drysdale reports as follows:

Twelve hundred unarmed prisoners at Nikolsk under very little restraint. They have town liberty, Bolsheviks fraternizing with them and would furnish arms in case of emergency. Thousand reserve infantry, hundred Red Guard and low-grade railway employees Bolsheviks. Majority of population and Cossacks unfriendly to Bolsheviks.

Thirty-five hundred unarmed prisoners including sixty officers properly guarded at Spasskoe; Bolsheviks not allowed to fraternize. Little probability of prisoners being armed. No reserve, no Red Guard.

Hundred and five Nikolsk Red Guard with battery of four 3-inch guns, caissons and ammunition *en route* Blagoveshchensk to aid Red Guard against Cossacks.

This telegram has been sent to Francis and Tokyo.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1307

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 17, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 10.40 a. m.]

Consul at Harbin telegraphs, two hundred Japanese volunteer militia participated in fighting at Blagoveshchensk. Six Japanese

killed, twelve wounded. Their leader, a shopkeeper, proved Japanese colonel.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1335

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, March 19, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received March 20, 3.40 a. m.]

Advisory Council of Foreign Affairs met on Sunday morning. This afternoon Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me the following confidential memorandum:

The Japanese Government have submitted to their most serious consideration the memorandum of the American Embassy under date of March 7<sup>1</sup> bearing on the question of the situation in Siberia. They highly appreciate the sentiments of friendship and confidence manifested to them in that memorandum and the absolute frankness with which the views of the American Government on this important question have been communicated to them.

It will be clearly understood that the intervention now proposed by the Allied Governments to arrest the sinister activities of Germany in Siberia did not originate from any desire expressed or any suggestion made by the Japanese Government. At the same time the Japanese Government have viewed with grave concern the chaotic conditions prevailing in Siberia and they fully realize the serious danger of the German aggression to which those regions are exposed. Desiring at all times to contribute whatever lies at their disposal towards the common end of the Allies they are prepared to entertain, as far as possible and with all sincerity, any plan of action with which they may be approached by the Allied Governments to meet the exigencies of the situation.

They, however, feel that the success of such undertaking will depend largely upon the whole-hearted support of all the great powers associated in the war against Germany. Accordingly, it is their intention to refrain from taking any action on which due understanding has not been reached between the United States and the other great powers of the Entente.

It will hardly be necessary to add that should the hostile activities in Siberia develop to such a degree as to jeopardize the national security or vital interests of Japan she may be compelled to resort to prompt and efficient measures of self-protection. The Japanese Government are confident that in such event they can count on the friendly support of the American Government in the struggle which may be forced upon them.

In all cases they are happy to assure the Government of the United States that whatever action they might be called upon to take in the Russian territory will be wholly uninfluenced by any aggressive

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 67; for date, see *ante*, p. 78.



motives or tendencies and that they will remain unshaken in the profound sympathy towards the Russian people with whom they have every desire to maintain the relations of cordial friendship.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1360b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1918, noon.

Please take the first suitable opportunity to say confidentially to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this Government most earnestly hopes that the Japanese Government understands that our attitude in regard to Japan's sending an expeditionary force into Siberia is in no way based upon suspicion of the motives which would induce the Japanese Government to take such action in the event that it seems advisable. On the contrary we have implicit faith in the loyalty of Japan to the common cause and in her sincere desire to bear unselfishly her part in this war.

The attitude of this Government rests upon the fact (1) that, from the information which we have received from various sources, we must conclude that the moral effect of such action upon the Russian people would be bad and would undoubtedly work to the advantage of Germany; and (2) that the evidence which we possess is insufficient to show that the military effect of that action would be great enough to compensate for the moral loss which it would entail.

You will especially impress upon his excellency our full reliance upon the good faith of his Government and our sincere hope that the reasons for our policy are not misconstrued.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1344e

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1918, 7 p. m.

15. If you see no objection convey following to Summers by special messenger if necessary:

Important to regularize information regarding Russia. Your initiative in sending men to Siberia wholly approved but to attain full usefulness they must telegraph fully not less than twice a week. Written reports arrived too late to serve immediate needs of the Department. Spare no reasonable expense to keep Department regularly and fully informed of facts in different parts of Russia, specially

Omsk, Novo Nikolaevsk, Barnaul, Irkutsk, Chita and intervening points. Also different parts European Russia, specially east and southeast Ukraine and Orenburg districts also Archangel and Kola. Ambassador must be kept fully advised of all reports you receive. . . .

Secretary of Commerce desires Huntington, commercial attaché, to report to you whenever service no longer needed by Ambassador. Huntington reports he now at Irkutsk working with Macgowan.

Department relies on Harbin and Vladivostok and Peking for information points eastwards from Chita.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1344d

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Spencer)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1918, 7 p. m.

Department desires to regularize information service regarding Russia. Instruct Harbin and Vladivostok to spare no reasonable expense to keep Department fully and regularly informed as to facts obtained from reliable sources not less than twice a week. Written reports arrived too late to serve immediate needs. Department relies on you and consuls for facts of situation eastwards from Chita. Ambassador Francis and Consul Moscow have had like instructions as to situation westwards from Chita. Ambassador will advise you if he leaves Vologda. Keep him advised of developments at regular and frequent intervals.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1361

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 21, 1918.

[Received March 25, 9.35 p. m.]

25. Repeated message from Macgowan<sup>1</sup> hitherto undecipherable confirms Moran's<sup>2</sup> report about prisoners at Irkutsk. Summers says Germans advancing from south without resistance. Morris cables Emery<sup>3</sup> taken, sent Berlin. Crosley, Stines and others at Björneborg.

<sup>1</sup> David B. Macgowan, Consul at Moscow, on detail in Siberia.

<sup>2</sup> Hugh Moran, representative of the Y.M.C.A. in Siberia; see vol. I, p. 483.

<sup>3</sup> Henry C. Emery, in 1917 American member of the Inter-Ally Priority Board at Petrograd (Michelsen commission), was arrested by German forces Mar. 10, 1918, on the Åland Islands when *en route* from Petrograd to Stockholm.

Trotsky denies prisoners being armed and Robins<sup>1</sup> credits denial saying Russian officer and Webster<sup>2</sup> with British officer who *en route* Irkutsk to investigate going only to convince me that reports of prisoners organizing are untrue.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1344a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

Butler Wright should now be near Vladivostok or Harbin. Advise Seoul, Harbin, Vladivostok, that Department wishes Wright to telegraph promptly full summary of his estimate of political situation based on his trip across Siberia; also summary of facts and incidents he has noted which bear on the situation.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1460

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

No. 84

TOKYO, March 22, 1918.

[Received April 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to attach herewith copy of the memorandum handed to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the evening of March 19<sup>3</sup> and telegraphed textually to the Department on that night. This note concludes the discussions which as I learned only recently were initiated by my British colleague. On December 14, under instructions from his Government, he first informally discussed with the Japanese Government what action ought to be taken by the Allies in Siberia to protect stores and ammunition at Vladivostok and to control in case of emergency the Amur and Trans-Siberian Railways.

It would thus appear that the initiative in the Siberian situation was taken by Great Britain and that prior to December 14 the Japanese Government had not seriously considered the question of intervention. It also fully confirms the statement in the attached

---

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. Col. Raymond Robins, in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

<sup>2</sup> Capt. William B. Webster, member of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

<sup>3</sup> See the Ambassador's telegram, Mar. 19, 12 p. m., *ante*, p. 81.

memorandum that "the intervention proposed by the Allied Governments did not originate from any desire expressed or any suggestion made by the Japanese Government."

The result of the confidential conversations between Great Britain and Japan was the dispatch of warships to Vladivostok as reported to the Department in my telegram of January 5, 10 p. m. This action first drew extended public attention to the serious conditions which were developing in eastern Siberia and the arrival of the *Brooklyn* at Yokohama a few days later was also much discussed.

It was about this time and as a result of several conversations with Baron Goto that I fully realized the division existing in the present Ministry. Viscount Motono was from the very first inclined to accede to the suggestion of the British Government and undertake some military movement in Siberia. In this he was supported by the General Staff. The Premier and Baron Goto, however, were far more cautious and doubted the wisdom of acting with England under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As a preliminary to any plan of intervention Viscount Motono requested the British Government to agree that Japan should act alone. To this request the British Government made no reply but as reported in my telegram of February 8, 10 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> the French Ambassador received instructions to join with his British colleague in acceding to the request of the Japanese Government.

From this time alarming reports about conditions in Siberia, almost all of French origin, began to circulate in Government circles and among the diplomatic representatives. There were also persistent reports of movement of Japanese troops, and both in the Diet and the press the Government was urged to take prompt and efficient measures for the protection of Japanese interests in Siberia. Viscount Motono expressed to the French Ambassador his opinion that Japan could not hold off much longer, especially after Russia had concluded a separate peace with Germany, and deplored the lack of unity in the counsels of the Allies.

On February 28<sup>2</sup> the Japanese Government issued in the press an authorized statement, as reported in my telegram of that date, to the effect that they were not yet in a position to begin military activities in Siberia and that it would be some time before a decision was reached. I can not help but feel that this decision to go slowly was largely the result of the clearly expressed attitude of the United States. From that time on there was a distinct turn in the tide of public opinion, except in certain interested quarters, and it was at low ebb when, on March 13,<sup>3</sup> the British Ambassador presented to

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 78.

the Japanese Government his long-deferred reply and suggested to them the military occupation of Siberia as far as the Ural Mountains. The Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his regret that the suggestion had not come earlier when public sentiment in Japan was more favorable.

In fact, it seemed at one time as though the Cabinet could not possibly survive unless it yielded to the popular demand for immediate intervention; but sober second thoughts prevailed and the decision finally reached by the Government, after several meetings with the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, meets with general approval in all responsible circles.

The attitude of the press on this important question is worthy of separate consideration. While there had been a great deal of comment, opinion did not begin to crystallize in favor of intervention until February 25, which was a day or two after the withdrawal of the ambassadors from Petrograd was announced. Before this date however the *Kokumin* and one or two of the more irresponsible and chauvinistic journals had been urging drastic action on the part of Japan, but they were in the minority. On January 22, the day that the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were scheduled to address the Diet, the *Kokumin* came out with a long editorial urging that Japan take steps to protect herself from German encroachment in Siberia and advocating that the Allies treat the Maximalists as enemies. From that date this influential journal has taken the leadership in the drive for intervention. The *Yorodzu*, which from the very beginning of the war has urged more complete Japanese participation, demanded the occupation of Siberia to make up for Russia's announced policy of repudiating her foreign loans. The *Niroku*, of February 17, suggested a similar policy.

The majority of the press however did not at first go to this extent. Quite naturally resentment was expressed at the action of the Maximalists in going back on their agreement against concluding a separate peace, and in publishing the details of Japan's secret treaty with the Government of the Tsar. On January 19 the *Asahi* asked the authorities to watch the situation in Siberia, but on February 16 it went further and expressed the view that it might be a case of imperative necessity for the Allies to adopt some plan to meet the Russian situation. On February 4 the *Jiji* discussing the conditions under which Japan should act, said that nothing should be done until the lives and the property of Allied subjects were in actual danger.

On the evening of February 23, news reached Tokyo of the withdrawal of the Allied Ambassadors from Petrograd. Lurid reports which had been drifting in about the release and arming of German prisoners and the activity of German spies began to take effect. On

the morning of the 25th many journals published editorials specifically urging intervention. Beginning with this date the *Kokumin* commenced a series of editorials with a view to rousing the nation to action. For a day or two any journals that might have been opposed to intervention said nothing.

On February 28, the *Jiji* made a statement of the Government's view giving the reason why the dispatch of troops was not necessary at that time. On the same day the *Nichi Nichi* published the unofficial view of the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai Parties, both of which were opposed to intervention, regarding the proposal as an expedient of the Government to intrench itself in its position. The Seiyukai has consistently opposed such action, it having been opposed to Japan's declaring war on Germany in the first place.

After this public opinion, which had been so eager for action, began to simmer down. This was reflected in the press, not so much in arguments opposing action, but in silence.

When the agitation for intervention was at its height, one or two of the more sensational journals like the *Nichi Nichi*, which is notoriously anti-American, raised suspicions of America's motives in opposing Japanese action, saying that America had herself designs upon Siberia. The majority of the press, however, appreciated America's point of view. The *Kokumin*, for instance, could not criticize America's wish to sympathize with the establishment of a republican form of government, but at the same time declared that Russia needs powerful and actual assistance.

About the middle of this month anti-Government journals began to criticize the Government for making proposals to the Allies leading to intervention before sounding public opinion in Japan. The *Asahi* on March 15 published an editorial attacking the Foreign Minister for proposing intervention in spite of the manifest general opposition. The *Asahi* agreed with the American position that intervention was not necessary. Many of the journals suggested that the Foreign Minister should resign because his views were so opposed to those of the majority of the Cabinet and of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. Rumors soon began to be circulated that he would resign, but within a day or two it has become generally understood that Viscount Motono had not proposed intervention to the powers, but had merely sounded their views, and that if any responsibility was to be assumed it would be by the entire Cabinet. Translations of a number of selected editorials are enclosed herewith.<sup>1</sup>

To-day excitement has almost entirely died down. The Government has announced that unless the situation changed the Government would take no action.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Throughout this critical period I have had numerous interviews with representative Japanese belonging to Government, Diet, newspaper and business circles and have spared no effort to make plain the disinterested motives of the United States and our entire confidence in Japan's good faith. I have good reason to believe that our position is clearly understood and appreciated by all whose opinion is of value, particularly in Government circles. They now look at the matter in the same light as we do, and consider that it is of first importance to weigh the evidence and measure the possible effects of any action in Siberia, before taking an irrevocable step.

The ultimate effect upon the Cabinet is still uncertain and it is quite possible that changes may yet follow; but if so, it will be for reasons other than a desire on the part of Japan for intervention in Siberia.

I have [etc.]

ROLAND S. MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1335

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1918, noon.

Your telegram of 19th midnight containing confidential memorandum.

You will please express to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the sincere appreciation of this Government of the spirit with which the Japanese Government has received the communication of this Government in regard to the Siberian situation and assure him that the frankness shown in the memorandum is most gratifying and removes any possibility of misunderstanding which might otherwise arise. The Government of the United States in the same spirit of candor and friendliness will not fail to express freely to the Japanese Government its views as to the course which it considers advisable in dealing with the perplexing problems presented by the serious conditions existing in Siberia; and it will give careful and sympathetic consideration to the opinions which the Japanese Government may be pleased to give as to the situation.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1382a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

23. *Japan Advertiser* has published text of telegram from Tomsk to Allied powers dated last February asking recognition of the pro-

visional government of Siberia and announcing further sessions of a Siberian conference in January. Can you verify authenticity of document? Have you further information regarding Siberian conference which you reported would be held in March? Department desires all information available.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1385

*The Counselor of Embassy in Russia (Wright) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, March 26, 1918.

[Received March 28, 3.12 p. m.]

Pursuant to Ambassador's orders, of which he advised the Department on March 5, I arrived here by Amur route on 24th, after excessively delayed trip of nineteen days from Vologda, with Connor and Simmang of Embassy staff, who are returning home, and Stalinski, dragoman of Embassy, as interpreter. I have signed drafts for February salaries of these three Embassy clerks. Please advise my wife, also my mother in care of Embassy, Paris, and families of staff. I have apprised Admiral Knight of the situation in Petrograd and *en route* and will endeavor to get in touch with railroad commission. I await the receipt of instructions from the Department as to my further movements.

From a close study and many interviews during the trip I am convinced that the Bolshevik power, which appears strongly predominant in every section of Siberia through which I have passed and which is increasing here, arises more from the inertia or inability of the better or more intelligent classes to combat it than from any tacit acquiescence therein. The effectiveness of force as typified and practised by a man with a gun is undisguisedly feared and bitterly hated. The most arbitrary confiscation of property, execution of individuals, levying of loans and searches of trains are matters of daily occurrence. The railroad officials of all grades do not even endeavor to disguise their disgust at employees' agreements which have resulted in almost complete demoralization of railroad transportation and morale. While some of the lower grades of railroad workmen may be momentarily satisfied with shorter hours and more pay, the higher grades of employees share the disgust of their superiors. So-called troop trains, composed of freight cars filled with a disorderly rabble of demobilized soldiers proceeding home, demand, command, and obstruct the right of way over all traffic,

<sup>1</sup> Garbled text subsequently corrected by Mr. Wright.



while, strange as it may seem, many soldiers and sailors still in uniform and proceeding westward in similar trains bent on food speculation obtain the same preference in treatment.

Little or no direct supervision of Austrian or German prisoners was noticed and they appeared to have almost complete freedom of movement in the cities where their camps were located. I saw none armed and likewise no confirmation of any united action by them as yet and I procured no evidence of the presence of officers from their former camps notwithstanding the fact that their numbers in Petrograd had noticeably increased prior to my departure. Austrians appeared more numerous but more dejected than Germans and inferior in health and in general appearance.

The viewpoint of a member of the executive committee of the Russian Railway Union, traveling on the same train from Petrograd in connection with railroad material from the United States, which he reports has been discharged at Dairen, may be regarded as typical. He states that although peace has been signed and ratified he believes that the Germans will nevertheless continue operations of a military character against European Russia; that an army of workingmen is being formed; that the demobilization of the former army is more of a blessing than otherwise as it releases men who are tired of life in the trenches; that the *bourgeoisie* must work or starve or leave the country; that the proletariat will fight as never before against Germany or any other power on account of their conviction that the revolution itself hangs in the balance; and that the Russian proletariat still clings to the hope that the Russian peace formula will ultimately appeal to the German proletariat and strengthen its hands against German autocracy. His arguments as regards economics and politics are very feeble and equally typical and non-intelligent. While he declined to discuss the matter of the cancellation of our loans to Russia he clearly intimated that Russia would be willing to arrange payment for this railroad material either by direct payment with the gold which the Government is now confiscating, or by the exchange of products, or by concessions in Siberia to Americans. The last proposal, while dangerous and impracticable, is an interesting and radical departure not only on account of Siberia's incalculable wealth and opportunities but also of its vital importance in any reorganization or assistance that we may plan to lend Russia.

I believe it fair to deduce that the present authorities are so overwhelmed with problems in Petrograd, Moscow and European Russia, that the development of Siberia would be promptly intrusted to any power which might convey, by the very sincerity of its attitude, the idea that no territorial acquisition is intended. The fear of, and animosity to, Japanese invasion of the east is uppermost,

however, in the minds of all in Siberia but the idea of American assistance is one to which I find sympathetic consideration given in all instances. I am therefore more than ever convinced that our country enjoys what little confidence the present *de facto* authorities repose in any foreign power to a greater degree than any other; that commercial as well as ultimate political bonds of great strength can be formed and that inevitable German [expansion] in Siberia may thus be observed and thwarted. If, as it now appears, Russian intelligence is too supine to combat the elements which may easily become even more uncontrolled than at present, our opportunity tactfully to guide those elements may never be favorable as now.

The present party in power is long on attempted organization and sadly deficient in men of intelligence or experience. Their theories are fanatical. I am fully aware that our policy is against any intervention in Russia's internal affairs, but my conviction is daily strengthened by observation and by the comment of intelligent persons that it is inadvisable to expect any initiative from within, at least until the country has recovered from the wave of ultra socialism which is sweeping all before it and from which situation Germany can and will derive the only advantage. Encouragement, or even the propagation by us of any germ of a responsible Siberian government, would meet with welcome from a tired people and the reconstruction and maintenance of the Trans-Siberian Railway as an apparatus conveying education, principles of law and order, agricultural assistance and all the propaganda of the manifold institutions of the United States, would prove more acceptable and more lasting than any purely military occupation; provided, however, that such undertaking be clothed with the unwavering assurance that law, order, and respect of property will be maintained by American or Allied forces if necessary.

Interruption in local telegraph service is responsible for delay in this report.

WRIGHT

File No. 861.00/1367

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 26, 1918, noon.

[Received March 26, 7.43 a. m.]

Following from Harbin just received:

Drysdale and Morton telegraphed March 24 prisoners at Chita and northward armed, committing misdeeds. Contrary to orders of German and Austrian officers, very few are joining Red Guard.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1383

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 28, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 7.40 p. m.]

40. Answering your 23, March 25, 5 p. m., via Vladivostok, received March 26, 11 p. m. Received Siberian delegation in January who claimed were forming separate Siberian government and would advise when organized by assembly called March 10, and as cabled Department. Reported assembly failed to materialize. Present government claims undisputed jurisdiction throughout Siberia. This exactly what sent Huntington<sup>1</sup> to investigate and report but notwithstanding he arrived Irkutsk certainly March 10, no report received. Wright left Irkutsk 17th after staying two days, nothing from him since leaving Vologda. Macgowan's *en clair* telegrams received two days after filing and report Huntington and Thomas<sup>2</sup> efficiently assisting and Huntington awaiting instructions from Redfield concerning self and Thomas whom I requested for Embassy service Vologda. Am wiring them daily. Been there month. Reported nothing about new government.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1358

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your March 23, 3 p. m.<sup>3</sup> Get in touch with Masaryk and advise Department fully his views of situation in Russia and possibility of organizing within Russia any effective resistance to Central powers. Also forward any other messages he wishes to transmit. Masaryk well known to Department as Bohemian patriot.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1382

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 29, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received March 29, 11.55 a. m.]

The French Consul General at Irkutsk announces under yesterday's date the active cooperation of a thousand Austrian prisoners with

<sup>1</sup> William C. Huntington, Commercial Attaché.<sup>2</sup> Edward B. Thomas, attached to the office of the Commercial Attaché.<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

the Bolsheviks. They are supplied with machine guns, well armed, wear Russian uniforms and arrived yesterday from Omsk. They announce their intention of taking part against Semenov and eventually against any Allied expedition. Other Austrian prisoners have elsewhere joined the Red Guard.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1391

*The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, March 29, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 11.45 p. m.]

Moser telegraphs from Harbin in substance as follows:

Horvat has taken decisive stand to head movement for restoring order and subduing German menace in Siberia. He has issued a proclamation naming Pleshkov, veteran of Galicia campaigns and leader of Cossacks, commander in chief of all Russian forces in Siberia. Semenov's Manchurian movement [under] his control. Pleshkov now bringing 2,000 Cossacks from Nikolsk. He states that he can raise additional force 6,000, but will require minimum of 1,200 Allied troops additional to secure Irkutsk and control railways. Ustrugov and Stal of Siberian Constituent Assembly now in Peking to secure Allied support for temporary Constituent Assembly government Vladivostok. I consider their scheme impracticable as force must restore order in Siberia before stable government can be established. Confidence in leaders and Allied propaganda is required to secure support of the plebiscite [populace?] which daily demands Allied [intervention?]. Horvat has confidentially shown me letter from General Tanaka declaring Japan had no aggressive designs whatever upon Siberia and asking Horvat to head movement for restoration of order and promising him Japan would ask Allies to join her in supporting him with money, men and guns. Horvat says if Allies support Tomsk representatives, he will acquiesce, but doubts effectiveness of scheme. If Allies do not support Tomsk representatives, he will ask their support for organization in Harbin headed by himself with following associates as advisory cabinet: Putilov of Russian Bank, Shanghai, Admiral Kolchak, Ustrugov, General Pleshkov, Rusanov, Stal and several others, organization to operate from Harbin until proper government established at Irkutsk or Vladivostok. Believing Horvat's organization only possible solution, if supported by Japanese, I strongly advocate our full cooperation. Conditions unbearable in Siberia unless Allies intervene. Plebiscite [populace?] clamoring for Allied intervention. If we support movement, I strongly recommend establishing Allied commission at Harbin with full control of expenditures and as advisory board and suggest Wedgwood and Stevens. Think this, as well as American operation of railways, can be arranged if we support Horvat.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/1405

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, March 30, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

Following received from Irkutsk yesterday:

Just returned from railway where saw train box cars, first and fourth-class carriages [omission] those men with outfits. Four trucks loaded with field carts, two with machine guns, visible also many other cars. Occupants exclusively Hungarian prisoners dressed Hungarian boots, caps, Russian uniforms, rifles; talked freely to some, all saying they were no longer prisoners but free soldiers of the Red Army from Omsk where they left their officers except two or three [omission]. They pretended ignorance of destination. One party skilfully demonstrated American and Vickers machine guns. Station master reports many similar trains. Russian officer, who has been twenty years with Singer Company at Krasnoyarsk, came here last night and said that prisoners there threw officers into prison vans and are coming east in several trains.

At the meeting last night in Irkutsk suburb, 2,000 railway mechanics called upon to drop work and join Red Army. Refused to a man, saying: "Let Allies, devil himself, come and make order, we will not be cannon fodder." Similar meeting Chita while Drysdale there in some [with] like results.

Jenkins wires from Chita 400 Austrian prisoners voted join Red Army. Major Drysdale,<sup>1</sup> Huntington, Macgowan.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1412b

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your telegram 30th.<sup>2</sup> Wright's estimate of situation 26th from Vladivostok received. He should now report fully facts he observed along route traveled and result of conference with Stevens. Bailey should report similar statement of facts observed. What members Embassy staff or other Americans available for service Siberia or Harbin are with Bailey?

Department desires both Wright and Bailey to report facts observed regarding freight movement, activities and arming of prisoners, food conditions at different points, impressions of individual opinion, acts of violence or disorder, government or administration,

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. Col. Walter S. Drysdale, Military Attaché at Peking.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

political situations. Department notes that until recently soldiers along railway armed with old single shot rifles not new clip magazine rifles.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1413

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 2, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 2, 5.55 p. m.]

Consul telegraphs from Harbin that telegram received there from Macgowan, Huntington, Drysdale, Morton,<sup>1</sup> runs in substance as follows:

Train of forty-eight cars carrying about 800 prisoners armed by Bolsheviks with machine guns, bound from western Siberia to Dauria to aid Bolsheviks against Semenov, was seen by them passing through Irkutsk.

Consul at Chita telegraphs 400 prisoners there have voted to join Bolsheviks, 1,000 workmen have voted against opposing Semenov and approved entry of international troops. Workmen near Irkutsk voted in similar way. Consul urges immediate decision intervention and suggests sending agents to western Siberia to acquire supplies.

Second telegram from Drysdale and Huntington reads as follows:

President of Council of Workmen-Soldiers admits arming of prisoners of war by the Bolsheviks to fight Semenov who is regarded as international force interfering with internal affairs. This admission made to our Consul who vainly protested against arming prisoners of war.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1420

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 2, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received April 4, 6.59 a. m.]

61. Horn,<sup>2</sup> Moscow, telegraphs military attaché here that England requesting Washington consent to Japanese invasion. I think this would be greatly inopportune and hope will not be done; may be that advisable later and arrangements should be made to act

<sup>1</sup> William Morton, Vice Consul at Harbin.

<sup>2</sup> Henry J. Horn, member of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia,

promptly when necessary. Now when I am discreetly endeavoring to ascertain sincerity of opposition to Germany by interrogating government concerning organization army, disposition of Archangel supplies and arming prisoners of war, and attempting at the same time to secure its good will by improving transportation and by declaration concerning separate peace, which Robins wired after publication was heartily approved by the Department;<sup>1</sup> Japanese invasion at this juncture might result in Russia's becoming German ally.

Stevens first replied to my request for railroad men that he was awaiting instructions from Washington, but as I have just received telegram stating units coming under Emerson, I conclude you so instructed. Have asked government indirectly to protect and expedite transportation thereof, which it will certainly do, having repeatedly applied to me through Robins and Riggs that men be sent; have also requested sending experienced non-political railroad official Vologda for conference. Offer to confine Emerson force to Siberian Railway, using every precaution against serving enemy interest.

Webster reports only 1,200 prisoners of war armed and they expatriated themselves and took oath of allegiance to Russian Federated Republic. I think Government's original plan was to arm all accepted prisoners for resistance to threatened Japanese invasion, and intention was changed when invasion abandoned, and when learned if not abandoned we would encourage Japanese invasion. Situation delicate, requiring adroit handling. Allied Ambassadors inviting Japanese Chargé d'Affaires to-day.

Trust you pardon my activity apparently presumptuous but not intentionally, as considered justified by your 21, March 23, 7 p. m.;<sup>2</sup> please instruct if misunderstood. Much depends on organization new army. Understand your policy of non-recognition, which am carefully observing as I thoroughly concur.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1445

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received April 6, 8.59 p. m.]

67. Have seen Consul General's cable No. 303, March 31,<sup>3</sup> to-day. Robins forwards me daily reports from Webster in Irkutsk but [who]

<sup>1</sup> Soviet government? Cf. vol. I, p. 440.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 487.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 489.

proceeding Chita with British officer and Soviet representative. They say Bolsheviks protesting against Semenov<sup>1</sup> in the Siberian raids on Chinese territory and against assistance rendered by Allies. Semenov says only endeavoring to restore order in Siberia. Webster-Hicks's reports give different impression about conditions along Siberia from those of consuls.

Russian Government telegraphed Siberian Soviet and local Soviet and railroad officials to protect and expedite railway engineers *en route* Vologda and says experienced railroad official requested will be sent Vologda when time specified.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1446

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, April 4, 1918, 11 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

The following is translation of telegram sent by General Tanaka, Japanese General Staff, Tokyo, to General Nakajima, Harbin, Japanese Government's special agent here, for delivery to General Horvat:

From your telegram we have understood the real situation of the town of Harbin and the real aims of General Horvat. We also approved the advice given him concerning the organization of the new government.

I am sure our Government and people in no case recognize the Russian people as our enemies, therefore we have no aggressive aims. Since the time when the separate peace negotiation began between Russia and Germany, Russian territory has been divided and radical communism has been spreading very rapidly. Bolsheviks everywhere now begin to show their force destroying all government order. Entire government is in full anarchy. The Germans, profiting by this, are trying by all means to enlarge their influence in Russia and Far East. Our Empire and the continental countries according to their first program of action in the war, express the wish to participate in any [way] that would put an end at once to the disorder and to restore order against the [omission] of Germany and Austria. Our Government and people in this sense sincerely desire that the true Russians in Siberia would unitedly declare their autonomy, would retrieve the Russians from their unconscious situation, would restore and abolish the influence of the enemy.

In view of the fact that the principles and program organized by General Horvat's [associates?] agree with the above-mentioned ideas our country will not delay in assisting such a government which we

<sup>1</sup>Ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks.

<sup>2</sup>Time of receipt not noted.



are persuaded will follow its full agreement with our Allies but the Imperial Government can not hasten by military force the [omission] proposed government before this government is established because it would be construed that Japan has secret designs regarding the occupation of Russian soil which might produce inimical feelings in the Russians to force them to turn into the open arms of Germany. This would completely contradict the policy and principles that the Japanese Empire [is] following [in] the most recent situation in the Far East [, which] is very agitated, and up to this time there is a lack of the elements necessary for a declaration of autonomy. The representatives of different towns do not know [with] what or with whom to deal; among them there is no unity and no cooperation whatever and they quarrel [among] themselves in the most foolish manner. Therefore it would seem to us that for the speedy reestablishment of Siberian autonomy even those Bolsheviki should be approached who would sever relations with communism and have expressed a wish to join the new government.

Therefore you should explain fully to Horvat and to the representatives of all those countries regarding the above-mentioned platform and assure them that our Government remains inactive and well-wishing; it desires that the General and his associates would clearly [omission] to far eastern Russia the correct line of action and would form a permanent government uniting the representatives of different parties in one unit. In view of the above, in case the new Siberian government after its full organization turns to our Government with a request for assistance, the latter will not only be ready for all support but will also invite all other Allied countries to the common work for the attainment of the common cause.

Horvat asked what is the compensation Japan would expect for her support. Nakajima replied that he was not authorized to answer but that Japan would not require a foot of territory. She would, however, probably ask for (1) dismantling of all fortifications at Vladivostok which should be an open port; (2) full fishing rights in all Siberia; (3) open navigation of the Amur River; (4) preference forest and mining concessions similar to those demanded of China.

To-night Horvat stated Japan repeated her offer yesterday but he dare not act on her proposal alone lest he be charged with selling his country to Japan and arouse terrible opposition. He could only if America joined in Japan's requests. But if he should fully organize his government and then ask America's support and failed to get it his position would be extremely embarrassing. The question uppermost in mind was asked me to-night by M. Grave, Counselor of the Russian Embassy. "Can we secure the support of the United States at all and if so would it continue to the point standing by in case of dispute [with] Japan, or would we be abandoned for commercial reasons?"

Horvat authorized me to-night to inform the Government of the United States that if it cared to indicate its willingness to support him with money and men under American or Allied direction he would immediately organize a provisional government for Siberia here, composed of representatives of all the parties and endeavor to restore definite order in Siberia. He would turn [over] to the United States operation of Siberian, Manchurian railways until the end of the war and with cooperation Allied forces afford protection to the [omission] of war and prevent the movement accumulated Siberian stores of [by] the enemy. And government would follow the military forces into Siberia and when order was restored submit itself to popular election. He would guarantee a republican form of government and recognize no peace with the Central powers [except] in concert with the United States. If America considers this proposal favorably each of the Allies will be asked for support at the same time.

Personnel of Horvat's organization, substantially same as mentioned in my telegram March 27, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> is strongest and much more representative Russian in American experience [*sic*], and comprising Social Democrats, socialist and moderate republicans, I believe can not be properly charged with Jesuit [monarchist] intentions. Believe other factions Siberia are preparing to ask American assistance and think they would support Horvat government if propaganda makes its aims clear and shows Allies will support him. Siberia trusts only America.

MOSER

---

Landing of Japanese Forces at Vladivostok, April 5, 1918; British Landing: Attitude of the United States—Formation of the Autonomous Siberian Government, the Far Eastern Committee, and the Chinese Eastern Railway Governing Board—The Webster-Hicks Reports on Armed Prisoners—Appearance of the Czecho-Slovaks

File No. 861.00/1428

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, April 4, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received April 5, 5.50 a. m.]

At 11 o'clock a. m., five armed Russians entered Japanese office in central district this city, demanded money, and when refused shot three Japanese killing one and seriously wounding others.

CALDWELL

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram of Mar. 29, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in China, *ante*, p. 93.

File No. 861.00/1429

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, April 5, 1918, 7 a. m.

[Received April 5, 5.59 a. m.]

Referring to my April 4, 11 p. m. Japanese landed armed forces from their two cruisers about 5 o'clock a. m., and are patrolling city. Armed opposition unlikely if British and American forces operate with the Japanese or Japanese have immediate reinforcements.

Japanese Consul notified Russian officials in letter, copy of which I have received about 6 o'clock a. m., stating that Japanese Rear Admiral was landing armed forces to protect life and property of Japanese.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1420

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

45. Your 61, April 2, 7 p. m. Both British and French made request sometime ago which prompted statement to Japanese Government contained in Department's No. 2108, dated March 11.<sup>1</sup> Department now has assurance no action will be taken without full understanding with Allies or United States Government.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1428

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1918, 6 p. m.

47. At 11 p. m. [a. m.?], April 3 [4], five Russian soldiers entered a Japanese shop at Vladivostok and demanded money. Upon refusal three Japanese were killed. At about 5 a. m. the morning of April 4 [5], troops were landed from the two Japanese cruisers in the harbor and are now patrolling the city. The Japanese Admiral has furnished commanders of both British and American vessels, and also

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 67.

the American Consul, with a statement that his only purpose in landing men from his ships was to protect Japanese life and property.

Advise Moscow.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1437

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, April 5, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received 10.25 p. m.]

My British colleague has recently resumed his informal conversations on the subject of intervention in Siberia. On March 30 he conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the unanimous opinion of the British military authorities that intervention would be of strategic value to the Allied cause at this time. But the attitude of the Japanese Government as expressed in its memorandum of March 18 [19]<sup>1</sup> has remained unchanged, and public interest has subsided although it is of course impossible to foresee the results of the landing at Vladivostok reported in my April 5, 4 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

Viscount Ishii sailed yesterday by the *Siberia Maru* several weeks earlier than he had originally planned. For the past two weeks he has been in daily conference with the leading statesmen in and out of office, and is prepared to state frankly the Japanese position as he understands it, both as to Siberia and as to China. During the discussions here, I have seen him frequently and he has consistently advocated a policy of no action in Siberia without the fullest understanding with our Government.

Ministerial changes are still likely in the near future. Viscount Motono is seriously ill and this may hasten hinted retirement which has been imminent for some time. Uchida is much talked of as his successor.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1442

*The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia (Derber) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, undated.

[Received April 6, 1918, 7.31 p. m.]

Siberian Provincial Duma, formed by representatives of Zemstvos, Municipalities, Cooperative Societies, other public organizations and

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

nationalities, organized a government of autonomous Siberia. The immediate aims of the Siberian government are:

- (1) Establishing legitimate order with view to securing personal and property inviolability;
- (2) Active opposition to Bolsheviks in order to establish the legitimate power of All-Russian Constituent Assembly;
- (3) Defense of political and economical independence and territorial integrity of Siberia;
- (4) Convention of the All-Siberian Constituent Assembly;
- (5) Active resistance to Bolshevik-German peace jointly with Allied powers with view to concluding general democratic peace;
- (6) Reestablishment good relations with Allied and friendly powers based on existing treaties and agreements;
- (7) Taking all measures to counteract the further German advance on Russian territory.

Taking up these difficult and responsible tasks the government of autonomous Siberia recognizes that it is able to accomplish them only on condition of an energetic assistance to Russia from the Allied powers. The government of autonomous Siberia is fully convinced that it will receive active assistance from the United States knowing that the indicated aims of the government coincide with interests of your country which takes interest in establishing normal order and preventing of political and economical influence of Germany that is possible in Siberia as well as hindering Germany from availing herself of food and raw material for further fighting the Allies.

*Prime Minister*

DERBER

*Member Council Imperial [of Ministers]*

SECRETARY MORAVSKI

---

File No. 861.00/1455

*The Counselor of Embassy in Russia (Wright) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HARBIN, April 6, 1918, 8 a. m.

[Received April 7, 10.45 a. m.]

Your March 30, 5 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> to Consul. I arrived here night of April 1 and have apprised Stevens of situation as quoted in my telegram of March 26,<sup>3</sup> and of my conferences with Admiral Knight. I am

---

<sup>1</sup> Garbled text subsequently corrected by Mr. Wright.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 89.

gratified to find that our opinions concur regarding specific questions in your instructions. The express to which our cars were attached was delayed five times for periods of two to four hours each by demobilized soldiers who commandeered engine for their use notwithstanding the objections of the railroad officials. In three instances where we were forced to await arrival of troop trains of soldiers and sailors, the occupants hurled vilest and most obscene epithets at the express, spitting on the train and crying "down with the *bourgeoisie*!" Surly men in uniform boarded and traveled on the train without difficulty, but they respected the Embassy. Subsequent travelers report that such and worse incidents of violence frequently occur. Major David P. Barrows, of the Philippine Intelligence Service, is here preparing full report of credible witnesses of the Blagoveshchensk massacre and of situation, which I shall bring with me. I have previously reported individual position of railroad officials of all grades.

Later arrivals confirm report on the food conditions. In addition thereto Stevens informs me that a reliable French intelligence officer, Major Billet, who traveled through the Altai district, observed huge quantities of wheat stored by the peasants in that region which they will only barter for needed supplies and will not sell for depreciated unstable Russian currency or for any money. This confirms reports regarding attitude of peasants which we have received for over six months. Furthermore German commercial agents are covering the country promising early delivery of such supplies. This region is perilously near the Urals. He inquired what our railway commission could do in transportation of such food westward if procured and what Germans might be able to accomplish; Stevens replied that with coal, proper order, and a few weeks' preparation, from four to five thousand tons daily could be moved by them. The movement of coal west, due to paralysis of the mines in the Urals and near Tomsk observed and reported by Stevens last summer, still continues. Practically no through westbound freight traffic exists. Hay and lumber were the only commodities noticed in any quantity although many cars were sealed; no movement of food supplies was observed.

Reports of activities of German-Austrian prisoners increase. German menace and endeavor is certainly and rapidly growing and I learn from reliable persons that technical Germans formerly employed in enterprises in eastern Siberia are reappearing and do not disguise that fact. Every effort is being made by German agents to secure metals of the Urals, principally gold and platinum, mines of the latter of which are open.

Stevens is still patiently working here on railway matters, but meeting with usual Russian delays and evasions and I fear almost at limit of his patience. Even if successful in some degree here he must explain that his work will prove worthless unless he can put men west of Manchuria, which can be done only if they may be assured proper military protection.

I am still of the opinion, formed long ago, that no further illusions should be entertained regarding Bolshevik policy. It is in no way a democratic movement even though we may desire so to construe it. Its basic element is force exerted by local Soviets whose officials are [intoxicated] by newly grasped authority which they abuse. It is not welcomed or respected in its statements or promises and the numerical majority now submit only through fear of terrorism. It strives to pull down society to its level and has in no instance accomplished anything constructive. If we accept hypothesis that its spokesmen are tools of Germany (regarding which the Embassy recently reported in detail) no link in the chain of the evidence seems to be lacking; if we do not, then fanaticism is the only explanation of the extremes to which they have gone. It is impossible to appraise or understand Siberia from the viewpoint of Petrograd and if it is to be saved from the crafty well-informed enemy, irrespective of what may eventually transpire in European Russia, maintenance and complete control of the railroad with ample military support and protection seem to be the only possible means to that end.

WRIGHT

File No. 861.00/1574

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 6, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received April 10, 12.50 p. m.]

329. Riggs, assistant military attaché, asks transmission following Military Information Section, War Department:

Great concern here over landing at Vladivostok. I had conversation with Trotsky this morning. He is waiting for a confidential statement from the Allies which will clarify aims of Japanese in Vladivostok. He professes belief that the Japanese are in secret accord with Germany. I suggested participation American troops and British subjects from China. He said Ministry [announcement] should be included in Allied statement. Therefore, I can recommend: (1) Immediate formulation of limits of Allied intervention, if such has been decided upon in Siberia, to be transmitted Bolshevik officials through Holbrook; (2) that intervention be made Allied instead of Japanese; (3) that one division of United States troops in

Pacific be warned for service [*sic*]; (4) that Allies guarantee limits resulting (?) territorial annexations. Am sending you direct as well as to Ruggles to save time.

For Department of State only: By [in] transmission the above, desire to make the following comments: (1) Concern over landing at Vladivostok is strictly limited to Bolshevik circles; (2) Trotsky's intimation that Japan is in secret agreement with Germany accords with his apparent policy to embroil Japan and the United States (see Summers's 278, March 20, noon,<sup>1</sup> and others); (3) strongly second recommendation that forces be Allied instead of Japanese only; (4) respecting Riggs's point (1) and (4): while recognizing the principle [of] desirableness of securing if possible concurrence of *de facto* government in Allied action I wish to point out (1) that the central Bolshevik authorities have only limited control over Siberian Soviets; and (2) that reserve is advisable in entering engagements of any kind with a government whose continuance in power is becoming daily more uncertain.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1439

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, April 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

British yesterday afternoon landed 50 armed sailors for the protection of Consulate in vicinity of which they are patrolling streets. Japanese this morning landed 250 more sailors. No armed opposition as yet but Soviet here and Khabarovsk made strong protest. Representative from the city hall called upon me and stated that city and Zemstvo authorities will not object to landing if it is Allied measure; they will object if purposes [purely] Japanese measure.

I have not considered guard necessary with the Consulate as yet.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1583

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 6, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received April 12, 11.11 p. m.]

78. French Ambassador has received telegram from the French Consul, Moscow, saying that Chicherin had asked what landing of

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 403,



Japanese and British troops at Vladivostok meant and if was approved by Allies. Robins<sup>1</sup> wires Chicherin asked him same question and requests instructions. Summers here. Caldwell telegraphs Japanese Admiral landed troops and notified Soviet government. Did so to protect Japanese lives and property, but Caldwell says nothing about British troops landing. Is the policy unchanged concerning Japanese intervention? Robins reports Vladivostok Soviet issues following statement:

We have taken measures through the city militia and others to find the criminals who attacked and killed the Japanese storekeepers. The unusual circumstances of the murder without robbery make it evident that it was political. The [omission] of Japanese Admiral Kato is evident and shows that it was an excuse.

[Robins further reports] that Russian Central Soviet Committee has issued order to resist any invasion of Russian territory; that to-day's official bulletin contains following:

Imperialists of Japan want to choke Russian revolution and cut off Russia from Pacific to grab rich territory of Siberia and enslave Siberian workmen, peasants. What do other Allied countries intend to do? Until now their policy was evidently uncertain. America has seemed against Japanese invasion but situation can not longer remain uncertain. British have landed descent [forces?] right after Japanese. Does this mean England intends to join hands with Japan in strangling Russia? This question must be put to British Government most categorically. Such questions must be put to diplomatic representative of America and also to other Allied Governments. One or another answer and mainly the action of Allies will have an important meaning for Near [Far] East international policy of Soviet government.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1584

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 7, 1918.

[Received April 13, 8.40 a. m.]

79. Continuing my 78, 6th. Made no reply to Robins's request for instructions but wired following to-day:

The Soviet government is attaching undue weight to the landing of Japanese at Vladivostok which the American Consul confirms but says nothing about the landing of British. Previous to this incident, and when I last received advices from Washington and from

---

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. Col. Raymond Robins, in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Tokyo, there was thorough understanding among the Allies concerning their intervention in Russia, including Japanese intervention, and that understanding was to the effect that there was no intention or desire on the part of any of Russia's allies to attach any of Russia's territory or to make an invasion of conquest. On the other hand, the Allies not only wish to see the integrity of Russia preserved, but are willing and desirous to aid the Russian people to that end.

Japanese Chargé called, asked whether following in Chicherin's statement yesterday represented views of Ambassador: "American representative emphatically announced that his Government is opposed to Japanese intervention in Siberia." Disliking to reflect on Robins, I handed him my statement to Robins and think he cabled same to Tokyo as views of American Ambassador. Stevens just arrived from Moscow handed me following note in Russian by request of Robins, who Stevens said disclaimed all responsibility for note's being addressed to him, as never professed to be American representative.

Mr. Robins: The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs refers to verbal statements made to you by the Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs about the very depressing impression made in Russia by the landing of Japanese and British troops in Vladivostok whose actions are openly directed against the Soviet authority, and about the highly unfavorable influence which this forcible invasion of Russia by foreign military forces may have upon the relations between the Soviet republic and the country represented by you, and considers it necessary to remind you of the extremely tense situation which has been created by this measure openly antagonistic (?) to Russia, and to point out once more that the only solution of the situation which has arisen is the immediate evacuation of the landed forces and the necessity of making a full and definite immediate statement of the attitude of your Government towards the occurrence which has taken place at Vladivostok. Chicherin.

French Ambassador received by wire text of similar note delivered French Consul, Moscow. I consider absurd charge that Japanese merchants killed by Japanese themselves as an excuse for their marines landing and highly improbable that the killing was German inspired. I think it is fortunate that British disembarked after Japanese did and I believe it exceedingly advisable that American and Chinese marines also land. As the American Ambassador Tokyo cabled, Japan would not intervene against our wishes and Japanese Chargé d'Affaires Vologda concurred therein. I am unable to account for landing except on the theory that the Japanese Admiral thought Japanese life and property menaced or that we yielded to British request and withdrew objection. In any event, whether Allied intervention decided upon or reembarking of marines agreed to, it is better that Allies act together. Bolshevik government more excited over

Japanese landing than Russian people generally, many if not majority of whom so dissatisfied with Bolshevik rule that they [are] ready for any change.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1448

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 371

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I beg to enclose, herewith, paraphrases of the four telegrams relative to the conditions in Siberia and at Vladivostok, which I mentioned to you during our conversation this morning.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

[Enclosure 1—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The British Embassy in Japan to the British Embassy at Washington*

TOKYO, April 4, 1918.<sup>1</sup>

The British military attaché has received the following report from a British officer recently arrived from Moscow:

1. Large quantity of rolling stock on Siberian Railway much of which is standing in stations unused. Sufficient locomotives throughout.
2. Large stocks of grain exist in western Siberian littoral having been sold since 1911. Farmers and some Austrian prisoners who have apparently settled there offering supplies at stations.
3. Prisoners seen along route under no restraint. None armed in western Siberia.
4. His Majesty's Consul at Irkutsk stated that German major general, two colonels, and thirty-four other ranks recently arrived to organize large concentration of armed prisoners there. Town and camp were now commanded by 4.6 guns. Preparations made for destruction of bridges and arches in case of Allied intervention. Prisoners trying to return to Europe had been stopped at Omsk and sent back to Irkutsk.

[Enclosure 2—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador at Washington (Reading)*

April 7, 1918.

The British Government earnestly hope that the American naval commander at Vladivostok may at once receive instructions to cooperate with the British and Japanese warships in landing a party, if he is not already cooperating. It is unnecessary for me to point out the essential importance of our acting together in this question.

<sup>1</sup> Received via London.

[Enclosure 3—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The British Foreign Office to the British Minister in China (Jordan)*

April 7, 1918.

We are now trying to lead the Bolshevik government at Moscow to resume warfare against the German Army and also to accept the assistance and cooperation of the Allies, including the Japanese, and we have some hopes of success.

It is clear that our policy must be seriously prejudiced with the Bolshevik authorities, even fatally so, in the event of Semenov, encouraged by the Allies, making an advance at this moment. Nor do we think it likely from the present and prospective composition of the forces under Semenov that they will be able to achieve very much from a military point of view.

On the other hand, Semenov and his force will constitute a very useful adjunct to any occupying forces, both from a political and military standpoint, if and when intervention in Siberia, either by the Allies or by the Japanese alone, materializes. It will be better in the meantime for Semenov to wait, and to devote himself to the organization of his force without embarking on military operations pending the further development of the situation as to intervention by the Allies in Siberia.

[Enclosure 4—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The British Foreign Office to the British Special Representative in Russia (Lockhart)*

April 7, 1918.

Report received from the *Suffolk* to the effect that an armed band of robbers shot three Japanese office employees at Vladivostok on April 4. Local police were impotent and such attacks had become frequent. As a result of the shooting an armed force of two companies was landed by the Japanese Admiral on April 5 in the morning to protect Japanese life and property, and at the same time the Japanese Admiral notified the local authorities of the reason for his taking this action. A party of fifty men was also landed from the *Suffolk* and we believe that similar action is being taken by the American warship, though we are not yet certain as to this. A further landing party of 250 men has been asked for by the Japanese Admiral.

Please notify Trotsky of this incident and give him an assurance that this landing by the Allies has been carried out solely with the object of affording security for the life and property of foreign residents in Vladivostok. Please point out that it is most regrettable that Vladivostok should be the scene of disorder and of attacks on citizens of the Allied countries just at the moment when the Allied Governments are desirous to do everything they can to afford support and assistance to Trotsky.

---

File No. 861.00/1464½*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Referring to the notes which I have previously had the honor to address to your excellency on the subject

of a Japanese action in Siberia, and in particular to that of the 14th [12th?] <sup>1</sup> of last month, I deem it my duty to let you know that fresh and highly important information on that question has just come to me from my Government.

The French naval attaché at Tokyo received word from the Japanese General Staff that by reason of the murder of three Japanese merchants in Vladivostok by Maximalists or Russian brigands it had been decided to land two companies of seamen at that port.

On the other hand, according to the same information, the Bolshevik troops which drove back the Russian general Semenov have been reinforced first by 4,000 prisoners and two guns and quite recently by 5,900 prisoners armed with 24 machine guns and 10 field guns. Six trains carrying prisoners to the east passed through Chita between the 28th of March and the 2d of April. The Cossacks and Chinese troops on the border could not withstand an attack.

There were 1,800 prisoners at Irkutsk in the early days of March; they now number 6,000 and more than 10,000 are on the way to that city. One thousand cars, a large quantity of rifles and ammunition and military automobiles have also been brought there.

According to a Russian officer 60 trains of prisoners from the west are now on their way to Irkutsk. One carrying arms has just arrived there. Arrangements have been made to organize two army corps consisting of Austro-German prisoners.

The Japanese General Staff looked as ready to act as ever to our naval attaché; but public opinion seems to be wavering and opposition to the expedition grows as the resistance to be met looms more serious. As for the Government it still holds its decision contingent on the United States Government's adhesion and promise of financial and industrial support.

In the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic these reports are worthy of very earnest consideration. The Japanese, with their excellent means of obtaining intelligence and clear-headedness, furnish us with data which are considered by my Government to be extremely grave. Consequently the longer the intervention which continues to be the one effective mode of action is delayed, the more difficult will it be of execution, while its purpose will be thereby impaired.

The various reports at hand indicate that Japan regards it as its duty to start to-day in Vladivostok an action of a personal character in the defense of its own interests, without any guarantee to the Allies or Russia; this would seem to be a departure that may draw it away from us and nearer to the Germans.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Ante*, p. 75.

Nothing final has yet happened, however, and encouragement from the United States would make it possible to carry out the plan, with its attendant pledges and guarantees, which the British Ambassador and I have taken the liberty of most urgently commending to the approval of the United States Government.

The American, French and Italian Ambassadors assembled at Vologda are under the impression that the Maximalists themselves might be induced to accept the Japanese intervention which the Ambassadors admit is necessary to combat Germany and make a reorganization of Russia possible. The Maximalists' call on the Allied military missions for their aid in reconstituting a Russian army is from that viewpoint a significant symptom, notwithstanding the precautions and reservations with which the suggestion ought to be received. After consultation the three Ambassadors with the assistance of their military advisers and of Captain Garstin of the British Army drew up on the 3d of this month an official statement, the text of which was no doubt directly sent to your excellency<sup>1</sup> but which, for greater safety, I deem it my duty to reproduce hereinbelow. That paper, of a very confidential character, runs as follows:

The three Ambassadors have unanimously found:

- (1) That Japanese intervention is more than ever necessary to combat Germany;
- (2) That it will only work its full effect if it bears the character of an inter-Allied participation and if the Bolshevik government is prevailed on to accept it, as grave risks would otherwise be taken;
- (3) That Allied personalities who have access to Trotsky are under the impression that he could probably be induced to accept Japanese intervention;
- (4) That the Ambassadors have deemed it expedient to maintain, by reason of those facts, the adhesion on principle given by the heads of missions and military attachés to cooperation in organizing the Russian army against Germany with the reservation that final adhesion will be put off until the drafts of decrees shall have been examined.

Informal negotiations will be entered into with a view to obtaining guarantees as to the true disposition of the Bolshevik government toward the Allies.

These guarantees will consist in the acceptance of Japanese intervention and the granting to the Allied citizens and subjects of at least the same advantages, privileges and indemnities granted by Russia to German subjects by the Brest treaty of peace.

On the other hand the detailed reports received from Colonel

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram No. 69, Apr. 4, from the Ambassador in Russia, vol. I, p. 493.

Pichon by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic show that a Siberian government which would restore order with the desired help of Japanese troops could easily be constituted. According to that high officer Russian opinion abroad and even in Russia has made considerable headway in that direction and would quite cheerfully accept the coming of the Japanese if preceded by a categorical declaration of the Allies and accompanied by an American representation.

There is no doubt that a cooperation of the United States even though it were purely nominal in the contemplated action would assume in the eyes of the Russians a capital importance as being the token of the absence of any intention that did not harmonize with their interests. To the Japanese it would stand as the best confirmation of that American approval without which the Mikado's Government, until it just now took the purely local measure at Vladivostok where it acted furthermore in concert with the English, has refused to take any broad action.

The events that are unfolding along our front are continually showing how timely such a diversion would prove in every respect, for from all the information that comes to us it appears that the Central Empires, which are preparing a renewed effort against our troops, are in position to draw from the eastern front several hundred thousand men if they foresee no danger on that side. Now no such danger can come to them from the demobilized Russian troops or the Russian people who thrown on their own resources will remain absolutely passive, whereas they might be led to react if they felt that a powerful military force stood ready to come to their assistance. The experience of the first few months has shown to Russia what she is to expect from the Germans and there is ground for a hope that she would rally if tangible succor were extended to her.

It seems to my Government, in any event, that the attempt should be made by all means and I am instructed by it again to point out to your excellency the importance and urgency of immediately adopting measures to which, owing to the existing circumstances, the American Ambassador to Russia has just adhered. From all that we hear they will be adopted without a doubt if President Wilson so wills, and the Government of the Republic would be most grateful to him if he would, taking these new considerations into account, consent to reexamine the question with a view to the earliest possible solution.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 861.00/1445

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

53. Your 67, April 4, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Referring Department's 15, March 20, 7 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Department desires full details Webster's reports.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1454

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 8, 5.15 p. m.]

In regard to Siberia: Russian Minister at Peking and Russian Ambassador at Tokyo are imperialists in sentiment, opposed to democratic movement in Russia. The same is true of General Horvat and his group whom they are backing. They are counting on support of Japan. The Japanese Government backing Horvat.

The Chinese Government director of Chinese Eastern Railroad informed Palmer, in strict confidence, that Japanese Minister had recently asked him whether there is any intention of using American assistance on the Chinese Eastern Railroad in north Manchuria. The Director was made to feel that such an arrangement was not wanted.

The Russian Minister called on me yesterday and stated that the Siberian situation could be solved only if the [members?] of the Tomsk government would back Horvat in carrying the burden of inviting foreign intervention. He then proceeded to speak of the Chinese Eastern Railway and stated that as this was a Chinese enterprise, in which Russia had certain treaty rights, it was supposed that the arrangements made for American assistance to Russian railways did not refer to it.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1589

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 8, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received April 13, 10.47 a. m.]

81. Referring to my 79. Military attaché just received following from Riggs:

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 96.<sup>2</sup> Ante, p. 82.



The Anglo-Japanese landing at Vladivostok has made a great impression. The government, although it considered something like this likely, is surprised and threatened with loss of influence. Under certain influences it might be brought to a declaration of war on Japan. Military representatives saw Soviet government to-day and after long and violent discussions certain conditions which the Allied Governments should examine before an agreement could be reached on the question of Allied intervention in Siberia were brought up. The conditions read:

- (1) Promise not to interfere in the interior politics of Russia as was done with the Ukraine, the Don, and elsewhere;
- (2) Loyal collaboration with the Soviet even without recognition and limited to military questions;
- (3) Not an exclusively Japanese intervention but an Allied one;
- (4) Definite and prearranged determination of the territorial economic price to be paid Japan;
- (5) If this intervention is to serve the interests of both Russia and the Allies it would appear legitimate that the latter examine the possibility of territorial and economic concessions in their Far Eastern possessions.

The Allied military have the impression that this last point could easily be contested.

The situation is so tense that the Allied military judge it necessary to communicate to their governments that a clear, neutral, and prompt reply only will permit the negotiations which have been commenced to continue, whereas a delay may force Soviet to the last extremities. It would appear advantageous that the powers telegraph at once that they are willing to examine these propositions.

And Soviet government also asks urgent written replies addressed to the People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs stipulating that they will be kept secret and submitted to the Council of People's Commissaires. It would be very advantageous if the replies were identical.

In any case the delay necessary to arrive at an agreement is to be reduced as much as possible for it retards the intervention and consequently lengthens the time in which the enemy disposes of all of his force on the eastern front.

The Allied military representatives consider that Russian opposition to inter-Allied intervention in the Far East would in a very large measure diminish the utility of intervention. Therefore, judge an understanding with the Soviet as very necessary.

Identical notes to the American, English, French, Italian Governments and Ambassadors.

Following are the military representatives, Moscow: French, General Lavergne; Italian, General Romei; British, Captain Garstin; and [American] Riggs. Siberian Central Soviet Committee has issued address charging Japanese-British landing welcomed by counter-revolutionary *bourgeoisie* to overturn Soviet. Maintenance

of control concerns Soviet leaders more than German resistance or welfare of Russia. I think efforts to organize army will prove futile and that Soviet could offer no resistance to Allied intervention, nor do I believe they would form German alliance as realization such would be fatal to their domination and would greatly impede progress of world-wide social revolution. However, we can far better afford to permit Soviet-German alliance than Japanese-German cooperation. Suppose Allies will confer before categorically replying to Soviet.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1442

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1918, 4 p. m.

Department received direct April 6 telegram from Harbin sent by Derber, Prime Minister, and Moravski, Secretary, announcing formation of Siberian Provincial Duma.<sup>1</sup> Please report fully as to purpose, personnel and present importance of this movement, also relation to movement headed by General Horvat.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1428

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

55. Department's 47, April 5, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Press reports received here and withheld publication quote you as announcing that Japanese landing at Vladivostok made by agreement with Allies. Landing was made by Japanese on their own initiative. Statement referred to in Department's No. 47 was addressed to Russian authorities by Japanese and copy furnished American Consul.

British on their own initiative have now landed fifty armed sailors to protect Consulate. American Consul has not considered guard for American Consulate necessary as yet.

No report of armed resistance has been received.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 100.

File No. 861.00/1420

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1918, 2 p. m.

57. Your 61, April 2, 7 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and subsequent telegrams. Department has reports from Summers, also from Major Drysdale, military attaché at Peking, who was sent to Irkutsk, showing conclusively that prisoners of war in Siberia are arming and getting beyond control. This movement obviously imperils lives of Americans and citizens of Allied countries. Moreover, action of prisoners prevents assistance by Russian Railway Service Corps, or other friendly help from Allies. Please ascertain informally and report to Department what action is proposed to control present movement, which is gradually assuming serious proportions.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1596

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 10, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received April 15, 9.23 a. m.]

86. Your 47<sup>2</sup> received. Moscow advised through Robins also through Consul General.

Have given out following statement:

The American Ambassador, upon being asked what was the position of his Government concerning the landing of Japanese and British marines at Vladivostok, said:

The Soviet government and the Soviet press are giving too much importance to the landing of these marines which has no political significance but merely was a police precaution taken by the Japanese Admiral on his own responsibility for the protection of Japanese life and property in Vladivostok, and the Japanese Admiral Kato so officially informed the American Admiral Knight and the American Consul Caldwell in Vladivostok. My impression is that the landing of the British marines was pursuant to the request of the British Consul for the protection of the British Consulate and British subjects in Vladivostok which he anticipated would possibly be jeopardized by the unrest that might result from the Japanese descent. The American Consul did not ask protection from the American cruiser in Vladivostok Harbor and consequently no American marines were landed; this together with the fact that the French

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 100.

Consul, at Vladivostok, made no request for protection from the British, American or Japanese cruisers in Vladivostok Harbor unquestionably demonstrates that the landing of Allied troops is not a concerted action between the Allies.

Soviet press making strenuous effort to strengthen sway of régime by appealing to Russian prejudices against Japanese invasion; intervention by all Allies would in my judgment be welcomed by Russian people and Soviet government could not afford to oppose it. My consistent effort has been to encourage Soviet government to resist German domination, and while I do not think Soviet government likely to form open German alliance, am endeavoring to give them no excuse for doing so; that is object of above public statement.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1571

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 10, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 8.53 p. m.]

Referring to my cable of April 8, 6 p. m. The American Government in holding back in the matter of intervention in Siberia is [justified] by recent reports from there, particularly British military attaché and Major Fitzwilliam, British Army. Following is a summary of the situation as it appears from here:

There is no evidence of a concerted plan on the part of Germans to control Siberia through the prisoners nor could such an attempt succeed. Earlier reports about armed prisoners were exaggerated; most of these reports came from one source in Irkutsk. A great many Austrian prisoners have become international socialists, joined Bolsheviks and thrown in their lot with Russians. Most German prisoners desire to return to Europe. In case of need Bolsheviks will make use of the technical knowledge of German officers, but the latter could not control unless the Russian people should be driven into the arms of Germany through some fatal mistake.

Intervention can do good only if understood and supported by the [omission] from there. Intervention in support of a group superimposed from above would badly upset things for the Allies. Semenov has no backing in Russia though at present [omission] by Kuroki, Japanese officer. Any advance would put him in a helpless condition dependent entirely upon outside force. Extent of Ussuri Cossack organization not known here but other Cossacks generally stand with

the workmen. Only reactionaries want intervention at all costs even in the last resort by Japan alone. The so-called Siberian autonomous government organized at Tomsk, members of which addressed President Wilson from Vladivostok by telegraph April 6, might possibly get sufficient backing in Siberia to warrant Allied support.

It is believed that the Allies, particularly the United States, still have it in their power to take action which will save Russia and Siberia from German dominion and keep up spirit of other Slavic nationalities in Europe; economic rather than military action will now accomplish this. Russian population needs clothes and manufactured goods; workmen need food held by peasants. The immediate creation of a Russian trading corporation, backed by the governments, which would import needed goods from the United States and Japan and would exchange for grain and supply same in cities, all through local Russian and Siberian committees, absolutely on condition that order be first restored so that beneficial use of materials assured—this policy if announced to people will gain their immediate adhesion. Restoration of railway traffic policing by local guards with only potential support by international force. If the policy of economic support to Siberia and restoration of traffic is put in the foreground, it is believed that other matters will take care of themselves. Should intervention come first there is danger that it will be understood to be in favor of reaction and capitalism and will alienate the people permanently. The financial support required for the economic program would be much smaller than military action would require; it would give far greater assurance of ultimate effective military action against Germany. Economic support as primary action, military assistance in the background made effective where local anarchy requires, would appear safe policy.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/1448

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1918, 4 p. m.

Please verify following reports received from reliable sources:

- (1) There are sufficient locomotives throughout Siberian Railway. Large quantities of rolling stock, much of which is standing in stations unused.
- (2) In western Siberia there are large quantities of grain, sold in 1911. Farmers and some Austrian prisoners have apparently settled there and are offering supplies at stations.
- (3) No armed prisoners in western Siberia.

- (4) German major general, two colonels and thirty-four other officers recently arrived at Irkutsk to organize large concentration of armed prisoners there. Town and camp now commanded by 4.6 guns.
- (5) Preparations are being made for destruction of bridges and arches in case of Allied intervention.
- (6) Prisoners trying to return to Europe have been stopped at Omsk and sent back to Irkutsk.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1602

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, April 12, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received April 12, 9 p. m.]

Your April 9, 4 p. m. Members of Siberian government elected to Constituent Siberian Assembly [*sic*] in elections wherein *bourgeoisie* and moderates were not permitted to participate. They met at Tomsk and proposed program in which chief features were community ownership of all lands and property which were to be equally divided without compensation to previous owners. The Bolsheviks dissolved this government which then proceeded Harbin where there are at present six members who came to ask Allied assistance and to secure the cooperation of General Horvat. They asked Horvat to enter their government but he declined on the ground that they were all extreme socialists and he could not work with them because he did not believe they represented majority of Siberian people. Since arriving Harbin their program has been changed, published here April 7, as follows:

At the end of last January a Siberian Provincial Duma was at Tomsk and from its members was selected a Siberian provisional government. It included the elected representatives of Siberian *Zemstvos*, municipalities, cooperative trade organizations, as well as representatives of numerous national and social bodies, and immediate aims of the Siberian government are—

- (1) Establishment of law and order to secure safety persons and property;
- (2) Active armed interference with the Bolsheviks on behalf of legal imperial authority of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly;
- (3) The protection of political, economical and territorial integrity of Siberia;
- (4) The convocation of the All-Siberian Constituent Assembly;
- (5) Active combat conjointly with the Allies against the Bolshevik-German peace in order to conclude a universal democratic peace;

- (6) The response of the friendly relations with Allied and friendly powers according to existing treaties;
- (7) Organization of all necessary measures to resist further penetration into Russian territory.

[This] will be the heavy and responsible task; the government of autonomous Siberia recognizes it will be able to bring it into operation only if it has energetic support of Allied powers. Government resolved to allow to participate in work personal active representatives [Allied?] mission.

Following present membership Siberian Provincial Assembly [provisional government?]: Derber, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, only man any ability, politician, succeeded Potanin when latter refused to act because of their extreme socialism; [Tiber-] Petrov, Minister [Interior?] Siberian [native] populations' [representative], Buriats and Kirghiz; Kolobov, former priest, slated as Minister Commerce, officials ignorant [*sic*]; Krakovetski, Trans-Siberian politician, for Minister of War; Patushinski, Jew, undistinguished, Minister of Justice; Ustrugov, former Provisional Vice Minister Communications, not certain whether he will form part of Siberian government or affiliate with Horvat movement, honest, able citizen; Vologodski, Siberian magistrate under Kerensky government; Moravski, aggressive politician, Jewish lawyer. These people undoubtedly have considerable support [among] both Manchurian and Siberian peoples but possess no talent or experience and no personality among them of sufficient significance as leaders. Believe them honest, patriotic, well [-meaning], but in my opinion without power and unfitted to cope with situation. They besought Horvat's assistance and still ask for it. Am informed to-day and think likely they would consent to form coalition government under Horvat leadership.

Horvat to-day perfecting his organization. Principal program to restore order; leave local government in hands of local Zemstvos; reestablish discipline in army on plan of American Army, dispensing with soldiers' committees; after the restoration of order hold popular elections participated in by all parties for formation of National Assembly, which shall choose its own government; Horvat party then to dissolve [omission]. In view of China's anxiety Horvat suggests applying this first to Russian population, Chinese Eastern Railway, afterwards extending it to the contiguous provinces if supported. Have promised me they will support any government which America supports but would like to see Horvat as Russian leader. If Department approves and will support will endeavor to amalgamate Horvat and Derber factions. The primary proposition [of both] govern-

ments [is] that nothing can be done without support of Allies even if this does not go so far as actual military intervention. The presence of Allied troops, however, would be guarantee to all classes and lead, in my opinion, to reestablishment of law and order. Earnestly request more information of your views as all parties press me and wait for your decision.

MOSER

---

File No. 861.00/1617

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 12, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received April 19, 3.22 p. m.]

95. Your special No. 55 of April 9, 5 p. m. I made no statement that the landing was with consent or by agreement of Allies. Same report published here. Emanated from Moscow and I am endeavoring to ascertain the source. Transmitted to you my verbatim statement in my No. 86, April 10, 4 p. m.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1581

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, April 13, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 1.37 a. m.]

My British colleague, in pursuance of instructions, yesterday informed the Japanese Government that in the view of his Government landing of British and Japanese marines at Vladivostok was due solely to need for the protection of Allied life and property, and had no relation to the larger question of Allied intervention in Siberia. He further stated that the captain of the *Suffolk* had been directed to do his best to settle the present difficulties with the local authorities and bring incident to an amicable close.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the hearty concurrence of the Japanese Government in this view and in the instructions given to the British captain.

I have repeated Peking.

MORRIS



File No. 861.00/1579

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Tokyo, April 13, 1918, 2 a. m.

[Received April 13, 1.40 a. m.]

Professor Masaryk,<sup>1</sup> traveling with British passport under the name of Marsden, reached Tokyo on April 8. Will leave on the *Empress of Asia*, April 20, going direct to Washington. Advocates: (1) closer relations with Bolshevik government, even to point of recognition *de facto* government; fears otherwise that Germans may acquire dominant influence; (2) unity of action by Allies toward Russia; (3) immediate organization of [corporation] to purchase with commodities and distribute grain and thus prevent it falling into hands of Germans; (4) extensive propaganda under American supervision throughout eastern Siberia.

Believes that Bolshevik government will survive some time longer. Likely to be succeeded by a coalition of Bolsheviks, Socialists and Liberals. Sees no hope whatever in Cadets or other moderate elements. Increased reaction unlikely for the present. Is convinced that as yet there is no organized German influence in eastern Siberia. Saw no evidence anywhere of organization of German or Austrian prisoners. Thinks it possible that Bolsheviks, with aid and sympathy Allies, could organize within year a substantial army to oppose German aggression. Fears that Japanese intervention would result in conflict with Bolshevik movement and permanently estrange Russia from all the Allies.

[File copy not signed]

File No. 861.00/1620

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 13, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received April 19, 8.50 p. m.]

97. Your 67, April 4, 4 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> received 11th. Webster<sup>3</sup> went Irkutsk with Hicks<sup>4</sup> and Trotsky's representative, special car. Party sent by Soviet or Robins to investigate reports concerning arming

<sup>1</sup> Thomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. telegram No. 53 of Apr. 8, *ante*, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> Capt. William B. Webster, member of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

<sup>4</sup> Capt. W. L. Hicks of the British Mission in Moscow.

war prisoners. Robins advised me that party going and inquired [should] same [be] accompanied by military officer, but [I] replied, Macgowan and Huntington at Irkutsk and thought sufficient for investigation. Arriving Irkutsk, were received by Siberian Soviet and, being requested to accompany latter to Manchuria Station for conference with Chinese, Webster wired Robins for consent, which Robins gave and asked my approval thereof. Replied, Webster in Siberia on account previous experience there, that as had not directed his going, my approval unnecessary. Webster telegraphed me twice but only one received. Robins, however, has repeated portions of Webster's reports to me, see my 61, April 2.<sup>1</sup> Think party sent by Soviet to investigate Macgowan's reports received by me through Summers and communicated to Soviet through Robins. Siberian Soviet attentive to Webster party, gained their confidence and made such deep impression that Webster's last *en clair* telegram to Robins, who forwarded me, also says:

Chief aim negotiations by Soviet, opening railway for transport which desirable, but handicapped by Allied non-recognition Soviet. Soviet desires recognition (1) to assure them control Russian Government; (2) would make foreign troops unnecessary [to] preserve domestic order; (3) if Germany attacks, enable them invite Allies cooperate; (4) assure exchange of raw materials for manufactured supplies. We heartily agree these statements.

Robins's cables through Embassy and the Department have advocated recognition. One said Sisson concurred and Robins tells me that he has Sisson's written approval on his retained copy. Robins repeatedly urged me to recommend recognition. Thompson<sup>2</sup> apparently has been carried by Robins; Thompson was so frightened after Bolshevik revolution that he did not sleep in his hotel but at Military Mission almost until departure because he had expended under Robins's guid[ance] over a million dollars to exterminate Bolshevism. Sisson unheard of since March 14; if he is through lines, is probably cabling you that Soviet leaders are German agents.

Robins intense and sincere in everything and he is now as earnest in support of Soviet as he was opposed to them before November revolution, even saying "we" when speaking of Soviet.

The power of Soviet is weakening daily, making little progress in organizing army. Soviet offered command to Lechitski, able general under Brusilov, and late commanding southwest front and extremely liberal, but L. refused after Soviet told him objects of army were: (1) to support Bolsheviks; (2) to fight *bourgeois* Germany; and (3) to fight capitalism of England, France, America,

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Lieut. Col. William B. Thompson, in charge in 1917 of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

and the Allies. Schwartz, another able Russian general, first accepted high position without asking objects but when ridiculed [advocated] changing name from Red Army to National or Russian Army, aroused such a controversy that he resigned or was relieved.

Furthermore, Bolsheviki are divided, jealous, envious. Kolontai exceedingly influential, good family, eloquent, brilliant, has married Debenko, fourth or fifth experiment, ten years younger but physically attractive, unscrupulous, ambitious, cruel, but cowardly, and they are under suspicion of Soviet. Debenko, hero of sailors who dislike Red Guard, was arrested for cowardice at Revel and imprisoned at Moscow, but released on examination and arranged meeting of sailors who congregated at Moscow when Soviet prohibited meeting. Moscow Soviet control Moscow district in addition to [omission] who fear and dislike them. If Allies or we alone should recognize Central Soviet, it would estrange many local [omission] and all opponents of present [régime]. I think time is fast approaching for Allied intervention and Allies should be prepared to act promptly.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1608

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, April 17, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received April 17, 2.56 p. m.]

Chinese cruiser arrived to-day to protect Chinese residents. Will remain indefinitely.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1615

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 17, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received April 19, 2.23 a. m.]

107. Your 57, April 10, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Have cabled all information when received concerning arming prisoners of war, concerning which advices conflicting. Following official communication from Berlin to Soviet government:

Information from authentic sources that German and Austrian voluntary fugitives menace Moscow, intending capture Swedish, Danish Consulates General same way they have captured war prisoners' camps and forced war prisoners enlist Red Guard. Civil, military

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 116.

authorities, Moscow, show utter helplessness, even favor these activities. German Government expects Russian Government take immediate energetic steps and insists (1) disbanding all war prisoners' committees, voluntary fugitives under direction Austrian Ebenholtz, (2) demands arresting members above committees.

Robins, when communicating this, expresses opinion that it demonstrates scare about arming prisoners is German work to frighten Allies. Webster expected Sunday but conditions probably changed since he left Irkutsk, 10th. Military attaché, to whom your 38, April 2,<sup>1</sup> referred, reports that Riggs says unknown number of Ukraine-Teutonic battalions been formed by Germans, but no confirmation obtainable. Consul General reports has cabled Department substance of report by local Bolshevik committees to their headquarters, Moscow, concerning German occupation of portions of Russia.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1690

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 18, 1918.

[Received April 30, 8.58 a. m.]

109. Continuing my 107, 17th. Following just received from Webster, Omsk, through Robins:

Leaving 18th for Moscow. Investigations, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, give entirely satisfactory results confirming impressions communicated previous telegrams. No armed prisoners Krasnoyarsk, discipline strict. Omsk chief center arming prisoners, total, including those sent against Semenov, 1,100. Omsk provincial arming prisoners confirmed. Guarantees obtained from All-Siberian Soviet. All armed prisoners violently socialistic. Present conditions without menace except against Central Empires or Japanese invasion.

Mail just received from Consul General enclosing telegrams from Macgowan, Jenkins, Thomson, Nielsen. Do not accord with Webster. Macgowan reported, 12th, had urged Webster visit Omsk, but said Webster party likewise disposed in this as in other matters to accept Bolshevik assurance that it was nothing. Thomson, Omsk,<sup>2</sup> April 5, reported thousand prisoners near there fully equipped under German officers and suggested that arming prisoners might be with German approval to oppose Japanese invasion. Jenkins, Chita, 13th, reports decree of local Soviet government declaring prisoners free as other inhabitants. You see reports disagree. Robins already cabled Davison, Thompson, that Webster investigation "admirably done."

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Alfred R. Thomson, Consul at Irkutsk, detailed to Omsk.

Petrograd press says Chinese press report two detachments of English and American troops arrived Harbin. Is it true? Caldwell wires Chinese cruiser arrived at Vladivostok.

American Consul, Petrograd, reports Viborg surrounded and rumored that few Russian vessels sunk in Finnish ports to avoid German capture. See Robins's cable Thompson through Davison. Passengers [reference my] 108, Davison.<sup>1</sup>

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1633

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 18, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received April 23, 9.45 a. m.]

110. French Ambassador, Italian Ambassador think that situation demands Allied consent to Japanese intervention immediately, or very soon, claiming that Motono speech in Japanese Diet, while affirming Japan's willingness to intervene with Allied consent, still indicated that Japan reserves the right to intervene if Japanese interests endangered. Colleagues fear Vladivostok landing first step toward independent action and argue that Japan craving more territory and having well-equipped army and great fleet, may conclude agreement with Germany whereby former will be given Siberia and remainder of Russia be divided between German and Austrian Governments. They indicate possibility of Allies' disagreeing if Japan takes independent step. This discussion originated by telegram of 17th instant from French Consul, Irkutsk, stating that Japanese and Chinese leaving by orders their Governments and that such action similar to that taken previous to Japanese-Russian War. I replied that I did not believe that Japan would intervene against our wishes. However, I can not close my eyes to [a] situation which gives a grasping nation a magnificent opportunity.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1619

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, April 19, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 7.31 p. m.]

Referring to your telegram April 4.<sup>1</sup> Now learn Professor Masaryk passed through here about three weeks ago under assumed

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

name *en route* Washington. He visited French Consul and stated forty or fifty thousand Czecho-Slovaks will arrive here in near future *en route* from Russia to France where they join French Army. First regiment under French general now on Amur Railway should arrive here within ten days. French Consul here without instructions regarding preparations for housing, feeding and transportation which can not be arranged on short notice. French Consul therefore requests assistance Allied Consuls. Can you ascertain from French Government when we may expect transports to arrive here to take these men? We can probably arrange to secure barracks but food problem serious unless can have steamer running regularly from Tsingtao with beef and flour while men are here. If transport not soon due might be better send men to Manchuria where food should be easily procured along railway. If not already provided for by plans of French Government immediate steps must be taken for provision and transportation.

May be ultimately total of 100,000 these men.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1635

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, April 20, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received April 21, 1 p. m.]

Russian Far Eastern Committee for the active defense of their country and the creation of a constitutional assembly, declaring itself a political organization without party lines, has asked the Consulate to forward to the Government of the United States its petition for the support of the Allied Governments. The committee proposes as follows:

- (1) The restoration of order Siberian Russia by disarmament [prisoners ?], overthrow of Bolsheviks as [bringing country] to anarchy and responsible for treacherous peace with Germany;
- (2) Measures for the [creation] of military force to oppose Bolsheviks and restoring the army and navy, to annul peace and reestablish action in accord with Allies;
- (3) Cooperation with all parties for the earliest possible formation of special government for Siberia and Far East leading up to constitutional assembly.

Immediate tasks declared are to restore authority of local Zemstvos and municipal councils, securing civil liberty to population, restoring economic finances through immediate reestablishment of transportation [facilities ?], food assistance where required.

Committee states it will work for coalition with members Siberian government previously reported my telegram April 11 [12], without regard for party lines but looks for leadership to Horvat faction.

Following is personnel of committee: . . . .

Hundreds refugees from Blagoveshchensk arrived yesterday having come overland Tsitsihar in pitiable condition bringing, however, 8,000,000 rubles in gold from State Bank and deposited here with Russian Asiatic Bank. They report horrible stories of Bolshevik atrocities similar to Belgium. Far Eastern Committee requests Allied consuls appoint commission one delegate from each consulate to sit with committee and take sworn testimony refugees. Telegraph instructions.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/1641

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1918.

[Received April 23.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government forwarded to me a telegram just sent to it by the Ambassador of France at Tokyo concerning the attitude of the Japanese Government toward an eventual action in Siberia. Thinking that these data may prove of interest to your excellency at this time when the importance of the question of intervention is daily growing, I hasten to give you hereinbelow the substance of that telegram:

In the course of a conversation he had with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is acting during Mr. Motono's illness, Mr. Regnault was told that the Japanese Government would give assurances that it would not interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia. But the Vice Minister believes that these assurances should not be formulated with excessive clearness and precision, as any co-operation with the Maximalists would in his opinion be directly antagonistic to the contemplated goal which is to repress anarchy and combat the Germans. A *rapprochement* with the Trotsky government would beforehand estrange all the sound elements of the Russian people who mainly yearn for the restoration of order and would compel Japan to forsake, if not to deliver up Semenov, who has had the Entente's support.

The Vice Minister added that according to reports received from the Japanese Consul at Moscow the Soviet Commissioners make no secret of the intention to use the Russian Army, which the Bolshevik government is trying to organize, not against the Germans but

against the enemy at home. In organizing and arming prisoners of war the Bolsheviki give further evidence of their subserviency to Germany and there is no doubt left that every attempt to find support on their side must be given up.

In conclusion the Vice Minister expressed the thought that the American Government, being made aware of the true situation, will kindly approve the contemplated projects and will not withhold its support from the Japanese Government.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

File No. 861.00/1672

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 22, 1918.

[Received April 27, 1.25 p. m.]

401. Following is translation of radio from German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 19, to Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

From reliable sources we hear that in various camps for prisoners of war in Russia revolutionary committees have been formed which are anxious to equalize the position of officers and soldiers. This has actually taken place in Omsk, Tomsk and Ekaterinburg. In Omsk the committees decided to prevent the prisoners of war from returning to their own country. Having this in view, the railway station was occupied by armed bands which have also been instructed to prevent the prisoners arriving from the east to continue their journey. Further, in the very near future, a congress of prisoners of war is to be held at Moscow intended to express the same ideas. Having these circumstances in view, the German Government makes the following demands on the Russian Government:

- (1) Prisoners of war are to be immediately disarmed in Omsk and only reliable government troops are to remain which will be able to prevent the repetition of such circumstances;
- (2) All the administration of the camps, especially in Omsk, Ekaterinburg, is to be taken over by the Russian authorities until the arrival of a German committee;
- (3) German and Austrian prisoners are not to live in the same camps;
- (4) The officers must be established in their former rank;
- (5) The railway station at Omsk is to be occupied by Russian Government forces which will be answerable for the journey of prisoners of war and civil prisoners arriving from eastern and central Siberia;



- (6) Meetings of prisoners of war, as the one which was to be held in Moscow, are to be forbidden and prisoners are to be allowed to return to their own country.

The German Government expects to receive information with regard to these demands.

Russian reply as follows:

Concerning the new German demands the Commissars wish to remind Germany that there was point in the Brest treaty dealing with the cessation of government agitation among the prisoners of war. This point is being actually fulfilled by Russia. The Russian authorities do not take any part in the political life of the prisoners. With regard to meetings, congresses, etc., they possess the same rights as all Russian civilians.

Press prints radio from Kiev that the Ukrainian republic does not recognize the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania and a protest has been made to Rumania and the Quadruple Alliance.

SUMMERS

---

File No. 861.00/1619

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1918, 3 p. m.

3600. Department has received report that forty or fifty thousand Czecho-Slovaks will arrive Vladivostok in near future on their way from Russia to France also that first regiment under French general now on Amur Railway and due Vladivostok within ten days. French Consul Vladivostok has no instructions as to maintenance, provisioning or transportation. It is further reported that these troops may aggregate 100,000 in all. This Government can not provide tonnage for transportation across Pacific. Please communicate with French Government and advise result earliest opportunity.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1652

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 22, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received April 24, 8.30 p. m.]

118. Replying to Robins's inquiry, I have told him could not ask him to remain in Moscow to neglect of Red Cross work but expressed

appreciation of information and suggestions received from him. He wires Kornilov death confirmed and states that ends all internal opposition to Soviet government. Robins very emphatically declares time has come for Allied cooperation with Soviet government or Allied opposition.

Webster, Hicks here to-day, returning from Siberia; report not exceeding 1,000 prisoners armed and have written guarantee from Siberian Soviet that maximum will not exceed 1,500. Reports of Macgowan, with newspaper instinct, reported every rumor and made erroneous impressions. They affirm prisoners will only be armed to oppose Japanese invasion in which event they will be organized by their own officers now in prison. Said that Siberians, when asked if Allied intervention would be opposed, replied that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ask Allied assistance in absence of recognition, as quoted in my No. 97, April 13, 7 p. m.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1647

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 23, 1918.

[Received April 24, 6.35 p. m.]

405. Commissariat Foreign Affairs has telegraphed Ministry Foreign Affairs, Berlin, that, according information received, German-Ukrainian troops have passed Perekop and are advancing on Simferopol in the Crimea. "Even according to *ex parte* statement [of] Ukrainian government, Crimea does not form part Ukrainian republic. Advance complete violation of Brest treaty as it is into territory of people's Soviet republic. It is a threat to our Black Sea Fleet."

Trotsky has issued order:

To prevent violence in war-prisoner camps between prisoners of certain convictions and those of other convictions, and against officers, I order measures to be taken immediately for disarmament of prisoners.

All stipulations of Russia's international agreements respecting war prisoners to be carefully observed.

Strictly to forbear from violation agreement in paragraph 2, Brest peace treaty, binding authority "to forbear from all agitation and propaganda against the government or state institutions" of the Central powers.

To admit into Red Army only those volunteers of foreign origin who have become Russian citizens.

Refer my 401, 22d.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1967

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1918.

[Received April 24.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government has just forwarded to me a telegram from the Ambassador of France to Russia who, under the impression made on him by the more and more alarming advance of German enterprise in that country, is led by the series of facts that have lately come to his knowledge to the conclusion that a Japanese intervention bearing an inter-Allied character has become an urgent necessity. I deem it my duty, owing to the gravity of the facts reported by Mr. Noulens, to transmit hereinbelow to your excellency the substance of his message:

In spite (so telegraphs Mr. Noulens) of the protests of the People's Commissioners and in violation of the provisions of the Brest Litovsk treaty, the Germans are still broadening their action and are advancing in every direction. Their soldiers have already passed beyond Kharkov and Odessa, in the south. In Finland they are extending to the White Guards an assistance which is but the first step toward a protectorate that would isolate Russia from the rest of Europe. They have possessed themselves of nearly all the Black Sea Fleet and that of Helsingfors which has sought temporary refuge at Kronstadt can hardly escape their clutches.

In control of the southern provinces and Black Sea ports, they are now using the Finnish guards in cutting off the communications of Russia with the Entente powers. If the Allied contingents are not reinforced, as I have repeatedly asked they should be, there is ground to fear that raids like that which was recently intended to blow up the Kem bridge will eventually be successful and that German-Finnish forces will occupy Kem and Kandalaksha where a submarine station could be established that would singularly hamper navigation to Archangel. . . .

Japan's military action, brought into play as soon as possible with the assistance and in the name of the Allies, can alone thwart the schemes of the German Government in eastern Europe. It would be important to complement such an intervention by the unavoidable landing, which may be urgent, of an inter-Allied body of troops at Murmansk and Archangel. The group of Czechs which has not yet been sent on to the Far East might render valuable service in that respect.

In order to offer the required guarantees to the Entente powers as well as to Russian opinion, the Japanese intervention should bear an inter-Allied character which of course implies the consent of the United States. Again it must be borne in mind that Japan has reserved to itself the right to intervene on its own initiative on the day when its interests are threatened.

Your excellency will perhaps share my view that considering the importance of these data and the gravity of the events that may be foreseen in the very near future, it might be advisable to place before the President of the United States the foregoing *résumé* of our Ambassador's telegram.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

File No. 861.00/1880

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

No. 2002

PEKING, April 23, 1918.

[Received May 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copies of a despatch from the Consulate at Harbin, dated April 20, and dealing with action of military units in Harbin.

The units against the action of which objection is made are parts of the forces of Colonel Semenov, to whom Major Barrows's report refers.

I have not been able to change my opinion that it is undesirable to give assistance to Colonel Semenov. While Major Barrows's letter is favorable to him, it indicates that his force of 2,000, including many Chinese and Buriats, is not of itself able to accomplish anything. Major Barrows says: "He terribly needs a supporting force of a few real soldiers." The Semenov contingent would therefore appear to be a very weak reed to lean upon.

Should Semenov make an advance at this time, it is a foregone conclusion that he would be driven back by the Red Guards. If this should happen it might be represented, on the part of those interested, that an attack was being made by the Bolsheviki upon Chinese territory.

Major Drysdale, the military attaché of this Legation, considers that it would be vain to attach any hopes to Semenov, and that any support given him would have a most unfavorable reaction throughout Siberia and Russia.

I have [etc.]

PAUL S. REINSCH

[Enclosure]

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

HARBIN, April 20, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith four copies of a letter received by me to-day from the editors of the three Russian newspapers at Harbin, to which was attached for my information a copy of their letter to the English, Japanese and French Consuls, respectively (also enclosed in quadruplicate).<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The military units to which reference is made are the force of Colonel Semenov and the officers' battalion still in course of organization at Harbin under Colonel Orlov, to cooperate with him. There has never been any question that Semenov's force has occasionally acted in a lawless and high-handed manner, the most recent incident having occurred three days ago at Harbin when six of Semenov's officers seized the person of a Greek merchant and attempted to mulct him for a sum said to be eighty thousand rubles. A full report of this incident can be found probably at the French Legation.

Sympathetic as I am bound to be with the aims of the Semenov movement, it is undeniable that the methods of this guerrilla leader have aroused a strong opposition among the Russian people; and that unless he is brought under more rigorous restraint (supposed to be exercised by General Pleshkov) without further delay, the continued association of his project with the support of the Allies may be of greater detriment than service to the cause of the Allies. I respectfully suggest that the Legation bring this matter to the attention of General Horvat during his sojourn in Peking, and, in connection with my previous despatch of this date enclosing copies of Major Barrows's letter, to the notice of the Department of State.<sup>1</sup>

I have [etc.]

C. K. MOSER

File No. 861.00/1674

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1918, 3 p. m.

3663. Recently the War Department was requested to transport from Nagasaki and Vladivostok respectively small contingents of Italian and Belgian troops, the latter with armored motor cars, and numbering in the former case 100 and in the latter case 350 officers and men inclusive.

It seemed advisable to this Department that as many as possible of the governments at war with Germany should be temporarily represented by military forces in the Far East. It seemed inadvisable to bring away from there troops carrying flags of co-belligerents when it might be embarrassing to send back there other such troops. With these ideas in view, representations were made through our representatives at Havre and Rome to have the Governments to which they were accredited withdraw their respective requests to have these troops transported, although the American transport was then in transit for Nagasaki and is now in transit for Vladivostok. Our representatives immediately advised that the matter had been presented and received in a favorable light. Since then Rome has advised that the Italian Government has acted as suggested. The Belgian Minister to-day informed the Department that his Government has consulted Paris. It was not the intention of this Government that any other governments should be consulted or that any wider circulation than possible should be given to the suggestion.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The position of the United States Government was predicated upon the possibility of intervention in Siberia, but was not intended to and did not commit this Government to intervention or to any form of intervention. Its purpose was simply to have representatives of the different Allied military units within reach in case intervention should become necessary and Allied intervention should prove expedient. For obvious reasons the suggestion emanated solely from this Government simply as a matter of political expediency.

If you are approached on the subject by the Foreign Office or by the representatives of the other two Governments mentioned herein you can discreetly use the information herein set forth, but it is felt to be highly desirable that the matter should not be discussed with other persons.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1653

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary by the Ambassador on April 25, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

April 25, 1918.

The British War Cabinet have now further considered the general military problem before the Allies, and have reached the conclusion that it is essential to treat Europe and Asia, for the purposes of strategy, though not of command, as a single front. The transfer of German divisions from east to west is still continuing and, under present conditions, can be further continued, and it is imperative to stop this movement if it can possibly be done.

Germany can now draw food and raw materials from Asia, and in these conditions, even if our defensive is successful, there is little chance that we could make a successful offensive. In the present state of affairs we cannot hope for a favourable change in internal conditions in Germany and for this reason also it is important that pressure should be brought on the Central powers from the east.

It must further be remembered that Germany is now trying to sow disorder throughout the east, and that German agents are already attempting to cause trouble in Afghanistan, Persia and Turkestan. This movement will have important effects unless it can be checked.

It thus becomes of the greatest urgency to reestablish an Allied front in Russia, and the only hope of doing this appears to be by producing a national revival of Russia, such as that which was seen in the time of Napoleon. Russia has an immense supply of soldiers trained to arms, and with experience of modern warfare, including capable generals, and if the necessary spirit could be aroused, an effective army could in a short time be produced, and supplied from the stores now at Russian ports. The Germans would then be compelled either to withdraw or strengthen their forces in Russia.

The British Government considers that it is necessary for the Allies to unite in order to bring about a Russian national revival, and in order to adopt a policy of freeing Russia from foreign control by means of Allied intervention. The Allies must, of course, avoid taking sides in Russian politics, and, if the Bolshevik government will cooperate in resisting Germany, it seems necessary to act with them as the *de facto* Russian Government. Trotsky, at least, has for some time shown signs of recognizing that cooperation with the Allies is the only hope of freeing Russia from the Germans, and, whatever his motives, he has taken steps against anti-Ally newspapers and has asked for cooperation at Murmansk, and on other matters. He has now definitely asked for a statement of the help which the Allies could give, and of the guarantee which they would furnish, and says that he considers an agreement desirable if the conditions are satisfactory. The British Government are of opinion that the Allies should avail themselves of this opportunity to offer Allied intervention against Germany, accompanied by a suitable declaration of disinterestedness and by proper guarantees as to the evacuation of Russian territory. If such an offer was accepted the whole position might be transformed, and if it was refused, the position of the Bolshevik government would at least be defined.

Japan would clearly have to furnish the greater part of any considerable military force which might be used, but it is desirable that all the Allies should participate.

The intervention of Japan alone clearly might throw a large proportion of the Russian population on to the side of Germany, and we can therefore only offer an intervention by all the Allies, Japan providing the greatest military strength. The British Government would be ready to make a naval demonstration at Murmansk and elsewhere, which would provide rallying points for anti-German forces and hold the ports as bases. The British could also give assistance to the Russian forces in Transcaucasia if communication through Persia can be established, which will depend largely on the cooperation of the Bolsheviks in that region. The important step to be taken would, however, be an advance through Siberia by a force predominantly Japanese and American. The Allied character of this force would have to be furnished mainly from the United States, though British and probably also French and Italian detachments could accompany it. The American contingent might be composed mainly of technical corps, especially mechanical transports, signal units, railway troops, and medical units, and also one complete division. This force would probably have little or no fighting for some time after landing, and the American division, if sent, could finish training in Siberia. A great quantity of war material now at the ports would be made available for refitting the Russian army.

The British War Cabinet are anxious to learn whether the President would be disposed to agree to the following course of action:

1. Great Britain and the United States to make a simultaneous proposal to the Bolshevik government for intervention by the Allies on the lines indicated, an undertaking to be given for the withdrawal of all Allied forces at the conclusion of hostilities.
2. An American force, composed as described above, to be sent to the Far East.

If this general policy is acceptable, the question of approaching the Japanese Government remains. Japan would under this scheme intervene in Siberia as part of a joint intervention by the Allies . . . and it would probably be necessary for her to use her troops, in conjunction with Russian and Allied forces, in European Russia as well as in Asia. The British Government con-

sider that Japan should, in return, have the military command of the expedition, though a mission from each Allied country, including a strong propaganda detachment, would be attached. It also seems desirable that the proposal should be made to the Japanese at an early date and pressed on the ground that the proposed course of action is necessary for a victory of the Allied cause. It would be difficult for the Japanese Government to refuse this scheme if pressed on these grounds.

The suggested plan is one of urgent importance. The proposals outlined above are in no way intended as an alternative to sending American infantry to Europe, the need for which is constantly increasing. The problem of Russia is one of pressing urgency and in the present situation it is essential to bring pressure against Germany in the East, without delay. If this cannot be done, it is difficult to see how the blockade can be made effective or how peace is to be reached through a conclusive defeat of the enemy's forces.

Before consulting the other Allied powers the British Government think the most important step is to ascertain whether the President concurs in these proposals, for without his concurrence the British Government would not care to proceed further with them.

---

File No. 861.00/1656

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 25, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received April 25, 10.18 a. m.]

Your April 12, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Information seems correct with the following modifications: (2) Large stocks of grain in western Siberia but farmers not willing to sell except in exchange for needed merchandise; (3) about eight hundred armed Hungarian prisoners have come to Irkutsk from Omsk; (4) no concentration of prisoners of war at Irkutsk could be verified, armed prisoners in Irkutsk district are all Bolshevik; (5) bridges between Manchouli and Chita believed to be mined for destruction should Semenov advance; (6) unknown, but German authorities apparently alarmed at spread of Bolshevik allegiance among prisoners.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/1664

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 5.56 p. m.]

My telegrams April 8, 6 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> and April 10, 5 p. m.<sup>3</sup> Russians here are organizing governing board for the Chinese Eastern Railway

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup>Ante, p. 117.



composed of Horvat and two other Russian bankers, Admiral Kolchak, Ustrugov, and two Chinese. While they are avowedly merely an administrative board, I am informed that they are planning military action against the Bolsheviks, and count on raising contingent of 14,000 Russians to be backed by Japanese forces. They state that constitutional or administrative matters should be postponed until military effort successful. Japanese financial and military support has been promised upon acceptance of conditions which are described as harsh.

It is feared that this attempt of the reactionaries will create a situation unfavorable to the general interest of Allies. It is believed force of 14,000 can not be raised. Semenov supplied with Japanese artillery but has inadequate forces. If his advance continues it will mean the destruction of important bridges and the organization of all Siberia for defense. In that case reactionary forces helpless without Japanese military assistance. Semenov movement therefore considered dangerous, unadvisable to support.

I beg to request information about any change in relations of Allies to Soviet in Russia. The protection of the general interest of Allies requires immediate action towards helping Siberian population organize a representative government. If United States and Allies are attempting to influence the situation in Russia important support is possible from the Siberian end. Allied commission sent for organization purposes should have power to command supplies. John Stevens, here at present, concurs in above and believes essential to avoid commitment Semenov and organize Allied action. British Minister of the same opinion expresses the hope United States would take the lead.

REINSCH

---

Attitude of the United States toward Siberian Political Organizations: Relations of Diplomatic and Consular Officers with Them—Advance and Repulse of Semenov—Appeals, Recommendations, and Plans for Intervention

File No. 861.00/1635

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Harbin (Moser)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your April 20, 2 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> last sentence. Department has no objection to your obtaining evidence regarding occurrences at Blagoveshchensk provided you can do so unofficially and without implying any recognition of Far Eastern Committee or affording any indica-

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 127.

tion of prejudice on the part of this Government against any particular elements in Russia. Department can not authorize appointment of a delegate to sit with committee.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1728

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 26, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received May 3, 6.26 p. m.]

127. I have just received telegram from Robins, whom I have asked what disposition he made of the communication other than forwarding me and whether Chicherin desired same transmitted you other than through me.

Colonel Robins, Chief of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia: The People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs transmits herewith the documents<sup>1</sup> regarding the discovery of the conspiracy against the government of the Soviets in Siberia and has the honor to request you to bring to the notice of the Government of the United States that the following published documents establish the undeniable fact that in this conspiracy participated the consular representatives of America, Great Britain, and France at Vladivostok and that the diplomatic representatives of the same powers at Peking were in communication with the counter-revolutionary organization which organization calls itself the Siberian government. On the basis of the above the government of the Russian Soviet Federated Republic requests the Government of the United States:

- (1) If possible without any delay to recall the American consular representative at Vladivostok;
- (2) If possible without any delay to appoint a public open investigation of the activity of the agent, also of the participation in the said counter-revolutionary [conspiracy] of the provisionally appointed [American diplomatic] mission at Peking;
- (3) To declare definitely and unequivocally the policy of the Government of the United States toward the Soviet government and toward all attempts of its representatives to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

Please accept, Colonel, my assurances of deep regard. Acting Commissaire for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin.

Motives of [forwarding] summary of documents in later cable. Only partially received, not convincing. French Consul General, Moscow, received similar communication demanding removal French Consul, Vladivostok.

FRANCIS

<sup>1</sup> Post, p. 142.

File No. 861.00/1658½

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was left at the Department by the Counselor of the British Embassy on April 27, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading)*

April 26, 1918.

The most recent reports from our representative at Moscow indicate that the attitude of the Bolsheviks on the question of intervention has undergone a marked change. If we can accept the assurances given by Trotsky and Mr. Lockhart's interpretation of Trotsky's views, the government at Moscow is no longer unwilling to see action by an Allied force in Russia operating through Vladivostok and under Japanese command, subject to the provision that the integrity and independence of Russia are properly guaranteed. The principal difficulty from the Russian viewpoint now therefore seems to be that it is impossible for the Bolshevik government to take any open steps against Germany until they have sufficient strength to enable them to make some kind of resistance against the German armies: that without help from the Allies it is impossible for them to be strong enough for this: that the Allies wish for an invitation before helping them and that an invitation from the Bolsheviks would constitute an overt action against Germany on their part. The immediate problem therefore is to discover some means of circumventing this deadlock.

The second problem is to reach an understanding with Japan relative to the operations in which it will be necessary for them to play the principal part and as to the strength of the forces which should be employed. We are of opinion that the aim of the military operations should not be less than that of driving out the Central powers from Russian territory. As regards the numbers of troops to be put in the field, the Russian military authorities consider that, in view of the support which would no doubt be afforded by the elements in Russia hostile to Germany and of the decreasing power of the enemy, an army of from 250,000 to 300,000 men would suffice.

It is, however, clear that until the policy of intervention has been completely accepted by the United States, we can do nothing with the Japanese Government. It is unnecessary for me again to indicate the arguments in favour of intervention with which you are familiar, but since our last communication the statements of the Bolshevik authorities have been far more in favour of intervention than before, and we have also information which appears to indicate that the desire for peace which is now strong in Austria might be made still stronger if it was found that the eastern frontiers of Austria have not been made secure by the collapse of Russia.

File No. 861.00/1670

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 27, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 7.45 p. m.]

Referring my cable of April 25, 5 p. m. It appears that Ustrugov is to have charge of technical management railway while Horvat will handle political matters.

Moser reports a protest of Harbin newspapers against breaches of law, infringements of personal rights committed by Semenov military units in Harbin. Moser states: "It is a case undeniable that the methods of this guerrilla leader have aroused strong opposition among the Russian people."

From available information it appears that the principal demands made by the Japanese in return for military support are free and exclusive mining rights in eastern Siberia and free Japanese navigation Amur River. It is not known whether the Harbin group have accepted these demands in full, though such acceptance is probable in the last resort. In return the Japanese give assurances to advance only as far as Irkutsk but so far as disclosed the Japanese plans exhibit little advantage to the Allies and offer prospect of Japan's creating for herself an exclusive position in eastern Siberia.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/1684

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, April 27, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received April 28, 1.50 a. m.]

Mr. Lavrov, former commissary Irkutsk government, as authorized representative presents address of provisional Siberian government to United States. Address represents party as provisional only and ready to work as best classes is with me our answer opinion [*sic*]. Satisfactory evidence furnished of there existing secret paid armed military organization embracing probably ten thousand officers in centers from Vladivostok to Chelyabinsk. Their object is to organize a battle front after [against] the Central powers at the Ural Mountains. Are prepared to take Vladivostok and Nikolsk at once but first desire America's counsel whether action against Bolsheviks of eastern Siberia should be undertaken and whether American help in troops, arms and funds can be counted upon. Desire that Siberian railways be operated by United States under Siberian minister of communications. They believe themselves strong enough to overcome Bolsheviks but too weak to hold Siberia against all opposition without Allied support. Whatever your decision they earnestly request answer to this petition through the Consulate, the United States Consul General.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/1729

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 27, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received May 7, 12.27 a. m.]

128. Referring to the Embassy's No. 127, April 26, 7 p. m. The following is a summary of documents mentioned therein, documents themselves not altogether clear because they do not show by whom or to whom sent, nor when. Horvat mentioned is the manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a man of strong personality who is consistently opposed to Bolshevik influence.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs received to-day, by direct wire, the following communications from the Commissaire for Foreign Affairs of eastern Siberia, Comrade Yanson, who reports from Vladivostok:

On the 21st April in the flat of the citizen Kolobov a search was made by the members of the Executive Committee. As result of the search it was ascertained that Kolobov is a member of the government of independent Siberia. From the papers found it was evident that the Siberian government is taking steps to realize its adventure with the help of the Allies. We quote the documents in full. (Summary of documents now follows. Document 1 does not state by whom sent nor to whom addressed though presumably Kolobov in whose apartment found.)

Document 1 advises that in conversation with British Consul latter should be informed preparatory measures taken regarding movement troops to Vladivostok. Put following questions to Consul: Can Allied military support be expected to prevent Bolshevik movement on Nikolsk from Khabarovsk thus permitting Siberian government hold railway Harbin, Vladivostok, and intervening towns? Would Allied military assistance be forthcoming to sustain Siberian government's occupation Vladivostok? The Consul should first be informed regarding western situation, arms being importable from Japan only; suggest consultation with Japanese and French, also other consuls. Regarding conversation with Knight, being interested our affairs, situation western Siberia should first be explained to him. Show that continued uncertainty situation benefits Japanese at expense other Allies. Attitude taken by Japanese representative regarding recognition Siberian government implies Japan reserves right individual action but on definite terms, among them non-arming Vladivostok. Siberian government worried by Japanese influence and disposal many groups to accept her separate assistance. Japan desires economic control including Kamchatka fisheries. Continued non-recognition Siberian government renders difficult sustained opposition to growing Japanese influence, ultimately giving

Japanese complete ascendancy with possibility of separate agreement between Siberian government and Japan. America should therefore define her attitude towards Siberian government.

Document 2. (1) Owing complexity international situation and difficult relations refer all matters of importance to us. Consider Derber should remain Harbin until final formation government in spite of fact that agreement not yet reached with Allied ministers Peking. (2) Members Siberian government Vladivostok must sit quietly. (3) Telegraph Vladivostok prohibiting publication decree regarding volunteer army. Pending official representation by Japan, correspondence with the Allied powers in Peking will be carried on through the mediation of members of the Siberian government in Vladivostok and Admiral Knight or the American Consul; while should Allied powers desire communicate with Siberian government at Vladivostok we shall send message in your cipher through American Minister, Peking, addressed to American Consul.

Document 3. Ustrugov and Stal to-day visited French Minister who expresses opinion immediate recognition Siberian government can not be expected. For present no action by government advisable only organization military forces; however, if latter has least [succeeds], he foresees no rival to this government based as it is on popular representation. We differed this opinion, believing pride makes difficult for creators Manchurian detachments to accede our point of view. Gradual action therefore necessary. If Horvat approves organization scheme and agrees to cooperate as is probable tell him cable Shanghai through Consul. Notify Kolchak regarding departure Derber.

Document 4. Complying your cable April 8, Ustrugov and Stal conferred with American and French Ministers who consider as premature declaration and decree regarding volunteer army and appeal to Allies making their position difficult. Legations' reports to their respective governments still *en route* but later important information concerning organization Harbin and support various groups must also be reported Allied Governments. Am advised to propose to government, in order to avoid misunderstanding with Ministers, Peking, and unfavorable reply from their governments or in case request unanswered, send Allied Governments additional cable pointing out that two representatives now in Peking authorized by you explain to Allied powers program Siberian government. If Allies prefer, negotiations can be transferred Japan. If so you should request Allied Governments so instruct Ministers Peking. After negotiations between French Minister and Pichon, latter finds that an agreement concluded between Horvat and *bourgeois* groups would disprove argument that Allies supporting government that represents one group only.

(Transmitting message continues:) We are only transmitting a part of the documents; as the investigation proceeds the documents will be transmitted by telegraph. Assistant chairman of the Vladivostok Soviet, Nikiforov.

File No. 861.00/1674a

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[Extract]

*April 29, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had an interview yesterday (Sunday) afternoon with Viscount Ishii.<sup>1</sup> We spent an hour discussing various questions relating to the Far East, particularly the Siberian situation. It is most gratifying to find that the Japanese Government agree fully with our point of view and that they do not see at present the military compensation for the danger of uniting the Russian factions to resist intervention and of throwing them into the arms of Germany.

Viscount Ishii said that the menace to Japan was a Germanized Russia and that intervention might increase rather than decrease it. I said to him that he had previously told me of the attempts Germany had made to enter into an agreement with Japan and that I had no doubt a fourth attempt would be made on the basis of a division of Siberia between them. He replied, "We can not trust them. They seize the profits of an agreement and then they break it at once. We never will trust them. Germany would take western Siberia and then drive us out of eastern Siberia even if we desired it, which we do not. Our national life would be next." He went on to say that the danger had not yet taken definite form; that he felt the Bolsheviks were still distrustful of Germany and would oppose German agents unless we did something to make them hostile to us; that many rumors had been received but no actual proofs to show the Germans were influencing the actions of the Soviets in Siberia; and that he felt that the wiser course was to wait until we knew the truth and could base action on something more substantial than the reports which we had thus far received.

I then said to him that, assuming the necessity or advisability of intervention, I would like to know what his views were as to Japan's attitude toward participation by the United States or of the Allies in the expedition. He replied that he could speak without hesitation so far as he was personally concerned and that was that it would be most welcome; that he believed his Government would hold the same opinion; and that it was evident that the presence at least of troops of the United States, Japan, and China would go far to remove the suspicion of the Russians as to the purpose of territorial conquest which might be inferred if Japan acted alone. I suggested to him to obtain authority from his Government to say this. He said that he would.

---

<sup>1</sup> Japanese Ambassador designate; his credentials were presented Apr. 30.

After speaking of the five several routes of advance against China from the west and the possible line of defense which would have to be taken, he answered to an inquiry of mine that including reserves Japan could put in the field 400,000 men and that fully 250,000 could be sent at once into Siberia if it was necessary. He also said that he did not think that it would be practical to go much further west than Irkutsk because of the difficulties of keeping open the line of communication. He said that he thought the southern routes to China from the west could be guarded by Chinese troops and he believed eight divisions would be sufficient to do this.

I told him that not being a military man I felt incompetent to judge of the possibilities but that it seemed to me that the chief purpose of intervention at this time would be to threaten German domination over western Russia to such an extent that no German troops could be withdrawn to take part in the battles in Flanders; that it was as essential to Japan as it was to the United States that Germany should not be victorious in France for if she was she could turn a large part of her force eastward and become mistress of Siberia; and that a German Siberia would be a grave peril to Japan, as he must know.

With these statements Ishii agreed and said that he was prepared to advise his Government to act in conjunction with the United States in defeating Germany's purposes by any means which seemed practicable.

My interview with the Ambassador was in every way satisfactory. He is most frank and evidently desirous to do only what is entirely acceptable to this Government; and he assured me that is the wish and purpose of his Government. . . .

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/1797

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 29, 1918.

[Received May 16, 4.42 p. m.]

439. Macgowan telegraphs from Irkutsk following official statements published by Siberian central [Soviet] government regarding recent arrest four Japanese subjects on charge of espionage:

On April 10 on highway between stations Manchuria and Borzya Russian soldiers arrested two Japanese subjects and seized packet addressed by the Japanese Consul at Harbin to the Japanese Vice Consul, Irkutsk, including under its seal packet addressed to Russian



subject Vera Shestyakovich, the former wife of a Cossack captain connected with Semenov, and another packet containing official communication in Russian bank [dated] March 23 from chief staff Russian armies in railway zone of Chinese Eastern Railway to director of military topographic department of staff of Irkutsk military circuit requesting transmission to Harbin of largest scale map of entire Trans-Baikal and Priamur. Communication from Japanese Consul at Harbin to Vice Consul Irkutsk disclosed that messenger was to return with maps, also that Russian woman mentioned was to obtain plans and deliver them to Irkutsk Vice Consul receiving in return 800 rubles. Among other letters in packet attention drawn to one from Harbin addressed to representative of Japanese colony at Irkutsk stating that three Japanese agents dispatched from Manchuria Station April 5 would communicate numerical strength of forces to be dispatched pursuant to request of military commanders at Harbin to occupy a certain place not named. Other letters communicated details respecting strength of Red Army forces at Dauriya.

Macgowan adds Japanese Vice Consul unable to secure release of arrested Japanese, to see them or to send them anything except food and clothing.

Following is translation of radiogram addressed to French Government, Paris, April 27 by Commissar Foreign Affairs:

On April 23 the following statement by your Ambassador Noulens was reported in the Moscow press (text of statement follows).<sup>1</sup> Having asked Noulens as to the correctness of this statement we have received an official confirmation of it through Labonne, the Consul at Moscow. In the serious days through which Russia is now living Noulens's statements can hardly lead to friendly relations between the Russian and the French people. A representative of the French Government who helps to prejudice relations between France and Russia cannot be tolerated within the Russian Republic. The government of the Russian Federated Socialistic Soviet Republic expresses its certainty that Noulens will be immediately recalled by the Government of the French Republic. Chicherin.

Press states that on April 27 [26] a further note was sent to Berlin regarding violation of the Brest treaty in substance as follows:

The Russian Soviet government has done its part to keep treaty so as to bring about a condition of peace, but in reality there is no peace. In the southern part of the republic German troops are advancing. They are advancing on to thoroughly Russian territory, such as Orel, Kursk and Voronezh. They have also advanced into the Crimea. At the same time Russian military stores in Finland are being captured by White Guards acting under German leadership. In accordance with the Brest treaty the Russian Government expressed its readiness to begin peace negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada, but no answer has been received from that government which acts under German instructions. It is quite evident that such a situation can not long endure. The Russian Republic earnestly desiring

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 509, footnote 2.

peace is prepared to observe the treaty in the future. At the moment when Mirbach delivers his papers to the Russian authorities Russia is sure that he will use all his influence with the German Government to obtain a statement whether it still regards the Brest treaty as being in force. In the affirmative case Germany is asked to state what measure they will take to stop this advance, which is a threat to the treaty. If German Government does not consider Brest treaty as law, it is asked to state its new terms, which are evidently such as to necessitate the advance of Ukrainian, Finnish and German troops into Russia. Peace for Russia and also universal peace, for which the Russian working classes are longing, depends on Germany's answer.

SUMMERS

File No. 893.77/1659

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, April 30, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 5.35 p. m.]

Russian Minister, Horvat, Kolchak, officially informed me to-day of the formation of board of directors Chinese Eastern Railway. Russian Minister stated the financial requirements were 3,500,000 rubles per month for which application had been made to those Allies who had hitherto given support and that this information was given in order that the American Government might consider participation. He stated it is planned railway troops to the number of 17,000 should be enlisted. Semenov would be under Kolchak who is in charge of military operations. He stated Semenov would be under attack of a Cossack community by a force including 300 Hungarian prisoners [*sic*].

I stated that personnel of the board would undoubtedly inspire confidence on account of standing and experience both parties. Probably the attitude of the American Government would be determined by considerations covering entire Russian situation. I asked whether in case a responsible authority emerged in Russia, the board could cooperate. Kolchak emphatically stated organization by Bolsheviks impossible, their principles incompatible with law and order.

Horvat to-day informed Stevens that [omission] had received financial support 1,000,000 yen from Japan. Military attaché is of opinion military action will meet with strong resistance and be unsuccessful without outside military assistance. He believes military operation by Allies purely for protection of their plan would meet with little or no resistance if properly explained.

If joint action by Allies in Siberia was possible controlling Semenov and giving railway board awkward [dominant] position, re-

sults would be better than if either they or Japanese alone gave exclusive support to the Harbin movement.

Repeated Tokyo.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1699

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, April 30, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received May 1, 3 a. m.]

Local Soviet have occupied offices Zemstvo without conflict and are attempting organize administrative force, but are hampered by disinclination former employees work for Soviet. Zemstvo state they are not dissolved and will meet elsewhere, but I believe they will not again be a governing body here. Soviet attempting persuade city authorities turn over power to Soviet, but so far unsuccessful, though Soviet may use same tactics as with Zemstvo. Situation complicated by fact that city has not sufficient funds pay employees and police this month, unless merchants will advance money. Soviet believed to be also withholding money, though claiming to have [omission].

Local authorities endeavoring form efficient police force but impossible without more money. Yesterday about noon, police shot and killed in main street two criminals resisting arrest, who are believed to be members of gang of about twenty who last week robbed Serbian fishing station about twenty miles from this city, killing twenty, of whom six were Serbs, six Chinese, and eight Koreans, Chinese having hands bound and apparently being shot after robbery to prevent identity robbers being revealed. Few weeks ago, similar crime occurred at fishing station about five miles from this city, six people being killed.

Czecho-Slovaks arriving daily; about 6,000 already here; appearance and discipline excellent; have some arms. Soviet furnishing barracks for them. Interested posts informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1726½

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary by the Ambassador on May 1, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

April 29, 1918.

It is true that the formation of a correct estimate as to Trotsky is one of our principal difficulties. It has not yet been possible for me to go into the documentary evidence against him which you mentioned, but quite apart from such evidence his course of action has so frequently been exactly that which the

Germans would have preferred that it is impossible to regard him as beyond suspicion. All witnesses returning from Russia, on the other hand, with whom I have discussed the matter, whether they like or dislike him, appear to agree in thinking that for the moment he holds an absolutely commanding position in Russia and in these circumstances we are obliged either to defy him, to work with him, or to do nothing. The first of these three alternatives is dangerous, and the last fatal, and we are therefore obliged to accept the second, whatever misgivings this may cause us.

The policy of working with Trotsky is not free from dangers. The simple fact that we are cooperating with him, even assuming that he does not betray us, will have a tendency to place in opposition large sections of Russian opinion who are at present absolutely powerless but may perhaps obtain control of Russia in the future, with or without help from Germany. As far as I am now able to judge, our only means of lessening this risk is by keeping ostentatiously apart from internal questions, and by avoiding, if we can, any formal recognition of the present government.

The actual number of troops sent by the United States to Siberia is, in my opinion, a matter merely of secondary importance, and the really vital problem with which we have to deal is to prevent the Central powers' obtaining supplies from Russia and, through a renewal of the Allied menace in the east, to prevent the continued removal of troops to the western front before it has been possible for the enemy to consolidate his grip upon Russian territory and Russian resources. I am very apprehensive that we are now allowing critical moments to go by without making full use of them.

We realize that there is a fear in the minds of many Americans that a reaction in favour of an autocratic régime may be produced by Allied intervention. It appears to me that, if the present chaotic conditions continue, a reaction in this direction cannot be avoided, and that when it occurs it will take place under German inspiration and in the interest of Germany. The only chance which we have is to provide for the patriotic elements in Russia, whatever political opinions they may hold, a solid Allied nucleus around which these elements may be able to organize themselves against the common enemy and against the system of autocracy, the establishment of which is part of the enemy's scheme. It is important to bear in mind that Russia, if she passes completely under the domination of Germany and is reduced to a condition of starvation, would furnish the enemy with an unlimited supply of man power which could be used either for war or for the purposes of industry. If the war continues for a long time, this possibility may prove to be one of the most serious dangers which we have to face.

File No. 861.00/1703

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 1, 1918, noon.

[Received 10.54 p. m.]

3770. Subject of your 3660 [3600], April 22, 3 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> was [submitted] to Foreign Office 23d instant when Embassy was informed this whole matter had been communicated in detail to Ambassador Jusserand two days previous with instructions that he bring it to the urgent attention of State Department.

<sup>1</sup> Ante. p. 130.

Mr. Pichon now writes that he has been informed by French Consul at Vladivostok of arrival in that port of a first contingent of 6,000 Czechs expected to be followed by several others aggregating 50,000 in all. However, competent military authorities believe that this number will not easily be reached. Nevertheless, the military attaché of the French Embassy at Tokyo has been instructed to proceed to Vladivostok there to provide for the billeting and ultimate transportation of these troops. Moreover, French and British staffs are considering the question of retaining in Russia such Czech elements, doubtless still numerous enough, who have reached Siberia with a view to their transportation by Archangel or Murmansk.

Foreign Office while appreciating the difficulties advanced by Federal Government regarding transportation from Vladivostok lays stress on the paramount political and military interest in assuring the transportation of these troops to France and requests me to submit these considerations to the Federal Government urging that the matter of transportation by such route as may seem most feasible be closely examined.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1739a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1918, 5 p. m.

Department has authoritative report that General Horvat has determined formally to head a government for Siberia and that Admiral Kolchak has committed himself to cooperate. Please verify at once giving full particulars as to personnel of government and support upon which it relies. This Government is not prepared at this time to support any of the movements for a government of Siberia, so far as reported.

Instruct Consul at Harbin to report direct to Department.

LANSING

[For the recommendation of the Ambassador in Russia concerning intervention, with considerations on which it is based, see telegram No. 140, of May 2, 6 p. m., Volume I, page 519.]

File No. 861.00/1740

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, May 3, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received May 5, 1918, 9 a. m.]

Officially [announced] that Semenov force has advanced to right bank of Onon River. As force nearly doubled by Cossacks, volun-

teers will endeavor to cross Onon and hold station of Olovyannaya ninety miles east of Karymskaya [omission] and await there the receipt of further arms from Japan including armored [cars] now *en route*, also help, before undertaking to advance beyond junction. Has now advanced appliances [headquarters] one mile west of Manchuria [Station] and has requested Chinese Eastern Railway to assume operation of [omission] lines as he advances. Is still receiving money and arms from British and Japanese Governments. His advance has aroused enthusiasm and force is said to have [increased] for past ten days.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/1969

*The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1918.

[Received May 5.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to the statement of Ambassador Francis published in the *Official Bulletin* of April 18, 1918,<sup>1</sup> I am instructed to submit to you the following observations on certain passages which appear to be somewhat at variance with the facts as known to the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government understand that the commander of the British war vessel at Vladivostok was in full sympathy with the steps taken by the Japanese Admiral and the landing of the British marine was effected, not in anticipation of the unrest that might result from the Japanese landing, but to protect the British subjects and Allied interests from the danger which existed prior to, and which in fact necessitated, the Japanese landing. That the British Government have approved the action taken by their naval commander was subsequently confirmed by the advices to the Japanese Admiral by that officer. A part of the Japanese marine was detailed to protect the local French Consulate in compliance with the wishes of the Consul who deemed it advisable to demonstrate to the Russians the stability of the Allied unity by openly supporting the action taken by the Japanese Admiral.

The Japanese Government further understand that Admiral Knight, in commending the Japanese action, remarked that were the American citizens exposed to a similar danger, he would not hesitate to resort to the same steps.

I am [etc.]

K. ISHII

<sup>1</sup> See telegram No. 86, Apr. 10, from the Ambassador in Russia, *ante*, p. 116.

File No. 861.00/1729

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

The American Ambassador in Russia telegraphed April 26 a complaint by the People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs of activities of American, British, and French consular representatives at Vladivostok and the diplomatic representatives at Peking of the same powers, charging that consuls mentioned participated in a conspiracy against the government of the Soviets in Siberia and that the Ministers held communication with a counter-revolutionary organization calling itself the Siberian government and that documents seized proved that the said organization expected to realize its aims by aid of Allied assistance.

The American Government is asked to recall American Consul at Vladivostok. Please caution all officers of Legation, Peking, and Consulate at Harbin to maintain strict neutrality. Tokyo has been instructed to caution Vladivostok.

PHILLIPS

File No. 861.00/1910

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, May 4, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 30, 3.03 p. m.]

Yesterday Soviet notified me they had dissolved City Council and taken over its business. Result cannot be apparent before 8th, as all offices closed till then for Easter holidays.

All interested posts informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1763a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1918, 5 p. m.

The American Government is disturbed by the reports that Chinese soil is being used for conferences looking to the establishment in Russian territory of a government opposed to those now in control and as a base for possible military operations to effectuate such a

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in Japan.

government. These activities may unnecessarily involve China in an entanglement that will embarrass other powers at war with Germany and Austria.

The scene of these operations seems to be on the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Has not the Chinese Government occupied this line with its troops? If so, is it not in control? Do you think the Chinese Government has carefully considered the possible results of these activities?

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1728

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

Department has received following message through Vologda from Robins, of Red Cross in Russia: . . .<sup>1</sup>

Documents in support of above are imperfectly received, inconclusive and unconvincing. They mention British, French, American, and Japanese Consuls, Admiral Knight, American and French Ministers, Peking, and "Allied Ministers, Peking." They tend to show consultations and communications between the above-mentioned representatives of powers at war with Germany and representatives of Siberian government; namely, Horvat, Ustrugov, Stal, Derber, and Kolchak. The inference is that correspondence between the Allied powers in Peking and the representatives of the Siberian government, Vladivostok, is being carried on through Admiral Knight and the American Consul and that messages for the Siberian government may be carried through American cipher. One document, so called, tends to establish conference between American and French Ministers, Peking, and Ustrugov and Stal concerning recognition of Siberian government and "volunteer army."

One is a report from one Yanson about papers found in possession of one Kolobov, "a member of the government of independent Siberia," so called.

Department is satisfied the policy of non-interference in the affairs of other nations, so long maintained by the Government of the United States, is being followed by its representatives in China, Japan, and Siberia. There is no reason why the representatives of the United States Government should not listen to persons interested in the prosecution of the war against Germany and Austria but the Department expects of its representatives that no encouragement

<sup>1</sup> See letter from Chicherin to Robins, quoted in telegram No. 127, Apr. 26, from the Ambassador in Russia, *ante*, p. 132.



be given to persons and that no commitment as to policy, no matter how slight, shall be made except under instruction from the Department.

In view of the apparent seriousness with which the matter is viewed by the person signing the message to Robins, you are requested to report by cable the facts and to repeat to Harbin and Vladivostok with the request that they do the same.

Repeat to Tokyo for information.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1641

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2131

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two notes of the respective dates of March 12 and April 21, 1918,<sup>1</sup> concerning the question of intervention by Japan in Siberia, in the former of which you were so good as to point out the consequences which your Government deem it proper to draw therefrom in the interest of the common cause, and in the latter, to give me the substance of a telegram received by your Government from the Ambassador of France at Tokyo reporting concerning a conversation he had with the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the attitude of the Japanese Government toward an eventual action in Siberia.

I beg to thank your excellency for the courtesy of your notes to which this Government has been pleased to give serious consideration. It has not, however, been able to find therein any reason to change the view it entertains that any action in the way of intervention in Siberia would now be inopportune and should for the present be deferred, which it is this Government's understanding is shared by the Government of Japan.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/1753

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State.*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 7, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received May 7, 2.50 p. m.]

Your May 1, 5 p. m. My telegrams April 25, 5 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> April 27, 1 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> April 30, 2 p. m.,<sup>4</sup> give the information available. The move-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 75 and 128.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 137.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 140.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 147.

ment, avowedly administrative, is believed to be primarily political and to aim at constituting a government for Siberia with the same personnel after military success achieved with assistance from Allies or Japanese alone.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1762

*The Vice Consul at Harbin (Warner) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, May 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 8, 6.15 p. m.]

After carefully attending Semenov advance, report following facts: In ten days he has cleared eastern Siberia from the Manchurian border beyond west bank of Onon River Bolsheviks army. Their losses 178 killed and his losses 18 wounded, 33 killed. Magyar detachment of Bolsheviks reported by citizens of four evacuated towns as most formidable element in resisting Semenov. Local Buriats flock to him, sending deputations, voluntary subscriptions his Red Cross and volunteer labor for road repairs. Cossacks respond his mobility [movement]. Semenov movement in no respect monarchical. On contrary monarchical support of Semenov from Harbin and Peking a political menace to the popularity in east Baikal. He made an agreement [omission?] which very popular amongst Siberians on which European Russia may reconstruct. Was impressed with serious purpose of Semenov and officers and men. His movement represents the strongest, most law-abiding, popular, hopeful, antagonistic German force active in Siberia. Bolsheviks melt before organized resistance. Tangible assistance Red Cross supplies, shoes, clothing, would encourage inhabitants east Baikal who eagerly await American guidance. Am proceeding to investigate the other camp.

WARNER

File No. 861.00/1768

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, May 8, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received May 9, 10.18 a. m.]

Referring your telegram to Legation, Peking. Am instructed by that Legation to investigate Horvat movement and to make a report Department direct.

Horvat has abandoned for present plan of organizing government for Siberia, but while in Peking secured the consent of Chinese Government that the Society of Chinese Eastern Railway, as formed by treaty of September 8, 1898 [1896], should sever its connection with the Russian Government and, on April 27, reorganized board of directors for Chinese Eastern Railway Society, consisting Chinese and Russians, independent of any declared Russian government. Following is personnel of new board of directors: [Kuo Hsiang-hsi], civil governor, Kirin Province, president; Horvat, vice president and managing director; Admiral Kolchak, supervisor of military organization in railway zone; Ustrugov, superintendent of traffic and technical equipment; Putilov and [name garbled], directors Russian Asiatic Bank, financial advisers; Konovalov, of Chinese Maritime Customs, director of relations with Chinese Government; Yeo Shih-ching, director of Chinese affairs; [name garbled], present chief commercial department, director of commerce.

Object of new organization is to administer Chinese Eastern Railway zone independently of any government except Chinese until complete restoration of order in Russia. Organization claims no intention to usurp government functions out of railway zone and in regions adjacent where it may acquire control of railways in order to facilitate transportation. Does not claim as an organization to support Semenov movement, but principal Russian individuals consider themselves unofficially controlling his movements in Siberian provinces adjacent to Chinese Eastern Railway zone. At present time these are receiving for the assistance of Semenov money from both British and French Governments and arms from Japan and also receiving from peasants' cooperative societies in Siberia. They state that if the several governments withdraw their support from Semenov, they will continue military activity in guarding railways and restoring order with contributions from peasant societies until exhausted. Do not rely upon support from United States but still hope for it and feel that if other Allies withdraw, they will be obliged to accept Japan's sole support and accede to her conditions.

Semenov now within forty miles of Karymskaya, junction of Amur and Trans-Baikal Railways; has again requested Chinese Eastern Railway to take charge as far as his advance and place American engineers on the railway lines. On May 4, Semenov, General Shilnikov and [omission] Trans-Baikal commissioner under Kerensky, declared themselves temporary Trans-Baikal government until proper government could be established. Semenov has also requested raising of embargo to all territory in rear of his advance.

Have notified Horvat and other pretenders to recognition for Siberian government of our neutrality. Copies of this and all other

telegrams invariably sent to the Legation, Peking, but since Soviet government has prohibited cipher messages to foreign representatives in Russia, consider it inadvisable to transmit copies to Ambassador, Vologda.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/1736

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your May 4, 5 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and April 25, 5 p. m.<sup>2</sup> The Department's telegrams of May 1, 5 p. m., May 4, 4 p. m., and May 6, 5 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> state clearly the attitude of this Government towards contending factions in Russia. Strict neutrality is desirable and must be observed. Although Allied governments have not recognized the Soviet they are interested in stimulating its opposition to the Central powers. No Allied commission for organizing representative or other government in Siberia is deemed advisable.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1758

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 9, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 11.28 a. m.]

Your May 6, 6 p. m.<sup>4</sup> In accordance with your repeated instructions to keep the Department informed about any developments in Siberia, I allowed Ustrugov and Stal in two interviews to inform me concerning the plans of the so-called autonomous government of Siberia, reporting to you by mail. Ustrugov, who has worked in full harmony with the American Railroad Commission to Russia, was introduced to me by John F. Stevens and accompanied by Charles H. Smith, representing Admiral Knight. No observation on their projects was made by me except appreciation of their desire to save Russia for the Allies and a statement that their project would be reported to you, but as long as the government had not established itself on Siberian soil it would be impossible for any power to take

<sup>1</sup> This telegram read: "Please reply my telegram Apr. 25, 5 p. m."

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 137.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 150 and 152.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 153.

any notice. Kolchak and Horvat called formally as reported April 30, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Needless to say no communications of any kind were transmitted for any Russian party by the Legation or received by it.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/2531

*The Military Attaché in Russia (Ruggles) to the Secretary of War*

[Telegram—Extract]

VOLOGDA, May 10, 1918.

[Copy received from War Department, May 17.]

24. Forty-six thousand Czecho-Slovak troops have been sent from the Ukraine and detachments are scattered between Samara and Vladivostok. About 6,000 have reached latter place and will embark there. All at Omsk and west at places mentioned have been ordered to return and will be sent to Archangel and Murmansk. None yet at last two places named. About 2,500 Serbian troops have passed here via [en] route Murmansk. About one-third of all above-mentioned troops are armed with rifles. They also have about 100 machine guns. None of the Czecho-Slovak troops employed to be used for policing railroads and probably not in case of intervention unless requested by Russia. The movement is financed mostly by France, the balance by Russia. They are commanded by their own officers and board of Russian officers of the general staff who control their movements. French officers have been assigned. It is intention of French Government to send these troops to France at the earliest possible moment. The number of these troops is being daily increased by voluntary enlistments from among 40,000 other Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war in Siberia in spite of efforts of Bolshevik government to induce them to enlist in Red Guards. These efforts meet with little success.

[File copy not signed]

File No. 861.00/1773

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 10, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 7.45 p. m.]

Major Barrows just returned from Siberia. Reports success of Semenov advance is surprising to everybody. Red Guards have been forced back to Karymskaya, 1,000 Onon Cossacks have already joined Semenov, local Cossacks generally expected to enlist. Forces

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 147.

are very mobile, are likely to cut main railway line at an early date controlling east and west communication. About 2,100 prisoners, mostly Hungarian, reported with Bolsheviks. Weakness of latter accounted for because returning troops originally favorable to them have now largely been absorbed by their native local population which is landholding and conservative. Conditions in Siberia essentially different from Russia. Farmers hold large tracts, city population well-to-do, subversive theories find unfavorable soil.

Semenov is somewhat at outs with Horvat and Pleshkov,<sup>1</sup> not amenable to their control and [thinks] unnecessary close relations with Kalmykov<sup>2</sup> in Amur Province.

Your May 6, 5 p. m.<sup>3</sup> Horvat railway board has one Chinese member in addition to Konovalov, adviser to the Chinese Government. Board is to confine itself to its functions under the treaty with China. The Chinese Government objected to issuance of a proclamation by Horvat referring to special position in north Manchuria. Political aims of board are not put forward. Contemplated military action difficult to reconcile with supposed character of board but it is exhausting [represented] as designed to protect communication with connecting lines. Orlov<sup>4</sup> force is not increasing, many have left to join Semenov. If the latter achieves continued military success will probably look to people of Siberia rather than Harbin for support.

Chinese Government has notified Russian Minister Boxer indemnity instalments will be retained until legitimate government constituted in Russia. The Russian Minister will protest and hopes for Allied support.

Recent developments in Siberia indicate desirability of treating Siberian situation as distinct from that in Russia. If it be made clear to the existing authorities in Russia that the interests of the Allies as well as Russia demand treating Siberia separately with a view to effecting organization there representative and satisfactory to local population but with no desire of reactionary movement against Russia itself but only for strengthening common defense against German dominion, the basis might be created for a policy under which United States and Allies could facilitate the solution of the Siberian problem in accordance with local conditions there and with excellent effect upon our interests in Europe and the continued independence of Russia. Siberians are particularly anxious for American support trusting America fully. Farming conditions not unlike America therefore we can be most helpful. It seems highly desirable immediately to constitute Allied commission. Advise us

---

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, p. 438.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 152.

<sup>4</sup> A former officer of the Russian Imperial Army recruiting in Harbin a volunteer army of anti-Bolshevik Russians.

promptly. Siberian situation [omission] composed of commanding personalities to complete constructive political action. The entire far eastern situation requires immediate strengthening of international joint action factor in order to avoid many dangerous developments.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1793a

*The Secretary of State to the President*

May 11, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Lord Reading called again this morning and presented me with the enclosed telegrams which he had received from Mr. Balfour in relation to intervention in Russia.<sup>1</sup>

I pointed out to Lord Reading that the problem had really become two problems in that intervention in western Russia in no way involved the racial difficulty which had to be considered in regard to Siberia. I further told him that intervention at Murmansk and Archangel would receive far more favorable consideration on our part than intervention in Siberia, for the reason that we could understand the military advantage of the former but had been unable, thus far, to find any advantage in sending troops into Siberia. I also said that the communications which had been received from Trotsky as to his favorable attitude toward intervention might apply only to the northern part and not to the Far East and that I had some doubts as to how far the reported invitation for intervention would go even if it was made by the Bolsheviks, and, therefore, it seemed to me advisable that that should be thoroughly understood in case the purpose of inducing an invitation persisted.

He asked me if you would not express your views as to whether it was not advisable, in any event, to secure an invitation from Trotsky or from the Bolshevik authorities and I told him I would ask you.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/1776

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 11, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 12.43 p. m.]

Following from Major Barrows for your information and for Colonel Van Deman, War College:

Accompanied Semenov to Olovyannaya April 20 to May 5. His success alters Siberian situation. Force augmenting and must now

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

be counted the decisive faction in eastern Siberia. I believe within a few days he will capture Chita and control railways east of Irkutsk. His aim is an autonomous Siberia in alliance with Allies to resume war against Central powers. If given moderate support Siberia could be secured and contact effected with loyal Russian forces in Orenburg and Caucasus this summer. The opportunity is great to confound German efforts in Russia if Bolshevik government can be induced to accept Allied intervention in Siberia, Caucasus and Ukraine. The military task reenlist [relatively] simple and for initial movement might be limited to a small supporting force. I consider Bolshevik rule in Siberia near its end.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1789

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 14, 1918, noon.

[Received May 14, 10.58 a. m.]

The Chinese Government is greatly concerned because of reports from Harbin that General Horvat has issued a government proclamation and that he has concluded a loan with a Japanese bank secured on the Harbin [omission] Chinese Eastern Railway, the proceeds to be used in recruiting troops.

Semenov intends to take Chita first and supervise but not suspend railway traffic. There is a large secret organization of officers and troops at Changchun who are ready to join him.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1795

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 16, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received May 16, 9.12 a. m.]

Semenov advance continues. He announces policy not to interrupt Siberian Railway traffic. Allied passengers and freight under special permit are to pass. He is ready to turn over operation of railway to American commission.

Charles H. Smith, formerly aid to Ustrugov, reports Siberian Railway men anxious to have American assistance; believes coalition of forces in Siberia possible. Offers his services to investigate; speaks Russian.

My telegram of May 14, noon. Horvat disclaims intention to publish government proclamation. Japanese and Russian ministers



recently informed the Chinese Government that the transfer of the Harbin-Changchun section to Japan was agreed to by Kerensky government and will be consummated when stable government established in Russia. This gave rise to loan rumor.

Situation in Siberia seems more favorable than ever for effective joint action of Allies and American initiative. A commission authorized to command moderate financial support would be able to reconstruct at least Siberia as an Allied factor. Should America remain inactive longer friendly feeling is likely to fail.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1839

---

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 16, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 23, 12.01 p. m.]

524. Jenkins<sup>1</sup> telegraphs, 14th, advance of Semenov has apparently been checked for the present. He is evidently trying to strengthen his positions. Bolsheviks have been considerably reinforced, principally by prisoners.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/1805

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Tokyo, May 16, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received May 17, 1.25 a. m.]

The question of intervention in Siberia has revived very actively during the last two weeks. This is due to several causes, among which are (1) report from Ishii to his Government that the President was now prepared to reconsider the entire question; (2) the unexpected success of Semenov, the significance of which would seem to be exaggerated; and (3) renewed agitation in [omission] aided by Major Pichon, who has been here for several days actively urging immediate military intervention. Emphasis is no longer placed on the German military menace, but on the necessity of establishing order, supporting more moderate elements and repressing Bolshevik movement.

The plan now advocated by the General Staff is Allied intervention under Japanese command. A responsible member of the General

---

<sup>1</sup> Douglas Jenkins, Consul at Riga, on detail in Siberia.

Staff advised my Italian colleague to-day that they were pressing for immediate intervention, but that the Cabinet was still reluctant. He further expressed the hope that my Italian colleague would support them whenever possible. My British colleague has informally suggested to the Foreign Office that Semenov should be used as a "spearhead" for such a movement. Prior to Semenov's recent advance the British Government had decided positively to discontinue the monthly payments to him of \$50,000. To intervene in support of Semenov would appear to be the most direct way to take issue with the Bolshevik movement in Siberia.

The present Cabinet is more secure than when I last reported. Continued efforts have failed to develop as yet any substitute group. It is reported that military negotiations between Japanese and Chinese commissions have been concluded and that results have been submitted to General Staff for approval. I have been unable thus far to obtain any reliable statement of these results, but there is apparent satisfaction in Japanese circles.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1819

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, May 19, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 3.40 p. m.]

For several weeks the Japanese papers have been carrying news items giving details of alleged economic activities of American Government in Siberia. These items are in the form of telegrams from Peking, Harbin, and Vladivostok and are clearly intended to arouse the suspicions of the Japanese people. They suggest some organized propaganda. To-day the papers are giving prominence to the following distributed through Kennedy's Kokusai service:

PEKING, May 17.

The United States is making steady progress in its activity in Siberia and it is now reported that the Washington government, as a result of recent agreement with the Bolshevik government, has obtained an exclusive control of the Siberian Railway and Emerson and several other engineers now believed soon to start from Vladivostok for Moscow.

Would you deem it wise to grant me discretion to deny briefly the truth of this and similar items? As Emerson proceeds on his journey I fear that comment of this sort would increase unless met promptly. I think the Japanese Government would welcome such denials and I would confirm this before acting.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1869

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 22, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received May 26, 7.13 p. m.]

539. Commercial Attaché Huntington reports as follows concerning conditions in Siberia:

Machinery of government in hands of Bolsheviks whose present real power very slight, consisting disaffected war prisoners mostly Austrians, Hungarians, and Slavs and paid soldiers otherwise out of work. Brains furnished by Jews of small-tradesmen mentality. Central government at Irkutsk has little authority, is ineffective, farcical, rough and violent as becomes pioneer country lacking even such proportion of idealism as seen amongst Bolsheviks in cultivated centers like Petrograd, Moscow.

This government now failing due to economic disaster and anarchism which works by penetration from within and occasional attempts at force from without. Hazy Bolshevik mentality resists this movement.

Normal life, that is, life in towns strung along Trans-Siberian Railroad, is paralyzed. Well-to-do people consistently persecuted, their property confiscated, businesses "nationalized" thus cutting off income. Live in constant fear homes will be requisitioned. Many have left, especially women and children. Many stores closed; remainder trying sell out motley collection old goods. No new goods coming in. Retail trade declined eastern Siberia, recently greatly diminished by departure upon orders their Governments all Chinese and Japanese merchants. Freight requisitioned *en route* and sold by "commercial food supply departments" of local Soviets. Unemployment [and] food scarcity [prevail] in Irkutsk with no relief from Western Siberia. Schools overcrowded, teachers non-Bolshevik apathetic, lackadaisical, frequently absent and late.

Western third Siberia tremendous grain producer but supply to towns insufficient. Peasants refuse bring grain and meat to market because Bolshevik requisition at inadequate prices and because no useful articles can be had in exchange. Sowing being limited as in Great Russia.

Railway continues to expedite passenger trains safely at moderate rate of speed. Without the good habits and discipline of railway, post, and telegraph employees, most of whom non-Bolshevik and constantly hampered in duties by ignorant commissaries, Russia as nation unit would cease to exist. Practically no freight movement. One sees good new engines every station lying on side track out of service for repairs.

Every class in Siberia except small minority of Bolsheviks desires friendly intervention and construction aid an outside power. Population distrusts Japanese but will accept them if no one else. Capitalists, attorneys, and post and telegraph employees visited consul in Irkutsk and testified their desire order would be living passivity and recent blow cannot rise without nucleus [*sic*]. Universal request is for Allied intervention with American participation which they feel guarantees motives.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1819

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your May 19, 1 p. m. In your discretion you may deny all statements showing any plan of economic activity on the part of this Government in Siberia. Please inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs informally that the Russian Railway Service Corps under Mr. Stevens and Colonel Emerson was organized last fall at the request of the Government of Russia to aid the Russian railway administration in improving their railways in order to assist the Russian people. The military attaché at Vologda has repeatedly urged the sending of several sections of the Railway Service Corps to European Russia and has cited an instance where 3,000 of the railway employees at Vologda had struck because two trainloads of grain had been allowed to pass to Finland when the local population was without bread; he stated that in his judgment the presence of the American engineers could have prevented this. At the urgent solicitation of the Ambassador at Vologda, Colonel Emerson with three assistants was finally sent to consult with him as to whether anything can now be done with the railways in European Russia in helping the people. You are already aware that the Russian Railway Service Corps is being maintained from funds previously set aside by the Russian Government and that its services will be devoted exclusively to assist the Russian people.

You may also inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that because of the important developments in Siberia, this Government has increased its consular representation in Siberia, as well as other parts of Russia, with a view to obtaining accurate information for its guidance in the very difficult conditions which now obtain in that country. This Government has no doubt whatever that the Government of Japan fully understands and sympathizes with our purpose to assist Russia and the consequent necessity to be accurately in-

formed of political developments as well as of the movements of the vast supplies endangered by the German penetration of Russian territory. If opportunity occurs, please say quite frankly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this Government views with concern the obvious attempts which are being made to divide our common efforts by the creation of mutual distrust, and will gladly cooperate with Japan to defeat them. Such attempts of the enemy will not be allowed to modify the confidence of this Government in the cordiality of its relations with the Government of Japan. We confide in the Government of Japan to use its good offices in the same spirit of understanding to make those relations still more beneficial to our two countries.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1858

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, May 23, 1918, 4 a. m.

[Received May 25, 9.20 a. m.]

Paraphrase Department's telegram received from Harbin.<sup>1</sup> I have two or three times received as private citizens Russians known to be connected with proposed Siberian government and have listened to their plans in order to be conversant with political situation but I have not intimated any willingness to render them the least assistance of any kind. I have not transmitted any message for them either written, telegraphic, or verbal. I have not been asked to do so nor have I said or done anything to indicate any willingness on my part to consider serving [them].

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/1852

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received May 24, 2.32 a. m.]

3966. Referring to my No. 3871, May 12, 3 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> in which General Niessel, chief of the French Military Mission to Russia, was quoted as to the situation in that country and the problems of Japanese intervention. I have since had placed in my hands a written statement of the General, elaborating his views on those questions. A

---

<sup>1</sup> Telegram of May 6 to the Minister in China, *ante*, p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 528.

statement was first submitted to M. Clemenceau and then transmitted by the Premier in a letter to me. The views therein contained undoubtedly have the approval of the French Government. I shall in the outgoing mail to-day transmit the text in full but deem it advisable to telegraph its salient features. The document impresses me as very carefully thought out by one who had most favorable opportunities to study the situation.

The General states, in brief, that there is a universal desire for the restoration of order and would welcome intervention in Siberia conditional to its assuming an inter-Allied character. Declarations should first be made of the intention to respect the integrity of Russian territory. All Russians agree that social order cannot be restored without help from outside. Undoubtedly the Central powers will offer such help at a propitious moment. There is no reason to believe that the Bolsheviks could win over Russian public opinion against Japanese intervention, because their own wickedness has exasperated the whole population which has lost confidence in them.

The General does not believe that the Japanese would encounter any check in the way of resistance in their operations in Siberia. The time of transportation would be considerably shortened on account of using a base afforded by Manchuria, where the railroad is in the hands of the Allies as far as the Trans-Baikal frontier. Irkutsk would be the first important objective. Siberia is not and can not be Bolshevik inasmuch as individual property is there the general rule. Irkutsk and Vladivostok, on account of their working classes, constitute the only Bolshevik centers. All the other representative classes of Siberia during the last winter clamored for Allied intervention.

General Niessel thenceforth goes on to point out the immediate advantage of the occupation of occidental Siberia in being able to seize the reserve foodstuffs to which the Central powers must soon look, as they have been disappointed in Ukrainia, and in greater Russia. Imperative that action should be taken soon so as not to allow time for the Austro-German prisoners in Siberia to be armed and organized by Germany, to oppose the seizure of the Trans-Siberian by the Allies. During the last winter while the General was in Russia the Germans made offers tending to restore order in Russia. The orderly elements however were afraid of the overbearing qualities of the Germans and hoped only for inter-Allied intervention. Belief is expressed that the Japanese people would be proud to take part in events of world-wide importance; that the Allies should cooperate with Japanese army to direct and keep it within bounds and while utilizing Russian port preserve its disinterested char-

acter in regard to Russia. In relation to the expediency of intervening in the Caucasus, particularly to prevent the massacre of the Armenians, any action in that region, inasmuch as it could only start from Mesopotamia, would have to overcome very great obstacles on account of the distance, the nature of it, and the difficulty of transportation, similar to the action in the objective ports, largely rests with the seizure of the food reserve which is at this moment the main endeavor of the Central powers.

General Niessel concludes his statement by observing that, in view of all the above considerations, intervention in Siberia appears to be the most efficacious action in the shape of helping the Russian nation by restoring social order and safeguarding it and which is, however, mastery of the Central powers. He adds that it is high time now to pass on to deeds. Whether the Bolshevik Party is consenting or not these deeds are looked for by all the orderly element of Russia.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1866

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, *May 23, 1918, 4 p. m.,*

*[Received May 25, 9 p. m.]*

Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin population greatly disturbed over Emerson journey to Vologda. Stevens and myself saw Horvat yesterday and assured him that Emerson visit was for consultation with Francis and to learn possibility of any cooperation that might seem feasible against [enemies] of Russia and Allies. We stated that our last instructions were: United States did not [recognize] Bolsheviks and had no official relations with them. Horvat said Siberian situation did not hang on conditions old Russia, the population mainly peasants, only desire restoration order and peaceful government with liberal measures. They realize their inability [to help] themselves is merely national defect and dependent upon outside help [*sic*]. America preferred but would willingly accept German, Japanese, or any other which restored order. The first to enter Siberia would secure its willing allegiance.

To-day I saw Kolchak who repeated similar message: without help from Allied nations organized government safety of human life in Russia impossible. If other Allies fail or withdraw support, Japan alone assured them support, they were compelled to accept at her terms. On 17th instant railway employees declared one-day strike out of sympathy for murdered school teacher, entire railway operation Manchuria to Vladivostok suspended, all stores, printing

offices closed. On May 21, on the ground of Chinese protest, Horvat dismissed thirteen members executive committee Railway Employees Union as strike ringleaders and sentenced them to banishment. After three days employees have supported executive committee, protested against Horvat's action, appealed to Consular Body to interfere and have threatened strike of all railway employees in Manchuria if order is carried out. Horvat stands pat; consuls can not interfere; complete strike probable.

Last week Kolchak appointed to command military organization railway zone, visited Semenov in Trans-Baikal claiming to be his superior officer; Semenov, declaring himself war minister and military commander new Trans-Baikal government, see my telegram May 8, 1 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> refused recognize Kolchak's authority. Declared himself part of the independent Trans-Baikal government without connection Chinese Eastern Railway. The difference has resulted in serious rupture which threatens disaster for both Semenov and railway administration. Semenov now here and Horvat endeavoring effect reconciliation but so far unsuccessful. Orlov and Manchuria forces support Kolchak, while Trans-Baikal generally support Semenov. General Nakajima hopes for reconciliation but declares [Japan] will continue to support with arms and ammunition both factions.

British Consul states British and French Governments have suspended financial support to Semenov, although Kolchak informs me that he personally was *en route* to Mesopotamian front when ordered by British Government to proceed Harbin and organize movement against Bolsheviks in cooperation with Semenov. Semenov's offensive stopped at Onon River by Bolsheviks [destroying] bridge. He has advanced force beyond Olovyannaya but his main force on eastern bank worried in attempting to construct temporary bridge by Bolsheviks' fire on opposite bank. His force is thus scattered. In fight with Bolsheviks three days ago Semenov killed the gunners of one battery, all of whom were Austrians. Kolchak states that Austrian prisoner of war, General Taube, was in the command of Bolshevik forces. Semenov has now 2,500 fighting troops of whom 400 belong to Orlov's Chinese Eastern battalion and will probably be withdrawn but easily replaced by Cossack recruits.

Kolchak states Chinese Eastern has 1,200 troops here and recruiting about 30 per diem with intention fitting them for attacks against Nikolsk and Vladivostok. Are hampered, however, by controversy with Semenov who has all their guns and with [by] difficulty of securing arms and ammunition. He has recruited 500 Chinese auxiliaries but has received intimation from Chinese Government that this

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 155.



must cease. Claims that Chinese Government is throwing every possible difficulty in way intentions of the railway administration. Openly expresses fear that [Japan] has obtained approval of China to bring Japanese forces into north Manchuria and ultimately secure complete control this region. Horvat stated yesterday Japanese asked him if it were not true that United States had lent him seventy million gold on guarantee of American control of railways. He promised Stevens full support to any measures proposed by American engineers on Chinese Eastern. The general effect of Emerson's Vologda mission, of quarrel between Semenov and railway administration, and of reported suspension of British and French financial support, combined with extreme activities of Japanese, has produced a feeling of great depression throughout the community.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/1868

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 25, 4.29 p. m.]

1657. De Giers, Russian Ambassador at Rome, has handed me copies of two memoranda on the prospects of aiding Russia, given by him to Baron Sonnino, who in an informal conversation with me, expressed himself, without entering into details, as strongly of the opinion that something of this kind should be done, and immediately, to save the situation. Same seems to be the view of French Ambassador. All agree that whatever is done should be done quickly and in complete unison. Sonnino further thinks that the Bolshevik so-called government should be disavowed. He says that it is playing into the hands of the Germans and is merely a blind.

There seems to be a growing feeling here that steps must be taken without delay to save Russia's falling completely and permanently into the hands of the Germans. The proposal from political standpoint seems excellent, but impracticable. I do not recommend military point of view.

The first memorandum states that the most vital interests of the Entente clearly indicate two aims which should be pursued in their political policies in regard to Russia: (1) During the war to help to establish without delay in Russia resistance to the German invasion, and to draw to eastern front largest possible Austro-Hungarian force; (2) after the war to safeguard the political and economic liberty of Russia, as the German domination of Russia would constitute great danger to entire world, and particularly to Allies whose material interests already amount to billions.

Help should not be given, however, to the Maximalists and other anarchical parties. The heads of the parties that protested through the French Consulate Moscow could facilitate formation of such a government. Allied troops would be needed as a nucleus for recruiting a national army. Real and solid assistance would be afforded by from 80,000 to 100,000 men to be sent to some Russian port, not as an army of [occupation], nor with police functions which might arouse opposition, but for the expressed purpose of supporting the proposed new government in the reestablishment of law, and would, it is declared, be well received as evinced by the growing hostility toward German occupation as well as this movement. The work of organization would take about eight months, at the end of which time Russia would again be at open war with Germany.

The second memorandum proposes in some detail the formation of the expeditionary force, even a small one of from 30,000 to 40,000, composing the mobile units which would suffice at first for the Russians to get in touch with, but which would not, like a large force stationed at some place, form a point for attack by the Germans. Small detachments of from 500 to 1,000 men could be sent to different parts of the country to help reorganize Russian Army, and prove to the people that they had not been abandoned by the Allies. Mention is also made along general lines concerning establishments of Allied troops, materials needed, railroad transportation in Russia, value of armored motor cars, cyclists, etc., which it is declared would be needed and would be most effective.

NELSON PAGE

---

File No. 861.00/1865

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 26, 1.30 p. m.]

1663. My cipher telegram 1657, May 24, 6 p. m. De Giers has been to see me and argued fully his ideas contained in confidential memorandum sent. Seems to be disappointed that I should consider military plan proposed impracticable. Says that he will furnish a brief memorandum showing it practicable. Thinks it might be way to save Russia from falling under absolute dominion of Germany and that this would save her. Says that the Maximalists are no longer trusted by any and together with the rest of the population at the mercy of armed bands who are simply robbers armed. A Russian league formed here representing about three hundred members who

feel that plan proposed is practicable. He thinks that troops might be sent into and through Siberia, though it would be more difficult and less effective than if sent to Russian ports, but in no case should Japanese go without American and other Allied representatives, as Russians would certainly oppose Japanese alone, but would he believes recognize object if accompanied American and other Allies.

NELSON PAGE

---

File No. 861.00/1908

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 26, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received May 30, 9.11 a. m.]

206. Chicherin telegraphs me copy of long note addressed to Chinese Government asking cessation of harboring of Semenov or permission for Soviet troops to pursue him on Chinese territory. Chicherin requests my aid in obtaining Chinese agreement. Have telegraphed American Minister, Peking, for information but made no reply to Chicherin. Has Department instructions?

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1876

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 26, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 27, 10.55 a. m.]

3999. The third bureau of the staff has drawn up for the French Government under date of May 23, 1918, a memorandum concerning the decisions to be taken in regard to Russia for the occupation of the two ports to the north, Alexandrovsk and Archangel, as well as Siberia and for preventing the Germans from capturing Petersburg, Smolensk, and Moscow, and seizing the Trans-Siberian Railroad as far as Irkutsk. The Germans are so organized as to be ready to begin this movement in two weeks. This note is based on information received from official sources by the third bureau, among these sources being General Niessel; also reports from the French Ambassador M. Noulens, from the Consuls in Moscow and Finland, military and naval attachés in Peking, etc., M. Boppe, French Consul in Siberia, etc. One piece of information which has reached the bureau from the French Consul in Finland, which information is not how-

ever included in the above-mentioned note, is that the American Consul in Finland, Mr. Haynes, has recommended to the American Government to send wheat to Finland. The French Consul protests as this is directly contrary to the French and British policy, all food given to Finland going to the Germans. The note is textually as follows. . . .

To the above note issued by the third bureau of the staff are appended telegrams from the French Ambassador to Russia, M. Noulens, now at Vologda, and the French Consul at Moscow, M. Grenard. These telegrams for the most part covered the period from the 9th to the 18th of May, all of which telegrams, which are very brief, bear substantially the same message, that the hour has come for active intervention in Siberia, and that no hope can be placed in the restoration of order by the Bolsheviks with whom an alliance would be fraught with the danger of losing Russia by allowing Germany to do there what she is now doing in Ukraine. One telegram from the French Ambassador under date of the 14th instant is interesting as reflecting the attitude of mind of the French Government toward the position assumed by both the English and American Governments on this question. More than a month ago M. de Margerie of the Foreign Office, as mentioned in a former telegram, said to me that he was at a loss to understand the reason of the American Government's opposing Japanese intervention. The telegram from the French Ambassador referred to reads as follows. . . .

Yesterday General Berthelot, until recently in command of the French forces in Rumania for more than two years past, called to see me to tell me of the situation existing in Rumania at the time of his departure and also of that in Russia. As the General informed me that he came to see me at the request of M. Clemenceau, there is no doubt that the Premier not only indorsed the views expressed by the General, but desired me to know them. It may be added that General Berthelot leaves in a few days for America where he goes upon a mission with which he is charged by the French Government. As the facts told me by the General and the views expressed relative to conditions in Russia are so similar to those of General Niessel, reported by me in a recent telegram, there might be little need to repeat what he told me. He is, of course, an interventionist, expressing no faith in the sincerity of purpose of Trotsky or his ability to restore order. One point which he brought out, not mentioned by General Niessel, was to the effect that the Bolsheviks themselves are so alarmed over the German threats to make further invasion of Russia that they would naturally be restrained from asking for Japanese intervention. Their peace treaty at Piraeus [Brest]

might in addition estop them from seeking new alliance which would, in fact, place them in a hostile position towards those powers. The General also said that delay might enable the German prisoners in Russia, numbering approximately 150,000, to become armed, in which event this will make a very formidable force in exercising authority in a country which was tired of the war and which could offer little resistance from a disorganized army. As to Rumania, the General was very emphatic in declaring that in his opinion the Allied representatives should remain there even if compelled to submit to certain abridgments of their privileges, for the people of Rumania were not only very loyal to the Allies, but would be otherwise left in a most helpless state under complete German domination.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1968

*Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

U.S.S. "BROOKLYN" (AT VLADIVOSTOK), May 27, 1918.

[Copy received from the Navy Department, May 28.]

*Résumé* conditions as follows: Soviet government here and elsewhere Siberia is losing popularity and ground, while the opposing forces are becoming each day bolder. Newspapers are publishing severe attacks for which two months ago they would have been suppressed as well as the editors imprisoned. Many workingmen are uniting with professions, and Constituent [Assembly] is being demanded by salaried classes. All Siberia and parts of European Russia are reported as being in similar condition. Growing indignant at the cessions made to Germany by central government. Learn from reliable source German consulate will be in Vladivostok soon.

Better class making inquiry as to why Allies do not come to assistance of Russia.

Coalition of Kurds is reported by three Americans recently arrived from Caucasus. Tatars and Persians under Turkish [?] officers constituting formidable threat Mesopotamia and India.

Ten thousand Czechs are now here. Have been informed they have been approached as to willingness to conduct military operations in Siberia and Russia and they are positively opposed to this, believing it would bring them at least virtually into conflict Russian faction even though the Germans are principal enemy. They are unwilling to fight any Slavic race or faction, but enthusiastically eager fight against Germany. Becoming restless over delay in transportation of which no news has been received. Present morale very high but suffering must come with prolonged stagnation. 12025.

Flag, BROOKLYN

File No. 861.00/1901

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 28, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 8.53 p. m.]

1669. Following is substance of a paper sent me through David Lubin, by Russian General Miller, president, and Schmurlo, vice president, at Rome of the League for Regeneration of Russia in Union with her Allies. Giers, Russian Ambassador, informs me he is in full accord with it. The press beginning to take up necessity of rushing aid to Russia as only means to prevent Germany's becoming absolute mistress there.

- (1) Allies cannot organize resistance against Germans in Russia without cooperation of Russians;
- (2) Bolshevik government is not representative of Russian people;
- (3) Bolsheviks and their government cannot be useful to Allies;
- (4) If Bolsheviks are recognized by Allies all sane elements in Russia will consider themselves abandoned by Allies;
- (5) If Allies desire regeneration of Russia on democratic constitutional basis, they must definitely first condemn Bolshevik rule;
- (6) Allies should help Russia form a strong central government around which all sane elements would group themselves against Bolsheviks and Germans;
- (7) Such a government could be formed either in or out of Russia—like government of Venizelos—and later transferred to Russia;
- (8) The league is an entirely non-partisan organization, looking only to salvation of Russia from Germans and Bolsheviks;
- (9) The league has full confidence in Russia and therefore addresses without hesitation the American people to take thenceforth upon itself charge of communicating with Russian leaders and of explaining to the Russian people the meaning and aims of Allied intervention;
- (10) League is now greatly hampered abroad in traveling and postal and telegraphic communications;
- (11) If the American Government would agree to main feature of the above program, league could enter into more detailed explanation of its plan of action.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 861.00/1896

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 28, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 29, 10.11 a. m.]

2180. There appeared in the Swedish press an article reported having come from Washington, to the effect that the American Gov-

ernment would feel out the Bolshevik government in Russia as regards their desire for intervention to prevent further German aggression, and if the Bolshevik government approved of this, it was the American Government's intention to recognize the Bolshevik government and to work with them. Also that it would be the American Government's intention to send troops for Allied intervention.

Referring to the above article, several people very close to the Russian conditions have called my attention to the fact that in their opinion such a course would be unwise since they claim it would alienate the sympathies of the remaining 90 per cent of the Russian people who are opposed to the Bolsheviks; the number of Bolsheviks compared to the total Russian population is, I am informed, very small, probably less than 10 per cent. I am informed that the stable people and the better element of people, all parties who have financial and landed interests, are all violently opposed to the Bolshevik government. I am informed that there is grave danger of the Germans pressing further and further in their occupation of Russia and if Allied help is not given them, these people will, of necessity, have to welcome Germany's advance. They feel that anything is better than the anarchistic conditions of to-day.

In conjunction with the above, I should like to call your attention to my telegram 2174, May 27, 6 p. m., giving the views on this subject of Herman Bernstein who has just returned from Russia and is well known to you.<sup>1</sup>

. . . a Russian formerly in the employment of our naval attaché Crosley in Petrograd, and who wishes to go to London to explain the matter to the British Government, informed me while passing through Stockholm that his views were the same as those expressed above and he has formulated a plan for the Allied movement at Archangel and Murman. It is especially with these plans in view that he is proceeding to London to lay same before the British Government.

I also call your attention to the papers which you now have in Washington, referred to in my telegram 1877, April 11, 5 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> showing the connection between the Bolsheviks and the German Government.

I have spoken to the British Minister in Stockholm regarding the above and he states that his views and the information he has on the Russian situation are in entire accord with this telegram and that he has cabled his Government in a similar manner.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see telegram from the Ambassador in Russia, Feb. 9-13, vol. I, p. 371.

As I am entirely unfamiliar with the ideas and plans regarding our Government's views on the Russian situation, I would not give advice or make comments on this matter and am sending this cablegram to you as a matter of information received by me from extremely well-informed sources and from people who are conversant with the Russian situation.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1889

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 28, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 28, 1 p. m.]

Barrows reports Semenov visiting Harbin seems to have come to an understanding with Horvat probably involving Japanese and desires support, as Allied support discontinued. Semenov stated he would take Japanese help very reluctantly but would accept it as a last resort. His action may give Japan the opportunity to bring the new Chinese treaty<sup>1</sup> into reality.

REINSCH

**Clashes between the Czecho-Slovaks and Soviet Forces: Good Offices of American and French Consuls**

File No. 861.00/1962

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 28, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 6, 5.43 p. m.]

219. Thomson, American Consul, Omsk, wires 26th:

Attempts to disarm nine echelons Czecho-Slovaks approaching Omsk caused severe fighting at station near there. Reinforcements being sent from here. Omsk proclaimed state of siege. Please wire acknowledgment.

These Czechs were Austrian prisoners of war in Russian military camps and appear to have been armed for fighting enemy, but when Russian Army demobilized started for France to join Allied forces, some going via Murman, some Archangel, and others Vladivostok; suppose these portion thereof. Have heard that other detachments proceeding eastward were also disarmed but disarming regret[table],

<sup>1</sup>See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, pp. 106 and 222.



as such troops possibly available for resisting prisoners loyal to Central Empires who would probably be armed by Germany for resisting Allied intervention. In this connection I had a call yesterday from a representative of united Polish parties; said that about sixty thousand Polish prisoners in prison camps around Perm who would earnestly fight Germany if armed. Am endeavoring to keep in touch with them and all such.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1969

*The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Ishii)*

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your letter of May 4, 1918, and am indebted to you for bringing to my attention the statement of Ambassador Francis, published in the *Official Bulletin* of April 18, 1918, in regard to the landing of Japanese forces at Vladivostok.

The Ambassador's statement was undoubtedly prompted by the discovery that the importance of the landing was being magnified in Russia and the action of the Japanese and British Admirals being used there to the prejudice of the powers at war with Germany, who were apparently being represented as beginning an intervention in Russian affairs by a concerted military movement in Siberia. Knowing that this was not true, he seems to have felt called upon to correct such misinterpretation of the incident, but while immediate action was needed to check the propaganda of the enemy, it was impossible at the time for the Ambassador to have received a complete account of the circumstances attending the landing.

I shall be glad to acquaint him with the facts as stated in your letter under acknowledgment and also to inform the Committee on Public Information so that a more accurate account of the incident may be published.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/1926

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, May 29, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received June 2, 1.45 a. m.]

Just received from United States Consul General Harris, Irkutsk, a telegram stating Czecho-Slovak troops fighting with armed pris-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate General at Yokohama.

oners of war near said city and that telegraph communication with Moscow and with Vologda interrupted. A copy of the message will be forwarded first opportunity, after admittable [difficult] deciphering which cannot be finished before the steamer taking this telegram leaves for Japan. Local telegraph commissioner has informed me also, yesterday, confidentially, that there was fighting at several points on the railway west of Irkutsk, between Czecho-Slovaks and combination of Bolsheviki and prisoners of war attempting disarm former.

As I stated in my telegram of yesterday local telegraph office was yesterday instructed by the Moscow Soviet not to receive further cipher telegrams from me. Therefore code telegrams must be sent by messenger to Japan or else Harbin for their transmission as the *Brooklyn's* wireless already crowded and is working badly to Peking.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1927

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 29, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received June 2, 6.54 a. m.]

226. Just had call from French and Italian Ambassadors accompanied by Lockhart<sup>1</sup> and French military and naval attachés who came from Moscow for this special purpose. They requested me to frame joint telegram for all signatures urging immediate Allied intervention from Murman and Archangel but I counter-proposed that each cable individually which was [done]. French Ambassador reported that Allied conference would be held in Paris June 1 at which such agreement should be made. Lockhart exhibited cable which he sent to London yesterday urging prompt intervention regardless of Bolshevik consent. French and Italian Ambassadors have so recommended for two months or more.

I have not changed from expressions in my 140, May 2,<sup>2</sup> except to grow in the conviction that Allied intervention advisable from every viewpoint. Red Army organization is a failure and Trotsky influence rapidly waning. Chicherin absolutely controlled by Lenin who champions peace at any price and social revolution. German Ambassador endeavoring in every way to establish closer relations with Soviet government and effectually succeeding. Am convinced if we wait for Bolsheviks' invitation Allies will never intervene. Meantime Germany disappointed in inability to make larger pur-

<sup>1</sup> Robert H. B. Lockhart, British special representative in Russia.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 519.

chases because has no products to exchange therefor and demanding products as offset to indemnities or expense of maintaining her prisoners of war; furthermore German claimants making exorbitant demands for confiscations since beginning of war.

Soviet government asserts Allied intervention spells German capture Moscow and Petrograd and possibly true but Soviet government daily grows weaker and I much doubt whether would oppose Allied intervention. Opponents of Bolsheviks and of Germany and friends of Allies expect at any moment Allied intervention and would be greatly disappointed if did not occur. My judgment is that immediate intervention is opportune and further delay dangerous. My colleagues affirm that Japan likely to intervene even without Allied consent but I doubt that. My 140 urged that Japanese negotiations be immediately commenced and previous cables recommended that all possible preparations for intervention be made. Think advisable that such action [be agreed] at Paris shortly and every precaution taken that Allied press not reveal.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1898

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 29, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 30, 11.55 a. m.]

4033. I learn that Signor Orlando and Mr. Lloyd George are coming to Paris for a conference to be held on Saturday about the attitude which the Allies are to adopt towards Russia. Among the subjects discussed will of course be that of Japanese intervention in Siberia. The Japanese Government has telegraphed asking the French Government if its active cooperation can be counted upon at once to back up Semenov in Siberia while waiting for the military action which Japan is now preparing in view of an understanding with the Allies. I am told that France has not felt able to complete arrangement, as anything she might say now would appear to commit her. As a matter of fact, her only effective forces in Siberia at the present moment are some four hundred or five hundred marines.

It is reported in military circles that a French mission is very shortly to be sent to Washington to discuss Japanese intervention. Mr. Henri Bergson told me to-day that he would leave for America in a few days. He regards the situation in Russia as of such gravity as to demand the intervention of the Allied powers.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1900

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, May 30, 1918, noon.

[Received 3.44 p. m.]

My telegrams of May 10, 5 p. m., May 16, 1 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Reports received here from all sources indicate extreme need for Allied action Siberia. German influence extending eastward while armed prisoners, though strategically unimportant, facilitate pro-German organization. West Siberia, source of supplies, is at stake. Positive action is required also in order to prevent Russian moderate elements in despair accepting German influence. Bolsheviks waiting for social revolution in western Europe cannot resist nor effectually organize. Should Siberia fall under German control, junction of German and Japanese militarism threatens.

Immediate Allied action in Siberia to protect common interests and prevent spread of German control is likely to string their [strengthen] union between Japan and other Allies as well as antagonism toward Germany. Russia is craving order and will follow those who establish it. Only if established through Allied assistance will order be compatible with development of democracy. I cannot refrain from this urgent appeal, because all information indicates action is demanded and delay dangerous.

REINSCH

File No. 861.00/1918

*The Chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia (Stevens) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, May 30, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 31, 2.50 a. m.]

From information received from General Horvat; his word can be depended on:

Conservative, 3,000 German and Austrian prisoners are fighting with Bolsheviks against Semenov, Trans-Baikal, command of Taube, German general. They have field and machine guns served by prisoners. There are 15,000 armed organized prisoners Chita, Irkutsk, Omsk, holding out, more available. Some apprehension prisoners Semenov would be [omission]. Have been notified Irkutsk line cleared, service restored. Peasants anxious to aid him, but in

<sup>1</sup> Ante, pp. 158 and 161.

fear of the ruin of themselves if he fails on account weakness. Eighty percentage Siberian people would welcome cooperation Allied, especially American, assistance to Semenov movement. If it is given promptly, Bolshevik Siberia will collapse.

I agree wholly the above, have no faith in their eleventh-hour repentance. They know the end [of their] power is in sight and are desperate. Heavy concentration prisoners from east and west towards Irkutsk is going on. German propaganda, influence, occupation, increasing daily. Quick effective Allied action Siberia against treacherous combination necessary. The idea of organizing effective Bolshevik army to fight Germans eastern front purely visionary; if Allies expect to save Siberia they should move. Imperatively feel is my duty to give matured convictions in view of situation and conflicting reports.

STEVENS

---

File No. 861.00/1957

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, May 31, 1918.

[Received June 5, 11.52 a. m.]

Central Soviet Government, Irkutsk, states that one reason for disturbances along Siberian Railroad is due the fact that [Allies] have no transports in [Vladivostok] wherewith to send Czecho-Slovaks away. [Soviet] states that there are now 10,000 Czecho-Slovaks in [Vladivostok]. [It] is undesirable from their point of view [to] permit the mass [concentration] of Czecho-Slovaks there. Will you kindly inform me how soon such transport going to call?

[HARRIS]

---

File No. 861.00/1898

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

4289. Your 4033, May 29, 11 p. m. There seems to be no justification for a change in the policy of this Government. You will please keep us fully and frequently advised of the conference and its developments.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok and the Consulate General at Yokohama.

File No. 861.00/1985

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 21 [31], 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 9, 12.14 p. m.]

229. Your circular, 29th,<sup>1</sup> forwarded Consulate General with instruction informally to advise Chicherin but not officially as I have had no official communication with Soviet government.

Circular probably distasteful as Trotsky has issued order to disarm Czecho-Slovaks and kill if they refuse including therein prohibition of transportation with severe penalty to railroad employees who ignore.

Reported body Czech soldiers declined to be disarmed and have taken station near Ekaterinburg on Siberian Railway which is refusing to sell tickets beyond Vyatka.

Embassy attaché sent for information reports Czecho-Slovaks have effected union with Dutov<sup>2</sup> and surrounded Ekaterinburg; his informant who is government employee but anti-Bolshevik told Embassy representative that Soviet power hangs on a [hair] and on first manifestation of Allied intervention Soviet government will be overturned and he ended conversation with, "Why are not Allies taking definite action?"

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1998

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 31, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received June 11, 11.07 a. m.]

588. Difficulties between local Soviets and Czecho-Slovak troops starting apparently from minor incident has grown into serious conflict between them and Red Army especially at Chelyabinsk. Williams reports from Samara Soviet troops being rushed toward that city. Railway cut east of Ufa. From Ekaterinburg Palmer<sup>3</sup> telegraphs unconfirmed reports of trouble at Omsk as well as Chelya-

<sup>1</sup> Circular telegram, May 29, 1918 (File No. 763.72/10103) :

The Secretary of State has made public the following announcement: "The Secretary of State desires to announce that the proceedings of the congress of oppressed races of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome in April, have been followed with great interest by the Government of the United States, and that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this Government."

<sup>2</sup> Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.

<sup>3</sup> Henry L. Palmer, Vice Consul at Ekaterinburg.

binsk. All trains toward east and south of Ekaterinburg held up. Consulate General has had no telegrams from Siberia for four days.

In Lomzha [Moscow?] martial law has been declared; none but Bolshevik newspapers appeared this morning. These contain long and rather hysterical appeals to the people setting forth that, owing to treachery *bourgeoisie*, bread famine imminent, that counter-revolutionary plotters have caused Czech outbreak and that counter-revolutionary plot has been discovered in Moscow. Have been no disturbances here but Commissariat Foreign Affairs informs Consul General that many arrests are being carried out. Commissariat expresses grave concern over Dutov's activities and reactionary movement in Don led by Krasnow.<sup>1</sup> Evince fear Czechs will join these movements and remark informally that they have proof French have instigated all the trouble. This untrue, moreover Czechs have heretofore resolutely refused to mix in Russian internal affairs. French using best endeavors to adjust difficulty between Czechs and Soviet authority.

POOLE

[For an argument against military intervention in Russia, whether from the east or from the north, see letter from the Consul at Archangel to the Ambassador in Russia, June 1, 1918, *post*, page 477.]

File No. 861.00/2375

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*  
No. 6

IRKUTSK, June 2, 1918.

[Received July 30.]

SIR: Concerning the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks through Siberia to Vladivostok I have the honor to state: On May 28 I telegraphed in cipher to the American Consul in Vladivostok a report concerning the Czecho-Slovaks in Irkutsk.<sup>2</sup> This was done because this Consulate has not yet been furnished with a cipher code which will enable me to communicate direct with the Department. At present it is also impossible to communicate with the Ambassador at Vologda for the reason that the line is interrupted.

On the afternoon of May 26 a train arrived in Irkutsk carrying Czecho-Slovaks to Vladivostok. I may add here that according to a statement of the Central Siberian government here in Irkutsk

<sup>1</sup> Gen. P. N. Krasnov, who commanded the Cossack forces which defended the Provisional Government in the first days of the Bolshevik *coup d'état* in November 1917, later succeeded Kaledin as ataman of the Don Cossacks.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams narrating the events described below were received, with numerous omissions, via Vladivostok and Yokohama, June 5 (File No. 861.00/1960). One of them was also received, via Peking, July 4 (File No. 763.72/10601).

instructions have been received from the Bolshevik government in Moscow to disarm all the Czecho-Slovak trains.

An attempt was made to carry out this program and it resulted in a clash in which according to the official Czech report 8 were killed, 7 died of wounds, 36 wounded, and 5 wounded who were subjected afterwards to surgical amputations. There were about 600 Czechs engaged. The official report of the Red Guard losses has not been made public but I am certain that they were even heavier than those of the Czechs. However, it would appear that the Czechs finally gave up their arms voluntarily and further bloodshed was avoided, and this particular train shortly proceeded on its way.

About 10 o'clock that night two further Czech trains arrived at a station called Innokentevskaya seven versts west of Irkutsk and directly opposite an Austro-German prison camp which is located about one and one-half miles across an open field. From the best information obtainable and supported by the personal investigations of the French Consul General and myself on the spot it would appear that these two trains were attacked about midnight by armed Austrian and German prisoners. There were about 1,000 Czechs engaged and they evidently made short work of the Austrians and Germans who made the attack. While the conflict was on, the Soviet sent two Commissars of Foreign Affairs to me urging my intervention in order to stop further bloodshed. I immediately called upon the French Consul General and we proceeded at daybreak under a flag of truce to the scene of action. The Czechs had captured 22 Austrians, 4 Germans, and 9 Russians who were members of the Red Guard. There were also a large number of Austrian and German wounded who had been removed to the camp. I at once called upon the Russian commandant of the prison camp in order to get all the facts from both sides. An Austrian officer was permitted to accompany me back to the Czech trains in order to establish the nationality of the prisoners. In addition to the prisoners above mentioned 5 had been killed and already buried before my arrival. These I had disinterred in order to establish their nationality. The Austrian officer identified these as being 4 Austrians and 1 German. I desire to state in this connection that the dead and all the prisoners, with the exception of two or three, were all in the uniforms of their respective nationalities. This seems to establish beyond doubt the question that a large number of the prisoners in Irkutsk are armed. From the best authority obtainable I have it that there are now 600 prisoners armed in this city and they compose a large part of the Red Guard. I have seen a few Austrian prisoners on the streets in Austrian uniforms bearing arms.

Under the good offices of the French Consul General and myself we succeeded in disarming these two trains of Czechs, also a third



train which had arrived in the meantime at another station a few versts farther west. The compact of disarmament agreed upon by the Czech commanders, the two Soviet Commissars, the French Consul General, and myself was as enclosed herewith. That was signed by the Czech commanders, the two Commissars for Foreign Affairs, the French Consul General, and myself.

The disarmament of these three trains was carried out without a hitch in spite of the fact that the feeling was running high. A Commissar of the Soviet was placed in each train, and I instructed Consul Macgowan to accompany the whole lot to Vladivostok. I have just received a telegram at a station beyond Chita from Consul Jenkins who joined Consul Macgowan that these trains had already passed this station. It would appear therefore that the action taken by the French Consul General and myself here in Irkutsk is being justified, inasmuch as no further trouble has been reported to me concerning the Czech trains which are now proceeding eastward.

I shall keep the Department promptly informed by cable of all new developments in this matter.

I have [etc.]

ERNEST L. HARRIS

[Enclosure]

*Agreement between the Representatives of the Central Siberian Soviet and of the Czecho-Slovak Forces*

STATION VOENNY GORODOK, TRANS-BAIKAL RAILWAY,

May 27, 1918.

We undersigned:

(1) Chairman [*sic*] of Russian authorities: Yansen, Geizman, Lytkin, Russkis;

(2) Representatives of Czecho-Slovak Forces: Staff Captain Goblik, Doctor Tayer and Lieutenant Daksner;

(3) Consul General of France, Mr. Bourgeois; officer of the French Army, Mr. Verge;

[4] American Consul General E. L. Harris; American Consul D. B. Macgowan; and Interpreter Charles Bergen;

Have accepted on all sides binding conditions:

1. In view of preventing any unnecessary misunderstandings and bloodshed, and for establishing mutual confidence with the Czecho-Slovak forces, the Russian authorities are bound to apply all physical possibilities in forwarding the trains with the Czecho-Slovak echelons towards the Far East without any impediment and with a possible quickness. In this view the Russian authorities are bound to appoint to each Czecho-Slovak echelon a commissioned officer (comissar) whose problem it will be to dissolve any misunderstandings and all sided questions that may arise, and also full cooperation in forwarding of persons put in his charge.

2. Counting the above-mentioned guarantees fully securing the freedom of movement, the Czecho-Slovaks from their side are bound without any retardation to give up their arms; bar their own, such as sabers, knives, poniards and revolvers.

3. The technical part of the disarmament is to be discussed separately by mutual agreement on both sides.

4. Wishing to finally guarantee the safety of the passage of the Czecho-Slovak echelons to the Far East the Russian authorities are leaving them as guard 30 (thirty) rifles and 20 (twenty) shots of ammunition for each rifle.

5. Point of final disarmament will be at a town called Chita on the Trans-Baikal Railway.

6. Present agreement begins at once after affixing of the signatures of the agreeing sides.

*People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs:* Y. D. YANSEN, I. M. GEIZMAN

*People's Commissary of Soviet Head Office:* TH. LYTKIN

*Siberian Military Commissary:* A. RUSSKIS

*Staff Captain:* GOBLIK

DOCTOR TAYER

LIEUTENANT PETER DAKSNER

*Consul General of France:* BOURGEOIS

*French Officer:* A. VERGE

*American Consul General:* E. L. HARRIS

*American Consul:* D. B. MACGOWAN

*Interpreter of the American Consulate General:* CHARLES BERGEN

File No. 861.00/2018

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 2, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received June 14, 6 a. m.]

592. My No. 588.<sup>1</sup> Soviet authorities demanding complete disarmament Czecho-Slovaks. Trotsky even suggests the necessity of their disbanding. On the other hand, emissary arriving from Czechs informs Soviet authorities Czechs are thoroughly exasperated with their treatment by the Bolsheviks, that they evince a very warlike spirit and talk of forcing their way through to Vladivostok. Allied military missions here feel that if no support in sight, Czech leaders will be constrained to capitulate in order to prevent useless bloodshed but that if there is any prospect of Allied intervention they will hold out guarding bridges and strategic points and eventually forming advance guard of Allied advance.

All observers agree that Czechs are splendid were they [well ?] disciplined troops; violently against Germans. Total number about 40,000, of whom probably one-half now in western Siberia and on Penza-Samara-Chelyabinsk line. Bolsheviks announce they have retaken Penza and Syzran but east of Samara Czechs apparently in complete control.

Communication with Siberia continues broken.

POOLE

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 183.

File No. 861.00/1908

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1918, 1 p. m.

155. Your 206, May 26, 9 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The attitude of the American Government is that it is dangerous for Chinese soil to be used as a base for hostile military operations by a faction of the Russian people. It is possible that such activities may unnecessarily involve China in an entanglement that will embarrass other powers at war with Germany and Austria. Minister Reinsch was so informed on May 6. Do not answer note.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1965

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 3, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 7, 6.42 p. m.]

241. Am just leaving for Petrograd. Have arranged for forwarding cables. In my judgment Czecho-Slovaks should not be disarmed, consequently am instructing Consulate General to inform Soviet government that the Allies would consider disarmament and severe treatment as inspired by Germany or certainly by hostile sentiment toward the Allies.

FRANCIS

Consideration of Intervention by the American Government—Development of the Czecho-Slovaks' Conflict with Soviet Forces—Protest of the Allied and American Representatives against the Disarmament of the Czecho-Slovaks—Good Offices of American Officials—Formation of the Temporary Siberian Government at Omsk

File No. 861.00/1901

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1918, 3 p. m.

1395. Your 1669, May 28, 3 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Deeply interested in program of League for Regeneration of Russia with which this Government, in the main, agrees. Would be pleased to have the league communicate confidentially details of its plan of action, for consideration.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 172.<sup>2</sup> Ante, p. 175.

File No. 861.00/1955

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your 140, May 2, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The Department is considering carefully your suggestion as to intervention in Siberia and would be pleased to have you suggest in more concrete form a plan of action, taking into consideration the fact that the military forces to be employed would of necessity be almost wholly Japanese on account of the lack of shipping in the Pacific, which prevents our sending troops at present.

I would also be pleased to have your views as to the military advantage to be gained by an advance into Siberia which could not, on account of the great distances, extend much if any beyond Irkutsk, and also as to the effect upon the attitude of the people of European Russia if the Japanese entered Siberia with the approval and support of this country and the Allies.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1946

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, June 5, 1918, noon.

[Received 3.52 p. m.]

My telegram of May 30, 12 noon.<sup>2</sup> Semenov expects two battalions Japanese troops, called unofficial assistance. He has agreed with Horvat on this policy and financial support, eliminating Kolchak. The latter and Orlov devote themselves to recovering Amur Province, where sentiment is becoming increasingly hostile to Bolsheviks. Semenov compensation to Japan believed to comprise exclusive mining, fishery rights Amur Province and dismantling Vladivostok fortifications.

All American representatives in Siberia are agreed that Allied intervention is absolutely demanded; Siberia will be in German control unless immediate action is taken. Joint action desirable because of Russian fear of Japan. Presence of Czecho-Slovaks can be utilized. American force of 10,000 considered sufficient.

REINSCH

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 519.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 181.

File No. 861.00/1967a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Moscow (Poole)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1918, midnight.

Can you ascertain views of "Union of Siberian Cooperative Societies," in regard to maintaining resistance against Germany and how they believe it should be accomplished? Understand headquarters are at Novo Nikolaevsk. Similar report desired concerning Moscow Cooperative Societies. Please make every effort to secure early and authoritative reply.

POLK

File No. 861.00/1978

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, June 6, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received June 8, 2.48 p. m.]

Reports from American engineers, Pogradichnaya, state that Bolsheviks at station Grodekovo stop westbound trains and remove all men without foreign passports between ages 18 and 35. Report also seems authentic that women between 18 and 30 are removed. Same source reports information that large Bolshevik force concentrated at Nikolsk-Ussuriisk, and 300 armed prisoners have joined Bolsheviks at Grodekovo. I passed through both towns one week ago, saw small force at Nikolsk, about 200 Bolsheviks, Grodekovo. Nearly all boys and immature men from 17 to 27 years, the majority of them armed and boisterous without responsible leaders. They impressed me as young street vagrants in United States without stability and no realization of the responsibilities they have assumed. Barrows and myself thought that with intelligent experienced leaders from outside they would voluntarily restore order.

Kolchak, in command of Chinese Eastern force, has concentrated all present available [forces] at Pogradichnaya, preparing to take offensive against Grodekovo and Nikolsk. He has 1,200 Russian troops and 600 Chinese but only eight field guns and sufficient ammunition. Plans to recruit, equip, and train troops at Pogradichnaya strong enough for offensive which the Vladivostok population looks for generally with relief. Chinese troops will not take any part in actual fighting, but will be left behind to guard railway line. Besides forces mentioned, approximately 2,500 Chinese under Chinese command concentrated at Pogradichnaya protect frontier. Kol-

chak informed me this morning that Chinese authorities were throwing every obstacle in his way and it was necessary to push on to Russian soil. He has been ordered here by British Government to organize force for intervention and found himself deserted. Siberian reserves ordered up by Germany, and the Allies were opposing with nothing but words.

Semenov has returned to Manchuria and has apparently again beaten the Bolsheviks back beyond the Onon River; stated that he cannot hold his position much longer without foreign troops. Is receiving money from Japanese as well as arms. There are twenty Japanese with him at Manchuria and a number of Japanese have joined his ranks as volunteers in the guise of [Chinese?]. [Japanese?] military agents very numerous and active at Harbin, have established their own communications with Semenov's force.

In conversation with British Consul to-day, he informed me that he confidentially understood from his Government that the United States considered military intervention on the part of Japan, the Allies and ourselves would be unfavorably regarded by the Russians. I believe it my duty to state from my acquaintance with all classes in Siberia and nearly four years' experience my firm conviction that, with the exception of the young vagrant class of Bolsheviks already alluded to, the whole population would welcome such joint intervention and in its absence will turn to Germany or to any other power that can promise the restoration of order. Major Barrows, the best military adviser that has been here, will fully support this view.

MOSER

---

File No. 861.00/1989

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, undated.

[Received June 10, 1918, 3.22 p. m.]

Following from [Emerson and Slaughter,] Suslovo near Mariinsk:

On return Mariinsk June 2<sup>2</sup> found Czechs and Russians reenforcing, strongly entrenched, 3,500 Czechs, 2,500 Russians ready fight. We attempted mediate, secured armistice until June 10. Now going Vladivostok with Russian and Czech representatives secure final settlement. Russians will never agree permit Czechs proceed fully armed; Czechs want to learn [*sic*], rear trains safe to [omission]. White Guards Novo Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, Mariinsk, taken advantage

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulates at Vladivostok and Kobe.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram of June 15, 2 p. m., from the Consul at Vladivostok, *post*, p. 212.

situation to arm and take control places named. Czechs refuse permit Russians resume authority places prior their departure. Details by Thomas leaving to-day.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/2008

*Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

*June 7, 1918.*

The Russian Ambassador called to-day and read telegrams to me which contained the following information:

There are, for the purpose of anti-Bolshevik activity in Siberia, three military fronts being located respectively as follows: West front at Irkutsk, north front at Khabarovsk, east front at Vladivostok.

The strength of the Bolshevik forces at each of these fronts is as follows:

Irkutsk: Infantry 7,000 (of which 1,000 are German prisoners, and of which about 5 per cent must be kept at Irkutsk), cavalry 800, guns 70, machine guns 50. This is under expert command.

Khabarovsk: Infantry 1,500, cavalry 700, guns 16, machine guns 26, 4 gunboats on the Amur River.

Vladivostok: Infantry 1,500, armed workmen (Red Guard) 3,500, cavalry 600, guns 100, machine guns 35.

The latter two are under very mediocre command.

The total strength of Semenov with his base on the Onon River: Infantry 1,500, Cossacks 2,000, guns and machine guns 70. Their discipline is reported as very good but their management is bad.

The forces under Admiral Kolchak, operating with a base at Pogranichnaya on the border of Manchuria, have a strength of—infantry 1,000, hired Chinese infantry 1,000, 8 guns, 12 machine guns.

The Ambassador's information was to the effect that Semenov and Kolchak combined had a force equal to approximately one half of the Bolshevik western front or equal to that part of the Bolshevik west front which could [not?] be supported from Irkutsk.

The logic is that Semenov could advance to a point near Chita, possibly west of Chita, but could not advance to a point farther west which would permit the entire Bolshevik force (including that half of it stationed at Irkutsk) to be brought into action.

The Ambassador is arguing for intervention of an Allied character and says that the Czecho-Slovak troops, of which 15,000 are now encamped just out of Vladivostok, could be used for a military force under the leadership of an Allied staff. He feels that, in spite of Masaryk's declaration that these troops will not fight on Russian soil against any part of the Russian population, they will eventually

become antagonistic to the Bolsheviks and will then be available to be used as a military expedition to overcome Bolshevik influence, and under Allied guidance to restore order.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

File No. 861.00/2079

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

No. 9288

LONDON, June 7, 1918.

[Received June 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, herewith, a copy of a memorandum<sup>1</sup> on Allied assistance to Siberia which was yesterday submitted to me by . . . a prominent Siberian, and a former member of the Kerensky government.

. . . represents the Siberian Cooperative Creameries comprising over 3,000 cooperative associations and acting on behalf of 500,000 farms in western Siberia. He represents also the Yenisei Cossacks and a number of commercial and industrial organizations in eastern Siberia. Mr. A. F. Whyte, M. P., editor of *New Europe*, who brought him to the Embassy, informed me that a copy of this memorandum has just been sent to the British Foreign Office, and that in Mr. Whyte's opinion the advice given by . . . seems practical.

This advice, briefly, is that the Allies should immediately send into Siberia a force of about 30,000 men, which he states would be ample to hold the railway from Vladivostok to the Urals and to police Siberia and protect it from the anarchy of the Red Guards and Bolsheviks while the government was being organized and elections being held. He says it is highly important that this force should be international, but that if 5,000 men are British, French or American, or all combined, it will do no harm if the remaining 25,000 should be Japanese. A purely Japanese expeditionary force should in his opinion not be contemplated.

He informs me that he escaped from Russia with much difficulty, from Murmansk, and has been in England only about a month. His family consisting of wife and four children are shortly proceeding to Archangel and he hopes that they will soon rejoin him. He does not know of any one either in France or the United States who is in a position to offer the advice given by him in this memorandum. That is why he has asked me to forward these copies.

When I asked . . . whether an invitation to the Allies could be elicited from any public body in Siberia suggesting intervention of the Allies proposed in this memorandum, he replied that this was doubtful because of the difficulty of holding meetings at

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



present owing to the fear of Bolshevik terrorism. If, however, the Allies would at once occupy the country and dispel the Bolshevik terror, he has not the remotest doubt that all Siberians anxious for a sound democratic government would rally to the support of the Allies. He also feels sure that the Kirghiz republic recently formed in southwestern Siberia, the president of which was formerly a fellow pupil of his own at the University of Petrograd, will gladly join the Siberian republic, which shall have been established under Allied auspices. He is emphatic in the opinion that if his advice be taken, Siberia from the Urals to Vladivostok can be saved from German infiltration, and he feels sure that when once a democratic government is established in Siberia, it will be the means of saving from German control large portions of European Russia as well.

I submit this report merely for the Department's information and without venturing any recommendations of my own.

I have [etc.]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72/10281

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, June 7, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 10.45 p. m.]

4120. . . . Russian official wireless June 6, 12 p. m., gives proclamation signed Trotsky addressed "to all". An order announcing the concentration of Russian troops is complete and unity of command is assured on fronts of Volga, Ural, and Siberia. This movement is directed against Czecho-Slovaks who are denounced as direct allies of counter-revolution and agents of capitalism. Message continues: "Hunted down from both sides at once the Czecho-Slovaks are retreating along railroad line in evident state of agitation. Since these military operations along the railroad are interfering seriously with trains bearing food supplies, we order that operations be pursued with all possible energy."

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1980

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, June 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 8, 11.55 a. m.]

1708. Department's 1395. De Giers, Russian Ambassador, states that he is now able to communicate with Russian political men in

Russia and get a reply within a week. He says that he received information yesterday that all parties from socialists to Cadets and moderate monarchists are together. They cannot ask that military expedition be sent, but hope it will. He gave me a report from General Miller, ex-commandant of army corps of southern Russia, and Colonel Niemchenko, who was attached to the Russian administration for military supplies in Italy, upon a possible Allied military entry and establishment in Russia. Report sent by mail.<sup>1</sup>

NELSON PAGE

---

File No. 861.00/1977

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, June 7, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received June 9, 2.45 a. m.]

9. Papers state Chicherin answered consuls<sup>2</sup> by saying no objection to departure Czechs if disarmed. Have telegraphed to Vologda advising reply be delayed until instructions received from our governments. Poole advises that Soviet order to disarm was dictated by Germans and many German and Austrian prisoners fighting with Red Guard against Slovaks; that Soviet government spreading Bolshevik doctrine among Slovaks and endeavoring every way to interfere with departure claiming that Slovak organization is counter-revolution movement.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1973

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, June 7, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received June 7, 6.50 a. m.]

The agitation recently renewed in favor of armed intervention in Siberia continues quite vigorously. The General Staff appears to be using every effort to force a decision. Several French officers returning from Russia now are urging immediate action. The subject is again becoming the chief topic of newspaper discussions.

The Diplomatic Advisory Council met yesterday and it is reported that the meeting which lasted the greater part of the day was devoted

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See the Ambassador's telegram No. 241, June 3, *ante*, p. 188.

to the discussion of conditions in Siberia. The diplomatic aspects of the question are being discussed by Japan and Great Britain. Immediately after assuming office, Baron Goto expressed to my British colleague his desire to reconsider the entire subject. Subsequently he authorized Baron Chinda to discuss the question with the British Foreign Office on the ground that the Government of Great Britain had never submitted any definite proposal to the Government of Japan. Lord Robert Cecil reaffirmed the position of Great Britain as expressed in the memorandum of March 10, giving the views of the British General Staff, and reported in my telegram of March 12, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup> He further explained that no formal request had been made on behalf of the Allies because the President of the United States did not favor the plan suggested and inquired if the Japanese Government was still willing to undertake intervention if requested. At the same time my British colleague has reopened the informal discussions here and is apparently endeavoring to persuade the Government of Japan to propose some plan of its own which may be submitted to the Allied Governments as an alternative to independent action by Japan in the protection of its national interests.

Semenov's success was short lived and his movement appears to be disintegrating.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1986

*The Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Central Siberian Soviet Government (Geyzman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, undated.

[Received June 9, 1918, 11.41 p. m.]

Official communication Centro-Sibir. Having received orders from Moscow, end March, to pass Czecho-Slovak Army through Vladivostok aboard [ships], the supreme Siberian power, Centro-Sibir, took measures to expedite furtherance of [above-]mentioned army to east, but to [its] regret, due to catastrophic conditions of transport and supplies, we could not pass them so fast as we wanted. At the beginning of May, when Siberian Railroad communication was threatened by Semenov, we were compelled to stop the passing of Czecho-Slovaks. This circumstance was misinterpreted by Czecho-Slovaks and used by reactionary elements as agitation against present Russian Government. They thought and were told that Russia

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 78.

purposely keeps them back. Saturday, May 25, Centro-Sibir informed, from Novo Nikolaevsk to Nizhneudinsk two or three railroad stations are captured and held by armed force of Czecho-Slovaks. Being unable to explain such occurrence, we took measures to safeguard railroad from being further captured by them. On May 27 a Czecho-Slovak echelon arrived in Irkutsk and, due to misunderstanding or provocation, a conflict between sides occurred; human blood was shed for neither reason nor purpose, but at the arrival of government representative the conflict was very soon settled to satisfaction and conviction of both sides that there were no reasons for quarrel between Soviet republic and Czecho-Slovak Army. The same happened with other two echelons; [at] Innokentevskaya either [both] sides concluded treaty to mutual satisfaction. Nevertheless, situation with echelons located west of Irkutsk at Nizhneudinsk, Mariinsk, and Novo Nikolaevsk is not settled yet. Soviet republic, together with American Consulate, are doing everything to settle it without bloodshed.

Majority echelons that succeeded in reaching Vladivostok, together with their National Council and chief commanders, are exceedingly dissatisfied with the situation and categorically ordered their fellow countrymen located in the west to submit to Soviets and instantly proceed east. We reached an armistice up to 10th June, and Centro-Sibir representatives, with American mission headed by Emerson, hope to end issue, arrange the conflict peacefully. We declare: the Russian Soviet republic was respecting the ideas of Czecho-Slovaks as an oppressed nation, has neither reason to detain them nor cause of conflict. We do all in our power to find amicable mutual understanding, and we are certain that if there are not hidden motives and aforethought [*sic*] reasons on the side of the Czecho-Slovaks, we will settle it peacefully. Czecho-Slovaks will be able without any obstacles and as quick as possible follow to the east, and our mutual normal relations will be restored.

*Foreign Commissariat, Centro-Sibir,*

GEYZMAN

File No. 861.00/2063

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 9, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received June 18, 9.30 a. m.]

621. Czechs continue fighting their way eastward, have taken Omsk. Flank detachment within few miles of Ekaterinburg. French agents report large numbers of German and Austrian prisoners among

troops of Red Army but no effective resistance so far offered to Czechs.

Letter from Vice Consul Williams, Samara, dated June 1, contains following statement of American Y.M.C.A. secretary who has been working with Czechs for some time:

Czechs will not give up arms nor go out via Archangel under existing conditions. Therefore they have decided to concentrate entire first division around Chelyabinsk as soon as possible and from there begin movement toward Vladivostok in spite of all opposition. If resistance offered to their rapid transport they will seize important towns along way above cited. If press reports Czechs are trying to capture Siberia and oust Bolshevik government, we are to know that they are only endeavoring to reach Vladivostok and will not let Bolshevik government trifle with them more.

According to French reports, when Czechs enter a city they occupy only station and railroad yards issuing proclamation to inhabitants that they will not interfere in affairs, will only preserve order. This had resulted in all cases so far in immediate overthrow of Bolshevik and facilitation of new government by coalition of Social Revolutionary radical party, Cooperatives, etc.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2005

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1918.

[Received June 11.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I take pleasure in forwarding to you a copy of the extract of the resolution recently adopted by the central committee of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party concerning Allied intervention in Russia which has been transmitted to me by cable from Paris with the request that this message be respectfully submitted to the President.

I understand that the Cadet Party considers it imperative that their loyal feelings be emphasized because of the recent rumors concerning the presumed pro-German views of the Russian intellectual and well-to-do classes.

I avail myself [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure]

*Extract of the Resolution Adopted by the Central Committee of the Cadet Party  
Concerning Allied Intervention in Russia*

We never recognized the conditions of the Brest Litovsk peace and consider that the disastrous situation in which they have placed Russia can only be ameliorated with the aid of the Allies.

The movement of the Germans on Russian soil, their perpetual seizure of new regions, still continues and there seems to be no limit to such occupation. Under such conditions we cannot restrain from appealing to our Allies to whom we have frequently given proof of the loyalty of our feelings.

We proclaim our conviction that the appearance of a new powerful factor on the scene of struggle undoubtedly will have a decisive bearing on the issues of the war and on the conditions of peace.

We can assure in the most conclusive manner that the information picturing that the Russian democracy does not approve of Allied aid is false. If such information has reached the President of the United States it must originate from Bolshevik sources. The Bolsheviks in no way are representative of the Russian democracy. Their régime, a fictitious rule of democracy, is really oligarchy, demagogy and despotism, which at the present moment relies only on physical force and daily becomes more and more odious to the popular masses.

Nevertheless, we consider it our duty to emphasize that the attitude of the Russian public opinion towards the Allied action is conditioned by the forms of its realization. Its success depends on the whole-hearted support of national feeling in Russia. It is furthermore imperative for the Russian public opinion to receive assurances that the compensations due to Japan and to the other powers who will take part in the expedition be coordinated with the inviolability of rights and interests of Russia and that the actions of all the Allies on Russian territory be performed under international control.

---

File No. 763.72/10309

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 638

MEMORANDUM

The British Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that the Allied Governments have had under consideration the question of the transportation to France of Czecho-Slovak troops now in Russian territory.

In the present situation the services of trained Czecho-Slovak troops, who are in process of arriving at Vladivostok in considerable force, would be of the utmost value on the western front, and an agreement was recently reached by the British, French and Italian Governments that every effort should be made to transport them to France as soon as possible.

These troops desire above all things to be transported to France, being unwilling either to remain in Russia or to take any part in the internal struggles which are taking place there, and their wishes are fully supported by their national representatives.

The available tonnage at the disposal of His Majesty's Government is, unfortunately, not sufficient to embark more than 4,000 or 5,000 of them by the middle of July.

The British, French and Italian Governments decided at the Supreme War Council at Versailles to ask the Japanese Government whether they would agree to divert, for the transport of the Czecho-Slovak troops, the Japanese tonnage at present allotted for the transport of German and Austrian subjects from China to Australia.

This question of the transportation of enemy prisoners from China, and the threat of reprisals made by the Central powers, was dealt with in the memoranda from the British Ambassador, No. 562 of May 23 and Nos. 599 and 600 of May 31.<sup>1</sup>

The Allied Governments have come to the conclusion that a re-examination of the question of transporting German and Austrian subjects from China to Australia is necessary, owing to the threat of severe reprisals from the German Government and to a consequential request from the Belgian Government for a further consideration of the subject. The British, French and Italian Governments trust that, as a reexamination of the question must occupy a considerable time, during which the allotted transport would remain mobilized, the Japanese Government will consent to the scheme now put forward.

His Majesty's Government are further anxious to ascertain from the Japanese Government whether they would consent to provide additional vessels for the purpose of transporting these Czecho-Slovak forces to Vancouver on their way to France, in the event of the diversion of tonnage proving insufficient to transport the full number which have arrived or may arrive at Vladivostok. His Majesty's Government realize that all available Japanese ships must be used for Allied intervention in Siberia, to the exclusion of all less important objects, if the Japanese Government assent to intervention, but they earnestly hope that until that question is actually determined, the Japanese Government may find it possible to render a signal service to the Allied cause by supplying tonnage for the transport of Czecho-Slovaks.

The British Ambassador, in bringing the above to the notice of the Secretary of State, is instructed to add that a communication has been addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in London, explaining the situation in regard to the proposed transfer of enemy subjects to Australia, and asking the consent of the Japanese Government for the utilization of the tonnage assigned for this purpose for the transportation of Czecho-Slovak troops.

WASHINGTON, *June 10, 1918.*

[*Received June 11.*]

File No. 861.00/2032

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, *June 10, 1918.*

[*Received June 15, 6.40 p. m.*]

17. On June 2 Social Committee's [*sic*] Party captured Nizhne-udinsk from Bolsheviks and sent ultimatum to Soviet here ordering

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

surrender Irkutsk within twenty-four hours. Local Soviet did not reply but sent Red Army west of city to meet attacking force. Latter has not yet come. No news obtainable as all communications west of city interrupted.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2031

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 10, 1918.

[Received June 15, 6.40 p. m.]

Following telegram received to-day from Harris, Irkutsk:

21, 10th. Courier from west reports real reason Czech trouble is detention in Russia of all Czech troops by order of Trotsky. Czechs in Siberia permitted move forward while their comrades in Russia are detained. Mariinsk and Novo Nikolaevsk still held by Czechs. Czech troops in Russia 38,000 and in Siberia west of Irkutsk nearly 7,000. Temporary neutral zone made between Irkutsk White Army west of city and of Red Army near Nizhneudinsk. Inform Ambassador of above. Have not been able communicate with Ambassador for fortnight.

Peking informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/1965

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1918, 2 p. m.

170. Your 241, June 3, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Department believes instructions to Consul Moscow to communicate with Soviet should, so far as practicable, be limited to matters affecting American interests.

POLK

File No. 861.00/1996

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, June 10, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received June 11, 3.21 a. m.]

All railway communication with Russia and Siberia broken both east and [west?]. Line from Pogranichnaya has not been cut but Bolsheviks at Grodekovo prevent trains coming west beyond Grodekovo, and Chinese Eastern refuses to send trains east of Pogranichnaya because they cannot be returned. Telegraph communication

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 188.



with all points Russia [and?] Siberia also cut off except by way of Peking. Semenov's forces attacked Bolsheviks 7th instant at Borzya reported defeated and Semenov expected at Harbin to secure further aid.

Higgins of Stevens's engineers returned from Vladivostok to Pogranichnaya Sunday riding in cart from Grodekovo, reported many soldiers in vicinity of Grodekovo sailors one hundred three deserters from Czechs many civilians, boys and old men all armed. Reports seeing twelve 3-inch guns, and number machine guns, trains of soldiers coming into Nikolsk from Khabarovsk and from as far west as Blagoveshchensk. He could not estimate number but was certain they greatly outnumbered forces at Pogranichnaya. He saw many troop trains between Vladivostok and Grodekovo moving troops and supplies. Soldiers said there was no work in Siberia and the people were starving, forcing them to join the army. Cart roads near boundary heavily guarded by Bolsheviks. Orlov returned last night from Pogranichnaya and his adjutant informed me they were discouraged. He said Allies would not aid them, believing them monarchists and that they could do no more for Russia but go to Mesopotamia. Orlov still expects Japanese troops to intervene shortly.

Japanese Consul General has sent Russian translations to newspapers here of article from Japanese newspaper *Osaka Mainichi-Shimbun* of May 3 containing charges attack on United States suggesting that America means to share with Germany in despoiling Russia.

MOSER

File No. 763.72Su/55

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier),  
to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 10, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 5.43 p. m.]

92. Referring to my 77, 5th.<sup>1</sup> Exact language of the three conditions subject to which Great Britain, France and Italy desired Japanese intervention in Russia is: (1) that Japan should promise to respect the territorial integrity of Russia; (2) that she would take no side in the internal politics of the country; (3) that she would advance as far west as possible for the purpose of encountering the Germans. At the French Foreign Office it is felt that the wording of these three conditions is unfortunate, aspiring to be in the nature of an ultimatum to Japan, while in reality they are binding for the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

three above-mentioned powers as well. Foreign Office inform me that the joint note is addressed to Japan. An effort will be made to couch the proposal in less harsh terms.

FRAZIER

File No. 861.00/2056

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 11, 1918.

[Received June 17, 11.46 p. m.]

626. Official gazette to-day publishes proclamation signed by Lenin, Trotsky, and Bonch Bruevich of which following is digest:

Enemies of Russian people making last desperate attempt to regain authority [over] land and race. Working people hate their oppressors, therefore their former exploiters look abroad for help among foreign imperialists of [all] camps. Czecho-Slovak corps has considered itself at disposal France and received constant material support from her. Russian counter-revolutionists, together with Allied plotters, decided to use Czechs to overthrow Soviet authority and urged stupefied Czechs to rebellion. Czechs temporarily seized Penza, and authority of *bourgeoisie* is established there at present. Pursued by our troops they have seized Samara, Omsk, and Novo Nikolaevsk. Siberian *bourgeoisie* with officers expelled from army either for enmity to people [omission?] immediately formed their "temporary Siberian government." Following proclamation sent to People's Commissariat of [by] this government dated Omsk, June 10:

Authority of Bolsheviks in Siberia destroyed and temporary Siberian government closed [chosen] by Siberian Duma, consisting of Zemstvo and municipal self-governments, Cooperative Societies and national Cossack councils, is governing Siberia. Siberian government makes its first object reestablishment of organs of self-government chosen on basis of general equitable direct and secret voting and speedy convocation Constituent Assembly to decide finally political organization of Siberia and her attitude to European Russia. In pursuance instructions, temporary Siberian government informs you we are ready to guarantee prompt and continuous shipment of food-stuffs into starving governments Russia and to begin negotiations regarding conditions of supplying Great Russia which temporary government considers indissolubly tied to Siberia. Will be impossible to supply Russia however if People's Commissars attempt to cross Urals with idea of reestablishing overthrown Soviets. We shall meet these attempts with armed force and [stoppage of] shipment food supplies into Russia. Commander of Steppes Corps, Colonel E. Ivanov, and Plenipotentiary of Temporary Siberian Government, Lyakhovich.

If these people had any real force they would not turn to us with their miserable promises and threats. Ivanov, the Siberian Kornilov,

is asking your support of Constituent Assembly against workingmen's and peasants' Soviets. This colonel is supported [by] Cadets, right Social Revolutionists and Mensheviks, their armies are the misled Czechs who are kept with money of Anglo-French capitalists. If Siberian *bourgeoisie* is allowed to choke the Siberian workingmen and peasants, Siberian counter-revolutionists will immediately cross Urals to smash [establish] authority of landowners and capitalists throughout country. Under guise of Constituent Assembly struggle for rule of rich over poor being carried on. People's Commissars enter into no negotiations with counter-revolutionary adventurers. Reliable detachments have been sent against the rebels. The Russian, French and Czecho-Slovak imperialists will not overturn Russian revolution by hunger. Southeast is coming to help of starving north. People's Commissariat, Tsaritsyn, hopes to ship enormous stores from Don and Kuban in next few days. To effect food shipments, at same time to wipe *bourgeois* treachery off face of earth and protect Trans-Siberian Railroad, following extraordinary measures taken: (1) mobilization in Vologda rural and Siberian districts of persons subject military service of last five years; (2) mobilization in Moscow of artillery and engineering troops of last five years; (3) strict watch on local *bourgeoisie*; (4) former officers working honestly for reestablishment of Soviet army to be protected, others to be exterminated.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2052

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, undated.

[Received June 18, 1918, 12.22 a. m.]

626 [?]. Thomson telegraphs from Omsk under date June 3 in part as follows:

Local authorities have now permitted me to give out the following concerning the local situation. Omsk and the vicinity are as heretofore under martial law; passenger and railway communication eastward to Irkutsk and westward to Chelyabinsk has stopped. No trains with provisions are passing to Chelyabinsk; telegraph communication with the east has been stopped by the new Siberian government at Novo Nikolaevsk, therefore, information concerning communication in the east is lacking. Counter-revolutionary activities occurring in Altai region. Stations of Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, Petropavlovsk, Isil are in hands Czecho-Slovak detachments. No further military activities have taken place on western Omsk front. At present time *pourparlers* being carried on here between Soviet on one hand and French mission and Czechs on other, with view toward liquidating incident in peaceful manner and permitting Czech detachments to proceed on their journey to Vladivostok unmolested.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2040

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 12, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received June 15, 6.40 p. m.]

Following received from Harris, Irkutsk:

22, 10th. Inform Department French Consul and myself have sent joint note to Soviet [in?] protest against (1) mining of railroad tunnel and of bridge for the purpose of blowing up Czech troop train when they pass Irkutsk for Vladivostok; (2) local meeting to be held to discuss plan oppose passage of Czech troops through Irkutsk; (3) campaign against Czechs in local newspapers. To-day German war prisoners were compelled at point of bayonet assist Red Army dig trenches eight versts west of city.

Tokyo and Peking informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2053

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 12, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received June 15, 1.12 p. m.]

628. . . . member of the board of the All-Russian Union of Cooperative Societies, which includes Moscow national and Siberian union at Novo Nikolaevsk and is in close relation with Siberian union of butter makers, has authorized Consulate General to transmit to the Department statement given below as an exact and confidential expression of his personal views on points stated in Department's unnumbered June 5, 12 midnight.<sup>1</sup> . . . is considered the most solid leader among the Cooperatives of Siberia and Russia on the purely business side. Commended for his participation in the Moscow conference, he has carefully refrained from all political activity and he desired it to be understood that he gives the statement below as a business man and humanitarian worker, not as a politician. Every one whom Consulate General has consulted agrees that . . . is the most dependable spokesman for the rank and file of the Cooperatives, especially those of Siberia. The statement is as follows:

The Cooperative Societies are non-political organizations. Our rule that the leaders should not be politicians has been broken only when the Cooperatives, under my leadership, took part in the Moscow

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 190.

conference of last August. We thought it was our duty to help save the country at a crisis. Our efforts were in vain. The country has perished.

Now an economic calamity surpassing the imagination impends, and it is the duty of the Cooperative Societies to endeavor to save the people from starvation. For this, outside help is necessary.

The weariness of the great masses of the people in European Russia has become such, as a result of disorganization and Bolshevik terror, that they desire only the reestablishment of normal economic order; and although as a rule antagonistic to Germany, are now prepared to accept the reestablishment of order through the interference of either the Allies or even the Central powers. As for the Cooperatives, we have worked under the Bolshevik régime and now, if necessary, we can work under German, as our main duty is to relieve the masses of their suffering.

However, the political sympathies of the Cooperatives are with the Allies. In Siberia, where the Cooperative Societies represent the people here in the fullest measure, there is a special feeling of friendliness fixed and upholding in [unshaken toward] America. On the other hand there is distrust of Japan. We have no means ourselves of stopping the German advance or of preventing the spread of all German influence. Direct military aid from the Allies is the only means of making resistance against Germany. We are practical men and understand that for intervention there must be compensation of some sort. Many of us fear that if Japan is allowed to enter Siberia by herself without the control of other nations she may demand compensation such as none of us is prepared to grant.

It is my personal view that the Allies should take the leaders of the Cooperatives, as well as other pro-Ally leaders, into their confidence stating definitely their objects and intentions, what compensation is expected, especially by Japan, the manner of intervention and the approximate date at which it will come. Speed is especially important as the suffering of the people has reached such a pitch that it cannot be endured much longer.

I believe that in view of the confidence of the Siberian people in America, American assurances respecting the preservation of what we consider our vital interests would be acceptable, and that intervention begun after such assurances have been given would be welcomed by the Siberian Cooperatives, and the Allies could count upon our support and the support of the Siberian people in carrying out a combined resistance to German aggression.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2014

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, June 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received June 13, 4.31 p. m.]

It is the general opinion of Allied representatives here in which I concur that it would be a serious mistake to remove the Czechoslovak troops from Siberia. With only slight countenance and sup-

port they could control all of Siberia against the Germans. They are sympathetic to the Russian population, eager to be accessories to the Allied cause, the most serious means [menace] to extension of German influence in Russia. Their removal would greatly benefit Germany and further discourage Russia. If they were not in Siberia it would be worth while to bring them there from a distance.

Representatives of the Moscow Central Supply Committee here at present describe the nature of their organization, elective in its communal, district and central bodies, devoted to task of filling crying needs Russian population, saving lives, resisting extension of German influence, preventing supplies to regions under German control. They seem an organization which Allies could support with good results. They are working here for relaxation of Manchurian export embargo. Do you desire that I support release of merchandise addressed to that committee?

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/2061

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 18, 5.05 a. m.]

264. Your 170, June 10, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup> "American interests" are in my judgment involved in welfare of Czechs. They number approximately 50,000, are by agreement part of Allied army as American troops are, and were endeavoring to reach France according to agreement with Russia, when ordered disarmed. This came to my knowledge three days after receipt of your circular of May 29, announcing sympathy with Czechs, whereupon I instructed Consulate General to inform Chicherin that "our Government" would in my judgment consider their disarmament and swine [severe] treatment newspaper correspondent [as constituting] unfriendly act, inspired by Germany or certainly by hostile act of Berlin [sentiment] toward the Allies. Poole followed strictly my instructions and on returning to Consulate, found there British, French, Italian Consuls General who persuaded him to accompany them to the Foreign Office in which he acquiesced. Chicherin promised to answer by the following day, June 5, saying that he would submit matter to the Council of Commissaires. No reply yet received but learn from reliable source that Chicherin ordered Czechs not only disarmed but disbanded, and ordered those not joining Red Army to be forced to

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 201.

work; has abolished Czechs' headquarters, and dissolved headquarters council Moscow. Headquarters incident appears as I anticipated fraught with important consequences, one being overthrow of Soviet authority in Siberia, another cutting off food supply from western Russia, which was already scant; see my 260, June 11, 8 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

If exceeded my authority or transgressed regulations of service am very sorry but distance from Department and unsatisfactory cable service compel me to assume authority to meet emergencies, and I am always willing to accept cheerfully correction when make mistake. Please cable receipt hereof.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2033

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, June 14, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received June 15, 9.48 a. m.]

Under the protection of assurance of my Japanese colleague that the views presented below were the sincere convictions of his government and himself I have reduced them to writing and secured his signature with that of the other Allied consuls. My principal motive was the hope of being able to use this as an antidote to the strongly anti-American campaign which has been commenced here by the Japanese who are endeavoring, by every means, to persuade the Russians to place all intervention in their hands. If the Department can approve its publication I believe it will prove of much value.

The following memorial was signed by all the Allied consular representatives to-day and telegraphed to their respective governments:

We, the consular representatives of the Allied powers at Harbin, being persuaded that the opinions of all classes in Russia and Siberia are faithfully reflected amongst the population of Harbin, and without any purpose of depreciating the authority or patriotic motives of any political faction now struggling in Russia and Siberia, do declare to our respective governments unanimous belief that:

1. The present situation in Siberia and European Russia is accomplishing political and social destruction of the Russian people, and is a menace to the cause of the Allies.
2. Russia and Siberia are being drawn irresistibly into the control of Germany.
3. The only possible means of restoring order and of assisting the Russian people to assured self-government, of defending Asia and of safeguarding the interests of the Allies, is the intervention of an Allied military force.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 126.

We believe that we speak for the great majority of the Russian people, when we express our unanimous conviction that military intervention by one power, alone, would be unwise; but that military intervention in which several or all of the Allied nations participated would be salutary and welcome.

We desire to place on record the fact that we are working in cooperation and confirm [conformity] one with the other, and that it is our firm belief that there is nothing in the kind of military intervention indicated, provided that such intervention is preceded by a declaration defining its aims, to justify apprehension that the sovereign rights, territory or interests of any nation concerned would be exploited at the expense of another, but that on the contrary such intervention would operate in the highest interests of Russia and of the Allied peoples.

In the hope that it may help to remove some of the misunderstanding and mistrust which are now being fostered both amongst the Russians and our own peoples, we respectfully submit for consideration the desirability of a communication to the press in the form of this declaration.

Dated and signed at Harbin, China, June 14, 1918.

N. SATO,  
*Imperial Japanese Consul General*  
 H. E. SLY, C.M.G.,  
*His Britannic Majesty's Consul*  
 C. K. MOSER,  
*Consul of the United States of America*  
 HENRY LEPIE,  
*Vice Consul of France*

I have telegraphed copies of foregoing to Tokyo, Peking, Caldwell, and Ambassador Francis.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/2025

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 14, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

Yesterday executive committee Soviet called upon American, British, Japanese consuls in order named, for no apparent definite purpose, apparently to cultivate friendly relations against time of need. They are now in full control here, but strength decreasing and gathering of troops on Chinese frontier near here causing uneasiness.

They inquired from each consul, as though merely incidental to their visit, whether notice has been received that consuls may send code telegrams, stating to me notice has been sent Consul General of Japan for communication other consuls two weeks ago. Japanese deny receiving such notice. Official written notice promised to me to-day not yet received.

Tokyo, Peking informed.

CALDWELL



File No. 861.00/2021

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 14, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

Following telegram received from Harris, Irkutsk:

[June] 13. Have just returned from investigation of conditions along Siberian Railroad line as far west as [omission]. There is a counter-Bolshevik movement in progress throughout whole of central Siberia. Taking advantage of presence Czech trains scattered all along railroad from Penza in Russia to Nizhneudinsk, a point about halfway between Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, counter-Bolshevik or [temporary] Siberian government are in possession of Tomsk, Taiga, Novo Nikolaevsk, Kainsk, Kansk, Nizhneudinsk, and probably Omsk. The Czechs have remained neutral except where they have been attacked by Red Guards. Situation is serious owing to arming of war prisoners and enlistment of them in Red Guards as internationalists. All telegraphic communications between Irkutsk and Vologda and Moscow interrupted since a fortnight. I have stopped all attempts to use good offices between Czechs and Bolsheviks to facilitate movement of trains to Vladivostok owing to counter-Bolshevik movement which would involve us in factional internal strife. Under present conditions Czechs refuse to deliver up arms and are prepared to fight. I was accompanied by party, Drysdale and Warner of Department of State, who will also report. Found no evidence of [omission] Royalist movement. Harris.

Peking, Tokyo informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2160

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received June 28, 5.12 a. m.]

637. . . . of Siberian Cooperative Societies, Novo Nikolaevsk, who chances to be in Moscow, in personal interview with me to-day replied to the questions stated in the Department's unnumbered June 5, 12 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> almost identically with the member of the board of the All-Russian Union, whose views were reported in my No. 628, June 15 [12], 5 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> though he was quite unaware of this other statement. He says question of direct military aid from Allies has been frequently discussed in Siberian cooperative circles and he con-

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 190.<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 205.

siders the views which he expresses as authoritative. A confidential invitation to the Allies to intervene has, however, heretofore been considered a matter for the future. Now that the new Siberian government, which has the hearty support of the Cooperatives, must be prepared to fight not only upon the Soviets but Germany, which is directing German war prisoners against the Czecho-Slovaks, he does not hesitate, although without stated authority to do so, to invite on behalf of the Siberian Union of Cooperatives immediate Allied intervention in Siberia, on the clear understanding that the greater portion of the troops will be Japanese, especially before troops to land America will guarantee [integrity] of Siberian [territory] with Japan against possible Japanese aggression.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2202

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received July 4, 6.07 p. m.]

269. Soviet government after stating, 11th, would not reply to disarmament protest, sent Poole written reply evening 12th, which, after detailed explanations charging that Czech movement counter-revolutionary and arrest of local Soviets, proceeds:

Soviet government has taken most decisive measures to put down with armed hand the Czechs and to make them disarm unconditionally. No other issue is admissible to the Soviet government.

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs expresses its certainty that after all above-stated representatives of the Allied powers will not regard disarmament of Czech detachments, which they have called Allied and under their protection, as an unfriendly act, but on the contrary will recognize the necessity and expediency of the measures taken by Soviet government also its proposed basis [*sic*]. The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs moreover expresses the hope that the representatives of the Allied powers will not delay in expressing their disapproval to the Czech detachments, which they consider under their protection, for their counter-revolutionary armed rebellion, which is most obviously and decidedly intervention in home affairs of Russia.

British Intelligence, Moscow, claims to know positively that three days ago three trainloads of German prisoners of war clothed in Russian uniforms were sent from Smolensk district to Penza to fight Czechs and trainload artillery accompanied them. French Embassy reports Soviet government ordered 12,000 uniforms and rifles provided at Petrograd—presumably to arm German prisoners of war.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs cables French Embassy here that military conference Paris, June 3, decided to hold Murman first, then Archangel, if impossible simultaneously, and to land battalions American, British, French, Italian troops with necessary munitions and provisions to hold those ports, all troops being under British command until otherwise ordered. Paris conference also decided to hold Czech detachments in Russia for the present.

I hope not necessary to instruct Consulate General reply Chicherin note before 18th as planning military conference 17th if General Poole arrives. If Department has instructions please answer by telegraph immediately.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2199

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, June 15, 1918.

[Received July 5, 11.58 a. m.]

Irkutsk to-day is in the hands of 3,000 armed Austrian and German prisoners commanded by prisoner officers. No Czech trains present Irkutsk.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2038

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 15, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 7.14 p. m.]

Following delayed telegram [to Military Staff, Washington] received from Slaughter and Emerson:

May 30. Commanding officers of Czech troops at Suslovo have agreed to an armistice on our arrival. Arrived Suslovo 11 a. m.

Commanders Russian forces advised us as follows: We agree to allow Czech troops proceed there to carry out the original agreement, cause no disturbance *en route*, deliver rifles and ammunition in excess twenty, officers to retain side arms.

In conference with Czech commander, Mariinsk, he stated emphatically they would not give up arms and munitions. He admitted movement was concerted action Czech forces in Siberia and European Russia under instructions to take cities in vicinity where they were located. They would agree defer action three days give us opportunity confer with their commanding officer at Novo Nikolaevsk.

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 23).

Russians would not allow us to [omission] our return Krasnoyarsk. Some places much disturbed yesterday. Claimed French through concerted movement Czech troops are trying control Siberia. President Soviet Krasnoyarsk stated this morning message received from central government directing Soviet to cease military operations, and that Czechs have received message from their commander directing them to cease action against Soviet. Soviet Krasnoyarsk states that they will bring French officers from Irkutsk here by special [train], and send American mission and French officers west together, in order to aid us in settling remaining difficulties.

Caldwell

File No. 861.00/2029

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 15, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 5.20 p. m.]

Following from Irkutsk, 14th:

Drysdale reports Czechs now fighting Red Guards near Omsk. Armistice Mariinsk-Irkutsk front ends June 16. Consider agreement between Czechs and Bolsheviks not probable. If agreement not made, consider it advisable urge immediate return of Czechs now in Vladivostok to Karymskaya and Irkutsk to insure passage of Czechs now in western Siberia. American and French Consuls General, Irkutsk, concur. Harris.

Tokyo, Peking, and Harbin informed.

Caldwell

File No. 861.00/2193

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 15, 1918, midnight.

[Received June 19, 3.25 p. m.]

Your June 4, midnight [5 p. m.],<sup>1</sup> received 8th when armed Czecho-Slovaks had severed connections with that section [i.e., Siberia]. Railroad now refusing sell tickets east of Vologda therefore conclude Czecho-Slovaks moving. Soviet government received proposition from new Siberian government to send provisions on condition that Soviet would recognize new Siberian government which Soviet refuses.

Meantime French Embassy Vologda received cablegram from French Minister of Foreign Affairs stating military conference was

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 189.

held Paris June 3, decided to hold Murman first and then Archangel and to land British, French, Italian, American battalions for this purpose. Cable stated [Czecho-Slovaks] remain in Russia for the present with approval of Czecho-Slovak National Council, and Allied troops be under command of British until otherwise ordered. General Poole<sup>1</sup> been expected Archangel since 12th but as troops are needed to expedite evacuation of supplies from Archangel, Soviet government probably ascertained that plan and may prevent Poole landing. Martin<sup>2</sup> telegraphed 10th, received to-day, that *Olympia* landed 100 armed sailors 9th to replace British marines sent to Kandalaksha.

Under new phase situation has assumed I think Allied advance in Siberia very important if not absolutely necessary. Forces should contain Americans and Chinese although mainly Japanese troops but should contain American representation carrying flags.

Answering second question I think intervention from east will be welcome by great majority Russians especially after Allied intervention Archangel, Murman. Moreover armed Czechs are rapidly extending domination westward which Soviet government powerless to prevent except by arming German prisoners of war which reported doing. Furthermore famine imminent in Petrograd and throughout western Russia in consequence of Siberian supplies being cut off. Special representative from Moscow visited me to-day to ascertain on what conditions we will furnish flour; says Moscow has three days' supply only and Petrograd virtually none; expresses willingness and claims authority to represent Soviet government or opposition thereto saying situation desperate and America is only source of relief.

More after military conference.

[FRANCIS]

File No. 861.00/2184

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 17, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 3, 2.05 p. m.]

646. Letters dated 12th received to-day from Williams<sup>3</sup> transmit formal written address signed by Czech leaders setting forth to the representatives of the Allies: (1) bad faith of Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders toward them; (2) continued refusal of Czechs to mix in Russian internal affairs [affirming] their continued adhesion

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Poole, commanding the British forces in north Russia.

<sup>2</sup> Lieut. (later Capt.) Hugh S. Martin, Assistant Military Attaché.

<sup>3</sup> George W. Williams, Vice Consul at Moscow, on detail at Samara.

to Allied cause and desire to fight Central powers. Personal Government [observations] convince Williams that it is indifferent to Czechs where they are to fight and that if the Allies so direct they will gladly remain in present position establishing new anti-German front along Volga. However, in the absence other instructions, they will resume movement east as soon as railroad repaired which should be in a few days.

Williams reports that 12,000 Czechs near Samara and 5,000 at Chelyabinsk; part of the latter are moving westward against the Bolshevik forces at Ufa with a view to facilitating easterly passage of troops from Samara. Czechs have captured munitions and supplies and are so far masters of the situation though, while Ufa remains in Bolshevik hands, their strategic position is not good. Reports that they have taken Ekaterinburg cannot be confirmed but a French officer telegraphs from Lyublin that passage from that point eastward impracticable owing to precipitate westward flight of Red Army. Unconfirmed rumors that Bolsheviks have taken the Tsar and his brother Michael from Ekaterinburg and that the Tsarevich is dead.

Siberian Cooperatives' league interviewed in connection with Department's June 5, midnight, have all expressed earnest hope that Czechs will be left in predominating present positions while new Siberian government is consolidating. Williams reports citizens Samara, fearful of departure of Czechs, are hastening organization of forces intended (1) to prevent the return of Bolsheviks and (2) obstruct German advance across Volga. Provisional city government consists of delegates to Constitutional Assembly and members of previous municipal administration. Czechs have given over part of city to local guards. All quiet.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2196

---

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received July 4, 7 a. m.]

650. Department's June 5, 12 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The most prominent leader of the Cooperatives on the upper house side [*sic*] has reiterated in substance, during an interview with Jenkins, the statement transmitted in my No. 628,<sup>2</sup> although like person mentioned in my No.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Ante*, p. 190.

<sup>2</sup>*Ante*, p. 205.

637<sup>1</sup> he was unaware of the existence of this statement. He made following additional observation.

Siberia desires local autonomy not independence from Russia. Bolshevism is a passing phase which has never infected the masses of the people. It has had foothold only in the centers; its chief stronghold has been Krasnoyarsk; at Irkutsk forces about equal; at Chita anti-Bolsheviki predominate. Coalition which has set up present provisional Siberian government, embracing Cooperatives, other modified socialists, and Cadets, planned overthrow of Bolsheviki for June 4 independently of Czechs whose conflict with Soviet troops precipitated action 10 days earlier than planned. As result of Czech assistance Siberians now hope to advance anti-German frontier from originally planned Chelyabinsk, Ekaterinburg localities to a line beginning with Orenburg on the south following Rivers Volga and Kama on the west and running northward through Perm and Vyatka to include Archangel. Siberian leaders hope Allied troops will be sent to Archangel at once as this port considered economically and strategically necessary to maintenance of resistance against Germany in western Siberia.

Please acknowledge this and my Nos. 628 and 637 on same subject.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2076

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, June 19, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received June 20, 9.40 a. m.]

Semenov's forces definitely defeated are returning to Chinese territory, will probably be obliged to surrender arms to the Chinese Government. Prisoners war, forces well disciplined under German commander, have proved too strong without the Allied aid anticipated. Between 2,000 and 3,000 prisoners and two airships with Bolshevik forces east of Chita. Chinese officials border province worried lest war prisoners may cross Chinese frontiers.

Minor engagements Pogranichnaya front indicate superior Bolshevik strength. Train and telegraph communication still suspended. Kolchak resigns to-day or to-morrow. Reports that Czecho-Slovak forces have overthrown Bolsheviks at Chelyabinsk and Irkutsk and that counter-Bolshevik movement organized last February by supporters of Siberian self-government has overthrown Bolsheviks at Tomsk and Omsk, reported through underground connections, hoped for here and believed, but not verified. Seems certain that the anti-Bolshevik movement is spreading throughout Siberia probably suc-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 210.

cessfully. My conviction is that no purely Russian movement whatever can restore law and order without armed Allied support; believe any action not founded on this view will be wasted.

Am privately informed to-day General Horvat leaving Harbin with family to reside permanently in Peking to direct its political activities there. Have not yet learned what is behind this move but regard it as significant and unfortunate for all Allied interests except one. Am laid up with dislocated knee but will endeavor to keep you fully informed.

MOSEK

---

File No. 861.00/2199

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, June 20, 1918.

[Received July 5, 11.58 a. m.]

Supplementing my telegram 15th. The trouble began early on morning of June 14, when city was attacked by few hundred White Guard. The jail was attacked and about 100 officers released, who joined White Guard. In the course of day Red Guard was augmented by revolutionists, numbers of armed Austrian and German prisoners, many of whom were in their own uniforms. These armed prisoners form strongest element in Red Guard amounting to fully 60 per cent. Armed prisoners are in charge of all responsible posts in Irkutsk and all military motor cars and all machine guns are under command of armed prisoners. Soviet power in Irkutsk sustained only by armed prisoners. There is a lull at present but trouble likely to begin at any moment.

[HARRIS]

---

File No. 861.00/2093

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, June 20, 1918.

[Received 10.15 a. m.]

Large meeting public and political men, composed principally of members former Siberian Duma of so-called Siberian autonomous government, local Blagoveshchensk Amur Valley Duma, members Siberian Cooperative Societies for Far East. Committee held meeting upon question of requesting Allied intervention in Siberia. . . . member of Russian National Duma for central Siberia from

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 23).



1905 to revolution, presented proposal that Allied help was imperative and that appeals should be made to all Allies collectively, but that Japan should be specified for the task. Vigorous discussion brought forth views that Russia's previous services to Allies justified not appeal but her demand by right for intervention and assistance to restore new front against Germans. There were also bitter speeches warning that such action would result in Japanese seizure of Siberia, and attacking United States for dilatory policy. Alternative proposal that Allies be appealed to for aid without indicating Japan as the executive, that steps be taken to organize Siberian government which should be authorized to make a treaty with the Allies for military cooperation against Germany, was defeated. Overwhelming majority voted to appeal to Allies, specifying Japan as intervener, the majority [minority] however left the meeting. The main other note sounded by the meeting universally applauded, as expressed by the Tomsk representative of the Constituent Assembly, was that Russia's fate would be settled not by the struggle with the Bolsheviks but by the struggle with Germany. About 150 representative men present nearly all from Siberia but the meeting was [packed], only people known to favor appeal to Japan having been invited. Strong condemnation in to-day's newspapers which denounce action as treachery.

MOSER

File No. 861.00/1957

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1918, 3 p. m.

Your May 31 much garbled.<sup>2</sup> No plans yet formulated to bring Czecho-Slovaks from Vladivostok.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1960

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your telegram, 28th, and two telegrams, 30th, practically unintelligible.<sup>3</sup> This Government not prepared to recognize Bolshevik authorities or to deal with them officially. Department approves your actions so far as reported. Sending code as soon as practicable.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Senat via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 182.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, *ante*, p. 184.

File No. 861.00/2083

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 20, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 6.35 p. m.]

Czechs to-day placing their guards on all military stores in this vicinity to prevent their being sent west to be used against Czechs. I believe they are being encouraged take action by British who are prepared to use force to prevent stores being shipped and are on point of having to do so as shipments are being made in spite of British protests.

I believe consuls Irkutsk [omission?] cannot send here cipher telegrams as they reply in plain to cipher inquiries. Apparently situation is very bad, prisoners still have control. Czech and Soviet representatives left yesterday for Irkutsk to settle trouble but I do not expect satisfactory results.

Tokyo informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2098

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, June 22, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received June 23, 4.34 p. m.]

Supplementing my telegram of June 11, noon.<sup>1</sup> A reply has been prepared by the Japanese Government to Mr. Balfour's formal inquiry. It was to be dispatched to Chinda to-day, but was held back because of recent reports of increasing disorder in Siberia which is now reported to be threatening the lives and property of all nationals, and also because the Foreign Office has been informed of the President's statement to M. Delanney<sup>2</sup> that he was considering anew the entire situation, and would express his conclusions within the next ten days.

I am reliably informed that my British, French and Italian colleagues will be called in conference at the Foreign Office to-morrow, when Japan's proposed reply to Mr. Balfour will be read and discussed. I will not be invited to conference. I feel safe, however, in reporting that Japan will not act without the fullest understanding with the United States Government.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> French Ambassador to Japan, en route to his post, received by President Wilson June 18.

Baron Goto has been careful during the past month to keep me confidentially advised of Japanese development in the situation. He has repeatedly stated to me that he is doing this in pursuance of his conviction that the closest cooperation with the United States is an essential condition Japanese Foreign Office.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2033

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1918, 4 p. m.

Referring telegram to Department from Consul Harbin June 14<sup>1</sup> recommending publication of written memorial signed by Allied consular representatives, Department disapproves of publication and is not prepared at this time that any of its representatives should be connected with any public statement endorsing military intervention in Siberia.

Please advise Tokyo, Harbin, and Vladivostok accordingly.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2131

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 22, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received June 25, 12.04 p. m.]

295. Suppose Department still considering my 140, May 2,<sup>2</sup> if not reached adverse conclusion. French Ambassador received yesterday cable June 19 from French Minister for Foreign Affairs stating French Prime Minister received telegram from the French Ambassador to Japan in Washington *en route* Tokyo stating had urged President to consent to Allied intervention and the President replied expected various persons from Russia next week notably Masaryk who would furnish information and thus aid him in forming opinion. I respectfully submit following views:

#### SECTION I

A. Russia is awaking from the orgy or dream of the last seven months realizing this fallacy Bolshevism and the failure Lenin's "experiment in government" to use his own words. Short experience has taught them what would ordinarily have required years to learn

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 519.

by people so little educated, so unaccustomed to self-government. Workmen and peasants have turned against Soviet government as they see paralysis of industry and are facing famine. Weakness of Soviet government is demonstrated by the success of Czecho-Slovaks who have overcome whatever resistance offered and have been welcomed by every city because they have carefully abstained from interference in internal affairs while overturning unpopular local Soviets and installing whatever Russian government citizens desired. Vosnesenski talked to me two hours to-day saying had been sent by Chicherin to learn whether Allies had decided on intervention and wished to know what message I had. I told him if conclusion reached, I had not been advised and he [said] would return next week, whereupon I stated would not promise to be so candid again and on return would not say whether I knew. He was importunate, even asking my personal opinion concerning likelihood of intervention, to which I replied that some days I thought intervention would occur and other days otherwise; he said that Soviet government was divided and that he has favored non-resistance but that order issued for resistance to intervention. He asked if Allies [would] compel them overturn existing government if intervene. I replied that American policy was to permit Russians to select their own government and if America intervened it would be in opposition to German encroachment. He said that All-Russian Soviet would meet Moscow, 28th, and expected serious opposition to Soviet government on the subject of Brest treaty.

B. Russian people confidently expecting Allied intervention and will welcome it; if despair of intervention or survival Allied support of Soviet government will turn to Germany for deliverance as a last resort. Their patriotic pride is touched and they are becoming sensitive concerning Russia's position among nations. They see their country, in whose greatness they sincerely believed, being divided by German machinations, Finland, Ukraine, Caucasus, all lost, Siberia and Archangel Province threatening rebellion and Finland claiming Petrograd Province.

## SECTION II

A. Germany is practically exhausted. All reports agree that importation of German manufactured goods is extremely disappointing. Germany would have starved ere this but for Ukraine supplies. Ukraine peasants refuse to sell grain to Germany and resist by force requisitioning thereof. They consider German domination in Ukraine as temporary, refusing German paper money for their products as Germany has no manufactured goods to exchange.

B. German treatment of Russia under Brest treaty is contemptuous, besides not observing territorial boundaries of treaty and on-

couraging rebellion of Russian provinces, Germany has demanded and is exacting man-for-man exchange of prisoners which is outrage unprecedented after peace treaty signed. Furthermore, Germany sends to French front all able-bodied German prisoners of war while returning to Russia invalids only and retaining able-bodied Russian prisoners for work in Germany. Vosnesenski admits this, saying Soviet government objects but is powerless to prevent.

C. In my opinion, Germany is rapidly sucking the lifeblood of Russia at little cost to Germany. She sends only Landsturm soldiers, disabled and boys to subdue Russia while making strenuous efforts to negotiate commercial treaties and control industries. The Russian people are beginning to see that themselves.

### SECTION III

Japan. In my judgment no promises should be exacted of Japan and no promises made to her if she will consent to intervene without them. If Japan can be induced to join with us in intervention we need have no fear concerning her exactions or demands when the war ends. War will certainly terminate in our favor. It cannot end otherwise, and when the end comes, the Entente will dominate the peace table and Japan will be compelled to accept the just terms offered whether she likes them or not. We have announced the principle of self-determination of peoples and our Allies have agreed thereto, consequently Japan cannot afford to object in the final peace conference.

### SECTION IV

A. America is not only taking the lead in this world war but is expected to do so and the magnificent preparations she has made therefor within fifteen months entitle her to leadership; she was herself unacquainted with her resources, capabilities and the energy and patriotic spirit of her people. Bonar Law was right when he said in the House of Commons two days ago that Germany could not succeed as America is in the conflict and showing such magnificent strength. Thanks to the superb leadership of President Wilson, ably supported by his Cabinet, we have demonstrated to the world that a peaceful democracy can wage successful war if principle is involved and necessity exists.

B. Russian people are expecting America to lead in intervention; we are not suspected of territorial ambitions and few charge us with sinister commercial designs; our President has consistently and perseveringly expressed sympathy with the Russian people and our representatives here have abstained from interference in internal affairs. At the same time these people require leadership and look to us therefor. Two shiploads of provisions delivered Archangel

could be exchanged for Russian products without material loss but if distributed free would be good investment and would have effect of inducing Russian people to expect guidance from Washington government.

C. Failure to intervene will prolong the war perhaps two years and cost us priceless blood and untold treasure as such failure would enable Germany to draw on Russia for supplies and perhaps to organize an army.

D. Intervention would be opportune. Czecho-Slovaks control great portion of Siberian Railway and if intervention announced would dominate its entire length. Germany might possibly capture Moscow and Petrograd but would not venture to invade interior. Impossible to estimate number of Russian soldiers that would assist Allies but would undoubtedly far exceed Russians who would oppose, if any would, which I much doubt.

#### SECTION V

Our Allies are all insisting upon intervention and while not likely to intervene without us will feel, in the event of calamity in France or Italy, that Russian intervention would have prevented same and may possibly conclude to intervene without our consent. Such position, however, would be embarrassing, as they all are receiving aid from us and submit to our leadership, having abandoned territorial aspirations and ideas of conquest and partly or greatly through our influence are fighting for self-determination and enduring peace.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2108a

*The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1918, 4 p. m.

British Embassy Paris reports that French Minister for Foreign Affairs recently made an important statement in the lobbies of the Chamber to the effect that Colonel House had told him that he, Colonel House, was emphatically in favor of Japanese intervention in Siberia. Please investigate this report and cable fully.

Colonel House cannot believe that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been correctly quoted. You will remember that Colonel House stated his views on this subject on several occasions during the meetings in November last.

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4758).

If you should find confirmation of the above report and that such statements are being made, please ask the Ambassador whether he will intimate to Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially that the President has the Russian question now under consideration and any statements at the present time regarding the views supposed to be held by various people are very likely to hinder the solution of this problem.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2143b

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

Please report full statement:

- (1) As to total number of Czecho-Slovak troops now at Vladivostok;
- (2) Number armed with rifles;
- (3) Character and quantity of other arms including machine guns, etc.;
- (4) Amount of ammunition they now have;
- (5) Are additional stores of ammunition available—if so where?
- (6) Morale of troops;
- (7) Character and number of higher officers;
- (8) Outline of military organization.

Answer urgent soon as possible. Questions are to indicate general scope of inquiry, but reply need not be too precise.

LANSING

Request of the Czecho-Slovak Leaders for Aid in Establishing a New Eastern Front—Overthrow of the Vladivostok Soviet by the Czecho-Slovaks—Landing of American Marines—Proclamation of the Protection of Vladivostok by Commanders of Allied and Associated Forces—Proclamation of a Government by Horvat: Controversy with Other Political Organizations

File No. 861.00/2180a

*The President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Masaryk) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1918.

In the interview with the Associated Press you explain your hostile attitude towards our Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia by saying that they have been counter-revolutionary since the days of the Kiev

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the Department of State, at Dr. Masaryk's expense, as an ordinary telegram, not through American diplomatic channels.

Rada, and that they even conspired against the Soviet government, as you can prove by documentary evidence in your possession. I was in Russia since May 1917 till March 1918; I organized the troops, I know every detail of their life during this period: with the full knowledge of all circumstances I must state that your assertion is incorrect, and that you are mistaken. You evidently allude to the fact that when the Kiev Bolsheviks rose against the Rada one of our regiments was brought to Kiev. But it seems you do not know that this was done by Russian military authorities under false pretext. This misuse of my name was soon ascertained, and the regiment was sent back at once; two or three of our people yielding to the false pretext were duly rebuked and punished. When the Bolshevik movement began I gave at once the strictest order to all regiments to abstain from all interference in Russian internal matters, and this order has under all conditions strictly been observed; the best proof is the fact that your Bolshevik Commander in Chief Muraviev, to whom the Kiev incident was explained, recognized the armed neutrality of our whole army. Our relations to the Rada were absolutely correct. I could prove to Muraviev that I did not accept the fourth Ukrainian Universal as I officially announced to Minister Shulgin the 26th of January, 1918. We agreed in this fundamental question of the relation of Ukraina to Russia with the position taken by your Petrograd Soviet.

I can prove by incontrovertible documents that I rejected every plan directed against your government submitted to me by your political adversaries: even of such adversaries who justly could not be called counter-revolutionist. I can prove that until lately I recommended to the Allies' statesmen to be on good terms with your government. We Czecho-Slovaks love Russia, and we wish her to be a strong and free democracy: it has been proved that our peoples did not accept the Slav plans of the old régime under Sturmer, though they were threatened with exile to Siberia.

We have been absolutely loyal to Russia and correct in our attitude toward your government: in recognition of this loyalty Commander Muraviev granted our army free passage to France (February 16), and the same has been granted by the Soviet of Moscow.

Being away from Russia three months, and having no detailed reports, I dare not express an opinion on what is happening now. It seems that some local soviet yielded to the Austrian and German intrigue and attacked our troops, who under given circumstances have been forced to defend themselves. I would not oppose your demand of disarmament if you can guarantee us free and unmolested passage to France. I assure you our soldiers' only wish is to fight the common enemy and help, by that, Russia. I ask you in the name of



democracy to keep the promise given by your own commander. Please investigate carefully the matter, for it would be a disgraceful absurdity that a democratic and socialistic government should by mistake promote the interest of its greatest enemies.

PROFESSOR MASARYK

*President of Czecho-Slovak National Council*

File No. 861.00/2137

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 25, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 26, 2.49 p. m.]

9. Allied consuls here just met with the two principal members Czech National Council, who state that even if willing, Soviets are powerless to prevent armed prisoners from interfering with movement Czech troops east, that Trotsky has ordered all Czech troops disarmed, arrested and imprisoned and that the 15,000 Czech troops now here must return west to assist their fellows. To do this they require arms and munitions, and these they request from Allies, together with a supporting armed Allied force.

Allied Consuls all agreed to recommend to their respective Governments that favorable action be taken immediately on request of Czechs, both as to supplying arms and supplies, and also the sending of an Allied force into Siberia for the double purpose of assisting a splendid body of Allied troops in their just fight against armed war prisoners, and of checking German activity in Siberia.

The strength of Soviets is decreasing, that of armed war prisoners is increasing constantly. Only a few days ago, the most important official of Soviet in eastern Siberia stated in the presence of Consul Macgowan, in answer to question put by private American, that Soviets will never ask foreign help. I believe intervention is necessary, and there is evidently no use in waiting for it to be requested by Soviets. If intervention is to be undertaken, favorable situation created by holding of large section of railway by Czechs should be taken advantage of.

Czechs [say] that action must be begun here within three weeks. They estimate that they require 13,000 rifles, three mounted batteries, 100 machine guns and 1,000,000 cartridges, and should be supported by from 50 to 100,000 Allied troops, to establish permanent front against Germany.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2139

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 25, 1918, noon.

[Received June 26, 3.46 p. m.]

## 10. For Military Staff:

Ten thousand armed war prisoners in central and eastern Siberia, number increasing rapidly; Soviet arming prisoners not internationalists, and not requiring naturalization. Armed prisoners becoming independent of Soviet, but are chief source Soviet strength. Armed prisoners make agreement between Czechs and Red Guard impossible. Fighting continues in central western Siberia.

Establishment of anti-Bolshevik Siberian government probable. This government genuinely eager resume hostilities against Germany. Czechs total 50,000: 15,000, Vladivostok, remainder west of Irkutsk. Evacuation via Archangel abandoned. This force is a splendidly adequate nucleus for new Siberian army. With Allied support an army of minimum 200,000 can be organized in Siberia from best elements by next spring, to operate against Germans in European Russia. This may well result in bringing Russia also back into war. Information concerning European Russia limited to statements of Czech officers recently arrived from Ukraine, who are unanimous that European Russian sentiment would be friendly to such an effort to extent of joining in large numbers an army given Allied support. They state effective Bolshevik opposition impossible. Strongly urge consideration this plan as conceivably offering quick and effective aid Allied cause. Refer cable from Admiral Knight this date.<sup>1</sup> Drysdale.

Copy telegraphed Peking.

Caldwell

File No. 861.00/2146

*Mr. Alexandre Konovaloff<sup>2</sup> to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During our interview you requested me to present further expression of my views in regard to certain questions raised during our conversation; namely, you expressed the desire to have my opinion as to the effect it would have on the Russian people that, in case of inter-Allied action in Siberia, the predominant part of troops would have to be necessarily Japanese; further what would be the attitude towards Japanese military commandership and ultimately what use could be possibly made of the Czecho-Slovak troops.

<sup>1</sup> See telegram of June 26, *post*, p. 230.

<sup>2</sup> From March to June 1917, and again in the fall of 1917, Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry.

I take pleasure in presenting to you my answers with all frankness and liberty of opinion which, may I request, you will treat absolutely confidential and private.

## I

As I have told you, some months ago when the question of a Japanese intervention into Russia was raised I was opposed to such idea. If I do at present with all emphasis urge active inter-Allied action in the Far East, this is for the following reasons:

Firstly, since then, German progress in Russia and the sufferings of the people have performed a deep change in the spirit of the Russian people. This change has manifestly reflected itself in the opinion of leaders both in Russia and abroad. It is but a few days that a new confirmation of this change was received from Far East groups representing different political parties which, convened in Harbin, adopted resolutions calling active Allied assistance to Russia. The resolution explicitly mentions the participation of Japanese in an Allied expedition and I call your attention to the fact that feeling in the Far East is especially delicate.

On the other hand at the present moment the very conception of the aims and procedure of action in Russia appears entirely different. No mention is any longer made of independent Japanese action and especially no plans are entertained of forceful passage of numerous Japanese troops through Russian territory without consideration to the attitude of the people, their spirit and needs. The aim of the enterprise is conceived as an endeavor to assist the Russians in a process of self-organization, it being expected that the Allied force will encourage the development of national feeling and patriotism which through consolidation will enable the people to throw aside German grip. It is a national movement brought into effect by the Russians themselves which is the basis of success.

As I have stated in the notes that I have presented to you, I perceive two phases in the development of the proposed action. In the initial I visualize a relatively small inter-Allied force entering Russia under an Allied and not a Japanese supreme chief. To this could be added numerous detachments of Czecho-Slovaks. In this phase, as I foresee, activities would largely tend to encourage and assist the people to organize themselves. Military operations will be more of a passive character. Although Japanese troops will form the majority, the whole operation would bear a distinctively inter-Allied character. Further Japanese troops, possibly in large numbers, would be necessary only in a later stage when the national movement

spreading westward would meet German opposition and necessitate action of military character. But this will take place only as a result of the success of a national consolidation in which an active anti-German spirit would develop, rallying, in particular, Russian volunteer forces as a nucleus of the future Russian army. Military action against Germans in such case will be a natural act of self-defense in which the Japanese troops would be considered by the population not as invaders occupying territory of powerless Russia, but would be looked upon as Allies cooperating and helping resurrected Russia to defend herself against the common foe. In this form the entrance of Japanese troops could provoke but welcome, especially if Allied action is preceded, as it naturally should be, by a solemn declaration of all the Allies guaranteeing the integrity of Russian territory.

## II

It will undoubtedly be difficult to have a non-Japanese in control of troops of which the majority would be Japanese. On the other hand the Russians would raise objections to Japanese commandship. The difficulty is solved by the fact that the discussed inter-Allied enterprise does not bear a narrow military character, but is conceived as a vast liberating action. It is, therefore, presumed that the expedition as a whole will be headed by a supreme chief who, besides military functions, would be intrusted with varied functions of most important character. This head of the expedition, a civil high commissioner or even a military supreme chief, an American or Frenchman, should necessarily be a person possessing universally acknowledged high moral qualifications and authority. In such case it should not be offending for a Japanese military commander to be under the orders of such a chief. This Japanese commander, however, would be independent in his special military activities which would represent but a branch of the general Allied action.

## III

It is hardly necessary to emphasize how fortunate is the presence of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia and how highly desirable is their participation in inter-Allied action in Siberia. The fact that Czecho-Slovak detachments are spread over the whole of Trans-Siberia appears to greatly assist the initial step in protecting the railway from wanton destruction and enabling the formation of a screen in western Siberia or the Urals.

Accept [etc.]

ALEXANDRE KONOVALOFF

File No. 861.00/2223

*Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

U.S.S. BROOKLYN (AT VLADIVOSTOK), June 26, 1918.

[Copy received from Navy Department, June 29.]

Members of Czecho-Slovak National Council have to-day visited me and desire to communicate to me and through me to the United States Government the present situation of the Czecho-Slovak military forces in Siberia and attitude of those forces and of the National Council towards the Soviet government of Russia and the Austrian-German prisoners of war. Intelligence from the westward and central Siberia is not complete but it is understood that Czechs have control Siberian Railroad from Penza to Nizhneudinsk with force of approximately 40,000. Their relatively small emigration [echelon] at Nizhneudinsk is opposed by perhaps 20,000 Austrian-German prisoners armed by Soviet government and commanded by German officers. The railroad eastward is held by mixed force, prisoners and Red Guard, but with prisoners heavily predominating. There are several thousand at Chita and the same at Khabarovsk and Nikolsk. The indications now are that prisoners instead of acting with and under Soviets are out of hand and compelling obedience.

The Soviets have been overthrown in region controlled by Czechs and largely as result of their presence, but without their active assistance, and replaced by a new government wholly Russian but anti-Bolshevik and made up largely of delegates elected some months ago to Constitutional Convention to [by] local dumas and zemstvos. This government appears to be supported by large majority of people including entire peasant population. All observers coming over Amur line recently say that popular sentiment whenever it finds free expression is strongly anti-Bolshevik and that Soviet power from Nizhneudinsk eastward would fall at once if it were not supported by prisoners of war. As stated by the Czech National Council all the foregoing is fully confirmed by Major Drysdale, American attaché at Peking, and Langdon Warner,<sup>1</sup> who arrived last night from Mariinsk. Drysdale who has heretofore minimized danger from war prisoners admits they have now gone beyond control Soviets. Czech forces Vladivostok have received orders from Commander at Novo Nikolaevsk to proceed westward to open and hold railroad and join forces from the westward to [for] attack on Austro-German forces Irkutsk.

The object of the National Council in visiting me was not only to lay out situation before me for transmission to my Government but put out the following questions:

---

<sup>1</sup> Vice Consul at Harbin.

1. In view of many difficulties involved for the Czech forces in making their way to Irkutsk, holding the road open behind them and finally cooperating efficiently with their western detachments, they ask to be informed whether help can be expected from the other Allied powers whose ally they consider themselves to be and in whose interest as well as in their own they consider that they are acting against the many thousands of armed Austro-German prisoners in Siberia.
2. If they succeed with or without help in obtaining control of the Siberian Railroad from Vladivostok to the Volga they ask to be informed whether the Allies desire that they continue to hold the road with the expectation that the Allies will join them in the establishment of a new eastern front.
3. If they remain in Russia to fight on a new eastern front they ask to be informed minimum [whether] this force will be accepted by the Allies as the equivalent of fighting on the western front and as entitling them to same consideration when terms of peace are finally agreed upon as if they had proceeded to the western front in accordance with their original agreement with the French Government.

The foregoing questions were submitted by the members of the council in the finest spirit of loyalty and with no intimation of intent to abate in any degree their determination to fight on one front or the other, whatever the reply to their question might be. They appeared doubtful as to possibility of working their way back to Irkutsk against the combined opposition of Bolsheviki and prisoners without Allied help, but am convinced they will attempt it if necessary and I should feel confident of their success if it were not for the ease with which bridges and tunnels can be destroyed.

I stated that I was not in a position to reply to any of their questions but that I should take pleasure to comply with the request to forward them to my Government. It is my understanding that the same questions will be submitted to the other Allied Governments through naval or consular channels. I request, if it is not considered advisable to reply to these questions, that I be so informed. Acknowledge.

Flag "BROOKLYN"

File No. 861.00/2135

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, June 26, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received June 26, 9.41 a. m.]

The Chinese Government confronted by dilemma requiring immediate decision. Part of Semenov forces crossed Chinese boundary.

Attempt to disarm has been resisted by Cossacks with encouragement of Japanese officers attached to Cossack forces; failure to disarm will be synonymous with taking sides with Semenov. General Saito, Japanese adviser, [urges] Premier to support Semenov. It would seem Japanese, relying on new [military ?] treaty, are attempting to commit Chinese by their sole initiative. Russian conference at Harbin strongly pleading for intervention with the use of Japanese army.

Above information given me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the request to obtain from the American Government an expression of its attitude toward Siberian situation and towards the advisability of taking definite action or necessity of disarming refugee troops. The question is reported as requested; the Chinese seek guidance in difficult situation.

REINSCH

---

File No. 861.00/2327

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary*

*June 27, 1918.*

TO THE SECRETARY: Mr. Sookine<sup>1</sup> has just returned from Paris where he met and talked with all the high French officials in regard to the Russian situation. He reports that the French have already changed their views regarding intervention; that they are no longer seeking to form a "front" against the Germans in European Russia, and realize the necessity of first bringing Russia into being before an offensive against the Germans in the East can be thought of. Sookine's machine for carrying out his idea, which he tells me now coincides with the French official idea, is somewhat as follows:

1. A high commissioner—a Joffre—who will be more a symbol than a military leader. (It is interesting to note that Mr. Pichon and various other Frenchmen were of the opinion that Joffre was the man to head such a commission.)
2. Under the commissioner would be:
  - (1) A political department—propaganda, etc.;
  - (2) An economic department (largely American);
  - (3) A military force, to be divided into:
    - (a) Japanese and Czecho-Slovaks to be used as shock troops;
    - (b) American, British, and French troops to be used as garrison troops; i. e., they could mingle among the natives and thus produce friendly relations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Formerly secretary attached to the Russian Embassy at Washington.

Sookine's idea is that Japanese will ultimately be the larger military force and that therefore they must be commanded by a Japanese general who, however, would be subordinate to the civilian commissioner. On paper the machine will look somewhat as follows [diagram omitted].

Mr. Sookine believes that as soon as the Allied commission begins to operate there will arise from the ruins of Russia a Russian commission; that this commission should work harmoniously and in collaboration with the Allies, and should eventually be the nucleus for a Russian provisional government. Mr. Sookine himself prefers an American to head the Allied commission.

Sincerely,

W. PHILLIPS

File No. 861.00/2147

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier),  
to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 27, 1918, noon.

[Received 5.55 p. m.]

96. Department's 4758, 25th.<sup>1</sup> Statement referred to by British Embassy appeared in *L'Humanité* and several other French newspapers on the 21st instant. It should have appeared in *L'Homme Libre*, Mr. Clemenceau's newspaper, but the article was censored; the other newspapers which published it attributed the information to *L'Homme Libre*. The statement reads as follows:

M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an important declaration yesterday in the lobbies of the Chamber. Colonel House, who it is well known is a personal friend of the President of the United States, informed M. Pichon that Mr. Wilson would give his full adhesion to the principle of Japanese intervention in Siberia.

It not infrequently happens in Paris that an article censored in the newspaper in which it should have appeared slips by and is published in other newspapers. I have unofficially ascertained that the foundation for this statement was a conversation between M. Bergson and Colonel House which was telegraphed by the former to M. Pichon who was under the impression that this coincided with Colonel House's views. I have made the communication to the Ambassador as directed by the Department.

In well-informed circles here it was yesterday asserted and believed that Japan had agreed upon intervention in Siberia under conditions suggested at the last meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

FRAZIER

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 223.



File No. 861.00/2158

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 27, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 28, 9.40 a. m.]

15. Your June 25, 5 p. m.<sup>1</sup> First, there are now 15,000 Czech troops here. Sixth, morale of troops is splendid. Second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth questions are being answered by Admiral Knight in telegram to Navy Department which is to furnish a copy to Department of State. Admiral Knight is better able to answer questions than I and his code is safer than mine.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2173

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 28, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received June 30, 3.50 p. m.]

General commanding Czechs here just notified me they will deliver ultimatum to Soviet June 29, 10 a. m., demanding disarming the latter's troops here by June 30, 6 p. m.

British yesterday prevented by armed force attempt to ship copper from here west.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2168

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 29, 1918, noon.

[Received June 30, 11.30 a. m.]

2372. I should like to call your attention to the Czecho-Slovak movement, which I learn from reliable sources has been steadily growing stronger [and] is now spreading in western and southern Siberia including the industrial districts of the Urals. Well-informed people on Russia believe that there is great probability of this being the basis of a new government and since this movement is started largely by former Austro-Hungarian prisoners and deserters in Russia entirely from the Slovak provinces who were on their way to join the troops in France it would seem that this movement were wholly one in favor of the Allies and against Germany.

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 224.

In connection with the above Lieutenant Stines<sup>1</sup> has given me the following report:

In a letter written in Viborg on June 12 there was the following: "There is a continuous movement in favor of Michael Alexandrovich, brother of the former Tsar, as new monarch and he has now fled to join the Czecho-Slovak troops operating between Samara and Omsk." These troops are acting in conjunction with Semenov and Dutov and are working to form a government which can be supported by the Allies. All assistance possible should be given them for they apparently have the full support of all the better elements of Russia, socialists as well as monarchists. They should be supported not only morally but materially with all the resources of the Allies.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2181

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 29, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 2, 4.58 p. m.]

Supplementing my June 28, 10 p. m. Czechs presented ultimatum to Soviet at 10 this morning, demanding reply within thirty minutes, which not received. Czechs therefore occupied Soviet headquarters and began forcible disarmament [of] Red Guard, which was unopposed except by group gathered in and about fortress staff headquarters across street from the railway station and British Consulate. This group surrendered about 6 o'clock p. m. after two hours' fighting with rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. Building caught fire just before surrender but was saved. No accurate figures yet but killed probably not more than 15 and wounded 40.

Japanese and British landed large armed parties this morning but did not participate. Admiral Knight landed small detachment marines this evening to guard Consulate only. At Czechs' request Japanese and British patrols are being withdrawn except at consulates, Czechs retreating to street.

Ultimatum was due to attempt made by Soviet to ship ammunition west where Czechs are certain it would be used against them and where reported arming of large numbers war prisoners at Nikolsk about 80 miles away, several hundred of these prisoners even being reported at station ten miles away.

I anticipate no further disturbance here as change welcomed by majority population. Officers and soldiers who have served at front are already collecting arms and organizing in order to make the return of Soviet impossible.

CALDWELL

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. Norman C. Stines, Assistant Military Attaché at Stockholm.

File No. 861.00/2476

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 30, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received August 11, 8.20 p. m.]

683. The situation has come to the most critical pass which has yet been experienced. The Department no doubt has full reports from the Embassy concerning developments at Archangel. Chicherin assured me on the 28th that the note to the British representative, communicated in my No. 679,<sup>2</sup> unlike the previous protests concerning Murman, is really meant, and that the Soviet government is dispatching troops to Murman and to Archangel. Respecting the expedition to Murman, he said that there will be an inevitable conflict with any foreign troops encountered and that it is not to be foreseen where such conflict may end. Admitting by inference that the local Murman soviets deplore the withdrawal of the Allied forces, he said that they will nevertheless have to bend to the will of the central authorities. Concerning the dispatch of troops to Archangel, he remarked that, with so much talk of intervention, the Soviets must be prepared to resist a landing.

As the Red Army is of slight military value, and has already more than it can do on the Czech front, this belligerent attitude of the Soviets derives its chief importance from the menace of direct German cooperation. The British have learned from a source they consider sure that reported, 27th, Chicherin instructed Soviet representative at Berlin to request formally of the supreme German command military assistance against the Allies and the British. Observers fail so far to confirm persistent rumors of the passage east or north Ukraine of actual German units, and the situation in the Ukraine as well as events on the western front suggest their general improbability. However, the Department is aware of German war prisoners in Russia and of the presence of number of important German forces in Finland. An observer just returned from Kem reports continuance of military activities in Karelia threatening the Murman railway at various points, and reports come from good sources of preparations for a movement northward toward Pechenga Bay or Murmansk.

The development of the political situation during the week lends color to the view that the Germans have decided to support the Bolsheviks for the moment, and that the Bolsheviks, in despair of dealing with the situation themselves, have accepted. The general

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see telegram from the Ambassador, June 16, 3 a. m., *post*, p. 486.

bearing of the Bolshevik leaders has become most assured during the week and they are most active and outspoken respecting Allied intervention. Some of the most indiscreet among them have stated openly that the general mobilization, which is now being attempted with only moderate success, is directed against the Allies. Their subservience to German domination has become most manifest. See my Nos. 668<sup>1</sup> and 680.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand the anti-Bolshevik parties are experiencing a resurgence of pro-Ally sentiment, resulting from conviction of a German-Bolshevik understanding and the success of the Allied arms in the west.

The moment is peculiarly ripe for Allied intervention, of the unavoidable necessity for which sooner or later I trust the Department is also convinced. Coming at this time, it promises to result in a declaration of war against the Allies by the Bolsheviks and an alliance with Germany. This will have two important effects: (1) A reciprocal alliance with imperial Germany will come as a final revelation of the sordid and insincere selfishness which characterizes the greater part of the Bolshevik leaders; it will place the onus of action on them and throw definitely into the Allied camp the parties of opposition. (2) It will draw Germany into central Russia, increasing her military effort in the east and widening the surface of the Russian [theater of war].

While, as pointed out in my No. 643,<sup>3</sup> the Russian press exaggerates the unrest in the Ukraine, it claims it is still certain that the Ukraine situation seriously hampers German freedom of action in the west. Chicherin argues that if the Allies intervene they will encounter the same difficulties in the portions of Russia occupied by them. There is a fundamental difference. Germany has nothing to give and ruthlessly strips occupied territory of food and manufactures. I take it for granted that the Allies will not overlook the political aspects of intervention which in some ways overtop the purely military in importance and that within the regions defended the good will of the population will be secured not only by tactful administration but direct economic assistance. In this way the influence of intervention will spread far beyond the field of military operations, based on the formula that, while Germany takes, the Allies give, food.

It [is] generally understood that the feeding of even small portions of northern Russia is an enormous undertaking, but its assumption can not be avoided by non-intervention, as the famine of the coming winter will imperatively command the attention of civilized nations by its humanitarian, if not military and political

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 566.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 694.

aspects. Obviously we cannot and should not undertake to send our own food, except possibly a few initial shiploads to appease the population in the territory immediately to be defended. Northern Russia can be adequately fed only from the granary of western Siberia. To effect this the new front must include Semipalatinsk, [omission], and Ekaterinburg, as well as the points now held by the Czechs.

On this account and in view of favorable military situation created by the unsuccessful Soviet attack on the Czechs and because the Czechs, if not promptly supported, will inevitably be crushed by direct or indirect German military pressure, the moment is also ripe for intervention in Siberia. While action in northern Russia might be limited to an armed demonstration designed only to draw Germany into central Russia, intervention in Siberia must be especially [effected by] sufficient military force to create a secure secondary base for operations in northern Russia and to maintain communication with Archangel via Vyatka and Kotlas, if not Verkhneuralsk. If intervention can also in time project itself down the Volga with your [*sic*] supporting expeditions towards Ekaterinoslav on the one hand and towards the Caucasus on the other, so much the better, but that is for the future.

Like intervention in northern Russia, that in Siberia will fail if undertaken as a purely military enterprise. There is need for as good political and economic administrative genius as can be found. As shown in my Nos. 628, 637, and 650,<sup>1</sup> the Siberians are disgusted with Bolshevism and consider Allied intervention the only means of escaping German domination, but they distrust the Japanese. Against this we have their faith in America and we must develop this asset by every conceivable means.

Regarding intervention in general the people of the Allied countries must not permit themselves illusions. The bulk of the Russians are generally ignorant and moved only by immediate and material considerations. The educated political leaders are party men lacking in the western conception of patriotism. No class has developed self-reliance and all dislike hard work. They look to others for guidance and support and delude them[selves] with the thought that foreign intervention will forthwith bring order and comfort without special privation or effort on their part. It is certain therefore that even with the good will of the Russian people we can count upon very little serious practical help from them. We must also foresee that, following a possibly enthusiastic initial reception, there will be a reaction of disillusion and discontent.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, pp. 205, 210, and 215.

Have shown foregoing to Smith<sup>1</sup> and asked him to inform Department of his views.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2176

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, July 1, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received July 2, 9 p. m.]

Following the occupation of Vladivostok by the Czech forces on the 29th, fully reported by Admiral Knight and Caldwell,<sup>2</sup> the French Government to-day requested the Japanese Government to lend to the Czech army 30 machine guns and a number of mountain batteries with the necessary ammunition to prevent a possible counter attack by the Red Guard. The Japanese Government is considering this request, but appears inclined to answer that it does not feel justified in taking any action until the Allies and the United States are agreed on a general plan to be adopted in meeting the situation.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2205

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>3</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, undated.

[Received July 5, 1918, 11.40 a. m.]

25. Since April 1, 1917, as commercial representative of National City Bank,<sup>4</sup> I have traveled 18,000 miles in Finland, Russia, Turkistan, and Siberia. Have resided in Petrograd, Moscow, Nizhni Novogorod, Samara, Astrakhan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Archangel, Omsk, and Irkutsk. Have come in contact with every class of Russian society, including financiers, workmen, peasant, manufacturers, merchants, soldiers, general, nobility, *intelligentsia*, politicians, and anarchists. Believe I am entitled to offer an opinion on present conditions. I presume our great present interest in Russia is to get her, if possible, to fight Germany again. Russia will never fight Germany again under Bolshevik government. Bolsheviks are only interested in seizure of their power and ruining Russia. Bolsheviks

<sup>1</sup> Presumably F. Willoughby Smith, Consul at Tiflis, temporarily in Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram of June 29 from the Consul at Vladivostok, *ante*, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 20).

<sup>4</sup> Ernest L. Harris retired from the Consular Service in August 1916, was reappointed in May 1918, and detailed as Consul General at Irkutsk.

in every city I have resided in are simply robbing, murdering, and burning. Practically every business is ruined. Seventy-five per cent of all shops closed. Private banks seized and funds confiscated. Courts of justice abolished and public-school education reduced to minimum. Foreign commerce nationalized. Landed property both large and small seized and divided. Factories nationalized and workmen paid for doing nothing. Currency system reduced to printing unlimited quantities of worthless paper. Not content with ruining Russia in a disgraceful treaty with Germany Bolsheviks are now permitting Germany, wherever possible, to buy up all raw materials and foodstuffs for shipment to Germany while Russians starve. Fifty per cent of Soviet government in each town consists of Jews of worst type, many of whom are anarchists.

It would be grave mistake on our part to officially recognize Bolsheviks who scarcely represent 8 per cent of Russian population and in many places, as Irkutsk for example, depend upon armed prisoners of war to keep them in power. I recommend intervention on part of Allies in such a way as to enable the real people of Russia to rally to Ally standard and fight the common enemy. Best element in Russia will never rally to Bolsheviks even if they should declare war on Germany. The great mass of Russian people prefer even German tyranny to Bolshevik terrorism. I suggest careful consideration of Allied intervention even with Japanese assistance along with American, French, English and Chinese troops, making it perfectly clear to Russian people that there will be no occupation of Russian territory but that such action is solely to assist them in again renewing the struggle with Germany. Am certain Russian people would accept such statement in good faith and not object to Japanese. There are at present 70,000 armed Czechs between Penza and Vladivostok, an army which may be utilized as a nucleus, and many anti-Bolsheviks are now rallying to the Czechs in order to overthrow Bolsheviks. If we can induce Russia to again declare war upon Germany the moral effect upon German people would be as discouraging as if a great battle were lost in France.

As soon as a new government is firmly established after overthrow of Bolsheviks in Siberia and Russia we should recognize and assist it by every means in our power so that a new battle line may again be drawn up against Germany. The effect of such Russian action upon Austria and Turkey would be incalculable. In this connection I recommend that Czechs remain for the present in Siberia and that a joint Allied intervention be immediately considered. A German advance might result in occupation of Moscow and Petrograd but such action would also give Germany a starving,

discontented and revolting population. If Allies do not intervene and Czechs are left unsupported there is grave danger of Germany's seizing Siberian Railway line through armed prisoners of war. If Czechs are not supported there is danger that they may be overthrown by Bolsheviks and prisoners of war.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/2168

---

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1918, 3 p. m.

904. Your 2372, June 29, noon, received. Department well informed regarding Czecho-Slovak troops. Fifteen thousand already at Vladivostok *en route* to France now contemplating turning back to aid comrades in western Siberia whose progress obstructed by armed prisoners of war. Groups totaling altogether about 40,000 occupying points on railway Syzran to Irkutsk. Reported that Russians have taken advantage of their presence to eject local Soviets and set up provisional government western Siberia. Czecho-Slovaks determined to fight Central powers but unwilling to take arms against fellow Slavs except in self-defense. Masaryk, head of Czecho-Slovak committee, who organized these forces and arranged transportation out of Russia, now here in touch with the Department.

LANSING

---

File No. 763.72Su/145

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier), to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, July 2, 1918, midnight, and July 3, 1 a. m.

[Received July 3, 10.20 and 11.30 a. m.]

100. The Supreme War Council consider that since its last meeting a complete change has come over the situation in Russia and Siberia, which makes Allied intervention in these countries an urgent and imperative necessity.

In the first place the recent action of the Czecho-Slovak troops has transformed the Siberian eclipse. There is now a force of 50,000 troops, of Slav nationality, totally disinterested in the internal politics of Russia, yet determined fight Germany for the liberation of their own country, in control of the railway in western Siberia. This success of the Czecho-Slovak troops proves that the bulk of the Siberian population are no longer sympathetic to the Bolsheviks



and must be friendly disposed to the Allied cause. It also removes the apprehension that Allied intervention will meet with such serious opposition from the local population east of the Urals as would make penetration through western Siberia to the Urals very difficult. Provided intervention takes place in time, there will be a Slav army in western Siberia to which Russian patriots can rally, which eliminates the return of Russian public opinion [*sic*] being thrown into the arms of Germany as might have been the case if intervention were effected by forces almost entirely Japanese. This Czecho-Slovak force, however, is in grave danger of being cut off by the organization of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war at Irkutsk, and an appeal for immediate military assistance has been made by the Czech National Council to the Allied consuls at Vladivostok. The Allies are under the responsibility of taking immediate action, if these gallant allies are not to be overwhelmed. To fail in bringing support to these faithful troops, now desperately fighting for the Allied cause, would not only forever discredit the Allies, but might have a disastrous effect on the Slav population both of Russia itself and of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans as proving that the Allies are unable or unwilling to exert themselves effectively to save the Slav world from falling wholly under German domination. On the other hand to push a force through to Irkutsk to overwhelm the German prisoner organization and join hands with the Czecho-Slovaks would probably be a simple and rapid matter if it were taken in hand immediately. Intervention in Siberia, therefore, is an urgent necessity both to save the Czecho-Slovaks and to take advantage of an opportunity of gaining control of Siberia for the Allies which may never return.

In the second place a great change has come over the internal situation in Russia itself. There is no doubt that the Bolshevik power is waning. It is daily becoming clearer to all classes in Russia including ex-soldiers, peasants, and workmen that the Bolsheviks cannot fulfil their promises of the social millennium, and that anarchy, disorder and starvation lie ahead under the Bolshevik régime. The accounts from all our representatives agree upon this. It is further clear that the Bolsheviks have no real power with which to support their rule. They have entirely failed to raise an effective army. They remain in office simply because Russia is too divided to create any alternative organization with which to supplant them.

There is much evidence, however, that the best liberal and democratic elements in Russia are beginning to lift their heads and to get into touch with one another. They are animated partly by disgust with the autocratic methods of the Bolsheviks, partly by

the determination not to submit to the humiliation and partition of the Brest Litovsk treaties, and partly by a growing fear of German domination.

Practically all elements of the Russian population indeed except the dwindling minority of the Bolsheviks now recognize intervention of some kind to be necessary and inevitable because it is the only alternative to continuous anarchy and disorder ending in universal starvation. The only difference of opinion is as to whether intervention should be Allied or German. The reactionaries and the pro-German agents among the Bolsheviks naturally prefer German intervention. The liberal and democratic elements urgently ask for Allied intervention, and make it clear while they desire economic assistance, the essential need is military support. Unless they can secure effective Allied support in the field, and a base upon which to rally, the reactionary forces, backed by German bayonets, will inevitably crush the movement for national freedom and regeneration.

Allied intervention therefore is urgently necessary in order to save Russia from the establishment of autocracy supported by German bayonets. If, however, the Allies are to bring effective assistance to liberal Russia, not only must they occupy Murmansk and Archangel in order to retain the bridgeheads into Russia from the north from which forces can eventually advance rapidly to the center of Russia, they must also control Siberia to the Urals without delay. If the Germans gain control of western Siberia, as well as of Archangel and Murmansk, they close the last means of contact between Russia and the outside world, and they obtain possession of the supplies of food without which Russia will starve. The Germans have already made the Black Sea a German [lake]. They are advancing as fast as they can on the Caspian which will give them control of the Volga and its water communications with western Siberia, and they are preparing to occupy the Murman coast before winter. If they once succeed in these objects the German domination of Russia would be complete. They will then not only control Russian resources, but under penalty of starvation they may be able to compel the Russian people to serve as labor, and possibly even as recruits for their armies in the field. All hope of the regeneration of Russia on truly democratic lines depends upon the seizure by the Allies of the granary of western Siberia without delay.

In the third place Allied intervention is essential in order to win the war. There is no doubt that if the Germans fail to gain a decision in the west in the next few weeks they will turn east and endeavor with all their power to paralyze any possibility of the national regeneration of Russia during the war. They know as

well as we know that there is but the smallest chance of an Allied victory on the western front in 1919 unless Germany is compelled to transfer a considerable amount of her strength back again from west to east. It will therefore be a primary object of her policy to prevent the re-creation of an eastern Allied front. During the forthcoming autumn and winter she will endeavor to do this either by establishing in Russia a government favorable to herself or destroying all possibility of organized resistance to her domination. If the Allies are to win the war in 1919 it should be a primary object of their policy to foster and assist the national movement in Russia in order to reform an eastern front or at least to sustain such a vigorous spirit of independence in the occupied territories behind the German lines as will compel Germany to maintain large bodies of troops in the east. Allied intervention at the earliest moment is therefore a necessity if any headway is to be made in organizing that eastern front which is essential, if the Allies are to win the war in 1919 before Germany has concentrated her whole strength once more on the encirclement and domination of Russia. At the present moment intervention as a practical policy is easier than it has ever been.

The Japanese have now agreed to send an expedition into Siberia provided they are assured of the approval and active support of the United States Government and though they have not engaged themselves to go beyond Irkutsk there is no ground for thinking that this necessarily represents the limits of their effort. They have also accepted the two conditions which the Supreme War Council has considered as necessary conditions of Allied intervention; namely, disinterestedness in Russian internal politics and guarantees to evacuate Russian territory after the war. The Czecho-Slovak forces are already in occupancy of western Siberia. The addition of American and Allied detachments would create a force really Allied in character and acceptable to both Russian and Allied occupants especially if Russian forces under Russian leaders were associated with it as soon as it was established in territory. If action were taken immediately it ought to be possible for the Allies to gain control of the railway through the whole of Siberia as far as the Urals in a very few weeks. Only the assent and cooperation of the United States Government is now required in order to set in motion a policy which promises success and which if successfully accomplished is bound to have decisive results on the future of the war.

On the other hand the Supreme War Council feel bound to point out that in their judgment failure to intervene immediately must inevitably cause effects which can only be described as disastrous to the Allied cause. In the first place it would mean the abandonment of the Russian people to the [triumphant] militarism of Germany and

the destruction of all hope of the resuscitation of Russia as the liberal ally of the western democracies during the war. In the second place it would mean the permanent impairment of the blockade for if Germany were to establish effective control over central Russia and Siberia her chief anxiety as to the supply both of raw material and food would be removed. In the third place it would mean the indefinite prolongation of the war and the surrender of any real prospect of victory for the Allies in 1919. Fourthly, it would mean the abandonment of the army of yet another little nation, the Czecho-Slovaks, to the mercies of Berlin with inevitably disastrous consequences to the sentiments of the Slav peoples of Russia, the Balkans and throughout the world.

If the policy of intervention however is to be really successful, an adequate military force must be employed. The Allied representatives in Russia are agreed that while economic assistance is important, military intervention is absolutely essential. The Czecho-Slovak leaders have informed the Allied consuls at Vladivostok that in their judgment 100,000 men are necessary to save the situation. It is evident therefore that while the rest of the Allies should send what troops they can, the bulk of the force must be provided by the Japanese.

For these reasons the Supreme War Council, having carefully considered the military situation and the prospects of the Allies in all the theaters of war, have come to conclusion—

I. That immediate Allied armed assistance to Russia is imperatively necessary for the following reasons:

(a) To assist the Russian nation to throw off their German oppressors and to prevent the unlimited military and economic domination of Russia by Germany in her own interests.

(b) For the decisive military reason given by General Foch in his telegram to President Wilson; i.e., that the Germans have already called back from Russia a number of divisions and sent them to the western front. Allied intervention will be the first step in stimulating the national uprising in Russia against German domination which will have an immediate effect in renewing German anxiety in regard to the east and compelling her to refrain from removing further troops westward and perhaps to move troops back to the east.

(c) To shorten the war by the reconstitution of the Russian front.

(d) To prevent the isolation of Russia from western Europe. They are advised that if action is not taken in Siberia the existing Allied forces in northern Russia may have to be withdrawn and Russia will be completely cut off from the Allies.

(e) To deny to Germany the supplies of western Siberia and the important military stores at Vladivostok and to render these available for the Russian population.

(f) To bring assistance to the Czecho-Slovak forces which have made great sacrifices to the cause for which we are fighting.

II. That the intervention should be Allied in character, should be accompanied by pledges to the Russian people as agreed to at the last Versailles conference, and should include the following:

1. An Allied force to operate in Siberia. Circumstances render imperative that the force shall be considerable in number, military in character and Allied in composition, and that above all things it should operate immediately; delay would be fatal. It is recognized that owing to geographical and shipping conditions Japanese troops will comprise the larger portion of the force but its Allied character must be maintained and it must include American and Allied units. The force should be under a single command appointed by the power that provides the largest number of troops.

2. Such developments of the Allied forces in Murmansk and Archangel as the military advisers of the Allies may recommend.

3. Relief expeditions under American direction and control to supply the wants and alleviate the sufferings of the Russian people.

The primary object of Allied action being to cooperate with the Russian nation in re-creating the eastern front as a first step towards freeing Russia, the closest coordination must exist between the above forces and the Russian people.

III. Therefore, in view of—

1. The unanimous opinion of General Foch and the Allied military advisers of the Supreme War Council that immediate dispatch of a considerable Allied force to Siberia is essential for the victory of the Allied armies;

2. The fact that no adequate expedition can be sent without Japanese cooperation and that Japan will not undertake effective action without the encouragement and support of the United States Government; and

3. The shortness of the time available before the winter for initiating active operations in Siberia and the rapid German penetration into Russia:

the Supreme War Council appeal to President Wilson to approve the policy here recommended and thus to enable it to be carried into effect before it is too late.

FRAZIER

File No. 861.00/2195

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, July 3, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 4, 12.35 p. m.]

2407. From various sources of reliable information I have had

drawn up the following statement of conditions in Russia, and the probable tendencies which I felt would be of interest to you:

During the last two or three months the dissatisfaction with the Bolsheviks throughout Russia has been growing, and particularly in the industrial centers. This is shown by the workmen's organizations, the former staunch supporters of the Bolsheviks, demanding the convening of the Constitutional Assembly. This opposition took more active form in outlying districts. The Cossacks of the Don, the Urals, and the Baikal raised armed forces against the representatives of the Bolshevik régime in their respective districts. Lastly the Czecho-Slovak troops decided to side in with the opposition to the Government and placed their forces at the disposal of so-called counter-revolutionists.

The movement has been gaining force for some two weeks and lately it has spread so quickly that it reaches from the Volga River in the west to at least Omsk, a distance of about 1,500 miles. The latest news seems to indicate that it has even extended as far as Krasnoyarsk.

The center of fighting seems to have been between Perm, Samara, Chelyabinsk and Ekaterinburg. In this territory they seem to have been successful and have captured the industrial part of the Urals, which were a former stronghold of the Bolsheviks.

All parties, socialistic and monarchistic [alike], seem to have agreed to bury their differences in an effort to oust the Bolsheviks and reestablish order in Russia. The difficulty in deciding on the head for their new government has probably been solved by uniting on Michael Alexandrovich who has now escaped to the Urals and joined Czecho-Slovaks.

The only possible way at the present time of consolidating the uneducated masses of Russia is by making the spiritual and political head one as by returning to a monarchy. Milyukov in a recent letter has supported this idea. Undoubtedly the present movement is pro-Ally, as it has not only the restoration of Russia as its object but the expulsion of the Germans as well.

If it is confirmed that as it now appears probable the Government at Harbin and that at Omsk have united, and if the success of the present movement is continued then it would seem that such a government would represent the real Russian people and would be deserving of the material as well as the moral support of the Allies.

The events of the last months may be summed up: the end of Bolshevik régime in the Urals and Siberia is at hand and a new government monarchistic in its tendencies with Michael Alexandrovich as its head is about to be established there.

File No. 861.00/2983

*The Consul at Omsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1

OMSK, July 4, 1918.

[Received October 17.<sup>1</sup>]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on May 19, 1918, I sent despatches to the Embassy and the Moscow Consulate General commenting on the local situation and emphasizing the fact that, as elsewhere in Russia, Slavic peoples in western Siberia possessed little initiative; and consequently a small group of energetic radical socialists had been able to secure sufficient support from dissatisfied elements to seize control of the cities, while not representing the will of the majority of the rural or urban population. Further, I pointed out that the Soviet authorities seemed incapable of handling the local political and industrial situation.

A fall of the Soviet authority in Siberia probably would have been brought about by the workingmen, sooner or later, as they were becoming the ultimate sufferers in the demoralized industrial situation which the Soviet régime had produced. The end of the Soviet power was hastened by the "Czecho-Slovak incident," which demonstrated that the Soviets had the support of only a portion of the workingmen, and that armed Hungarian and German prisoners were the chief military support of the Soviet authority.

## THE CZECHO-SLOVAK INCIDENT

The circumstances in connection with the plan to send the Czecho-Slovak troops to the French front are doubtless known to the Department. The details will be given in another part of this report.

As reported in my telegrams of May 26 to the Embassy in Vologda and the Consulate General in Moscow, an armed conflict occurred at Maryanovka station (25 miles west of Omsk) which was caused by the attempt of the Omsk Red Guard to disarm an echelon of Czecho-Slovak troops there. The fight occurred on the evening of May 25. The Czech echelon had approached Omsk, but learning that an ambush was prepared for them retired to Maryanovka where they were overtaken by two fully armed echelons of Red Guards. The Czechs, having practically no rifles, fought with hand grenades, and succeeded in routing their assailants. It appeared later that ambushes, similar to the one prepared at Omsk, were simultaneously prepared by the Red Guard all along the Siberian Railway.

<sup>1</sup> As enclosure No. 7 to despatch No. 8 of July 29 from the Consul General at Irkutsk; see *post*, p. 309.

## THE OMSK SOVIET'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT

The Omsk Soviet's version of the incident, as given to me May 28 by Commissar Schlichter, representing the Moscow central government, and on May 29 by Mr. Tverton, vice president of the Omsk Soviet, is as follows:

The trouble originated in Chelyabinsk (one day's journey by train west of Omsk). There the Czechs had seized 700 rifles from the Red Guard. Since then, May 17, Czechs were assuming control of railway and telegraph stations *en route* and the Omsk Soviet had been receiving direct messages from Czech officers, couched in overbearing language, so that the Soviet's position was becoming intolerable.

Further, when the Czech soldiers formed a regular fighting unit in the Russian Army, they had several Russian officers. The commander of the troops which resorted to forcible methods in Chelyabinsk was a certain Voichekhovski, who was formerly connected with the Russian General Staff; and, in the eyes of the Soviet authorities, was a counter-revolutionist. As far as the Soviet authorities understood, the soldiers in the Czech command had but one desire, and that was to reach France; but their officers, it was feared, were not so single-minded and had developed counter-revolutionary activities.

In Novo Nikolaevsk, a certain Gaida, an Austrian officer, presumably of Czech origin, had suddenly sprung into prominence and was acting in conjunction with the counter-revolutionary forces in that city, where a new government had just been formed.

A great deal of detailed information was given to me concerning the alleged activities of the Czechs, the most important elements of which were as follows:

(1) The Soviet was entirely in the dark as to what developments were taking place east of Tomsk. The new government at Novo Nikolaevsk had refused the use of the telegraph line to the Soviet authorities until the latter would recognize the new Siberian government.

(2) One Maxa, in Moscow, who represented the Czech National Council, had just wired the Omsk Soviet to inform all Czechs that all which had happened during the past few days was due to a deplorable misunderstanding; that all Czechs should cease action and remain calm; and that the whole matter of the departure of the Czechs for France would be regulated by a mixed commission with the active participation of the Allied Governments.

(3) A delegation of Czechs from Issyk-kul and two French officers (who were accompanying the Czech command) were expected in Omsk within a day or so to confer with the Omsk Soviet. In the meantime Soviet troops would not attack the Czechs at Issyk-kul to which place the latter had retired from Maryanovka.

In connection with the Omsk Soviet's version of the incident, I enclose herewith (see appendix No. 1<sup>1</sup>) the Soviet's official proclama-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



tion, dated May 28, calling for volunteers to defend the city, and which sets forth that the leaders of the Czech soldiers are in the service of Franco-Japanese capitalists who covet the riches of Siberia. Attention is also drawn to an appeal to Hungarian prisoners (appendix No. 2<sup>1</sup>) to take up arms against the Czech troops. This appeal is designed to take advantage of the racial hatred existing among the various nationalities in Austria-Hungary.

The Omsk Soviet appeared exceedingly desirous of having my support in their controversy, and I agreed to ask the Ambassador for appropriate instructions in the matter, provided the Soviet would permit me to report the situation to the Ambassador, using the code, in accordance with the following telegram received from DeWitt C. Poole, consul in charge at Moscow:

28th. Your 66 received. Chicherin has informed me American consuls in Siberia may send cipher telegrams to Washington, the Embassy and the Consulate General. Try to send a cipher telegram. If refused, telegraph immediately. Meanwhile do not inform other consuls. Poole.

The Omsk Soviet advised me that the assurances of Mr. Chicherin to Mr. Poole were probably given before the existence of martial law in Omsk. The Soviet would not permit me to send a cipher telegram, but agreed to consider an open telegram. I promptly submitted such telegram reporting the situation, as I saw it, and also submitted several open telegrams relative to purely routine consular business. On the day following, the Soviet addressed a brief letter to me saying that all of my telegrams would be delayed for the present.

On the evening of May 31, the Soviet asked me to be present at a conference then taking place between the Soviet on the one side and the French and Czech delegates on the other side. It appeared that, during the course of the meeting, the Czechs had sent an ultimatum to the Soviet. Both the Soviet and Czech representatives at the meeting exhibited lack of confidence. It appeared from an intercepted telegram read by the Soviet president that the commander of the Czech troops at Chelyabinsk had instructed other Czech echelons that the situation had developed to such an extent that the French control would have to be disregarded for the present. The single result of the meeting was a telegram composed by the French Major Guinet reading in substance as follows:

To the Czechs at Issyk-kul: Your action forces the French mission to wash its hands of this affair. It will be a disgrace for the Czechs to become involved in Russian difficulties. If the Czechs persist in their activities everything must end between them and the French

---

<sup>1</sup> Printed *post* as Enclosure 1.

Government. The Czechs must take no action whatever until the French mission (which was leaving Omsk immediately) arrives in Issyk-kul.

Asked by the Soviet President as to whether I concurred in the telegram drafted by the French officer, I replied that I was not authorized to act in the matter; that I had offered to wire the American Ambassador for authority to act but the Soviet had refused to allow me to send any telegrams. Therefore, I could not act in any way as a representative of the United States Government; but, in so far as the matter lay within my competence in a personal capacity, I supported the attitude taken by the French delegates.

On the evening of June 1, a second conference took place between the same parties who had participated in the conference of May 31. No agreement was reached. A great many excited conversations occurred. In connection with the arrest by the Czechs of certain Soviet officials in Issyk-kul, a Czech delegate stated that one of the Commissars had made the remark that the Czechs must be disarmed in accordance with *the German demand*. The Czech attitude toward the question of total disarmament of the Czechs is expressed in a statement made by a Czech delegate, as follows: "There is a telegram from Trotsky instructing that we be disarmed and confined in prison camps. We will never consent! Sooner will we die!" With regard to the question of total disarmament (upon which the Soviet insisted), French Major Guinet spoke as follows:

The Czechs are courageous troops. Armed, they know that they can attain their end and complete their journey. While *en route* they have no desire to shed blood. Their aim is France! Concessions from both sides are imperative. You possess some strength and they possess some strength. Safety is necessary to them and must be guaranteed. At present, it is only a question of a truce. It is premature to talk of the surrender of arms. This question must be referred to the coming conference at Chelyabinsk. Otherwise, the Czechs will take Omsk, and, arms in hand, will secure their onward progress.

The meeting was concluded at 2 o'clock the following morning, after which the Czech and French delegates left immediately for Chelyabinsk.

#### THE FALL OF OMSK

The longer the truce lasted the more the support of the working-men of Omsk fell away from the Omsk Soviet. Very few cared to fight the Czechs and, indeed, the chief support of the Omsk Soviet's authority, toward the end, were Hungarian and German armed prisoners. Furthermore, the so-called Red Army had no officers and no discipline. Finally, the Bolshevik leaders left Omsk on June 7,

by steamers in the direction of Tobolsk. These leaders took with them 280,000,000 rubles from the various Omsk banks. Five hours after their departure from Omsk, their official surrender of the town was published and circulated in the form of handbills. After the circulation of these handbills, the organization known as the White Guard appeared from their various homes and took possession of the city. No fighting occurred in the town. The Czechs were many miles to the west of Omsk at the time of the surrender. The deciding factor in the surrender of Omsk seemed to be that the railway workmen and other groups of workmen, after receiving arms from the Soviet, became disloyal to it and showed a tendency to cooperate with the Czechs. Thus the trouble came from within and the workmen themselves menaced the authority of the Omsk Soviet and were prompt in supporting the new government when it announced itself.

In the meantime, before anything could be accomplished at the expected conference at Chelyabinsk, movements similar to the one at Omsk were taking place to the west and east of Omsk so that most important cities between Samara (in Russia proper) and Krasnoyarsk (in Siberia) had overthrown the Soviet authority at the time of the fall of Omsk.

Public opinion and sympathy seemed to be with the Czechs. Their discipline was good. They had paid for their food. They had not abused women. In short, their general conduct stood out in sharp contrast to that of the so-called Red Guard of the Soviet, undisciplined bodies of men who were terrorizing the peasant population.

#### THE CZECHO-SLOVAK VERSION OF THE INCIDENT

The fundamental idea of the Czecho-Slovak revolution beyond the border of Austria-Hungary, is the overthrow of Teuton influence and the establishment of an independent Czecho-Slovak state in Bohemia and other Slavic countries of Austria-Hungary. This the Czech soldiers sought to accomplish by deserting (regiments at a time) from the Austrian Army. The Czech troops are generally known to have formed the most effective fighting unit in the Kerensky offensive of July 1917.

An article printed on March 21, 1918, in the daily official journal of the Czecho-Slovak Army, reads in substance as follows:

In agreement with the Allies, it has been decided by those in charge of our revolutionary movement, that our army should go to the French front via Siberia. The present Russian Government has come to the conclusion that Russia cannot fight any longer, and has concluded peace with the Central powers. We do not recognize this peace. Therefore, we are leaving Russia for another Allied front.

We have remained in Russia until the very last moment. Our forces were always ready to fight for Russian freedom; and, as we leave Russia only because we cannot employ our forces here, we go to fight for Russia on another battle field.

Through the instrumentality of Reverend Kenneth D. Miller, an American citizen engaged in social work among the Czech soldiers, I obtained an authorized and verified translation (see appendix No. 3<sup>1</sup>) of the official version of the incident prepared by the temporary executive committee of the Czecho-Slovak Army into whose hands the direction of military operations and political negotiations was placed by the assembly of Czecho-Slovak soldiers at Chelyabinsk, Russia, during May 1918. (Signatures and seals are affixed to this document which will be sent to the Department when safe communication is reestablished.)

The Department's attention is respectfully drawn to the following points emphasized in the attached Czech official version of the incident:

- (1) Strict neutrality observed by the Czechs with reference to Russian internal difficulties while these troops were in the Ukraine;
- (2) Systematic hindrance by the Soviet authorities against the passage of the Czechs eastward to France;
- (3) Soviet propaganda with a view to causing the Czechs to desert their command and join the Red Army;
- (4) Czech account of the Chelyabinsk incident (which should be read carefully in connection with the Omsk Soviet's version of the affair given on the second page of my despatch);
- (5) The Soviet's use of armed Hungarian and German prisoners against the Czechs;
- (6) The Soviet claim that railway technical reasons prevented the passage of the Czech troops eastward in contradistinction to their readiness to provide plenty of cars and locomotives for the transport of German and Austrian prisoners to the Central powers to fight in support of German imperialism.

Informally and unofficially I have heard many accounts of the incident from Czech soldiers and officials. Their accounts differ slightly in detail; but the principal facts furnished are the same. Throughout all narratives, the justification of self-preservation prevails. All felt that the Soviet authorities, in connection with German agents, were preparing a net for the purpose of preventing the Czechs from reaching the French front, and for returning these troops to Austria where death as traitors to the Central powers would await them.

---

<sup>1</sup> Printed post as Enclosure 2.

On June 22, French Major Guinet, at Chelyabinsk, received a code message brought by courier and dated Perm, May 18, reading in translation as follows:

The French Ambassador informs Major Guinet he can thank the Czecho-Slovaks for their action, this in the name of all the Allies, who have decided to intervene the end of June, and the Czech army and French mission form the advance guard of the Allied army. Recommendations will follow concerning political and military points with respect to occupation and organization.

I am firm in the conviction that the Czech soldiers are entitled to the support of the Allies. The situation between the Czechs and the Allies is a delicate one and will require tact and wisdom on the part of the latter. Czech soldiers who have managed to escape from Bohemia state that the Czech revolution beyond the borders of Austria-Hungary is secretly applauded by Slavic peoples in Austria. The Entente Allies thus have at their disposal a potent weapon for undermining the German and Austrian domination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

#### THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SIBERIA

As a result of the Czech determination to defend themselves from possible imprisonment and death, a new government prematurely sprung into existence in Siberia. It is formed by the Constituent Assembly Party which maintains that all classes of people shall participate in the government of Siberia and, indeed, all Russia; and that the government of Russia should be taken out of the hands of a single political party which (whether its leaders are the paid agents of Germany or not) has served Germany's purpose by opening up the Russian front, has given to Germany, by military submission, the control of a large part of Russia, and has prolonged the war by enabling the enemy to concentrate his forces upon the French front—all this in opposition to the will of the Russian people as a whole.

The details in connection with the formation of the new government will be made the subject of my next despatch.

I have [etc.]

ALFRED R. THOMSON

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

#### *Appeal of the Magyar Section of the Communist Party to Magyar Prisoners of War*

Comrades! An enormous danger is approaching us. The Czech formations which were bought by the Tsar, and afterwards by the government of Kerensky, have sold themselves to the counter-revolutionary Russian *bourgeoisie*. Under the pretense of being dispatched to the French front, they are traveling to the heart of Siberia, to the grain-producing regions. When they saw they were many, they treacherously fell upon the Soviet authority and introduced in

Chelyabinsk a régime of terror. They shot and robbed the town and Soviet, who, attacked unexpectedly, were not in a position to resist. Seizing the power, they began a bloody reckoning with the prisoners. If some Magyar or German prisoner of war fell into their hands, not one was left alive. They murdered mercilessly under the influence of national hatred. This corrupted miserable band sprang from Chelyabinsk to Omsk. The Omsk Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies took steps to prevent this dangerous company from reaching here. To meet them was sent out a delegation for negotiation accompanied by 200 Red Guards. According to the order of the Commissary for Foreign Affairs, they were told to lay down their arms. The rascals did not submit to the order, and began to fire at the Red Guards. A fight ensued. Comrades Rakop and Babka were taken prisoner and slaughtered without mercy. In every place hitherto occupied by them, they have opened fire on the German-Magyar prisoners and slaughtered mercilessly whoever fell into their hands. Savage national hatred has transformed them into mad animals, and now they wish to take into their hands our fate.

Comrades! It must not be permitted that we sit idly like dolls while this band fastens itself on our necks. The Soviet has decided to defend itself. The Omsk proletariat is fighting against the Czech formations at Maryanovka. But the Soviet forces are insufficient. Every moment threatens dangers and therefore we must prepare for defense in the widest measure. Before us stands open the question: to exist or not to exist. The Soviet has placed at the disposition of the central organization 1,000 rifles. These 1,000 rifles we must use if we wish to guard ourselves and the Russian revolution, which is our ally and the basis of our future revolution.

Comrades! The leaders of the country call to arms. Every organized workman must take arms. As soon as we shatter the formations, peaceful relations will again insue and we will lay down our arms, but until then we must hold them in our hands.

Comrades! The innocent blood of our brothers must be avenged. Our lives and the salvation of future proletarianism demands that we honorably take our place in the fight of the Omsk proletariat.

Each foreign organized proletarian to arms!

Long live the world revolution begun by the Russian proletariat!

Away with the corrupted troops falling upon us!

Long live the victorious proletariat dictatorship!

Long live the armed foreign proletariat!

THE MAGYAR SECTION OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTIC PARTY

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*Official Statement by the Temporary Executive Committee of the Czecho-Slovak Army, Placed in Charge of Military and Political Affairs by the Assembly of Soldiers at Chelyabinsk*

The principle of the neutrality of the Czecho-Slovak Army as regards the internal conflicts and battles of Russia was definitely expressed and recognized both in the agreement and treaty made by the Czecho-Slovak National Council with the Temporary Government of Russia, and in that arrived at later with the government of the Ukrainian republic, the Ukrainian National Council. To this principle both political and military leaders adhered firmly, and succeeded in implanting it so deeply in the minds of the soldiers, that, in spite of the attempts made right and left to induce them to break it, not a single section of the army could be induced to do so.

Later, when the Ukrainian National Council was defeated and gradually driven out of the governments on the eastern side of the Dnieper and later out of Kiev and the rest of the Ukraine, the commander in chief of the Soviet forces, Colonel Muraviev, and Mr. Kochubinski, the Minister of War of the Soviet government of the Ukraine, recognized the strict armed neutrality of the Czecho-Slovak Army. (See official order to the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps No. 12, January 28, 1918, published in the *Czecho-Slavenny Dennik* [*Czecho-Slovak Daily*], the official organ of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.)

Prior to this, when on January 12, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council adopted the "fourth universal," which expressed the desire of the Ukrainian government "to live on terms of friendship and harmony with all neighboring states," and especially with Austria, it was decided at a meeting of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, at which Professor Masaryk himself presided, "to declare the Czecho-Slovak Army in all parts of the former Russian state as a part of the autonomous army of the Czecho-Slovaks in France." This proclamation was published on February 10, 1918, after the arrival of the Bolsheviks in Kiev. Soon after that, simultaneously with the success of the peace negotiations of the delegates of the Soviet and Ukrainian governments with the representatives of the Central powers at Brest Litovsk, definite steps were taken to arrange for the departure of the Czecho-Slovak Army to the French front.

The first movement was to be the concentration of all our forces on the eastern side of the Dnieper, and this was to be carried out on the basis of an agreement made with the Ukrainian Soviet government, which at one time planned to establish a front against the Germans in the Ukraine. (See *Czecho-Slavenny Dennik*, No. 102.) In the meantime, however, the Germans began to threaten the Czecho-Slovaks from both flanks, and they were obliged to retire into the territory of Great Russia. Again this retirement was made in complete agreement with the Soviet authorities in the Ukraine, an arrangement having been reached with the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the commander of the Soviet forces of the south Russian republics, Antonov-Ovseinko. On the basis of this agreement an order was issued to the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps (No. 26, March 16, 1918) to turn over to the Soviet forces all superfluous arms and other military equipment, while Antonov on his part issued an order to all revolutionary forces of the south Russian republics (No. 92, March 16) from which the following is a literal extract:

Our comrades of the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps, who fought so bravely and gloriously at Zhitomir, Kiev, Grebenka and Bakhmach, defending the way to Poltava and Kharkov, are now leaving Ukrainian territory and are turning over to us a part of their military equipment. The revolutionary army will never forget the fraternal assistance rendered by the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps in the battle of the working people of the Ukraine against the thieving bands of imperialism. The military equipment given up by the Czecho-Slovaks the revolutionary army accepts as a fraternal gift.

On the basis of this agreement, Antonov consented to the departure of the Czecho-Slovaks from the Ukraine, and the staff of the Soviet Army of Great Russia also agreed to our departure towards the east and issued the necessary orders to the railway officials who were to attend to the details of the transport on behalf of the Soviet government. Agreement to our departure from Russia via Vladivostok was also expressed in telegrams sent by Lenin and Trotsky.

In Penza, however, a new set of negotiations was begun. The Council of People's Commissioners in Moscow demanded the complete disarmament of

the Czecho-Slovak Army. As the result of the negotiations between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Moscow authorities a telegram was sent from Moscow on March 26, signed by Stalin, in which a certain number of arms were to be left to each echelon to provide protection against attack by counter-revolutionists. In this same telegram the promise was made to "help in every way possible the Czecho-Slovaks as long as they remain on Russian territory, provided they maintain an honest and sincere loyalty." Further the Penza Soviet was ordered to appoint reliable commissioners who were to accompany the Czecho-Slovak echelons to Vladivostok, see that their unity as an organization was unimpaired, and at the same time keep the Council of People's Commissioners informed as to the progress of the transport. In this same telegram it was stated "that telegrams with necessary instructions would be sent by the Council of People's Commissioners to all interested parties."

Our army maintained an honest and sincere loyalty. But meanwhile the Soviet government proceeded to break its word at every step. The Penza Soviet named but one commissioner, who went on ahead to Vladivostok with the first echelon, and there sat down and did nothing. In spite of our repeated requests that other commissioners be named, the Penza authorities absolutely refused to do this, giving as an excuse the lack of suitable men.

The local soviets one after another put all sorts of obstacles in our path. In Samara, but 400 versts beyond Penza, the local soviet demanded that we give up more of our arms. These demands were repeated in Ufa, Zlatoust, Omsk, Irkutsk, Chita, and so on all along the line. The representatives of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, as well as the commanders of the various echelons, used every possible means to prevent the movement of our transports from being halted. In Samara the echelons gave up 138 rifles apiece, leaving only 30 to an echelon; in Omsk each echelon gave up a machine gun, and in Irkutsk more rifles, until there were left but 20 to an echelon. The negotiations of these local soviets, being in clear opposition to the orders of the Council of People's Commissioners quoted above, often had the appearance of bargaining at the bazar, and for the Czecho-Slovak soldiers were insulting in the extreme, and had the effect of increasing every day their mistrust of the Soviet government, and in creating a disgust for them which ever grew stronger.

One great reason for this lack of confidence and disgust was the attitude assumed by the Soviet authorities, both local and central, towards those who had deserted the Czecho-Slovak Army and joined the ranks of the Red Army. There were not many of them, and they were bad soldiers and men of weak character. They went over to the Soviet army for mercenary reasons. The munificent salaries, the opportunity to at once assume a position of high rank, fear of the French front, petty personal spite—these were the motives that led these men to desert their comrades. Our soldiers knew these men, and were glad that they were rid of them. The Soviet government welcomed these deserters and supported them in every way possible. At Penza the Soviet named some of these deserters as their representatives on the commission which had charge of receiving the arms given up by the Czecho-Slovaks. Other deserters holding documents from the Soviet political or military authorities insisted on coming into the Czecho-Slovak echelons to carry on agitation for the Red Army, and to determine if we did not have some arms hidden away.

These deserters, who called themselves Social Revolutionists, internationalists and communists, often declared that the holding up of our transport and all the obstacles put in our path were for the purpose of causing dissension within our ranks, and gaining as many recruits as possible for the Red Army.



They declared that this was the reason why the Soviet government wished a part of the troops to go by way of Archangel; that somewhere on the way in a region where no food was to be had they planned to halt us, and compel us from very hunger to join their ranks.

The Czecho-Slovak National Council exercised all its influence with the army to keep them from taking stock in these tales, and to induce them to keep their patience and as good soldiers not to make any reply to the unfaithfulness and insulting behavior of the Soviet government.

The atmosphere was therefore highly charged with electricity when the Chelyabinsk incident occurred. At Chelyabinsk besides the Czecho-Slovak echelons there stood several trains filled with prisoners on their way home to Austria and Germany. The relations between the Czecho-Slovak soldiers and these prisoners was good, as it was uniformly whenever they came in contact with one another on the road. The soldiers did carry on an agitation amongst them against Austrian and German imperialism, and laughed at them for returning to serve once more under Austrian and German officers. But at the same time they felt sorry for them, and often shared their food with them. On May 14 one of these prisoners threw a piece of iron out of a train that was just leaving, wounding one of the Czecho-Slovak soldiers. The soldiers immediately surrounded the car from which the iron had been thrown, and demanded that the guilty prisoner be given up to them. When this was done, they immediately killed him. In the course of the investigation of this affair, the local Soviet called as witnesses the members of the guard which had been on duty at the station. But, instead of hearing their testimony, they put these men under arrest. A deputation which was later sent by the Czecho-Slovaks to demand the release of the guard was likewise put under arrest. This illegal imprisonment of their fellows was more than the soldiers in the echelons at Chelyabinsk could stand, and, led by their commanders, they marched into the city, released their imprisoned comrades, and returned immediately to their trains. No attack by force was made, the whole proceeding was conducted in an orderly and quiet manner, hardly a shot being fired.

The local Soviet proceeded to describe this action on the part of the Czecho-Slovaks in lurid colors in telegrams sent out in all directions. Believing the information thus imparted to them, the Council of People's Commissioners issued an order to completely disarm all Czecho-Slovak echelons. At the same time orders were issued to the Soviets of all cities where our echelons were then located to proceed against them by force. Accordingly almost on the same day the Soviet forces, composed for the most part of Magyar and German prisoners of war, fell upon the Czecho-Slovak echelons which were almost entirely disarmed. At the attack made upon echelons of the Sixth Czecho-Slovak Regiment at Maryanovka, near Omsk, the Czecho-Slovaks suffered losses amounting to 10 killed and 10 severely wounded. The staff of the First Regiment, whose echelon was attacked at Zlatoust, defended itself with stones against the machine guns and rifles of the Bolsheviks, but lost 6 men killed and 10 severely wounded, and was compelled to make its way across the Urals on foot. Similarly the staff of the Second Artillery Brigade was attacked at Innokentevskaya, near Irkutsk, when they had already given up their arms. Machine guns placed in the windows of the railway station opened up a heavy fire upon the Czecho-Slovaks, but in spite of the fact that the men had no arms except a few hand grenades, they succeeded in clearing the station of Bolshevik forces and in capturing their machine guns. A fourth attack was made at Serodobsok, south from Penza, but as yet there is no detailed information in regard to it, owing to the fact that communication has not yet been established with the so-called Penza

group of echelons. All of these attacks were made on May 27 and the following two or three days, immediately after the issuance of the order from Moscow to disarm the Czecho-Slovaks at any cost.

Prior to these events, but after the first incident at Chelyabinsk, the assembly of Czecho-Slovak soldiers, met for its annual meeting, had decided that in view of the tense situation existing between the Soviet government and the Czecho-Slovaks, vigorous measures must be taken immediately in order to secure the rapid passage of the trains towards Vladivostok. Accordingly delegates were dispatched to all echelons with instructions to proceed ahead at any cost, and an executive committee was appointed to see that these plans were carried out. The executive committee in formulating its plans counted on the probability of an armed conflict with the Bolshevik forces, but felt confident that they would be able to force their way through to Vladivostok in spite of any resistance that might be offered by the Soviet forces. The reason for their confidence in the successful outcome of their new plan lay not only in the well-known weakness of the Red Army, but also in their knowledge that the people at large were sick and tired of the Bolshevik rule, and that therefore they would not turn a hand to help the Bolsheviks in any possible conflict with the Czecho-Slovaks. Furthermore, the Czecho-Slovaks from their intimate knowledge of political conditions throughout Russia judged that the feeling against the Bolsheviks was strongest in the very regions where most of their echelons were located, namely in the Urals and western Siberia. The executive committee, therefore, in planning their action, took cognizance of these facts, and planned to take advantage both of the weakness of the Red Army and of the strong popular feeling against the Bolsheviks to force their way through to the east. That their action would be accompanied by or followed by the overthrow of the Soviet government and the establishment of a new government in western Siberia never entered into their calculations, although later when the fall of the Soviet government was an accomplished fact, the Czecho-Slovaks were the first to welcome the new government and to lend it their moral and armed support.

The plans of the executive committee for the forcing of the passage to Vladivostok had not been thoroughly worked out when the events of May 25-26 brought things to an issue. By its cowardly attacks upon the Czecho-Slovak echelons the Soviet government began a warfare against the Czecho-Slovaks, the object of which was, according to the command of Trotsky, to disarm and disband the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps, place them in prison camps, and there try to enlist them in the ranks of the Red Army or to put them out at hard labor. In short, they wished to destroy entirely the Czecho-Slovak Army, that important moral support of the revolutionary movement of the Czecho-Slovaks and the other oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

After the first order to disarm completely the Czecho-Slovak echelons, there still remained the possibility of diplomatic negotiations. But after the attacks made upon the echelons on May 25-26, the soul of each soldier cried out for revenge for the blood of his innocent comrades. And so there was nothing left but war, a war which has already resulted in the seizure of almost the entire Siberian Railway by the Czecho-Slovaks and the fall of the Soviet government all along the line.

The Czecho-Slovaks are convinced that the action taken against them by the Soviet government was dictated from Berlin by Von Mirbach. This conviction is based on the opinion, very widely spread throughout Russia, that the Soviet government are the paid agents of Germany. This conviction grew stronger as repeated attempts were made to disarm the soldiers, for the men could not

but see in this disarmament real danger, knowing as they did that the central Soviet government was really powerless, and that in most places the chief strength of their armed forces consisted in armed German and Magyar prisoners. For example, in Omsk the commander of the forces of the internationalists composed of prisoners was an Austro-Hungarian officer, a Magyar by race. This officer, Ligeti by name, had all the Czecho-Slovaks and other Slavs who were serving in the Red Army disarmed, so that Omsk was really in the hands of this Austro-Hungarian officer. In Ishim the Red Army was composed entirely of Magyars. In Petropavlovsk the men who came to negotiate with the Czecho-Slovaks in the guise of Czech communists afterward proved to be the representatives of the German section of the internationalists. The commanding officers of the Red Army were in many cases Germans and Magyars, judging by the orders and the curses in those tongues that were heard on all sides during the battles. When the echelon was attacked near Irkutsk, there was heard the command: "*Schiessen!*"

The conviction that the Soviet government wished to destroy our forces was also strengthened by the constant holding up of the transport, for which no adequate cause could be found. At first the delay was blamed upon the Amur Railway, where transportation was reported to have been halted. The advance of Semenov upon Irkutsk was given as an excuse. But the Czecho-Slovaks soon learned that transportation on the Amur Railway had been soon resumed, while the advance of Semenov existed more in the imagination of the Soviet authorities than in reality. Amongst other excuses given was that of a lack of locomotives on the Amur road, but all the while German prisoners were being merrily transported towards the west, and there were plenty of locomotives for them.

On April 20, the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Chicherin sent the following telegram to the Siberian Soviets: "Transport German prisoners as rapidly as possible towards the west. Hold back the Czecho-Slovak echelons."

It was only after a long and tedious session of negotiations that there was secured an order for the renewal of our transport towards Vladivostok. One day, about May 15, a member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council was officially informed that the trains would now be moved. On the very next day, however, he learned through private conversation with the railway officials that another order had been issued in Irkutsk to stop the movements of the Czecho-Slovak trains. He finally learned that this command had issued from the commander of the Soviet forces at Irkutsk, General von Taube, a German, whose adjutant had issued the order by "mistake."

The Seventh Czecho-Slovak Regiment captured a German engineer, who had been commandeered from Moscow to destroy the bridges and tunnels on the railroad beyond the Baikal. In Troitsk the commanders of the Soviet artillery were all Austrian officers.

From all these facts even an uninterested onlooker may picture to himself the net which had been spread for the Czecho-Slovak Army. Inasmuch as the warfare is still being carried on on all sides, it has not been possible to gather all the evidence from the Soviet offices, and unfortunately in many cases the Bolsheviks succeeded in carrying away with them or destroying all their papers before our men took possession. Later however there will be certainly found many proofs of the truth of the assertion made by the president of the Chelyabinsk Soviet and the military commissioner in that town, who informed our representatives in confidence shortly before the outbreak of hostilities that the cause of all the acts against the Czecho-Slovaks was the German Ambassador at Moscow.

File No. 861.00/2215

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 5, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received July 8, 11.30 a. m.]

30. Supplementing my June 29, 9 p. m.<sup>1</sup> No disturbance since 29th. City policed by Czechs assisted by Japanese and British and to less extent by American marines who police immediate vicinity of Consulate only. Czechs now fighting force of at least 2,000 Magyars and Germans under German officers near Nikolsk. Two hundred wounded Czechs have just returned here bringing 30 Hungarian prisoners.

Number killed here trivial, cannot be accurately ascertained but is reported Czechs had 4 killed and 21 wounded and newspapers report about 60 Red Guards killed including uncertain number Hungarians.

Czechs and Consular Corps after joint conference decided to deal with mayor and Zemstvo as legally elected local officials whose functions were temporarily suspended by Soviet force and declining to have any dealings with so-called autonomous Siberian government which is endeavoring to establish itself here, as result of Czech action, but is meeting great opposition from sections of all classes, principal objection being that it has no authority for claiming to be government of Siberia and that its representatives are not acceptable. I do not believe it can now establish itself here.

Soviet has not existed since Czechs delivered ultimatum, 29th, its five principal members remaining voluntarily in Czech barracks for self-protection until yesterday, when they made speeches at funeral of Red Guards killed 29th. This funeral was attended by five to six thousand people who gave cheers for the United States of America opposite the [omission] *Brooklyn* and before this Consulate, under the impression *Brooklyn* dressed ship out of sympathy Red Guards funeral not realizing it was our Independence Day, some even mistaking Admiral's flag for black flag of anarchy. Crowd and speakers evinced no hostility toward Czechs but appealed to them to stop fighting, stating Czechs here being induced to fight by capitalists against whom Soviets could not stand without aid of war prisoners for which reason Soviets made use of armed prisoners.

Czech's funeral of 2d attended by much smaller crowd including mayor and representative of so-called Siberian government who both made speeches when about grave. Mayor also attended Red Guard funeral yesterday. Consular Corps all attended Czech funeral.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 235.

Japanese Consul informed me this morning his Government has decided to furnish arms to Czechs. Czechs wish to act in full cooperation with Allies and have consulted Allies' local representatives about all their actions, looking particularly to the United States for guidance and assistance and I regret that Admiral Knight and Secretary of State so far been able to offer them less encouragement and assistance [than] representatives of Japan and Great Britain. I consider situation requires immediate action and that we should assist Czechs in their fight against armed war prisoners by furnishing arms, munitions, Red Cross hospitals with doctors and supplies and also some armed force. This action would not be for or against any Russian party but on same ground as Czechs; namely, against Germany and Austria. It should be possible to establish some front against Germany and at the same time produce conditions under which election for temporary government could be held and so an improvement effected economically.

Copy sent Tokyo and Peking.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/2240½

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State of a Conference at the White House in Reference to the Siberian Situation*

July 6, 1918.

Present: The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General March, and Admiral Benson.

After debating the whole subject of the present conditions in Siberia as affected by the taking of Vladivostok by the Czecho-Slovaks, the landing of American, British, French, and Japanese forces from the naval vessels in that port, and the occupation of the railroad through western Siberia by other Czecho-Slovaks with the reported taking of Irkutsk by these troops; and after reading and discussing the communication of the Supreme War Council favoring an attempt to restore an eastern front against the Central powers; and also a memorandum by the Secretary of State—

The following propositions and program were decided upon:

- (1) That the establishment of an eastern front through a military expedition, even if it was wise to employ a large Japanese force, is physically impossible though the front was established east of the Ural Mountains;
- (2) That under present conditions any advance westward of Irkutsk does not seem possible and needs no further consideration;

- (3) That the present situation of the Czecho-Slovaks requires this Government and other governments to make an effort to aid those at Vladivostok in forming a junction with their compatriots in western Siberia; and that this Government on sentimental grounds and because of the effect upon the friendly Slavs everywhere would be subject to criticism if it did not make this effort and would doubtless be held responsible if they were defeated by lack of such effort;
- (4) That in view of the inability of the United States to furnish any considerable force within a short time to assist the Czecho-Slovaks the following plan of operations should be adopted, provided the Japanese Government agrees to cooperate;
  - (a) The furnishing of small arms, machine guns, and ammunition to the Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok by the Japanese Government; this Government to share the expense and to supplement the supplies as rapidly as possible;
  - (b) The assembling of a military force at Vladivostok composed of approximately 7,000 Americans and 7,000 Japanese to guard the line of communication of the Czecho-Slovaks proceeding toward Irkutsk; the Japanese to send troops at once;
  - (c) The landing of available forces from the American and Allied naval vessels to hold possession of Vladivostok and cooperate with the Czecho-Slovaks;
  - (d) The public announcement by this and Japanese Governments that the purpose of landing troops is to aid Czecho-Slovaks against German and Austrian prisoners, that there is no purpose to interfere with internal affairs of Russia, and that they guarantee not to impair the political or territorial sovereignty of Russia; and
  - (e) To await further developments before taking further steps.

[File copy not signed]

File No. 861.00/2335f

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918, 8 p. m.

For your information. Secretary of Navy has sent following message to-day to flagship *Brooklyn*:

This Government desires Vladivostok kept available as a base for the safety of Czechs and as a means of egress for them should the necessity arise. In order to accomplish this and to indicate our sympathy and support you are authorized to utilize the force at your disposal and to request similar action by Allied naval forces in holding the city. Avoid any action tending to offend Russian

sentiment or to become involved in any political question. Keep in close touch with leader of Czecho-Slovaks and inform Department daily of progress of events, development of any new situations and sentiments of various parties.

Repeat to Consul, Vladivostok, for his information.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2228

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 7, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received July 9, 10.29 a. m.]

35. Supplementing my July 5, 3 p. m. Czechs took Nikolsk 5th, losing 40 killed and 200 wounded. Opposing force, including Red Guard and armed German and Hungarian war prisoners with artillery and armored train, retreated toward Khabarovsk after destroying short bridge and three miles railway which probably will be temporarily repaired to-day.

Retiring force filled eight trains and took all rolling stock from Nikolsk except two engines and about 20 cars.

Population Nikolsk and railway employees very friendly to Czechs and rendered them much assistance, especially in repairing railway, but are hostile to Bolsheviks, and also to Russian forces in Manchuria.

Czechs have 600 Hungarian war prisoners under guard at Nikolsk investigating whether any bore arms. Bolsheviks hung several members Nikolsk city administration and railway employees for refusing to assist Bolsheviks. After hearing report of commander of Czech forces this district, Allied consuls unanimously resolved to telegraph their respective governments and to Peking legations, requesting all possible efforts be made immediately for passage Czechs through Manchuria, pointing out that Czechs do not support any Russian party and can have no connection with any Harbin organization, who should be so informed. Also Czech commander and Allied consuls consider Russian military forces now in Manchuria could not be used unless as a part of Allied military expedition, and then only for purely military, and not for political purposes. Very necessary I have immediate reply, indicating attitude of Allied Governments toward Czechs. We are awaiting for this. For them, delay is very serious and may even prove fatal, if Allied support denied.

Copy sent Tokyo and Peking.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2212

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, July 7, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 7, 5.27 p. m.]

Referring to my cable of July 1, 3 p. m. According to advices received by Foreign Office the Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the French Ambassador that the Japanese Government will give as a present to the Czech Army the thirty machine guns and mountain batteries previously requested.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2441

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

No. 250

VLADIVOSTOK, July 8, 1918.

[Received August 9.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram (No. 15) June 27, 6 p. m., I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of document presented by the representatives of the Czecho-Slovak National Council to the Vladivostok Allied consuls, explaining the position of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia. The spirit shown in this document and by the actions of the Czecho-Slovak troops is worthy of the most sympathetic cooperation of the people of the United States.

I have [etc.]

JOHN K. CALDWELL

[Enclosure]

*The Representatives of the Czecho-Slovak National Council to the Consuls of the Allied Powers*

VLADIVOSTOK, June 25, 1918.

At the very beginning of the war, the Czecho-Slovaks understood that the Allies had right and justice on their side, that the object of Germany was to obtain hegemony over the whole world, while the Allies were fighting for right and liberty for all mankind. This truth showed us that our place is with the Allies, and our people having taken of its own free will this fixed determination and accepted this duty, not only has always remained faithful thereto but has been ready to do all that was possible to assist in attaining the common object without heeding any sacrifices which this might entail. Truly it is not selfishness which guides our actions; we want no more for ourselves than for others and we are fighting for others also to attain that which every civilized and politically developed nation has a full right to demand, namely, full political independence.

To-day there is no battle field on any front where Czecho-Slovak soldiers have not poured out their blood. The majority of our troops have been fighting in the ranks of the Russian Army and only when the Russian Army collapsed



irremediably and after the peace of Brest Litovsk, did we clearly understand that the part we could play on the Russian front was over.

Refusing to recognize the peace of Brest Litovsk, so shameful for the Russian people, we, the only portion of the once glorious Russian Army remaining strong in morale and organized as a military force, determined to pass to France to continue the strife.

The central Bolshevik government allowed us to leave Russia upon conditions which were laid down in the treaty concluded between our army and the government of the People's Commissioners on the 26th of March 1918.

Loyally and faithfully have we fulfilled all the conditions imposed upon us by this treaty: never have we become involved in the internal political affairs of Russia.

Of this the best proof is that, in spite of all the obstacles that the local Bolshevik authorities placed in our road, 13,000 of our soldiers have accomplished the journey all through Russia without disputes and have been living for the past two months in Vladivostok in correct and loyal relations with the Bolshevik authorities here. This condition of things continued as long as the Bolshevik government remained in the hands of Russians but changed completely the moment Germans and Magyars obtained the mastery in the central government of Siberia and, under the guise of internationalists and communists, were accepted by the Bolshevik government in the ranks of the Red forces and even in the administrative organs of which they form to-day the kernel.

Obedying the ultimatum from Berlin, Trotsky, the People's Commissioner, gave the order for our troops to be disarmed, our officers outlawed and our soldiers placed as prisoners in internment camps under severe control. As a result of this order, our troops along the line between Irkutsk and Penza were attacked simultaneously by Germans and Magyars. By Trotsky's order, the treaty made between us and the Bolsheviks guaranteeing to us free departure from Russia was treacherously violated and the central government of Siberia fell into the hands of the Germans.

Our troops, ambushed by Germans and Magyars, had in self-defense to accept the combat, the result of which is that to-day the whole of the Trans-Siberian line from Penza to Irkutsk is in our hands. In all the places along this line, the Bolshevik government has been overthrown by the Russian Mensheviks and Revolutionary Socialists of the right wing without any cooperation from our troops. The central government of Siberia (Bolshevik) is hastily organizing against the Czecho-Slovaks German and Magyar prisoners. The Russian people welcomes our troops and supports them with all its power.

Our troops at Vladivostok hold it to be their duty to go to the help of their brothers attacked in western Siberia but can not do this now, when all negotiations with the central government of Siberia have come to nothing, otherwise than with arms in their hands. Now that we are about to fight here in Siberia only against the Germans and Magyars, we would much desire that our expedition should be made with the consent of the local Bolshevik authorities though we are very doubtful of obtaining such consent. To-day, we address ourselves to the representatives of the Allied nations in Vladivostok in order to put before them the absolute necessity of the decision which we have taken and the reasons which have dictated it; to request their consent and to ask them, in case of necessity, to assure us of their help.

At the same time, we would call their attention to the following fact. To-day, the central government of Siberia is, without doubt, under a strong or even a dominant influence of Germans and Magyars and, immediately our troops

will leave the soil of Siberia, the whole of Siberia will at once fall into the hands of the Germans. There is no need to insist upon the influence which this circumstance might have upon the future of the war and, for this reason, we believe it to be essential that the troops of the Allies when our troops are withdrawn, should occupy the railway line in Siberia with the object we all have in view of forming a new front against the Germans. By following this course, the welfare of Russia would best be served; for the Allies in delivering Russia, or at least Siberia, from civil war will give her the possibility of building up a new form of government in accordance with the true desire and will of the Russian people.

The only object, and the most ardent desire of the Czecho-Slovak troops, is to arrive as soon as may be possible upon the French front but, should the Allies, together and unanimously, esteem that the final result of the war would best be attained, under present circumstances, by the return of our troops to the Russian front to be created, then our army would obey the order of its supreme political leader, Professor Masaryk.

(Two signatures which are illegible.<sup>1</sup>)

---

File No. 861.00/2241½

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State of a Conference with the Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) concerning a Siberian Program*

*July 8, 1918, 10 a. m.*

The Ambassador came to the Department at my request and I laid before him orally the propositions and program determined upon by the President after the conference at the White House.

He told me that he was favorable personally to the views expressed and the plan proposed and that he would immediately communicate with his Government and ask their agreement to the plan.

He said that I would be pleased to know that on his return to Washington last night he found a telegram from Tokyo directing him to advise me that the leader of the Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok had asked his Government to furnish that force with arms and ammunition and that his Government were ready to do this at once if it met the approval of this Government. I said that this news was most gratifying as that was the first step in our program, and that I hoped that he would urge the shipment with all possible speed. He replied that he would.

We discussed more in detail the possible effect of landing troops by this country and Japan with an identical announcement at Washington and Tokyo as to the purpose of the expedition and the preservation of the integrity of the political and territorial sovereignty of Russia. We also considered the possibility of a friendly attitude by the Russians toward the Czecho-Slovaks thus aided and also the possible consequence of their forming a nucleus about which

---

<sup>1</sup> The Consul's comment.

the Russians might rally even to the extent of becoming again a military factor in the war.

We both agreed, however, that, while we had these possibilities in mind, no plans should be predicated upon them; and that the objective for the present should be limited to furnishing facilities for the Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok to form a juncture with those near Irkutsk by obtaining control of the Amur branch of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

In discussing the foregoing, Ishii said:

The possibilities of extending the program will depend very much upon the way the Siberian people view the present plan (if it is adopted) and how other Russians will look upon it. This we cannot tell until our forces are actually landed at Vladivostok. That will test the question. If they are very friendly, we can revise our program.

The Ambassador spoke as if he was sure the suggestion of a small force of 14,000 men equally divided between the United States and Japan would be acceptable to his Government.

I impressed upon him that time was an essential factor in carrying out the program and I urged him to emphasize to his Government the great importance of a speedy decision and prompt action.

This he said he would do.

[File copy not signed]

---

File No. 861.00/2227

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, undated.

[Received July 9, 1918, 9.44 a. m.]

206[26?]. No train or telegraph service west of this city. Krasnoyarsk reported in hands of anti-Bolsheviks. Large numbers armed prisoners have arrived from Chita and Semenov front, some remaining in Irkutsk and others proceeding westward to oppose Czechs. Swedish mission in Irkutsk is composed largely of German officers. Swedes and Germans together are trying to buy up tallow, cocoanut oil and coffee for shipment to Germany. In secret meeting of internationalists held June 18, it was decided to hold present Bolshevik government in power even if same wished to resign. In recent convention [conversation] with Geyzman, Commissary of Foreign Affairs, he informed me that three ways were being considered to disarm Czechs. First was to blow up the [omission] tunnels; second, to recall all troops now engaged against Semenov; and, third, to arm

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 36).

every available prisoner in Siberia. When Red Guard killed were buried on June 18, 2,000 armed prisoners marched in parade.

[HARRIS]

---

File No. 861.00/2244a

*The Secretary of State to the President*

*July 9, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS I surmised Lord Reading was responsible for the interview which I had this afternoon with him and the French and Italian Ambassadors (you see they asked Jusserand to come with them). This was evident because Jusserand requested Reading to do the talking and he did it all though Jusserand, being the *doyen* of the corps, was the natural spokesman.

Lord Reading stated that they wished to know whether the Allied Governments were not to take part in the initial landing of troops at Vladivostok or whether it was our purpose to confine the enterprise to Japanese and American troops.

I replied that I had never discussed the question with you and I could see no object in doing so until the Japanese had agreed to the principle of joint equal military action; that our view had been that it was useless to consider details until the Japanese had approved the general plan; and that it had been always our purpose to lay the matter before the Allied Governments and to advise with them provided the Japanese accepted our program.

Lord Reading said that he was not complaining of the course which we had pursued but that he thought that the Allies should have a chance to land available troops in this initial movement in order to impress the Russians with the idea that we were a unit and that the United States and Japan were not acting independently without the sanction of the other powers.

To this I answered that this seemed to me rather a matter of national pride and sentiment than a practical question; that I could not understand why this subject should be raised and that it showed to me the wisdom of the course which we had taken in not consulting all the Allied Governments before we had acted as apparently there would have been delay in discussing the details which would have been very unfortunate in view of the necessity of prompt action.

Lord Reading said that I should not hold that point of view as he only intended to suggest that it would be wise to have unity of action in this important step and that he felt that we should impress the Russian people with the united purpose of all the Governments to resist the attacks upon the Czecho-Slovaks.

I answered to this that I unfortunately could not agree with him; that the whole question was one of expediency which involved the advisability of participation by other powers in the proposed enterprise; and that I was not disposed to consider the sentimental phase but only the expedient side of the question. I went on to say that after Japan had agreed to the proposed program of 7,000 American and 7,000 Japanese being landed this Government would consider the question of British troops being incorporated in the landing force, but until Japan had so agreed the details seemed to me to be needless.

To this Lord Reading answered that while I might be right, he was sure that his Government would not understand action which did not include all parties. I said in reply that I was sorry to have him express this opinion, because I was sure that you had no intention of submitting the questions to the Allied Governments until Japan had declared that she was favorable to the general plan. I repeated that I thought expediency should control and that if expediency was opposed to British participation that, to my mind, ended it, although it possibly might be advisable for all the powers to declare in favor of preserving unimpaired Russian political and territorial sovereignty.

The British Ambassador was manifestly disturbed but did not pursue the subject further.

The French Ambassador asked if we had made any suggestion about superior military command. I replied that the subject had not been raised; that I could see no value in raising it at the present time; that the principal question was as to Japan's military cooperation; and that inviting controversy at a time when the Czecho-Slovaks needed our assistance immediately was most unwise.

Throughout this conference I felt that the French Ambassador and in a measure the Italian approved of our program, but that the British Ambassador was not entirely favorable because he felt Great Britain had been ignored.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2486

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

No. 254

VLADIVOSTOK, July 9, 1918.

[Received August 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a proclamation issued by the commanders of Allied forces at Vladivostok, announcing that the city and its vicinity are thereby taken under the temporary

protection of the Allied powers and that all measures will be taken for its defense against dangers both external and internal.

I have [etc.]

JOHN K. CALDWELL

[Enclosure]

*Proclamation by the Commanders of Allied and Associated Forces at Vladivostok*

In view of the dangers which threaten Vladivostok and the Allied forces here assembled from the open and secret activities of Austro-German war prisoners, spies and emissaries, the city and its vicinity are hereby taken under the temporary protection of the Allied powers and all necessary measures will be taken for its defense against dangers both external and internal.

All orders heretofore issued by the Czecho-Slovak authorities continue in force.

The authority of the Zemstvo and municipality will be recognized in local affairs but the local military forces and police will be supplemented by such Allied force as may be found necessary in emergency to prevent danger from Austro-German agencies and influence which are known to be at work in the city.

This action is taken in a spirit of sympathetic friendship for the Russian people without reference to any political faction or party and in the hope that the period of tranquillity which will result may permit the reconciling of all factions and their cooperation in a harmonious and patriotic effort for the establishment of a stable and permanent government and for throwing off the yoke of tyrannical dictation which the Austro-German powers are endeavoring to fasten permanently upon the Russian people.

All good citizens are enjoined to cooperate in the maintenance of law and order.

AUSTIN M. KNIGHT

*Admiral, United States Navy,  
Commander in Chief, United States  
Asiatic Fleet*

HIROGARU KATO

*Rear Admiral, Japanese Navy, Com-  
manding Special Division Imperial  
Japanese Navy*

PAYNE

*Captain, Royal Navy, Senior British  
Naval Officer*

PARIS

*Colonel, French Army, Chief of  
the French Military Mission  
to the Czecho-Slovak Army*

H. LIU

*Captain, Chinese Navy, Commanding  
R.C.S. "Hai Yung"*

BADUIRA

*Captain, Czecho-Slovak Army, Town  
Mayor*

VLADIVOSTOK, SIBERIA.

July 6, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2241

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 9, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 10, 2.25 p. m.]

The French, British, and Japanese Ministers, considering it imperative to transfer Czech forces from Vladivostok to assist Czechs

in western Siberia, are requesting Russian Legation to arrange with the Russian railway authorities at Harbin for the transportation of these troops by the Chinese Eastern Railway; and upon receiving the expected favorable reply they propose simply to inform the Chinese Government that these forces are to pass through Manchuria.

In the absence of instructions I have not felt warranted in associating myself with these démarches which contemplate the probability of conflict with Bolshevik forces near Chita and which might therefore be considered as an act of intervention. I beg to request instructions as to the attitude to be taken in regard to this and other movements of the Czech forces in Siberia.

MACMURRAY

---

File No. 861.00/2234

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, July 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 10, 4.12 a. m.]

4408. The Russian Ambassador has just sent to me the following appeal to President Wilson signed by the three Russian political organizations located in Paris with the request that it be telegraphed to the Department. The Ambassador points out that their statement is particularly significant as these organizations represent different political parties.

We, Russians, the representatives of different political opinions, in this hour of desperate danger to our country, appeal to you, Mr. President, as the recognized champion of right and liberty, to advocate that the American forces in cooperation with all other Allies at once enter Russia, not to interfere in her internal affairs, but to assist us to expel the Germans from our native land. We do not recognize the Brest Litovsk treaty and therefore still consider ourselves in a state of war with Germany.

The above appeal is signed by prominent members of the three political organizations known as the Union of Russians Faithful to their Country and Alliances, the Committee of Russian Republican Leagues, and the League for the Regeneration of Russia in Union with the Allies.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/2248

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received July 11, 11.35 p. m.]

Consul at Harbin requests immediate repetition of following telegram received to-day:

July 6, 10 p. m. Repeat Department immediately and to Admiral Knight. Horvat has just asserted and requested me to inform you that upon the demand of Far Eastern Committee for salvation of Russia, he has organized a non-partisan government for Siberia. Cabinet consists of Horvat, president and commander in chief, constitutional monarchist by choice, a position which he announced at the beginning of the revolution and from which he has never receded, but willing to work as conservative democrat; Vostrotin, member of Third and Fourth Russian Dumas from central Siberia, assistant minister of supplies under Provisional Government, Cadet Party; Taskin, member second and fourth Siberian Constituent Assembly, Cadet; Ustrugov, assistant minister railways Provisional Government, Independent Democrat; Pflug, former governor Vladivostok now representing Kornilov and also Russian central eastern military organization, Independent Democrat; Okorokov, provisional commissioner of the Altai state and representative of the spectator [Siberian] Cooperative Societies, Socialist; Kurski, [omission] workman, member of spectator [Siberian] Cooperative Societies, Socialist.

On being informed that to-day Nikolsk had been taken by combined Czecho-Slovaks [and Kalmykov's?] Cossacks, Horvat said his organization would go to Siberia to-morrow and announce publicly that they would take over the government at that point, thus renouncing any attempt to govern Siberia from interior [exterior?]. He hoped for the support of Czecho-Slovaks and Siberian people and Allied Governments but if these failed his organization was prepared to accept the consequences. He will not [?] guarantee Constituent Assembly, full suffrage [omission]. [Omission] are without money, arms or soldiers except Semenov's force and Orlov's and Kalmykov's forces now augmented by 1,500 Cossack volunteers. The democratic party called Siberian self-government too exclusively socialistic and scattered to be representative or powerful. Will make public announcement as soon as they arrive Nikolsk. Japanese Consul informs me [his] government will undoubtedly support Horvat organization until it can call always with [together] Constituent Assembly, as Japan believes Horvat organization only one capable of resisting.

MACMURRAY



File No. 861.00/2246½

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received July 11, 11.30 a. m.]

Consul at Harbin requests immediate repetition of following telegram received to-day:

July 8, 11 a. m. Inform Secretary of State immediately Horvat party left for Nikolsk yesterday accompanied by Alexander, military attaché, and many Japanese officers. Warner to join Germans [Horvat's] train *en route* and remain with them. Apparently [Russians] in China prepared to support Horvat strongly but local Japanese authorities disapprove, fearing failure which may involve railway. Local Chinese governor will see me to-day to discuss feasibility of stopping all political activities Chinese Eastern Railway.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/7415

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary on July 11, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

July 10, 1918.

Czechs at Vladivostok. Instructions have been issued for the British garrison battalion at Hong Kong to proceed immediately to Vladivostok in order to replace the Czechs there, who are starting a movement on Irkutsk.

File No. 861.00/7413

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed by the Ambassador to the Counselor for the Department of State on July 12, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

July 10, 1918.

Czechs at Vladivostok. We trust that the United States Government will give authority to the U. S. S. *Brooklyn* to support the Czechs in case of necessity. Without going into the wider question of Allied intervention, it is certain that a most serious effect would everywhere be produced if the Czechs at Vladivostok were to suffer a collapse which could in any way be attributed to a failure on the part of the Allies to give them support.

File No. 861.00/7414

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Counselor for the Department of State on July 12, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

July 10, 1918.

Czechs at Vladivostok. Please inform the United States Government of the steps taken by His Majesty's Government and explain that our action has not been adopted with any intention to start intervention but for the sole purposes of ensuring order in Vladivostok, securing the communications of the Czech forces, and safeguarding the Allied stores in the city. At the present crisis the greatest importance is attached to all of these objects.

File No. 861.00/7416

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Counselor for the Department of State on July 12, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

July 11, 1918.

The following message has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris July 11:

The general in command of the Czechs has reached the decision that every available man under his command at Vladivostok must be taken to assist the other Czech force at Irkutsk. As a result of this development he states that transport will not be required for the purpose of removing the Czechs from Vladivostok.

We propose, therefore, to employ for other essential work the tonnage which it was originally intended to use for transporting the Czechs and to inform the Japanese Government that we withdraw, in view of the present circumstances, the Allied request for Japanese shipping for the transportation of this force.

Please inform me if this proposal is acceptable to the French Government.

In communicating the decision mentioned above, the Czech General stated that the troops opposed to him at different points between Irkutsk and Vladivostok amounted to 12,000 armed prisoners, 15,000 Red Army, with 50 guns, and 25,000 armed Red Guards as a reserve. He was moving with 13,000 Czechoslovak troops and he requested that a reserve of 1,000 men should be guaranteed by the Allied ships in the harbour as a support, in case of necessity, for the small force of Czechs remaining in the city. The Captain of H.M.S. *Suffolk* has been authorized to put a force ashore should circumstances arise which make it necessary for him to do so.

File No. 861.00/2493

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1918.

DEAR MR. POLK: The Italian Ambassador at his own request came to see me to-day regarding the Siberian situation. He dwelt on the

position that Baron Sonnino had taken during the last two months in trying to curb the enthusiasm for action of the British and French Governments, that he had always pointed out to them that nothing must be done without the cordial support of the American Government. He referred to the 700 *Italia irridenta* troops which had found their way into northern China and were anxious to be transported to Italy; that at that time the Department had intimated to him that possibly these Italian troops might be utilized in Siberia in the event of an inter-Allied expedition and that, therefore, it might be wise not to move them until a final decision had been reached regarding Siberia; that he had put up this proposition to his Government who had accepted it and that these troops were now in Tientsin ready under orders of their Government to proceed at once to Siberia; and he dwelt particularly on the fact that they were ready because the Secretary of State had suggested some time ago that they might be utilized.

He referred to the public discussions concerning the advisability of inter-Allied intervention, not only in this country but even more so in Italy, France and England, and that these discussions had gone on so long that a popular opinion had been created which must be reckoned with. He told me that the first announcement which the Secretary made to Jusserand, Reading and himself came as a shock to them all especially after the diplomatic exchanges of the last few weeks looking towards an Allied movement. In telegraphing his Government the decision of the United States he had stated that in his opinion the decision was more a matter of form than of substance. I explained the underlying reason that had made it necessary for the Secretary to approach the Japanese Government in the first instance and I think Count Cellere was convinced of the desirability of this move. He replied, however, by saying that everything could be settled agreeably if after the United States and Japan have reached their agreement, the Governments of Italy, Great Britain and France would be informed of this fact and asked what assistance they could send immediately.

W. PHILLIPS

File No. 861.00/2255

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, July 12, 1918.

[Received July 13, 1.35 a. m.]

2466. United Press correspondent here yesterday interviewed Gavronski, elected to Constituent Assembly from Simbirsk, Sukhomlin, elected from Tomsk, and Rusanov, member of Central Executive

Committee of Social Revolutionary Party, who made an appeal on behalf of their party for Allied intervention which he has telegraphed home. As this party is the strongest in Russia, this appeal is very significant.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2261

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 12, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 13, 10.36 p. m.]

General Horvat, manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, having proceeded to Grodekovo, west of Nikolsk, on the 9th instant, issued a proclamation declaring himself the head of a new governmental organization whose program included the following purposes:

- (1) Abrogation of all decrees issued by Bolsheviks;
- (2) Reestablishment of judicial and administrative organizations and organs of local administration;
- (3) Equality of all citizens before the law and safeguarding of civil rights and liberties;
- (4) Universal suffrage;
- (5) Entire resumption of all treaties with the Allied and neutral powers and of political and economic obligations;
- (6) Reorganization of the army on the basis of rigorous discipline divorced from politics;
- (7) Reestablishment of the right of property;
- (8) Solution of agrarian question by the Constituent Assembly;
- (9) Reestablishment of industry by means of the abolition of socialization and nationalization of enterprises simultaneously with the satisfaction of the needs of the workmen;
- (10) Development of public instruction;
- (11) Religious freedom.

Pending formal recognition by the Allied powers, he requests their favorable consideration and immediate support.

In communicating to me last night the full text of this proclamation Russian Minister requested that you should be asked to make known at least the substance of it to the Russian Ambassador at Washington.

The British, French and Japanese Consuls at Vladivostok have telegraphed that the attempted establishment of a government by Horvat is generally resented there and would probably lead to further dissension in Siberia, French Consul adding that Horvat has antagonized Czechs by attempting to take advantage of the situation created by them and by refusing them passage through Manchuria to assist Czechs in western Siberia.

At a meeting of the representatives of Great Britain, Japan, France and Russia, which I attended on the understanding that I was without instructions which would enable me to participate in the decisions taken, it was agreed this morning that the Russian Minister should communicate the following telegram in the names of the three colleagues specified:

The representatives of Great Britain, Japan, and France, being in receipt of telegrams from their respective Consuls at Vladivostok pointing out the danger of civil strife which may result from the proclamation of General Horvat and which may prevent the passage of the Czechs through Manchuria, which is all important and has a purely military object directed against the Germans, advise General Horvat to withdraw his proclamation and return to Harbin so as to facilitate the passage of the Czechs over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Ministers beg General Horvat to be good enough to favor them with a prompt reply to their communication.

The following is the substance of a telegram from Harbin Consulate dated 10th, received to-day:

First announcement of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia, dated July 2, received at Harbin on the 9th, stated that that government, which was elected in January by the Siberian provincial Duma, will establish authority and order and military forces to clear the Far East of Bolsheviks; it hopes to accomplish this without foreign intervention and promises that, thereafter, provincial Duma will be assembled which in turn will convoke all Siberian Constituent Assembly. Announcement signed by P. Derber and others. A cabinet has been formed and recruiting of volunteers begun. City Duma, on June 30, resolved to acknowledge this government of autonomous Siberia.

The above is being sent to Tokyo.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2262

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received July 15, 11.35 a. m.]

The following telegram received to-day from Harbin for immediate repetition. Have repeated to Vladivostok and Tokyo.

July 9, 2 p. m. Inform Department and Admiral Knight last night Chinese governor called and said if Horvat and his party went into Siberia, Chinese would not permit their return in any administrative capacity, his troops could not return with arms and uniforms. Horvat could come back with [as] railway manager only. He said

Chinese wished to regain complete sovereignty and take over railways as Horvat's departure constituted Russia's abandonment, but it was difficult to accomplish because Chinese lacked money and operatives necessary. He wished my advice. I refused to suggest the possibility of American cooperation and assistance for which he seemed to be fishing, and he left me with the impression that he was unsatisfied and would call again. Chinese attitude in this matter surprising, unless instigated by Japan.

Am informed by reliable authority that Horvat before leaving told him Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich was now *en route* to Vladivostok by gunboat *Askold* to head constitutional monarchy by Constituent Assembly. Horvat said this need not conflict with his organization as their aims were similar. It is possible that Horvat is in communication with Grand Duke Michael and means to rush through to Vladivostok in time to meet him after setting the stage. This would account for presence of Pflug, Kornilov's representative, in his proposed cabinet. No other reason apparent. Ustrugov probably there to inspire American railway cooperation. My information is, any attempt to restore monarchy in Siberia would be unpopular, but may be forced upon her through Japanese assistance. Horvat frankly admitted guarantee Japan's assistance, but appeared unwilling to proceed without support other Allies. Suggest Legation consult British Minister. Moser.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2268

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received July 14, 5.23 p. m.]

Following telegram received to-day from Harbin for immediate repetition. Have repeated it to Vladivostok and Tokyo.

July 11, 8 p. m. Repeat Department and Admiral Knight. Suspicion rapidly gaining ground that Horvat's game is closely connected with plot to establish Grand Duke Michael as constitutional monarch. Kornilov and Klemm [Kolchak?] both secure what should have been [representation in] cabinet. Major Nearne, British secret agent, absolutely assured me Horvat told him personally that Grand Duke Michael might be made Emperor with Constituent Assembly in which event his adventure would not clash as their aims were identical. Klemm [Kolchak?] told him Horvat had direct communication with Michael (evidently through Pflug mission), that Grand Duke was coming to Vladivostok via Japan on *Askold* from Murman coast. Nearne knew *Askold* [had been] operating in Mediterranean, very likely now in Persian Gulf. Have

learned Horvat was intriguing with British and Japanese Consuls without knowledge of French and American therefore [before] his coup. His proclamation declares himself oral [provisional] ruler whole Russian state but general opinion is that full Japanese support guaranteed him. Scheme will fail unless [agreement reached] with Siberian government Vladivostok and supported by Czecho-Slovaks and all Allies. American engineers inform me Japanese took over Russian telegraph wire to Changchun for their exclusive use. Newspapers report to-day arrival detachment Japanese staff and arrival yesterday of quartermaster of troops stating staff will be quartered in Millerovski, a base of Grand Duke. Newspapers also state that order had been given canceling all extra trains [Chinese Eastern] railway from 5th to 25th July on account transportation of troops. Moser.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2266

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 13, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 14, 2.45 p. m.]

Following undated telegram just received from Harbin, immediate repetition to the Department:

Inform Department Warner telegraphs from Horvat train [Grodekovo]:

Czechs proceeding along Amur line to broken bridge at Evgenyevka. Japanese officers arrived here as mediators claiming that Vladivostok Czechs have disarmed what Red Guards who helped incite, threatened disarm all and use for Horvat. Japanese further announce they will disarm Czechs if they do not recognize Horvat and we now await General Dietrichs who proclaimed neutrality after this train not agreed on policy and Horvat deeply mixed with Japan [*sic*].

Your [*sic*] railway engineers inform special train with sleeping car containing Japanese general and 91 others left here noon to-day to meet Horvat. Leading newspapers state Horvat's abandonment leaves no recognized or political authority with whom China can deal in railway zone. China is even bound to consider railway board remaining as having only industrial authority and that members of Horvat government can only reappear on territory of railway as private persons. Last night Pleshkov, Horvat's general here, seized nickel [newspaper] plant *Trud* belonging to working-men's party and destroyed it because of criticisms against Horvat [for] declaring Harbin under martial law.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2335c

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

TOKYO, July 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

Please obtain information desired for Military Intelligence Branch General Staff concerning Czecho-Slovaks, Red Guards, armed and unarmed prisoners of war as to: (1) Location of forces; (2) numerical strength; (3) movements; (4) number and make of rifles and ammunition supply; (5) artillery: number and size of guns and ammunition supply.

Inform Harris this information desired also from Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Chelyabinsk, and other places in Siberia.

POLK

File No. 763.72/10704

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, July 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 14, 2.55 p. m.]

I am reliably informed that the General Staff is urging upon the Cabinet the immediate occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops as this can be done now without offense to China because of the recent military agreement.<sup>2</sup> The plan submitted includes taking over the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Cabinet met yesterday to consider this proposal which if approved will be submitted to the Advisory Council which is to meet to-day.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2234

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

No. 2194

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1918.

SIR: Your telegram No. 4408 dated July 9, 5 p. m., transmitting an appeal to President Wilson, signed by the three Russian political organizations located in Paris, has been received.

<sup>1</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Consul at Moscow, except that the final paragraph reads as follows:

This information desired from all points of Russia that you are able to reach and especially along Volga River and Orenburg district.

<sup>2</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, pp. 106 and 222.



The President has asked the Department to be kind enough to request you to say to the gentlemen who sent him this interesting and impressive message, that he has received it and that they may rest assured that the United States is diligently endeavoring to find a way in which to give wise assistance to the Russian people.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

---

File No. 861.00/2269

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 15, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received July 16, 9.56 a. m.]

45. Local Chamber of Commerce favorably disposed toward Horvat but working classes and peasants hostile.

Siberian government has reasonably good claim to authority but its representatives appear mediocre and are not popular here. If their claims to success in establishing themselves in western and central Siberia are correct, they have good chance of becoming actual provisional government of Siberia, especially if they receive guidance and support from Allies. They do not now ask official recognition as a government but beg for support of all kinds. They can be guided to a great extent by Allied advice if Allies decide to work with them.

Referring to Harbin telegram July 6, 10 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> stating Nikolsk taken by combination Czechs and Kalmykov's [Cossacks]. This is incorrect. Czechs so far have declined accepting [omission] assistance from any party in Russia.

I consider entrance into Siberia of Harbin armed forces should be prevented because it would rouse populace against Czechs and produce civil war. Populace would believe Czechs had acted in complicity with Harbin in counter-revolutionary effort.

If satisfactory to the Department I shall make no reports on Czech military affairs, but deliver any such information I may obtain to Admiral Knight, who is reporting regularly and fully to Navy Department.

Tokyo and Peking informed.

CALDWELL

---

<sup>1</sup> See telegram from the Chargé in China, July 9, 7 p. m., *ante*, p. 273.

File No. 861.00/2275

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Tokyo, July 15, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 17, 9.53 a. m.]

Doctor Teusler<sup>1</sup> has returned from Vladivostok and reports that Czecho-Slovak forces are in immediate need of Red Cross supplies. Admiral Knight joins him in urging assistance by Japan chapter, as suggested in my telegram of July 9.<sup>2</sup>

Langdon Warner, Acting Vice Consul, Harbin, has just arrived in Tokyo after an extended trip over two months through central Siberia. He reports that German and Magyar prisoners organized by German agents finally have obtained the mastery in the central Soviet government of Siberia and thus forced the issue with the Czecho-Slovak Army. Joins with the Admiral in urging that the Allies give prompt support to enable Czechs to hold their present strategic position. There is continued activity in government circles here. It is reported that the elder statesmen will meet to-day and that another meeting of the advisory council will be held to-morrow. All the newspapers this morning contained long and apparently inspired articles alleging that definite proposals in regard to the Siberian situation have been received from our Government, looking to joint American and Japanese intervention. If correct, I would welcome information on this subject for my guidance.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2241

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1918, 6 p. m.

Yours July 9, 4 p. m.<sup>3</sup> If proposed movement of Czecho-Slovak troops takes place their starting point and destination will both be in Russian territory. They will pass through the railway zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway which is a Russian railway. Their sole purpose is to rescue their comrades from the menace of armed German and Austrian prisoners now bringing the war into Siberia. The Czecho-Slovaks were organized to fight the Central powers.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Rudolph C. Teusler, director of St. Luke's Hospital, Tokyo, and commissioner of the American Red Cross to Siberia.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 271.

This Government believes that no exception can be taken to assisting them and accordingly desires that the acquiescence and approval of the Chinese Government be sought so that they can pass over the Chinese Eastern Railway if such a movement becomes necessary.

POLK

File No. 861.00/3380

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 791

MEMORANDUM

The British Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour to inform him that the Commander of H. M. S. *Suffolk* has reported the establishment of a combined naval patrol at the entrance to the port of Vladivostok, this step having been taken partly to stop the exit or entry of enemy prisoners and agents, and partly as a demonstration of unity amongst the Allies and the Czechs. The vessels available for the patrol are, however, at present quite inadequate for the protection of the length of coast involved and it is urgently desired that further destroyers should be furnished from Japan.

His Majesty's Government have instructed the British Ambassador at Tokyo to communicate with the Japanese Government on this subject and to ask that the necessary destroyers for this purpose may be sent as soon as possible.

The British Ambassador has received instructions to bring this question to the notice of the United States Government, and to express the hope that instructions may be sent to the American representative at Tokyo to support the request made by His Majesty's Government.

WASHINGTON, *July 16, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/2385

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, *July 16, 1918.*

[*Received July 18.*]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: With the object of furthering the union movement reported from eastern Siberia and of assisting in the recruitment of military elements capable of bringing effective aid to the Czech troops, General Paris, a French officer attached to these troops at Vladivostok, has asked to have a lump-sum credit of 5,000,000 rubles immediately opened.

The Government of the Republic has given its full assent to the request and in view of the urgency has assumed the following ex-

penditures: 3,500,000 rubles for the upkeep of the Czecho-Slovak troops; 250,000 rubles for the recruiting of soldiers who would join the Czechs.

Believing that the extension of financial aid to those Bohemian contingents that are fighting in Siberia in the cause of the Allies is an urgent necessity, my Government would be glad if the Federal Government would also agree to opening the aforesaid credit and in that case would kindly direct the payment of its quota to be effected without delay either at Peking or Tokyo.

I should be very thankful to your excellency if you would kindly let me know whether the American Government is disposed to accede to this proposition of the French Government.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

File No. 861.00/2467

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

No. 2150

PEKING, July 16, 1918.

[Received August 12.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram of July 12, 5 p. m., on the subject of General Horvat's proclamation of the establishment of a provisional Siberian government on the 9th instant, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch on that subject, addressed to the Legation by the Consulate at Harbin under date of the 12th instant.<sup>1</sup>

In this connection, I have to report that late in the evening of July 11, the Russian Minister communicated to me a French translation of a telegram addressed to him by General Horvat, embodying the substance of this proclamation, which telegram, it may be remarked, was dated as early as July 3.

It is also to be noted that the program of General Horvat's government, as set forth in this telegram to the Russian Legation here, and as communicated in my telegram above cited, did not include the twelfth item as given in the proclamation published in Harbin, of which the translation is enclosed with Mr. Moser's despatch, this item reading as follows:

12. Right of autonomy of Siberia and other provinces to be acknowledged, on condition that the unity of Russia be preserved.

On the morning of the 12th instant, the British Minister called a meeting of certain of his colleagues—the French, Japanese and Russian Ministers, and myself—to consider the situation created by

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

General Horvat's action, with particular reference to its effect upon the transfer of Czecho-Slovak troops from the Maritime Region to assist their fellow nationals in western Siberia. The Russian Minister was apparently disposed to urge, though somewhat diffidently, General Horvat's claim to the support of the Allied Governments, but was persuaded to concur with his colleagues in the opinion that General Horvat must be induced to refrain from any action which might impede the movements of the Czecho-Slovaks. The French Minister was particularly insistent that the Allied Ministers should decline to recognize any of the pretensions of General Horvat, an opinion in which his British and Japanese colleagues concurred, the Japanese Minister stating his conviction that General Horvat should be removed as an obstacle to the proposed transfer of the Czecho-Slovak troops, although the Japanese Government would thereafter regard with indifference the establishment of General Horvat's or any other government in eastern Siberia.

In the absence of instructions, I did not feel warranted in taking any part in the decision reached. That decision, as reported in my telegram above cited, was to send to General Horvat, through the Russian Minister, but in the names of the British, French, and Japanese Ministers, a telegram to the following effect:

The representatives of Great Britain, Japan, and France, being in receipt of telegrams from their respective consuls at Vladivostok pointing out the danger of civil strife which may result from the proclamation of General Horvat and which may prevent the passage of the Czechs through Manchuria, which is all important and has a purely military object directed against the Germans, advise General Horvat to withdraw his proclamation and return to Harbin so as to facilitate the passage of the Czechs over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Ministers beg General Horvat to be good enough to favor them with a prompt reply to their communication.

At the present time, telegraphic communications with Siberia (except Vladivostok) are interrupted; and it is not known whether General Horvat has in fact received the telegram sent in the names of the three Allied Ministers. I am to-day informed by the French Minister, however, that the Russian Legation received on the 14th instant a further telegram from General Horvat, stating that he would not oppose the transfer of the Czecho-Slovak troops from eastern to western Siberia. It has not thus far been possible for the Legation to obtain any information, supplementing that embodied in the telegram from Harbin, which was repeated to the Department by me, July 12, 7 p. m., as to the support apparently given to General Horvat by the Japanese.

I have [etc.]

J. V. A. MACMURRAY

American Proposals for Military Action, July 17, 1918; Discussion with the Japanese and British Governments—Chinese Request for Participation—Rivalry of Local Organizations

File No. 861.00/3054b

*The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the Allied Governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact.

In full agreement with the Allied Governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the Allied Governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense program which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object.

In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other

field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requests its associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere.

It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander in Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by the armies of the United States.

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It can not, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immedi-

ate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola, and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw those forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its associates.

It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the Allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and



only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.

WASHINGTON, *July 17, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/2288

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *July 17, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[*Received July 18, 9.45 a. m.*]

51. Department's July 13, 5 p. m. No communication with Harris or any point interior Siberia since June 29, 9 a. m., but following is most accurate information obtainable here:

1 and 2. There are 2,000 Czechs here and 12,000 along railway for 150 miles towards Khabarovsk; between Volga River bridge and vicinity of Irkutsk there are 40,000 plus uncertain number prisoners from prison camps estimated from 5,000 to 20,000.

3. Movement in west is toward Irkutsk in effort to reach Vladivostok *en route* to France. Movement here is toward Khabarovsk and thence to Irkutsk in effort to effect junction with, and rescue Czechs west of that point. Until object attained both bodies must retain control of present positions and railway over which they have passed. They prefer to go via Chinese Eastern Railway if permission of China can be secured.

4. Czechs in this section have 10,000 Japanese rifles, 40 machine guns, 3,000,000 cartridges, and unknown number Russian three-line rifles without much ammunition for them; western group have unknown number Russian three-line rifles and machine guns and such ammunition as they have been able to capture, quantity being entirely unknown here.

5. Czechs this section have 6 Japanese three-inch mountain guns with 1,000 shells and 7 old Russian three-inch guns without sufficient ammunition.

## RED ARMY AND RED GUARDS

1. They are located south of Khabarovsk to eradicate Czechs, on Chita front, facing [Udinsk?], and between Irkutsk and Volga River against western group of Czechs.

2. There are about 10,000 east of Irkutsk, possibly 20,000 in western Siberia, and unknown number west of Ural Mountains.

3. Movement is east to Khabarovsk and south toward Nikolsk, west from Chita toward Irkutsk and probably east from European Russia toward Volga River.

4. They have Russian three-line rifles and abundant ammunition at Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Novo Nikolaevsk, and Omsk which has been seized by Czechs.

5. They have 80 to 120 three-inch field guns of which about 40 are on Khabarovsk front, 30 to 50 on [Udinsk?] front, and remainder at and west of Irkutsk; 8 to 20 six-inch guns and abundant ammunition for all guns.

Answers 3, 4, and 5 under this heading include also armed prisoners of war as separate figures can not be given for them.

## ARMED AND UNARMED PRISONERS OF WAR

Following data were delivered confidentially and in good faith furnished Consul Macgowan May 28 by . . . Vice Consul at Irkutsk:

1 and 2. In Priamur district about 10,000 war prisoners, number each nationality not given; in remainder Siberia 150,000 Austro-Hungarians and 13,000 Germans. Prisoners not more than 5 per cent armed before Czechs came except in Omsk where movement began.

Up to June not more than 5,000 armed prisoners known to have passed Irkutsk eastward at which time they were ostensibly Bolshevik international, principally fighting class war, but now they include nationally loyal Hungarians and Germans, fighting Czechs only and their army has greatly increased. Illustrating this: at Irkutsk before clash with Czechs May 26 there were few armed prisoners from local camp, and officers apparently opposed movement, but within two weeks Consul General Harris telegraphed Irkutsk was in hands of 3,000 armed prisoners of war under their own officers. At same time Soviet leaders at several places stated they would arm every prisoner in Siberia rather than lose power. Since middle June no reliable information from west of Khabarovsk but coalitions of [from conditions at] that point it appears one-fourth to one-half prisoners are armed against the Czechs. On this basis there must be not less than 50,000 war prisoners in Siberia armed or who can be armed, of whom 15,000 to 27,000 east of Irkutsk.

Local Czech information service supplies following, dated July 14: Forces opposing Czechs north of Nikolsk 4,000 prisoners and 1,000 [garbled groups], 10,000 Hungarians and Germans from Khabarovsk. Enemy received artillery reinforcements including six-inch howitzers. Instructions have been given to increase output Khabarovsk arsenal and remove cannon from Amur River gunboats for use against Czechs. Forcible recruiting of the peasants and even of Chinese and Koreans reported. Czechs claim to have documentary proof of wide participation of Hungarian and German prisoners in command of Red Army and also anti-Ally agitation.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2275

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your July 15, 5 p. m., last two sentences. The American Government has communicated through the Japanese Ambassador here a proposal to Japan that the United States and Japan each send a small contingent of 7,000 men to assist the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, this to be followed by an economic mission.

The British and French Ambassadors were informed. The Japanese will have the high command. No reply as yet from Japan. The plans for an economic mission are temporarily held in abeyance pending result of above.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2266

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

Repeat to Tokyo your July 13, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Please say to Minister for Foreign Affairs that the American Government would view with regret any attempt by China to take advantage of Russia's present distress to regain control of the Chinese Eastern Railway as reported in above-mentioned telegram. The American Government fears such action now would arouse resentment in Russian people and defeat our common desire to assist them.

POLK

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 280. See also the Chargé's telegram of July 12, ante, p. 278.

File No. 861.00/2289

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 8.34 p. m.]

52. Local representatives of provisional government of autonomous Siberia have presented notes to local Allied consuls asking them to transmit to their respective Governments request for Allied military intervention in Siberia and Russia, with the object of interning Austrian and German war prisoners and establishing new Russian front against Germany. They express entire willingness to furnish Russian force to cooperate with Allied army provided intervention does not violate territorial sovereignty of Russia which Siberian government considers its duty to restrain [retain].

Allied consuls mutually agreed forward above to their Governments.

Tokyo and Peking informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2634

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

No. 262

VLADIVOSTOK, July 19, 1918.

[Received September 4.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the provisional government of autonomous Siberia in which is enclosed a declaration of that government in regard to its establishment and its rights in Siberian territory.

I have [etc.]

JOHN K. CALDWELL

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Declaration of the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia relative to the Establishment of its Power over the Territory of Siberia*

The provisional government of autonomous Siberia has the honor to bring to the knowledge of the powers friendly to Russia, both Allied and neutral, that on June 29, new style, it assumed central governmental power over the territory of Siberia.

It raises its flag at a political moment of sorrow to Russia but nevertheless realizing the seriousness and responsibilities of the position taken by it for the purpose of restoring political order in Siberia and thus starting the reconstitution of united Russia into a democratic federal republic competent to enter as a substantial unit the ranks of the powers that are fighting for the triumph of democratic principles in international relations.

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 10, 1918; not printed.

The immediate aim of the government of Siberia is now to convene a regional assembly of Siberia and to prepare to convene the national representative assembly of Siberia which, elected by universal suffrage, will set up, in perfect accord with the Pan-Russian Constituent Assembly, the form of government in Siberia, as an inseparable part of the Russian Republic.

In order to secure the conditions needed for the accomplishment of the above-stated purposes, the provisional government regards it as its foremost duty to restore the government organs and institutions suppressed by the Soviet government and first of all, the Zemstvos and municipalities; it also regards it as its duty to place under adequate guarantees personal liberty and private ownership rights. To these ends the provisional government of autonomous Siberia will instantly take measures tending to the revival of the laws existing prior to October 25 [/November 7], 1917, and to the repeal of the laws and decrees enacted under the Bolshevik rule. At the same time, the provisional government of autonomous Siberia deems it necessary to affirm by means of a special act the points gained by the revolution with regard to occupational freedom; it further deems it necessary to promote by all available means the commerce and industry of Siberia by creating conditions favorable to the development of cooperative enterprise and private initiative; government control will be established to thwart possible speculation.

The provisional government assumed the central government power after being vested with authority therefor by the Regional Duma of Siberia constituted on the basis of representation from the Zemstvos, the municipalities, national organizations of the people of Siberia, Cossacks, Council of Peasants' Deputies, labor and cooperative associations, higher schools, etc.

The provisional government of autonomous Siberia is recognized as the lawful power in western Siberia where its functions are temporarily exercised—until the seat of the government is transferred—by the emissaries of western Siberia, who are Messrs. Lindberg, Mikhailov, Sidorov and Grishin. In the Maritime Province the legality of the powers of the government of Siberia has likewise been acknowledged in resolutions of the executive committee of the Zemstvos and the municipality and in motions adopted by the several organizations of the city of Vladivostok whose political tenets are based on the principle of universal suffrage and of calling the Pan-Russian Constituent Assembly and lastly by the several political parties; viz., the Social Democratic Party (united Mensheviks), Socialist-Revolutionist, and the Labor (People's Socialist) Party.

The provisional government of autonomous Siberia has every reason to believe that as the anti-governmental elements which are carrying on their destructive work in some parts of the Far East are eliminated, it will easily be acknowledged by the people, as it has already been in central and western Siberia. At the same time the government expresses a hope that the armed forces which have heretofore operated in the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway, fighting for the principles of a reorganization of the Russian state, will now turn the task over to the lawful government and desist from independent action.

The provisional government of autonomous Siberia makes no pretense of hiding from the friendly powers and the people that there were a few gaps in the membership of the Regional Duma of Siberia which elected it but the conditions under which the elections were held admitted of no other course.

The provisional government of autonomous Siberia expresses a hope that the governments of the friendly powers will not lay stress on those imperfections which do not injuriously affect the principles of its legal authority since

the majority of the Siberian people have endorsed and recognized the elected government.

The provisional government regrets to acknowledge that representatives of the *bourgeois* classes were temporarily absent from the Regional Duma, deeming as it does that a union of all the classes of the people in the supreme organ of government is indispensable.

Unwilling however to overstep the powers that were ascribed to it by changing, of its own motion, the principles of election to and representation in the Regional Duma, the provisional government feels bound to give to the non-represented part of the population the formal assurance that it will introduce into the Regional Duma, at its first session, a bill for the immediate completion of the membership of the Duma.

With regard to its own make-up the government has decided to perfect it at once and without delay by admitting on terms of equality delegates of the non-represented classes so as to impart to it a wholly national character.

Under the resolutions passed at the meeting of the representatives of Siberia on the 15th [28th] of December 1917 and confirmed by the Regional Duma of Siberia on January 28 [February 10], 1918, Siberia is to be regarded as an autonomous province of the Russian Federative Republic, and by the same token the provisional government of autonomous Siberia solemnly declares that it regards it as its foremost and imperative duty to safeguard the interests of Russia as a whole throughout Siberia and acknowledges as binding upon itself all the international treaties and conventions of Russia with the friendly powers in force up to October 25 [November 7], 1917.

The foregoing declaration makes it clear that the provisional government of autonomous Siberia can not recognize any of the treaties negotiated by the Council of Commissioners of the People and, first of all, the Brest Litovsk peace treaty.

At the same time the provisional government declares that any legislative, administrative, or international act of any organization whatever claiming authority on the territory of Siberia shall be considered to be null and void.

The provisional government considering Siberia to be inseparable part of one great Russia, in a state of war against the coalition of the Central powers of Europe, declares its main, paramount aim to be the regeneration of Russia and resumption of hostilities against the Austro-German coalition, in full accord with the Allied powers and with a view to an international peace founded on true democratic principles. To that end, the provisional government of autonomous Siberia, while organizing volunteer military units, is already engaged in realizing the general plan of creating in Siberia a new army governed by the principles of strict non-political discipline.

In the first place, in carrying out its firm will to resume the fight against the German coalition, the provisional government considers itself in duty bound to take active measures against the hostile acts of the prisoners of war who have organized themselves into a vanguard of the Austro-German armed forces in Siberian territory.

Conformably to that decision the provisional government is taking measures to disarm in every section free from the Soviet authority and send back to concentration camps all the prisoners of war found in Siberia.

The provisional government of autonomous Siberia considering in a general way all independent action taken without its consent by any armed forces whatsoever within the territory of Siberia as being contrary to the principles

of international law, recognizes nevertheless the action of Czecho-Slovak detachments as an act of self-defense against hostile attempts on their independence.

The common sentiments of Slavic relationship and the purely strategic problems which actuate the Czecho-Slovaks, force upon the provisional government an understanding with the Czecho-Slovak National Council permitting military operations of its forces within Siberia so long as the said operations will be necessary in promoting the struggle against Germanic penetration into Siberia.

All the above-stated considerations and the program of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia as above outlined justify its hope that the governments of the Allied powers will recognize its program as meeting in every respect the demands of public law that may confront a new government and will therefore not fail to take into consideration the general interests of the friendly powers and the interests of autonomous Siberia as an integral part of Russia and to express their confidence in and recognition of the government of autonomous Siberia.

*President of the Council of Ministers:* P. DERBER

*Members of the Council of Ministers:*

VICTOR TIBER-PETROV

Illegible<sup>1</sup>

NIKOLAI ZHERNAKOV

V. MORAVSKI

Illegible<sup>1</sup>

A. KRAKOVETSKI

ALEXANDER TRUTNEV

ARKADI PETROV

*Secretary of State:* Illegible<sup>1</sup>

[July 8, 1918.]

File No. 861.00/2322

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia (Derber) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Translation]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 19, 1918.

[Received July 23.]

Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia as follows:

In compliance with the provisions of the declaration of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia under date of July 8 to the friendly powers and on the ground of a special decision of the government under date of July 15, I have the honor of begging you to bring to the knowledge of your Government the desire of the provisional government of autonomous Siberia to strengthen the relations of friendship which exist between our two countries by uniting as soon as possible our military forces before the menace of the common enemies. Our respective governments must understand the consequences of the further advance of the Austro-German forces

<sup>1</sup> The Consul's comment.

in the heart of Russia and of Siberia, especially when a great number of prisoners of war are in Siberia and Russia already occasioning uneasiness by their independent actions toward that end and owing to the fact that one may conceive how difficult it will be to mobilize all the forces of Russia, in a more or less near future. The provisional government of autonomous Siberia has instructed me to ask you to ascertain and to communicate to it, through me, the views and the intentions of your Government upon the possible organization, with the aid of the Allied military forces, of a new Russo-German front. The provisional government of autonomous Siberia expresses the firm confidence that the real intentions of your Government will be welcomed by it with the liveliest interest provided the common problems are settled without impairment of the territorial sovereignty of Russia which the provisional government of autonomous Siberia believes it is its duty to safeguard. I hope for my part that the gravity of the situation will constrain our two governments immediately to enter into *pourparlers* for the examination of the conditions for common action aiming at a settlement of the common problems herein referred to. I take the liberty of expressing the firm hope that you will be so obliging as to acquaint me, in the near future, with the reply of your Government.

For the Minister :

ARKADI PETROV

File No. 86100/2262

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1918, 3 a. m.

Repeat to Peking your July 13, 5 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

Please make occasion to say discreetly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the American Government has heard the rumors mentioned in your telegram and that of Japan's promised support to Horvat mentioned in Harbin's July 9, 2 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> but is not disposed to credit them. You may add that the American Government trusts that the Imperial Japanese Government shares its opinion that a military occupation of Manchuria would arouse deep resentment in Russia which would be greatly increased by any appearance of support by the Allies of plans to restore the monarchy. The American Government believes the Japanese Government will agree that such

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 281.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram from the Chargé in China, July 12, 7 p. m., *ante*, p. 278.



a feeling of resentment would defeat the desire of the United States and Japan to aid in the rehabilitation of Russia and to reenlist her people in the war against our common enemy. The American Government is not prepared at this time to support any of the factions claiming to govern Siberia. If the Japanese Government shares this feeling I shall be glad to know whether they will be disposed to take steps to correct the statement of General Horvat that he has the promise of Japanese support.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/2307

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 20, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 20, 3.10 p. m.]

Chinese Legation at Tokyo has been informed in behalf of the Japanese Government that the United States has requested Japan to land forces at Vladivostok, each nation furnishing 7,000 troops; and that Japan would decide upon that invitation without consulting China, as the military action so proposed is not considered by Japan as coming within the contemplation of the recent military agreement between Japan and China. This information was informally conveyed to me by a representative of the Premier, who stated that this Government is disposed to offer participation with approximately 7,000 troops in the military operations proposed and who further intimated that the Chinese Government would for that purpose welcome such an invitation from the United States as had been given to Japan. I discouraged this suggestion, pointing out that our Government has heretofore had under consideration with Japan the whole question of action in Siberia so that in that case there exists a basis for what might perhaps be described as an invitation, whereas no such basis exists *vis-à-vis* [China]; and I furthermore intimated a doubt whether our Government would be disposed to take any initiative in respect to military cooperation by China which might be construed as ignoring the relationship established by the recent Sino-Japanese convention.

I beg to request instructions as to the attitude which the Legation should take towards the proposed participation by China in any joint military operations which may be undertaken.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2306

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 20, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received 11.20 p. m.]

My telegram July 20, 4 p. m. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs now advises me that the Cabinet to-day decided to dispatch to Vladivostok by the Chinese Eastern Railway 1,000 troops immediately and probably a further 1,000 in the near future. This decision to participate in the military operations is to be communicated to you and to the British, French, and Japanese Governments through the diplomatic channel. Upon the announcement of this decision to the Japanese Minister, he urged that such participation is unnecessary and that Chinese apprehend that Japan may offer objections to proposed action. Chinese Minister at Washington is being specially instructed to urge upon you the advisability of Chinese cooperation with the Allies and to bespeak your assistance in such difficulties as may be raised by Japan.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2309

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 20, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received 9.30 p. m.]

Your telegram July 18, 5 p. m. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that the Chinese Government has no intention of attempting to oust Russians from the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He states however that two days ago such a course was strongly urged upon the Foreign Office by a representative of "a certain nation," obviously meaning Japan.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2340½

*Memorandum of Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chinese Minister (Koo)*

July 23, 1918.

The Chinese Minister called to-day and said that his Government was desirous of being represented in any Allied body of troops which

might go into Siberia. He asked for some definite information about the proposal which had been made to Japan. I gave him no additional information but told him that this Government would be very glad to consider any suggestions his Government might care to make, but that it being a military matter in which the different Allies were represented the inclusion of China in a military contingent would have to be referred to the Inter-Allied Military Conference in France.

He said that his Government probably would make the request to have one or two thousand troops associated with the military body and would take it up with America, Japan, England, and Italy.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

File No. 861.00/2341

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, July 23, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received July 25, 11.10 a. m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs called at the Embassy last night. I took this occasion to advise him informally of your views in reference to a military occupation of Manchuria, as instructed in your telegram July 19, 3 a. m. He again expressed his clear conviction that a patrol of troops along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Trans-Siberian Railway as far as Karymskaya was a military necessity. He confirmed my advices that the Twelfth Division is prepared to embark for Vladivostok and the Eighth Division is prepared to embark for Harbin to protect the railway. The present plan is to send the Vladivostok expedition first and to follow with the Harbin expedition between two and four weeks later. He admitted that the Japanese Government had given aid to Horvat, but authorized me to assure you that Japan had made no promise of further support and Japan would pledge herself not to support any group or interfere in the internal politics of Siberia. He added that Ishii had informed him of the contents of our Government's statement handed to the Allied Ambassadors in Washington and he expressed entire sympathy with our attitude toward Russia and our proposed efforts to render economic assistance. He hoped that our Government could see its way clear to cooperate for the assistance of the Czecho-Slovaks in the slightly modified manner suggested in his Government's reply to the American proposals.

In response to my inquiry whether he felt at liberty to give his views as to the future of the present Ministry, concerning which

many wild rumors in circulation, he stated that the Premier had definitely decided to continue in office if the American reply to the Japanese suggestions was favorable, otherwise he would resign on the ground that his efforts to bring the policy of Japan into full accord with that of the United States had failed. He referred to the recent request of the Chinese Government to participate in any action in Siberia and expressed his opinion that the request should as a matter of policy receive favorable consideration.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/2358½

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President*

*July 24, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Japanese Ambassador came in this afternoon and gave me orally the answer of the Japanese Government to the proposals in regard to sending troops to Vladivostok. He said that his Government for political reasons could not bind itself to limit the force to 7,000 as it would be said by the people of Japan, and particularly the opposition, that the limitation was being imposed because of lack of confidence in Japan and its motives. He said of course his Government knew the limitation was not suggested for any such reason, but the political situation in Japan was such that the acceptance of this limitation would be used against the Government, and therefore, much to their regret, they could not accept it.

He assured me it was not his Government's intention to send a large number of troops, but he said that the Japanese Government was convinced that the forces proposed would be too small adequately to protect the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks. He said he had learned from his military attaché that his Government would send a division which, on a peace footing, would be about 12,000 men, with the understanding that the number of troops that they would send would depend on the amount of resistance that they met from the Bolsheviks, Austrian, and German prisoners.

I tried to argue with him as to limiting the number to 7,000 but without success. He reiterated that there was no misunderstanding on the part of the Government of our motives in making the limitation, but they were afraid of public opinion.

He read me a copy of the declaration which they proposed to make, stating that his Government felt that separate declarations would be better than a joint declaration. I enclose a copy of the declara-

tion.<sup>1</sup> I told the Ambassador that I would communicate with you and he would hear from me very shortly.

I suppose the number of troops they intend to send now is not as important as their reserving the right to send more later. He said at the end of the interview that when we were in agreement we could then arrange with the Entente Governments for their participation.

Yours faithfully,

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 861.00/2352

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 24, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received July 25, 5.30 a. m.]

61. Consul Jenkins, Khabarovsk, writes July 15 Bolsheviks tried get cooperation Swedish [Red Cross] representative in arming war prisoners, but Jenkins believed Swedish [Red Cross] representative and large majority prisoners opposed to taking arms, fearing they will be killed by Czechs if taken with arms. Prisoners Khabarovsk had not been armed the 15th. Jenkins noted entire apathy between these [of the] workingmen, disinclination Red Guards to fight. Yet Bolshevik leaders grasping every straw even trying to persuade Chinese Koreans to take arms and seemed determined to make no further stands against Czechs. Jenkins observed few troops city except Hungarian and not so many Hungarians. Bolsheviks treated foreigners courteously permitting wounded Czechs to depart by Amur for Nikolaevsk and, on Jenkins's request, issuing permits for departure of British and French for Harbin via Sungari. Tobin-son, known here as Krasnoshchekov, former resident Chicago, now president Khabarovsk Bolshevik organization. In the course of conversation with Jenkins displayed much bitterness against the Allies, particularly America, threatening to summon Germany if the Allies enter Siberia. Krasnoshchekov admitted decided local op-

<sup>1</sup> Identical with the copy handed to the Acting Secretary, Aug. 2, as published in Japan on that date (*post*, p. 324), excepting the first two sentences of the second paragraph, which read as follows:

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies and having regard at the same time to the special position of Japan, have decided to proceed at once to dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok and, if called for by the further exigencies of the situation, another detachment will eventually be ordered to operate and to maintain order along the Siberian Railway.

position to Bolsheviks and Jenkins supposed there is a secret organization with the object of revolting when Czechs arrive. Jenkins's observations confined to Khabarovsk whereas concentration of troops is reported at a village ten miles south.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/2336

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 24, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 24, 4.53 p. m.]

Foreign Office unofficially advises me that Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Chinese Minister in Tokyo that the Allies contemplate sending Czecho-Slovaks from neighborhood of Vladivostok to western Siberia by either Amur or Chinese Eastern Railway or by both; that Japan has proposed to the United States that Allied forces cover their rear and establish patrols on the railways; that in any event the Japanese forces would establish such railway patrols and in the communication line through Manchuria would expect approval of the Chinese Government in view of the existing military convention, although forces of other nations would, of course, have to obtain the specific consent of China for that purpose. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs professed his surprise that the Allies were not willing to rely upon Chinese protection of the railway within Chinese territory. I replied that while uninformed of the plans for the expedition I conceived it entirely possible that there was an intention to give to all phases of such military action as might be undertaken a purely international character.

MACMURRAY

---

File No. 861.00/2351½

*Memorandum of Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chinese Minister (Koo)*

July 25, 1918.

The Chinese Minister called to ask about the reply we had received from Japan which he said he saw in the morning paper had been received.

I told him that I was not at liberty to indicate to him its nature. He expressed considerable regret because he would be unable to advise his Government, stating that they had every desire to cooperate with this Government and to follow any policy this Government might outline, but that they could best do that if they were advised of

the plans, intentions, and advices received by this Government. He said that his Government had not been advised at the time the plan was submitted to Japan and that he had hoped that he would be taken into our confidence at this time. He asked what information he could send his Government. I replied that I could only indicate that he would be able to say that we had received a reply but did not feel it to be advisable to communicate it to anybody at this time.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

---

File No. 861.00/2356½

*Memorandum of Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chinese Minister (Koo)*

*July 26, 1918.*

The Chinese Minister called this afternoon at my request. I told him that it was rumored from Peking that, by the recent military convention with Japan,<sup>1</sup> China might have committed herself to delegate control of that part of the Chinese Eastern Railroad which lies within Chinese territory to some other government; that if it did not appear exactly on the face of the military convention it might be inferred from the terms of the convention that such was the case. I told him that this Government felt it would be advisable, in case there should be a military operation of an Allied character in Siberia, that the Chinese Government should control that part of the Chinese Eastern Railroad which lies within Chinese territory, and should control it alone. I informed him that we were cabling this information to our representative in Peking and that we desired him to be informed of it.

He stated that the military convention itself did not authorize or warrant such a delegation of control, but provided that the original terms of the railroad agreement should be carried out. I pointed out to him that those terms of the military convention which provided that China and Japan, through their military representatives, should agree as to the details of any particular operation made it possible for those military representatives to agree to this operation and, if agreed to, it would be controlling and that it was rumored and had been reported to us that this probably was in contemplation.

He said that he would cable his Government recommending that they should act alone and assume control.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

---

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, pp. 106 and 222.

File No. 861.00/2357½

*Memorandum of Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chinese Minister (Koo)*

*July 26, 1918.*

In the course of the conversation had with the Chinese Minister to-day he referred to the subject of China's participation in any military force that might be sent into Siberia and argued that such military participation and control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad were integral parts of an aggressive activity which China would like to contribute to the Allied cause. He also hinted that it would have a good political effect on the internal affairs of China if the people had some force operating outside the Chinese border and had some definite and concrete action in conjunction with the Allies. He urged it further upon the ground that it would give China a standing amongst the other nations of the world which she did not have without it and which would be magnified if there was a military action in territory immediately adjoining her by governments with which she was associated in the war against Germany.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

---

File No. 861.00/2336

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your July 24, 5 p. m. It is felt that it would be entirely appropriate that China should guard the lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway within Manchuria and that she should act alone in so doing.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/7412

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[Copies of the following paraphrase of a telegram and of the draft proclamation were handed by the Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State on July 27, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

*July 25, 1918.*

I am to-day telegraphing to you the draft of a proclamation which has been prepared by a committee of experts having an intimate acquaintance with Russia. The committee believe that the proposed proclamation is an effective and suitable method of explaining the policy of the Allies to the Russian people themselves.



You are authorized to communicate the draft to the Secretary of State and to ask his views upon it.<sup>1</sup>

#### DRAFT PROCLAMATION

Peoples of Russia! Your Allies have not forgotten you. We remember all the services which you heroically rendered us in the early years of the war, and we are coming to your help. We are coming as friends to save you from dismemberment and disaster at the hands of Germany who is trying to enslave your people and to use the great resources of your country for their own ends.

But we wish solemnly to assure you that while our troops are entering Russia to assist you in your struggle against Germany, we shall not retain one foot of your territory. We deplore the civil war that divides you, and internal dissensions that facilitate German plans of conquest. The destinies of Russia are in the hands of the Russian people. It is for them and for them alone to decide their form of government and to find a solution for their social problems.

Peoples of Russia! Your very existence as an independent nation is at stake; the liberties you have won in revolution are threatened with extinction by the iron hand of Germany. Rally round the banner of freedom and independence that we, who are still your Allies, are raising in your midst, and secure the triumphs of those two great principles without which there can be no lasting peace or real liberty for the world.

Peoples of Russia! We want not only to stem the German penetration, but to bring economic relief to you and your country. Supplies accompany the military expedition, and there are more to follow. It is our wish to aid the development of the industrial and national resources of your country, not to exploit them for ourselves, to restore the exchange of goods, to stimulate agriculture, to reestablish Russia's commercial integrity and to enable you to take your rightful place amongst the free nations of the world. All your chief allies are represented in the force that is coming to help you. As the Allies are united in defence of their ideals of liberty on the battle fronts of the West, so that [they] are united in their desire to deliver Russia from the German yoke.

Peoples of Russia! Unite with us in defence of your liberties. Our one desire is to see Russia strong and free, and then to retire and watch the Russian people work out its destinies in accordance with the free expression of the wishes of the people.

File No. 861.00/2424a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

For your information: Japanese Ambassador called on Wednesday and presented reply of his Government to proposals in regard to expedition to Siberia to assist Czechs. He said that his Government feared a limitation on the number to be sent would be misconstrued by Japanese people and considered evidence of lack of con-

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum attached to the above reads as follows:

July 29, 1918. According to the President's [telephone] conversation, sent for Mr. Barclay and told him we think this proposal was inadvisable for many reasons and particularly because it promises too much to the Russians. We could not agree with the suggestion at all. F. L. P[olk].

fidence. Said he had understood from his military attaché that his Government was considering sending division on peace footing. At present his Government also felt that the force was inadequate and therefore as reinforcements would have to be sent it was inadvisable for that reason also to place any limit on the force. Presented form of statement which their Government would give out when the matter was settled.

This statement spoke of the "special position of Japan." On the 25th I told the Ambassador that his answer was a new proposal. This Government felt limitation as to numbers was essential in order to create the proper impression on the Russian mind. Any indefiniteness as to the number of troops would create the impression of a large expedition for the purpose of interfering with Russian internal affairs, which would be most unfortunate. Assured him we had utmost confidence in Japanese motives and in no way wished to interfere with their field of action, and if they and the other Allies considered it necessary for military reasons to have a large expedition we would be compelled to withdraw as that was not our plan. I said we had no objection to their sending more troops than we did, indicating a maximum of 10,000 or 12,000, the question to be discussed after the expedition had landed as to whether this force was adequate. If the Japanese and other powers felt the force to be inadequate we could then decide whether we would wish to go on with them or withdraw. He was informed that we were bending all our energies on the western front in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council and it was impossible for us to supply or finance an expedition of any size in the East. This was a material factor.

In regard to "special interest," the Ambassador was informed Department felt that in view of declaration in Lansing-Ishii agreement, and in view of the fact that they would have supreme command and larger number of troops than all the other powers put together, this declaration was unnecessary, and further than that, this assertion would be apt to create a misunderstanding in the minds of the Russian people and would be seized on by the Germans as having much greater significance than was intended.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2357

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 27, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 27, 3.05 p. m.]

In reply to Russian Minister's inquiry as to the position this Legation would take in regard to the recommendation of the Allied

consuls at Vladivostok that General Horvat be advised not to proceed to Vladivostok unless as a private citizen or chief of the railway, I stated that under my instructions, I did not feel competent to express any views in regard to the political activities of General Horvat or of any other faction in Siberia. In view of the suspicions of a monarchical tendency in his movement, does the Department desire any modification of this attitude?

MACMURRAY

---

File No. 861.00/2359

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 27, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received July 28, 1.50 a. m.]

My telegram of July 24, 5 p. m. A memorandum from the Foreign Office announces that the Chinese Government consents that the Czecho-Slovak Army shall enjoy unrestricted freedom in the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

MACMURRAY

---

File No. 861.00/2421

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1918.

[Received July 31.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Referring to my note of the 16th instant relative to the advances of money needed by the Czech troops in Siberia, I have the honor to inform your excellency that it appears from information since then received by the Embassy that the sum of 3,500,000 rubles already paid by us is not included in the present application and was delivered by us to the Czech units in Siberia as elements of the Czecho-Slovak national army organized through us.

The sum to be paid by the three countries concerned (France, United States, Great Britain) is 5,000,000 rubles, namely, one third for each country. For its part the French Government immediately paid, on account of the urgency of the case, the 250,000 rubles mentioned in my above-referred-to correspondence for the recruiting of soldiers of other nationalities who are to join the Czechs.

Be pleased [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

File No. 861.00/2983

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*

No. 8

IRKUTSK, July 29, 1918.

[Received October 1.]

SIR: I have the honor to make the following further report concerning the actions of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.

On July 11 the Czech and Cossack troops captured the city of Irkutsk practically without resistance, the Red Guard and Bolsheviks having retired from the city the day before, after having blown up the bridge over the Irkut River. Preceding this event a number of things happened which are worthy of mention.

On June 14, a few days after my return from Novo Nikolaevsk, as reported in my No. 7,<sup>1</sup> an attempt was made in the city of Irkutsk to overthrow the Bolsheviks and the Red Guard, the latter consisting chiefly of armed prisoners of war. It is claimed that the attacking party of the White Guard consisted of about one thousand men. It appears, from all the facts at hand, that the main object of this attack, was to release about one hundred Russian officers from the prison situated in the north of the city. These prisoners consisted chiefly of anti-Bolsheviks and political prisoners who were all adherents of the various parties who tried to overthrow the Bolsheviks. If the liberation of these prisoners was the real object of the attacking party, then they fully succeeded in carrying their object. One party of revolutionaries made a feint attack on the bridge near the railroad station, and after killing a few of the guards stationed there, and drawing a considerable force of the Bolsheviks to the south of the city, they withdrew. In the meantime the main body of the White Guard made a determined attack on the prison to the north of the city. Here they met with practically no resistance. The prison was taken and the Commissar in command and his two assistants were killed. The Russian officers in the jail were all released and they immediately joined the White Guard. The criminals incarcerated in the jail were not released. The revolutionaries, or White Guard, then took possession of some of the workshops on the northern outskirts of the city, but were only able to hold them temporarily. Factory whistles summoned the Red Guard from all parts of the city to arms, this having been agreed upon as the signal in case of attack. Inasmuch as these workshops, which had been appointed as a place of meeting for the Red Guard of the Bolsheviks, were temporarily held by the White Guard, each assembling member of the Red Guard was relieved of his rifle and ammunition

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

as he approached. A considerable quantity of arms and ammunition must have been collected by the revolutionaries in this way.

A fight for the possession of the northern suburbs of the city and the prison took place between the revolutionary forces and the Red Guard between the hours of 4 and 9 in the morning. The forces of the Red Guard were augmented by large numbers of armed German and Austrian prisoners, some of whom were partly clad in the uniforms of their respective countries, while others appeared in the uniforms of the Red Guard. These armed prisoners were, in fact, the strongest element among the Red Guard from that date until the occupation of the city by the Czechs, in complete charge of all responsible posts in Irkutsk. The military motor cars were all under the command of armed prisoners. The White Guard not being able to withstand the heavy machine-gun fire of the Red Guard was compelled to withdraw to the north of the city about 9 o'clock.

On the 15th of June I had a conversation with Yansen and Geyzman, the Commissars of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet here in Irkutsk, concerning this uprising, and was informed by them that the attempt to overthrow the Bolsheviki authorities had been previously communicated to them, and they were thus enabled to meet and insure the failure of the movement by a wise disposition of the Red Guard troops.

As the Czech echelons advanced nearer to Irkutsk the Bolsheviks made every preparation to evacuate the city. The so-called central Siberian government was the first to go, taking up its headquarters at Verkhneudinsk, a town in the Trans-Baikal district. Money, ammunition, and food supplies were slowly sent away until it became apparent to the inhabitants that unless some steps were taken to prevent it, the city would be left without sufficient supplies to undergo a state of siege as might be the case if the Red Guard offered any serious resistance. The Consular Corps of Irkutsk called upon a representative of the Bolshevik government left in charge of the city and requested that a sufficient quantity of food be left to the inhabitants, especially so, as owing to the unsettled condition of the surrounding country, it would be impossible for the peasants to bring in their farm produce. Little satisfaction was obtained from this individual who was extremely coarse and brutal in his make-up. The Danish Vice Consul, who was present, for example, called his attention to the fact that on the preceding day the Red Guard under his command had invaded the supply stores which contained provisions for the prisoners of war. The Danish Vice Consul further declared that inasmuch as he had charge of the interests of the Austrian prisoners in Irkutsk, and as the supplies in question were really the property of the Danish Government, he felt called upon to pro-

test energetically against the lawless actions of the Red Guard. The Bolshevik commander replied that he was cognizant of the fact, but the only satisfaction that he would give in return was, in effect, that he would take all the supplies in case he saw fit to do so. This shows the attitude of the Bolshevik leaders towards those prisoners of war who refused to listen to Bolshevik propaganda and join the Red Guard to assist in keeping the Bolsheviks in power.

During the last few days the local Soviet remained in Irkutsk the city was turned over entirely to the anarchists, of whom there were a number variously estimated at from three to five hundred. They were all well armed and well mounted. The city was turned over to martial law. Everyone was obliged to be at home by 7 o'clock in the evening. Innumerable robberies by bands of anarchists were perpetrated both by day and night. I was witness personally of one such high-handed robbery in the magazine of the Singer Sewing Machine Co. This robbery was committed by six Austrian anarchists, one of whom wore the Austrian uniform. Five sewing machines were taken and the hour chosen for this deed was 11 in the morning upon the main street of Irkutsk. The city was completely terrorized by these anarchists until within a few hours of the time when the Czech and Cossack calvary entered. At 11 o'clock on the day the city was delivered the city commandant above referred to went to the Commissariat of Stores for Irkutsk and demanded 75,000 rubles in money and a large stock of clothing. Upon being refused he promptly sent for a troop of about fifty mounted anarchists, and the money and clothes were taken by force. I was also witness to this act of lawlessness.

In connection with this last-mentioned act I have the following to state: shortly after the anarchists had departed, and before the Czechs entered, three members of the Commissariat called at the Consulate and asked me to take charge of 100,000 rubles which they had been successful in holding or hiding from the Bolsheviks. Having been informed the day before of the intention of the anarchists to rob this organization, they had taken steps during the night to falsify the books in such a manner that there would be no clew to the deficiency. They were informed that it would be impossible for the Consulate to take charge of the money in question.

As has been said, the Czechs entered the city on July 11 and were received with enthusiasm by the people. As if by magic, law and order were established, and the streets became crowded with every class of society exceedingly happy at having been rescued from Bolshevik rule. The White Guard took over policing the city and the former local Duma assumed charge of the municipal government,

Shops were opened, even many which had no goods for sale. The banks were denationalized and people are slowly bringing in money for deposit. The price of food showed a downward tendency, and there is also a much larger supply on the market now than when the Bolsheviks were in power. The rights of the church have been restored, and law courts have resumed the dispensation of justice. In the autumn all schools and higher educational institutions in the city will be opened as prior to the advent of the Bolsheviks.

With the passing of the Bolsheviks the people of Siberia are coming to themselves again. All along the Siberian Railroad line summary justice is being meted out to the leaders of the Red Guard and Commissars. Austrian and German prisoners caught by the Czechs with arms in their possession are immediately shot, while all Red Guard prisoners of Russian nationality are handed over to the Cossacks and White Guard for such treatment as their case may require. The fate of most of the Commissars thus far caught has been hanging, especially those in the large cities. In contradistinction to this, the chairmen of the Soviets in the small villages received from twenty-five to fifty lashes from an old fashioned Russian whip which was often resorted to here in Siberia under the old régime. It usually takes from two to three months to cure the unfortunate subject who has been administered treatment of this nature.

Politically speaking a new Siberian government is being formed, but judging from all indications it would appear that this government, which is passing through the constituent phase, is inclined to waste its energies in factional strife and lose sight of the great things which must be done in order that Russia may once again become a nation. It would appear that the people have not fully taken to heart the terrible lessons which have been taught them by the Bolsheviks, and that a still powerful Social Revolutionary element will be able to foment strife and impede the progress of the country along the lines of sound and rational democracy. The great danger lies herein, that if the Russian people are left entirely to themselves they will not be able to rise above the governmental status which obtained during the Kerensky fiasco. There is but one line of policy which will save Russia, and it is a policy from which her leaders should never have departed; namely, she should have, and must to-day, remain true and steadfast to all the obligations to her Allies and fight to a finish her German foes who have invaded Russian territory, and who, through underhand methods and scheming intrigues, caused the direct downfall of this country—an act which is so colossal that the human mind cannot grasp it in all its potentialities fraught with the gravest consequences for the future, and something which knows no parallel in the history of the world.

Unquestionably a psychological moment has arrived in the history of Russia. Shakespeare has said that there is a time and tide in the affairs of man. What is true in the framing of the destinies of the individual, if seized upon at the right moment, is doubly true if applied to the affairs of nations. A handful of Czecho-Slovak soldiers, men of unparalleled courage, trained in the school of adversity, having always in mind the oppression of their own country, after fighting their way out of the hands of their Austro-German pursuers, after fighting their way out of the Ukraine, after being completely disarmed in the city of Penza, realizing that the time had come for action which meant to them liberty or death, they have, unaided by the assistance of the outside world, entirely dependent upon their own resources in the heart of a vast continent and surrounded by enemies whose every act toward them meant ruin, performed a deed which will live in history as long as the deeds of mankind shall be worthy of chronicling. Furthermore, if we are to look at the actual practical results of what these Czecho-Slovaks have achieved, it is nothing more or less than the Siberian Railroad line, which would extend from Liverpool to San Francisco, [which] has been handed to the Allies to take advantage of in the stupendous struggle which we are now waging against Germany. There are a few things which we must all realize and the more forcibly they are visualized the better it will be for all concerned. First, it is absolutely necessary that the Czecho-Slovak troops should remain in Russia and not be sent to France as was originally intended. No one knows the frame of mind, customs, and habits of the Russian people better than the Czechs. They all speak Russian, and if their units are left unimpaired they will form the backbone of Allied intervention and in [of] once more reestablishing a front against Germany in Russia. The thinking people of Russia realize the necessity of the continuation of the war against the Central powers and the moment the line of communication is reestablished with Vladivostok, Allied troops must hasten to the assistance of the Czechs.

In my judgment a military dictatorship should be established in Siberia and Russia during the time of war. During the period of such dictatorship the Russian people will have an opportunity to find themselves politically, and it is quite likely that the country will gradually gravitate to the opinion that the Cadet Party, which has as its leaders such men as Milyukov, Guchkov, Prince Lvov, General Alexeev, General Horvat, Admiral Kolchak, and Rodzyanko, will best be able to inaugurate a safe and conservative republic. Time would also be given to the Russian people to map out a complete program and elect members to the Constituent Assembly after the war with Germany is over. One thing appears certain,



and that is politics must be completely eliminated from the military situation, otherwise Russia will retrograde back again to Bolshevism.

At the present writing the Czechs and Cossacks control the Siberian Railroad from Penza to Lake Baikal. Orenburg is also in the hands of the Cossacks, as well as Simbirsk on the Volga, and Ekaterinburg in the Ural Mountains. Colonel Gaida, the Czech commander of the Czech forces in Irkutsk, is carrying on an energetic campaign against the remaining Red Guard and Magyar prisoners of war. He hopes to decisively crush them in about a fortnight's time, thus opening up the way to Vladivostok. His operations are somewhat hampered by the lack of rolling stock, which the Bolsheviks removed before the evacuation from Irkutsk, but with the rapid repair of certain bridges and tunnels which were partially destroyed all impediments are being overcome. It is expected that telegraphic communication with Peking will be reestablished before communications with Vladivostok are restored. If such is the case the whole of Siberia, which has been cut off from the outside world during a space of one month, will once more come in contact with civilization.

I have [etc.] <sup>1</sup>

ERNEST L. HARRIS

File No. 861.00/2341

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1918, 3 p. m.

Your July 23, 10 p. m.<sup>2</sup> There are two particularly interesting points in your despatch: (1) we quite agree that a patrol of troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway is a military precaution it would be wise to take; (2) we agree that the request of the Chinese Government to participate should be favorably acted upon in view of Chinese territorial position and her desire to join.

There being agreement on these two views it follows as most logical and proper that some of Chinese military activity should be exerted in controlling that part of the Chinese Eastern within Manchuria without interference from any of the governments participating in the Siberian enterprise. As that is Chinese soil and as the Chinese Government desires to take a part in the undertaking it is felt that she should be allowed to play this specific part and that a small contingent of Chinese troops be in addition added to the international force at Vladivostok.

You are authorized to take this up orally.

POLK

<sup>1</sup> For enclosure No. 7 to this despatch, see *ante*, p. 248.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 300.

File No. 861.00/2382

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 29, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 30, 10.35 a. m.]

65. Siberian provisional autonomous government informed Allied consuls they consider essential that before Allied troops are landed here Allied Governments should make public declaration of position and purposes, should recall their military officers now with Horvat and should come to an understanding with Siberian government in order to secure latter's cooperation in military campaign which it is believed Allies are about to undertake in Siberia. Both Siberian government and Czechs desire immediate American railway assistance which I recommend American Railway Service Corps be instructed to render at once but for Czechs rather than Siberian government unless we decide to give them the encouragement they would desire [derive] from receiving such assistance. Horvat, 26th, issued proclamation ordering all government institutions obey his instructions. To-day Siberian government notify that above order is to be ignored and any one obeying it or distributing such orders will be prosecuted.

Peking and Tokyo informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2957

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

[A copy of the following telegram was handed by the Counselor of the British Embassy to Mr. Auchincloss of the office of the Counselor for the Department of State on July 30, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading)*

July 29, 1918.

The following memorandum has been approved by the Imperial War Cabinet:

His Majesty's Government recognize to the full the spirit in which the *aide-mémoire* of July 17<sup>1</sup> is conceived, and they sincerely welcome the decision of the United States to assist towards safeguarding the Czecho-Slovak Army, though they entertain serious misgivings that the proposed force may prove inadequate for its purpose.

They are also in complete accord with the President's proposal to send an economic mission through Vladivostok in order to supply material assistance to a people sorely tried by the miseries of war and revolution.

These are in themselves most admirable schemes, which deserve and will assuredly receive the gratitude of America's allies. His Majesty's Government

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 287.

have, however, never concealed their view that they are insufficient in themselves to cope with the Russian situation, regarded as an element in a great military and political problem with which the Allies are confronted. The arguments, indeed, which have led us to this conclusion have been so often stated by the European Allies that it seems neither necessary nor desirable to repeat them on the present occasion. But there are two points, the one military and the other political, on which the *aide-mémoire* seems so seriously to misconceive the attitude of the Entente powers as to require further comment and explanation.

The military misconception bears on the relations between the western and eastern theatres of operations. His Majesty's Government are entirely in accord with the *aide-mémoire* in thinking that of these two theatres, the western is the more important. They admit to the full that it is on the west that the great effort must be made, and they believe that to endanger successes in the west in the hope of securing advantages in the east would be not only foolish but suicidal. But for this very reason they desire Allied intervention in Russia. Their scheme is not designed to diminish the relative strength of the Allied armies in the west by sending to Russia American troops who might be fighting in France or Italy, but to increase our relative strength in France by retaining in the east important bodies of Germans and Austrians, achieving this purpose by utilizing forces that are not available for the western front. In our view this can only be done on a considerable scale by enabling Japan, should she be willing, to employ her unused military strength against the common enemy. If this were possible the gain would be incontestable, and nowhere would it be more appreciated than in the western theatre of war. It may be too sanguine an expectation that Russia can, with Allied aid, recover the military strength she possessed before the revolution, but it is not unreasonable to look forward to a recovery which would constitute a real menace to German occupation of conquered territories, thus absorbing considerable German forces which would otherwise have been employed in France. If this could be accomplished the task of French, British, and American forces in France next year would be materially lightened.

The second misconception which (as it seems to us) pervades the *aide-mémoire*, is that the Allies, in advocating intervention in Russia are not thinking of Russia, but solely of themselves. "Military intervention," says the *aide-mémoire*, "even supposing it to be efficacious in its repeatedly avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her."

If this statement is based upon the assumption that the Allies wish to make use of Russia merely for their own purposes His Majesty's Government must observe that their attitude has been misunderstood. In our view, Germany has used and misused the struggle for liberty of the Russian people to serve her own selfish end. Herself the great example of efficient autocracy, she has sedulously fostered in Russia every influence, from extremes of socialism to extremes of reaction, to paralyze the national will and destroy the national integrity. She has forced the country into a degrading and disastrous peace. Even that peace she has refused to keep. Russian territories which she has forcibly taken under protection she is treating with characteristic brutality. Russia is to her no more than a conquered area from which she can squeeze supplies, and the Russian people are no more than a subject rabble, to be stripped and plundered in exact proportion to Germany's strength and Russia's weakness.

To His Majesty's Government, therefore, it seems that an attack on German forces in Russia would confer upon the Russian people the most signal service that could be imagined. If Russia is ever to develop along her own lines, if she is ever to regain her self-respect, she must first be free from an alien domination, the whole object of which is to shatter her political fabric and exploit her material resources.

The *aide-mémoire* also seems to carry a possible suggestion that intervention has a political as well as a military object; and even that it may be in some fashion calculated to foster reaction. We had hoped that our reiterated declarations upon this subject made doubts about our policy impossible. Above all things we desire to keep free from party disputes, by which Russia is torn. There is no principle on which we have laid greater stress than that she should manage her own affairs. We wish her to choose her own form of government and to pursue in her own way her own line of self-development. But, unless

all the information which reaches us is worthless, the best hope—perhaps the only hope—of allowing the voice of the Russian people to be heard, lies in the cleansing of the country by [from] German influences supported by German soldiers. This, it seems to us, can only be accomplished by foreign aid. Were it accompanied by a proclamation of the kind approved by the President, and repeatedly suggested by His Majesty's Government, there should be no error or misconception as to the motives of the Allies; and there seems no reason to doubt that all the best elements in the country, whatever be their political opinions, would rally to the Allied standard and make use of Allies' support.

We desire to add that in making admittance of the great difficulty of the Russian problem, we know how deeply it has engaged the attention of the President, we rejoice to recognize the spirit of disinterested cooperation which animates all his policy, whether in the west or in the east, and we firmly count upon its continuance. We have, however, thought it right to deal briefly in this memorandum with certain points solely for the purpose of removing any possible misconceptions as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government.

---

File No. 861.00/2357

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram].

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your cipher telegram of July 27, 5 p. m. Your understanding of your instructions is correct. Department does not desire to modify its attitude.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/2407

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

Moscow, July 30, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 3, 1.10 p. m.]

43. Supplementing information on the military side forwarded through British Embassy, following important statements respecting political situation in Volga-Ural region are quoted from a report of Vice Consul Williams, dated Samara, July 19:

Since July 1 there has been no communication with Moscow or Vladivostok and the whole region east of the Volga is isolated from the rest of the world. A central executive governing body has been created around the nucleus of fifteen of the thirty members of the all-Russian committee chosen by the Constitutional Assembly in Petrograd last January to arrange for its next meeting. The whole thought of the new army and of this governing body is now directed to the establishment of another front against Germany, and it is a source of great regret that the continued hostility of the Bolsheviks makes necessary further civil war. In this move against the Central powers all look to the Allies for help, particularly to America through Vladivostok.

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in France; by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

We must not, however, make the error of thinking that even here in Samara all are in sympathy with the turn of events which overthrew the Bolshevik power. Every day in the bazaars and on the streets one may hear the advantages of the former régime set forth. Prices are mounting steadily higher and to peasants who think in terms of their stomachs the former condition seems preferable. The other night proclamations advocating the return of the Bolsheviki were thrown around the streets under cover darkness. This sentiment must be reckoned with.

The success of such action as the Allies may take in Russia will largely depend upon the attitude of the Russian people thereto. The motives of the Allies must not be misunderstood. At the outset a clear statement of purposes should be issued in which care should be taken to set forth that any action here is only against the common enemy, Germany; that we sympathize with the Russians in their sufferings from a scarcity of food, and that these food conditions will continue as long as Germany continues to take the food in Russia which belongs to the Russian people; and that in part to save the crop this year for the Russians, the Allies are coming here and that all their actions will be based only on a desire to help deliver the Russians from their oppressor. Please communicate to Allied missions, Paris.

For Department: The foregoing is recommended to the Department's very special consideration. Please compare my No. 683, June 30, 10 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Also I beg once more to urge the need for immediate inauguration of an intensive publicity campaign from an eastern base. German Ambassador arrived 28th.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2441b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1918, 8 p. m.

We have just been advised by the Japanese Embassy here as follows:

It has been reported that the Bolsheviki north of Khabarovsk are showing signs of great unrest under the guidance of German officers and that they are preparing in the Amur River, presumably in the upper currents, boats with the inferred intention of sending them to sea, and that the Japanese Government has further heard that there are disorders at Nikolaevsk at the mouth of the Amur River and that the Japanese Government had sent some torpedo boats to protect Japanese interests in Nikolaevsk.

Repeat to Peking.

POLK

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 236.

File No. 861.00/2530

*Members of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Girsa, Spacek, and Houska) to the President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Masaryk)*<sup>1</sup>

VLADIVOSTOK, July 31, 1918.

Our advance guard has now reached the River Ussuri, the Vladivostok detachment having lost 170 wounded and 80 killed, while the enemy have had considerably heavier losses. The enemy have good and plentiful equipment, and we are still in need of much to complete our equipment, more especially artillery, aircraft, and cavalry, and we need considerable assistance from the Allies in this respect. The Bolsheviks have proclaimed a forced mobilization in the district between Chita and Khabarovsk, but this is no less unpopular with the inhabitants than the previous voluntary mobilization. The enemy have now a total of some 50,000 men operating against our two forces. The advance guard of our western group has reached the south shore of Lake Baikal at Kultuk. They are in a critical position and require help from us immediately, but we cannot supply this unless the Allies, by immediately landing troops to protect our rear, free us from Vladivostok, and also support us by sending one division with our force. When they do this we can immediately advance towards Chita on the Manchurian Railway, and we could thus connect in five weeks with our force advancing from Irkutsk. We could then proceed either to Dairen or Vladivostok, if the winter is to be spent here. Our men are in excellent spirits and health. Rest will be required after operations are finished, and military technical reorganization could be undertaken during this period of rest. The task immediately before us is to set free our force and to concentrate it either in Vladivostok or at some other point. In undertaking this, we maintain the principle of keeping ourselves free from Russian domestic affairs, unless our interference is absolutely essential for the protection of our force and for carrying on military operations. This attitude is recognized by the population, who are therefore friendly disposed to us. We ask you to place at once before the Allies:

- (a) The question of the completion of our armament and equipment; and
- (b) The need for expediting military support, which Japan would have already given if they had obtained the official concurrence of the United States. This point is an essential one for us.

Bolshevism now seems to be disappearing, and continues to exist only owing to the forcible support of the Germans and Magyars of

<sup>1</sup> Copy received from the Czecho-Slovak National Council and transmitted by the Acting Secretary of State to the President Aug. 8, 1918.

the "International Army." The movement against the Bolsheviks has been strengthened throughout Russia by our action, and reports have been received indicating the deposition of Soviets in Russia, and it is also stated that a coalition central government has been created in European Russia, including Milyukov and Rodzyanko. A temporary government of autonomous Siberia has been set up in western Siberia and it is stated that the Russian central government will be recognized by this government. Conditions are not so favorable in eastern Siberia owing to the disputes between the Bolsheviks and General Horvat. We request your opinion, in view of the new situation thus presented, as to whether we should stay in Russia, supposing this to be possible, and if so, under what conditions. Please communicate to us for our information the results of our formations in America and, further, whether it will be possible to make use of our surplus officers with these detachments, and also whether, supposing that we remain in Russia, we can depend upon completing our army with volunteers from the United States. We should also like details as to our forces in Italy and France.

[File copy not signed]

---

File No. 861.00/2390

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 31, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

70. Election for Vladivostok municipal council held July 27, 28th, gave Bolsheviks 53 seats out of total of 101, remainder being divided as follows: Social Democrats 22, property owners 17, and among various independent groups such as Koreans, Hebrews, Uk[rainians?] 9. Among Bolshevik members is former president local Soviet who is now held under arrest by Czechs. There is already talk that first meeting of new municipal council will vote to reestablish Soviet which will then abolish municipal council. However, this is uncertain as some elected as Bolsheviks are not really such and will combine other groups.

The reasons given for this strong showing of Bolsheviks are: the failure of many upper-class Russians to vote and their division into several groups, and fact that population here has not suffered from evil of Bolshevik rule as have other parts of Russia, Bolsheviks here always having been restrained by fear of foreign armed intervention from taking steps which they took elsewhere.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2391

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 1, 9.55 a. m.]

71. Members of Horvat government collected here and commander military forces announced publicly to-day his desire to assist Czechs to travel west via Harbin.

Siberian government announces the receipt of telegrams from British and American Governments, the latter being through Russian Ambassador, Washington. The situation very complicated and difficult and would appreciate an intimation of attitude of the Department of State toward Czechs and toward Siberian and Horvat governments to guide me in my action because I am constantly being requested by Czechs and the Allied consuls to take action or give advice regarding or approval of steps taken by them.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2390

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

Admiral Knight telegraphs Bolsheviks won control in city election. Department desires information concerning causes of this, part played by rivalry of autonomous Siberian and Horvat governments and by pro-German elements, and effect on local situation. Who is Czecho-Slovak commander? Department desires further information concerning Czecho-Slovak request for assistance Japanese torpedo boats at Nikolaevsk.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2396

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, August 1, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 12.49 p. m.]

I had an informal conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon. I communicated to him the suggestion contained in your July 29, 3 p. m., that Chinese troops should control



the railway in Manchuria. He expressed the opinion that the whole situation was a difficult one but that he was inclined to accede to the suggestion of our Government, not because he believed that they would prove effective in helping the Czechs, but simply because he and his colleagues desired to act in full accord with our views. I am inclined to believe that the Japanese Government will therefore instruct Ishii to agree (1) to the use of only Chinese troops in Manchuria; (2) to the elimination of the phrase, "special interest of Japan," as contained in the declaration submitted; and (3) to limiting the expedition to Vladivostok. They will, however, request the retention of the clause in the declaration, "if called for by the exigencies of the situation." They will agree not to take advantage of this clause without the concurrence of our Government but desire to retain it to "satisfy public opinion" here. . . .

The Government, fearing popular resentment, is taking unusual precautions to conceal the nature of the negotiations from the public. Special censors have been placed in the office of Tokyo newspapers to prevent the publication of any comment.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/2441a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1918, 4 p. m.

Telegrams received from Admiral Knight in the last twenty-four hours show that the situation of Czecho-Slovaks is serious and that coming six weeks will probably decide the issue of their safety. Czech commander at Vladivostok has decided to send the bulk of his forces westwards to support 4,000 of his comrades who are just east of Lake Baikal and in danger of being overwhelmed by superior forces of war prisoners and Red Guards commanded by Major General von Taube. The Czech General realizes his force is inadequate, but both he and Allied naval and military representatives agree that he has no other choice. Movement westwards will leave total force covering Vladivostok (including one battalion of British due to arrive August 2 and one battalion of French due about August 6) of approximately 3,000 effectives who will be opposed by 6,000 war prisoners and 9,000 Red Guards between Nikolsk and Khabarovsk.

Recent elections at Vladivostok, in which Bolsheviks secured a majority, add an additional unfavorable element to the situation.

This Government believes that, if the Japanese Government can not reach an early and favorable decision in regard to the proposed

plan of action to secure the safety of the Czecho-Slovaks, the support of even the very moderate military force which this Government proposes should now be used will prove abortive.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2382

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your 65, July 29, 4 p. m. What military officers are with Horvat? This Government will not fail to make clear its friendly purpose to safeguard Russian interests and territory if it decides to take any action such as you suggest but is not prepared at this time to support any one faction or party. The section of the Russian Railway Corps at Nagasaki has been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. Under ordinary conditions they would serve with the Russian railway authorities. What Russian railway authorities now operating railways from Vladivostok? Answer.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2391

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your 71, July 31, 4 p. m., and referring further to Department's August 1, 6 p. m. The Department has sent no telegram to the Siberian government either through the Russian Ambassador or direct. The Department understands informally that the Russian Ambassador has received a telegram signed by Mr. Derber and to which the Ambassador has replied in his official capacity, but without the cognizance of or any authority from this Government.

In regard to the Czechs, the Department sympathizes with and approves of the purpose and spirit of these gallant troops and hopes to be able to lend them such material assistance as may be practicable; for example, inquiries are now being made as to whether warm clothing can be provided for the men.

This Government sympathizes with the desire of patriotic groups in Siberia to secure the restoration of order and the welfare of the population but is not prepared to assist any one movement or group

as distinct from others. Please keep the Department fully informed of the movements and plans of different parties and the respective strength and character of following of each. Department insufficiently informed on this subject.

POLK

---

Japanese and American Public Statements Regarding Military Action,  
August 2 and 3, 1918—British Statement, August 8, 1918

File No. 861.00/7015

*The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Acting Secretary of State*

MEMORANDUM

The Japanese Government, actuated by the sentiment of sincere friendship towards the Russian people, have always entertained the most sanguine hopes of the speedy reestablishment of order in Russia and a healthy and untrammelled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenseless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian far eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted and they practically assume the position of command. The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the cobelligerents to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern. In the presence of danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hand of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for an early dispatch of troops to relieve pressure now weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces.

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to

dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people and reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases whether political or military.

WASHINGTON, *undated*.<sup>1</sup>

[Received August 2, 1918.]

---

File No. 861.00/2449a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President*

*August 3, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you the following report merely as a matter of record.

The Japanese Ambassador called this morning and told me that his Government cordially appreciated the frank expression of the views of the United States Government; Japan was glad there were no fundamental differences between us; they had no intention of sending more men than was necessary to assist the Czechs; and the only difference between the two Governments was as to the number that was necessary.

He said his Government still felt a larger force than proposed was essential, but in view of the necessity for immediate action, and in view of the attitude of this Government, his Government authorized him to say that they accepted our proposals, reserving the question as to the sending of additional troops to Vladivostok or elsewhere until circumstances should arise which might make it necessary.

He said that his Government had explained this last point by saying it might be necessary for the troops to move out of Vladivostok in order to prevent the slaughter of the Czechs, or it might be necessary to send reinforcements for this same purpose. He said his Government felt that such a slaughter would be a misfortune on humanitarian grounds and on political grounds, as it would hopelessly injure the prestige of all the Governments concerned if a

---

<sup>1</sup> Note in the margin of MS.: "Handed to me by Japanese Amb[assador] who said it was published on Aug. 2 in Japan. F. L. P[olk]."

slaughter took place which could have been prevented by prompt action of the Allied forces. He said that in such an emergency it was his Government's intention to consult this Government and the other Governments, but it was conceivable that there might be no time for consultation, in which case the Japanese Government wished to say frankly that they would be compelled for the reasons already stated to move without consultation. He said it meant a great deal to his Government to be in accord with the United States, and they felt that they had met our views on all the disputed points.

I asked him two or three times whether it was his understanding that the Japanese forces would be limited to ten or twelve thousand men, and he said that in view of the fact that such a number had been mentioned by me in our previous conversation, and in view of the fact that his Government stated they accepted our proposal, he felt there was no question on that point.

I asked him whether it was their intention to send troops anywhere else. He said no, not as far as he knew, and he thought that he had been fully informed on this point.

He showed me a copy of their proposed statement, and they had made the amendments we had suggested, that is, that his Government was in accord with the Allies as to *this* expedition. They had stricken out the reference to Japan's particular interest. He said that now that we were in agreement his Government had given out their statement in Tokyo on August 2, and they were getting ready to move the troops.

Yours faithfully,

[File copy not signed]

---

File No. 861.00/2494

*Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

VLADIVOSTOK, *undated*.

[*Copy received from Navy Department, August 3, 1918.*]

Conditions have been reported bad by Colonel Robertson, British military attaché from Peking, who has just returned from Ussuri. Czechs are greatly outnumbered and are withdrawing southwards. The roads and bridges which they recently constructed will be destroyed in their advance [retreat].

The 800 British troops arriving to-night will be pushed to the front immediately instead of remaining to hold Vladivostok. It is uncertain when the French troops will arrive who will also be rushed to Ussuri front.

The German force is from ten to twenty miles inside the Manchurian border, and the Semenov defeat is more complete than at first reported.

[KNIGHT]

File No. 861.00/2412

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 3, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 4, 4.17 a. m.]

76. Replying Department's July 31, 6 p. m., and supplementing my July 31, 2 p. m. Do not believe rivalry between two governments mentioned or pro-German elements were responsible for the result of election to any large extent, but fear of and hostility toward Horvat government which is regarded by laboring classes as anti-revolutionary appear to have induced some to go to other extreme. Disinclination of this class to fight again also probably had some effect. This feeling is shown in refusal of Russian workmen at local naval shops to make hand grenades for Czechs, saying they prefer no work and hunger to doing such work and threatening to damage machinery which necessitated placing of international patrol in navy yard to protect property. Figures now show 77 per cent of possible voters voted, as against 53 per cent at previous election, so that result cannot be attributed to failure to vote to the extent at first supposed. Czechs are being pressed for the release of Soviet member elected to city council and whom Czechs hold for agitation against them and for connections with Hungarian war prisoners; Czechs appeal to Allied Consuls for advice.

Czech commander is Major General Dietrichs, Russian, elected by Czechs; request for Japanese war vessels at Nikolaevsk was made by him to Admiral Kato during conference on *Brooklyn*, but did not come to the attention of Admiral Knight at the time. Request was due to reports that German war prisoner naval officers were operating the Russian river gunboats near mouth of the Amur River. Czechs announce that attack made on Bell [*sic*] Telegraph was a part of [anarchist?] plan, and that hereafter persons guilty of crimes will be tried by court-martial. Colonel [name garbled], who was appointed by Zemstvo to command Russian forces to date raised here, has declared this province in state of siege without consulting Allied commanders or Czechs, by whom matter now will be considered.

Eight hundred British troops arrived this morning.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2440a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1918, 4 p. m.

Copy of following statement has been handed to Japanese Ambassador and given to the press:<sup>2</sup>

In the judgment of the Government of the United States, a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation, military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distresses.

Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would in its judgment be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women, and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would in the judgment of the Government of the United States be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view the Government of the United States is now cooperating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of cooperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding,

<sup>1</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the diplomatic representatives in Great Britain (for repetition to the Ambassador in Russia), France, Italy, and China (for repetition to the Consul at Harbin).

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Bulletin*, Aug. 5, 1918.

so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks; and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/2439b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1918, 7 p. m.

It is reported by Admiral Knight that a German force is from ten to twenty miles inside the Manchurian border. If this is so it would seem to necessitate the prompt and forceful action of the Chinese military authorities.

POLK



File No. 861.00/2417

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Tokyo, August 5, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received August 6, 10.50 a. m.]

The Japanese declaration was made public on the evening of August 2. In a conversation to-day when Miller accompanied me to the Foreign Office Baron Goto explained that this unexpected action was taken to allow public opinion to accede to all the suggestions of our Government. He also again assured me that the number of troops to be sent would not exceed the limits of 12,000 mentioned by our Government although he expressed grave doubt whether this force would be sufficient to meet the increasingly serious conditions developing in northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. He further stated that the defeat of Semenov and the invasion of Chinese territory by Bolsheviks and organized German prisoners was giving them more concern than the Czech situation, and that four days ago he had requested from the Chinese Government an explanation of the reported settlement made between the Chinese Governor of the Manchouli District and the German officer in command of the invading forces.

The General Staff reports that troops have already entrained and the first contingent is expected to reach Vladivostok by August 10. As far as one can observe the final decision of the Government to fall in with the American proposals meets with general approval, but there is no enthusiasm for the enterprise. The Ministry will remain in for the present.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2428½

*Memorandum of a Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chinese Minister (Koo)*

August 6, 1918.

The Chinese Minister called to-day and stated that the Bolshevik forces reported to have crossed the Manchurian border at Manchouli in pursuit of Semenov had not, as a matter of fact, crossed the border, but had been stopped on a warning from the Chinese general in control in that province forbidding them to cross the border, which was backed up by the stationing of Chinese troops along the border from the railroad some miles north.

He also said that he had just been advised by his Government that Chinese forces would start to-day for Vladivostok and that the Japanese and French had indicated that they would be welcome. The

forces proceeding to Vladivostok will not exceed 2,000 in number and probably not more than 1,500, though he was not advised [as] to the exact number.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

---

File No. 861.00/2418

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 6, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 7.23 p. m.]

80. Department's August 1, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> No foreign military officers now with General Horvat but Japanese and British have been with him until recently.

Railway is being run by Russians as heretofore, but under Czech military control and supervision. Our men could go to work at once with Russians, but there must be military control of railway for the present either by Czechs or Allies.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/2422

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, August 6, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received August 6, 1.04 p. m.]

Your telegram of July 26, 5 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day informed me that, although no such representations had been made through diplomatic channels, the Japanese Military Attaché who is also attached to the Chinese General Staff has repeatedly urged that China should undertake an expedition into Siberia in cooperation with Japan under the terms of the recent military convention and added that the Chinese Government had assented in principle to such cooperation, although no definite proposal has yet been made by the Japanese as to when this expedition is to be undertaken.

The Chinese Government is now preparing to dispatch approximately 1,600 troops from Peking to Vladivostok. Contrary to reports the Japanese [have] opposed no obstacles to the arrangements for their passage over the South Manchuria Railway.

MACMURRAY

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 323.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 305.

File No. 861.00/2425

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 6, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 11.45 p. m.]

79. Department's August 2, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> General Horvat arrived here, 3d, with 50 armed officers and was joined here by about 20 more armed men who guard rails area in which he remains. His cabinet have also collected here and yesterday Colonel Semenov arrived. Much resentment is being shown toward Horvat by working classes which is made worse by presence here of his armed guard for which he asked permission of no one: local Zemstvo has sent consuls long protest against their action in permitting Horvat to come here and threatening general strike in this city if he is allowed to remain. I can see no prospect of success for Horvat without force with which to control the working classes, whereas Siberian government being more socialistic may succeed if its strength in western Siberia is correctly reported. Siberian government requested consuls endeavor to arrange coalition between them and Horvat but terms offer no immediate hope of success. Consuls are sending to Horvat copy Siberian government proposal.

Japanese declaration regarding Siberian situation published and evoking favorable comment. Our declaration appeared to-day but no comment yet.

Czechs forced to retreat on Khabarovsk front owing to superior forces, with eight guns being brought from Irkutsk front. Czech commander informed consuls yesterday that owing to increase in strength armed prisoners during past month, three divisions now necessary to reach Czechs at Irkutsk.

Tokyo and Peking informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2426

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 7, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 3.18 p. m.]

81. Your August 2, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Impossible state strength of following of Siberian government without information from western Siberia with which I have had no communication past month. Either

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 323.

Macgowan or Embry<sup>1</sup> willing to undertake trip to [Omsk?] via Peking and Mongolian route in effort to secure such information if Department considers expense and effort would be justified. Hardly practicable. Instruct.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2439c

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1918, 4 p. m.

5236. Red Cross here is willing to undertake providing warm clothing, other than uniforms, for 70,000 Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia. Please ascertain, discreetly, whether French Government contemplates any similar assistance which would render it unnecessary for Red Cross to undertake full responsibility for clothing, other than uniforms. Answer urgent.<sup>2</sup>

POLK

File No. 861.00/2430

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, August 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 8, 10.05 a. m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated to me to-day his serious concern over the report from the Japanese Consul at Vladivostok that our Government would send 10,000 troops to aid the Czechs. The consul stated that he learned [this] from Admiral Knight.

May I take this occasion to suggest the wisdom of limiting our present contingent to 7,000 as originally suggested to the Japanese Government? The Ministry has secured the support of the General Staff on this assumption. Should we now enlarge our force I fear it would make a most unfortunate impression.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2463

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 883

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that, in view

<sup>1</sup> David B. Macgowan and John A. Embry, Consuls at Vladivostok.

<sup>2</sup> Answered Oct. 2, *post*, p. 403.

of the fact that Archangel was occupied by Allied forces under General Poole on August 2, and that the American and Japanese Governments had already made declarations respecting their support of the Czechs, His Majesty's Government have considered it incumbent upon them to issue a statement, of which the following is the text:

Peoples of Russia! Your Allies have not forgotten you, we remember all the services which your heroic armies rendered us in the early years of the war, we are coming as friends to help you to save yourselves from dismemberment and destruction at the hands of Germany, who is trying to enslave your people and to use the great resources of your country for her own ends, but we wish solemnly to assure you that, while our troops are entering Russia to assist you in your struggle against Germany, we shall not retain one foot of your territory. We deplore the civil war that divides you, and the internal dissensions that facilitate the German plans of conquest, but we have no intention of imposing on Russia any political system. The destinies of Russia are in the hands of the Russian people; it is for them and for them alone to decide their form of government and to find a solution for their social problems.

Peoples of Russia! Your very existence as an independent nation is at stake, the liberties you have won in the revolution are threatened with extinction by the iron hand of Germany. Rally round the banner of freedom and independence that we who are still your Allies are raising in your midst, and secure the triumphs of those two great principles without which there can be no lasting peace or real liberty for the world.

Peoples of Russia! We want not only to stem German penetration but to bring economic relief to your ruined and suffering country. Some supplies we have sent, and there are more to follow. It is our wish to aid the development of the industrial and natural resources of your country, not to exploit them for ourselves; to restore the exchange of goods, to stimulate agriculture and to enable you to take your rightful place among the free nations of the world.

Peoples of Russia! Unite with us in defence of your liberties. Our one desire is to see Russia strong and free and then to retire and watch the Russian people work out its destinies in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

WASHINGTON, *August 8, 1918.*

[*Received August 9.*]

File No. 861.00/2439

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, *August 8, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received August 8, 4.35 p. m.*]

Your August 5, 7 p. m. I am advised in behalf of the Foreign Office that there is no truth whatever in the report that German forces have entered Manchuria. Military Governor of Heilung-

kiang Province reports that he has made an arrangement with the Bolshevik leaders with whom the German and Austrian prisoners are acting that they will remain at Duria [Dauriya?].

Supplementing my August 6, 3 p. m. I have now learned in strict confidence that the military convention with Japan having been made conditional on the existence of an actual necessity the Chinese Government by a note to the Japanese Legation dated July 27 formally acknowledged the existence of such a necessity, the effect of this acknowledgment being that the convention would automatically come into operation upon the Japanese Government's declaring its intention to undertake an expedition whether in Siberia or in Chinese territory.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2373

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

The Department has received telegram signed by Lavrov, President of the Council of Ministers, and Derber, Minister for Foreign Affairs, purporting to represent the provisional government of autonomous Siberia and asking that any action conducted in Siberia should have exclusive regard for the authorities of the supreme power in Siberia represented by the aforesaid provisional government.<sup>1</sup> For the information of yourself and Admiral Knight, the Department has not acknowledged this telegram and is not prepared at this time to represent [recognize] any group or faction in Siberia. In this same connection referring to a telegram from Admiral Knight to the Navy Department, 21004, and in view of the attitude of this Government just described, the Department regards the presence of General Horvat at Vladivostok as an embarrassment rather than an asset.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2475

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

[The following translation of a cable was sent by the Ambassador to the Department of State on August 9, 1918:]

*The Siberian Temporary Government to the Russian Ambassador at  
Washington*

VLADIVOSTOK, August 3, 1918.

SIR: We have received your telegram of July 27 and we express to you our sincere gratitude. The Siberian temporary government was elected on January 26, 1918, by the Siberian Regional Duma at Tomsk. Western Siberia,

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

as has been reported by our emissary, is liberated from the Bolsheviks and from the prisoners of war thanks to the mutual efforts of regiments organized by the temporary Siberian government and of the Czecho-Slovaks. The seat of the Siberian government, which announced its authority in Vladivostok on the 29th of June, is temporarily here; some of the members are at Omsk. Until the government moves to Siberia, the plenitude of its supreme and central authority is vested in our ministers Vologodski, Krutovski, Shatilov, Mikhailov, and Patushinski, who were elected by the Siberian Regional Duma. The general political relations with the countries of the extreme orient and of the west are directed by us.

We have received telegram of the Commissariat of the Siberian temporary government at Omsk which has been transmitted through the Minister at Peking, Kudachev. Its text is as follows:

The Czecho-Slovak regiments and the military units of the Siberian government have destroyed the authority of the Bolsheviks at Mariinsk, Novo Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, Naryn, Tobolsk, Barnaul, Semipalatinsk, Karkaralinsk, Atbassar, Troitsk, and other points. Achinsk and Krasnoyarsk are occupied by forces of the temporary Siberian government. We encounter marks of vivid sympathy on behalf of the population without difference of classes and of group interests. The organization of the army intended to form, together with the Allies, a united anti-German front progresses splendidly. Our relations with the Czecho-Slovaks are fraternal.

I congratulate the Siberian temporary government and you, Mr. Minister, on behalf of the troops which have been entrusted to me. We, who have been placed under the banners of the Siberian government, vow that we will loyally serve this Siberian people's government. Grishin-Almazov.

The recognition of the Siberian government by the municipalities and by the Zemstvos has been enforced here by declarations of groups of the population and other organizations. Our problems, which were announced by the declaration of July 8 addressed to the friendly powers, are as follows: Creation of a well-disciplined Russian army; establishment of an anti-German front in common with the Allies; as an inseparable part of Russia, Siberia is considered an autonomous province of the federative republic, in virtue whereof the temporary government of autonomous Siberia solemnly declares that it believes it to be its first and imperative duty to safeguard the interests of entire Russia on the territory of Siberia; it also recognizes all the international treaties and conventions of Russia with the friendly powers, in force up to October 25 [November 7], 1917. The temporary Siberian government has as its aim the reestablishment of state order in Siberia in order to commence thereby the reconstitution of a pan-Russian central authority recognized by all. It is, therefore, preparing the convocation of the temporary Regional Duma as well as of the national representative assembly of Siberia, on the basis of universal suffrage; simultaneously it considers its duty to reestablish the local organs and the municipalities; to establish the guarantees of personal freedom and of the rights of private property; liquidation of laws published during the domination of the Bolsheviks. Believing necessary to realize the principles of coalition in the construction of the authority and bearing in mind at the same time the absence of *bourgeois* classes in the government and in the Siberian Regional Duma, the government decided to complete its membership by representatives of the *bourgeois* elements of the population, on the basis of equality.

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
COUNSELOR PROFESSOR GREBENCHIKOV

File No. 861.00/2464

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

[The following paraphrase of a telegram was sent by the Chargé to the Department of State on August 9, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading)*

August 7, 1918.

The following is a paraphrase of a telegram received from H.M.S. *Suffolk*:

Allied naval and military representatives held a conference on board the U.S.S. *Brooklyn* on July 31, at which the Czech General explained that the critical position of the Czechs south of Baikal was due to the fact that the enemy had recently blown up the tunnel between them and Irkutsk. The General proposes to proceed immediately via Harbin to their rescue with his forces, which only number 4,000 men, this small number making it impossible for him to take the route line of communication. The enemy are gathering forces in great numbers, and the large enemy force by which Semenov was badly defeated are in a strong position to the westward of Manchuria Station. The enemy are forcing the Cossacks to join the war prisoners, and news is being circulated that the Czech forces are small and that the Allies will not support them. It will only be possible for the Czech General to leave a small defensive force on the Ussuri front. The present situation both for the Allies and the Czechs is a dangerous one. The Czech General estimates that 6,000 Allied troops would be necessary to strengthen the force for the defence of the Nikolsk front, and that 20,000 would be necessary in addition to his small force to relieve the Czechs at Baikal, also that a further 20,000 will be required to send forward to the Ussuri front, and to overcome the enemy in the Amur Province, where Von Taube has established his headquarters at Blagoveschensk. The Czech General considers that the British flag should be shown on the Ussuri front and he therefore requests that the half battalion of British troops arriving August 3 be sent direct there. The battalion of French troops which are due here on August 6 will be sent on to the Ussuri front on arrival. It was unanimously agreed at the conference that two divisions of Allied troops should be sent to support the Czechs immediately, and that the remainder should follow on afterwards.

A telegram from the French Minister at Tokyo was read by General Paris, in which it was explained that at a meeting on July 29 at which the immediate dispatch of Japanese troops was recommended, all the Allied representatives agreed, with the exception of the United States representative, who considered that no help was required by the Czechs.

File No. 861.00/2430

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1918, noon.

You may officially deny rumor.<sup>1</sup> There is no foundation for it whatsoever.

POLK

<sup>1</sup> See the Ambassador's telegram, Aug. 7, 6 p. m., *ante*, p. 333.



File No. 861.00/2465

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, August 10, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 11, 10.38 a. m.]

Repeat to Committee on Public Information. Preface Reuter's exclusive report of your official declaration, regard to our position in Siberia, was issued to public before any American representative made aware of it and by misconstruction in translation aroused antagonism of Russians here. The following is a translation from to-day's *Vestnik Manchurii*, the principal organ of the so-called Horvat government, with wide circulation:

In our yesterday's edition we published a semiofficial communication from the Government of the United States made especially for the foreign press with the purpose of acquainting all with the purposes pursued by America in connection with the sending of troops into Russia.

First of all it must be noted that, either this communication in English was intentionally drawn up in unclear expressions, which sharply distinguished it from the Japanese Government's declaration of August 2, couched, on the contrary, in extremely clear and most exact expressions, or the translators transmitted it carelessly in the Russian text to the editors of the Harbin papers.

The American communication noticeably narrows the program of the Allied intervention given in the Japanese communication. The Government at Washington, for instance, says that there is no need of reestablishing the front on the part of Russia against Germany, as the struggle has been transferred by the Allies entirely to the western front, and therefore, if the Russians wish and are able to reestablish their army for this purpose, let them fight; it is of no interest to the Allies.

The internal condition of Russia seems to the American Government so bad that any intervention on the part of the Allies in favor of restoration of quiet and order in Russia would only make matters worse.

The task of the Japanese-American military mission amounts solely to succoring the Czecho-Slovaks, who are threatened by the German and Magyar war prisoners; and the first step in aiding the Czecho-Slovaks consists in enabling them, as quickly as possible, in leaving Russia for the western front. From this it is concluded: first, that the Americans do not attach special significance to the formation of the Siberian front by the Germans; and, secondly, that they leave it to the Russians to liquidate that front.

The chief care of the United States is to safeguard the war material sold by America to Russia and now in the ports of Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Archangel. In its desire to safeguard this valuable property, which may become of use to Russia, the Government at Washington shows its consideration for us further and says that military aid from the Allies would be too expensive for

the Russians, and therefore it is better to let them spend this money on the restoration of the army and the feeding of hungry citizens.

The only effective means of guarding the above-mentioned property in Vladivostok is considered to be the occupation of Allied troops. Such occupation has already taken place in Murmansk and Archangel, but for the complete safety of the Vladivostok depots it may be necessary to clear the localities in the vicinity of Vladivostok of the Germans and Magyars.

If all the plans of America, as enumerated above, are carried out exactly, the result will be as follows: (1) The Allies will not help us to restore the front; (2) they will take the Czecho-Slovaks away from Russia as soon as possible; (3) they will occupy all our chief ports, guarding property for which money has not been paid to America; (4) they will leave Russia to disintegrate further, if the bacilli of disintegration be sufficiently strong.

Perhaps following upon the communication for the press the Government of the United States will make a formal declaration, and from it [it] will then be possible to draw some different conclusions.

We therefore confine ourselves for the time being to deciphering the unclear communication which makes an important amendment to Japan's declaration, which latter is imbued with an entirely different spirit and contains broader aims for extending aid to Russia.

Am issuing statement through Committee on Public Information to the effect that the American position has been misconstrued, our aim being heartily to assist Russia in her efforts for the restoration of order, and to make possible her cooperation against the common enemy upon a basis of equality with the other Allies; also that our hesitation to interfere in her internal affairs is inspired solely by our respect for her status of sovereignty. Earnestly suggest in future official statement of this character be issued to our consular representatives and Committee on Public Information before given to the public press. Official statements circulated through general news agencies rather than through our own Government official mediums, established for the purpose, sure to cause embarrassment and bring about misunderstanding.

MOSER

---

Proposals for the Political Direction of Intervention and for Augmentation of the Forces: Attitude of the United States—Japanese Activities in Manchuria—Arrival of American and Allied Troops at Vladivostok—Increase of the Japanese Forces—Reply of the Soviet Government to American and Japanese Statements

File No. 861.00/2548

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 893

#### MEMORANDUM

The British Chargé d'Affaires has received instructions to inform the Acting Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government have

decided to appoint a High Commissioner in Siberia, in connection with the measures to be taken by the Allies in that region. The post has been offered to Sir Charles Eliot, who has accepted the offer. Sir Charles will represent His Majesty's Government in all political questions which come before the Allies, and will be in control of all British agents in Siberia, other than military or naval commands. An important part of his duties will be to promote the closest possible cooperation amongst the Allied forces and their leaders.

In informing the United States Government of this appointment the British Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to add that His Majesty's Government attach the very greatest importance to the question of facilitating combined action by the Allies in Siberia; and it is hoped that the United States Government will cooperate to this end, either by themselves appointing a High Commissioner in Siberia or in whatever other way they may consider most advisable in the circumstances.

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1918.

[Received August 12.]

---

File No. 861.00/2507

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1918.

[Received August 13.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: At this time when the Allies are about to exert their action in both Siberia and northern Russia, the Government of the Republic, thinking that this dual action will be more effective if better coordinated, has directed me to offer to the Federal Government suggestions tending to the establishment of some sort of political direction of and connection between the two operations simultaneously set on foot at Archangel and Vladivostok. The successes of the Czechs, the weakening of the Bolsheviki, the growing difficulties encountered by the Germans are, one and all, reasons for resolute action by the Allies in the two or three months when it can be taken and for the earliest possible establishment of northern as well as eastern connection with the Czechs.

With a view to the best possible harmonizing of that dual action and to the settling of the political or economic questions that may arise, my Government believes it would be the part of wisdom and foresight, while adhering to the local military command, British on one side, Japanese on the other, to organize an inter-Allied civilian board charged with the duty of safeguarding unity of action toward

the Russian people. That board should have the last say in all questions flowing from the assistance brought to Russia by the Allies, decide the political disputes, give the economic, financial, and technical directions, define the relations between the Allied Governments and the local authorities.

If the Federal Government concurred in my Government's view the chairmanship of the board would go to the United States. A few Russians might be admitted or attached to the board in an advisory capacity. This would facilitate an adjustment of the differences that have arisen among the several Russian groups, whose proneness to improvise is but too well known and who are seeking recognition by the Allies.

I should be thankful to your excellency if you would kindly let me know whether the foregoing suggestions coincide, as is my Government's hope, with the Federal Government's view.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

File No. 861.00/2501

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 894

MEMORANDUM

In view of recent reports, the British Government feel the greatest concern over the critical position in which the Czech forces in Siberia now find themselves, and it is felt that all the Allies are under an obligation of honour to provide for the safety of these troops.

If it were in their power the British Government would be glad to give further help, but they have unfortunately no means of doing more than has already been done in this direction.

The only possibility of saving the situation by immediate action seems to lie with the Japanese.

In these circumstances the British Government earnestly hope that the United States authorities will feel it possible formally to request the Japanese Government to dispatch at the earliest possible moment such military assistance as the military experts of the Czech and Japanese forces may consider desirable and necessary. Such a procedure would be in accordance with the public declaration of the United States Government, as the present state of affairs is clearly one of emergency, demanding the application of extraordinary measures.

The Japanese authorities have pointed out to the British Government that no formal request has been received from them by Japan with a view to sending the increased help now evidently necessary for the Czechs. In view of what the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs has said on this point, and considering the deep resentment

which would be felt in Great Britain at any disaster to the Czech forces, the British Government feel that it will be incumbent on them to make a request of this nature, unless the United States Government have grave objections to such a course.

A recent report on the position of the Czech forces is attached to this memorandum.<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1918.

File 861.00/2506

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed by the Chargé to the Secretary of State on August 13, 1918:]

*The British Consul at Vladivostok (Hodgson) to the British Foreign Office*

August 9, 1918.

Representations have been made by Dr. Girska of the Czech National Council to the effect that the Czechs in Siberia are daily being placed in a more and more critical position. They have insufficient supplies of clothing, boots, military material, arms and ammunition, and their numbers are being reduced. The position of the troops between Samara and Irkutsk is even worse. The forces at the disposal of the enemy are constantly increasing; they are fully supplied with aeroplanes, automobiles, and artillery, and their organization is being perfected. There are now only two months before the beginning of winter and the Czech troops in central Siberia will be lost unless help can reach them by then. Dr. Girska urged that the Allies should extend their plan of operations and send a stronger force and also supplies, more especially aeroplanes and artillery; the forces so far proposed to be sent by the Allies are certainly inadequate.

The positive statement is made by the general in command of the Czechs that not less than three Allied divisions are imperatively necessary to deal with the situation on the Manchuria-Irkutsk front. The prisoners of war have now obtained control of the Trans-Baikal Province, where they are terrorizing the inhabitants and forcing them to enlist in the Red forces.

File No. 861.00/2483

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

95. Following telegram dated July 8 received from Consul Ray,<sup>2</sup> Novo Nikolaevsk, having been forwarded to Urga by messenger and transmitted by Russian diplomatic agent there:

The government created last January by the popularly elected Siberian territorial parliament in Tomsk has assumed power and its authority has been accepted throughout western Siberia from near

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> John A. Ray, Consul at Odessa, detailed to Tomsk.

Irkutsk to the Urals, except in Ekaterinburg. Conventions of peasants and Cossacks held and [at] Omsk voted to support new government. The new ministry is composed of representatives of all moderate parties including the Constitutional Democrats [who support] government. Five ministers now in Omsk, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Premier, who is Vologodski, conservative Social Revolutionary, prominent Tomsk lawyer. Complete order is maintained with popularly elected Zemstvos and city councils in operation and organization new army proceeding as rapidly as limited equipment permits. Fourth of July government issued declaration independence Siberia until federation can be effected with other Russian states after expulsion Germans and usurping Bolsheviks and convocation All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Government is pro-Ally and declaration of war on Central powers delayed only by desire to ascertain whether united Allied support can be obtained in the matter of munitions. As soon as Ural Diet consolidated [omission] eastern Siberia can be taken [omission] but we suggest Czechs in Vladivostok be armed and sent to help other Slav peoples against Teutonic oppression. Recommended prompt recognition and support with munitions and money, thereby preventing the dispatch 300,000 Hungarian and Austrian prisoners to French front.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2485

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, August 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received August 14, 12.45 a. m.]

Yesterday six trains Czechs arrived Harbin, five more will arrive to-day or to-morrow. Total force between 5,000 and 6,000, Harbin, main headquarters Hailar. Secondary [serious] field operations westward to begin as soon as equipment completed. War prisoners seriously threatening Manchuria Station which is at their mercy. Am informed 5,000 Japanese troops leave Changchun to join Czechs here. . . .

MOSER

File No. 861.00/2481

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, August 13, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received August 14, 3.41 a. m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this afternoon and again referring to the serious condition existing in northern Manchuria, as reported in my August 5, 8 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> advised me that the

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 330.

Japanese Government after consultation with the Chinese Government had decided to send a Japanese force to Manchouli Station. The force will consist of one brigade of about 1,700 men, 600 of whom are artillery, and will begin to move from Mukden and Kirin by way of Harbin to-morrow and should reach Manchouli in about four days. They expect to be accompanied by a force of approximately 2,000 Chinese.

In explanation of this action he stated as follows: That the Maximalist troops recently in the neighborhood of Manchouli have submitted to the actual leadership of armed German prisoners; they are pressing upon Semenov's army; a part of the city of Manchouli is being bombarded; 250 Japanese residents of this city have been obliged to flee to Hailar; the Chinese troops quartered in this region are very weak and are unable to oppose the Maximalist force; even though they are able to escape their invasion temporarily by negotiations, the situation is daily becoming more dangerous; accordingly the Government had decided upon moving a section of the troops quartered in south Manchuria to the vicinity of Manchouli; however, the movement of Japanese troops within Chinese territory was affected only with the consent and agreement of China and they will be withdrawn as soon as the necessity occasioned by the temporary emergency is over; consequently it is entirely different in nature from the present joint intervention in Vladivostok, or from military action within Russian territory, and the only nations that have interests involved are Japan and China; in view of the fact that there is apprehension of false reports at such a time, this matter was thus brought to my attention.

He further stated that he had yesterday advised Ambassador Ishii of the proposed action with a view to communicating it to you.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/2501

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1918.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum which you were good enough to hand to the Acting Secretary of State on August 12, in which you express the concern of your Government over the critical position in which the Czech forces in Siberia now find themselves. You inform me that your Government earnestly hope that this Government will feel it possible formally to request the Japanese Government to dispatch at the earliest possible moment such military assistance as the military experts of the Czech and Japanese forces may consider desirable and necessary. You add

that in view of the deep resentment which will be felt in Great Britain at any disaster to the Czech forces, your Government feel that it will be incumbent on them to make a request of this nature, unless the United States Government have grave objections to such a course.

In reply I am bound in candor to say that this Government would be gravely embarrassed if the British Government should take the action suggested. The plan of action recently proposed by the Government of the United States, accepted by Japan and acquiesced in in principle by the Government of Great Britain is now in course of execution. Only a small part of the troops have reached Vladivostok. When all are assembled there they will number, approximately, 25,000. It should, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be left to a later time and other circumstances, not yet developed, to consider radical alterations of the whole scale and character of action in Siberia. The President advises me that on several occasions he has stated to Lord Reading the unalterable facts which must of necessity limit military action and the supplying of armies in Siberia, and the President hopes that Lord Reading will be kind enough to set those facts before his Government in London more fully than is possible in a cable message.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2531½

*Statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, August 14, 1918*

The attention of the Japanese Government has recently been called to the growing activities of the armed German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Siberia along borders of Manchuria. These prisoners having practically assumed command of the forces of the Soviet are now pressing upon the Chinese frontier in the direction of the town of Manchouli and the imminence of danger has compelled a large number of Japanese and Chinese inhabitants of that town to seek refuge in flight. The situation involves a direct menace to Chinese territory and is of no less serious concern to Japan united as she is with China by bonds of close solidarity. The two governments have accordingly considered in common the course to be adopted in this state of affairs and have agreed that as a provisional measure of emergency a portion of the Japanese troops at present stationed in south Manchuria shall be ordered immediately to proceed towards Manchouli. Such movement of troops has been actuated solely by the spirit of harmonious cooperation between Japan and China in face of threatening danger and, in undertaking it, the Japa-



nese Government will scrupulously respect the sovereignty of China as well as the rights and interests of local population. They are happy to believe that the proposed measure will be largely instrumental in promoting relations of mutual confidence and good neighborhood between the two nations.

---

File No. 861.00/2493a

*The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Ishii)*

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In the course of our conversation Tuesday afternoon we touched upon the number of American troops ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. Since then I have gone into the matter very carefully and I now take this opportunity to communicate to you that there have been ordered 8,763 men and 251 officers.

As a matter of fact there are two regiments, which on a war footing contain 3,699 men each. Both regiments would have a strength of 7,398 men. These are the only combatant troops. In addition to the soldiers and fighting units there are such complementary units as field hospital, ambulance, bakery, intelligence, telegraph, staff officers, base hospital and medical supply depots. This accounts for the difference between the figures 7,398 and 8,763, the difference between the two representing the numerical strength of all these various units, which are attached to the expedition for medical, hospital and similar work, but which are not a part of the regular military fighting strength.

I have understood from the Secretary of War that your military attaché has been furnished a complete and specific statement, outlining in detail the strength of the entire expeditionary forces.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2503

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 15, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received 8.41 p. m.]

98. Following is a summary of a report by General Dietrichs, commanding Czech forces, and of the transmitting letter of Doctor Girsá, member Czech National Council, showing the necessity of more extensive Allied military assistance to save their troops in western Siberia. The fact is that war prisoners are being armed faster than Allied assistance can arrive under present plans, and force considered sufficient when asked for six weeks ago is now in-

adequate. This is clearly shown by telegram from Consul Ray forwarded by my 95, August 13, 5 p. m. which also shows that large number war prisoners will have to be fought on other fronts if not fought in Russia. I therefore earnestly recommend immediate extension of plans to provide sufficient force to reach Irkutsk before winter.

Following is summary of letter of Doctor Girsá :

In sending you statement addressed by General Dietrichs to Czecho-Slovak National Council regarding military hostility our troops, we have the honor to request you to communicate to your Government our following appeal. It is clear that the position of our troops becomes daily more severe whereas enemy forces are growing. Therefore the task of our eastern detachment becomes, if not impossible, at least very difficult without any guarantee of success. Our troops will of course cheerfully fulfil their duty, but we feel obliged to point out to the Allied powers that this may mean the loss of the troops participating. If our troops do not reach their destination by winter (within six weeks) our troops will be lost, which would be a great gain for Germany and a loss to the Allies. Russia would be entirely at the mercy of Germany.

Having received so many proofs of the sincere sympathy and active help of all the Allied powers we venture to point out that our object—the liberation of our troops in Siberia from Germans and Hungarians—can be achieved only in case the Allies do not confine themselves to operations on the Khabarovsk front, but grant our troops sufficient military assistance in our advance on Irkutsk. Doctor Girsá, Member Czecho-Slovak National Council.

Following is summary of report of General Dietrichs :

The limiting of Allied assistance to Khabarovsk front makes question of re[dis]tribution Czecho-Slovaks between Lake Baikal and Volga River assume critical form as enemy forces will be withdrawn from Khabarovsk front to strengthen Irkutsk front, forcing Czechs to remain in western Siberia over winter, insufficiently provided with munitions, money and clothing. Enemy can concentrate 30,000 organized Germans and Hungarians, 70 guns, and 200 machine guns in Chita-Baikal area, where Czecho-Slovaks will have 5,000 men with 6 to 12 guns and limited ammunition. Czech force of 8,000 cannot be now concentrated on Manchurian border before September with 900 miles to cover by fighting to reach other body our troops, during which it is possible enemy may attack in overwhelming force and drive our western body of troops still further west placing between me and them permanent obstruction in the form of strong military force or destruction of railway.

I do not wish to deal with the position of Czecho-Slovak western group in case pressure from Baikal region is accompanied by pressure by Germans in Volga River area. It is evident that eastern group of armed German war prisoners will endeavor to break through to west, join Germans advancing from Volga, and that strength of eastern enemy group will increase as Czechs retreat westward, enemy

forces being augmented by recruits from war prisoners now disarmed by Czechs.

In this attempt the eastern German-Hungarian group takes very small risk because they can rely upon food being supplied by Bolshevik authorities restored by their advance and in the event of reverse they would be no worse off than on Khabarovsk front, where a large proportion of them at critical moment appeared to be in prison camps or at work.

It should be pointed out that regardless of high fighting qualities of the 13,000 Czecho-Slovaks their chances of success against 30,000 German-Hungarian war prisoners cannot be regarded with complete confidence considering Czechs' great lack of artillery, machine guns and cavalry, and fact that with Bolshevik assistance enemy forces can be increased to 35,000 or 40,000 men.

No time should be lost as only six weeks remain for military operations in which time every effort should be made to carry out these operations as swiftly and successfully as possible. This can be done only by the Allies' extending their operations to the Manchurian-Transbaikal front with large forces. General Commandant Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2499a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1918, 1 p. m.

Entire strength American expeditionary forces ordered Vladivostok as follows:

Force consists of two regiments with a combined combatant strength of 7,398 men with 251 officers. Attached to the force are noncombatants of complementary units totaling 1,375 men in hospital, bakery, intelligence, ambulance, supply, medical, telegraph, and similar bodies.

Repeat to Peking and Vladivostok.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2502

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, August 15, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 15, 3.17 p. m.]

I was last night advised in behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that on the 11th instant the Japanese Minister announced to a representative of the Premier, whom he had asked to call upon

him, that the Japanese Government proposed immediately to send 5,000 troops to Manchouli in view of the exigency recognized by the Chinese Government's note of July 27 and that he inquired whether China was prepared to cooperate and if so with how many troops. Later that day the Premier sent word that China would dispatch a force of 10,000 men, but would require some days to prepare them; to this it was answered that the Japanese forces must start without waiting for the Chinese.

The Chinese have thus far received no intimation whether or not the expedition to Manchouli proposed by Japan contemplates action beyond Chinese territory.

The Chinese absolutely deny that Maximalist or enemy forces have bombarded Manchouli or otherwise made military encroachment on Chinese territory.

The small Chinese contingent for Vladivostok was ready to leave from here on the 10th instant, but has been delayed by the impossibility of effecting arrangements for transportation by the South Manchuria Railway, which is reported to be waiting for necessary instructions from the Japanese General Staff. All movements of Chinese troops over the railway northward from Mukden are meanwhile postponed until Japanese have taken action.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2536

---

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 914

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it seems to His Majesty's Government essential to establish order in Vladivostok, and it is clear that this can only be done by definite action on the part of the Allies.

The Russians are too divided amongst themselves to do so effectively and impartially, even though the Allied troops may control Vladivostok. His Majesty's Government have accordingly sent the following instructions to their Consul at Vladivostok:

The Allies would be greatly blamed if they fail in their self-imposed duty of maintaining order, for which purpose they have taken the responsibility of landing troops in Vladivostok. Soldiers are the only persons who can at present be trusted with the maintenance of order, and they should be organized in sufficient numbers to enable them to perform the task of protecting life and property.

You might suggest to the Czech commander that he might perhaps take the necessary action, and you might also offer him British support, if you consider that it would ease matters.

In informing the United States Government of the above, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was directed to request them, if they concur, to send similar instructions to their representatives at Vladivostok.

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1918.

---

File No. 861.00/2550

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

[The following paraphrase of a telegram was left by the Ambassador at the Department of State on August 17, 1918:]

*Professor Grebenchikov to the Russian Ambassador at Washington*

VLADIVOSTOK, undated.

SIR: Much obliged for your answer and readiness for cooperation. America's declaration that she is ready to give all kinds of support to Russia in her political and economical revival evokes most comfortable frame of mind in all classes of population. Western section of Siberian government informs us that the boundaries of Siberia include Uruul [Ural] region. There also have been proclaimed rules for keeping order, also exclusive rules for martial law by civil and military authorities. The completion of the Siberian army is carried out on the principle of complete centralization. In relation to this there arises the extreme need of urgent shipment of all kind of army supplies. Relying on the declaration of America we address to the latter the request of large assistance in war munitions for the new army for fighting Austria-Germany. We shall soon send to America a general commission on questions of financial and economical character for ascertaining the situation of purchases of war supplies formerly made by Russia and the possibility and conditions of quick delivery to Vladivostok. With regard to the above questions we request your authoritative and energetic cooperation and reply.

For Minister Counselor to Ministry Foreign Affairs

PROFESSOR GREBENCHIKOV

---

File No. 861.00/2537

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

[The following paraphrase of a telegram was left by the Chargé at the Department of State on August 19, 1918:]

*H. M. S. "Suffolk" to the British Embassy*

August 11, 1918.

The proposal with regard to the question of martial law which was again raised on the morning of August 10 was defeated owing to the opposition on the part of the American Admiral. All the other naval and military representatives were in favour of instituting it.

It was finally agreed to form a committee to draw up for further consideration a statement of the limitations imposed on the Russian authorities should

they declare martial law, it being understood that if this were done at all it could only be done if the Allies approved of and supported it. The Russians are most anxious for a declaration of martial law.

The immediate establishment of martial law is an urgent necessity, as enemy propaganda is rife and enemy agents are doing their best to obtain information of a military nature from our men by the free offer of liquor and to instil the doctrine of violence against authority and of insubordination. We have no machinery at present with which to deal with these persons.

---

File No. 861.00/2555½

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State on Siberian Policy after  
Conference with the President, August 20, 1918*

This Government can not aid in equipping, transporting or maintaining any troops beyond the numbers agreed upon between the United States and Japan.

This Government is not in favor of proceeding west of Irkutsk in relieving the Czecho-Slovaks in western Siberia.

This Government favors the retirement of Czecho-Slovaks eastward from western Siberia as rapidly as safety will permit and the concentration of all troops in eastern Siberia where they should jointly operate against the hostile forces along the Amur River and about Lake Baikal.

This Government prefers to defer a consideration of the future movements of the Czecho-Slovaks whether eastward to France or westward to Russia until after eastern Siberia has been cleared of enemies.

---

File No. 861.00/2548

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State has received memorandum No. 893, dated August 11, 1918, from the Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy at Washington, conveying the information that His Majesty's Government have decided to appoint a High Commissioner in Siberia, in connection with the measures to be taken by the Allies in that region, and that the post has been offered to Sir Charles Eliot who has accepted the offer.

It is noted that Sir Charles will represent His Majesty's Government in all political questions which come before the Allies and will be in control of all British agents in Siberia, other than military or naval commands. It is further noted that His Majesty's Government attach the very greatest importance to the questions of facilitating combined action by the Allies in Siberia.

In acknowledging the receipt of this memorandum, the Secretary of State improves the opportunity of expressing his entire conviction that, upon their arrival in Siberia, the most cordial cooperation will govern the relations between the representatives of the United States charged with these matters and the representatives of the Allied nations engaged in the same task. The determination of the means by which such essential *liaison* may best be effected must, of course, await the arrival in Siberia of the respective officials.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2534

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 20, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 9.34 p. m.]

107. American troops paraded yesterday and were well received, being cheered by crowd, as had been French. British and Japanese were received in silence, though British were at some disadvantage in coming first before populace fully realized significance, whereas silent reception of Japanese came after French had been cheered with some enthusiasm. It is evident Russians still feel much hostility toward Japanese, which latter are sure to increase by many small but irritating actions, such as sentries preventing people from walking on pavement before Japanese staff headquarters.

Court has declared recent municipal elections void on technical grounds. General strike was threatened for 17th in protest against abolition of Soviet and detention its leaders, but was prevented.

Tokyo and Peking informed.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72/10309

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Hohler)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Great Britain, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the British Embassy's memorandum of June 10, 1918, respecting the question of the transportation to France of Czecho-Slovak troops now in Russian territory.

In reply the Secretary of State begs to inform the British Chargé d'Affaires that the delay in acknowledging the Embassy's memorandum was unavoidable on account of the uncertainty of the Siberian situation and that the Department of State will reserve judgment in the matter until the situation has become more clarified.

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2542½

*Memorandum of a Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chinese Minister (Koo)**August 21, 1918.*

The Chinese Minister called to-day and stated that he was just in receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese had moved 12,000 troops along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and had stationed them as follows: Harbin, 6,000; Buchta[sic], 3,000; and Manchouli, 3,000; but his Government had not been consulted by the Japanese under the terms of the military convention they had made with Japan. Under the terms of the convention the only excuse for Japanese military action along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad in China was that there should be claim by China for the project, or that there should exist an emergency; that no emergency existed.

He further stated that 1,700 Chinese troops had been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok and that the Japanese on the railroad running north from Mukden had prevented all but 950 from proceeding.

He asked what steps this Government was going to take under the circumstances.

I told him that we would consider, but that the present circumstances probably would not have resulted if his Government had acted on the advice of our Government some months ago and had assumed control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad within Chinese territory.

His reply was that "control" was a word not susceptible of exact definition but that the facts were that there were 40,000 Chinese troops in Heilungkiang Province, part of whom were on the railroad running from Manchouli to Harbin; that there was no disorder, or none had been reported along the line of the railroad; that the "control" which the Chinese exercised over that part of the railroad would seem to have been sufficient to protect it. He did not know the exact location or disposition or composition of the 40,000 but that they were one and one-half divisions of their peace strength. He said that it had been reported that the Chinese commander in chief had had some friendly intercourse with the commanding officer of the Bolsheviki troops when they approached Chinese territory in pursuit of Semenov. He denied that this was true except that the commander had warned them not to penetrate Chinese territory.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG



File No. 861.00/2544

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 22, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 12.03 p. m.]

109. Local representatives of government autonomous Siberia inform Allied consuls in writing that the Siberian governments at Omsk and Vladivostok are in full accord, and that they are integral parts of the same organization. They stated they have telegraphed Siberian government at Omsk to notify Allied Governments direct that they are the same government.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2610

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

[The following paraphrase of a telegram was received by the Department of State on August 23, 1918:]

*The British Ambassador in France to the British Foreign Office*

[Received August 21, 1918.]

The French Government have intimated their agreement as to the urgency of establishing Czech police at Vladivostok with Allied help. They draw attention to the fact that the Czechs were hitherto unwilling to intervene out of respect for the liberty of the Russian population. The recent pro-Bolshevist election at Vladivostok is the result of this. The French Consul at Vladivostok has been instructed by his Government to act in concert with his British, Japanese and American colleagues, with a view to the formation of a police force for the town of Vladivostok, in agreement with the Czechs, as, in order to avoid arousing any suspicion, inter-Allied policing of towns in Siberia is desirable.

File No. 861.00/2571

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 24, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received August 26, 2.10 a. m.]

112. Local armed military force which Zemstvo has been allowed to form since Czechs took control here in the hope that it might act as nucleus of Russian army to cooperate with Allies last night changed allegiance from officer appointed by Zemstvo to Horvat and seized staff building attempting to seize government bank and other buildings but being prevented by city police. This move not sur-

prising as force mainly officers and young students to whom Horvat appeals. Allied consuls to-day met with representatives Czech National Council and unanimously agreed to present to council Allied commanders recommendation that force be disarmed or compelled to leave Russian territory as they are now here in defiance of regulations made by Czechs and Allied commanders and should be therefore treated as other Horvat forces which were sent from here by Horvat on demand of Allied commanders.

Consuls also informed Allied commanders they consider no Russian armed force other than city police should be permitted here until Allies can supervise and control organization so as to insure its being used solely in cooperation with Allies in war against Germany. I believe Allies should at once undertake formation such Russian force under Allied control to fight with Allies thus giving chance to assist to those Russians who really wish to do so. I also consider some measure of martial law should be proclaimed and enforced by Allies in this province including railways on which our Railway Service Corps should be placed immediately under control our army.

Allied consuls are about ready to make effort to have Horvat leave Russian territory, possibly asking Allied commanders to use force to this end if necessary because his continued presence here is turning against Czechs rural population who believe his presence here proves that he is supported by Allies and Czechs thus making Czech campaign more difficult. Horvat issuing orders which show he considers he is in control of local situation. People here much excited, many street gatherings mainly despite Horvat.

Copies sent Department and Tokyo.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/2573

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, August 26, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 27, 2.15 a. m.]

The military attaché of the Embassy was this morning called in conference with his colleagues by the vice chief of staff and advised that the remainder of the Twelfth Division consisting of approximately 10,000 additional men had embarked for Vladivostok on August 24, and that the Government further intended to send the Third Division now being mobilized at Nagoya to northern Manchuria by way of Harbin. This division consists of about 20,000 men. The vice chief of staff explained to Major Baldwin<sup>1</sup> the stra-

---

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Karl F. Baldwin, Military Attaché at Tokyo.

tegic conditions which forced this sudden action and expressed privately to him the hope that our Government would fully appreciate the antithesis [urgency] of it. Major Baldwin is telegraphing to the War Department a detailed report of this conversation.

I have had as yet no advices from the Foreign Office.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/2583

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, August 26, 1918, midnight.

[Received August 27, 9.43 p. m.]

Just after filing my August 26, 4 p. m., the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested a conference and I called upon him late this afternoon. He expressed a fear that my Government did not understand the motives which actuated Japan in moving troops to Manchouli as reported in my telegram of August 13, 9 p. m.; stated that while no formal protest had been filed by the Government of the United States he gathered from suggestions in the reports of Ambassador Ishii that there existed some doubt of the real meaning of this action; and asked whether I had any information on the subject. I replied that I had reported to my Government the statement which he made to me on August 13 and that since then I had received no indication of the Government's attitude.

He then proceeded to explain to me in detail the conditions which faced the Allies in Siberia; with a carefully prepared map pointed out the various positions of the forces as explained to Major Baldwin at the military conference this morning, and expressed his entire agreement with the conclusions of the General Staff that immediate reinforcements were required to protect the Czech Army from disaster; emphasized the fact that winter was approaching and that speedy action was essential; again called attention to the strategic value Karymskaya; spoke at length of the recent battle with Bolsheviks and German prisoners in the Ussuri region beyond Lake Khanka, which had convinced General Otani that additional troops were required at Vladivostok and for this reason the General had asked for the remainder of the Twelfth Division. In addition to this the Minister for Foreign Affairs understood that all the military authorities at Vladivostok had agreed that additional troops were urgently needed, he himself felt that it was vital to control the junction of the railways at Karymskaya, and explained that the troops now at Manchouli were not equipped for service in Siberia. To meet these requirements the Japanese Government had

on the 24th of August started to dispatch the remainder of the Twelfth Division to Vladivostok and were mobilizing the Third Division at Nagoya to be sent by way of Harbin and Manchouli to Karymskaya where he said that they could not arrive before September 15. This action he assured me was adopted as a military necessity and was not viewed by the Government of Japan as contrary to the spirit of the recent understanding with the Government of the United States; but was intended solely to help the Czechs, that was the only motive.

I inquired whether before taking this action he had conferred with you through Ishii, and he replied that on August 22 he had instructed the Japanese Ambassador at Washington to advise you of this decision but that the Ambassador had reserved the right to consider the matter before carrying out the instructions and had so reported to him, and he was therefore unable to say whether Ishii had as yet complied but that he had to-day telegraphed urging him to act promptly.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2598½

---

*The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1918.

DEAR MR. LANSING: I hasten to enclose to you the rough statement prepared in all haste. Excuse my bad English.

Yours sincerely,

K. ISHII

[Enclosure <sup>1</sup>]

*Statement of the Japanese Ambassador*

The enemy forces in front of the Czecho-Slovak troops in the Maritime Provinces which were hitherto estimated to be from 10,000 to 12,000 are reported to have obtained a reinforcement of 3,000 strong and are now pressing the Czecho-Slovaks to the south. A part of the British and French detachments have first been sent out to their aid. The Japanese contingent which landed at Vladivostok on the 13th instant has also dispatched a detachment in view of the increasing urgent situation. The combined forces of all the Allied contingents in and near Vladivostok amount at present to only 14,000 and it will require more than two months to attain the strength of about 25,000 as originally figured out by the American Government. The consequence is that it would prove extremely difficult for this present feeble force of the Allies to deal the confronting enemy a complete blow before the winter sets in and that the important object of relieving in time the Czecho-Slovak army in Siberia would end in failure.

---

<sup>1</sup> Note of the Secretary of State in the margin of MS.: "The Japanese Ambassador read this to me this morning and asked me to treat it as having been read the 23d. He had delayed by reason of doubtful passages. Aug. 27, 1918. R[obert] L[ansing]."

At the military conference recently held at Vladivostok of the inter-Allied representative officers it was unanimously concluded that the only way to meet the situation would be to have the new reinforcement promptly sent from Japan, the American representatives taking the initiative in proposing to report to the respective governments about the situation presented and the conclusion reached.

In the meantime General Dietrichs commanding the Czecho-Slovak forces has repeatedly appealed to the Japanese General Staff with the same object. The Imperial Government have given their most earnest consideration to the imminent situation thus created. In view of the fact that the Allied powers have sent their troops to Siberia with their declared object of rescuing the Czecho-Slovaks, the Imperial Government came to the conclusion that it would be an irreparable loss of the Allies' prestige if they should now hesitate to send further reinforcements absolutely necessary to the execution of their object. The Imperial Government have, therefore, the intention of sending anew about 10,000 troops to the Maritime Provinces.

The enemy prisoners under the leadership of Lieutenant General Taube (?) and with their principal force at Chita are exerting themselves in conjunction with the Bolsheviki to prevent the Czecho-Slovaks in their westward advance. The enemy forces distributed between Manchouli and Lake Baikal are reported to be not less than 30,000. The 6,000 or 7,000 Czecho-Slovaks now concentrating in the neighborhood of Harbin would find it next to impossible to force their way through the outnumbering enemy to the Baikal and deliver their brothers. If they cannot reach the Baikal before the winter sets in, their brothers beyond the lake would be placed in a most perilous situation. Any military action will become extremely difficult in the Za-Baikal region in about a month hence.

In order to enable the Czecho-Slovaks to join hands with their brothers in western Siberia, it becomes absolutely necessary that a force of sufficient strength should at once be dispatched to assist the Czecho-Slovaks in their westward movement so that they will at least occupy Chita, the enemy headquarters, before the approaching winter and disperse the enemy forces in the Za-Baikal region. In view of these considerations, the Imperial Government intend to send another detachment (probably one division) to this region.

It is a matter of mutual satisfaction that the friendly attitude of Japan and her allies has been generally recognized by the Russians in Siberia and that the dispatch of the Allied troops has been welcomed by them so far as can be judged by the reports at hand. It is the belief of the Japanese Government that the intended reinforcements in the Maritime Provinces and the dispatch of troops to the Za-Baikal region may not give rise to any unfavorable development on the part of the local inhabitants. The Japanese Government feel confident that the American Government will entertain the same view with them in the light of the recent situation in Siberia.

---

File No. 861.00/2675

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

No. 4278

BERNE, August 27, 1918.

[Received September 12.]

SIR: With reference to my cipher telegram No. 4434 of August 22,<sup>1</sup> transmitting a *résumé* of the despatches handed me by the rep-

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

representative of the Russian Soviet government in Switzerland, I have the honor to transmit herewith translations in full of these three despatches.<sup>1</sup>

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the Soviet Representative in Switzerland*

Will you be so kind as to transmit to the representatives of the United States and Japan in Switzerland, with the object of communicating to their respective Governments, the following answer in response to their call to the Russian people, a call in which the intervention is explained by the chief concern caused by the Czecho-Slovak situation:

The Governments of the United States and Japan addressed this appeal to the Russian people at the time of landing military forces on Russian territory. With the expression of sincere friendship for the Russian people, the two Governments explain their intervention on Russian soil by the desire to come to the aid of the Czecho-Slovaks who are menaced "by the Germans and Austrians."

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic finds it necessary to make the following explanation in this connection:

The explanation which the United States and Japan give is based on pretexts which do not correspond to the truth of events. Detachments of Czecho-Slovaks are neither menaced by Germans nor Austrians. A struggle did take place on the territory occupied by the Soviet Republic between the Red Army of the Soviets in Russia, an army made up of workmen and peasants, on the one hand, and detachments of Czecho-Slovaks, in combination with the counter-revolutionists, the landed property holders, the *bourgeoisie*, and the exploiters of the peasants besides.

Their power, destroyed by the October revolution,<sup>2</sup> is everywhere restored where the Czecho-Slovaks have the best of it. The workmen and the peasants of the Soviet republic defend the conquests of the revolution in this struggle, menaced by the counter-revolutionists who rely on the Czecho-Slovak detachments.

The republic of the Soviet is persuaded that its enemies, having blinded the proletarian elements, have done so also with regard to those who wrongly believe that the Germans and Austrians menace the Czecho-Slovaks. If the reasons for the attack against the Soviet republic were really those which the Governments of the United States and Japan gave in their appeal, then the republic's government of the Soviet begs the Governments of the United States and Japan, upon the receipt of this declaration, that they will exactly state their desires upon this matter.

[CHICHERIN]

<sup>1</sup>Two enclosures, not printed, outlined conditions under which representatives and citizens of countries of the Entente might leave Russia. One was addressed to the Netherland Minister at Petrograd; the second bore no designation.

<sup>2</sup>November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

File No. 861.00/2595

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 29, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 4.28 p. m.]

115. British and Japanese commissions for political and economic questions now here. French commissioner appointed, and Secretary French Legation at Peking is here acting until his arrival. British commission suggests I be authorized to act on commission until arrival our commissioner in order to avoid United States being unrepresented. Please instruct.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2617

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, August 30, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received September 1, 1.27 p. m.]

The following is the substance of a mutilated telegram received from United States Consul General Harris by way of Uliassutai and Urga:

287, August 13. In accordance with instructions of General Poole commanding Allied forces in Murman, which instructions were brought here by Captain Jones, Czechs were asked to advance on and take Perm and Vyatka in order to effect a junction with the Allies at Vologda at the earliest possible moment. In endeavoring to carry out this plan Czechs are meeting unexpected and strong resistance and flank attacks from organized bands of Magyars and German prisoners commanded by German and Austrian officers. (Passage undecipherable.) Taking of Perm will be delayed indefinitely and in all probability will be impossible without reinforcements from Allies in Siberia. As no reliance (?) can be placed in the Russian mobilization and as guns are not available in any case, all the burden falls on the Czechs whose losses are heavy. Please communicate immediately with Allied forces in Siberia to hasten advance and send officers to strengthen the Czech staff. In view of the fact that recent battles have been exclusively with German and Austrian prisoners commanded by German and Austrian officers, the Allies need have no fear of fighting against Russian Bolsheviks. All ask that Allies in east inform General Poole at Murman that unless reinforcements are forthcoming immediately it will be impossible to

carry out his instructions as above stated regarding junction at Vologda.

Remainder of telegram received undecipherable but apparently makes urgent request for information as to plans of Allies for the relief of the Czechs.

The above repeated to Tokyo, Harbin, and Vladivostok for communication to American military and naval authorities.

MACMURRAY

---

File No. 861.00/2571

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your 112, August 24, 9 p. m. The Department expects you to deal with and support the city police and the authorities constituted by that municipality. Instructions regarding Railway Service Corps will follow.

Participation by the United States in police operations in Vladivostok, or elsewhere in Siberia, is not believed wise. The policy of this Government is not to interfere in local governments, municipal or provincial.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2536

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

#### MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, of August 16, 1918,<sup>1</sup> informing him of the instructions sent by the British Government to the British Consul at Vladivostok in connection with the methods deemed essential by the British Government in order to establish order in that city; and further requesting that, if this Government concur, similar instructions be sent to the American representatives at Vladivostok.

The Department of State has been happy to take under consideration the suggestions advanced by His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 349.



File No. 861.00/2507

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2220

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note of August 12, 1918, in regard to the coordination of the action of the Allies in Siberia and northern Russia. You advise me that your Government believes that it would be wise to organize an inter-Allied civilian board charged, among other duties, with that of safeguarding unity of action towards the Russian people, of deciding political disputes and of defining the attitude between the Allied Governments and local authorities; and you are good enough to suggest that the chairmanship of such a board would go to a representative from the United States.

In this connection I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States feels confident that, upon their arrival, cordial cooperation will govern the relations between the representatives of the United States and the representatives of the Allied nations, but believes that the means by which such essential *liaison* may best be effected must await the arrival in Siberia of the respective officials. The foregoing refers to the cooperation in such relief as it may be decided to extend in eastern Siberia, as distinct from any political activities which governments may choose to exercise there. Moreover, as has been publicly announced in the press of this country, it is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the governments with which it is associated will lend their active aid in the execution of these plans.

Since the beginning of the revolutionary movement this Government has maintained an attitude of strict impartiality as between contending political parties and, as it contemplates no change in this attitude, it deems cooperation in any political action impossible and believes it would be as unnecessary as it is undesirable. It prefers to occupy a position in eastern Siberia merely as a friend who stands at hand ready to help in the most practical and wholehearted manner.

While, therefore, this Government cannot see its way clear to concur in the suggestion that a representative of the United States should assume the chairmanship of such an inter-Allied board, I beg to express my appreciation of your excellency's courtesy and consideration.

Furthermore, I improve this opportunity to inform your excellency that, while the matter of the extension of economic relief to the Siberian people is receiving constant and attentive consideration, this Government has not as yet definitely determined upon the action it will take in that respect.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2612

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 31, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 31, 10.44 a. m.]

116. Yesterday Zemstvo issued proclamation turning over "full powers" to so-called provisional government of autonomous Siberia which is to perform all functions of state. This may make it necessary to deal with Siberian government as local administrative organ unless Allied military government accepts command.

Referring to my August 24, 9 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> upper classes are much incensed by disarmament [order] sent out by Allied military commanders on recommendation of Consular Corps and request Russian force be permitted to form and proceed to front as part of international force fighting against Germany. This is desirable if it can be arranged but Allied control essential to prevent force being used in interests of any one party. Also some parts of present international force may decline to accept Russian unit.

Tokyo and Peking informed.

Caldwell

File No. 861.00/2614

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, August 31, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received September 2, 12.02 a. m.]

4196. Since the recent Japanese intervention in Siberia, Dutch public opinion has become more than ever exercised over the future of the Dutch East Indies. The suspicion prevails that the Entente may have arranged for Japanese assistance on the understanding that certain territorial readjustments would later be sanctioned in the Far East, notably in the Dutch colonies. In this connection, certain Dutch journalists have informally called attention to article published in *Outlook* of May 1. Speculation on this subject has been brought to a head by the publication in the Dutch press on August 23 of a telegram from the *Vossische Zeitung* purporting to give the text printed in the Russian Bolshevik newspaper *Izvestia* of certain secret archives of the Russian Foreign Office referring to the Dutch East Indies in a prejudicial manner.

Further stated the German press and press agents in Holland are attempting to excite Dutch public with rumors that Japan with the

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 354.

air of approval of the United States is regarding Dutch East Indies as eventual compensation for cooperation in Russia. In view of these circumstances it may appear desirable to take some steps to check this particular form of enemy propaganda.

KIRK

File No. 861.00/2595

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1918, 3 p. m.

Your 115, August 29, 4 p. m. This Government does not contemplate the dispatch of a high commissioner and has so informed the French Ambassador in reply to a suggestion that the representative of the United States assume the chairmanship of an inter-Allied board charged, among other duties, with that of safeguarding unity of action towards the Russian people, of deciding political disputes and of defining the attitude between the Allied Governments and local authorities. This Government deems cooperation in any political action unwise and believes it would be as unnecessary as it is undesirable at the present time.

LANSING

Special Mission of Ambassador Morris to Vladivostok: His Recommendation that an American Force be Sent to Omsk—Westward Movement of the Czecho-Slovaks from Vladivostok: Reverses on the Volga—Formation of a Government by Constituent Assembly Delegates at Samara: Conference at Ufa with Other Organizations

File No. 861.00/2628

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 2, 1918.

[Received September 6, 10.20 a. m.]

At the present moment Czechs are in power from Chelyabinsk and Ekaterinburg to Chita. They were also in power westward as far as Samara, Orenburg, and Kazan but since a week the Bolsheviks have succeeded in breaking the railway line at Ufa and the fate of these towns is not known. This proves that the Czechs are not strong enough to hold their grip on such a large territory and will be destroyed unless Allies hurry to their assistance. Russian army not progressing as it should and can not be depended on to materially assist Czechs.

[HARRIS]

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/2639

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 4, 1918.

[Received September 7, 3.40 p. m.]

Unofficially reported that Samara is probably retaken by Bolsheviks. This means that Orenburg, Simbirsk, and Kazan are in danger. No communication with Ekaterinburg since yesterday, the worst is feared. Report August 25 from American Vice Consul Hadley, Samara [to Omsk?] says Bolsheviks are going strong all along the front west of the Volga from Penza to north of Kazan. This is due to the artillery which is under German direction. Unless Allies make strenuous efforts half the results of Czech victories will be lost.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2651

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1918.

[Received September 5.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note on the subject of the coordination of the Allies' action in Siberia and northern Russia. I hastened to communicate it to my Government.

If I correctly understood your excellency's idea in the passage of the note wherein it is stated that the Federal Government, which has ever since the Russian revolution maintained a strict impartiality among the parties, deems that any cooperation in a political action in Russia would be neither useful nor desirable, it seems as if your excellency may have thought that in speaking of political difficulties to be settled my communication of August 12 referred to preferences to be made between this or that government or local grouping. I wish to specify in this regard that the only difficulties which the French Government, anxious, like the Federal Government, to abstain from any interference in Russian internal affairs, had in view are those which the presence of the Allies may render inevitable with each one of the governmental elements with which we may have to deal on this or that point, and whose regulation it seems to us more appropriate to leave to a civil commission than to the commanders of the armed forces.

Please accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/2643a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1918, 3 p. m.

Please proceed at once to Vladivostok taking with you only such personnel as will insure efficiency and at the same time preserve a definitely informal character to your visit. The information you obtain and the judgments you reach are for the special information of the Department and your stay at Vladivostok will be unofficial and temporary.

Upon arrival confer, in your discretion, with leading Russians and with Allied military and civilian representatives. Report in detail to the Department your views as to how the purpose of the United States to aid the Russian people, as expressed repeatedly in public statements by this Government, may best be furthered under the conditions which you will find to exist there. Your inquiries and reports should cover the economic, social, financial, political, and military situations.

Please inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tokyo frankly of these instructions and say that your reports, where they concern our two countries, will be discussed fully with Viscount Ishii here. Please make clear orally also to the Allied diplomatic representatives at Tokyo the informal, special, and temporary character of your visit.

Spare no effort to present a complete review of the situation as you see it. Time is a vital element in view of the approach of severe weather. The Department regards intelligent assistance in Siberia, supplementary to the military support already afforded the Czecho-Slovaks, as a matter of the first importance.

The United States Government has been invited by the French Government to take the chairmanship of an inter-Allied civilian board at Vladivostok charged, among other things, with deciding political disputes and defining the attitude between the Allied Governments and local authorities. This has been answered by a refusal, with the statement that political activity there is undesirable to this Government. The American Consul at Vladivostok, in answer to an inquiry as to whether he should act temporarily with the Allied commissioners now there, has been told that we contemplate the dispatch of no high commissioner to Siberia.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2629

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 5, 1918, noon.

[Received 4.52 p. m.]

124. Opposition which Czechs feared would prevent their reaching comrades in Irkutsk before winter has suddenly collapsed under pressure from both sides, and railway should soon be open from here to near Perm.

It is evident Czechs have been greatly assisted by Russian forces in western Siberia which appear to be under Siberian government and this should relieve difficult political situation in eastern Siberia. General Horvat suddenly left here night before last; is ready to confer with Czechs at Irkutsk. Military forces against Czechs and all other Allies in this district will also probably collapse within a very short time.

This makes imperative immediate assistance in transportation, economic and money matters if we are [to] alleviate to any degree suffering which appears certain this winter. If it is intended to send here engines, cars which were ordered for Russian railways and some of which have been stopped *en route*, information should be sent at once to prevent building intended for their erection being so altered by army for military purposes as to prevent or delay erection.

The addition of Allied military and associated organizations to an already overcrowded city have made the securing of any living or office accommodations so extremely difficult that I would request that I be notified as far in advance as possible of the arrival of any commission for which my assistance in securing quarters would be required.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72/11342b

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1918, 5 p. m.

For immediate transmission to Irkutsk:

Please cable Department the following:

- (1) The number of Russian military forces cooperating with the Czechs west of Irkutsk, including European Russia;
- (2) Their organization and to what extent it is developed;

- (3) Their supplies, what they are and how obtained;
- (4) Their morale;
- (5) Whether they are subject to proper military discipline;
- (6) Whether they are representative of the real sentiment of the Siberian people;
- (7) Who are their leaders.

Cable preliminary report at once.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2627

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, September 5, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 5, 5.15 p. m.]

The General Staff to-day confirmed the report that connections had been established between the Czech forces operating east of Karymskaya and those which had been cut off in the Baikal region. This connection was effected by the capture of both Chita and Karymskaya and trains are now being operated from the Irkutsk to the Onon River. The bridge over the Onon is still unrepaired. Otherwise through service could be established to Manchouli, thus releasing all the Czech forces in Siberia. The General Staff still fear the activities of Austrians and Germans in the Amur region. In Central Siberia reliable reports indicate close cooperation between Czechs and the Central Siberian Army.

The third Japanese division has been fully mobilized and it is expected to embark from Ujina for Manchouli Saturday afternoon. It is apparently the intention of the Japanese General Staff to begin operations at Karymskaya eastward to clear the Amur of the Austrian and German prisoners concentrated there. In the meantime the main part of the French forces and a portion of the British contingent have left the Ussuri front and have passed through Harbin on their way to Manchouli. The success of the expedition to relieve the Czechs seems now assured.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2614

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Kirk)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1918, 6 p. m.

2008. Your 4196, August 31, 1 p. m. Mail to the Department texts and translations of the secret archives and comment published in Dutch press.

For your information and for such discreet use as you may deem advisable. There is absolutely no foundation whatever for the statement that there is an understanding between the United States and Japan regarding the Dutch East Indies as compensation for Japan's aid in Russia nor is there such an understanding between any other governments so far as the American Government knows.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2652

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 7 (6?), 1918.

[Received September 9, 4.15 a. m.]

Telegraphic communication again reestablished with Ekaterinburg and Samara. No material change in the situation on that front as Czechs are carrying on defensive warfare until reenforcements arrive. Two thousand two hundred Czechs and Siberians from here were sent westward last week. An attempt will be made shortly to capture Perm.

[HARRIS]

---

File No. 861.00/2652

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 7 (6?), 1918.

[Received September 9, 4.15 a. m.]

Following message just received at Consulate at Omsk through courier from Consulate at Moscow:

Bolshevik battle order July 20: First army, region Syzran and Simbirsk, 8,800 infantry, 250 machine guns, 120 cavalry, 32 field pieces, 2 heavy guns, 9 armored automobiles, 1 armored train; second army, retiring toward Kama River, 2,000 infantry; third army, including the detachment in the Ekaterinburg region, 15,000 infantry, 331 machine guns, 750 cavalry, 21 field pieces, 4 heavy guns, 4 armored automobiles, and 11 aeroplanes; total of the three armies collectively, 27,130 infantry, 500 machine guns, 835 cavalry, 6 heavy field pieces, 6 heavy guns, 13 armored automobiles, 3 armored trains, 11 aeroplanes. Since this date great reinforcements of Red Army have arrived [from?] city of St. Petersburg and from the German front with numerous commissars from Moscow. According to a Ger-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.



man order, a desperate effort is to be made against Czechs' victorious advance. It is therefore of great importance to come in touch toward Vyatka with the Allied contingent landed on Archangel. In view of the pro-German policy of Bolsheviks certain elements of the Lettish regiment may be disposed to join Czechs or Allies. It would be useful to receive the first deserters for the purpose of provoking a more important movement.

I have given this information to Czech staff, Irkutsk. Since above was written the situation has changed somewhat, inasmuch as Simbirsk, Kazan, and Ekaterinburg have been occupied by Czechs but otherwise the situation is a heavy strain on Czechs.

[HARRIS]

---

File No. 861.00/2716

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 7, 1918.

[Received September 17, 2.25 a. m.]

55. General Grishin-Almazov, Minister of War of temporary Siberian government, Omsk, was requested by the other ministers to resign; he has been succeeded by General Ivanov, Cossacks' chief. Almazov has been guilty of many indiscretions, chief of which was a statement that Siberia was the key to the whole situation and that the Allies needed Siberia more than Siberia the Allies. He also stated that the Czechs were no longer needed and that they might now pass on. Consular Corps, Irkutsk, protested to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Omsk, against such statements.

There is widespread feeling in Siberia that the Allies favor Kerensky and that they will attempt to force him on Russian people again. If this is attempted it will be resented by all the people, as they attribute to him more than to any other cause the Bolshevik catastrophe.

Military prisoners at large still causing trouble in Irkutsk, Tomsk, and the other Siberian towns. German officers are frequently entertained by wealthy citizens. Germans in the guise of Swedish agents make mysterious trips to Semipalatinsk and elsewhere. Consular Corps, Irkutsk, have protested against and demanded that such prisoners be returned to prison camps and strictly guarded.

General situation improving now that it is definitely known that the Allies are entering Siberia. Much less politics all over country now and agitation against Czechs by laborers and the other dissatisfied elements quieting down.

[HARRIS]

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/2644

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Tokyo, September 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 9, 3.20 a. m.]

Your September 4, 3 p. m. I am preparing to leave for Vladivostok on the first available boat sailing from Tsuruga next Saturday and will take with me Hawley for stenographic and clerical work and MacDonald for coding.

I have advised Admiral Knight confidentially and requested him to advise General Graves<sup>1</sup> and Caldwell. I frankly explained the object of my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs who offered my [any] assistance in his power. I [informed] such of my colleagues as are in Tokyo of the informal and temporary character of my journey and caused to be inserted in an article on American activities in Russia which appeared in the *Japan Advertiser* this morning the following:

The American Ambassador, as chairman of the Japan chapter of the American Red Cross, acted as chairman of the meeting Friday. There was a generally expressed wish that he might find an early opportunity to visit Vladivostok and study conditions on the ground. It is reported that he is seriously considering this suggestion and may in the near future go to Siberia in a purely unofficial and informal manner to confer with Russian and Allied representatives over plans for enlarged cooperation in rendering aid and assistance to the Russian people.

I hoped that in thus associating my proposed visit with our Red Cross refugee work I would in large part deprive it of the political significance which otherwise might attach to it.

In my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs he expressed his regret that Viscount Ishii's conversation with [you] last Tuesday had, as reported by him, been so unsatisfactory and he feared that a misunderstanding still existed because of the dispatch of additional troops to Siberia. He [asked if I had] recent advices which might throw light on the Government's attitude. I assured him that I had none.

The diplomatic advisory council met last Wednesday and adjourned for a week. I surmise that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is greatly embarrassed by his inability to report definitely on the American attitude toward recent developments in Siberia. Political gossip has set September 15 as the date of Terauchi's resignation. It is still uncertain whether the elder statesmen will consent to a Hara ministry and attention is again turned toward Saionji as the only solution.

MORRIS

<sup>1</sup> Gen. William S. Graves, commanding the American forces in Siberia.

File No. 861.00/2658

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 9, 1918, noon.

[Received 6.34 p. m.]

128. Japanese army is making payments this district with Japanese paper currency, for this purpose including small denominations which Russians resent as indicating more than temporary occupation and as tending to further depreciate ruble.

Khabarovsk has been taken and there will be probably no more fighting along Amur Railway except possibly at Blagoveshchensk.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2719a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

In making your observations and in framing your recommendations you will please keep in mind the aims and desires of this Government expressed in the following extracts taken from a memorandum handed to the British, French and Italian Governments at the time that activities in Siberia were decided upon by the United States Government, and of which copies were handed to the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Minister in Washington. The policies of the United States Government and the limitations upon its action in Siberia are set forth as follows:

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States that military intervention in Siberia would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure Russia rather than help her and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design to win the war against Germany. It cannot therefore take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would in the judgment of the United States Government, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia and not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies and not to reconstitute their own. As we see it, military action is admis-

sible in Russia only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. The only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, in the mind of the United States Government, whether at Vladivostok or at Murmansk and Archangel, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. The Government of the United States owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than to participate in and approve of such modest methods and experimental plans as will contribute to the objects indicated above and has no reasonable expectation of being in a position to take part in organized intervention in adequate forces from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add also that it will use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes herein stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

It was further announced to be the hope and purpose of this Government to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisors, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Y.M.C.A. accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. However, the execution of the plans to send such a commission will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass such military assistance as the United States in conjunction with the Allied forces will render in line with the policies indicated hereinabove.

You will please read very carefully the contents of this cable. It expresses the present policy of this Government in dealing with Siberian and Russian situations. In making your observations you will please keep constantly in mind the policies indicated and in making any recommendations you will please be guided by the expressed wish of this Government to conform to those policies. You may announce briefly the purpose of your visit to Vladivostok having in mind these and previous instructions of September 5.

LANSING

File No. 861.48/680b

*The Secretary of State to the Russian Ambassador (Balhmeteff)*

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am pleased to note your willingness to transfer to the American Red Cross 150,000 pairs of shoes, for the purpose of supplying the Czecho-Slovaks with footwear, and cordially approve of this effort to relieve suffering and to aid in the common cause.

Notification of your proposal has been sent to the American Red Cross, together with a request that the Czecho-Slovaks be informed of the fact that these shoes were furnished by the Russian Embassy in Washington.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2694

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 10, 1918.

[Received September 14, 12.54 p. m.]

## 70. Following report Vice Consul Williams, Samara:

Returned from Kazan August 3 and send summary report at first opportunity. Military situation around Kazan serious since its capture August 7; at least 10,000 Bolsheviks and war prisoners here surrounded city; three times cut off all communication by river below Kazan and came within two versts of city. Only persistent heroic work of small force of Serbians and Czechs and frequent sending of Czech reinforcements saved Kazan from recapture. Repeated aeroplane attacks over city did little damage but terrified population. Situation now better and believe city can not fall. Unsatisfactory response to new army mobilization in Kazan. Afraid to identify themselves with movement while danger of Bolshevik return. New Russian army has been disappointing in fighting around Kazan, officers and men alike have deserted important positions through blunder of staff and desertions of men. Kazan water works retaken by Bolsheviks and [who] now hold them.

Losses heavier than in other fighting and Czechs weary from constant fighting at most difficult points with minimum of rest. Czechs are curtailing spy activity energetically. Captain Borde of French Military Mission directs all movements of Czechs and Serbians there. Simbirsk was captured easily and held without much effort. City quiet, but there also poor response to mobilization. Population seems indifferent regarding political situation. There is strong Bolshevik sympathy among 30,000 workmen of Kazan [out of] population of

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

city of 300,000; Tatar element, comprising one third, is peaceable, strongly anti-socialistic. Simbirsk with 90,000 population and little industry is conservative and has few. Strong feeling in both cities that the delegates to Constitutional Assembly, all Social Revolutionists, elected one year ago, do not now represent the constituents and citizens. Generally are unwilling to recognize the authority of this government in Samara. In recent election to City Duma in Simbirsk the socialists secured only 32 seats out of 61 which shows present trend of political sentiments there; while of the eight delegates to the Constitutional Assembly from Simbirsk government, chosen one year ago, seven are Social Revolutionary and one Bolshevik. The government of members of Constitutional Assembly in Samara is regarded as extreme and radical party government not representative of Russia to-day and incapable of saving country now. When Kazan was taken the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Samara government published there the decree abolishing all private ownership of land, vesting all ownership of land in the government. This decree alienated the support of a large proportion of the population. No such decree issued in [Simbirsk?]. I saw many Russians, representatives of city and military authority and business life. All, except those whose position prevents freedom of expression, agree that government of members of Constitutional Assembly, as now constituted, offers no help to situation. All agree military dictator is absolutely necessary and all but one think he can not be Russian but an Allied military dictator with a few thousand troops supporting him to restore order, compel men to work again, and establish the army.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2698

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 12, 1918.

[Received September 14, 7 p. m.]

78. Following is declaration of Czecho-Slovak National Soviet [Council], Russian department, in relation to question of formation of central power in Russia issued to All-Russian Assembly at Chelyabinsk, August 25:

Czecho-Slovak National Soviet [Council] sends brotherly greetings to all representatives of Russian society and separate governments taking part in All-Russian Assembly called assembly of central Russian government. Czecho-Slovak National Soviet [Council] deeply hopes that present assembly will easily arrive at its object in forming such central power which could answer all great questions of present historical moment when it is question of establishing one free federal Russian Republic, of saving Russian revolution, of con-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

firming people's rights, and of reinstating political, economic and military power of Russia. Czecho-Slovak troops entering against the Bolshevik position three months ago in first place defended their freedom but starting from second day of our uprising we pledged ourselves not to continue our interrupted journey through Vladivostok to France but to render assistance to our brother Russian people.

Czecho-Slovak troops, in hope that Russian society will take upon itself business of reestablishing military, political, social and economic life, decided to make sacrifices in name of our brothers of Russia. Unhappily, business of reestablishing not only political but military power is proceeding too slowly: instead of what would be more natural, namely, that Czecho-Slovaks should be helped by Russian troops in freeing their fatherland, hitherto burden of military operations has fallen upon Czecho-Slovaks to unusual measure. Principle of formation of volunteer army neither in Siberia nor in Samara has given any result. Result of that mobilization has not been of advantage on front while the Czecho-Slovak forces are continually decreasing and those of Bolsheviks continually increasing, principally from Magyar and German war prisoners and officers.

Three months of continual battles almost without rest can not but have deteriorating effect upon physical force of Czecho-Slovak Army but it must be regretted that assistance comes too slowly. Naturally, under the circumstances Czecho-Slovaks must ask themselves what is going to happen next. What are causes of this weakness? Why, after three months, is so little done? Instead of government organization or reestablishment we are witnessing some sort of customs war between parts of Russia having in view material interests of some one part of Russia only. Under such circumstances there should be no doubt that present moment demands formation of central Russian government which could take upon itself business of reestablishment. Programs of separate governments formed on certain territory freed from Bolsheviks, as well [as] of more important political parties, put forward as their watchword reestablishment of united Russia, nonrecognition of Brest treaty, and cooperation with Allies by declaration of war against Central powers.

Formation of national Russian central government capable of symbolizing undisputed authority in business of freeing Russia is the absolute condition of carrying out this program. Federal principle of reestablishment of Russian Government suggests of course preservation of autonomy of separate governments but at same time demands formation of such organ as will take upon itself management of foreign affairs. Immediate formation of all-Russian power is undisputed necessity for proper organization of those means by which it will be possible to establish united and free Russia. All-Russian government would be very precise guarantee that further development of events in Russia will take right course. Such government could also count on all assistance from Allies. Czecho-Slovaks now in third month of war for reestablishment of downtrodden Russia with great interest appeal to the All-Russian Assembly and await results and wise decision and satisfactory

answer on question which interests them in order to know how to continue battle without useless sacrifice. Pavlu, President of Czech National Council in Siberia.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2694

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 12, 1918.

[Received September 14, 12.54 p. m.]

77. Czechs and Russian army compelled to evacuate Kazan during night of 9th. Evacuation orderly; most valuable war material, including all good, removed previously. French Military Mission left Kazan 6th for Simbirsk.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2696

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 12, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received September 14, 2.10 a. m.]

135. Doctor Girska of Czech National Council yesterday informed local consuls third Red Army and units from German Army are advancing against Czechs on Volga front necessitating return to that front of Czech forces which have fought their way through Siberia. This return movement began 9th under General Gaida who has been appointed commander of all Czech forces. General Dietrichs, who has been commanding Czechs this district and who is a Russian army officer, retains rank of Czech general but assumes command and organization of Russian forces which have been co-operating with Czechs including forces from central to western Siberia command of Semenov and Kalmykov, all of whom have agreed. Horvat is not included on account of his political activities but his forces have melted away to practically nothing.

Forces which were disarmed here, as reported in my telegram of August 24, 9 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> were given arms again tentative [conditionally?] by conference of Allied military commanders [on assurances?] exchanged that will shortly leave for front. Am informed that they will leave to-day for Harbin, part intending to join Semenov.

CALDWELL

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> Ante, p. 354.



File No. 861.00/2882

*The Chinese Minister (Koo) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I beg to enclose herewith the memorandum which I spoke to you yesterday about for your personal information.

Very sincerely yours,

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on the dispatch of Japanese Troops to Manchouli*

With reference to the subject of dispatching Japanese troops to Manchouli and other points along the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Minister at Peking, in an interview with Premier Tuan on the 8th of August last, inquired whether China would consent to the carrying out of measures for joint defense against the enemy according to the Sino-Japanese military agreement. The Premier replied that since an agreement for the purpose had been concluded between the two countries China would, of course, give her consent in accordance with the agreement, should the exigency arise.

On the 14th, Minister Hayashi informed orally one of the Counselors of the Foreign Office that the Japanese troops at Port Arthur had orders to move on the 13th. On the evening of the same day the Foreign Office sent an official to the Japanese Legation and informed the Minister that the haste with which Japan had dispatched troops did not give China sufficient time to notify the people along the route of this step. The Minister promised to cable to his own Government. But there was no interruption in the movement of Japanese troops. This is all that has passed between the Government of China and the Government of Japan regarding the dispatch of troops by Japan to northern Manchuria.

Now, apparently, the Japanese Government construed the casual reply of the Premier on the 8th as China's consent to cooperate in measures of common defense according to the agreement; but China holds that according to Article 11 of the agreement such measures should be decided upon and initiated by the highest military commands of the two countries, and, therefore, an answer to a mere inquiry from Minister Hayashi should not be considered as such a consent by China as is contemplated in the agreement.

File No. 861.00/2704

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 13, 1918.

[Received September 14, 11.57 p. m.]

82. Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vologodski and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Golovachev, Omsk gov-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

ernment, now Irkutsk *en route* east to discuss situation with Allies. Latter called upon Consulate and stated that Omsk government was entirely pro-Ally and that it wished Allies to enter Siberia and assist in regaining Russia from Germans. Stated he would discuss military needs with Allies. Suggest Allies observe closely development of relations between the Omsk government and Horvat government.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2692

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, September 13, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received September 14, 11.55 a. m.]

Consul General at Irkutsk telegraphs to-day:

In view of retreat from Kazan, Czech staff at Samara asks me to inform Allies that help is urgently needed. There are also needed at present 600,000 rifles and 500,000,000 cartridges. They must have them at once. Prince Lvov, former minister president, is now *en route* to Vladivostok and America to purchase supplies. Minister of War Ivanov informs me that he has supply of cartridges sufficient only for three weeks. Czechs have 7,000 Japanese rifles but not yet cartridges, have asked me to urge that immediate supply be sent.

There are between 30,000 and 40,000 Bolsheviki and Austro-German war prisoners around Ekaterinburg commanded by an Austrian general who was formerly in command at Przemyśl. It is doubtful if the town can be held as there are only some 12,000 Czechs and Cossacks opposing them.

The above repeated to the Department. Communicate to the American military and naval authorities.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2693

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, September 13, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received September 14, 11.38 a. m.]

Referring to your September 5, 5 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Pending receipt of detailed reply from Irkutsk, the following replies to your interrogations are submitted based on telegrams received from Major Slaughter, U. S. A.,<sup>2</sup> dated Irkutsk September 9 and 10:

1. In Siberia west of Irkutsk there are 4,200 Czechs and 3,500 Russians on the Ekaterinburg-Perm front; 12,000 Czechs on the

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 367.

<sup>2</sup> Maj. Homer H. Slaughter, Assistant Military Attaché in Russia.

Volga front; and 32,000 Russians mobilized in western Siberia. Information from the Russian sources states that a force of 25,000 Cossacks is operating north from the Caspian and has occupied Tsaritsyn. Late reports unconfirmed state that these troops have effected junction with Czechs on the Samara-Kazan front.

2. Their organization is imperfect due to lack of material and trained officers.

3. A great deficiency of supplies exists; what they have has been obtained locally. It is claimed and believed that a very much larger force can be mobilized if the Allies give support in the way of officers and material.

4. Their morale, while not equal to that of Czechs, is fair and better than that of the enemy.

5. They are subject to military discipline.

6. They are directed by Omsk government which appears to be representative of the real sentiment of western Siberia. Bolshevik Party has practically ceased to exist in western Siberia and is now composed of a small and criminally inclined minority directed by Germans and depending on armed prisoners for support. Czechs report that their recent engagements in Ekaterinburg-Perm district have been against forces composed exclusively of Magyars officered by Germans and Austrians.

7. The Russian forces in western Siberia are under direction of General Ivanov, Minister of War in the Omsk government.

With regard to conditions in European Russia, Slaughter, who bases his statements on the stories of refugees . . . reports conditions very similar.

Slaughter further states that there is active German propaganda to the effect that Americans are willing to spend money but not to fight, and that Czechs will not understand how even small numbers of Allied forces can guard rear without assisting at the front, and that there is danger of their regarding this as confirming propaganda.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2703

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 14, 1918.

[Received 11.57 p. m.]

85. Referring my No. 81 [82?], 13th. Golovachev will probably visit Peking and advocate the recognition of Omsk government. I

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

have to suggest great caution in dealing with this question. Such recognition would immediately estrange Samara, Orenburg, and Ekaterinburg. Government [conference] now convened at Ufa in the attempt to form all-Russian government. Omsk government reluctantly sent delegates at late date to attend Ufa conference.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2715

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 15, 1918.

[Received September 17, 2.25 a. m.]

91. Pavlu, President Czech National Council of Siberia, telegraphs me as follows:

Kazan has been given up on the 10th instant under superior Bolshevik forces which were very well armed and strongly disciplined. There were more than 30,000 Bolsheviks. Czecho-Slovaks and national Russian army are retreating in good order on the left bank of Volga. Steamers from Samara can only go to within thirty versts of Kazan. On 12th instant Bolsheviks have taken Simbirsk. Situation Volga front critical. New difficulty will arise from Kashirin's Bolshevik troops of about 6,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry with about thirty guns, which troops are very well organized and are able maneuver perfectly and which troops a few days ago got off on the north and are now operating towards Krasnoufinsk where they will receive shells and cartridges. Here no reliable forces against these troops.

The situation on Ekaterinburg front, which at present fairly good, will become again critical if there does not arrive considerable help at early date. Thus after fall of Kazan we are losing again the possibility of junction with Archangel. Neither the Samara army nor the Siberian are at present in position to render an effective aid. There are no arms. If there does not come soon help from the east we will be forced to abandon Samara and retreat to Ufa. That means to lose the possibility of an early junction with General Alexeev who is operating towards Tsaritsyn in command [conjunction] with the British on the Caspian Sea. In view of these conditions the Ufa meeting last night addressed a special appeal to the Allies requesting early help. The enthusiasm of the Ufa meeting has been somewhat dampened by the events of the last few days on the front and by the unknown situation in the east, political and military.

There are rumors about that the Allies may not recognize the all-Russian government which is to be formed in Ufa. This uneasiness of the situation caused uncertainty. However, the possibility of an early agreement regarding all-Russian government seems to be near. The following plan and form seems to have the best chance of realization: power will be invested in hands of five or seven per-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

sons elected by Ufa meeting, who will nominate a capable, good cabinet and who will be responsible to either the Constituent Assembly, the adequate quorum of the conference, or to some other new assembly which may evolve from the present Ufa meeting. The maintaining of the prestige of the Constituent Assembly will favorably influence the psychology of the masses of the part of Russia not yet liberated from the Bolsheviks. Bohdan Pavlu.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2821

*Memorandum of Conversation between the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1918.

The Italian Ambassador called this afternoon and said that his Government was being pressed by the British and French Governments to appoint a high commissioner to Siberia; that he understood that some other Governments had not consulted America before appointments were made; that Italy did not care to make an appointment without consulting America; that Italy wanted to be in perfect accord with America and that she had adopted as her own the policy which America had laid down toward Russia and Siberia. He said, however, that Italy being the only one of the three big Allies who were not represented in some extraordinary capacity, she might be criticized by the other Allies and that they might feel that she was not in sympathy with them. He said that he had understood from the Secretary of State a good deal of the trouble that high commissioners might cause in Siberia, some of the trouble which this Government had experienced through the high commissioner acting for the Government.

I explained to him at length our position and our desire to refrain from any interference in political affairs in Russia and our fears that a high commissioner would necessarily become involved in political affairs.

He read me several cables from his Government, indicating their faith and reliance in the American policy and stating their desire to follow it. He expressed a hope that, if it should be found necessary to make an appointment of a high commissioner, this Government would understand that his Government was acting not in the interest of Italy but in the interest as they saw it of all the Allied Governments. He stated that, if a commissioner was appointed, he would not be an associate of or a coordinate with the representatives of other governments, but would be a person stationed on Siberian soil to report conditions to his Government.

I explained to him the very high position which the American Government had in the estimation of the Russian people; the suspicion which attached to some other governments because of the

appointment by them of high commissioners; the suggestion that the appointment of high commissioners carried with it some purpose which was liable to be misinterpreted by the people of Russia; that the people of Russia had put their interpretation upon such appointments as had been made; that an appointment of high commissioner by Italy might be occasion for similar interpretation to be placed on the motive of the Italian Government, and that there would be a consequent fall, in the minds of the people in Russia, from the present high standing which the Italian Government had in Russia; that as long as Italy had no extraordinary representative, she would maintain her position with the Russian people; our desire that his Government should consider that point of view before making an appointment.

I further stated that we realized that any appointment which might be made would be made upon the conclusion that it was the best thing for the Allied countries and that we appreciated having been consulted in the matter; that we would make no objection of course, but would call to his Government's attention the danger which lay in the appointment of any person who might be vested with authority to act in political matters or who might be by virtue of his associations drawn into cooperation or coordination with others in political activities in Russia. I told him that we had not appointed a high commissioner and had no intention to appoint a high commissioner, and that we felt that all such appointments were mistakes and were made upon a mistaken conception of the policy which should be adopted toward Russia.

He said he would communicate with his Government and would suggest that instead of appointing a high commissioner they designate some consular officer to proceed to Vladivostok or some other point in Siberia, but that if his Government should not accept his recommendation, he hoped we would understand that their representative, whoever he might be, would be instructed to follow the policy of the American Government and not to become entangled with representatives of any other governments.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

File No. 861.00/2714

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 16, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received September 17, 5.10 a. m.]

147. Following is summary translation of telegram from commander of Czech troops dated Chelyabinsk, 12th:

Our situation on Volga is critical. Kazan just fell enabling enemy to operate on Kama. Simbirsk is being evacuated which en-

dangers Samara and Volga front. Our troops, wearied by three months' uninterrupted fighting, tire incredibly fast, and transfer of troops from east will only delay catastrophe temporarily. It is impossible to continue to operate without immediate assistance of strong Allied force. Demand from Allies immediate and categorical reply following questions, if our common cause is dear to them: (1) Is it their intention to participate in any way in operations supporting us on Volga front; (2) if so do they intend to start at once an extraordinary transfer of troops and in what numbers? Failure to render immediate assistance will prevent us from clearing further than Urals. There is small hope of aid from Russian army in near future. There is no time for consideration and conference. Telegraph immediately answer of Allies. Major General Syrovyy.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.48/706

*Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

*September 17, 1918.*

The Russian Ambassador called to-day and asked what the intention of this Government was as regards the sending of military supplies to the Russian people. He had several cables from the Omsk government indicating that they were forming an army to fight against the German and Austrian prisoners opposing the Czechs on the Volga River [and] on the Ekaterinburg front. This government has asked him to send them some of the money which is held in rubles in New York and which they now need. He said he did not know what effect the meeting at Ufa would have on the future of the Omsk government and he did not know that it mattered materially because in Ufa and Omsk and in all of the other places where there are movements of Russian regeneration there is a desire to become active against the Germans. Before replying to the cable he wanted to know whether he could encourage them in their expectations that they will receive help.

He said that he had been in contact with Mr. Baruch who was sending supplies to the Czechs and he hoped that Mr. Baruch could expand a little bit and let some of these supplies go to Russia. I told him that we could send supplies and lend men to the Czechs because we recognized them as a nation, but that there was no government in Russia which we could recognize. I suggested that he also talk to Mr. McCormick and have Mr. Ughet of his Embassy call upon Mr. McCormick.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

File No. 861.48/657b

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1918, noon.

For Morris from McCormick: <sup>1</sup>

The President has designated Baruch,<sup>2</sup> Hurley,<sup>3</sup> and me as an informal committee to take charge for the present through our respective organizations of the purchase, shipment, and distribution of supplies, including Red Cross supplies, for the Czecho-Slovak forces and possibly limited amounts of other supplies required by the communities in the neighborhood of which Czecho-Slovaks are operating, and numerous applications for the export of which are on file with the War Trade Board.

I will appreciate your giving me by cable a full expression of your views concerning this general situation and such information as may be available to you and not transmitted in another way which would assist us in determining the character and amount of supplies which should be purchased, the priority of shipment which should be accorded them and the method of consignment and distribution in Siberia. The War Trade Board had already planned to send to Vladivostok forthwith one or more representatives and it is possible that they on their arrival could be helpful in assisting in distribution and control, particularly of any commodities which would be offered for public sale.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2764

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State <sup>4</sup>*

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 21, 1918.

[Received 10.05 p. m.]

108. All-Russian Government Assembly convening at Ufa has reached following chief results: Government consisting five persons responsible only to Constituent Assembly. Denial Brest Litovsk and all other contracts signed by Bolsheviks and renewal all contracts which signed by Tsar as well as by Temporary Government. Continuation of war with Germany. A strong and well-disciplined all-Russian army, standing beyond politics and chief of which subject to all-Russian government. Large autonomy for various provincial governments. Protection of private Russian and foreign capital and protection of private initiative. Governmental control of manufacturing and trade. Annulment of grain monopoly and fixed prices. Increase of direct and indirect taxes. Land question

<sup>1</sup> Vance C. McCormick, chairman, War Trade Board.<sup>2</sup> Bernard M. Baruch, chairman, War Industries Board.<sup>3</sup> Edward N. Hurley, chairman, U. S. Shipping Board.<sup>4</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.



remains [undecided] at present; final decision will be made by Constituent Assembly. Members of government to be nominated on basis of personal capacity. [HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2792

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1051

MEMORANDUM

The British Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that all the information at the disposal of the British Government indicates that it is of great importance to start without delay training such Russian officers and volunteers as may desire to support the Allies. If such training is deferred the Russians are likely to take the view that the Allies are not seriously interested in them, and they would then completely lose faith in the Allied policy. It has therefore been suggested that General Knox<sup>1</sup> should be authorized to proceed, provisionally, with the training of a maximum number of 3,000 Russian officers and men, and His Majesty's Government would propose to sanction this scheme, in the absence of any objection on the part of the United States Government. In putting forward this suggestion the British Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to explain that the proposal for the training of these men is completely without prejudice to any arrangement which may eventually be decided upon between the Allies as to the command of the Russian forces and the responsibility for them; it will also in no way affect the general Allied policy in the Far East. His Majesty's Government think, however, that, in order to combat the growing feeling of discouragement and doubt which seems to be felt among Russians in Siberia, it is urgently necessary to start this training as soon as possible, and they would therefore be very glad to receive as early as possible the views of the United States Government on this proposal.

WASHINGTON, *September 23, 1918.*

[*Received September 24.*]

File No. 861.00/2769

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, *September 25 [23], 1918.*

[*Received September 23, 7.02 p. m.*]

114. Short *résumé* present conditions Siberia based on personal observation. No enthusiasm shown among people for recruiting or

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Gen. Sir Alfred W. F. Knox, in command of the British forces in Siberia.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via Legation in China.

for continuation war. All statements by the various governments, no matter what nature, received with indifference. If Czechs were removed from any city in Siberia, Urals or Samara districts, Bolsheviks would immediately get control again. Time wasted in petty politics. No large grasp of whole situation or ability, even among intelligent classes, to view procedure from an all-Russian standpoint. Their horizon bounded by what they can see from their village church steeples. Declarations of All-Russian Assembly just held at Ufa read well from their Allied standpoint and were framed for that purpose but policy for regeneration Russia internally so radically socialistic as concerns land question, private ownership, manufacturing and trade, that is practically the Bolshevik plan [in another] form and would only sink Russia deeper in the mire if practised. No strong men have come forward in any of the governments as yet. German agitations still fermenting strong. Swedish agents responsible for much of it. Unless Allies are prepared to assist Czechs in their present struggle against the Germans in European Russia, the Allies in all fairness to the Czechs should seasonably withdraw them from the whole country so they may not be needlessly sacrificed. Czechs doomed to failure if dependent alone upon help of Siberians and Russians. The presence of at least 50,000 Allied forces in company with Czechs at the front absolutely necessary for prestige and morale generally and to knit together the Russian troops. Presence of American troops in these operations is highly desirable. The Russian turn of mind at present is such that they think Americans lay a little too much stress upon sending of Y.M.C.A. agents, Red Cross representatives, labor advisers, agricultural experts and commissions of merchants. While appreciating all these things they express themselves at this moment as being strongly in favor of seeing a few thousand American soldiers marching through their cities.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2772

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok,  
to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 23, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received September 23, 5.48 p. m.]

Preliminary to our economic, social, and publicity program in Siberia, and second only to the question of the railways, is the question of the future disposition of our military forces during the approaching winter. The significant factors in the military situation are:

1. There are at present in Vladivostok and vicinity approximately 25,000 soldiers. Very few of these forces are now engaged in active military operations. The number in the city will be increased by new arrivals and is already excessive for the requirements maintaining order and protecting stores.

2. The Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are practically open as far as Omsk and beyond and every report we receive indicates the lines to that point are in no way threatened. They are guarded by Japanese and Czech soldiers scattered at intervals along their entire length and are equal to the movements of troops under the present Russian management.

3. The advance guard of the Third Division of the Japanese Army, which is reported mobilizing at Nagoya, has now reached Harbin on its way toward Manchouli and may possibly proceed directly to Chita or even to Irkutsk.

4. A small British force is now preparing to leave for the Volga region and will soon be followed by the French and Italian contingents.

5. Reports from the Volga region all agree that the Czech forces there are seriously menaced from various directions. Their commanding officers are pleading earnestly for immediate assistance. General Gaida has come to Vladivostok for the avowed purpose of urging upon the Allies the necessity of some immediate help without which the Czechs will be compelled to fall back to a position east of the Ural Mountains, possibly to Omsk. He fears that if they thus fall back, they will leave their supporters in the evacuated towns defenseless against the general massacres which are likely to follow.

The single question which confronts the Czech leaders is whether they can make some arrangement with the Allies which will permit them to hold the Volga region or, failing that, the line of the Urals during the coming winter and thus keep the door open into European Russia. They are clear that this can not be done unless reinforcements are sent to them promptly.

General Graves is of the opinion that he should go to Omsk with a substantial portion of his command and form a base there for the winter, cooperating as necessity required with other Allied forces in supporting the Czechs to the west. The advantages of such a movement would be:

- (1) It would give much needed support to the Czech forces in the Volga region and would therefore be consistent with the purpose of the present expedition;
- (2) It would make more certain the protection of the railway and thus secure a base from which economic and other activities might penetrate even into European Russia;

- (3) The presence of an Allied force, and particularly of American troops in that part of Russia, would have a strong moral effect upon the entire population in a territory which so directly affects European Russia;
- (4) It would have the additional advantage of giving our own forces during the winter an opportunity for more valuable service than any that will present itself at Vladivostok where there is so little direct contact with Russian opinion.

The movement suggested is open to the possible objection that it might convey to the Czech commanders and to the Russian people the impression that the United States Government, in cooperation with the Allies, was preparing for much more extended military operations than are in fact contemplated. This objection could be met by a formal reaffirmation of the limitations clearly announced in the statement of August 3. A further possible objection is that this movement of our troops might be interpreted as an indication of our intention to give direct support to the recently organized Siberian government at Omsk. No doubt such an interpretation would be fostered at the outset but I think could be fully corrected by our subsequent action.

Admiral Knight, General Graves, and I have carefully weighed these facts. Admiral Knight is convinced that such an expedition, far from antagonizing the Russian people, would be generally welcomed and would form a very effective center for American activities in that part of Siberia. General Graves has studied carefully the strategic situation and feels that there are no serious military difficulties or dangers involved provided that the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are protected and operated to the extent they now are. He is also of the opinion that, with the line of communication thus secured, their maintenance would not constitute a drain upon the resources of the country.

In my judgment such movement would be entirely consistent with the policy which has been adopted by our Government in reference to Siberia. In fact it seems to me to offer the only practicable way in which that policy can be applied during the winter, for it will accomplish the two main objects which we have in view: to render assistance to the Czech forces represented along the railway and concentrated at railway centers in the Volga region; and to open up the field for social and economic action. If these centers are not properly guarded, they will revert to a condition of anarchy which will prevent any effective service.

Finally, I fear that our failure to come into closer contact with the Czech forces and with the Russian people in western Siberia may have serious results. Already I find that the British and French

representatives here, particularly General Knox and General Paris, are influencing the Czech leaders with impracticable plans to create by force a new Russian army and a new eastern front. General Gaida, who is very young, has been impressed by these schemes and misled by unauthorized suggestions of ultimate unlimited American support. I believe that General Graves's presence in western Siberia would steady the Czechs' leaders and make clear to them and to the Russian people our policy and purpose.

I would therefore recommend for the consideration of the Department the wisdom of granting to General Graves the privilege of proceeding, in his discretion and with a substantial portion of his forces, to a point in the vicinity of Omsk and wintering there if conditions all justify such action. I further suggest that when General Graves has decided upon the details of such a plan, they be submitted to the Japanese Government with the request that it cooperate by [sending] a portion of its troops to the base selected.

In conclusion, I venture to urge that whatever action is decided upon be announced to the Czech commanders at the earliest practicable moment for the reason that, as has been clearly pointed out to me by General Gaida, his plans for the winter are dependent upon the character and extent of the assistance which he can count on receiving from our own and the Allied Governments.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/2782

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, September 24, 1918, noon.

[Received 3.54 p. m.]

Mr. Golovachev, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the so-called autonomous Siberian government, established at Omsk, called yesterday with the Russian Minister here. While presenting the claim of that organization to recognition by the Allies as a *de facto* government pending the constitution of a government of all Russia he did not press that point in reply to my intimation that, however much the Omsk organization had accomplished in restoring order [in] Siberia, it might be difficult for our Government to grant recognition to any separate governmental authority in Russia.

He thereupon urged that, while such political decisions might be postponed, there is an immediate and urgent necessity for decision by the Allies as to the military exigencies of the situation; that the sentiment of all Siberia is now favorable to the Allied cause and concretely to the proposal to restore Allied front in Russia; that the

mobilization now being effected is making available unexpected man power but that the arms at their disposal are adequate for only a fortnight's active fighting and that defeat resulting from shortage of such munitions would have psychological effect which would destroy favorable situation now existing. He therefore urged that, although reserving for further consideration all questions as to the recognition of Omsk government and as to its relationship towards any such national Russian government as may be [formed], the Allies should as a matter of urgent military necessity supply to the Siberian forces small arms and artillery and ammunition therefor.

He further expressed a hope that in order to strengthen to the utmost the feeling of mutual interest in the general Allied cause it might be possible to distribute at least as far westward as the Urals contingents of joint Allied forces.

In response to an intimation that the Omsk government had not adequately curtailed activities of Austro-German prisoners in Siberia he assured me that his organization was fully aware of the necessity of such action, had already taken steps to control them in most places, and was now putting into effect measures to confine all such prisoners. . . .

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2783

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 25, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received September 25, 10.35 a. m.]

165. Yesterday agreement was made between Siberian government and Horvat, latter to be a member of Siberian government and to act as its general commissioner for Far East with authority of civil governor general. This followed immediately after arrival here of Vologodski, head of Omsk Siberian government.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2791a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1918, 1 p. m.

You will please ask the Chinese Government if there would be any objection if the American forces now in Siberia under General Graves should be ordered to Harbin or some similar place on the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

For your information: The change from Vladivostok to Harbin is considered very desirable by this Government so that the closing of the port at Vladivostok and the severe winter there will not interfere with the shipment of supplies to the American forces.

Immediately that you obtain the answer of the Chinese Government, you will communicate it to me.

LANSING

Declaration Restricting American Operations, September 26, 1918—Formation of the All-Russian Provisional Government at Ufa: Fusion with the Siberian Government at Omsk—Further Increase of Japanese Forces <sup>1</sup>

File No. 861.00/2806

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State* <sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 25, 1918.

[Received September 26, 9.12 p. m.]

118. Consul, Omsk, reports on the night of 20th-21st following:

Minister Krutovski, Minister of Interior, Omsk government, Shatilov, Minister of Native Affairs, and Yakushev were arrested by armed officers, taken to a house and upon threat of their lives, made to sign resignation papers. After being kept captive twenty-four hours were freed but given twenty hours to leave Omsk which first two did. Whole proceedings put in force by Mikhailov, Minister of Finance, but it is thought that Grishin-Almazov back of it. No Siberian government now exists. Eight Czech regiments going to Omsk to establish order.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2808

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State* <sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 25, 1918.

[Received September 26, 9.12 p. m.]

121. Vice Consul, Omsk, reports further that Minister of Finance Mikhailov of temporary Siberian government was arrested by order of Czech General Syrový, and Almazov, former Minister of War, under strict surveillance.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/2772

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your September 23, 10 p. m. Your suggestion that General Graves establish himself at Omsk or any other point in the far

<sup>1</sup> See also vol. III, pp. 278, 281, and 302.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

interior must be disapproved because, strongly as our sympathies constrain us to make every possible sacrifice to keep the country on the Volga front out of the hands of the merciless Red Guards, it is the unqualified judgment of our military authorities that to attempt military activities west of the Urals is to attempt the impossible. We mean to send all available supplies that we can spare from the western front as fast as possible for the use of the Czecho-Slovak forces, but we can not undertake to send them west of the Urals. So far as our cooperation is concerned we must frankly say that the Czech forces should retire to the eastern side of the Urals to some point at which they will be certainly accessible to supplies sent from the east, preferably where they will be in a position to make it impossible for the Germans to draw supplies of any kind from western Siberia, but in any case where they can make themselves secure against attack. With the deepest regret but with perfect realization of compelling facts we must in frankness say that our assistance can not be given in the carrying out of any other program. All that some in authority expected to happen upon the sending of Allied and American troops to the northern ports has failed of realization. This Government can not cooperate in an effort to establish lines of operation and defense through from Siberia to Archangel.

However, we are giving General Graves authority to establish his headquarters at some such place as Harbin provided the Chinese Government interposes no objection, so that he can be in touch with an open port during the winter and can make the best use of his force to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks.

We have asked the Chinese Government if there would be any objection to this plan.

Peking will be directed to advise you of the answer.

The foregoing you are at liberty to use in your discretion with the civil and military authorities of other governments at Vladivostok.

The following you will treat as strictly confidential:<sup>1</sup>

The ideas and purposes of the Allies with respect to military operations in Siberia and on the "Volga front" are ideas and purposes with which we have no sympathy. We do not believe them to be practical or based upon sound reason or good military judgment. Consequently, while we have said that we do not desire to set the limits of the actions or to define the policies of our associates, we are

<sup>1</sup>The following paragraph repeated "for your confidential information," in telegrams of Sept. 26, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, for repetition to the Ambassadors in France and Italy, and to the Chargé in Japan, for repetition to the Minister in China (File No. 861.00/2799b).



not prepared and do not intend to follow their lead and do not desire our representatives to be influenced by their persistent representations as to facts and as to plans for action which, to us, seem chimerical and wholly impossible. You will please impress upon the military, naval and civil authorities of the United States Government at Vladivostok <sup>1</sup> that, notwithstanding any pressure to the contrary, they are expected to be governed wholly and absolutely by the policy of this Government as expressed herein.

For your information there follows the text of a cable I am to-day sending to Mr. Francis at Archangel, and which, with the first part of this telegram, is being sent to London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, and Peking for the information of the Governments at those places. [Here follow the first three paragraphs of telegram of September 26, 1918, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in Russia, *post*, page 546.]

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2799c

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)<sup>2</sup>*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1918, 8 p. m.

You will please say to the Government to which you are accredited that the Government of the United States has been considering the disposition for the winter of the American expeditionary forces in Siberia and in Russia. The Government of the United States has decided that its forces in Siberia should not be established at Omsk or any other point in the far interior, because [here follows the remainder of the first three paragraphs of the telegram of September 26, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in Japan, *ante*, page 392.]

The Government of the United States has very carefully considered the situation which exists in north Russia and has informed the American Ambassador at Archangel that as it is, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, plain that no gathering of any effective force by the Russians is to be hoped for, we shall

---

<sup>1</sup> There is used in place of *at Vladivostok* in telegrams sent elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Ambassadors in France and Italy, and to the Chargé in Japan, for repetition to the Minister in China. On Sept. 27 a memorandum was communicated to the British Chargé, to the French, Italian, Japanese, and Russian Ambassadors, and to Professor Masaryk, in practically the same words, the introduction reading: "After consideration of the matter of the disposition for the winter of the American expeditionary forces in Siberia and in Russia, the Government of the United States has decided [etc.]" (File No. 861.00/2887a).

insist with the other governments, so far as our cooperation is concerned, that all military effort in northern Russia be given up except the guarding of the ports themselves and as much of the country round about them as may develop threatening conditions. We will, of course, do our utmost to send supplies, but cannot undertake general relief, and must presently, of course, be cut off from Archangel by the ice and able to go only to Murmansk.

No more American troops will be sent to the northern ports.

The course which the Government of the United States is following is not the course of our free choice but that of stern necessity. Circumstances in European Russia, which have thrown that country into one of the saddest periods recorded in all history, and our separation from the scenes of bloodshed and anarchy by the intervening hostile territory render any efforts which this Government could make to bring succor to the distressed people of Russia inadequate and impracticable. We are constrained, consequently, to come to this decision.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2421

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2243

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: Your communications dated July 16 and 28th last, respectively, relative to the contribution of financial aid with a view of furthering the movement of the Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia in which this Government is asked to contribute one third of a total sum of 5,000,000 rubles, a part of which has already been paid by the French Government, the money to be used for the benefit of Czecho-Slovak troops and for recruiting troops to join the Czecho-Slovak forces, have been received.

Regarding this matter, and since the receipt of your two communications, I have the honor to inform you that this Department is in touch with Professor Masaryk, as representing Czecho-Slovak interests, and applications for assistance for the Czecho-Slovaks and for financial contributions by this Government for the support of their cause, are coming from Professor Masaryk. At his request, steps are being taken to furnish the Czecho-Slovaks with certain supplies but the method of financing the undertaking, while under consideration, has not yet been determined upon.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.77/501

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, September 28, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received 7.50 p. m.]

The following is the substance of the reply made by the Chinese Government which however requests that it should be treated as confidential:

As Chinese troops are using the Chinese Eastern Railway in cooperation with forces of the Allied Governments in opposing the enemy, the Chinese Government must naturally express its consent to the proposal.

In communicating this to me the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that his Government not only consented but heartily welcomed the presence of American troops in the railway zone although it feared that any expression of that sort might be resented by Japan.

It is perhaps significant that he asked me whether the proposed transfer of our troops was known to and approved by the Japanese general understood to be in command of all the Allied forces at Vladivostok—to which I of course replied that I did not know.

MACMURRAY

File No. 861.00/2904

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your communication of September 27, transmitting a memorandum of even date, relating to the disposition for the winter of the American expeditionary forces in Russia and the sending of supplies to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is with deep affliction that I have learned of the sad conclusion to which the Government of the United States has arrived with regard to the military situation beyond the Ural Mountains, and of the decision which it has reached upon the prospects of the Czecho-Slovak action in that region. The disheartening effect of the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovaks in face of the pressure of the German forces and their merciless satellites can scarcely be overvalued.

However, I understand that the program, embodied in the memorandum, is primarily a result of considerations of military character, and that the whole statement is to be regarded as an inter-governmental *communiqué*, of most confidential character, expressing an estimation of an existing military situation with certain tactical

consequences, and not as an *exposé* of general policy. In particular, I am led to feel that the memorandum is not intended to manifest a change of attitude of the United States in regard to Russia and that the practical decisions, covered by the document, do not interfere with the general line of policy expressed on so many occasions.

Nevertheless, as the memorandum refers to issues of most vital political consequence, it seems to be of the greatest importance, with regard to the interests of the Russian people, that any misconception relating to the real purport of the United States Government should be possibly avoided.

I would greatly appreciate, therefore, if, for my guidance, you would consider it possible to confirm to me whether my understanding of the purpose and the character of the document is congruent with the views and the intentions of your Government.

I avail myself [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

File No. 861.00/2857

*The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1918.

[Received October 3.]

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: With reference to our conversation on the matter and thinking it may be of interest to you, I beg to inform you that the Royal Italian Government does not intend to send for the present a high commissioner to Siberia. They have nevertheless extended to all the Siberian territory where the Allied troops are operating, the jurisdiction of the Royal Consul General at Vladivostok charging him to coordinate all the Italian interests in those territories and to keep, as the only Italian representative there for the purposes of the war, the necessary contacts with the high commissioners of the Allied powers in the carrying out of their economic duties.

Believe [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

File No. 861.00/2877

*The Consul at Tomsk (Ray) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, September 30, 1918.

[Received October 3, 3.40 a. m.]

14. Territorial Duma party tried to profit by absence of Volodski to seize control of government, whereat Ivan Mikhailov, act-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

ing head of the government, closed Duma. Then the president [of] Duma complained of [to] Czech commandant of Omsk who tried to arrest Mikhailov, but all-Russian government intervened in time to save him. Duma has now submitted and the situation appears saved. General impression derived from trip in various cities western Siberia is that political situation has suddenly grown extremely serious since it has become known that Allies have not sent strong military forces to Vladivostok. In order to dispel discouragement of Russian public, I recommend that some American troops be sent immediately into western Siberia, coupled with promise adequate military aid.

RAY

File No. 861.00/2841

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, undated.

[Received September 30, 1918, 4.37 p. m.]

134. Vice Consul at Samara reports military situation around Samara critical. Czechs and Russians tired from weeks constant fighting five times superior numerically. No new forces to relieve them at time when German officers are making new army out of enemy. Enemy advancing and has crossed the Volga at Simbirsk and below Syzran; enemy now only thirty versts from latter city and threatening it from three sides. Eight hundred Serbians have no guns. Can arm no more Russian recruits so further mobilization impossible. Need rifles and ammunition at Simbirsk at once, also Allied officers for consultation. The Allies only can save situation. Even a few hundred fresh Allies would bring sufficient encouragement. Cannot Allies send quickly a few thousand troops, account serious danger which threatens to turn over Samara with large quantities of valuable supplies to Germany giving German control whole Volga Valley and practically all Russia. Such catastrophe would crush hopes of Russian people now fighting with Czechs against German domination of whole country and relying on Allied help.

Please advise what can be done for immediate help on Volga front.

[THOMSON]

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/2792

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

## MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the British Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his memorandum No. 1051, dated September 23, wherein it is stated that all the information at the disposal of the British Government indicates that it is of great importance to begin without delay training such Russian officers and volunteers as may desire to support the Allies, in order that the Russians may not lose faith in the Allied policy.

The United States Government has given due consideration to all of the provisions outlined in the memorandum and sees no objection in principle to the carrying into effect of the policy of the British Government. However, in view of the fact that General Janin has been designated as commander in chief of the Czecho-Slovak forces, and the possibility that his advice would be of great value in making the proposed scheme effective, the United States Government desires to suggest that action in the matter be held in abeyance pending his arrival in Siberia.

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1918.

---

File No. 861.00/3457

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1092

## MEMORANDUM

The British Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government have been giving serious consideration to the present organization of Allied effort in Siberia. The present system is one which occasions considerable anxiety to His Majesty's Government, who would suggest that the question of reorganizing the system might well be considered by the Associated Governments, without prejudice to the larger questions of policy which arise in this matter. His Majesty's Government desire therefore to offer certain suggestions, which will be found set forth in this memorandum, but in doing so they wish to make it perfectly plain that the object of these suggestions is solely to deal with the machinery of administration of the Allied effort in Siberia and not with its

objects; and that the suggestions put forward are not and are not intended to be any contribution to the discussion of the more important questions of policy. His Majesty's Government are, in fact, of opinion that it is absolutely necessary to make some reform in Allied methods in Siberia, even if the object in view be restricted to the rescue of the Czecho-Slovak troops and their transfer to Vladivostok and to France. The districts in which the Czecho-Slovak troops are now or soon will be operating, are divided among different Governments of different political colours. These districts are crossed by contending armies of different allegiances. Commodities are always scarce and food and money are sometimes lacking. Large portions of the country, the boundaries of which are not exactly fixed, are under the control of the enemy and even where there are no enemy troops there are large numbers of enemy agents.

His Majesty's Government take the view that it is not possible for the Allies to deal with questions which will be forced upon their attention by this condition of things by giving additional powers to the commander in chief. The questions which will arise are not purely military matters in connection with the supply of forces in the field, their control or their safety, but political and other questions of the greatest delicacy and difficulty must frequently be involved. The Associated powers have decided as a settled policy not to take sides in Russian political questions and all the Associated powers agree in the belief that it is for the Russians alone to decide on the future government of Russia. In spite of this settled policy, however, it is not possible for the Associated Governments to isolate themselves entirely from the disputes of the immediate present: it is necessary to oppose those forces which are opposed to our friends and to cooperate with those which are opposed to our enemies. Even if it were desired to do so, it would be impossible to avoid entering into relations of some kind with the different armies and governments by which the country is controlled and when such relations are entered into questions will unavoidably be raised which are beyond the proper functions of the commander in chief and his staff.

In these circumstances the question arises as to what other machinery exists for dealing with the problems likely to arise, and, as far as His Majesty's Government are informed, none exists except such as have been evolved by informal communications between the commissioners, consuls, and naval and military officers of the Allies at Vladivostok, who belong, including the Czechs, to six different nationalities, and exercise no collective authority and little in-

dividual power. They are obliged to refer constantly to their own governments which, in their turn must, in any questions in which common action is required, consult with each other before a decision can be reached. Realizing the possible vital importance of prompt action and the near approach of the Russian winter it is impossible to regard this state of affairs without serious anxiety.

His Majesty's Government are unable to suggest any absolute remedy for the evils above described, but the following suggestions are made in the hope that their adoption might result in an improvement of the situation:

(a) The military authorities should of course continue to decide all purely military matters, but any questions involving economic, social, or political issues should be referred to a body containing a strong civilian element and representative of all the powers. The work of this convention might be done through committees when such a course seems most convenient.

(b) Washington or Vladivostok should be the meeting place for the convention suggested above. The latter is of course the nearest to the theatre of operations, but of the various capitals of the powers Washington seems most suitable if it is thought desirable that a capital should be the seat of the convention. Washington would be more convenient than Tokyo for the European Allies and would be more convenient than [than] either Vladivostok or Tokyo for the United States.

In this connection it may be observed that neither Japan nor the United States are fully represented at Versailles, while as these two powers have the largest share in Siberian operations they would naturally be entitled to special consideration in any arrangements for a convention.

(c) Unlike the council at Versailles, the convention should sit continuously and should, to a certain extent, be granted executive responsibility. The various governments in consultation would, as hitherto, take the decision on large questions of policy, but it is hoped that the convention would settle minor questions on the spot and that, even in cases in which it does not feel able to act on its own responsibility, it will be able to give advice which would be of great value to the several governments.

In communicating the above suggestions, the British Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to add that His Majesty's Government do not attach special value to the particular scheme outlined, but they regard it as of the utmost importance that some scheme of organization should be devised which would be less unwieldy in its operation than that by which the difficult work of the cobelligerent powers in Siberia is now being carried on.

WASHINGTON, *October 1, 1918.*

[*Received October 2.*]



File No. 861.00/2867

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 2, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received October 3, 7 a. m.]

183. Following is a translation of letter from Doctor Girska, member of Czech National Council, to Allied consuls for transmission to their Governments:

September 29. News which I receive regularly every day from commanders of our troops on the Volga front bring out more and more formidably their tragic situation. Having subsisted nine months on food insufficient in quantity and very indifferent in quality, our men are extremely weak. Moreover, during four months' incessant fighting with enemy mostly superior numerically, they had to continue struggle, as they had no reserves to relieve them. They have had extremely deficient medical treatment and have totally lacked necessary hospital supplies, clothing and arms. Their utter exhaustion has led them to communicate to me through their commander in chief that they will do their duty to the very last in spite of everything, and they beg me to inform Professor Masaryk that all of them to the last man will prefer to die rather than tarnish the honor and glory of the Czecho-Slovaks. For my part I will say it is plain and indisputable that fate of our troops is determined; one cannot but expect their loss. There is limit to human endurance.

When troops are animated as ours are by liveliest possible patriotism and desire to do their duty, they cannot maintain front in country like Russia under the circumstances. It is impossible to fight successfully when there are constant disorders in rear which render communications precarious and interfere with operation of primary military services. Sole desire of our troops is to struggle against common enemy and that is why we started for French front. Enemy attacks frustrated that purpose and we were obliged to remain in Russia although perfectly aware that in undertaking to fight in Russia we were going to our death. But there was nothing else for our troops to do since to have left for another front would have seemed under such circumstances a sort of desertion and Czecho-Slovaks never flee from enemy. Our army knows and will do their duty to the last survivor, but I believe it is my duty under the circumstances to call the attention of Allied representatives to the interests of their respective countries which will be gravely compromised.

During four months of fighting our troops have obtained considerable success, and fruits of their sufferings and losses perhaps will be lost if they do not receive reinforcements sufficient to enable them successfully to terminate unequal struggle they have so far maintained. Only [by] immediate sending Allied troops to Volga front, in sufficient numbers to enable ours to continue to combat against superior enemy forces and reestablish order and tranquillity in rear and repress constantly renewed efforts of anarchists in Siberia

and beyond Urals, can effective aid be given. Confidence and sympathy constantly shown us by Allies and gratitude of our army move me to make known to Allied representatives situation above described, and at the same time would add for them we shall always remain faithful to the ideal of the Allies and will act always entirely in accord with Allies and in conjunction with them, regardless of whatever decision they make as to sending aid to our troops.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/2870

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 2, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 3, 6.14 p. m.]

5281. Your 5236, August 7, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office replies that the imminent reorganization of new contingents of volunteer troops of Russian, Polish and Jugo-Slav nationalities will necessitate the supplying of a considerable amount of supplementary winter clothing and that it is impossible to fix the quantity. It appears from information taken that the French military authorities with the Czecho-Slovak troops have already given the necessary orders in this respect. It seems, however, to the French Government that if the American Government could make immediate shipment of warm clothing to be consigned to the American military authorities at Vladivostok with the necessary instructions for their delivery, this stock could be readily utilized and would be of tremendous importance to the health and well-being of the new troops called upon to fight in a particularly severe climate. It appears that the French Government has taken steps to clothe the present organization but that in the future it prefers to lean on American assistance. Copy of note goes out in to-morrow's despatch.

SHARP

---

File No. 861.48/679

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1099

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1918.

[Received October 4.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I duly telegraphed to my Government the text of the memorandum enclosed in your letter of September 27, with respect to the disposition for the winter of the American expeditionary forces in Siberia and in Russia, and the sending of supplies for the use of the Czecho-Slovak forces.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 333.

I have now the honour to transmit, herewith, a copy of a telegram which I have received from Mr. Balfour in reply, setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

Believe me [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

[Enclosure]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Chargé at Washington (Barclay)*

October 2, 1918.

We fully appreciate the attitude of the United States Government and their desire to act in such a matter in accordance with the advice of their military authorities. Our position is, however, a little different to theirs. In the first place our military authorities do not take the same view. So far as they are able to judge, the Czechs, if given the full support of every one of the Allies, might still be able, in conjunction with the forces under General Alexeev, to hold the line of the Volga against any force that is likely to be brought there by our enemies. The position is very obscure and possibly further information might modify their judgment but that is the present view of the case by our soldiers. Apart from this we feel the very greatest reluctance in abandoning elements in Russia loyal to the Allies; General Alexeev, for instance, has fought throughout the war against our enemies and in the early part of it he and his troops rendered essential and heroic services to the Allied cause. Since the revolution he has never wavered and we know he has resisted many approaches from the German side backed though they were by old associations such as Milyukov. We feel, therefore, honourably bound to do our very utmost, even at some risk to our own interests, to come to his assistance. If we were now to ask the Czechs to withdraw to the east of the Urals, that would be to cut off from Alexeev and those with him their last hope of Allied assistance. We therefore propose, subject to any observations that the United States Government may have to make, to present this view of the situation to our French and Japanese Allies and to appeal to them to continue their efforts to stand by our friends in European Russia. We quite recognize that the above considerations do not apply to the United States in the same way as they do to those who fought side by side with the Russians in the early part of the war, and His Majesty's Government will quite understand it if the United States Government feel unable to take a more active line than that indicated in the telegram under reply. We venture to express the hope that the United States Government will appreciate our position in the matter and will not think it amiss if we endeavour to carry out the task that seems to be imposed upon us by obligations of honour. In short, if they feel unable to assist us beyond the point indicated, we hope they will not discourage our other Allies from helping us.

---

File No. 861.51/364

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Vladivostok, to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received October 5, 11.53 p. m.]

The visit here of Prince Lvov and his earnest plea for Allied support of the Omsk government have had a pronounced effect upon

the opinion of the Allied representatives. This has encouraged Vologodski, the provisional president, to ask for immediate financial aid and I have been surprised to learn that the request has been favorably considered by the French High Commissioner and the British Diplomatic Agent, both of whom have recommended to their Governments that 15,000,000 rubles be advanced immediately.

My own opinion is that such action would be premature and ill advised. Nothing I can learn of the Omsk government would justify confidence in its permanence. It was apparently organized as a result of the Czech successes with the hope that it would command the support of Allied troops and Allied money. It seems to represent very little beyond the opinion of the few men who compose it, and is already torn by factions.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2899

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, October 6, 1918.

[Received October 7, 10.30 p. m.]

Frantic appeals coming from all Siberian and Czecho-Slovak associations to send at least 100 American soldiers by special train to Ekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk to encourage Slovaks who are losing their morale because expected aid of Allies is not arriving.

[THOMSON]

File No. 861.00/3057

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit to you the French text and the English paraphrase of an "Act constituting the supreme power of Russia" as approved by the National State Conference held at Ufa between the 8th and 23d of September, 1918.

This text has been transmitted to me by Mr. Nicholas D. Avksentiev, president of the new-formed provisional government, with a request to transmit it to the Government of the United States.

Mr. Avksentiev further informs me that the newly elected Russian provisional government considers itself as successor in power to the Provisional Government constituted in March 1917. The government emphasizes in particular that, in the sphere of foreign policy, the newly formed Russian provisional government, expressing the

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 188).

genuine will of the people of Russia, will continue to fight in close union with the Allied powers against the German coalition. The government confirms all treaties concluded with the Allied powers by the Provisional Government of 1917 and proclaims the annihilation of the treaty of Brest as well as of all other international arrangements which have been concluded after the revolution of March 1917 in the name of Russia or of any of its provinces by any authorities except that of the Russian Provisional Government of 1917.

The government further declares that it regards the government of the Bolsheviki Soviets, which ventured to act in the name of the Russian people, as but a power of usurpers, and that the Russian people rallying around the newly formed provisional government are struggling in order to liberate the country from the Bolsheviki authorities, the very existence of whom is based on German-Hungarian forces.

I avail myself [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Act Constituting the Supreme Power of All Russia, as Approved by the National State Conference Held at Ufa, September 8-23, 1918*

The Russian Provisional Government which was formed at the National Convention held at Ufa, on September 8-23, 1918, has communicated to the Russian Embassy at Washington the text of the "Act constituting the supreme power of Russia" as approved by that convention. The text follows:

The National Convention was composed of:

1. The present members of the Constituent Assembly and representatives of the committee of the same assembly;
2. Representatives of the temporary government of Siberia; the regional government of the Ural; the temporary government of Esthonia;
3. Representatives of the Cossacks of Orenburg, Uralsk, Siberia, Irkutsk, Semirechensk, Yenisei and Astrakhan;
4. Representatives of the governments of the Bashkirs, the Kirghiz, the Turkestan and the Turko-Tatars of interior Russia and Siberia;
5. Representatives of the Convention of Municipalities and Zemstvos of Siberia, the Ural and the Volga;
6. Representatives of the following parties and organizations: Socialist Revolutionists, Social Democrats (Mensheviks), Socialist Labor Party, Constitutional Democrats (*Narodnaya Svoboda*), of the Social Democratic organization "Edinstvo" and of the "Association of the Rebirth of Russia."

In an unanimous effort to save the fatherland, to reestablish its unity and its independence, the convention has decreed to transmit the supreme power over the whole territory of Russia to the Provisional Government, composed of five persons:

Nicholas D. Avksentiev  
 Nicholas I. Astrov  
 Lieut. Gen. Vassili G. Boldyrev  
 Peter V. Vologodski  
 Nicholas V. Chaikovski

The Provisional Government in its activities will be guided by principles announced in this constitutive act, as follows:

#### GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. Until the moment of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the Russian Provisional Government is the sole possessor of supreme power over the whole territory of Russia.

2. On the order of the Russian Provisional Government all functions of supreme power, temporarily exercised by regional governments, are transmitted to the Provisional Government.

3. Definition of the limits of power of the regional governments, which are to be founded on the principles of broad regional autonomy and in accord with the program stated below, is confided to the judgment of the Russian Provisional Government.

#### OBLIGATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Russian Provisional Government accepts the following obligations:

1. The Provisional Government will aid the Convention of Members of the Constituent Assembly, which is acting as a state institution, in its work, aiming to secure the attendance of members of the Constituent Assembly and to prepare for the opening of the session of the assembly, as elected in November 1917, at the earliest possible date.

2. All acts of the Government will be based on the presumption of the sovereign and unquestionable rights of the Constituent Assembly. The Government will take vigilant care that the subordinate administrative institutions should not infringe the rights of the Constituent Assembly or retard in any way the beginning of the assembly's activities.

3. The Government will, without delay, report concerning all its acts to the Constituent Assembly, from the very beginning of its activities; it owes entire submission to the Constituent Assembly as the only possessor of sovereign power in Russia.<sup>1</sup>

#### IMMEDIATE AIMS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

In endeavoring to reconstitute the unity and independence of Russia, the Provisional Government sets forth as its immediate aim:

1. Struggle for the liberation of Russia from the power of the Bolshevik Soviets.

2. The reintegration of Russia in readjoining regions which were detached or separated.

3. Disavowal of the treaty of Brest Litovsk and of all other international treaties concluded after the revolution of March 1917, either in the name of Russia or in the name of its Provinces, by any authority except the Provisional Government.

4. Restoration of treaties with the Allied nations.

5.<sup>2</sup> Continuation of war against the German coalition.

---

<sup>1</sup> In the French text there appears here the resolution printed *post*, p. 409.

<sup>2</sup> In the French text, and in a Russian text printed in 1926, the paragraph here numbered 5 is numbered 4 and the paragraph here numbered 4 becomes a part of paragraph 3.

In its interior policy the Provisional Government pursues the following aims:

#### MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The creation of a single and powerful Russian army beyond the influence of political parties and subordinate, through its military chief, to the Russian Provisional Government.
2. Exclusion of intervention by military authorities in the domain of civil authorities except in the fighting zone of the armies or regions declared by the Government, in cases of extreme necessity, in conditions of siege.
3. Establishment of strict military discipline based on law and humanity.
4. Interdiction of political organizations in the army and its entire separation from politics.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Liberated Russia must be constituted in accord with liberal principles of regional autonomy, taking into consideration the geographical, economic, and ethnographical differences. The national organization and federation of the state will be determined by the Constituent Assembly, possessor of the supreme power.
2. The Government secures to national minorities which do not occupy definite territories the free development of their national culture.
3. The Government secures to the liberated parts of Russia the reestablishment of democratic municipalities and Zemstvos, fixing immediately the nearest possible date for new elections.
4. The Government secures the realization of civil liberties.
5. The Government will take necessary measures actually guaranteeing general security and public order.

#### ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. To cope with the economic disorganization.
2. Development of productive forces of the country with the aid of private capital, as well Russian as foreign, and of personal initiative.
3. Legal regulation of commerce and industry.
4. Increase the productiveness of labor and reduce the non-essential expenditure of national revenues.
5. Development of labor legislation, protection of labor and regulation of the conditions of employment and discharge of workmen.
6. The Government recognizes full liberty of unions.
7. Relative to questions of supplies the Government stands for abolition of state monopoly of wheat and abolition of fixed prices, continuing at the same time to regulate distribution of products existing in insufficient quantities, and will organize state warehouses with the aid of private commercial and cooperative societies.
8. In the sphere of finance the Government will combat the depreciation of paper money in working out the reconstitution of the fiscal system, increasing the direct income tax and the indirect taxes.
9. The Constituent Assembly alone has the right to solve definitely the agrarian question and the Government cannot admit any modification which would impede the work of the Constituent Assembly. It, therefore, temporarily leaves the exploitation of the soil to its present holders and resumes activities aiming to regulate and increase to the utmost the exploitation of the soil, in conformity with the peculiarities of the regional customs.

## ORDER OF SUBSTITUTION OF MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government, possessor of supreme power, exercises this power in accordance with the above principles. Until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly the members of this body cannot be recalled and are not responsible to anybody for their activities.

The following persons are chosen to serve as substitutes for members of the Provisional Government who might be obliged to quit their functions:

Andrei A. Argunov, Vladimir A. Vinogradov, Gen. Michael V. Alexeev, Vasili V. Sapozhnikov and Vladimir M. Zenzinov.

In case of the absence of one of the members of the Provisional Government, their substitution will take place in the following manner:

N. D. Avksentiev would be replaced by A. A. Argunov.

N. I. Astrov would be replaced by V. A. Vinogradov.

Lieut. Gen. V. G. Boldyrev would be replaced by Gen. M. V. Alexeev.

P. V. Vologodski would be replaced by V. V. Sapozhnikov.

N. V. Chaikovski would be replaced by V. M. Zenzinov.

So as to fully realize the activities of government, those members of the Provisional Government who are at present absent are replaced in the order designated in the preceding article.

Members of the Provisional Government will take a solemn oath when assuming their functions.

(Signatures follow)

[Annex]

Attached hereto the resolution of the Convention of the Constituent Assembly of September 18, 1918:

The Convention of Members of the Constituent Assembly held on territory liberated from the Bolsheviks at its meeting of September 18, decrees, in case of organization in the near future by the national convention of a provisional government of Russia, which would assume temporarily the power so needed by the population, to convoke the Constituent Assembly on January 1, 1919, if the number of members present is not less than 250 to open its session; if the indicated quorum is not attained at the given date, the Constituent Assembly should resume its activities on February 1, 1919, under condition of attendance of 170 members.

*President of the Convention, V. ZENZINOV*  
*Secretary, N. ZDOBNOV*

(Then come the signatures of all the members.)

File No. 861.00/2914

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, undated.

[Received October 8, 1918, 7.30 p. m.]

Situation around Samara which we have repeatedly reported in detail to you has become so bad that to-day the evacuation of the city officially began. This afternoon a conference of representative leaders—Russians and Czechs—decided to put every possible effort

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 187).



in a final defense of Samara in the hope that the promised help can arrive in time to save the situation. The fall of Samara does not mean only the loss of one city and the Volga but the opening up of the way to Turkestan, the forcing of the Russian Government and army practically out of European Russia and a reaction to Bolshevism and to Germany which will be of direct consequence to the Allies. The conference which I have already referred to has requested that official inquiry be made as to what extent Allied help can be expected here and when. Our position here as officers will become untenable if we do not receive definite information in detail immediately regarding these matters.

THOMSON

---

File No. 861.00/2841

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)* <sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

For your confidential information, answering your 134<sup>2</sup> and subsequent telegrams. Small detachment of British and French troops reported proceeding westward to join Czechs on the Volga. This Government, however, with great reluctance but as a matter of military necessity determined by the extraordinary efforts being made by the United States on the western front, has definitely decided it can not send American troops to Omsk or any other point in the far interior of Siberia. It has also expressed its opinion to the Allies that the Czechs should withdraw from the Volga front. At the same time the United States is making all speed to supply the Czechs in Siberia with munitions and clothing. The American troops now at Vladivostok will establish themselves at Harbin.

The Allied representatives at Washington and also the Russian Ambassador and Professor Masaryk, who represents the Czechoslovaks here, have been fully advised of the position which this Government has felt constrained to take. It was expressly made clear that this Government did not wish to intimate, even by implication, its desire to embarrass the choices of policy on the part of other governments or to set limits to their actions.

Instructions have been issued that the American forces now at Archangel, numbering approximately 5,000, are to be used only in safeguarding supplies at that point and protecting the country around them which may develop threatening conditions. For your information Ambassador Morris from Tokyo is now at Vladivostok

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 398.

and is reporting to the Department as to what measures can be taken for economic and social assistance to follow the military assistance which has now been established at Vladivostok and Archangel. It should be possible to advise you shortly of the plans adopted.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3017

*The Consul Detailed for Special Duty in Russia and Siberia  
(Jameson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

CHELYABINSK, October 10 [?], 1918.

[Received October 22, 3.40 a. m.]

Referring to my previous telegrams sent through the United States Consuls General at Irkutsk and Peking, it is my duty again to point out these facts:

1. Czechs hold the United States Government alone responsible for Allied failure to aid them on Volga front.

2. British and Japanese openly state [Americans?] assume the responsibility for betrayal of Czechs' lives.

3. New Russian army also infected with the idea that America is grave danger [to] Russians, preventing Allies from helping Czechs in their fight against Germans and Irkutsk [Bolsheviks?] on Volga front; the result is grave danger Russians will welcome Germans in default of Allies to preserve order.

4. Russians already turning against Americans and Allies on account delay Allied forces; German propaganda strong and Russians will welcome troops of any nationality who assist them.

5. America was the most popular nation with the Czechs and the majority of Russians months ago but now reverse is true.

6. There is still time to make the name of the United States respected as before by Czechs and Russians but action must be immediate; if American troops no matter how few arrive on Volga front, our reputation may be regained but if not will be completely discredited.

7. Very few troops will be sufficient to regain our reputation; even two battalions on front in American uniforms would show that we were supporting Czech Allies, not betraying them.

8. Even if it is decided not advisable to form front in Russia, it is vital to send American troops now to Volga front and afterwards to withdraw Czech and American troops.

Realize that from purely military viewpoint perhaps problematical to lend [*sic*] troops, but it is vital to American prestige and Czechs' morale that we contradict German reports of our standpoint by actual appearance in the field.

Telegraph answer informing me American plans number included.

JAMESON

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 212).

File No. 861.00/3054

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1918.

[Received October 21.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: The Ambassador of Russia to Paris has communicated to the French Government a telegram in which the Directory constituted at Ufa sets forth its program for the restoration of a provisional government of all Russia and applies for recognition by the Allies.

Although the program which is no doubt known to the American Government is satisfactory as to its principles, the degree of influence on the masses that may be possessed by the five directors, two of whom, Mr. Chaikovski and Mr. Vologodski, were absent from Ufa at the time it was drawn up, is not sufficiently demonstrated to enable the Government of the Republic to grant them official recognition. Any other course of action would run counter to the policy which the Allies have proclaimed under all circumstances and which consists in non-intervention in Russian domestic policy and in not favoring one party or government to the injury of any other.

It is through its acts, if it succeeds in developing its resources, in reestablishing the right to tax, and in carrying into practice the plan for the reorganization of the Russian Army work at Ufa and Omsk by General Boldyrev and General Ivanov, that the Directory will demonstrate that it is a real government enjoying the required stability, and will thus draw nearer to recognition by the Allies.

The Government of the Republic, however, thinks that it should not go so far as to refrain from getting into touch with the men of good will who, without outside help, have succeeded in constituting an embryo of government centralization and in forming a union with the provisional governments of Archangel and Omsk in the same way as the latter government appears itself to have absorbed the divergent combinations of Harbin and Vladivostok.

The large number of ethnical and economic parties or groups that the Ufa Directory represents and the general principles by which it is guided cannot but induce the Allies to extend to it some assistance, particularly of a financial character, and to keep in touch with it through consular officers who may watch its proceedings, furnish it advice, and keep us informed of the cause of events.

In order not to let the declaration of the Ufa Directory go unanswered and to avoid any possible difficulties among the cobelligerents, my Government has instructed me to submit to your excellency the enclosed draft, which in its opinion suits the circumstances.

I should be very thankful to your excellency, if you would kindly let me know as soon as possible if your own views agree with those hereinabove stated.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Draft of Answer to the Directory at Ufa*

The Allied Governments have received copies of the telegrams sent by the Ufa Directory to the Embassies of Russia abroad, which set forth the political program adopted by the Ufa conference for the restoration of the Russian state.

The principles upon which the Directory rests its policy are the recognition of the alliances and treaties of Russia and cooperation with the Allies against Germany.

The Allied Governments are glad to greet the dawn of new days for Russia, thanks to the reestablishment of the disciplined military forces conducive to the restoration of order. They will accordingly keep in touch with the Ufa Directory through agents appointed to watch with sympathy and facilitate in every way the labors of the Directory up to the time when the Directory, by the successful outcome of this action, the firmness of its acts, and the consent freely expressed by the people shall have been consecrated by official recognition.

The Allies, desirous of coming to Russia's assistance and to labor jointly with the leaders towards the restoration of the state, will not fail to accord in full confidence to the Directory the moral support that it may need, as also all the material assistance at their command.

File No. 861.00/3089b

*The Secretary of State to the Russian Ambassador (Bakmeteff)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1918.

[MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:] As you are aware, this Government is not, at the present time, prepared to recognize any new government in Russia, though we watch with interest and hope for the future the various efforts which are being made to restore law and order under a stable government.

I note that the conference at Ufa includes the names of many distinguished Russians and shall be very glad to be kept advised as to the progress of this movement.

As you are aware, the purpose of the United States to assist Russia by any practical means which may be devised remains unchanged. The fact that this Government does not see its way clear at the present time to recognize political movements at Ufa and elsewhere must not be construed as a lack of sympathy with the efforts of the Russian people to erect a government which is able to protect individual rights and to perform its international obligations.

[I am, etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

<sup>1</sup> From a copy sent to the Italian Ambassador, Oct. 22; no record of original.

File No. 861.00/3008

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Harbin, to the  
Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HARBIN, October 18, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received October 21, 12.36 p. m.]

Although I have not had time or opportunity for a thorough investigation I submit the following summary of the political situation in Siberia as it appears after a month of daily conferences with representative Russians and other careful observers:

1. There is no central government in Siberia which exercises any real authority.

2. There have been groups which aspired to the title of central Siberian government and one which has assumed the more ambitious title of all-Russian government.

3. Of these governments the most active is the one organized at Omsk, which has the support of Prince Lvov and which has recently concluded negotiations for consolidation with the so-called Horvat government. It has had from the beginning the sympathy of the British and French representatives, largely because it has cultivated close relations with the Czech forces operating in the Omsk district. While it has gone through the forms of issuing orders, appointing local representatives, distributing offices and creating an army, it does not of itself exercise any authority whatever.

4. Supplementing above governments of this character are a number of municipal and provincial governments which possess some authority and which are endeavoring, sometimes efficiently, more often rather crudely, to bring a semblance of order out of the chaos of local affairs.

5. In the local governments there is a real popular interest and also an intense jealousy lest any central organization may interfere with their purposes and efforts. It is this attitude which in part explains the present political confusion and the failure of various attempts to form an all-Siberian government.

6. All information I can obtain justifies the conclusion that there still exists in the larger towns, on the Trans-Siberian Railway a strong Bolshevik sentiment, which is less a political movement than an expression of industrial discontent. It is no longer organized but would probably reassert itself as soon as the Czech or Allied forces were withdrawn. In my judgment only an improvement in economic conditions and a frank recognition and correction of the industrial inequalities will modify the existing bitter class feeling of the Bolsheviks.

Therefore suggest for the present:

- (1) That no recognition or assistance be accorded to any of the so-called all-Siberian governments;
- (2) That aid and advice be given by our representatives whenever possible to local governments in their efforts to improve local conditions;

- (3) That in the proposed operation of the railways no recognition be accorded to any one of the several Ministers of Ways of Communication, who are now making futile efforts to exercise their jurisdiction, but that every assistance be given Mr. Stevens to introduce modern equipment and spirit of (co)operation;
- (4) That our military forces be spread in groups over as large a part as possible of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways with strict instructions to avoid all political entanglements and simply to maintain order along the line of the railway.

This suggested policy will no doubt require modification hereafter, and I hope I have complied with Department's instruction of last February to investigate and report fully upon political conditions in western Siberia. It is based, however, on my present hope that if we can arrange the efficient operation of the railways with a high standard of justice to the employees and retain sufficient Allied and American troops for protection and support, we can begin our economic and social program and at the same time permit the free development of local self-government out of which may grow a central Siberian authority which will be truly representative.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3017

*The Consul Detailed for Special Duty in Russia and Siberia (Jameson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

CHELYABINSK, October 19, 1918.

[Received October 22, 3.40 a. m.]

Now that peace negotiations are pending it is more vital than ever that our Government act immediately in accordance with my suggestion.

[JAMESON]

---

File No. 861.00/3032

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1165

#### MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that General Knox has telegraphed to His Majesty's Government that in his opinion a retirement from the Volga may be followed by a recrudescence of Bolshevism in central Siberia owing to the slackness of the Siberian government in their attitude towards prisoners of war.

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 212).

General Knox has put forward the suggestion to His Majesty's Government that the best way of dealing with this situation would be for the United States, who are at war with Austria and Germany, to undertake the guarding of the prisoners of war, who could be concentrated for this purpose in Manchuria, where it is proposed that the Allied troops should pass the winter months.

His Majesty's Government agree with General Knox's view as to the danger which will be constituted by the German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia, and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to point out to the United States Government the great service they would render by undertaking the guardianship of such enemy prisoners as it may be possible to concentrate in Manchuria and to express the earnest hope that they will see their way to undertaking this important duty.

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1918.*

[*Received October 24.*]

---

File No. 861.00/3008

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Department appreciates very helpful summary contained in your October 18, 8 p. m., from Harbin. Regarding your recommendations:

1. The Russian Ambassador here has already been informed that this Government is not yet prepared to recognize any new government in Russia, although this decision must not be construed as a lack of sympathy with efforts to restore a stable government which will be able to protect individual rights and fulfil its international obligations.

2. The Consul General at Irkutsk has been authorized to have consular representatives in Siberia give aid and advice to local governments in efforts to improve local conditions wherever opportunity offers.

3. Department concurs and would like to know whether this question cannot be met for the present by dealing with the management of the Ussuri, Chinese-Eastern, Trans-Baikal, and other sections of the Siberian system.

4. Will advise you later how, if at all, it may be practicable to follow your recommendation.

The Department concurs in views expressed in last paragraph of your telegram excepting employment of troops which under consideration and wishes to inform you have fulfilled admirably the purpose of your visit to Vladivostok.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3088a

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1918, 6 p. m.

The Department is without adequate current reports of conditions both civil and military at Chita, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novo Nikolaevsk, Omsk, Petropavlovsk, Ekaterinburg and other centers in Siberia, also the Volga front. In this matter your most careful consideration is required. You represent the Government's highest responsible authority at present available in Siberia for reliable information to guide its decisions and conclusions. The Government of the United States must rely on you for facts upon which a decision of its course of action may be based. Until such course of action is determined it desires you personally, if practicable, and certainly through your subordinates and without committing this Government, to keep in touch with the leaders of all movements and report regularly the progress of their endeavors, the development of the various efforts to establish law and order which are being made, and the strength and character of support from the Russian population which they attract. Reports must be made by telegraph.

For your guidance, the Government of the United States is not prepared to recognize any new government in Russia; but this must not be construed as a lack of sympathy with the efforts of the Russian people to erect a government which is able to protect individual rights and to perform its international obligations. The Government of the United States has stated that it desires where practicable to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance and you may authorize consular representatives wherever opportunity offers to give aid and advice to local governments in their efforts to improve local conditions. This, of course, applies only to local and municipal authorities and not to any others. The purpose of the United States to assist Russia has not been modified. It has not only arranged jointly with France and Great Britain to ration the Murmansk and Archangel districts for the winter but is now planning practical measures of economic relief in Siberia additional to the moderate military assistance which the demands of the western front have enabled it to send to Vladivostok. The necessary tonnage to carry supplies has been allotted. Supplies will be distributed under the direction of the representatives of the War Trade Board at Vladivostok.

Please acknowledge receipt immediately.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.



File No. 861.00/3182

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, October 25, 1918.

[Received November 7, 8.53 p. m.]

All-Russian Directory and Siberian temporary government have agreed on following ten points:

1. Formation all-Russian government agreed upon, therefore Siberian temporary government no longer exists as the Russian government.
2. Principle of provincial government agreed upon; eliminations [delimitations] such districts or provinces will be determined later.
3. All-Russian Directory takes over and uses organization of temporary Siberian government.
4. Working ministry will be formed by Siberian temporary government and all-Russian Directory but in future only the Directory can fill vacancies in Ministry.
5. Members of Ministry responsible only to all-Russian Directory.
6. Minister President (probably will be Vologodski) must be member present all-Russian Directory.
7. New election laws for Constituent Assembly will be drafted by special committee one member of which will be president of Tomsk territorial Duma and these laws must be ratified by all-Russian Directory before becoming effective.
8. After Russia freed various provinces will form local state government (modeled after American state government).
9. For present all-Russian Directory accepts laws of provincial governments to date but can revise when necessary.
10. Army will be all-Russian and wear Russian cockade but soldiers may wear provincial colors across cockade.

Further details being sent Department to-day via Legation, Peking.

THOMSON

File No. 861.00/3049

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, October 27, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received October 27, 11 p. m.]

The Japanese Government has refused the recent request of the British Government to send additional forces into Siberia to support the Czechs in the Volga region. The French Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to join in the request but did not receive his instructions until after the answer of the Japanese Government had been handed to my British colleague.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3115

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, October 31, 1918.

[Received November 1, 12.03 p. m.]

159. For Department's attention and consideration. Following message received through courier by Vice Consul, Ekaterinburg, from Ambassador Francis:<sup>2</sup>

To liberty-loving Poles: As American Ambassador representing a free people I appeal to you to make every effort to throw off German yoke. The President of the United States before America came into the war expressed the sentiment of the American people when he said, "Poland should be free and independent." America is unselfishly waging a war for humanity against force, for the right of all people to govern themselves, for every nation great and small to have free access to the seas, and Poland is not only included in America's roster of nations but was the first named. Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs have also been recognized by my government as Allies and American troops are advancing from Archangel and Vladivostok to reinforce the valiant soldiers who are now so courageously struggling with armed German and Austrian war prisoners and Bolsheviks under German and Austrian officers. Do not lose hope. Do not be discouraged. The Allied forces are achieving great victories on the western front. America will never lay down her arms until an enduring peace is secured. Francis, American Ambassador, Archangel.

Unfortunately Vice Consul at Ekaterinburg, without referring matter to me or consulting me, caused this message to be published. That part referring to American military assistance to the Czechs from Vladivostok is directly at variance with the Department's instructions to me and has made a disagreeable impression among the Czechs, as it would appear that there is lack of harmony among the Americans. Acknowledge by telegraph.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3138

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, October 31, 1918.

[Received November 2, 1.34 p. m.]

157. Situation Chita: Semenov attempting to obviate [obstruct] shipment of supplies, especially automobile and truck, from Vladivostok.

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> A text of this message, in practically identical words, was enclosed in the Ambassador's despatch No. 1213, Sept. 10-12, received Oct. 1 (File No. 861.00/2847).

vostok and Harbin to Czechs in west. Two trainloads automobiles now held by order Semenov at Chita. Armed conflict possible. Have sent Vice Consul Thomas there to watch situation. Will attempt learn real cause, as Semenov unlikely to take such action unless supported by some power. Czechs suspect Japanese.

In passing through Manchuria last week, I gained the impression that there are at least 40,000 Japanese along railway and scattered through country district. There are 6,000 in Chita alone. I have suggested in telegram to General Graves that he will send one American army officer and one intelligence officer to watch situation at Manchuria Station, where they are [omission] American railway office at present. . . .

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3132

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, November 1, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 2, 4.30 a. m.]

General political situation Siberia to-day: Department's policy not to recognize any government at present exceedingly wise. Such recognition, for example, of temporary Siberian government at Omsk would but encourage a half-dozen other governments to strive also for recognition and such policy would but dismember Russia, and but further add to complications and conflicts which now unfortunately exist. Unquestionably if Omsk government were recognized, it would but strengthen its position and encourage it in eventually insisting that Siberia become permanently separated from Russia, a spirit which would be unwise to foster at this time.

Just at present general outlook seems dubious. Dissension and strife exist everywhere among the political and military leaders and the disposition to intrigue and mutual distrust of one another keeps them from organizing under one leadership, and working out a definite course of action. Were the Czechs eliminated as a factor in Siberia, the Bolsheviks would be in Archangel soon after. There has been no spontaneous enthusiastic uprising on the part of the people, especially the intelligent classes, to put their country in order and keep it from Bolshevism. Heads of the government have learned nothing from the [omission] but I have the conviction that if the Czechs had not forced an outlet to the east when they did, the Siberians would have turned upon them before long. Not even the presence of the Japanese, whom they fear and hate, is sufficient to serve as a factor to spur them to unity.

The so-called all-Russian government recently formed at Ufa and now joined with Omsk government is also something which would be unwise to recognize. That convention was dominated by the Social Revolutionary Party of Samara and the difference between it and the Bolsheviks is in name only. The Ufa convention stated that all private initiative was to be protected, but [at] the same time the government must control all manufacturing at home and all foreign trade home [*sic*]. The land question was left undecided and many of the most radical Bolshevik elements [measures] left in force. In an attempt to blind foreign countries as regards internal policies, pleasing phrases were adopted in regard to foreign policy, such as revising the Brest Litovsk treaty and a continuation of the war on Germany. Nothing said about Russia's foreign debt and how same was to be paid.

In spite of present conditions, I am certain that Russia will slowly and gradually free itself from evil influences. The chief difficulty will be in definitely stamping out the effects of Bolshevism which has so thoroughly disorganized the body politic, and put the laboring classes in a frame of mind where they do not wish to work.

While the Czechs are keenly disappointed at not seeing American soldiers in western Siberia, yet the force of the President's diplomacy is beginning to dawn upon them, and they are becoming aware of the fact that his [insistence] upon a free Bohemia and that all Russian territory will be evacuated by the common enemy is of greater value than what might be accomplished by any number of American troops in western Siberia. Such is the case with Czech civil authorities especially, and even the Russians [are] beginning to see in this light.

Acknowledge by cable.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3147

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1918.

[Received November 4.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the original cable received October 31 by the Russian Embassy from Omsk, signed by Mr. Avksentieff and Mr. Vologodski, as well as the English paraphrase of this cable.

Believe me [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

*Mr. Avksentiev and Mr. Vologodski to the Russian Ambassador*

OMSK, undated.

[Received October 31, 1918.]

On behalf of the Directory, we request you to transmit the following note to President Wilson as well as bring its contents to the knowledge of our diplomatic representatives abroad.

The provisional government of Russia considers it necessary to bring to the knowledge of President Wilson the following facts concerning the situation of Russia:

Owing to the false promises and usurping of their power as well as taking advantage of the reverses of the war, of the weariness of the Russian Army and of the conditions of the revolution, the Bolsheviks seized the power. Since then the country was thrust under the régime of the most merciless terror. The new leaders of Russia under the pretext of defending the interests of the workmen and peasants destroy in the most barbarous manner all the treasures of national culture, persecute the representatives of intellectual classes and ruin industry and commerce. The newspapers, except the official organs of the Soviets, are not published. The libraries and museums are robbed and set afire. Numbers of eminent persons—distinguished scientists, clergymen, doctors, lawyers, not mentioning representatives of the *bourgeoisie*—are thrown into prison as hostages and shot without investigation or trial. Women, children, and the aged are not spared. The power of the Bolsheviks which calls itself "democratic" has in reality degenerated into party dictatorship, which, through all its acts, tramples the principles of democracy. Universal suffrage, basis of all true democracy, is abolished. The Constituent Assembly as well as the Zemstvos and municipal councils, in other words, all bodies elected by universal suffrage, have been dissolved. Only delegates belonging to the Bolshevik Party are admitted into the Soviets. Thus workmen who do not accept the yoke of the Bolsheviks and who endeavor to insure the democratic ideas and the principle of universal suffrage are shot in hundreds by the Bolshevik government, as has happened at Petrograd, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Kolpino, Sormovo, and a number of other Russian towns.

The population, exasperated by the injustice and tyranny of this régime, has revolted in many places against the Bolshevik power and everywhere the defeat of the Bolsheviks is unanimously acclaimed with intense joy. The whole of Russia—all the classes of the Russian people—have become enemies of the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism would have long ago disappeared if not assisted by foreign serviceable and powerful friends. These friends are those who calculate to profit from the collapse of Russia and who intend to enrich themselves to the detriment of other nations. First among these are the Germans: in adroitly using the extreme tendencies of the Bolshevik program, in greatly helping the Bolsheviks with their money, their officers and their soldiers, prisoners of war, Germany with threats and demands has already managed to destroy the economic life of European Russia, and, having weakened the Russian working classes, is preparing for the absolute reign of her industry on the Russian market.

At present the Bolsheviks and the Germans are approaching the Ural Mountains, this last rampart, under the protection of which the restitution of Russia's national unity is still possible. Triumph of Germany in the region of the Urals would give her new unexhausted means to continue the war and

would radically change the correlation and direction of international forces not only in the center of Europe but also in the Far East.

It is evident that the exit of Russia from the number of belligerents and the process of dismemberment which it is suffering, have a deep influence on the fate of all the other countries. Furthermore, the problems of the future of Russia should be considered by governments and nations of the universe as a problem of their own future.

Russia will not perish. She is greatly suffering but not dead. Her national forces are regaining remarkably quickly and her effort to recover her unity and greatness will not cease until she attains the sublime aim. Moreover, the reconstruction of a powerful and prosperous Russia presents itself as a condition necessary to the maintenance of order and international equilibrium.

For this reason, the new provisional government, into whose hands has been entrusted the supreme power by the people of Russia, the regional governments, the convention and committee of the members of the Constituent Assembly, the Zemstvos and municipalities, addresses itself to the Allied powers. It expects to receive their aid and considers itself in right to demand insistently upon such help.

It is to the head of the great American democracy, recognized apostle of peace and fraternity of the nations, that it makes its appeal. All aid already extended to Russia by the Allies would be in vain if the new help should arrive too late, or in insufficient quantity.

Every hour of delay threatens with innumerable calamities Russia, the Allies, and other nations.

N. AVKSENTIEV

P. VOLOGODSKI

File No. 861.00/3161

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, November 3, 1918.

[Received November 4, 11.53 a. m.]

164. Situation Irkutsk to-day very much better. [Omission] quiet; 1,500 Czechs and 500 Japanese in barracks here. Japanese control three out of five telegraph lines to Vladivostok. Japanese are desirous proving utility wherever there is a local organization and [omission] consists of 200 Bolshevik members and a monarchist club of 300 members.

Latest news from Omsk indicates that function [fusion] of Omsk government with that of all-Russian government is progressing favorably and outlook this respect better. Latest reliable reports from Ural front extremely unfavorable. Ufa has been evacuated. Apparently demoralization is ceasing [seizing?] first army. Second army badly in need of boots and ammunition. Prevalent feeling is

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

that Bolsheviks will soon take Chelyabinsk and that [Irtysh] River at Omsk will become front before Christmas. Effort should be made to hasten supply of clothing and ammunition.

Situation Chita: Czech-Semenov incident serious, and two shipments of autos and trucks now *en route* to Chita [for] Ural front. As many supplies for Chita will pass through Manchuria, I suggest Allies take precautionary measures in order to prevent repetition of such Semenov incident. There are 6,000 Japanese troops Chita. Owing to explosion on railway west of Irkutsk telegraph lines to all points in western Siberia temporarily interrupted.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3032

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain and begs to acknowledge the receipt of memorandum No. 1165, dated October 23, in which the suggestion is made that the United States undertake the guarding of prisoners of war who could become concentrated for that purpose in Manchuria. This question has already been the subject of correspondence with General Graves and it would appear that an arrangement has already been reached by which prisoners of war found in prisons and held by the Allies or captured by the Allies during their joint operations, will be cared for at the expense of the Allies and under the control of Japan and the United States. This arrangement applies to the Maritime and Amur Provinces.

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1918.

File No. 861.00/3158

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, November 4, 1918.

[Received November 5, 3.45 a. m.]

166. 1, November 1.<sup>2</sup> At 2 o'clock in the morning an armed band of Bolsheviks started an uprising in Tomsk. They were assisted by one regiment of the Siberian forces stationed in Tomsk. The prison was broken open and inmates freed. A munition factory and railway station were captured. The revolt has been quelled by Siberian troops. Three hundred Bolsheviks are dead and wounded. Six Siberians are reported killed.

HARRIS

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently from Consul Jameson, temporarily at Tomsk.

File No. 861.00/3054

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2280

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have received your note of October 15, 1918,<sup>1</sup> in regard to the attitude which the Government of the French Republic proposes to assume towards the Directory constituted recently at Ufa.

In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States has already directed its consular representatives in Siberia, without committing this Government, to keep in close touch with the leaders of all movements having for their purpose the restoration of orderly government in Russia. I have also informed the Russian Ambassador at Washington that I hope he will keep me informed of the progress of the movement inaugurated by the Directory and have explained to him that non-recognition by the United States must not be construed as a lack of sympathy with any efforts in Russia to erect a government capable of protecting individual rights and performing its international obligations.

You will therefore see that this Government sympathizes with many of the sentiments expressed in the draft of an announcement which your excellency's Government proposes to be made by the Allied Governments. At the same time it will be evident that the Government of the United States is not prepared to join in a general statement declaring that "the Allies, desirous of coming to Russia's assistance and to labor jointly with the leaders towards the restoration of the state, will not fail to accord in full confidence to the Directory the moral support that it may need as well as all the material assistance at their command."

As you are aware, this Government is determined to devise means to render economic assistance to the Russian people and has not modified its purpose to assist Russia. However, it is not yet in a position to lend definite support to any movement or to any group of leaders. It will continue, therefore, for the present, to keep in close touch with events in Russia and to pursue its efforts to lend such economic relief and support as may prove practicable for it to undertake in those parts of Russia where such efforts can be made effective.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 412.



File No. 861.00/3192

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, November 6, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 7, 3.55 p. m.]

170. French Ambassador Regnault and English Sir Charles Eliot, high commissioner to Siberia, both now Irkutsk, have agreed to the following formula which will govern their relations with this all-Russian government at Omsk:

The Governments of the Allies welcome the entering of a new era for Russia by which order will be restored through the reenforcements of military forces and are glad to be able to maintain, through the nomination of agents, relations with the Directorate. The duty of the Allies' representatives will be to follow sympathetically and render [assist] in every way the work of the Directorate until the latter can receive the status of official recognition through its firmness in practice, its genial action and by the freely expressed consent of the people. It is the wish of the Allied Governments to render help to Russia and to cooperate with the directors of Russian Government policy and to help them restore the state. The Allied Governments will do anything in their power to render all material and moral assistance which the directors may need.

The above is a literal translation from the French.

The commissioners France and England have asked my cooperation and I have replied that I must confine myself to the policy laid down in the Department's instructions, October 23, 6 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> especially that part which authorizes me to give aid and advice to local institutions in their efforts improve local conditions and not to any other.

In my judgment, the best policy for United States Government to follow is to wait until all governments of Russia are in position to communicate freely with each other, thus enabling a truly all-Russian government to govern vast importation [population] which will have represented in it all the diversified interests of the country, including not only Siberia but all the provinces of European Russia, the Caucasus and Turkestan. A recognition of the present Omsk all-Russian government would be futile for the reason that European Russia will never rally to it as at present constituted. Then, again, the present Omsk government consists chiefly of [omission] and in its process of reconstruction last week it was as thoroughly dominated by the Siberian politicians as was the [Ufa] convention dominated two months ago by the Social Revolutionary element of Samara. I am of the opinion that the sending of high commis-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 417.

sioners to Siberia on the part France and England was unwise because it savors of recognition and is lending encouragement to a group which has its own territorial ends in view rather than the best interests of all Russia. In my judgment the all-Russian government the United States Government should recognize is the one formed by a newly elected Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives of all the people. It is certain that the eventual seat of this government will not be Omsk but some city in European Russia and the United States Government should be represented in such city by the Embassy now at Archangel.

On the other hand I recommend that the American Government give every possible assistance in the way of clothing and ammunition to the Siberian army, the same thing which is now being done for the Czechs in Siberia. My experience proves that military leaders, with a few exceptions, have the interests of all Russia more at heart than is the case with the civil leaders. Their efforts should be encouraged for it is only through the police work of a well-disciplined army that law and order ever will be restored in Siberia and Russia.

Please send Ambassador Francis, Archangel, copy this telegram and acknowledge receipt to me.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3173

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, November 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 7, 7.10 a. m.]

Consul Ray<sup>1</sup> who has just arrived here informs me that about six thousand Japanese troops have occupied Verkhneudinsk. It is also reliably reported that Japanese troops have landed at Possiet Bay. An examination of the map would indicate that these last movements complete the Japanese military occupation of every possible entrance into Siberia and Manchuria. Verkhneudinsk is the junction of the [Mongolian] trade route with the Trans-Siberian Railway, and Possiet Bay is the terminal of the railway from Kirin.

Now that full military control has been thus established I presume that the General Staff will permit the Minister for Foreign Affairs to formulate the Government's reply to our proposals for the operation of the Russian railways.

---

<sup>1</sup> John A. Ray, formerly Consul at Odessa, en route to the United States.

I called upon Viscount Uchida Monday evening to present the case of the Seoul Mining Co. and he introduced the subject of the railways. He expressed regret at the delay and said that the question was a difficult one because of the attitude of the military authorities and the sensitive state of public opinion. He gave no indication of what reply his Government would make.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3177

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, November 7, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 12.43 p. m.]

I am now informed that the Japanese General Staff has completed arrangements with Semenov, Kalmykov and Gamov, atamans of Cossacks in eastern Siberia, and Makovkin, captain of Cossacks, to organize a Russian army of 20,000 men. It is understood that the General Staff will furnish equipment and bear the necessary expenses.

My Russian colleague is greatly disturbed over this action. He understands that it is to be followed by the withdrawal of a part of the Japanese troops now in Manchuria and the substitution of the Cossacks who will be in the pay of Japan. He further states that the Cossack leaders have been directed not to cooperate with Horvat or the central Siberian government and he sees in this an effort by the Japanese Government to apply the same policy in eastern Siberia which has since successfully established Japanese influence in portions [of Manchuria?].

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.01/17

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1918.

[Received November 12.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Supplementary to my letter of November 9,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor to transmit to you paraphrase of cable received from Omsk, concerning the formation of the all-Russian government.

Accept [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*Relations between the All-Russian Government and the Siberian Government*

OMSK, undated.

[Received by the Russian Embassy, November 9, 1918.]

Am transmitting for your information extracts from decree of November 4 of all-Russian government.

The Siberian government has transferred the plenitude of power to the provisional all-Russian government.

It has been resolved:

1. Owing to the creation of central governmental institutions, all the regional governments and representative bodies should cease to exist.

2. The formation anew of regional institutions is only possible after the all-Russian government will have recognized the right of certain regions to autonomous rule and after the supreme power will have in detail defined limits of competence of the regional institutions in questions of regional bearing.

3. The all-Russian government recognizes the already existing regional legislative acts; the amendment and annulment of such acts will be effected in the general legislative order.

4. In order to organize the all-Russian government with the greatest expediency, the central governmental bodies of the Siberian government shall act in the capacity of all-Russian bodies; alteration of these bodies and of their personnel will be effected in the general legislative order.

5. Establishing the unity of the Russian Army to be subordinate to a single supreme command, the all-Russian government grants certain units of this army regional denominations; such units are also allowed to have distinctive standards besides the national three-colored banner.

The Directory is composed of members as previously announced. The Cabinet consists of the following persons: President, Vologodski; Vice President, Vinogradov; Minister of War and Navy, Admiral Kolchak; temporary chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Klyuchnikov; Minister of Interior, Gattenberg; Minister of Supplies, Serebryannikov; Minister of Finance, Mikhailov; Food Administrator, Zefirov; Minister of Justice, Starynkevich; Minister of Ways of Communication, Ustrugov; Minister of Public Instruction, Sapozhnikov; Minister of Labor, Shumilovski; Minister of Agriculture, Petrov; Minister of Commerce and Industry (temporarily) Shchukin; Minister of Post and Telegraph, Tseslinski; State Controller, Krasnov; Manager of the Affairs of the Council of Ministers, Telberg.

---

File No. 861.00/3227

*The Consul Detailed for Special Duty in Russia and Siberia  
(Jameson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

TOMSK, November 12, 1918.

[Received November 17, 2.23 a. m.]

14. Having visited during autumn chief cities of central and western Siberia from Chita to Ekaterinburg, Russia, I submit here-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

with brief report regarding political conditions in territory above mentioned as follows:

- (1) There is great political agitation by conflicting political parties everywhere and presence of Czech forces supporting government alone enables new government to exist.
- (2) Russian army in very poor condition because of shortage of clothing, the lack of arms and ammunition, the lack of experienced officers, unreliability of troops because impossible to know how many are Bolsheviks, and the lack of discipline due to extreme socialistic ideas.
- (3) There is considerable friction between officials of new Russian government and temporary Siberian government, though they are in accord on surface; these feelings may cause open rupture any time, splitting government.
- (4) Czechs not only helped form all-Russian government but are supporting it against all opposition.
- (5) Strong Bolshevik propaganda reinforced by anarchical and socialist societies causes frequent and often serious uprisings throughout western Siberia, some of these apparently due to German instigation.
- (6) Austrian and German war prisoners are constant menace because any more military [momentary] success of insurgents enables them to release thousands of these prisoners from prison camps, making formidable rebellion of small uprising.
- (7) There is strong monarchist movement gaining ground daily throughout Siberia.
- (8) Kerensky is in close touch with all-Russian government and it is feared will try to make himself part of it; believe any government with Kerensky as member will be failure as feeling against him intense.
- (9) There is strong feeling among many Russians that the American Government [un]willing to help Russians unless guaranteed concessions and commercial advantages; this feeling increased by efforts of our consular and commercial offices to collect information regarding economic and commercial assets and needs of Siberia.  
The Russians want help in establishing sound government and look to America as democratic government for assistance; our declared desire to help Russian people has hollow ring, when they need everything and can obtain nothing from us.
- (10) Our failure to send troops to support Russians and Czechs on Volga front in fighting against Bolsheviks and Germans has shaken Russian confidence in America.
- (11) And most important, the Russian Government must have help in many ways and very soon in order to continue to exist—its leaders are determined to obtain help; if possible they prefer to obtain it from America, but if we do not give soon there is great danger they will make a

bargain with Japan, offering large concessions for immediate and adequate help.

- (12) In this connection, Government may revert to monarchy; number of strongest leaders are known to favor, especially the men who are said to be negotiating with Japan.

Shall be pleased to report in detail regarding any of the points above mentioned. Am convinced that this is the time for the American Government to show its desire to help the Russian people by actions. Suggest as first step that we have the embargo against imports into Siberia raised and see that Russians know that America has caused raising of embargo, not some other nation. Also suggest that American plans for relief and reconstruction work in Europe after the war be extended to Siberia immediately; namely, goods of all kinds shipped to Siberia including military supplies to enable new government to preserve order. If these two acts can be carried out at once you will secure the enthusiastic support for America of the vast majority of the Russian people. Acknowledge by telegraph.

JAMESON

File No. 861.00/3217

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, November 12, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 13, 10.48 p. m.]

General situation to date. Banks in Siberia are greatly in need of money, especially small change. Commerce everywhere practically at a standstill. Difficult to keep down speculation. Cost of living increasing every day. Practically impossible to get robes, shoes, matches, candles, and many other necessities. Irkutsk quiet although heavily patrolled at night. Considerable Bolshevik unrest in Krasnoyarsk and kept down only by presence of soldiers. Vice Consul Palmer, Ekaterinburg, reports military situation stationary that front. Radio from Perm states that large reinforcements of Bolsheviks coming toward that city from Vyatka. Czechs on Ekaterinburg front being replaced by Russian troops. Vice Consul is of opinion if Czechs withdraw Russian army will fall to pieces.

HARRIS

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/3207

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 13, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received 11.47 a. m.]

275. During last month Japanese have landed detachments of six to eight hundred troops at Possiet Harbor near Korean frontier and at various harbors east and north from here which has caused considerable Russian hostility and protests. Japanese staff have stated landing at Possiet was for repairing telegraph line but I have not heard reason given for landing at other harbors. At Possiet Japanese disarmed Korean force which claimed to be a part of the new Russian army.

Japanese attitude and actions have tended to increase hostility felt toward them by a majority of Russians and also by other nationalities.

However it is now stated that Japanese troops are being withdrawn from Archangel [Amur] Railway which should have somewhat quelling effect.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/3115

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

352. Consul General at Irkutsk reports text of message addressed to liberty-loving Poles received by courier and published by American Vice Consul at Ekaterinburg, contained following statement: "Allied and American troops are advancing from Archangel and Vladivostok."<sup>1</sup>

Department would be glad to know how such misunderstanding arose.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3239

*The Consul General at Irkutsk to the Secretary of State<sup>2</sup>*

[Telegram—Extract]

KRASNOYARSK, November 16, 1918.

[Received November 18, 7.15 p. m.]

185. Referring to Consul Jameson's telegraphic report dated November 12, especially paragraphs numbered 9, 10, 11. These statements meet with my disapproval, for they do not represent actual

<sup>1</sup> See telegram No. 159, Oct. 31, from the Consul General at Irkutsk, *ante*, p. 419.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

facts and are misleading. I have met no Russian who believes Americans are unwilling to help unless concessions and commercial advantages are guaranteed them beforehand. The reference to the consular service is untrue. I am absolutely of the opinion that the President's decision not to send American troops to western Siberia and thus keep from becoming embroiled in the internal troubles of Russia is wise and sound and events are proving it. Russians will not play into hands of Japanese unless forced to. Whatever we do in Siberia should be done in a quiet, unostentatious manner. Attempts on some [our] part to advertise what we are doing and that we did it first will meet with resentment on part of Siberian people and other nations. . . .

HARRIS

---

**Representations of the American Government against the Size of Japanese Forces and the Degree of Control Assumed in Manchuria and Siberia, November 16, 1918—The Establishment of Kolchak as Supreme Governor at Omsk, November 18, 1918—Refusal of Semenov to Recognize Kolchak's Authority**

File No. 861.77/548

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1918.

2856. I have to-day discussed with the Japanese Ambassador here the four points contained in the following telegram to the American Ambassador at Tokyo. [Here follows telegram of November 16, 1918, noon, to the Ambassador in Japan, *infra*.]

Please take up this matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs orally, leaving with him a copy of the text of the telegram sent to Ambassador Morris [except last paragraph]. Inform him also of substance of [last paragraph] and say to him that the United States desires to keep his Government fully informed of what it does in regard to Russia. I shall be very glad to know how far his Government shares the views of the United States and whether if he sees no objections the diplomatic representative of his Government at Tokyo will be informed accordingly.

Repeat to Archangel for information. Repeat *mutatis mutandis* to Paris, Rome, except last sentence.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.77/548

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1918, noon.

Referring to your November 12, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and previous telegrams regarding Siberian situation, also Department's September 24,

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 283.



8 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> explaining this Government's whole purpose in regard to railways, please take up frankly with the Japanese Government the following points:

1. The United States has viewed with surprise the presence of the very large number of Japanese troops now in north Manchuria and eastern Siberia. Reliable information shows the number of these troops to be so great as to constitute a definite departure from the express understanding for cooperation between Japan and the United States and quite unwarranted by any military necessity.

2. This Government believes that any undertaking in regard to the Siberian situation must be based on a spirit of frank and open cooperation. It is convinced that any monopoly of control such as that now exercised by Japan in north Manchuria and in the eastern part of the Trans-Baikal will arouse suspicion and prove open to the charges of exploitation. Such monopoly is certainly opposed not only to the purpose of this Government to assist Russia but also to its views regarding China.

3. In suggesting that Mr. Stevens assume charge of railway operations, as representing Russia and not the United States or any interest of the United States, this Government had the express intention not to modify any previously existing rights of Russia or China. The memorandum of agreement, approved by all the Allied representatives at Vladivostok and by Russian authorities, expressly provides for supervision by international or Russian control and not by any one power. In other words, every measure advocated by this Government has had the purpose of avoiding a monopoly of control creating conditions such as would arouse alarm or suspicion. Moreover, in the opinion of this Government, the question of railway operation is a practical one which the welfare of the Russian people requires should be met by practical measures. Such practical measures of assistance had already been undertaken by the United States, acting in behalf of Russia, in 1917 when Mr. Stevens was requested by the Russian railway administration to secure the assistance of the Russian Railway Service Corps. Furthermore this Government is convinced that a divided control of the operation of the Siberian railway system is foredoomed to failure.

4. The Government of the United States believes that fundamentally the Government of Japan shares its views and that the United States and Japan have a common purpose in the part each has played in the present war, in full accord with the Governments associated against the military autocracies of the Central powers. Each is mutually concerned that the peoples with whom it comes in contact shall be safeguarded from aggression. It was in this spirit of confidence that the Government of the United States approached the Japanese Government in regard to joint action of assistance in Siberia. This Government therefore deems it only the part of frankness and friendly counsel to point out how far in practice the military undertakings of Japan appear now to have diverged from the previously declared purpose of the two Governments.

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 267.

I am presenting these same points to the Japanese Ambassador here to-day. Please let me know at the earliest opportunity the result of such action as you may be able to take at Tokyo. At the same time, let me have your views (1) as to the advisability of sending along the railway as far as Omsk such American troops as may now be available; (2) in the event Japan declines to alter its present policy, what would be the effect of withdrawing from Siberia all American forces, including Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps, as evidence of our unwillingness to be associated with a policy so contrary to our declared purpose regarding Russia. The possibility of such action was expressly declared in the *aide-mémoire* handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington under date of July 17.

Repeat to Peking for its information.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3242

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 18, 1918.

[Received November 19, 2.30 p. m.]

193. Early this morning three Social Revolutionary members of the all-Russian Directory were arrested by Cossacks supposedly of monarchical tendencies. No bloodshed. Omsk quiet to-day. Siberian soldiers are going front in large numbers.

HARRIS

File No. 861.01/19

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 19, 1918.

[Received November 20, 1.07 p. m.]

194. All-Russian government has made Admiral Kolchak dictator. In an announcement of policy he states that he will avoid party politics and reaction. His principal aim will be to create a strong army to overcome Bolshevism and maintain law and order so that later the people may without hindrance choose their own form of government. Omsk is quiet and attitude of people one of indifference.

HARRIS

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/3252

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, November 20, 1918, midnight.

[Received November 20, 9.55 p. m.]

Your November 16, noon. The Minister of Foreign Affairs could not see me until this afternoon. I took up with him the points stated in your telegram and left with him a summary of them. He did not attempt to justify the action of the previous Ministry in sending additional troops to Manchuria and Siberia. He admitted that the total number sent was 72,400, of whom 44,700 were combatants and 27,000 were noncombatants. He stated that the total number had now been reduced to 58,600 who were protecting 3,400 miles of railway, which he thought was not an excessive guard.

Turning to the question of the railway, he repeated that he had instructed Ishii to submit to you the three alternative suggestions which I have already reported. He apparently conceded the difficulties incident to a diversion of the main line or of the control and confined himself to a discussion of the proposal that Stevens be named as chairman of an Allied advisory committee, which should cooperate with the present Russian management. When I questioned him as to practical details of this plan, he produced an elaborate diagram, and explained that he was unfamiliar with it, but would arrange to have the Japanese railway expert see me to-morrow morning. He concluded by reading me portions of Ishii's report of his interview with you on the 16th, but did not appear in the least disturbed by your suggestion to Ishii that we might withdraw our troops and make public the reasons.

The entire discussion left on me the impression that the Cabinet and diplomatic council, which were in session yesterday, decided not to approve the plan of railway operations as submitted, but to make every effort to reach some compromise which would better preserve the special interest which Japan claims in Manchuria, and particularly in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

I do not favor a rigid adherence to the plan evolved at Vladivostok, but think that we should be prepared to examine carefully and with an open mind any counter proposal offered. I will report to-morrow on the details of the proposal emphasized by Uchida to-day. Should this prove impracticable may I again submit as a possible compromise the solution contained in my October 26, 3 p. m.?<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 280.

Replying to the questions in your November 16, noon:

(1) I do not think it would be advisable now to send any American troops along the railway as far as Omsk, but should cooperation with Japan become impossible then I would favor such a movement unless we withdraw entirely from Siberia.

(2) The withdrawal of our troops from Siberia with the withdrawal of Stevens and his corps from Manchuria would, I fear, be welcomed by the Japanese military authorities and interpreted as an abandonment of our efforts to assist in the reconstruction of Siberia. It would place our representatives who are giving social and economic aid in a most embarrassing position and would bitterly disappoint large numbers of Russian forces who in their helplessness are looking to us.

Stevens returned to Harbin yesterday. He has done all that can be done in presenting his views here and he feels that he should keep in closer touch with Horvat and other representative Russians. He also desires to confer with Emerson and his men who are increasingly restless under their forced inactivity and most anxious to return home. He fears that he will be unable to hold the corps together much longer if they continue unemployed.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3254

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 21, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received November 22, 7.13 a. m.]

282. Directory of five, of Omsk government, has been abolished and replaced by Admiral Kolchak who is appointed "supreme governor" by Cabinet council, several members of which were arrested for objecting. This change is acquiesced in by General Horvat, who arrived here a few days since as "high representative of the provisional government in the Far East," but change will not have approval or support of socialist groups, because it will be considered step toward the restoration of monarchy. I believe change was due to fear of socialist elements controlling directory, and was made possible mainly by presence of foreign troops in Siberia, preventing armed opposition which might still result unfavorably for Kolchak, Horvat, the conservative party, if permitted.

Sukhanov, the last president local Soviet, and companion were shot by Czechs three days ago while attempting to escape.

Kalmykov, the ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks, is killing numbers of people every few days in Khabarovsk without proper trial. Russian authorities refuse to interfere because he has stated to Cossack assembly that Japanese were supporting him. Japanese have so far failed to take the necessary measures to check him. It seems certain that two Swedish Red Cross representatives, one Swede and one Norwegian, who were arrested by Kalmykov, have been killed by his men, although he claims they escaped. Swedish and Norwegian honorary consuls are Russians and fear to go to Khabarovsk to investigate.

It is frequently charged that Japanese are giving both Horvat and Kalmykov financial support in order to prolong disturbed conditions. I mention this, not as my opinion, but for your information, as it is believed by many.

Certain Y.M.C.A. men known to be friendly to the Japanese report that lower Japanese army officers and men in Manchuria have been rude and insolent, and have insisted on inspecting unnecessarily contents of their cars, although there has been recently some improvement in their conduct. At the same time those men find higher Japanese officers willing to assist them, whereas Russian officials of Chinese Eastern Railway are felt to be unfriendly and obstructing for some reason or other not apparent on the surface. Empty railway cars which those men have secured in western Siberia and were bringing with them to Vladivostok for their westbound freight, have been seized in Harbin, in spite of permits from all existing Russian authorities. Red Cross finds the same hostility and every effort will be made hereafter to send goods via Amur Railway. This hostility in Manchuria, coupled with the decreased motive power due to want of repairs and the lack of lubricant oil, makes transportation progressively difficult. Unless an improvement can be effected work of [Red] Cross and Y.M.C.A. must gradually decrease and proposed economic assistance will be impossible on any large scale.

If Chinese Eastern Railway problem is blocking negotiations for working railway agreement, I have to suggest elimination that line and substitution of Amur Railway.

Attitude of Russians toward signature of armistice is distinctly apathetic.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/3259

---

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

PRO MEMORIA

The afternoon papers of November 21 contain an Associated Press report from Vladivostok stating that through a *coup* on the part of the Council of Ministers of the government of Omsk, Admiral Kol-

chak has become virtual dictator and commander of the army. It was further stated that two members of the Directorate, Mr. Avksentiev and Mr. Zenzinov, who opposed Admiral Kolchak's dictatorship, had been arrested. This move was assigned to "extraordinary danger, menacing the state."

While this cable appears to render correctly the facts as they had been interpreted in Vladivostok, direct information received by the Embassy throws a different light on the whole situation. Following is a paraphrase of Mr. Sookine's cable, dated Omsk, November 15 [*sic*]:

During the night of November 18 three military officers, one of whom was Ataman Krasilnikov, illicitly acting on their own behalf, arrested Messrs. Avksentiev, Zenzinov, Argunov, as well as Mr. Rogovski, Assistant Secretary of the Interior. The *coup* was committed with no participation whatever of the government and with its entire disapproval. The cause seems to be certain weakness exhibited on the part of the Ufa Directorate, which did not entirely respond to the aspirations of the country for firm power and which, through lack of energy, rendered possible such independent action by dissatisfied groups. In order to prevent further disorder and to uphold the principle of orderly and firm power, the Council of Ministers were urged to take extreme measures. By their decree, Admiral Kolchak was vested with supreme power. There have been no changes within the Council of Ministers, which fact emphasizes continuity of authority. By order of Admiral Kolchak the offenders have been turned over for trial. Such action by a military organization is most emphatically condemned by the authorities who in no way express tendencies of military-reactionary character. The first aim is to be the eradication of the very possibility of reiteration of such action and the abolishment of politics from the army. Admiral Kolchak appears to exemplify the endeavor to consolidate and strengthen the successes attained up to this day by the national movement, and to put an end to outbursts of illicit action on the part of certain military groups.

It appears that the three officers who undertook the *coup* were the same which exhibited their reactionary tendencies a few days ago at the banquet in honor of the Allied troops. The whole incident is very similar to what happened some time ago in Archangel.

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1918.

File No. 763.72114/4190

---

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1316

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him

that the substance of the memorandum from the State Department of the 4th November<sup>1</sup> respecting the suggestion that the United States should undertake guarding prisoners of war in Manchuria, was telegraphed to His Majesty's Government. A reply has now been received stating that His Majesty's Government do not consider that the scheme mentioned in the memorandum from the State Department is wholly satisfactory since it limits the United States and Japanese control to the prisoners east of Lake Baikal. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the freedom thus allowed to enemy prisoners in western Siberia constitutes a grave danger to the small British force in that region. In pointing this out to the United States Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to urge upon them that the United States and Japan should undertake the duty of guarding *all* enemy prisoners in Siberia. He is at the same time directed to point out the advisability that instructions should be issued that prisoners under the control of the United States should be allowed to work on the lines of communication, should they be required to do so.

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1918.

[Received November 23.]

---

File No. 861.00/3260

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 22, 1918.

[Received November 23, 7.28 a. m.]

198. Avksentiev and other three Social Revolutionary leaders now released from prison and being sent out of Siberia in direction Irkutsk.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3253

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 22, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received midnight.]

5955. Referring to Department telegram to London November 16, 6 p. m., number of which not given in telegram from Mr. Laughlin, I left with Mr. Pichon this afternoon a copy of all that was set forth in the text of that telegram which was sent to Ambassador

---

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 424.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

Morris. During my conversation with the Minister, I also informed him of the substance of the portion in which certain instructions were given to Ambassador Morris. Mr. Pichon declared that he had heard nothing whatever of the matter referred to in Department's telegram. He says that he has on another occasion, however, called the attention of the Japanese Government to the need of a strict compliance with the agreements entered into as they affected the control of the railway operations in Siberia. He promised to communicate at once the substance of the Department's telegram to the representative of the French Government at Tokyo.

While he was somewhat reserved in expressing an opinion as to the attitude of the French Government upon the question raised by the Department, yet he said that naturally the French Government would favor the position taken by the American Government. He thought it would be deplorable for the Americans to withdraw their forces as well as cease their railway operations in the Far East. The Minister said that France would not tolerate any step toward imperialism by Japan in that direction. He promised in conclusion to keep our government informed of whatever steps the French Government would take with reference to the questions raised in Department's telegram.

SHARP

---

File No. 861.00/3258

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, undated.

[Received November 22, 1918, 11.26 a. m.]

197. It is possible that Czech and Siberian troops at Ekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk fronts will refuse to recognize Kolchak as dictator of all-Russian government. Soldiers apparently feel that Kolchak is supported by reactionary elements who wish the restoration of the monarchy. General impression here is that Kolchak's step is premature and that he will not last long.

French Ambassador [Commissioner] Regnault and Japanese Consul G[eneral] Sato of Harbin at present in Omsk.

HARRIS

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.



File No. 861.00/3261

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

291. General Semenov now at Chita refuses to acknowledge Admiral Kolchak's authority as dictator and is reported to have declared himself a dictator. He has cut telegraph so we have now no communication beyond Chita.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/3279

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 24, 1918.

[Received November 26, 1.22 a. m.]

201. Referring to my despatch of 13th.<sup>2</sup> The question American troops for western Siberia development [discussed?] with Kolchak. I informed him that the American Government was of the opinion that the concentrated power of American military force should be used in France to defeat Germany and in accomplishing this result Germany would be compelled to withdraw all troops from Russian territory. No number of American troops could have accomplished as much in western Siberia and the wisdom of this policy was now being demonstrated. This was now self-evident to Kolchak. He believed, however, that a small detachment of American troops at this front, similar to the British, French and Italian, was desirable for the moral effect. I informed him that I was of the opinion that our Government would not send troops west of Baikal.

There is undercurrent of opinion here in western Siberia which would be somewhat adverse to presence of foreign troops. This is noticeable as regards the Czechs and is beginning to be apparent in respect of British. There is a tendency on the part of many to be content with the presence of these foreign troops as long as they remain at the front and bear the brunt of the fighting. If the Czechs show disposition to let Russians take the initiative against the Bolsheviki and accept the full responsibility, the Russians criticize this policy and manifest hostility by making it evident that

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

the Czech troops might well quit the country. This same spirit may be shown towards British unless they are prepared to remain actually at the front and fight rather than do police duty in the rear. The frame of mind the Czechs have [fallen] into is that they are willing to fight for the Russians provided they are disposed to do something for themselves. Unfortunately many of the old Russian and Siberian officers manifest desire to revive old customs and traditions of independence [autocracy] and this enables Bolsheviks to carry on a fairly effective propaganda.

The military authorities are now in favor of making strong offensive on Samara and the Volga River in order to join in forces of General Denikin. If this can be accomplished, it is thought an avenue may be open for receiving supplies to [by] Rostov and the Black Sea.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3343

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 24, 1918.

[Received December 5, 12.22 p. m.]

Consul Thomson, Irkutsk, reports that Volkov and Krasniemkov arrived Irkutsk last Sunday for the purpose of persuading Semenov recognize Kolchak government. Semenov and part of his command expected Irkutsk. According to Vice Consul Palmer, Ekaterinburg, Social Revolutionist committee planning vigorous action against Kolchak government. Certain members of the committee state that they would rather join with the Bolsheviks and fight Kolchak than remain with Kolchak and fight Bolsheviks. Personally I believe if Czechs decide to hold western front the Social Revolutionist element will remain inactive.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3271

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK[?], undated.

[Received November 25, 1918, 11.02 a. m.]

Had long interview with Admiral Kolchak to-day. He is a high-type Russian and personally makes favorable impression.

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

Whether or not his action has been wise the events of the very near future will decide. I regard him as a man in the last [best] class where one would group Milyukov, Alexeev, Guchkov, Lvov, and Rodzyanko, that is, a man who seriously has the best interest of all Russia at heart.

He stated that he represented no upper-house [class] party, was neither Social Revolutionary nor reactionary and his first step would be to attack the Bolsheviks in the direction of Perm and Samara.

Semenov is causing considerable trouble by declaring himself a sort of commissioner for the Trans-Baikal district and threatens to cut telegraphic communication unless Kolchak complies with all his demands. It is likewise believed that Japanese support and encourage Semenov. Opinion is still everywhere considerably divided concerning the wisdom of Kolchak dictatorship. Czech G[eneral] Gaida has declared for him. Chernov, late Social Revolutionary president Constituent Assembly St. Petersburg, was arrested in Ekaterinburg yesterday and conducted to Chelyabinsk. All consular officers in Siberia report everything quiet.

[HARRIS]

---

File No. 861.00/3289

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, November 25, 1918.

[Received November 27, 10.49 a. m.]

204. As nearly as can be ascertained at the present moment the trend of affairs here in Omsk all-Russian government is to free itself as much as possible from the intrigues, German influence of the various groups and Russian politicians in Harbin and Vladivostok. It is felt that every dissatisfied official or politician who has failed in western and central Siberia goes to the Far East and settles down with the idea of creating as much trouble as possible for the government here. There is a marked tendency races [manifest?] to break completely with the contraventions [Constituent?] and, concentrating every effort towards connecting up with European Russia, to accept the Omsk all-Russian government as a nucleus for complete new arrangement which will include all western and central Siberia. This policy same as [seems?] being forced upon the Omsk government by machinations of Semenov and not known [now shown?] by General Ivanov. The open hostility which General Ivanov has shown to-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

wards every effort of the Siberians to form their government and against the Czechs is well known. Very interesting telegrams, which have been intercepted, of Ivanov, who is now in Vladivostok, to Minister for Foreign Affairs shows the extent of the intrigue now going on. One of these telegrams was sent before Kolchak was appointed dictator; contains certain statements as follows:

VLADIVOSTOK, October 21, the 22d hour.

The Czechs are, with all their power, endeavoring to maintain their accidentally acquired world-wide reputation at the expense of Russia, for which reason they are exercising their propaganda expedition [affecting] America and are attempting to show that the Russians are incapable of self-government. The Czechs are supporting socialism and by a direct interference in the internal affairs of Russia are trying to paralyze its regeneration. The Czechs would like to form an all-Slav government including a Russia which they may dominate. Therefore it is not to the Czech interests to let Russia organize an independent government from them. We now plainly see the reason why the Czechs desire to take from us clothing, boots, rifles, cartridges and a great many supplies. Hence, the interference in its internal affairs. Hence the taking over the command of "fighting army." I fully realize the large amount of war material which the Czechs have taken from us and what immense supplies have been accumulated and right at a time when the army is naked, barefooted, and disarmed. The Czechs have hinted that emigrants in America, restricting [especially?] the Jews, [prevent] from recognizing us as a government. Up until now America has helped only the Czechs and has sent write [right] to 120,000 of our rifles and 200,000 boots, and I have managed to change the address of the shipment to our favor. I have also managed to ship to our army 150,000 boots, so the Czechs were not able to get recognized [*sic*]. I have also sized up [Gaida?] and do not believe in him very much, as the order on the 30,000 rifles was given by America to England and Knox were given write [*sic*] to Gaida and the latter by giving weapons to Pepelik will delay [*sic*].

MAJOR GENERAL IVANOV.

As stated, Kolchak and his advisers appear determined to ignore the political groups unreasonably far east and concentrate their efforts to [on] Siberia west of Baikal and seek relief for all Russia by forcing [way] open to Perm, Samara, and Rostov and journeys [junction] with the Allies in western and southern European Russia. Naturally there is the [no?] intention to secede from that part of Siberia east of the Baikal, but the atmosphere in that whole region is so complicated and charged with intrigue and corruption that is now felt that the best solution would be to cut loose entirely from it as far as possible and deal with the whole far eastern situation with a strong hand at some later date after the more important questions involving European Russia have been definitely solved. It is felt that this pose [plan] can be carried out provided the telegraph and railroad communications with Harbin and Vladivostok can be kept open as supplies to any similar connections, at least, beside those with the Allies, in that case west [*sic*].

File No. 861.00/3294

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 26, 1918.

[Received November 29, 2.43 p. m.]

206. Consul Thomson, Irkutsk, reports that telegraphic communication between that city and Vladivostok resumed. Bolshevik insurrections were expected in Irkutsk and other cities, but strict military precautions have been enforced for the past few days and Irkutsk has been always quiet. The intelligent class of Irkutsk regard the outcome of the Kolchak incident here in Omsk as a turn for the better in Russian affairs.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3285

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 26, 1918, 5 p. m. .

[Received November 27, 7.50 a. m.]

296. Local representative Committee Public Information on November 23 received from his Shanghai representative following message which has been published as Committee Public Information telegram:

WASHINGTON, November 21.

News received at the Department of State of Admiral Kolchak's appointment is regarded as another sign of the movement relied upon for regenerating Russia. More optimism felt than for months. Admiral Kolchak is regarded as a man who will not abuse his authority and strong enough not to be swung by popular demonstrations.

While this does not state who so regards Admiral Kolchak's appointment, message is so worded as to give impression that above is attitude of the Department of State and is so considered by both foreigners and Russians and commented on by Russian press as such being considered official owing to distribution through Committee Public Information.

Am not convinced that this is correct. Would greatly appreciate expression from the Department of State relative thereto.

CALDWELL

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/3301

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 27, 1918.

[Received November 29, 4.15 p. m.]

207. All-Russian provincial [provisional] government has issued following statement:

Considering ourselves proper and lawful successors to all lawful Russian governments which existed up to the end of October 1917, the government with Admiral Kolchak at its head takes the stand of absolutely executing, following the reestablishment of united Russia, all financial obligations which the government has taken upon itself, for instance, the payment of interest, the settlement of interior and foreign loans, payments per contracts, the supporting of employees, pensions and all sorts of other payments payable legally from the Treasury. The government has declared that all financial acts which were established by the Soviet government are unlawful and are not to be executed, being acts established by rebels. Admiral Kolchak and the members of the Government.

Minister of Finance Mikhailov confirmed this statement to me yesterday. He further stated that it took 500,000,000 rubles monthly to meet the expenditures of the new government: 350,000,000 were necessary for army, and 100,000,000 for Siberian Railroad, leaving only 50,000,000 for miscellaneous expenses.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3306

*The Consul at Harbin (Moser) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HARBIN, November 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received November 29, 2.25 p. m.]

Avksentiev, Argunov, Rogovski, Zenzinov, the four ministers arrested at Omsk, arrived to-day on a special train under heavy guard with machine guns. Are being deported to China via Changchun state [station]. They were saved from execution after six days in jail by Allied protection. Report conditions in Omsk quiet but foreshadow disaster, owing to extreme measures inaugurated by Kolchak but [which] were tempting [tending] to turn moderates into Bolsheviks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

I know Kolchak well, consider him capable, honest patriot but fear he will be helpless unless America and Allies indicate substantial approval and support. Harbin quiet but sullen under authorized proclamation threatening punishment to Kolchak political opponents. Japanese have completely changed tactics and show great friendliness to all elements of population but are secretly doing everything to undermine Kolchak. Semenov fostered by Japanese who, I believe, are still supplying him with arms and money. Responsible Russians and foreigners see in Kolchak's organization best opportunity to restore order if Semenov will not (?) attempt to overcome. Respectfully suggest desirability of Ambassador's unofficially supporting Kolchak by sending experienced advisers to [Omsk]. Former Japanese consul here also recommends sending Clagett of Major General Graves's force through to Omsk where their presence will greatly encourage and assist better Russian elements in the restoration of order. American operation of railways absolutely imperative to provide against serious economic situation this winter. Price of railway cars now 8,000 rubles per car between Changchun and Harbin; 20,000 rubles from Harbin to Irkutsk.

Harbin Russians and Allies uniting with Americans to celebrate Thanksgiving to-morrow. Russian and Chinese population join in celebration of Allied victory 30th instant. Our publicity here turning hopes all classes toward our allies. Inform Mott Harbin district will give more than 100,000 dollars to united war work. Russian merchants alone will contribute over 100,000 dollars rubles [*sic*].

MOSER

---

File No. 861.00/3303

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 28, 1918.

[Received November 29, 5.40 p. m.]

209. Situation to date. It appears that the Kolchak government is becoming firmer. This also opinion of French Ambassador Regnault here with whom I discussed situation to-day. Understand that post of Minister for Foreign Affairs is being held open for Sazonov. Kolchak expects to work in close harmony with General Denikin now operating on the lower Volga. Yesterday present manager of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Sato, the Japanese diplomatic agent here, to request his Government [to cease]

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

supporting Semenov. Sato replied that his Government might gradually withdraw such support, as the all-Russian provisional government in Omsk grew stronger. This is elegant [eloquent] proof of the active support still being given to Semenov, and at a time when such assistance arouses the suspicions of all Russians. Japanese General now in Omsk stated to Kolchak yesterday that Japan would be glad to send troops to Omsk. Kolchak replied that the presence of Japanese troops in western Siberia would be [resented] by Russians and that he felt compelled to decline the offer. Kolchak making telegraph communications with General Dutov at Orenburg, who has declared has no intention favor. Considerable misunderstanding exists at present between General Gaida and the Czech National Council in Ekaterinburg. Gaida apparently favors Kolchak while many of the soldiers state they will not fight for a dictator and they look to the National Council for their orders, rather than to Gaida. The Czech National Council is mostly Social Revolutionary composition. It is probable that the Czech attitude towards recent events, in connection with the all-Russian provisional government, will be one of neutrality. Sir Charles Eliot is returning Vladivostok to Omsk.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3298

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, November 28, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received November 29, 7.17 a. m.]

2422. Referring to the Department's circular telegram of November 16, 6 p. m., and my telegram 2389.<sup>1</sup> I have received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs a note stating that Italian Government agrees in principle with our point of view and is ready to support [our representations], and has so telegraphed to Italian Ambassador at Tokyo.

Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 861.00/3320

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, November 29, 1918.

[Received December 1, 11.04 a. m.]

213. Vice Consul Thomas now stationed Chita reports as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.



Concerning refusal Semenov to recognize Kolchak. Semenov staff says this applies not to ministry but to Kolchak personally. They expect Kolchak resign but if not they say they are ready to declare autonomy of eastern Siberia as temporary government, that they count on support of entire eastern Siberia and possibly have agreement with Horvat. Representative here of Omsk government confident Horvat will stand [by] Kolchak government and that Semenov will receive no support outside his own small divisions and many people attribute Semenov action to Japanese for two reasons: (1) Kolchak is Anglophile and wishes Japanese troops withdrawn; [2] Semenov will prevent turning over the Siberian Railroad to the United States on the principle that this could not be done if United States will not recognize government here.

Representative people think the disorder is being caused for the benefit of Michael, brother of Tsar, who is rumored to be in Irkutsk. Such a movement would receive wide support.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3332

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis), en route to the United States, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

LONDON, November 30, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received December 3, 5.28 p. m.]

3. Your 352, November 15 [13], 5 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> to American Embassy, Archangel. Am unable to refer to Archangel files which show whatever I sent by courier to American Consulate, Ekaterinburg. This courier was dispatched by Consulate, Ekaterinburg, with instructions to return thereto. I do not recall definitely what communicated, if anything, by courier, but possibly spirit thereof was [in]tended to encourage Poles who were hesitating between supporting Czechs and Bolsheviks allied with German war prisoners.<sup>3</sup> Am certainly confident that sent nothing conflicting with our policy which studied carefully and conscientiously followed; furthermore, it had my thorough personal approval as far as it went. I do not forget that later I recommended that we, in conjunction with Allies, exterminate Bolsheviks in interest of humanity, as their reign of terror was not only injuring Russia irreparably but strengthening Germany with all right-thinking Russians and was a reflection on Allies and professed friends Russia. I do not recall dates except that our Russian-Siberian policy promulgated August 3 did not officially reach me until August 22, when I cabled Department policy seemed admirably adapted to situation. I had previously cabled Department request-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in Great Britain (No. 4247).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 432.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, *ante*, p. 419.

ing commander American troops be instructed to keep in close touch with me lest British commander would order movements contrary to our policy. That policy was to effect that American and Allied troops should protect rear of Czechs and that American troops in northern Russia were sent under British command to protect supplies from Germans and their Bolshevik allies while abstaining from interference in internal affairs. I did not put narrow construction on such policy especially as large stocks of supplies were assembled at Kotlas and Sukhona, consequently I did not interfere with orders issued by British commander to American troops to proceed down railroad and up Dvina. Such interference would not only have produced friction with British and French but would have encouraged Bolsheviks advance on Archangel under German officers. Department was kept advised concerning movement American troops and policy pursued by me.

Why is this question asked now?

Gaining strength continuously.

[FRANCIS]

---

File No. 861.00/3347

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, December 1, 1918.

[Received December 5, 11.31 a. m.]

216. Situation to-day. Everything quiet throughout Siberia on the surface at least. Certain amount of tension however in anticipation of what may happen next. Czech Minister of War Stefanik and Pavlu, the president of Czech National Council, expected arrive Omsk to-day. There is no denying the fact that the Czech troops at the [front] are getting very restless and desire to leave Russia for Omsk [France?] and many are becoming persistent on going to Vladivostok in order to be transported by sea. It appears on good authority that the Czech fighting forces have been reduced from 49,000 to 25,000. It is expected that the presence of Stefanik will have a salutary effect upon the Czechs. It is possible also that Czechs may decide to take no further active part in warfare against Bolsheviks. The Russians are nervous on account of Czech attitude as they not only wish of [Czechs] to fight, but they wish the Allies to send troops to Russia in large numbers for same purpose. The Russian troops are very poorly equipped with clothing and ammunition. This one cause of friction between Russians and Czechs as Czechs

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

apparently are better clothed. Unfortunately I have also found an undercurrent of opinion which is somewhat adverse to opinion [expediting?] of Red Cross and [relief trains?]. Many of the Russian officers seem to think that those trains tend to hinder movement their troops. Naturally this opinion not shared by the best government officials who mean well but are often powerless to enforce their orders. I have heard that most Russian army officers are indifferent to relief afforded to civil population and would be willing to let them starve if supplies intended for civilians could be requisitioned for benefit of army. In this respect our efforts to afford economic relief not fully appreciated as it is felt everything should go to the military organization.

I have been investigating lately the strength of Bolshevism in Siberia. In Omsk, with the present population approximately 300,000, there are probably 5 per cent Bolsheviks and extreme Social Revolutionists. In Chelyabinsk, a city now comprising 7,000 inhabitants, 10 per cent are Bolsheviks, as nearly as can be ascertained, although city only will contribute 2,000 soldiers to Red Army. The country districts about Chelyabinsk are without doubt Bolshevik. When the Czechs came to Chelyabinsk they dispersed an active organization of workmen which had a million [rubles] for propaganda. There is still a small organization there consisting of 50 mechanics but it is closely watched by Czechs. Some Bolshevism still exists in Novo Nikolaevsk. If Czech and Polish legions were removed it is generally believed Bolshevism would soon dominate district. If Russian army is left to itself it is thought there are enough Bolsheviks and near Bolsheviks in army to make it worthless as an instrumentality to crush out Bolshevism.

In Tomsk the situation has been uncertain. Before Vice Consul Hansen [arrived], whom I sent there recently to investigate, the Bolshevik insurgents lost 438 men in the uprising of November 2. The loss of the government troops amounted to 48 killed and twice that number wounded. There were two companies of the Siberian army implicated in the affair. At present the military appear to have situation well in hand, although Bolshevik element is far from being stamped out. In Ekaterinburg, out of population of 75,000, there are 5,000 real Bolsheviks and same number [Social Revolutionists?]. In case town should be taken by Red Army 50 per cent of population would pretend to be Bolsheviks and would actively support them. In Irkutsk has been less demonstration. Their active club harbors 200 members. In Krasnoyarsk Bolsheviks have been acted upon by strong measures, most of the leaders have been executed. I have no data on Bolsheviks east of Baikal for this report. Received conservative estimates of all consular officers in the

field. From this it will be seen that the Bolsheviks even in Siberia are still a potent force, not so much by strength of numbers, than [as] by the potency of the weakness [*sic*] of the Russians who really seem to be powerless to oppose them.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3285

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok  
(Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your 296, November 26, 5 p. m. Please inform Committee on Public Information that this Government has expressed no views whatever regarding the appointment of Admiral Kolchak and is not prepared at this time to recognize any new government in Siberia. The Department will take this matter up directly with the chairman of the Committee on Public Information at Washington but, in the meanwhile, desires that no further misconstruction of the Government's attitude be allowed to appear. In this same connection Department is informed that an article was published as emanating from the Committee on Public Information at Harbin or Vladivostok containing a statement that the United States had made a loan of \$5,000,000 to the Omsk government. Please investigate and have statement corrected if you think advisable. No such loan has been made or has been contemplated.

POLK

---

File No. 861.00/3355

*The Russian Embassy to the Department of State*

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was sent by Mr. Ughet, Chargé d'Affaires of the Russian Embassy, to the Department of State on December 5, 1918:]

*Mr. Sookine to the Russian Embassy at Washington*

OMSK, November 30, 1918.

Admiral Kolchak considers that the military character of his power at the present moment is indispensable only for the possibility of concentrating every effort for achieving military success and for the achievement of the greatest efficiency in the process of national reconstruction.

The military character of his power does not affect the administrative bodies of the country, which have remained unchanged. More so, owing to the fact

that political strife which impeded the work of the administrative bodies during the last two months is being eliminated, these institutions will be able to fulfil their tasks more efficiently. It is emphasized that the military régime will not, in any way, interfere with the economic constructive developments of the country.

Admiral Kolchak has manifested his firm intention in this direction by the following act:

He has convoked an extraordinary economic conference, at which he presides, for the purpose of uniting all the popular economic, industrial and other forces of the country, so as to organize the best possible supplying of the front with all necessities, as well as to elaborate measures which would secure the improvement of economic conditions.

---

File No. 861.00/3360

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, December 5, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received December 6, 12.10 p. m.]

Czech staff has just informed me that telegraphic communication with Chita, which was interrupted during the day, was resumed at 5 o'clock p. m. uninterruptedly, and that Semenov has agreed to submit to Kolchak provided Semenov may retain his command. It is believed that Semenov will not be retained.

THOMSON

---

File No. 861.00/3368

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, December 6, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received December 9, 9.35 a. m.]

Controversy between Semenov and Kolchak government not yet ended, and feeling of all classes Russians this district very bitter against Semenov and his mercenary troops, who are regarded as hirelings of Japan. Semenov desires supreme authority over eastern Siberia, which territory is coveted by Japan as sphere of influence. General feeling is that Semenov's [policies?] are dictated by Japanese military officers.

THOMSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/3369

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

EKATERINBURG, undated.

[Received December 7, 1918, 11.45 p. m.]

221. Am inclined to believe that situation in Siberia is very slowly improving. Although Czechs are retiring from Ufa leaving that front in the hands of the Russians, yet I am of opinion that arrival of Stefanik will have salutary effect on relations between the Czechs and Russians. It would appear also that Semenov is gradually is [being] eliminated as creditable factor. From fairly good source, am informed that Japanese are withdrawing their support from Semenov. This will probably force him to retire from the railway line at least and it is thought that he, together with a part of his followers, will go to Mongolia. Unless some of the hot-headed reactionary officers attempt to proclaim a monarchy, and thus spoil everything, the developments of the past week are in favor of Kolchak. I feel that even the rank and file of the Social Revolutionists are not disinclined to see him succeed, for the reason that they feel at least that he is not for a monarchy. This belief is now being shared by the Czechs to a great extent.

I have gained the impression that a spirit is now being engendered through which will be expressed a sincere desire to do something in the right direction. Extreme partisan feeling is less marked than a fortnight back, and unfriendly races here [one now hears?] more about what might be best for all Russia and less about the local interests of Siberia. I feel confident that such men as Kolchak, Ustrugov, and Vologodski certainly do not stand for reaction but are imbued with the patriotic desire to bring about the regeneration of Russia along democratic [lines]. [Omission] their respective governments. In this respect, I have not [omission]. As I have pointed out before, the Russian Government which the Government of the United States should finally recognize is the one which gradually rises up out of all these internal convulsions and provided that it has strength enough to survive. Such a government cannot be created until all Russia is definitely cleared of Bolsheviks. In which case, meantime it would be wise policy to encourage such efforts as are now being made in Omsk; naturally the position of the Omsk government, however, is very dangerous. It is without money. The soldiers are without sufficient clothes and are badly and irregularly paid, and what is worse, the government has not

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

been able to combat Social Revolutionists and Bolshevik propaganda which is undermining the discipline of the soldiers on this front. It would appear that the English and French representatives are inclined to favor Kolchak. It is possible [I] may eventually recommend recognition too, without committing ourselves, for the reason that an effort is actually being made to do best possible under most trying and adverse circumstances.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3389

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

EKATERINBURG, December 9, 1918.

[Received December 10, 10.33 p. m.]

226. Klyuchnikov, manager of Foreign Office, Omsk provisional government, has brought the following to my attention.

On the morning 7th instant Admiral Kolchak had conversation by direct wire with General Janin at Chita, who informed him that the Japanese are supporting Semenov with both money and munitions and that General Oba has told Semenov not to withdraw from Chita. General Oba has told Volkov they will not permit him to operate against Semenov. Volkov has been instructed by Kolchak not to precipitate a conflict and to await the result of Omsk government's [effort] to enlist aid of Allies in eliminating Japanese from Siberian politics. Klyuchnikov appeared greatly concerned over the turn of affairs and begged that the American Government be fully informed of the part Japan is playing in preventing the union of Siberia. The Japanese refer to their position by stating that they are the guardians of the peace of the Far East and that they cannot permit civil war in districts where they are established for the protection of the persecuted people.

HARRIS

File No. 861.00/3385

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

LONDON, December 9, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 9.27 p. m.]

4436. I took up with Mr. Balfour contents of your 2856, November 16, 6 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> who has submitted the following observations on the

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was repeated on Dec. 12 to the Ambassador in Japan, with instruction to repeat to Peking. The Chargé in Great Britain was instructed in telegram No. 3377 of Dec. 11 to repeat to Paris and Rome and to Colonel House.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 433.

four specific points put to the Japanese Government by United States Government:

1. In regard to paragraph 1. His Majesty's Government have always been anxious for the active participation of American and Japanese troops in Siberia and they see no reason therefore for criticizing from their own point of view the mere presence of considerable bodies of Japanese troops in Russian territory. . . .

2. As regards paragraph 2, His Majesty's Government entirely share the view of the United States of America that the Siberian situation can only be properly dealt with in a spirit of frank and open cooperation. They are entirely opposed to any monopoly of control either in Russia or in China.

3. With the general principles enunciated in paragraph 3, His Majesty's Government are also in full agreement and, as they have already informed the United States Government, they are prepared to accept any arrangement which the United States Government may come to with the Japanese about railway control. They view with much misgiving the rapid deterioration of all railway communication in Siberia. They believe that this is partly responsible for the extravagant prices which now rule in the western part of that region and are of opinion that the suffering thus occasioned is a potent cause of disaster.

4. With the fourth paragraph also His Majesty's Government believe themselves to be in full accord. Now that Russia is relieved of the danger of German military aggression, His Majesty's Government are retaining their forces in that country for no other objects but the relief of the Czechs and the safeguard of the populations who have loyally thrown in their lot with the Associated powers. They are now in imminent peril for [from] militant Bolshevism which Germany treats as an enemy at home and as an ally abroad. His Majesty's Government desire so far as it can to support them but is not disposed to use its troops for any ulterior purpose. In this task it earnestly desires the cooperation of the United States of America.

LAUGHLIN

---

File No. 861.00/3394

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, December 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received December 10, 5.22 p. m.]

Situation Semenov affair without change to date. Semenov has under his command about 15,000 troops, but only 3,000 loyal troops. General Volkov informed me confidentially to-day that he is still try-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.



ing to dispose of Semenov diplomatically but, if necessary to fight, Volkov can dispose of Semenov in three or four days if no Japanese influence is brought to bear to help Semenov. Japanese say they cannot permit any troubles on railway. To illustrate Japanese action, Volkov read two telegrams which he intercepted by wireless to-day, first telegram from Blagoveshchensk to Chita to Semenov from Tfmel in regular command of the Amur detachment reading as follows: "In accordance with the Japanese demand I am obliged to give over the Amur detachment of [to] Gamov." (Gamov is an Amur Cossack who is on good terms with Semenov.) The second telegram was a cipher to Kuroki on Semenov train. Kuroki is a nephew of Japanese Field Marshal Kuroki. Yesterday two Semenov scouts were arrested here by staff, but the Japanese mission in Irkutsk demanded their release.

THOMSON

---

File No. 861.00/3437

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

EKATERINBURG, December 10, 1918.

[Received December 14, 8.15 p. m.]

229. Situation as regarding discontent of Czech soldiers is improving. The impression is gaining ground with them that they should do the sensible thing just at this time and remain where they are, thus giving backbone to the Russian offensive on the Perm front. The report which got abroad that the Czechs would arrange with the Bolsheviks for a passage through Russia to Bohemia is nonsense. No Czech leaders think such a thing. The offensive against Perm is a Russian one and Russian troops are now within 100 miles of that city. With the Allies approaching, entire aspect of situation in western Siberia is changing for better. Russian troops are still 65 miles west of Ufa and when Perm is captured the situation on Ufa front will materially improve and it is probable that an offensive on Samara may be expected in a few weeks.

Reception of Stefanik in Ekaterinburg while not specially enthusiastic, yet his presence will have wholesome effect on Czech troops.

With all due regards for what Czechs have accomplished in Russia, yet they are just at this moment behaving somewhat like pet and pampered child. As the Russians grow stronger they naturally assert themselves more than any other time and this tends to create

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

friction between Czechs and Russians although not dangerously so. The moving spirit among Czechs at present is to get back to Bohemia but have no clear conception how this may be accomplished. Stefanik and Pavlu, however, wish to act in close harmony with the wishes of Allies and this phase of situation gives us no concern as I believe soldiers are responsible. Unfortunately Social Revolutionary ideas have entered Czech ranks and recently regiments (refused?) to obey orders. Such behavior naturally undermines all discipline. It must also be said that Czech National Council, Ekaterinburg, is saturated with the Social Revolutionary ideas.

In my judgment, position of Czechs was never better. With what they have accomplished, their losses have been very small. From June 1 to November 15, the total number of Czech troops engaged in campaign amount to 49,709 soldiers and 1,600 officers. The actual battling forces have been 23,499. The actual losses amount to killed only 1,139; died of wounds 220; wounded 3,888; missing 362; [seriously] ill 3,161. In addition 64 officers were killed. Total losses only 8,787. These statistics have been prepared by Czech General Staff and are reliable. They definitely explode the idea of abnormal losses. Reports of there being fifteen and twenty thousand killed have been spread broadcast in order to obtain sympathy and Allied help. It has not been done exactly intentionally in order deceive but nothing on the other hand has been done to contradict such exaggerated reports. Czech troops everywhere in [Russia] to-day better fed and clothed than Russian troops. [In whatever] there is best to be obtained in [Siberia], Czechs come first [unintelligible groups]. I am not criticizing this state of affairs but simply mention it as a fact. From the viewpoint of what they have accomplished against Bolshevism they certainly deserve every consideration but I also think the time has definitely come but [when] substantial assistance and moral support should be given to the Russian in the same spirit, sympathy and admiration as has been manifested towards the Czech. Being in very close touch with the situation I am now more hopeful than at any time past.

The better elements in Russia are very slowly [omission] to the monarchist and are reaching out for control. Our Government can assist by the application of cautious diplomacy in slowly eliminating baneful Japanese influence, [in] which every Russian believes United States secretly connives, [tending] to keep the [different] parties in [Siberia] from uniting. Department's splendid assistance can be given by Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. to Russian soldiers. Every effort must be made to stamp out Bolshevik and Social Revolutionary [elements]. There is no difference between radical Social Revolutionary and Bolshevik in principle. There is no difference

between Chernov and Lenin and Trotsky. They are both destructive, inverted autocracies, incomparably worse than what the blackest forces of reaction might inaugurate were they to seize this power. The world has just freed itself from the aspirations of Hohenzollern tyranny but an [absence] of law and order still [prevails] in Russia which may become dangerous to other countries unless summarily dealt with now.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3414

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 12, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 5.30 p. m.]

337. Department's December 3, 6 p. m. Several months ago a wireless telegram reported American loan of \$5,000,000 to Siberia, which newspapers reaching here a few days later showed was to Liberia instead of Siberia. I believe this telegram was sent from here to Harbin and published there by Committee Public Information, local representative of which is now investigating. I have no doubt this is statement referred to, but consider further correction unnecessary.

CALDWELL

---

File No. 861.00/3430

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, December 13, 1918.

[Received December 14, 1.22 p. m.]

Volkov staff received a letter dated December 10 from Japanese General [?] stating that the troops of the Kolchak government may not come eastward any farther than station Slavyanka on Lake Baikal to fight against Semenov. To-day Semenov proclaimed himself commander of the Far Eastern Army. Staff of Volkov claims that telegram from Kato, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Semenov intercepted two weeks ago states Japanese disapproved Volkov appointment and Semenov must oppose Volkov nomination.

THOMSON

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

File No. 861.00/3462

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1918.

[Received December 16.]

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith paraphrase of two cables received by the Russian Embassy from Omsk, dated respectively December 8 and 10, the importance of which you will appreciate by their contents.

Believe me [etc.]

S. UGHET

[Enclosure 1—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*Admiral Kolchak to the Russian Embassy at Washington*

December 8, 1918.

Since becoming supreme chief I have been shown disobedience by former Ataman Semenov, who continues his independent activities in the Trans-Baikal region. Semenov has destroyed railway transportation and interrupted telegraphic messages. Communications between the front and the eastern regions are threatened by his irresponsible activities, owing to which the population is terrorized and the railway workmen flee. By reason of such activities of Semenov, I have dismissed him from his offices and have ordered that he be brought to subordination by force so as to check his arbitrary actions and the ensuing anarchy. I have, however, met opposition in this matter on behalf of Japan, which is openly sympathizing with Semenov and am prevented from rendering the necessary aid to the population. The Japanese General declared that no troops could be dispatched for the suppressing of the bands of Semenov.

Kindly bring to the knowledge of the United States Government that such acts represent a direct interference into interior affairs of Russia instead of assistance in establishing necessary order.

[Enclosure 2—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Omsk to the Russian Embassy at Washington*

OMSK, December 10, 1918.

The Ataman Semenov has refused to submit to the authority of Admiral Kolchak, supreme chief, and relinquish the command of the Fifth Army corps. At the same time Japanese representatives have categorically declared that they would not permit any military action in the region where Japanese troops are stationed and that they will, therefore, take over protection and management of the telegraph and railway lines of this region. General Janin communicated with Admiral Kolchak by direct wire and transmitted that the Japanese General had informed him that he would not allow the troops of General Volkov, who was ordered to replace Semenov, to penetrate into the Trans-Baikal region. General Janin pointed out to the Japanese General that such orders could be interpreted as a support of Semenov by Japan, but was told that there was no other way of protecting the rear of the Czech troops. General Janin transmitted his impression that such measures had been premeditated by the Japanese Government. Such interference by Japan into the

Russian interior affairs is in contradiction with her numerous official statements. Fear is being entertained that Japan intends to take advantage of the present situation and of the fact that the Allies are concentrating all their forces in connection with the solutions of European questions so as to pursue her personal aims in Russia. Public opinion in Russia is very much disturbed by these aggressive acts of Japan which are made to appear as if approved by the Allies.

The Russian Government is anxiously awaiting the attitude of the United States in this matter, on which it places the greatest hope.

---

**Representations of the American Government against Japanese Support of Semenov, December 16, 1918—Continuance of the Conflict—Reduction of the Japanese Forces**

File No. 861.00/3430

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Referring to Department's telegram December 11,<sup>1</sup> regarding suspicion towards the United States, and to Department's November 15 [16], 1918,<sup>2</sup> regarding railway situation and excessive Japanese forces in Siberia, please confer frankly with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding Japanese political policy in eastern Siberia. Reports from many different sources in Siberia show that Japan has not only supported General Semenov in the past, but is now backing him against Admiral Kolchak; has also encouraged General Kalmykov near Khabarovsk and seems generally to be pursuing a policy to prevent the establishment of a united orderly government in Siberia.

Department has evidence that command of Amur detachment was transferred from adherent of Kolchak to the followers of Semenov upon demand of the Japanese; also that General Kuroki has advised Semenov not to cooperate with Kolchak because Kolchak is not regarded favorably by Japan.

You are already aware that General Graves reports all barracks and troop accommodations east of Irkutsk occupied by Japanese, rendering it impossible for him to winter at Harbin or anywhere in eastern Siberia save on the line between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Further reports not quite so circumstantial indicate that the Japanese are using monopoly of Chinese Eastern not only for troop movements, but for transporting merchandise for Japanese merchants to the exclusion of others. Also that exclusive military control is being taken advantage of to enable Japanese merchants and Japanese capital to be established to the exclusion of other

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 433.

foreign merchants and capital. The evidence regarding the support of Semenov appears conclusive and you may say that this Government is surprised that Japan should support any one group of loyal Russians against another. The Government of the United States believes that the present policy of Japan is fraught with possibility of dangerous consequences for Russia and desires you to discuss the question in the most free and frank manner pointing to our mutual understanding to join in rendering assistance to Russia and our desire that all of the Associated Governments should take part wherever it proves necessary or practical.

This Government expects that the Government of Japan is prepared to discuss this matter with you frankly and in that spirit of friendship which is the basis of our present cordial relations.

It is not to be understood that this Government desires to support Admiral Kolchak as against General Semenov, but merely its purpose to see that loyal Russians be allowed to manage their own affairs.

Is there any foundation for report that Japan contemplated withdrawing all its forces from Siberia relinquishing further support of Semenov?

POLK

File No. 861.00/3430

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain  
(Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1918, 7 p. m.

3471. As this Government desires to keep the Government to which you are accredited fully and frankly informed of all its actions in regard to Russia, please read, without leaving copy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs the following instruction sent December 16 to the American Ambassador at Tokyo. Repeat to Paris and Rome for similar action and to Archangel for confidential information and no action. Paris to inform American mission. [Here follows the instruction, *ante*, p. 462.]

POLK

File No. 861.00/3529

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, December 24, 1918.

[Received December 26, 12.22 p. m.]

253. Situation Omsk to-day's date. Small Bolshevik uprising in village near Omsk (?) was supported [*sic*] by Czech and Cossack troops. Attempt on Semenov's life in Chita with hand grenade.

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

Semenov not seriously wounded. Czech National Council in Ekaterinburg has been disarmed [dissolved?]. Situation Ufa front somewhat improved. Slight Bolshevik unrest reported in Krasnoyarsk, otherwise quiet Siberia.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3538

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, December 26, 1918.

[Received December 27, 7 p. m.]

259. It is officially announced that Perm has been captured by Siberian troops.

HARRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3552

*The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, December 28, 1918.

[Received December 30, 12.43 p. m.]

Referring to my 27th.<sup>2</sup> Semenov's General Skipetrov arrived Verkhneudinsk with armored train and arrested the garrison commander there and all officials loyal to Kolchak government. Due to a Bolshevik uprising near Kansk, which is 500 miles west of Irkutsk, the Kolchak troops [at] Irkutsk are being sent westward and will not be able to oppose Semenov at Verkhneudinsk. The Bolshevik uprising will probably be liquidated in a few days but in meantime all communication is interrupted between Irkutsk and Omsk and Consul General Harris will not be able to telegraph Washington until insurrection is put down.

THOMSON

---

File No. 861.00/3539

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, December 28, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 9.26 a. m.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day handed to me the following confidential memorandum which he advised me is being telegraphed to Viscount Ishii for formal communication to you:

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

The Japanese Government in their declaration of August 2, 1918, made it clear that the primary object which they had in view in undertaking a military expedition to Siberia was to relieve the critical situation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in that region due to the pressure of German and Austro-Hungarian armed prisoners, and of certain Bolshevik forces under Teutonic influence and command. Soon after the advance of a Japanese detachment to Trans-Baikalia occupied with the operations conducted by the Allied forces in the Ussuri and Amur districts, the Czecho-Slovaks who had been isolated in the interior of Siberia succeeded in reestablishing communication with their comrades and Allies at Vladivostok and elsewhere. The grave danger that had once threatened their existence has thus been averted and the primary object of the military activities undertaken by Japan in Siberia in cooperation with the powers associated against Germany has now been successfully achieved.

At the same time the Japanese Government fully realize that the immediate and complete withdrawal from Siberia of Japanese or Allied troops at the present moment would be calculated to produce serious consequences, more especially as regards the maintenance of order and security in the localities in which those troops are now operating. Nor do they feel that the number of Japanese troops so far maintained in north Manchuria and eastern Siberia is wholly unwarranted by any necessity as was remarked by Mr. Lansing in his conversation with Viscount Ishii on November 16.

They are, however, quite ready to reexamine the Siberian situation in the light of changed circumstances, and, having regard to the expressed views of the American Government, they have decided to effect as much reduction in the number of Japanese troops in Siberia as the absolute requirement for the preservation of public order in the localities will permit. Already 13,800 men of those troops had been withdrawn up to end of November, and it is now intended to proceed to a further withdrawal of 34,000 men in due course.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3545

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, December 29, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 5.56 p. m.]

The formal announcement of the intended withdrawal of 34,000 troops from Siberia and Manchuria as reported in my December 28, 1 a. m., and the concessions made by the Japanese Government in regard to the proposed operation of the Siberian railways as reported in my December 27, 10 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> mark the conclusion of a month's period of discussing and controversy in Government circles here. As I view it, the results are far more satisfactory than I had

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 301.



dared to hope and indicate that Hara has not only succeeded in modifying Japan's Siberian policy so that it seems to more nearly accord with the expressed views of our Government but has also won an initial victory over the reactionary forces of the General Staff. . . .

The consolidation of military authority has already been completed. The Ministry still having trouble with the General Staff on the question of Semenov. Your December 11, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and December 16, 6 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> have been of the greatest value. Opportunities, largely unsought, have been offered and during the past two weeks I have frankly and informally discussed the entire situation with Hara, Goto, Uchida and Shidehara and also with several men not in office but who are influential in Government circles. I will summarize the impressions gathered from these discussions in a subsequent telegram. Makino might speak unreservedly if given an opportunity during his stay in Washington. Recent advices from Harbin indicate that Stevens is not well and very impatient at the slow progress of the negotiations. The following telegram to me exhibits his state of mind which is not surprising when one considers his experiences during the past year.

I have returned to Harbin much disappointed in not meeting you. My position personally unchanged as to conditions; in no way could I submit even to semblance of Japanese control. Japanese newspaper Harbin publishing most bitter attacks upon American motives in general.

Trust he will not permit his quite justifiable irritation to influence his judgment on the new proposals of Japanese Government.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3560

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*<sup>3</sup>

[Telegram]

OMSK, December 30, 1918.

[Received January 2, 1919, 12.40 a. m.]

268. Current report to date. It is reported that Semenov has declared mobilization of Buriats and peaceful natives in Trans-Baikal.

Vice Consul Williams at Chelyabinsk under date 26th reports in substance that situation on Ufa front remains serious. During past

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 462.

<sup>3</sup> Sent via the Legation in China,

ten days Ufa has been very generally evacuated, but troops still hold all fronts. English armored trains and French troops have just gone from Ufa to extreme fronts, neither being willing to go without the other. Bolsheviks' Red Army broke through the line at Birsik, where they are most dangerous, but still 25 miles away from Ufa. No Red Guards are yet in Ufa. The sentiment among laborers in that section is strongly pro-Bolshevik. The soldiers on the fronts are continually slipping, perhaps to the enemy, in small groups including a few of the Siberian troops' new reinforcements. This constitutes most serious danger.

The victory of the Siberian army at Perm has been complete. From 25th to 28th December, 31,000 prisoners, 120 guns, several thousand machine guns, 30 automobiles, nine armored trains, and the entire Bolshevik supply trains. The entire loss of Red Army is estimated at 60,000. The Russian commander was Lieutenant General Pepelyaev, 28 years old, and an ordinary soldier at beginning of the war in 1914.

[HARRIS]

File No. 861.00/3563

*The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, January 1, 1919, 1 p. m.

[Received January 2, 1.04 a m.]

387. Municipal elections were held here, 29th, previous elections having been nullified by court under Horvat influence, owing to alleged irregularities. Final count: of 37,400 qualified electors, 4,217 valid ballots cast. Non-socialist bloc returned 55 of 101 municipal councilmen; socialist bloc 31, remainder scattering. These results were due to restriction of franchise since last election and as most [boycott] of elections by a majority workmen. Department is referred for instructive comparison with former elections to my July 31, 2 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and August 3, 11 a. m.<sup>2</sup>

CALDWELL

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 320.

<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 327.

## CHAPTER II

### THE NORTHERN REGION

Opposition in Archangel to the Soviet Régime—German Threat through Finland to the Murman Railway—Shipment of Arms and Stores to the Interior of Russia—British Requests for the Dispatch of American Forces to Murmansk—Arrival of a French Warship—Landing of Armed Forces—Allied Cooperation with the Murmansk Soviet—Arrival of an American Cruiser—German and Soviet Demands for Withdrawal of Allied and American Forces—Agreement of July 6, 1918, with the Murmansk Soviet—Argument of the Consul at Archangel against Intervention

File No. 861.00/953

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, January 13, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received January 15, 10.20 a. m.]

2228. Cole, Consul at Archangel, in reports dated January 2, 9th, latter being reply to your 1931, December 24,<sup>1</sup> states that commander in chief of Archangel and White Sea region same person appointed by Kerensky, and still directs all military, naval, and civilian affairs. When Bolshevik revolution occurred, socialist anti-Bolshevik leaders, with consent and cooperation of commander in chief, formed revolutionary committee in anticipation of possibility local Bolsheviks' assuming authority. This committee proclaimed itself the supreme power in the province and has been continuously sustained by commander in chief and civil authorities; no independence proclaimed, but committee function [proclamation?] announced orders of People's Commissaries obeyed. Munition shipments practically ceased.

Cole report January 4 stated movement started for federation of eight northeastern provinces by representatives of Zemstvos, Councils of Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Deputies, professional unions, City Dumas of Archangel, Vologda, Olonets, Novgorod, Yaroslav, Vyatka, and Perm Provinces, but his report of 9th states separation movement less strong and sentiment favoring semi-autonomous policy, as fear was growing that starvation would ensue if declared complete independence, starvation being only influence checking anti-Bolshevik sentiment.

Cole reports Constituent Assembly elections show following percentages for Archangel Province: Social Revolutionists 62, Cadets 10,

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 324.

Mensheviks 6, Bolsheviks 21, and that Bolshevik vote in Archangel city confined to soldiers, sailors, and naval shop workmen, that anti-Bolshevik sentiment attributable to money scarcity, interference with Constituent Assembly, and seizure of banks.

Reports railroad transportation steadily declining because of lack of locomotives, that food committee declares breadstuff supply will last until middle of February and that local supply meat and fish, small but steady. Postscript says "both" Constituent Assembly delegates are conservative Social Revolutionists.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1233

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 232

MEMORANDUM

The British Rear Admiral at Murmansk has reported to His Majesty's Government that a serious situation exists there owing to the anti-Ally attitude adopted by the Bolshevik garrison, and to the reported intention of the Finns who, acting at the instigation of the Germans, propose to advance on the Petrograd-Murmansk Railway. The arrival at Murmansk from Petrograd of refugees who are seeking passages for England and of repatriated Russian sailors and soldiers, the attitude of whom will probably be hostile, is complicating the situation.

In the opinion of the British Rear Admiral, the occupation of Murmansk will probably be necessary and he has made an urgent appeal for reinforcements. A British cruiser has been sent and the British Embassy are instructed to ask the United States Government to dispatch a man-of-war to join the squadron now on the spot as soon as possible, as the situation may develop rapidly and the matter is therefore extremely urgent.

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1918.

[Received March 5.]

File No. 861.00/1401a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1918, 3 p. m.

2107. Request Norwegian Consul, Petrograd, deliver following message for Robins, head of American Red Cross Commission:

Please telegraph full statement of conditions at Murmansk as reported by Wardwell when he arrives, covering political situation, accumulation of supplies if any and condition of railroad transportation.

POLK

File No. 861.00/1268

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 11, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received March 12, 11:37 a. m.]

5. Martin<sup>1</sup> wires several hundred marines landed at Murman, more troops expected and that he participated by invitation in meeting with Russian, British, French officers who are organizing to defend Murman Railway from threatened or probable attack by Germans. He says that he saw a telegram from Trotsky approving of concerted action, and all regretted that no American officers on the ground to participate.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1293

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 12, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received March 14, 12 p. m.]

Cole wires answering inquiry concerning rifles *en route* Petrograd from Archangel that 50,000 ordered by Red Guard but that local committee sailors shipped 210,000 [rifles?] and 16,000,000 cartridges: still 110,000 rifles at Archangel.

Haynes<sup>2</sup> reports all attempts to pass Americans through Red and White Guard lines unsuccessful, that impossible to dispatch vessel from Stockholm, account mines, and that Germans have landed in Hangö and their aeroplanes been over Helsingfors for several days; that peace will be signed and Germans will take Petrograd.

Summers<sup>3</sup> thinks peace will be ratified as no army in opposition in any way; says greatest danger now is drifting of sentiment of educated classes to Germany on account of the continued persecution by Bolsheviks.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1461

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Robertson) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)*

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1918.

DEAR MR. POLK: The Ambassador has asked me to send to you the enclosed paraphrase of the telegram which he read to you this afternoon.

Yours [etc.]

ARNOLD ROBERTSON

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. (later Capt.) Hugh S. Martin, assistant military attaché.

<sup>2</sup> Thornwell Haynes, Consul at Helsingfors.

<sup>3</sup> Maddin Summers, Consul General at Moscow.

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading)*

March 12, 1918.

It appears most probable that the Germans will, as a result of the peace concluded with Russia, demand the evacuation of Murmansk by the Allies and that they may make an attempt themselves to occupy the port (1) as a submarine base; (2) with a view to furthering their designs on Spitzbergen; (3) for the purpose of cutting off Allied trade with Russia after the war. They will probably also be anxious to seize or destroy the large number of Russian vessels now at Archangel and Murmansk.

It appears essential for the above reasons that the position of the Allies at Murmansk should be a strong one, and it is considered desirable that their fleet there should be as representative as possible. Arrangements have been made by the French Government to send a man-of-war immediately and you should again urge upon the United States Government that it is desirable that they should follow the French example.

---

File No. 861.00/1388

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 28, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received March 29, 6.51 p. m.]

45. Leading [Martin?], Murman wires that British, French co-operating with Soviet there and that presence of American war vessel [would] have good effect. Military attaché and I so recommend. Can you send one? French, Italian Embassy, Serbian Legation arriving Vologda to-morrow numbering seventy. This tribute gratifying but regrettable from food standpoint.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/1400

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 9.56 p. m.]

49. Martin, Murman, wires, 24th, French cruiser there and 200 troops in barracks, also armed marines and field pieces being landed from British cruiser. It is reported that Finnish White Guards being drilled by German officers and that points of Murman line are threatened and that railroad mined south of Murman and five war vessels in port to resist possible attack.

Cole wires, 27th, that public meeting will be held at Archangel to-morrow concerning food supplies which proposed attending unofficially; that evacuation commission rapidly shipping to interior from accumulation of supplies purchased from Allies on loans subsequently repudiated; that the local Soviet through British influence vainly objecting. Endeavoring through Robins and Summers to ascertain destination and explanation of such Soviet policy.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1693

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Vologda, April 24, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 30, 3.14 p. m.]

121. Cole wires two food ships arrived river mouth from England and met by armed ice-breaker. Lockhart,<sup>1</sup> answering inquiry whether Soviet government complied with landing conditions, said [he was?] endeavoring to have such conditions stated in my 92, April 12, 3 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> observed. I understood that vessels would remain with me [White Sea?] until Soviet accepted conditions but arrival at Archangel presents interesting situation, as local Soviet clamoring for provisions and opposing the removal of military supplies from Archangel which Central Soviet been transferring to Sukhona, twenty miles north Vologda, and to Siberian localities.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1765

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 8, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received May 9, 8.46 p. m.]

492. From source considered reliable it is learned that Count Mirbach<sup>3</sup> has presented an ultimatum to the Soviet authorities stating that if British and French troops do not at once evacuate Murman Peninsula the consequence will be most grave and it will be necessary for Germany to undertake military operations occupying further territory either in the direction of Murmansk or elsewhere.

POOLE

<sup>1</sup> Robert H. B. Lockhart, British special representative in Russia.

<sup>2</sup> No record of receipt of such telegram.

<sup>3</sup> Wilhelm, Count von Mirbach, German Ambassador to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

File No. 861.00/1764

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 9, 8.19 p. m.]

Remaining here for two days longer to study situation, including subjects mentioned in your 87, April 26, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> If Germany delivered ultimatum to Soviet government as reported in Consul General's No. 492, May 8, 1 p. m., Allied intervention should not be delayed, regardless of Soviet reply to ultimatum. If a demand for evacuation Murman is denied, Soviet government will require and probably request Allied assistance. If Soviet government accedes to German demand, of course Murman will not be evacuated and in such event Allied intervention should be announced regardless of Soviet wishes. Soviet government alarmed by German action in Ukraine, see Consul General's No. 493 of to-day,<sup>3</sup> and by German possession of Rostov-on-Don and is evidently nervous concerning situation generally. No known organized opposition to Soviet government with force at its command but dissatisfaction therewith evidently [indicated], and maintain my opinion majority of Russian people would welcome Allied intervention.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1774

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 9, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received May 11, 1.55 p. m.]

504. Information received to-day practically confirms rumor of German ultimatum to the Soviet government reported my No. 492.

It is stated now that ultimatum contains three conditions: (1) immediate departure of British and French troops from Murman Peninsula; (2) occupation of Fort Ino near Petrograd; (3) disarmament of Lettish regiment which is now serving as personal guard to the Bolshevik leaders. We learned that the demand based on ground that Letts are [not] Russians but foreigners and should be sent to their native land. Demand respecting withdrawal French, British troops considered critical and evidence accumulating of consternation in Bolshevik circles accompanied by tendency on their part to seek assistance of the Allies.

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate General at Moscow (No. 496).

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III, p. 122.

<sup>3</sup> Post, p. 682.



There is press gossip of further German demands involving economic reforms and the restoration of order through the placing of German troops of occupation at important centers. Possibility of German occupation of Moscow within near future again being discussed by serious people.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1887

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract <sup>1</sup>]

VOLOGDA, May 20, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 26, 10.42 p. m.]

185. . . . Latest information from Embassy's men, Murman, dated 14th, states Finns attacking railway but repulsed by assistance of the British landed in greater number. Halsey,<sup>2</sup> substitute for Martin who is now in Moscow but is returning Murman soon, reports local Soviet cooperating with French contingents there but Central Soviet endeavoring with the assistance of German agitators at Murman to prevent such cooperation. Arrival of *Olympia* Murman anxiously awaited. The capture of Murman by Germans would jeopardize Archangel connection with England and America if not wholly sever it, consequently urgently important to send assistance to Murman immediately.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1894

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 22, 1918.

[Received May 29, 5.20 a. m.]

192. Station agent Vologda received service message that Murman Railroad cut on northern third by Finns. German submarines destroyed Russian wireless station at Murman and sunk Russian freighters, and several Norwegian fish boats in Murman waters.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1914

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 26, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received May 30, 6 p. m.]

205. Information from various sources confirms reported plan of Swedes [Finns], Germans to capture Murman line and Murman

<sup>1</sup>Printed in full in vol. I, p. 536.

<sup>2</sup>The Rev. Jesse Halsey, Y.M.C.A. secretary.

itself. Halsey wires *Olympia* arrived at Murman 24th which is exceedingly gratifying. Martin leaving here to-day for there with instruction to communicate with you direct if my communication severed. Have instructed him to advise *Olympia* commander to land marines if so requested by the local Soviet as the British and the French have already landed. Highly important Allies should retain Murman as its capture by the Germans would sever Archangel and result in Russian-American communication's being confined to Pacific.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1897

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, May 26, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 29, 9.39 a. m.]

Munition stores and two food ships question still unsettled. Believe presence American cruiser would have excellent effect on this and other problems. British cruiser expected here at end of month or first of next.

Four-cornered struggle here for power, parties thereto being:

- (1) Extraordinary evacuation commission whose members personally dishonest, pro-German and overbearing.
- (2) Chief [of] newly created old [Red] army White Sea military district, reported self-seeking, wily, and by some lukewarm pro-Ally only; both the above have mandates from Moscow, the first from Lenin, the second from Trotsky.
- (3) Central [committee,] Arctic Ocean flotilla, now influenced by newly arrived Black Sea sailors; this committee overbearing has just sanctioned murder on main street in broad daylight which forced assistant to commander in chief escape at once by leaving Archangel; this committee desires to dictate for entire province but lacks determined leadership.
- (4) Soviet provincial executive committee now nominally controlling province and pro-Ally because hoping receive food supplies; president this committee resents control from center but has no armed force to support him.

Old office of commander in chief being liquidated, the above four institutions [are] taking all his functions.

COLE

File No. 861.00/1907½

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

[The following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary by the Ambassador on May 29, 1918:]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington*

May 28, 1918.

We understand from your reports that intervention at Archangel and Murmansk is regarded by the United States as a different question from that of intervention in the Far East.

I should be much obliged if you would urgently impress upon the United States Government and upon the President the following considered opinion of our military and naval authorities on this question.

On the Murmansk coast assistance from America is badly required and is, in fact, essential. Every day the position of Murmansk is more seriously endangered and, as the United States Government will of course be aware, it is of vital importance to us to retain Murmansk, if we desire to retain any possibility at all of entering Russia.

This danger has become so extreme that we are sending to Murmansk such small marine and military forces as we are able to spare during the present crisis in France. These forces will, however, clearly not be enough to resist the further efforts which the enemy are certain to put forward on this coast. The despatch of additional French or British reinforcements is impossible and it is therefore essential that America should help by sending a brigade, to which a few guns should be added. It is not necessary that the troops sent should be completely trained, as we anticipate that military operations in this region will only be of an irregular character.

It is possible that we may be asked why British troops are not sent. The reason is that Great Britain is now completely denuded of troops, and it is not feasible to take trained troops, even in small numbers, from France where they are being used more or less as *cadres* for the training of the American forces now reaching the west front. There is a further consideration which is worthy of careful consideration by the President. Great use has been made already of the divergence of view among the Allied countries with regard to the Russian situation, and for this reason it is of great importance that the United States should show their agreement with us on this matter by taking part in the steps adopted for preventing the closing of the only remaining door through which assistance can be given to Russia in her hour of need.

File No. 861.00/1987

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*[Telegram—Extract <sup>1</sup>]

Moscow, May 29, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received June 9, 10.21 p. m.]

576. . . . Halsey telegraphs from Murman May 25:

Notwithstanding orders received direct from Moscow Commissariat Foreign Affairs, district Soviet desires Allies to remain. They

inform me in writing that their feelings toward United States are most sincere and cordial and that this friendship will only be cemented by presence American warship. *Olympia* arrived 24th and is under orders British admiral.

Bolsheviks probably hope that by Murman cession to Finland they can avoid issue through direct clash between Allies on one side and Finland and Germany on other. . . .

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/2299

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

ARCHANGEL, June 1, 1918.

[Copy received from the Consul July 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to request your attention to the following considerations regarding intervention in Russia by the Allies, considerations which lead me to fear and be apprehensive of such an intervention:

1. Intervention will begin on a small scale but with each step forward will grow in scope and in its demands for ships, men, money and materials.

To hold Archangel a part of the Archangel-Vologda Railroad must be held. As the River Dvina diverges to the east from the railroad line a part of the river must be held. The right flank toward Petrozavodsk must also be held. If the munitions evacuated toward the interior from Archangel are to be salvaged by force the railroad to and beyond Vologda must be held and the river to and beyond Kotlas. This means not the mere occupation of Archangel but an expedition into the interior of Russia. It means establishing and maintaining telegraph, telephone, wireless, railroad, river, White Sea water, sledge, automobile and horse communication with repair shops, hospitals, food warehouses, munitions trains, etc., etc. All of these things must be brought here in ships from Europe or America and maintained entirely by Allied means as the Russians can not be depended on to work willingly or, if at all, effectively. They work for themselves neither willingly nor effectively. Still less so will they work for others.

If intervention develops normally and according to its own inner necessities it will eventually result in establishing a new "Russian front" in place of the one ruined by the revolution. This front will lie somewhere north of Moscow, somewhere east of Petrograd

and somewhere west of the southern Ural Mountains. This time, however, the front will not be maintained by Russia with the Allies' help, but by the Allies without Russia's help and perhaps even against a large part of Russia's active or passive resistance.

In any case there are neither coal nor iron nor factories to work either coal or iron, nor is there wheat, in that part of Russia that will lie behind the new Allied front in Russia. If there had been any of these things Germany would have treated the north of Russia as she has treated the fruitful Ukraine, and the iron-bearing and coal-producing Donets Basin long ago.

Count the number of fighting men necessary to hold a front from Finland to the southern Urals. To this add the number of artisans, transport workers, etc., including the men to load and unload and run ships between New York or London and Russia and you will have the personnel needed for intervention. Then count the number of ships needed to support every hundred men at the front or in the rear of an army, and you will have the man power and ship power that intervention will cost—the approximate drain on our present none-too-great power needed in France.

Add to this that once launched there is no stopping such an expedition at any moment. The Dardanelles expedition was withdrawn almost in a night, but it never went more than a few miles inland and never operated over a front of more than a few miles. An expedition into Russia could not be withdrawn in a night or a week or a month—especially after Archangel freezes and the neck of the White Sea clogs up with ice.

The Murman Railroad communicates with Vologda only via Zvanka (which is practically Petrograd) and which will by the time of an intervention be in German or Finnish hands. Further, in winter, which will arrive before an expeditionary force could more than get started, the Murman line from Kandalaksha to Murmansk is the only way in and out of Archangel except the always possible but always difficult and dangerous passage of the neck of the White Sea by ice breaker. And navigation in the White Sea itself in winter must be maintained by ice breakers. Furthermore, from Kandalaksha to Murmansk, in fact for its whole length, the Murman Railroad has an open and exposed flank for it runs its entire length parallel to the Finnish frontier.

2. The ground for landing an interventionary force has not been properly prepared. The north of Russia is nowhere near as pro-Ally as it might be. Before talking business with a Russian you have to sit down to a glass of tea with him, preferably, if you are proposing the business, at your expense. The Russian native population in the north should be given "baksheesh" before it is asked to assist

an interventionary force. A few food ships should have been sent with no conditions or demands attached to them except that a fair exchange of the food for local produce or money be arranged.

3. Intervention in the north of Russia will mean that we must feed the entire north of Russia containing from 500,000 to 1,500,000 population, depending on the area of territory embraced in the intervention—perhaps even more if the intervention grows like a snowball, as I am convinced it will, at first anyway. The moment that any move is made at Archangel that the Soviet government can interpret as intervention or hostility, that thin stream of food that is now trickling into Archangel will cease abruptly. Then the Allies will be forced either to feed that entire population of Archangel Province and the region embraced in the intervention, or else to see thousands starve to death. If the intervention is withdrawn the moral obligation to feed will remain as the thin thread now uniting Archangel in this sense with the rest of Russia, once broken, can not soon be reestablished.

4. Intervention can not reckon on active support from Russians. All the fight is out of Russia. The Russians have definitely "quit". In fact they "quit" last spring before June. The only men who will fight are a few Red Guards and Red Army men, and their best stomach for fighting is against the *bourgeois* in their own land. Some Russian officers and *bourgeois* volunteers would undoubtedly rally to an Allied anti-Soviet movement but more for their pocket-books than for Russia or for hate of Germany. If nearer, they would, and have, rallied to Germany.

I believe every hope based on raising volunteers among the Russians to support an Allied army in Russia against Germany is doomed to complete and utter disappointment. Few men will be so raised and they will fight worse than indifferently.

The bulk of the population is indifferent to everything except their stomachs (bank accounts, wages or food). It cares more for food than for Russia, more for sugar than for independence, more for bread than for national pride.

5. The Socialist Revolutionists, Mensheviks, and Cadets who now advocate intervention are discredited officeholders seeking to regain power. They were only able to "lead" the people when they advocated peace (no more fighting), anti-imperialism (an excuse to desert from the front), and socialism (an excuse to raise wages indefinitely or to steal land or property belonging to others—such is the ignorant peasant's understanding of it). The very men who now pray for our bayonets to restore them to power are the ones who did more than even the Bolsheviks to ruin the Russian front and the Allies' common cause in Russia. They are more

responsible than the Bolsheviks for the present terrible struggle in France. The B[olsheviks] did not ruin the army, they merely swam into power on the ruination of the army.

The Socialist Revolutionist, Menshevik, and Cadet "intellectuals" will never rule Russia. Their place is around the steaming samovar, not in the halls of government. Their invitation to enter Russia is not an invitation from the Russian people. They misjudge the temper of the Russian people to-day as badly as they did a year ago.

6. On the other hand, the men who do rule Russia, however badly it is done, are the small Bolshevik leaders, who will always and everywhere oppose intervention. These men, not the "intellectuals," will direct Russian public opinion. They are coming more and more to see that Germany is the real enemy of Russia, not the so-called imperialist Allies. The attacks on the "imperialists of all nations" are becoming more and more phrases of habit, mere sops to the necessity for impartiality, and are losing their characters of being believed in either by those who repeat them or by those who hear them. In this sense the landing of Japanese at Vladivostok set back the progress of pro-Ally sentiment in Russia many months without adding anything tangible to the strength of our moral or political position. The same will be just as true, although on a more grandiose scale, of any intervention through Archangel, or deeper intervention through Vladivostok or Harbin.

The small Bolshevik leaders are becoming more and more anti-German. "Give the devil enough rope and he will hang himself." That is what Germany began at the robber's peace signed at Brest, what she has been doing in the Donets region, in the Crimea, and now, again, in the Ukraine (Skoropadski). The same is true of her action in Finland, Lithuania, Esthonia and Poland. Intervention will give many the chance to say that the Allies are no better than Germany, whereas, like Caesar's wife, we should be above suspicion even.

7. No child can ever be convinced that it is spanked for its own benefit. The mass of the Russian lower classes still believe in the Bolsheviks. Intervention will alienate thousands of anti-German Bolsheviks and we shall merely gain the support of discredited "intellectuals" and *bourgeois*. The *bourgeois* will soon tire of us if we do not restore their bank accounts.

8. Every foreign invasion that has gone deep into Russia has been swallowed up. The Germans know this and have only taken the nearest and most fruitful regions, avoiding the unproductive north. If they advance farther it will only be to their own ruin unless they come as allies to help the Soviet government against

the Allies. If we intervene, going farther into Russia as we succeed, we shall be swallowed up.

9. I can not see that the fundamental situation in Russia is changed even if it were proven that Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, etc., drew monthly pay checks from the Berlin treasury. Whether intentionally or unintentionally everything that they or any other socialists in Russia have done has redounded to the advantage of Germany and our disadvantage, beginning with order No. 1 on the second day of the revolution. But the future of Russia is still in the Russian people, and it is of them we must think, of obtaining their lasting good will. Unless we are to march to Moscow and depose Lenin it is of little importance whether he be a German agent or not. If he is a German agent nothing would please him better than an intervention as he could at once throw himself into an open alliance with Germany. It is vitally important to the Allies, for the sake of the future (I hold that the present holds no military profit for us in Russia, see paragraph 4), that any cooperation between Russians and Germany be clandestine and contraband and attained either by the use of brute force by Germany, against Russia's will, or by German bribery and Russian treachery. It should have no possibility of a color of justification due to action by the Allies.

Intervention will not strengthen Russia against Germany, for, as said, it will only force the Bolshevik government into Germany's arms, commercially, financially, and militarily, and worst of all will establish, *de facto*, a friendly cooperation between the official Russian government and Berlin. If the war ends in less than victory in the west, such an alliance will be fatal to all our hopes for the great future in Russia. If the war ends in victory, such an alliance could never be entirely undone and for years would be a brake on our work in Russia.

10. Intervention will not engage three Germans in Russia to every one Ally. As at Saloniki, Rumania and Italy, and even in Russia, Germany will have the inside communication line while we must move in ships on the outside line. The front that will grow up will be infinitely nearer Berlin than London or Paris or New York. If the ships and men and auxiliary services for the new front be counted, it will be found that intervention will use three Allied war-power units to Germany's one.

11. Intervention will belie all our promises to the Russian people made since October 26, 1917.

12. We will lose that moral superiority over Germany which is a tower of strength to us everywhere, because we shall have de-



scended to using Germany's own weapons; namely, intervention and force.

13. We shall have sold our birthright in Russia for a mess of pottage. The birthright is the future friendship and economic cooperation with a great and free democracy controlling untold riches. The pottage will be the recovery of a few thousand tons of materials that we once gave to Russia after deciding we could ourselves do without them, the temporary control (for we do not intend annexation) of some hundreds of square miles of forest and barren northern tundra, trackless and as yet unproductive, a new front to drain our none-too-great resources for the war, and the thanks of a few discredited politicians without constituents.

And after all, unless we are to invade the whole of Russia, we shall not have affected that part of Russia where the population is massed, namely the center and the south where the industrial, mining and agricultural strength of Russia lies.

I leave out of consideration the point of view which to my mind might justify intervention eventually; namely, that our policy in Russia must be to keep her ruined and keep her in a turmoil. This would prevent Germany's making use of Russia just as after the revolution Germany prevented Russia's being of use to the Allies by fomenting turmoil and ruin.

Now for what I believe to be the best way to meet Germany in Russia and give her battle.

Russia is for a long time definitely and finally out of the war. The Allies, therefore, in Russia, are in the economic struggle with Germany that has been called the "war after the war." Thanks in part to Russia's economic backwardness, thanks in part to the war itself, and thanks in part to the economic insanity of the Bolsheviks, Russia is down and out economically and financially—at Germany's mercy now and for a long time to come. This is highly disadvantageous to the Allies, because now and in the future it strengthens Germany. Therefore it is our task to make Russia independent of Germany by sending her, so far as our own needs permit, what she needs for her factories (machines and materials), by sending her agricultural implements for her fields. If this latter leads to a surplus of grain, we should buy it for our own use to prevent Germany's profiting thereby.

We can make more friends in Russia by the proper use of sugar, boots, fishnets, and machinery than by 200,000 or 500,000 troops (see paragraph 4, end).

Trade with Russia is possible through the various foreign trade councils and committees and other government organs. In fact these organs are advantageous to us, as they will guarantee distribu-

tion to the actual consumer as trade with private parties could not. Russia and the Bolsheviks want to trade with us. We need certain products Russia yet has in abundance. Above and beyond this, trade is necessary to help put Russia industrially on her own feet again and to prevent her sinking deeper into dependency on Germany.

This trade will take ships. But the sending of ships for trade can be stopped at any moment by a simple order from Washington. The stream of ships necessary to supply and support an interventionary force, however, can not be stopped at will. The sending of ships must be continued until circumstances permit the force to be withdrawn. Ships must be sent in unusually large numbers to withdraw the force. And the development of the force will not depend on the number of ships available but on entirely other factors having no connection with the number of available ships. Trade, however, can be limited to the number of ships available at a given moment.

Further, in trade, the ships will be in use productively, bringing return cargoes, not unproductively.

In a word, intervention is sure to:

- (1) Go farther than at first planned involving unforeseen and difficult expenditures of ships, men, and materials;
- (2) Fail to reestablish Russia as a military factor in the war against Germany, because there is no fight in Russia except small, sporadic, class or party skirmishes;
- (3) Fail to divert large forces of men from the western front, as any force we can at present afford to send her can be met by a force drawn from within Germany, from other parts of Russia, or by reserves of the Landsturm class;
- (4) Fail to counteract German influence, if anything strengthening that influence except under and behind the guns of the interventionary force itself;
- (5) Necessitate the feeding of from 500,000 to 1,500,000 people;
- (6) Be likely to make Russia—or the best part of Russia left now, the center—an ally of Germany for years to come;
- (7) Break our solemn promises to Russia not to interfere.

Continuing the present policy will:

- (1) Make us no new enemies in Russia except the *bourgeois*, who think it is our duty to save their bank accounts;
- (2) Continue the contrast between the Allies and Germany, the Allies putting up with injury (annulment of loans) and insult (publishing the secret treaties), without, like Germany, using brute force in retaliation;
- (3) Preserving our hard-pressed man and economic war-power from a drain, whose extent it is impossible to foresee.

Continuing our present policy of nonrecognition, but still engaging in as broad trade relations as our resources in materials and ships permit will:

- (1) Insure a return for the tonnage used.
- (2) Insure our ability to stop or divert the tonnage involved at any moment at our own will.
- (3) Fight Germany's future economic supremacy in Russia at the most important moment of all; namely, when that economic supremacy is just in its first beginnings and before it can renew its strong hold on Russian economic life.
- (4) Help Russia to get somewhat on her own industrial and economic and financial feet, which is to my mind the supreme task of the moment, as otherwise we will always be at a disadvantage in Russia compared with Germany, and after the war German militarism, if not utterly broken, will have a limitless field for drawing resources from.

There is no greater danger in the world to-day than that Russia should become Germanized, except of course the danger that Germany should win on the western front. This policy of building up a strong and independent commercial, financial, and industrial Russia will be the task of the Allies' whole policy in Russia in the future, and now is the time to begin.

The time for soldiers in Russia has gone beyond recall.

The Allies must fight Germany in Russia with merchandise.

Every consideration presented above as regards Archangel or intervention basing on Archangel, applies equally, to my mind, to intervention basing on Vladivostok.

None of the above considerations prejudice, to my mind, in the slightest, the necessity for having at once strong naval forces in the Archangel harbor, at Murmansk and in the White Sea to steady Russia and strengthen our hands here in general. This will help without injuring anything as intervention will. The naval force at all the points mentioned should be considerable.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

---

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State*

After conference with the President on Saturday, June 1, it was agreed that I should say to Lord Reading that this Government was entirely willing to send troops to Murmansk provided General

Foch approved the diversion of troops and the necessary shipping for that purpose from those now going to France. Before doing this I saw Secretary Baker who entirely agreed with this action and to-day I saw Lord Reading and told him of our attitude. He made notes and said he would inform his Government.

ROBERT LANSING

June 3, 1918.

File No. 861.00/1818

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1918, 4 p. m.

180. Your 134, April 30, 8 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> received May 18, 7 p. m., and 205, May 26.<sup>2</sup>

After consulting Secretary of Navy suggest you get in touch with Captain Bierer, commander of *Olympia*, who is under direct orders of the British Admiral at Murmansk. No additional American cruiser at present available to Murman coast or White Sea. Department studying question and will advise if anything further is possible but no further measures contemplated for the present.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2202

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract \*]

MOSCOW, June 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received July 4, 6.07 p. m.]

269. . . . French Minister for Foreign Affairs cables French Embassy here that military conference Paris, June 3, decided to hold Murman first, then Archangel, if impossible simultaneously, and to land battalions American, British, French, Italian troops with necessary munitions and provisions to hold those ports, all troops being under British command until otherwise ordered. . . .

FRANCIS

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 511.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 474.

<sup>3</sup> Printed in full, *ante* p. 211.

File No. 861.00/2103

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 16, 1918, 3 a. m.

[Received June 24, 8.38 a. m.]

Poole wires following received to-day:

People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs allows itself to request American Consul General at Moscow to direct attention United States of America to the fact that the presence of military vessels belonging to the belligerent powers in the ports of the Russian Republic, with the possibility of their leaving for the open sea at any time for military purposes, must be regarded as inadmissible by the Russian Government. People's Commissariat expresses certainty that the United States Government, which has given so many proofs of its friendly attitude towards the Russian Republic, will lend attention to this stipulation which is obligatory upon Russia, and will give it full consideration. People's Commissar Foreign Affairs, George Chicherin.

Note of like import sent Lockhart but states in addition that writer "has several times pointed out to you necessity for English vessels to leave our northern ports," and ends:

Hopes that you will draw the attention of British Government to the impossibility of the further stay of English military vessels, even in small number, in the ports of the Russian Soviet Republic. Chicherin.

Note to French Consul General states that further presence of vessels of warring powers in ports of Russian Republic is inadmissible—even when long stay of such vessel is not connected with any military operations. Commissariat therefore expresses hope that French Government will not delay in recalling the military vessel which is in the Arctic Ocean near the Russian Coast. Chicherin.

These messages received midnight *en clair* being translations of originals in Russian.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2108

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, June 21, 1918, 5 a. m.

[Received June 24, 4.59 p. m.]

Just received at 9 in the evening the following announcement from the People's Commissary, Kedrov, mentioned my telegram 99,

Embassy,<sup>1</sup> and 117, Consul General,<sup>1</sup> with accompanying letter from the local civil authorities:

In view of the well-known international and political situation, I announced that the arrival of a foreign warship, especially with an armed crew, at Archangel, where there is now concentrated an enormous quantity military stores and explosives, will be regarded as commencement military operations which may lead to serious consequences.

The Archangel Provincial Executive Committee encloses an announcement made by the People's Commissary Kedrov and requests that all war vessels of the country now within the port of Archangel be immediately removed from the district as above mentioned.

The same has been sent to British Consul, French Consul. Former conferring with commander of ice breaker. Have advised British Consul my opinion is that everything under the English flag should be withdrawn to Murmansk pending decision about military intervention, or until entry can be made with a sufficient strength to guarantee quick certain occupation.

I shall answer authorities by the obvious statement no naval forces here.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2089

*The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to the Secretary of State*

C-20-220 Op 36

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Department's letter of June 14, 1918, enclosing a copy of a cablegram from the American Ambassador to Russia in regard to conditions in Finland.<sup>1</sup>

For the information of the Department of State, I enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from Admiral Sims, dated April 13, 1918, setting forth the instructions under which the British and French forces were to operate. These instructions were approved by this department and a copy given to the commanding officer of the *Olympia* for his guidance. The *Olympia* is now operating under the orders of the British Rear Admiral at Murmansk.

Attention is respectfully invited to the enclosed copy of a despatch of Admiral Sims concerning the proposed operations in this region of a British military force and to the proposed defensive measures by the Russian local authorities against German submarines.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

[Enclosure—Telegrams]

*Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

April 13, 1918.

Instructions have been issued to the British Rear Admiral at Murmansk to take any steps which he may consider necessary and desirable with the forces at his disposal to protect and further the Allied interests generally, and to assist in recovering the Allied stores at Archangel. Instructions have also been given him that he is not to commit himself to land military operations away from the port, but subject to the above-mentioned restriction he may utilize the crew of the ships for the purpose of stiffening the local resistance against Germans if it be found practicable. The same instructions have been issued to the French senior officer. It is considered essential by the Admiralty that the Allied ships at Murmansk should be placed under the orders of the senior Allied commander, and that the ships be instructed to cooperate with him in carrying out the above instructions. I concur in the above and recommend that it be carried out. SIMS

*Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

June 3, 1918.

A force of 600 infantry with field and machine guns has been sent to Murmansk in command of General Poole of the British Army. General Poole is to have under his command all the military forces ashore both at Archangel and Murmansk, his special duty being the organization of the Czechs, Serbian and other units which are reported to be at those places. Ships can now approach the harbor at Archangel safely as the River Dvina at that place is now clear of ice.

The president of Murmansk has requested permission of the central authorities to organize defensive force against German submarines, as a result of the recent activity of the enemy submarines in the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea. SIMS

File No. 861.00/2175

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received July 2, 12.35 p. m.]

297. Civil authorities Duma Archangel arrested, taken through Vologda en route Moscow; Vologda Duma also threatened for failure to execute orders of central Soviet government.

Shooting of Admiral Peplumasny yesterday arouses deep indignation and likely will cause sailors mutiny; bitterness augmented by ordering return Black Sea Fleet to Sevastopol on German dictation and consequent destruction many Russian war vessels. Numerous manifestations of Bolshevik desperation.

[Omission] says has been promised locomotives and equipment to move men and munitions from Archangel south if given two weeks' notice.

Cole reports that American, British, French Consuls [received] local official communication ordering withdrawal war vessels and prohibiting further arrivals. I instructed him make no reply whatever.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2168½

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 27, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Copied from confirmation, original not received.]

304. Soviet government requests cables be short and few because only available cable impaired, overloaded.

Cole wires June 26, 3 p. m., martial law declared Archangel and "orders issued for immediate military battle readiness."

British report Germans advancing from Pskov toward Petrograd. French military attaché, Moscow, reports Lenin and Trotsky told him, 25th, 2,000 British soldiers landed Murman, which Martin confirms, and said Council of Commissaires were considering the question of declaration of war against Entente "of which principle already adopted"; that Mirbach proffered aid, been refused, and Soviet government decided to operate its own forces immediately against efforts of French at Murman and against Japanese if intervened; that Trotsky stated no one could prevent Germans from intervening.

Since above Vosnesenski called and says reports of German advance untrue.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/11422

*The Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. "Olympia" (Bierer) to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters (Sims)*

MURMANSK, July 6, 1918.

[Copy transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy  
to the Secretary of State, August 20.<sup>1</sup>]

1. There is forwarded herewith enclosure A. Referring to I of enclosure A, Nasarenus therein mentioned is the same individual as Natsaremus previously mentioned in my weekly reports. Enclosure A was adopted by the District Council on 30 June and Moscow notified the same day. At a public meeting in Murmansk, which was attended by General Poole, Admiral Kemp, R.N., French Captain

<sup>1</sup> The letter of transmittal, which was returned to the Navy Department, has not been found in its files. See the reply of the Secretary of State, Oct. 14, 1918, *post*, p. 556.



Petit, and myself, the assent to the declaration, enclosure A, was called for by the president of the Murmansk District Council and the populace, probably 2,000 or more, practically to a man, raised their hands in token of approval.

2. The District Soviet, Murmansk District Council, Murmansk Regional Council, and Murman Region Council are the same thing, and are the council of administration or government of the Murman region. The Murman or Murmansk region includes the former Alexandrovsk and Kem districts of the Archangel Government, that is, the Murman coast, including the towns of Pechenga, Alexandrovsk, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kem, and Soroka. The administration of this region is directly under the District Council. The Council is composed of representatives from various committees, such as Railroad Workmen's Committee, Sailors' Committee, Military Committee, District Committee, etc. The number of committees is apparently unlimited, any special group of people who are numerous enough or powerful enough being allowed representation. The various committees choose representatives and these representatives combine and form the Council and elect their own officers to exercise powers of administration, tenure of office being entirely dependent upon the wishes of the majority.

3. The present head of the District Council is a man by the name of Yuriev. He is a native Russian, but he has been in this vicinity for only a few months, having appeared some time subsequent to the revolution. For some time, according to his own accounts and from other reports believed to be reliable, he lived in the United States working at various trades in various parts of the country. He does not speak very much English but seems to understand pretty near everything that is said in English. He seems very desirous of assisting in the relief of the country from its present chaotic condition and is a sincere worker to that end. He seems pro-Ally inclined and is pronouncedly pro-American. Another influential member of the District Council is a man by the name of Vesselago, formerly a captain in the Russian Navy. He is a member of the executive council of the District Council, acts in the capacity of a sort of business manager, and occupies in general a position of power. He is very able. While rather noncommittal he seems to favor the Allies. The military command of the district is under the charge of Zvigentsov, formerly an officer of the Russian Army and said to have been of the Imperial Guards. He was second in command of the whole Archangel district of northern Russia, acting under an appointment from the national Soviet at Moscow. He appears pro-Ally inclined. These three men, Yuriev, Vesselago, and Zvigentsov, form a sort of triumvirate as regards district and local affairs and seem to work together

to a marked degree. The head of the railway committee is Promortsev. He is a good listener, evidently does not understand English, and apparently seems purely concerned with workmen's interests, wages, etc.

4. The Sailors' Committee is known as the Centramur, organized by and composed chiefly of men of the old Russian Navy. They have representation in the District Council but tend more or less to independent exercise of power. They control in general the Russian vessels here, both naval and merchant. Officers are elected by popular vote amongst themselves. A few of the present officers were officers under the Imperial Government, but the majority are selected more on account of popularity than ability. The Centramur exerts a certain power by virtue of being in possession of the Russian men-of-war and certain arms and ammunition; also on account of the fact that at the time of the revolution the sailors succeeded in obtaining possession of considerable funds. With these funds on hand they have been able to get along with little work and by virtue of their numbers, estimated about 800 in all, and possession of arms and ammunition have wielded a sort of power through fear alone. With the presence of Allied men-of-war they are merely a factor of tolerance. At the same time, among the sailors are a number of officers of the ex-Russian navy who are excellent men and who seem to be earnest endeavorers to work for the good and upbuilding of Russia. The head of the Sailors' Committee, that is, president of the Centramur, is Laudanski and he seems to be an excellent man and especially well liked by the officers and sailors.

5. The situation is, of course, unsettled, whether or not more than it has been remains to be seen. Nasarenus or Natsaremus has not appeared.

6. On 4 July at Kem three Russians were killed by the British forces at Kem. It had been decided to disarm the Russians there, as at least some of those who had arms there did not seem to be friendly and some coming into Kem were supposed to be advance guards of Mr. Natsaremus. The three men who were killed resisted being disarmed. . . .

12. There is forwarded herewith enclosure B. This temporary agreement was gotten up and signed yesterday<sup>1</sup> due to the desire on the part of the Murmansk Region Council to be able to inform the Murmansk region in regard to the presence, objectives, and help of the Allies here, together with their cooperation with the Murmansk Regional Council. It is in writing a statement of the policy, opera-

---

<sup>1</sup>The Russian translation printed and widely circulated in Murmansk at the time is dated July 6, which date is confirmed by the U. S. Military Attaché then in Murmansk.

tions, and intent of the Allied command represented at present by the senior Allied officers, British General Poole and Admiral Kemp, R.N. As finally drawn up in its present form, I saw no objections to signing it but on the contrary thought it desirable to sign it as all parties felt, in view of the present situation, that it was desirable. The Murmansk District Council especially persisted, in view of the present situation, in having something in writing in order to inform in particular the people of the district.

13. This agreement was drawn up in English. The Russian translation is a translation made from the English by the Murman District Council.

B. B. BIERER

[Enclosure A]

*Resolution Adopted by the Murmansk District Council, June 30, 1918*

GENTLEMEN, Representatives of the Nations and the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France:

The Murmansk District Council considers that the respite given to Russia by the Brest treaty is finished. The arrogant German imperialists have already occupied a good half of European Russia and have divided her into small, feeble groups incapable of resistance. In each of these groups there has been restored, in different forms, the old autocratic system which had been overthrown by the Russian revolution.

The German advance into Russia continues and we can not see where it will stop. In particular, the Germans and their servants, the White Guard of Finland, are attempting to occupy the Murmansk district, the last outlet from Russia to the open sea and the last route of communication with the Allies free from German control.

Russia, in the present state of her disorganized industries, means of transport, and food supply, can not recover herself and organize a serious defense against the Germans. In particular, she is unable to defend the Murmansk district against the attacks of the Germans and Finns. We are not able to provide for our district the necessary food and consolidate our economic affairs.

The help which Russia and, in particular, the Murmansk district so greatly desire can come only from your Governments, representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France. That is why the protest against the presence of your military forces here, which the central government has ordered us to transmit, is, to our firm conviction, an act of suicide and disaster for Russia, and especially for the Murmansk district.

The Murmansk District Council, in the firm conviction of its duty to Russia and to the population of the territory, whose confidence it enjoys, considering all these things, has decided:

I. The orders of Lenin, Trotsky, and Nasarenus to protest against the presence of the Allies here and drive them out are not to be obeyed.

II. The Allies must remain here and assist the highest local Russian power, the Murmansk District Council, to defend the country against the Germans and Finns, to organize a Russian Army, and improve our economic condition.

III. The highest power of this territory is the Murmansk District Council, in the hands of which must remain all the initiative, the Allies assisting it, but not interfering in internal affairs.

IV. To give to the relations between the District Council and the Allies a more definite and precise character, the Presidium of the District Council, together with two members of the Central Committee of the Fleet and two members of the Central Railway Committee, are authorized to begin immediate negotiations for working out a concrete written agreement, determining on the basis of the second and third paragraphs mentioned above the mutual rights and obligations of the Murmansk District Council and the Allies.

V. The District Council must take all measures for an early liquidation of the conflict between it and the central government and must endeavor to find some way of working again together.

VI. In agreeing to the above points of the resolution, we are guided by a sense of duty to retain this territory inviolate for Russia, in the name of which, as one nation, we are acting.

[Enclosure B]

*Temporary Agreement owing to Exceptional Circumstances between the Representatives in Murmansk of Great Britain, United States of America, and France, and the Presidium of the Murmansk Region Council*<sup>1</sup>

#### ARTICLE 1

Subject on the part of the Allies to approval by their respective governments, this agreement has been made between the Representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France on one side, and the Murmansk Region Council on the other, with the object of united action on the part of the Signatories for the defence of the Murmansk Region against the powers of the German coalition. Both signatories agree to the fullest mutual co-operation for this end.

*Nota:* The Murmansk Region includes the former Alexandrovsk and Kem districts of the Archangel Government.

#### ARTICLE 2

The superior command of the Allied and Russian military forces in the Murmansk Region shall be organised on the same plan as actually exists on all other Allied fronts.

#### ARTICLE 3

All separate units of the Murmansk Region armed forces, already existing, or which are going to be formed, are to be under the direct command of the Russian military authorities, appointed by the Murmansk District Council.

*Nota:* It is most desirable that the Russians should form a purely Russian army; however, to further the ends in view, voluntary enlistment by the Allies of such Russians as may desire to join their forces is to be permitted. In principle however such forces should not be formed into separate Russian units but should as far as circumstances permit be formed into units composed of an equal number of companies of Allies and Russians.

#### ARTICLE 4

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France are to give to the Russian military command the necessary assistance in equipment, supplies, transporting and instructing the Russian military forces which are to be formed.

#### ARTICLE 5

All the authority in the internal government of the region belongs to the Murmansk Region Council.

---

<sup>1</sup>Approved by the Council, July 7.

## ARTICLE 6

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France, and agents do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Region, and for this reason:

(a) In all cases necessitating application to the local population the representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France, and their agents address themselves to the respective Russian authorities, but not directly to the population, except in the frontal region, where all orders of the Allied military command, arising out of the conditions of war, must be immediately executed by all.

(b) The regulations for entering and leaving the Murmansk region are defined by the Murmansk Region Council, who at the same time take into consideration the practically existing state of war in the region and the necessity of energetic measures being taken against spies.

(c) Scale of wages and productiveness of labour are to be fixed by the Murmansk Region Council.

## ARTICLE 7

Owing to the impossibility at the present time to obtain the necessary food stuffs from Russia, the representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France bind themselves as far as possible to supply the Murmansk Region Council with foodstuffs for the whole population of the region, including workmen who have already come from other parts with their families on the basis equivalent in nourishment to the scale used in the Allied military forces at Murmansk.

## ARTICLE 8

The distribution of the foodstuffs among the population is to be carried out by the competent Russian authorities.

## ARTICLE 9

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France bind themselves to supply as far as possible textile goods and other necessities of life.

## ARTICLE 10

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France bind themselves as far as possible to supply the Murmansk Region Council with the necessary materials, goods and technical appliances for carrying out the building programme, in accordance with mutual agreement to be arrived at, taking into consideration in the first place the needs of war time, in the second place the needs for development by way of the Murmansk Railway of international trade, and in the third place the local fishing industry.

## ARTICLE 11

All sums expended by the Governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France in accordance with this agreement are to be placed to the debit of the general account of the government debt of Russia to the respective Powers, but a separate account for the Murmansk Region is to be kept of such sums.

## ARTICLE 12

The representatives realise that it will be necessary for the governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France to accord the Murman Region Council the necessary financial assistance, the amount, form and conditions of which will be decided by further agreement.

## ARTICLE 13

This agreement comes into force from the moment of confirmation by the Murman Region Council and remains in force subject to Art. No. 1 until such time as normal conditions between the central Russian Government and the Murman Region Council, as also with the governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France, are established.

## ARTICLE 14

On the signature of this agreement the representatives of Great Britain, United States of America, and France in the name of their respective governments, do again confirm the absence on their part of any intention of taking possession of the Murmansk Region in its entirety or part thereof. The Presidium of the Murmansk Region Council on behalf of the Council declares before the people of Russia and the governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France that the sole reason of concluding this Agreement is to save the Murmansk Region in its integrity for the great Undivided Russia.<sup>1</sup>

[Presidium of the Murmansk Region Council:

*President YURIEV*

*Vice President KORELSKI*

*Secretary TALY*

*Director of Affairs VESSELAGO*

British Representative: F. C. POOLE, *Major General,*  
*Commanding Allied Forces in North Russia*

French Representative: PETIT, *Capitaine de Vaisseau,*  
*Commanding "Amiral Aube"*

Representative of United States of America: B. B. BIEBER, *Captain,*  
*U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. "Olympia."*

MURMANSK, July 6, 1918.]

File No. 861.00/2104

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918, 7 p. m.

212. Your 289, June 20, 10 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Department understands you will make no reply and take no other action regarding request for American ships to leave Russian ports. LANSING

<sup>1</sup> The signatures and date are reconstructed from this copy (British, French, and American signatures only) and from the Russian translation described in footnote 1, p. 491.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 564. See also the Ambassador's telegram of June 16, 3 a. m., ante, p. 486.

File No. 861.00/2239

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, July 7, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received July 10, 4 p. m.]

324. Crisis precipitated by killing Mirbach renders necessary immediate troops Archangel. Poole at Murman with forces wholly inadequate and plans to land Archangel first week in August with 5,000 men. This is [intended for?] moral effect and will dishearten [enhearten?] Russians and probably Czechs also. The Germans will doubtless advance promptly with all force can command. If Allied troops [advance?], will encourage thousands of Russians who otherwise would remain inactive and permit Germany to restore order and gain secure foothold.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2089

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (C-20-220 Op 36), enclosing telegram embodying the instructions to Allied naval officers at Murmansk.

I am thoroughly in accord with the general principles by which the actions of the commander of the *Olympia* are to be governed. Referring to the proposed measures of the Russian local authorities at Murmansk against German submarines, I shall be glad to know what tangible preparations have been effected and how, in your judgment, this Government may cooperate to assist.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2266½

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, July 11, 1918, 2 a. m.

[Copied from confirmation, original not received.]

329. Referring to my telegram No. 328<sup>1</sup> similar telegrams also received by French and Italian colleagues, tone of French telegram however stronger than others. After conferring with Allied chiefs here to-night we have unanimously agreed not to comply with demand. British Embassy has so advised General Poole, Murman,

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 618.

and Admiral Kemp, Archangel, at the same time urging immediate sending Allied troops Archangel. I am so informing Consuls, Moscow and Archangel.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2310

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, July 15, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received July 20, 12.23 p. m.]

76. Local authorities, dissatisfied British violation Russian sovereignty west shores White Sea, issued a proclamation summoning guards to resist English, French robbers seeking destruction Soviet government because it refuses rejoining the war between greedy capitalists, without having mentioned the United States of America. Violated sovereignty Russia in the hoisting of the British flag on some Russian boats as well as introducing vessels in the service by armed force proving the inhabitants of occupied regions are [dis]satisfied on account food-distribution. In reference to information about above-mentioned encroachments, Archangel Soviet finally declined responsibility for the safety British armed ice breaker named *Alexander* wherewith she departed.

COLE

---

File No. 861.00/2304

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, July 15, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 20, 12.08 p. m.]

77. The attitude of the inhabitants of Archangel in anticipation of the arrival of the Allied forces as follows: (1) Welcome on the part of civilians; (2) publicly expressed disfavor toward military intervention by the local Bolshevik leaders goaded thereto by Moscow; (3) part of the Archangel executive department would nevertheless eventually cooperate as well as welcome the Allies, if they proceed with tact, luring rather than bullying.

My cipher telegrams in Russia will not be accepted except diplomatics to the Department.

COLE



File No. 861.00/2586

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 27

ARCHANGEL, July 19, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that during the recent visit to this city of Admiral Kemp, the British senior naval officer in the Arctic Ocean, word was received by the local authorities here, through the master of a Russian vessel just returned to Archangel from Kem, that what the local authorities deemed violations of Russian sovereignty had been committed by the British military and naval authorities along the Murman Railroad and on the west coast of the White Sea. Among these alleged acts was the shooting of three members of the Kem County Council of Workmen's Deputies. Admiral Kemp immediately departed for the west coast of the White Sea (Kandalaksha) to investigate, as he stated nothing of the kind could have been done under the orders given by him to the captain of H. M. S. *Attentive*, then in the region mentioned (Kandalaksha, Kem, Soroka). With the Admiral, on a Russian vessel, went two members of the Archangel Soviet Executive Committee.

After the return of the members of the local committee it has been represented in the local papers that the three men were arrested during a meeting of the Soviet and then taken out and summarily shot. In the meantime there is no other version of the affair authoritatively current nor are the Allies in this city able to contradict the above version due to the oversight in not sending representatives from the Allied consulates or military mission of Archangel to Kem with the members of the local executive committee.

I have suggested to the British and French Consuls that it is not now too late to send such representatives, if a permit to leave the city for Kem should be granted, to go to the scene of the alleged shooting and obtain an authoritative account of the affair from the British authorities in command there. Should a permit be granted it will enable the Allied representatives here to obtain the means of denying a false report which has been, and throughout the future will be, of great disadvantage. The People's Commissar Mr. Kedrov, who is here in direction of all the Soviet affairs under mandate from Lenin and Trotsky, has already stated that this affair is definitive proof that the English and French are no better than the Germans in their attitude toward the Soviet government.

The only means at the disposal of the French Consul to combat such a statement is a secret report as to what was learned by the executive committee representatives at Kem, which is not in itself authoritative or capable of publication. According to this report it

was ascertained that the three men had not been killed at the same time or place: that two were killed while resisting Allied troops, either while resisting arrest or while firing from buildings at the soldiers entering the city, while the third was killed by four Serbian soldiers who were convoying him, after arrest, to prison or to an officer.

Other acts complained of by the Soviet authorities are the hoisting of the old Russian commercial flag on requisitioned Russian vessels (called by the Bolsheviks the "Tsar's flag"), the hoisting of the British merchant ensign on other requisitioned ships, the impressment of Russian boats into service, the refusal to allow the crews of Russian ships to land, and the requisition of considerable quantities of timber for barracks.

In the meantime both the Allied Consuls directly concerned, namely, the British and French, have no official word regarding these affairs, nor has such word been sent to the Allied Ambassadors at Vologda, although communication can be had occasionally and more or less illegally.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

---

File No. 861.00/2587

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 28

ARCHANGEL, July 20, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Central Commissariat of Food Supply has telegraphed the Archangel Food Supply Committee (now called the Provincial Food Supply Commissariat) that it may make purchases abroad in its own name and for its own account because the continued interruption of transportation between European Russia and Siberia, due to the Czecho-Slovak movement and the military operations connected therewith, have made it impossible for Archangel to expect to be supplied with grain from the central distributing organ.

This is, at last, the clear permission to trade with abroad that Archangel moderates have been striving for since early spring. It is, however, at the present moment useless. No negotiations are possible on account of the political tension and the ban laid on telegrams to and from Europe.

The fact, however, that the central government has, so to speak, washed its hands of Archangel's food supply for the coming winter, is significant and of utmost importance to the Allies since now, if Archangel starves, the fault therefore will be laid entirely at our

door, most especially at the door of the British who have held a dominating position throughout all the negotiations with the local authorities—negotiations that have only resulted in exasperating the local Bolsheviks, putting the harbor into a state of defense under orders of the central government, losing to the Allies the entire quantity of war stores, metals, and merchandise that lay here throughout the winter and that could have been exchanged for food products, and which have undoubtedly had a most deplorable effect on the course of the politics maintained by the central Soviet government at Moscow, as every check or mistaken move in the policy maintained by England in the north has had as its result a strengthening of the hold established by the Moscow Soviet government on Archangel, and an increased anti-Ally attitude on the part of the Archangel authorities delegated here from Moscow.

If, however, the anticipated British occupation of this city does not occur, I believe that the United States, by taking up the opportunity offered by the present free hand given the local food commissariat, could reach a working agreement with it that would eventually enable the Allies to maintain armed force here to form a rallying point for the scattered and weak Russian spirits that may still rally for a struggle against Germany. Such a peaceful creation of a "nucleus" or "rallying point" would have a much more far-reaching effect throughout the mass of the Russian populace than the forcible establishment of such a "nucleus" by an occupationary or expeditionary force can possibly have.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

---

File No. 861.00/2589

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 29

ARCHANGEL, July 22, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of July 20, the British Consul learned that two parties of Allied subjects, soldiers and sailors, including one officer, had been captured by the Bolsheviks near Archangel and were then in the city. It was added that they were to be shot the following morning. In order to verify this report and save the men should it prove well-founded, the British Consul, the French Consul, and myself immediately proceeded to the railroad station across the river to the special train in which was living People's Commissar Kedrov, who is at Archangel under special authority granted him as one of the Council of People's Commissars and is in full charge of all Soviet

activities here. It would appear that the facts of the matter are these, based on the statement made by Kedrov and afterwards partially verified through other sources in the city. About July 15 a Serbian soldier and a Canadian soldier from Kem were arrested near the Nikolski monastery a few miles west of the Dvina River delta. These two men, it is stated, bore false Russian passports and both spoke Russian perfectly, both being the sons of Russian mothers, and brought up in Russia. It is said the two admitted, probably under considerable pressure, that they had been sent by the British military at Kem to discover likely spots along the coast for "agitators" to land. They further are said to have declared that in a few days a small boat would come from Kem to take them back. The Russians lay in wait for this boat and stopped it when it came by a blank shot from a large armed yacht, the *Gorislava*. From the small boat from Kem, a former Russian tug, the *Mitrofan*, were taken a sub-lieutenant of the British Navy and five sailors from H.M.S. *Attentive*, all in uniform.

Commissar Kedrov admitted that the men had been arrested but stated that they were not to be shot as he had decided to send them to Moscow. The way in which he said this left us to understand that he considered he was justified in having the men summarily executed had he so deemed best, and that he had, in fact, thought of so doing but had changed his mind. As agreed upon among us, the British Consul immediately declared that, as there was a state of peace between Great Britain and Serbia on one side and Russia on the other, it would have been unjustifiable, since in peace time espionage (the charge against the men) was not judiciable by court-martial but was for trial by civil criminal law unless the accused was a member of the army or a subject of the nation against which the act was committed. Kedrov claimed there were precedents for the contrary and went on to reproach the British with having acted in even a more flagrant way than the shooting of two spies caught red-handed; namely, in having arrested three members of a local government organ during one of its sessions and summarily executing them. He referred, of course, to the alleged shooting of the three members of the Kem County Council of Workmen's Deputies. He went on to declare that experience had shown that every time a local body, against the wish of the central authority, had invited outside aid, the outsider had soon made himself master and had overthrown the body which invited him in. He cited the Ukraine, the Caucasus, made some vague reference to Japan, and ended by saying that the recent events in Kem and on the west coast of the White Sea had justified that theory, as the British and French "had proven themselves no better than the Germans" (his exact

words). He then cited the events, in proof of his statement, that were mentioned in my despatch of July 19<sup>1</sup> . . . . He said an almost *de facto* state of war existed there.

On the British Consul's requesting an interview with the men, Kedrov declined, stating that it was necessary to keep the men's statements secret "in order to forestall other events." He did, however, give the names of as many of them as he had at hand in his car, and stated that had he decided to shoot them he would have allowed them an interview with their Consul the night before their execution.

It is learned to-day that the men were sent to Moscow yesterday. Before their departure they were allowed to receive food from the British Consulate.

It is significant that not only does the name of America rarely appear in the newspaper diatribes and in the poster proclamations against the "foreign invaders," the "imperialistic vultures," etc., etc., but that Kedrov also failed to mention America in his remarks about the Allies and the Germans above quoted. In fact he did not use the word "Allies" at all, confining himself always to either "England," "France" or "Anglo-French" and "Franco-English."

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/3018

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1120

VOLOGDA, July 22, 1918.

[Received October 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of telegrams exchanged between the Embassy and the Consul at Archangel regarding an order issued by the representative of the Council of People's Commissars, Kedrov, while at Archangel, concerning the prohibition of the entrance of foreign warships into the port of Archangel.

Kedrov, who is one of the most violent and unscrupulous members of the Bolshevik Party, was sent to Archangel for the purpose of strengthening the power of the local Soviet there, which, prior to his arrival, had been showing signs of pro-Ally sentiment, and in connection with which mission he issued the order contained in Mr. Cole's telegram to the Embassy No. 103 of June 23, 1918 (enclosure No. 1.)<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 498.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see the Consul's telegram of June 21, 5 a. m., *ante*, p. 486.

Upon receipt of this telegram I called a conference of my colleagues, at which a reply was agreed upon, the text of which is embodied in my telegram No. 78 of June 26, 1918, to Mr. Cole (enclosure No. 2.)<sup>1</sup> The Department will note that it is specifically stated in my telegram that this statement should not be given out as coming from the Ambassadors, but as an expression from the Consuls at Archangel. This instruction was carried out as given and the announcement was made as coming from the Consuls themselves. I deemed it expedient to handle the matter in this way rather than have Mr. Cole take up the question direct with the local Archangel civil authorities, as suggested in his telegram No. 105 of June 24 (enclosure No. 3).<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after the publication of this Allied statement, Kedrov left Archangel returning to Moscow by way of Vologda. During his short stay in Vologda he spent his time in exhorting the local Soviet against the Allies and removed from office the mayor and assistant mayor, both of whom having been elected prior to the Bolshevik revolution of November last were not in sympathy with the Soviet government or methods.

Kedrov passed through Vologda two days ago, *en route* to Archangel, apparently to endeavor once more to hearten the local Soviet, which is again showing signs of weakening under pressure of pro-Ally sentiment in the surrounding districts.

I am informed by my Italian colleague that disturbances have recently broken out in the vicinity of Archangel, during which members of local Bolshevik organizations have been killed, and apparently Kedrov's mission is an attempt to stem what would appear to be a general tide of pro-Ally sentiment following the distribution of food from the two British ships mentioned in my No. 121 of April 24, 1918.<sup>3</sup>

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Consul at Archangel (Cole)*

VOLOGDA, June 26, 1918, 11 p. m.

78. French Ambassador and I agree that letters of Commissaires and Executive Committee should be given newspapers and have concurred in following statement which British Consulate here also wiring to British Consul, Archangel, with discretionary instructions:

The communications received by the American, British and French Consuls at Archangel concerning war vessels are somewhat surprising when viewed

<sup>1</sup> Printed *post* as enclosure.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 472.

*vis-à-vis* with the efforts of those countries to send supplies to remedy the scarcity of food in the northern provinces as well as to give sustenance to Russian war prisoners who are being returned from the Central Empires in emaciated condition and to minister to the necessities of Russian children. The American Red Cross has distributed thousands of cans of condensed milk and has more supplies *en route*. The Young Men's Christian Association which recently lost 150 tons of supplies by the wreck of the steamship *Wrexham* has additional food and medicines *en route* and is constantly shipping supplies to Russia. We know that the American Ambassador has cabled to America to send to Archangel immediately 10,000 tons of flour within thirty days and 10,000 additional within thirty days thereafter and is attempting to have agricultural implements shipped and other commodities needed by Russia. We are also aware that England and France would ship food or certainly medical supplies and manufactured goods if the safe arrival thereof could be assured. The war vessels of the Allied powers are the only protection such shipments can have from German submarines; consequently our surprise at the issuance of this order by the Soviet authorities.

Furthermore the British and French Governments shipped to Archangel when they were Allies of Russia's Government and before the Brest treaty great quantities of munitions and other supplies which those governments have been endeavoring to have returned to the armies which need them especially since the Soviet government has attempted to repudiate the obligations therefor. The position of those governments is that they do not relinquish their claims on these supplies notwithstanding the strenuous efforts being made for their evacuation from Archangel. They claim the right to reserve liberty of action to take such measures as appear to them conformable to their interests.

The others of the Allies who have not received the preceding document, notably, Italy and Japan, we are confident consider themselves as jointly bound and will act in accord with America, France and Great Britain.

This should not be given as statement of ambassadors but as expression from consuls although not signed; probably interview from dean of these consuls.

Show British Consul who may concur possibly without consulting Lockhart to whom copy sent by British Consulate here.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2428a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Archangel (Cole)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1918, 3 p. m.

Convey following message to American Ambassador by hand if no other sure and confidential means of communication exists:

Nothing from you since July 11. Latest message from Moscow reporting your movements is dated July 25, sent via wireless to Paris. Department has noted your reply July 15 to request that Allied missions remove to Moscow. For your information the Red Cross is sending some 4,000 tons of medicines and foodstuffs to Archangel next month. This Government has also consented to send a small force of American troops to Murmansk but will not take part in any expedition into Russia from that port. Spare no effort to keep Department advised of your movements. Have cabled you fully and frequently but assume messages have been largely interrupted.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2416

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, July 31, 1918.

[Received August 6, 11.55 a. m.]

Commissariat Foreign Affairs informs Allied representatives Moscow under date July 30 that—

In view of situation on White Sea, reinforced defense has been established on its shores and no vessel, boat, or ship of any kind will under any circumstances whatsoever be permitted to land or to set passengers ashore. Should any such attempt be made they will be fired upon by the coast defense.

POOLE

---

Occupation of Archangel by Allied Forces, August 2, 1918<sup>2</sup>—Overthrow of the Soviet and Formation of the Supreme Government of the Northern Region—Relations with the Allied and American Diplomatic Representatives and Military Authorities—Arrival of American Troops, September 4, 1918

File No. 119.2/469

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 1, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 2, 7 a. m.]

343. Your 218, 220, 221, 228, and circular July 11, 8 a. m.,<sup>3</sup> from London delivered last midnight. Stopped here because wire communication with Vologda severed. Your 221 undecipherable. Please repeat groups. No advice from General Poole<sup>4</sup> who arrives Archangel to-morrow with force of about 1,700 and whose landing will be resisted if Bolsheviks still in control. When will American troops arrive here and how many? Think important their coming be expedited with all haste possible.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2405

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 2, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 3, 7.47 p. m.]

344. Arrived Murman 10 p. m., July 31, and came aboard *Olympia* where have been since. When left Kandalaksha thought would re-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4674) ; by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> See also vol. I, chap. xiii.

<sup>3</sup> None printed.

<sup>4</sup> Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Poole commanding the British forces in north Russia.



turn to-day and possibly go thence on the same boats to Archangel where anti-Bolshevik *coup d'état* arranged for 31st; not that I had any connection therewith, quite the contrary, as thought no Allied chiefs should be there when occurred. Allied forces due Archangel under Poole this evening but landing resisted if Bolsheviks still control, otherwise not. Do not know character or object of opposition nor what government it will establish if successful, consequently shall [make] no recommendation until better informed; cannot be worse than Soviet, with whom Allies cannot possibly afford to even cooperate. Bolshevik success in Russia would be menace to all orderly governments, ours not excepted, and would in my judgment impair the foundations of society itself; the guiding impulse is class hatred and it looks contemptuously on the sacredness of the family as well as the inviolability of person and property. I believe in division of land and that tillers of the soil should own it and that state should apportion same at extremely moderate compensation to present holders on easy terms but not in confiscation absolute.

Germany, disappointed in France, thanks to our timely action, will now turn to Russia and organize fighting front which the Allies should oppose with forces numbering minimum of 25,000 provisioned and equipped for winter; such force would attract 100,000 Russians, possibly more, but 5,000 or 10,000 Allied troops would be ineffectual in moral influence, while it might hold Murman and Archangel winter. No time for delay and am contemplating sending Riggs or Ruggles to Paris probably with French and British officers to acquaint War Council with Russian situation; they will not leave however before seeing Poole and ascertaining his views and plans nor before I see your cables accumulated here where cable manager says frightful congestion prevails; estimates over 200 for embassies and consulates and promises us some at 4 p. m. to-day as expecting twelve additional men from Alexandrovsk to assist in relieving congestion.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2409

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 3, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received August 4, 5.05 p. m.]

345. Local Soviet Archangel deposed yesterday with no casualties, so reported by Chaplin, Russian officer commanding anti-Bolshevik forces Archangel, to local agents commissaire Murmansk; Murman Soviet renounced allegiance to central Soviet about six weeks ago. Reported unofficially to-day that Allied forces landed Archangel not only without opposition but were welcomed by people with

flowers and cheers. Trying to establish communication with Poole preparatory for a conference to learn his instructions and plans. Probably return to Kandalaksha to-morrow with Italian and British chiefs of mission.

Understood that Chaplin represents Social Revolutionary government, right and left, also Cadets and Octobrists and Monarchists who have formed organization and designated it "Center," whose bond of union is opposition to Bolshevism.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2419

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Department of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

ARCHANGEL, August 4, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 6, 11.15 a. m.]

83. Government of northern territory formed during night of August 1, containing nine members as follows: seven members of the Constituent Assembly from provinces of Archangel, Vyatka, Vologda, Novgorod, Kazan, Samara, from old northern front, also assistant mayor Vologda city and [vice] president Archangel city Duma, N. V. Chaikovski being president thereof.

City quiet. Pierce and other Americans safe. . . .

COLE

File No. 861.00/2433

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 864

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government have received a communication from Mr. Lindley, His Majesty's representative at Archangel, reporting that the city was occupied by British troops on August 2 without casualties. Mr. Lindley, in reporting this operation, strongly urges the vital necessity for sending out American battalions at the earliest possible moment in order to take full advantage of this success. He adds that it is of no great importance whether the American troops sent are fully trained or not.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to communicate this report to the Secretary of State, and to add that His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will concur in the view expressed as to the urgency of sending American troops.

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1918.

[Received August 7.]

File No. 861.00/2448

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 6, 1918.

[Received August 10, 9.50 a. m.]

88. New government issued following proclamation August 3:

## SUPREME GOVERNMENT NORTHERN TERRITORY

To Citizens Province and City Archangel:

Bolshevik power has fallen. Bolsheviks fled because in hour of their need unsupported by populace which detested them for their betrayal of Russia at Brest Litovsk, for civil war, augmentation of universal famine, destruction of liberties and rights, legalized system of robbery and shooting squads and for their ruination of country's economic, industrial life.

People's representatives elected by universal suffrage now forced to take into their hands governmental authority in northern region because as yet no legal all-Russian government.

These presents bring to common notice that highest governmental authority in northern territory is "Supreme Government of Northern Territory" consisting of delegates to Constituent Assembly, also representatives Zemstvos and cities.

Supreme government undertakes following task: (1) reestablishment of single all-Russian national government by cooperation to that end with other territories, also reestablishment of local self-government in north; (2) defense of north and entire nation against insolent onslaughts on Russian territory and independence of inhabitants made by Germany, Finland, other enemy countries; (3) reunion to Russia of lost districts in accordance with desires of inhabitants thereof; (4) reestablishment of crushed liberties and reestablishment of true organs of popular government, namely Constituent Assembly, Zemstvos, city Dumas; (5) reestablishment of firm administration of justice assuring citizens satisfaction of economic, social, spiritual needs; (6) guarantee that laboring classes may obtain land they are by right entitled to; (7) defense of rights of labor in accordance with economic, political interests of north and Russia as whole; (8) overcome existing famine.

Supreme government will immediately publish orders naturally resulting from above program.

It relies for support on all classes which treasure above objects.

In particular expects to defend north with friendly assistance of governments and peoples allied to Russia: England, America, and France and others. Also counts on Allied assistance against starvation and financial difficulties.

Is convinced Russia's and Allies' interests in struggle against foreign enemy are one and same.

Knows Allied troops come not to interfere in internal affairs and their arrival not against desires of local population. Therefore greets Allied forces entering north to wage contest against common enemy and summons entire population to greet them gladly and assist by every possible means.

Supreme government proclaims above and calls upon people to maintain calm, order and pursue its labors.

*Members Supreme Government Northern Territory:* Chaikovski,  
Member Constituent Assembly from Vyatka Province; Ivanov,  
same, Archangel; [Maslov], same, Vologda; Gukovski, same,

Novgorod; Martyushin, same, Kazan; Diedusenko, same, Samara; Likhach, same, former northern front; Zubov, Assistant Mayor, City Vologda; Startsev, Vice President, Archangel City Duma.

ARCHANGEL, August 2.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2429½

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State .*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 6, 1918.

[Received August 8, 12.26 p. m.]

89. New government issues following orders: (1) appointing commander in chief Russian forces military and naval; (2) abolishing all organs so-called Soviet government and ordering arrest all Soviet commissars, committees, officials, etc.; (3) appointing government commissars for provinces and counties; (4) appointing governmental committees in provinces and counties, consisting commissar as above and representative from Zemstvo and city, making three in committee; (5) reestablishing municipal governments and Zemstvos, latter both provincial, county and township; (6) empowering local self-government organs control food supply, maintaining so far as possible existing apparatus but cleansing from Bolshevik elements; (7) reestablishing judicial apparatus; (8) reestablishing freedom press, conscience, meeting and speech; (9) reestablishing free existence, activity cooperative associations, labor unions, organizations to further the prosecution of war, etc.; (10) denationalizing transportation, financial and industrial institutions.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2727

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 31

ARCHANGEL, August 6, 1918.

[Received September 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Allied Embassies which had arrived from Vologda set sail from this port on Monday, the 29th of July, and that the days immediately following their departure were extremely quiet except for a noticeable feverish activity in the various Bolshevik headquarters.

The White Sea military district staff had already completely evacuated to Vologda and the control of the city and region had passed from the hands of the Civil Provincial Executive Committee

to the Council of Defense of the region consisting of the commander, Colonel Potapov, a prominent member of the Provincial Executive Committee, his military political commissar, and one other. This body was busy perfecting plans for the defense of the city and for its destruction in case evacuation should become necessary.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of August 1 all Allied consuls in Archangel received a note from the Council of Defense which read as follows:

The Council of Defense of the Archangel region informs you herewith that after bombarding the city of Onega, British troops have occupied it. The Council of Defense requests a prompt reply giving your interpretation of this act and stating whether or not you consider it to be the opening of hostilities against the Russian Federated Republic of Soviets or as a misunderstanding. Measures have been taken to resist the landing.

The French Consul and myself replied evasively and I expressed my surprise at the receipt of the letter inasmuch as the American consular service is a civil and not a military institution and that my government was not called into question by the alleged act. I concluded by saying that the United States had never and did not now have any intention of warring with Russia and furthermore I could not consider the possibility of war between America and Russia.

Incidentally, the Acting Belgian Consul, who is a Russian subject, was unable to reply since he had fled from the city.

During the entire forenoon of this day the city was calm, the only sign of anything unusual being the small number of persons on the streets. All the ferries crossing the river were crowded, although the evacuation proper did not begin until late in the afternoon, at which time an Allied aeroplane flew over the city and the news came out that the Allied naval forces by the valuable aid of aircraft had captured the batteries which are situated on an island in the mouth of the river entrance to the harbor of Archangel.

From then on, the Bolsheviks hurried their evacuation which reached its height at 10 in the evening and was completed by midnight.

I remained in the Consulate during the greater part of the day and in the afternoon and evening did not leave the office until arrested. About two hours previous to the arrest, which took place at 11 in the evening, a secret message was received warning us that all Allied Consuls were to be arrested in a few minutes. Consul Pierce and myself thereupon placed the codes beside an open stove with a bottle of kerosene and a constantly burning candle in preparation

for immediate destruction in case of necessity and gave directions that any one demanding entrance should be detained in conversation at the door.

After waiting about an hour and a half in expectation of immediate arrest, members of the Young Men's Christian Association called and announced that there were but few soldiers on the street all hastening to the river front there to embark on any available craft. This led us to believe that the news of our intended arrest was a false rumor and Consul Pierce left the Consulate to reconnoiter with the intention of returning in a half hour to report on the progress of the evacuation.

He had scarcely left the office when some officers from the commander's staff wearing Caucasian uniforms arrived in an automobile to make the arrest. The codes were hastily burned and after packing some necessary clothes together I was escorted to a modern mansion in the center of the city where I found the British Consul and Vice Consul, the French Consul, and a number of French and British officers. We were given to understand that we were imprisoned by the commander's staff, which while pretending to be Bolshevik, was proceeding in the interests of the Allies. During the night the Caucasians brought in the commander himself and a safe containing 4,500,000 rubles belonging to the Bolshevik staff. We were released at 11 o'clock of the following morning by N. V. Chaikovski, who is at the present time at the head of the local government.

It is now apparent that the Caucasians were adventurers pure and simple, acting, after the evacuation commenced, solely to obtain the above-mentioned sum of money and that the consuls were arrested in order to guarantee the persons of the adventurers, to be held as hostages or likely to assure and prove loyalty to whichever party might obtain permanent control.

Consul Pierce returned to the Consulate shortly after my arrest and not knowing the exact nature of the arrest remained on the streets until 6 in the morning, when, after learning the details, he reentered the Consulate and awaited my return.

Later in the day of August the 2d, at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the American Consular Corps went down the river in a tug-boat to meet the incoming Allied military and naval officials which were greeted by the Russians along the shore with cheers, blowing of whistles, and the waving of handkerchiefs.

The landing of the Allied officials was received by an armed guard of counter-revolutionists and a procession was made through the streets filled with cheering people to the new government headquarters where expressions of good will on both sides and short speeches were made to the people.

Consul Pierce and myself desire to mention Y. M. C. A. secretaries Hofstra and Craig and a courier from the Consulate General in Moscow . . . for the excellent manner in which they stood by and the courage they showed during the above-mentioned critical period.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/2479

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 10, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received August 13, 6.10 a. m.]

356. Diplomatic Corps still on boats attempting to find domiciles. Poole says promised 5,000 American troops this month and when asked by whom replied War Council, Paris. Bierer with 50 blue-jackets only American forces here. Would appreciate information about coming American forces and their disposition. Nothing from you since your August 3, 7 p. m., received as leaving Murman. Sent card Chaikovski, president of the supreme government of the northern region, who called to-day bringing Minister of Finance; financing new government difficult problem. Think it will request Allied assistance. Was also visited by Minister of War who says new government represents all Russian parties except Bolsheviks and pro-Germans, and formed for resurrecting Russia and resisting Germany; that of ten members composing new administration, nine were elected to the Constituent Assembly; that similar movement started in Samara, also in Siberia and that thorough understanding between such new governments which are energetically extending their respective jurisdiction.

Nothing about conditions in Moscow nor the attitude of Soviet government toward the Allies or Allied representatives as no communication with interior. Have you any?

Indications of friction between Allied military authority and new civil government which diplomats endeavoring to prevent.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2738

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, August 19, 1918.

[Received September 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith translation of a number of orders<sup>1</sup> issued by the "supreme government of the northern re-

<sup>1</sup>Not printed; see telegram No. 88 of Aug. 6 from the Consul at Archangel, ante, p. 508.

gion" decreeing the construction and operation of the new government.

It will be seen from these orders that in principle there is a reversion to the general form of government during the Kerensky régime, using the Zemstvo and municipal Duma organizations as a base, with the addition of an appointed commissar who will exercise rather arbitrary powers in connection with the other representatives in each [the] government; however, at the present time, this is probably necessary in order to exert some positive control of the functioning of such representatives, the government being in its primitive stage. Because of the impossibility at the present time of holding elections to determine the representatives from the Zemstvo and municipal organizations, they too are, of necessity, selected by the leaders of the present new government. This form of government, on the whole, should and undoubtedly will appeal to the majority of the people, who have not forgotten the practical efficiency of the Zemstvo organizations nor their actual popular representation.

I will keep the Department informed both by despatch and by cable as to the future changes in the form of this government together with pertinent comment thereon.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2615

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received September 2, 5.50 a. m.]

366. Nothing from you since unnumbered July 30,<sup>1</sup> except unnumbered cable August 3<sup>2</sup> received 4th, Murman, approving decision remaining Russia and Reuter [statement] 4th received August 17 and Department confirmation thereof August 22.<sup>3</sup> Sending this by courier to Murman as Archangel-Murman cable overloaded and efficiency impaired by conflicting currents from magnetic pole.

Quiet here, where not exceeding 200 [2,000?] Allied soldiers under Poole, who has expeditions 100 miles south on Vologda Railroad and 200 miles up Dvina River toward Kotlas, but is awaiting reinforcements before attempting further advance. Poole expects 4,800 Americans here September 15 and 1,000 British September 1, says is confident that whatever troops opposing his are under German instruction as none but experienced men could [handle] machine and aerial guns with which enemy seems to be equipped.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 504.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 625.

<sup>3</sup> Statement of Aug. 3, regarding military action in Russia, *ante*, p. 328.



Of 50 American bluejackets 25 were sent up Dvina in a party of 300 August 13, three Americans detailed with Garstin expedition on branch of Dvina, one Pescke, slightly wounded, returned to Archangel. Garstin [to be?] buried 24th with military honors, forces [British] officer well known to Embassy staff.

Department's official announcement of Siberian policy, although mystifying on first reading, appears admirably adapted to Russian situation and pleases [omission]; resulting Japanese statement which was received before receipt of declaration and consequently was obscure when [not?] read in connection with ours, was quite [omission] Russian Government. I shall endeavor to follow policy outlined when American troops arrive.

Meantime American, French and Italian chancelleries assigned quarters in governor's mansion. I have secured comfortable apartment and have attendant on [omission] invitations tea afternoon 24th to the officials of the new government to meet Allied chiefs and General Poole and staff and other Allied military missions. [Embassy] staff consists of Johnston, McClelland, Groves and the Misses Woodworth, Knox, Struve with Military Attaché Ruggles, Lieutenant Kliefoth and two assistants. Riggs left 20th instant for Paris on his urgent request approved by Ruggles and myself to acquaint War Council, Paris, with Russian situation and the necessity for prompt reinforcements. His return expected in one month.

Captain Bierer returned to Murman 17th instant with Admiral Kemp.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2621

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 25, 1918.

[Received September 2, 2.47 a. m.]

369. I gave informal copy of Department's declaration on Russian relations to President new government. Just received following reply:

After the receipt from you [of] copy [of] communication [of] your government to press, 4th August, transmitted by Reuter, its contents were put before sovereign government, northern region, for its consideration. As result this sovereign government asked me [to] inform you [of] its conclusions.

Sovereign government shares fully your government's opinion regarding rôle of Allied armed forces in Russia under present conditions. It welcomes with a particular pleasure the readiness of your government to help us in reconstructing our own army for suc-

cessful struggle against our common enemy as well as in reorganization of our national government for one whole Russia and so far as it would be acceptable for the Russian people. This help of Allied powers seems to us essential for interests of Allied cause and is guarantee of sincerely friendly future relations between us and Allies in general, and between American and Russian democracies in particular. We fully appreciate your government's decisive declaration regarding its intention not to break the sovereignty of Russia and abstain from any interference into internal affairs our country. Such disinterested decision on part [of] your government appears to us proof of its deep and truly statesmanlike understanding of interests of Allied cause in Russia, success of which depends to great extent on unanimous enthusiasm of population and on its full confidence towards Allies. We are quite certain any attempt to exercise any political pressure or interfere in governing of country would provoke among population, not the strengthening of its true patriotism, but either protest and resistance, or in the best case indifference to regeneration of our motherland.

With a feeling of sadness we must state that the true interests of Allied cause and the ways of effectively helping Russia in her present conditions are not equally understood by all the Allies. Still we hope that the organized efforts of the interested parties will result, in the near future, in a full unity of the opinions in this question and in a complete accord of the united actions.

The sovereign government evidently is pointing out that the humane and leading part in this uniting of the views [for] arrival at true interpretation of the interests of the Allied cause in Russia will belong to the Government of the United States.

Chaikovski, replying to my request that [when] his reply published last two foregoing paragraphs be omitted as would injure government and embarrass me, said reply not be published here. Just attended meeting Russo-American committee for closer commercial relations and made speech noncommittal except anti-German.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2944

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 1207

ARCHANGEL, August 27, 1918.

[Received October 15.]

SIR: . . . In default of instructions to the contrary I shall, to the extent of my authority, encourage American troops if and when landed, to proceed to such points in the interior as Kotlas, Sukhona, and Vologda, as at those places, as well as in Petrograd and Moscow, are stored war supplies which the Soviet government, in violation of its promises and agreements, transferred from Archangel. Furthermore, I shall encourage American troops to obey the

commands of General Poole in his effort to effect a junction with the Czecho-Slovaks and to relieve them from the menace which surrounds them; that menace is nominally Bolshevik but is virtually inspired and directed by Germany. . . .

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2620

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 3, 9.45 a. m.]

374. Situation exceedingly difficult, but not impossible in my judgment. New government claims jurisdiction over six provinces but freedom of action limited exclusively to territory occupied by Allied forces, of which have reminded government in my effort to reconcile it to orders issued by military authorities without previous consultation. Friction invariably accompanies exercise of military and civil authority over same territory. British military complain because some Russians suspicious of British and French intentions and resent foreign domination. Have started report that America disapproves presence of Allied forces and has demanded their departure within two days; it appears that different construction placed on Department's declaration of August 3 from what was intended and some charge discord between America and other Allies. Furthermore new government is opposed by monarchists and extreme revolutionists who mistake [miss?] no opportunity to undermine it. I think new government should be encouraged and strengthened in every way possible as its overthrow would prolong civil dissension and greatly strengthen Bolsheviks and perpetuate Soviet government. I have taken this position with my colleagues who unanimously expressed agreement therewith and said they were cooperating. The new government claims understanding with sober [Social Revolutionist?] movement in Samara and with new Siberian government.

It is reported that American troops will arrive within three days and I hope report true as their presence would be effective answer to false rumors and would probably reconcile new government to exercise military authority. General Poole's orders are meant to strengthen new government by repressing opposition thereto but new officials claim they have no authority and are being effaced by military rule. If Allied forces were not here Bolsheviks would drive into Arctic Ocean all new government officials and supporters not caught and shot.

Courier from American Consul, Samara, arrived 30th. Left Samara August 3 for Vologda where he arrived 15th and remained few hours, long enough to learn that Bolshevik troops shooting ten men daily without trial because suspected of counter-revolutionary sentiments. Some days ago reports courier from Allied Consuls, Ekaterinburg, who arrived Archangel 24th, fifty men, four women, interned as hostages, were shot in cold blood including women on approach Czechs. More later, as holding daily conferences with colleagues and new government officials.

Tell Mott<sup>1</sup> Russia great field. Food supplies work of his association but men of experience and judgment required including educators and send same immediately with supplies as food situation is critical.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2638

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 3, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 6, 5.07 p. m.]

379. Situation complicated, requires adroit handling, comparatively few *bourgeois* here or in northern provinces where Provisional Government officials continued to function months after Bolshevik revolution, and would have remained in undisturbed possession if Bolshevik rule had not become inconsiderate and cruel throughout Russia. Central Soviet sent Commissaire Kedrov here who arrested non-Bolshevik members City Duma, taking them Moscow and committed many outrages, thus embittering the people, majority of whom had accepted anti-bourgeois instincts. Meantime many secret organizations had been formed throughout Russia, but most or all suppressed by Soviet killing leaders without trial or by German bribing or by personal jealousies. The French were prompt to encourage and financially assist every anti-Bolshevik movement. French Ambassador went from Vologda to Moscow in June telling me object of his visit was to confer with French officials and nationals there; have since learned that he proposed to a nonpolitical organization called the Center that triumvirate should be named to administer affairs after Bolshevik deposed, and demanded as two members thereof Savinkov and Chernov, the promoters to select the third, which proposition killed that movement about middle June as leaders

---

<sup>1</sup> John R. Mott, general secretary of the National War Work Council of the Y. M. C. A.

said were distrustful of Savinkov whom considered murderer, and that Chernov reformed Bolshevik, unworthy of trust. They did not tell French Ambassador this, but so expressed themselves to my informant.

About July 10 when Chicherin and Radek trying to move Allied missions to Moscow, British captain visited me Vologda and stated Archangel ripe for revolution. My No. 355 [350] narrated movements from Vologda and causes thereof until landed Archangel, see instruction [telegram 355?] of August 9.<sup>1</sup> Found new government here but realize same would not have succeeded if Allied forces had not landed, neither would it survive if Allied troops taken away. Have had frequent conferences with new government which is profuse in complaints against military, claiming that orders issued by latter belittle the new government and impair its influence.

New Ministry talks irrationally about Russian laws demanding that French Colonel appointed military governor of Archangel city by Poole be removed, and that order issued by him with Poole's approval be rescinded. An order which was meant for protection of new government requires militia to arrest anyone accused by a citizen of Bolshevik propaganda and take accused and accuser to authorities. I told President when he came to my apartment about midnight complaining of order that there was nothing objectionable therein; in fact such is law in America. The President is theorist, if not dreamer.

British who are colonizers by instinct and practice, and in control Archangel port since war began are disposed to treat the government contemptuously, but I remonstrate, arguing that must avoid repetition of German experience in Ukraine.

Furthermore, overthrow of this government would prolong civil dissension, strengthen Soviet government and Bolsheviks generally, and would injure Allied cause. This government repudiates Brest treaty and is mobilizing army to fight Germany, consequently is our ally and should be protected and encouraged. Do not understand that I recommend recognition now, but if, as government claims is contemplated, union with similar movement in Siberia is effected, then we could recognize. If, however, people believe that we come as conquerors they will recklessly resist.

Three American battalions expected here to-morrow and their landing will not only strengthen my position, but go a long way toward reconciling Russians. I do not know what instructions these troops have, but if General Poole asks my approval I shall not object to his sending them to the interior in accordance with objects set forth in the Department's declaration of August 3.

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 631.

Have been reading American papers on Allied intervention in Russia and see that sentiment is divided; I realize enormous responsibility of the President and the Department and I am aware of conflicting appeals and influences to which you are subjected; and I highly appreciate confidence manifested in my efforts cable communication in reply as you have been advised [*sic*]. Observe President considering sending commission to Siberia but hope if sent will be instructed to confer with me before adopting policy. Imperative send [provisions?] here or Murman. I would appreciate it if experienced men should accompany same for distribution under my direction or with my approval.

No reply to my telegram No. 364, August 13, 8 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> recommending authority to join British and French in guaranteeing 15,000,000 ruble loan of new government, guaranty secured by merchandise.

[Information] anxiously awaited concerning vessel with 4,000 tons supplies mentioned in your unnumbered telegram July 30.<sup>2</sup>

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2648

---

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 4, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received September 7, 7.36 p. m.]

381. Lindley says 3,000 tons flour will arrive from England 10th September and 6,000 tons additional about the 15th. I hoped we would be first to report food shipments.

About 4,800 American troops on three transports arrived here to-day, Colonel Stewart commanding.

Naval Lieutenant Riis also arrived on transport not touching Murman where he had orders to report from Admiral Strauss but no official designated in order. He brought two boiler makers with orders to report to *Olympia*. Riis speaks Russian and Esthonian. I have designated him acting naval attaché until otherwise instructed.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2645

---

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 8, 2.52 p. m.]

385. July 6, agreement signed, Murman, between [by?] England, America and France represented respectively by Poole, Bierer and

---

<sup>1</sup>Vol. III, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup>*Ante*, p. 504.

Petit, French naval captain, with Murman Soviet.<sup>1</sup> I suppose Department duly advised. Department never informed me of agreement, but when I was on *Olympia* cable was received from Navy Department or probably Admiral Sims approving Bierer's action. Agreement binds Allies to supply Murman region with foodstuffs including workmen and their families to [omission] extent possible and "to accord Murman region council necessary financial assistance, amount, form, and conditions of which to be decided by further agreement." Object of agreement was to effect unresisted landing Allied forces and induce local Soviet to renounce allegiance to Central Soviet, Moscow.

Poole left Murman for Archangel July 31, leaving Maynard in command. No money ever paid by Allies and only 1,200 tons flour furnished by England. It appears no workmen paid since June, some since January. Representative Murman council has been here a week demanding 32,000,000 rubles concerning which he has had several conferences with American, French, British and Italian chiefs. To-day agreed to accept 5,000,000 rubles to appease striking workmen. Maynard arrived to-day, reports situation Murman serious if workmen's claims ignored longer. Chiefs agree subject to the approval of governments to pay Maynard for distribution among workmen 5,000,000 [rubles] on condition Allied representatives supervise distribution money, and further condition that management of Murman Railway be controlled by Allies.

Murman region includes Alexandrovsk and Kem districts, and the Murman council negotiating for a union with sovereign government here. Another condition of 5,000,000 ruble advance and future advances is that sovereign government guarantee repayment or adding same to Russian war debt. Maynard returns to Murman 7th taking 5,000,000 [rubles] furnished by French Ambassador. The Italian and the Serbian Governments informed representatives here that [they?] approve aforesaid agreement. Shall I concur and obligate Government to pay our share? Railroad never constructed properly, requires much reconstruction, but essential for transporting men and supplies for which road now almost exclusively used. The Allies control to Soroka about 360 miles from Arctic coast. Do not see how we can decline participation. Answer. No reply to my 364,<sup>2</sup> asking authority of guarantee with the British and French 15,000,000 ruble loan secured by 20,000,000 [rubles] worth merchandise.

New government experiencing financial difficulties. It appears England has cabled [garbled group] proposing plan for holding [building] up reserve in London to secure note issue by new govern-

<sup>1</sup> For text of agreement, see *ante*, p. 493.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III, p. 58.

ment.<sup>1</sup> I see no objection thereto except fear reserve inadequate and can see no reason why such reserve should be confined to London and not include New York for whatever rubles we purchase for our requirements here.

FRANCIS

---

Coup d'état of September 5, 1918; Restoration of the Deposed Government through Efforts of the American Ambassador—Protest of the American Government against the Conduct of the British Commander in Chief—Plan of the Reinstated Ministers to Resign in Favor of the Samara Government: Efforts of the American Ambassador to Dissuade Them

File No. 861.00/2646

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 6, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 8, 9.30 p. m.]

386. After reviewing with General Poole Italian, American soldiers at 10, told me that revolution had taken place during the night and that President and six Ministers of new government been put upon steamer at 2 o'clock and now *en route* to Solovetski Monastery 30 hours distant where ministers be confined. When asked if movement resisted Poole replied no, as government had no forces for resistance. It appears that Captain Chaplin, commander Russian soldiers and as such reporting to Poole, also controls municipal militia or police, had ordered ministry arrested and deported. I asked Poole if he knew such action contemplated. Reply was that he heard rumors thereof and wrote note to Chaplin advising against it. This conversation on steps of government building where Poole and I received salute of American troops. Seeing Chaplin I beckoned to him and demanded explanation. Chaplin said he had driven out the Bolsheviki and had permitted new government installation but administration composed of eight ministers including one Archangel citizen had shown itself inefficient by permitting Bolshevik propaganda and given permission for public meetings in opposition to expressed will of Poole. The latter had said Chaplin intended issuing proclamation immediately announcing government deposed and appointing Startsev manager of civil affairs of northern region.

Leaving Chaplin I joined Poole who was talking with Stewart and other American officers and told Poole to permit no proclamation from Chaplin until submitting same to Allied chiefs whom I requested to assemble my apartment at 12 o'clock. They came with Poole who had secured copies of two proclamations signed by Chaplin. Diplomatic conference consisted French, Italian,

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, pp. 66 and 67.



British, American chiefs. I opened conference by stating Chaplin's action was outrageous usurpation of power and insult to diplomatic chiefs; no disagreement. When this statement being expressed, I proposed that Poole be requested to prevent Chaplin and Startsev from functioning and prohibit circulation of the proclamation. Both propositions met approval and Poole agreed to execute same.

Meantime representatives of the cooperatives were awaiting audience with me in an outer room having stated to Cole whose attendance [*sic*] I saw that news of *coup d'état* was rapidly gaining circulation and was promoting great excitement as suspected of being monarchist movement and cooperatives desired to know whether sanction from London or Paris or Washington. I proposed that cooperatives be shown in but my colleagues preferred that I go and talk with them taking Cole to interpret. I left conference and think convinced cooperatives that Allies were not a party to *coup d'état*. This consumed half an hour. Returning to conference I asked Poole opinion of arresting Chaplin and found him very much opposed thereto as thought Chaplin sole reliance to organize Russian army as Chaplin only Russian believing Russians fighting. Cooperatives had said that *coup d'état* was monarchical and if something was not done to convince the people especially those [of sawmill] villages that Allies not fostering movement bloody civil war might ensue. Poole objecting to Chaplin arrest, it was agreed that ministers should be brought back to Archangel and Poole, consenting thereto, as [said] would catch steamer by wireless if possible, if not would send a destroyer. Thereupon conference adjourned till 5 p. m. when Chaplin and Startsev requested to be present.

Later nine representatives of Zemstvos called and presented protest against overthrow of the new government saying as cooperatives had affirmed that if anything done to perpetuate or support Chaplin act, life of the district would immediately cease and sanguinary strife would follow. I convinced cooperatives and Zemstvos that Allied diplomats disapproved *coup d'état* but cooperatives, while accepting my statement that my colleagues knew nothing of Chaplin plans, expressed themselves as suspicious of British and French military officers and evidently doubted Poole's sincerity.

Colonel Stewart commanding American troops called immediately upon arrival September 4 but mention had no message the particulars [*sic*] and said his only orders were to report to Poole. I have been vainly trying to see him since to explain situation lest he become inoculated by British and French officers who have lost faith in Russians. If Department approves I would appreciate War Department's instructing ranking American officer in Russia to keep close touch with me. More later.

Your telegrams as reported in my No. 373, August 30, 7 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> still missing also 243, 4, and 5. Please repeat those pertaining to policy. Your 246, September 4, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> received to-day via London. Am utilizing Coolidge.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2647

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 7, 1918.

[Received September 9, 6.06 p. m.]

387. Following was promulgated yesterday evening:

The representatives of those of the Allied powers whose troops have arrived in northern Russia, having heard of the kidnaping of the members of the government of the northern region, desire to disclaim all responsibility for this act. They disapprove of violent measures from whichever side they may originate and all the more in that they have come to Russia with hope of seeing established a free régime of order and legality.

The act was carried out by Russians against Russians and is not therefore strictly speaking the concern of the Allies. The representatives of the latter feel, nevertheless, constrained in the special circumstances which exist to see that the arrested members of the government are at once given their liberty and brought back to Archangel. As soon as this has been done it is hoped that an arrangement will be made which will prevent the recurrence of such regrettable incidents and which will unite every Russian of good will in the work of the regeneration of his country.

Meantime the affairs of the district will go on as before. The Allied representatives invite all good Russians to pursue their normal occupations in full confidence that no attack on their liberties will be encouraged by the Allies. Francis, American Ambassador; J. Noulens, *Ambassadeur de France*; Torretta, *Ministre d'Italie*; F. O. Lindley, His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2684

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 8, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 12, 6.07 p. m.]

388. After my 386, September 6, 9 [7] p. m. Chaplin distributed circular order reinstating military governor Archangel who was removed by deposed government. Two ministers, Diedusenko and Ivanov, had escaped arrest and issued incendiary circular inciting people to resist Chaplin government which Startsev, civil governor

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

of Archangel, was supporting. Poole on my request had prohibited Chaplin from issuing proclamations but when people congregated around two contradictory proclamations and read in connection with Ambassadors' proclamation all posted on telegraph poles and walls they were greatly confused. Poole called and concurred in my suggestion that Allied Ambassadors assume control local situation to prevent civil war in rear of Allied front, which extends 60 miles on railroad toward Vologda and about 160 on Dvina toward Kotlas, neither expedition having definite knowledge of strength of Bolsheviks opposing them. Consequently Allied forces numbering not exceeding 9,000 altogether, Americans included, would be in precarious situation with civil war in the rear. Failure of Archangel anti-Bolshevik movement would be deplorable from every viewpoint. It would strengthen Bolshevik government, weaken anti-Bolshevik movement in Samara and Siberia, endanger position of Allied forces throughout Russia. These reasons moved me to aggressively espouse assuming control until return of kidnaped ministers and the restoration of sovereign government, if I can persuade Poole to support it.

I consider *coup d'état* a crime, and if Poole and Kemp would agree I should have its originators arrested. Poole objects because says Chaplin assisted in Bolshevik overthrow and is energetic and decidedly pro-Ally. Allied Ambassadors told Chaplin and Startsev yesterday to cease functioning in any capacity from that moment and they understood thoroughly as I was spokesman and Chaplin fully comprehends English. Proclamation was immediately prepared to the effect that Ambassadors of Allied countries having troops in northern region and the commander had decided to assume control of affairs pending establishment of a constituted government representative of majority of people for the prevention of civil strife in rear of Allied front and to avoid calamity of widespread famine which threatens and for relief of which provisions are being sent from our countries. This proclamation translated into Russian was sent to printers last evening but I was informed after last midnight that the printers refused to work, consequently proclamation not promulgated. Meantime Admiral Kemp reports deposed ministers will return 9 p. m. Allied Ambassadors will meet at my apartment at 6 p. m. to determine future course. Think I shall advocate restoration sovereign government but on conditions enabling military to cooperate without friction. Colonel Stewart yesterday told me one American battalion had gone on railroad and another left by river. Stewart again said only orders he had were to report to General Poole.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2719b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

253. The American Ambassador at Tokyo has been ordered to proceed informally to Vladivostok and report to the Department his views as to how the purpose of the United States to assist Russia may be furthered under the conditions which he will find to exist there. His reports will be for the special information of the Department and his stay at Vladivostok will be unofficial and temporary.

The following supplementary instructions have been sent him to-day: [Here follows telegram to the Ambassador in Japan, dated September 9, 1918, 5 p. m., *ante*, page 372.]

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2680

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 12, 8.42 p. m.]

389. Kidnaped Ministers returned last night and promised representative of Allied Ambassadors would perform no act of government before conferring 11 a. m. to-day, but before that hour issued a proclamation officially signed, stating had been brought back by the Allies and assuring people their rights be protected. President telephoned me of this whereupon I requested him come my apartment to meet Allied Ambassadors, and withhold circulation of the proclamation until workable agreement effected to prevent friction, which continually arose before kidnaping. Ambassadors prepared statement for signature of Chaikovski personally, officially stating kidnaped Ministers been brought back by Allies and promising preservation of people's rights and liberties. Such declaration submitted to Ministers who not disposed to accept but agreed to consider and return 4 p. m. Italian Ambassador and I of one mind. Commissioner Lindley reasonably concurs, but apparently hampered by Poole, who issues orders without submitting to any authority while professing desire to comply with wishes of Ambassadors, especially American Ambassador. French Ambassador and Poole himself are surrounded by military officers who have no patience with Russians and no faith in reorganization of army without mailed fist. Mean-time returned Ministers propose unreasonable conditions. Situa-

tion extremely difficult, but I am assiduously endeavoring to reconcile conflicting opinions and avoid bloodshed.

Returned Ministers assert that British Colonel Thornhill, chief British Intelligence Bureau, was cognizant of kidnaping and assisted in planning same, which Lindley discredits.

I think I have given Colonel Stewart thorough understanding of the situation. He dined with me last night as did Lindley, Poole and Admiral Kemp. I have refrained from giving Stewart orders.

Am hourly receiving delegations, decided majority of which protest against *coup d'état* and threaten armed uprising if sovereign government not restored. These delegations represent peasants, Zemstvos and laborers, who constitute bulk of population; while other side composed of Russian officers claiming to number 500 and wholesale and retail timber organizations and commercial interests generally complain that supreme government is weak, incapable, but opponents represent very small percentage of the people. While sovereign government inexperienced and deficient in comprehending fully the situation, they are supported by overwhelming majority of the people and claim to be working in cooperation with regeneration movements in Samara and Irkutsk. For this reason I am supporting sovereign government and endeavoring to reconcile thereto my colleagues and military authorities.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2683

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *September 9, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[*Received September 13, 7 a. m.*]

390. After second conference of four hours, supreme government Ministers reinstated and they are issuing proclamations so announcing and calling off strikes which were general. They demanded court-martial to try Chaplin and his associates but Ambassadors advised against. This point unsettled. I opposed court-martial because fear would result in revealing that some British and French officers were behind Chaplin, who I think guilty of a crime. Government consent to three additional portfolios and transfers of present ministers to other departments but are firm in opposition to dismissal of any minister. Present Minister of War inexperienced and unable to cooperate with Allied military. Several times to-day bloodshed seemed imminent but was fortunately avoided.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2855

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 41

ARCHANGEL [September 10, 1918].

[Received October 1.]

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report as to the political situation in Archangel before the kidnaping of the members of the sovereign government of the northern territory took place. I think it necessary to make the report even now, after the crisis due to the *coup d'état* has passed, in order to show into what inflammable material the bomb fell.

On the afternoon of August 2, when General Poole and the Allied troops and war vessels entered the city and harbor, there was considerable enthusiasm shown but it was plain to be seen that this enthusiasm was confined to certain classes. The General was greeted on the quay by a guard of honor hastily gotten together and consisting of peasants armed and clothed, as to uniform, in a makeshift way. There was also a large crowd of enthusiastic middle-class persons. Thus the General's landing immediately revealed what classes favored his coming, namely those two classes, the peasantry, and the city "intelligents" and *bourgeois*, who had suffered most under the Bolsheviks. The working class was patently absent. As the General's yacht approached the quay a few tugs whistled but the great majority of tugs and river craft kept silence. During the march of the Allied officers through the streets to the government building the absence of the city working class was even more conspicuous.

The feeling that there was something new in the city, something new about which people were enthusiastic, lasted only a few days. The populace soon sank back into the apathy that had become habitual with it. This apathy continued until the *coup d'état* when the populace became aroused again, but in a very different sense.

After the troops had received the check administered to them at Obozersk by the Bolsheviks the apathy deepened into what almost approached dissatisfaction in some quarters and blame was laid to the Allies for not having brought more troops. The arrival of a food ship in these first days would have done much to relieve the situation but no such ship came.

One of the first orders issued by the Allied military aroused much disapprobation, without at the same time accomplishing much. This was the order forbidding the display of any flags anywhere except the white, blue, and red national ensign, the navy Andreievski cross flag and the Allied flags. What struck the Russian popu-

lace (and it also looked strange to persons who had been in Russia continuously before the Allies' entrance) was the total absence of red flags. It was expected that the Bolshevik emblem, a red flag with white or yellow letters, R.S.F.S.R., would be forbidden but the plain red flag was not a Bolshevik but a universal socialist emblem. As a prominent Menshevik leader, who had been in the Food Supply Ministry under Kerensky, and a prominent local Socialist Revolutionist of the right, who had been in prison under the Bolsheviks for pro-Ally sympathy, said to me: "The order is understandable to intelligent persons who realize that the Allied military intend it as a measure against the Bolsheviks and not against the socialists who invited the Allies into Russia." But they said it actually operated against those socialists and that the masses unfortunately understood it in this sense, and that the Bolsheviks were active in so interpreting it to the masses. They regretted that the Allied military did not understand that after eight months of uninterrupted Bolshevik control in Russia the masses actually saw more meaning in the red flag than in the white, blue, and red one. The Allies, they said, had come to change this and the moderate socialists wished to change it, but it could be done only with time, and the order in question merely hindered instead of helping the convalescence from Bolshevism.

The same men pointed out that they themselves, prominent pro-Ally leaders, and all their pro-Ally colleagues, were seriously handicapped in their struggle against Bolshevism by the fact that the military governor general would issue no permits for any political meetings whatsoever. They declared that there was no open propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the sawmill villages below the city where the immense majority of the workmen of the region around Archangel are located. The men stated that in the two meetings that had been held in the day or two before the order was issued forbidding meetings not a single Bolshevik had appeared to heckle or argue against the moderates. According to them, however, before the mill opening in the morning, during the lunch hour and after the close of work, wherever a few workmen would gather together or group themselves on their way home, a Bolshevik workman or agitator would appear and agitate against the moderates and against the Allies. The two strongest Bolshevik arguments were continuously the forbidding of the socialist flag and the non-appearance of food ships. The two men referred to declared that were absolute freedom of meeting allowed it would be the most effective means of combating Bolshevism as unless in absolute control the Bolsheviks had always thriven best in a state of conspiracy and that repression

had been proven to be the food on which they best thrive. It was also stated that were the free publication and sale of any and all newspapers permitted no Bolshevik organ would appear.

An incident that occurred on the 15th of August created a great deal of anger against certain circles among the Allies. This anger was felt not among the Bolsheviks, who, I am told, used the occurrence to point their "I-told-you-so" statements, but among the pro-Ally socialists. General Poole issued a proclamation to the people and it was criticized in No. 3 of the *Vozrozhdenie Severa* (Rebirth of the North). This paper is the semiofficial organ of the government, reflecting more or less the political views of the members of the government. The article appears on the second page of the number mentioned, beginning at the top of the third column. It is distinctly a criticism but not a malicious one. On the afternoon of the 15th, a French officer, M. le Comte de Luberzac, of the Allied Counter-Espionage Bureau, appeared at the newspaper office and apparently demanded the arrest of the author of the article. It is reported that high words resulted on both sides. So far as I know nothing ever came of the matter and the incident only attains its full significance in the light of later events. It left, however, in the minds of the moderate socialists connected with the paper, all of whom stand close to the government, an impression of an acute hostility already existing between them and certain Allied officers in the group to which Luberzac belonged.

On the other [hand], after General Poole's entrance the Russian political leaders, the majority of whom had been in hiding until August 2, did not display a proper understanding of the fact that such an attitude actually existed among trusted and powerful Ally counselors regardless of the rightness or wrongness thereof. These men who had been shut tight for months in a conspiracy and unable to express their views openly were rather too eager to enjoy the full freedom to express their opinions that they took for granted after the Bolshevik overthrow. They were, however, very circumspect after all, but not as circumspect as they should have been, knowing as they did of the existence of the bitterness against them and their kind on the part of influential Allied officers as mentioned above.

It was during these days, but probably without any connection with the incident above referred to, that desertions began among the Russians who had enlisted in the British-Slavic Legion. An undoubted part in these desertions was played by the failure of the expedition on the railroad and river to make rapid progress which would have had an extremely beneficial effect on the situation in its entirety and prevented the loss to Allied military prestige which occurred at this time.



Among the mass of the populace, however, none of the above factors, all of them unfavorable to the Allied cause in Archangel and northern Russia, played so strong a rôle as the apparent indifference of the Allied authorities to the food situation. No food ships had come in with the troops. No word as to the near approach of any such ships had been, or could be spread, among the people. At this time the Allied command and the Allied diplomatic corps did not itself know what would be sent. This uncertainty was a trump card in the hands of the Bolsheviks who argued that the Allies could not furnish food being themselves on the verge of starvation and needing every ounce of food to use at home to prevent the outbreak of those hunger riots which would soon develop into the world revolution so long predicted by the Bolsheviks and which latterly was their only reliance. America, said the B[olshevik]s, would furnish nothing, she being only interested in strengthening her own financial, military and commercial position *vis-à-vis* the weakened nations of Europe, and in furthering her own imperialistic aims in Siberia. Great anxiety was constantly expressed by the moderate socialists and cooperative leaders in the food-supply committees, who did not doubt that food would be sent but feared it would come too late to avoid a severe pinch of a week or so. They justly argued that the food question was a vital one and one on which they had based a great deal of their pro-Ally propaganda against the Bolsheviks and that delay in bringing food would block their agitation in favor of the intervention. They feared that it was not sufficiently realized that the mere arrival of food ships in the harbor did not mean food in the peasants' huts as time must elapse between the ship's arrival and the receipt by the consumer, due to the necessary work of distribution, etc. In a word the delay and uncertainty concerning food worked a good deal of injury to the Allied cause here.

These, then, were the factors causing the cessation of enthusiasm for the Allies that once existed among moderate socialist and *bourgeois* liberal circles, and which prevented the birth of enthusiasm among those classes where it had never existed. Into this unhappy situation burst the attempted *coup d'état* which definitely ruined the Allied cause for the time being and left a situation which only the presence of an overwhelming number of American troops and the vague consciousness among the people that great, democratic, friendly America was at Russia's side made bearable even to the pro-Ally Russians.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/3079

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 1214

ARCHANGEL, *September 17, 1918.*

[Received October 29.]

SIR: . . . Permit me here to give some of the details and circumstances of the kidnaping which I have not given you before. . . . Several days after my arrival here when I was endeavoring to lessen the friction between the sovereign government and General Poole, the latter told me a man had said to him that he would take all of the government Ministers away some night and General Poole need know nothing about it. In reply to my inquiry as to what his answer was the General told me that he said the government should not be taken away; I thereupon impressed General Poole with the importance of protecting the Ministers, saying the overthrow of this government would strengthen the Bolsheviks greatly, weaken the regeneration of Russia and would be very injurious to the Allied cause, with all of which General Poole expressed assent. About six hours before the kidnaping occurred, or at 7.15 p. m., a conference adjourned after two hours' session in my office at the chancery; the persons in this conference besides myself were Noulens, Lindley and Torretta, together with Chaikovski, Martyushin, Minister of Finance, and two or three others. We had adjourned to meet the following day at my apartment.

It has developed since that after leaving my office Noulens told Lindley that he had heard from a secret source that the Ministers were to be deported that night, but that he did not credit the report. Lindley went to General Poole and told him what he had heard, whereupon General Poole directed one of his aides to write to Chaplin that he had heard such a rumor, but did not think Chaplin could be contemplating such a move. This was at 8 p. m. The British Intelligence Bureau, of which Colonel Thornhill is chief, is just across the street from and immediately opposite the apartment occupied by the Ministers, both houses being on corners. The American troops had arrived on three transports about 1 p. m., September 3; one battalion had been sent up the Dvina River, another battalion down the railroad toward Vologda, and the third battalion was being quartered at Smolny Barracks, but had not yet begun its duty of patrolling the street, which was still the duty of British and Russian soldiers. There must not have been a patrol on the streets the night of the kidnaping, September 5-6, or even if

there was it was instructed not to interfere with thirty soldiers who were taking from the house immediately opposite the British Intelligence Bureau the Ministers of the sovereign government and conveying them to a steamer at the wharf. . . .

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2661

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 10, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 11, 5.15 a. m.]

391. Lindley says confidentially has asked to be relieved if not given control over military forces which General Poole appears empowered to command; apparently friction setting out [in]. Poole when informed by me that supreme Government reinstated and relations between it and military be defined, to-day writes informally requesting nothing be decided before knowing his views as "Military dispositions in this town remain in my hands." Americans constitute decided majority of Allied forces under Poole, totaling about 4,000; one battalion sent on railroad toward Vologda, one on Dvina toward Kotlas and one performing guard duty in Archangel. Americans arrived 3d, debarked 4th. Kidnaping occurred night of 5th. Americans first assigned guard duty 6th from which community concluded Americans planned or supported *coup d'état*. Stewart says only orders were report to Poole. While I suspect British and probably French officers planned *coup d'état* American officers absolutely knew nothing about it. Your unnumbered July 30, 3 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> through American Consul, Archangel, and also your circular of August 3, 4 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> stated American troops sent Archangel but gave me no instructions or authority over them. If Poole has unlimited control I fear he has learned military and colonizing instincts together with his contempt for sovereign government and his general mistrust of Russians will handicap American policy in Russia and may possibly bring about condition like that in Ukraine. I am not asking control of American troops but informing Department of conditions so that it can give instructions if so elects.

Since above written have seen Stewart who says Poole desires him to take command of railroad expedition toward Vologda; Stewart, while not shirking responsibility, dislikes leaving Archangel and I prefer he remain here as he commands three battalions and Arch-

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 504.

<sup>2</sup>See footnote 1, ante, p. 328.

angel is base of operations. Tramway employees on strike because Ministry kidnaped; Major Nichols commanding American battalion here says was asked by military control office if had men who could run street cars and replying affirmatively was told to send such men to car barn and take out cars consequently since yesterday afternoon American soldiers have been acting as motormen and conductors but collecting no fares, public riding free and every car crowded to full capacity. I advised Nichols to request that written order be given him for such use of American soldiers.

Please send Jenkins or Willoughby Smith or both here immediately, also Flack.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2720a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 12, 1918, 3 p. m.*

1313. The Department has received most disturbing reports concerning the high-handed methods taken by General Poole with the local government at Archangel, whose authority he apparently ignores. The natural effect upon the Russian people will be to arouse resentment and possibly open hostility toward the Governments whose troops have been landed in northern Russia for the purpose of aiding and not of coercing the inhabitants. The course which General Poole is reported to have taken is entirely at variance with the policy of this Government as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* handed to Lord Reading on July 18<sup>1</sup> and with the understanding when American troops were sent to Russian territory.

In view of this unfortunate state of affairs and the possibly serious consequences which may result in the attitude of the Russian people, not only at Archangel but elsewhere, toward the governments whose troops are under General Poole's command, you are requested to lay this matter before the British Government without delay, expressing the deep concern which the President feels as to a continuance of military interference with the local authorities at Archangel in matters of a civil nature.

You may also, in urging the British Government to instruct General Poole to be more considerate of the civil authorities, say that the President, in the event that this reported interference is not checked, will be compelled to consider the withdrawal of the Amer-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 17, *ante*, p. 287.

ican troops from the superior command of General Poole and the directing of Colonel Stewart to act independently in accordance with the announced policy of this Government. The President would deplore the necessity of taking this step but he cannot permit the United States to share responsibility for the reported action of General Poole as commander of the united forces.

The direct interference of General Poole with the civil authorities at Archangel has been most unfortunate and is reported to have caused great offense and humiliation to the Russians. This Government has been able thus far to retain the good will and confidence of the Russian people in general. It cannot afford to risk this friendly attitude by being a participant in an expedition whose commander apparently is indifferent to the rights and feelings of the Russian communities with which he comes in contact. I have very frankly and emphatically explained the situation to the British Chargé here who assured me he would immediately telegraph his Government.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2697

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *September 12, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[Received September 14, 10.03 a.m.]

396. When Ministers came to conference yesterday afternoon they greatly surprised Ambassadors by stating they had decided to abandon supreme government of northern region. Government had been reinstated, but complained of military interference and cited several cases. They submitted written statement to the effect that zone occupied by Allied forces is narrow with little prospect of being enlarged soon and that—

Under present circumstances existence in northern region of subordinate organs of Russian state government and organs of self-government or local administration quite sufficient.

They planned to appoint military governor who would report to triumvirate directly at Samara, composed of Alexeev, Avksentiev, and Stepanov. Said they were going to Zemstvo meeting at 6 p. m. and knew we were also, and they would announce abdication there. Ambassadors dissuaded them from making such announcement and I requested reconsideration of determination. Thereupon they said had fully considered and were immovably resolved to abdicate because two powers could not function in limited territory without

friction and furthermore their decree of mobilization had met with disappointing response. Ambassadors met to-day but Ministry appears arranging for departure and did not come to conference. I called President by telephone and requested him to dine with me but he said had engagement and when I suggested 11 o'clock visit he replied would be engaged most of night with colleagues arranging abdication but promised to call at 11 to-morrow. My colleagues do not attach great importance to government's departure saying civil and military can not function in such a narrow zone without friction. Lindley had called on President and suggested President be a governor general himself but he declined. Ambassadors concluded to insist on his remaining as representative of general government at Samara and adviser to military governor general of Archangel which I shall advise. If Ministry abdicate proposed abdication unknown to public.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2681

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 12, 1918.

[Received September 13, 9.14 a. m.]

397. The Zemstvos of Archangel Province met yesterday and invited Allied diplomats to attend. As dean I spoke. I had prepared speech, which, after thanking Zemstvos for invitation, drifted into speech of American Ambassador. Colleagues on reading same requested that I eliminate American Ambassador and deliver speech for Allied representatives which I did.

I stated we realized the condition of Russia and did not recognize Brest or Ukraine treaties, and trusted patriotic Russians did not, as they were disgraceful and insulting and dismembered Russia and had for their object making Russia a German province, which elicited hearty applause. Attention was then called to civil strife in Russia, to idleness of industries, and paralysis of commerce, proceeding:

And that is not all. There is suffering from hunger in this land of plenty. You have produced ample for the necessities of your own people and can do so again. Armed German and Austrian prisoners and armed Bolsheviks under command of German and Austrian officers have prevented this section of Russia from getting food from those sections which produced an abundance. Allied forces have come within your borders with the sole intention of remedying this

deplorable situation. The Allied countries have already *en route* to Archangel ships laden with provisions and are able and planning to send more to relieve the threatened famine and to clothe those who would otherwise suffer from the rigors of a northern winter. Your surplus products such as flax and lumber and sugar-beet seed and ores and other articles which you can give in exchange [*sic*].

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2680

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 13, 1918, 5 p. m.*

Your 389, September 9, 6 p. m., and two previous telegrams regarding recent events.<sup>1</sup>

Department approves your action fully. Determine your future course by careful compliance with policy communicated to you in Department's No. 253, September 9, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

Colonel Stewart will receive by cable complete text of statement of policy towards Russia, of which essential portions are embodied in above telegram. It is important that you and Colonel Stewart should keep in closest personal touch. Please inform me if instructions to that effect fail also to reach him. You appreciate of course that in military matters Colonel Stewart is under the command of General Poole. Please continue to keep Department fully advised of developments.

Department appreciates notable service performed in the past by Chaikovski in the cooperative movement, but is not surprised at the difficulties you report in practical matters.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/2701

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *September 13, 1918, 7 p. m.*

[*Received September 15, 7.33 p. m.*]

399. Had a thorough talk with the governor [*sic*] Chaikovski who says government decision to abdicate very near immovable. I endeavored to persuade him to continue until communication established with triumvirate directory at Samara so could inform them

---

<sup>1</sup>*Ante*, pp. 525 and 523.

<sup>2</sup>*Ante*, p. 525.

of contemplated movement and satisfy people that abandonment government part general plan. He expressed a desire to go to England and explain to the Allies the nature of movement for regeneration of Russia. He said movement non-partisan but combination occasionally [essentially?] patriotic. Russians humiliated by condition to which Bolsheviks had brought country and while considerable fraction of the organization favored constitutional monarchy such fraction willing first to aid movement for establishment of republic with the understanding that if majority favored monarchy they would be permitted to assume leadership.

Said association composed of 200 representative Russians who held secret meetings in Moscow over which he presided and which (representing three elements; namely, military, socialistic or conservative democrats, and limited monarchist) self-controlled, that each element selected three men, total nine, who did meet at Samara and chose of their number for triumvirate directory: Alexeev representing military and constitutional monarchy element, Avksentiey representing socialists, and Stepanov for the conservatives. Stepanov substituted for Kishkin who was arrested before escaping from Moscow and imprisoned there. Scheme contemplated new constituent assembly chosen by universal suffrage to meet and determine character of the government and select administrators. Communication severed with Samara which Soviet radios claim captured by Red Army but unconfirmed. Can you ascertain whether true? He said other governments like this organized in sections but success unknown.

Ministry will confer with Ambassadors to-morrow and will submit public statement explaining abdication, also orders for military governor who will represent and report to the triumvirate.

My objection to abdication is that it will strengthen central Soviet and give Allied occupancy the appearance of military invasion; peasants and laborers probably can be quieted by food distribution but otherwise would be irresponsible. Hear confidentially that ship left New York September 7, with 1,500 tons flour for Archangel; to whom consigned and what purpose?

President said Poole sending democratic Russian soldiers to the front which [while] keeping here those [opposed to?] sovereign government and expresses fear that another *coup d'état* being planned; that British and French had opened [recruiting] stations for Russians to which mobilization failure greatly due. My No. 363, August 13, 7 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> recommended opening American recruiting station here and I renew recommendation if Russians abandon effort to raise army as many Russians would enlist with us who would not

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



with the British or French. If however you could place fund at my disposal, say \$100,000, for feeding and equipping Russian army could use same to great advantage; military attaché and other American officers visited by Russian officers who desire to enlist Russian army but sovereign government has no funds with which to feed and equip them except that furnished by British, who President charges are withholding funds and persuading Russians to join British army. Can you do this? Amount advanced would not be gift but loan and the moral effect would be telling.

Poole grants my demand for American representation in censorship and requests Russian-speaking American officer. Please hasten Prince's coming.

Your No. 253, September 9, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> received 11th garbled but substance comprehended. Please keep me advised concerning Siberian movement.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 763.72/13456

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 15, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 6.30 p. m.]

1899. The Secretary of War<sup>2</sup> requests that the following urgent and extremely confidential message be given to the President immediately:

The message from Clemenceau which has been sent you through the Department of State requests sending of five additional [American] battalions to Murmansk.<sup>3</sup> The French profess themselves unable to send any further forces but further secured Foch's indorsement to Clemenceau's request. You will observe, however, that Foch stipulates that they be sent direct from America and not detached from forces now in France. The military advisers at Versailles considered the subject yesterday and unanimously but informally agreed that in future no further forces of any kind should be sent to Murmansk this year, English and French representatives concurring. Bliss says Foch consents only out of deference for Clemenceau and will not misunderstand your declining. Bliss and I agree that yielding to this request would only open the door to further diversion of American forces as French and British will not send theirs and will join in requests upon us. Could you not decline on ground that all our energy is to be devoted to early and decided success on western front? Our men are thus in battle and in both France and

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 525.

<sup>2</sup> Newton D. Baker, at this time on special mission in Europe.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 544.

England their success is on every tongue. Pershing really won a great fight and his army is impatient to go on. Our losses are about 5,000 wounded and sick sent to hospitals but very few dead or mortally hurt. Of those I saw most were slight injuries. Prisoners numbered 15,000 when I left. Full details of casualties and captures not available for some days.

PAGE

File No. 861.00/2731

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 16, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 18, 10.10 a. m.]

403. Ambassadors just had satisfactory conference my house with Chaikovski, Poole and Durov, new governor general. Departing government submitted address to people of northern region stating original object of its formation was temporary and terminates with formation of all-Russian state government. Aim having been accomplished by formation [of] said government at Samara composed of members Constituent Assembly, government of northern region resigns its powers and appoints governor general who reports to all-Russian authority Samara. No direct communication with Samara now but same expected to be established by wireless in a few days. While advance "clearing country of German-Bolshevik detachments" proceeds in accordance with well-devised plan it is necessarily slow; as that portion of northern region freed from Bolsheviks is under military authority and Allied representatives have agreed to appointment of governor general responsible to all-Russian government and will see that his legitimate functioning is not interfered with—are main reasons why relinquishment of and transfer of power occur now.

Address calls upon all citizens of region to support governor general with their confidence and their cooperation in discharge of his onerous duties and in his efforts to organize Russian army and that governor general will work hand in hand with town and Zemstvo organs of self-government with friendly collaboration of Allies. The address furthermore states that supreme administration takes this grave decision only after careful consideration of affairs in northern region from all points of view and of course with the consent of Allied representatives and assures people against possibility of restoration or reactionary conspiracies such as *coup d'état* of September 6.

Address ends with felicitation on beginning of regeneration and unification of fatherland which troops operating in north and east

will secure by joining, and ends, "Long life to united independent and free Russia! Long life to all-Russian Constituent Assembly and to new all-Russian government!" I think no disturbance will follow this announcement. In fact it would have been excellent arrangement if criminal kidnaping not occurred as territory is too small contribute toward civil and military functioning without friction. Durov and assistant Samarin dining with me this evening. Ministers of supreme government giving tea 5 p. m. which chiefs will attend.

I broached Russian mobilization to the President and Poole when latter said was not enlisting Russians in British army but forming Slav-British legion and when any Russian military authority organized would turn legion over to it as nucleus Russian army (such information enlightening to me furthermore). Poole stated had ample supplies, equipment for all Russians enlisting and said that President Wilson should understand that fighting Bolsheviks was not fighting Russians but Germans as Bolsheviks indissolubly linked with Germans as demonstrated in every engagement.

British supply ship arrived to-day but unadvised whether for military or civil relief. Poole furthermore stated eight vessels would clear by September 25 from Canada, United States and England with sufficient supplies to relieve food necessities of the civil population. Please inform me on the subject.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2730

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

1982. Your 1313, September 12, 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The Counselor of the Embassy presented this matter yesterday in conversation with Mr. Balfour who said in substance that he entirely shared the views you set forth, which the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington had also already conveyed to him by telegraph. He also said that even before he had received Barclay's communication of your views he had taken vigorous steps to mend matters at Archangel both as to the future action of General Poole and to correct the bad impression the occurrence had made on the Russians as far as possible. He specially wished you to know of his immediate action, and said that in addition to this he had repeated Barclay's telegram textually to Lindley at Archangel.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 533.

File No. 861.00/2778

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 18, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received September 24, 7.50 a. m.]

410. Quiet. Government will publish resignation to-morrow, possibly 20th, but uncertain. *Fatherland*, journal recently established, Chaikovski says by British, contains article criticizing, ridiculing Durov, sovereign government and Constituent Assembly, consequently government attempting to suppress. Another journal, *Resurrection of the North*, has two blank columns, from which article criticizing Poole eliminated by censors. I have demanded censorship representation [garbled groups] but have no satisfaction therefor. Please expedite arrival of Prince, Lehrs, Bukowski.

Allies gained decided victory on Dvina killing, capturing 150 opponents who numbered 600 and fled in disorder. Our casualties unknown, [fatalities] thought light. Three Americans killed on railroad 17th. Total Americans died of [influenza] epidemic, 50, including one lieutenant.

Military attaché received garbled cable from March<sup>1</sup> directing close touch with me but omitting Stewart's name. Stewart understands meant for him.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2845

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 20, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 12.24 p. m.]

432[?]. Y.M.C.A. occupy theater here where they maintain reading, billiards and writing rooms much frequented by Allied soldiers. Last evening I addressed them inviting Governor General and President to accompany me. Latter requested, made a speech after I had spoken and stated that he had prepared cable to President Wilson asking for more American troops and to [after] consultation requested me to send the following telegram:

To the President: Torn to pieces and bleeding, tumbling to death, Russia appeals to you, great citizen, for a quick and decisive help. It was thanks to the American forces that the glorious change has been effected on the [western?] front. Now the eastern front, which we are endeavoring to restore under trying conditions of struggle

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, U. S. A.

against the Bolsheviks, is craving for a similar change at your convenience. Strategic situation in northern Russia needs sending more American troops here for enabling us to form a second Russian army for delivering a decisive blow to the enemy and for putting an immediate end to the horrible spilling of innocent blood in the central part of Russia. Quite appreciating the hardships of the task, Russian democracy offers in advance her heartiest gratitude and admiration to her precatory sister for the exploit. Nicholas Chaikovski.

I send in cipher by request because sender wished same unknown to British and French.

Two steamers just arrived here conveying 500 American, 500 British, 700 French soldiers, also two American couriers with six pouches, also Consul Davis, wife and child.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2730

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

267. Referring to the action of General Poole and resultant friction with Russians, I understand Lindley has been advised of this Government's views and of action by British Government both as to the future course of General Poole and to correct the unfortunate impression made at Archangel.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2776

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 21, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 24, 6.20 a. m.]

416. Quiet. Another officer died. Total deaths, 65, including two lieutenants.

Government installing Durov governor general, will publish abdication Monday. Three ministers left yesterday for Samara; delegation of Russian officers opposed to sovereign government planning to go Samara to explain conditions here to Alexeev and represent that American Ambassador protected two ministers. French Ambassador thinks undue favoring sovereign government, which socialistic, may drive anti-socialistic Russian officers and Russian *bourgeoisie* to German side. I told him our policy was not to interfere

even with local governments and to discreetly protect same if decided choice of people as this government undoubtedly is.

The transport *Rhodesian* arrived from Montreal with 5,800 tons flour which being transferred to Russian craft for shipment to interior points, where flour exhausted. Please advise what vessels *en route* Archangel with supplies.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/2777

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 23, 1918, midnight.

[Received September 24, 2.45 a. m.]

420. Your telegrams Nos. 265<sup>1</sup> and 267 received to-day. Two officers of Omsk government arrived here to-day; left Ekaterinburg August 13; report all-Russian government Samara not yet established, consequently sovereign government here not now abdicating. I insisted always government continue functioning until abdication and appointment approved by Samara government, thereby differing with colleagues who, while not so admitting, were pleased by abdication. Governor General appointed issued first order to-day which unobjectionable except in branding *coup d'état* as a crime of adventurers. While I think kidnaping was crime and perpetrator deserved punishment, I believe Governor General indiscreet when calling promoters adventurers as they may be sincere patriots, but nevertheless perpetrated crime.

Likewise Lindley advocates Allied Ambassadors' promulgating statement that proclamation issued by two Ministers stating Grand Duke Michael in Archangel did so from interested motives solely. While I object to impugning their sincerity, but willing to sign, stated they were mistaken. A number of Russian officers organized by Chaplin have agreed to disobey and ignore Samarin, assistant governor general. Chaikovski tells Allied chiefs that a Russian officer Filinenko so persuaded officers, and is planning another conspiracy and should be banished from Archangel. I agree, but French Ambassador argued that Filinenko entitled to right of free speech while properly denied same to strikers and socialistic journals criticizing Poole. I proposed that neither sovereign government nor Poole nor Governor General issue proclamation or order with-

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

out approval of Allied Ambassadors. This was not adopted but seems only solution of situation.

Your 259, September 14, 1 p. m.<sup>1</sup> As telegraphic communication Samara [not?] established, please ask American Consul there what status of all-Russian regeneration movement.

Can Department advise me whether a state of war exists between the United States and Bolshevik government?

FRANCIS

---

Proposal for Increasing the American Forces at Archangel and Extending the Operations: Refusal of the American Government, September 26, 1918—Reorganization of the Local Government: Subordination to the All-Russian Government at Omsk—Disapproval of the Ambassador's Plan to Recruit an American-Slavic Legion—Replacement of the Commander in Chief—Disaffection among the American Soldiers and among the Local Russian Recruits

File No. 861.00/2858

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, *September 25, 1918.*

[*Received September 27.*]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: As your excellency knows, I have had by order of my Government the honor to expound to the President of the United States and to yourself the grave reasons which led us to believe that the progress of events in Russia was such as to justify an additional effort, very limited to be sure, in Murmania, so as to turn to account the gains already made and prevent dangerous setbacks.

With the President we hold that the whole American effort properly should be brought to bear at the French front where the war will be won, since our archenemy's forces are massed there. No one can have an interest superior to our own in a final victory on that battle field since it will mark, for us in particular, the hour of a long-awaited deliverance.

It seems to us however that that hour would not be delayed, but in all likelihood brought nearer, on the contrary, if we did not allow the elements of success we command elsewhere, and which could be turned to profitable advantage through a very slight increase of the present effort, to run to waste. The less secure the Germans feel themselves in the east the more difficult will it be for them to swell their armies and reserves on our front. We have agreed with the President in entirely giving up every idea of reorganizing an

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See also telegram No. 1899, Sept. 15, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, *ante*, p. 538.

eastern front, but it strikes us there would be a very great advantage to all concerned in taking measures to prevent the food products of Siberia and metals of the Ural from reaching the Bolsheviki and through them the Germans. The hardest part of that task has already been accomplished, thanks to the admirable action of the Czechs who, isolated in a vast country, have succeeded without outside help in rescuing the whole of the Trans-Siberian for the benefit of the parties of order and justice. Very little would need be done firmly to establish that conquest and do for the still more important stores of Siberia what we have done for the stores of Archangel and Vladivostok.

That little, according to the information gathered by the military command there, would consist in adding nine battalions to the forces now in northern Russia; England is furnishing four. We would wish the United States kindly to furnish the other five. This increase of forces would make it possible to achieve two objects the importance of which is to us obvious: first, the defense of Murmania, the essential basis of ice-free communications against a German attack from Finland, which it would be very dangerous passively to await; next an advance from Archangel to give a hand to the Czechs and make a reality of the above-mentioned barrage through the occupation of Vologda and Perm.

Marshal Foch, whose advice was sought on the subject, answered (as I have already had occasion to remark orally) in his note of September 12, that by reason of the great results which apparently may be achieved at this time with a limited force in northern Russia, the Marshal Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies deems it advantageous to send five battalions of American troops direct to Archangel from America.

The members of the Versailles council, on the other hand, appear to have considered the same question without having more recent data and on the mere strength of the previous decision of the War Supreme Council which contemplated, in case difficulty arose, a stay of operations during the winter, when bases of action would be merely maintained at Vladivostok and Archangel. Their opinion however has not been approved by their governments as it should have been under the existing agreements and therefore can not prevail.

Upon the immediate carrying out of the measures which I have again the honor most earnestly to urge upon your excellency, on account of the time of the year, depend not only the mastery of the ways of communication, toward which the Czechs have already done the main work (and, in the opinion of my Government, our failure to do the rest would hardly be excusable), but also a stiffening of



the orderly elements which appear to grow more consistent in Russia and portend a reawakening which might be fraught with consequences for the present and future.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 861.00/2799a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1918, 6 p. m.

274. As it is, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, plain that no gathering of any effective force by the Russians is to be hoped for, we shall insist with the other governments, so far as our cooperation is concerned, that all military effort in northern Russia be given up except the guarding of the ports themselves and as much of the country round about them as may develop threatening conditions. We will, of course, do our utmost to send supplies, but cannot undertake general relief, and must presently, of course, be cut off from Archangel by the ice and able to go only to Murmansk.

You are advised that no more American troops will be sent to the northern ports.

The course which you have followed is most earnestly commended. It has the entire admiration of the President who has characterized it as being thoroughly American. I highly approve of your actions. They have been very consistent and have been guided by a very sound judgment exercised under the most trying and complicated circumstances. The course which the Government of the United States is following is not the course of our free choice but that of stern necessity. Circumstances in European Russia, which have thrown the country into one of the saddest periods recorded in all history, and our separation from the scenes of bloodshed and anarchy by the intervening hostile territory render any efforts which this Government could make to bring succor to the distressed people of Russia inadequate and impracticable. We are constrained, consequently, to come to a decision which this message will convey to you.

For your information the following is sent to you. It is being sent to Mr. Morris who is now at Vladivostok and is being conveyed directly to the Governments at London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo and Peking. [Here follow the first seven paragraphs of telegram of September 26, 1918, 6 p. m., to Ambassador Morris, temporarily at Vladivostok, *ante*, page 392.]

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2814

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 26, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received September 27, 9.37 p. m.]

426. Chaikovski and Durov dined with me last evening. Appeared harmonious but French Ambassador and Lindley say Durov complaining that government remaining and threatening to resign, having accepted appointment under the impression government abdicating. He is unacceptable to Russian officers because they consider him inexperienced and not sufficiently high rank. Both thought last evening another conspiracy planned but mainly against Durov. Prince<sup>1</sup> here installed as censor and member of Intelligence Bureau will keep me advised. I am opposed to *coup d'état* and shall prevent if possible.

Chaikovski telephoned to me 4 p. m. desired to meet Ambassadors which he did 6 p. m., when announced Ministry decided resign and form executive government four members: Chaikovski, President and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Gukovski, Minister of Justice, both socialists; Durov, Governor General and Director of Military Affairs; Grudistov, representing commercial interests, Minister of Finance and Trade and Commerce and Minister of the Interior. Durov without politics. Think Grudistov also but represents commercial financial interests and will reconcile antisocialistic elements; has not accepted on account of large business interests but Chaikovski and Ambassadors think should accept and endeavoring to persuade him to do so.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2819

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 27, 1918.

[Received September 28, 11.30 a. m.]

428. Have had conference with two representatives Siberian government arrived Archangel 23d. They report object of Siberian government is struggle against Brest Litovsk peace; creation of national Russian army; organization of common anti-German front with Allies; restoration order and social life which will result in regeneration of Russia. Jurisdiction or influence of government extends east to Chita; west including Ekaterinburg where exists inde-

<sup>1</sup> Capt. Eugene Prince, U. S. N. A., Assistant Military Attaché.

pendent local government but closely allied with Siberian government Omsk; south to union with Dutov,<sup>1</sup> with whom relations friendly; north to Arctic Ocean, immense area population approximating 30,000,000. They report Siberian government financially independent and has loaned Samara local government 20,000,000 rubles, 15,000,000 of which secured by silver taken from Bolsheviks. . . .

[One representing] Siberian cooperatives on special mission to arrange for purchase agricultural and other machinery and sale of Siberian products England and America; says 15,000,000 pounds butter are stored also large quantity of flax; have concluded visa his passport for America.

These officials state railroad and telegraph open east to Vladivostok by both lines. Please cable if true. This leaves only Perm, Vyatka and Vologda held by Bolsheviks.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2777

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

276. Your September 23, 12 p. m., No. 420, received. The Government of the United States has never recognized the Bolshevik authorities and does not consider that its efforts to safeguard supplies at Archangel or to help the Czechs in Siberia have created a state of war with the Bolsheviks.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2829

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 27, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 28, 2.06 p. m.]

427. Ambassadors and General Poole just had a conference with Chaikovski, Gukovski, Durov, Grudistov. After prolonged heated discussion Chaikovski agreed to issue amnesty proclamation pardoning all implicated in *coup d'état* and Poole guaranteed against another *coup d'état*.

Grudistov persisted in declination to become minister on the ground that executive council, fifteen members, of which he expected to be chairman, should be separated from Ministry and I thought same correct, but colleagues insisted that *bourgeoisie* be represented

<sup>1</sup> Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.

in ministry. Consequently Mefodiev was suggested and will probably be offered membership in the ministry. Executive council is representative of following interests: Zemstvo, two members; following one each—Archangel city government, trades-union, cooperative producers, cooperative consumers, peoples' bank, bourse, chamber of commerce, retailers, shipbuilders, owners fishing boats, [omission] private banks, society for studying north, and timber interests which are represented by Grudistov who proposed plan. Council represents local interests which the sovereign government did not. Plan approved unanimously and promises satisfactory operation but Russians very uncertain and mutually suspicious.

Riggs cables from Paris that Bliss<sup>1</sup> may be opposed to sending additional American troops Archangel and the French Ambassador Washington had cabled Paris President Wilson likewise opposed. Riis, acting naval attaché by orders from the Navy Department (operations), reports two ships, *McElvare*, *Dundee*, with British and French troops and two American couriers; Poole's chief of staff told me last evening these expected arrivals were to fill military organizations already here. Epidemic apparently under control, total deaths, including four killed in action, 68.

Allied forces expect to take Kotlas within ten days and [as] Bolsheviks only waging guerrilla warfare but have mined Dvina, also planning advance down railroad toward Vologda which starts within next few days. [American] troops with both expeditions. Poole says will confer medal on an American for gallant service.

In action on the Dvina, 21st, one officer, 30 Americans wounded; all brought here, doing well but anxious to return to duty.

British, French and myself guaranteed 250,000 rubles jointly for the construction of additional hospital space.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2840

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *September 29, 1918, 7 p. m.*

[*Received September 30, 1 p. m.*]

431. The President's message received. Your telegram 274, September 26, deciphered and clear. Thanks for personal commendation but I am not resting on past efforts. I may be flattering myself but I think I have been greatly instrumental in bringing about present cooperation between sovereign government, Poole, and the Allied Ambassadors which I believe is more in accord with

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, U.S. member of the Supreme War Council.

our policy, thanks to assistance by you, see your telegram No. 267; have not mentioned to Lindley nor he to me but observe changed attitude of Poole. Difficulties not absolutely removed but making a persistent effort to that end.

Y.M.C.A. doing excellent work, also the American Red Cross; vessel just arrived with 2,000 tons supplies. American soldiers here besides helping physically have a widespread moral effect, their joyousness, buoyancy contagious, inspiring, cannot fail to impress Russians consequently regret no more coming.

Desiring encourage formation Russian army is my reason for organizing Slav-American Legion. Friction between Russian officers and soldiers will disappear when Russian and American officers associated in instructing battalion; furthermore, our own well-disciplined troops beneficial example.

I am not planning to enlist battalion in our army. I think Russian army essential to establishment of government and the regeneration of Russia and association of our soldiers will convince Russians that an army is not inimical to liberty as our government has been model since the revolution for all democratic Russians except Bolsheviks.

See my 428, 27th, concerning Siberian government. If the Siberian Railway opened, northern Russia will be supplied from Siberia and consequently not depending on foreign aid. If I am rightly informed concerning Omsk government the capture of Vologda, Vyatka, and Perm will make such supplies accessible and will render many Russian surplus products available for export.

British Secret Service states famous German baron, bomb expert, *en route* from Finland to Archangel to explode supplies; and Prince, from information gained Moscow, believes report true. Munitions evacuated from Petrograd, Archangel stored Vologda, Kotlas toward which Allied forces advancing.

The government will have mobilization Archangel next week of five classes, '93 to '98, but probably be only 15,000 available in this province; Vologda and Vyatka Provinces under this government jurisdiction have respectively 60,000 and 120,000 available men.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2831

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 29, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received September 30, 9.15 a. m.]

430. After some further discussion to remove misunderstanding scheme for government outlined in my 427, September 27, 6 p. m.,

was adopted. Mefodiev declined but another representative *bourgeois* will be selected.

British and French are enlisting British-Slavic legion and French-Slavic legion, claiming have several thousand Russians enlisted. Many Russians express desire to enlist under American auspices, consequently am planning to organize American-Slavic legion also. All legions thus formed will be transferred to the Russian Government when organized.

I assume that remainder of \$6,000,000 allotted in your 2064<sup>1</sup> and 179,<sup>2</sup> or about \$1,500,000, can be used for this purpose. Do not be discouraged about Russians enlisting yet; understand many thousands Russians have joined Czechs. Expect Vologda will be taken before navigation closes and possibly Kotlas and Vyatka.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2840

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

284. Your 430 and 431, September 29. There are definite limiting facts which govern your proposal to organize American-Slavic legion. It is certain that no money additional to the balance of \$6,000,000 fund, which balance, I understand, now approximates \$1,300,000, is or will be available for this purpose. You must therefore consider the consequences of what may follow when fund is exhausted. The President wants you to know how much we admire the spirit and success with which you have guided matters at Archangel, but has serious doubts about the undertaking. Please consider the foregoing carefully before you go further and report.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2876

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 3, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received October 4, 9.30 p. m.]

444. Quiet here; epidemic practically ended. Five British battalions landed at Murman, 30th; Poole dissatisfied because he desired them here; five more battalions reported coming soon. If

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

American forces had landed with Poole, he thinks could have routed Bolsheviks and captured Vologda and Kotlas but delay has enabled Bolsheviks to increase their strength and present more formidable resistance under German instruction. If American troops had not come, doubtful whether central committee or diplomatic corps or sovereign government could have remained in Archangel.

I have had the President's speech and appeal of Department to Allied and neutral governments translated and shall publish, 5th, with a note from myself directing attention thereto.

Minister of Justice resigned because he disagreed with President who is now forming ministry but is obsessed with the idea that Russian law requires his colleagues to be Constituent Assembly members in order to have legislative or supreme power. President more pliable has agreed to abstain from participation in municipal elections to be held soon. Poole and the Governor General cooperating. Archangel crowded; experiencing difficulty in securing hospital.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.002/55

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 4, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received October 6, 9 p. m.]

449. After 5 p. m. President requested a conference with Ambassadors which was held 7 p. m. when the following Ministry submitted: Chaikovski, President and Minister of Agriculture; Gukovski,<sup>1</sup> Minister of Justice; Kurakin, Minister of Finance; with Kalinin and Graner assistants over Bureaus of Commerce and Supplies respectively. Zubov, secretary with portfolio Posts and Telegraphs, Durov, Minister of War and Governor General. Conference held with commercial interests which were asked to submit names for portfolios without votes, but after discussion disagreeing resume negotiations disaffections resulted, the President claiming that association for regeneration of Russia held at Moscow months ago limiting legislative or sovereign power to members Constituent Assembly which includes above-mentioned President and the Minister of Justice who are socialists. [Durov?] is a Cadet, others not politically active. Graner leader of cooperatives in Europe. Kurakin is the manager of the State Bank. The executive council, Grudistov chairman, continues. I am personally acquainted with all and think se-

---

<sup>1</sup> In a notice published in the official collection of orders of the Supreme government of the northern region (No. 1, Art. 136, p. 156), Gorodetski was named as Minister of Justice and Mefodiev as Minister of Commerce, Industry, and supplies.

lection good as many active in commerce and politics here were arrested by Bolsheviks, taken to Moscow, or fled to escape arrest. Ambassadors expressed no opposition. Ministry will be announced 6th.

French Ambassador received cable Paris stating Omsk and Ufa governments formed all-Russian government with five representatives: Avksentiev; Chaikovski, president Archangel government; Vologodski, president of Omsk government; Astrov, former mayor of Moscow; and General Boldyrev.

Bolsheviks claiming victories against Czechs and say that when Archangel port closes will turn attention thereto and easily capture Allied forces there. Please cable Siberian situation.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2897

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 7, 11.07 a. m.]

451. Deciphering of your 284, October 3, 6 p. m., completed while I was holding a conference with Ruggles, Stewart, and [Samarin?], assistant governor general, to determine how we could render the most effective assistance to formation Russian army. The conclusion was to defer organizing petition for Slav legion and assist sovereign government in every consistent way in promoting mobilization which it has decided upon. The government and ourselves also dependent on British for clothing and food for our armies. The British and French efforts towards respective legions disappointing in results, former secured about 1,600, latter maximum 200. Government's mobilization will be hampered by competing efforts of British and the French to organize in the city. I shall have a conference with Poole before his departure and with Ironside on the subject.

Please express to the President my sincere appreciation of his approval, also my congratulation [on] speech of 27th ultimo.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2915

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 8, 10.13 a. m.]

456. Delegation of commercial interests conferred with Ambassadors my apartment, evening 5th, stating had visited President



by request and were prepared to submit representatives of such interests for portfolios but did not do so because the President refused compliance with the conditions they sought to impose. I listened respectfully, although previously advised and familiar with occurrence, then emphatically, perhaps impatiently, gave them my views prefacing remarks with the statement that I had not conferred with my colleagues who were present and could speak for themselves.

After remarking that I belonged to commercial class in America, noting that the delegation represented [it] here, and admitting that at home I was called *bourgeois*, stated that I had for one year waited and endured inconveniences, indignities, and risks in expectation of Russian *bourgeoisie* or *intelligentsia* doing something to save Russia from the Bolsheviki and Germans, and this sovereign government was the first organized opposition to such enemies of Russia that I had been able to get in touch with; that this government had redeemed Archangel and northern Russia from Bolsheviks, had invited the Allied forces to enter Russia, had renounced the Brest Litovsk peace and were attempting to organize resistance to the Central Empires; that under such circumstances my opinion was that every patriotic Russian should not only be prompt to render aid when requested, but should proffer his services and means; that all party differences should be buried temporarily and all should unite for the regeneration of Russia. I called attention to the conciliatory spirit of this government as evidenced by general amnesty extended to all engaged in the criminal kidnaping of the Ministers.

My colleagues in turn concurred in my appeal, thereupon a member of the delegation, previously quiet, said that if our friends, the Allies, feel this way, I think we should comply with their wishes and his associates reluctantly assented. A meeting of the Commercial Industrial Union held yesterday unanimously approved advice and sent to the government three names, one or two of which will be given portfolios. The union advised me immediately and I promptly transmitted their action to the Department.

Later, since the above was dictated, the President phoned saying that two of the three men submitted by the commercial interests, Mefodiev and Gorodetski, will be given portfolios.<sup>1</sup>

FRANCIS

---

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, p. 552.

File No. 861.00/2929

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 10, 12.17 p. m.]

464. For the Navy Department also, if you approve. *Amiral Aube*, French cruiser, been here two months. Has powerful wireless equipment by which news is received; acting naval attaché says will be replaced by a cruiser same class, *en route* from France, which will remain Archangel through the winter. French naval attaché requests American cruiser be sent also; the British will probably have a cruiser. Acting naval attaché and I think it advisable American cruiser be stationed here; also cruiser, class of *Baltimore*, or large destroyer would answer. Is McCully coming? Understand *Olympia* remaining at Murmansk through the winter. President Chaikovski says British requisitioning many Russian craft, including volunteer Russian fleet, and can get no satisfaction from them on the subject. Have we commandeered any Russian craft? Three British ships just arrived from England with food and ordnance supplies for the military.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2932

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 10, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 11, 12.31 p. m.]

465. Major arrived here left Petrograd 16th instant gives a horrible account of Bolshevik cruelties saying that 43,000 innocent men and women are imprisoned, hundreds being killed daily. My conclusion is that the only way to end this disgrace to civilization is for the Allies immediately to take Petrograd and Moscow by sending sufficient troops therefor to Murman and Archangel without delay; 50,000 would serve but 100,000 would be ample. Poole says could take Petrograd with 10,000, could not hold it.

Bolsheviks gaining strength by terrorizing. Russians correctly reason that if no additional Allied troops come the Allies will be driven from northern Russia and all Russians will be exterminated by the Bolsheviks, consequently efforts to mobilize army against the Bolsheviks and Germans doomed to failure unless Allied forces materially increased at once.

Furthermore Bolsheviks have captured Kazan, Samara, and Simbirsk and the Czechs reported routed Allies [along?] Volga. Bolsheviks hold Perm and Vyatka and are reenforcing Kotlas. Unconfirmed reports state that they are doing successful propaganda work among the Czechs in upper [Urals?] where Czechs becoming inoculated with Russian politics. If our policy of having the Czechs remain east of Urals is followed, the Bolsheviks with German assistance can drive small Allied forces from Archangel and Murman. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to capture Moscow and Petrograd from Vladivostok before the Germans can send troops to assist Bolsheviks, but if, however, forces promptly sent Murman and here, Germans are too much occupied in France to render material aid.

Kemp, candid talker, says the United States most culpable ally, that Allied forces so [too?] small and that horrible slaughter by the Bolsheviks is a disgrace to the Allies.

How do we construe supplemental treaty of August 20 [27] between Germany [and?] Soviet? Of course we will not desert Russia but if Bolsheviks not promptly suppressed there is danger of a revolution in Austria and if proletariat dominates Russia and Austria-Hungary all countries are in jeopardy from radical social revolution.

Does our reply to German peace proposal just received include Russia when it states armistice can not be proposed to Governments associated with us against the Central powers "so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil"?

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3680

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 20, 1918, enclosing the weekly report of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. *Olympia* dated July 6, 1918, in which while reporting conditions in the Murmansk region of Russia he transmits:

- (a) A declaration and resolution of the Murmansk District Council, and
- (b) A temporary agreement between the representatives of the Allies and the Murmansk Region Council, to the latter of which the commanding officer of the *Olympia* was a signatory, and whose action in signing this agreement has been provisionally approved by Vice Admiral Sims.

After careful consideration of the agreement in question you express the opinion that it is sound in principle and should meet with

the approval of this Government, and request that if this Department concurs therein you may be so informed in order that the agreement may receive final approval.

In view of the fact that the agreement in question sets forth that all authority in the internal government of the region belongs to the Murmansk Region Council and that the representatives of Great Britain, France and the United States do not interfere in the internal affairs of the region, this Department perceives no reason why the commander of the U.S.S. *Olympia* should not be informed that the agreement meets with the approval of this Government.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with your request, the correspondence in your communication under acknowledgment is herewith returned.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2943

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received October 15, 2 p. m.]

478. *Attentive* cleared with Poole and Colonels Thornhill, Banters, and Grimes; consented to wait until 16th if I would [go] but I informed Kemp and Poole early 12th that I would not. Poole asked Chaikovski for a letter which I thought indicated need for support in order to return. General Ironside is in command. Can not we arrange that an American general command Allied forces here? The British are feared, disliked, Americans welcomed fraternizing with Russians.

Municipal elections yesterday resulted 32 socialists, 26 *bourgeoisie*, two Jews. Political conditions very sensitive. If British policy dominates will drive many socialists to Bolshevism which will be, I repeat, a menace to well-regulated government everywhere if not eradicated. Russian vessel arriving from Pechora reports intercepted radios from Ukraine stating German soldiery mutinied, embraced Bolshevism, captured Kharkov and allied with Russian Bolsheviks. This was told me by Chaikovski who nearly embraced me when I told him I am not leaving.

FRANCIS

<sup>1</sup>The substance of this approval was communicated to the Ambassador in Russia in telegram No. 308, Oct. 16, 1918, in reply to his No. 385, Sept. 6, *ante*, p. 519.

File No. 861.00/2640

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1918, 6 p. m.

308. Your 385, September 6, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Agreement regarding Murmansk District Council signed tentatively by commanding officer of the *Olympia* and referred to this Department by the Secretary of the Navy, has now been approved and Secretary of the Navy so advised October 14.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3311

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 1230

ARCHANGEL, October 16 and 18, 1918.

[Received November 30.]

. . . Since the above was dictated, I have received the detailed results of the municipal election of last Sunday. The total registered vote was 21,613, but only 8,733 votes were cashed [*sic*], little more than 40 per cent. The following was the result:

Ticket No. 1 (union of house renters)	-----	102 votes
“ “ 2 (socialists)	-----	4,610 “
“ “ 3 ( <i>bourgeoisie</i> )	-----	3,769 “
“ “ 4 (Jews)	-----	195 “
“ “ 5 (fire brigade)	-----	57 “

The number to be elected was 60, of which—

Ticket No. 1 elected	-----	1 candidate
“ “ 2 “	-----	32 candidates
“ “ 3 “	-----	26 candidates
“ “ 4 “	-----	1 candidate
“ “ 5	-----	did not elect any candidate

This election is looked upon as a *bourgeois* victory, because the socialists have only 53, or  $\frac{4}{16}$  per cent [*sic*], of the new Duma while they had 70 per cent of the former Duma. There are very few *bourgeois* in Archangel City and the proportion of that vote in Archangel Province is still less than it is in the city. The socialists claim that the workmen did not vote, which accounts for the diminished socialist vote, while some of the *bourgeoisie* claim that the workmen are dissatisfied with the present provisional government

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 519.

and other *bourgeois* say that the workmen are really Bolsheviks. The same vote is another indication that if the Allies should abandon Archangel many socialists and many non-voters would turn to the Bolsheviks.

The condition at Murmansk is critical. The provisional government has dissolved the Murmansk Soviet and appointed a governor general, Ermolov. Yuriev, an ignorant but honest sailor with judgment, was the president of the Murman Soviet when the Allies landed there and he was the leader in the movement of the Murmansk Soviet renouncing allegiance to the Central Soviet at Moscow. Yuriev and Vesselago paid me a visit of about two hours this forenoon. Vesselago is an educated Russian and by some is thought to be "too smart"; his integrity is questioned and Yuriev has demanded a thorough investigation of the acts of the Murmansk Soviet. President Chaikovski calls on me daily and when asked yesterday whether he feared a *coup d'état* at Murmansk when the Soviet was dissolved, replied negatively, provided the new governor general can take 5,000,000 rubles when he goes to Murmansk to assume office. Yuriev will bring Ermolov, the new governor general, to see me to-morrow. . . .

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3001

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 18, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 20, 7.25 a. m.]

491. American naval attaché returned from railroad front reporting great dissatisfaction among two companies American troops and three companies French under British command. No British troops that front, all troops exhausted from continuous service. French inclined to insubordination because they had heard that hostilities ceased western front and claimed further service here solely in British interest, such feeling permeating officers also and American soldiers and officers becoming inoculated. Bolsheviks outnumbering Allied forces but are undisciplined in their fighting and are abstaining therefrom at will; warfare has been guerrilla character from the beginning. If American troops withdrawn, the French would not remain and the Bolsheviks advancing would besiege Archangel. I am sending a member of military mission to front and shall keep one there continuously when officers arrive, who Riggs advises are *en route*.

I think the British are doing all possible with the few men available. Ironside dining with me this evening alone, shall have thorough talk and telegraph further. The mistake was in not sending more troops when landing as the Bolsheviks were then demoralized and 10,000 soldiers could have taken Vologda and [Vyatka?] and possibly overturned Soviet government. The Bolsheviks have learned of the small force here and are reenforcing their resistance and radiating false reports from Moscow concerning victories. I learn confidentially from Lindley that the British War Office is being urged to permit 5,000 British soldiers to come to Archangel from Murman if cannot send additional force from other places.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/3003

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 19, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 20, 5 a. m.]

495. General Ironside regretfully says appeal for permission to transfer troops Murman to Archangel refused by the British War Office but the General is not discouraged and is making best disposition of few troops here. Has arranged for each American company at the front to spend eight days monthly in Archangel. He says that he is aiding Russian mobilization. The President is pleased that 800 responded to mobilization call out of a possible 1,500 in territory mobilized. Ironside concurs, saying has recommended additional call in the territory occupied by Allies.

Your 312, October 17, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> gives gratifying information which was unknown hitherto and renders me less modest in suggesting and demanding.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/3002

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 20, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 11.20 p. m.]

497. Tereshchenko<sup>2</sup> arrived 18th incognito, dined with me last evening alone; has been exclusively in Norway since released from

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Michael I. Tereshchenko, from March to May 1917, Russian Minister of Finance; from May to November, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

prison about the middle of March; comes as a courier from Russian Minister at Stockholm to the provisional government here, also Omsk government. Chaikovski requested him to come to Archangel but he left Stockholm before receiving message. I consider Tere-shchenko patriotic Russian, supporting our policy. He plans, if impossible to go to Omsk direct, to go via the United States and I have assured him visa.

He gives me first information about the formation in London of a Russo-British organization with a capital of £300,000,000 for exploit[ation] northern Russia, especially Pechora district, and colonizing same with Irish. Buchanan, former British Ambassador, Russia, vice chairman. Tereshchenko objects to scheme as I do.

Please inform me when replies received [on proposals] to Allies mentioned in your 193 [1953], October 11.<sup>1</sup>

Martyushin, former Minister of Finance, sovereign government, tendered same position provisional government but declined and will sail for United States on direct steamer within ten days; is a representative of cooperatives authorized to arrange exchange of Russian products for our manufactures. Intended going via England but the President and myself induced him to go direct to America. I am giving him a letter to War Trade Board, copy to the Department. He speaks Russian only.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/3037

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *October 23, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received October 24, 11.14 a. m.*]

510. Chaikovski reports mobilization proceeding quite satisfactorily and Ironside encouraging. Less friction since the departure of Poole, Thornhill, Grimes. Chaikovski respected by all and situation improving but would be greatly benefited by eminent Russian general as Minister of War and ranking all Allied generals. President says General Lechitski who commanded Russian army in the last success on south front is available but would not be subordinate to any Allied general. He says that Lechitski is desired by Omsk government. If you could possibly arrange with Allies having forces here to agree to such arrangement I strongly recommend doing so. He is recognized by all as having ability, fidelity, char-

---

<sup>1</sup> To the Ambassador in Great Britain; see vol. III, p. 147, footnote 1.



acter with brilliant record; is liberal conservative, been hiding since last revolution but whereabouts known.

I think this very desirable not only because it strengthens government, aids mobilization, but would be in line with our policy by divesting Allied occupation of its conquest or military phase. Have we received replies from Allies to plan outlined in your telegram 193 [1953], October 11, 1 p. m. [8 p. m.],<sup>1</sup> to London, or from neutrals concerning protest against Bolshevik crimes? Please answer.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3002

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1918, 7 p. m.

322. Your 497, October 20, 6 p. m. Department will now be pleased to have Tereshchenko visit the United States in capacity of private individual and to facilitate his departure for Siberia. Visa authorized for Tereshchenko and also Martyushin.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3043

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 25, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 26, 10.17 a. m.]

520. Answering your 315, October 22, 4 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Neither McCully, Poole arrived. I see Chaikovski and Ironside often, former favorably impressed by latter. I think they will cooperate harmoniously if General Poole remains away, which I think advisable, also Thornhill and Grimes. Ironside supplanted British commander on railroad front with French commander upon which I congratulated him as I think change will remedy French disaffection. I have received reports of American officers and soldiers on the railroad front being dissatisfied and am sending Stewart there.

After Consul Poole arrives if present harmony continues and Poole and McCully view the situation properly, I think I can safely leave for London but be compelled to go to Murman to take *Olympia* as her captain says she cannot come here, if ice heavy, first due 29th. Poole's arrival unknown. Shall inform Department if and when depart. Can I safely go to Vladivostok via Mediterranean from Lon-

<sup>1</sup> See vol. III, p. 147, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

don? Planning to take Johnston. Doolittle arrived; Flack, Calder, Zahler not arrived; no instructions. What advices from Ambassador Morris, Vladivostok; what responses to the *aide-mémoire* mentioned in Department's 193 [1953], October 11, 1 p. m. [8 p. m.]<sup>1</sup> to London?

I am willing after the operation to return here or go to Siberia, but in either event think should be out of Russia shortest time possible. I consider union of Archangel and Omsk governments exceedingly important and the junction from this end depends on armistice; if armistice arranged, believe would be able to reach Omsk via northern route sooner than via Vladivostok as Allies would immediately send sufficient troops to rescue the Czech Army.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3070

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 28, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 29, 2.30 p. m.]

525. President received October 26 cable from Omsk October 19, signed by Avksentiev, President of the all-Russian government, and saying that Allies requested a statement from Archangel provisional government of recognition and subordination to the all-Russian government, Omsk. The President has addressed a communication to me as Dean, saying provisional government placed before the representatives of the Allied powers the following declaration:

Provisional government of northern Russia hereby declares that considering unselfish northern region of Russia an inalienable part in the all-Russian state and recognizing as the sovereign authority of this state the government elected by a conference of members of the Constituent Assembly at Ufa, having its seat now at Omsk, and presided over by N. D. Avksentiev, it expresses its willingness to obey directly communicated orders of this sovereign Russian authority until the next all-Russian Constituent Assembly be called together.

Chiefs of American, British, French, Italian missions received this and made no objection thereto. Marshall [missions?] took no formal action thereon, personally expressing approval of declaration.

This cable came through the United States (proper?) [in?] Russian without relay; can you communicate with all-Russian government Omsk? Have we representatives there?<sup>2</sup>

FRANCIS

<sup>1</sup> See vol. III, p. 147, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Answered, Nov. 2, that message was being transmitted through the Vice Consul at Omsk.

File No. 861.00/3037

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918, 3 p. m.

331. Your 510, October 23, 6 p. m., under consideration. For your confidential information: command of forces in northern Russia was assigned to the British by decision of War Council at Versailles. Any change would require consideration by the Council. War Department would probably agree to control of American troops by Russian only if officer selected were of definitely approved capacity.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3130

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 31, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received November 1, 5.34 p. m.]

532. Mobilization success beyond expectations; 1,500 Russians mobilized but Ironside says Durov weak man. If mutiny occurs Ironside thinks can manage but says will kill mobilization and I concur. Mobilized Russians disobeyed parade orders 29th. Durov addressed recalcitrants in two-hour speech to which corporal replied, then Durov asked if another soldier desired to talk, whereupon another corporal spoke and then about one thousand men attempted to speak at once. One grievance is Allied forces are given more meat than Russians, also given jam and cigarettes, which are withheld from the Russians. In meeting Allied Ambassadors with President to-day I advocated making rations same when Lindley replied ration fixed by British War Office and can not be changed, which is characteristic but unwise. Durov asked Ironside if he would send two companies Allied troops to disarm men, if so requested, and told me Ironside refused; but the latter said had not refused, but required opportunity to judge whether armed Allied forces necessary, otherwise would be blamed for fatal blow to mobilization.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3196

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 2, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 9, 1.08 p. m.]

540. My 532, October 31, 7 p. m. Chaikovski states situation quieted and dissatisfaction among the 1,300 Russian soldiers liqui-

dated, with changes in command to ensue and segregation of troops. While speaking of matter as unimportant his manner belied his words. Your 331, October 31, 3 p. m., just received and being deciphered.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/3226

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 4, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 16, 10.50 p. m.]

548. Durov and Samarin replaced yesterday on order of President Chaikovski by temporary appointees, namely Rear Admiral Vikorst, formerly commander of division of northern Russian fleet, and Lieutenant Colonel Zilinski, formerly General Staff. President to-day stated had cabled General Miller, well-known Russian general in Rome, inviting him to come and accept place in government but as yet no time for reply; also that General Marushevski supposedly *en route* here from Stockholm and that with the assistance of General Ironside all difficulties with newly formed mobilized Russian troops would be peacefully liquidated to-day.

Mobilization in Onega and Shenkursk districts postponed a few days.

The President stated that he had requested Tereshchenko to remain here and work with him in the government but that the latter stated the time had not yet arrived for a member of Kerensky government to come forward.

He stated in private conversation that he had informed Chaikovski that he did not find his policy sufficiently vigorous and that he expected to telegraph in this sense to the Omsk government upon his arrival in Stockholm.

President stated that he had cabled Omsk acknowledging subordination of provisional government of the northern region to the authority of Omsk all-Russian government. Tereshchenko expects to leave to-morrow night for Stockholm.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/3119

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1918, 4 p. m.

343. For your information. Navy Department has informed this Department that upon the assumption of the duties of commander

the United States naval forces in northern Russia, Rear Admiral N. A. McCully was given the following instructions as to policy:

1. Call promptly on our Ambassador and consult with him freely.
2. Read carefully the President's proclamation on Siberian intervention, and the attached despatch of the State Department to our Ambassador to Russia. Shape your policy in accordance with these pronouncements.
3. Cooperate with the military and naval forces of the Allies, in so far as the policies above indicated and the forces at your disposal permit. Maintain cordial relations with the senior United States Army officer.
4. Exert your influence towards the conservation and support of local Russian authority, except where that authority is exercised in a manner contrary to the interests of the Russian people.
5. Your actions should make it clear that you are the sincere friend of the Russian people, and that American forces have no ulterior military or political motive inimical to Russian sovereignty.
6. Subject to the restrictions imposed by our Government's policy and by these instructions, you will regard yourself as under the orders of the senior naval officer of the cobelligerent powers present in northern Russian waters.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/3225

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 7, 1918.

[Received November 16, 4.45 p. m.]

560. After leaving I have authorized address to American soldiers northern Russia framed by myself. Their spirit of sacrifice and service is commended notwithstanding handicaps under which they have labored. I alluded to provisions made for their comfort by Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. and stated that no service of Allied troops anywhere is of greater importance than in northern Russia. Reference is made to many expressions of President and statement ventured that war will continue in Russia after negotiations for peace between our Government and Allies with Central Empires are effected but that we should be recreant to our obligations if we should withdraw our forces from Russia and permit the Russian people, who have already suffered by loss of six million young manhood, enormous damage to their industries, their commerce and their commercial interests, to continue to exhaust themselves in civil strife or become the victims of any foreign power, etc.

FRANCIS

Retention of American and Allied Troops in North Russia after the  
Armistice with Germany—Local Attitude toward the Kolchak Govern-  
ment at Omsk

File No. 861.00/3220

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 13, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received November 15, 10.45 p. m.]

572. Signing of the armistice has created some uncertainty among the American and French troops. The reasons heretofore assigned for their presence in north Russia no longer seem valid to them. If they are held here there must be an early and authoritative statement of motives as already suggested in my telegram 553 of November 6, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Officers and men inquire why military operations are necessary against the Bolsheviki. The situation is aggravated by the British. The military attaché will telegraph the War Department concerning the situation of our troops *vis-à-vis* the British military authority. There is in addition a suspicion that the British may be "imperialistic" and that American forces are possibly being used toward ends which do not accord with our own ideas. News of the impending return of General Poole tends to confirm this view.

Concerning possible withdrawal of American troops it is to be observed, *contra*, that we have an obligation to the inhabitants of this region who would be exposed, if we withdrew, to severe Bolshevik reprisals and that we have an even more important obligation to all Russia to protect her from economic exploitation by creditor nations which may find themselves with a freer hand now that peace has come. Whether or not the information of the French Ambassador communicated in No. 571, November 12, 8 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> is correct, it must be foreseen that any Russian government of the near future will be weak and therefore liable to incur unwise obligations heavily mortgaging the capital wealth of the country and it is by no means certain that nations whose losses in Russia have been more considerable than ours will find it easy to forego the opportunity of obtaining concessions or establishing spheres of influence. The interests of Russia and the ultimate interests of her creditors demand an unhampered reconstruction of the national economy. To this end both have need, but above all Russia, of the friendly offices of a disinterested third party. It is difficult to see how the United

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; it contained the report of a Soviet offer of payment of interest on loans in return for recognition (File No. 861.00/3223).

States can avoid the obligation of this rôle in view of our professed friendship for the Russians and their special confidence in us and our ideals. [We?] will not even fulfil it if we withdraw our troops and leave the field free to our less disinterested associates. One feature of the north Russian situation is the influence which Ambassador Francis has exercised in favor of square deal and I feel sure the presence of an American force here has been an essential factor in his success.

POOLE

---

File No. 763.72119/2694

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 19, 3.03 p. m.]

582. Yesterday at a public meeting organized by the Northern Region Union for the Regeneration of Russia, on the occasion of the Allied victory, Chaikovski and representatives of the union, City Duma, Zemstvo, and Cooperatives emphasized Russia's right to representation at the coming peace conference, on the ground of her sacrifices earlier in the war and the repudiation of the Brest Litovsk treaty by the greater part of Russian opinion.

The French Ambassador replying for the Diplomatic Corps said that the Allies cannot fail to recognize Russia's claim, that future considerations of fact and law must determine what Russian government will be admitted to representation but it can be said now that it will not be the Bolshevik government. He also gave assurances of disinterested aid by the Allies in the regeneration of Russia.

General Miller has telegraphed [from] Rome accepting Chaikovski's invitation to come to Archangel saying he will start at once. It is proposed to make him governor general of the northern region and commander in chief of the Russian forces. Until he arrives General Marushevski, who arrived yesterday from Stockholm, will fill these offices and subsequently become Miller's assistant. Miller is repudiated [reputed] to be an able soldier of liberal ideas. He went to Rome as chief Russian military mission to Italy. Marushevski seems to enjoy general respect. Is reputed to be liberal and a good organizer.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3237

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 19, 10.17 a. m.]

585. General Ironside has received official notification of his appointment as commander in chief in northern Russia. Lindley informs me that General Poole has been ordered to the south of Russia to join Denikin who has succeeded Alexeev at the head of the Volunteer Army and that General Milne, heretofore commanding British forces at Saloniki, has been ordered to take command at Odessa. Lindley adds that his civil propaganda and intelligence personnel has been ordered to leave Archangel for Odessa.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3381

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1302

## MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that a telegram has been received at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's representative at Archangel who states that the situation there would undoubtedly be immensely improved by a clear declaration of policy from the Allies. The friendly or indifferent portion of the population are at present afraid to declare themselves on our side or to cooperate with us as they fear a withdrawal of our troops and subsequent Bolshevik reprisals. Their hesitation will become more pronounced as soon as the armistice is settled and will continue to increase until the Allies make an authoritative pronouncement as to their future intentions.

Mr. Lindley stated in an interview which he gave recently to the editor of the pro-government paper that the Allied Governments were no doubt considering their action in case of peace, but that the armistice would in his personal opinion not alter the situation in the Archangel region and that it would certainly not entail an immediate withdrawal of Allied troops. Mr. Lindley adds that such an expression of personal opinion carried little weight with it. He states that he fully realises the difficulty of arriving at a decision when it is a question of continuously taking into considera-



tion the fact that so many governments and questions of home politics must be thought of, but the longer it is postponed the stronger the Bolsheviks will become. It is generally agreed that they were in a very tottering condition in August last. His Majesty's representative enquires whether it would not be possible to take the line that the presence of representative Russian delegates is necessary at the peace conference and that so long as all free expression of opinion in Russia is prevented by the reign of terror such representatives cannot be found. The fact that no punishment has been inflicted on the murderers of Captain Cromie or of the innocent Russians whom we still consider as our Allies might be added to this broad reason for intervention.

In communicating the above to the United States Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to inform them that His Majesty's Government consider it desirable that some form of statement should be made with a view to easing the situation. While in the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is undesirable to enter into any explanation, as Mr. Lindley has proposed, with regard to retaining the Allied troops in the Archangel region, it is suggested that the Allied representatives should make a plain official statement to the effect that the Allied occupation is not likely to be terminating in the immediate future, although it is not intended that it should be permanent.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to add that His Majesty's Government would be grateful for an expression of the views of the United States Government in the matter.

WASHINGTON, *November 20, 1918.*

---

File No. 861.00/3257

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *November 21, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received November 22, 9.35 a. m.]

3906. The Foreign Office have given me the following telegram they have received from Lindley, the British representative at Archangel, which our Consul there asked to have communicated to you:

Following is text of proclamation issued by Chaikovski to-day:

To the population of northern region and Russian Allies: The world war is at an end, all civilized humanity breathes a sigh of relief, the crisis of our sickness is past and we are now freed from immediate threat to civilization and liberty but danger of incidental complications due to the war remains. One such complication, Bol-

shevism, must be liquidated before humanity can devote itself to constructive work of peace. It is a mistake to suppose conclusion of peace between Allies and Central powers puts an end to danger of Bolshevism.

Unfortunately, Bolshevism is a danger not merely to Russia but equally from an international point of view. This danger consists in seizure of power by a negligible minority relying on the armed support of rebel army and navy in order to force the majority to submit to the will of leaders of a single party unrecognized by population and not elected by them for government of the country.

Such usurpation of authority is only possible in the atmosphere of war; with cessation of wars it should immediately be liquidated no matter what high-sounding watchwords it may adopt to justify such violation of the rights of the free people.

In Russia it has taken the form of return to the previous government by intensive and extraordinary police methods similar to those employed by Imperial Government during period of martial law lasting from 1889 to 1917 with short intervals in 1905 and 1906 at the time of first Russian revolution. Soviet authorities returned to this policy after the October rebellion<sup>1</sup> of 1917. Since that time they have committed more crimes and acts of violence than the Imperial Government during the whole twenty-seven years of its unnatural dictatorship. Now this siren tempting to influence either the credulous, weak-minded, or unprincipled is trying to persuade the world it represents longed-for socialist heaven, "proletariat dictatorship." It is time to put an end to this mystification. All peoples must strain every nerve for the sake of liberty, justice and happiness of the proletariat of the world; otherwise it will be the grave, not only for their own liberty, prosperity, but those of all humanity.

In any case there can be no place for Bolshevik usurpers at international peace congress for peaceful relations between nations incompatible with policy of violence on which Bolshevik power is based. Such policy can only lead to civil war and inevitably leads to war with neighboring nations and destroys the state of peace.

That is why there can be no true end to the war without final liquidation of Bolshevism, that is why no one having at heart the cause of peace can lay down arms before Soviet power has been broken.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 861.00/3381

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

#### MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain and begs to acknowledge the receipt of a memorandum No. 1302, dated November 20, 1918, on the subject of making some statement with a view to easing the situation at Archangel.

<sup>1</sup> November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

In view of the fact that the President and the Secretary of State will shortly proceed to Paris, where they will be able to confer directly with representatives of the Allied Governments, it is believed that consideration of any general statement in regard to the Bolsheviks in Russia might best be deferred until that time. In the meanwhile, the Government of the United States proposes to inform the American Chargé d'Affaires at Archangel that the signing of the armistice will make no change in the general situation relative to American troops in north Russia until such time as the President and the Secretary of State are able to discuss this question upon their arrival in Paris.

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1918.

---

File No. 861.00/3307

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 29, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 30, 7.50 a. m.]

610. I am telegraphing *en clair* No. 611 for the Department's possible criticism Thanksgiving address which I delivered before soldiers at Y.M.C.A. after reading to them the most significant portions of the President's address to Congress communicating terms of armistice. Reference is made to my 572, dated November 13, 3 p. m.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3316½

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 29, 1918.

[Received November 30, 4.03 a. m.]

611. To hold the light steady until they find themselves—that is now task of nations which like ourselves are so fortunate as to have acquired capacity for peaceful orderly adjustment their political institution to progress of age.

To hold light steady until they find themselves—it's no easy matter even most general point view. For individual it's even more difficult to perceive always just how effort being applied to accomplishment general purpose. This feeling uncertainty comes especially to us in northern Russia who are working on outskirts of the big job on edge of befogged situation not always clear even to those having all facts before them.

Let me tell you who have just come from central Russia that down there as sly and dangerous set of demagogues as ever known are pil-laging a poor and benighted people. 'Twas not Bolsheviki who made Russian revolution, 'twas not they who overthrew Tsar, giving to Russia first hope she might enjoy that liberty, peace, comfort which we Americans have almost come to take for granted. Men that did that now languishing in Bolshevik prisons, fled abroad or died at hands mercenary alien firing squad. These men struggling with monumental task establishing free government for people just emerged from centuries black ignorance oppression were forcibly dispersed by gang of political adventurers admittedly sustained by German money, German intrigue, seeking German military ends in Russia's confusion, Russia's dismemberment, abasement. These political adventurers aim not at what we conceive democracy where every man entitled to life, liberty, etc., but at what they call "dictatorship of proletariat" which is in fact but inversion of old autocracy which we in common with other democratic peoples of world gloried to see overthrown.

You men want know what you are doing here. You are protecting one spot in Russia from sanguinary bedlam of Bolshevism, you are keeping safe one spot where real progressives of Russian revolution may begin to lay foundation of great free Russian state which is to come. Don't think you are forgotten. Washington knows what you are doing, what you are up against. You may be sure that President has thought of you and in good time will tell you and rest of us what he expects each to do in order hold steady light of our forward-working democracy.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3324

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 2, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received December 3, 5.11 a. m.]

625. To Paris also. News of *coup d'état* in Siberia which was received by Allied Embassies several days ago has now been officially communicated to Chaikovski by Maklakov at Paris and will probably be published to-morrow.

Chaikovski is disturbed by Siberian developments and apparent Allied support for Denikin in the south. He desired to send a protest to Omsk but failed to obtain support of the other members of the provisional government of the northern region, who are

almost all *bourgeois*. Two of them are more or less frankly pleased with the turn of events in Siberia, only one supported his proposal for a protest, the remaining either vacillated or counseled delay.

Failing support of the government, he desired to send independent protest in his capacity as a member of the Directory, but the British and the French Ambassadors have dissuaded him for the present, creating the hope that the Allied Governments may effect some adjustment at Omsk acceptable to him. They have informed him that they have recommended to their governments the discountenancing of illegal and forceful measures.

Increased activity has been perceptible for some days in local commercial and banking circles in favor of the reaction. A leading Cadet has published in a local newspaper an attack upon the Constitutional Assembly as having been elected under circumstances which gave it no real sanction, and denying the authority of highest members of the Assembly or groups thereof to set up governments such as the Omsk Directory. There seems to be also some monarchist agitation among the Russian army officers. As a precautionary measure, Chaplin, who figured in the arrest of the Governor, September 5, has been sent out of Archangel. Concurrently with the foregoing there are evidences of increased unrest and radical agitation among the laboring classes.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3220

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1918, 8 p. m.

386. Your 572, November 13, 3 p. m. Signing of the armistice has created no change in the situation until the question of how to further assist Russia, particularly after the withdrawal of German troops from occupied Russian territory, is determined by discussion with the Allied Governments at Paris. The President and Secretary of State have to-day sailed for France. As already made quite clear by this Government American forces were sent to Archangel only to safeguard Russian stores and supplies and to protect the port of Archangel from attacks which were being organized or directed in whole or in part by German and Austrian prisoners of war.

POLK

File No. 861.00/3399

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 10, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received December 11, 8.23 a. m.]

648. Lindley has received from Balfour statement British policy in Hamilton [Russia], of which the following is the gist:

Dispatch of British troops to Russia warrant [was] for the purpose of withholding German forces from the western front, and not to overthrow any existing régime or to reestablish order. His Majesty's Government do not intend to interfere in Russian domestic affairs, but owe certain obligations to the Czechs who are our allies and certain governments which have grown from [up] under our protection on the White Sea, in Siberia, the Caucasus and Transcaspien. The extent of the protection to be given and what may develop thereafter can not now be foreseen. As, after four years of war, His Majesty's Government have not forces available to be dispersed over the large area of Russia, this will depend largely upon the decisions of Associated Governments having more considerable resources at their disposal. British activities will be limited for the present to the use of the troops now in Russia and to furnishing munitions to certain elements known to be friendly to the Allied cause.

Military attaché learns that 3,400 additional British troops recently arrived at Murmansk.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3404

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 11, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received December 12, 11.50 a. m.]

654. One company of the local Russian regiment having been ordered to the front this morning, meetings were begun which resulted in the entire regiment's declining to leave its barracks. On the second order being sent to them by General Ironside himself, five hundred, mostly old soldiers, prisoners of war, returned from Germany, presented themselves in proper formation, the remainder were then driven from the buildings by a few shots from a trench mortar and placed under guard. On being ordered to indicate the ringleaders, they pointed out some thirty men who were forthwith

shot. The company designated for service at the front was then sent forward without arms. No reaction on the general public is perceptible so far.

The incident emphasizes anew the incapacity of Russian officers of the old régime to adjust themselves to new conditions and the unwisdom of persisting in conscription. I understand that conscription was insisted upon by the local Russian government, including Chaikovski, despite the opinion of Mr. Francis and the other Ambassadors that the volunteer system is alone practicable at present.

General Marushevski, who has commanded the Russian forces since November 18, as reported my No. 582, is an excellent man, but inevitably embarrassed by the constant necessity of accommodating the revolutionary [sentiments?] of the men on the one side to the stupid reactionary ideas of many of the officers on the other. Miller, who will supersede Marushevski, the latter remaining as second in command, is reported leaving London to-day *en route* from Rome.

Foregoing also sent to Paris.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3434

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received December 13, 3.04 p. m.]

658. To Paris also. Tendencies noted in the last paragraph of my 625, December 2, 8 p. m., especially unrest among left elements, becoming somewhat more marked as news Siberian events spreading. Allied embassies have had following published to-day:

In view of current rumors, the Allied military command, after consulting with the Allied embassies, considers it desirable to inform the people of the Archangel government that while adhering carefully to the principle of noninterference in Russian internal politics it cannot permit public order to be disturbed in the areas protected by Allied troops. Political activity in this region must be carried on within the legal limits. Any attempts at a *coup d'état* or other violent or illegal political change, whether coming from the parties of the right or the left, is forbidden and will be rigorously put down.

This action was taken on my proposal. It seemed important first to put a definite stop by this means to the silly counter-revolutionary plotting of certain Russian officers, who thought they had the secret sympathy of the Allies, in which they may not have been without

encouragement from certain French officers, although Noulens has energetically opposed all such movements; second and most important, to reassure the mass of the people whose uneasiness seems to have been largely due to a fear that the Allies might countenance or support a reactionary *coup*.

There is still no perceptible popular reflex from the events reported in my telegram 654 of yesterday. This disturbance was somewhat apart from the developments mentioned above, having its origin in the conditions described in the second and third paragraphs of my 654, and its most immediate cause in the unwise insistence of the Russian officers upon resuming epaulets which are to the soldiers the outward symbol of reaction.

Bolshevik propaganda has been especially active recently; it has also aimed to influence the American troops and to create ill feeling among them against the British in which it has unfortunately not been without success. The situation is reported to have been acute in M Company, since one of its popular men was killed at the front by a Canadian aviator under circumstances which are now being investigated. By the arrest of four Bolshevik agitators yesterday, Colonel Ruggles's office broke up a Bolshevik plot directed to produce an uprising among the American troops early next month. The plot had apparently made no progress.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3460

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received December 18, 1.52 p. m.]

664. Local situation generally quiet and satisfactory. Announcement by the Allied command and embassies reported my No. 658, December 12, 7 p. m., seems to have had good effect, reassuring elements of the left.

Vigor with which mutiny, reported in Embassy's telegram 654, December 11, 8 p. m., was handled, and the fact that executions were carried out entirely by Russians, has produced favorable effect; only thirteen were executed instead of thirty as originally reported. Bulk of soldiers have expressed themselves satisfied to be free of agitators; company designated for service at the front has again received its arms and went forward with apparently good morale; I have had no reports as yet concerning its further behavior.

Foregoing to Paris also.

POOLE



## CHAPTER III

### SOUTHEASTERN RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS

**Nationalist and anti-Bolshevik Movements: the Don Cossacks under Kaledin, the Southeastern Federation, the Trans-Caucasus, the Volunteer Army under Alexeev and Kornilov—Attitude of the American and Allied Governments toward "de facto" Political and Military Authorities**

File No. 861.00/734

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

No. 69

TIFLIS, October 19, 1917.

[Received November 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith in duplicate copies of my despatch of even date to the Embassy on the political and military situation in this district.

I have [etc.]

F. WILLOUGHBY SMITH

[Enclosure]

*The American Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the American Ambassador (Francis)*

TIFLIS, October 19, 1917.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt last week of the Embassy's instruction of October 5, 1917, in reply to several requests made by this office in connection with the political and military situation in this district. In answer to my repeated requests for the Embassy's support in the reorganization of the army on this front by the transfer to it of Armenian and Georgian troops from the other fronts, I note that the Embassy considers this step one relating to internal affairs in which the Embassy can take no action.

Though I am fully aware that my request under ordinary circumstances would not be fully in accord with the established policy of the United States, yet in view of the intensive German propaganda conducted here and throughout Russia and the great difficulties with which the Provisional Government has to contend, I believe it my duty to do all I can to counteract such propaganda and to advise and help both the military and civil authorities. In adopting this course I was guided by the President's message to Russia in which he states, as reported, that the United States is ready and willing to assist Russia against both her external and internal enemies.

Without our active help, advice, and participation in the internal affairs of the country, it is difficult to imagine or hope for the reestablishment of order by next spring, particularly when the agents of the Central powers are most active in sowing discord and distrust both in the army and among the civil population.

I found the authorities here at times so discouraged by the difficulties of the situation and the apparent lack of support from Petrograd that, if it had not been for the encouragement and support I was able to give them, they would

have allowed matters to drift. It is in great measure owing to my efforts that the Caucasus army is still holding its position on this front and the most pressing needs in regard to supplying the army and the population have been met. A number of my suggestions in regard to transportation on the Black Sea have also been adopted. It is owing to my interference with the internal politics of the Caucasus that German intrigue establishing a *bloc* between the Moslems and Georgians has failed, and more friendly relations have been established with the Armenians and the Cossacks of the north. It was I who discovered that active Russian cooperation with General Maude was at this time impossible and that a reorganization on national lines had to be undertaken in order to secure such cooperation. There are many other points, both military and civil, on which I have given advice that has been gratefully accepted and followed with advantage. I am fully aware of the seriousness of conditions here and have followed every movement with infinite care. My conclusions are based on knowledge so acquired, and these conclusions are fully endorsed and supported by the experienced military representatives of England and France: General Shore, Colonel Marsh, and Colonel Chardigny.

Since last July the general conditions throughout Russia and the rapid development of events have forced me to somewhat revise the opinions which I had the honor to report both to the Ambassador and Senator Root. There seems to be a total lack of patriotism and national spirit towards this country as a whole, and every effort of the Provisional Government to meet this situation has only tended to aggravate it. The Provisional Government has heretofore tended to discourage the local national spirit, considering it as a disruptive force, but recent events have shown that practically the only hope of union and peace lies in the encouragement of this racial or national spirit and the utilization of this force towards the formation of units which in turn would inevitably unite in the formation of a Russian federation on the lines indicated by the Russian declaration of independence. The course of events clearly shows that the people are drifting in that direction notwithstanding German propaganda and the former indecision or even opposition of the Provisional Government. These racial feelings if encouraged and wisely guided would save Russia and would be of particular and lasting benefit to this district.

A union is now on its way between the Armenians, Georgians, and Cossacks of the Terek and the Kuban; the latter are in close understanding with the Cossacks of the Don and are coming to an agreement with a purified Ukraine; this combination in turn finds influence and support among the other Cossack settlements throughout the country. When united, all these groups will be in a position to offer to Russia itself an organized force with which to form a union leading to the federative republic, the ideal which events show the great majority of the people are unconsciously striving to attain. The creation of such a republic by the several races composing it would give that love of country which at present is totally lacking, these same nations having individually and collectively created it. Though there appears at this time little hope of the Russians being able to assume an offensive on the main front by next spring and even strenuous efforts must be made to have them maintain a defensive, conditions on this front are totally different and by the regroupment, in favor of which I requested the Embassy's support, an effective offensive could be relied on at small cost and less sacrifice. If this measure is not adopted at once and carried out, this district will be gravely menaced

and it will cost us a hundredfold to remedy the damage done and we will be guilty as well of the greatest injustice and injury to the Christian population of the Caucasus.

As I have previously stated my advice has been eagerly accepted and followed by the authorities in many instances, but to make such advice continuously effective it is essential to render some material aid, to obtain which I hope I can rely on the Embassy's cooperation and support.

I have [etc.]

F. WILLOUGHBY SMITH

File No. 861.00/934

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 179

Moscow, November 8, 1917.

[Received January 10, 1918.]

SIR: . . . A conference of Cossack armies and mountaineers of the Caucasus, held at Vladikavkaz, spoke for the speedy creation of a Russian federal republic with states as members thereof; for the strengthening of the central government; for a vigorous prosecution of the war and the conclusion of an honorable peace; and for the return to law and order and the suppression of anarchy and counter-revolution. The conference proposes the representation of the several states, whose creation and whose indissoluble union are proposed, in the central government by two persons. The conference assumed the name of the Southeastern league, including the Don, Kuban, Terek, and Astrakhan Cossack armies, the Kalmyk tribe, all the tribes of Daghestan and the Transcatalian [Zakataly] district, the mountain tribes of the Terek and Kuban territories and the Sukhum district, and the steppe tribes of the Terek territory and of the Stavropol government.<sup>1</sup> . . .

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/639

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, November 9, 1917, 3 p. m.

[Received November 10, 10.25 a. m.]

The Prime Minister left St. Petersburg for army headquarters. All other Ministers prisoners in Winter Palace. It is reported from Moscow Maximalist Committee getting control there. Caucasus population and army refuse to unite with Maximalist movement but I have doubt about their ability hold out much more than five days without financial aid which it is of vital interest for the Allies to

<sup>1</sup>The federation agreement is printed *post*, p. 616.

extend. Recommend that I be authorized if necessary draw \$10,000,000 by telegraph for this purpose. Please instruct me what attitude should be adopted if approached on the subject by local government and Central Committee. Cable via Bombay.

SMITH

File No. 861.00/683

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, November 18, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received November 19, 11.50 a. m.]

Having no communication or news from Petrograd or Moscow. Baku in the control of the Maximalists. Have advised sending troops to locality [to put down?] this uprising. Situation throughout district can be kept in hand for another week or ten days when financial crisis owing to lack currency by the government and private banks will precipitate serious disorders among troops and population. [Important to check?] this rebellion at all cost. Only available means owing to urgency and lack some legal means of printing paper currency lies in purchase and import large amount rubles now in Persia. If it is desired to keep this section of Russia and Russian front loyal to the Allies this delay should be met at once by depositing \$10,000,000 London or New York immediately for the purpose above mentioned, purchase rubles made through me, Paddock,<sup>1</sup> and American mission, Persia. Also I or other American officials should be instructed to check expenditures. Elections for Russian Constituent Assembly continuing. Members for this district will convene here if assembly will not be called together Petrograd. Strong determination on the part of leaders and majority population not submit to Maximalist government and separate peace tendency; to unite with British colors and Southern federation and continue the war in case of separate peace. The advantage to be gained by the Allies of holding the line Ural Mountains, Volga, Don Basin, grain, coal, petroleum resources of all Russia obvious and would give nucleus for the army [through?] which loyal Russians could greatly add to German difficulties and keep German army with little additional resources [occupied] on eastern front and with riotous starving mobs to deal with. Please instruct by cable via London, Bombay, urgent. I am in close touch and working unani-  
mously with representatives of the Provisional Government, political leaders, and military.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Gordon Paddock, Consul at Tabriz.

File No. 861.00/711

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, November 23, 1917, 3 p. m.

[Received November 24, 1 p. m.]

Saturday I shall be present at the meeting for organization government of Caucasus which will unite with Southern federation and repudiate armistice or a separate peace. Essential to give them financial support as indicated in my telegrams of 9th, 18th. Anxiously awaiting instructions. This aid is requested both by representatives the Provisional Government and commander in chief.

SMITH

File No. 861.51/244

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tiflis (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1917, 4 p. m.

Your telegram November 23 and previous telegrams. Please advise how under circumstances you describe the financial support you propose will not tend to encourage sectionalism or disruption of Russia or civil war. Department cannot encourage tendencies in any of these directions.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/719

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1917, 5 p. m.

2864. For Colonel House:

Following telegram, dated November 25, just received from American Consul at Tiflis:

In the presence of high commissioners, commander in chief, consuls, and military agents the Allies, a meeting of representatives all local nationalists, parties, and assemblies was held yesterday at which it was decided to establish temporary separate government of Trans-Caucasus and to continue war upon this front. Full loyalty to Russia was expressed and the fact that this government was created solely to keep out anarchy until time true representative government of Russia may be established to which this government would revert was specially emphasized. All executive and legis-

lative powers were given to members of Russian National Assembly for Caucasus, numbering 36, to be convened December 28; until that date power vested in special committee appointed; excludes various national and party committees. Military commander Cossacks declared republic and elected president a few days since with Ekaterinodar as the capital. Such a movement taking place among the Cossacks of the Terek. Encouraging a union of these states with Southern federation and Don Cossacks, strongly recommend I may be instructed to recognize these *de facto* governments and Don [omission] requested in my telegram November 18 be immediately extended in order to check disturbances which otherwise would be precipitated by Russian troops here and on front, at all events until sufficient force national troops will be assembled. Entire success of this federation and its power to stop the growth of Maximalists principally must depend upon ability meet obligations. Smith.

Consul indicates that this temporary separate government of Trans-Caucasus expressed full loyalty to Russia but definite opposition to Bolshevik government at Petrograd. The omission in the latter part of the Consul's telegram would seem to refer to a fund of \$10,000,000 which the Consul telegraphed for November 18 for the purpose of pay and supplies for the troops on Caucasus front. Department understands that British Embassy is recommending to British Government that more financial relief be given. The American Consul at Tiflis will not be given authority to recognize *de facto* government until it is evident that such action will not tend to foster sectionalism or disruption of Russia or civil war.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/719

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1917, 4 p. m.

2870. For Colonel House:

Department would be glad to have a report from you on the general attitude of your colleagues in the matter of the recognition of the *de facto* government of the Trans-Caucasus.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/7926

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 2, 1917, 1 p. m.

[Received 9.50 p. m.]

Your 2864, November 27, 5 p. m., received December 1, 4 p. m., when I was in conference with Prime Ministers of England, of

France, and of Italy discussing this very situation. The inclination of England, of France, and of Italy is to give encouragement to the Transcaucasian movement. Personally I consider it dangerous for the reason that it is encouraging internal disturbances without our having any definite program in mind or any force with which to back up a program. On the other hand if they are not given money or encouragement they may go to pieces. At conference it was decided by France, Italy, and England to send a French and British military mission from Rumania to Tiflis to Kaledin's headquarters to confer with him and to ascertain what his program is. . . .

EDWARD HOUSE

---

File No. 861.00/779

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 4, 1917, 9 p. m.

[Received December 7, 2.20 a. m.]

Replying Department's November 26. Respectfully submit following based on information available here:

If America permits Russian armistice Russian armies can be kept on the front only with financial assistance of the Allies, and provisions, notwithstanding scarcity, would be smuggled in large quantities into Germany as they are now being smuggled into Persia. Thus such assistance would be wasted. If Russia is left entirely to her own resources the country will within brief period come under German domination without use of force on their part; and no matter what government is in power, Russian resources which are now being wasted will be utilized by Germany. The only practicable measure left seems to be to withdraw our interests from that part of Russia which would be of the least service to the Allies and the most embarrassment to the enemy, as indicated in my despatch November 18,<sup>1</sup> and to utilize existing force remaining loyal to the Allies which is represented by Rumanian [*sic*] majority, Russian Cossacks' forces, and Armenian troops.

This loyalty can only be [assured?] by immediate assistance in money, men, and control and by taking over Siberian Railway. If it is not immediately done all these newly formed states must inevitably, for lack currency and in self-defense, shortly submit to Maximalist government. Cossacks are reported to be withdrawing from front with declared object of keeping order therein. From lack of support they have lost confidence in their strength. Only the most energetic and stringent measures can prevent German domination

---

<sup>1</sup> No despatch of this date is on file; for telegram of Nov. 18, see *ante*, p. 581.

throughout Russia and utilization Russia's resources against the Allies. Demoralization and disorganization attained by army and entire country since General Scott visited Russia incredible and only moral fear of Germany or a demonstration of force by the Allies can bring about order by supporting states opposed to Maximalists. The Allies would be supporting both Russian union and democracy against absolute dependence of Russia on Germany.

Election returns throughout Russia so far published would seem to indicate Cadet plurality but if [omission] Cadets obtain control of national assembly, Maximalists declare it [they] will dissolve assembly. This threat can be carried out as only radicals have force behind them. Do not think any reliance can be placed in an agreement not to return German prisoners or in any other obligations at present assumed by any likely Russian government; any agreement would only embarrass the Allies and it would be wiser to reserve freedom of action. I do not exclude possibility of Germany's using Russian troops against the Allies. The Prime Minister of Trans-Caucasus told me to-day his government might be able to hold out for a short time but forces unpaid. Russian army on this front and total lack funds might oblige this government to recognize Maximalists and follow their lead notwithstanding that entire population is opposed to the latter. This would involve loss of Armenia and render most likely the concentration of Turkish-German forces against British in Bagdad. Am not certain of success if policy submitted is adopted but it appears to offer less risk than any other alternative and would certainly afford greatest embarrassment to the enemy chiefs. British and French military mission here agree with the above conclusions and believe it of the utmost importance to confer with governments separate states south Russia with the object of placing before them definite proposals.

Please instruct me as to position I shall assume towards the three governments in this district. To avoid delay and insure delivery, telegrams should be sent via Eastern, Bombay.

SMITH

File No. 763.72119/996

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 5, 1917, 9 p. m.

[Received December 7, 8.30 a. m.]

During an interview with French and British military agents and commander in chief of this front to-day the latter informed us that he received letter from [omission] Pasha, commanding Third



Turkish Army, proposing negotiations for terms. At a meeting of the government here at which this fact was officially adjusted [announced] by him it was decided to open negotiations for armistice of three months, troops on both sides to remain in the present positions. He particularly stated that he would insist upon no troops being withdrawn to Turkish-British front. He stated also he could no longer hold the army in place under present conditions and even if armistice is declared he could only hope to hold the armies on the front with financial assistance of the Allies. The government here was obliged to take such a step in order to save front and prevent Maximalists' obtaining full control. We took note of the facts communicated and jointly protested against any such step's being taken without previously submitting the question to our respective governments. I later had a conversation with the Prime Minister who confirmed commander in chief's statement. Formation of national troops, am informed, is to proceed if funds are available. I still hold the views expressed in my telegram of yesterday but steps indicated therein must be taken immediately.

SMITH

---

File No. 861.00/768*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 6, 1917.

[Received December 7, 1.48 a. m.]

1134. Russian Ambassador, Rome, telegraphed following information which he received from Russian Minister, Teheran, to Russian Minister here:

Civil and military authorities in Caucasus have not recognized Bolsheviki and have sent special mission to Teheran to open negotiations with Allies through British Legation there. Principal subject these negotiations is obtain funds to continue war. In Tiflis national socialist government been set up which will stay until legal government is restored and order reestablished throughout Russia. Head of this government is Gegechkori who stands between Cadets and Mensheviks and is supported by Tseretelli and Cheidze. Latter was president of Soviets during early days of revolution. They are trying establish military line between Caucasus and Kaledin in order fight Bolsheviki.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72/8033

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, December 6, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received December 9, 7.55 p. m.]

104. General Brusilov<sup>1</sup> who was recently wounded by Bolsheviki yesterday called me to hospital and asked me to state to the American Government that General Alexeev<sup>2</sup> as commander in chief and General Kaledin the lieutenant governor, ataman of the combined Cossack troops, have formed a well-equipped army of 50,000 cavalry and a trusted infantry force. A union will be effected with the Ukrain[ian] troops and loyal elements of the army and people who are flocking to the south. Rodzyanko<sup>3</sup> and other leaders of the constitutional régime supporting them. In case Bolsheviki dissolve or terrorize Constitutional Assembly, a cabinet will be determined upon. In case they cannot control same, Alexeev and members of the partisan government will proclaim seat government in Cossack country and will then send forces to Moscow and St. Petersburg to reestablish order. Brusilov thinks armies Alexeev and Kaledin more than sufficient to reestablish order and avert further anarchy but thinks several weeks will elapse before active operation can be begun. Brusilov states that there are still loyal troops in Russia which will continue to fight Germany and hold German troops on this front. He says that Prince Trubetskoi has communicated Alexeev's plans to British Embassy and that financial support has been promised. He asks that the United States support them morally and financially. He strongly urged that unless such an important movement is successful Russia will become a prey to anarchy and civil war.

General Alexeev sent a trusted friend to inform me confidentially of his movements. He confirmed Brusilov's statements that Alexeev had formed a union with the Ukrain[ian] forces and a part of the army of the southwestern front. He stated that Alexeev strongly recommended the occupation of the Siberian Railway by the Allies in order to insure arrival of supplies and prevent liberation of large numbers of German prisoners who may do irreparable harm by stirring up civil war, organizing massacres of foreigners, and destroying the railway.

The Consulate General would greatly appreciate the confidential aims of the Department as to its attitude with respect to the Bol-

<sup>1</sup> Gen. A. A. Brusilov, in 1916 commander of the Russian offensive in Galicia; from June to July 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. M. V. Alexeev, from March to June 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army and in September 1917 Chief of Staff.

<sup>3</sup> M. V. Rodzyanko, President of the Fourth Duma.

sheviki who have violently seized the power and the government which has been recognized as that of the Russian people.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/807

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 11, 1917, 10 p. m.

[Received December 13, 7.35 p. m.]

In a private conference to-day at this Consulate between the chairman of the government of Southeastern Russian federation, Kharlamov, and General Shore, Colonel Chardigny, and myself, former stated that federation is composed of Cossacks of the Don Plateau, Terek, Astrakhan, and of Daghestan. This union was joined by the Cossacks of the Ural and rest [negotiations in progress?] with upper Caucasians and are on their way with Little Russia, Poland, and Siberia. In the first little confidence felt. That Generals Kaledin and Alexeev were organizing an armed force which was rapidly being joined by Cossack officers and loyal troops from all Russia; that the force already existing was sufficient to withstand any effort that could be made by the disorganized Russian Army and to take Tambov, Saratov, Samara; that for the present federation contemplated holding its front and maintaining order within its borders and would endeavor to create an army for fighting with the Allies; that it would not submit to a separate peace or armistice without the consent of the Allies. The line to be held by the federation is as indicated in my telegram of November 18.

There is little doubt of the success of this movement if given active support in men, money, equipment, and administration. Federation would welcome presence American or Allied forces, would turn over administration railroads and would be able to feed Rumanian Army as well as Allied forces which might be sent to their assistance. This federation, if supported, would hold practically all Russia's supplies. Not a train could move unless federation gave coal or petroleum. It could reduce northwestern Russia to starvation and it could save Rumanian Army, giving it possibility of falling back east to the government of Ekaterinoslav. Federation contemplates an issue of paper currency to be printed, for lack paper and presses, in United States or India. Civil capital of federation, Ekaterinodar; military center Novoherkassk. Kharlamov was formerly chairman of the high commissioners for the Caucasus and is sound man. The

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to the Ambassador in Great Britain (No. 6044), Dec. 15, 1917, "for your information and for Crosby."

Black Sea Fleet very hostile to federation but can not live without coal. Please give general instructions for telegrams [by telegraph?] to me via Eastern, Bombay.

SMITH

File No. 861.00/801

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 12, 1917, 8 p. m.

[Received December 13, 1.45 p. m.]

Maximalist uprising Rostov reported crushed with considerable bloodshed. Two transports and one torpedo boat the Black Sea Fleet attacking Taganrog but government of Don anticipates no trouble liquidating the affair. On official authority it is believed that Russian National Assembly will be convened at Kiev or Novo-cherkassk, as indications appear favorable to Cadets, and assembly, if convened at Petrograd, would be under German influence and in Moscow would be dispersed by Maximalists. Either of the two former centers would be favorable for Allied influence. Convention it is supposed will be called for former. The Provisional Government, being socialist, would prefer the first [i. e., Kiev]. I am personally strongly in favor of convention's being called by Duma's committee on claims [*sic*] with Rodzyanko chairman. He is now at second [i. e., Novo-cherkassk]. Strongly recommend that I or some other diplomatic or consular officer should visit at that place and Ekaterinodar to report situation and discuss it with R[odzyanko] and Alexeev. William Jenkins or Poole could take charge here temporarily. Another officer should be sent immediately to Kiev. Please instruct me as soon as possible regarding recognition state and south Russian federation governments and if they may be assured sympathy and assistance.

SMITH

File No. 763.72/8124

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 13, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received December 14, 3 p. m.]

The Prime Minister of Trans-Caucasus informed me to-day that unless the government could obtain 60,000,000 rubles immediately it would have to turn over government to Maximalists. This will be a great disaster particularly in view of the proposed early union with federation indicated in my telegram of December 11. Strongly

urge as provisional measure that I may be authorized by return cable to place this sum at their disposal, expenditures subject to joint control of the Allies. If loan is granted on the conditions named, I believe I shall be able to secure disarmament of the troops returning from the Turkish front, all Maximalists. The arsenal here was taken from the latter by the government to-day. I anticipate little bloodshed if proposed measures be carried out promptly. I am energetically supporting the union with South-eastern Russian federation.

SMITH

File No. 861.00/828

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, December 15, 1917, 4 p. m.

[Received December 16, 4 p. m.]

125. In view of decided [decisive?] events we have observed Don section, am sending Poole unofficially to Rostov ostensibly to investigate commercial situation but in reality to advise the Department of what is occurring. I have authorized him to telegraph Department direct in case of necessity. Please give most careful consideration his telegrams as the Don and Ukrainian sections chiefly deciding factors in restoring peace in Russia.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/807

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tiflis (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1917, 6 p. m.

Your telegrams December 4, 9 p. m., and subsequent dates including December 13, 6 p. m., received. Department appreciates your thorough reports on situation, is in touch with Allied Governments, and hopes to give you definite instructions shortly on whole subject. Meanwhile do not commit this Government. No country either belligerent or neutral has recognized Bolshevik government, Petrograd.

LANSING

[For a description of the development of the anti-Bolshevik movement of the Cossacks under Kaledin during the first days of December 1917, see despatch No. 212 of December 15, 1917, from the Consul General at Moscow, Volume I, page 304.]

File No. 763.72/8142

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1917, 6 p. m.

6051. Please advise what information Foreign Office has regarding subject matter following telegram from Jassy, dated December 13, also any action taken:

After long conference with military attaché I beg to inform Department of following: Many Russian officers and men are starting an organization for defense and order to which not only the officers but also soldiers and civilians who wish to continue the war will be admitted. They claim to have a large membership already and expect in a very short time to have an organized force of over one million men. This organization needs money if our Government is in favor of supporting it. Our military attaché claims that our Government, just as the English and French Governments, should appropriate liberal sum, between \$10,000,000 and \$50,000,000, for financing this movement, for Russian, Rumanian requirements, with object of continuing the war on their Rumanian and Russian fronts. This sum should be put immediately at my disposal because when emergency arises there is no time to telegraph Department for specific sums. The Government must have confidence in me and military attaché to see to the proper expenditure of this money. British Minister here has £10,000,000 at his disposal for this purpose and he offered me 1,000,000 lei immediately but I refused to accept it until I receive instruction from the Department. [Vopicka.]

LANSING

File No. 763.72/8200

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, December 18, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received December 19, 3.25 p. m.]

7999. Your 6023, December 13, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

About ten days ago British Government authorized agents in southern Russia to offer £10,000,000 to one group, £10,000,000 to another, and sum not fixed to Armenians and Georgians in order that latter might offer resistance against anticipated attacks from Turks who are presumed to be arming themselves with rifles sold by Russian soldiers. Thus far no results from these authorizations and latest news though very incomplete represents situation as unpromising for movements of kind indicated in your telegram. However, have reason to believe that British effort will accomplish all that can now be considered valuable in this direction. Since this effort was made quite independently even of French both Ambassador and I feel it

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

unnecessary for us to offer just now to share liability though British have been given to understand we will consider sharing in any wise effort. Views of French Government similar to British. Expect to hear from Paris again to-morrow. Ambassador and I will cable you further in few days. Crosby.<sup>1</sup>

I should go further than Crosby and decline to risk money in an enterprise so doubtful and about which so little is known either by British Government or ourselves. I should surely wait till these people give some hopeful evidence of their strength and spirit.

PAGE

---

File No. 861.00/839

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 18, 1917, 3 p. m.

[Received December 19, 4.25 p. m.]

General Shore, high [head of] British Military Mission, has received instructions by cable accepting the plan which I submitted to the State Department in my telegram of December 11, which was on the same date forwarded by him to London. As this action has doubtless been approved by the United States and as any delay seriously complicates already existing critical condition, in the absence of instructions am not [now?] proceeding with work on the lines indicated in my several recent telegrams to the Department and am sending Vice Consul this evening to Ekaterinodar with personal letter to Kharlamov suggesting Cossacks' cooperation with the Allies and foreign [Armenian and Georgian] troops to disarm, at various points on railroad between front and here, returning soldier mobs of which there are about half million in this district.<sup>2</sup>

I have also asked him unofficially to give me an outline of their most urgent needs. I hope the Department will authorize the loan of 60,000,000 rubles referred to in my telegram of December 13. It is necessary to support this Government by checking Maximalist movement which if successful would greatly impede if not entirely stop formation national troops. I have to suggest all financial aid to this or the federal government be [granted] only if expenditures will be under control Allied commission. Referring to my telegram of November 30<sup>3</sup> for Armenian Relief Committee, recommend that

---

<sup>1</sup> Oscar T. Crosby, delegate of the Treasury to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance.

<sup>2</sup> Text of letter, *post*, p. 607.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

our Government grant or advance committee \$1,000,000 for [extensive] manufacture clothing for use units now forming, such goods being unobtainable sufficient quantities. Owing to vast increase work at this office require the assistance of at least two additional consular officers. Communication with Embassy interrupted. Please instruct.

SMITH

---

File No. 861.00/851

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, December 18, 1917, 7 p. m.

[Received December 22, 8.45 a. m.]

129. Consul, Odessa, reports fights there stopped by compromise between Maximalists and Little Russians. No Americans injured. Conflict arose about refusal Little Russians to take part [in] expedition against Don Cossacks. Morning press announces defeat of Bolshevik forces at Rostov and other points. At Kiev Ukrainian forces disarming all Bolsheviks and will probably support Cossack troops in reestablishing order. Consul, Archangel, reports authorities and people refuse recognize Bolsheviks.

General indignation being shown by all classes against terrorism of Bolsheviks, and populist, socialist, radical, democratic, liberal, and conservative press all over Russia condemn Bolshevikism and declare it to be nothing less than German propaganda. The victory of Kaledin and loyal troops may liquidate the Bolshevik movement more quickly than expected. Soldiers Russia can no longer be counted on as an active fighting unit. If Alexeev and Kaledin put down this movement as it seems now they will, they will reorganize the army and at least prevent food and supplies reaching the enemy. They will also prevent release a million prisoners, being turned loose to join the enemy's ranks or to spread anarchy over Russia. They will also guarantee the existence and work of the Constitutional Assembly which the Bolsheviks are now threatening to dissolve. In order to carry out their program the Siberian Railroad must be kept open and they will need money and supplies. Even if the Bolsheviks carry out their program the civil war in Russia will only be equaled by the present great European conflict. Every possible step should be taken to stop their campaign which can only result in loss of countless lives and a civilization of several centuries.

SUMMERS



File No. 763.72/8204

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, December 19, 1917, 4 p. m.

[Received December 20, 11.25 a. m.]

[From Crosby:]

Referring to despatch from our Consul at Tiflis<sup>1</sup> received after wiring you yesterday. Comparing that statement with later telegrams received here from British agents, find situation viewed differently and that our Consul's report far more optimistic as to possible resistance against Germany than any English reports. Best that can be looked for from these reports is creation of disorganization in southern Russia which might prevent Germany from organized commercial enjoyment of resources of southern Russia. Suggest our Consul be notified that the British Government has instructed its agents to make offers of needed financial help to various Russian and Armenian groups . . . . Desirable, however, that he should be instructed to confer closely with British and French representatives and if possible agree with them concerning their recommendations to London and Paris, which in turn will be immediately available to Ambassador Page and myself, if you think desirable, although I recognize delicacy of urging this. He might also be authorized to telegraph me directly London or Paris. Recognize danger of having independent communications with your agents and make this suggestion based on theory that comparison of our Consul's report with English and French reports here can then be promptly reported to you thus giving you better material for forming final decision than if you receive reports from him alone.

PAGE

File No. 861.00/848

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, December 19, 1917, 10 p. m.

[Received December 21, 7.04 a. m.]

Armistice concluded between Turks and Russia along the whole Caucasus front from December 18, duration until final treaty of peace is declared. May be terminated by either side on fourteen days' notice. Line already demoralized from Trebizond to Lake Van, reserves and [omission] corps was separately draining their

<sup>1</sup> The reference is probably to the telegram described in footnote 1, *ante*, p. 588.

front. Cessation any reassembling units to date from 15th December also affects the Black Sea Fleet for which special committee both powers will be appointed. Russian troops already reported leaving their positions without orders in First and Second Corps, and staff endeavoring to form everywhere local volunteers. This is for civil administration and had no direct connection with the military loans extended by British Government. As railroads insufficient transport Rumanian Army as indicated in my telegram of December 11 and the Black Sea Fleet may be tied up by armistice, negotiations should be opened with Jewish circles [for] transport corps [by] merchant marine through Odessa to take place. General preparation armistice and foreign troops has been ordered [*sic*]. Turkish troops [omission?] Armenian corps, ordered formed immediately on the lines indicated in my report to General Scott last July. Government here doing all possible to cope with the situation and to keep line of front. The loan referred to in my telegrams of December 13 and 18 should be immediately authorized by cable. Office assistance urgently required at the Consulate. Have not received any instructions from the Department on the political military situation which renders my position with the authorities very difficult.

SMITH

---

File No. 763.72/8249

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *December 21, 1917.*

[*Received December 22, 2.35 a. m.*]

8037. Your 6051, December 17, 6 p. m. Cecil informs me that British Government authorized one of its agents to spend £10,000,000, another to spend a similar sum, and a third to spend an indeterminate sum to help towards military organization and equipment if they think that these military efforts in south Russia are promising enough to warrant such help. I telegraphed this to you for Crosby in my 7999, December 18, 6 p. m.

Concerning the action proposed by our Minister at Jassy, Cecil intimated the hope that you would approve it provided you have confidence in military and financial judgment of our Minister and military attaché and in their knowledge of the situation.

I infer from my conversation with Cecil and from the conference that Crosby and I had with Bonar Law that they think the chance of success by these southern Russians too important to neglect but they confessed to a lack of knowledge themselves of the situation and

were consequently in some doubt about the wisdom of their [course?]. It is a chance that they were afraid to let pass, for it is the only chance for any Russian resistance to Germany or even for holding off the Germans from the coal fields and mines and harvests of south Russia.

. . . informs me that in his opinion the Cossacks will win and will set up a permanent government. His conviction is that these southern groups are far more important and far stronger than all the rest of Russia. He tells me that if the Germans secure southern Russia they will have not only the mineral and coal and grain of that region but they will have also a better route to Asia than the Bagdad region by Constantinople. His opinion is that the Germans do not expect to keep what they have won in the west but that their main military purpose now is, and has been from the first, to secure southern Russia and the old route to Asia. If they win this they will win the empire that they want and can easily afford to give up Belgium and all other western conquests. This man is trying to persuade the British to send Indian troops to southern Russia and to give the most generous financial support.

The British Government, I am sure, would welcome such financial help by us as our Minister at Jassy proposes but they are so ignorant themselves of the exact situation that they have a timid attitude towards the problem, yet their agents there all seem to agree in substance with the opinion of . . . . It is this British tone of timidity that has made me timid in forming an opinion.

Thomson, who spent months in Petrograd, thinks the Bolsheviks will win. . . . who has spent many years in Russia, regards them as revolutionary irresponsibles and the Cossacks as the coherent organized ultimate masters of Russia. I pursue my inquiries daily.

PAGE

---

File No. 763.72/8278

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 23, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received December 24, 7.42 p. m.]

2942. Frazier informs me that the following is summarized translation of resolutions adopted at meeting of Supreme War Council this morning:

With the purpose of adopting a policy to be followed in Russia, the war cabinet of Great Britain requests the military representatives to express an opinion as to whether southern Russia and

Rumania are capable of opposing an effective [resistance to] the Bolshevik forces maintained and directed by the Germans. If the Bolsheviks are allowed freedom of action:

- (1) The wheat of Odessa and the gasoline of Batum will re-provision Germany;
- (2) This reprovisioning will not only benefit the Central Empires but also the neutrals (the Allied blockade pressure on Holland and Scandinavia especially would no longer be effective, and, as Germans could more easily re-provision Switzerland with Russian wheat than the Allies with American wheat, it will be in her power to dominate the reprovisioning of Switzerland and consequently be in a position to exact a free passage for her troops through Switzerland);
- (3) Supposing that the Allies lose control of southern Russia altogether, it is essential that they continue to dispose of Batum and Trebizond as naval bases against enemy commerce in the Black Sea;
- (4) It is the duty of Allies to assure the existence of the Rumanian Army and of Rumania which has made no treaty with the enemy and to this end to enter into relations with Ukraine and the Cossack countries which would furnish the Allies with the necessary resources.

For all these reasons of supreme importance and without being able to guarantee that the forces of southern Russia and Rumania are or are not in a condition to oppose a victorious resistance to the Bolshevik forces maintained by the Germans, the military representatives consider that it is necessary for the Allies to sustain by all means in their power all the national groups which are resolved to continue the struggle.

The military representatives, however, believe that such resistance cannot be sustained indefinitely unless it were possible to establish more direct communication between the Allies and their friends in Russia either through operations in Turkey, which would open a direct route to Tiflis and lead to a separate peace with Turkey, or the opening of the Dardanelles to navigation, or via Vladivostok and the Siberian Railway.

Suggested by British representative.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8352

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 27, 1917.

[Received December 29, 8.11 p. m.]

2955. From Crosby for Lansing and McAdoo:

209[29?]. Russia and Rumania. At conference held here between Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Milner, and French representatives, agreement reached that French agents should give general direction to

political moves in Rumania and Ukraine, English agents in Caucasus and Persia, with mixed direction not antagonist [*sic*] defined for Province of the Don. Reports from Russia still much confused. General theory of action is substantially this: that by support of anti-Bolshevik organizations the time of establishing general peace between Germany and whole of Russia will be delayed with corresponding delay in German enjoyment of Russian resources. It is fully recognized that movement in southern Russia against Petrograd authority caused rather by differences in regard to internal Russian questions than because of desire to continue war with Germany. Ukraine may insist upon making its own peace terms if possible independently of Petrograd. Leaders in Ukraine may resist application of land doctrines advocated in Petrograd, but it is not expected they will be willing to make the great sacrifices involved in continuing military resistance to Germany and Austria unless extraordinary hardships should appear in terms peace proposed by Germany.

It is clear to me that British action in Persia and Armenia largely dictated by special interests of Great Britain some of which grew out of *ante bellum* operations and none of which have any relation to the Great War. It is also clear that in respect to Rumania both French and British are acting partly from feeling that Rumania was compromised and ruined by the failure of Allied Governments, chiefly Russia, to fulfil promises and that their present and future interest with Rumania require effort and perhaps sacrifice beyond the requirements of war considered alone. They will therefore be tempted to do all and much more [than] present war conditions suggest and may make undertakings to which our Government would be indifferent or perhaps even unwilling to adopt. . . .

Answering their inquiry here and in London as to what plans had been made to realize in the hands of southern Russian organizations the large credits authorized to be offered, find no practical steps have been taken in this respect. Enormous difficulty of accomplishing actual delivery of funds is just now being appreciated. The support of southern Russian movements tends in itself to destroy the value of ruble which in fact is an evidence of debt of the Russian Government now centralized at Petrograd. Am convinced if southern Russian movement attains large proportions financing must be done by issues of paper money by some sovereign Russian government guaranteed by Allies. All this requires much machinery and capable men for accomplishment. Unless plans properly made beforehand large promises of help which cannot be practically realized may result in ill feeling and sense of deception in Russia and Rumania. Rumanian Minister here suggests possible use of about \$70,000,000

Rumanian gold now deposited Moscow. Without official authority he outlines following plan; namely, that preferably American representations should be made to Petrograd government that this gold be transferred to America for aid given to Rumania, shall then be physically taken to Kiev or Odessa depending on relative safety of deposit and that it may be then transferred to control of a new governmental bank associated with some new southern Russian government. As this gold is already pledged to secure Rumanian circulation Rumanian Government would part with it only on the supposition that its return after the war would be guaranteed [by] Allied Governments. If possible to accomplish, this bold plan would undoubtedly give best foundation for paper money issue in southern Russia. No immediate action can be taken, but I consider it wise to report as a possibility.

Rumanian Minister also shows telegram received yesterday from Jassy reporting that Maximalist agents attempted assassination of Shcherbachev commanding portion of Russian army on Rumanian flank. On appeal being made by Shcherbachev and four Allied diplomatic representatives to Rumanian Government it was agreed if necessary Rumanian troops would be used to resist effort of Maximalist troops to remove Shcherbachev who apparently still has some military following and who as an individual stands ready to continue resistance to Germany if he and Rumanians can be supported. Rumanian Government instructed Rumanian Minister here to notify French Government that in undertaking this resistance they were taking desperate chance and discharging perhaps the last obligation which they could discharge to their Allies and that they must be held as freed from all responsibility in ceasing military resistance if they found themselves between Russian army in rear and Austrian-German army in front. This situation makes clear that there is but little hope that Bessarabia can be counted upon as a safe place of retreat for Rumanian army since to receive that army would be to continue open defiance to Germany and to all Russian sentiment which is favorable to armistice followed by peace.

Without true military resistance to Austrian-German army it would be difficult to prevent southern Russian producers and merchants from selling to Austrian-German purchasers, but the British-French policy above referred to may considerably delay the actual establishment of any peace conditions which would open southern Russian resources to free commercial movement with Central Empires. Delay in enjoyment of these resources may also come from the mere existence of anarchy in southern Russia, which however would doubtless be followed by more complete German control

in the end and would likewise result in great suffering to innocent populations. Hence policy adopted of endeavoring to delay establishment of formal peace seems wisest from present indications. Further arguments in favor of leaving present direction in southern Russia, Rumania to British and French found in fact that they have many more representatives in all these regions than American Government and I am inclined to think they feel their special interests are so involved that they would prefer to use American direction only in case it should appear that they cannot accomplish objectives indicated above. Looking to the possibility of our future action, consider it to be desirable that American representatives should be chosen with respect to political and financial judgment and stationed at Jassy, Kiev, Odessa, and Tiflis, their official relation to be made known only after further developments but their original instructions being such that they could take official action instantly when so instructed from Washington. If our diplomatic and consular force at these places considered sufficiently strong now, this suggestion of no consequence.

Answering your 36.<sup>1</sup> Method of handling Vopicka's drafts suggested my 22<sup>1</sup> based solely on representations of Rumanian representatives that Kiev and Odessa banks who are really to make the immediate advances would be more readily induced to act if they could draw on their correspondents London and Paris rather than on New York where their relations are less intimate. Just received cable from Vopicka stating that my telegram concerning method of drawing reached him so poorly written that could not decipher. I expect to reach him now more accurately through Rumanian Minister here. Will advise him to make drafts upon the United States Treasury as proposed by you though it may create inconvenience above referred to. Hope to learn authoritatively through Rumanian Minister shortly whether Rumania has received 25,000,000 rubles from Russian Government.

SHARP

---

File No. 861.00/848

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tiflis (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1917, 2 p. m.

Referring your telegram December 19, 10 p. m. Desirable that you should confer closely with British and French representatives

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and inquire for your information instructions they have received from their Governments. Only instructions for you for present are to keep us informed.

To save time in keeping our London and Paris Embassies informed of developments this situation, you are instructed to repeat to the American Embassy, London, "for Crosby," the reports you make to the Department.

Referring last sentence your telegram, December 19, Department telegraphed you on December 15, which is repeated to you as follows:

Your telegrams December 4, 9 p. m., and subsequent dates including December 13, 6 p. m., received. Department appreciates thorough reports on situation, is in touch with Allies and hopes to give you definite instructions shortly on whole subject. Meanwhile do not commit this Government. No country either belligerent or neutral has recognized Bolshevik government, Petrograd.

In this connection this Government does not wish to participate in any control of expenditures.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/894

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, December 29, 1917, 1 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1918, 1.06 a. m.]

139. Bolsheviks have suppressed press and seized and closed all banks. Factories and business enterprises threatened with confiscation. Lawless bands pillaging and terrorizing population. Moscow declared under martial law. Bolshevik papers violently attacking American motives entering war charging imperialists and in the interests of capitalists.

Bolshevik forces defeated in Don section and Ukrainia has begun disarming them. Moscow Bolshevik garrison refuses to march against Cossacks or Ukrainians who are joining forces. Large numbers German prisoners reaching city returning home presumably. Poole telegraphs that he has unofficially seen at Novochevassk Generals Alexeev and Kaledin, Sogaev the ataman, Milyukov,<sup>1</sup> and a member of French Military Mission. Kaledin is occupied for the present consolidating the situation in the Don country; Alexeev organizing Volunteer Army and working in cooperation

---

<sup>1</sup> Paul N. Milyukov, from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.



with Kaledin; Milyukov and other popular leaders in the South-eastern federation, which is in the formative stage but developing strongly. It does not seek independence but aims to serve as a nucleus from which Russia may be reconstructed on a federative basis through the action of the Constitutional Assembly. It has undoubtedly the support of the best element in Russia rapidly concentrating on the south. The President, Kharlamov, is a person of much character and highly spoken of by Alexeev. He is a Cadet and former Duma member and a friend of Milyukov.

The alliance with the Ukraine progressing favorably, with Siberia doubtless will be consolidated at the second Siberian congress which will be held in Omsk the end of December. As an outgrowth of the Southeastern federation a military district of the southeast is in process of formation. It is planned to make Alexeev commander in chief thereof thus bringing under one head all the Cossack troops and the Volunteer Army. Kornilov<sup>1</sup> is [t]here secretly. For political reasons he must keep out of sight for the present but will aid with generous military advice. Undoubtedly a [beginning?] has been made for bringing into a close working union the regenerative elements in Russia which can be expected to act effectively against the Bolsheviki and the Germans. Poole is of opinion, and I thoroughly share his views, that the Government of the United States and the Allies should immediately lend this nucleus all possible moral and material support and thereby fortify the one remaining serious hope of saving Russia and Rumania from complete German domination and a catastrophe for the Allies in Asiatic Turkey.

With adequate support Alexeev will be prepared to undertake an offensive campaign in the spring. With less help he can still defend this region. The mere defense for the time being of this southern country, comprising the greatest food-producing districts of Russia and the coal fields, would be of the utmost military value. On the other hand loss of this region would go far to nullify our campaign of starvation against Germany. These opinions of Poole are formed after carefully and impartially studying the situation with me, then confirming them by conversations with leaders of the movement. I consider his views express the only hope of Russia's avoiding complete anarchy and German control and that the future of democracy here depends on the moral and material aid given Alexeev and Kaledin at this critical moment. This is the

---

<sup>1</sup> Gen. L. G. Kornilov, in July 1917 commander of the southwestern front, and from July to September 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.

universal opinion of Milyukov, Rodzyanko, and others who have the country's interests at heart. With material and continued successes against the Bolshevik element the armies of Kaledin and Alexeev soon will be vastly augmented by large bodies of loyal troops and of other elements which are beginning to see that they have been duped by their leaders and whose hatred toward the latter is becoming very bitter. The Allies should also take immediate steps to prevent the Bolsheviks and the German prisoners from destroying the Siberian Railway as this is of paramount importance to the armies of Alexeev and Kaledin.

Kaledin's pressing need is money. If that is assured him at once the tide may soon turn. Could not the United States join with the Allies and render him and Alexeev immediate aid? The eyes of all Russia are turned to the south and the Ukraine as the deliverers of the country.

The increasingly bitter attacks of the Bolsheviks on the Allies and especially the United States show how completely northern Russia is under the control of Germany. We can expect no change for the better as the sinister German influence to the [passage indicating groups garbled] will not stop until anarchy is the result and the monarchy restored in all its former horrors. The Russia we welcomed as a democratic nation is in the south. The rest is practically at war with us. At the most there is no organized power that can cope with the situation except in the south. This information is strictly confidential and informative. Poole explained fully in his conversations that he was acting purely unofficially and only endeavoring to obtain such data on the situation as would enable his Government better to understand the problems confronting Russia. He remains in Rostov for the present preparing some consular reports on that section.

I thoroughly appreciate the Department's attitude in not desiring to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, yet feel it my duty to say that while the Embassy and Consulate will until the last moment continue to perform all their duties in Moscow and St. Petersburg, yet this section is rapidly falling into German control and anarchy and the only salvation of the country is in Alexeev's army. I think that if eventually we are forced to leave we should go to Rostov and there continue to support the (loyal?) elements in Russia. I am expecting report from Jenkins on situation in Kiev and will cable same, on receipt of which I request Department outline confidentially its views on situation.

SUMMERS

File No. 125.631

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, December 31, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1918, 1.45 p. m.]

140. As a precautionary measure request permission Department draw for funds to send out of the country, in case of necessity, such Americans as have no means. Political situation extremely grave and Bolshevik leaders in conjunction with German agents may force Allies to leave country unless [omission?]. In this connection and only in case of being forcibly compelled to leave, would suggest moving Consulate General to Rostov and turning over archives to Swiss Consulate. This is not to be construed as anticipating immediate trouble though events are moving so fast that it is necessary to have instructions enabling us to act quickly.

SUMMERS

File No. 125.631

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow (Summers)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1918, 1 p. m.

Your 140, December 31, 6 p. m. In case of necessity you may draw not exceeding \$5,000 for sending indigent Americans out of the country. If imperative to leave Moscow you should go to some place other than Rostov or headquarters of any sectional movement.

LIANSING

File No. 861.00/939

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, January 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received January 11, 3.07 a. m.]

147. In view of the increasing strength united forces in the south and the grave situation in Moscow and the north, have instructed Poole remain Rostov and communicate direct to the Department, via Bombay, developments. Communication with Rostov difficult. Continued code telegrams from Poole to United States Consul General might be unadvisable. Only these combined armies will be able to restore order and prevent Germany's controlling all the resources in Russia. All the loyal elements in Russia are in favor of the

Allies' supporting forces in the south. Of the utmost importance that the German prisoners Siberia be guarded to prevent destruction railway. I have received trustworthy information that ten German officers are now assisting Moscow General Staff to organize forces to support present government.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/929

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, January 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received January 9, 1.22 p. m.]

Vice Consul Doolittle on his return from North Caucasus reports that the Southeastern federation appears to be more a proposition of leaders living in more remote districts [omission?]. In the Kuban district there is much friction between Cossacks and Russian settlers. The native Cossacks are returning from front to retain their predominance and to concentrate a force which later can be used for the common defense but which for the next few months cannot be relied upon for active assistance. The Terek government has combined with the Mohammedans along their southeastern border, but the natural feud of the two races continues and cannot permit a permanent alliance or a common action. The attitude of the latter will depend on developments in upper Caucasus. The two governments are attempting to disarm the Russian troops, returning from the Turkish front and upper Caucasus, but meet with less success than the Don Cossacks. However, a certain amount of rifles are thus collected.

Kharlamov reports that an agreement has been reached with Little Russia on all points except that the latter insists on federation's being called socialist. The federation's greatest need is currency. The easiest way to supply this need appearing from facts available here would be by issuing its own paper currency printed in India or United States as against credits opened by Allies. Currency should be issued in the name of Russian federative republic. In securing, all issues by Maximalists to be declared illegal. Temporary currency crisis could be met by means indicated in my telegram of January 6.

The conditions in Don district as being reported are very remarkable. Federation disposes of: Don 60,000 effective forces, Kuban 60,000, Terek 25,000; this number constantly increasing. The next need is supplies such as rifles, machine guns, artillery,

airplanes, all classes ammunition and clothing for both troops and civil population. There is a strong Allied moral support tending to unite all elements within federation. Federation cannot be relied on to furnish active force at present but can be molded so as to provide such force by the assistance above referred to. With this in view reorganization of its industry should be given [profound?] attention. This applies also to upper Caucasus. It is reported that the federation is being placed within French sphere of influence with General Berthelot at the head of French mission. The British are attempting to establish similar sphere in upper Caucasus. This provokes criticism which could be more easily met if Allies acted as one without splitting up spheres of influence, [which] not only premature but liable to create undesirable complications in future. Most satisfactory results would be obtained by sending both to the federation and to upper Caucasus a small body of foreign troops not for their importance as a fighting unit but as a healthy nucleus for others to gather round and to show we mean business.

SMITH

---

File No. 861.00/894

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow (Summers)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1918, 7 p. m.

Your 139, December 28 [29], 1 p. m. Only instructions for you at present other than those already sent December [January] 5 as to leaving Moscow are to keep Department fully advised.

Appreciate value of Poole's report and your comment. Send Jenkins's report soonest possible.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1314

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

No. 82

TIFLIS, January 9, 1918.

[Received March 18.]

SIR: For the Department's information, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a personal letter addressed by me to Mr. Kharlamov. Being unable to leave Tiflis, and acting in accordance with the Department's cabled instruction of November 9, 1917, I sent Mr. Doolittle<sup>1</sup> to Vladikavkaz and Ekaterinodar to obtain infor-

---

<sup>1</sup> H. A. Doolittle, Vice Consul at Tiflis.

mation on conditions there. My letter to Kharlamov, with whom I am in personal friendly relations, was written at the request of the heads of the British and French military missions here. A report on Mr. Doolittle's mission was cabled to the Department yesterday.

Trusting my action will be approved by the Department, I have [etc.]

F. WILLOUGHBY SMITH

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The American Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the President of the Southeastern Federation (Kharlamov)*

TIFLIS, December 5/18, 1917.

MY DEAR VASILI: I take the liberty to inform you that the Allies, according to reports received, will probably soon lend extensive aid to the federative government. I am personally very glad, as I see in this step the only way of salvation for Russia and the maintenance of the friendly and honest relations which have existed between Russia and her allies from the very beginning of the war.

Unfortunately the reasons which are known to you still prevent Transcaucasia from openly entering into an alliance with the federation. In order to facilitate this step it is necessary, in my opinion, to take two measures.

The first of these measures consists in having the Kuban and Terek governments prevent the return to Transcaucasia of disorganized troop units which, returning home from that front and not receiving a hearty welcome, return to the rear of the Transcaucasian army and thereby increase the number of dangerous idlers already present there.

The second measure is of still greater significance and demands certain sacrifices from the aforesaid two governments, but these sacrifices are essential to the accomplishment of the general plan. This measure would be to send and place at the disposal of the commander in chief of the Caucasian armies Cossack detachments which, together with the Georgian and Armenian units, would form lines of defense at various points along the railroad between the front and Tiflis for the purpose of disarming bodies of troops returning from the front and dangerous to internal order.

In the name of General Shore, Colonel Chardigny, and in my own I ask your cooperation in effecting the adoption of the aforementioned indispensable and undelayable measures.

The bearer hereof, my assistant, Vice Consul Doolittle, is returning immediately to Tiflis and I will ask you to give him for me written instructions regarding the undelayable measures of the federative government for the accomplishment of which the cooperation of the Allied Governments is necessary and to inform me whether your government, in case of necessity, can extend hospitality to the Rumanian troops.

It would be very desirable, if you deemed it possible, for you to send two of your representatives to Tiflis, one on military and the other on financial matters.

I am very glad that our friendly relations enable me to write you unofficially, and I embrace the opportunity to express to you my best wishes and the sentiments of sincere esteem and devotion.

F. T. WILLOUGHBY SMITH

File No. 861.00/2006

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy present their compliments to the Department of State and have the honour to inform them that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Government stating that General de Candolle, British representative with the Cossacks at Novocherkassk, is of opinion that, as events are at present shaping themselves, the various attempts to establish settled government and autonomy in southern Russia are doomed to result in the formation of disconnected and isolated islands in a sea of anarchy. In his view the only possible expedient for keeping the Ukraine, Cossacks of the Southeastern union, and Siberia in touch with the local authorities and one another, is for those bodies to take some opportunity of composing differences with the Bolshevik government at Petrograd. Such an opportunity would arise were the Petrograd government to have a momentary falling out with the Central powers. The composition of differences would have to be based on a confederation of autonomous states whose bond of union would be limited to resistance to the Central powers, mutual undertakings not to interfere with one another's territory, and the exchange of fuel and food from the south with, for example, manufactured goods and munitions from the north.

His Majesty's Government hold that it has become quite clear that passive resistance to the Central powers is the utmost that can be expected from the southern governments. It is also clear that the Rumanian Army must form the first element in such resistance. So long as that army is in being in Moldavia, it prevents our enemies from having access to the foodstuffs of the Black Sea coast and the Ukraine. The keeping of that army in Moldavia and the feeding of it from Bessarabia and the Ukraine have, therefore, become vital matters. They can only be carried out if the Rada is adequately assured of its relations with the rest of Russia so that it can attend to matters beyond those which are immediately necessary to enable it to secure its own existence.

His Majesty's Government are, therefore, in accord with the views expressed by General de Candolle, and they are approaching the Allied Governments with a view to instructions in this sense being sent to the Allied representatives throughout Russia.

The British Embassy are instructed to ask the United States Secretary of State for an expression of his views at as early a date as possible.

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/1707

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1036

PETROGRAD, *January 24/February 6, 1918.*

[Received May 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith report made by Consul DeWitt Poole, jr., upon his return to Petrograd after his recent journey through the south of Russia.

I take advantage of this occasion not only to remark upon the value of this report but to express my appreciation of the intelligence and ability displayed by Consul Poole in this connection.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure]

*Report to the Ambassador Respecting the Movement in the Don Country for the Restoration of Order in Russia, the Holding of a Constitutional Assembly, and the Continuance of the War*

PETROGRAD, *January 26, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Having arrived in Rostov-on-Don December 18, new style, to investigate the question of the establishment of an American Consulate in that city, I took occasion, on the 21st, to go to Novochoerkassk and call upon General Kaledin, who is the chief executive of the Don Province, and also upon General Alexeev and certain others who are now in that region unofficially engaged with the movement described above. On December 25 I sent a preliminary report to Consul General Summers, the substance of which I believe he has furnished to you.<sup>1</sup> This report distinguished three elements in the situation; namely, General Alexeev and the Volunteer Army; General Kaledin and the Cossacks; and the Southeastern federation. The Alexeev group has now become the dominant element, under the title "League for the Defense of our Native Land and Liberty." General Kaledin is a member of the league and is working in full and hearty cooperation therewith. The recent entry of Mr. Ageev, representing the left wing of the Don Cossacks, signals the complete amalgamation of the Cossacks with the Alexeev element. The Southeastern federation has also become subordinate to the league. It serves to bring to the league's support the other Cossack tribes and the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, also as a means of maintaining contact with the Ukraine (until just recently), with Siberia (so far as means of communication exist at present), and with the Trans-Caucasus and Bessarabia.

Colonel Hucher of the French Military Mission for the provisioning of Rumania arrived at Novochoerkassk on December 23. On December 27 he informed General Alexeev that the French Government had granted him (Alexeev) a credit of 100,000,000 rubles for the purpose of restoring order in Russia and continuing the war against the Central powers.

---

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.



The sum of 100,000,000 rubles was that fixed by General Alexeev as necessary to carry out a military program which he had formulated as follows:

The organization of:	
Between December 15 and } January 15, old style:	6 battalions of infantry 3 batteries of artillery
January 15 to February 15:	12 battalions of infantry 6 batteries of artillery
February 15 to March 15:	18 battalions of infantry 6 batteries of artillery
March 15 to April 15:	12 battalions of infantry 6 batteries of artillery
Total:	48 battalions of infantry (of 800 men each) and 21 batteries of artillery (4 guns to a battery)

in addition to which four technical battalions (engineers, etc.).

General Alexeev at once communicated to the French representative his desire that a financial commission be created to control the expenditure of this money, as well as a bureau of organization for the army, in both of which he asked that French officers be included.

At this juncture, military questions gave way to political, due to the attitude of Boris Savinkov, former terrorist, and later member of the Kerensky government. When I first saw General Alexeev he took particular pains to say that Mr. Savinkov had endeavored to become associated with him but that his advances had not been encouraged. General Alexeev said it had been his first endeavor to bring together in the Don country what remained of the old Provisional Government, but this proving quite impossible he had appealed to certain persons in Moscow who brought about meetings in that city resulting in the choice of two delegates each by the Cadet Party, the nationalist patriotic group, the industrials, the landowners, and the right wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. This group was the nucleus, General Alexeev said, of an organization which would sooner or later proclaim itself to be the Provisional Government of Russia. He said that the principles of this government would be in substance as follows:

- (1) As to internal affairs, to create such a situation of order in Russia that elections might be held for a Constitutional Assembly in which every citizen might vote according to his wish without fear or molestation; and, a Constitutional Assembly having been so elected, to place the existing military forces at its disposal.
- (2) As to foreign affairs, to keep Russia's engagements with the Allies.

Mr. Savinkov persisted in his efforts to be admitted to the Alexeev group. He threatened, by intimation, to attack Alexeev before the people as a counter-revolutionary and pro-monarchist. Let me say at this point that I am personally absolutely convinced of General Alexeev's high patriotic purpose. I am sure that he does not seek to carry out a partisan program. Savinkov's threat had some validity, however, because there had naturally rallied about General Alexeev certain elements which have been designated, for purposes of political propaganda, as counter-revolutionaries.

At the same time another group was forming about General Kornilov. It appeared toward the end of December (new style) that the whole movement might miscarry for want of agreement among these different groups. In part, I believe, as a result of pressure brought to bear by the French representative, the following results were obtained:

- (1) An agreement was signed January 7 among Generals Alexeev, Kornilov, and Kaledin, by which the first named undertook the leadership on the political side and such duties as pertained to a Minister of War; the second, the organization of the Volunteer Army and chief command of all forces whenever operations might be pushed beyond the Don; and the third, the command of the Cossacks and of all defensive operations within the Don.
- (2) A council was formed about General Alexeev, in which Mr. Savinkov was included.

As conditions precedent to joining, Mr. Savinkov demanded and General Alexeev conceded:

- (1) The admission to the council also of Mr. Ageev, Mr. Vinderzgol'ski, Mr. Mazurienko, a representative of the central organization of the employees of the railways of the Caucasus and the southeast, and a representative of the armies of the Caucasus front;
- (2) An immediate proclamation of the purposes of the movement.

Mr. Ageev is the leader of the left wing of the Don Cossacks and president of the parliament, or so-called "krug," of the Don government. Mr. Vinderzgol'ski is former commissar of the Eighth Army and former president of the committee of the First Army. Mr. Mazurienko is a member of the All-Russian Peasants' Union and president of the Peasants' Union of the Don. At the time of my leaving Rostov the representatives of the other organizations mentioned above had not yet been chosen.

Negotiations are in progress for the admission to the council of three representative Social Democrats, namely, Chaikovski, Kuskova, and Plekhanov; and two Social Revolutionaries, namely, Argunov and Potresov.

On the conservative side the council, as now constituted, includes, besides the three generals (Alexeev, Kornilov, and Kaledin), Mr. Milyukov; Prince Gregory Trubetskoi; Professor Struve; Mr. Fedorov, representing the banking and other larger commercial interests of Moscow; two other Cadets or nationalist patriots yet to be chosen; Mr. Bogaevski, the vice ataman of the Don Cossacks; and Mr. Paramonov, a rich Cossack. The council will undoubtedly undergo changes in personnel, but a framework of an equal number of conservatives and radicals, not counting the three generals, appears to have been adopted.

In pursuance of the agreement with Mr. Savinkov, a proclamation to the Russian people has been drafted. At the last report it had been sent to Moscow for discussion there. The proclamation, which has been read to me, appeals to the people on the ground that the Bolshevik government has failed to provide them with the chief things promised, that is, peace with liberty and bread. It refers to the suppression of the Constitutional Assembly and asks for the support of the people in defending that institution. It is sound on the subject of the continuance of the war. The proclamation will be issued in the name of the league, unsigned, because it is frankly admitted that it has not yet been possible to obtain the names of persons who, it is thought, would be thoroughly acceptable to the people at large. For example, Alexeev's signature would be politically helpful but Milyukov, one of the other ablest men in the movement, is known as the father of the Cadet Party which has been a special butt of radical attack. Among the "left" members the most prominent is Savinkov and to his name not a little distrust attaches, owing to his part in the Kornilov affair of last September and to his record as a terrorist. These are difficulties natural at the inception of a movement of this kind and it is believed that later a further signed proclamation can be issued revealing adhesion to the movement by a good proportion of the substantial political leaders of Russia.

Returning to the military phase, the adhesion of General Kornilov has injected perceptible vigor into the work of organizing the Volunteer Army. General Lukhowski has been made Chief of Staff, with General Romanovski as his assistant. General Denikin commands the First Division, which is now being organized. General Erdelli has no definite position at present but is assisting in a general way.

General Kornilov will follow General Alexeev's military program, stated above, but will endeavor to accelerate it. Early in March (Russian style) he hopes to have two divisions organized, each division consisting of 12 battalions of infantry with machine-gun complements, and 6 batteries of artillery (3 batteries of field pieces and 3 batteries of howitzers). By the end of April he hopes to have the 48 battalions and 21 batteries (40,000 men) called for by the Alexeev program. In addition, he hopes to have within two months two regiments of Kalmuk volunteer cavalry, and within three months an infantry brigade (6 battalions) recruited from the mountain tribes of the Caucasus.

He has at present in the territory of the Terek Cossacks two divisions of native troops (Circassian mountain tribes), each division made up of 4 regiments of infantry and 3 batteries of artillery. These are the troops which he directed against Petrograd last fall. As there has not been money to pay them recently, some of the regiments are dispersed but he believes that it will now be possible to bring them together again.

The Volunteer Army consists at present of from 1,500 to 2,000 men. Being made up of earnest soldiers, under good discipline and without committees, it has a much greater value than its meager numbers would at first suggest. It is proving effective against the much larger Bolshevik units which are being directed against the Don.

The units of the Volunteer Army, all still in process of formation, are as follows:

Battalion of St. George's Cavaliers: present strength about 400 men.

First officers' battalion: present strength 200 men.

Second officers' battalion.

*Junkers'* battalion: 300 men.

Company of naval officers and sailors.

Three batteries of field artillery, officers, men, and horses complete but only four guns.

In addition, there is the so-called "Kornilov regiment" comprising from 500 to 600 men. The officers and equipment are at Novocherkassk. The soldiers are now reassembling from leave.

There are 30 regiments of cavalry among the Don Cossacks and 10 batteries of artillery.

General Kornilov is endeavoring to stimulate recruiting for the Volunteer Army, apparently with success, by increasing the pay of officers and soldiers. General Alexeev proposed originally to pay soldiers only 20 rubles a month. There is pretty good evidence that Bolshevik soldiers fighting against the Don are receiving as much as 20 rubles per day. The Volunteer Army now offers to private soldiers 30 rubles a month with an additional 30 rubles monthly while on active service, and appropriate indemnities for injuries and deaths. Second lieutenants are offered 100 rubles per month; if married, 100 rubles additional for the family, plus one ruble and a half per day while on active service. Posters setting forth these facts and asking for enlistments had been printed just before my departure and are now being displayed wherever possible.

It is hoped to supply the immediate needs of the Volunteer Army for ammunition and equipment by purchases from the Bolshevik soldiers in the Caucasus. General Kornilov says that this expedient may suffice for the ensuing two months. A regular scale of payments has been established. For example, 1,000 rubles is offered for a field piece, 500 rubles for a machine gun, 100 rubles for a rifle, etc.

To meet expenditures for material and men reliance is placed in the first instance upon the French grant. The needs for January (Russian style) are estimated at 20,000,000 rubles, of which the Russians hope to supply 4,000,000 themselves. Needs to the end of April are now estimated at 200,000,000 rubles, of which the Russians think that they may be able to supply one fourth.

As there is a great lack of currency in the Don country, a local emission by the Don government, guaranteed by one or more of the Allied governments or by some private banking firm, is considered necessary. This matter is receiving the particular attention of the French and British representatives.

For immediate needs the French representative has endeavored to realize on the credit granted by his Government through the sale of drafts to bankers in Rostov and other cities. At the time I left Colonel Hucher informed me that he had some 5,000,000 rubles in sight. The Russians say that they are also receiving certain sums, amounts mentioned in a very indefinite way, from Petrograd and Moscow.

At present, then, the league is developing in the right direction politically, that is, toward the left; its proposed proclamation is sound both as to continuance of the war against the Central powers and as to interior politics, that is, it is not separatist but national and seeks to reestablish order and give expression to the will of the people. On the military side, the organization of the Volunteer Army has been gotten under way, since General Kornilov took charge, with a vigor unusual in Russia, and the attacks of the Bolshevik troops on the Don, according to my last information, were being withstood satisfactorily.

I beg to quote here my No. 3 to the Department, dated January 14:

It is presumed that the policy of the United States in Russia is (1) to hold as many enemy troops as possible upon the Russian fronts, and (2) to assist the Russian people to establish as soon as possible an orderly government representative of their political desires.

No. 2 being the avowed purpose of the present movement and resistance to the common enemy an integral part of its foreign policy, in principle it should receive the countenance and support of the Government of the United States. Whether or not aid should actually be extended should be determined by a consideration of the probabilities for and against the practical success of the enterprise.

On the military side the first question is, Can Alexeev carry out his military program? The French subsidy having disposed of the financial question for the moment, if we accept Alexeev's assurance, as I think we may, that sufficient men are available, his success depends chiefly upon the continued maintenance of order and security in his organized base, that is, the Don country. This may be disturbed (1) by unrest among the Bolsheviks in Rostov and other larger centers, or disaffection among the Cossacks themselves, who have been influenced by Bolshevism at the front and must be allowed to return to their native villages to regain a more healthy outlook; (2) by hostile military action by Bolshevik forces on the Caucasus front, or those to the north or west.

Alexeev states that for the present the Cossacks can not be counted upon for active military operations. The Volunteer Army now organizing includes as yet no infantry to speak of, and what artillery exists is practically without ammunition. From a military point of view the position of the Don government is lamentably weak. It may, however, continue to exercise its

present control of the situation, but that it will certainly do so can be assured only by the prompt receipt of (1) money and (2) ammunition and equipment. You are already informed respecting the measure for satisfying the first need. As to the second, some munitions may be found in the Caucasus, but for a permanent solution, and more particularly for the supplying of Alexeev's volunteer army, contact with the Allies through Siberia is absolutely essential.

The second question is, if Alexeev carries out his military program, what may then be expected? The projected army will be a mobile police force, whose action against certain centers may bring about the restoration of order in those portions of Russia which are not at the moment occupied by German troops or German organized units of Bolsheviks and released German prisoners. It will be quite ineffective against the regular German fighting machine.

In estimating the value of this rather meager promise, sight must not be lost of possible concurrent action by Ukrainian troops, of the general consideration that small initial successes may bring greater successes not now to be foreseen, and that the exclusion of Germany from this rich southern country, or the mere necessity of a German movement against it, have each an important military value. The capacity of this coal- and food-producing region for passive resistance, especially against unproductive northern Russia, is great and might become of decisive importance if its munition deficiency were remedied by outside contact through Siberia.

On the political side the movement has these elements of strength: (1) general recognition of the high patriotic purpose of the leader Alexeev; (2) the respectable character of the men about him and the manner in which some of them have been chosen, giving them as near a mandate from the people as it is probably physically [possible] to obtain in Russia at the present moment; and (3) its very acceptable chief political aim. Elements of weakness seem to me: (1) existence of the not unjustified but often misguided social unrest which is now manifesting itself as Bolshevism, but which may appear to-morrow in another form directed against some of the elements included in the present movement; (2) the undertaking to keep Russia's engagements with the Allies, that is, to continue an unpopular war. These factors are imponderable and judgment of their relative importance is purely personal.

For myself, I think that the movement will have moral and therefore political strength in the measure that it adheres to the simplicity and high character of its main purpose; that is, to enable the Russian people to choose their own government through the action of their duly chosen representatives, an aim which should find sympathetic response in the popular mind, where it will stand in contrast to the Bolshevik suppression of the Constitutional Assembly.

Since the above was written, it seems to me that the league has been weakened by the trend of events in the Ukraine. On the other hand, if the Bolshevik government is about to make a peace, or is succeeded by a party which would make a peace, the league is revealed as the one serious hope of saving at least a part of Russia. Envisaging the contingency, first, that the Bolsheviks decide to continue the war, I respectfully refer to your own suggestion that the United States might, without formally recognizing any one, offer to assist, under proper control and advice, any and all factions purposing seriously to fight the Central powers. In the case of the opposite eventuality, namely, that the Bolsheviks make a separate peace and the Embassy possibly withdraws from Petrograd, I am convinced that the United States should then actively support the league as the only serious nationalist movement in the country.

Pending events, I respectfully recommend continued observation of the work of the league by a consular officer stationed at Rostov and immediate careful study of the Siberian situation. It is needless to dwell further on the two fundamental corollaries: (1) that substantial assistance can be extended to the league only over the Siberian Railway; and (2) that without such aid the league can not develop its possibilities in any important measure.

In considering the league's possibilities permit me to point out that it may have three results other than complete failure: (1) the complete accomplish-

ment of its purpose, namely, the restoration of order in Russia, continued resistance to the Central powers, and the holding of a Constitutional Assembly; (2) the maintenance of an orderly government in part of southern Russia and all or a part of the Caucasus and continued resistance to the Central powers from that base; (3) the maintenance of enough resistance in southern Russia to necessitate a military movement in that direction by the Central powers. Any one of these results has an important military value for the Allies. In fact the success of our blockade is seriously involved in each.

You are aware that France and Great Britain are already committed to the movement. According to the information given by the French representative at Novoherkassk, France has taken under its particular care the Ukraine, the Crimea, Bessarabia, and Rumania; Great Britain has taken the Caucasus and the Cossack country.

In conclusion, I respectfully recommend that the attention of the Department be drawn at the earliest opportunity to the fact that the league is not such a sectional movement as the Department has very naturally instructed us not to support. Of necessity its organization base is now in a particular section of the country but the activities of the league have already extended throughout Russia and reach into Siberia as well. In contrast to those of the Ukrainian government, the aims of the league are nationalist in the broadest Russian sense.

To complete the record I append a copy of my last cablegram to the State Department, No. 4 of January 18.<sup>1</sup>

Very respectfully,

[File copy not signed]

File No. 861.00/1706

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

No. 262

Moscow, February 7, 1918.

[Received May 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to forward to the Department herewith copy of a translation of the treaty of federation or the constitution of the Southeastern federation of Russia. This matter is supplementary to the letter to the Embassy at Petrograd, under date of January 14,<sup>2</sup> copy of which was sent to the Department; to the despatches of Consul Poole from the Don Cossack Territory; and to the various reports that have been made to the Department on political conditions in Russia. The treaty leaves the several Cossack armies and tribes of the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains and the adjoining steppes, which form the federation, ample liberty to manage their own affairs, while binding each to give such assistance as the circumstances require to the Don Cossacks, who are the backbone of the federation. This treaty should be considered as supplemented by the agreement between the Don Cossacks and General Alexeev and the constitutional and conservative politicians

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; it summarizes portions of this report and discusses communication with Siberia (in two sections, File Nos. 861.00/1149 and 1150).

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 338.

that have taken refuge in the Don Territory. General Alexeev is the commander of the forces that are being organized to uphold law and order, and which are being recruited from all parts of Russia. The Don Cossacks and the Southeastern federation are thus important mainly as supporters of the Alexeev movement, which is the main chance, as far as law and order are concerned, for the present at least.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Southeastern Federation of the Cossack Troops, the Hill Tribes of the Caucasus, and the Free Peoples of the Steppes*

#### TREATY OF THE FEDERATION DRAWN UP ON OCTOBER 20, 1917

We, the undernamed Cossack troops, hill tribes of the Caucasus, and free peoples of the steppes, are concluding a treaty, to form a federation, in order to help the establishment of a most perfect form of government, which will assure the national defense and the public security of the Russian state, and in order to safeguard the liberty of the members of the federation, to uphold order within the country, promote the general well-being and thereby forever to secure the benefits of liberty, gained by the revolution.

#### I. MEMBERS OF THE FEDERATION

1. The following are members of the federation: the Cossack troops of the Don, Kuban, Terek, and Astrakhan Provinces, as well as their faithful ally, the Kalmyk people, and the following hill tribes and peoples of the steppes, who compose a special union of the highlanders of the Caucasus:

(a) All the peoples of Daghestan (Avartsy, Darguintzy, Laki or Kazi-Koumiki, Kourintzy, Koumiki, Tabasarintzy and others) and those of the Zakataly Province (Lesguiniens).

(b) All the peoples of the Terek Province (Kabardintzy, Balkartzy, Osetintzy, Ingouche, Tchetchentzy, Koumiky and Salatanzy).

(c) All the mountain tribes of the Kuban Province (Karatchaevtsy, Abasintzy, Circassians, Nogautzy).

(d) Mountain tribes of the Sukhum Province (Abhaztsy).

(e) The free peoples of the steppes of the Terek Province (Nogaytzy and Kara-Nogaytzy) as well as those of the Stavropol government (Nogaytzy and Tourkmen).

2. The territory of the members of the federation is comprised by the lands belonging to the mountain tribes of the Caucasus, the Cossack troops, and the peoples of the steppes, enumerated in paragraph 1.

3. The federation calls itself "The Southeastern Federation of Cossack Troops, the Hill Tribes of the Caucasus, and the Free Peoples of the Steppes."

4. Absolute independence is assured to the members of the federation in regard to the management of their interior affairs and they are at liberty to make agreements as long as they conform to the principles of the federation.

#### II. THE AIM OF THE FEDERATION

5. (a) The establishment, as soon as possible, of a Russian democratic federal republic, every member of which will constitute an independent state.

(b) To help, as much as possible, all other peoples in their efforts towards the establishment of a Russian state, based on federal principles, and to form an alliance with them.

(c) To establish a firm democratic authority, supported by all the nationalities of the country, which will not be subjected to the oppression of irresponsible organizations.

(d) To aid central government authority in its struggle with the enemy and to conclude honorable peace, conforming to the principle of self-assertion of nationalities; to aid in the reestablishment of lawful order in the country and to suppress anarchy and counter-revolution.

(e) To guarantee independence to every federal state, with regard to management of interior affairs.

(f) To afford active assistance to the members of the federation in everything that could help them to reorganize their life as members of the Russian federation.

(g) To defend the political, economic, and agrarian rights of the members of the federation, and to assist them in the settlement of their lines of frontier.

(h) Unity and coordination in the measures necessary to maintain public security and order in the federal territories.

(i) To develop the well-being of the federal states and to assist them in supplying the inhabitants with the first necessities of life.

(j) To solve, with mutual help, the present political and social problems, which conform to the principles of the federation.

### III. THE RIGHTS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERATION

6. The authority of the federation is only limited by the laws resulting from this treaty, or by such as are prescribed by separate members of the federation.

7. The federal authority is independent, within the limits of its recognized competence.

8. The federation is governed by the united government of the Southeastern federation.

9. Every federal state has two representatives in the united government.

Remark 1: The union of the mountain tribes of the Caucasus has four representatives, two of whom are from the Daghestan and the Zakataly region.

Remark 2: The Cossacks of Astrakhan, together with their faithful ally, the Kalmyk people, each have two representatives.

10. The members of the united government of the federation are elected by the bodies of executive power. (Each body must elect one member.)

11. The members of the united government of the federation are responsible to their electors (the bodies of executive power of the members of the federation).

12. The united government fulfils the aims of the federation, acts in its name, and is in touch with the central and local government authorities of the Russian state, as well as with the authority of the federal states.

13. All questions are examined and settled according to the regulations of the united government.

14. The Southeastern federation is represented in the central government of Russia by one delegate, who is either elected from among the members of the united government of the federation or from among the citizens of the federation.

Remark 1: If a member of the united government is sent as representative to Petrograd, his duties should be performed by his substitute.



## IV. THE SEAT OF THE UNITED GOVERNMENT

15. The united government temporarily resides at Ekaterinodar.

## V. ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE FEDERATION

16. New members of the federation are admitted on conditions conforming to this treaty and by consent of the bodies of executive power of all the members of the federation.

## VI. ALTERATIONS IN THE TEXT OF THE TREATY AND ITS DISSOLUTION

17. Dissolution of the treaty and alterations in its text are decided by a conference of representatives of all the federal states.

## VII. THE TERM OF COMING INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY

18. This treaty comes into force after its approval by the bodies of executive power of all the federal states.

---

Bolshevik, Turkish, and German Advances—Formation of the Independent States of North Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—The Cossack Organization under Krasnov—Revival of the Volunteer Army: Succession of Denikin as its Commander—Formation of a Governmental Commission Attached to the Army—Recognition by it of the Supreme Authority of Kolchak

File No. 763.72/8861

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, February 12, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received February 13, 7.25 p. m.]

Caucasus front practically abandoned by Russian forces. Line Zrberum [Erzerum?], Van, Erzingan occupied by Armenian troops and [omission] coast towns east and west Trebizond seized or attacked by irregular Turkish bands. Large military stores at Trebizond and all along the line threatened by Kurds and local Mohammedan population. Sirdar of Maku refuses to permit Armenian troops through his territory without permission Persian Government. South Caucasian and Vladikavkaz railroads harassed by Mohammedan bands. Communication cut at many points. Grozny reported pillaged by Mohammedans; much oil property destroyed. Formation national troops is progressing slowly for lack of funds. . . .

Currency stringency such that all business at a standstill and government unable to meet most urgent needs. Present government not willing enter into an agreement contemplating certain financial control without is satisfied that the Caucasian Constituent Assembly meeting February 23. In the meantime some measure should be adopted to give immediate financial relief.

Gegechkori, Prime Minister, assures me there will not be separate peace even with Turkey. It is doubtful whether under pres-

ent conditions the government will be able to resist Mohammedan and pacific pressure in favor of such peace, particularly as railroad conditions render difficult presence at conference (see my telegram of February 2, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup>) of Little Russian and federation representatives. Armenian leaders showing tendency to come to an understanding with Maximalists. This is merely protective move against the Mohammedans. Among foreign population Maximalist theories gaining ground. Maximalists assisted British Germans are reported have been repulsed at Ekaterinodar [*sic*]. Civil war raging throughout Kuban and Terek governments. Lack funds and support has checked development federation government. Telegraph communication with Rostov very irregular; none further north; entirely cut off from the Consulate General and Embassy. Maximalists in large force under German General von Mars are reported moving against Don. Telegraphic communication open only via India.

SMITH

File No. 861.00/1094

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, February 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 14, 4.11 p. m.]

General Kaledin reported dead. Alexeev obliged to fall back on Ekaterinodar with 3,000 men. Persian frontier closed to Allied forces, individual officers and men. Mohammedan excesses reported in previous telegrams continuing. Maximalist movement in Transcaucasia gaining ground. Measure suggested my telegram of yesterday to Crosby if carried out immediately may help situation though it is now too serious to admit of much hope. Please instruct me whether American residents and relief committee should leave Transcaucasia. Trebizond Consulate in danger.

SMITH

File No. 861.00/1101

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, February 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received February 15, 9.05 p. m.]

8667. For Lansing and McAdoo from Crosby:

72. Have received telegrams from Smith, Tiflis, Consul, asking confirmation of rumor British have captured Constantinople, ex-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

pressing fear of separate peace with Turkey; complaining of Colonel Pike, British representative, for failure of adequate cooperation, stating that Pike is handicapped because of local feeling; that British have territorial ambitions in Caucasus and Persia; and recommending independent measures of financial and political relief. Under existing arrangements between British and French Governments, British are taking lead in Caucasus district. After conference with Foreign Office have cabled Smith as follows:

Your telegrams of February 2 and 6 and earlier telegrams received. No foundation for report of capture of Constantinople by British. General Dunsterville, new British representative, delayed by snow. Colonel Pike has been instructed by British Government to keep you informed and to call on you freely for cooperation and suggestions. Am assured British Government doing its best to get money to its representative to aid his efforts. In view of existing arrangements, cannot recommend to Washington any modification in what I understand to be your present instructions; namely, that you should keep Department and me informed of developments. I of course have no authority to give you instructions for action which must come from Secretary of State alone, to whom I am cabling substance of your telegrams to me and information I have received here.

Cravath has received assurance from Foreign Office that there is no foundation for feeling that British Government has territorial aspirations in Caucasus and Persia. This purely political question, hence did not feel authorized to report to Smith. Endeavoring to hold my action in financial limits. . . .

PAGE

---

File No. 861.00/1102

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, February 15, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 16, 1.56 p. m.]

Enver Pasha<sup>1</sup> telegraphs to commander in chief here informing him that in view of the Armenian raids and atrocities against Mohammedans he is constrained to resume offensive. Few Armenian troops holding front, scarcely will be able to resist an advance but have been advised to fall back in order, destroying supplies, which I believe form main object of Turkish threat.

SMITH

---

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Minister of War.

File No. 861.00/1120

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 187

## MEMORANDUM

A report has been received by His Majesty's Government from the British military agent in the Caucasus to the effect that three American citizens were recently in Tiflis who proposed to subsidize Georgia with a view to a declaration of autonomy.

The British Embassy are instructed to enquire whether the Department of State have any information in regard to this report. They are to point out that, while American assistance in the Caucasus would be welcomed, independent action by private individuals must cause inconvenience to the official British mission, and they are to express the hope that the Department of State will concur in this view and will instruct the United States Consul at Tiflis that no separate action should be taken without full consultation with the British mission and in consultation [concert?] with them.

WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1918.*

[*Received February 19.*]

File No. 861.00/1132

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, *February 18, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[*Received February 21, 1.45 a. m.*]

182. Poole submits the following report of his recent personal observations in the Don:

Bolshevik successes in the Don are due to disaffection among the younger unindustrious Cossacks recently returned from the front (fully explained fourth paragraph my No. 3 from Rostov dated January 14<sup>1</sup>) who have responded to Bolshevik propaganda and risen against their fathers and the Kaledin government. It is an internal Cossack revolution rather than a Bolshevik military invasion, though the military movement is naturally from contiguous Bolshevik territory inward towards Novochoerkassk, the provincial capital.

After three days with the command of the forces operating against Novochoerkassk from the north I left them on February 13 at a point sixty miles from their objective, their front line being then twenty miles further on. They were elated by victory and pressing vigorously forward. Regular military units cannot be discerned among them; the control exercised by the revolutionary committee is at times uncertain. But individual determination and fighting spirit are high.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

If the reports are true, as they probably are, that many other Bolshevik forces are in control at Taganrog and Tikhoretskaya, the key points south, west, and east of Rostov, Novocherkassk is isolated and must capitulate. This will mean jeopardy "League for the Defense of our Native Land and Liberty" and probably also of the Southeastern monarchy [federation], as Bolshevism is as prevalent among the young Cossacks of the Kuban and Terek as among those of the Don. I heard reports of serious disorders in both those regions. Poole.

SUMMERS

---

File No. 861.00/1094

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tiflis (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your February 13, 6 p. m. Department relies on you to take measures necessary for safety of American life and property and for you to lend all proper assistance to relief committee.

If you are in communication with Trebizond inform Consul that Department relies on his judgment as to his remaining at post and that he is authorized to take all measures necessary to safeguard American life and property and the archives of his Consulate.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1120

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tiflis (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1918, 7 p. m.

Your February 12, 10 p. m. British military agent, Caucasus, reports to his Government that three Americans were recently in Tiflis who proposed to subsidize Georgia with view to declaration of autonomy.

Advise Department fully and promptly facts of this report.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1336

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 301

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy present their compliments to the Department of State and have the honour to communicate to them the following information which has been received from the Caucasus by

His Majesty's Government, and which may be of interest to the United States Government:

Petrovsk and Krasnovodsk are in control of the Bolsheviks. The railways and telegraphs between Baku and Tiflis are controlled by the Tatars. Foreign intervention is opposed by the latter, who desire that the land shall be restored to the Turks. They have 70 field guns, 150 machine guns, and 20,000 rifles, and are concentrated at Elisavetpol, Lenkoran, and Kachmez. They are being organized by German and Turkish released prisoners. The Russian evacuation is complete. It is the intention of the Moslems to hold the regions of Resht, Elisavetpol, and Baku. The Bolsheviks are working with the Tatars.

WASHINGTON, *March 19, 1918.*

[Received March 21.]

---

File No. 763.72/9405a

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Tiflis (Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 30, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Referring your recent telegrams March 10 to 15.<sup>2</sup> The United States is not in a position to support active military operations on Caucasus front. Summary of your reports has been communicated to British Government. Messages to Barton<sup>3</sup> and Red Cross also delivered. Department will advise whether any measures possible to relieve situation among civilian population.

LANSING

---

File No. 763.72/9295

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 3, 1918, 2 p. m.*

7116. Consul, Tiflis, sent Vice Consul Doolittle to Teheran to dispatch telegrams dated Tiflis, March 10, 11, and 12. American missionary Yarrow informs Barton and American Red Cross Caucasian situation most critical. Turks advancing. Surrounded by unfriendly Tatars. Armenians in real danger of extermination. If properly led and financed latter possess great potential military force. British

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Persia (No. 37).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see telegram to the Ambassador in Great Britain (No. 7116), Apr. 3, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> The Rev. Dr. James L. Barton, foreign secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

mission must use more adequate efforts if situation is to be saved. Russian Red Cross work disorganized. Yarrow urgently appeals for \$400,000 to reorganize hospitals and \$100,000 monthly for maintenance. Red Cross here asking London whether credit can be made available in Caucasus.

Consul telegraphs Secretary of State German plan of utilizing native Moslem population being accomplished. Tatars and Turkish troops disguised as natives, pro-Turk Moslem leaders supplied with abundant cash, feverishly active in creating disturbances. Fighting between Moslem tribes and Terek Cossacks. Armenian villages and detachments constantly attacked by armed Moslems, although latter usually repulsed. Situation aggravated by inactivity of Allies. Turkish demand of part of Caucasus brought Georgians' desire to join hands with Armenians. Defense of front depends entirely on latter whose present forces are 15,000 Ottoman subjects and 25,000 Russian subjects. With proper assistance probably force of 30,000 Georgians can be raised. Prime Minister requests help and states Armeno-Georgians will resist Turkish advance, but without instant financial aid and hope of future British military assistance, Turks may occupy as much Caucasian territory as they please. Without most urgent measures such occupation and massacre of Armenians within two months practically certain.

Prime Minister stated Black Sea Russian fleet offering sell his Government cruisers, torpedo boats, transports, and supplies, and that these would be sold to Turkish Government unless purchased by Allies.

Consul suggests placing in London to the credit of head of British mission at Tiflis 2,000,000 rubles to be used at his discretion for military purposes and possible purchase of Black Sea and Caspian fleets. Dunsterville, Tapping, or other tactful person could be charged with negotiations. Also credit of 2,000,000 rubles should be placed in London at disposal in Tiflis to provide for safety of Armenian people and prevent total extermination. The plan is to provision and supply the three mountain fastnesses in Russian Armenia, where in case of disasters troops at front may fall back and hold out probably for six months. If above is done Prime Minister promises hold Baku to keep open communications with British and North Caucasians.

As United States is not at war with Turkey this Government is prevented from taking action in the above premises. You may, however, inform Mr. Balfour of foregoing; telegraph result to the Department.

Since drafting the above Department received telegram March 28 from Doolittle still at Teheran stating his immediate return impossible, that Persian chieftain with 3,000 well-armed natives under

German influence and fostering anti-Ally sentiments in north Persia; that British authorities at Teheran have lost hope of saving Caucasian situation.

Please inform Department what information British Government has.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1642

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 18, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 22, 11 p. m.]

372. Following substance of report just received Moscow, from British agent in Caucasus:

Strength of Armenian and Georgian national units reorganized loyal armies, which left front in November, is about four army corps. They are in need of war material. Turks have taken Erzerum, Ardakhan, and approaching Kars and Batum. Wholesale massacres of the Armenians. Persia putting forward claims compensation Persian inhabitants who have suffered through war and establishment frontier line favorable Persia in the Lenkoran district. Transcaucasian parliament does not recognize Soviets and carries on peace negotiations with Turkey on its own. These negotiations have been broken off by Turks whose agents are stirring up Mohammedan population of Caucasus in favor of annexing whole of that country with Turkey. Bolsheviks predominate in Baku. Civil war in interior between Tatars and Armenians in the south and mountaineers and Mussulmans in the north. In Baku region Russian Bolsheviks fighting Tatars. Railway communication between Mineralnyya Vody and Baku and Baku [and] Tiflis has been cut for two months. Communication maintained over entire [omission] by a leaning [*sic*] road or [omission] when mountaineers allow messengers to pass. Rapid [omission] prevails in Trans-Caucasus especially among Armenian refugees. Local currency has been issued in Tiflis. Germans having taken Kharkov are advancing toward the Volga and isolation of the Caucasus from Russia is possible. The Black Sea completely under German control. Turks negotiating with whole of Crimea with a view to annexation with autonomous Government under their protection.

SUMMERS

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.



File No. 861.00/1671

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 22, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received April 25, 7.40 a. m.]

402. It is becoming more and more evident that the purpose of the German advance in the south may be not only to secure the natural and industrial wealth of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin but also the occupation of Rostov, Tsaritsyn, and possibly Astrakhan, and a junction with the Turks in the Caucasus. Besides far-reaching secondary results bearing on the situation in Persia and Mesopotamia, Turkestan, and even India, the successful execution of such a movement will place immediately at their disposal mineral oil and the grain and vegetable oil stores of the Kuban region which can be shipped from Novorossiisk by Tuapse and Batum through the Black Sea to Danube. The complete overthrow of public order in the Caucasus and the resulting activity of the Mohammedan elements in preventing supplies reaching the Georgian and Armenian units are enabling the Turks to advance from the south. The Bolshevik suppression of the nationalist movement on the Don, culminating in the death now reported of Kornilov, and the purely nominal resistance offered by these same Bolshevik forces to the Germans, are at the same time enabling the latter to carry out their advance through southern Russia with a minimum of military effort. Reports agree that, although this advance is being effected almost solely by German troops, the work of the Austrian and Ukrainian units being confined to the service of the rear, the number of these troops is almost incredibly small. A detachment of hardly more than 50 men is reported to have taken Nikolaev, city of 100,000 including over 30,000 workmen.

Viewing the situation in the south it seems certain that the readiness of the Germans to undertake so extended a movement with so few troops is based on complete confidence in the ineffectiveness of the Soviet government against them. The Germans can not count on the active support of the Polish troops, which have flatly declined to go to the western front, do not care on the other hand to fight the Russians, and are therefore remaining in large part neutral. Secondly, the political situation in the Ukraine is developing unfavorably to the Germans as their efforts to reestablish the old order and their intensive requisitions are accentuating the naturally pro-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

Russian resolutions of a population which was driven temporarily into the Austrian-German camp by the Bolshevik attack on the Ukraine. At a recent election in Kiev the Russian list carried against Ukrainian which stood for an Austrian orientation. The Bolshevik organization at Minsk reports to Moscow:

This whole territory is covered by a network for requisitioning organs which affront the local commandants; their troops systematically and mercilessly confiscate every article of food or clothing. The whole of loading, packing, and transport of the requisitioned goods is done by the local population and the carts and animals taken therefor are frequently not returned. Everything requisitioned is taken to Germany. The whole territory is on verge of catastrophic famine not only as to food but all kinds of supplies. No goods come from Germany. In the cities socialists, trade socialists [unions?], and other unions suppressed. Trade disbanded and old type customs reinstated. Socialist leaders arrested and principal ones deported to Germany for trial.

One of the most dependable liberal newspapers of Moscow writes:

The present Ukrainian cabinet principally composed of Social Revolutionists finds no support with any section of the population. The peasants are discontented with it because it brought in Germans into the country where they are requisitioning all the grain and other food products. The workmen detest it because of number of their effectives who have been executed by the German troops. The educated classes reject it because they can only support a coalition ministry on record that is one not altogether the socialist parliament [*sic*]. If they are forced to support it, it is for the simple reason that if the present cabinet falls it would be necessary whether they wished or not to form a coalition ministry which would inevitably take on a national character and would not tolerate the seizure of the Ukraine by Germany.

If the growing popular discontent in the Ukraine and the disposition of the Polish troops to side rather against than with Germany could be translated into action, obviously the Central powers would have the utmost difficulty in handling present lines of communication and an advance eastward would probably be quite out of the question, but, in the general opinion, they may have to be realized [re-signed?] until there is a different government in Russia. As much as the population has come to hate Germany they hate the Bolshevik even more [and] unless driven to desperation they will hastily [hardly] attempt concerted armed opposition to Germany in the absence of a more stable and trustworthy government in their rear upon whose sincere and active support they could count. The Polish troops are in the same situation. It is plain that they can not openly oppose the Central powers while the Russian Government by whom support would be a military necessity remains practically inert

against the Germans and is in the view of many of the Poles actually sold out to them.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1787

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 1, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 13, 2.14 a. m.]

454. General de Candolle, chief British railway mission to Rumania, has reached Moscow from Baku via Astrakhan and Saratov. Left Baku April 21.

Confirms reports recently submitted from this office on Caucasus conditions as far as it is possible to judge from Baku. Communication between Baku and Tiflis difficult, owing activities Tatars, who are opposed to the Soviet authority in Baku. If Turks advance beyond Kutais and Kars, probably the only line of withdrawal for Allied military missions and consuls in Tiflis will be over Georgian road to Vladikavkaz. Railway communication between Vladikavkaz and Petrovsk interrupted by mountain tribes near Grozny and just west of Petrovsk. At Grozny these people have fired the new oil field comprising about one third of the gushers. Remainder of field at this point and whole field at Baku intact but not working full owing to labor conditions. Caspian Sea Fleet operating and Volga now open to navigation, but usual oil shipments up Volga Valley have not begun.

Latter part of March Smith sent Doolittle with telegrams from Tiflis to Teheran via Baku, Enzeli. Doolittle sent back word much disorder northern Persia and would probably be unable return by this route, quite closed as [to] British by insurgent Kuchik Khan who has stirred up famed [fanatic?] tribes and controls whole Caspian littoral. British officers endeavoring to enter into Persia via Meshed.

De Candolle states he is reporting at length to War Office, London, recommending show of force by British, advance toward Tabriz and Enzeli, coupled with conciliatory attitude toward Tatars and rest of Armenians, who are disturbing element which, so far as possible to judge from Baku situation, rather out of hand, and Turkish agents operating among Tatars are having considerable success.

Party American refugees from Tiflis reached Samara 28th. Hope to proceed through Siberia.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1779

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

Moscow, May 9, 1918.

[Received May 11, 3.37 p. m.]

505. According official Soviet gazette for May 9 Turkish diplomatic representative Moscow has delivered note to Commissariat Foreign Affairs stating that peace negotiations have been opened between Turkey and the government of the Caucasus. Note explains that Caucasus government at Tiflis, basing action on Article 4 of Brest treaty, requested Turkey and Germany to open negotiations for regulation of territorial and other questions, that Turkish Government has acceded to request, and that German and Turkish Governments will accordingly send delegates to Batum. . . .

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1919

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 17, 1918.

[Received May 31, 9.11 p. m.]

528. According the announcement official Soviet gazette, May 16, Mirbach has communicated text of radiogram said to have been sent by the so-called union of hill tribes of the Caucasus to all warring and neutral countries, as well as to the governments of Trans-Caucasus and Russia. Essential parts of radiogram as follows:

The peoples of the Caucasus lawfully elected a national assembly which met in May and September 1917 and issued statement respecting formation of a union of Caucasian hill tribes. In considering the prevailing anarchy in Russia and taking advantage of right recognized by Petrograd government itself for all peoples of former empire of the Tsars freely to decide their political future, government of the hill tribes has decided: (1) to separate from Russia and form independent state; (2) that territory of new state shall have same boundaries of north as districts of Daghestan, Terek, Stavropol, and Kuban; on west, Black Sea; on east, Caspian; and on south boundary of which details to be determined in agreement with Transcaucasian government.

Referring to communication of this radiogram by Mirbach, Commissariat Foreign Affairs telegraphs Joffe,<sup>1</sup> Berlin, pointing out that—

people and tribes of Black Sea coast, Kuban, Terek, and Daghestan have long since expressed their wish at organized democratic con-

<sup>1</sup> A. A. Joffe, Soviet Ambassador in Germany.

gresses for an indissoluble union with the Russian federation. Attempt of a small party to set at naught will of the wide masses of the people will undoubtedly be discovered by the population itself. Russian Soviet authority will act in most decided manner against usurpation of authority by this small party.

Same paper prints request by Soviet authorities that representative of Russian government participate in negotiations at Batum between German and Ottoman governments on one hand, and Transcaucasian government on other. See Consulate's No. 505. Note says: "In many parts of Caucasus authority of so-called Transcaucasian government is not recognized at all and throughout Trans-Caucasus the wide masses of the people are against it." Numerous specific instances cited of protests against this government. Note concludes: "While insisting that Russian delegate take part in negotiations at Batum, Commissariat points out this in no way signifies recognition Transcaucasian government by Russian government."

[POOLE]

File No. 861.00/1856

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 17, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received May 24, 8.58 p. m.]

529. From open telegram No. 528, even date, Department will see how Germany is planning to obtain control of Caucasus including rich Kuban region by sustaining independent government which will be subservient to its wishes. Chicherin says that owing mountainous character country and prevalence Bolshevik doctrines among people Germany cannot succeed here as in Ukraine and Finland. It is true [omission] Kuban and Terek Cossacks have responded rather generally to Bolshevik propaganda but it is not to be expected that German absorption of Caucasus will be seriously interfered with except possibly by native uprisings which might be fomented from bases established by the British advancing from direction of Persia and Mesopotamia.

Letter dated April 18 received to-day by courier from Smith, Tiflis. He outlines plans for defense of Trans-Caucasus against Turks but peace conference now in progress Batum indicates that further resistance found impossible. No telegraphic communication with Tiflis.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1856

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Moscow (Poole)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1918, 5 p. m.

52. Your 529, May 17, 3 p. m. Department will be pleased to learn plans for defense of Trans-Caucasus furnished by Smith.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2015

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 2, 1918.

[Received June 14, 3.55 a. m.]

593. Official Soviet gazette publishes radiogram received from Tiflis May 28, of which following substance:

May 27. The Transcaucasian government sent telegram to Minister for Foreign Affairs of all countries announcing that on May 26 Caucasian republic fell to pieces and no longer exists. The parliament has given up its authority and declared itself dissolved. An act has been passed making Georgia independent democratic republic. German-Caucasian chamber of commerce being established at Tiflis.

Turkey has sent Transcaucasian government ultimatum: The following districts go over to Turkey: Nakhichevanski district except Ordubad, half Sharuro-Daralagezski district, half Erivanski district except Erivan, Surmalinski district, almost whole Echmiadzininski district, part of Alexandropolski district, with town Alexandropol, whole of Akhalkalaski district. Besides this Turks demand unhindered transport their troops on all Transcaucasian railways. Troops also must be provided with food supplies. Answer to this note must be given within seventy-two hours beginning at 7 p. m., May 26, after which the attitude between two governments will be made clear.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2041

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 7, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received June 17, 1.56 a. m.]

609. Department's 52, May 28, 2 [5] p. m. Substance of Smith's letter as follows:

Vote at meeting of Diet March 30, first resolution adopted for continuing war. Order for immediate general mobilization has just

been issued. It is hoped something will be accomplished to stop Turkish advance and prevent probable German invasion. Batum fallen to Turks owing lack discipline among Georgian troops. Small patriotic forces might have held out indefinitely. Turks aided by local Mussulman element which will always render Caucasia's situation difficult and complicated. Advance of Armenian troops [who?] were acquitting themselves more credulously [creditably]. Baku, fighting between Armenians and Bolsheviks on one side against Tatars on the other side. Is it possible this conflict be stopped by central authorities Moscow in order to prepare common defense against Turks? Tiflis isolated. In absence of instructions we are working to aid and encourage local elements and consider recent decision of Diet decided victory against always active German and Turkish influences. Heavy responsibilities on our part especially in realm of finance. Supreme council of defense of Transcaucasia has just been formed constituting dictatorship of three.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/2200

*The Consulat Tiflis (Smith), temporarily in Moscow, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 16, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received July 4, 3.10 p. m.]

On April 23, after declaration in favor of continuing war and union with Russia, the government of Gegechkori was forced to resign by vote of Armenian and Georgian majority in Diet, pro-German Chenkelli and Ramishvilli succeeding to power. From that time all effective armed resistance to Turkish advance ceased and territory from Kars, Alexandropol, and Vorontsovka as well as railroad to Julfa were occupied by Turks. Batum and southeast provinces are also occupied by them under the treaty of Brest Litovsk. Railroads Baku, Rostov-on-Don, and part of Baku-Groznyi line are held by native Moslems under Turkish officers. Up to date of my departure Persian road Enzeli to Resht was held by Kuchik Khan's Gelds [Jangalis] amounting to about 3,000 men.

May 26 Georgia was declared independent and a *de facto* German protectorate accepted. Ramishvilli had informed me the day before that Georgians might be forced to this step to protect Tiflis from invasion by approaching Turkish forces. After dissolution of Diet, Moslem delegates are reported to have established state of Azerbaijan under Turkish protection, see previous telegrams. All Transcaucasia and railroad systems with the exception of Baku now controlled by

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent from the Consulate General at Moscow (No. 612).

enemy and Turkish advance on Baku is under way. Turkish regular troops employed in Transcaucasia do not exceed 20,000. They are supplied entirely by military stores found on occupied territory. In the absence of German troops attempt is being made to arm prisoners and concentrate force in Turkestan. Number available limited. Tatar and Kurdish bands cooperating with Turks, roughly estimated at 50,000 well armed.

[Armenian] troops under General Nazarbekov, after being ordered by Chenkelli government to evacuate Kars, were dispersed by occupation of Alexandropol and the railroad by Turks. Armenian policy when leaving was to follow Georgian lead and appeal to Germany for protection. Turco-German friction relied on by Armenians and Georgians I believe is not serious as reported. Conquest of [omission] is more due to belief in the existence of such friction than to active Turkish military operations. Baku is still held by Bolsheviks, estimated total force about 6,000 Russians and 5,000 Armenians. This force cannot hold out for more than six weeks on account lack of supplies and backbone which latter can only be strengthened by nucleus of really efficient foreign troops. . . .

[SMITH]

---

File No. 881.00/2210

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith), temporarily in Moscow, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 18, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 5, 9.45 a. m.]

In the government of the Terek, Bolsheviks are nominally in control and are supported by Russian population for fear of something worse. Cossacks and Mohammedans acquiesce temporarily in such government in order to delay open conflict between their respective tribes. Cossacks and most of the Russians realize the failure of Bolshevism, and former could be reorganized and utilized against the Germans and Turks. Turkish propaganda energetically is carried out among the Mohammedans of North Caucasus and they can be expected to cooperate with Turks and Germans from Kuban or with any force inspiring confidence in ultimate success and which would not be suspected of a desire to crush our [their] nationality. Crops in the Kuban are above the average owing partly to increased area of grain and easily supply an army of occupation. This is fully realized by Germans who have recaptured Rostov-on-Don and

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent from the Consulate General at Moscow (No. 647).



are advancing beyond Bataisk towards Armavir. French mission agent's estimate is three to four divisions German infantry, one division cavalry, and three divisions Austrian infantry in Don region. Impressions received from conversations with and reports from representative people of all classes, confirmed by what I had occasion to observe on my way from Tiflis to Moscow, are that military intervention would be welcomed; that such intervention, unless on large scale, would not only be futile but would do harm; that there would be no objection to Japanese troops if accompanied by small forces of Americans both military and administrative; that it would be impossible to supply large force in northern Russia; that an active military campaign must be in the south where troops could live on the country; that an active anti-German propaganda in the Ukraine could effectively counteract the effect of an occupation of the governments of Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov; that the line of the Urals, Volga west [must be held?]. Participate in [people look on?] the intervention as a hand stretched out to a drunken man. They prefer the hand of a friend but an enemy's is better than none.

[SMITH]

---

File No. 861.00/2386

*Statement issued by the Georgian Information Bureau*

[LONDON,] 22 ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1, June 26, 1918.

[Received July 30.]

#### GEORGIA AND TRANSCAUCASIA

For the last three months the news from this important bridge-head, from Europe to Asia, has been of a most confusing nature: firstly, because the telegraphic lines of communication are controlled by the Bolsheviks and the Turks; and secondly through the ignorance of the press correspondents on this particular subject. For those who know what is going on, it is amazing to read in the British press announcements of an entirely operative character, which are not compatible with the dignity and seriousness of the political situation. Several names are confused. One hears announcements about "Caucasus," "Caucasia," "Ciscaucasia," "Transcaucasia," and Georgia.

Before going further it is necessary to mention the correct names. The whole area of the Caucasus, situated between the Black and Caspian Seas, is divided by the chain of the Caucasian Mountains into two distinct parts: North Caucasia and Transcaucasia. In the North Caucasus the districts of Terek and Daghestan form a mountaineers'

republic. They have declared themselves independent and claim the entire area of North Caucasus, the capital of the new republic being Vladikavkaz.

This claim is not recognized by the Kuban Cossacks who, on their part, claim the entire territory of North Caucasus and have constituted a separate republic, together with the Don Cossacks, with the capital at Ekaterinodar. The head of this Cossack republic, General Krasnov, asked the commander of the German troops in Ukraine to cooperate with him against the Bolsheviks. Whilst General von Eichhorn seems quite ready to accept the invitation, the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, seems to be against it. It is also reported that General Kornilov, with some Cossacks, is in North Caucasus organizing an attack against the Bolsheviks. The Caucasus is the more interesting as there are huge quantities of grain stored in that country which the Central powers would try to secure for themselves and with the capture of the entire Black Sea Fleet this operation seems to be quite probable.

In Transcaucasia, after the appearance of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, a separate state was formed consisting of three nationalities: Georgians, Tatars, and Armenians. It was a federal republic with the capital in Tiflis and a national army consisting of Georgians and Armenians.

As is well known, the Bolsheviks at the Brest Litovsk conference ceded the large districts of Batum and Kars to Turkey behind the back of the Transcaucasian government. This was not recognized by the Transcaucasian government, which government mobilized the army in order to prevent Turkish invasion of the provinces. Being entirely isolated from Allied assistance, after stubborn fighting they lost Batum and Kars, which Turkey occupied. After this, Turkey offered to send delegates for peace negotiations, but the negotiations were broken off as the Transcaucasian government would not agree to the terms proposed by Turkey. Fighting was resumed and the Turks penetrated into the eastern part of Transcaucasia where they joined hands with the Tatars, who broke away from Transcaucasia and came under the influence of Turkey. At this stage Germany intervened and invited the Transcaucasian government to send delegates to Batum for negotiations. After these negotiations the Transcaucasian government, which consisted only of Georgians and Armenians, was compelled to accept the loss of Kars and Batum districts but would not agree to abandon the important port of Batum, on the Black Sea, chief outlet of Transcaucasia. Germany and Turkey agreed to return Batum, but suddenly Turkey made a new claim to the Sukhum district on the Black Sea. This was prevented by the concentration of Georgian troops in that town. By the occu-

pation of the Kars and Batum districts and by the breaking away of the Tatars, the only territory remaining in Transcaucasia free of enemy occupation was Georgia, inhabited by Christian Georgians, and on 26th May the Georgian Diet assembled in Tiflis and declared independence of Georgia.

It is rumored that Turkey has demanded that the Georgian government should send delegates to Constantinople for peace negotiations, and it is further declared that a peace treaty with Turkey has been signed, although nothing is known as to the terms. It is quite evident that Turkey, having lost Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Palestine, is determined to compensate herself at the expense of the Georgians and Armenians. This intention is very much dis[ap]proved by the conservative press of Berlin.

Independent Georgia, after being stripped of her fairest provinces by Turkey, comprises 40,000 square miles of territory, with the capital in Tiflis. The government of independent Georgia is republican, and the Prime Minister is Mr. I. Ramishvili, member of the First Duma.

It is obvious that, under some pretext, the Turks and Germans will make entry into the country in order to dominate it in the same way as they have done in Ukraine. Dr. Paul Rohrbach announced some weeks ago that, through domination of Ukraine and Georgia, Germany hoped to obtain the necessary raw materials and strategic communications towards the middle East. In addition to this, the Turks have penetrated northern Persia. It is quite certain that "sick man" is not in a position to revive his ramshackle empire and at best, it can only continue its wretched existence as a colony of the Central powers.

It is very deplorable that Persia is in a state of decay and therefore is not capable of preventing various surgery experiments which Turkey is making on her territory. Without outside Allied pressure further penetration on the part of the Central powers and Turkey will be continued far into the depths of Turkestan.

According to a Stockholm telegram, an unsuccessful attempt has been made on the life of Mr. A. Chenkelli, Foreign Minister of Georgia, in Tiflis; a bomb was thrown by a Turkish agent who was arrested. Mr. Chenkelli was a Georgian member of the former Duma and offered great resistance to the Turkish Government in negotiations.

It is further communicated that the Georgian diplomatic delegation has arrived at Berlin in order to settle the conditions of the Georgian state with the Central powers. Constantinople has been proposed by the Central powers as a place for conference. On 19th June, thirty-two Georgian and Armenian delegates arrived in Con-

stantinople from Transcaucasia. The leader of the Georgian delegation is Mr. Gegechkori, the former Prime Minister, and the leader of the Armenian delegation is Mr. Aharonian. This delegation is going to attend a special conference with the Central powers.

It is obvious that the Central powers will try to create in Transcaucasia as favorable conditions for themselves as they have in Ukraine.

Although help from the Allies seems to be remote, it is at any rate the duty of the British press to follow matters up very closely and to give as correct information to the public as possible under the circumstances. In doing this it is necessary not to make mistakes in the geographical names and to study the maps as closely as possible.

It is once more evident that the center of gravity in the eastern contest between the British Empire and Central powers is Transcaucasia and Georgia, which countries are entirely isolated from immediate contact with the Allied forces and therefore left to the mercy of the Central powers. This is the more clear as, according to a recent message from Tiflis, the Turkish Government is demanding the disarmament of Georgian and Armenian troops. Should this plan succeed, Transcaucasia will be left entirely undefended. The Turkish occupation of Tabriz provides them with the best base for operations in Transcaucasia, and the deplorable state of affairs in Persia is a further convenience to them.

On the face of all these happenings it is very remarkable that the Bolsheviks have surrendered various economic concessions to the Central powers, which gives Germany excuses for penetrating into the middle East. In this way, Germany is gradually completing her scheme of threatening India and Afghanistan along the road Berlin-Constanța-Batum-Krasnovosk-Kushk and through Erivan to Tabriz.

---

File No. 861.00/2458

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith), temporarily in Moscow, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, July 15, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 24, 9.35 p. m.]

Food conditions at Baku, June 25, greatly improved, shipments being received from Astrakhan. Garrison 8,000 Armenian troops, Bolshevik 2,500. Caspian fleet cooperating with the above. Enemy force 25,000: 800 German troops, 2,000 Georgians, 5,000 Turkish

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent from the Consulate General at Moscow (No. 712) via Paris.

regulars, balance Tatar irregular formations under Russian and Turkish officers. Germans reported landing inadequate forces at Poti. Armenians here urge landing of small British force at Baku within four weeks would enable Baku to hold out against present enemy force. German agents reported active at Astrakhan. The government here informed Baku has been captured by Ottomans. Report not confirmed. Yesterday's Moscow papers report the capture of Mosul and Tabriz by British. Please confirm this report.

The new Armenian state reported recognized by Germany and Turkey is limited to 12,000 kilometers, boundary from Delizhan southwest to Alagez, from there south to Echmiadzin and east to Erivan, from the latter to Lake Levan [Sevanga]. State includes the counties of Erivan, Echmiadzin, and Novo-Bayazet.

Reports of Cossack successes in the Kuban are admitted by [omission]. Armavir is reported occupied by Cossacks; 30,000 Armenian refugees concentrated there.

[SMITH]

---

File No. 861.00/2666

*The Consul at Tifl (Smith), temporarily in Stockholm, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, September 11, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received September 12, 4.20 a. m.]

Owing to fighting in the North Caucasus and Don I was unable to communicate from Moscow with Montesanto or with other agents in that district. Bolshevik reports indicate the capture by Kuban Cossacks and Alexeev of most of the Kuban Province. Fighting between Cossacks and Red Guard was reported by one of my agents last month in the locality west of Baku on Caspian. The Soviet of Don Cossacks is endeavoring to deprive Krasnov of his command or have him openly side with Allies. Have encouraged Soviet to take this attitude and have started pro-Ally propaganda in Don region. Recommend that direct relations be established with the Don, Orenburg, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks and with Alexeev and Dutov for the purpose of bringing them more closely together under one command. This would appear to be essential to secure left wing of Czecho-Slovaks and establish order in one of the principal agricultural and industrial regions of Russia. Owing to the difficulty of securing team work from Russian political parties and leaders if left to themselves the Department might consider it advisable to

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent from the Legation in Sweden (No. 2815).

instruct its representatives in Russia to come in closer contact with the leaders of the several parties, not for the purpose of shaping the internal policies of the country, but to bring about such a union between the parties as to enable them to work out a common program and prevent personal interests or ambitions from seriously interfering therewith. This work has heretofore been totally neglected by American and British representatives in European Russia. Owing to French activities a small success in this direction was obtained in the formation of the *Vozrozhdenie*. This success was however limited owing to the uncertainty heretofore existing in regard to the policy of the Allies in Russia. This lack of union and individual intrigues and ambitions have led to the failure of every effort heretofore made to establish a government in Russia unless the Bolshevik Soviets can be called such. The latter however is a mere dictatorship of blood and terror upheld by mercenary bands and the predatory instincts of that part of the population which has nothing to lose. It has not taken root among the mass of the Russian peasants.

[SMITH]

---

File No. 861.00/3127

*The Chargé in Norway (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

No. 978

CHRISTIANIA, September 28, 1918.

[Received November 1.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith copies and translations of a letter dated September 14, 1918, and a memorandum relative to the proclamation of the independence of Georgia in Russia, received by this Legation from Mr. Zourab Avaloff, member of the Georgian delegation, with the request that it be transmitted to the United States Government.

I have [etc.]

H. F. ARTHUR SCHOENFELD

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Georgian De'egate (Avaloff) to the Minister in Norway (Morris)*

CHRISTIANIA, September 14, 1918.

MR. MINISTER: The independence of Georgia was proclaimed on May 26, 1918, at Tiflis, its capital, by the National Council of Georgia, as a result of universal suffrage. A government responsible to the said council was established, of which the President is Mr. Zhordanya, while the direction of foreign affairs was entrusted to Mr. Chenkelli, former member of the Russian Duma.

The Transcaucasian Diet declared itself dissolved on the same date, May 26, so that the Transcaucasian republic no longer exists.

Georgia includes the two governments of Tiflis and Kutais, as well as the districts of Sukhum and Zakataly. An integral part of Georgia, the district of Batum, including the town of that name, is occupied at the present time by

Turkish forces; this is one of the provinces referred to in Article 4 (section 3) of the treaty of Brest Litovsk. Georgia considers this territory ceded by Russia as its legitimate patrimony.

After 117 years, therefore, of Russian domination the Georgian people, formerly freely united to the Russian Empire, resumes its place among independent nations and it intends to organize its internal affairs and its external relations in such a manner as will assure its perfect freedom of development.

In communicating the above to your excellency, I have the honor to request that you will be good enough to make known to your Government the fact of the formation of the Georgian state, in order that the republic of Georgia may be recognized by the United States of North America.

Please accept [etc.]

ZOURAB AVALOFF

[Subenclosure—Memorandum—Translation]

*The Trans-Caucasus, its Connection with the Russian State, Relations with Turkey, and Dissolution of the Diet—Georgia Proclaims her Independence*

After the Russian revolution of March 1917, the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov organized a special committee for the Trans-Caucasus delegated with full governmental powers. It was a sort of local autonomy having considerable extension while the Trans-Caucasus remained united to the Russian state by the ties of solidarity. The Maximalist *coup d'état* in November 1917 wrought a great change in these relations. The Bolshevik government was never recognized by the Trans-Caucasus, with the exception of the town of Baku. A "commissariat" was then formed at Tiflis where the principal nations of the country and the political parties were represented and which assumed the government of the Trans-Caucasus until the calling of the Russian Constitutive Assembly. But, as is known, this was dissolved, and the government of Tiflis considered it necessary to reunite a provincial parliament, the Diet of the Trans-Caucasus.

The government inaugurated by the Maximalists in Russia and the conclusion of the disastrous treaty of Brest Litovsk created an abyss between the Trans-Caucasus and Russia. The Transcaucasian government entered into direct negotiations with Turkey at Trebizond. At the same time the independence of the Trans-Caucasus was formally proclaimed by its parliament and the powers were notified.

The Transcaucasian delegation was obliged to accept, at the conclusion of the negotiations at Trebizond, the stipulations of the treaty of Brest Litovsk as a basis for subsequent negotiations. But without awaiting their result Turkey proceeded to the military occupation of the districts of Batum and of Kars, to which, unfortunately, it was impossible for the Trans-Caucasus to offer any resistance, in view of the state of dissolution of the Caucasian front at that time.

Another conference was held at Batum in the month of May (Batum was already occupied by the Turks), at which Germany was also represented by a special delegation with General von Lossow, German military plenipotentiary at Constantinople, at the head. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Germans who endeavored to conciliate the opposing interests of the two parties, it was impossible to find a common basis for these negotiations. Turkey, whose delegation was presided over by the Minister of Justice, Khalil-bey, no longer desired to consider the treaty of Brest as a unique basis for an arrangement with the Trans-Caucasus; she demanded the total annexation, not only of the provinces referred to in Article 4 (section 3) of this treaty, but also parts of the governments of Tiflis and Erivan. As a matter of fact these territories were occupied by the Turkish troops. Officers and emissaries followed by their detachments

were sent to the eastern provinces of the Trans-Caucasus (Azerbaijan) where there is such a pronounced Turcophile trend that the unity of the country could no longer be maintained and the separation of the different parts of the Trans-Caucasus became necessary and inevitable.

It was thereupon that the independence of Georgia was proclaimed by the National Council of Georgia at Tiflis on the 26th of May, 1918; and in view of the dismemberment which had taken place of the Trans-Caucasus the Trans-caucasian Diet declared itself dissolved.

On the same date, but a few hours after the above events, an ultimatum was addressed by Turkey at Batum to the Transcaucasian delegation which replied that the Trans-Caucasus no longer existed. Delegations appointed separately by Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan arrived later at Batum and signed, on the 4th of June, a series of treaties accepting the ultimatum of Turkey. According to the Turco-Georgian treaty, Turkey not only secures Batum with its district but also the towns of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki with their respective districts. From Akhaltsikh Turkey can always threaten the most vital centers of Georgia: Tiflis and Kutais.

The treaty of the 4th of June is not yet ratified. The idea was conceived of calling a conference at Constantinople to examine the stipulations signed at Batum. The Caucasian delegations have even arrived there, but so far the conference has not been held (September 14).

It should be noted that the Turks take military occupation *de facto* of the territories they wish to appropriate and that after having organized bases at Batum and at Kars they have taken possession of the railway Kars-Alexandropol-Julfa-Tabriz, which facilitates certain operations against the English army for them; they have prepared the route at the narrow pass of Delizhan, from Karaklis to Elisavetpol, whence they operate against Baku and control Azerbaijan. In this way half of the Trans-Caucasus is in reality dominated by Turkey, while Georgia, by proclaiming its independence, has remained outside the Turkish pressure, with the exception of the Georgian provinces occupied by the Ottoman army mentioned above.

The independence of Georgia was formally recognized by Turkey upon the signing of the treaty of the 4th of June at Batum; by the supplementary treaty to the treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed at Berlin on the 27th of August and already ratified, Russia consents to Germany's recognizing the independence of Georgia.

The complete dissolution of the former Russian Empire was the principal cause of this movement in Georgia which resulted in the proclamation of its absolute independence; it was found necessary to abandon the policy adopted by Georgia during the first phase of the Russian revolution which had for its object a political autonomy included in the Russian state.

The Georgian government and parliament now have at their head politicians who played a great rôle in the Russian revolution until the arrival of the Maximalists in November 1917; for instance, Mr. Cheldze, now president of the Georgian parliament, and Mr. Tseretelli, leader of the socialists in the parliament. The government is presided over by Mr. Zhordanya, former member of the first Russian Duma and recognized chief of the moderate socialists in Georgia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chenkelli, was also a member of the last Russian Duma and member of the Transcaucasian Committee in 1917; he was president of the Transcaucasian government until the dismemberment of the Trans-Caucasus.

The constitution of Georgia has not yet been elaborated, but republican government will have a deep root in it; the government and the parliament (the



National Council of Georgia), which is based on universal suffrage, enjoy great popularity.

The first steps of political independence are, of course, difficult and beset with dangers in a country overthrown by successive revolutions and the war; but the problems with which the Georgian government will occupy itself above all are: the reestablishment of public order, the reprovisioning of the country, the organization of administrative authority, of public force and finance, the settlement of the agrarian question.

The frontiers of Georgia are not definitely fixed. With the exception of minor modifications, the Georgian government considers as belonging to Georgia all the territories of the former Georgian kingdoms and principalities which concluded agreements with Russia from the year 1801 placing them under the Russian protectorate, as well as the Georgian territory belonging to the Turks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and afterwards ceded to Russia by the treaty of Adrianople (1828) and the treaty of Berlin (1878). Georgia would include in its limits the two former governments of Tiflis and Kutais, with the districts of Sukhum and Zakataly, as well as the district of Batum. The Georgian element dominates everywhere in these districts and from an economic point of view all these provinces are closely united.

The Georgian government is firmly persuaded that, provided external circumstances render it possible, the unity of the Trans-Caucasus can ultimately be restored on the basis of a confederation of the three states: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. But above all it is necessary that Georgia should consolidate its own political existence and independence. In order that this existence may be guaranteed and preserved by the international public order which will result from the war of the world, Georgia must first of all be formally recognized by the principal powers; and the Georgian government hopes that the great democracies of the west will not refuse this recognition to the Georgian people at the dawn of its reconquered independence.

File No. 861.00/2850

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole), en route to Archangel, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, October 1, 1918.

[Received October 2, 1.45 a. m.]

14. My No. 8, dated at Petrograd September 17, has apparently not yet reached Christiania.<sup>2</sup> It dealt with some of the results of the German-Bolshevik alliance established by the supplementary treaties of September 6. Early in August, when German policy was still undetermined, the Bolshevik government seemed in process of dissolution. Some of the more important commissaires are even reported to have fled from Moscow. A little later as it became known that Germany had decided to support the Bolsheviks and would give effect to this decision in definite treaty engagements, the

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Norway (No. 1196).

<sup>2</sup> Arrived and forwarded Oct. 8; not printed.

Bolshevik government gained in assurance. After the middle of August, it unmistakably disclosed the policy of hostility to the Allies which it had begun more or less covertly with the removal of the Ambassador from Vologda; it increased the violence of the terror against its own people; it had military successes on the Czech front, notably the taking of Kazan, Simbirsk, and Uralsk. These developments must all be regarded as beyond question direct results of the German alliance. The world should know that the Bolshevik government has been preserved beyond its natural end by German support and that Germany is morally if not directly responsible for its present misdeeds. If confirmation beyond that contained in the supplementary treaties is needed of the thoroughness of the pro-Bolshevik policy which Germany has adopted, I had it yesterday from the Duke of Leuchtenberg who is in Christiania after an unsuccessful mission to Berlin to obtain German recognition for the anti-Bolshevik government of Krasnov in the Don, and help for the monarchist movement in southern Russia. After being kept in expectancy until the supplementary treaties with the Bolsheviks were agreed to Ludendorff gave Leuchtenberg a categorical refusal on the ground that the Germans had promised the Bolsheviks to help none of the factions opposing them.

As a result the position of the Krasnov government, which has accepted German help rather unwillingly and it is understood only through the intermediary of the Ukraine, and which might in the end become one of the elements which the terms of our intervention would permit us to support, becomes critical as the Volunteer Army of Alexeev is exposed to annihilation. Both have drawn support from the Ukraine, and it is possible that in pursuance of its present policy and in view of its military distress Germany will withdraw the troops which sustain the Skoropadski government. This government would then by reason of the premature and severe reaction carried out recently in the Ukraine with German help, almost certainly give way to a strong radical or revolutionary revulsion.

[POOLE]

File No. 861.00/3237

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 19, 10.17 a. m.]

585. General Ironside has received official notification of his appointment as commander in chief in northern Russia. Lindley informs me that General Poole has been ordered to the south of Russia

to join Denikin who has succeeded Alexeev at the head of the Volunteer Army and that General Milne, heretofore commanding British forces at Saloniki, has been ordered to take command at Odessa. Lindley adds that his civil propaganda and intelligence personnel has been ordered to leave Archangel for Odessa.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3241

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 19, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received 4.55 p. m.]

588. With reference to my No. 585, November 18, 6 p. m., Lindley now informs me that Milne is not ordered to Odessa but to Batum to see to Turkish evacuation of Caucasus. From a personal telegram to Ironside for [from?] headquarters London it appears that British do not contemplate important operations in the south of Russia at present but will support Denikin with money and material.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/3406

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 11, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received December 12, 8.59 a. m.]

6238. Following telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 14:

Mr. Poklevski, Russian Minister, was accredited to us in the quality of representative of the army of volunteers formed by Alexeev and at present under the orders of General Denikin. We confirm that according to concordant reports from all the Allied agents this army constitutes the only national following [force?] which could serve as a basis for the reconstitution of Russia with such assistance of the Allies. Mr. Poklevski handed us a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Neratov, [former assistant?] at the Russian Foreign Office, who is temporarily replacing Mr. Sazonov assigned as a member of the political council formed and assigned to the army of Denikin and which appears destined to be the nucleus of the future provisional government. We transmit in plain language this document under the number [omission].<sup>1</sup> The final phrase of Article 3 concerning the evacuation of Poland should, according to Mr. Poklevski, be interpreted as meaning that this demand for evacuation emanates

---

<sup>1</sup> Post, p. 645.

from the Polish group of the Denikin army and does not imply any Russian claim to the former Polish provinces. As for Article 4 on the occupation of Russian strategical points "by Russian forces or provisionally by those of the Allies," this [article?] calculated to avoid giving offense to the nation.

Pride does not lessen the impatience with which all the elements of order are awaiting Allied intervention. By reason of the importance of the assistance which the Denikin army can offer to the action of the Allies we have asked the Rumanian Government to facilitate the furnishing of munitions to it from the Russian depots still existing in Rumania until such time as the commander of the armies of the Orient can assure same. We again insist on the urgency of sending to Russia the first contingent of Allied troops available so as to reduce to a minimum the interval between German evacuation and inter-Allied occupation. In Ukraine the population terrorized by the Bolsheviks asks that the Germans may receive from the Entente the instruction to maintain order while awaiting the arrival of the Allies.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3461

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 18, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 8.20 p. m.]

6346. Following joint telegram marked urgent received from Allied Ministers dated Jassy via Saloniki, December 12:

*[The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Governmental Commission attached to the Volunteer Army (Neratov) to the Allied Ministers in Rumania]*

In view of the present international situation which has arisen following upon the action of the Central powers regarding the question of peace, one must reckon on the possibility that the international negotiations will commence; as the negotiations progress they will doubtless treat Russian questions so that it is necessary to avoid the possibility of decisions being taken which are not desirable for Russia. It would therefore be highly desirable for an agreement to be reached by the Allies aspiring to the restoration of Russia on the basis of the integrity of her territory and the formation [of a government?] which would be most apt to reestablish internal order and to guarantee Russia situation worthy of a great power. Perhaps the French representative at Jassy would not refuse to transmit as soon as possible the following to his government.

A governmental commission has been assigned to the Volunteer Army consisting of General Denikin, commander in chief of the army; General Dragomirov, chairman of the commission; General Lukomski, chief of the military section; Shulgin and Stepanov, members of the Duma; Mr. I. Neratov, former assistant to Minister for Foreign Affairs; etc. Messrs. Sazonov, Astrov, Bernatski, and others have been invited to take part therein. According to the firm conviction of this commission the aims pursued by the Volunteer Army correspond entirely with the views of the Allied powers. The Volunteer Army

is the sole organized force which since the beginning of the internal crisis has defended, by great efforts and innumerable sacrifices, the aims followed in the struggle against the Germanophile currents and for union with the Allied powers. At present this army has increased in numbers and is concentrated in the regions of northern Caucasus; on the part of the local and neighboring populations a tendency is already being manifested to enter into contact with this army so as to struggle against the Bolsheviks and the German invasion. In this way it does not seem unrealizable that southern Russia will shortly place herself under the protection of the Volunteer Army; the latter possesses sufficient funds and having accomplished [has accumulated?] considerable quantity of munitions.

The governmental commission hopes that the Allied powers will come to the assistance of the army; in this connection the Volunteer Army would greatly appreciate the sending of Allied naval forces to the Black Sea with some military forces so as to create a base of support at Novorossiisk. Such a measure would have the result desired on the elements which are still hesitating. As regards the general plan for an advance of the army towards the north, it would have also a favorable influence on the state of mind of the masses in the Ukraine and the Czechs; or otherwise in the event of the departure of the Austro-Germans one may expect a new outbreak of Bolshevism.

The present Ukrainian government, which relies on the German armies, is very uneasy concerning its fate, in view of the interior and exterior difficulties which Germany is experiencing, but it goes without saying that all attempts of this government to establish a unity of action with the Volunteer Army have been neglected on account of the position of the Ukraine. The Volunteer Army is treating in the same way the centrifugal tendencies of the other regions situated on the borders of Russia. Special consideration is being given to the question of the Siberian government which, so it appears, has received a certain support from the Allies and whose aims are practically similar to those pursued by the Volunteer Army. As the Volunteer Army is only in irregular communication with Siberia it does not consider it possible to define from now its attitude *vis-à-vis* the government of Omsk, but so as to avoid disseminating the forces the commission hopes that the Volunteer Army [will] receive the preference as regards the support of the Allies, who certainly have estimated at its correct value the wisdom of the firm attitude adopted by the army.

As regards the peace question, the governmental commission considers that it would be essential for the Allies, if they intend meeting the demands of the Volunteer Army, to give their consent to the following preliminary points:

- (1) Unity of representation for Russia at the peace conference with nonadmission of the Bolshevik delegates and delegates from the territorial formations which in principle deviate from the aims pursued by the Volunteer Army.

- (2) Cancellation of the political and economic treaties concluded with Germany and her allies as well as the unilateral acts concerning the introduction in the occupied provinces of certain systems of administration, the reestablishment of the rights violated by these treaties or acts, indemnity for the damage caused in this way, the restitution of the gold, of the military and commercial fleet, the Russian Government stock, etc., and the suspension of the exportation from Russia of foodstuffs and material. This request certainly does not apply to the treaties concluded with the Allied powers.

- (3) The evacuation by Germany and her allies of Russian territory within the limits of the frontiers of 1914 including Finland. It is also desirable to address a similar request regarding Poland.

- (4) The occupation by Russian forces or provisionally by those of the Allies until the formation of sufficiently strong Russian detachments of the

principal junctions of the railways and other points having a strategical importance in Russian territory at present occupied by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies.

(5) The immediate execution of the exchange of prisoners.

(6) The engagement on the part of Germany and her allies not to hinder in any way the reestablishment of the solid and indissoluble state organization of Russia.

The governmental commission considers it extremely necessary, in order that the activity of the Volunteer Army may conform to the points of view and decisions of the Allied powers, to establish an exchange of telegrams at once between the army and Paris, all the more so as one can foresee the possibility of the [a] delegate being detached from this army to be attached to the Allied powers with full powers concerning political questions so as to collaborate with the Russian Ambassador in Paris. It is not necessary again to mention the firm conviction of the Volunteer Army that the Allied powers will not allow the entry into their territory of representatives of the Bolsheviks and of the state organizations which have based their policy on the support of Germany.

NERATOV

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3531

*The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1918.

[Received December 27.]

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to transmit to you paraphrase of a cable received by the Russian Embassy from Mr. Maklakov, giving the text of a message that has been sent by S Sazonov, at present at Ekaterinodar, to Admiral Kolchak.

With renewed assurances [etc.]

S. UGHET

[Enclosure—Paraphrase—Telegram]

*The Russian Ambassador in France (Maklakov) to the Russian Embassy at Washington*

Complying with the request of S. Sazonov,<sup>1</sup> who is at Ekaterinodar, I have transmitted the following message from him to Admiral Kolchak:

We recognize the supreme power exercised by you, being confident that you are in accord with the fundamental principles of the political and military program of the Volunteer Army. These principles are as follows:

Reconstitution of a single and indivisible Russia without defining in advance the ultimate form of its government, admitting, however, the principle of extensive autonomy for those parts of Russia which could be entitled thereto by reasons of ethnographical or historical character.

Continuance of the struggle against Bolshevik organizations until they are absolutely destroyed.

The military activities of the Siberian armies should be coordinated with the general plans of campaign of the chief command of the Volunteer Army as well as with the Allies with whom we are in direct contact and who entirely share our views concerning the above questions and are rendering us extensive assistance.

<sup>1</sup> S. D. Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-1916.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE UKRAINE AND THE CRIMEA

Establishment of a Ukrainian Government—Relations with the Soviet Government, the Central Powers, and the Allies—The Treaty of Brest Litovsk with the Central Powers, February 9, 1918

File No. 861.00/421

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract<sup>1</sup>]

PETROGRAD, July 16, 1917, 8' p. m.

[Received July 18, 9.05 a. m.]

1519. . . . Cause [of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers] attributed is that Minister of War, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet Party unable to agree. . . .

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/698

*The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ODESSA, November 14, 1917, 3 p. m.

[Received November 20, 9.30 p. m.]

In view of the situation in Petrograd the revolutionary committees of Odessa, representing conflicting national policies, have agreed to cooperate to maintain order locally with the result that normal life in the city continues undisturbed. Outlook uncertain.

RAY

---

File No. 861.00/712

*The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ODESSA, November 20, 1917, 2 p. m.

[Received November 24, 6.42 a. m.]

The arrangement between revolutionary committees broken by Ukrainian troops who proclaimed the annexation of Odessa to

---

<sup>1</sup> Printed in full in vol. I, p. 159.

Ukrainia November 15.<sup>1</sup> Movement unpopular among Jewish population but supported by the Black Sea Fleet and railroads. No serious disorders.

RAY

File No. 861.00/813

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, December 12, 1917.

[Received December 15, 10 a. m.]

2090. The following received yesterday addressed:

Ambassadors of England, France, America, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Portugal.

The citizens of Kiev, assembled on November 23 [December 6 ?], have decided to address to you, Mr. Ambassador, the following declaration:

We ask you to show the greatest possible indulgence to our country, our unfortunate native country, which, to our deep shame and disgrace, has swerved from the path of honor and duty. We take the liberty to make this request and we firmly believe in the future recovery of the Russian nation. This nation during the course of many centuries created a powerful state, guided by the will of its rulers. When there were no more such, the Russian people, unused to self-government, not having learned to independently decide its destiny, was deceived and deluded by German agents spread in large numbers over our country. These German agents have drawn the attention of the nation away from the menacing force advancing towards and from the west and they have transferred lawful hatred of the crafty and merciless conqueror to the cultured portion of the Russian nation, using for this end the doctrines of socialism falsely and perversely understood. This deception cannot long continue, it will be revealed. The Russian people will see and understand who are its true friends just as we understand it, we the better educated Russian citizens, whom German intrigue never has and never will turn aside from the right road. We ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to believe that a separate peace without the consent of [our] allies produces in us feelings of indignation and disgust, that we consider it to be black treason to our friends, and that we shall make every effort to redeem this shameful action if it take place against our will.

By order of the Assembly. Shulgin.

Guchkov and Shulgin were sent to the Emperor in March and induced His Excellency to abdicate.

Am sending Jenkins<sup>2</sup> to Kiev to-night with instructions to consult Summers, Moscow, concerning establishing consulate at Kiev,

<sup>1</sup> For the communication to foreign states of the Ukrainian Rada's declaration of temporary independence, voted Nov. 7/20, see despatch No. 244 of Jan. 1, 1918, from the Consul General at Moscow, vol. 1, p. 408.

<sup>2</sup> Douglas Jenkins, formerly Consul at Riga.



which Department approved and for which Embassy requested exequatur from the Provisional Government but latter deposed before replying. Cautioned Jenkins against recognizing any government; gave him discretion as to opening consulate.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/837a

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Odessa (Ray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1917, 6 p. m.

Please report immediately conditions your district as affecting army, food supplies, sentiment for separate peace. What information have you regarding progress of reported effort by Alexeev,<sup>1</sup> Kornilov,<sup>2</sup> and Kaledin<sup>3</sup> to reconstruct loyal portions of army.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/831

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, December 12, 1917, 11 p. m.

[Received December 16, 3 a. m.]

2094. Papers having announced France had recognized Ukrainian independence I sent Secretary to French Embassy who reports Ambassador said absolutely untrue.

French Ambassador sends following telegram [from] Shulgin (cousin of Shulgin in my No. 2090): "Secretary of State for International Affairs of Ukraine to Ambassadors of Great Britain, Belgium, United States, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia." Ukraine as Little Russia has population of 30,000,000 Ukrainians and 5,000,000 non-Ukrainians, or nearly 20 per cent of entire population. Telegram follows:

MR. AMBASSADOR: I request you to bring to the knowledge of your Government that in the absence in Russia of a central power recognized by all peoples of the Russian federation and Secretary of State of Ukraine had constituted self [*sic*] into a complete and independent government and that the central provisional Rada of Ukraine which has proclaimed in Ukraine a democratic

<sup>1</sup> Gen. M. V. Alexeev, from March to June 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army and in September 1917 Chief of Staff; at this time engaged with Kornilov and others in the formation of the Volunteer Army.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. L. G. Kornilov, in July 1917 commander of the southwestern front and from July to September 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. A. M. Kaledin, Ataman of the Don Cossacks.

republic which if [the] union of [the] various people of Russia is reformed will figure as an autonomous member of [the] federative republic. Remaining in close relation with Russia our republic considers itself always [the] ally of all the powers which were fighting with Russia against the Central Empires.

Owing to the attempt of Krylenko against the Stavka, the beginning of the armistice by General Shcherbachev, chief commander of the Russian troops on the Rumanian front, and owing to the situation on the southwest front where we have not yet had time to mass the troops of the national Ukrainian army which is being constituted, the central Rada has deemed it necessary to begin the armistice. The situation is so grave that the Secretary of State saw himself [obliged] first without having had the time to get in accord with the Allies to begin the armistice negotiation the thousands of its delegates to the southwest front in order to initiate them [*sic*].

At present we request you to bring to the knowledge of your Government the accompanying text of the instructions which the Secretary of State has given its delegates and of the resolution voted by the Secretary. We will receive with pleasure all the suggestions and all the advice which our allies will give us for the defense of the common interests.

Kindly accept [etc.]

*The Secretary of State of [Inter]National Affairs*

SHULGIN

Instructions [and] the resolutions not received.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/837

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, December 15, 1917, 5 p. m.

[Received December 18, 6.51 p. m.]

2104. Referring to my 2094, December 12, 11 p. m. Instructions and resolutions of the Secretariat of State of Ukraine received on 13th from French Embassy. Briefly summarized translations of French texts are as follows:

Instructions stating that Commissaries should be guided by decision of Rada and Secretariat with whom they should closely cooperate; that temporary armistice should be conducted with view to obtain general peace in all Europe; that conditions of armistice on Russian west front may serve as basis but obligatory corrections in paragraph 9 and 15 are indispensable; that question concerning possibility of grouping Ukrainian troops by exchange for non-Ukrainians be strongly presented; that representatives of each of the belligerents should be attached to general staffs at front to supervise accurate fulfilment of conditions of armistice; that demobilization is absolutely inadmissible, there being no right to raise this question; that hostages which have been taken in Galicia by former gov-

ernment be liberated affecting only those over fifty years of age or ecclesiastics in exchange for whom the liberation of certain classes of Russian subjects still detained is to be proposed, Galician hostages to be considered as inhabitants of a country very close to Ukrainians by sentiment and the destiny of which concerns Ukraine; that the exchange of prisoners of war is not at all desirable and that all commerce between Austrian and German soldiers and Russian soldiers be forbidden.

Minister of State states that recent events menace Ukrainian territory which can only be defended by absolute accord and coordination on the front and that therefore the Secretariat, in accord with Rumanian Government and that of autonomous Moldavia, unites the front, assuming its entire direction and informs headquarters thereof for coordination of Ukrainian front with that of Russian Republic. In order to establish necessary contact special commissaries will be sent to these two states, Ukrainian troops being advised by Secretariat that it adopts all measures necessary to concentrate them on the Ukrainian front without prejudice to other gatherings. All non-Ukrainian troops stationed on Ukrainian front shall be informed that defense of that front also preserves unity of Russian front and thus insures a peace advantageous to all the Russian people. In declaring the armistice on the Ukrainian front it is deemed indispensable to strive together with the Allied powers for immediate peace.

FRANCIS

---

[For information concerning events in the Ukraine reported by the Consul General at Moscow in his despatch No. 212, December 15, 1917, see Volume I, page 304.]

---

File No. 861.00/852

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract <sup>1</sup>]

PETROGRAD, December 17, 1917, 9 p. m.

[Received December 22, 1.35 p. m.]

2117. Trotsky visited French Ambassador yesterday and was received but can not learn whether by previous appointment. Interview as reported in Soviet organ was concerning presence of French officers with Ukrainian army which Trotsky construed as "openly supporting countenanced [counter-] revolutionary machinations of Kaledin" and disorganizing [Russia]. Ambassador replied all

---

<sup>1</sup> Printed in full in vol. I, p. 317.

French officers on mission in Russia have received instructions not to intervene in internal political struggles and that presence of officers mentioned was long since accredited to generals commanding the southwest and Rumanian front, and "is explained by the invitation frequently expressed by various Russian governments to supervise the formation of the national Ukrainian army" and in case of armed conflict between Rada and Soviet would take no part therein. . . .

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/853

*The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ODESSA, December 18, 1917, noon.

[Received December 22, 8.30 a. m.]

In reply to your December 12, 6 p. m., according to published statement food comptroller of south Russia, who has resigned, available supplies barely sufficient for one month, cannot be replenished owing to agrarian disorders and the arrogant rural food committees hoarding grain and cattle for local consumption. Fearing starvation numbers of soldiers are deserting front in order to return to villages. The idea of separate peace unpopular but the general conviction is that prolongation of the war is impossible for Russia. The hope is cherished that the United States will oblige the Allies to join in general peace negotiations or somehow extricate Russia from present predicament. Rumors indicate the failure of the three generals you mentioned to accomplish anything important; no definite information. Local situation serious; fighting ended by an agreement whereby the power in Odessa is shared equally by Maximalists and Little Russians, but sailors threaten to bombard city in case the latter break the agreement. Banks are closed, drunken soldiers shooting in the streets, and the future dependent upon the policy of the Ukrainian government at Kiev which appears to be trying to conciliate the extreme left of the socialists.

RAY

File No. 861.00/838

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 19, 1917.

[Received December 20, 10.36 a. m.]

1200. According Swedish press Agency Havas reports situation southern Russia unfavorable [to] Soviet government. Cos-

sack government causes anxiety to Commissary Council. Fact Maximalists not reported battles proves [unfavorable?] position their troops. [Ukrainian forces disarming] Red Guards and opposing uniting Soldiers-Workmen's Councils of district. Official communication established between government Kiev, Don, Terek, and Kuban Cossacks. Because position taken by Rada, Lenin, Trotsky threaten dissolve it and declare war. Lenin telegraphed Rada prohibiting stopping passage troops to Kuban and Don, assisting Kaledin, disarming Maximalist Red Guard troops, and removing Ukrainian troops from front. Unless satisfactory reply within forty-eight hours state war will exist with Soviet government. Petrograd telegraph bureau reports fighting around Odessa continues, under pressure representatives. Warship *Sinope* and two cruisers on side Bolsheviks. Meeting all organizations held, resolution passed all power put in hands Soldiers-Workmen's Councils and executive organ of Rada. Strike in Kiev, Bolshevik troops sent against city.

Russian Ambassador, Tokyo, Krupenski, and London, Nabokov, ordered before revolutionary court because spread reports unfavorable Commissary government. If fail appear, property confiscated. Trotsky appeared at Peasant Congress, applauded by Maximalists and Social Revolutionists, but right protested, so impossible him speak. Stated to his supporters Germans protested against Russian demand regarding transfer troops, but finally Kühlmann and Czernin [agreed] to participate. Russian delegates to take up following questions: position toward Russian idea of peace without annexation, as to Poles in Ukraina and Ukrainians in Austria, etc. When reply received delegates will come Petrograd discuss peace. Stated Allies had two months join peace movement but we have not promised not conclude separate peace; we cannot continue war ten years interest French stock exchange, English imperialists. Commissary Council issued following armistice signed Brest Litovsk. Operations east front cease for twenty-eight days. Have published secret treaties and will continue doing so, proclaiming Soviet government [not] bound by them; have declared all people right decide own fate. Only workmen's revolutionary struggle against present governments Europe can bring democratic peace nearer. Russia has two aims making peace: (1) put end bloodshed soon as possible; (2) help workmen all countries break power capitalists and gain political control to conclude democratic peace and socially reconstruct Europe and all humanity.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/927

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1918.

[Received January 9.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: In informing me that it is maintaining with the secretary of the Rada of the Ukraine *de facto* relations further accentuated by the recent appointment of General Tabouis as commissioner of the French Republic to that country, my Government adds that the turn of events in Russia and the reports it has received about Austro-German activities at Kiev led it to the conclusion that it could not defer any longer taking a more clearly defined attitude toward the Ukraine.

General Tabouis is therefore to be instructed to notify the Ukrainian government that the French Government is glad actually to recognize it as an independent government.

I am directed and hereby have the honor to communicate the foregoing to your excellency and to inquire whether the United States Government would be inclined to take a similar step with the Ukrainian government.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 861.00/927

*The Acting Secretary of State (Polk) to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2041

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 7, 1918, in which you inform me that your excellency's Government has designated General Tabouis as commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukraine and instructed him to notify the Ukrainian government that the French Government is pleased to recognize it in fact as an independent government. Furthermore you inquire whether the United States Government would be inclined to take a similar step with the Ukrainian government.

In reply I have the honor to inform your excellency that this Government is giving careful consideration to the whole situation, but as yet has reached no determination as to acknowledging separate governments in Russia.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 861.00/952

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, January 13, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received January 15, 8.53 a. m.]

2227. Letter from Jenkins<sup>1</sup> of 8th, received 12th by our official courier, reports France appointed General Tabouis commissioner to Ukrainian government and with other consuls Jenkins received formal notice thereof from the commissioner. Press generally considers such action recognition of Ukrainian republic; French Ambassador here concurs but said action was from Paris direct not through Petrograd.

British Embassy told me, 10th, had only consular agent at Kiev; Jenkins reports British Consul General, Odessa, transferred to Kiev.

Reports relation between the Rumanian and Russian troops bad at the front and Kerth<sup>2</sup> who returned from Stavka to-day says heard confidentially that Krylenko had ordered Russian troops to leave Rumanian front January 10, supposedly Russian calculation.

Jenkins not called officially on the Minister of Foreign Affairs fearing might embarrass me here; gave him discretionary [power] when sending him there.

Jenkins interviewed French Chief of Staff who said immediate aim of the French was to offset Austrian influence in Ukraine and from Kiev to gradually work into the interior; there seems, though, be little expected of the Ukrainian army for six months if at all as discipline destroyed; that Minister of War friendly to Allies had resigned and succeeded by lawyer who former Minister of Labor but whose plans unknown; that Minister of Railways, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and Assistant Minister of Agriculture also resigned but successors not named.

Jenkins reports that land question which threatened division in Ukraine been referred to special commissioners of various political parties and thus temporarily quieted; that money scarce, unobtainable, and Rada provided for issuance of Ukrainian money now being printed in same denominations as Russian but printed in Ukrainian, Russian, and possibly Yiddish (basis of issue unmentioned); that government issued an order requiring every business concern to deposit 75 per cent of cash received in government bank which was formerly Kiev branch of Russian State Bank; that private banks not nationalized as are here and will not be.

<sup>1</sup> For the status of the Consul at Kiev, see *ante*, p. 649.

<sup>2</sup> Lieut. Col. Monroe C. Kerth, representative of the U. S. Army at the Stavka, or Russian Army headquarters.

Jenkins reports Poles very active; leaders held a meeting to arrange for help from the Allies; Jenkins invited, wisely declined attending, but expressed a desire for information about action taken.

Jenkin's letter excellent but gives no detailed answer to your 1931, December 24,<sup>1</sup> which telegraphed him in cipher but Summers ordered him to leave code Moscow where thought be needed more than Kiev. Have telegraphed Summers send Jenkins cipher immediately.

Morning papers reported one-hour session Brest yesterday resulting in Ukrainian delegation's being admitted as representing separate government with Trotsky and Kühlmann concurring.

FRANCIS

---

[For a detailed report on the political, military, financial, and economic conditions in the Ukraine, see despatch from the Consul General at Moscow, dated January 14, 1918, Volume I, page 338.]

---

File No. 860d.00/-

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram—Extract <sup>2</sup>]

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1918, 3 p. m.*

1992. . . . French Embassy advises that General Tabouis, the French commissioner at Kiev, is being instructed to recognize Ukraine as in fact an independent government. This Government not disposed as yet to recognize any independent governments until the will of Russian people has been more definitely expressed on this general subject. The public utterances of the President have defined clearly the sympathy of the United States for democracy and self-government.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1239

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

No. 248

Moscow, *January 16, 1918.*

[*Received March 2.*]

SIR: I have the honor to forward to the Department of State the salient points of a number of reports that Consul Douglas Jenkins has made to this office from Kiev in regard to the situation in the Ukraine. A brief *résumé* of the more important statements will be attempted here.

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 324.

<sup>2</sup> Printed in full, *post*, p. 743.



The Ukrainian government, whose beginnings date back to the March revolution, has steadily gained strength. There is now a completely organized ministry. A small army has been formed by drawing soldiers of Ukrainian nationality from the Russian forces.

Kiev is an active political center. French, British, Belgian, and other Allied officers are there observing the situation.

It is reported that the Rada, or parliament, has been informed that Austria-Hungary has placed 3,000,000 rubles to its credit. The newspapers betray evidence of successful Austrian propaganda. There are pro-Austrian and pro-Entente groups in the government.

The Ukrainian army is said to number 50,000 to 75,000 and to be growing rapidly. The Minister of War has estimated that there will be 100,000 men organized on Ukrainian territory by January 1, this report having been dated December 22. Ukrainian soldiers under arms at the several fronts and in garrison at the beginning of the revolution could not have numbered less than 1,000,000 to 1,500,000. Unless there should be a change of heart on the part of Russian soldiers generally, Ukrainian troops can hardly be relied upon to continue the war, though French and British officers hope to have a sufficiently organized and numerous army within a few months to take the field against the Central powers in a purely defensive campaign. The French plan seems to be to combine this army, the Rumanian forces, 200,000 Polish troops, and 50,000 Bohemian troops. The calculation is not convincing. But morale and discipline may return in time.

The Kiev government is frankly socialistic. The Councils are still in existence but appear to be in accord with the Rada. Salutes are not exchanged between officers and men, and seldom between officers, though ill-feeling between men and officers is not reported.

On the other hand the Ukrainian Foot Guards, in process of organization, salute officers respectfully and carry themselves like soldiers.

In general Kiev shows more animation and a greater sense of security than Petrograd and Moscow, perhaps because the food situation is easier.

Dissension, jealousy, and distrust in the Ministry are undeniably in evidence.

There is trouble on account of shortage of currency, and Ukrainian paper money will be issued.

The opinion is expressed that the Ukrainians may be expected to furnish a point of rallying the forces of reorganization of Russia on a federal basis, while offering relative resistance to German and Austrian influence and trade. Like all Russians the Ukrainians are ready to welcome foreign interference, and noninterference on

the part of the Entente powers would simply leave them at the mercy of the Central powers.

Reports brought from the northern and western fronts are that an average reduction of units at these fronts approaches 90 per cent, and that Germans were penetrating Russia for purposes of trade, offering hardware, notions, and a variety of other articles for fats and foodstuffs.

In a conversation had with Consul Jenkins Mr. Shulgin, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that the Entente powers might reasonably expend money to counteract Austrian propaganda, but he did not favor the offer of financial assistance to his government. He urged caution in selecting agents of propaganda and disbursement, mentioning the president of the Rada as among those working for union with Austria. Kiev is full of Austrian secret agents, and the Entente should have its also.

The Ukrainian government's peace declaration of December 8/21<sup>1</sup> and that of December 12/25,<sup>2</sup> are given in translation. These declarations are thought to have exerted a marked influence on the peace negotiations.

The Secretary and Assistant Secretary for Agriculture have resigned, owing to difficulties in carrying out the proposed general land reform. Agrarian disorders are universal in the Ukraine, 250 complaints having been made in a single day by telegraph. As elsewhere in Russia the peasants are seizing private estates without waiting for the government to act. There is no prospect of agreement as to what is a proper limit of individual holdings, the wealthier peasants insisting on 40 dessiatines, or a bit over 100 acres. The land question is crucial.

Minister of War Petlyura has resigned, without giving reasons. He was regarded as pro-Entente. There is a feeling that a crisis is approaching, owing to Bolshevik aggression and to social unrest in the Ukraine. Railway communications are reported much interrupted.

General Tabouis, chief of the French military mission at Kiev, has been appointed commissioner to the Ukrainian government; he has been received formally by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs; he has notified the Consular Corps of his appointment, and the newspapers declare that this is recognition of the Ukrainian government by the French, but the French officers do not so understand it. General Tabouis's Chief of Staff expressed himself unfavorably about the new Minister of War, Mr. Porsh, and expressed the opinion that nothing in a military way could be expected from the Ukrainian army for six months or a year, if ever.

---

<sup>1</sup> For the note which formed the major part of the declaration, see vol. I, p. 415.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

A commission to frame a land bill has been chosen. Conditions in the Ukrainian army are not much better than among Bolshevik troops. Of Ukrainian troops stationed in Kiev two thirds are said to have gone home for the holidays. Bolshevism seems to be growing in the Ukraine and in the ranks of Ukrainian troops.

Ukrainian currency has begun to appear in the same denominations as Russian, with text in Ukrainian, Russian, and Yiddish, it is said. "I have not seen these notes yet," reported Mr. Jenkins on January 9.

In addition to the above-mentioned reports, there is forwarded herewith to the Department copy of a part of a letter from Mr. E. T. Heald, Y.M.C.A. secretary at Kiev, under date of December 5:<sup>1</sup> Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Czechs, and all others at Kiev seem to be agreed that order can be restored only by the Entente or the Central powers. The Ukrainian government impressed this observer as weak, compromised by its relations with the Bolsheviks and the Austrians, lacking dependable military force, and being a very artificial growth, without much popular support. But there is universal agreement that conditions changed radically after this letter was written.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/988

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 22, 1918, noon.

[Received 8 p. m.]

3074. Following joint telegram dated Jassy, January 18, received from the Ministers of the United States, Italy, England, and France:

Yesterday morning we received a visit from the delegates of the Ukraine, Messrs. Galip, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Galicinski, the Director of Finance. From the rather vague statement made to us by Mr. Galicinski, we gathered following:

- (1) That on account of the state of public opinion the Ukraine does not consider itself bound to recognize the treaties concluded under the régime of the Tsar;
- (2) That having no army she is unable to continue the war and that as regards the Brest Litovsk conference, the desire for peace is so widespread among the Ukrainian population that the government of the Rada would be unable to withstand this current, especially if the Bolsheviks manage to conclude peace with the Austro-Germans;

<sup>1</sup> Not found with the despatch.

- (3) That the Ukrainian government is apparently engaged in recruiting troops of which the greater number will be by voluntary enlistment for maintaining order in the interior as well as for fighting against the Bolsheviks and incidentally for guaranteeing the independence of the country against foreigners;
- (4) That the Ukraine has no intention of allowing any interference in its internal affairs on the part of other states of Russia, as for her part she undertakes to respect scrupulously the independence of these states (nevertheless Mr. Galip added that his country does not exclude the possibility of a federal union between her and the other parts of Russia and that he had even tried to get into communication with the union of south Russia and with Bessarabia, but we ourselves have gathered the impression that the federalist tendency had rather weakened in Ukraine lately);
- (5) That as a result of her internal condition and of her relations with the other states of Russia as well as with foreign powers, the economic and financial situation of the Ukraine is particularly serious.

As a result of what preceded Mr. Galip has formulated the following demands:

- (1) Recognition of the independence of Ukraine by the great powers of the Entente and nomination of the Allied diplomatic representatives at Kiev;
- (2) Financial support to the Ukrainian government;
- (3) Facilities on the part of the Entente for supplying the Ukraine with manufacturing products.

In the course of conversation Mr. Galip admitted that the military situation would change completely if there were Allied forces in Russia, if the Allied powers were masters of the communications with Vladivostok, and if agreements could be concluded with Turkey and Bulgaria, whose representatives at Brest Litovsk had apparently made advances to the Ukrainian delegates and shown a certain resentment against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

We informed the delegates that we would reserve our reply pending a discussion. Consequently this morning we called upon them and stated:

- (1) That in the first place, the Allied powers must ask the Ukraine, even if it could not carry on the war financially, to give at least an undertaking that it would conclude no separate peace (we called the attention of the delegates to the fact that this engagement was already implicitly contained in the note that its government addressed, when assuming power, to the Allied Ambassadors at Petrograd and in which it was stated that the Ukraine did not intend making a separate peace but only participating in a general peace in full agreement with the Allied powers);

- (2) That the Ukrainian government should at the same time undertake to enter into no degrading relations with our enemies;
- (3) That the Ukrainian authorities should organize with the assistance of the Allied military mission an armed force that would be sufficient to assure not only order in the interior but also to render the country independent of an attack from outside;
- (4) That the Ukrainian government should enter into relations with the other Russian autonomous states as well as with Rumania so as to present a solid front to the Central Empires who are the natural adversaries of the principles of nationalities as has again been confirmed by the Brest Litovsk negotiations;
- (5) That the Ukrainian government should undertake to facilitate the revictualing of Rumania and to take to this end the means for assuring the regular service of the railways in conjunction with the measures that the Bessarabian government is now adopting for this purpose with the assistance of the Rumanian Government.

At the same time we considered it our duty not to let pass unprotected Mr. Galip's statement regarding treaties concluded under the Tsar's régime. We remarked in this respect that the powers entered into the war not for a cause which interested the Tsar and his government but at the request of Russia for the cause of a small Slavonic people which the Central Empires wished to crush; that the war provoked by the Germanic powers had therefore been carried on by the Allied powers to defend the principles of nationalities in accordance with sentiments manifested at all times by the Russian people. Consequently the Allied powers had treated through the mediation of the Imperial Government with entire Russia and the fundamental principles of the treaties of alliance ought to be accepted and recognized by all the states of Russia and especially the Ukraine.

We finally decided that the attitude of the great Allied powers towards the Ukraine from the point of view of recognizing her independence, her financial help, and military collaboration was dependent on the reply which we received on the above five points. The French Minister added that he was already authorized to acknowledge the independence of Ukraine and that he was ready to do so immediately on receipt of a satisfactory answer from the delegates. Mr. Galip having informed us that he had not the necessary powers to understand [undertake] the engagements we asked of him but that he would refer by telegram to the Rada, we decided to have another interview with the Ukrainian delegates as soon as the reply reached them.

The language of the Ukrainian delegates agrees with the information received from the Allied agents at Kiev showing that the Entente can at present expect no effective help from the Ukraine. All that we can ask of her is to gain time to allow the Allied powers to act for the improvement of the general situation on this front. We again expressed the opinion that the only means of attaining

this and consequently of deciding the attitude of the Ukraine in a manner conformable with the interests of our cause is to send to Russia international [force] under the conditions we have indicated. It is well to note that this impression is shared by the Rumanian Government which has also had interviews with the delegates of the Ukrainian government.

SHARP

---

File No. 763.72119/1174

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

JASSY, January 24, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received January 26, 2.04 a. m.]

18. General Shcherbachev, chief of the Ukrainian army, informed the Allied ministers confidentially this morning that Ukrainia will sign separate peace with the Central powers within ten days on very favorable terms. The Allied ministers will endeavor to have signing of such a peace postponed on the ground that if Bolsheviks conclude peace for north Russia such a peace would be useless to the Ukrainians and would not be considered a friendly act towards the Allied powers.

Your 128, January 21, 12 noon.<sup>2</sup> Missing telegrams repeated immediately. Your telegrams 107 to 110 inclusive, 114 to 117 inclusive, 119 to 127 inclusive, missing.

VOPICKA

---

File No. 763.72/8653

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, January 26, 1918.

[Received January 27, 3 a. m.]

3100. Joint telegram from the Ministers of United States, England, France, and Italy, dated Jassy, January 23:

The head of the Ukrainian delegation has communicated to us the following information: The Ukrainian delegates at Brest Litovsk have received full powers to negotiate peace with the Central Empires. The latter are insisting especially on the resumption of economic relations. They ask to exchange their manufactured products against provisions from the Ukraine. The government of Kiev not disposing of an army, and being obliged to employ its feeble police forces against the Maximalists, cannot resist the pres-

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 3094).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

sure of the Germanic powers. According to Mr. Galip the Ukraine, even after conclusion of peace, will endeavor to safeguard its future, to maintain good relations with the Allied powers, to organize itself with their help and to limit to the inevitable minimum the amount of provisions sent to our enemies. Mr. Galip also states that the Ukraine will assist in the revictualing of Rumania and the evacuation of national Czech, Serbian, and Transylvanian armies. It is doubtful in the present state of anarchy and in presence of the German occupation, whether the Ukraine will have the means of conforming to the intentions if they are sincere. . . .

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8684

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 28, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received January 29, 5.45 a. m.]

3106. Following joint telegram dated Jassy, January 27, from Ministers of United States, France, Great Britain and Italy:

At the request of the Russian Minister we have conferred with General Shcherbachev<sup>1</sup> who himself had called a meeting with the Rumanian Chief of Staff. He declared to us that the Ukrainian delegation had [informed] him that according to a recent telegram from Kiev, the Ukraine had concluded peace to take effect within eight to ten days. He asked us to intervene to force the Ukraine to gain time; we replied that the Allied representatives at Kiev are neglecting no [effort] but that according to their information the state of opinion renders the pacifist current more and more irresistible. We added that whatever may be the attitude of the Ukraine we count on the fidelity of its [his?] cooperation. He assured us that in no case would he take part in a peace with the enemies of the Entente. To prevent the Russian troops placed under his command and a large proportion forming part of the Ukrainian front being automatically included in the peace which Ukraine may make, it was decided that, seizing the opportunity of the troubles at Galatz, General Shcherbachev should issue an order to his army reminding it of his rank of commander in chief of all soldiers on the Rumanian front without distinction of origin. General Shcherbachev and, above all, General Prezan called our attention to the untenable position of the language of the Rumanian Chief of Staff; was all the more striking that till now his optimism has remained unchangeable. Imminence [of peace] has aggravated the pacifist movement which has spread to official circles, public opinion, and even the army. Furthermore, the fact that even the anticipated sending of Czech divisions no longer appears possible, gives the impression of total and definite isolation. We shall spare no effort to counteract this current but on the one hand Russian events and on the other the

<sup>1</sup> Commander of the Russian Army on the Rumanian front.

impossibility of all direct help from the Allied powers renders the situation here inextricable and without precedent. In fact it cannot be compared to that of Belgium and Serbia who are in immediate contact with the Allied powers.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/2049

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 27, 1918.

[Received May 17, 10.21 a. m.]

432. Following is text treaty between Ukraine and Central powers. Text commercial and supplementary treaties promised few days.

# TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UKRAINE AND THE CENTRAL POWERS<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

Inasmuch as during the present war the Ukrainian people have declared their independence and expressed a desire to establish a state of peace between the Ukraine and the powers at war with Russia, therefore the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey proclaim the conclusion of a peace treaty with the People's Republic of the Ukraine. They desire to take the first steps toward the establishment of a permanent universal peace, not only to end the horrors of war but also to reestablish friendly relations between the nations respecting political, judicial, economic and spiritual questions.

For this purpose the governments authorize the undersigned (for Germany, Von Kühlmann; for Austria-Hungary, Czernin von und zu Chudnitz; for Bulgaria, Radoslavoff, Toscheff, Stoyanovitch, military attaché, Colonel Gantchew, Anastassoff; for Turkey, Talaat Pasha, Ahmed Nessimi Bey, Ibrahim Hakky Pasha, General Ahmed Izzet Pasha; for the Ukraine, Alexander Sewrjuk, Mykola Ljubynskyj and Mikola Lewytskyj) to enter into peace negotiations at Brest Litovsk, where they have met and agreed upon the following stipulations as acceptable to both parties:

## ARTICLE 1

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the one hand, and the People's Republic of the Ukraine on the other, declare the state of war between them ended. The powers concluding the treaty bind themselves to live in peace and concord in the future.

<sup>1</sup>The translation has been left essentially in the form in which it was received. A few brief omitted passages have been supplied and occasional verbal corrections made after comparison with the German text as published in the *Deutscher Reichsanzeiger*, Feb. 11, 1918, and the translation thereof, which were printed for the Department of State in the booklet, *Texts of the Ukraine "Peace"* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), prepared by the Inquiry, a body of scholars assembled by Colonel House to assist the Department in the study of problems of the coming peace settlement.



## ARTICLE 2

1. The frontier between Austria-Hungary and the People's Republic of the Ukraine, in so far as these countries border on each other, shall remain as it was before the war between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia.

2. The northern frontier of the Ukrainian People's Republic shall extend in a general way from Tarnogród along the line Biłgoraj, Krasnystaw, Puchaczów, Sarnaki, Mielnik, Wysokie Litewskie, Kamieniec Litewski, Pruzana, and Wygonowskie Lake. In detail, the frontier shall be in accordance with ethnographic conditions and the will of the inhabitants after determination by a mixed commission.

3. In case the People's Republic of the Ukraine has to decide frontier questions with other powers of the Quadruple Alliance, this shall be done in a special manner.

## ARTICLE 3

Immediately upon the ratification of the present peace treaty the clearing of evacuated districts must take place. The method of clearing these districts shall be decided by the delegates of the interested countries.

## ARTICLE 4

Diplomatic and consular relations between parties concluding the peace treaty shall be resumed immediately upon the ratification of the present peace treaty.

## ARTICLE 5

The parties concluding the peace treaty mutually bind themselves to renounce repayment of military outlays, both governmental expenditures for carrying on the war and losses from military operations, including requisitions.

## ARTICLE 6

The prisoners of war of both parties shall be allowed to return home if they do not desire to remain in their districts or emigrate to other countries.

## SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/2047

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 7, 1918.

[Received June 17, 4.25 p. m.]

607. Continuing No. 432, April 27, Article 7 of treaty between Central powers and Ukraine follows:

## ARTICLE 7

The following is agreed upon concerning the economic relations between the contracting parties:

## CHAPTER I

The contracting parties engage themselves mutually to restore immediately all economic relations and to organize the exchange of merchandise on the basis of the following regulations:

Until the 31st of July of the present year all exchanges of surpluses of the most important agricultural and industrial products, in order to fill current needs, will be executed according to the following regulations:

(a) The quantity and variety of products, the exchange of which has been mentioned in the preceding paragraph, will be fixed for each party by a committee composed of an equal number of members of both parties and convened immediately after the signing of the peace treaty.

(b) The prices of the products in the above-mentioned exchange of merchandise will be fixed on a basis of mutual agreement by a committee composed of an equal number of members from both parties.

(c) The computation shall be made in gold upon the following basis: 1,000 German imperial marks gold equal 462 karbowanjec gold of the Ukrainian People's Republic or 462 rubles gold of the former Russian Imperial Government (counting the ruble as one fifteenth of an imperial) or 1,000 Austro-Hungarian gold kronen equal 393 karbowanjec 78 grosch gold of the Ukrainian People's Republic or 393 rubles 78 kopeks gold of the former Russian Imperial Government (counting the ruble as one fifteenth of an imperial).

(d) The exchange of merchandise by the committee provided for in paragraph a shall be effected through governmental centers or through centers under government control.

The exchange of products not provided for by the above-mentioned committees shall be effected in free intercourse on the basis of the provisional commercial treaty which is provided for in the following Chapter II.

#### CHAPTER II

In so far as the contrary has not been provided for in Chapter I, all economic relations between the contracting parties, provisionally until the conclusion of definite commercial treaty and in any case until at least six months after the conclusion of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on one side, and on the other side European states which at the time are in a state of war with them, the United States of America, and Japan, will be based on the following regulations:

(a) With regard to the economic relations between the German Empire and the Ukrainian People's Republic those agreements that are stipulated in the following regulations of the German-Russian commercial and maritime treaty of 1894-1904, namely:

Articles 1 to 6, Article 7 (including tariffs A and B), 8 to 10, 12, 13 to 19; further regulations of the final protocol, first part, additional<sup>1</sup> to Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 3; additional to Articles 1 and 12, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9; additional to Article 3; additional to Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2; additional to Articles 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10; additional to Articles 6, 7 and 11; additional to Articles 6 to 9; additional to Articles 6 and 7; additional to Article 12, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 5; further in the final protocol, fourth part, paragraphs 3, 6, 7, 12, 12b, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 (with the retention of the corrections which have been made), 19, 20, 21 and 23.

Further, the following points are agreed upon:

1. The general Russian customs tariff of January the 13th/26th, 1903, will be maintained.

2. Article 5 shall read as follows:

"The contracting parties bind themselves not to impede mutual intercourse by any import, export, or transit restriction and to grant unhindered transit.

<sup>1</sup> The word "additional," as used by the Consulate's translator here and in (b), has no equivalent in the German text, which reads simply, "Zu Artikel 1," etc. This German phrase reproduces the actual form of the headings of the sections of the final protocols referred to.

"Exceptions are granted only for such products which, on the territory of one of the contracting parties, are or will be subject to governmental monopoly, as well as for certain products which could be subject to extraordinary restrictive measures on account of health, veterinary policy, and public security or for other weighty political and economic reasons, especially in connection with the transitory conditions after the war."

3. Neither party shall claim any privileges which are or will be granted by the other party to any other state on the basis of an existing or future customs union, as exists, for instance, between the German Empire and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, or in limited frontier trade within a frontier zone of 15 kilometers in width.

4. Article 10 shall read as follows:

"Goods of every kind which are transported through the territory of one of the parties, shall be mutually exempt from every transit duty whether they are transported directly or whether they have been unloaded, stored, and reloaded during their period of transit."

5. Instead of Article 12 (a) the following provisions shall be effective:

"(a) The provisions of the treaty concluded between the German Empire and Russia on February 28, 1913, are effective with regard to the mutual protection of copyrights of works of art, literature, and photography.

"(b) With regard to the mutual protection of the trade names of products, the regulations of the declaration of July 11/23, 1873, shall be effective in the future."

6. The provision of the final protocol referring to Article 19 has the following construction:

"The contracting parties will as far as possible support each other in regard to railway rates, especially by creating through rates. For this purpose both contracting parties are ready to enter into mutual negotiations as soon as possible."

7. Paragraph 5 of the fourth part of the final protocol shall read as follows:

"It has been mutually agreed that the customhouses of both countries will be open every day of the year, Sundays and legal holidays excepted."

(b) With regard to the economic relations between Austria-Hungary and the Ukrainian People's Republic, the agreements set forth in the following regulations of the Austro-Hungarian-Russian commercial and maritime treaty of February 15, 1906, namely: Articles 1 and 2, 5 (including tariffs A and B); Articles 6, 7, 9 to 13; Article 14, paragraphs 2 and 3; Articles 15 to 24; further in the regulations of the final protocol, additional to Articles 1 and 12, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6; additional to Article 2; to Articles 2, 3 and 5; additional to Articles 2 and 5; to Articles 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8; additional to Articles 2, 5, 6 and 7; additional to Article 17; also additional to Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 3.

Further, the following points have been agreed upon:

1. The general Russian customs tariff of January 13/26, 1903, shall be maintained.

2. Article 4 shall read as follows:

"The contracting parties bind themselves not to impede the mutual intercourse between their territories by any import, export, or transit restrictions. Exceptions thereto can be admitted only:

"(a) For tobacco, salt, gunpowder and other explosive materials, as well as for other articles which at the time, on the territory of one of the contracting parties, shall be subject to governmental monopoly;

"(b) Because of war needs under extraordinary circumstances;

"(c) In consideration of public security, health and veterinary policy;

"(d) For certain products, which for other weighty political and economic reasons, might be subject to extraordinary restrictive measures, especially in connection with the transitory conditions after the war."

3. Neither party shall claim any privileges which are granted or shall be granted by the other party to any state on the basis of an existing or future customs union, as exists, for instance, between Austria-Hungary and the Principality of Liechtenstein, or in limited frontier trade within a frontier zone of 15 kilometers width.

4. Article 8 has the following construction:

"Goods of every kind which are transported through the territory of one of the parties, shall be mutually exempt from every transit tax, whether they have been transported directly or whether they have been unloaded, stored and reloaded during their period of transit."

5. The regulation of the final protocol to Article 21 has the following construction:

"The contracting parties shall, as far as possible, support each other in regard to railway rates, especially by creating through rates. For this purpose both contracting parties are ready to enter into mutual negotiations as soon as possible."

(c) With regard to the economic relations between Bulgaria and the Ukrainian People's Republic, they shall be regulated until the conclusion of a definite commercial treaty, according to the rights of the most-favored nation.

Neither party shall claim any privileges which are granted or shall be granted by the other party to any state on the basis of an existing or future customs union, or in limited frontier trade within a frontier zone of 15 kilometers in width.

(d) With regard to the economic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Ukrainian People's Republic, both parties will grant each other, until the conclusion of a definite commercial treaty, the treatment applied to the most-favored nation.

Neither party shall claim any privileges which are granted or shall be granted by the other party to any state on the basis of an existing or future customs union, or in limited frontier trade.

#### CHAPTER III

The term of validity of the provisional regulations provided for in Chapter II of the present treaty concerning the economic relations between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other, can be extended by the mutual agreement of both parties.

If the periods specified in Chapter II, paragraph 1, do not expire before June 30, 1919, each of the two contracting parties shall be free to revoke the regulations of the above-mentioned chapter within six months after June 30, 1919.<sup>1</sup>

#### CHAPTER IV

(a) The Ukrainian People's Republic shall not claim any privileges granted by Germany to Austria-Hungary or to another country connected with Germany by a customs union, which borders directly upon Germany or through another country connected by customs union with Germany or Austria-Hungary, or any privileges granted by Germany to her own colonies, foreign possessions and protectorates, or to those belonging to countries in customs union with her.

<sup>1</sup> See notice, *post*, p. 671.

Germany shall not claim any privileges granted by the Ukrainian People's Republic to another country connected with the Ukraine by a customs union, which borders upon her directly or through another country in customs union with her, or privileges which she grants to the colonies, foreign possessions and protectorates of a country in customs union with her.

(b) In the economic relations between the territory covered by the customs convention of both states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other, the Ukrainian People's Republic shall not claim any privileges granted by Austria-Hungary to Germany or to another country connected with her by a customs union, which borders upon Austria-Hungary directly or through another country in customs union with her or Germany. Colonies, foreign possessions and protectorates are equal to the mother country in this respect.

Austria-Hungary shall claim no privileges granted by the Ukrainian People's Republic to another country connected with her by a customs union, which borders upon the Ukrainian Republic directly or through another country in customs union with her, or privileges granted by her to the colonies, foreign possessions or protectorates of one of the countries in customs union with her.

#### CHAPTER V

(a) In so far as German and Ukrainian goods, originating in Germany or Ukraina, stored in neutral states, are obligated not to be exported either directly or indirectly to the territory of the other contracting party, such limitations with regard to the contracting parties shall be revoked.

Both contracting parties therefore bind themselves to bring immediately to the knowledge of the governments of the neutral states the above-mentioned revocation of these limitations.

(b) In so far as Austro-Hungarian and Ukrainian goods, originating in Austria-Hungary or Ukraina, stored in neutral states, are obligated not to be exported either directly or indirectly to the territory of the other contracting parties, such restrictions with regard to the contracting parties shall be revoked.

Both contracting parties therefore bind themselves to bring immediately to the knowledge of the governments of the neutral states the above-mentioned revocation of these limitations.

#### ARTICLE 8

The reestablishment of public and private legal relations, the exchange of war prisoners and interned civilians, the question of amnesty as well as the question of the treatment of commercial vessels which have fallen into the hands of the opponent, shall be regulated by separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic which shall form an essential integral part of the present peace treaty and shall, as far as possible, become effective simultaneously with that treaty.

#### ARTICLE 9

The agreements reached in this peace treaty shall be considered as an indivisible whole.

#### ARTICLE 10

The interpretation of the present treaty shall be based, for relations between Germany and the Ukraine, on the German and the Ukrainian text; for the relations between Austria-Hungary and the Ukraine, on the German, the Hungarian

and the Ukrainian text; for the relations between Bulgaria and the Ukraine, on the Bulgarian and the Ukrainian text; and for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine, on the Turkish and the Ukrainian text.

## FINAL REGULATION

The present peace treaty shall be ratified. The ratification documents shall be exchanged in Vienna as soon as possible.

The peace treaty becomes effective with its ratification, in so far as is not otherwise specified in the treaty itself.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals.

Executed in five originals at Brest Litovsk on the 9th of February, 1918.

KÜHLMANN

TALAAT

HOFFMANN

HAKKY

CZERNIN

NESSIMI

RADOSLAVOFF

IZZET

TOSCHEFF

SEWBJUK

STOYANOVITCH

LJUBYNSKYJ

GANTCHEW

LEWYTSKYJ

ANASTASSOFF

## NOTICE

## REGARDING ARTICLE 7 OF THE PEACE TREATY OF FEBRUARY 9, 1918

It has been agreed that the right of refusal mentioned in paragraph 2 in Chapter III of the above-mentioned article, relative to separate agreements (in Chapter II under A, B, C, D) shall be exercised independently by the parties participating in these separate agreements.

Therefore this paragraph instead of reading "each of the two contracting parties" should read "each of the five contracting parties."

POOLE

---

Capture of Kiev and Odessa by the Bolsheviks and Subsequently by the Austro-German Forces—Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Crimea—Establishment of the Skoropadski Government in the Ukraine, April 29, 1918—The Crimean Government of Sulkevich—Exploitation of these Regions by the Central Powers—Appeal of the Ukrainian National Council to President Wilson, October 15, 1918

File No. 861.00/1167

*The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ODESSA, February 21, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received February 27, 9.51 p. m.]

After three days' battle between the Little Russians and Maximalists aided by the fleet which bombarded the city Odessa remains under the control of the Maximalists. The Americans are uninjured.

RAY

File No. 861.00/1803

*The Consul at Kiev (Jenkins) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 1, 1918.

[Received May 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows with reference to the evacuation of Kiev.

Owing to the approach of Austrian and German forces, the consulates of all the Allied powers in Kiev were closed on February 24, and the French, British, and American consular representatives left that evening for Moscow. The French and British military missions left Kiev two days earlier, also coming to Moscow. These missions included General Tabouis and Mr. Bagge, who had been appointed commissioners by the French and British Governments, respectively, to the former Ukrainian government.

It is difficult to say how large the enemy forces were which were advancing on Kiev from several directions on the date the consular representatives left, but they were believed to be considerably larger than anything the Bolsheviki had to oppose them. Information coming into Kiev was very unsatisfactory, but there was no doubt but that some of these forces had approached to within fifty or sixty miles of the city, and scouting parties were even nearer, some within twenty-five or thirty miles. It was estimated, on good authority, that Kiev would be occupied the first week in March.

The political situation with relation to Kiev and the Ukraine is very much involved. It will be remembered that the Rada government, just a few hours before it was driven out of Kiev by the Bolsheviki, had declared the complete independence of the Ukrainian republic and had followed that declaration with an announcement that peace terms had been signed between the Ukrainian government and the Central powers.

The Rada government succeeded in escaping from the Bolsheviki and went over into territory occupied by Austrian troops. From that point it is presumed the Rada got into touch with Austria and Germany and completed its plan for a "friendly" invasion of Ukraine territory with the object of suppressing the Bolsheviki and establishing order in the country. Such a plan had long been hinted at in Kiev.

So far as could be learned before the consular representatives left Kiev, the enemy forces entering the Ukraine were all preceded or accompanied by Ukrainian troops. These troops assured the people as they came along that the Austrians and Germans were not coming as enemies but as friends of the Ukrainian people and that they

should all remain at home where there would be nothing to fear. As has been hinted at in these reports before, it has now become evident that the moving spirits in the Ukraine Rada were pro-Austrian, including Vinnichenko, the former president of the Council of Ministers, and Hruchevski, the president of the Rada. In returning to Kiev with the support of Austrian and German military forces, these leaders are simply carrying out their original plan.

The Rada government has tried to impress the people with the idea that the Ukraine would be entirely independent. This is generally believed to be impossible, however, for the Ukraine is in no position to govern itself. It is exceedingly doubtful if the people, as a whole, were in favor of complete independence. What they really seemed to want was a confederation with Russia. The aims of the Central powers seem to be to control the Ukraine by military force and ultimately make the state a dependent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In its peace agreement with the Central powers, the Rada government agreed to allow them to have large supplies of grain, fats, etc., and at the same time the Central powers bound themselves to supply the Ukraine with certain manufactured goods, including farming implements, agricultural machinery, hardware, etc. There was no provision in the terms, as published, giving the Central powers the right to police the Ukraine, but it was thought at the time that a secret arrangement to that effect had been made. There is now no doubt but that it has been done.

When the Bolshevik forces took possession of Kiev on February 8, there were all sorts of rumors about the position of the Bolshevik authorities with regard to the French and British missions. There were also rumors that the Belgians, who had armored cars at Kiev, had taken part in the fighting on the side of the Ukrainians. This later proved to be false. It was difficult to learn just what passed between the Bolshevik leaders and the missions mentioned, but I am inclined to believe they were pleasant enough on the surface. The Allied missions certainly took no part in the fighting. It is hardly necessary to say this, in view of the fact that it had been known for some time before the Rada fell that it was about to conclude a separate peace with the Central powers entirely against the interests and wishes of the Allies. In this connection it is interesting to note that at a conference the Consular Corps had with the Bolshevik commandant of Kiev on the day following the capture of the city, the commandant asked the British Vice Consul if Mr. Bagge, the British commissioner, intended to remain in Kiev, and whether it was true that the British had recognized the Rada government. The commandant said that although they wished to remain friendly



with Great Britain that was a question he would have to know. The Vice Consul explained that Mr. Bagge was already conferring with the Bolshevik commander in chief, but that so far as he knew Great Britain had not recognized the Ukraine; that Mr. Bagge had been appointed unofficially to look after British interests.

When the commandant was introduced to the American Consul he said something about all the anarchists coming from America to Russia and that perhaps the anarchists would end by putting the Bolsheviks out. He said this in a sort of laughing manner. It is impossible to say whether he intended it to convey any hidden meaning or not. It was probably a mere pleasantry.

With regard to the benefits the Central powers will derive from their occupation of the Ukraine, it must be admitted that this is the richest agricultural district in Russia. It is a large territory, including several governments, and there are enormous supplies of grain and sugar. These supplies are partly assembled at various points and partly in the hands of the peasants. Most of the sugar is assembled at the factories and refineries. There is an arsenal at Kiev which will benefit the invaders and one large factory which has been engaged in the manufacture of ammunition. There are no other factories of importance, except those for the making and refining of sugar. There is no coal in the Ukraine and the wood supply is limited. Coal will have to be brought in from Germany unless the Central powers succeed in reaching as far as the Donets Basin, the Russian coal fields.

In order to profit by the rich grain supplies in the Ukraine, it will be necessary for the Central powers to bring about some order in the country and arrange for transport. Difficulties will be met with in doing this, but it can undoubtedly be accomplished in the course of a month or two. The next step will be to reorganize agriculture with a view to inducing the peasants to till their lands for the coming year. This will be more difficult, it is thought, because the peasants will probably be hostile to the Germans and Austrians. Besides, they are imbued with the idea of distributing the lands of the great proprietors and if the Germans decline to allow this there will be disorders and discontent. A large part of the sugar and wheat lands are owned by these great proprietors, especially the sugar estates, though they have been seized by the peasants upon promises of the Rada government that all land should be given to them.

In leaving Kiev, the American Consul burned all archives of any importance and turned over American interests to the Spanish Consul. All Americans who wished to leave were assisted in getting away.

Owing to the interruption of the telegraph and the danger of transmitting matter through the post, even by special messenger, the American Consul was unable to make a detailed report of the fighting in Kiev, which began January 29 and ended February 8. He sent messengers through, who called at the Consulate General and gave such verbal accounts as they were able.

The people of Kiev were stunned after the battle was over. They seemed dazed by the bombardment and the terrible events they witnessed during the closing hours of the battle. It is estimated that there were 6,000 casualties, of whom between 2,000 and 3,000 were killed, but these figures may be too low.

Before they left the city the Ukrainians, whose forces were composed principally of so-called free Cossacks and volunteers, executed many soldiers who had deserted to the Bolsheviki and were later captured. For the first two days of Bolshevik occupation there were hundreds of executions, or more properly speaking, murders. It is estimated that 300 or 400 officers were shot down on the streets or taken to a park near the former residence of the governor, where they were killed. Many well-dressed civilians were also reported to have been shot down, but this is not confirmed. The Bolshevik troops were embittered against the officers found in Kiev, because they believed they had all assisted the Ukrainians, and at first seem to have made little effort to find out whether the officers had actually taken part in the fighting or not. They were simply shot or clubbed with rifle butts. Later, however, as order began to be established, this promiscuous shooting practically ceased, though whenever officers who carried Ukrainian papers were found, they were shot.

Dozens of officers came to the Consul, disguised as common soldiers or peasants, and begged to be assisted to leave for America. People of means ceased to appear on the streets in good clothing. Furs were discarded to a great extent and many well-bred women appeared in peasant headdress instead of hats. There were robberies and looting of shops. In fairness to the Bolsheviki it must be said that much of the looting was done before the Ukrainians left the city. As the excitement wore off and the Bolshevik authorities began to get their troops back under control, vigorous efforts were made to reestablish order. The shooting of officers ceased, unless it could be shown that they had had some connection with the former government, and many robbers were summarily executed.

It is impossible to give any reliable estimate of the damage done to property in the city. Many houses were practically destroyed by shell fire, and several were burned. The house in which the American Consul lived was struck by a shell which passed through three rooms. The British Vice Consul's house was also damaged by

shell fire. It is reported that toward the last the Bolsheviks poured shells into the city from five different directions. Their guns were undoubtedly served by experienced artillerymen. Damage was greatest around the arsenal, at the railway station, and in the center of the city, known as the "old town." At the latter point the Ukrainians had a battery. Damage from shell fire, however, was general through the city.

Food became very scarce as the fighting continued and there was also much suffering when the water supply was cut off for two days. This shortage of food and water forced many people to go into the streets in search of supplies, even while the shelling was going on. Many casualties resulted from this. Among the killed and wounded were hundreds of women and children. After the fighting the food situation gradually improved, but there was still a serious shortage up to the time the Consul left the city. The authorities were trying to force prices down, with the result that the peasants were bringing in little or nothing.

I have [etc.]

DOUGLAS JENKINS

File No. 861.00/1313

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, March 13, 1918, noon.

[Received March 17, 1.45 p. m.]

260. Odessa occupied Austro-German troops. No news consul who was instructed go Rostov.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1355

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, March 23, 1918.

[Received 4.56 p. m.]

1755. Swedish press reports from Petrograd demobilization on front completed. Yesterday last military organizations dissolved. Reports labor council at Simferopol has advised Smolny as to establishment of independent Taurida republic comprising whole of Crimea and has submitted list of delegates to Council of People's Commissioners of new republic.

MORRIS

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

File No. 763.72119/1556

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 4, 1918.

[Received April 8, 9.17 a. m.]

313. In reply to demand Soviet government Germany states Ukrainian boundaries will comprise governments Volhynia, Podolsk, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Taurida, excluding Crimea, Kiev, Rostov, Chernigov, and part of the government of Kholm, under agreement Central powers.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1433

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 4, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 5, 5.15 p. m.]

3522. Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers dated Jassy, March 27:

The information coming to us from Mr. Bertrand confirms that the Germans are progressing there without meeting with any resistance and are finding immense political and economic possibilities. They are already utilizing there large forces of former Russian prisoners formed more than a year ago in instruction camps in Germany and stiffened by Germans. They are also using Austro-German prisoners found on the territory. Finally they have begun the recruiting of a Ukrainian army. They propose to occupy Donets [Basin] shortly where they will find the raw material which they lack. Must not these terms of the commercial agreement, when [with] the exodus of the Allied diplomatic missions from Russian territory, is [be] interpreted as a total abdication of the Entente? The only means of rallying the elements still favorable to it, is an energetic and immediate military action. If this action, already much delayed, is still further postponed, it would soon run the risk of being exercised by completely enemy countries and presenting the appearance of a friendly aid for the reestablishment of a united and independent Russia. Doubtless this action can, henceforth, only be taken by way of Siberia and by troops the majority of which are Japanese. But in order to have the necessary efficacy it must as soon as possible cease being limited to extreme oriental troops and be pushed as far as the vital interests of the Allied powers demand.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9422

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 4, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received April 5, 5.30 a. m.]

3523. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers, dated Jassy, April 2:

According to a reliable source the Austro-German action in southern Russia is developing to an extent which is very threatening to the interests of the Allied powers. The Central powers are preparing arbitrarily to extend the limits of the Ukraine to all regions which they wish to exploit politically and economically. They include therein the valley of the Black Sea, a portion of Bessarabia, the Don, Crimea, Caucasus, thus marking out the road to Persia and India. Odessa would become a free town under Austro-German control.

Differences are arising between the Austrians and Germans concerning the policy to be followed in Russia. The Austrians, whose ambitions are less excessive, recommend a Ukraine endowed with a nominal independence and limits more or less national. They flatter themselves doubtless that they will easily assert their preponderance by concentrating their efforts there. The Germans on the other hand recommend a federal Russia under their aegis. They seem to be preparing to abandon for a greater objective the Ukrainian field which they are already compromising by developing it out of all proportion. Meanwhile they are employing, in the regions which they occupy, fugitive Russians of the Tsarist party who are moreover considered as Ukrainians. Except at Kherson, where a German detachment is said to have been massacred, the Austro-Germans are welcomed as deliverers in all towns. In the country districts where they seize all the food supplies they meet with some difficulties, as the peasants who are disbanded soldiers are massacring with their arms isolated parties. Nevertheless the Austro-Germans are continuing to obtain immense results with practically no effort, their troops being far from numerous and composed of elements of the most inferior order. The head of their revictualing service estimates at 20 per cent the immediate increase of the stock of food of the Central powers on account of the supplies from Russia. This increase will be unlimited as soon as the first crop in September is gathered. One can foresee that the [conduct?] of the Austro-Germans, more preoccupied in obtaining, by no matter what means, an immediate revictualing rather than renewing friendly relations with a view to the future, will soon cause a reaction of a nature to facilitate the intervention of the Allied powers. The latter should be prepared so as to produce these results before the Austro-Germans are able to gather next harvest.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1607

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 16, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 17, 6.53 a. m.]

3635. Joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, April (?):

According to reliable information the situation in Ukrainia, and especially at Odessa, is as follows:

(1) Ukrainia is completely cut off from all communication with Russia; (2) native officials are gradually being replaced by Austro-German officials; (3) German and Austrian money is in forced circulation; (4) orders have been given to arrest all officers of the Entente who may be found in Ukrainia in the future (we are informed that our officers have already left Ukrainia); (5) domiciliary visits have been made to the houses of consuls at Odessa with the view of billeting Austro-German officers; (6) there is a rumor that the Austro-Germans intend to dissolve the Rada at Kiev and to install a German Government.

In fine Ukrainia is in process of transformation into a German colony.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1660

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 25, 1918.

[Received April 26, 2 a. m.]

1944. Swedish press reports from Moscow Foreign Commissariat has sent following telegram to German Foreign Ministry:

We learn that German-Ukrainian troops have crossed Perekop and advanced on Simferopol despite declaration of German-Ukrainian Government that does not belong to territory Ukrainian republic. Advancing of German-Ukrainian troops in Crimea constitutes violation of Brest treaty. This raid being threat to our Black Sea Fleet, [measures] will have to be taken for its security which might lead to deplorable events. Commissariat in expressing hopes that troops in Crimea will be ordered to retire requests German Government immediately to notify us that request been complied with.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1723

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 2, 1918.

[Received May 3, 2.50 a. m.]

1991. Swedish press reports the decree recently issued by German Commander in Chief Eichhorn in Ukraine has caused serious conflicts both in German Reichstag and Ukraine. The decree notified the peasants the German commander in Ukraine exacted fulfilment of following points:

1. The man cultivating soil be the one to get the crop and payment in accordance current prices.
2. The man cultivating land beyond his forces was inflicting detriment on Ukrainian state and would receive severe punishment.
3. Where peasants unable plant whole of the soil the proprietors must provide for planting, and in such case the land distribution commissions should not take it for distribution among peasants; on contrary they should supply horses and machines for the planting.

The Ukrainian Agricultural Minister regarded decree as intolerable intrusion of his official authority and resigned. The Rada unanimously adopted following resolution in protest:

The Rada having heard declaration of Agricultural Minister and noted his resignation emphasized that German troops were called by Ukrainian troops for purpose of helping them in restoring order within such limits and in such direction only as decided by the Ukrainian people's republic, that no arbitrary interference on part of German and Austro-Hungarian military commanders [in] social-political life of Ukraine will be tolerated, that such interference as that of General Eichhorn will disorganize our economic life, aggravate social-political conditions, and render impossible fulfilment of obligations concluded and signed between Ukrainian people's republic and Central powers. At same time the Rada in refusing to grant demission of Minister of Agriculture requests him to announce to population that Eichhorn's order shall not be obeyed. Foreign Minister will send presidents of Berlin and Vienna Ministries notes in accordance with this decision, protesting against order and other interference on part of German-Austrian military authorities in social-political life of Ukraine.

Decree been subject of debate in main committee of German Reichstag, where was criticized by Scheidemann, Erzberger, and others. However, it is asserted semiofficially discontent in Ukraine over decree partly due to fact it had been corrupted in translation reproduced by Kiev paper, and therefore been mistaken for some kind of interference in Ukrainian land proprietorship question.

Eichhorn prompted by regard for necessity of getting cultivation started had therefore guaranteed crop be given to those cultivating soil even if were proprietors, and he had also proclaimed the one failing to do his part of the spring work must be prepared to take punishment for detriment thus inflicted upon Ukrainian state. German military committee must see to it Germany really received the quantities of grain provided for in agreement for sake of which peace had been concluded and military assistance given Ukraine. It is announced moreover a formal agreement fixing scope of activity of German army in Ukraine is being drafted, and is expected for benefit both parties to settle conflict arisen through Eichhorn decree.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1738

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, May 5, 1918.

[Received 10.45 p. m.]

2463. Dutch press publishes Wolff telegram from Berlin dated May 4, containing Vice Chancellor's statement before Reichstag committee regarding Ukraina, of which following is summary:

We entered Ukraine at express wish of Ukrainian government to restore order, also to get food quickly as possible. General opinion at that time was that large quantities of foodstuffs were to be collected there and Ukrainians had undertaken to deliver by August 1 next at least million tons corn. But Rada has no real means available to constrain population to hand it over. We ourselves had to arrange for delivery of wheat according to treaty. That has been source of ill-feeling. The three events of chief interest were the order of Von Eichhorn to till fields, arrest of members of Rada, and replacing of Ukrainian government by government constructed on new basis. Reconstruction of government was purely Ukrainian affair which has nothing to do with first two events. Rada has recently been losing ground, though it was [has] to its credit creation of Ukrainian state and the bringing of peace. Stubborn adherence to communist theories which found no echo in peasant population seems chiefly to have brought about its end.

Order to till fields was issued because owing to threatening expropriations of land there was danger that great portion of ground would remain untilled and Ukraine deprived of possibility of fulfilling its obligations to us, thus interests of our people were at stake. This order was directed to German authorities, whilst its publication made it appear to be a German proclamation to people. German Chancellor has caused steps to be taken that military commander in chief shall act only hand in hand with Ambassador in all matters of political importance.

Paper then described arrest of Director Dobri by three men who said they were acting on behalf of committee to save Ukraine. This



committee of irresponsibles wished to drive Germans out of country and meetings had taken place in house of War Minister in which killing of German officers was urged to be followed by that of soldiers. Of course Germans had to secure their army and as Ukrainian government did nothing Eichhorn took his own measures. Courts were established and arrests made. That arrests included members of Rada during sitting was due to regrettable mistake for of course immunity of Rada and its members is respected by German authorities. Eichhorn immediately remedied this mistake and German commander responsible was immediately removed from his post. After that the new government was called into existence by Ukrainians themselves and will not recognize communistic theories of property.

GARRETT

---

File No. 763.72/9857

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 5, 1918, noon.

[Received May 6, 2.40 p. m.]

3801. German official wireless, Nauen, May 3, 9 a. m.:

Organization for transporting provisions has been put in operation according to arrangements already announced as concluded between Central powers and Ukraine. According to telegraphic information from Kiev 2,000,000 hundredweights of wheat and forage were put at the disposal of Central powers in last days of April. Considerable quantities have already crossed frontier and during these last days about 1,200 carloads provisions. Owing to food shortage existing temporarily in Austria, most of this is ceded to Austria-Hungary. Crops coming early in Hungary. Within a few weeks Austria-Hungary will meet its own needs. Largest shipments for Germany will be made in June and July. Already shipments from frontier are on way to Germany. Loads of wheat and other provisions reaching Braila from Black Sea are transported Germany by rail; 30,000 hundredweights of wheat already reached Braila.

SHARP

---

File No. 861.00/1769

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 8, 1918.

[Received May 10, 4.30 p. m.]

493. Owing Easter holidays no newspapers since May 5 until this morning, when official Soviet gazette prints account of events

in Ukraine, according to which Pavlo Skoropadski was proclaimed hetman of the Ukraine by landowners' meeting April 29. On same date he issued open letter to the Ukrainian people of which following is substance:

Owing to recent events the reborn Ukrainian power stood on the brink of ruin. Its salvation is due to strong support of Central powers which, true to their word, are continuing to fight for the integrity and peace of the Ukraine. The former Ukrainian government has proved to be absolutely incompetent. Disorder, economic disorganization, and unemployment are increasing daily. The population has been profoundly stirred and has demanded immediate establishment of a governmental authority able to guarantee quiet and the possibility of productive labor. I have decided to answer this appeal and have taken full authority temporarily into my hands. By this act I declare myself hetman of the Ukraine. Government will be effected through a cabinet of ministers appointed by me. The central and smaller Radas and all land committees are abolished. All ministers and assistant ministers are dismissed. A law will be issued shortly providing [omission], not stopping at any measures to accomplish this end. Right to private property is reestablished in full, also liberty regarding sale and purchase of land. At same time measures will be taken for expropriation of land from large owners for granting to peasants not now possessing any. In the same way the rights of working class will be guaranteed. Absolute freedom of trade is reestablished and wide scope is given to private initiative and enterprise.

Signed at Kiev, April 29.

This proclamation is accompanied by a fundamental statute of twenty-two paragraphs giving the hetman practically autocratic power. Under its provisions hetman will appoint prime minister, approve cabinet ministers selected by him, confirm laws, act without restriction in international affairs, and be supreme chief of army and navy. Hetman is the historic title of chief executive in Ukraine. Skoropadski is said to have hereditary claims to same.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/1763

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, May 9, 1918.

[Received May 10, 12.23 a. m.]

2514. Referring my 2497, May 8.<sup>1</sup> *Vorwärts*, 7th. In Reichstag committee Ebert complained of entirely inadequate reports published of debates on affairs in Ukrainia claiming they only misled public all more so since censor forbade any reports on action against

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Rada. Committee then voted to raise injunction of secrecy on debates. Scheidemann read following official Ukrainian report dated April 26 in committee:

Yesterday at 4 o'clock afternoon building in which central Rada sits was surrounded by men in uniform of German officers and soldiers, and members of central Rada as well as members of government who were assembled for session of Rada were searched and arrested. Those present were ordered hold up their hands. Treatment was rough and discourteous. Protest of president of central Rada, Professor Hrushevski, against arrest of members of parliament in parliament building was disregarded. More than this brachial force was used against Professor Hrushevski during search. All private papers and documents of central Rada were taken away from Professor Hrushevski. Search lasted three and half hours. Without any warrants of any sort being shown following ministers were arrested: Minister of Interior, Tkachenko; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lubinski; Minister of War, Zhukovski; and Director of Political Administrative Department, Kayevski. German Minister, Baron Mumm, was informed of what had happened and asked whether case was known to him. As representative of state friendly towards Ukraina, Minister was requested to inform German Government. Ukrainian government filed decided protest against such conduct with German Minister and pointed out serious consequences to which interference might lead. German Minister promised inform his Government of event and remarked that what had taken place in central Rada was unknown to him. At 8.30 in evening Ukrainian Minister President was notified by German Consul General that statement of Ukrainian government had been transmitted to Berlin. Other members of central Rada and government protested similarly against this interference in internal affairs of the republic, against violation of constitution of international law and usages of nations. Report spread like lightning throughout Ukraina. Disorders are reported from various localities, so that country is threatened with anarchy.

Scheidemann closed his speech with advising Government not to continue to play part of figurehead. If it were not in agreement with occurrences in east openly leave responsibility to those who are to blame.

GARRETT

File No. 861.00/1775

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 9, 1918.

[Received May 12, 5.50 a. m.]

500. Official Soviet gazette for May 9 publishes text of German reply to Soviet radiogram of April 21 respecting German intentions in the Crimea.<sup>1</sup> Essential portions of note are as follows:

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 679.

I have been commissioned to answer the Russian Government to the effect that the German Government has no intention of forcing any particular form of government on the Crimea. In any case the Imperial Government considers itself forced in view of the attacks made by the fleet from Sevastopol on Kherson and Nikolaev to send its troops there and to occupy Sevastopol.

This action has a purely military significance. With regard to political and state organization, the Imperial Government will allow the right of self-determination proclaimed by the Russian Government and proposes that the question regarding the Crimea, which until now belonged to the Taurida government, should be the subject of the Russian-Ukrainian treaty.

The question regarding the Crimean Fleet was only raised owing to naval and technical considerations and in no way prejudices the future state of the province. Count Mirbach.

Essential portions of Russian reply, published in same paper, are as follows:

The National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs considers it its duty to point out that until the present time the German Government had made no statement regarding hostile actions on the part of our Black Sea Fleet. In a radiogram of April 15 the German Government merely notified hostile actions on the part of some vessels which had separated themselves from our Black Sea Fleet, and for which the fleet could not be held responsible.

The seizure of the Black Sea Fleet by German military forces, through a military advance on Sevastopol through the Crimea, is absolutely contrary to the Brest Litovsk treaty. This provides for the presence of military vessels in Russian harbors or their disarmament, but not for their seizure by German military forces, and the national Commissariat sees itself forced to make a decided protest against this seizure which is contrary to the treaty. The occupation of the Crimea is contradictory to the statement made by the German Government itself in a radiogram of March 26 to the effect that the Taurida government should constitute part of the Ukraine, but without the Crimea.

The Taurida government would have been guaranteed self-determination through its belonging to the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, and the national Commissariat does not see how the application of the right of self[-determination is guaranteed?] by German-Ukrainian troops, whose presence could only make this right illusory.

The national Commissariat considers that in the note of the German diplomatic representative the German Government, which several times reminded the Russian Soviet government of its obligation to conclude a peace treaty with the Ukraine, still considers such a treaty immediately imminent. The Russian Soviet government is awaiting the arrival of the Ukrainian delegates at Kursk, shares this point of view and would thank the German Government to inform it whether the invitation to carry on negotiations at Kursk, which was expressed in a note to the central Rada dated April 14

and supplanted [supported?] by the German Government, still remains in force.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1778

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 11, 1918.

[Received May 12, 3.45 a. m.]

2059. Swedish press reports from Petrograd. Soviet government has ordered local Soviets in districts bordering upon Ukraine: (1) that disarmament troops belonging to republics in south is effected whenever they cross border of Soviet republic; (2) that German-Ukrainian high command is immediately notified thereof through negotiators who shall demand that military operations be discontinued and that demarcation line be drawn; (3) that all measures towards mobilization and counteraction are carried out to utmost in event Germany, Ukrainia disregard these steps and continue their advance thereby bringing war operations to territory Soviet republic.

Secretary Russian peace delegation Zaitsev on Soviet's behalf concluded armistice with German high command at Korenevo, May 5 [4], regarding part of Kursk. With view to extending armistice to Belgorod and Bryansk fronts Zaitsev went to Vorozhba where Ukrainian delegation staying. Chairman Russian delegation Rakovski stated negotiations been delayed through events in Ukraine. Armistice been concluded for indefinite time to enable peace negotiations begun and affects only German front, no Ukrainian representative having participated. It comprises territory ten kilometers depth, German demarcation line running from Sudzha to Korenevo-Rylsk and enters into force May 5 to allow ample time notify operating forces both parties. Conditions will be discussed at Konotop, where peace negotiations will be conducted.

General Schwarz, supreme commander Petrograd, has declared Petrograd confronted by no direct menace at present and no reason for alarm for population. All measures defense taken against possible attack from Finland, some minor fighting having occurred between Finnish Reds and Whites at Beloostrov. Either group shall be disarmed if cross Russian frontier. Ino Fort not given up and rumors regarding attempts to blow up fort unfounded.

With authorization German high command in Finland Russian torpedo boats and several warships have returned Petrograd, those

seeking leave Helsingfors without permission being brought back by Germans.

Reports from Moscow via Reuter:<sup>1</sup>

German Government notified Chicherin, Foreign Commissary, owing change government Ukrainian peace delegation appointed to conduct peace negotiations Kursk must undergo thorough revision. Political situation having changed, German Government wishes peace negotiations be at Kiev where Russian Government should send delegates.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1849

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 16, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received May 23, 9.10 p. m.]

525. Owing to some initial readjustments, the precise make-up of the new Ukrainian cabinet can not be reported for a day or two, but the following analysis arrangement may now be noted: (1) political complexion Cadet and Octobrist; (2) previous records of individual members pro-Ally rather than pro-German; (3) individual tendencies to judge by past records, not separatist or specifically Ukrainian but rather pan-Russian.

This is interesting from two points of view. First, it suggests that the Germans, having made use so far of the fiction of a Ukrainian nationality, may henceforth support a movement for the reconstruction of Russia through amalgamation of Great Russia with the Ukraine under government similar to that now seated at Kiev, which is strictly non-socialist and subservient to Germany. Secondly, the participation of men of moderate political views and previous pro-Ally tendencies in a government created by Germany shows concretely what has long been felt, namely, that in the continued absence of active Allied support, the non-socialist elements of Russia and even the more sane socialist elements will be forced into the German camp.

On May 12 at Moscow, the Central Committee of the Cadet Party adopted the following resolution:

Believing still that Russia must remain faithful to her allies, the Central Committee considers it absolutely inadmissible to take any step whatsoever to apply to the Germans for the formation of a new government, and finds it impossible to lend them any support.

<sup>1</sup> Reuter's news agency.

It is plain from the composition of the Ukrainian cabinet, from the pro-German activities of certain insurgent Cadets in Petrograd, and from the general tone of political gossip in liberal circles that the pro-German drift which has called forth this resolution is rapidly becoming more marked. Apparently all the Allied observers here agree: (1) That the Russian people can not come out of their present difficulties without foreign aid; (2) that all parties, with the exception of possibly the extreme monarchists, look to the Allies to intervene; (3) that the present German drift is due almost solely to growing despair of a favorable response in that quarter; and (4) that, in the continued absence of any positive action by the Allies, the government which is to succeed the Bolsheviks will inevitably, like that in the Ukraine, be based upon German support and subservient to German dictation.

Kerensky, who has been hiding in Petrograd and latterly in Moscow, had a personal interview day before yesterday with . . . . He will endeavor shortly to leave Russia for the purpose of visiting England and United States and requesting direct Allied military assistance for Russia against Germany.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/1920

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 17, 1918.

[Received May 31, 5.42 p. m.]

530. According later information, following composition Ukrainian cabinet:

Lisogub, Prime Minister and Minister Interior, landowner, aristocratic extraction, higher education in France, been two or three years in America, one of foremost Zemstvo workers in Russia and distinguished by genius for organization; Chubinski, Justice, was professor law Petrograd University; Sokolovski, Supplies, formerly Zemstvo agricultural expert; Kyanyresin, Agriculture, lawyer, Zemstvo worker; Shebeko, offered Foreign Affairs, not yet accepted, once Russian Ambassador, Vienna; Lukashevich, acting Ways of Communication; Gutnik, Trade and Industry, Jew, well-known member Odessa Board Trade; Rzhetski, Finance, Kiev alderman and bank director; Vasilenko, Education; Wagner, Labor; Slivinski, reported War. See my No. 525.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1812

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 18, 1918.

[Received May 19, 7 a. m.]

2120. Swedish press reports from Petrograd Foreign Commissariat sent Ukrainian Foreign Minister following telegram:

Russian Government accepts proposal German Government to open peace negotiations with Ukraine at Kiev on express condition that couriers, experts, peace delegates of Soviet government be permitted pass frontier freely and that Russian Government granted sole right use direct telegraph line to Kiev.

Answer of Vasilenko, Ukrainian Foreign Minister, transmitted to peace delegation Soviet at Kiev follows:

Have honor inform you (1) that Ukrainian government has [no] objection in principle to armistice between Russian fronts, must however first communicate with German high command; (2) measures will immediately be taken in Ukraine with view establishing direct telegraph line Moscow, Kiev via Kursk for exclusive use Russian peace delegation; (3) measures shall be taken for establishment direct railway between Kiev, Kursk as also for restoration railway Korenevo [-Belopolie?]; four railway cars for forty passengers will be placed disposal Russian peace delegation and accommodations secured; (5) upon agreement and cooperation with German high command troops will protect railway to Kiev and also Russian delegation in city; (6) meeting should begin May 22.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1915

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 22, 1918.

[Received May 31, 10 a. m.]

541. Moscow newspaper reports speech before Cadet Party, Kiev, last week of N. P. Vasilenko, Ukrainian Minister Foreign Affairs and Education. *Résumé* as follows:

Some people will talk of a united, indivisible Russia but this is a matter of the future. Perhaps such a Russia will exist, perhaps it will not. The fact remains that Russia at present does not exist. There is not even the kernel of a healthy conception of a state in Russia. In the Ukraine we see a healthy national feeling and the strength of the Ukraine is in this. We know that the entire Slavonic revival was built upon the national principle.



I was asked how one could at present work with the government when foreign support must be leaned upon. But, for example, leaning upon the support of Russian bayonets, Bulgaria established her state and for some time has been playing a considerable part in European history. Should you not wish to employ this aid, let this authority go, let the Bolsheviks come again and repeat all their experiments and you will continue to follow the path of destruction. Our authority may be severe, perhaps the conditions are hard, the commercial treaties may be disadvantageous. I will not touch on any of these questions. But what has one to do but make use of this authority until those forces are collected in the Ukraine which will take part in the healthy organic life and governing of the country? The moment is sure to come when it will be possible for the Ukraine to exist independently and when she will have to work at the establishment of a Ukrainian national state.

A question which to many presents serious difficulties is the question of our attitude towards the Central powers. I have long since been convinced that historical conditions are such that our economic and commercial interests are united to the Central powers, chiefly to Germany. Some may reply that we have obligations to the Allies. It is true that we gave the Allies our word, but we have not kept it. That was difficult psychological moment but we have lived through it all and are faced with bare reality. Before the war we were in close relations with Germany; our science and commerce drew strength from there. Think of the number of Russians who yearly visited Germany and you will see what a tie existed between ourselves and Germany. A country always must stand on the basis of state interests and the attitude of a country is susceptible to change. History has shown us that our oriental interests and Germany always were closer than our interests with England. Our political interests often coincided with Germany's but you can not conceal the fact our political interests and England's often differed. For instance, it is an historical fact that our chief loss at the Berlin Congress was due England. Owing to English diplomacy we then lost the Dardanelles and Constantinople. We and Germany are geographical neighbors and as neighbors we should be in contact and our interests should intertwine. So it was before the war, so it is now, and so I think it will be after the war. It is necessary to stand on a basis of effective relations with the Central powers and lead them of course in the interests of the establishment of a free Ukraine.

The facts upon which I base my stand: for the good of the Ukraine, the establishment of its strength and power, the development of its capacity for defense in the future, for these I intend giving all my strength.

In the debate which followed Vasilenko's address, no speaker is reported vigorously to have objected to this close contact between the Ukraine and Germany. Two speakers are quoted as having been of the opinion that the minister is mistaken in relying entirely upon Germany, that Germany does not think of establishing an independent state in the Ukraine.

Vasilenko's speech has attracted lively editorial comment in Moscow press. Journal *Nashe Slovo*, conservative, formerly *Russkoe Slovo*, cites present measures employed by Germany to bleed Ukraine with query:

Perhaps these are the famous economic interests of the Ukraine and Germany. The Ukrainian minister is dreaming of everlasting German aid, friendship. However, responsible German political workers unanimously declare that in establishing relations with the newly appointed hetman they are not concerned with the distant future but wish only to draw from everything possible. Perhaps these are the Ukrainian-German common political interests.

To-day's *Lokal*, official Bolshevik organ, under caption, "Treachery of the Cadets," comments editorially in much same vein.

[POOLE]

---

File No. 861.00/1934

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, *undated*.

[Received June 3, 1918, 3.11 p. m.]

578. In peace negotiations at Kiev Ukraine has stipulated the following fundamental conditions:

- (1) Establishment new line of demarcation;
- (2) Free transit for Ukrainians out of Russia with their property, including money and securities;
- (3) Restitution within fortnight of railway rolling stock taken out of Ukraine;
- (4) Ukraine to be permitted, on the basis of reciprocity, to maintain representatives in Russia for the protection of interests of its citizens.

Consulate General informed by Commissariat Foreign Affairs that proposed new demarcation line begins in south at Bataisk just east Rostov-on-Don, follows River Don, and the northern Donets, then runs northwestward taking in cities of Valuiki, Belgorod and Rylsk, last just west of Kursk.

According to Kiev press, emissaries have arrived there from the North Caucasus representing Southeastern federation. This is federation formed in October last by the governments of the Don, Kuban, Astrakhan, etc., and reported upon at the time in connection with the Don movement. From Kiev there is also news of the formation of a reactionary Don government which will join Austro-Hungarians in driving Red Army out of that region. All this is preparatory, of course, to absorption of the Don and North Caucasus

by the Central powers. From wording of Don government's proclamation and the presence of Turkish and Bulgarian as well as Austrian troops in Odessa it is presumed that this further advance will be carried out by Germany's allies while Germany attends to the Ukraine. There is discussion whether the Crimea belongs to the Ukraine or should be given to Turkey.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/1961

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 6, 1918.

[Received June 7, 9.15 a. m.]

2243. Swedish press reports via Petrograd's telegram bureau: In its relations with foreign powers Federative Socialistic Russian Soviet Republic is acting on principle of absolute equality for great and small nations. Hence Council People's Commissaries decides: first, to abolish titles, like Ambassador, Minister, etc., and call all Russian representatives accredited to foreign powers "Representative Plenipotentiary of Federative and Socialistic Russian Soviet Republic" sent in conformity with fundamental principle international law regarding equality all states, to regard as representatives plenipotentiary all diplomatic agents of foreign powers accredited to Federative Socialistic Russian Republic regardless of rank.

Reported from Vienna Skoropadski made statements to Austrian correspondent tending to show Ukraine looking towards extending boundaries in uniting with her adjoining states and territories. He said:

Vasilenko daily receiving deputations from border districts seeking union with Ukraine. Don and Kuban Cossacks wish unity with us whereby valuable Donets Basin, with its immeasurable coal treasures, will be available to us. But first of all we need union with Crimea, Black Sea being way for Ukraine to gain access to highways of seas. We need navy for our commerce and our position as state and therefore need harbors which only to be found on Crimea. Our independence also demands financial order; to-day country is overflowed by paper notes and prices rising madly. These interests coincide with rational and equitable solution of land question. We will give peasants land out of immense reserves of country thus founding sound and conservative peasantry. This land the state will buy out from large estates against adequate compensation and sell to peasants at reasonable prices.

Regarding relations with Russia, Skoropadski said, "With our Russian neighbor we wish peaceable relations."

Reported from Berlin Skoropadski will visit governments of Central powers, Vienna, Berlin, shortly.

Reported from Helsingfors German Colonel von Redern, aide-de-camp to chief General Staff, has stated Finnish army will comprise three divisions of all arms, regiments will be nine, battalions twenty-seven. A six-weeks course will be arranged for reserve officers and one-year military school established at Fredrikshamn, some twenty German officers to be employed as teachers. Aircraft station will be Uttia (?). Eminent Finnish officers will be detailed to Germany for staff training. Main task of navy, which being organized by Germany, will be coast defense. Guarding of Red prisoners to be transferred to civil authority. Army is placed on peace footing and men over twenty-five years released from service. Industrial activity reviving throughout country.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2187

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 17, 1918.

[Received July 4, 11.32 a. m.]

644. Following is summary of provisions of truce signed June 12 by Russian and Ukrainian delegates at Kiev:

1. Military activities along entire front are stopped during period of peace negotiations.

2. Nationals of contracting parties are allowed to return to their respective states with their property with exception of merchandise, interest-bearing papers, and valuables; cash to be taken limited to 10,000 rubles for head of family and 2,000 rubles for each member with maximum of 20,000 for family. Additional 80,000 may be transferred if resulting from sale of property. Both contracting parties have right to limit and stop import and export of foreign currency.

3. Commission of representatives of both states will be formed to transfer gradually from Russia to Ukrainian railways rolling stock taken from Ukraine. Postal, telegraphic, and passenger communication will be reestablished simultaneously with fulfilment of above provisions of this paragraph.

4. Both states on basis of reciprocity will establish their representatives, commissars, and consuls. The Russian and Ukrainian Red Cross Societies shall facilitate journey to their respective states of prisoners of war who are citizens of either state.

5. Committee shall be formed within one week to regulate requests for and exchange of merchandise.

6. Both states shall immediately consider terms of peace.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2198

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 17, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received July 5, 2.07 a. m.]

643. The new U. N. [Ukrainian] government lacks general support. Large estate owners and upper *bourgeois* are friendly for the most part, the middle citizens are at best indifferent, and the peasants and workingmen openly hostile, though not emboldened to speak out or act concertedly. The left parties of the German Reichstag are said to disapprove of the new government as proffered and it is displeasing to Austria because its members are pan-Russian in their views (see my No. 525, May 16, 8 p. m.<sup>1</sup>) and therefore opposed to a separatist policy such as Austria would favor. For the same reason there is disagreement between the Austrians and the German military party which has created the new government. The German military occupation is a source of great bitterness to the people. Although the accounts in the Russian press of widespread turmoil are exaggerated, observers sent into the Ukraine by the Consulate General report frequent individual acts of violence and sporadic local outbreaks. Unquestionably the general development of the situation is causing the Germans uneasiness and has necessitated considerable increase in the army of occupation. The people have been bitterly disappointed because the expected flood of manufactured goods from Germany has not materialized. The Germans have delivered in Kiev, with great acclaim, 50 carloads of agricultural implements and practically nothing else. In the meantime the country is being systematically and ruthlessly stripped of textiles and other manufactured goods as well as foodstuffs.

Reports that lack of railway rolling stock hampers somewhat the shipment of this loot to Germany are confirmed by the daily insistence of the delegates at the Kiev peace conference on the immediate return of the cars and engines which were taken out of the Ukraine during the Bolshevik retreat. Under German influence the Ukraine is also endeavoring to hasten the conclusion of a commercial agreement with Russia even before the conclusion of a treaty of peace, in order to open the Russian frontier for the movement of goods into the Ukraine and by this of course into Germany. The Soviet government, Chicherin tells me, is promised grain and coal and lends a willing ear as the German occupation of the south and the Siberian counter-revolution have quite deprived central Russia of these two commodities.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 687.

Respecting general conditions in the Ukraine the observers agree in reporting that the people do not regard the German occupation as permanent. They speak of it as though unfortunate passing phase saying that they [Bolsheviks?] have taken Russia and the Germans the Ukraine. When the Bolsheviks are gone the Ukraine will somehow, they expect, become once more a part of Russia.

The land bank is endeavoring to facilitate the repurchase by peasants of the land which they have had to return to the former owners, but the scheme is not proving popular. Disputes between landlords and peasants have led to ploughing under of growing crops and serious losses of stock. It is estimated that the acreage sown to grain is about 90 per cent of normal, but much uneasiness is felt about sugar beets which were the product of the big estates, and require especially careful cultivation. The general weather conditions were bad during the first half of May, but recent rains have improved the outlook of the crops.

Reports from industrial centers show unemployment, wages reduced, and many factories idle, though recently some are being restarted under German direction.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/2197

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 19, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received July 5, 5.29 p. m.]

658. Following is substance of report of observer just returned from Crimea:

At Sevastopol, Germans rushing harbor repairs, already six to ten vessels of small capacity leaving in order with cargoes of live-stock and fats. German soldiers draining country of all supplies as in Ukraine. At present three German Landsturm divisions under General von Koch besides artillery and engineers and a few Turkish troops. Military vessels in Sevastopol harbor undergoing repairs by Germans include *Gochen*, *Ochakov*, *Almaz*, and *Georgi Pobedonosets*. Germans assisting formation of a Tatar army. They have organized a temporary government headed by General Sulkevich, Mohammedan and monarchist. In Sevastopol people seem indifferent to presence of Germans; in Simferopol attitude more hostile. Concerning future government, majority of people favor union with Ukraine with reservation of large autonomy rights. General oppo-

sition to the supposed German ratification [proposition?] of making Crimea German colony or a Tatar state under Turkish protection. Ukrainian government has recently addressed note to German representative at Kiev urging inclusion of Crimea in Ukraine on economical, political, and ethnographic grounds, especially latter.

On basis Article 5, Brest treaty, Germans pressing for return to Sevastopol of that portion of the Black Sea Fleet which went to Novorossiisk and it [Soviet government] is believed to have issued order to this effect. Staff Red Army reports German naval operations against Tuapse and other Black Sea ports north of Batum.

POOLE

---

File No. 861.00/2495

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

Moscow, August 4, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 14, 8.09 p. m.]

Observer who left Crimea July 10 reports in substance as follows: Independent Crimean government comprises peninsula only. Population 600,000. Government organized by Germans and headed by General Sulkevich, Mohammedan and monarchist. Cadet leaders have withdrawn from cabinet. Despite wish of the majority of inhabitants of the peninsula for union with Ukraine with reservation of large autonomous rights, friction has developed between Crimea and Ukraine through tactlessness of Sulkevich and has resulted in prohibition of all exports from the latter into the former, making available for Central powers grain from Ukrainian districts which formerly fed Crimea.

Troops apparently from western and Ukrainian front and also Turks and Bulgarians moving through Crimea for Poti, Tiflis, and Baku. As in the Ukraine, these troops are draining country of all supplies. In Sevastopol is commission of representatives of Quadruple Alliance having as object division of what remains of former Black Sea Fleet. Repair work on warships being rushed, repairs on harbor progressing rapidly. Average of ten boats of small capacity leaving daily with cargoes livestock and fats. Ukrainian government in June addressed note to German representative at Kiev urging inclusion of Crimea in Ukraina, economic, political, and ethnographic grounds.

POOLE

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Norway.

File No. 861.00/2452

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, August 8, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 10, 10.20 a. m.]

2615. Rumanian engineer . . . just arrived from Kharkov via Moscow, Petrograd, states feeling of bitterness against Germans amongst Ukrainian peasant and working classes growing. German soldiers travel around country only in large squads, otherwise armed bands of peasants attack, attempting to capture them alive and if successful such Germans are tortured by being buried alive. Germans will not succeed in securing food or in organizing Ukrainians into divisions for fighting in west. Number of German occupation troops increasing. He estimated same at between 400,000 and 500,000. Banks now are open and conducting general banking businesses charging 12 per cent commission for withdrawals from old accounts but nothing for withdrawals from new accounts. These measures been successful in drawing large amounts of hoarded money to banks thereby lessening shortage bank notes. When leaving Petrograd he saw barge with hundred elderly men of educated class being taken to Kronstadt but for what purpose he could not ascertain.

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 861.00/3179

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

No. 4855

BERNE, October 17, 1918.

[Received November 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to quote herewith the text of a message, the substance of which was communicated telegraphically to the Department in my telegram No. 5260 of October 17,<sup>1</sup> and which was received from the Ukrainian National Council:

LAUSANNE, October 15, 1918.

TO PRESIDENT WILSON,

WASHINGTON.

Ukrainian National Council just founded in Switzerland of representatives of almost all political parties of the Ukraine for the defense of the Ukrainian national and democratic cause abroad formulates its best wishes to you, Mr. President. It places itself entirely on the basis of your program in which it sees the best guarantee for the continued free existence of the independent

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Ukrainian state. We are sure that the entire Ukrainian people is at one with us in placing its entire confidence in your defense of our independence before our enemies. Ukraine does not wish to encroach upon the rights of other peoples. Her only wish is that all the territories populated by our race, including eastern Galicia and Bukovina now oppressed by the Austrians, be reunited under a free and independent government entering as a member into the society of nations.

ALEXANDRE SEVRIUK

For the Ukrainian National Council.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

File No. 861.00/3159

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, November 3, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received November 5, 3.15 a. m.]

5558. Stanislav Gutovski called at the Legation to-day and stated that he had recently been in the United States and was known to Mr. Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State. As a representative of the Slavs of White Russia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, he urged me to report to the Department that immediate action is necessary to prevent the massacre of Polish population in these regions by Bolsheviks upon withdrawal of German troops. He advocated the landing of armed forces, particularly cavalry and armed motor cars, at Odessa, who would be favorably received by the population and who could proceed to Kiev *en route* to Orsha. In this connection see my 4988, October 24,<sup>1</sup> from the local representative of the Ukraine.

Weight to this idea is lent by the statements of Dr. Kramarz, leader of the Czech delegation, who is an authority on Russian affairs and who stated with great earnestness and solemnity to-day that it is essential for Allied forces to proceed to Odessa, in order to give security to the local population in stemming the tide of Bolshevikism which will follow withdrawal of armed forces of Central powers.

STOVALL

File No. 860e.00/-

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, November 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 11, 4.31 a. m.]

5687. Minister for Foreign Affairs has just handed me memorandum from various influential business organizations in Ukraine

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

which was transmitted to him by the Swiss Minister in Vienna. These organizations request the following telegram sent to President of the United States:

In the name of humanity and safeguarding the rest of civilization, management companies and organizations undersigned beg to obtain from the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments in the signature armistice the obligation to safeguard order in Ukraine until the situation is changed, and to be responsible for all the results of the appearance of Bolshevism in the form of internal riots or violation of the frontier. A memorandum follows by post signed by these organizations.

Memorandum being forwarded by mail.<sup>1</sup>

STOVALL

---

Declaration of the Intention of the Allied Governments to Maintain Order in the Ukraine—Landing of Allied Troops at Odessa—Establishment of the Directory by Petlyura

File No. 861.00/3283

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 25, 1918, midnight.

[Received November 26, 7.48 a. m.]

6008. The following telegram has been received from Allied Ministers at Jassy dated November 21:

Referring to our telegram 804 as complementary to the telegram sent on the 18th of last November.<sup>1</sup> We consider it extremely urgent to inform you [1] that the Ukrainian chauvinists have started a rebellion in the district of Kiev, in which in addition to a small number of national elements bands of anarchists and Bolshevik elements have also engaged less numbers; [2] that this rebellion presents a danger which is the more considerable, in that the disintegration of the Austro-German troops is complete, that the outbreak in the country of the Bolshevik army which has been effected locally may rapidly become general; (3) that the Bolshevik troops threaten especially the Ukrainian northern frontier which may consequently have as its next result the breaking of the line of communication between the Ukraine and the Don; (4) that in case of the realization of this menace the coal fields of the Don with all its wealth indispensable for transport, as well as its metallurgic factories and its very considerable military stores, will fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks, which might entail the complete control of the Bolsheviks over the whole of Ukrainia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

We think that it is urgent to take the following measures:

- (1) Immediately send inter-Allied troops even in small numbers to Odessa and to proceed immediately with the occupation of Kiev and Kharkov;
- (2) To make a special and exact declaration setting forth the firm decision of the Allies to support these elements of order in Russia;
- (3) To warn the German Government that the Allies will hold the German troops responsible for any disturbances in which they may participate, either by the sale or the delivery of arms to the rebels or by preventing the groups of Russian officers who are maintaining order to seize and to use the arms stored at Kiev.

Failure to [of] effect[ive] and speedy intervention for the suppression of the rebellion with numerous forces and without delay would necessitate later on the use of perhaps larger forces and a regular campaign of several months.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3282

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 26, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received November 27, 12.14 a. m.]

6028. Following joint telegram received from four Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 23:

The hetman of Ukrainia has communicated to us, with the request that it be transmitted to our governments, a manifesto in which he appeals to the Ukrainian people inviting them to join with the other national forces for the reconstitution of Russia upon a federal basis. The press correspondents will telegraph the principal portions of this document.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3335

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1918, 4 p. m.

243. Your 151, November 24, 10 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Department has been in touch for some time with Czecho-Slovaks and has recognized Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* government to which it has advanced a loan of \$7,000,000 to assist in maintaining Czecho-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Slovak Army in Siberia.<sup>1</sup> Department is without reliable information regarding the Ukraine and is anxious at as early possible date to know facts about conditions there. Press reports here state General Denikin with Russian troops prepared on the Don recently took Kiev and overthrew the régime of Skoropadski.

POLK

File No. 861.00/3395

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 10, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 6.20 p. m.]

6205. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, December 7:

[846.] Referring our telegram No. 845.<sup>2</sup> The powers of the Entente state through their special delegate, the French Consul at Kiev, that they will not permit that the work of the reestablishment of order and the reorganization of Russia begun by patriotic Russians and powerfully supported by the Allies shall be disturbed in any manner whatsoever. The regeneration of Russia as a power, forming part of the victorious group of democratic countries of the Entente, shall be carried out in conformity with the desire of all patriots and of all elements which stand for the maintenance of order in Russia, particularly as it effects the parts of southern Russia occupied as well as unoccupied by the Germans and threatened by Bolsheviks. The powers of the Entente declare their firm purpose to maintain order there. This decision will be carried out within the shortest possible period by an armed force as large as circumstances may require. Furthermore, they declare that from the present they will render personally responsible all political leaders for every attempt to create trouble and anarchy. The French Consul at Kiev declares the Entente powers intend to support, with all their force, the existing authority at Kiev represented by the hetman and his government, in the hope that he will be able to maintain order in the cities and provinces until the arrival of the Allied troops in the country. The soldiers of the Entente powers do not desire to enter your territory as enemies or police. They come as friends of people who for two years have fought in the same ranks. Every attack upon the existing authorities, every revolt which will render [harder] the task of the Allies, will be severely punished. The Entente powers urge you to preserve calm, to return to your work, and to aid in the maintenance of order.

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> For the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council on Sept. 3, 1918, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supplement 1, vol. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.

File No. 861.00/3401

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 11, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 3.46 p. m.]

6218. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy, dated Army of the Danube, December 7:

[845.] The Russian delegation having brought to our notice the immediate necessity of a denunciatory declaration to the Bolsheviks we have charged the French Consul at Kiev to make it in our name. We did not hesitate to do this so as to prepare, as far as possible, the channels for an intervention on the part of the Allies; although the decisions of the Entente in this regard have not yet been notified to us. We send in our telegram in plain language No. 846<sup>1</sup> the text of this declaration. The first part was drafted at Jassy, the second part to the present government of Kiev was added there by the French Consul. Exercising the latitude which we had given him he considered, in view of the local situation, that without making engagements any time for the future the present system of government should be supported as it represented the only organization which could at present be utilized against Bolshevism.

SHARP

File No. 860e.01/2

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, December 11, 1918, midnight.

[Received December 12, 8.03 a. m.]

6240. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated November 27:

The government of the Ukraine has communicated to us a note bearing principally on the following points:

(1) Formation of a new Ministry which has declared itself in favor of the reconstitution of the unity of Russia, and has decided to take a definite part in the struggle against the Bolsheviks.

(2) Request for the immediate sending of Allied delegates to Kiev. The Consul of France has already left for his post there and has been invited to make in the name of the Allied Ministers a joint declaration against Bolshevism. The state of anarchy of the country and the interruption of all channels of communication have so far prevented him from going beyond Odessa.

(3) Request for the immediate sending of four battalions; viz., two to Kiev and two to Odessa.

(4) Request for the immediate occupation of the railroad to Odessa at the two following points: Zhmerinka and Birzula. It

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

is estimated that this operation can be carried out by four battalions, three being assigned to the first point and one to the second. A French torpedo boat and an English torpedo boat having arrived at Galatz, the French and British Ministers have wired them to go immediately to Odessa.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3347

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1918, 6 p. m.

. . . For your information. Allied powers other than the United States have issued statement that they propose to restore order in the Ukraine by lending friendly support and assistance to the authorities established there. It is understood that British and French troops are already arriving at Sevastopol and Odessa for this purpose. . . .

POLK

File No. 861.00/3448

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, December 16, 1918.

[Received December 17, 6.40 a. m.]

3347. . . . Reports from Berlin: Kiev besieged by troops of Ukrainian National League which captured all Ukraine. Political situation very favorable to this league. . . .

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3528

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUCHAREST, December 19, 1918, [5 p. m.]

[Received December 25, 10.35 a. m.]

17. Referring to Department's telegram No. 243, I beg to report that I have some of the best information I have ever received from Czech who left Moscow six weeks ago and from a Russian officer, born Czech, who came from Kiev a few days ago. Both of them were living in Russia a very long time and know the conditions prevailing there very well.

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in China.

The following information about the Bolsheviks they obtained directly from highest [officers] Bolshevik army. The main guards are formed of Austrian and Hungarian war prisoners, further about 50,000 Letts from the Baltic provinces, and about 40,000 Chinese workmen. The balance, more than half million men, are Russians who are taken into the army by compulsion and regular mobilization, as, unless they enter, they get nothing to eat and their lives are in peril. In Moscow there are many Americans, French, English, and Czecho-Slovaks arrested and in terrible conditions. Hunger is prevailing everywhere and unless help reaches them immediately they will probably all die from hunger and the only way they can save themselves is to join the Bolshevik army, and now even the Bolshevik army is getting very low with their supplies. . . .

In Kiev the situation is as follows: Kiev held by about 15,000 Russian officers and some Ukrainian soldiers under the high commandant Dolgorukov. Skoropadski is still the hetman of Ukrainia. The Germans before they left gave all ammunition and rifles and everything else which they had on hand to Petlyura who used to be the official storekeeper of the Russian Government. He is now head of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine and he is gaining ground; it is feared that he will take Odessa where now only two French regiments are at present. And unless the Allied armies will be able to come to the rescue soon it is expected Kiev also will be taken by the Bolsheviks. Denikin<sup>1</sup> army is far from Kiev; the strength of this army is uncertain but the correct estimate is about 25,000 men. Please do not place very much confidence in it; I have no faith in it.

My colleague, the French Minister, told me yesterday it will be necessary to have a volunteer army in Russia and that means in his opinion that some of the French soldiers object to serving any more, claiming that the war is already ended. General Berthelot expects to engage some Rumanian and Greek troops under French commanding officers, but I am afraid this combination will not work very well.

. . . further says that in Russia now exists a great organization [agitation?] against the Jews and it is generally believed that the *pogrom* will take place when the Allied army enters Russia from the south. Taking into consideration the steady growth of Bolsheviks, the present situation in Russia is very dangerous. I again ask that our army be sent to Russia for the reasons which I stated in my previous telegrams.

VOPICKA

---

<sup>1</sup> Gen. A. I. Denikin, who was successively chief of staff and commander of the western and of the southwestern fronts under the Provisional Government, had succeeded Kornilov at the head of the Volunteer Army.

File No. 861.00/3541

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUCHAREST, *December 21, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[Received December 27, 8 p. m.]

23. Referring to my telegram of December 13 [19], 5 p. m., No. 17, I beg to add that this morning a committee of Ukrainians, representing public organizations which are most influential, called on me and stated that Petlyura does not lead the Bolshevik army as is reported, but the republican army, which is fighting for independence of Ukraina against Hetman Skoropadski, who favors the federation system for Russia. They, however, stated that also reformed Bolsheviks joined this republican army. They claim that Ukrainians should have the right to regulate themselves, and this right should be recognized by the Allies. They make also a positive statement that they will eradicate Bolshevism in Ukraina themselves. I shall investigate this new important movement fully and report later.

VOPICKA

File No. 861.00/3505

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, *undated.*

[Received December 22, 1918, 12.55 a. m.]

3377. . . . Reports from Kiev: Nikolaev, Zhitomir, and Berdichev been occupied by troops Directory. Commander chief Ukrainian troops Kiev requested authorities take steps against every attempt of arbitrary house examinations, arrests, and maintain order, peace. Decrees issued by commander chief hetman group regarding mobilization of population Kiev been annulled. Ukrainian General Staff declares all rumors spread lately that Bolsheviks advancing Ukrainian frontier inaccurate. . . .

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3567

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *January 2, 1919, 1 p. m.*

[Received January 3.]

3424. Prominent editor just from Kiev reports following: Skoropadski's government fell without serious resistance. Hatred of



peasants toward Germans and landlords account past persecutions tremendous. Petlyura, leader of nationalists, has 150,000 trained troops at least. German-Austrian troops are reported neutral and even cooperating. Agreement to that effect stated to exist. An understanding between Petlyura and Moscow is suspected and support of local Bolsheviks is certain. Petlyura's program is for a coalition government from socialists, federalists to Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks not included but recognized as legal opposition. Denikin reported to have 120,000 troops. Krasnov's Cossacks are tainted with Bolshevism. Dutov's <sup>1</sup> forces are considered reconstructed. The editor who is disturbed thinks Petlyura's government is a forerunner of the Bolshevik government and foresees possibility of the Moscow-Berlin-Kiev combination. Petlyura is reported conducting negotiations with Allies. French Consul Henot at Odessa in name Allies supported Skoropadski and other extremely reactionary elements preceding fall of Kiev.

MORRIS

---

<sup>1</sup> Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.

## CHAPTER V

### BESSARABIA

The Moldavian Republic: Military Support by Rumania—Announcement by the Soviet Government of a State of War with Rumania: Expulsion of the Rumanian Minister and Sequestration of Rumanian Gold—Agreement between Rumania and the Soviet Government, March 9, 1918—Union of Bessarabia with Rumania, April 9, 1918

File No. 861.00/886

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, December 28, 1917, 6 p. m.

[Received December 31, 1.35 a. m.]

202. Yesterday V. Cristi, director of internal affairs, I. Pelivan, director of external affairs, of the new republic of Bessarabia named Moldavia called upon me, being introduced by Rumanian Minister Interior. Inkulets is president of Parliament and Erhan president of the Council. This new republic expects to be federal state like Ukraine if Russia forms federal government. It is opposed to Bolshevik régime and friendly to the Allies.

VOPICKA

File No. 763.72/8677

*The Rumanian Minister (Angelesco) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1918.

[Received January 28.]

MR. SECRETARY: My government directs me to inform your excellency that upon an agreement reached with the government of the Moldavian republic of Bessarabia and General Shcherbachev, commander in chief of the Russian army at the Rumanian front, it has placed Rumanian troops at the disposal of the aforesaid government.

The measure was taken in consequence of the progress lately made by anarchy in Bessarabia which severely threatened the re-victualing and lines of communication of the armies at the Rumanian front.

But a few days ago armed bands arrested in the station at Kishinev Rumanian officers sent on parleys and going to Odessa

on leave, insulted and robbed them and after detaining them a few hours sent them back to Jassy by force.

Another act of extreme gravity is the capturing by the revolutionists of trains carrying supplies for the Russian army at the Rumanian front.

In order to prevent a recurrence of such acts, which are likely to starve the army and drive it into disorderliness and plundering, the Rumanian Government in accord with the government of the Moldavian republic of Bessarabia and General Shcherbachev has placed its troops at the disposal of that government.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

DR. ANGELESCO

File No. 763.72119/1209

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract<sup>1</sup>]

PETROGRAD, January 27, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received January 30, 10.31 a. m.]

2293. Trotsky, speaking last night to Soviet over two hours . . . stated war existed between Rumania and Russia and Rumanian Minister would be given passports immediately. . . .

Saw Rumanian Minister 6 o'clock when had received no communication from Soviet, but was packing preparatory leaving. Said not heard from Government for fifteen days and knew nothing of occurrences there; that Bessarabia had declared independence and Rumania irresponsible for occurrences in Moldavian republic, which name assumed by Bessarabia. . . .

FRANCIS

File No. 701.7161/7

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, January 29, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received February 4, 10.27 a. m.]

2300. Rumanian Minister received notice 3 o'clock yesterday to leave within ten hours. He sent his secretary to the Foreign Office requesting twelve hours' extension because Legation numbered about hundred and because of difficulty in packing and procuring transportation to station. Secretary was told must observe order or

<sup>1</sup> Printed in vol. I, p. 359.

abide consequences whereupon Rumanian Minister asked my intercession. I telephoned Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister being absent, and was asked to come to Foreign Office by Zalkind, assistant secretary of Minister. Called Robins who cheerfully went and reported after 11 that Zalkind demanded compliance with order. Having learned Legation had gone station, I went there myself and found that Minister had special train which left 1 o'clock for Torneã without guard other than fifteen Rumanian soldiers. Minister told me communication with Jassy severed and was unacquainted with conditions in Rumania. What is the situation there?

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/8728

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 1, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 2, 1.21 p. m.]

3122. Joint telegram from Ministers of United States, England, France, and Italy dated Jassy, January 30:

The president of the Council has to-day communicated the telegram which he addressed to the representatives of our governments in Rumania informing them of the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Maximalist government and the seizure of the Rumanian state funds deposited at Moscow. At the same time he made known to us the request of the Ukrainian government to send Rumanian troops to Kiev, Poltava, and Odessa. Regarding the first point Mr. Bratianu asks how the Allied powers intend showing their solidarity with Rumania. He recalls that the measures, moreover indispensable, taken against the Maximalists were adopted in agreement with the Allied powers. He apprehends the consequence of the rupture with the government of Petrograd on the Russian troops of this front as this rupture will only confirm an accomplished fact. As regards the state funds, he considers them as guaranteed by the Allied powers. Regarding the situation in the Ukraine, considers that it implied [appears?] very threatening for Rumania whether the Kiev government signs spontaneously a separate peace or not, as in the latter case an Austro-German invasion is to be feared. Thus, as we have often stated, the only means of coming to the aid of Rumania and of seriously improving the situation in Russia whilst protecting the Allies against fresh attacks, would be the sending of inter-Allied troops. The request for assistance of the Ukrainian government to Rumania, who is the most unpopular of the Allied powers in Russia, confirms that an international expedition will be welcomed with the greatest satisfaction by all the elements of order.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1050

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, February 1, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 3, 10.37 p. m.]

25. Replying to the Department's circular January 29, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> I beg to report that I have no means of communication with Petrograd and the other Russian towns except Kiev and Odessa through military wireless. Last American courier left here January 12 and since then there have been no couriers.

General [Mackensen?] notified Rumanian Consul to send representative to Focșani to discuss armistice as they claim that new situation is created by the severing of diplomatic relations with Rumania by the Bolsheviki. No time limit was stipulated but it was intimated that negotiations should begin as soon as possible. Prime Minister will call military and ministerial meeting to-morrow to decide on future action. He does not appear to be downcast but Rumania is and feels with us [used up?]. My opinion is that if Germany will return occupied territory with the exception of Silistria and permit Rumanians to occupy Bessarabia Rumania will make separate peace. Nothing else left for Rumania to do and if Bolsheviki obtain upper hand in Ukrainia and south Russia they would be worse enemies than Germany. The Allied Ministers will endeavor to have armistice prolonged and have no action taken. I believe nothing will be done unless Germany threatens attack Rumania.

Rumanians have about 50,000 soldiers in Bessarabia. Rumanians have occupied Kishinev and [entering] Bendery to-day. It is impossible ship food from Bessarabia to Rumania unless Rumanians in the control of railroad between Kishinev and Jassy and therefore Rumanian intervention was necessary.

Believing that the Department has no report from Russia, report that fight took place yesterday in Odessa between the Bolsheviki and other factions. A great many killed and about 5,000 wounded. Shall endeavor to obtain information regarding Russia from French and communicate the same to the Department. In Ukrainia fight is going on between the Bolsheviki and Ukrainians. Latest information is that Bolsheviki possess [omission?] arsenal. Bolsheviki do not wish Ukrainians make separate peace unless the whole of Russia does.

VOPICKA

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72/9269

*The Rumanian Minister (Angelesco) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: According to the most recent information from my Government, the Bolsheviki, considering themselves at war with Rumania, have in advance of a declaration of war, given an order for their troops to attack ours. The latter have been attacked in a most cowardly way at Pașcani, Galatz, and Dorohoi. Our troops resisted heroically and disarmed part of the Maximalists while the rest took refuge within the German lines. The city of Falticeni, which up to that time had sheltered the Russian troops, was then bombarded by them. At Kishinev, Odessa, and Bolgrad members of the Rumanian Parliament, as well as officers and officials of the Rumanian Government who formed the Inter-Allied Supply Commission, were arrested. Our treasure and our deposits which have been sent to Russia, an Allied country, after an understanding with the representatives of our other allies, have been sequestered and are now in the greatest danger. The Government representatives provided to guard these deposits have been arrested. The Rumanian Legation at Petrograd has been closed arbitrarily and the Rumanian Minister and his staff have been ordered to leave the city promptly. Our consuls, subjected to threats and maltreatment, have been exposed to all kinds of risks. The Commissaires of the People have even decreed the arrest of His Majesty the King.

This extremely grave state of affairs is one of the consequences of the military measures which the Rumanian Government took in favor of the Ukrainians and which had been requested in writing in a very pressing way by the representatives of all our Allies, including the American Minister.

My Government directs me to call the attention of the Government of the United States to the situation which has been created for us. Rumania once more suffers the consequences of undertaking responsibilities which are not ours alone.

Accept [etc.]

DR. ANGELESCO

File No. 871.51/110

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, February 2, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received February 7, 10.10 p. m.]

2323. Also for Secretary of the Treasury:

Allied Ambassadors conclude present status unalterable until result of peace negotiations determined, consequently no meeting of the Diplomatic Corps or Allied chiefs at present.

French Ambassador submitted cable from Paris suggesting joint protest by French, British, American Consuls, Moscow, against interference with 600,000,000 gold lei stored in the Kremlin by Rumania for safety and of which the Soviet government taken possession saying same held for Rumanian people but not for present Rumanian Government. French Foreign Office asks such action because says this gold pledged to Allies to secure advances to Rumania. Having no official advice on the subject I opportunely requested joint action. Furthermore gold was deposited in the Kremlin when Jassy threatened and before we made advances to Rumania. All finally concurred in submitting question to respective Governments and awaiting instructions. How much advance to Rumania?

FRANCIS

---

File No. 763.72/9289

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Rumanian Minister  
(Angelesco)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 2, 1918, and to assure you that this Government does not fail to appreciate the difficult situation created by Rumania's resistance to the Bolshevik authorities and the consequent declaration of hostility by the Bolshevik government.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

---

File No. 871.51/111

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, February 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received February 9, 4.33 a. m.]

2345. British, French colleagues asking whether received reply to my inquiry in my 2323. Shall I direct Consul, Moscow, to join protest?

FRANCIS

---

File No. 763.72/8677

*The Secretary of State to the Rumanian Minister (Angelesco)*

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 25, 1918,<sup>1</sup> in which you inform me that in consequence of

---

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 707.

the progress lately made by anarchy in Bessarabia, your Government, upon an agreement reached with the government of the Moldavian republic of Bessarabia and General Shcherbachev, commander in chief of the Russian Army at the Rumanian front, has placed Rumanian troops at the disposal of the Government of that Republic.

Thanking you for this information, I beg to renew [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 871.51/110

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

2060. Your 2323 and 2345. Inasmuch as the United States had not entered the war at the time the original arrangement for the deposit of the Rumanian funds was made, the Department is disposed to feel that this Government should not take part in the joint protest. You may, however, instruct the Consul General at Moscow to take an occasion to bring to the attention of the Soviet authorities the injustice which they are reported to be contemplating. The funds in question belong to a friendly Government which has been recognized and supported by the people of Rumania throughout their struggle against military imperialism of Central powers and any action to sequester these funds is an act of injustice incompatible with principles to which this Government is dedicated.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/8936

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 20, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received February 21, 6.11 a. m.]

3220. Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers dated Jassy, February 19:

The news of the rupture of the armistice between Russia and the Central Empires makes the situation here appear more inextricable. It is in fact foreseen that as Russia is incapable of the least resistance, the enemy troops will invade her without fighting, thereupon completely surround Rumania. On the other hand the Maximalist Committee of Odessa, presided over by well-known agitator, the Rumanian-Bulgarian Rakovski, has just sent an ultimatum to the Rumanian Government summoning it to evacuate Bessarabia and formulating other unacceptable demands. This attitude of the Maximalists, in spite of the efforts of the Allies to disarm them, confirms the impression among the Rumanians that in case of a German offen-



sive, all retreat on the Russian side is cut off for them. Resulting immediately after the rupture of the German-Russian armistice, the new provocation against Rumania, which disposes of the sole army of all the oriental front which could be used against the Germans, proves to what extent the troops of the Central Empires are assured of meeting with no obstacles in Russia. We repeat that under these conditions no new effort on our part can delay the conclusion of peace unless the Germans formulate absolutely unacceptable demands. Even in this event the resistance could only be of short duration, the Allied powers not having been up to now in a position to constitute in Russia a base of retreat for the Russian Army.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8980

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 23, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received February 24, 3.06 a. m.]

3241. Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy dated February 22:

Without even waiting for the reply of the Rumanian Government to their ultimatum and without taking into account the negotiations which they themselves had initiated, the Maximalists of Odessa have arrested Rumanians among whom are numerous members of Parliament who are retained in a hold of the war vessel *Sozho* where they are undergoing the most barbarous treatment. We have telegraphed to our consuls to protest energetically in our name. At the request of the president of the Council and of the president of the Chambers, we urge our Governments that all steps may be taken for the immediate liberation and repatriation of the Rumanians of Odessa. These grave incidents, which emphasize the difficulty of the retreat into Russia, exercise the most unfortunate reaction recorded on peace negotiations.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/1276

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1918.

[Received March 8.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government informs me that it has received, with a request that it be transmitted to several governments, among these that of the United States, a telegram dated at Kishinev by which the "Moldavian Republic" gives notice of its having been constituted.

I have the honor to transmit herewith to your excellency, in compliance with the instructions I have received, the text of the telegram which the Government of the Republic forwarded to me in this connection.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pichon) to the Ambassador at Washington (Jusserand)*

PARIS, March 5, 1918.

[Received March 6.]

No. 590. Please transmit to the Federal Government the following telegram which has been sent to me with a request that I communicate it to it.

KISHINEV, 11/24 February, 1918.

To the Government of the French Republic, at Paris, with a request that the same text be also transmitted to the governments of the following countries:

To the Government of the Republic of the United States.

The Government of the Moldavian Republic constituted in the territory lying between the Dniester and the Prut has the honor to inform the Royal Government (*sic*) that by a vote of the Moldavian Parliament named Sfatul Tarei on January 24 (old style) the Moldavian Republic, which until January 24, 1918, formed part of the federation of the other republics constituted in the territory of the former Russian Empire, proclaimed its independence.

The Government of the Moldavian Republic earnestly prays the Royal Government (*sic*) to take note of the said declaration and to recognize the existence of the Moldavian Republic as an independent state possessing absolute national sovereignty.

We beg the Royal Government (*sic*) to reply to the Government of the Moldavian Republic at Kishinev and to recognize the Moldavian Republic as being sovereign independent (state).

CIUGUREANO, *President of the Council of Ministers*  
PELIVAN, *Minister of Foreign Affairs*

PICHON

File No. 861.00/1276

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2101

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 6, 1918, advising me that your Government has received, with the request that its contents be made known to the several governments, including that of the United States, a telegram, dated at Kishinev., announcing the constitution of the "Moldavian Republic."

In reply I have the honor to say that the question seems to be one the consideration of which should be deferred owing to the unsettled conditions which now exist.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1591

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 11, 1918.

[Received April 16, 4 p. m.]

337. Following is text Russo-Rumanian treaty dated March 9:

TREATY BETWEEN RUMANIA AND RUSSIA

ARTICLE 1

Rumania agrees to evacuate Bessarabia during the course of two months. She will evacuate immediately the strategic point of Zhebriany (the position is situated at the lower end of the bay near the mouth of the Danube). All positions evacuated by the Rumanians will be immediately occupied by Russian troops. By the end of two months there will remain in Bessarabia only one detachment of 10,000 men to guard the depots and railway lines.

ARTICLE 2

And [at] the signing of the treaty Bessarabian guard passes into the hands of the local, city and country militia. The Rumanian military commander gives up the right of arrest and all judiciary and administrative functions generally and these will pertain exclusively to the elected local authorities.

ARTICLE 3

Rumanian subjects arrested in Russia will be exchanged for the Russian revolutionary officers and soldiers arrested in Rumania.

ARTICLE 4

Rumania agrees not to take any hostile military or other action against the Russian Republican Federation of Councils of Workmen and Peasants and will not attempt to support those made by other states.

ARTICLE 5

Russia agrees to put at the disposition of Rumania the excess grain in Bessarabia after the needs of the local population and the Russian troops have been satisfied. On the other hand Rumania has the right to purchase from the rest of Russia the products necessary to sustain the Rumanian population now located in Bessarabia (fish, fats, sugar, grain, etc.).

ARTICLE 6

Russia returns to Rumania the food distribution points constructed by the Allies and destined for the alimentation of the Rumanian population.

ARTICLE 7

In case the Rumanian Army is forced to abandon Rumanian territory it will find refuge and sustenance on Russian soil.

ARTICLE 8

In case of equal sections against enemies states and their allies contact will establish itself between the high Russian command of the Russian armies, the Councils and the Rumanians.

## ARTICLE 9

For the solution of eventual conflicts between Rumania and the Russian Federation of Councils of Workmen and Peasants there is formed an international commission at Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, Petrograd, Jassy and Galatz of representatives of Russia, Rumania, England, France and the United States.

## ARTICLE 10

By reason of the aforesaid agreement the Rumanian Consul General at Moscow has proposed to the Commissary of Foreign Affairs the revival of official relations and the restitution to Rumania of the distributing depots in Russia. The Commissary has agreed to the first point and has proposed to make the international commission look to the treaty for the realization of all the points of the treaty.

The courier with official text not yet arrived but am assured foregoing is correct and that there are a few unimportant additions which will be transmitted as soon as possible.

SUMMERS

File No. 763.72119/1531

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 29, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received March 30, 4.44 p. m.]

46. Robins wires following:

Minister for Foreign Affairs sends me following:

In view of liquidation of the conflict between Russian Soviet Republic and Rumania, the Minister for Foreign Affairs offered to the Rumanian Consul General, Moscow, to begin negotiations for settlement of issues involved in accordance with agreement made in Odessa and by the mixed commission. In above-mentioned commission, it was arranged to have representatives of England, Germany, and the United States.

The note was handed me without instructions. I forward to you and await your orders.

This was my first information on the subject. Have you any? Kühlmann has protested to Soviet government against my statement to Russian people that my Government did not recognize separate peace but still considers America ally of the Russian people.<sup>1</sup> It was not my intention to please Germany, and I was indifferent concerning effect upon the Russian Government, but thought was reflecting our governmental policy and think no serious complications will eventuate therefrom.

FRANCIS

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 440.

File No. 763.72119/1558

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received 9.15 p. m.]

3545. Following joint telegram of Allied Ministers dated Jassy, April 5:

The Commissioner of the People for Foreign Affairs has advised the French Consul General at Moscow of proposition to bring to end the conflict between the Maximalists and Rumania. This proposition which comes too late, no longer appears, as regards the representatives of the Allied powers, in harmony with the new situation. First, our intervention on this point would be prompted by the preoccupation [*sic*] of prolonging the resistance of Rumania and rendering possible by means of a *rapprochement* between her and the Maximalists the revictualing of the army and its eventual retreat into Russia; secondly, one of the essential points of the matters in dispute, viz., the exchange of interned persons and hostages, has already been settled between the Rumanian Government and the Soviets of Odessa and Sevastopol through the intermediary of Colonel Fuller [Boyle?]. If we ourselves intervene in the negotiations relative to the Rumanian treaty at Moscow, we should risk giving Maximalists an opportunity to raise other questions, in particular that of the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia, which would embarrass our Governments. Under these circumstances it would be preferable to leave to the Rumanian Government the duty of soliciting our intervention if it is thought proper to do so.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1564

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 10, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 11, 3.11 a. m.]

3568. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers, dated Jassy, April 9:

The union of Bessarabia and Rumania appears imminent. The president of the Council left yesterday for Kishinev in order to accelerate this step. We have held ourselves aloof from the recent negotiations on this subject. When the event is an accomplished fact, it would be well to favorably comment thereon in the Allied press, so as to frustrate the efforts which the Austro-Germans will doubtless make to claim the merit for themselves.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1588

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

JASSY, April 10, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 12, 10.48 a. m.]

68. It was published in this morning's *Monitor Official*, the official organ of the Government, that Doctor Angelesco, the Rumanian Minister to our country, was officially recalled forthwith March 25. This recall is simply on account of the change of government.

The following is a proclamation of the Government to the citizens of Jassy:

With the greatest happiness we bring to your knowledge that the Sfatul Țarei, council of the country of Bessarabia, voted on the evening of April 9 the union with Rumania. The Prime Minister, Alexander Marghiloman, who is at Kishinev, will take portfolio in the name of the Rumanian people and of His Majesty Ferdinand of [by] the vote of a [the] Sfatul Țarei.

VOPICKA

File No. 763.72119/1587

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 13, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received April 14, 2 a. m.]

3595. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, April 12:

The union of Bessarabia and Rumania was proclaimed unanimously except for five votes yesterday [*sic*] at Kishinev by the Bessarabian assembly with the reservation, however, of a wide autonomy. It appears from a recent speech of Count Czernin that the Central powers have declared that they place no opposition on this union. We confirm that in order to prevent them from making capital of this event, it should be sympathetically welcomed, all the more so as this application of the principle of nationalities sanctioned by the vote of a free assembly seems entirely in agreement with the program of the Entente. The event appears in conformity with our interests. Being too weak to guarantee her independence by her own means, and cut off from greater Russia, Bessarabia has no other alternative than to unite with Rumania or the Ukraine which has voluntarily become an Austrian-German colony.

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Consulate at Saloniki (No. 58).

File No. 763.72119/1606

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, April 18, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received April 20, 7 a. m.]

72. In addition to the telegram of the Allied Ministers of yesterday, I beg to ask for instructions regarding the recognition by our Government of the union of Bessarabia [with] Rumania.<sup>1</sup> The present Germanophile government of Rumania makes much of this annexation claiming that Rumania is larger than before, even with the loss of Dobruja, and is taking the credit for it although it has no right to it. The Germans in permitting this union advertise [obviously?] had in view a plan to make the Rumanians fight with them against the Bolsheviks. There are rumors being circulated here that the Germans have already made demands that the Rumanians send a few divisions of their soldiers to Ukrainia to protect the depots which the Rumanians have there and to help the Germans make order. However, I believe, together with my colleagues, that the King will never consent to send an army into Ukrainia for the purpose, and that Rumania at present will refuse to assist the Germans in their scheme in Ukrainia. Therefore it is very important that [how?] this union of Bessarabia [with] Rumania is treated by our Government and the Allies. Word came from Bucharest that peace will not be signed for thirty days. Russian officers here are displeased with the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania.

VOPICKA

File No. 861.00/1623

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 20, 1918.

[Received 7.54 p. m.]

1920. Swedish press publishes Wolff bureau report from Kiev stating Ukrainian Central Rada has refused to recognize Bessarabia's union with Rumania and demanded separation from Bessarabia of portions that wish Ukrainian people's republic. Ukrainian Central Rada has requested council to address protest to Rumania and Central powers. While refusing to regard proclamation of April 9 as decisive, Ukrainian Central Rada calls on council of Ministers to

<sup>1</sup> Note, dated May 7, in the margin of telegram: "Secretary decided to take no action."

take every step towards immediate deciding Bessarabia's fate on basis of approval of Ukrainian people's republic and in agreement with wishes of whole Bessarabian population.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72119/1621

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, undated.

[Received April 27, 1918, 2.28 a. m.]

397. Following is résumé interview with Rakovski, chief, Rumanian department, Russian Commissariat Foreign Affairs, published 19th, *Svoboda Rossii*, formerly *Russkoe Slovo*:

Exact information Rumanian situation lacking but apparent that owing German influence Rumania is unable conduct affairs independently or beneficially to herself. Treaty gives Central powers extraordinary right export grain, naphtha, and most probably power to quote own prices.<sup>1</sup> This economic dependence seriously affects interests Rumanian peasants. Rumania has lost all Dobruja and part Wallachia to Austria, thus establishing direct communication Bulgaria, with total loss 35,000 square kilometers. Most important loss economically Black Sea coast although Danube frontiers not yet decided. Possible this territory to Bulgaria but more likely Sulinsk Canal district to Austria, as advices from Jassy indicate Germany considers Bulgaria stronger than intended which explains occupation Sulinsk and Sulina by Austrian troops.

Frontier Bessarabia, as ceded to Rumania, running along Dniester cannot be considered final as Rumanian interests identical with those Ukrainian Rada which is chiefly interested [in] annexation provinces Akkerman and Khotin while Austria also desires latter. Kiev Rada now negotiating with Rumania regarding these provinces but whatever agreement reached will not receive sanction international jurisprudence as Bessarabia is part of Russia and sanction People's Commissars necessary; moreover, population will oppose cession, while for Rumania annexation of millions of revolutionary peasants means spread of civil war to Rumanian soil.

Same journal publishes telegram from Chicherin to Prime Minister, Rumania, which characterizes annexation Bessarabia as challenge to Russian Republic and complete violation treaty which provides evacuation within two months, also as an act of violence against population which telegram says protested unanimously against Rumanian occupation and insisted upon evacuation Rumanian troops at meeting peasants Moldavian republic at Kishinev [in] January.

SUMMERS

<sup>1</sup> Treaty of Bucharest between Rumania and the Central powers, signed May 7, 1918; see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supplement 1, vol. I.



File No. 763.72119/1633

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 3, 1918.

[Received May 4, 10 a. m.]

1999. Swedish press reports People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs on April 18 sent following telegram Rumanian Premier:

Your *communiqué* to European press, announcing representatives Bessarabia proclaimed union with Rumania and that you regard Bessarabia in future as integral part of Rumania, constitutes challenge to Federative Russian Soviet Republic and flagrant violation of agreement concluded between your predecessor and Russia as to evacuation of Bessarabia within two months. Bessarabia's union with Rumania, moreover, constitutes violation of opinion of local population which has openly pronounced against Rumanian occupation. Your attempt make what is expression of desire only of landed proprietors stand for desire also of Bessarabian peasants and workers evidences complete lack insight, also demands international law. The enforced incorporation of Bessarabia with Rumania will not extinguish brotherly solidarity uniting labor masses of Russia and Bessarabia. Foreign Commissariat, Chicherin.

MORRIS

## CHAPTER VI

### FINLAND

Indefinite Relations with the Russian Provisional Government—Autonomy Law Passed by the Diet, July 18, 1917—Dissolution of the Diet; Elections of October 2, 1917—Labor Disturbances in Protest against Bourgeois Control

File No. 861.00/399

*The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State*

No. 314

PETROGRAD, June 2, 1917.

[Received June 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that in the first days following the revolution, the Temporary Government in consultation with Finnish representatives issued a decree abrogating all the encroachments on Finnish constitutional rights made by the old régime in recent years. It was held that the suzerain rights over Finland had passed from the Grand Duke of Finland, Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, to the Temporary Government, together with all other rights held by Nicholas II in general. It was understood that these rights of the Temporary Government would be handed by it to the Constitutional Assembly. This was accepted by all Finns during the first weeks of the revolution.

The first public expression of a different attitude on the part of the Finns was shown in a speech made by the Social Democrat Tokoi, vice president of the Finnish Senate, who indicated that a certain current of opinion in Finland considered the question of Finland's future connection to Russia an open question.<sup>1</sup>

Soon it was more prominently and unambiguously stated publicly that the Russian revolution had destroyed the juridical bond between Finland and Russia which had existed only in the person of Nicholas II. This opinion denies that the Temporary Government has inherited any rights of sovereignty regarding Finland and, consequently, that the Finnish question will not be within the jurisdiction of the Russian Constitutional Convention, that the relations of Russia and Finland can only be established by the will of the Finnish people itself and by international treaty. Some partisans of this view declare that Finland's relations to Russia ought never to be of a federal nature as this will injure Finland in the interests of Russia.

---

<sup>1</sup> See also the Consul's despatch No. 297, Apr. 30, vol. I, p. 34.

In this connection two clear lines of opinion among the Russian socialists have appeared. The moderate socialists, those now taking part in the government or not openly inimical to any socialist participation in government in a *bourgeois* state, take the attitude of the Temporary Government, whereas the irreconcilable Maximalist socialists, now opposing the Temporary Government in Russia, entirely favor immediate and complete Finnish independence.

The immediate aspect of the question rests on the mode of confirmation of laws passed by the Finnish Seim. The Temporary Government claims a right to pass finally on these laws that was formerly held by Nicholas as Grand Duke of Finland. The particular case in hand is the confirmation of the law regarding the regulation of food supplies and trading rights of Russian subjects in Finland recently adopted by the Seim. During the debates the Finnish Social Democrats and the Swedish party took a decided stand in favor of complete and immediate independence; namely, that the Russian Temporary Government has no right to pass on these laws. The Seim eventually adopted a resolution stating that the two laws under consideration should be confirmed by the Temporary Government but that the Seim's consent must not be taken as a precedent, the Seim reserving its right to a later and final decision.

Since this the influential Swedish organ in Helsingfors, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, states that the immediate and complete autonomy of Finland in regard to all internal affairs is the present minimum demand of all Finnish political parties, but that eventually full independence will be necessary to the Finns.

The Temporary Government [is] now deliberating two questions raised by the Finns: first, that Finland should be given the full parliamentary system, namely, that administrative officials now appointed by the Temporary Government should be responsible to the Seim and Senate; and, secondly, that there should be a supreme administrative court. Finns are now, according to the well-informed *Rech* of this city, negotiating with the Temporary Government in regard to these two demands, and are insisting that nothing whatever be made public regarding the nature or progress of these negotiations. They further demand that when their demands are granted, this grant should be made not only by Russia but should be further guaranteed by other powers. The *Rech's* source further stated that the Finns will give no direct answer to the Temporary Government queries regarding the status of the Jews in Finland. The restrictions on Jews in Finland in regard to carrying on trade, being witnesses in legal proceedings, and marrying without special permit have not yet been abolished.

While in Helsingfors, Minister of War Kerensky spoke as follows:

We will do this (end the war) and will pay no attention to what governments and people do who do not understand magnanimity. It shows, comrades, how careful one must be and how often other people try to reap ugly profits from the simplicity and open-heartedness of the Russian people. And here in Finland (raising his voice) we must be especially careful because not only the Germans alone may misunderstand our magnanimity and love as weakness. The revolution is creative strength and let no one think that the Russian revolutionary people is weaker than the old Tsarism, and that it need not be taken into account.

This speech aroused much comment in the Helsingfors press. The *Hufvudstadsbladet* says that Russia must not forget that all Finnish parties are united on the question of Finland's relations to Russia, and the *Svenska Tidningen* declares that the Russian Temporary Government is preparing to commit its first violation of the principle it proclaimed itself, that every nation has the right to determine its own future.

It was reported here recently that the Finnish Social-Democrats, then attending the Socialist conference at Stockholm, declared that Russian-Finnish relations should be included in the competency of the international socialist conferences and should also be handled by the official and general peace conference at the end of the war.

It is significant that the Swedish parties in Finland are leading this movement for immediate Finnish independence, and are being seconded in Russia particularly by the *New Life*, the Social Democrat Maximalist paper in Petrograd, which published the attempt to prove that the Entente Allies had made greater preparations for the war than the Central powers (see despatch No. 310 of May 29<sup>1</sup>) and is attacking the coalition Temporary Government and the present movement in Russia for an aggressive forward movement at the front. This same *New Life* also received the secret letter from the Bulgarian envoy in Berlin mentioned in despatch No. 315 of June 5.<sup>1</sup>

The strike movement in Finland is very large. It is stated that the strikes of hired farm laborers are particularly serious. There is a movement of the farm interests in all political parties to unite in a single party in defense of their interests and in the interests of the country at large, threatened by a serious diminution of the scanty Finnish breadstuffs crops this season.

So long as Russia refuses or is unable to send flour to Finland no steps will be taken to relieve the rate of exchange. The Bank of Finland has reduced the exchange on the ruble to 194 rubles for 100 marks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The present shortage of export from Russia to Finland has caused hardship in Finland which, since the war, is dependent to a large extent on Russia for cereals. If the shortage continues it may increase the growing Finnish dissatisfaction with the Russian revolutionary government.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

---

File No. 861.00/397

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 23, 1917.

[Received June 24, 1 a. m.]

480. Swedish telegram bureau publishes telegram from Helsingfors via Petrograd to-day that congress Finnish Social Democratic Party has adopted resolution demanding Finland be made independent republic and Russia be forbidden have troops there after war. Economic relations with Russia to be same as with other nations, establishment independent Finland to be decided by international agreement, otherwise insufficient guarantees for liberty.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/509

*The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 352

PETROGRAD, July 31, 1917.

[Received September 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 314 of June 2, 1917, on the revolutionary movement in Petrograd as affecting Finland. In that despatch it was stated that the first understanding of the mutual relations between Russia and Finland after the fall of the old régime was that the powers held by Nicholas II as Grand Duke of Finland passed, on his abdication, to the Russian Temporary Government which held them in custody to be handed over to the Russian Constitutional Convention. It was stated that this idea was first held both in Russia and in Finland, but that as time went on a Finnish movement gained strength, asserting that with the abdication of Nicholas II his rights over Finland did not pass to the Russian Temporary Government but reverted to the Finnish people.

As the Temporary Government in Petrograd has been growing weaker and weaker in the last months, especially during June and early July, under the influence of the pro-German Maximalist social-

ist propaganda, the Finnish separatist movement has been increasing in strength. This movement took form in the draft of a law declaring the Seim, the Finnish popular assembly, the supreme authority in the land, except as regards military matters and foreign affairs, which were left within the competence of the Russian Temporary Government.

This law has now been passed. It is expected that its immediate consequences, from the Finnish point of view, will be the abolishment of the Russian governor general in Helsingfors, the ending of the responsibility to Russian authority of the governors of the provinces in Finland, the recall of the Finnish government's representative in Petrograd, and the abolition of the Finnish Senate's responsibility to the Russian Government. The Senate is to be responsible to the Seim only.

The following translation of the report of the Seim debates that appeared in the Petrograd papers gives a picture of the conditions under which the law establishing the supreme right of the Seim was adopted by that body. . . .

The text of the law is as follows:<sup>1</sup>

After the end of the monarch's rights in Finland, may the following be in force, according to the will of the Seim in Finland:

1. The Finnish Seim declares, confirms and enforces all Finnish laws not excluding those affecting national economics, taxation and customs duties. The decision of the Seim is final in all other Finnish affairs that were formerly decided by the Emperor and Grand Duke on the basis of existing laws. The present law does not affect matters of foreign policy, military legislation or military control.

2. The current session of the Seim is called without special summons and is to last until a new form of government is established. According to paragraph 18 of the Seim rules, the Seim appoints new elections and decrees its own dissolution.

3. The Seim appoints the executive power in Finland. The supreme executive power temporarily belongs to the economic department of the Senate, whose members are appointed and dismissed by the Seim.

Aside from the nature of the law itself, in abolishing all Russian authority in Finland except that of "military legislation and control," the important points regarding it are that it was passed by the Social Democrats against the opposition of the *bourgeois* political parties, and that its passage was hastened by the news of the Maximalist socialist mutiny in Petrograd. The underlined portions<sup>2</sup> of Senator Tokoi's speech prove this. Tokoi even stated that the Temporary Government no longer existed, at the very moment it was

<sup>1</sup> Passed July 18, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> "The only obstacle in the way of such a solution of the question was the Russian Temporary Government. According to the latest information this obstacle does not exist any more."

regaining control of the situation in Petrograd. Schubergson's hint that the Finnish separatist movement had appealed to the Russian troops, who are largely Maximalists, further shows the reliance its leaders placed in the Socialist Maximalist movement against the Temporary Government.

As this despatch is closed it is announced, unofficially in the press, that the Temporary Government will refuse to recognize the law as passed, and will continue to maintain the Governor General in Finland. No intention to take active measures, however, is indicated. . . .

To-day it is announced that the Finnish Seim has been dissolved by the Temporary Government, exercising its right under the Finnish Constitution. The decree states, in substance, that according to the Finnish Constitution Finland only enjoys internal independence within the limits set by the mutual juridical relations between Finland and Russia, and that the very foundation of these relations is that one and the same legal person wields the supreme national authority in both countries. The decree continues that, with the abdication of Nicholas II, his powers as Grand Duke of Finland passed to the Temporary Government, and that the Temporary Government, by its oath of office, is bound to hand all its powers to the Russian Constitutional Convention. The law passed by the Seim is declared an infraction of the Finnish Constitution. The question is left for the Finnish people themselves to reconsider and therefore the present Seim is dissolved and a new one ordered to be elected to assemble not later than November 1 (old style).

When this decree was announced to the Finnish Senate by the Governor General, the Senate only voted to publish the decree by 7 to 6, the Social Democratic senators voting in the minority. The same day the Talman, or speaker, of the Seim, without reporting the decree, announced that its session was closed until further notice.

Below are given some of the Petrograd press comments on the dissolution . . . .

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

---

File No. 861.00/724

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

PETROGRAD, October 23, 1917.

[Received November 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of valuable interest to the Department, copies of three recent communications from Mr. Douglas Jenkins, American Consul temporarily detailed to Helsing-

fors, Finland, relative to the political and financial situation in that province. The communications are dated October 5, 11,<sup>1</sup> and 12 respectively.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure 1]

*The American Consul at Helsingfors (Jenkins) to the American Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

HELSINGFORS, October 5, 1917.

SIR: In an order recently published by the commandant of the Sveaborg fortress here advising the families of all Russian officials to leave because of the scarcity of food, it was intimated very strongly that while it was possible to obtain accommodations on the railways at present, conditions in the near future might be such that no one would be able to get away from Helsingfors.

I am arranging to have a translation of this order made and will forward it to the Embassy as soon as it has been done.<sup>1</sup> While it is not clear just what the commandant means the inference is that an attack on the part of the Germans is expected on the Finnish coast, in the event of which the railways would have so much to do in the movement of troops and military supplies that no civilian passengers could be carried.

It is possible, of course, that in his desire to induce the families of Russian officials to leave, the commandant may have intimated a little more than was actually necessary. At any rate I shall pay close attention to the situation and keep the Embassy informed, either by post or by telegraph.

The elections for the Finnish Diet on October 2 passed off quietly. The returns, which have begun to come in, indicate that the Social Democrats will not have a majority in the next Diet, but this cannot be definitely stated until the final results are announced, which will be in the next week or ten days.

The Socialist members of the old Diet convened on September 27 in spite of the orders of the Governor General. The doors to the chamber had been locked and sealed by order of the Governor General, but the president of the Diet, Mr. Manner, ordered the seals to be broken and the doors forced. This was done and the Diet immediately convened. Only the Socialist members, however, attended, and it is said that a quorum was not present.

The Governor General did not attempt to use force to prevent the meeting of the Diet, and as a result there was no disorder. It is said that the Provisional Government will consider all acts of this Diet as illegal and void. It is not very clear just why the old Diet insisted on meeting at this time, unless it is with the intention of contesting the election of the newly elected Diet. It is possible that the old Diet intends to take the position that the elections of October 2 were illegal and void and that the new members, in the event of an anti-socialist majority, have no right to their seats.

So far as can be seen there is no indication of any improvement in the discipline in the fleet here. On the battleships and larger cruisers conditions are said to be very bad. On the submarines and smaller vessels, however, the morale is reported to be fairly satisfactory.

It may be interesting to note that at a meeting of the local Council of Soldiers', Sailors' and Workmen's Deputies, which was convened to elect delegates to the Democratic Congress in Petrograd, a quorum was not present. In

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



spite of this fact, however, the meeting proceeded to elect delegates. The executive committee of the Council also appears to have transacted business of importance without a quorum. This information comes from the publication of the minutes of the various meetings in the official organ of the Council. These failures to have a quorum may or may not indicate an interest on the part of the members of the Council themselves.

With regard to pro-German feeling among the Finnish people, I am informed by Mr. Arthur Ruhl, of *Collier's Weekly*, that in a conversation he had several days ago with a Mr. von Franckel, one of the leaders of the Swedish People's Party here, Mr. von Franckel said with a good deal of feeling that the Allies had never done anything for Finland and never would, either at the peace conference or elsewhere. He said Finland had one good friend and that friend was Germany. It appears, however, that Mr. von Franckel was educated in Germany and spent much time there. He is also evidently a man of extreme prejudices. The majority of the Swedish Finns, while all are more or less in sympathy with the idea of independence from Russia, do not appear to share Mr. von Franckel's extreme views. They take the position that it would be much against Finland's interests to push matters to the extent of an actual rupture with Russia.

In conversation with a Finn who had spent a great many years in America, I was told that among the middle and working classes in Finland there was only good feeling toward the United States. This man said that pro-German feeling was only to be found among the professional classes and the merchants.

The following from the Helsingfors *Svenska Tidningen* of September 15, 1917, may be of interest to the Embassy:

#### ESPIONAGE FLOURISHES

According to report there is being formed in Helsingfors at present an English-French espionage department. It is said that assiduous attempts are being made to recruit natives of Finland for the service. Again a clear proof of the unselfish interest on the part of the western powers for the welfare of the small peoples!

I expect to forward this letter to the Embassy by Mr. Ruhl, who is leaving to-morrow.

I have [etc.]

DOUGLAS JENKINS

[Enclosure 2]

*The American Consul at Helsingfors (Jenkins) to the American Ambassador in Russia (Francois)*

HELSINGFORS, October 12, 1917.

SIR: With regard to the recent elections to the Finnish Diet, it may interest the Embassy to know that the Socialists lost 12 seats and the Christian Workmen 1 seat. The United Finnish Party gained 6 seats, and the Agrarian Party 7. The Swedish People's Party remains the same with 21 seats.

The comparative standing of the several parties in the old and new Diets is as follows:

	Old Diet	New Diet
Socialists.....	103	91
United Finnish Party.....	56	62
Swedish People's Party.....	21	21
Agrarian Party.....	19	26
Christian Workmen.....	1	--
	200	200

It is believed that all parties will generally be united in opposition to the Socialists, at least on important questions. The United Finnish and the

Swedish People's Parties are said to represent the upper and middle classes, while the Agrarians are made up of small landowners and to a certain extent farm laborers, who are said to feel that their interests are not in line with the policies of the Socialists. In a sense the Agrarians will hold the balance of power.

In view of the fact that the Socialists refused to recognize the order of the Provisional Government which prohibited the old Diet from meeting and ordered the election, the next move of that party is now being awaited with interest, in view of the fact that it has evidently lost control as a result of the recent election.

Some people believe that the Socialists will take the ground that the election was illegal and that therefore the old Diet is the only legally constituted one. Others point out that as the Socialists actually took part in the election such a position on the part of the old Diet would be illogical. However, it remains to be seen whether or not any radical move will be undertaken. I shall watch the newspapers, especially those of the Socialist Party, and will keep the Embassy informed.

I have [etc.]

DOUGLAS JENKINS

File No. 861.00/864

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, November 16, 1917.

[Received 7.35 p. m.]

995. Swedish press reports great Socialist *coup* in Finland with help Russian soldiers. Socialists seized telegraph and other public institutions proceeding to Senate and Landtag which they declared dissolved. Old Socialist Landtag is to be called and new Socialist Senate under presidency of Tokoi to be formed. *Coup d'état* took place without disturbance, feeling in Finland greatly excited, meetings everywhere, and disorders feared. History of *coup* short though its roots deep. Wednesday Socialists presented Conservatives ultimatum either renounce Conservative moderate directorate or accept consequences general strike. Conservatives refused and general strike began Wednesday evening in Helsingfors therefrom spreading over whole country [through?] railway men who took part. Last train arrived Wednesday evening at Torneå from Petrograd and it is feared will be last one for some time.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/671

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, November 17, 1917, 2 p. m.

[Received November 18, 3.40 a. m.]

1003. I have obtained this morning the following information in regard to conditions in Finland. I am unable to vouch for the

authenticity of this information but I believe it is in general based on facts.

Finland under Socialists who have sent out delegates throughout country to arrange strikes and take over local authority. Officials allowed remain under Socialist supervision. *Bourgeoisie* guards at first opposed by Socialists reported now to have united with them for maintenance order. Russian soldiers aided Finnish workers in dissolution of Senate and Landtag and formation socialistic Senate and Landtag. Strike continues except in some minor trades. *Bourgeoisie* resigned but watchful. Torneå controlled by workmen's deputation of 300, leaders of which visé all passports. No international telegraph conversation allowed. Telegrams from south Finland and Helsingfors censored by Socialists. Russian garrison in Torneå in cause with workers. House examinations of *bourgeoisie* taking place. As result of strike frontier at Torneå closed. Travelers from Stockholm arriving Haparanda Friday refused entry Torneå, among them several couriers. Excepting supply trains connections with south Finland broken.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/707

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, *undated*.

[Received November 23, 1917, 2.18 p. m.]

Owing to temporary overthrow interim government no authority existing in Finland. Present *bourgeois* Diet, which succeeded Socialist Diet dissolved last July by Russian Government, assembled first November. Diet proposes to establish triumvirate of supreme power in Finland. Socialists regard this [as] *coup d'état* and threaten forcibly to overthrow Diet and assume government. Numerous workmen's meetings are held versus present Diet, situation threatening.

HAYNES

---

File No. 860d.48/38

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 3, 1917, 6 p. m.*

[Received December 5, 1.30 a. m.]

1107. Von Wendt, Finnish food commissioner, called on me this morning and stated that he knows that the German Minister, Stock-

holm, had received telegram from his government directing him to inquire how much food Finland was in need of. Von Wendt states that German proposals will be made not later than the latter part of next week and that he fears the consequences unless you have by that time released at least one vessel with food destined for Finland. Von Wendt states that Finland must have food and that she will be obliged to take it from whom she can get it but that he is very anxious that she secure it from America. He states that if she is obliged to accept German food she will undoubtedly be more in sympathy with Germany than she is at present. I should like to be advised of any action taken in the premises.

Copy of this telegram being sent to London.

MORRIS

---

Proclamation of Independence, December 4-6, 1917: Attitude of the American and Other Governments—Recognition by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France, January 4-10, 1918—Seizure of Power by the Red Guards; Civil War with the White Guards under Mannerheim—Swedish Occupation of the Åland Islands—Request for American Recognition by Commissioners of the White Government: Counter-Representations by the Delegate of the Red Government—Appeals for Food

File No. 861.00/766

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, December 4, 1917.

[Received December 6, 11.10 a. m.]

The president Finland Senate to-day before Diet proclaimed Finland free republic. He asks me to ascertain if the United States of America will recognize Finland as independent state and if so may government send delegates to lay their point of view before our Government.<sup>2</sup> I learn from reliable sources that Swedish-Germans [*sic*] urging Germany immediately to recognize Finland independence. Only our prompt recognition will prevent Germany from securing firm sympathy and domination in eastern Baltic. Names of delegates will be referred to me for approval. After having consulted French and English colleagues they are dispatching similar wires to their Governments and Embassies.

THORNWELL HAYNES

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to the Ambassador in Russia in telegram No. 1890, Dec. 8, 5 p. m., with instructions: "Advise Department your views fully and at earliest opportunity."

<sup>2</sup> Answered Dec. 8: "Matter under consideration."

File No. 861.00/772

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, December 6, 1917.

[Received December 7, 2 a. m.]

1133. Stockholm *Aftonbladet* reports this afternoon following from Haparanda: Finnish Senate has followed previous action of Finnish Landtag in proclaiming Finland's complete independence. Government issued formal proclamation giving particulars step taken by Diet. Premier Svinhufvud declared that immediate relationship with foreign powers urgently needed, account Finland's threatened starvation, also that effort would be made to secure international recognition of independence. . . .

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/804

*The Finnish Commissioner (Ignatius) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1917.

SIR: Referring to our conversation of this morning, I have the honor to hand you herewith a copy of a cablegram from my government received yesterday, December 9, 1917.

I am [etc.]

KAARLO IGNATIUS

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The President of the Finnish Senate (Svinhufvud) to the Finnish Commissioner at Washington (Ignatius)*

Presenting to Diet proposal concerning new form of government establishing Finland an independent republic and referring to Diet's previous decision of taking over supreme power in virtue of Section 38 of form of government of 1772, Svinhufvud, president of Finnish Senate, has on behalf of the Government solemnly declared that it is the Finnish people's right and considering the present isolation of the country and the extraordinary scarcity of provisions its incontestable duty to approach foreign powers with request to acknowledge Finland's sovereign independence. Diet's speaker welcomed this, as corresponding to country's right and people's unanimous wish. Empowered deputations leave for abroad within few days for purposes of official notification. Urgentest direct communication with American Government being necessary owing to critical situation of provision question, please immediately see Lansing, inform him contents this telegram and sound readiness receive deputation. Russia will be notified as soon as Constituent National Assembly meets. Paasikivi will telegraph regarding Scandinavian attitude. This cable sent from Haparanda by Svinhufvud's order.

PEHR SVINHUFVUD

File No. 861.00/809

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 13, 1917, 5 p. m.

[Received December 14, 11.50 a. m.]

1175. Saw the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs who informed me that last week the Finnish government had asked the Swedish Government as to their disposition regarding recognizing Finland's independence. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday telegraphed to the Swedish representatives in London, Paris, and Berlin to ascertain what position England, France, and Germany, respectively, will take regarding recognizing Finland's independence. Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me if I could ascertain from my Government in an informal and unofficial way as to what attitude we would take regarding recognizing Finland's independence. I told him I would cable you ascertain this information and acquaint him with my reply. In the course of the conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs told me confidentially that Orlovski, who has been appointed official representative to Sweden of the Russian Bolshevik government, called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his house this morning. Orlovski said that he felt quite sure that Bolshevik government would have no hesitancy in recognizing Finland's independence. In this conversation the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me to understand [what] I cabled you in my 1159<sup>1</sup> that Sweden would not recognize the government of Bolshevik in Russia at present. They will wait to see how matters develop in Russia.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/821

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, December 14, 1917, 3 p. m.

[Received December 16, 2.20 a. m.]

2102. Answering your 1890, December 8,<sup>2</sup> received to-day. Do not see how can recognize Finland independence before Constituent Assembly acts. Similar recognition would be demanded by Ukraine, Siberia, and other provinces. Would not definitely refuse, however,

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I, p. 297.<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, ante, p. 733.

and see no objection to permitting Finnish delegation to visit America.

Prompt shipment of flour, sugar, and pork recommended in my 2097<sup>1</sup> and 2098<sup>1</sup> would have a beneficial effect.

FRANCIS

---

File No. 861.00/835

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1917, 4 p. m.

1899. Referring Department telegram 1890, December 8,<sup>3</sup> have approved following telegram sent by Ignatius, Finnish Food Commissioner in United States, to Lars Krogius at Haparanda:

State Department does not object to deputation coming here to state Finland's case but is not yet prepared to assume any position regarding the recognition.

Advise Consul, Helsingfors.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/835

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1917, 7 p. m.

1907. Department has to-day cabled American Legation, Stockholm, as follows:

Referring Department's instruction 1899 [448] of December 14, regarding recognition of Finland.

In its reply to Ignatius that this Government is not yet prepared to assume any position regarding the recognition of Finland, the Department did not intend to indicate indifference to the request of Finland but merely that owing to present political conditions in Russia it is impossible at the present time to give a definite answer to the inquiry regarding recognition.

Communicate to American Consul, Helsingfors, for his information and guidance.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Similar telegram (No. 448) on the same date to the Minister in Sweden.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 733.

File No. 861.00/818

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, undated.

[Received December 15, 1917, 8.46 p. m.]

1186. My 1175. I have just been informed by the British Legation here that the attitude of the British Government in recognizing the independence of Finland is that as soon as a properly constituted Russian Government recognizes the independence of Finland the British Government is prepared to do the same.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/843

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 20, 1917, 12 noon.

[Received December 21, 9.30 a. m.]

1193. I asked my representative, Alfred W. Kliefoth, stationed at Haparanda and Torneå, to come to Stockholm so as to explain to me personally the conditions of the present situation as he sees them. I am therefore cabling a statement which I have asked Kliefoth to prepare regarding the existing situation. I desire to call your attention particularly to his statement regarding the great number of German and Austrian officers remaining in Russia and its possible significance. Kliefoth's statement follows:

In Torneå the Allies are represented by a French, British, and American officer, their duties being: (1) to facilitate passing of respective couriers and officials; (2) assist Russian authorities in work contra espionage and prevention smuggling. Under Bolshevik domination their work limited to assist respective nationals across frontier. Smuggling is only limited by Finnish custom authorities who are inefficient and incapable to cope with situation. Following goods are being smuggled from Finland into Sweden: rubber, lubricating oils, tin, copper, wire, platinum, and Russian rubles. Bolsheviks are represented in Torneå by two so-called commission[er]s or delegates of Soldiers' and Workmen's Committee. These are two ordinary sailors without rank, hardly capable of reading or writing their own language. Their authority is supported by Red Guard composed of Russian soldiers and armed Finnish workmen. The six Russian officers formerly in control are continuing their work under control of these commissioners. These commissioners are exceptionally courteous to American subjects and American control officer.



People leaving Russia required to have permit from the Bolshevik government. With sole exception of British, foreigners have little difficulty in obtaining permit. Foreign diplomats also required now to have this permit. Russians leaving country have Bolshevik passports. Persons entering Russia are not required to have permit but all persons having visé of Bolshevik representative can pass immediately. Diplomats and couriers still admitted without Russian visé but private foreign nationals must wait at Haparanda until permit has been obtained for them. Bolshevik sympathizers, workmen, and poor people, are usually admitted without formality but so-called Russian *bourgeois* are practically excluded in all cases.

German agents may enter Russia almost at will. Large number German civilians are daily leaving Russia with Bolshevik permits. The regular biweekly Red Cross train is still in operation, five hundred Russian invalid prisoners being exchanged each week for the same number of German and Austrian prisoners but the number of German and Austrian officers leaving Russia in this exchange is below the average. It is believed that these officers remain in Russia to assist in disorganization of the country. German soldiers have stated that most of all officers did not care to go home although they had opportunity. German subjects are also entering Russia with German passports, majority claim to be Russian political exiles although German subjects, their entrance being usually arranged by the Bolshevik representative at Stockholm.

Bolshevik proclamations are printed in the German language and are being distributed in Finland. Russian printer stated that neither type nor paper was Russian or Finnish.

Situation in Finland is somewhat as follows. There are 100,000 Russian soldiers there undisciplined and disorderly and Finns are endeavoring to get rid of them. Finnish Bolsheviks although in decided minority are in control of government owing to assistance of Russian soldiers and sailors. Food situation is serious. In many localities people living on half rations. The fact that America is not giving aid at present time is used as a basis of propaganda.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/860

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 24, 1917, 10 a. m.

[Received December 25, 12.24 a. m.]

1224. I have ascertained that a Finnish contingent has come to Stockholm and was received privately by Weden, president of the Rigsdag, in one of the committees of Parliament. The Finns asked for the recognition of the independence of Finland and for the military assistance of Sweden in order to expel the Russians from Finland in the event of the Russians refusing to recognize the independence of Finland. As military assistance might involve losses for Sweden no agreement was reached and the negotiations were dropped.

Three Finnish delegations are leaving Stockholm for Berlin, London, and Washington. The first is composed of Hjelt and Erich, the second of Holsti and Kihlman, and the third of Reuter and Soskimo.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/880

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 29, 1917, 5 p. m.

[Received December 30, 3.37 a. m.]

1245. I have received official confirmation that delegation from Finnish government yesterday visited the King and asked Sweden to recognize Finland's independence. King replied:

I beg you to express to the Finnish government my hearty thanks for the proposal made by you. I myself and the whole Swedish nation I am sure highly appreciate the fact that you first turned to Sweden which because of our common history for centuries, even of late, has always had the greatest interest in Finland's fate.

I assure you that both I and my government have the warmest sympathy for Finland's efforts to gain full independence and we sincerely hope to be able to recognize Finland as an independent state.

An important circumstance in this whole question is the possibility of an agreement between your country and Russia. However, I have reason to hope for a favorable result of your efforts. The position taken by other powers must of course also be taken into consideration.

You can always be assured of my warm wishes for you and the future welfare of your country.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/885

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 31, 1917, 2 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1918, 3.26 a. m.]

1251. My 1245 [1224], December 26 [24], 10 a. m. Finnish government sending representatives to all European governments to request recognition of independence. Delegation to Washington will be composed of Dr. Ignatius and Professor Julio Reuter; latter now here and member of a delegation to Danish, Norwegian Governments after which will proceed United States via England. British Minister informs me he has been instructed to tell delegation they could proceed to London and would receive sympathetic reception.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/904

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, January 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received January 4, 5.35 p. m.]

1269. I have just been informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Swedish Government intends to-morrow to recognize officially independence of Finland.

I made no comment, but Italian Minister pointed out to him inopportuneness of such action and how it might cause public opinion in Allied countries to consider this government pro-German like its predecessor. I consider it an unfortunate move on their part but one partly dictated by internal conditions.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/921

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of State*

January 5, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The French Ambassador called this afternoon to say that the French Government has received information from the French Consul at Helsingfors and from other sources that the Bolsheviki are about to declare that they will not object to the independence of Finland. If these are the facts the French believe that it would be the best policy to recognize Finland instantly in order to prevent Germany from being the first of the belligerent powers to recognize. France, however, inquires how this Government feels.<sup>1</sup>

Sincerely,

W. PHILLIPS

File No. 861.00/918

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, January 8, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 5.52 p. m.]

451. A Finnish commission is to arrive here to-day for the purpose of requesting recognition by the Norwegian Government of Finnish independence. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me

<sup>1</sup> Note in the margin of MS.: "Consulted Sec'y and advised Ambassador that U. S. had no plans for immediate recognition Finland and no information as to attitude of Bolsheviki re Finland.—W[illiam] P[hillips]."

this morning that independence of Finland would undoubtedly be recognized by Norway.

The press reports that one or more members of the commission will proceed from here to the United States.

SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 861.00/922

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 8, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received *January 9, 11.29 a. m.*]

2208. Conferred with French Ambassador yesterday who suggested might be advisable for France, England, Italy, and America to join in recognizing independence of Finland. I concur and think should be done promptly before such action by Germany.

French Ambassador also said that British Ambassador who *en route* London had suggested Allied Governments' recognizing perhaps simultaneously Soviet government here, Ukrainian government, Cossack government, and Siberian government. Such course might be advisable in the event of separate peace unnegotiable [*sic*] but should await further developments.

Reported France recognized Finnish and Ukrainian independence but think untrue.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/941

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *January 11, 1918, noon.*

[Received *January 12, 3.32 p. m.*]

1809. Danish Government officially recognized the independence of Finland yesterday.

[GRANT-SMITH]

File No. 861.00/938

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *January 11, 1918, 2 p. m.*

[Received *5 p. m.*]

My telegram No. 451, January 8. Finnish commission had audience yesterday with the King of Norway, who welcomed Finland as

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Embassy in Great Britain.

an independent sister nation of Scandinavia. One of the members of the commission named Reuter will shortly leave for England and the United States.

SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 861.00/922

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1918, 6 p. m.

1984. Your 2208, January 8, 6 p. m. Department doubts advisability of recognizing Finland at present.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/-

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, January 11, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received January 13, 8.33 a. m.]

2217. France formally through Helsingfors Consul recognized independence of Finland. Reported France recognized Ukraine but unable verify. Know France sent a general to Kiev but recognition probably confined thereto. Did France consult us about Finnish recognition?

FRANCIS

File No. 860d.00/1

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 15, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 10.10 p. m.]

8270. The Minister at Christiania telegraphs me that a plenipotentiary of Finland, Dr. Julio Reuter, is about to arrive in London on his way to the United States and solicits a personal interview with me.

I am officially informed that Norway and Denmark have recognized the independence of Finland but as the United States has not yet done so I shall not receive Dr. Reuter unless you instruct me to do so, in which case I also request instructions as to the attitude you wish me to adopt.

PAGE

File No. 860d.00/-

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1918, 3 p. m.

1992. Your 2217, January 11, 7 p. m., just received. Independence Finland now officially recognized by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and France. France consulted this Government.

French Embassy advises that General Tabouis, the French Commissioner at Kiev, is being instructed to recognize Ukraine as in fact an independent government. This Government not disposed as yet to recognize any independent governments until the will of Russian people has been more definitely expressed on this general subject. The public utterances of the President have defined clearly the sympathy of the United States for democracy and self-government.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/4

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 23, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 4.50 p. m.]

8360. My 8270, January 15, 5 p. m. Mr. Balfour expresses the hope to me, if his Government's views meet our Government's views, that the two Governments may act in unison regarding recognition of Finland. He has informed Finnish delegates here that he approves Finnish independence and he has recognized independence in principle, but has not yet given formal recognition. He prefers to wait awhile hoping that there will be some government in Russia which may be trusted to respect Finland's independence. Russian soldiers continue to commit depredations there which is inconsistent with Bolshevik recognition of Finnish independence. Please instruct.

PAGE

File No. 860d.00/6

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, January 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received January 27, 4.40 p. m.]

13. Immediate recognition Finland independence would save us from being slandered as boasted champion small nations who

would sacrifice Finland in fruitless expectation of gaining a few feet of French trenches by clinging to a Russian corpse. Immediate recognition will gain a pro-American preponderance of the sympathy of the Norwegian-Swedish-Danish league wherein, when Finland is a member, Sweden would be outweighed, besides assuring to us post-war trade with Russia through Finland as a back door. No other small nation clamoring for recognition offers such historical worthiness nor such geographical trade advantages.

I beg recognition before England, not only to escape the intensely increasing hatred of England because of non-recognition, but because delay gains only uncertainty.

HAYNES

---

File No. 861.00/1014

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, January 28, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received January 29, 9.58 a. m.]

1389. Have just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs who informed me that Finnish government had notified Swedish representative in Helsingfors that it could not longer be responsible for lives of Swedish subjects and Swedish representative has left Helsingfors on special train. Viborg is entirely in the hands of Bolsheviks, Helsingfors soon will be, and St. Petersburg Bolsheviks have promised assistance. He added that Swedish delegate was watching internal situation closely, fearing spread of Bolshevik propaganda in Sweden.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1018

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, January 29, 1918.

[Received January 30, 6.54 a. m.]

1408. Have just secured from various official channels following information concerning situation in Finland. Finnish Senate has left Helsingfors which is now in control Red Guards. All public buildings occupied by them, private houses being attacked, there is general strike and all Red Cross work stopped. Slight casualties

reported from Jakobstad, country north of Seinäjoki under complete control *bourgeois* guard numbering several thousand. At Uleåborg, Russian soldiers and Red Guard disarmed. Train service Petrograd still suspended. Finnish Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm informs me heavy fighting taking place at Viborg and Helsingfors. At my request Swedish Foreign Office is endeavoring ascertain whereabouts well-being our Consul, Helsingfors.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1008

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1918, 4 p. m.

Swedish press reports conditions Helsingfors dangerous. Department relies on your judgment as to leaving your post but hopes situation may develop so you can remain. Please acknowledge this.

LANSING

---

File No. 860d.01/32

*Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of State*

January 30, 1918.

Mr. Barclay showed me a telegram just received to-day from his Government giving the Foreign Office views regarding a message from the British Consul at Helsingfors. The view is expressed that because of the discontinuance of the Constituent Assembly, with the approval of the Russian people, the question of the formal assent of the British Government to the independence of Finland is indefinitely postponed. They feel, however, that this fact should not weigh too heavily against the Finnish people. The British Government, therefore, are prepared to inform the Finnish people that they are ready to give formal recognition to their Government as soon as the Finns express by some unmistakable method such as an election their sanction of their own independence. Meanwhile, animated by the utmost good will and sympathy they (the British Government) are prepared to treat them as the *de facto* authorities in Finland.

The British Government are most anxious to act on parallel lines with the United States Government and would be glad to have their views.

W. PHILLIPS



File No. 861.00/1048 1/2

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, January 30, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Copied from confirmation; original not received.]

17. Socialist Party, with the help of Red Guards and Russian soldiers, yesterday forcibly overwhelmed *bourgeois* government and elected their own Senate. Members of *bourgeois* Senate in flight; city terrified; 50 killed; banks and all business places closed and under Red Guard military. White *bourgeois* Guards organized north of Helsingfors are coming to give battle Red Guards. It is feared that battleships in harbor, which are sympathizing with Red Guards, will bombard Helsingfors. It is arranged that whatever party succeeds it will render every aid proper distribution American food.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/9

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, January 30, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 11.54 p. m.]

1410. Regarding the rumor that Sweden might assist to restore order in Finland, the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs has given me as his personal opinion that the Socialist Party in Sweden would not be in favor of such action and that nothing would probably be done as Sweden's assisting Finland would be looked upon as a dangerous enterprise. British Minister, however, informs me that he has telegraphed to his Government recommending that Sweden be encouraged to help Finland if necessary as he fears that if Sweden refuses the Finnish government will appeal to Germany.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1056

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, January 31, 1918, noon.

[Received February 2, 6.45 a. m.]

19. Your January 29, 4 p. m. Believe *bourgeoisie* who will probably engage Red Guards at Tavastehus will regain power. As culminating center of the struggle, it is feared Helsingfors may be

sacked and bombarded by Russian fleet in harbor. Old yachts of the Tsar of Russia, *Standard* and *Polar Star*, in port hotbeds anarchy and Bolshevism. Fifteen Americans here. Fortunately Consulate is very near harbor. Gratitude for your solicitude; will remain at my post. Please telegraph wife not to be uneasy. Hope you received my January 30, 11 a. m., and January 26, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/22

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

No. 5527

LONDON, February 1, 1918.

[Received February 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to report, as a matter of interest to the Department, that I have just verified and issued the usual papers to facilitate the departure to the United States of Julio N. Reuter, Ph. D., LL. D., delegate of the government of Finland, who is proceeding to Washington with credentials from the Diet and Government of Finland to inform the Government of the United States of America of Finland's declaration of independence, and to petition for the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of that country.

Dr. Reuter's credentials also mention Kaarle Benedict Ignatius, LL. D., as a delegate with equal authority, but thus far Dr. Ignatius has not appeared to apply for the verification of his papers. I enclose a copy of the credentials shown by Dr. Reuter on the occasion of his visit to the Consulate General.<sup>1</sup> The papers appear to be completely in order.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

File No. 861.00/1046

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, February 2, 1918, noon.

[Received 8.40 p. m.]

20. Trainloads Petrograd troops arriving to assist Red Guards. Swedes, Danes, Norwegians escaping to [omission] to reach Swedish Government boat. Usurping Socialist government asks to discuss food. Replying unofficially America has not food to be wasted in civil war and that at present it is impossible to discuss anything.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

officially. Have telegraphed Embassy to send officer with money and food. Arrival uncertain. All banks and shops deserted and under Red military guard. Funds exhausted.

Americans nervous but I apprehend no violence unless accidental. Food extremely short.

HAYNES

File No. 861.00/1063

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 7, 1918.

[Received midnight.]

1455. Have just received information by telephone from our representative at Finnish frontier at Torneå who reports Torneå captured by White Guard last evening between 5 and 6 o'clock; Russian soldiers disarmed by force, 100 Russian prisoners, 60 Russian soldiers escaped to Sweden; maximum casualties 50. White Guards numbering several thousand arrived secretly surprising Red Guard. All northern Finland suddenly well organized and equipped; two trains arrived this morning, first one bringing Rumanian Legation, second train ordinary train; also third train expected on which are American couriers who left Petrograd last Saturday. Passengers of first train were twelve days *en route* crossing territory of opposing parties. Reliable report that Viborg in hands of White Guard which is planning to cut connections between Finland and Petrograd and proceed against Helsingfors; unconfirmed reports this morning that all Allied missions expelled from Russia and already *en route*. This report also given me by Finnish railroad authorities at Torneå. Petrograd reported with [in] disorder, much shooting on streets and food stealing.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/6

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1918, 7 p. m.

531. Consul, Helsingfors, telegraphs urgently for recognition of Finland. He says will gain sympathy of Norway-Sweden-Denmark League of which Finland will be member. What are your views as to action and as to stability of present Finnish government? This

Government appreciates thoroughly the historical, political, and economic considerations which would prompt a desire for recognition on the part of Finland. Answer promptly and fully. In this connection you may assure Finnish Chargé d'Affaires if occasion offers that the desire of the United States to assist Finland with food supplies is only limited by the urgent and vital needs of our allies and of our own forces in France.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/6

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1918, 3 p. m.

Your 13, January 24, 6 p. m. This Government appreciates thoroughly the considerations which prompt desire for recognition on part of Finland but is not yet prepared to take action. In this connection you may assure Finnish authorities that the purpose of the United States to assist Finland with food supplies is limited only by urgent and vital needs of our allies and of our own forces in France. Keep Department advised as to whether conditions develop so as to render possible proper control of distribution foodstuffs.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/11

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 12, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 9.06 p. m.]

1479. Your 531, February 8, 7 p. m. In my opinion civil war in Finland is likely to continue for some time. Swedish Government has not shown any signs of intervening while Smolny<sup>1</sup> is sending active aid to the Reds. Arms are of course being smuggled across from here and a certain number of officers have gone over, but General Mannerheim will require time to organize his forces and he has not yet taken Tammerfors. Under these circumstances, I do not see the advantage and therefore do not recommend recognizing the independence of Finland, particularly as the Reds at Helsingfors would claim that their government should be recognized, since they hold the capital and all the important cities.

<sup>1</sup> Smolny Institute was used by the Bolsheviki as their headquarters.

However, since the White government is now in control of the north, I think it would be both politic and humanitarian to allow a portion of the food mentioned in your 531, February 8, 7 p. m., to come forward via Narvik, as I can arrange matters as to stopping delivery at any time if the Whites should not make proper use of it.

MORRIS

---

File No. 860d.00/11

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

6559. Referring to foodstuffs for Finland American Minister Stockholm reports that the party of law and order is now in control of north Finland and an initial shipment of foodstuffs should come forward especially as he can arrange matters so as to stop delivery at any time when it may appear that the distribution is not being properly controlled.

LANSING

---

File No. 861.00/1103

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 15, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received February 16, 9.23 a. m.]

1503. The last deputy governor general of Finland,<sup>1</sup> who occupied this position for nine months just prior to the recent revolution, is in Stockholm. As he is considered one of the best authorities on Finnish affairs, I arranged for a conference as I thought it would be valuable for the Department to have his views. Prior to being deputy governor general of Finland he occupied the chair of international law at the University of Helsingfors for eleven years. He is married to a daughter of Admiral Van Reypen, United States Navy.

The Finnish Red Guards are recruited almost entirely from the industrial laboring classes, although a small moderate element of this class is with the White Guards, the agricultural and farm-peasant type being almost everywhere universally opposed to the Red Guards. About 80 per cent of the Red Guards are Finns. The Red Guards at present hold the four principal cities of Finland, that is, Helsingfors, Tammerfors, Viborg and Åbo. It was to be expected that Mannerheim would encounter the least resistance in the northern part of Finland because with the possible exception of Uleåborg there are no

---

<sup>1</sup> Serge A. (Baron) Korff.

important cities there and consequently less industrial labor organization. He will encounter his most serious opposition when he reaches the Tammerfors-Helsingfors-Viborg line. Russian troops from this district have not been removed and they are probably still being reenforced from Petrograd. The principal reason for this reinforcement lies in the fact that the Russian Bolshevik organization, while having its principal offices in Petrograd, had its roots in Helsingfors and therefore the Bolsheviks are afraid of their own power if the Finnish *bourgeoisie* triumphs over the Red Guards. They are especially fearful lest the White Guards gain control of the Baltic Fleet as this would be a serious loss to the Red Guards and would even undermine the Bolsheviks themselves in Russia.

Of the 3,000,000 people in Finland, there are about 500,000 Swedes, not more than 50,000 Russian civilians, and at present not more than 20,000 Russian soldiers. The only food shipped into Finland by the Bolshevik Russians is for the Russian garrisons. This is not always sufficient and occasional looting results. The better class of Finns are to a man in favor of the White Guard. The reported wholesale murders and other violence in Finland have been exaggerated in the press.

The Finnish government are opposed to any direct assistance from Sweden. The reason for this is primarily that they desire to master the situation without outside aid but they also feel that if Sweden actively assisted them the present condition of civil war in Finland is certain to continue for some time to come. She might afterwards make demands which would be unacceptable to the Finnish government. What the Finnish government want, however, is for the Swedish Government to grant permission for the purchase in and transshipment through Sweden of arms and ammunition for Mannerheim's forces. Another reason against active Swedish intervention is that Swedish officials know that there is a certain amount of discontent among Swedish troops and that the troops might waver if ordered out of the country. A third reason might be that Sweden does not want to run the risk of creating future complications with Russia and sailors [Socialists] here.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1100

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 15, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 16, 1.15 a. m.]

1504. The Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs informs me that on account of the scarcity of food on the Åland Islands and the

probable consequences arising out of such a scarcity between the armed Russian soldiers and the islanders, his government has requested Vorovski, the Bolshevik representative at Stockholm, to proceed to the Åland Islands for the purpose of inducing the Russian soldiers to leave the islands. In the event of a satisfactory arrangement, the Swedish Government will permit the necessary transports to take away the Russian soldiers.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/13

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 18, 1918.

[Received February 19, 4.25 a. m.]

1523. The Finnish Legation gave out following statement this morning:

1. Despite fact that Russian commissioners have recognized Finland's independence and repeated representations on part Finland's government the Russian Government have failed not only to withdraw their troops from Finnish territory but have added to them.

2. Before outbreak of Finnish war masses Russian agitators arrived in Finland who excited the people to fight the government and Landtag.

3. The Russian territorial committee at Helsingfors, representing the Commissioners' Council,<sup>1</sup> has declared war on the civic guard and Finland's government. The Commissioners' Council have officially not taken any marked attitude.

4. Against Finnish government troops stand numerous Russian troop divisions, Red Guardists, Russian soldiers garbed as civilians, and Finnish Red Guardists, armed and provided with artillery guns, armored train and automobiles.

5. The war in Finland is a fight between army Finnish subjects and Russian troop divisions including native rebels and is not a civil war.

6. The tension between a portion of the Social Democratic Party and majority of the Finnish people would never have developed into war had the Russian troops not interfered.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1122

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 19, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received February 20, 1.35 a. m.]

1533. Minister of Marine informed me to-day regarding the Åland Islands that he had ordered Swedish vessels sent there for

<sup>1</sup> Soviet of People's Commissars.

the purpose of taking away the Russian garrison and Swedish and Finnish refugees. They may be [plan] to land the Finns who are Whites in northern Finland and bring Swedes and Russians to Sweden where Russians will be placed under guard on an island. He also stated that they would give arms to the islanders so as to enable them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks and Red Guards who cross over from Finland.

The above would seem to indicate that the Swedish Government intends to take over the islands eventually in accordance with the desires of the population as expressed by the confederations [deputations] sent here some weeks ago.

MORRIS

---

File No. 860d.00/14

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, February 19, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 9.32 p. m.]

536. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Norwegian Government intended soon to accredit a minister or chargé d'affaires at Helsingfors and that Norway has adhered to Swedish *démarche* at Petrograd requesting withdrawal from Finland of Bolshevik troops. He added that Norway would send no military help to Finland but that Red Cross equipment and personnel would be sent as well as Norwegian fish and fish products for which a credit would be extended Finland.

SCHMEDEMAN

---

File No. 860d.00/21

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, February 19, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received February 24, 10.33 a. m.]

2390. Kliefoth<sup>1</sup> just arrived from Torneå after eight days across Finland to Murmansk road and reports as follows:

White Guard, comprising an army of patriots totaling about 50,000 well-drilled and disciplined men and under command of Mannerheim, a Russian-Finnish general distinguished in present and the Russian-Japanese war, who is virtually dictator, is in absolute control of all Finland north of general line Björneborg-Tammerfors-Viborg. This force includes many Russian generals and officers,

---

<sup>1</sup>Alfred W. Kliefoth, Vice Consul at Haparanda.



about 60 volunteer Swedish officers and only 6 volunteer Germans formerly affiliated with Finland. They are not fighting Russia, their sole object being to drive from their country Finnish-Bolshevik and Russian Red Guards and to establish Finnish independence. They are not expecting official German aid. Finland claims Åland Islands of which Sweden has taken possession.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1133

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, February 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 10.25 p. m.]

1541. Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday informed French Minister that as a result of negotiations between Vorovski, Bolshevik representative here, Russian soldiers, Red and White Guards, and the commander of Swedish expedition to the Åland Islands, it had been agreed that all three groups would leave the islands on Swedish ships on condition that Sweden would occupy islands with sufficient force to protect population, who do not wish to take sides in present Finnish struggle, but claim peace and protection. Swedish Government therefore decided to send, and did send yesterday, additional expedition composed of one infantry and one machine-gun company which with the force already there would amount to about 500 men. Commander has instructions not to land his troops before the three groups are ready to leave islands so as to avoid complications.

Minister of Foreign Affairs added that he desired to inform French and British Ministers of this, and to declare at the same time that this action was not to be considered as the beginning of a permanent occupation as the Swedish Government was still of the opinion that the Åland Islands question should be solved by negotiations between England, France, and Finland and if these negotiations led to no result, then at the peace conference.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72119/1364

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, February 22, 1918.

[Received February 23, 12.37 a. m.]

1522. Swedish press reports via Petrograd's telegram bureau . . .

Reported from Haparanda White Guard taking steps to completely surround Tammerfors and move fighting line towards Riihi-

mäki, headquarters of Red troops. Reported from Haparanda rumored Germans taking measures for transporting troops to southwestern Finland charged with clearing northwestern coast and eastern center part of country of Red Guardists, and press them towards line of government troops, thus putting Red troops between two fires. Telegraphed from Vasa that Finland's official press bureau reports Whites determine continue struggle until they have won. Arrival of Finnish infantry from Germany has strengthened their confidence. Reported Finland's legal government's provisional food administration reduced bread rations from 100 to 75 grams a day. Are hoping obtain grain from Ukraine sent via Germany, and Finnish state authorized its representative Ukraine buy grain for 60,000,000 marks. These consignments can not reach Finland until April.

MORRIS

---

File No. 860d.00/41

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State*

*February 27, 1918.*

Dr. Reuter and Dr. Ignatius came to the Department this morning by appointment and presented to me their credentials from the Government of Finland. They asked that we give recognition to Finland as an independent state.

I replied that this Government was very sympathetic with Finland's aspirations for independence and that we were disposed to recognize the Government there as *de facto* and that we sincerely hoped in a short time a stable constitutional government would be established.

I further said that the Commissioners must appreciate the fact that at present it would be unwise for this Government to take any official action in view of the disorder and confusion which prevailed in Finland; but that we looked forward hopefully to a satisfactory ending of these unfortunate conditions and that when that time came I should be glad to receive them again.

I also said that I was speaking unofficially and personally to them on this subject and that I was anticipating the time when I could speak with more authority.

The Commissioners said they were very desirous to see the President upon this subject and asked me my views as to the possibility of an interview with him.

I answered that I did not believe it was possible at present and that it would be, in my opinion, inadvisable for them to do so until the political situation in Finland was more favorable.

The Commissioners then showed me an address which they had been authorized to deliver to the President and I suggested to them that they retain it until an opportunity was offered for them to present it personally. This they agreed to do.

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 860d.00/27a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1918, 5 p. m.

571. For Finnish Legation:

Presented credentials today to Secretary Lansing who, expressing personal views, said America recognizes that Finland has set up a *de facto* government. He also assured us of America's sympathy for Finland's aspiration for independence. President unable to receive us pending internal disturbances in Finland. Secretary Lansing advised us to wait until authority of Finnish government firmly established whereupon audience with President would probably follow and recognition discussed. Please transmit above to Finnish government. Reuter, Ignatius.

LANSING

File No. 860d.01

*The Finnish Commissioner (Reuter) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

FINLAND'S CONSTITUTION: AT FIRST RESPECTED, 1809-1899, OVERRIDDEN BY TSAR NICHOLAS 1899-1905

The constitution of Finland, solemnly guaranteed to her by the Russian Emperor Alexander I, who declared that his guarantees were binding not only on himself but also on his successors, was on the whole respected by Russia and her rulers from 1809, when Finland was united to Russia, until the last decade of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Alexander II and in the first years of the reign of Alexander III the constitutional rights were even to some degree extended, the Finnish legislature (the Landtdag) being invested with larger powers than before.

In the reign of the last Russian Tsar a reactionary régime began, and during the era of oppression, commencing in 1899, numerous Finnish patriots were exiled or deported to remote parts of Russia. One of the most important results of this régime was the disbandment of the Finnish Army in 1902, after which year there has been

<sup>1</sup> Note in the margin of MS.: "Handed to Mr. Miles by Dr. Reuter, Finnish commissioner, Mar. 1, 1918."

no conscription in Finland, but instead a military contribution, amounting to 20,000,000 Finnish marks per annum, has been paid to Russia. The separation of Finland from Russia last year, therefore, did not in the least affect the fighting power of Russia.

#### CONSTITUTION RESTORED, SHORT PERIOD OF IMPORTANT REFORMS, 1905-1908

The popular movements in Russia as well as in Finland following on the war with Japan forced on the Tsar an attitude of a more liberal policy, the fruit of which in Russia consisted in the establishment of the legislative chambers, the Duma and the Council of Empire, while in Finland a manifesto was issued on November 4, 1905, "for the restoration of legal order in Finland," that is, a repeal of all, or at least the most important, of the numerous illegal and anti-constitutional measures taken by the Russian authorities in regard to Finland during the preceding period.

This manifesto became the signal in Finland for the introduction of many much-needed reforms, which it had been impossible to carry out before. Thus, to cite here the most important measures only, the Finnish Landtdag, which was the direct continuation of the old Swedish Riksdag, and consisted of four chambers with a very limited franchise, was replaced by a new legislature consisting of 200 members, sitting in one chamber only, and the franchise was extended to every Finnish citizen, man and woman, who is 24 years of age, without any property qualifications or other restrictions, except in the case of criminals and lunatics. A system of proportional election was introduced. Freedom of the press, of associations, and of meetings was guaranteed by law. Measures were also taken for extending civil rights to the Jews (of whom there are in Finland about 1,000), but owing to the reaction which set in in Russia it was impossible to pass the laws on this matter.

#### REACTIONARY TENDENCIES, POLICY OF OPPRESSION RESUMED, 1908-1917

It did not last long till these reactionary tendencies began to make themselves felt among the Russian autocratic and bureaucratic wire pullers. As for Russia proper, these tendencies resulted in the passing of new electoral laws, whereby the liberal elements were largely debarred from the Duma. As for Finland, the old policy of Russification was once more embarked upon, and the first signs of it appeared in 1908. In 1910 a law was enacted in Russia, withdrawing all more important matters of Finnish legislation from the competency of the Finnish Landtdag and investing legislative powers regarding Finland in the Russian legislature.

## OPINION OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENTS

This law of 1910 was passed in spite of vigorous protests of the Finnish Diet, and without paying any regard to the reasoned opinion of several European jurists who met at a conference in February and March 1910 in the house of the late Dr. John Westlake, K. C., that eminent English international lawyer, under the chairmanship of another great English lawyer, Sir Frederick Pollock, while Sir Edward Fry sent a written statement to be appended to the protocol of this conference which was drawn up by one of its members, the French international lawyer, Professor A. de Lapradelle. The Finnish claims were strongly upheld in this protocol, but without avail.

## PERSECUTION OF FINNISH OFFICIALS AND JUDGES

The law of 1910 was forced through the Russian legislature, and now followed a period of oppression in no manner less severe than the period between 1899 and 1905. A great many Finnish officials and judges now found themselves confronted with the workings of this illegally enacted law, and incurred severe punishment for their loyalty to the Finnish laws which they had sworn to uphold. Thus twenty-three judges of the court of appeal of Viborg were sentenced by a Russian law court—lower in grade than the court of which they were members—to sixteen months' confinement in Russian prisons, dismissed from their judgeships and disqualified to hold any office, salaried or honorary, for ten years.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR; DEPORTATION OF MR. P. E. SVINHUFVUD,  
SPEAKER OF THE LANDTDAG

Such was the state of things when the war broke out. It was then largely hoped in Finland that the Tsar would do the generous thing and restore Finland to her constitutional rights. But such hopes were soon scattered. On the contrary, in October 1914 the Tsar gave his sanction to a program of the complete Russification of Finland, but only some of its items were actually carried out. Others were deferred on account of representations made by the governments of some of the Allied powers. Nevertheless, cases of severe oppression occurred, the most notable being the deportation to Siberia of one of the most universally respected Finnish citizens, Mr. P. E. Svinhufvud, who 1905-1911 had been speaker of the Finnish Landtdag. It was not until the outbreak of the Russian revolution in March 1917 that he was allowed to return.

## THE COMPOSITION OF THE LANDTDAG

Since the war broke out the Finnish Landtdag had not once been convened, though it is especially provided that it should meet every year, and no exception is made for time of war. In 1916 the mandates of the members of the Landtdag expired, and new elections took place. Seeing that there was very little prospect of the legislature being convened to a session, the participation at the election was very lame, only 50 per cent of the electorate going to the poll. The Socialist contingent of the electorate, however, took a livelier part, and the result of the election was that 103 Socialist members were returned, as against 97 members belonging to various non-Socialist party groups.

## THE BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION; FINLAND'S AUTONOMY RESTORED

When the Russian revolution broke out in March 1917, and the Tsarist régime came to an end, things seemed to take a better turn for Finland. The members of the Temporary Government then formed in Russia were opposed to the previous régime also in its policy toward Finland, and one of the first steps of this new government was to restore Finland's constitutional rights and her autonomous position. The Finnish Landtdag was at once convened, and the Finnish government, which before the revolution was largely composed by Russians, contrary to the Finnish Constitution, under which only Finnish citizens can hold office in Finland, was deposed, and a new government formed. Since the majority in the Landtdag consisted of Socialists, it was offered to that party to form the government, but as they did not care to take over the responsibility, a coalition government was formed with a Socialist majority.

## THE WORKING OF THE FINNISH CONSTITUTION

It will be necessary, in order to elucidate further events in Finland, to give a brief sketch of the working of the Finnish Constitution.

The legislation in Finland is carried on by the Landtdag, but in minor matters the sovereign, i. e., the Russian Emperor in his capacity of Grand Duke of Finland, had the power to issue ordinances. All laws passed by the Landtdag must receive the sanction of the sovereign. The administration is invested in the Finnish government (called the Senate, which is not an upper legislative house, but the executive) and ultimately by the sovereign. All matters concerning foreign relations belong to the Emperor. The Tsar, as Grand Duke of Finland, appoints the members of the Finnish

government (who should, constitutionally, be chosen from among Finnish citizens); it belongs to him to summon the Diet, to dissolve the Landtdag, to issue writs for new elections, etc. When the Tsar abdicated, the powers formerly under the Finnish Constitution belonging to the Emperor-Grand Duke, were vested in the Russian Temporary Government.

#### DISORDERS AMONG THE RUSSIAN SOLDIERY

In the meantime among the Russian soldiery stationed in Finland all bonds of discipline were dissolved. Hundreds of Russian officers were killed in Finland by their own men, who also perpetrated numerous acts of violence against Finnish citizens and constantly interfered in the internal affairs of Finland. The Finnish government made repeated representations to the Russian Temporary Government, and the latter's remonstrances to their troops in Finland were of no avail. On the contrary, the soldiers and sailors committed graver acts of violence, robbing and murdering. It soon became evident that, whereas the Tsarist régime was unwilling to respect Finland's autonomy, the new Russian government was unable to carry out its undoubtedly good intentions.

#### CRAVING FOR INDEPENDENCE

The craving for independence fostered among the Finlanders during the rule of Russian bureaucracy, and temporarily lulled in consequence of the renewed Russian promises, now grew in intensity among all party groups in Finland, *bourgeois* as well as Socialists, and the question of complete independence was publicly discussed in the press, and the Finnish premier at that time, a Socialist, officially proclaimed total independence as the aim of Finnish aspirations.

#### THE LANDTDAG DISSOLVED; NEW ELECTIONS; DEFEAT OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY; NON-SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT FORMED

In the meantime, the Landtdag was at work, and in July a bill was adopted, principally carried by the Socialist vote, by which the supreme power, including that of sanctioning laws and appointing members of the government, was to be vested in the Landtdag, and thus to be withdrawn from the Russian Temporary Government. This last-named government, however, which, as pointed out above, had taken over the functions of the Grand Duke of Finland, refused to sanction this bill, dissolved the Diet, and issued writs for new elections. In consequence hereof the Socialist members of the Finnish government resigned, while the non-Socialist members remained as a working cabinet pending the result of the new elections. These took place on October 1 and 2, 1917, and resulted in a defeat

of the Socialist Party, only 92 Socialist members being returned, instead of 103 in the previous Landtdag. A new government was now formed, in which no Socialist took office. The new Premier was Mr. P. E. Svinhufvud, who is at present head of the Finnish government.

#### THE BOLSHEVIST RÉGIME IN RUSSIA; RED GUARDS IN FINLAND

At about this time important events had happened in Russia culminating in the victory of the Bolshevik wing of the Socialists over the moderate Socialist parties. The Russian reign of terror had grown in strength, and spread to Finland. The Socialists in Finland proclaimed a general strike in Helsingfors and organized a force called the Red Guards, ostensibly to keep order in the city, but really in order to terrorize the inhabitants. These guards were formed out of the dregs of the population, and their ranks included many criminals. They received rifles and ammunition from the Russian soldiers and sailors, and they committed numerous murders in Helsingfors and its vicinity, killing about 40 peaceful citizens. Also in other districts of Finland gross disturbances occurred. The Socialist leaders stood aghast over these atrocities, but they were powerless against the evil passions now let loose. However, order was eventually restored, and the Landtdag, which in the meantime had assembled in Helsingfors, could begin its work.

#### DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

In Russia there was complete anarchy. The Temporary Russian Government, at its latest stages so intimately associated with the name of M. Kerensky, had ceased to exist, and the Bolshevik government was by no means generally recognized by the Russian people, and still less by the governments of the Allied powers. This being the case, the Finnish government found the only salvation for Finland in proclaiming the independence of the country. The government therefore drew up a declaration of independence, which was presented to the Landtdag on December 4, 1917, and unanimously adopted by it. The Landtdag, furthermore, adopted an address, couched in deferential terms, to be presented to the Russian National Assembly, which then was expected to meet on the 11th of December, in which the reasons were given for the step now taken by the Finnish people, and asking for the Assembly's recognition. It should, perhaps, be added here, that in Russian government circles it had repeatedly been asserted that full liberty was conceded to Finland to determine her political status up to complete independence. The Landtdag also delegated to the government powers to take all necessary steps for carrying out the policy of independence.



## RECOGNITION OF THE BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT AND OF FOREIGN POWERS

The Finnish government consequently sent out commissions to various foreign powers in order to notify them of the declaration of independence and ask for their recognition. The first power to be thus approached was Sweden, and the deputation to the Swedish Government received from the King of Sweden on December 28 a reply, assuring the deputation of profound sympathies in Sweden but making it a condition for Sweden's recognition that the independence of Finland had previously been recognized by Russia.

As has been said above, the Finnish legislature and government had decided to seek the recognition from the Russian National Assembly. Since, however, it became highly uncertain at what date the Assembly would meet, if indeed it was allowed to meet at all, the Finnish government decided to approach the Russian Soviet government, which early in January decided to recognize Finland as an independent and sovereign republic. A joint commission of Russian and Finnish representatives was appointed to evaluate certain Russian government properties in Finland, such as the telegraph service, etc., to be redeemed by Finland, both parties binding themselves to submit to the findings of this commission.

As soon as the recognition of the Soviet government was known, Sweden definitely recognized the independence of Finland, and similar recognitions then followed in rapid succession: by France—even before the deputation charged with notifying the French government had arrived—Denmark, Norway, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Spain.

The Finnish deputation to Great Britain received from Mr. Balfour the following answer, published in the *Times* (London) on January 31:

Mr. Balfour has informed the Finnish mission now in this country that Great Britain fully approves the reasons for Finland's independence, and disapproves of the former Russian policy of oppression. The British Government has already recognized *de facto* Finland's independence by entering into direct relations through the appointment of the British Consul General at Helsingfors.

The presence of Russian soldiery in Finland is regarded as inconsistent with the Bolsheviks' recognition of Finland's independence, as foreign troops cannot occupy a sovereign country. The British Government hopes soon to be able to recognize Finland's independence *de jure*, this depending either upon a favourable view of consolidated Russian political power, or continued disorder.

Mr. Balfour also assured the mission that he was convinced that Finland would soon take her place forever among the sovereign nations.

To this it may be added that the British Government has consented to the establishment of a Finnish Consulate General in London.

File No. 860d.00/45

*Mr. Santeri Nuorteva to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1918.

[Received March 11.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I have been appointed by the provisional revolutionary government of the people's republic of Finland to represent the interests of the said government in the United States, particularly with reference to the vital and urgent problem of food supplies for the Finnish people. In view of the uncertainty of the political situation in Finland and Russia at this time, and particularly in view of the conflicting claims of the two rival governments in Finland, I do not at this time ask for official recognition by the Government of the United States; but speaking in behalf of the great majority of the people of Finland, I am at this time primarily interested in helping them to secure some dispensable food-stuffs from this country to save them from actual starvation.

With this object in view I have taken the liberty of submitting an application for leave to purchase and ship certain supplies to Honorable Herbert C. Hoover, Food Administrator, United States Food Administration, a copy of which application I have the honor to submit herewith. I was informed by the Food Administration that there was no objection on its part to the purchase and shipment of certain of the specified food products under the plan outlined in the application above mentioned, but that such arrangement required the sanction of the State Department.

I hereby respectfully submit the following applications to the State Department and urgently request speedy and favorable action thereon:

- (1) For the approval by your Department of the arrangement for the purchase, shipment, and distribution of such food-stuffs as outlined in the application to the Honorable Herbert C. Hoover;
- (2) For the right to communicate by cable and letter with the provisional revolutionary government of the people's republic of Finland on the subject of opening credits in this country for the purchase of such food supplies and for all other matters in connection with such transaction;
- (3) For the issuance of a passport to my representative, whom I contemplate sending to Sweden and Finland for the purpose of facilitating such transactions. The said proposed representative is a naturalized American citizen, of Finnish birth, and will make formal application for such passport immediately.

I also respectfully submit, for the information of your Department, a brief memorandum upon the status, *de jure* and *de facto*, of

the government which I have the honor to represent, and upon the present political situation of Finland.

If you will deem it proper to grant me an informal interview, I shall be happy to supplement the statements contained in the memorandum with such additional information on the subject that you may desire.

Very respectfully,

SANTERI NUORTEVA

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum of the status, "de jure" and "de facto," of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the People's Republic of Finland*

On behalf of the provisional revolutionary government of the people's republic of Finland, I hereby respectfully beg to bring to the knowledge of the Government and the people of the United States the following facts with reference to the present status of the government of the Finnish republic:

On July 18, 1917, the Finnish Diet declared the independence of Finland. This declaration was subsequently, on September 14, ratified at another session of the Diet, and later the independence of Finland was officially recognized by the present government of the Russian Republic.

The preceding Provisional Government of Russia, however, in August 1917, refused to recognize the Finnish declaration of independence and assumed to dissolve the Finnish Diet, which act, however, was entirely unauthorized and illegal. Following the alleged dissolution of the Diet new elections were ordered and a new government based on such election was formed. This is the "government" now in control of the northern part of Finland and represented in this country by Dr. Julio Reuter.

On January 27, 1918, this "government" was deposed by a revolutionary uprising of the people, and a new government was formed, known as the provisional government of the people's republic of Finland, which I have the honor to represent in this country.

The motives of the revolution were political as well as social. The political and juridical relations between Finland and Russia were, according to interpretations of weighty authorities on international law, a personal union, the monarch of Russia being the Grand Duke of Finland, invested with the powers, and subject to the limitations enumerated in the Constitution of Sweden, as it stood at the time of Finland's annexation by Russia in 1809, and as amended from time to time by the Finnish Diet with the approval of the Russian Government. One of the provisions of the Constitution was that if the monarch should be dethroned or lose sovereignty for any reason the supreme power should automatically pass into the hands of the Diet.

Thus the effect of the Russian revolution was to empower the Finnish Diet to take full charge of the government of the country. In accordance with that interpretation, the Finnish Diet, on July 18, 1917, by a vote of 136 to 55, passed a bill proclaiming Finland's independence, of which the following is a literal translation:

Be it enacted:

WHEREAS the prerogatives of the regent have been eliminated, the Finnish Diet resolves as follows:

## 1

The Finnish Diet alone decides, enforces, and executes all the laws of Finland, including those concerning state economy, taxation, and customs.

The power of the Diet is supreme also in all other Finnish matters in which the Tsar and Grand Duke heretofore had the decisive vote.

The provisions of this law do not include the foreign policies, the military statutes, or the military administration.

## 2

The Diet may convene without special call and it has the right to prorogue its sessions. Until a new form of government has been agreed upon in detail, the Diet, according to the election laws, shall determine upon new elections and the dissolution of the Diet.

## 3

The Diet appoints the supreme executive power of Finland.

The supreme executive power shall temporarily be in the hands of the economic department of the Finnish Senate, its members to be appointed and recalled by the Diet.

The Diet which adopted the above declaration, and which was controlled by the Socialists, did not at that time assume the government pursuant to the provisions of the declaration because the non-Socialist parties refused to attend the sessions of the Diet after it had been illegally dissolved by the Provisional Government of Russia. Subsequently, however, when through the illegal election above mentioned, the reactionary elements secured the control of the alleged new Diet, they reaffirmed the declaration of independence and assumed to form a government under its terms.

The chief reasons for the revolution were, however, more deep-seated than the purely juridic justification. In the first place, the government elected by the illegal Diet entered into such relations with the German Government, which threatened to jeopardize the new-won independence of Finland and to betray the cause of the Russian revolution—the real liberation of Finland. The representatives of that Finnish “government” attempted at Brest Litovsk to conclude a treaty with Germany similar to that made by the pro-German representatives of Ukraine. Even without waiting for a formal conclusion of peace with Germany, the illegal “government” of Finland entered into official relations with Germany, appointing a formal mission to Berlin. Subsequently, as we are informed from seemingly reliable sources, the deposed government actually entered into a political and economic treaty, practically placing the country under German protectorate. Latest advices, which seem quite credible, are to the effect that the representatives of the so-called conservative “government” are negotiating with Germany for the reestablishment of the monarchical form of government with one of the sons of the Kaiser as the King of Finland.

Such plans and activities of the pro-German element in Finland were deeply resented by the masses of the people, who well understood that the influence of German autocracy in Finland meant the destruction of all hopes of democratic evolution in the country and were an incalculable danger to the revolution not only in Finland but in Russia as well.

At the same time the illegal “government” of Finland did little or nothing to alleviate the misery and hunger of the people. Profiteering was allowed without restriction. Vitally necessary social legislation was hampered and reactionary measures were taken toward establishing oligarchical class rule.

The revolution of January 1918 was organized and accomplished by the labor organizations. The deposed government fled to the northern part of the country and has succeeded in maintaining itself, with the help of German-imported arms and soldiers, in the most sparsely populated section, inhabited by about one fourth of the people. The entire southern and middle regions, comprising the most important industrial, economic, and political centers, are in the control of the new revolutionary government which is rapidly reestablishing order and asserting its authority.

The provisional government of Finland consists of fourteen members, named the People's Commissaries, elected by the labor unions, cooperative societies, and the Socialist Party organizations. This government claims title as a provisional government, acting until order is reestablished throughout the country and until new elections are held and a new constitution is adopted.

The provisional government is supported by a voluntary army of workers' militia, comprising from 100,000 to 150,000 active and disciplined members. The authority of the new government is upheld and supported by a powerful chain of organizations, which in every town and village of the country, to some extent even in the northern part, work in sympathy with it and temporarily exercise the functions of local administration.

The provisional revolutionary government of Finland is in full sympathy with the revolutionary government of Russia and in active and close cooperation with it. Recently, I am informed, the government of Russia signed a treaty with the provisional government of Finland recognizing Finland's complete independence, even in the domain of foreign policies and military matters excluded from the provisions of the act of July 18, 1917.

Unless the deposed government succeeds in subjecting the country to the German autocracy, there is absolutely no chance of depriving the workers' organizations of the control of the country. And even then the workers' organizations of Finland are determined to render the most desperate resistance to the establishment of German autocracy in Finland. The power of the workers' organizations in Finland is by no means accidental or temporary. Since 1905, when the laboring classes of Finland, after long years of struggle, succeeded in abolishing the reactionary feudal political structure and establishing universal and equal suffrage, the Socialist Party has been in steady ascendancy. In 1907 it held 40 per cent of the seats in the Diet. This number steadily increased in subsequent elections until in the election of 1916, which was the last legal election, the party representing the workers' organizations secured an absolute majority of the Diet.

The reactionary policies of the opponents of the labor movement, and their present policy of relying upon German autocracy in their fight against the democratic institutions and movements in Finland, have forever discredited them in the eyes of the people. The popular resentment against the pro-German element in Finland is increased by the fact that although the country for the past ten years has had a liberal constitution in regard to general political rights, the country has in many respects remained extremely reactionary in its social institutions, as the wealthy classes, so long as the legislative power of the Diet was subject to approval by the Russian Government, always used their influence with the Russian Government to thwart progressive legislation of the Diet. Thus, for instance, the agricultural system of Finland in many respects retains elements of survival of medieval serfdom, the tenants being compelled to pay rent in the form of compulsory service without regard to the market price of labor. Public officers are appointed for lifetime and the spirit of arrogant

bureaucracy prevails in the public offices. The laws, civil as well as criminal, have as their basis the obsolete code of Sweden of the eighteenth century.

The struggle of the working people of Finland, a struggle which has lasted for a century, against internal and external tyranny, is in its present aspects a struggle for real democracy, for industrial as well as political freedom, and for modern civilization against medieval autocracy. I sincerely believe it has a just claim upon the full sympathy on the part of the democracy of the world.

Respectfully submitted,

SANTERI NUORTEVA

[Enclosure 2]

*Mr. Santeri Nuorteva to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

SIR: Supplementing my conversations with your office, permit me to submit the following facts and requests with respect to the food situation in Finland:

Finland is starving.

For months the greater part of the three and one-half million of the people of Finland have been without bread. Other foods are scarce. Leeches and ground bark are the chief food of hundreds of thousands of the Finnish people. Thousands have actually died of hunger. Thousands are slowly starving to death.

Prior to the war Finland had to rely largely upon imported food products. During the war the dislocation of commerce almost completely cut off Finland from food supplies. With the breakdown of transportation facilities in Russia assistance from that country was reduced to practically nothing.

On top of the lack of food supplies from the outside, the crops of Finland last year were much below normal, due largely to the inability to import fertilizer, without which the soil of Finland is relatively unproductive. While her suffering is equal to, if not greater than that of almost any other nation, Finland's tragedy is so much greater because the world seems not to have been able to pay any attention to her.

Acting on behalf of the provisional government of Finland, I hereby respectfully call the attention of America to the bitter need of Finland. Great as is the call for relief of the war-stricken world upon the generous American people, the cry of the Finns, we are sure, will not remain unheard.

Allowing one pound of grain per day per capita for five months from the 15th of April, when the supplies possibly could reach Finland if sent at once, to the 15th of September, when the new crop will be available, the people of Finland would require 262,000 tons of grain, other foodstuffs being practically exhausted. The available domestic supply being almost at an end, the calculated shortage for the year was 140,000 tons; actually it was much larger. Finland, to save herself from immediate starvation, will need at least 40,000 tons within the next few months. This need is urgent. Nothing but speedy help will save a large part of the population from death by starvation.

The provisional government of Finland is able and ready to pay for every pound of food, and I understand the most necessary foodstuffs, corn, oats, and barley, are available for export without inconvenience to America or her allies.

Yet there are many difficulties confronting the shipment of food to Finland:

If the deposed Finnish government, now in control of the northern section, more or less openly allied with Germany and aiding German invasion of Finland, should be allowed to receive the supplies, they might fall into German

hands or be used in furtherance of Germany's military plans, or else only one fourth of the population of Finland would get the benefit of the relief, only one fourth of the population living in the area controlled by the deposed government.

The government, which I have the honor to represent and which came into power through the revolution of January 1918, is ready to take full charge of the food supplies and to pledge itself to distribute such supplies impartially among the whole population, regardless of location or political affiliations. The provisional government of Finland, however, has no desire to involve the political aspects of the situation in the vital problem of food for the people.

I shall be glad to assist arrangements which will offer to the United States Government adequate guarantees that the food will not fall into German hands and relieve the government of the necessity of passing, in this connection, upon the contending claims of the rival governments in Finland.

Leaving the way open to any other practical proposition, I respectfully suggest the following plan:

1. A committee of well-known and reliable citizens of the United States shall be formed for the purpose of supervising and controlling all purchases and shipments of such food supplies.

2. A similar committee of citizens in Sweden shall be formed, possibly under the chairmanship of the mayor of Stockholm, and under the supervision of representatives of the United States in Sweden, to cooperate in conjunction with the American committee. The Swedish committee shall receive and hold all food shipments and apportion them in proper instalments among the population of the country as a whole, regardless of political affiliations and in a manner which will prevent their falling into German hands.

3. All expenses of the purchase, shipment, and distribution of the supplies will be borne by the provisional government of Finland which I have the honor to represent. If I am allowed freely to communicate with the Finnish government at this time I shall be able to establish credits in the United States fully covering all expenditures involved in the transaction.

Respectfully submitted,

SANTERI NUORTEVA

---

File No. 860d.00/45

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Santeri Nuorteva*

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1918.

SIR: The Department has received your letter of February 26,<sup>1</sup> addressed to the President, and also your letter of March 9, with enclosure, addressed to the Secretary of State, regarding the political situation in Finland and the urgent need for food supplies.

As you are perhaps aware, the situation in Finland has been, and is receiving the careful consideration of the Department.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

ALVEY A. ADEE

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Treaties between Finland and the Soviet Government, March 1, 1918, and between Finland and the German Government, March 7, 1918

File No. 763.72119/1442

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, March 8, 1918.

[Received March 9, 4.45 a. m.]

1647. Swedish press reports to-day peace treaty was signed between Germany and Finland including commercial and maritime agreement supplemented by a protocol. Germany guarantees Finland's independence be recognized by all powers. Finland is not to relinquish any part of her territory or grant any servitude to any foreign power without first reaching agreement with Germany. Sections in Russo-German peace treaty concerning Finland to be replaced by others more in accordance with altered conditions. German war prisoners in Finland and Finnish war prisoners in Germany will be exchanged soon as possible. Regarding Åland question, it is resolved fortifications in islands shall be removed at earliest possible time. A special agreement will provide that islands are to remain unfortified in future.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72119/1895

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1292

STOCKHOLM, August 10, 1918.

[Received September 11.]

SIR: I have the honor to call your attention to the following articles in the Finnish-German treaties, dated March 7 last:

The actual peace treaty contains, on the whole, merely the usual regulations as to the resumption of commercial intercourse, the exchange of prisoners of war, mutual obligations of compensation, etc. Articles 1 and 30 are the only two of any far-reaching significance.

By Article 1, clause 2, Germany guarantees that Finland's independence shall be recognized by all other powers, while Finland on her part must pledge herself not to cede any part of her territory to any foreign power or grant to any such power any suzerainty over her own sovereign power without having previously obtained Germany's consent.

Article 30 treats of the Åland Islands, the fortresses on which are to be done away with. Concerning the future of the islands from



a military and technical shipping point of view, an agreement will be made between Sweden, Finland, Russia, and Germany, and, if the latter desires it, other Baltic states also. The Åland treaty of March 30, 1856, will be adopted as the basis for negotiations. These regulations in the Finnish-German treaty have their counterpart in Article 6, clause 4, of the German-Russian treaty.

In connection with the Finnish-German commercial and shipping treaty concluded at the same time the following points will be of a certain interest:

It is laid down in Article 2 that the subjects of both the high contracting powers should conjointly enjoy the same privileges as to trade as the citizens in each respective country. As far as Germany is concerned this is a great step in advance, since formerly Germans in Finland only had the same rights as were accorded to subjects of most-favored nations.

In addition, by a note of the Finnish delegates, dated March 7, 1918, to the German Imperial Chancellor, it was stated that—

According to Article 2 of the commercial and shipping agreement between Finland and the German Empire of to-day's date the subjects of the one country in the domain of the other country shall, in respect of trade and industry, be on an equal footing with the inhabitants. The Finnish government presumes that the above decision will not cause any change in the rules that obtain in Finland, which, in respect of certain companies, make it a condition that Finnish state authorities should be among the members of the committee. Nevertheless, the Finnish government will, with all possible speed, propose to the Finnish Landtdag a law rendering it possible to place the subjects of the German Empire on an equal footing with the inhabitants of Finland in that respect also, and will make every effort to pass and enforce the law.

Article 6 of the commercial treaty shows that Finland, although looked upon as a favored nation in Germany, has not the right to claim the same advantages which the latter can bestow on Austria-Hungary or any other direct or indirect neighboring country that has a customs league with Germany. At the same time Finland is bound, apart from frontier traffic within an area of 15 kilometers, not to grant any special advantages to Russia, but rather to establish a customs boundary respecting that country.

The Finns have reserved the coastal traffic between home ports to vessels flying the Finnish flag and the only concession Germany was able to obtain was in Article 12 which states that the advantages in this regard, which Finland eventually may grant to any third power, will also be awarded to Germany.

I have [etc.]

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE

File No. 760d.62/-

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1492

STOCKHOLM, November 18, 1918.

[Received December 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith to the Department, for its information, copies with translations of a secret agreement between Finland and Germany, dated March 7, 1918.

I have [etc.]

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

*The German Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Von Stumm) to the Finnish Plenipotentiaries (Hjelt and Erich)*

A. A. Fr. II.677

BERLIN, March 7, 1918.

The undersigned has the honor to submit the following to Dr. Hjelt, Cabinet Minister, and Professor Dr. Erich, delegates of the Finnish government.

In order to prevent Germany from suffering through the reestablishment of internal order in Finland, brought about by German help, and the powers engaged in war against the former from deriving benefit therefrom, the Imperial German Government must lay stress on the fulfilment of the following wishes:

1. Finland is not to allow the powers engaged in war with Germany to take possession of Finnish railways or to establish themselves in Finnish harbors or coastal positions.

2. The Finnish government shall intern the naval forces of the powers engaged in war with Germany and her allies which may be or may arrive in Finnish waters.

3. The Finnish government declares itself willing to help the German naval forces by its pilotage system and the channel markings in Finnish waters.

4. Finland admits Germany's right to establish bases anywhere on Finnish territory for the German naval forces during the period of military support.

5. The Finnish government is to prohibit the export and transfer to foreigners of Finnish merchant ships, shares in the same, and also the alienation of shares in shipping concerns until the restoration of general peace.

The Finnish government shall during the designated period place the chartering of Finnish merchant ships under its control and only permit it in strictly Finnish interests.

No exceptions are to be made regarding merchant vessels at present in the Baltic Sea.

6. The Finnish government shall allow the Finnish merchant vessels at present in the Baltic Sea to navigate only this sea during the period mentioned in Paragraph 5. It furthermore declares its willingness to have enforced the restriction regarding this navigation which is necessitated by the German sea-warfare and which is to be agreed upon between it and the German Admiralty.

7. The Finnish government shall prohibit, during the period of military support, the granting of shore leave to the crews of foreign vessels lying in Finnish waters, unless they are Finnish subjects.

8. The Finnish government agrees to the establishment of a German control office at Torneå during the period of military support for the observation of enemy espionage.

Regarding the execution, reservation is made of the agreement between the two governments.

9. The Finnish government will see to it that the present supplies of the country as well as the further production of exportable goods will be utilized

as far as possible for the benefit of Germany and her allies during the period mentioned in Paragraph 5. These supplies and products shall be used especially as payment for the war material delivered by Germany.

The Finnish government shall accordingly during the time mentioned issue and maintain export prohibitions, especially for rough and finished wood, wooden ships, cellulose, cardboard, paper, skins and hides, wool, flax, and other textile materials, tin, nickel, copper and copper alloys and other scarce metals as well as waste therefrom; also mineral oils, caoutchouc, and old rubber. Exceptions to these prohibitions may be made only with the consent of the German Government.

The German Government shall not refuse to make exceptions for wood, wooden ships, cellulose, cardboard, and paper in so far as export of these articles to the Scandinavian countries is concerned and the question of payment for war materials delivered is not involved.

On the other hand the German Government's requests for permission of exportation to Germany or to her allies shall be granted to the greatest possible extent, in so far as consideration for Finland's own requirements does not stand in the way.

While the undersigned awaits a favorable answer as to the Finnish government's readiness to agree to the above-mentioned wishes, he also avails himself [etc.]

STUMM

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*The Finnish Plenipotentiaries (Hjelt and Erich) to the German Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Von Stumm)*

BERLIN, March 7, 1918.

The undersigned have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of to-day, Foreign Office Fr. II 677, from the Honorable the Undersecretary of State in A[uswärtigen] A[mt] Mr. Von Stumm, and to declare that the Finnish government in every respect agrees to the Imperial German Government's wishes as laid forth in Paragraphs 1 to 9, and necessary steps will immediately be taken for executing the same.

The undersigned avail themselves [etc.]

DR. HJELT

DR. ERICH

[Enclosure 3—Translation]

*The Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy (Von Below) to the German Naval Attaché at Stockholm*

26532

BERLIN, September 10, 1918.

The enclosed treaty for your information.

Your attention is specially drawn to the fact that this secret treaty must not under any circumstances be made public.

The visa on the declaration of acknowledgment is to be given only when the agreement regarding export with the naval representative at Helsingfors, K[orvetten] Kapitän Reuter, is at hand.

VON BELOW

File No. 763.72119/3168

*The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1258

ARCHANGEL, November 20, 1918.

[Received December 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to a telegraphic instruction which the Department addressed to me in care of the American Legation

at Stockholm on the subject of the texts of the Brest Litovsk and certain other treaties, and which was repeated by the Legation to me at Archangel. Under date of November 14 I telegraphed the Legation at Stockholm as follows:

I believe that the complete texts of the Brest Litovsk treaties were sent to the Department by pouch from Moscow. Please ask Vice Consul Nielsen about this. The Finnish treaty is being sent from here. I do not recall having seen the Rumanian treaty. The German official publications, which should be obtainable through Copenhagen, are the most authoritative sources for the Brest Litovsk treaties, the Russian texts being but bad translations from the German. The supplementary treaties were published in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* about September 6.

It is presumed that the Legation at Stockholm communicated the substance of the foregoing to the Department.

I now have the honor to forward a translation of the treaty of March 1/February 16, 1918, between the socialist republics of Russia and Finland. This translation has been prepared from a pamphlet, also enclosed, found in the files of the Embassy. There is nothing to indicate its authority.

I have [etc.]

DEW. C. POOLE, JR.

[Enclosure—Translation]

# TREATY BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF RUSSIA AND FINLAND<sup>1</sup>

The Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic and the Council of People's Delegates of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, in order to strengthen the friendship and fraternity between the above-mentioned free republics, have concluded the following treaty.

## ARTICLE 1

The Russian Federative Soviet Republic transfers to the independent Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic all real estate belonging to the Russian Republic or to Russian state establishments, whether by right of ownership or by right of use, that is: lands, stretches of water, urban districts, buildings, mills, factories, telegraph establishments, railroads, fortresses, lighthouses, beacons and buoys, situated within the limits of the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Finland.

## ARTICLE 2

The Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, on its part, transfers to the Russian Federative Soviet Republic all real estate belonging to the Finnish treasury or the state establishments of Finland whether by right of ownership or of use, that is: lands, stretches of water, urban districts, buildings, mills, factories, telegraph establishments, railroads, fortresses, lighthouses, beacons and buoys, situated within the limits of the territory of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic.

<sup>1</sup> The translation has been left substantially in the form in which it was received. Verbal corrections have been made upon comparison with the Russian text above described.

## ARTICLE 3

The Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic agrees also to the acquisition of the other property not mentioned in Article 1 of the present treaty, belonging to the Russian Federative Soviet Republic and situated within the limits of the former Grand Duchy of Finland, and has a preferential right in acquiring such property, in so far as it does not infringe upon the interests of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic.

## ARTICLE 4

From the above-mentioned properties subject to transfer to the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic are excluded those which, by decision of the Russian-Finnish Conciliation Commission, are transferred directly to workers' organizations.

## ARTICLE 5

In the interest of cooperation in the nationalization of the Finnish merchant marine the Russian Federative Soviet Republic transfers to the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic in their present condition all the ships belonging to the Finnish treasury, companies or private persons, requisitioned by the Russian Government before or during the war. All other requisitioned property will be turned over in a like degree in so far as it lies within the territorial limits of the Grand Duchy of Finland at the moment of the conclusion of this treaty.

## ARTICLE 6

The effect of the preceding paragraphs does not extend to real properties which are necessary for the Russian Federative Soviet Republic on the territory of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, and conversely those which are necessary for the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic on the territory of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic, for establishments and persons of the diplomatic, consular, or commercial services, as well as for educational and medical institutions.

## ARTICLE 7

The scale of compensation for the properties transferred in accordance with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the present treaty is to be fixed by the special Russian-Finnish Conciliation Commission. A special account is to be carried for the payments imputed to these transfers, to be effected upon demand of the Russian Liquidation Commission for Finnish Affairs, and to be concluded at the time of the final accounting.

## ARTICLE 8

The amounts owed by the Finnish state establishments and the Finnish treasury to the Russian state establishments and the Russian treasury and vice versa, as likewise the short-term obligations of Russia concluded through the medium of the Finnish Bank, are acknowledged as being in force by the governments of both socialist republics, and the means of their amortization, independently of the payments effected in accordance with Article 7, will be worked out by a special mixed financial subcommission, under the control of the Russian-Finnish Conciliation Commission.

## ARTICLE 9

The contracting parties mutually guarantee at all times to all commercial vessels of the Russian and Finnish socialist republics free, unobstructed access to all sea, river, and lake ports, anchorages, and canals, giving the right to all

above-mentioned vessels freely to load or unload their freight, and to make use of pilot service. The technical conditions of enjoyment of the above-mentioned rights will be defined by special arrangements.

#### ARTICLE 10

A direct, constant, and through train service between the railroads of Russia and Finland shall be established.

#### ARTICLE 11

The conditions of use by the Russian Federative Soviet Republic of the telegraphs and roads on the territory of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic and, correspondingly, by the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic on the territory of the Russian Federal Republic, will be settled by special arrangements; among these, by exception from the general application of Article 1, applicable to existing international understandings and agreements, three cables (Nos. 13, 60 and 42) running through the territory of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic and connecting Petrograd with Stockholm, Newcastle, and Frideritsiya, and one direct cable connecting uninterruptedly Petrograd-Vartniemi-Alexandrovsk (Murmanski), running through Viborg, Kuopio, Kemi, and Rovaniemi, will remain the property of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic for fifty years with the right of extraterritoriality; and also the Russian Federative Soviet Republic maintains all the rights obtained by the agreement with the Danish company in three direct cables from Nystad to Sweden via the Åland Islands.

#### ARTICLE 12

Both contracting parties will immediately appoint a subcommission of the Russian-Finnish Conciliation Commission for the drafting of a commercial treaty between the two republics.

#### ARTICLE 13

Russian citizens of Finnish descent in Russia, as likewise Finnish citizens of Russian descent in Finland, shall be accorded the same rights as other citizens of these respective countries.

Finnish citizens in Russia, as likewise Russian citizens in Finland, shall enjoy in the same measure as the citizens of these respective countries, all private rights, civil liberties, and general rights.

The Russian Federative Soviet Republic allows to Finnish citizens in Russia all the political rights of Russian citizens belonging to the working class or to peasants who do not exploit the labor of others, if they reside on Russian territory for the purpose of laboring occupations.

For its part the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic pledges itself to allow to citizens of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic in Finland the easiest possible conditions for the enjoyment of all political rights, especially taking into consideration the interests of the laboring population not always having a constant residence.

#### ARTICLE 14

The Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic pledges itself not to hinder and promises to cooperate in the continuation and the most rapid completion of the evacuation, already begun, from the territory of the Finnish Socialist Republic of all the land and naval forces and the establishments of military and naval departments of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic.

## ARTICLE 15

The Russian Federative Soviet Republic cedes in full ownership to the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic the territory delimited below, provided the consent of the local population is obtained by free consultation.

Henceforth the Russian-Finnish state frontier will be the line which runs from Korve Tunturi (on the present Russian-Finnish frontier) by a straight line to the sources of the River Pechenga (Petsamo), from there by the eastern watershed of the River Pechenga (Petsamo) it curves round the Motovski Gulf (Muotko Fjord) and Rybachi Peninsula and by a straight line it comes out on the coast of the Arctic Ocean near Zubov (Supuski).

The commission provided for in Article 17 is charged to draw up special provisions guaranteeing:

- (1) The rights of the Russian population engaged in the fishing and other industries on the alienated territory;
- (2) The rights of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic to an unhindered commercial transit to and from Norway; and
- (3) The rights resulting from treaties concluded and in effect between Russia and Norway.

The payments resulting from the cession of the above-mentioned territory shall be effected according to the principles set forth in Article 7 of the present treaty.

## ARTICLE 16

The contracting parties shall establish a subcommission of the Russian-Finnish Conciliation Commission, for the purpose of defining exactly the changes in the Russian-Finnish frontier. Nevertheless the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic immediately cedes in full ownership to the Russian Federal Republic the territory of Fort Ino, situated on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, and guarantees the necessary transit to this fort.

## ARTICLE 17

In the development of the articles of this fundamental treaty, drafts of detailed agreements will be worked out by the Conciliation Commission, established by the governments of both contracting parties, which drafts will be subject to ratification by the governments of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic and the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic.

## ARTICLE 18

Disagreements arising during the preparation of the above-mentioned detailed agreements and during the discussion of the present treaty and of the detailed arrangements included in its development, as likewise any cases of infraction of the provisions of the treaty and the agreements, shall be submitted to the judgment of an arbitration court, the president of which is appointed by the administration of the Swedish Left Social Democratic Party, unless later determined otherwise.

## ARTICLE 19

The present treaty goes into legal effect from the moment of its signature by the plenipotentiaries of the governments of both socialist republics.

## ARTICLE 20

The plenipotentiaries of the governments of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic and of the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic have signed and affixed their seals to two copies of the treaty in the Russian and Finnish languages.

Signed in Petrograd March 1/February 16, 1918.

File No. 760d.62/1

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1918, 3 p. m.

1392. Your despatch 1492, dated November 18, 1918. Was secret agreement ever accepted by Finland? Also, how long was it to remain in force?

POLK

File No. 760d.62/1

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 28, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received December 30, 11.34 a. m.]

Department's 1392, undated [December 21, 3 p. m.] referring to Legation's despatch 1492, November 18. The German-Finnish agreement was to remain in force until the conclusion of a general peace. It was accepted by delegates of Finland with full powers on October [March?] 7, 1918, but many of the provisions were never fully put in force on account of the changing fortunes of war.

MORRIS

German Military Intervention against the Red Guards; Victory of the White Guards—Advances into Karelia and toward the Murman Railway—New Negotiations with the Soviet Government—British, French, and American Attitude toward the White Government and Representatives of the Former Red Government—Resignation of Mannerheim—Monarchist Movement: Election of Frederick Carl of Hesse, October 9, 1918

File No. 860d.00/42

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 8, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received March 8, 5.11 p. m.]

8966. Your 6559, February 13, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Naval Attaché informed by British authorities that shipments of grain from America to north Finland have been stopped in view of the recent changes in the political situation there, which would make it probable that these supplies would fall into enemy hands. Please advise what policy has been adopted. British information is to effect that Germans have penetrated into northern Finland.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



File No. 860d.00/43

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, March 9, 1918.

[Received March 10, 1.20 a. m.]

1656. Swedish press reports Finnish government at Vasa has issued proclamation containing following:

German landing Åland is made with assent of Finnish government as is transference their operations to Finnish mainland. Commander in chief of troops of Finnish republic has informed Finnish government that after being provided with arms we would have been able with our own resources to bring struggle to successful end but the numerous brutalities committed in southern Finland, lack of food among population, and daily arrival of large hosts of Bolsheviks, have induced government for welfare of the country to accept the hand of a powerful friend. Peace terms signed between Germany and Russia include a provision as to removal of Russian troops and Bolsheviks from Finland and it is evacuation of these that Germany wants to supervise, backed by troops now arriving in Finland. Germany does not permit Russian soldiers garbed like civilians to fight in Finland, thus insidiously circumventing Russo-German peace treaty.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/60

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, March 11, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received March 13, 5.36 p. m.]

Fifteen Americans from Petrograd including Government officers' wives and business men are now refugees in Helsingfors because of increasing civil war activity. Red and White Guards refuse passage through lines. Stockholm Legation wires Swedish authorities refuse to send boat to Finland because of ice. According to arrangement with White Guards, Germans are landing at Hangö to take Helsingfors and drive Reds from Finland in order to restore order. German airplanes over Helsingfors. Consulate expenses considerably increased. Have bureau accounts protect possible drafts.

HAYNES

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1673).

File No. 860d.00/73

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, March 30, 1918.

[Received 10.40 p. m.]

1794. Swedish press reports Finnish government troops entered Tammerfors and captured great number prisoners, other spoils. Finnish press bureau reports Friday evening parts Tammerfors captured including suburbs and railway station. Fire broken out one part of city. Toijala also occupied by government troops. Losses Red Guards very heavy. Leaders Reds left Tammerfors few days ago for Helsingfors escaping in aeroplane.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/74

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 1, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 2, 12.26 a. m.]

1804. Following is memorandum on Finnish situation prepared for me by Captain Crosley:<sup>1</sup>

Civil war: After interviewing and observing leaders and other personnel on both sides, including a month of this with the Reds, the final outcome seems inevitable to me. The Whites must win.

Food: In southern Finland food is very scarce and grows more so. Much of the bread sold can only be eaten by a starving person. It is only a question of a short time when there will be starvation among the Reds and the civilian population in their control. This will most likely be avoided by the introduction of food by the Whites as they advance. In the north there is more food, the supply having been estimated for me by an apparently reliable source as sufficient for two months. The same source stated that "we will get food from Germany." In view of the large percentage of the population, including women, now engaged in military activities, present and future production of foodstuffs and manufactured articles may be considered as negligible. Under German influence, as now seems most likely in the near future will exist, these conditions will improve.

Fuel: Owing to military activities, not much fuel is available.

<sup>1</sup> Capt. Walter S. Crosley, formerly Naval Attaché in Russia.

Transportation: Because of all of the above, transportation of all kinds becomes more scarce and unreliable.

German influence: Among the Reds the Germans are hated. With the Whites are some Germans but many Finns who have served as much as two years with the German army and who are, so far as our interests are concerned, German. At the White front no German influence was observed. The officers and men at Ahlainen, front headquarters, could not have treated our party better. As we went north, first at Kristinestad we saw animosity against us which was marked at Seinäjoki and at Torneå, but did not result in any overt act against our party. The White officers are the *jägers* who have recently returned from the German Army. They wear a distinctive uniform and very much resemble Germans in manner and deportment. From a reliable source I learned that three German vessels had landed men and supplies in the White lines north of Mäntyluoto and south of Kristinestad.

MORRIS

---

File No. 860d.00/90

*The Vice Consul at Petrograd (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, April 14, 1918.

[Received 11.05 a. m.]

10. Haynes, Helsingfors, requests Department informed he can no longer communicate. Expects occupation of city but has been assured immunity.

IMBRIE

---

File No. 860d.00/93

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 16, 1918.

[Received 7.17 p. m.]

1902. Swedish press reports Finnish press bureau wires Count von der Goltz reports April 13 Helsingfors been stormed after three days' desperate fighting. Several thousand prisoners and great quantity booty captured, enemy offering desperate resistance. White prisoners were liberated.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/94

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 16, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 7.45 p. m.]

1904. Have received note from Finnish Chargé d'Affaires informing me that Finnish government guarantees, during the sojourn of German troops in Finland, integrity of diplomatic representatives, consuls and personnel of consulates Allied countries as well as safety of person and property of foreigners in the territory occupied by Finnish government troops.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/103

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received April 20, 3.35 a. m.]

1914. In reference to the reported capture of Kem on Murman Railway by Finnish bands, I am instructed that Sario, acting Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, has stated that Finland had no desire to invade Russian territory but that if the Karelians asked to be joined to Finland he did not see how the Finnish government could well refuse.

After such a statement, it would seem almost certain that the armed bands operating in Karelia are being paid by Germany, and that their purpose is to give an opportunity for Germany, under the cloak of Finland, to seize the Kola Railway and the peninsula as far as the White Sea, thus cutting off all our communication with Russia.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/102

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 20, 3.50 a. m.]

1916. British Minister is to-day handing following memorandum to Finnish Chargé d'Affaires here:

His Majesty's Government is prepared to recognize provisionally the *de facto* independence of Finland pending final settlement of question by peace congress in accordance with principle of self-determination on condition:

(a) That the Finnish government is able to obtain the release of the British subjects arrested by the Germans on Finnish territory; and

(b) That adequate guarantees for future maintenance of Finnish neutrality are given, e. g., guarantees for the life and property of Allied subjects in Finland, including right of free passage for British subjects and goods and guarantees for the safety of Allied ships in Finnish waters, and that Finland as a neutral state opens its waters to the ships of all nations.

As soon as the first question has been settled and the necessary guarantees given, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to accredit a chargé d'affaires with the Vasa Government.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/102

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received a report from the American Minister at Stockholm dated April 19, 1918, giving the text of a memorandum handed that day by the Minister of Great Britain at Stockholm to the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires to the effect that the British Government is prepared to recognize provisionally the *de facto* independence of Finland, pending final settlement of the question by the peace congress, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, provided certain conditions are complied with.

The American Minister at Stockholm has been informed that this Government is not prepared at present to take any action looking to the independence of Finland, and I have thought that you will be interested to know our attitude.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 860d.00/102

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1918, 6 p. m.

726. Your 1916, April 19, 6 p. m. You may inform your British colleague that Department not prepared at present to take any action looking to recognizing Finnish independence.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/105

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1918, 7 p. m.

733. Please report whether following statement alleged to have been made by Mannerheim is authentic:

The Germans' victorious and mighty army landed in Finland to help against the infamous Bolsheviks, and to help the friendship the Finnish people have always had for the noble Kaiser and mighty German people. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with the great German army the Finnish army should be imbued with the discipline that has brought that army from victory to victory. I greet the brave German troops and hope that every Finn will realize the great sacrifice of the noble German people who are helping them in an hour when every man is needed on the western front.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/111

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 26, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 27, 2.23 a. m.]

1950. As soon [as] telegraphic communication was restored with Helsingfors, I telegraphed our Consul to ask after his welfare and received following answer on April 23:

Thanks. The past terrible, the present bearable, and the future uncertain. Will telegraph fully when censorship is lifted.

To-day am in receipt of the following cipher from him:

Germans successfully quelling Red Guards. With alleged good intentions, Finnish White Guard government is now in power. Requisitioning all tobacco, oil, coffee, copper, and cloth. Generally understood such is not for Germany. Almost all of these articles obtained from America and England upon guarantee by Finnish buyers not to reexport. Telegraph present status food question in regard to Finland.

Am telegraphing him to-day in regard to food question.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/112

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 27, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received April 28, 3.34 a. m.]

1959. Your 733, April 25, 7 p. m. Have every reason to believe statement therein quoted was made by Mannerheim as it appeared in all Swedish papers.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/124

*The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 3, 1918.

[Received 11.45 p. m.]

466. According official Soviet gazette, National Commissariat Foreign Affairs addressed telegram German Ministry Foreign Affairs April 30 denying participation Russian troops in fighting in Finland as charged by Germany and quoting order to Petrograd Military Commissariat dated 29th directing inquiry in premises, punishment of guilty, if any, and immediate disarming of all troops crossing frontier of Russian Republic. Regarding participation of individual soldiers and officers in Finnish civil war, communication states same may be said about White Guards, as for instance, General Mannerheim. May 2, similar telegram communicates report of Petrograd labor commune that Finnish railway from Petrograd held by Russians as far as Beloostrov, that Finnish Red Guards being disarmed and no government money or property being allowed to be brought across frontier from Finland.

Referring German protest against reported landing 6,000 British troops at Murmansk, Commissariat Foreign Affairs has telegraphed Joffe,<sup>1</sup> Berlin, in part as follows:

In reality no descent was made on Murmansk. The evacuation of a number of English and French military specialists formerly in Russia could not be effected at once. When White Guards began to advance on Murman district, which had practically no armed defense, German Government replied to our inquiry that regular troops were not taking part in these operations, that German Government could not answer for them. In these circumstances not surprising but [that] local Soviet appealed for help to English and French, who had still not left, against bands with which German Government refused to have anything to do. We did not protest against temporary appeal for protection by the Soviet to English and French, who had not had time to leave, but now we protest against a prolonged stay of the British at Murmansk.

SUMMERS

File No. 860d.00/122

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 468

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I duly communicated to the Foreign Office the contents of your letter of April 20 regarding the provisional recognition by His Majesty's Government of the *de facto* independence of Finland, pending the final settlement of the question by the peace conference.

---

<sup>1</sup>A. A. Joffe, Soviet Ambassador in Germany.

I have now received a reply from Mr. Secretary Balfour from which it appears that the British Minister at Stockholm informed the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires that the *de facto* Finnish government would be recognized provisionally by His Majesty's Government, pending final settlement at the peace conference, if the Finnish government would (1) obtain the release of British subjects arrested on Finnish territory by the Germans and (2) give adequate guarantees for the maintenance of neutrality, including the security of Allied subjects and property and the passage of Allied ships through Finnish territorial waters.

The British Minister further pointed out that a satisfactory reply to British representations against the aggressive action by the Finns on the Murman Railway must be included in the guarantee of neutrality.

His Majesty's Government do not propose to take any action unless these conditions are fulfilled and unless they are fully satisfied as to the sincerity and adequacy of the guarantees.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

---

File No. 860d.00/123

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your letter of May 4, 1918, informing me of the action of your Government in regard to the provisional recognition of the *de facto* Finnish government, and shall be very glad to know of the final decision reached and how far the conditions laid down by your Government have been accepted and fulfilled.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

File No. 860d.00/162

*The Secretary of State to the President*

THE PRESIDENT: The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President an address, signed by representatives of Finland at Washington, requesting that the Government of the United States recognize the Government of Finland and enter into friendly relations with it.<sup>1</sup>

Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT LANSING

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1918.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see the last paragraph of the memorandum of the Secretary of State, Feb. 27, *ante*, p. 755.



File No. 860d.00/138

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 14, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 9.17 p. m.]

2081. I have received from Consul at Helsingfors following telegram which he asked to be transmitted to you:

27. May 13, 5 p. m. For your information and for Department of State. Our [I?] advise offer Finland food and provisional recognition independence subject to final peace-congress settlement, if the present government will give complete text German-Finnish agreement guaranteeing most-favored-nation-clause concerning passage American goods and subjects through Finland to Russia, free use Finnish territorial waters for American shipping, and protest for the release of Emery.<sup>1</sup>

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/144

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1918.

[Received May 17.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On the receipt of your letter of May 9 in regard to the question of the provisional recognition of the *de facto* Finnish government, I at once telegraphed to London to enquire what was the final decision reached in this matter and how far the conditions previously laid down by His Majesty's Government had been accepted and fulfilled.

We have now received a reply to the effect that no answer has yet been received from the Finnish government and that His Majesty's Government have no intention of proceeding further in the matter.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

File No. 860d.00/145

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, undated.

[Received May 17, 1918, 8.47 a. m.]

The principal cause for the present revolution was the hopeless

<sup>1</sup> Henry C. Emery, in 1917 American member of the Inter-Ally Priority Board at Petrograd (Michelsen commission), was arrested by German forces Mar. 10, 1918, on the Åland Islands, when *en route* from Petrograd to Stockholm, and interned in Germany.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2095, May 16).

state of food question and distrust of laboring class against *bourgeoisie* not providing food either from Russia or United States. Had food arrived according to my November and December telegrams, the Red Guard, amounting to 10,000, including Reds from Russia, would have been easily controlled by legal Finnish government and no German help would have been needed. Probably government would have won by arbitration with Reds.

To preserve independence against probable rising in Russia the local press is discussing alliance with Germany and some German prince for Finnish King. Recently monarchical tendencies relaxed. Leading organ Young Finnish Party decidedly republican, as well as most provincial *bourgeois* newspapers, which claim full neutral republic.

Diet meets 15th May. The affirming [after?] expulsion 80 [in] subordinate members who joined rebels, the Diet will be about half full; 108 *bourgeois* and 10 Socialists. The Diet will discuss new constitution, neutrality, and treaty with Germany. Young Finnish Party urging elections for the control of such questions, others opposing fearing Socialist propaganda during the elections.

Sixty per cent population are still pro-Allies. Socialist press wholly suppressed at present and *bourgeois* press not daring to express their feeling toward Allies, the majority intentionally treating Germany as the savior of the country.

Recently public opinion is changing. There is disappointment with Germany in her inability to furnish food for their compensation in butter, (?), tea, copper, which are greatly needed here in Finland but are now seized in stores. Because of hunger, the government is compelled to exchange these goods for grain from Germany. As Germans are stationed only in southern Finland and Finnish government consents to full American control of distribution, I believe shipment American grain would be advisable.

Lately pleasing changes in attitude of the newspapers toward Russia. In the first days of German invasion local newspapers discussed the question of attacking Russia and conquering Russian Karelia and Kola Peninsula. Now the government declares Finnish army is not operating in Russian Karelia and only small detachment from Finland has crossed frontier at the request of the population to aid against the Russian Reds. All newspapers are warning the country against a conflict with England if Murman Railway was taken or Russia attacked. The newspapers advise treaty with Russia and the solution of the Russian Karelia [question] by friendly agreement.

File No. 860d.00/163

*The President to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Do you not think that the proper reply to this<sup>1</sup> is that we shall be willing to recognize the republic of Finland only when she shows that she is not controlled by Germany, as she now seems to be?<sup>2</sup>

Faithfully yours,

W[OODROW] W[ILSON]

File No. 860d.00/151

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, May 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received May 22, 9.15 a. m.]

2134. Referring to the Legation's No. 2087, May 15, 5 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> Finnish Chargé d'Affaires informed me this morning that he had received word from his government that Finland had again asked Germany for Emery's<sup>4</sup> release and he hoped that he could soon inform me that same could be accomplished. He also informed me that Svinhufvud had been chosen chairman of an executive council and it is expected that Svinhufvud would make a recommendation to parliament regarding some prince to be placed upon the throne. The current opinion in Stockholm is that if this is done it will be some German prince.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/167

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

Moscow, May 27, 1918.

[Received June 3, 4.09 p. m.]

565. Official Soviet gazette, May 26, prints following note to Mirbach:

<sup>1</sup> See the note of the Secretary of State, May 11, *ante*, p. 785.

<sup>2</sup> Attached memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of State, May 27: "I gave the President's reply orally to Dr. Ignatius when he called upon me recently. The Secretary did not seem to think that it was necessary to make a formal reply to the memorial signed by the representatives of Finland. W[illiam] P[hillips]."

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 786.

Proposal made by German Government regarding basis for adjustment relations with present Finnish Government; viz., cession by Finland to Russian Republic of Fort Ino and Raivola under guarantee by Russian Government not to fortify these places, and cession by Russian Republic to Finland of western part of Murman Peninsula with exit to the sea, is accepted by the Russian Government, which joins German Government in desire for speedy arrival at definite agreement. Russian Government proposes Moscow as place of negotiation. National Commissariat convinced that in this way a considerable step has been taken toward removal of military complications and bloodshed. . . .

POOLE

File No. 860d.00/164

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 27, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 29, 10.17 p. m.]

209. Wardwell<sup>1</sup> visited me yesterday; said Red Cross representatives hereafter would confine themselves to relief work, only participating political affairs when requested; gave me confidential verbal message from Radek, who is able influential Bolshevik editor, asking whether I would recommend recognition Finnish independence if Finland would become neutral and sever close relations with Germany; I encouraged suggestion while expressing doubt of its success. Has Department instructions? Finnish-German alliance constitutes great menace to Murman, Archangel, Petrograd, and all European Russia, but means famine in Finland, Archangel Province. Can you communicate with Haynes?

FRANCIS

File No. 860d.00/161

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, May 28, 1918.

[Received May 29, 4.10 a. m.]

2181. Swedish press reports, account impossibility reach understanding between government and General Mannerheim regarding future organization Finnish army, General maintains resignation. Reconstruction Senate now accomplished. All Senators remaining and Paasikivi appointed Premier, Colonel Thesleff War Minister,

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Allen Wardwell, in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia. See vol. I, p. 531.

Senator Stenroth Foreign Minister, and Sario without portfolio. Agrarian Paloheima appointed chief Food Administration. *Dagens Nyheter* comments resignation Mannerheim. Seems signify victory for pure German influence in Young Finnish army, it being known for some time that so-called *chasseur* officers, who received training Germany, been undermining position Finnish officers and carrying on propaganda for thorough application German military system and placing leadership in German hands. Pro-German forces also been at work lessening Swedish influence high military officers, but appointment War Minister with subsequent curtailment power of Commander in Chief was determining factor in Mannerheim's resignation. No suggestion yet regarding his successor . . . .

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/165

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 28, 1918, noon.

[Received June 1, 9.25 a. m.]

570. My No. 565. Chicherin says cession to Finland of western part Murman Peninsula is based on an agreement in this sense made by Soviet government with defunct Red government of Finland, inasmuch as Germans have insisted that present government of Finland cannot be expected to accept less than was promised to predecessor and Russian government has perceived no means of resisting demand. Territory to be ceded includes narrow strip along Norwegian frontier reaching east to include Rybachi Peninsula but not the port of Murmansk. Exact line to be drawn during negotiations proposed to take place at Moscow.

[POOLE]

File No. 860d.00/178

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 31, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 11, 10 p. m.]

230. Riggs wires 30th that three to four infantry and one cavalry German divisions, also trained Finnish White Guard infantry, are estimated force in Finland, approximating 100,000 men, and great activity in Finnish training camps; also that preparations hastening for attack on Murman line and Murman by construction of railroad for transporting troops which expected to be completed in early July.

FRANCIS

File No. 860d.00/166

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 1, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 2, 12.35 a. m.]

2211. The French Legation in Stockholm make the following statement:

In view of recent declarations made by certain members of the Finnish Senate and in consideration of the facts that the monarchical principle does not seem to be supported by the majority required by constitutional laws the French Minister has been authorized to warn the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm that the Government of the French Republic will not recognize in Finland any régime which may be established in an illegal way.

The French Government holds the view that in making this declaration it is fulfilling towards the Finnish people the duty it assumed when first of all great powers it recognized Finland's sovereignty.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/172a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

831. Department has insistent reports that Finnish troops in cooperation with Germans contemplate attack on Murman Railway. You might cause inquiry to be made informally and unofficially of Finnish representative at Stockholm as to truth of such reports.

POLK

File No. 860d.00/164

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1918, 4 p. m.

168. Your 209, May 27, 5 p. m. Department has not changed policy regarding Finland, and is not prepared to recognize independence or to ship foodstuffs. Department has noted continued presence of German troops in Finnish territory and their reported activities in Karelia.

POLK

File No. 860d.00/174

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 8, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received June 9, 1.50 a. m.]

2256. Answering your telegram 831, June 7. In an interview with member of the Finnish Legation this morning he stated that the Finnish government sympathizes with the population in Russian Karelia which has sent to the Finnish government at Helsingfors several deputations asking for help against the Bolshevik terror; that the Finnish government does not find it possible to give these people in Karelia any effective help although they sympathize with them; that although Finnish volunteers had joined the local White Guards in Karelia, there were no officers with them and these volunteers had joined entirely unofficially and without the consent of the Finnish government. He also said that on April 14 the Finnish government instructed their representative in London to inform the British Foreign Office, in answer to an inquiry from the British Government, that the Finnish government would do all in its power to keep the Murman open for international traffic.

The Finnish Legation here has promised to telegraph to Helsingfors and will advise me whether there has been any change in their policy since the telegram to London on April 14.

I have learned this morning through the French Minister at Stockholm that the French Consul at Helsingfors has notified the Finnish government that any hostile act with regard to the Murman Railway will be regarded as a breach of neutrality by the French Government.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/181

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 12, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 14, 10.03 a. m.]

2293. Referring to your telegram 831, June 7, 6 p. m., and my 2256, June 8, 5 p. m. Finnish Legation at Stockholm has to-day given me copy of *note verbale* to French Minister at Stockholm dated May 16. Finnish Legation states that position of Finnish government on this subject has not changed and is the same as outlined in this note which reads:

From the *note verbale* of 30th of April of his excellency the French Minister it appears that the French and British Governments for desirable [are desirous?] that the Finnish government

should abstain from every enterprise which could facilitate the union of Finland and the Karelian provinces situated outside the present frontier of Finland.

In this regard the Finnish government cannot refrain from calling the attention of his excellency the French Minister to the note of April 24 of his excellency Sir Esme Howard, the British Minister, in which Sir Esme expresses the desire of his government that the Finnish government should not undertake any aggressive action against the Murman Railroad. In a despatch of April 14, 1918, to its representative in London, Mr. Holsti, the Finnish government had, however, already declared itself ready to conform to the desires of the British Government concerning the above-mentioned railroad. This despatch which was communicated to the British Government was then made public.

On the other hand the Finnish government believes it necessary to state that it does not understand the justice of putting in the way of the realization of the efforts of the Karelian population to join themselves to their brothers in Finland for the future free and independent.

This population is entirely Finnish except for a small number of Russian immigrants. In spite of Russian oppression which for centuries has in every way prevented the development of their culture they have always kept their national character. Up to the present the Finnish government has not, however, had the opportunity of supporting their national aspirations. But in time the Finnish government believes it impossible to fail in its duty of intervening in order to liberate Karelia from the bands of Bolshevik brigands of Russian or Finnish origin, who are terrorizing the peaceful population there. Intervention will already become necessary for purely defensive reasons for the said Bolshevik bands menace and infest the territories near the Finnish frontier. Several attempts to invade these provinces have already been repulsed, but at the same time the Finnish government is unable to decline to pay attention to the pathetic supplications presented to the government by numerous deputations and petitions by which the representatives of the Karelian population have asked the aid and help of the Finnish government for the establishment of administrative and economic order in the provinces, where the arbitrary rule and negligence of the Russian employees have made all civilizing work impossible by creating a state of affairs absolutely intolerable.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/184

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, *undated*.

[Received June 15, 1918, 5.40 a. m.]

Only 108 members, or 54 per cent, now compose the Diet which formerly comprised 200. Almost certain a majority vote of this 54 per cent will, in a short time, by declaring monarchy, accomplish

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2295, June 14).



*coup d'état*, since Constitution requires two-thirds the Diet or five-sixths popular vote to determine character sovereignty. Monarchy not discussed until Germans arrived.

Germans were lately reported moving northward from Helsingfors presumably to prepare for winter campaign against Karelia and Murman as lakes are passable only when frozen. French Consul and English Consul predict Finland will be with Germany against Allies by next October.

No political or military information allowed sent from Finland and Allied Consuls can post only open mail.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/182

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 14, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received June 15, 9.34 a. m.]

2302. For Polk, very confidential. General Mannerheim, the former commander in chief of the troops of Finland, is now in Stockholm. He has severed his connection with the Finnish government. He states that the movement of the German troops toward Murman and Finland's position regarding Karelia is such that it will probably lead to difficulties with the Allies. He states that he does not think the Finnish government would be easily dissuaded from their program regarding Karelia, and there does not seem to be much doubt but that the Germans intend to carry out their plans regarding the Murman Railway. This is likely to put Finland in a dangerous way regarding her neutrality as pointed out in my previous telegrams. General Mannerheim is leaving for Finland again to-morrow but returns to Stockholm in about a week, as he states that with the German situation in Finland as it is, he does not desire personally to live there. In future it may be well to bear this in mind should some opportune time come in which General Mannerheim could be of service to us.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/198

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 27, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 28, 11.10 a. m.]

2369. Finnish Chargé d'Affaires to-day handed to British Minister a note of which following is summary:

By order of his government, Finnish Chargé d'Affaires has the honor to communicate the following to Sir Esme Howard in ac-

cordance with an agreement between the Russian and Finnish authorities. Emperor Alexander II decreed on February 15, 1864, that the arms manufactory of Systerbäck with its grounds should be separated from Finland and be incorporated with Russia, in compensation for which Russia would cede to Finland a territory on the Arctic Sea to the east of Jakobselv. Although Systerbäck was separated from Finland, the said coast was not incorporated in Finland. However, this decree has lost none of its force and Finland has not renounced its right, having on several occasions asked for its fulfillment from Russia. Finland being now a free state, it is still more natural and urgent that this territory should be finally incorporated in it. The Finnish government has been delayed from taking the necessary steps by the recent revolt; but before the revolt was definitely crushed, some persons organized an expedition in the north of Finland to visit this territory. From information that has come to hand, the Finnish government has learned that this expedition was stopped by bands of Russians and rebel Finns. They would not, however, have prevented the expedition from reaching Arctic Sea if British sailors had not come to their assistance with machine guns. British troops having no right to act in this manner on territory undoubtedly belonging to Finland nor even to stay there, their conduct cannot in any way be justified. The Finnish government, therefore, finds itself obliged to protest categorically to the British Minister against the illegal actions of the troops mentioned and against damage caused to the rights of Finland, in begging him to bring this protest to the knowledge of his government, as well as the demand of the Finnish government that the British Government should immediately recall its troops from the said Finnish territory and likewise prevent the rebels from receiving any assistance from British Government.

The British Minister pointed out to Finnish Chargé d'Affaires: (1) That the decree of 1864 took two points into consideration, (a) the cession of part of the Murman coast, (b) a correction of the southern Finnish frontier; (2) that the occupation of Murmansk has been carried out in agreement with all the Allies and that French forces are also there; (3) that this note was extremely grave and equivalent to an ultimatum; (4) that the Allied Governments were animated with very friendly intentions toward Finland but that if Finland at the instigation of Germany commenced hostilities against Allies' forces she could no longer count on our good will at the final settlement.

British and French Ministers proposed to telephone Finnish Chargé d'Affaires to-morrow that after consulting Italian Minister and myself we have all communicated his note to our governments and that we are alike agreed concerning the gravity of this step of the Finnish government.

My colleagues and I would suggest that if it is desired to avoid rupture with Finland, the Associated Governments in answering might declare that they would be disposed to promise Finland pos-

session of the Gulf of Pechenga and of the territory ceded by the Bolshevik government on condition that the Allies continue in control of the whole coast of the Arctic Sea for the duration of the war. My private opinion is that this step has been taken by the Finnish government after deliberate consideration and at the instigation of Germany.

MORRIS

---

File No. 860d.00/198

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918, 5 p. m.

915. Your 2369, June 27, 7 p. m. This Government has not recognized either the Soviet government or the independence of Finland. It consequently takes no cognizance of agreement between Bolsheviks and Finnish Red Guard, nor of the adjustment of claims or arrangement with Russia at this time.

LANSING

---

File No. 860d.00/209

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, July 11, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 12, 1 p. m.]

2457. I have had several conferences with General Mannerheim, Finnish patriot and former chief commander of the army in Finland and an important man in Finland. He is now disassociated with the government, telling me in confidence that he did not sympathize with the German movement in Finland, and was opposed to same. Prior to his taking command of the army in Finland he was a general in the Russian service.

He expressed his opinion to me that it was a very grave mistake of the Allies to receive Kerensky, and allow him to visit the Allied countries. He said Kerensky was disavowed by all Russian people of all classes, and the population felt that he helped bring the great troubles upon the Russian people. As cabled you before, this feeling seems to be prevalent with the best-informed people on Russia with whom I have conferred. In connection with this Livingston Phelps, Secretary of the Embassy at Vologda, has just arrived in Stockholm, and stated that the Allied Embassies in Vologda entertained this same view regarding Kerensky. I mention this because the Swedish newspapers announce that Kerensky intends going to America.

General Mannerheim informed me that Finland was entirely under German domination, and what the future would lead to was very doubtful. He personally felt that they would succeed in having some German prince as King. The Finns themselves are not strong enough, and have not been working sufficiently together, to attempt to oppose the enemy movement. . . .

Regarding intervention in Russia, General Mannerheim felt that this was the correct thing to do, and I am quoting his views because he is thought of in Russia not only as a great soldier but as a man whose judgment on questions has been found good. He impressed me with the fact that he speaks entirely in an unofficial way, not being connected with the Finnish government any longer.

MORRIS

File No. 860d.00/259

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*

No. 24

HELSINGFORS, July 15, 1918.

[Received August 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report in duplicate on "Finland's present political situation as affecting the Allies and the Central powers."

This report is written in absolute loyalty and faithfulness to the policy pursued by our Government and is divulged only to the Department for the purpose of furnishing all possible information.

I have [etc.]

THORNWELL HAYNES

[Enclosure]

*Finland's Present Political Situation as Affecting the Allies and the Central Powers*

The long-continued agitation in Finland's Diet for a monarchy versus a republic was voted on last Saturday, July 13, 1918, with a failure of a two-thirds majority for the monarchy, the result being 52 votes for the republic and 57 for the monarchy. Another vote after the third reading is to be taken next Thursday, July 18, 1918.

Throughout the several days' discussion, the advocates of a republic have insisted that the Diet's decision of last December when the Whites were in power was a declaration of an independent republic which was so recognized by France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and the Soviet government of Russia.

The monarchical agitators, consisting of the *bourgeois* Swedes, Finns, and pro-Germans, still declare that the adherence to last December's decision is especially unwise, since the obstacles which then prevented a free choice no longer exist. "It is inexact," say they, "that Finland was recognized as a republic and that the oath of the White Guard army was given to it as such, for the principle involved is not the form of government but that of its spirit—not that of a republic, but that of independence."

The interior republican and monarchical dissension, which since the German occupation of Finland has threatened another civil war, is due to a firm belief on the part of the White Guard government that Germany will win the war, while the advocates of a republic are such from principle regardless of the world-war outcome, although their sentiments are for the most part decidedly pro-Entente.

#### A GEOGRAPHICALLY DIVIDED FINLAND

It is not without the realms of supposition that the persistence of the monarchists, encouraged by the German military, may lead to a divided Finland, wherein the northern portion, composed of farmers and the purer, un-Swedish-tainted, or anti-Swedish, proletariat Finns, may naturally become a republic; and the southern portion, by the efforts of the White Guard *bourgeois* and pro-German Swedes, organized as a monarchy. Such a result might relieve the country of its socialistic-versus-capitalistic grievances, and especially free it from the internal ethnological Swedish-Finnish-speaking antagonism which has been its tragedy since conquered by Sweden six hundred years ago—a tragedy intensified by Russia's forcing a third language upon the population in 1809—for the Tower of Babel is not the only aim brought to an untimely end by too many languages.

And, too, such a division as this, while still giving Germany a friendly nation across the Baltic, would be detrimental in cutting her off from her designs on the White Sea and Arctic Ocean, and throw more sympathetically that 60 or 65 per cent of pro-Ally Finland toward the Entente, establishing friends next to the Murman and Karelia where the Entente's interests for the present more nearly lie.

#### PRO-ENTENTE SYMPATHY GREATER THAN SUPPOSED

Parenthetically, the statement that there are still 60 or 65 per cent of the population possessing pro-Entente sympathies might be seriously challenged were it not explained that the present political situation is such that only the pro-German element is in power and can express itself, while the opposing element has no means of making itself known. And such a situation will hardly be changed until the monarchists realize that Germany is doomed to lose the war.

The pathos with which the opinion and feelings of a great portion of this 60 or 65 per cent are suppressed is accentuated by the report that scores of the population, who believe their country has been betrayed by its own people into the hands of Germany, often visit the bluffs of the southern coasts and strain their eyes toward the horizon in anticipation of the coming of the English fleet to deliver them.

#### CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD BOLSHEVISM

The Finns, who until a few weeks ago hated the Russian Bolsheviks, have been blinded by the Germans into loving them, or at least into that attitude wherein they would rejoice at the clash of arms between the Entente and the Soviet. This hoodwinking by Germany is of course due to a desire that Bolshevism may live and the shame of Brest Litovsk be perpetuated.

But the German manipulation of Finland's political vision has not arrived at the point where the present *de facto* government would officially order her White Guard troops to arrange themselves alongside of Germany and the Bolsheviks in a war against the Allies. A proof of this is partially shown by the present hesitancy and postponement of Finland to conclude a treaty with the

Soviet government in settlement of the Murman-Karelian question, for the Finnish government's doubt as to the validity of such a treaty is strengthened by its realization of the insecurity of the Bolshevik government. Continued pressure by Germany, however, has arranged a conference for a treaty to meet July 20, 1918, at Revel.

#### IMPROBABILITY OF WAR

The British Consul and the French Consul in Helsingfors still express their belief that war between the Entente and Finland is only a matter of a very few days, and that in the event of the Finnish *de facto* government's refusing officially to declare their White Guard army allied with Germany for the purpose of driving the Entente forces out of the Murman, the Allies will declare war on Finland if Germany is allowed to use the country as a base to attack the Entente troops.

Three reasons appear to oppose this belief:

1. Finland having seemingly been compelled to seek Germany's aid against the Red terror, is now unable to rid herself of German occupation, even if she earnestly desired it. What advantage then could arrive to the Allies in declaring such a war and thus controvert the humane and sympathetic attitude hitherto shown the unwilling but treacherously compelled betrayal of Rumania, as well as the patience shown Russia?

2. The military representatives of the Entente in the Murman have issued a proclamation declaring that the Allies have occupied the Murman coast in order to protect their property and to assure the continued possession of these regions to Russia who is at present too feeble to protect them, and that their presence there means no designs against Finland.

3. It has been stated in the Helsingfors press that there is no intention on the part of the Entente to disregard Finnish pretensions on the Murman, and that it would not be impossible to obtain a realization of these pretensions provided Finland preserves her neutrality and does not become an instrument in the hands of Germany.

#### DANGER AND UNREASONABLENESS OF A FINNISH-MURMAN PORT

It can not be overlooked, however, that many of Finland's public officials, especially those now composing the Senate, are simply German agents, and that Allied deference to Finland to the extent of preserving peace by granting her any right to a port on the Murman coast would be a very dearly bought peace, as such would mean nothing less than another German submarine base. Conclusions drawn from present conditions indicate the absurdity of Finland's claiming a Murman coast port. She is so fast jeopardizing her political and commercial relations with the Allies as to make such a northern port useless and unreasonable, whereas toward her greatest friend Germany, with whom she probably vainly expects future commercial possibilities, all her splendid southern ports lie open and free.

#### REASONS FOR NEUTRALITY

Finland's internal conditions offer every argument against her entering the war:

1. The recent Red terror, with all its civil-war bloodshed, is sufficient to satiate, at least for the present, any further desire for war.

2. The 75,000 idle and starving Red prisoners, composed entirely of the working classes, have decreased agricultural production and damaged economic and industrial resources so as greatly to accentuate the fear of famine. It is

this deficiency of labor which has prompted the Diet's serious consideration of lengthening the recently passed eight-hour labor law, or at least to make exceptions for those of 18 years and over who are especially strong.

3. In addition to these 75,000 idle prisoners, a war would mean a loss to the farms also of the White Guard labor now employed, and at the present crisis of lack of food it would be near suicidal to turn independent creators of foodstuffs into an army of dependent consumers. It is difficult to believe that Finnish officials, even though real German agents, can be quite active enough and Finland's gratitude to Germany quite strong enough to lead the country thus far.

4. Moreover, Finland's pro-German advocates of the monarchy must still be sensible enough to realize that agitation for war across the frontiers for the purpose, as urged, of relieving the distress of their brothers in Karelia, who can scarcely be in a worse condition than Finland herself, is an adventure undertaken really in the interest of Germany, and as such would simply increase the anti-German or pro-Entente feelings of those who are in favor of a republic.

5. Some 90 to 95 per cent of the wealthy classes have made their fortunes in trade with Russia, England, America, France, Spain, and Italy. The remuneratively exchangeable commodities between Finland and Germany are infinitesimal compared with those of the Entente powers, and this 90 to 95 per cent are already beginning to wonder what the future has in store for their bank accounts.

#### AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF FINLAND

The source from which America has gained much misconception concerning Finland is meager and not altogether reliable:

1. America has judged Finland by the immigrant class which up to 1914 has been entering the United States at an average yearly rate of 16,000, a class representing the lowest and most ignorant of the country's population.

2. This mistaken judgment has been emphasized by Finland's political affiliation with Russia and the evil genius of the present war which has mercilessly fallen upon her unfortunate geographical position and national aspirations.

3. A small per cent of Americans have had their opinions formed by occasional newspaper articles written by unintentionally irresponsible correspondents who as "passers-through" have naturally gathered the superficial instead of facts.

4. Since the war most articles appearing in the American press have been written by long-distance observers from such places as Moscow, Petrograd, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and even London and Paris, and compiled indiscriminately from unreliable anti-Finnish press news, verbal hearsay, and the writer's imagination.

5. Probably the source of our Government's official information has been our Ambassador in Petrograd and our Minister in Stockholm, both of whose time and judgment have for many months been taxed to cope with the political kaleidoscopic changes in their own immediate vicinity.

6. Up to November 1, 1917, the only American representative the American Government had in Finland was a Finnish pro-German who had held the post as consular agent for fourteen years. At present the only representative we have in Finland is a consul at Helsingfors. In contrast to this Great Britain has 12 consular representatives; Germany, in 1913, had 14; France has 7; Spain, 14; Italy, 2; Austria-Hungary, one; Sweden, 19; Belgium, 5; Denmark, 17; Netherlands, 10; Portugal, 10; Norway, 14; and Rumania, Greece, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay, each, one.

At present Sweden, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Spain, and Russia have diplomatic representatives in Helsingfors. There are a few other nations who have such representatives here, but the changes are so rapid it is difficult to give exact data.

#### AN ESTIMATE OF THE POPULATION

As far as a residential nine months' study of the Finns permits one to form an opinion of their character, the following estimate is briefly ventured:

1. Of all Russia's provinces, Finland is perhaps the most refined and educated.
2. It has been asserted even, by those in a position to know conditions, that Finland's misfortune is overeducation.
3. Her art and literature possess a worthy past and promise much for the future.
4. There are homes in Finland as refined and cultured as the best in America and Europe.
5. The worst critics of Finland assert the most unfortunate characteristics of the people are cruelty, stubbornness, treachery, and ungratefulness. Such characteristics, however, apply less to the Swedish-speaking population.

#### HAVE WE GIVEN FINLAND HER SHARE OF ATTENTION?

It appears that no neutral economic battle ground, Belgium not excepted, has for the past twelve months offered America more promising possibilities for diplomatic friendship and victory than Finland. Is it true that our embargo act has ruthlessly fallen upon all neutrals alike without any distinction as to national psychological demands, geographical situation, past history, or political tendencies? Is it true that Finland is in the hands of Germany to-day because the Allies refused her food?

The answer to these questions may be in the negative, for Finland is not blameless. She has not the political foresight of an independent nation which has the experience and wisdom of years of self-guidance. Even the act of refusing food to these people may have been wise and good and for the best, because the western front is of vastly more importance than Finland's paltry three and a half million inhabitants. And yet "three and a half million people" does not express all that Finland means. There is the back-door, post-war trade with Russia which Finland means; there are the geographical opportunities and military possibilities of Germany reaching across her to the White Sea and the Baltic; and there are all the future, far-reaching, intricate, world-destiny problems of the tragic East, which might more easily be solved in favor of America and the Entente with Finland as a friend.

P. S. The foregoing is written in all loyalty to the course pursued by our Government, and is divulged only to the Department of State for any side lights which it may afford.

THORNWELL HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/209

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1918, 2 p. m.

962. Your 2457, July 11, 5 p. m. Kerensky is not coming to the United States. Department has telegraphed London as follows:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Under date of July 6.



Department believes that the accumulation of food in Finland, the delivery of which would be contingent upon the Finnish people's breaking with the Germans, is inadvisable and would seem to imply that this Government is interested in Finland only in so far as it will serve as a pawn in the game of war against the Central powers. As the Finnish government seems to have committed itself definitely to cooperate with Germany and is furthermore insisting at this time in taking over Russian territory, this Government believes a clear decision should be reached to send no foodstuffs to Finland.

You may tell General Mannerheim that this Government is interested in his views and has always desired to maintain friendly relations with the people of Finland. This friendly purpose is based not only on an understanding of the aspirations of the Finnish people but also upon a regard and consideration for the many loyal American citizens of Finnish origin now in this country.

POLK

---

File No. 860d.00/242

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 887

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government have received information showing that the Germans have used the presence of Allied troops on the Murman coast to fill Finnish public opinion with alarm as to the aggressive intentions of the Allies against Finland.

His Majesty's Government consider that there is no doubt that Finnish public opinion is clearly, if unjustifiably, excited, and have therefore instructed their representative at Stockholm to communicate the following declaration officially to the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires and to have it published in the Swedish and if possible in the Finnish papers:

His Majesty's Government have received representations from the Finnish government indicating a belief that Allied forces had assisted or intended to assist one of the parties engaged in the civil war in Finland and showing an apprehension that His Majesty's Government might help certain Russians to invade Finland and foment civil war in that country. There would seem also to exist in Finland a fear that Great Britain desires to set up a separate republic in north Russia under British tutelage. His Majesty's Government desire formally to contradict the allegation of assistance having been given by the Allied forces to one of the parties in the civil war in Finland, and to state that the Allied military authorities have never at any time cooperated with the Finnish Red

Guards in Finland. Further, His Majesty's Government have no intention of assisting any Russian party to invade Finland or to foment civil war in that country.

In regard to the question of the Murman coast and Karelia, His Majesty's Government would be glad to see a satisfactory settlement attained, but are bound to point out that the solution of the question does not lie with them. His Majesty's Government understand that the claim of the Finnish government is based on an arrangement made between Finland and the Russian Government in 1864. Neither His Majesty's Government, however, nor any other government, would be justified in asserting of their own motion that territory, which so long as there was a recognized government in Russia had been unquestionably Russian, should now belong to another state. His Majesty's Government are in no way hostile to a final settlement of the question in harmony with Finnish aspirations, and it is unnecessary to say that they have no aggressive intentions towards Finland. His Majesty's Government fear, however, that so long as Finland is under German influence, the Finnish claim will be supported by Germany merely in order to enable German submarines to operate unhindered in the Arctic Ocean. This is consonant with the interests neither of the Allies nor of neutrals. It would inflict a great wrong on Russia and would be of no benefit to Finland. It is solely with a view to keeping up communications with Russia and to prevent Germany from obtaining a submarine base on the Arctic coast that the Allies are maintaining troops on the Murman coast. The last thing they contemplate is the acquisition of territory either there or any other part of Russia.

His Majesty's Government would have wished to consult with their Allies before making this declaration, but their information showed that there was no time to be lost if the effect of the German propaganda was to be successfully countered.

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1918.

[Received August 12.]

File No. 860d.00/258

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 22, 10.55 a. m.]

362. I am cabling to the American Legation, Stockholm, for publication in Finnish newspaper there, appeal from exiled Finns to their countrymen to enlist against Germany. As Finnish independence never acknowledged by us Finland is still constructively part of Russia. If you approve please cable following to the American Legation, Stockholm, for publication in connection with aforesaid appeal:

In connection with above I desire to state to all liberty-loving Finns on behalf of the American Government and on behalf of the

hundreds of thousands of Finns residing in America that it is my sincere hope and conviction that the defeat of Germany about which there can be no reasonable doubt and the success of the Allied cause will result in an independent Finland. I make this statement without reservation because the main issue of this war is the right of peoples to dispose of themselves and the Finns are unquestionably a distinctive race with a glorious record and have preserved their language and laws and have not lost their identity notwithstanding their sufferings through a long period of years. It is my feeling that every Finn who now enlists against Germany becomes thereby a champion of Finnish independence. Francis, American Ambassador.

Finns make excellent soldiers and nearly 2,000 have enlisted under the British within the last month. I am convinced many of them would enlist in our army if convinced Allied victory meant Finnish independence. If possible Finnish legion should be organized in America and sent immediately to Vladivostok or Archangel to join Allied forces.

FRANCIS

File No. 860d.00/251

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, August 15, 1918, noon.

[Received August 16, 1.23 a. m.]

70. Diet adjourned. Claiming Finland a republic according to a decision Diet 6th last December, republicans voted down a new constitution, whereupon monarchists revert to 1772 constitution, by paragraph numbered 38 of which Diet will elect king at its reassembling first week in September. Sixty per cent population republican, and internal trouble predicted by reason of doubtful [omission]. Anti-German events in Russia, England's recent note to Finland explaining Murman activities although without Finnish press comment, and successes western front render more than ever improbable Finland's entry into the world war. Practically assured Adolf of Mecklenburg-Schwerin will be selected.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/272

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 2, 12.45 p. m.]

109. My telegrams Nos. 110, 111 contain text of the proclamation to the Finns of all countries which I have obtained from Senator

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2650).

Tokoi, former head of the Finnish Red Labor Government, and which I am forwarding with the approval of the Ambassador.<sup>1</sup> The above-mentioned Finn is the same man for whom our Ambassador recently forwarded a proclamation to be inserted in the Stockholm Finnish newspaper.<sup>2</sup> Actual Finnish text will also be sent to be inserted in the following Finnish newspapers should you deem it advisable: *Riavaaja*, Fitchburg, Massachusetts; (2) *Tyomienmii* of Calumet, Michigan; (3) *Tyokansa* at Port Arthur, Canada; (4) *Toveri* printed in Astoria, Oregon State.

COLE

File No. 860d.00/255

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>3</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, August 20, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received August 21, 3.40 a. m.]

73. German instigation still pressing Finland toward military expedition against the Allies in Murman. Present Finnish government appears to be peacefully inclined and prominent Finnish people state that no aggressive act is expected before September 1. However, important conferences take place daily between the government and the Germans. Selection of Adolf Frederick of Mecklenburg-Schwerin is assured and forecasts of the future must be considered upon this certainty. England's Murman note has rather strengthened peace party which is strong and objects lodging great power in a king. Germany attempts to counteract quieting effect of the note by declaring England's real object is to establish a British vassal state of Murman-Archangel-Onega triangle with Admiral Kemp as viceroy. The same German propaganda states that local authorities in the territory occupied by the British have been transported inward, population forced into the army, and other outrages perpetrated in order to give the Allies free communication with Czecho-Slovaks. Food conditions growing worse. Germans realize hunger renders Finland more dependent upon them. Three hundred tons of cereals have been received from Germany. This has been exaggerated in the newspapers to 10,000 tons. In the form of butter, metals, horses, Germany has taken more than given. Indications are that when Finland becomes unbearably hungry, Germany will urge that the Allies' provisions in the Murman can be

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See the Ambassador's telegram No. 362 of Aug. 13, *ante*, p. 803.

<sup>3</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2676).

had for the taking. Government has approached me again in regard to recognition of *de facto* government, proposing exchange of *de facto* consuls general. Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed desire for interview. I think no harm could issue from such consultation, but suggest inaction until after the election king, and neutral character of the government more assured. I would appreciate instructions concerning this.

HAYNES

---

File No. 860d.00/261

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, August 21, 1918, midnight.

[Received August 22, 7.35 p. m.]

74. In order to ameliorate Finnish semidistrust of America because of the requisitioning of foodstuffs on board ships in America, nonrecognition of independence, and Murman irritation, would it be expedient to declare promptly in the Swedish and Finnish press the friendly feeling of the Allies to this country and their desire, willingness to supply food to northwest Finland provided that Germans leave there, the territory fed to be increased as the German forces are removed? This savors of no intrigue or buying friendship but if effected immediately and before election German monarch or before beginning of military operations, it would feed the starving innocent, redeem the past indifference with which we are charged, force hands of the present government, and put the population against the Germans. French and British colleagues are to-day cabling their Governments advocating the same policy.

HAYNES

---

File No. 860d.00/255

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your 73. Department concurs in your opinion and commends your judgment that any action or consultations relative to recognition of *de facto* government should be deferred until situation is more clearly defined than at present.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2689).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* (No. 1037).

File No. 860d.00/266

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, August 26, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received August 27, 5.35 a. m.]

76. The decision of the German General Staff that the present Finnish borders cannot be defended and must be shortened to include Murman Railway has brought about considerable adverse comment in Finland. Population is not willing to be pushed into a war of aggression by Germany but the army and the government are so under the control of Von der Goltz and the German military forces that such a project may be undertaken when Germany is ready. Just now all German energies are being directed to training Finnish army. One German officer is assigned to every Finnish company; all army orders have to be countersigned by Colonel von Redem who cooperates with Thesleff, chief of staff. At present it is incorrect to speak of any other army than a German-Finnish army. Railroad construction and all road building point to possible hostilities on the Murman, although Finnish newspapers and prominent men assert that no offensive action is intended until a just cause presents itself. German propaganda is poisoning minds of the Finnish people against Murman expedition so that slight border disturbances may be magnified later into a sufficient *casus belli*.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/267

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, August 27, 1918.

[Received August 28, 5.25 a. m.]

2726. Swedish press reports . . . Finnish-Russian peace negotiations broken off indefinitely. . . .

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 860d.00/270

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, August 27, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 28, 1.49 a. m.]

79. To render German naval control of the Baltic unquestionable a Finnish commission has visited Åland and now sits in Stock-

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2712).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* (No. 2725).

holm discussing demolition Åland fortifications. Germans dissatisfied with recent events in Russia may soon abandon working [through] Bolsheviki and act independently. It is reported that all available German forces Finland and Baltic provinces are now massed near Narva, presumably aimed at Petrograd, and a naval force assembled east of Gulf of Finland with the object of moving against Kronstadt. Germany's need of more man power is shown by her encouragement of interned Red prisoners, whose appalling mortality has occasioned denunciatory White terror articles in the Scandinavian press, to go to Germany to work farms and in mines induced by more wages offered and fear of starving at home. Many of the Finnish have enlisted in the German army, the enemy simulating such enlistment is voluntary. Germany alone has signed commercial agreement with this government although the three Scandinavian countries have tried. The situation means that much commercial man power in Finland is used by Germany. I have been informed personally by the three Scandinavian diplomatic representatives that they are trying to counteract German influence in industry and commerce, as well as opposing the Mecklenburg candidate for the Finnish throne and advising the government to give more attention to absolute neutrality. On the other hand the Germans assure this country that it is no more unneutral than Norway has been to the Entente powers. Finnish government has refused Norway's offer of Atlantic [Arctic?] port through Norwegian territory. Government is now trying to relieve the country's finances and is advising economy in all governmental departments. Prominent Finnish shippers assure me no Finnish or other ships allowed to leave Finland without a German permit.

HAYNES

---

File No. 860d.00/281

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1918, 3 p. m.

Your 74. The Department believes that such declaration may well await a more opportune moment for expression than the present.

LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1054).

File No. 860d.00/274

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 3 (?)*, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 3, 9.36 a. m.]

2754. Have received telegram from Ambassador Francis requesting me to deliver for publication in a Finnish newspaper in Stockholm a manifesto addressed to Finns in all countries by Tokoi, ex-Minister President in Finland, and other members of his government.

This manifesto repudiates a proclamation of the Moscow Central Committee of the Finnish Social Democrats warning Finnish working men not to join the British Army and states this committee has no authority to publish such a proclamation and no right to describe working men who are striving to rescue their country from the terrorism of the White Guard by assisting the Allied Army as the enemies of their Russian fellow workers. Further that Finnish Legion in British Army is not compelled to take any part in the Russian civil war, its sole object being the deliverance of Finland from the Germans and German-minded White Guards.

It seems to me this proclamation, if published, might lead the Finnish government to think that we intended to interfere in Finnish internal affairs, might enable the government to persuade the Finns that an offensive against Murman was really a defensive act, and I fear cause an unfavorable impression in Finland. Do you desire me under the circumstance to transmit the manifesto to the newspaper for which it is intended?

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 860d.00/258

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 5*, 1918, 4 p. m.

247. Your 362, August 13, 6 p. m. This Government has hitherto refrained from any expression of opinion or policy as to the independence of Finland. It therefore deems publication of your statement-inadvisable at present and the Legation at Stockholm has been so informed, adding that as the publication of any appeal from the Finns through us might be construed as intervention in Finnish internal affairs, its publication in that manner at this time appears equally inadvisable.

LANSING



File No. 860d.00/274

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

1082. Your 2754. Department concurs in the opinion that publication of such an appeal through American governmental channels is inadvisable, and has so informed the Ambassador at Archangel in reply to a telegram from him relative thereto in which he also requested simultaneous publication of a supplementary statement by him.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/258

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

252. Referring to Department's 247, September 5, 4 p. m., answering your 362, August 13, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> also 111, August 18, from Cole.<sup>2</sup> Department questions advisability of cooperating with or encouraging in any way members or advocates of former Finnish Red labor government. Santeri Nuorteva, who has informed the Department that he represents the Finnish Red labor party officially in this country, has announced that aims of his party are the same as the Soviet government of Russia. Department is not aware of exact situation at Archangel but relies on your judgment and discretion as to manner of carrying out Department's wishes.

LANSING

File No. 860d.00/287

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>3</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, September 11, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 13, 3 a. m.]

90. Finnish delegation which has been in Germany some time searching for a king has procured the assent of Frederick Carl of Hesse who married Kaiser Wilhelm's sister, Margarita, to accept the throne. Diet called to meet September 26 for the election.

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 803.<sup>2</sup>Not printed; see telegram No. 109 of Aug. 18 from the Consul at Archangel, ante, p. 804, which was answered on Sept. 6 by telegram containing instructions similar to those transmitted herein to the Ambassador.<sup>3</sup>Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2823).

Finnish government and the Krupp firm have formed two-million-mark company to investigate Finnish iron resources. This is another phase in Germany's program to exploit Finland commercially.

Coat of arms of the British Consulate in Helsingfors has been painted in German colors during the night of September 8. Finnish officials have apologized, restored damaged shield, and are searching for the guilty parties. The press deeply deplores the insult. I believe animosity against the present British Consul who is greatly disliked personally was the real cause of the incident.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/301

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, October 11, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received October 12, 10.25 p. m.]

101. Frederick Carl elected King October 9 in secret session. Vote reported to have been 76 to 41, unlikely he will be seated. (1) Personally he has previously advised that he would accept only on condition that not too much opposition; (2) parliamentary [opposition of] the left in Germany may prevent; and (3) peace arrangements may demand a king by the will of the people.

Diet adjourned yesterday to [reconvene] in ordinary session November 5 to arrange budget, order of succession, and the penal code. Reported to-day in Helsingfors that Kaiser Wilhelm has declared he would abdicate in favor of third son rather than stand in the way of peace.

HAYNES

Withdrawal of German Troops—Formation of a New Government under Mannerheim—Decision of the American Government to Ship Food

File No. 860d.00/310

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, October 20 [?], 1918.

[Received October 21, 10.17 p. m.]

104. It is estimated that there are less than 5,000 German troops now in Finland. Continuous departures indicate complete withdrawal in the near future. Still believe that Finland will never have

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 2990).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* (No. 3023?).

a king, as stated in my telegram No. 82 of September 3.<sup>1</sup> Present government destined to fall and a more representative one will succeed, which will inaugurate republican reforms even at the expense of being charged with taking revenge on the present pro-German monarchists. There may be bloodshed, but not country-wide unless the present disaffection in the army increases. Indications are that winter will be tragic since all political disturbances are detrimental to economic peace and safety. The amount of internal trouble is liable to be greater should the German troops remain. It appears unlikely at present that their withdrawal will invite attack from Russia; if so, Entente might reverse the present situation against Germany by becoming friends of Finland in utilizing Murman forces to prevent Bolshevik aggression.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/326

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, November 12, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received November 14, 12.30 p. m.]

117. Ex-Senator Lovonius and Dr. Schonman both strongly urge you [recognize Mannerheim?] as successor of Svinhufvud as regent of the new republican government, which is expected in a few days to supersede the present administration; assure me that Finland will be absolutely neutral and above all pro-Finnish. They say the new government will demand immediately withdrawal of German forces from Finland, order general elections, and request American food and recognition upon the basis of self-determination. It will be impossible for the new or any other government to succeed without food. Notwithstanding the increasing peril of Bolshevism, Finland under the new régime hopes to be able to defend itself on the eastern frontier if the United States will help it. Consequently, while the government will represent the majority of the people, being at present pro-Ally, still the fear of Bolshevism must increase before Associated military aid will be requested or welcomed, but it seems advisable that naval and military forces be ready to come at the earliest opportunity, for a greater danger threatens Finland than when the Red government was in charge or when the government put it down and it is believed that the Bolshevik's journey westward will be stopped only by Allied forces. The seriousness of the impending revolution in Finland depends on how soon Allied armies will establish order in Germany and the Russian border

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 3148).

states. The report that General Mannerheim's visit to London is to ask for the Allies' consent that German forces remain in Finland to protect the country against Bolshevism is said to be a sinister hope of the monarchists to protect themselves with German bayonets, a foolish hope, because German forces here are becoming disaffected and may join the Bolsheviks. The embryo republican government in the name of the Finnish people is sending Frederick Carl a message to refuse the crown for the sake of Finland. The paper of the republicans, the *Social Democrat*, has been suspended to-day by the governor of Nyland government. Circulation of 65,000 is greater than any other daily. All indications are that trouble is threatening in Finland.

I venture to suggest that my telegram <sup>1</sup> to grant visas to Ignatius and Paloheimo to go to America as representative of the present monarchical pro-German government be unanswered.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/328

*The Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes) to the Secretary of State* <sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

HELSINGFORS, November 16, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received November 19, 10.40 a. m.]

118. According to a decision reached yesterday, November 15, the Senate and the Diet have agreed to entrust General Mannerheim with the forming of new government, the personnel of which has not been determined as yet, but most of the present compromised officials will be removed.

The greatest point in dispute is the proportion of monarchists and republicans in the new coalition government. Indications are now that the former will be in the majority. The Agrarians, who are the principal republican guides, since the Socialists are not represented in the Diet, have decided after much hesitation to lend their tacit support to the coalition government, providing that new elections were definitely arranged. The Agrarians won their point and new general elections are fixed for February or March, by which time it is hoped that the Entente will be able to cope with the Bolshevik danger, which has been hitherto the principal objection to leaving existing mooted questions to the decision of the people.

The important question for America and the Entente to decide regarding Finland is as to whether food ought to be given to the coalition government for distribution to the people during the interim between now and the time fixed for the general election. Personally

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 3172).

I believe that if the composition of the coalition cabinet is at all satisfactory, and definite assurances as to the date of general election are given, food ought to be sent to Finland at once, because conditions among the common people are truly terrible, worse than in Russia or Germany. Von der Goltz has announced officially that the German forces are now leaving Finnish territory because Allied forces can now be expected, so the Allies can no longer deny food to the starving population by reason of the German occupation. An official announcement by the American Government regarding food for Finland would be appreciated and would come at a very opportune time. If the Department delays, the British will make the statement and to the Finnish mind get all the credit of saving them from starvation with food supplied by the United States. Kindly instruct me in regard to the latter point.

HAYNES

File No. 860d.00/324

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Helsingfors (Haynes)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your 115 [117?]. Department not now prepared to recognize independence of Finland or any separate government but is now preparing to send supplies of food commencing with an original shipment of 5,000 tons. You will be advised in advance as soon as it is found practicable to formulate a definite plan. In the meanwhile you may be confident that this Government appreciates the situation disclosed in your telegrams and is determined to use its best efforts to render some assistance to the Finnish population.

POLK

File No. 860d.00/343

*The British Chargé (Chilton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 1410

#### MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that the Finnish representative in London states that the remaining German officers, troops, and munitions of war were finally withdrawn from Finland on December 16.

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1918.

[Received December 27.]

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1318).

## CHAPTER VII

### THE BALTIC COUNTRIES

Appeals from Esthonia and Latvia for Support of Independence: Attitude of Great Britain—Declaration of the Independence of Lithuania and Request for Recognition: Attitude of the United States; Recognition by Germany—Movement by the Baltic Germans for a Monarchy in Personal Union with Prussia: Qualified Response by the German Government—Protests by Delegates of the Esthonian Provisional Government: Reception of these Delegates by the British, French, and Italian Governments—Refusal of Visa for an Esthonian Delegate to the United States—Protest of the Lettish National Committee against German Rule; Claim to Independence—British Project for a Lettish Legion: Attitude of the United States

File No. 763.72119/1389

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

#### MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Petrograd received a visit on January 23 from the Esthonian members of the Constituent Assembly who informed him that the German Government had a week before made an official offer to them of a guarantee of the independence of Esthonia provided that the latter accepted a German protectorate. This official offer was followed by private hints that in the event of its refusal Esthonia would be occupied. Mr. Lindley's visitors explained to him that they had originally desired that Esthonia should become an autonomous state within the Russian Republic but the situation at Petrograd rendered the fulfilment of this wish unlikely as it was their conviction that a monarchy would be restored sooner or later and they had suffered so much under the monarchy that much as they disliked the idea they preferred the alternative of a German protectorate. They added that the area of Esthonia was about forty thousand square kilometres, its population a million and a half, of which 95 per cent were Esthonians, and its capital Revel. They went on to say that the German offer required an answer, and before answering they desired to know if they could rely on Great Britain's support at the peace conference of their desire for independence. In this case they would risk the threat of German occupation. Mr. Lindley promised to obtain the views of His Majesty's Government by telegraph and added that his personal opinion was that they could not be indifferent to the fate of the Baltic provinces. They will call again on Mr. Lindley about January 30 to learn the reply of His Majesty's Government. He expressed the

view that their original intention of contenting themselves with autonomy was a wise one but that should that prove impossible it would seem desirable to do everything possible to prevent their falling under German domination.

The Lettish representatives on the Constituent Assembly also called recently at the British Embassy in Petrograd on the same subject and were given a similar answer, care being taken to avoid encouraging them to expect His Majesty's Government to continue the war solely for the sake of their country.

Mr. Lindley submits that the question of the future of the Baltic provinces should be given serious consideration. He points out that without them Russia will hardly continue to be a great western power while their accession to Germany would immensely increase the latter's strength. It would therefore seem desirable that if possible Russia should retain them, failing which that they should be independent and form a block with Scandinavia, Finland, and perhaps Poland.

He suggests that a reply should be returned to the effect that His Majesty's Government will do all they can at the peace conference to prevent annexation by Germany against their will and to secure some form of international guarantee of the independence of any states that may come into existence as a result of the war.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has received instructions to communicate the above to the United States Government and to add that His Majesty's Government consider that the most suitable reply to the Esthonians would be that contained in the preceding paragraph. They are anxious to learn the views of the United States Government and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to ask for a reply as soon as possible.

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1918.*

---

File No. 861.00/1459

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1017

PETROGRAD, *February 8, 1918.*

[*Received April 8.*]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on January 25, 1918, two members of the recent Constituent Assembly, who are representatives and residents of Esthonia, called at the Embassy and in a conversation with the Counselor stated as follows:

Esthonia has been promised independence by the Germans who have sent delegates to Esthonia for that purpose but with the condition that the district fall under German protection. At a meeting

of the political leaders of Esthonia in December and January it was decided to accept independence but not German protection and they wish so to reply to the German offers but have not yet done so because their country is so small that they would be compelled to submit.

They therefore wished to approach the Allied Ambassadors with the request that this question of their independence be discussed at the peace conference at the close of the war and likewise inquired whether a representative of Esthonia might be included therein. They further asked whether the United States could guarantee their independence if Russia would, or could, not. I learn that they have approached the French Ambassador and the British Chargé in a similar sense, who have duly informed their respective Governments.

After explaining to them in some detail the attitude of the Government of the United States as outlined not only in the instructions of the Embassy but in the public utterances of the President, especially our policy of desiring to await an expression of the will of the majority of the Russian people, and of the principles of democracy for which the United States had entered the war, the gentlemen were informed that the matters discussed above would be duly brought to the attention of the Department of State.

On the 5th instant the Embassy received a telegram which was likewise sent to the other Allied diplomatic missions, a translation of which is herewith enclosed.<sup>1</sup>

While the reply of the Embassy has appeared to satisfy the Esthonian representatives for the moment, a further expression of the policy of the Department might doubtless serve to encourage a people who appear to find themselves in most trying circumstances.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1261

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

No. 2355

BERNE, February 9, 1918.

[Received March 8.]

SIR: At the request of Dr. V. Bartuska, Vice President of the Lithuanian Council in America and the Executive Committee of Help for War Victims, I have the honor to transmit herewith two envelopes, one addressed to the President of the United States and the other to the Secretary of State. These letters contain declarations of the claims of the Taryba, the Lithuanian governing body at present, and a request for recognition.

Dr. Bartuska informs me that he has presented the same letters and claims to the representatives of the Allies here and that he

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



hopes early recognition can be given as he is informed that the Central powers intend to recognize Lithuania very shortly and he feels it would be unfortunate if their recognition should precede that of the Allies.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Lithuanian National Council to the Secretary of State*

LAUSANNE, February 7, 1918.

SIR: The Lithuanian Council, in accord with the Taryba (Council of State of Lithuania), being the accredited representative in neutral territory of the foreign interests of the Lithuanian state, has the honor to bring to your knowledge with the request that you report it to your Government for such consequences as may be proper in accordance with international law the following declaration:

The Taryba, supreme organ of the Lithuanian state and people of the mother country and also the Lithuanian communities in Russia and America, proclaims on the foundation unanimously recognized by the international conscience of the day, of "the right of peoples to dispose of themselves and of their own fate," and further invoking the resolutions of the Lithuanian Diet which met at Vilnus from the 18th to the 23d of September 1917, the restoration of a Lithuanian independent state, with Vilnus for its capital and the freeing of that state from all bonds whatever they may be previously entered into with or forced upon by the neighboring states.

That declaration rests on the twofold consideration:

- (1) *That Lithuania is a nation;*
- (2) *That Lithuania has again become a state.*

1. Lithuania is a strong and powerful nation, capable of withstanding anything; it gave numberless proofs of this in its glorious past; the power of its vitality in particular might have manifested itself during the last century when the Imperial Government of the Tsars failed in its efforts to annihilate it; in spite of all the powerful means at the disposal of that government it could not succeed.

2. Lithuania also became a state at the time its independence was recently proclaimed by the Diet of Vilnus. The existence of that state has never ceased, owing to the strong and lively national feeling which has endured and never discontinued its protests—even with arms in hand—against the violence that was exercised upon it.

At the present time, after 120 years of foreign domination, Lithuania is again lawfully restored to itself in the form of a state; it has at its disposal a full complement of the essential constituent elements.

1. It is certainly a permanent association of men, able to live upon its own resources. Its existence as a nation and its history are in support of that proposition.

2. It has an existence of its own which is only waiting for international recognition in order to become fully sovereign.

3. It possesses a well-defined territory sufficient to secure the independence and continuance of the community so organized.

Its area covers the following parts of the former Russian Empire: the governments of Vilnus, Kaunas (Kovna), Gardinas (Grodna), districts of Novogrodek and of Nisvich, government of Minsk, the government of Suvalki and the northern part of the government of Lomja, which would be nearly six times the area of Belgium.

4. It manifests and is still manifesting in a positive way a collective will regularly organized by the Lithuanian Diet of Vilnus under a supreme authority, that of the Taryba (Council of State) charged with the shaping of its destinies. That collective will has never ceased to assert itself at home and abroad; at home, against the oppressor—and the present step is another manifestation of this—abroad, by the initiative to which these presents bear witness and also by the resolutions and decisions that have preceded or followed it and which have won the votes of all Lithuanians, both those of Lithuania and those abroad, and of which the declaration of independence herein enclosed is the most characteristic as well as the most decisive measure.

On December 25, 1917, the Lithuanian National Council, authorized representative of Lithuania abroad as well as of all the Lithuanians residing abroad, declared as follows:

**WHEREAS:**

(1) Lithuania was independent from the thirteenth to the end of the eighteenth century;

(2) Lithuania, annexed to Russia by force, never ceased to claim its independence, even by appeals to arms in 1830, 1863, 1905;

(3) Lithuania has been shamefully oppressed and maltreated for 120 years by the Tsar's government and, after the revolution, the Provisional Government itself took no account of its claims in spite of our adhesion at the time of its coming into power (declaration of April 20, 1917);

**WHEREAS:**

At this time the greater part of Lithuania is occupied by the Germans, all Russia being in a new situation created by the recent events and unable to fulfil its duties and obligations to the Lithuanian people, and on the other hand, the Lithuanian people in spite of the oppression for a century, has never up to the present moment failed loyally to fulfil its obligations to the Russian state;

The Lithuanian National Council as depositary and faithful trustee of the supreme interests of the motherland declares:

(1) That the Lithuanian people from now on consider themselves released from any bonds with the Russian state;

(2) That the Lithuanian people, invoking the principle of the right of all peoples to dispose of themselves as proclaimed by the powers, has the right and duty to take charge of its own destinies and secure recognition of its independence by the foreign powers.

These constitute a series of conclusive and consistent facts and manifestations of will which, especially considering the circumstances in which the Russian community is struggling and the admission by all the belligerents of "the right of the peoples to dispose of themselves and of their fate," warrant the step we are now taking with a view to securing recognition of Lithuania as an independent state, both in its own interest and in that of the international community, in which it only wishes to take its place with the distinction and merits which have ennobled its glorious past.

We do not doubt that your Government will kindly receive our application and so trusting we beg you to accept [etc.]

For the President:

DR. V. KOVAS

File No. 861.00/1234

*The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 220

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I recently read to you a telegram addressed to Mr. Secretary Balfour by the British Minister at Stockholm stating that he had been told by Mr. Tönisson that, in view of

the approaching invasion of Esthonia, he expected the Esthonian Constituent Assembly, which had been duly elected and which was to meet on February 28, would meet immediately and declare the independence of Esthonia. He enquired how His Majesty's Government would receive such a declaration. The British Minister replied in general terms that the desires of the Baltic people were regarded with sympathy by His Majesty's Government, who would give them favourable consideration at the peace conference which could alone definitely decide these questions. He added, however, that if Russia were to become a federal state with free institutions it might be more advisable that Esthonia and countries like her should be satisfied with autonomy in such a state.

Mr. Tönisson said that the greater part of the population from Russia had been estranged by the action of the Bolsheviki in Esthonia and that the Bolsheviki had only 30 per cent of the votes of the Constituent Assembly. If the independence of Esthonia could not immediately be recognized by Great Britain, the people would be greatly encouraged in their determination not to be annexed by Germany, if the Constituent Assembly were at least provisionally recognized by the western powers as a *de facto* independent body until the meeting of the peace conference, and if the western powers would state that a final statement could only be made by the conference. He urged that an immediate declaration should be made before the Germans reached Esthonia, so that they might be faced with a *fait accompli*.

In view of the above, His Majesty's Government communicated to Mr. Tönisson their readiness provisionally to recognize the Esthonian Constituent Assembly as a *de facto* independent body until the peace conference, when the future status of Esthonia ought to be settled on the principle of self-determination.

Believe me [etc.]

For the Ambassador:

COLVILLE BARCLAY

---

File No. 861.00/1370

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, March 26, 1918.

[Received 9 p. m.]

1772. Swedish press reports via Berlin deputation Lithuania's National Council waited on Imperial Chancellor in Lithuanian people's behalf to request German Government recognize Lithuania as

independent state. Imperial Chancellor replied German Government's name:

WHEREAS, Lithuanian National Council, as recognized representatives Lithuanian people, December 11, 1917, declared Lithuania independent state united with Germany through eternal and close alliances and connections in traffic, monetary, and other fields, and asked Germany's protection and help in reconstruction of the state, we hereby recognize Lithuania as free and independent. German Empire is prepared lend Lithuania required help and in concert with Lithuania's population take necessary measures. Conventions for establishment confederation with German Empire will be made. Imperial Government presupposes conventions will be to Germany's interest as well as Lithuania's, and Lithuania will take share Germany's war burdens, which are promoting Lithuania's emancipation. Formal document of recognition Lithuania's independence will be forwarded National Council.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1261

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*<sup>1</sup>

No. 1365

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1918.

SIR: The Department begs to acknowledge the receipt of your Legation despatch No. 2355, dated February 9, 1918, transmitting two communications containing declarations of the claims of the Taryba, the present Lithuanian governing body, and a request for recognition.

In reply you are instructed to inform Dr. V. Bartuska that the communications in question have been received and will be given careful consideration; but that while both the historical and political reasons which prompt the declarations of the Lithuanian desire for independence are fully understood, the Department, nevertheless, is of the opinion that this question is one upon which a decision should be deferred in view of the unsettled existing conditions.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 861.00/1597

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 15, 1918.

[Received 11.34 p. m.]

1896. Swedish press publishes official Berlin report that United National Council of Livonia, Esthonia, Riga, and Ösel has passed following resolution with great enthusiasm:

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this instruction was communicated on the same date to the British and French Embassies.

1. To require German Emperor to continue keep Livonia, Esthonia under military protection, and effectively support them in ultimately effecting their liberation from Russia.

2. To express desire that monarchical constitutional state with united constitution and administration be formed of Livonia, Esthonia, Courland, islands, and city of Riga, which through personal union with King of Prussia, will be united with German Empire and to require Emperor to approve this desire, and effect its realization.

3. To ask German Emperor that he facilitate creation national institutions Livonia, Esthonia which should conduct administration until governmental unification of Baltic territories be effected; that convention be concluded between German Empire, Kingdom of Prussia, and state composed of Baltic provinces concerning military, monetary, traffic, customs, measures, weights, etc.

Telegram was sent German Emperor stating that representatives of whole population of Livonia, Esthonia, Riga, and Ösel offer Kaiser their heartfelt thanks for having saved them from suppression, and unanimously asking that Kaiser forever unite Baltic countries with German Empire through personal union with King of Prussia.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/1807

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1361

COPENHAGEN, April 20, 1918.

[Received May 18.]

SIR: Adverting to my telegram of April 6 last, No. 2132,<sup>1</sup> relative to the visit to Copenhagen of a delegation from the Provisional Government (of three months ago) of the former Russian Province of Esthonia, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy and translation of an interview with a member of the delegation, published in the Copenhagen *Ekstrabladet* of April 14 last, together with a photograph of the delegation which appeared in the *Dagens Nyheder* of April 5 last.<sup>1</sup>

I further enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum drawn up by Lieutenant Commander John A. Gade, U.S.N.R., naval attaché of this Legation, and Mr. Lithgow Osborne, second secretary, of the conversation which they had on April 5 last with the Esthonian delegation, which consisted of Mr. M. Martna, *Stadtrat* of the city of Revel, Mr. Karl Menning, a government deputy, and Mr. Jaan Tõnisson, editor of the largest Esthonian newspaper, *Pakrdeht* [*Postimees?*]. The members of the delegation left Esthonia to-

---

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

ward the end of January 1918, about a month before the German occupation.

I venture to add that three other delegates of the former provisional government of Esthonia, after having called upon the Swedish and Norwegian Governments, are proceeding to London and Paris to lay before the British and French Governments the ambitions and hopes of the people of Esthonia.

I have [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

*Interview with the Esthonian Delegation as published in the Copenhagen "Ekstrabladet," April 14, 1918*

The Government and Landtag of Esthonia recently sent out a delegation the task of which was to induce the European powers to recognize the independence of Esthonia. Upon the way here the delegation, which consists of Mikhel Martna, a member of the Landtag, Karl Menning, editor, and Tönnisson, also a member of the Landtag, made a stop-over in Stockholm. In a recent interview Mr. Martna made the following statement:

We have now handed a statement to the Danish and Swedish Governments concerning the present political situation in Esthonia. The Ministers are in sympathy with us, but they can take no action in the matter inasmuch as the question must first be settled by Germany and Russia.

My two companions have now left for Norway, and when they return, we shall all go to Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest where we contemplate making representations to the Governments and getting into contact with the democratic parties.

After the Russian revolution, Esthonia obtained autonomy and in July 1917 a Landtag was elected upon the basis of equal suffrage and a provisional Cabinet was appointed. The old provincial Landtag of the nobles ceded all its rights to the benefit of the new Landtag, but after the invasion of the German armies the nobility tried to get into power again and is now aiming at a close approximation with Prussia. The population of Esthonia totals about 1,700,000 people, of whom 90 per cent are Esthonians, 5 per cent Germans, 3 per cent Russians, and the remainder Jews, Poles, and Swedes. The German nobility only amounts to 0.5 per cent of the total population but they own 60 per cent of the land and the remainder, 40 per cent, which is now in the hands of the peasants, is practically also the property of the nobility.

The nobility refers to the peace convention of 1721, by which Sweden surrendered Esthonia to Russia, as constituting the basis of their rights, and the reactionary nobility agitates throughout Germany for a close approximation with Prussia, whereas the representatives elected by the people, who stand for a democratic republic, have been cut off from all means of agitation.

The Esthonian people have nothing against Germany and the German people, but the antipathy which we bear toward the German nobility in Esthonia, who are supported in certain quarters in Germany, is bound to affect our feeling toward Germany, which would otherwise rather be in favor of Germany than in favor of Russia.

Mr. Martna, who has several times visited Copenhagen and participated in the socialist conferences, has lived twelve years in exile in Switzerland owing to the fact that he participated in the revolution in 1905. In conclusion he expressed the hope that the representatives of the Esthonians may succeed in inducing the Central powers to recognize the independence of Esthonia and to create good relations between the democratic elements in these countries,

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum of Conversation with the Esthonian Delegation*

Under the Russian Tsar the only elective assembly in Esthonia had been the Landtag of the nobility which represented exclusively German interests. On April 12, 1917, autonomy was granted to Esthonia by the Russian revolutionary government and thereupon elections were held on a basis of equal and direct and universal suffrage and a provisional government formed. It was this government which the three delegates represented. On July 5, 1917, the nobility, acting under protest, gave up all their governmental as well as social privileges to the popularly formed government.

Upon the accession to power of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, the Bolshevik elements in the troops in Esthonia seized the power in Esthonia also by controlling the Zemstvos. In the election, on a basis of equal suffrage, for an Esthonian Landtag and for a Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks had received only about 20 to 30 per cent of the votes. A few days before the arrival of the German troops the Government and local authorities based on the popularly elected Landtag succeeded in regaining power and restoring order so that the Germans found everything under the control of a government and a popular assembly of a democratic sort.

Previous to the Russian revolution the government of Esthonia did not include all Esthonians. Subsequent to the revolution the section of the government of Livonia inhabited by Ests was joined to Esthonia. By the treaty of peace between Germany and the Bolsheviks only the old province of Esthonia is recognized and the Esthonian portion of Livonia has been once more separated from what is now recognized as Esthonia.

The Germans have, up to the present, made no general requisitions beyond what were absolutely necessary for the occupying troops. The conditions as to wheat and flour were extremely bad—practically the same as in Finland. German language and German procedure are being introduced, German teaching in the schools. The university and high schools at Dorpat, which once were German, but which during the past twenty-five years have exclusively taught in Russian, are in turn to be Teutonized.

Since the occupation by the German armies the nobility are once more in the saddle and a quite one-sided government by them, hand in hand with German officers and functionaries, has taken over the power. The German nobility and *bourgeoisie* endeavor to represent themselves as the only cultivated elements in Esthonia and are agitating for a close alliance with Germany, recognizing that under Germany they would be permitted to largely control Esthonia locally and could thus play something of a rôle, whereas under a democratic system in an independent or semi-independent Esthonia their influence would be practically nil. In the meantime the German authorities have to a large extent taken over the control of the country from the Esthonian government based on the popular elections, permitting it only certain limited divisions of activity. In the meantime the German interests, which aim at having all the Baltic provinces considered as a whole, are agitating for practical union with Germany, which agitation is being covertly forwarded by the German Government by having all its activities widely published. Thus the German papers have recently published manifestoes by the assembly of the Baltic nobility in Riga, and of a similar assembly in Esthonia, an address to the Emperor by 1,000 German women in Revel, etc., all aiming at German absorption. On the other hand a

portion of the manifesto of the three delegates was erroneously published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, much to the horror of the annexationist papers in Germany, and in the discussion which followed it appeared that the German Foreign Office had requested the whole German press to publish only resolutions, etc., favoring German absorption for the Baltic provinces and that the telegram setting forth the wishes for independence of the Esthonian population, sent out by the three delegates from Stockholm, had been inserted in the German semiofficial paper entirely by mistake.

The wish of the Esthonian people is to form an independent state with a close commercial connection with Russia which can hardly exist without Esthonian harbors. Simultaneously, it wishes to be a "free harbor" for the trade of all nations to and from Russia. Its independence should be internationally guaranteed.

The Esthonians fear:

1. Absorption by Germany. (The present situation between the Bolshevik government and Germany is strained and Germany might easily seize upon a real or alleged breach of the treaty by the Bolsheviks to declare the portions of the treaty whereby Esthonia is still recognized as Russian territory as null and void, and proceed to extend their temporary police powers to permanent occupation. The German Government is apparently preparing the way for such a move by aiding the pro-German agitation in Esthonia.)
2. Absorption by Russia, particularly by a possible reactionary imperialistic Russia. (A change of power in Russia is probable and a return to some form of the old régime is possible, under which Esthonia would be oppressed as formerly. Anything more than a close commercial relation with Russia, under its present government, would likewise be disadvantageous to Esthonia, Russia being so much the greater power. Participation in a federated Russian republic was once regarded favorably but the chances of such a federation seem now extremely remote. The Bolshevik government has technically recognized the independence of the various "subject nationalities" of the old Russia and it is hoped that a special recognition concerning Esthonia may be obtained.)
3. Becoming the apple of discord between Germany and Russia, in which case the struggle would be fought out on Esthonian territory. (Some sort of a stable position for Esthonia in the near future is necessary because being a small country it will be ruined unless stability can be soon arrived at. It is the commercial interest of England and America to maintain an open trade route to Russia and to assist in defining Esthonia's position as soon as possible.)

The main fact that Esthonian delegates desired to emphasize was the desire to have the western powers, especially England and the United States, recognize an independent Esthonia, similar to the recognition accorded by the Russian revolutionary decree of 1917. The sooner Esthonia is declared independent by the western powers, the more difficult will it prove for Germany to absorb it. Esthonia does not desire to tear itself loose from Russia, nor with the present political situation does it now see any possibility of entering into any new confederation of Russian states. Esthonia realizes that with its splendid ice-free harbors, not only Revel, but also on its Baltic islands, it must be the northern trade outlet and inlet of the great "hinterland," that it must form Russia's great commercial channel to the west. It desires economic alliance with Russia, without customs borders; it does not, however, desire political dependency upon Russia. Germany does not underestimate the value of Esthonia, either its farm lands or its harbors, or as a buffer between Germany itself and Germanized Finland.



File No. 861.00/1638

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 23, 1918.

[Received April 24, 10.20 a. m.]

1931. Swedish press reports from Berlin: Imperial Chancellor received an Esthonian-Livonian deputation in general headquarters on April 21. He thanked deputation for confidence in Kaiser and expressed Kaiser's willingness to take countries, represented by National Council, under military protection of German Empire, support them [in] their endeavors [to] set themselves free from Russia, and recognize them as independent state. The desire of National Council to form a constitutional state, in personal union with Prussia, would be taken under consideration by Emperor whereupon National Council would be notified as to decision taken. Swedish newspaper, *Stockholms Dagblad*, comments Hertling confines himself to state willingness Emperor recognize these territories as an independent state. Thus there has been no actual recognition, but German Government still regards these countries belonging formally to Russia although can count on German support in endeavors to divorce Russia. Concerning request for personal union, Hertling promises consideration, no more no less. That is all he can promise before Federal Council and Reichstag have expressed themselves. Position of Esthonia, Livonia is consequently another than that of Lithuania and Courland whose independence already been recognized by Germany.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1851

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

No. 9011

LONDON, May 10, 1918.

[Received May 24.]

SIR: At the request of Professor Antoine Piip, who is described on his visiting card as diplomatic representative of Esthonia and member of the Esthonian Council, and who is at present residing in London, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for such attention as the Department may see fit to give, copies of certain documents on the political situation in Esthonia.

Mr. Piip called to see me at the Embassy yesterday but I did not receive him, directing the Counselor of the Embassy to see him in my stead, and he then left these papers with the request that they be transmitted to you.

I have [etc.]

WALTER HINES PAGE

[Enclosure 1]

*The Esthonian Delegation to the American Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

LONDON, May 3, 1918.

SIR: In January last and February the representatives of the Esthonian people have visited the Ambassador of the United States of America in Petrograd, and expressed the national desire of Esthonia for independence, pronounced by the democratic Esthonian Diet, or National Council, and confirmed in January by the authorized United Assembly of the Presidency of Council, the Committee of Ancients and Country Government. It was declared that Esthonia should be also a perpetual neutral state, and a free country for international trade.

At the same time, the whole of the Esthonian people protested against the occupation of the country by Germans.

In consequence of recent events in Esthonia, the most important of which is the invasion of the country by German troops, we, being authorized, have the honor to make this declaration and to beg you to transmit it to your Government, the answer to be transmitted to the plenipotentiary representative of the Esthonian provisional government in London, Professor Antonius Piip.

Contrary to the will of the Esthonian people and its representative organs, the Esthonian German nobility decided on the 28th of January 1918 to make an appeal to the German Government to occupy the country with German troops. Against such an appeal the authorized representative of the provisional government of Esthonia in Stockholm has made, on the 4th of February 1918, a protest to the German Government.

However, after the resumption of hostilities on the part of Germany against Russia, the German troops have crossed the Moon Sound and occupied Verder, Leal, etc. The German motive in occupying the country was to combat the anarchy of the free-handed actions of the Bolsheviks, who declared all the Esthonian nobility to be outlaws.

Nevertheless, the Esthonian provisional government had succeeded in overthrowing the domination of the Bolsheviks, and in establishing legal order with the help of loyal Esthonian troops before the German invasion.

On the 24th of February, the last representatives of the Bolshevik government left the country, going on Russian warships to Helsingfors. Immediately afterwards the new government of the independent democratic republic of Esthonia was finally formed in the following manner:

Prime Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs and Trade, member of the Esthonian Diet, Konstantin Päts; his assistant; Minister of Justice, member of the Diet, Jüri Wilms; Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of the Russian Constituent Assembly from Esthonia, Jaan Poska; War Minister, Commander in Chief of Esthonian troops, Colonel of General Staff, M. Laidoner; Minister of Finance and Domains of the State, member of the Diet, Johan Kukk; Minister of Agriculture, member of the Diet, Jaan Raamot; Minister of Ways and Communications, Ferdinand Petersen; Minister of Labor and Charitable Board, member of the Diet, Willem Maasik; Minister of Education, member of the Diet, Peter Pöld.

The authorized Provisional Government of Esthonia has reestablished the order in the country. All the confiscations and requisitions made by the Bolsheviks have been declared null and void. All the property has been returned to its former proprietors.

The Germans, however, continued their advance, and soon afterwards occupied the whole country.

According to information to hand, the situation in Esthonia at present is as follows:

The government is deprived of its power *de facto*; the Esthonian troops are disarmed; the town democratic self-governments, elected and established in 1917, are dismissed; in Revel a German was appointed mayor of the town; with him a committee composed of eighteen Germans was also appointed; Esthonians refused to participate in this committee; in Dorpat a German merchant was also appointed the mayor of the town; in the villages, all the district committees established on the basis of the common electoral laws are dismissed and, in their place, self-governing censuses of 1914 were appointed.

Under such conditions, the formation of an Esthonian Constituent Assembly is practically impossible, and more so since the process of elections could not be completed before the German invasion. The formation of a Constituent Assembly can only be possible and expedient when the German troops have completely left the country.

It is necessary, however, to note that the elections to the Esthonian Constituent Assembly were *de facto* at the same time a referendum on the independence of Esthonia. Seventy per cent voted for the absolute independence of Esthonia, the rest for autonomy, but as a part of the Russian federation. Thus it is evident that the democratic will expressed by the people goes to show that independence is needed for Esthonia. At the present time, while the German troops are in the country, the only recognized and lawful government of Esthonia is the Esthonian Diet, and the provisional government authorized by this Diet of which we are the representatives.

We know that German nobility Landtags of Estland and Livland will speak on behalf of the country, expressing their desire for a personal union with Prussia, but they have no right whatever to make such a declaration. A detailed protest against such an unlawful attempt by this nobility, was made to the German Government by the Esthonian delegation in Stockholm on the 21st of March 1918. A new protest against the resolution of the Liv-Esthonian Landesrat's proposition of a union with Prussia was made to the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary of State by the plenipotentiary Esthonian delegation in Christiania on the 13th of April 1918.

We may also add that Russia was asked to immediately declare her recognition of Esthonia's independence on supposition that the general democratic parliament decided over Esthonia's future political state and international position but not the Liv-Esthonian German nobility or appointed Landesrat; this supposition we maintain in like manner.

In consideration of all the above said, we have the honor to ask the Government of United States of America—

- (1) To recognize the independence of the democratic republic of Esthonia, within her ethnographical frontiers, including the isles of the Moon Sound;
- (2) To recognize the provisional government authorized by the Esthonian Diet as the only legal power of Esthonia; and
- (3) To grant to Esthonia the right to participate at the general peace conference, so as to be able to defend her interests and introduce the question of Esthonian perpetual neutrality and its international guarantees.

We have [etc.]

ANT. PIIP

K. R. PUSTA

EDWARD WIRGO

*Authorized Representatives of Esthonia*

LONDON, 3rd of May 1918.

[Enclosure 2]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Estonian Representatives*<sup>1</sup>

71866/W/38

LONDON, May 3, 1918.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing a memorandum on the political situation of Esthonia, and asking for recognition from His Majesty's Government.

It gave me much pleasure to receive your recent visit, and I take this opportunity of assuring you that His Majesty's Government greet with sympathy the aspirations of the Esthonian people and are glad to reaffirm their readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Esthonian National Council as a *de facto* independent body, until the peace conference takes place, when the future status of Esthonia ought to be settled as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the population. It would obviously be impossible for His Majesty's Government at the present time to guarantee to Esthonia the right to participate at the peace conference, but at any such conference His Majesty's Government will do their utmost to secure that the above principle is applied to Esthonia.

In the meantime His Majesty's Government will be glad to receive Professor Antonius Piip as the informal diplomatic representative of the Esthonian provisional government.

I have [etc.]

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

File No. 861.00/2048

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received June 16, 12.15 p. m.]

596. Owing to German military control difficult to obtain first-hand information concerning conditions in the Baltic provinces. Germans have reestablished the provincial parliaments, which were abolished under the Kerensky government, and have reinstituted old forms of local government. Elections to the parliaments under German control and practically limited to the so-called Baltic barons. Protests by the liberal and socialistic elements against the action of the united Landtag of Livonia and Esthonia, which has requested incorporation of these two provinces into Germany. Among the peoples there is thankfulness for the restoration of order through the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, but on the other hand a growing

<sup>1</sup> Copies of letters in similar terms from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, under date of May 13, and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, under date of May 29, were given by one of the Esthonian delegates to the Chargé in Denmark and forwarded by him as enclosures to his despatch No. 1754, Sept. 13, 1918 (File No. 861.00/3031).

sense of oppression. Thousands of Letts have withdrawn into Russia. No evidence of the Lettish or Esthonian national movements taking concrete form but according to some reports German Landsturm troops policing country meet desultory opposition from Lettish sharpshooters.

A German newspaper, published in Moscow, states that the reestablishment of order in the Baltic provinces is complete, that all schools are open and the inhabitants are working for an adjustment of the land question but adds:

Labor conditions are poor. Banks and factories are closed in the towns and there is no trade. In the country, especially in southern Livonia, but also in Courland, the peasants have no agricultural implements and no seed. Railway passenger traffic is subject to [military?] control. It requires about three weeks' preliminary work to arrange a trip from Riga to Mitau.

In Lithuania less apparent opposition to Germany but reports from this region also reflect general sense of oppression and tendency is now to develop closer contact with Poland for the purpose of organizing combined opposition to German encroachments. Polish colony in Moscow informs Consulate General that German rule in Poland has recently become exceedingly oppressive, more especially since disarmament of Polish legions in the Ukraine. In White Russia Germans supporting a liberal government representative of landowners and city middle classes. Same thankfulness to Germany for restoring a condition of order accompanied by restlessness among laboring classes which have felt influence. It is reported contact with the Russian revolutionary elements has affected portions of the German army of occupation: 5,000 German soldiers, constituting garrison of Kishinev, mutinied against order to go western front and were disarmed and returned to Germany. Russian newspapers not allowed to circulate. Russian Red Cross doctor returning from Minsk reports German officers discouraged about the situation on the western front. Soldiers give impression of being worn out. No goods arrive in White Russia from Germany. Purpose of the Germans evidently to drain the occupied territory of all supplies. In White Russia as in the Ukraine they are correct and relatively considerate to the city population but in the country severe, carrying out intensive requisitions and shooting peasants for small offenses or sending them to work in Germany. [Omission] prices in both White Russia and Ukraine. Prices in Kiev now approaching Moscow.

File No. 861.00/2251

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, July 11, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received July 12, 9.55 a. m.]

2459. A committee representing the Esthonian government called upon me yesterday and gave me copy of a protest which they have made to Berlin covering their grievances and their aims and desires. They state that the Esthonian people are entirely dissatisfied with the German situation in Esthonia and hope to find a way to be rid of same. One of their representatives, Ferdinand Kull, desires to proceed to America to confer direct regarding these matters. They already have representatives in France and England, and this the British Minister has confirmed to me. After conferring with the British Minister here, we both feel it would be a good thing to allow this man to proceed to America. He desires to go via England, and I request authority to permit him to proceed.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/2251

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1918, 6 p. m.

959. Your 2459. No objection to visa passport Ferdinand Kull to proceed to America, but Department wishes it clearly understood that it is unwilling to make any commitment as to his reception.

POLK

File No. 811.111/9784g

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1918, 4 p. m.

972. Your 2527.<sup>1</sup> Disregard Department's former instructions and refuse visa Kull.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2597

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

No. 9724

LONDON, August 19, 1918.

[Received August 30.]

SIR: With reference to my despatch No. 9011 of May 10, 1918, I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed, for such action as may

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

be deemed appropriate, the copy of a communication which was left at the Embassy by Professor Antoine Piip with the request that it be transmitted to you.

I have [etc.]

[For the Ambassador:]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure]

*The Esthonian Representative (Piip) to the American Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

LONDON, August 14, 1918.

SIR: According to the latest news, the Russian *de facto* Government and Germany have recently made an agreement, by which the parts of Esthonia and Livonia, indicated in Article 6 of Brest Litovsk treaty, are also separated from Russia, and that the Germans have created a general administration for the whole Baltic provinces, preparing the incorporation of these provinces into Germany.

In this manner Russia renounced the last shadow of rights of sovereignty which she had conserved by the Brest Litovsk treaty on these ceded territories. Meanwhile Bolshevik Russia and Germany made a new attempt to decide the fate of the Esthonian people without consulting them.

Therefore I, as authorized representative of the Esthonian provisional government and National Council, consider it my duty to protest emphatically, on behalf of the Esthonian people, against such acts of the Russian and German Governments, and declare that sovereign Esthonia and the Esthonian people, being an independent republic, according to the acts of Esthonian National Council from [15/]28 November 1917 and 24 February 1918, on the basis of self-determination of peoples which is proclaimed as the status of the country in former Russia, deny any right whatever for Russian or other foreign governments to negotiate about the fate of Esthonia and make any international agreement, without the consent of the Esthonian people and republic in the person of their provisional government and National Council, and all such arrangements, concluded without the participation or adhesion of Esthonian provisional government and National Council, are for the Esthonian republic and people nil and void.

Having the honor to notify this to the Government of United States of America, the Esthonian people are sure that the sovereign rights of Esthonian people for self-determination and independence of Esthonian republic will be infallibly respected by all the civilized world and governments. Esthonian people, holding fast their hope for victory of freedom and justice, are sure that in the decisive hour all crimes, committed by Germans to Esthonia, will find their impartial and strong retaliation.

I have [etc.]

ANTOINE PIIP

File No. 861.00/2609

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, August 31, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received September 1, 4 a. m.]

2748. Referring to your 972, July 24, 4 p. m. Kull and Wirgo, two Esthonian delegates, have informed me that they are very desirous to

send a delegate to United States to see the President and obtain if possible from him a declaration regarding Esthonia similar to those given out by the British and French Governments. They added that if Mr. Kull had been refused a visé for personal reasons they would name any other delegate that would suit us. Is the Department disposed to allow an Esthonian delegate to visit United States?

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 861.00/2972

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

ARCHANGEL, September 2, 1918.

[Received October 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith at the request of the Lettish Provisional National Committee, Department of Internal [Foreign?] Affairs, at Petrograd the following documents:

- (1) Protestation du Conseil National Letton;
- (2) Politique allemande générale en Lettonie et Conseil National Letton, with one appendix;<sup>1</sup>
- (3) Situation économique de la Lettonie, with two appendixes.<sup>1</sup>

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Lettish National Council to the American Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

#### PROTEST OF THE LETTISH NATIONAL COUNCIL

Possessing an unshakeable faith in the final victory of right and justice, the Lettish people have sacrificed without stint their wealth and their best sons in the struggle against the subjection and oppression of nations by Germany. Nevertheless, in the month of February, the enemy accomplished the occupation of all Latvia. Its young and flourishing economic culture is in ruins and its very intense intellectual life is checked. Its rich and picturesque farms are burned and its bustling cities are plunged in a profound silence. About 70 per cent of the inhabitants of Latvia have voluntarily left their hearths or have been forced to do so and have since then been wandering the roads of immense Russia. Before the war Courland numbered 800,000 inhabitants; after the German invasion there remained only 200,000; the city of Riga numbered 520,000 inhabitants before the war; at present it numbers only 210,000.

The peace of Brest inflicted the most terrible blow on ruined Latvia. Courland and the city of Riga with its district are given over to the protectorate of Germany; the rest of Lettish Livonia, namely, the districts of Wenden, of Wolmar, and of Walk, are subjected to German occupation until peace and order shall have been reestablished in agreement with the wishes of the population; the fate of Latgalia, comprising the districts of Rezekne, Dvinsk, and Ludza of the government of Vitebsk, remains undecided.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



In this way the territory of Latvia, inhabited by a people united by a particular civilization, by a community of political and national aspirations, and by economic interests, is artificially dismembered and partitioned between two states under quite different political conditions. The treaty of Brest is a crime directed against the national, political, and economic existence of the Lettish people in the future; it is a violation of the principles of democracy, an offense against the right of a people to dispose of itself.

The German occupying power has forged for Latvia heavy chains shackling the economic and intellectual life of the country. The Germanization of the administration and the schools has already commenced. The military authorities have replaced most of the mayors of the rural communes, all the mayors of the cities, and municipal councilors by functionaries devoted to the local nobility. Teachers conscientious in their duties have likewise been replaced by ill-educated masters whose sole merit is their pro-Germanism. All freedom of speech in the press and in social life is prosecuted and prohibited. Social and intellectual life is completely stopped; travel, even local, is strictly regulated and limited.

Espionage and informing are penetrating into private life as well as into public life and prevail everywhere; the repatriation of war refugees is disorganized and impeded in every way.

The Letts now living in Latvia, as likewise those who have just returned or who are still wandering in the plains and cities of Russia, would never desire the annexation of Latvia by Germany, nor the personal union with the King of Prussia. The two countries, Latvia and Prussia, have neither political or national aspirations nor economic or cultural interests in common; they are not even contiguous enough to have sufficient organic ties. For that reason, relying upon armed force, the occupying power is trying to subjugate Courland to German imperialism and militarism; the fate of Posen and Alsace-Lorraine threatens Latvia.

In order to create a juridical and moral basis for these acts of violation of justice within the dismembered portions of Latvia, the military authorities have hastened to form Landesrats composed of the mayors of rural communes and cities and of the representatives of the great landlords of German origin. The resolutions passed at the sessions of these Landesrats give an absolutely false idea of the political tendencies and the will of the Lettish people. The Landesrats are usurping the right of the people to political self-determination, masking the final annexation of Latvia to Prussia. Thus, on March 8, 1918, the Landesrat of Courland passed a resolution setting up the province of Courland as a duchy and offering the crown to the Hohenzollern dynasty; on April 12, 1918, the "United Landesrat," composed of representatives of the municipality of Riga, of Livonia, of Ösel Island, and of Esthonia, decided to set up the Baltic provinces as a monarchy joined with Prussia by a personal union through its king, and to offer the crown of the new monarchy to the German Emperor. The German Government has just given the order to conclude military and economic conventions between the Duchy of Courland and Germany.

The Landesrats created by the occupying power have no right whatever to discuss and decide, in the name of the Lettish people, the fate of Latvia. Their members have not been elected, but appointed by the German administration; they are not representatives of the Lettish people, but of the Baltic nobility, carrying out the annexationist aims of the Pan-Germanists. In order

to get an idea of the way in which these Landesrats look after the interests of Latvia, it is enough to recall the resolution pledging Courland, the blood of its sons, and all its riches, to German imperialism. In order to perceive how deeply the members of this Landesrat have taken to heart the vital needs of the working class, the historic phrase uttered at Berlin by M. Bernewitz must be quoted: "You ask for lands, but the lands of Courland ask for colonists," although 70 per cent of its rural population is landless, demanding lands for centuries.

In view of the great importance of the coast of the Baltic Sea, the problem of Latvia has become an international problem of world importance. The Baltic Landesrats created by the occupying power have neither the qualifications nor the competence to solve it. It must be solved by the Lettish people themselves, in accord with the interests of world democracy, at the general peace conference.

The Lettish National Council, uniting all national political parties, central communal institutions, and most important social organizations, excepting the extremist parties—the maximalist-internationalists on the one hand and the little group of monarchists on the other—on April 4, 1918, submitted a vigorous protest to the German Imperial Chancellor, Count Hertling, and the Zemstvo of Livonia took a similar action with respect to the German Imperial Chancellor and the Commander in Chief of the army of occupation. The two protests have had no result.

The Lettish National Council, supported by the unanimous national will of an undivided and indivisible Latvia, in this historic moment addresses to the governments and nations of the entire world its energetic protest against the dismemberment of the territory of Latvia and against the falsification of the will of the Lettish people, and it declares categorically and firmly the will of the Lettish people:

1. The treaty of Brest of March 3, 1918, dismembering the territory of Latvia, is an act of violence against the right of the people to self-determination and must be regarded as null and void.
2. The Lettish people do not desire the annexation of Latvia to Germany nor the personal union of Latvia with Prussia.
3. The decisions of the Landesrats are gross falsifications of the wishes of the population of Latvia.
4. The military and economic conventions which the German Government is about to conclude with the Landesrats of Latvia will not be recognized nor carried out by Latvia and the Lettish nation.
5. The Lettish National Council protests against the violation of the freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly, of personal liberty and of travel, against the arbitrary replacing of the mayors of communes and cities by the occupying power.
6. It deems an urgent necessity the recognition of the Lettish National Council as the supreme institution of the Lettish state until the war refugees shall have returned to their homes and the political constitution of Latvia shall have been drawn up and put into effect.
7. It demands the creation of an independent and indivisible Lettish state under international guarantee.

*The President of the Department of Foreign Affairs  
of the Lettish National Council*

J. GOLDMANS  
Secretary, J. SESKIS

[Received at the Embassy in Petrograd, July 14, 1918.]

File No. 861.22/36

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1076

## MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him by instruction of His Majesty's Government that a number of Letts are being recruited for service with the Allies in northern Russia and the question has been raised of the formation of a Lettish legion there with Lettish officers. In order to secure publicity for this and obtain further Lettish recruits it is suggested that the following announcement should be published through the Lettish representative in London and the Lettish Committee in the United States as well as in Scandinavia:

The commander in chief of the Allied forces in north Russia has consented to the formation of a Lettish legion for the purpose of fighting to free Livonia from the German yoke. The legion will be trained by Allied instructors and officered by Letts.

The conditions of service and discipline are the same as those of the Allied soldiers. We ask all to join who value the honour and freedom of their country.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to enquire whether the United States Government see any objection to the proposed announcement and, if not, whether they will approach the Lettish Committee on the subject. On being informed of the concurrence of the United States Government His Majesty's Government will take the necessary steps to secure publication in the United Kingdom and in Scandinavia.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires would be most grateful for an early expression of the Secretary of State's views.

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1918.

[Received October 2.]

File No. 861.00/2873

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, October 1, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received October 4, 3 a. m.]

2935. Kull, the Esthonian diplomatic representative here, has handed me a memorandum regarding the German outrages in Esthonia. He said that the German troops were being evacuated and that a popular uprising was likely in a few weeks although the Esthonian military organization was naturally primitive and they

had few arms. He added, however, that they were much preoccupied by the possibility that if they got rid of the Germans the Bolshevik Esthonian Committee in Petrograd would invade Esthonia with the aid of the Red Russian Army in which case their situation would be worse than at present. He inquired at the same time whether I had yet received an answer regarding his mission concerning which I telegraphed you in my 2748, August 31, 1 p. m.

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 861.22/36

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

### MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his memorandum No. 1076, dated September 28, last, stating by the instruction of the British Government that a number of Letts are being recruited for service with the Allies in northern Russia and the question has been raised of the formation of a Lettish legion there with Lettish officers. In order to secure publicity for this and obtain further Lettish recruits, it is suggested by the British Government that an announcement be published through the Lettish representative in London and the Lettish Committee in the United States as well as in Scandinavia.

This Government has given due consideration to the terms of the proposed announcement, and while it does not interpose any objection to the proposed endeavors of the British Government to promote the formation of a Lettish legion for the purpose of fighting to free Livonia from the German yoke, it does not now feel disposed to join in the proposed announcement or to approach the Lettish Committee in the United States on the subject.

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2938

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, October 11, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 8.37 p. m.]

2977. Referring to my cable 2935, October 1, 1 p. m. Esthonian delegates here have informed me that they no longer desire Ferdinand Kull to proceed to the United States as their representative and his request for visa is therefore withdrawn.

WHITEHOUSE

The Question of Protection of the Baltic Countries from Bolshevism upon Withdrawal of the German Troops: Attempts to Enlist the Help of the Scandinavian Countries—Postponement of German Withdrawal in the Armistice—Formation of National Governments in Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—Reservation of Consideration of National Claims by the United States until the Peace Conference—Dispatch of a British Naval Force to the Baltic Sea—German Withdrawal and Bolshevik Advance—Yudenich's Project of an Anti-Bolshevik Force to Take Petrograd

File No. 860d.00/300

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, October 12, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received October 13, 5.13 a. m.]

2985. Referring to my 2970, October 9, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The same fear concerning Bolshevism is felt in regard to the Baltic provinces and Ukraine. It is the opinion of those American, English, and French officials with whom I have talked that the departure of the German and Austrian troops from these localities would lead immediately to disturbances and shortly thereafter to Bolshevik intervention. In the event of an armistice with the Central powers it would seem, therefore, advisable not to insist on the date evacuation of these territories until we are in a position to send Allied troops. There can be no doubt that the Bolshevik cause would be greatly strengthened by the occupation of these territories and the task of restoring Russia correspondingly more difficult.

The Esthonian democratic representatives here have even discussed with the Foreign Office the possibility of a Swedish occupation but the Minister of Foreign Affairs informs me that on account of internal conditions such action even if advisable would be impracticable.

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 860d.00/300

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1918, 5 p. m.

1215. Your 2985, October 12, 5 p. m. While fears for the consequences which would follow withdrawal of enemy troops may be well founded, at the same time in investigating and reporting further on this question, bear in mind that Department has confidential information to show that Germany is instigating requests for protection by German troops on the same pretexts.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 861.00/3050

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, October 26, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received October 28, 10.34 a. m.]

5415. Augustin Waldemar called at the Legation and informed me that he had been charged by the Lithuanian Taryba to form a Lithuanian government. He stated that before doing so he desired to get in contact with Entente and America and had therefore proceeded to Switzerland from Lithuania. Waldemar states that he had recent conference with German Chancellor who stated that arrangements for the formation of a Lithuanian government would be left to the Lithuanians but that Germany would retain military force in the country to keep order in case Lithuanians requested it. Waldemar claimed that Lithuanian people were unanimous in desiring immediate withdrawal of German troops, but upon taking such action it was important that he should know what assistance he might hope for from the Allies.

Gabrys, who has been in charge of the Lausanne "National Lithuanian Council," has recently been disavowed by representatives of the Taryba, which has resulted in a split in the Lithuanian ranks. I shall report further in this matter.

STOVALL

File No. 861.00/3103

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1204

## MEMORANDUM

The British Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour, in accordance with instructions received from the Foreign Office, to make the following communication with regard to the position of the small states on the western frontier of Russia.

At the present moment great anxiety is felt in these states as to the position in which they will be left if German troops are withdrawn from the occupied territory, which, it is feared, will then be left undefended and open to domination by the Bolsheviks.

Of the states in question, it is possible that Finland may be able to defend herself, though it is also possible that a renewal of civil war between the Red and White parties may take place. In the case, however, of the Lithuanians, Esthonians, and Letts, it appears that

their territories must be open to attack by the Bolsheviks long before any local defence forces can be organized, unless help can be provided from outside. Such developments would be contrary to the interests both of these states themselves and also to those of the civilized world, and it seems to the British Government that the most satisfactory solution would perhaps be for the Swedish Government, or the Scandinavian Governments in cooperation, to act upon the suggestion which has previously been put forward and to undertake to afford military protection to the territories in question.

The British authorities are, however, informed that the Esthonian National Council, if they were provided with about 40,000 rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per rifle, might perhaps be in a position to raise a force capable of holding the Russian frontier. The Letts would not be able to raise a force as rapidly as the Esthonians but might in a month or three weeks be able to organize a force up to about 10,000 men, which would enable them to protect their Russian frontier. This would, however, be dependent on their being assisted by a small force of 2,000 foreign troops. Up to the present the British Government have not found it possible to get into communication with any responsible authority in Lithuania and consequently no accurate estimation of the position there can be made.

An appeal has, however, been received from Lithuania, in which country Bolshevism is strong, for help to be rendered as soon as the Germans are withdrawn, and it is understood that M. Waldemar, a Lithuanian representative, has lately reached Sweden. It is proposed to discuss the position with M. Waldemar, and to ascertain from him as accurately as possible what assistance will be required by the Lithuanians. The British Government hope that in any case the Scandinavian Governments, even assuming that they do not find it possible to reconsider the decision which they previously reached, to refuse protection to these states, will in any case be ready to supply the Lithuanian, Lettish, and Esthonian authorities with the arms and ammunition necessary for defensive purposes. Should they be prepared to furnish supplies for this purpose the British Government are ready to replace as soon as possible the amounts of clothing supplied.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have sent instructions to their representatives at Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Christiania to approach the Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian Governments in the sense indicated. The British representatives at these capitals have also been instructed to recommend to such Lithuanian, Lettish, and Esthonian authorities as they may be in

touch with, to endeavour to reach some arrangement with the retreating Germans under which a sufficient supply of arms and ammunition should be left behind by the latter to render possible the defence of the frontiers of the respective states.

The British Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to inform the United States Government of the suggestions made by His Majesty's Government and to add that, if the United States Government concur in the suggested course of action, it will be much appreciated if the American representatives at the Scandinavian capitals could be instructed to make representations in a similar sense to those made by their British colleagues.

WASHINGTON, *October 31, 1918.*

[*Received November 1.*]

File No. 861.00/3117

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1206

WASHINGTON, *October 31, 1918.*

[*Received November 2.*]

SIR: I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, by direction of my Government, copy of a memorandum in regard to Esthonia and the question of the recognition of the Esthonian National Council by His Majesty's Government.

I am directed to enquire whether information in the possession of the State Department regarding conditions in Esthonia tends to confirm the contents of this memorandum.

I have [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

[Enclosure]

*Esthonia: Recognition of the National Council by the British Government*

In view of the advisability or otherwise of the general policy of granting provisional recognition to the national councils and other representative bodies of the smaller nationalities, for the purpose of stimulating their passive resistance under German occupation and so encouraging them in their determination to secure self-determination, to which principle the Entente powers have pledged themselves, the following data, showing the result of this policy in Esthonia, may be of interest.

With regard to the general question of the relation of these smaller nationalities to Russia, it becomes increasingly clear (a) that the general recovery and return to normal political conditions in Russia will be a long process; (b) that it therefore becomes more difficult to suggest to these smaller nationalities that they shall become units in a federation of Russian states; and (c) that in proportion as we encourage the independence of Finland and the Baltic states, whether they remain apart or grow into a larger Baltic league, we probably at the same time encourage the drawing together again of cer-



tain elements in Great Russia and Germany, particularly if the former country in the future becomes strong again and once more develops an aggressive centralising tendency. To combat the latter eventuality there appear to be only two lines of counter-move, either the break-up or thorough democratisation of Germany, or the full encouragement and support of the independence of these Baltic states, and Lithuania in particular, as a buffer.

The latest news from Esthonia is a story of brutal oppression, of which possibly the most significant item in connection with the above is the following:

The German commander in chief has issued instructions to the district commanders to keep a careful watch over such of the Esthonian *intelligentsia* as are spreading propaganda in the British interests. Should such cases be observed, the suspects are immediately to be arrested, even if there are no definite proofs. It is further stated from the same source that the people desire the liberation of their country from the German oppression at the hands of Great Britain. Those who are believed by the Germans to harbour such a desire are punished with ten years of imprisonment: "In the prisons they await death by starvation; the people moan but they still hope." It would appear that if the recognition already given has led to such fortitude and endurance on the part of the Esthonian people, we can hardly withdraw from the line already taken up, and should on the contrary do everything to make our intentions more clear. Other items of news from the same source are as follows:

The former Esthonian Prime Minister, K. Pääts, who was imprisoned by the Germans and who had been brought back to Revel and temporarily liberated owing to his physical condition as the result of imprisonment, has again been interned in a concentration camp. A deputation, headed by the Esthonian Bishop Platon, who interceded for his release, was met with a refusal: "We cannot liberate him as this would lead to risings among the population." All the prisons are overcrowded with political prisoners. By order of the German military authorities, the German language has been made compulsory in all the secondary schools. A conference dealing with the question of secondary schools was informed that of foreign languages instruction in only French and English was permitted. When the question of teaching in Esthonian was raised, the conference was told that it was not a political gathering and that the question could not be discussed. Russian can only be taught from the fifth class onwards, and then only two hours a week. *Verordnungs Blatt No. 26* further states that in all primary schools the German language has to be taught for six hours weekly during the first year, and for ten hours weekly during the second year. On the railways German soldiers rob travelers of such foodstuffs as they may find on them. The old gendarmes of the Tsarist times are employed in increasing numbers by the Germans. A well-known *provocateur*, Sinka, is again at work at Revel, and so are secret police agents like the Bolshevik Piskunov. Formerly there seemed to be a considerable number of German sympathizers. Owing to their measures of oppression the Germans are hated in the towns, but especially in the country. The barons and the German clergy are trying everywhere and by every means to arrange collections of signatures, requesting the union of the country with Germany, but the farmers are showing increased resentment of the methods employed. The local papers are suppressed if they refuse to publish German-inspired articles, which articles in turn are used as evidence of the desire of the country to be united to Germany.

File No. 861.00/3144

*The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, November 2, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received November 3, 1.23 a. m.]

3090. Have received note from Russian Minister here, of which following is substance:

Natural consequences of recent events would seem to be retreat of German troops from the occupied Russian provinces and recrudescence of Bolshevism would then be inevitable in these regions. Many Russian refugees have appealed to our Legations to intervene with the Allied Governments to point out this danger and obtain their consent for the German troops to remain in these territories until they can be replaced by Allied forces.

I have not wished to take any steps chiefly because the Germans themselves were urging the inhabitants of the occupied provinces to express themselves in their favor in this way and I did not wish even indirectly to comply with the views of our enemies, not being able to judge how much military interest the Germans had in remaining in Russia under the pretext of fighting the Bolsheviks. However, although absolutely opposed to the presence of German troops in any [my] country, I cannot remain deaf to the appeals of my compatriots who were worried over the fate of their relatives in these provinces, and I have therefore decided to request you to give me your support with your Government in begging it to consider among the alternatives which the Allies may take in view to preserve order in the occupied provinces, the installing at any rate an Allied command.

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 861.00/3167

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, November 5, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 6, 9.27 a. m.]

3075. My 3038, October 28, 1 p. m.<sup>1</sup> On the 29th ultimo, the British Chargé d'Affaires left a memorandum with the Danish Government, on behalf of his Government, suggesting Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries should, in the event of the withdrawal of the Germans from Esthonia, Livonia, and Lithuania, render military assistance to the populations of these territories in defending themselves against the Bolsheviks and that failing this they

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

should furnish them arms and ammunition which would be replaced by the Allies as soon as possible. It appears that neither proposal was received with enthusiasm.

On the second instant I was called upon by Gregory Kaplan, representative of the Ruthenian national Rada, Stanislas Khrzostowski, mayor of Minsk, and Simon Rosenbaum, second mayor of Vilna, who asked for military aid to White Russia and yesterday dispatched a telegram to the President in that sense. These men had all arrived in Copenhagen from Russia via Berlin. In reply to my suggestion that their people should organize, they replied that such a step would only serve to draw down on the population and especially the Jews, the added vengeance of the Bolsheviki. I proposed also that they should endeavor to arrange with the Germans, before they retire, to leave sufficient arms and ammunition for their defense, a suggestion which has been also put forth by the British. This suggestion was likewise received with skepticism. Their general attitude was that the Associated Governments had created this new situation and were morally bound to remedy it with a minimum of inconvenience and loss to the populations of the territories in question. I stated my opinion that while some aid would probably be extended it was not likely to be other than in support of their own efforts.

Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

File No. 861.00/3218

*The Spanish Ambassador (Riaño) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 7019

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1918.

[Received November 9.]

MR. SECRETARY: By order of the Government of His Majesty, I have the honor to apply to your excellency and to inform you that the president of the Supreme Executive Council of "Letgalie" and the president of that district Diet have applied to His Majesty the King, my august sovereign, asking him kindly to use his good offices with the President of the United States to the end that he may bring his powerful influence to bear for the purpose of having the German troops continue to occupy those territories until order and justice are secure, and thus save the inhabitants from death and ruin, which would befall them if they were turned over to the Bolshevik violence, which exists in the districts Minsk and Vitebsk evacuated by the German troops. The Minister of Ukrainia in Berlin, and the representatives of other states which formerly belonged to the Russian

Empire, have applied to the Ambassador of His Majesty bespeaking the intervention of his Government with the United States and the Entente powers, so that they may not insist upon the retirement of the German troops, which would mean total devastation to the territory and death to a large number of the inhabitants, pending the organization of other forces that may afford safety from the oppression of the Bolshevik terrorists. The Vice Consul of Spain in Esthonia has reported to His Majesty's Government that the neutral consuls had a meeting and all agreed to apply to their respective chiefs and urge them to ask that the German troops should stay.

Prince Lubomirski also has laid before His Majesty the King, my august sovereign, a memorial praying for the organization in Poland of a neutral force to defend that country against the Bolsheviks when the German troops are withdrawn.

Taking all these requests into consideration, His Majesty the King and the Spanish Government would fail in the imperative duty to humanity that they have assumed since the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, if they should fail to listen to the suggestions that have been made to them and did not intervene with the Government of the United States by making a statement of the facts above specified in the assurance that the President of the United States jointly with the Allied powers will appreciate them to their full value and decide in accordance with justice and the principles of humanity.

I avail myself [etc.]

JUAN RIAÑO

---

File No. 763.72119/2697

*The Lithuanian National Council to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1918.

[Received November 15.]

Believing in the principles of justice, i.e., the right of an individual as well as of a nation (which is a conglomerate of individuals having mutual interests) to life, property, and liberty, and to the pursuit of happiness, we do hereby respectfully submit the summary of the present desires and requests of the Lithuanians in America as well as of those in Europe, as far as their views are known to us, for the consideration of the United States Government to whose care we, as members of the Democratic Mid-European Union, have pledged the Lithuanian people and their property.

1. The Lithuanians ask for independence and sovereignty of the Lithuanian state and nation. The Lithuanians in America desire the republican form of government for Lithuania with a guarantee and protection of the rights of racial minorities.

2. The Lithuanian state should include both Lithuania major (districts of Kaunas, Vilnius, Grodno, Suvalkai, and a part of Minsk) and Lithuania minor or Eastern Prussia (the basins of the Rivers Niemen and Pregel) as specified below, because this extent of territory is the abode of the Lithuanian nation from immemorial times. The port of Memel (Klaipėda) is the rightful way of Lithuania to the Baltic Sea.

3. Since the Letts and Lettgalls are members of the same race, the Lithuanians do desire, if it so pleases the Letts and Lettgalls, to unite the whole race under the same flag and to form one nation, on the basis of equality and liberty and brotherhood.

4. Since it is the desire of Poland, all Polish parties entertaining concurrent views, to recognize independent Lithuania only when united with Poland, the Lithuanians who are not Slavs and who live on the shores of the Baltic Sea find their life interests trending toward the peoples living around the Baltic Sea, and therefore earnestly desire to remain in closer contact with the northern peoples, not refusing however to entertain sympathetic and neighborly relations with either the Poles or the Russians. Yet a determination of a closer union whether with Poland or Russia, under the present conditions and differences of the social and cultural development of the respective nations, must be left to future exigencies and needs of welfare and civilization of the nations concerned.

5. In order to promote the cause of peace between nations and brotherhood of man, Lithuania as an independent nation fervently desires the creation of a League of Nations and a membership therein.

6. Lithuania has elected the Lithuania State Council (Lietuvos Valstybės Taryba) in Vilnius which is considered to be the provisional government of the country, and the Lithuanians in America have constituted as their respective body the Lithuanian National Council in Washington. For the welfare of the nation it is imperative that the Lithuanians through their representatives shall be permitted to participate in the deliberations of the peace congress when the interests of the Lithuanian nation, its territorial questions, and relations to other nations shall be decided upon.

7. In order to prevent disorder and lawlessness, leading to bloodshed and devastation among population which under the German military occupation for more than three years has suffered untold oppression and abject destitution, we consider to be necessary either:

- (a) To send a United States military commission to assist in the creation of a national militia or a national army out of the elements which constituted the former Russian Army, and which were dispersed by the Germans and partly by the Bolsheviks of Russia;

- (b) That the United States of America, if the Allies should decide to send an army of occupation, shall temporarily occupy the country by the American contingent for the maintenance of peace and order.

Only by these means can the marauding bands hiding in the forests, which terrorize the inhabitants, be effectively put down, and the irritating agitation which comes from abroad in interests foreign to the welfare of the Lithuanian nation can be allayed, and the country spared the horrors of Bolshevism. This same measure could serve for the peaceful and orderly convocation of a constituent assembly, elected on democratic principles, in the capital city of Vilnius, which shall elaborate the Constitution, install the government and order the affairs of the new state.

8. We respectfully request the United States Government to cause a United States Commission composed of experts to be sent to Lithuania to survey the food and agricultural situation and also to accord medical assistance for the suffering people from the effects of war and German occupation. This commission would study out ways and means for relieving the country from material suffering, which if unattended might cause unrest and possible disturbances tending to impair the welfare and peace of the country.

9. Since Lithuania has been a battle ground between Russia and Germany and has cruelly suffered (like Belgium and Serbia) in loss of life and property, the Lithuanians deem it just and proper to ask for indemnification for the losses sustained, and pray in particular that:

- (a) The Lithuanian exiles into Russia and the war prisoners in Germany must be returned safely to their homes at once;
- (b) The civil population, deported to Germany either for insubordination or as laborers, must be repatriated;
- (c) German colonists who have settled in Lithuania during the military occupation must leave the country;
- (d) All property, carried off to Germany, must be returned;
- (e) Contracts on immovable property, made by Germans during the military occupation, shall be considered illegal.

10. A commission must be instituted to appraise the damages from devastation of cities and villages, or requisitioning of cattle and horses and cereals and clothing, and the vast spoliation of forests and exportation of timber to Germany for the supply of all the fronts and for domestic manufactures, and that retribution for the damage done shall be made by the liable parties.

11. The Lithuanians pray that Russia return the libraries and museums which she abstracted during her domination (1832-1864), the money and the property confiscated by the Tsaristic régime (1842-

1864) from the monastic orders, the clergy, and the gentry, as well as the scholarships at the institutions of learning (1832). Besides, returned must be institutions, official acts and documents, savings banks, machinery, commercial and industrial establishments carried off to Russia during the World War. Only on the basis of such indemnification could there be a possibility of determining the responsibility of the new Lithuania for a proportionate part of the debts of Russia to the Allied nations.

12. Germany should not be permitted to claim any indemnification for the construction of new railways or new highways, the repairing of old roads, the administration of estates deserted by refugees or exiles, because of severe requisitions, unheard-of taxes, compulsory work without any or with only partial remuneration, confiscation of property and carrying off the population in labor battalions to drudge for naught and to starve in Germany. Besides, if there have been any improvements made, their object was the military efficiency of Germany but not the welfare of Lithuania.

These are in general our fervent requests which we present to the United States Government, looking forward with confidence that the long-suffering Lithuanian nation will find a just retribution and thereby shall be enabled to start its life anew on the basis of equal opportunity with other nations of the world. Presenting their requests and rights, the Lithuanians are by no means forgetful of the duties they owe to the Allies, to the United States, and to humanity. No distemper mars our undertaking; we do not covet what should be the possession of our neighbors, and our sincere belief is that right and duty should constitute the nation's right.

We append to this paper the detailed description of the boundaries of Lithuania, Latvia (Lettonia), as we know them.

Lithuania consists of the districts of Kaunas, Vilnius, Grodno, Suvalkai, and a part of Minsk; they were under the Russian sway before the World War, while Lithuania minor, known as Eastern Prussia, was a part of Germany. The northern boundary starts with the Baltic Sea and the River Bartava, then goes to Nygranda, Ringē Žagarē, Schönberg, Kurmiai, Nertis, Aknista, Bebra, Dvinsk, by the River Duna to Kreslavl and Drisa. The eastern boundary: from Drisa to Dokshicy, Kraisk, Rakov, Liachoviči and Lake Vygonovsk. The southern boundary: from Lake Vygonovsk to Kamieniec Litovsk, Surazh. From the south, northwestward: from Surazh by the Rivers Narev and Bobr to Raigrod, to Angerburg, in Eastern Prussia, Gerdaunen, Wehlau, up to Königsberg.

So then, Eastern Prussia, or Lithuania minor, occupies the basins of the Rivers Niemen and Pregel, as is testified by German authors Lohmeyer, Horn, Hagen, etc. Especially is interesting Dr. Alb. Zweck's standard work *Litauen, eine Landes-und Volkskunde* (Stutt-

gart, 1898). He attributes to Lithuania minor 650,000 inhabitants and an area of 11,430 square kilometers.

Latvia, or Lettonia, comprises Courland (to the north of the district of Kaunas) and four counties of Livland or Livonia: Riga, Wenden, Walk, and Wolmar.

The Lettgalls occupy a part of the district of Vitebsk (counties of Dvinsk, Riezhica, and Lutzyn). The eastern boundary extends from Disna, to Siebezh, to Marienhausen.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE  
LITHUANIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL  
*President, F. Narushevich*

File No. 861.00/3413

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 1056

CHRISTIANIA, November 16, 1918.

[Received December 11.]

SIR: . . . In reply to the representations of my British and Italian colleagues to the Norwegian Government that, upon the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops, the Norwegian Government should assist in protecting them against the spreading of Bolshevism (see my telegram No. 1313<sup>1</sup>), the Minister for Foreign Affairs has intimated to them that even if such action were desirable in principle it could not be taken by the Norwegian Government, as it would not be possible to obtain the consent of the Storting with its large Socialist majority.

I have [etc.]

A. G. SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 763.72119/2697

*The Secretary of State to the Lithuanian National Council*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918.

GENTLEMEN: The Department has received your communication of November 14 and has the honor to inform you that the points which are raised in the communication relative to the aspirations for Lithuanian independence have been carefully noted and will receive due consideration in connection with similar questions which will require attention in negotiations for a general peace which will prove lasting.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



File No. 861.00/3218

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (Riaño)*

No. 994

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter informing me that the president of the Supreme Council of "Letgalie," and the president of the district Diet have applied to His Majesty the King of Spain, requesting that he use his good offices with the President of the United States to the end that German troops be allowed to continue in those territories which they have formerly occupied in Russia in order that the inhabitants of those districts may not be submitted to violations and reprisals at the hands of the Bolsheviks.

You further state that the Minister of the Ukraine and other states formerly comprised within the Russian Empire, have made like representations to His Majesty.

As your excellency is aware, by the terms of the armistice recently concluded between the Associated Governments and Germany, it was stipulated that—

All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as defined above, as soon as the Allies taking into account the internal situation of those territories shall decide that the time for this has come.

In the meantime this Government is seeking to reach a solution by which order and control may be established within those districts, following the withdrawal of the German troops.

Accept [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

File No. 861.00/3508

*The Consul General at Copenhagen (Gale) to the Secretary of State, forwarding report by Vice Consul (Lehrs)*

[Extract]

COPENHAGEN, November 27, 1918.

[Received December 21.]

## 1. THE BALTIC PROVINCES

During the period of occupation of the Baltic provinces by German troops the local administration was under complete control of the Germans. The revolution in Germany brought about a relaxation of the influence and deprived the local government of its strong support. The old authorities having thus become powerless, new governments have recently been established.

According to the Finnish and German papers independent republics were proclaimed, Esthonia and Latvia, about a week ago, the latter with its capital in Riga.

According to German sources, the government of the republic of Latvia consists of the following persons: Karl Ulmann, Prime Minister; Meierovich, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Walter, Minister of the Interior; Yaranchavski, Minister of Finance; Ulmann, Minister of Agriculture; Germanerski, Minister of Labor. It is alleged that there is not a single German amongst the members of the republican governments of Esthonia and Latvia.

No information is at hand regarding the new government of Esthonia. It is known, however, that in Esthonia the local election in the summer of 1917, as well as the Constitutional Assembly elections in November 1917, gave the majority to the non-socialistic parties and to such who desired a connection with Russia. The representative of the people of Esthonia at the central government in Ufa, expressed the hope that Esthonia would not be severed from Russia.

Although the character of the new government of Latvia is unknown at present, it may be feared that it is in sympathy with the radical socialistic parties; it should not also be left unobserved that the only reliable battalions in the service of the Soviet government in Russia are those consisting of Letts; the commander in chief of the Russian forces, Vadsetis, as well as the president of the "Russian Extraordinary Committee against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation," Peters, are Letts. The attitude towards the Russian Soviet government, however, seems to be a negative one in both republics.

The Russian Government is demanding that Workmen's and Peasants' Councils should be established in the new republics and that the same should unite with the existing councils of German soldiers. The Bolsheviks are threatening heavy reprisals if the councils are not formed immediately, but notwithstanding the pressure the councils have not been established. . . .

---

File No. 861.00/3117

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

No. 322

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication dated the 31st ultimo, enclosing copy of a memorandum, by direction of the British Government, in regard to Esthonia and the question of recognition of the Esthonian National Council by His Majesty's Government.

In reply to your inquiry whether information in the possession of the Department of State regarding conditions in Esthonia tends to confirm the contents of the memorandum, I beg to say that the information obtained by this Government tends to confirm the story of political, social, and military conditions as outlined in the contents of the memorandum by His Majesty's Government. Nevertheless, public and official declarations which have been made by the Government of the United States on various occasions proclaiming its friendship and loyalty to Russia and the Russian people causes it to feel in honor bound to refrain from adopting any premature action before the meeting of the peace conference.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

File No. 861.01/20

*The American Esthonian League to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 29, 1918.

SIR: We take the liberty to bring to your attention the fact that a firm democratic form of government has been established in Esthonia, which has nothing whatever common with the Bolshevik régime of Lenin in Petrograd or elsewhere in Russia, which is practically the first step in so far after the Russian revolution that marks the beginning of a real stable republican movement, free of any intrigues and extreme tendencies of any kind. An Esthonian National Council elected by universal suffrage in all districts of the Esthonian population in the provinces of Esthonia and Livonia met on the 14th of July in Revel and elected an executive government, consisting of a Prime and eight Cabinet Ministers. Mr. Konstantin Päts, the former mayor of Revel and the editor of *Teataja*, was elected Prime Minister. He and the rest of the Cabinet Ministers are well-known public men of Esthonia, of outspoken democratic tendencies and men who held no office under the old monarchic régime of Russia.

Basing on the principle of self-determination of nations, recognized by President Wilson and the Allied powers, the Esthonian National Council met on the 28th of November and decided the following:

(1) To determine the future form of government and to create a democratic power of Esthonia, as well as to decide all ulterior questions, and has found necessary to call together an Esthonian Constituent Assembly.

(2) The Esthonian National Council proclaims itself the supreme power in Esthonia until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly; this assembly will be elected by universal suffrage, and after being

[having] determined a form of government, it will definitely form the legislative and administrative powers.

(3) During the interruption of its sessions, the National Council accords to its executive committee as well to the government of the country and the Committee of County Delegates (Walla Wanemad) the right of taking all the administrative power of the public institutions of the country in its hands.

(4) The National Council declared Esthonia an independent democratic republic until a stable government or a republican form of government will be established in Russia, and an All-Russian Constituent Assembly will decide the future of the federal states of Russia.

On basis of this declaration by all the duly elected representatives of the Esthonian people, the Esthonian Government has taken all the political affairs of the country, all the public institutions, railways, courts, banks, schools, police, and the army under the supreme control of the National Assembly and the Cabinet, and in consequence of that the life in this newly established provisional republic is absolutely normal and will remain as the first example for the establishment of a republic by the people and for the people in Russia.

The Esthonian Republican Government sent its special envoys to England, France, and the Scandinavian countries. The Esthonian Envoy to Great Britain is Professor A. Piip who was received by Arthur James Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, on May 3 as an informal diplomatic representative of the Esthonian Government. Mr. Balfour in his letter of that date pointed out to Mr. Piip the fact that the final recognition of the Esthonian Republic will take place on the future peace conference and that the British Government on that occasion will do their utmost to secure that the above principle is applied to Esthonia.

The Esthonian Government has, however, not been able to send their envoy yet to this country, but our league and the diplomatic agent of the same stand in communication with Mr. Piip in London who has requested and authorized us to appeal to the United States people and Government for contributions to the ill-treated population of Esthonia by the Germans and the Bolshevik looters. We like to send a member of this league as a delegate to the peace conference in France and ask you kindly to grant us the privilege as you have done so with other less organized nations in Russia and Austria. We also request you to give your full support to the democratic Esthonian Government for this is the first bright start [star] of free and democratic Russia and kindly advise us how we can best serve the United States in this mission.

We have [etc.]

*Secretary, S. TEINE*

File No. 861.00/3297

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, November 29, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 10.37 p. m.]

3240. I have learned through the Foreign Office here that a delegation from the Province of Esthonia is proceeding to Stockholm to wait on this Legation regarding the Bolshevik situation. It is stated that the Bolsheviks are already crossing into their country from Petrograd. In connection with this, as I cabled before, there is great anxiety felt throughout the Baltic provinces and Finland as well as Scandinavia, to some extent, regarding the spread of Bolshevism. The government here is watching the developments with anxiety.

In best-informed circles, the opinion seems to prevail that Finland should receive food so as to prevent the renewal and spread of Bolshevism. I am informed, as I cabled, that the food conditions in Finland are appalling, and the Finnish representative in Sweden informs me that his government considers this condition a great help to the Bolsheviks.

All the Scandinavian countries wish to cooperate in every way possible to stamp out Bolshevism, not only in their own countries, but to assist in the general cause, realizing that the spread of (this?) terror is apt to undermine their Governments.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3296

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, November 29, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received November 30, 2.05 a. m.]

3226. British light squadron composed of five light cruisers, nine destroyers, one transport, with provisions and mine sweepers under command of Rear Admiral Alexander Sinclair arrived off Copenhagen the night of the 28th, and leave at midnight to-night for Revel, where I understand arms and some men will be landed to give support to the Esthonian authorities as opposed to the Bolsheviks. Some discontent has been expressed by members of other Allied missions here, especially the French, that the British navy should be alone concerned, and maintain that unless French

and American ships participate in the naval activities in the Baltic, our prestige will seriously suffer. My attitude has been that the inter-(Allied?) authorities had doubtless not lost sight of such a contingency in arriving at their decision. The point made by my colleagues, however, seems worthy of serious consideration.

Repeated to House. Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

---

File No. 861.01/21

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 2, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received December 3, 1.40 p. m.]

3260. The Esthonian Committee composed of Eduard Laamann, Ferdinand Kull, and Joseph Goldarbeiter, of whom I cabled you previously, has arrived in Stockholm and waited upon me to-day.

Mr. Goldarbeiter gave me the following information regarding Esthonia:

1. The present authority is vested in a Diet elected on March 30, 1917, by popular vote of the people of all Esthonia. This Diet has elected the present government which after the commencement of evacuation by the Germans is taking over from the German military authorities the government of Esthonia.

2. This Diet represents the Esthonian people only and is composed of 5 Bolsheviks, 24 socialists of various complexion, and 31 with inclinations to the right.

3. Present government stands for absolute independence of Esthonia as regards Russia but is prepared to accede preferential rights to Russia for use of Esthonian ports for purposes of import and export. Only as an alternative are they ready to join other parts of Russia in a federation of states or republics fearing that after such a union should reaction set in in Russia they would be likely to lose what independence they had gained.

Esthonians view with alarm withdrawal of Germans and go so far as to state that if Allies do not immediately send individual ships to available ports of the Baltic Sea Bolsheviks will be able in a very short time to overrun the whole of Esthonia.

Also cabled Paris.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3103

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

## MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his memorandum dated October 31, 1918,<sup>1</sup> relative to the advisability of taking precautionary measures of a military character with regard to the small states on the western frontier of Russia.

The Secretary of State has given this matter careful consideration and believes that the situation in these border states should be considered in connection with the general problem of the occupied territory of Russia.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1918.

File No. 861.00/3277

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Lithuanian National Council*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1918.

GENTLEMEN: The Department has received your letter of November 25, 1918,<sup>2</sup> submitting a report made to the executive committee of the Lithuanian National Council by the secretary of the delegation sent to the Lithuanian committee in Switzerland for the purpose of investigating the present political situation in Lithuania. The Department notes that the Lithuanian National Council requests:

- (1) That the newly organized state council in Lithuania be recognized as the representative body of the Lithuanian nation and as the provisional government of the country;
- (2) That the United States render military assistance by sending to Lithuania ammunition and instructors for organizing and equipping a Lithuanian army to maintain peace in the country and assist in reconstruction work;
- (3) To assist the provisional government of Lithuania in obtaining the necessary credit for a loan of \$10,000,000 for reconstruction work.

The United States has not been unmindful of the aspirations of Lithuanians to manage their own affairs and will see that the American delegation to the peace conference is advised of the measures which the Lithuanian National Council advocates. At the same time you are informed that the Department is not prepared to recognize any new government in Lithuania at present and is fur-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 839.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

thermore of the opinion that the question of military assistance is one for consideration by the War Council in Versailles.

I am [etc.]

For the Acting Secretary of State:  
WILLIAM PHILLIPS

File No. 861.00/3363

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received December 7, 4.42 a. m.]

3289. Following telegram sent to Esthonian delegation from Esthonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poska, from Helsingfors December 6:

Narova front. Bolsheviks advancing, are to-day landing troops at Asserin supported by two torpedo boats. To-day received information from our agents Petrograd that Bolsheviks decided take Revel before arrival Allies, which will make further operations of Allies more difficult, as owing to mine fields it is impossible to penetrate into Finnish Gulf from Baltic and *vice versa*, except by passing Revel. At Narva and occupied territory Bolsheviks perpetrate atrocities, shooting people, taking women on board vessels and into camps. Allied torpedo craft sufficient to quiet situation. Few days delay will make it late. Inform Allied legations of this position. No disturbances, quiet and order everywhere, only population look with horror towards approaching danger.

Repeated Paris. Copy to London.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3433

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 14, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received December 15, 5.30 a. m.]

3341. General Yudenich submitted to me to-day memorandum, summary of which is given below. General Yudenich is one of the most popular generals of the former Russian army and has seen most of his service in the Caucasus. He was one of the commanders of the army fighting the Turks and was the general who was in charge of the troops which captured Erzerum. He is associated with Baron Taube, professor of international exchange of the Uni-



versity of Petrograd, and Trepov, under the Tsar Minister of Communications and Labor [Premier] following Sturmer and [before] Golitsyn.

Present aim of all parties should be common battle against the Bolsheviks with material assistance Entente. Basing conclusions on this it is necessary add following considerations. Evacuation German garrisons from territories Russia and Finland, unless those garrisons replaced by Entente troops, and unless disorganization German troops by Bolshevik propaganda should cease, gives Bolsheviks possibility penetrating regions which at present slightly subject to their influence. On other hand progress revolution in Germany with apparent tendency toward Bolshevism adds prestige to Bolsheviks, makes them realize their strength and in general betters their position. Moreover, important remember that Red Army while increasing numerically is also improving in quality, consequently battle against Bolshevism would be more serious later than now. Moreover, Bolshevism tending become veritable international scourge. Important in common interest civilized states definitely give up system combating Bolsheviks by limitation of their activity and desire you adopt strong measures in order paralyze very sources from which Bolshevism spreads.

Best location for military action against Bolsheviks would be in Baltic provinces and Finland. Their advantageous geographic situation, their ports and railways, their proximity to Petrograd, the possibility of raising voluntary troops in those regions, and furthermore the absence of fortifications on routes leading to capital, sympathy of population already tried by Bolshevik régime, difficulties for Bolsheviks to provision themselves in these already exhausted parts, all speak in favor of such operation. Principal ports and towns Baltic provinces should be occupied by Entente troops in order maintain law and order and permit Russian oriental races [*sic*] to organize under those circumstances to take part in [battle] against Bolsheviks.

Now 50,000 Entente troops sufficient occupy shores of Finland and Baltic provinces, while if occupation delayed number required later will be considerably more. Finland can furnish arms and munitions out of large store left in that country by former Russian army, while uniforms and food would have to be brought in. Matter of provisioning most complicated in the Empire [and requires?] parts of army fighting Bolsheviks be supplied with food from England; also population of reoccupied territories would have to be fed. By equipping 1,000 officers and men now in Finland, those now in Baltic provinces, and bringing those from Archangel and Moscow [Murmansk?], Russian nucleus of 10,000 or 12,000 could

be obtained. After first successes, Russian army of 50,000 could be found which would require, not counting cost of arms, uniforms and transportation, about 50,000,000 rubles monthly.

Repeated to Paris. Copy to London.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3448

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, December 16, 1918.

[Received December 17, 6.40 a. m.]

3347. Stockholm *Dagens Nyheter* states: Now ascertained Trepov in Stockholm for purpose forming new Russian Government with Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich as Tsar. He had entered into communication with certain Finnish circles, notably with Mannerheim, who was enlisted for the plans. Through Mannerheim's mediation Trepov received 500,000 marks in advance from Finnish treasury and was planned he would follow Mannerheim's troops when entering Petrograd. In compensation Finland was to receive Karelia and would be guaranteed that Åland not be ceded to Sweden. Reasons these plans failed were that Trepov did not get the support he expected from Entente Legations, fact that Taube and Yudenich adopted negative attitude and above all that plans became known ahead thereby eliminating first prerequisite for success. Trepov had to abandon plans and left Stockholm 17th.

Reports from Revel: To-day's *communiqué* reports English squadron bombarded rear front sector of Bolsheviks as far as Wesenberg. Advance of enemy on Asserin front been checked. On Pskov front advance guards of enemy stand in vicinity village of Polva. Mobilization of Esthonian army continues successful, support of Allies having strengthened spirit population. . . .

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3456

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received December 18, 2.58 a. m.]

3354. Esthonian delegation Stockholm received following telegram from their government at Revel:

German troops [evacuating] Walk about December 20 and it is expected that Lettish Bolsheviks will then occupy Walk. Bolshe-

vik bands now operating 20 miles south Dorpat. Our troops evacuated Wesenberg and Bolsheviks advancing on wide front along winter routes where difficult make stand with our small forces against them. Convince Allied Ministers necessity of sending immediately at least two infantry regiments with some artillery. Provisional government places Esthonian republic, until definite decision at peace conference, under protection Allies. Quick Allied action will save depots with goods worth millions.

Repeated to Paris; copy to London.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3471

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, December 18, 1918.

[Received December 19, 3.30 p. m.]

3360. Local representatives of the Lettish republic called on me this morning requesting Allied assistance in fighting Bolsheviks. They outlined the present position as resulting from present tactics of the German Government.

During German occupation Germans refused allow Letts organize their own army or even their own police or militia. Now when Germans are retiring they do not hand civil organizations over to Letts but they retire in such a manner that small bands of Bolshevik troops advance immediately behind them along railroads and occupy territory. This interval between withdrawal German troops and appearance Bolsheviks is only one of hours and Lettish people having no arms and munitions in such short time cannot organize means of defense. Hence Bolshevik advance meets no opposition at all and they are able to strengthen their positions in various centers without any resistance whatsoever.

The Bolsheviks in their advance are taking hostages, pillaging and levying contributions on wealthy. They are also performing all other terroristic acts for which they are so well known. Their advance is steady one and they have now reached a point about 100 kilometers east of Riga. At present rate it will be only short time until all Livland and Courland are in their hands.

These representatives are convinced that German policy is such that they [are] purposely handing over this territory to Bolsheviks only because by so doing they will compel the peoples of those territories, unless Allied assistance is given to drive out Bolsheviks, to appeal to Germans for help and in this way Germany will again obtain and secure hold on these regions.

Representatives also pointed out that they did not a month ago anticipate such situation because according to terms armistice Germans were to leave their troops in these territories until Allies requested them withdraw them. However, Germans are not observing this clause of the armistice.

They urgently requested that Allied assistance in form warships be dispatched immediately to Riga, Libau, and Windau not only that their moral influence will be felt but with ammunition and arms so that local population may organize to resist Bolsheviki.

Repeated to London and Paris.

MORRIS

---

File No. 861.00/3530

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, December 24, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received December 26, 6.50 p. m.]

6260. For Committee on Public Information from Whitehouse:

No. 1087. For Lithuanian National Assembly [Council?] from Pakstas. Dvinsk and Sventsiany taken by Bolsheviki. Vilna in greatest danger. Lithuanian Government fleeing from capital. Germans refused to sell rifles for Lithuanian army and means of communication given up to Bolsheviki. Lithuanian Government requested American troops several times.

STOVALL



# INDEX



# INDEX

- Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia (*see also* Railways; Stevens):  
 Far East, activities, 26, 103, 104, 190, 202, 367; Japanese criticism, 113, 163, 170; Russian factions, attitude, 74, 99, 156, 157, 161, 315, 450.  
 Soviet régime: conference planned, 96, 97, 165, 168; relations, 74.  
 Åland Islands, 752-753, 754, 769-770, 807-808.  
 German landing, 778, 786*n*.  
 Alexander Mikhailovich, Grand Duke, 859.  
 Alexeev, Gen. M. V., 381, 404, 409, 534, 537, 569, 619.  
 Volunteer Army, 587, 588, 601-602, 609-611, 615-616, 638, 644, 650.  
 Allied and American Diplomatic Missions. *See* Diplomatic Missions.  
 Allied and American Governments (*see also under* individual countries; Code messages; Communications; Diplomatic Missions; Inter-Allied military conference; Intervention; Recognition; World War):  
 commission, political, in Siberia, plans, 138, 159-160, 162, 232-233, 340-341; U. S. attitude, 157, 362.  
 noninterference in Russian affairs, 167, 306, 334, 491-492, 495, 576.  
 representatives: detention, Archangel, 510-512; Horvat's Siberian activities, views, 277-278, 286, 307-308, 332; interference in Russian affairs, Soviet charge, 139, 142-143, 152, 153-154; intervention, memorial at Harbin, 208-209; Ukraine, relations, 660-663, 663-664; Zemstvo Committee, relations, 17, 18-19.  
 Russian people, proclamation to, 305-306, 334.  
 Siberian governments: aid sought against Bolshevism, 53, 168, 422-423; against Germany, 343, 350, 379, 390-391, 405.  
 Soviet régime: aid sought against Germany, 111, 114, 122, 473; war, state of, discussion, 489, 510, 544, 548.  
 Allied Governments (*see also under* individual countries):  
 Ministers at Jassy, post-war efforts to maintain order in the Ukraine, 699-700, 701-703.
- All-Russian provisional government (Ufa; Omsk):  
 Allied and American aid sought, 422-423, 456.  
 army, 412, 441, 455-456.  
 arrest of members, 435, 440, 447.  
*coup d'état*, 435, 437, 438-439, 440; Russian attitude, 448, 573-574.  
 Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 441, 451-452, 455, 458-459.  
 Directory, 381-382, 406, 409, 429, 437.  
 formation, 398, 406-409, 421.  
 France, relations, 412-413, 426-427.  
 Great Britain, relations, 426-427.  
 Kolchak, 429, 447, 455-456; Supreme Governor, 435, 438-439, 441, 448, 453-454.  
 policies, 405-406, 408, 421, 447.  
 provisional government of autonomous Siberia, fusion with, 418, 423, 429, 430, 553.  
 Siberians, attitude, 441, 443, 444, 445, 447, 455.  
 Supreme government of the northern region, relations, 563, 565.  
 Ufa conference, 381-382, 385, 405-409.  
 World War, attitude, 407, 412, 422-423.  
 American Red Cross Commission to Russia (*see also* Robins; Wardwell; Webster), 262, 459.  
 activities, northern region, 469, 504, 550, 566.  
 Soviet régime, relations, 789.  
 American Red Cross Commission to Siberia:  
 Czecho-Slovaks, aid, 262, 283, 333, 374, 385.  
 Japanese, relations, 371, 438.  
 Americans, unofficial, views, 84, 96-97, 123, 125, 131.  
 Amur Railway. *See* Trans-Siberian Railway.  
 Anarchists, 64, 311.  
 Anglo-French invasion, Soviet charge, 497, 498-499, 500-502, 505, 510.  
 Archangel (*see also* Intervention; Supreme government of the northern region):  
 Allied and American forces: activities, 532-533, 541, 542, 549, 564, 576; commander in chief, change of, 533-534, 540, 557, 569; instructions, 488; warships to leave Russian ports, Soviet request, 236, 486-487, 489, 495, 502-504.



## Archangel—Continued.

- Allied forces: landing, 334, 496, 497, 505, 506-507, 510-511; popular attitude, 527.
- Allied military interference: British attitude, 533-534, 540, 542; U.S. attitude, 533-534, 540.
- anti-Bolshevik elements, 468-469, 488, 497, 507, 510, 516.
- armistice, retention of troops after, 567-568, 569-570, 570-573; U.S. attitude, 571-572, 574.
- City Duma, arrest, 488, 517.
- elections, 557, 558-559.
- food supply: Allied and American shipments, plan, 222-223, 417, 494, 504, 536, 537, 538, 540; British shipments, 472, 475, 497, 519; conditions, 468, 472, 499-500, 530, 535.
- intervention: Allied and American representatives in Russia, views, 75, 172-174, 179; inter-Allied military conference, plans, 212, 213-214, 485; Supreme War Council, plans, 243, 246; U.S. attitude, 160, 288, 289, 328, 574.
- monarchy, restoration discussed, 537, 574, 576-577.
- munitions, shipment by Soviet to interior, 96, 451, 468, 470, 472, 475, 477, 488, 504, 515, 550.
- mutiny, 575-576, 577.
- Soviets, local and provincial, 74, 475, 506.
- U.S. forces, 410, 451, 512, 518, 519, 524, 532, 533, 541, 542, 549, 552; aid sought, 507; disaffection, 559, 560, 562, 567; increase of, French suggestion, 544-546; increase of, U.S. attitude, 546.
- Archangel Province. *See* Anglo-French invasion.
- Armenians (*see also* South Russia; Trans-Caucasus):  
 Bolsheviks, relations, 619, 632, 633, 635, 637.  
 Georgians, union with, 579, 624, 625, 635, 642.  
 Germany, relations, 633, 638.  
 Great Britain, relations, 591, 598.  
 independence, 638.  
 massacres, 168, 623-624, 625, 638.  
 military forces, 35, 578, 584, 592, 595, 618, 624, 625, 626, 628.  
 Relief Committee, 592-593.  
 Turkey: conflicts, 620, 624, 625, 632, 633, 635, 637; peace, 638, 641.
- Armistice, Associated Governments—Central Powers. *See under* World War.
- Armistice, Rumania—Central powers, 710.
- Armistice, Russia—Central powers, 654.
- Armistice, Russia—Turkey, 585-586, 594.
- Army (*see also* Horvat; Orlov; Red Army; Semenov; Siberian Army; Volunteer Army; World War):  
 demoralization, 32, 80, 120, 659; desertions, 467, 595, 653.  
 reorganization, plan, 1-2.  
 Rumanian front, 656, 664-665.
- Associated Governments. *See* Allied and American Governments.
- Asylum, Provisional Government officials in Consulate, 22.
- Atrocities:  
 Blagoveshchensk, 128, 138-139.  
 Irkutsk, 16, 17, 18, 20-21, 22, 29, 32, 61.
- Austria-Hungary. *See* Central powers.
- Autonomous Siberian government. *See* Provisional government of autonomous Siberia.
- Avksentiev, Nicholas D.:  
 all-Russian government, 553, 563; arrest, 439, 440, 447.  
 Samara government, 534, 537.  
 Ufa Directory, 405, 406, 409, 421, 422.
- Azerbaijan, state of, 632, 641, 642.
- Baku, conflicts to gain, 581, 623, 625, 628, 632-633, 637-638, 640, 641.
- Baltic provinces (*see also* Esthonia; Latvia; Letgalia; Lithuania; Livonia):  
 appeal to Germany by Baltic Germans, 821-822, 829.  
 Bolshevism, 844, 854-855, 857-859, 859-861; Allied efforts to prevent, 838, 839-841, 849, 854-855, 859; German attitude, 838, 843; U.S. attitude, 856.  
 occupation, German, 829, 831-832, 850.  
 self-determination of peoples, 818, 819, 832, 834, 835, 852; Allied powers, attitude, 816, 820, 841.
- Banks:  
 closure, 601.  
 nationalization, 312, 469.
- Belgium:  
 forces in Far East, 134-135.
- Bergson, Henri, 180, 233.
- Berthelot, Gen. Henri M., 173-174, 606, 704.
- Bessarabia:  
 France, relations, 615.  
 independence, 707, 708, 714-715.  
 recognition, U.S. attitude, 715.  
 Rumania, union with, 130, 718, 719, 720; Central powers, attitude, 719, 720; Russia, attitude, 130, 720-722; U.S. attitude, 720n.  
 Rumanian Army, relations, 599, 608, 707-708, 710, 713, 716.  
 Ukraine, relations, 130, 652, 720-721.
- Bierer, Capt. Bion B., 485, 495, 512, 514, 519, 520.

Bolsheviks (*see also* Red Army; Red Guard; Siberian Soviet; Soviet régime):

anarchists, relations, 311.

Armenians, relations, 619, 632, 633, 635, 637.

Baku, 581, 623, 625, 637, 640.

Baltic countries, post-war military advance, 844, 854-855, 857-859, 859-861; Allied efforts to prevent, 838, 839-841, 849, 854-855, 859; German attitude, 838, 843; U.S. attitude, 856.

Caucasus, 581, 586, 589, 590-591, 619, 623.

Cossacks, relations, 77-78, 80, 247, 584, 590, 601, 619, 621-622, 626, 633, 653-654, 706.

Finland, growth in, 729, 744, 745, 751, 752, 854; post-war efforts to prevent, 813.

forces: European Russia, 369, 381, 556; Siberia, 190, 192-193, 201-202.

Harbin, activities, 2-4, 5, 8, 14; U.S. attitude, 15.

Helsingfors, 744, 745, 751.

popular attitude, 210, 247, 251-252, 312, 319-320, 374, 422, 467, 593.

provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 210, 216.

Rostov, 589, 593.

Samara, 365, 556.

Semenov: conflicts, 66, 71, 95, 110, 155, 158-159, 160-161, 162, 169, 181, 189, 191, 202, 327, 330; protests against, 97, 172.

Siberia, growth in, 190, 202, 414, 452; Amur Province, 189; Blagoveshchensk, 77-78, 103, 128, 138-139; Irkutsk, 16, 17, 20, 22, 201; Tomsk, 424; Vladivostok, 6, 10, 13-14, 16, 18, 25-26, 320, 321.

Ukraine, growth in, 557, 593, 601, 660, 705, 706, 710; Allied Ministers at Jassy, declaration to maintain order, 699-700, 701-703; military advance, 699; post-war efforts to prevent, 702, 703, 706, 838.

Brest Litovsk. *See* Treaty of.

Brusilov, Gen. A. A., 587.

Bulgaria, separate peace with Russia, report, 23-24.

Cadet Party. *See* Constitutional Democratic Party.

Capital, removal to Moscow, 75.

Caucasus (*see also* North Caucasus; South Russia; Southeastern federation; Trans-Caucasus):

Bolshevism, 581, 586, 589, 590-591, 619, 623.

disarming of returned troops, 590, 592.

financial aid, 586; efforts of Consul at Tiflis, 581, 582, 583, 584, 594; Great Britain, attitude, 595.

Caucasus—Continued.

Germany: influence, 596, 623, 624, 626, 629, 630, 631, 632, 637, 678; supplies obtainable, 584-585, 594, 597, 602, 633, 635, 636.

Great Britain, relations, 581, 595, 598, 606, 615, 620.

history, 634-637.

interference in internal affairs: Consul at Tiflis, views, 578-580; U.S. attitude, 582, 583.

intervention, Allied and American: discussion, 161, 168; popular attitude, 604-605; Supreme War Council, 596-597.

intervention, Central powers, 626, 633-634, 638.

military aid, efforts of Consul at Tiflis, 578-580, 584; U.S. attitude, 623, 624, 630, 631.

mountain tribes, 579, 580, 583, 609, 616-618, 625, 628.

recognition: Allied attitude, 584; U.S. attitude, 583.

Tatars, activities, 174, 623, 624, 625, 628, 635, 638.

Turks: forces, 623, 624, 625, 644.

World War, attitude, 579, 580, 582, 585-586.

Central powers (*see also* Armistice; Germany; Intervention; Treaty of Brest Litovsk; World War):

advance into Russia before Brest Litovsk peace, 672.

Don Territory, activities in, 633-634, 643, 691-692.

Georgia, relations, 636-637.

internment of nationals in Far East, 199-200.

Rumania: peace negotiations, 710, 713-714.

supplies obtainable in Russia, 599, 633, 635, 678; in Caucasus, 635; in Crimea, 696; in Siberia, 167-168; in Ukraine, 673, 674, 682, 696.

Trans-Caucasus, relations, 635, 636-637.

Ukraine, relations, 673, 690, 719.

Chaikovski, N. V., 409, 536, 553, 568, 570, 611.

Supreme government of the northern region, 507, 508, 512, 518, 521; abdication, 535, 539; provisional government, 547, 548, 552, 555, 557, 559, 561, 562, 564.

Chaplin, George Ermolaevich, 506, 521, 524, 543, 574.

Cheidze, N. S., 586, 641.

Cheka. *See* Extraordinary Commission against Counter-Revolution.

Chenkelli, A. I., 632, 636, 639, 641.

Chernov, V. M., 444, 517-518.

Chicherin, George V.:

conspiracy, charge against Allied and American representatives, 139.

## Chicherin—Continued.

- Czecho-Slovaks, attitude, 207-208, 260, 359.  
 harboring of Semenov, protest to China, 172.  
 warships, Allied and American, in Russian ports, attitude, 486.
- China (*see also* Chinese Eastern Railway; Diplomatic Missions; Manchuria; Siberia; Trans-Siberian Railway):  
 asylum to Russians in Consulate, 22.  
 Bolsheviks and armed prisoners, invasion of territory, report, 327, 329, 330, 334-335, 343, 353.  
 Boxer indemnity payments, 159.  
 embargo on food to Russia, 55, 64, 71.  
 enlistment of nationals in foreign forces, 169-170.  
 foreign military activities, harboring, 172, 274, 278, 280; U.S. attitude, 152-153, 188.  
 Horvat's activities, objections, 159, 161, 264, 278-279, 280; Allied Ministers in China, attitude, 278, 286.  
 Japanese forces in Manchuria, 300, 344, 345-346, 349, 353, 356-357, 388, 420; Chinese attitude, 170, 349, 353, 378; U.S. attitude, 58, 297-298, 304, 305, 314, 353.  
 military agreement with Japan, application, 177, 232, 281, 303, 304, 331, 335, 344, 353, 378.  
 safe passage for Czecho-Slovaks through Manchuria, 264, 271-272, 278, 286, 321; Chinese attitude, 308; U.S. attitude, 283-284.  
 Semenov, invasion of territory, 216, 231-232, 344, 353; Soviet protest against harboring of, 97, 172.  
 territorial sovereignty, military guard, 5, 8, 14, 78, 79, 110, 190, 209, 216, 231-232, 327, 330; U.S. attitude, 5, 15.  
 U.S. troops, permission to winter at Harbin, 391-392, 396.  
 warship at Vladivostok, 124, 126.
- Chinese Eastern Railway (*see also* Horvat; Trans-Siberian Railway):  
 board of directors, reorganization, 137-138, 147, 156, 159; Allied aid, 147, 156.  
 China's desire to regain, 279, 299; Japanese attitude, 299; U.S. attitude, 292.  
 Chinese military forces, guard, 353; Japanese attitude, 321-322; U.S. attitude, 45-46, 58, 304, 305, 314, 353.  
 foreign military activities, 274, 278.  
 Harbin-Changchun section, transfer to Japan, report, 161-162.  
 Japanese forces, 353, 356, 378, 388.
- Chinese Eastern Railway—Contd.  
 Japanese sole occupation, desire, 30, 45, 281, 462; Allied attitude, 42, 45, 75-77; U.S. attitude, 42, 45-46.  
 Japanese special interest, claim, 436.  
 Kolchak, relations, 147, 169.  
 Maritime Province, refusal to enter, 201.  
 military forces, activities in Siberia, 134, 138, 147, 159<sup>n</sup>, 169, 189, 190, 201-202, 273.  
 safe passage of Czecho-Slovak forces, 264, 271-272, 278, 283-284, 286, 308, 321.  
 Semenov, relations, 147, 156, 169.  
 U.S. technical aid, Japanese and Russian attitude, 113.
- Church, Russian Orthodox, 312.
- Code messages (*see also* Communications), Soviet prohibition to Allied and American representatives, 179, 209, 250.
- Colonization of north Russia, scheme, 561.
- Committee of Public Safety, Harbin, 2, 3.
- Committee on Public Information, U.S., 178, 338, 339, 446, 453, 460.
- Communications of Allied and American representatives with home governments (*see also* Code messages), 489.
- Confiscation (*see also* Industrial interests; Nationalization), 89, 164, 240, 601.  
 indemnity to Germans, 180.
- Constituent Assembly, 279, 589, 723.  
 authority ascribed to members, 230, 317, 508, 512, 539, 552, 583.  
 Bolsheviks, relations, 587, 593.  
 criticism, 375, 574.  
 elections, 10-11, 468-469, 581, 585.  
 popular attitude, 119, 127, 174, 247, 294, 343, 382, 407, 408, 610, 615.
- Constituent Assembly, Siberian, plans, 43, 93, 102, 119, 203.
- Constitutional Democratic Party (*see also* Milyukov), 11, 12, 610.  
 Germans, *rapprochement*, 687.  
 intervention, attitude, 198-199.
- Consuls. *See under* Allied and American Governments, representatives.
- Contributions. *See* Industrial interests.
- Cooperative Societies:  
 intervention, attitude, 193-194, 205-206, 210-211, 215-216.  
 intervention, separate Japanese, attitude, 217-218.  
 northern region, 509, 522, 530, 549, 552, 568; visit of agent to United States, 561.  
 Siberia, 101, 119, 156, 190, 203, 273, 548.

- Cossacks (*see also* Kaledin; Kalmykov; Krasnov; Pleshkov; Semenov), 117-118, 193, 435, 596.
- Allied Governments, relations, 50, 592, 597-598, 601, 638.
- Bolshevism, attitude, 77-78, 80, 247, 584, 590, 601, 619, 621-622, 626, 633, 653-654, 706.
- Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 183, 273, 282, 309, 314, 337, 380, 463.
- Don Territory, activities of Central powers, 633-634, 643, 691-692.
- food and fuel supply of Russia, control, 35.
- forces: European Russia, 587, 588, 609, 612, 635, 638; Siberia, 39, 48, 93, 110, 150-151, 155, 158.
- Great Britain, relations, 598, 615.
- Japanese General Staff, relations, 428.
- provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 203, 294.
- republic, 583, 635, 638.
- Southeastern federation, part in, 580, 588, 615-618.
- Ukraine, relations, 654, 692.
- World War, attitude, 605, 609-615, 638.
- Council. *See* Soviet.
- Counter-Revolution (*see also* Extraordinary Commission against), charges:
- Allied and American Consuls, Vladivostok, and Ministers, China, 139, 142-143, 152, 153-154.
- Russians, 203-204.
- Crimea (*see also* Taurida republic):
- France, relations, 615.
- Germany: advance, 480, 684-685; Soviet protest, 131, 679, 685; supplies obtainable, 695.
- Sulkevich government, 695, 696.
- Turkey, relations, 625.
- Ukraine, relations, 692, 695-696.
- Czecho-Slovak forces (*see also* Gaida; Girs; Janin; Masaryk):
- Allied and American aid, 158, 242, 246, 262-263, 268, 274-275, 288-289, 303, 319, 322-323, 324, 328, 341-342, 356, 418; request for, 226, 241, 342, 346-348, 364, 365, 379, 384, 387, 388, 402-403; Soviet protest, 203-204, 213.
- Archangel, 198, 488, 516; exit, plans, 150, 158.
- Cossacks, relations, 183, 273, 282, 309, 314, 337, 380, 463.
- detention by Soviet, 187, 200-201, 253.
- disarmament, Soviet order, 183, 198, 210, 226, 251, 256-259; clashes at Chelyabinsk, 183-184, 216, 258; at Irkutsk, 178-179, 184-187, 197, 216, 309-312; at Mariinsk, 191-192; at Omsk, 177-178, 213, 248-252; protests, Allied and American representatives, 188, 195, 201, 205, 207-208; Soviet reply, 211.
- Czecho-Slovak forces—Continued.
- disbanding, Soviet order, 194, 207-208, 259.
- eastern front, desire to establish, 215, 230-231, 267.
- enlistment in Red Army, 158, 257-258.
- equipment, 290, 319, 342, 374.
- European Russia, military action in, 370, 374, 383-384, 388, 402-403, 405; British attitude, 403-404; U.S. attitude, 393-394, 396, 398.
- France: financial aid, 284-285, 308; military aid, 158, 199, 239, 249, 250-251, 374, 377; Soviet protest, 203-204, 213.
- Germany, opposition in Russia, 195, 211, 251, 253, 259-260, 266, 369-370, 643.
- good offices of Allied and American representatives, 184-187, 191-192, 197, 204, 210, 211, 212-213, 250-251.
- Great Britain: support, 274-275, 341-342, 418; transport to France, plan, 199-200.
- inter-Allied military conference, plans, 212, 213-214.
- Japanese aid, separate, 262, 265, 267, 319, 337, 358, 418; British request, 341-342, 418; U.S. attitude, 344-345.
- Kolchak, relations, 441, 444, 449.
- noninterference in Russian affairs, 214, 221, 225, 241, 250-251, 253, 266, 319.
- numbers, 182, 185, 187, 201, 215, 227, 234, 240, 241, 290, 322, 358, 379-380; losses, 451, 459.
- prisoners, armed, opposition, 178-179, 185, 211, 226, 227, 230-231, 242, 251, 253, 258, 260, 262, 266-267, 283, 322, 337, 342, 346, 360, 376, 384.
- proposals for Siberian service, 132, 174, 178, 212, 214, 240; aiding intervention, 189, 192-193, 227-229, 254, 313; opposing German control, 206-207, 215.
- provisional Siberian government, relations, 210, 241, 259, 295-296, 336, 367, 369, 430.
- recognition by United States, attitude, 183<sup>n</sup>, 700.
- Russia, relations with, 214-215, 224-226, 252, 255-260, 265-267, 309-314, 359, 387.
- Russians: cooperation, 158, 249, 252, 264, 370, 375-377, 387, 442-443; friction, 420, 441, 445, 451-452, 455, 458-459.
- safe passage through Manchuria: Allied and American representatives, attitude, 264, 271-272, 278, 286; China, attitude, 308; Horvat, views, 277-278, 286, 321; U.S. attitude, 283-284.

## Czecho-Slovak forces—Continued.

- Semenov, detention of supplies, 419–420, 424.
- Siberian anabasis, 127, 130, 148, 150, 153, 174, 197, 234, 252–253, 256; aims, 174, 177, 199, 207, 267, 313, 376, 402; change of plans, 275, 376, 402.
- Siberian Soviet, relations, 182, 186–187, 196–197, 266, 337, 369, 451, 452.
- transport to France, discussion, 127, 130, 149–150, 182, 199–200, 218, 275, 352.
- Trans-Siberian Railway, control, 197, 198, 204, 223, 226, 241, 259, 262, 266, 314, 331, 545; U.S. aid sought, 315.
- Ukraine, relations, 255–256.
- United States: financial aid and supplies, 323, 385, 393, 395, 403, 410, 424, 700–701; Japanese separate aid, attitude, 344–345; military aid, 262–263, 268, 288–289, 322–323, 324, 328, 405, 410, 411, 415, 419, 424.
- Vladivostok: capture from Soviet, 234, 235, 261, 262, 271, 327, 354; stores, guarding, 219.
- westward movement, 214, 215, 263, 271–272, 275, 319, 322, 343, 367, 368, 377; purpose, 213, 226, 266, 275, 283, 368.
- Czecho-Slovak National Council (*see also* Girsá; Masaryk; Pavlu), 214, 459, 464.
- Consular Corps, Vladivostok, relations, 226, 265, 355.
- recognition, U. S. attitude, 183*n*, 700.
- Russia, relations, 224–226, 255–260, 375–376.
- Siberian policy, statement, 230–231.
- Denikin, Gen. A. I.:  
Volunteer Army, 443, 448, 645, 704, 706; Allied support, discussion, 573, 644.
- Denmark:  
Bolshevism: in Baltic countries, attitude, 840–841, 843–844; propaganda, attitude, 854.
- Derber, P., 101–102, 120, 278, 296, 323, 335.
- Diplomatic and consular service, previous régimes, relations with Soviet régime, 8; with other Russian governments, 232–233, 561.
- Diplomatic and consular service, Soviet régime, titles abolished, 692.
- Diplomatic immunity, in Finland, 781.
- Diplomatic Missions, Allied and American (*see also* Allied and American Governments):  
removal: to Vologda, 471; to Moscow, Soviet request, 496; via Siberia, plans, 57, 61, 66; to Murmansk, 505–507, 514; to Archangel, 509, 512.

## Diplomatic Missions, etc.—Continued.

- Supreme government of the northern region, relations, 534–535, 539, 542, 543, 548, 549–550, 550–551, 552–553, 563, 576; *coup d'état*, attitude, 522, 523, 524, 525, 531.
- Diplomatic Missions in China, Allied and American, interference in Russian affairs, Soviet charge, 139, 142–143, 152, 153–154.
- Duma, Siberian Provincial, 101, 115, 203, 217, 278, 294, 335, 342, 397, 398, 418.
- Dumas, city, 311, 468, 508, 568; Soviet régime, relations, 488, 517.
- Durov, Gen. B. A., 539, 541, 542, 543, 547, 548, 552, 564, 565.
- Dutch East Indies, future possession by Japan, report, 363, 369.
- Dutov, Gen. A. I., 40, 183, 184, 449, 548, 706.
- Ekaterinburg, conflicts, 369, 370, 381, 431, 452.
- Eliot, Sir Charles, 340, 449.
- Embargo, Chinese, on exports to Russia, 55, 64, 71, 207.
- Emerson, Col. George H., 17, 71, 96, 165, 168, 437.
- Emery, Henry C., 83, 786, 788.
- Enlistment of Russians in—  
American-Slavic legion, plan, 550, 551, 553; U. S. attitude, 551.
- British-Slavic and French-Slavic legions, 529, 537–538, 540, 551.
- Esthonia (*see also* Baltic provinces):  
appeal to Germany by Baltic Germans, 821–822, 823, 824, 826, 827; German response, 826; protests, 828, 829.
- Bolshevism, 827, 837, 852; appeal for aid against, 840, 855, 857, 860; British response, 854–855, 859; Scandinavian countries, attitude, 838, 840–841, 843–844, 849.
- Brest Litovsk treaty, protest, 832.
- history, 823, 824.
- independence, 851, 852–853, 855; appeals for support of, 815–817, 823, 827–828, 832–833, 852–853.
- Kull, Ferdinand, visa, 831, 837.
- Minister in Great Britain, 853.
- occupation, German, 828; attitude, 827, 831, 832, 836–837, 842.
- peace conference, plans, 815, 817, 828, 829, 853, 860.
- port, free, plan, 825, 855.
- protectorate, German plan, 815, 816–817.
- provisional government, 827, 851.
- recognition: *de facto*, by Great Britain, 816, 820, 829, 841–842; German attitude, 815, 816, 826; U. S. attitude, 851–852.
- self-determination of peoples, 852.
- soviets, attitude of Soviet Russia, 851.

- Extraordinary Commission against Counter-Revolution, 571, 851.  
 Far Eastern Committee, 127-128, 273.  
 Federal government of Russia:  
   foreign views: Czecho-Slovak National Council, 375-376; Germany, 678, 687; Great Britain, 608, 841; U.S. representatives, 420, 579.  
   nationalities and groups, attitude: Bessarabia, 707; Caucasus, 579, 582; Esthonia, 815, 825, 828, 851, 853, 855; Finland, 723; Georgia, 641; Latvia, 816; northern region, 468; Siberian governments, 285, 295, 343; Southeastern federation, 580, 616-618; Ufa conference, 407; Ukraine, 651, 658, 661, 673, 689, 700, 702; Volunteer Army, 647.  
 Finland (*see also* Åland Islands; Mannerheim):  
   Ambassador, U.S., in Russia, appeal to Finns, 803-804, 804-805, 809-810.  
   Bolshevism, 729, 744, 745, 751, 752, 854; post-war efforts to prevent, 813.  
   Brest Litovsk treaty, German attitude, 778.  
   diplomatic immunity, 781.  
   elections, 730-731.  
   food: Nuorteva's representations, 763-764, 767-768; shortage, 729, 733, 734, 738, 748, 755, 779, 786-787, 799, 805, 813-814, 854; U.S. shipment, plans, 173, 736, 746, 747, 749, 750, 814; U.S. shipment withheld, 777, 791, 802, 806, 808.  
   Germany: aid, Finnish statements, 778, 782-783; forces, 132, 236, 470, 686-687, 766, 790, 808, 811, 812, 814; German-Finnish treaties, 769-772, 777, 808; military training, 693; political relations, 730, 765-767, 789, 796, 797, 799; Russian-Finnish treaties, attitude, 789, 790, 798-799, 807; supplies, 805.  
   governments: Diet, 727, 729, 732, 734, 765, 793; Directory, plan, 732; Mannerheim regency, 812-813; monarchy, plans, 787, 793-794, 797-798, 804, 805, 810, 811-812; Socialist *coups*, 731, 732, 738, 746, 747, 761; Socialist republic, 763, 764-767; Svinhufvud regency, 783, 786, 788, 789-790; U.S. attitude, 768, 810.  
   history, 756-762.  
   independence, proclamation, 733, 734, 761, 764-765; struggle for, 723-726, 726-728, 759, 760, 765.  
   intervention by Sweden, discussion, 746, 749, 751.  
 Finland—Continued.  
   Karelia, activities, 781, 787, 791, 792, 794; statement, 792-793.  
   Kerensky, views, 725.  
   Murman: activities, 787, 790, 805; Allied attitude, 792-793, 795; Allied proclamation, 799; British declaration, 802-803; British troops, Finnish protest, 794-795; French attitude, 792; German attitude, 794, 805, 807; railway, 236, 469, 471, 474, 781, 785, 787, 790, 791, 793, 807.  
   protection of foreigners, 781.  
   recognition: attitude of Denmark, 741; Finnish commissioners, 755-756, 785; Finnish Red delegate, 764-767; France, 741, 742, 791; Germany, 769; Great Britain, 737, 739, 743, 745, 762, 781-782, 784-785, 786; Norway, 740-741, 741-742, 753; Soviet Russia, 735, 740, 762, 764; Sweden, 735, 738, 739, 740; United States, 736, 740, 742, 743, 749, 756, 782, 788, 791, 796, 806, 814; U.S. Consul at Helsinki, views, 743-744, 748, 786.  
   Red Guards, assisted by Soviet Russia, 744, 746-747, 749, 750, 751, 761, 779, 780; Finnish protest, 752; Soviet denial, 784.  
   revolution, 746, 764, 766.  
   Russian garrisons, 731, 732, 738, 751, 752.  
   Soviet Russia: forces, Norway and Sweden request withdrawal, 753; military aid, denial, 784; political relations, 732, 766, 812; treaty, 773-776; treaty negotiations, German pressure, 789, 790, 798, 799, 807.  
   strikes, 725, 731.  
   terror, 799.  
   White Guards, assisted by Germany, 132, 471, 746, 748, 750, 753-754, 755, 778, 779, 780, 783, 790; Finnish statements, 778, 782-783.  
 Food supply:  
   Allied and American shipments, plan, 222-223, 417, 494, 536, 537, 538, 540.  
   British shipments, 472, 475, 497, 519.  
   hoarding and requisition, 103, 164, 221.  
   shortage, 704; Archangel, 468, 499-500, 530, 535; Finland, 729, 733, 734, 738, 748, 755, 779, 786-787, 799, 805, 813-814, 854; northern Russia, 468, 472; southern Russia, 653.  
   Siberian grain, importance, 181, 203, 214, 243.  
   U.S. shipments, plan, 222-223, 238, 519.

- France (*see also* Allied and American Governments; Archangel; Diplomatic Missions; Intervention; Murman; Recognition; Siberia; Trans-Siberian Railway; World War):  
 Ambassador in Russia, recall demanded by Soviet, 146.  
 anti-Bolshevik elements, relations, 517-518.  
 Bessarabia, relations, 615.  
 commissioner in Siberia, 50, 405, 426, 441.  
 commissioner in Ukraine, 34, 655, 656, 657, 659, 672.  
 Consul at Vladivostok, recall demanded, 139, 142-143.  
 Crimea, relations, 615.  
 Czecho-Slovaks: financial aid, 284-285, 308; good offices of French representatives, 184-187, 204, 212-213, 250-251; safe passage over Chinese Eastern Railway, attitude, 271-272, 278, 286; support in Russia, 158, 239, 249, 250-251, 374, 377; transport to France, plan, 199-200.  
 Esthonia, relations, 854.  
 Finland, relations, 792.  
 forces, disaffection among, 704.  
 Horvat's activities, joint protest of Allied Ministers in China, 278, 286; of Consuls at Vladivostok, 277, 307-308.  
 interference in Russian affairs, Soviet charges: aid to Czecho-Slovaks, 203-204, 213; aid to Ukrainian army, 652-653; Consul at Vladivostok and Minister in China, 139, 142-143, 152, 153-154.  
 internment in Far East of Germans and Austrians, attitude, 199-200.  
 military mission in south Russia, 584, 601, 634, 659.  
 mission to United States, 180.  
 murder of nationals at Irkutsk, 32.  
 noninterference in Russian affairs, 365.  
 Rumania, relations, 597-598, 600, 609, 615.  
 Semenov, aid, 73, 169, 180.  
 Southeastern federation, relations, 606.  
 Ukraine: recognition, 650, 655, 656, 657, 662, 743; relations, 34, 597-598, 615.  
 warship at Murman, 471, 495, 555; Soviet protest, 236, 486-487, 489, 502-504.  
 Frederick Carl of Hesse, 810, 811, 813.  
 Gaida, Col. (later Gen.) G. R., 249, 314, 377, 388, 444, 445, 449.  
 Gegechkori, Eugene, 586, 618, 632.
- Georgia (*see also* South Russia; Trans-Caucasus):  
 Armenia, joint military action, 578, 579, 592, 624, 625, 626, 632, 637, 642.  
 Germany, influence, 631, 632, 641.  
 Great Britain, relations, 591.  
 history, 634-637.  
 independence, 631, 632, 636, 639-640, 641.  
 Turkey, peace negotiations, 636-637, 641.  
 U.S. citizens, proposed subsidy, 621, 622.  
 Germany (*see also* Armistice; Baltic provinces; Central powers; Esthonia; Finland; Intervention; Latvia; Lithuania; Prisoners; Propaganda; Recognition; Submarine warfare; Treaty of Brest Litovsk; Ukraine; World War):  
 advance into Russia before Brest Litovsk peace, 603, 672.  
 aid to Soviet Russia against Allies, 236, 398, 422, 489.  
 Åland Islands, 769-770, 807-808; landing, 778, 786n.  
 Ambassador in Soviet Russia: Mirbach, 179; Helfferich, 318.  
 anti-Bolshevik elements, relations, 176, 181, 198, 404-405, 470.  
 Armenia, relations, 633, 638.  
 Asia, route to, discussion, 585, 596, 626, 636, 637, 678.  
 Black Sea Fleet, 132, 685-686, 696.  
 Bolsheviks, relations, 104, 115, 117, 129, 176, 236-237, 251, 253, 259, 260, 369-370, 380, 398, 422, 513, 539, 540, 626, 642-643; military aid, 398, 422; opposition in border provinces, 838, 843; Sisson documents, 176.  
 Czecho-Slovaks, attitude, 195, 251, 253, 259-260, 266, 369-370.  
 Georgia, relations, 631, 632, 641.  
 Japanese alliance, reports, 58, 74, 75, 115, 126, 181.  
 Murman: evacuation of Allied forces desired, 471, 472, 473-474, 784; railway, threat to, 236, 469, 470, 471, 474, 781, 790, 791, 794, 807.  
 naval operations in Pacific, reports, 23, 71, 318, 327.  
 North Caucasus, relations, 629, 630.  
 Russian alliance, reports, 74, 115.  
 supplies obtainable in Russia, 179-180, 240, 596, 597, 830; in Caucasus, 584-585, 594, 597, 602, 633, 635, 636; in Crimea, 695; in Finland, 805; in Siberia, 47, 56, 59, 61, 76, 102, 103, 122, 135, 166, 167-168; in Ukraine, 221, 673, 674, 677, 681, 694, 697; requisitions, 626-627, 678, 830, 848.

Germany—Continued.

trade with Russia, 103.

Trans-Caucasus, relations, 629, 632–633, 635, 640.

Girsá, Václav, 342, 347, 377, 402–403.

Good offices of Allied and American representatives, between Czech and Soviet forces, 184–187, 191–192, 197, 204, 210, 212–213, 250–251.

Grain. *See* Food supply.

Graves, Maj. Gen. William S., 388, 390, 392, 420, 448, 462.

Great Britain (*see also* Allied and American Governments; Archangel; Diplomatic Missions; Esthonia; Intervention; Murman; Recognition; Siberia; Trans-Siberian Railway; World War):

Armenia, relations, 591, 598.

arrest of nationals, 500–502.

Caucasus, relations, 581, 595, 598, 606, 615, 619–620.

commissioner in Siberia, 339–340, 351–352.

commissioner in Ukraine, 672, 673.

convention to coordinate Allied non-military action in Siberia, plan, 399–401.

Cossacks, relations, 598, 615.

Czecho-Slovaks: safe passage over Chinese Eastern Railway, attitude, 271–272, 278, 286; support in Russia, 274–275, 341–342, 418; transport to France, plan, 199–200; U.S. attitude, 344–345.

espionage, Soviet charge, 500–502.

Finland, relations, 792–793, 794–795, 802–803.

harbor patrol, Vladivostok, views, 284.

Horvat: activities, joint protest of Allied Ministers in China, 278, 286; of Consuls at Vladivostok, 277, 307–308; relations, 331.

interference in Russian affairs, Soviet charge, Consul at Vladivostok and Minister in China, 139, 142–143, 152, 153–154.

internment in Far East of Germans and Austrians, attitude, 199–200.

military training in Siberia, 386, 390; U.S. attitude, 399.

noninterference in Russian affairs, 306, 334, 575.

Persia, relations, 598, 630.

requisitions in northern region, 499, 555.

Rumania, relations, 600, 628.

Russian people, proclamation, 305–306, 334.

Semenov, aid, 38, 40–41, 46, 48, 73, 151, 163, 169.

south Russia: financial aid, 591–592, 594, 595, 620; military aid, 584, 592, 644.

Great Britain—Continued.

territorial sovereignty of Russia, violation charged, 497, 498–499, 505, 510.

warship: at Murman, 471; at Vladivostok, 20, 25, 30, 109, 350; Soviet protest against stay in northern ports, 236, 486–487, 489, 502–504.

Halsey, Rev. Jesse, 474, 475, 476.

Harbin (*see also* Chinese Eastern Railway; Horvat):

Consular Corps, memorial on intervention, 208–209.

political conditions, 2–4, 5, 8, 14, 52, 119, 448.

Harbin Soviet, 2–4, 5, 8, 14.

Hicks, Capt. W. L., 84, 96–97, 122–123, 131.

Horvat, Gen. Dmitri L., 99, 113, 142.

Allied aid sought, 53, 168.

army, 93, 120, 138, 147; in Siberia, 321, 332, 354–355, 377.

Chinese Eastern Railway: board of directors reorganized, 137–138, 147, 156, 159; abandonment, 278–279, 280.

Czecho-Slovaks, safe passage through Manchuria, attitude, 277, 278, 286, 321.

governments: *March 1918*, 93, 99; plans, 99, 150, 154–155, 155–156; *July 1918*, 273, 277, 279, 285–286, 332.

Great Britain, relations, 331.

Harbin Soviet, relations, 2–4, 5, 8.

Japan, relations: aid, 53, 79, 93, 97–98, 113, 177, 273, 279, 280, 297, 300, 331, 438; Chinese Eastern Railway as security for loan, report, 161; compensation desired, 98, 138, 141.

Kolchak, relations, 93, 138, 150, 437, 450.

monarchy, restoration, attitude, 273, 279.

proclamations, governmental, 159, 161, 277; Allied and American Ministers in China, attitude, 278, 286; Chinese attitude, 159, 161.

provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 93, 113, 119–120, 273, 280, 294; in Vladivostok, 315, 332, 391, 414.

railway aid, U.S., attitude, 99, 168, 170.

Semenov, relations, 79, 147, 156, 159, 169, 177, 181–182, 189, 273.

Siberian activities: Allied and American Ministers in China, attitude, 277–278, 286; Allied Consuls, Vladivostok, attitude, 277, 307–308, 332; Vladivostok, establishment in, 282, 315, 321, 332, 354–355.

United States: aid sought, 98–99; attitude, 307–308, 317, 335.



## Horvat—Continued.

workers and peasants, relations, 156, 169, 280, 282, 327, 332.

## Hostages, 517.

House, Col. Edward M., views on intervention, 223-224, 233.

Ignatius, Kaarlo B., 739, 747, 755, 756.

Industrial interests (*see also* Confiscation; Nationalization):

foreign, forced contributions, 70-71.

Russian, 610; Supreme government of the northern region, attitude, 526, 549, 552-553, 553-554; Ufa conference, attitude, 385, 408.

Inter-Allied military conference at Paris, 179, 180, 182, 212, 213-214, 485.

Intervention, Allied and American (*see also* Archangel; Baltic provinces; Bessarabia; Caucasus; Chinese Eastern Railway; Crimea; Finland; Manchuria; Murman; Siberia; South Russia; Trans-Siberian Railway; Ukraine; Vladivostok; Volga-Ural region):

commissions proposed: economic commission, U.S. plan, 290, 292, 329, 362, 373, 389, 417, 425, 437; inter-Allied civilian board, French plan, 340-341, 365; Minister in China, plan, 138, 159-160, 162; Russian plan, 232-233; U.S. attitude, 157, 362.

discussion by: Allied and American representatives in Russia, 111, 179; at Harbin, 208-209, 220; at Jassy, 33-35, 677, 678, 700, 702, 709; Bergson, Henri, 180; British Foreign Secretary, 305-306, 334; French Ambassador in Russia, 132; French military representatives, 162, 166-168, 172-174; inter-Allied military conference, Paris, 212, 213-214; Italian Foreign Minister, 170; Japanese Ambassador at Washington, 144-145, 267-268; Japanese Foreign Minister, 42-43; Supreme War Council, 241-246, 596-597; U.S. Ambassador in Russia, 111, 124, 179-180, 189, 214, 220-223, 473; U.S. consular and military representatives in Russia, 53-54, 91, 104-105, 114, 237-238, 240-241, 477-484, 500, 634; U.S. Minister in China, 117; U.S. representatives in Siberia, 189.

objects: British statement, 334, 575; Czechoslovaks, support, 242, 246, 262-263, 268, 288-289, 322, 324, 328, 356, 368, 389, 457, 465, 575; German domination, prevention, 21, 34, 36, 51-52, 54, 55, 59, 149, 170, 176, 181, 226, 245, 334, 575, 579, 584-585, 594, 596-597, 599-600, 602; munitions, guarding, 17, 20, 47, 288, 289, 328, 451, 488, 574;

## Intervention—Continued.

objects—Continued.

Russians, aid in self-defense, 882, 328, 457, 799; social order in accord with Allies, 54, 91, 97-98, 112, 138, 162, 168, 171, 175, 181, 243-246, 555, 613, 701, 703, 838, 839-840.

Russian attitude: Cooperatives, 193-194, 205-206, 210-211, 215-216, 217-218; Konovloff, A., 227-229; Mannerheim, General, 797; Miller, General, 175; parties and organizations, 198-199, 272, 276-277, 281-282; popular opinion, 16, 36, 53, 55, 65, 117, 165, 167, 176, 191, 214, 221, 222, 242, 604-605, 688, 844; provisional government of autonomous Siberia, 217-218, 293; request for aid awaited, 193-194, 194-195, 211; Russian diplomatic representatives, 37, 59-60, 62-63, 170-172, 175, 192-193, 194-195, 396-397, 843; Siberians, 120-121, 216, 238; Sookine, John, 232-233; Soviet request for aid awaited, 111, 136, 160, 161, 173, 175-176, 179, 226; Soviet views, 114, 140, 180, 359; Supreme government of the northern region, 514-515; Ukraine, 658-659, 660, 703-704; Volunteer Army, 645.

Intervention, Central powers, advance into Russia after Brest Litovsk peace. *See* Caucasus; South Russia; Ukraine.

Intervention, Czecho-Slovak, charge, 211.

Intervention, German, advance into Russia after Brest Litovsk peace. *See* Baltic provinces; Caucasus; Crimea; Finland; Murman; South Russia; Ukraine.

Irkutsk (*see also* Siberian Soviet):

anarchists, 64, 311.

Czecho-Slovaks: clashes with Soviet forces, 178-179, 184-187, 197, 216; seizure of city, 309-312.

massacre, 16, 17, 18, 20-21, 22, 29, 32, 61.

prisoners, armed: alliance with Soviet forces, 95, 217, 240; numbers, 110, 181-182, 268; seizure of city, 212, 217, 219.

Ironside, Lt. Col. William E., 553, 557, 560, 561, 562, 564, 569.

Italy (*see also* Allied and American Governments; Diplomatic Missions; Intervention; Siberia; World War):

Bolshevism in Baltic provinces, post-war efforts to prevent, 849.

commissioner in Siberia, attitude, 382-383, 397.

Czecho-Slovaks, transport to France, plan, 199-200.

## Italy—Continued.

- forces in Far East, 134, 275-276, 388.  
 internment in Far East of Germans  
 and Austrians, attitude, 199-200.  
 military mission in south Russia, 584.  
 Janin, Gen. Maurice, 399, 456, 461.  
 Japan (*see also* Allied and American  
 Governments; Diplomatic Mis-  
 sions; Intervention; Siberia; Vladi-  
 vostok):  
 Chinese Eastern Railway: forces,  
 353, 356, 378, 388; security for  
 loan, report, 161; sole occupation,  
 desire, 30, 45, 281, 462; special  
 interest, claim, 436; views of  
 Allies, 42, 45, 76; of the United  
 States, 42, 45-46.  
 currency, use in Siberia, 372.  
 Czecho-Slovaks: aid to, 262, 265,  
 267, 358, 418; British and U.S.  
 attitude toward aid, 341-342, 344-  
 345, 418; safe passage over Chinese  
 Eastern Railway, attitude, 271-272;  
 transport to France, plan, 199-200.  
 Dutch East Indies, report of future  
 possession, 363, 369.  
 espionage, charge against subjects in  
 Siberia, 145-146.  
 estrangement sought by Soviet:  
 from Allies, 10; from United States,  
 105, 166.  
 German alliance, reports, 58, 74, 75,  
 115, 126, 181.  
 harbor patrol, Vladivostok, 284.  
 Horvat: aid to, 53, 79, 93, 97-98,  
 113, 177, 273, 279, 280, 297, 300, 438;  
 compensation sought, 98, 138, 141;  
 joint protest of Ministers in China,  
 278, 286; U.S. views, 297-298.  
 interference in Russian affairs, Kol-  
 chak's protest, 448-449, 456, 460,  
 461-462; U.S. protest, 297-298,  
 462-463.  
 Manchuria, forces in, 170, 300, 344,  
 345-346, 349, 353, 356-357, 388,  
 420; Chinese attitude, 170, 349,  
 353, 378; "special interest," 307,  
 322, 436; U.S. attitude, 297-298.  
 military agreement with China, ap-  
 plication, 177, 232, 281, 303, 304,  
 331, 335, 353, 378.  
 monopoly, military and commercial,  
 462.  
 noninterference in Chinese affairs,  
 statement, 345-346; in Russian  
 affairs, statements, 267, 300, 325.  
 Russian attitude toward, 31, 117,  
 206, 352.  
 secret treaty, statement, 10.  
 Semenov, aid to, 65, 117, 138, 151,  
 180, 189, 191, 428, 444, 448, 449,  
 454, 455, 456, 457-458, 460, 462;  
 compensation sought, 189; U.S.  
 attitude, 462-463.  
 Siberia: representative in, 441, 448;  
 support of Cossacks, 50, 428.

## Japan—Continued.

- Trans-Siberian Railway: joint con-  
 trol with China, plan, 55, 57-58;  
 U.S. attitude toward joint control,  
 57-58; joint guard with Czecho-  
 Slovaks, 388.  
 Trans-Siberian Railway, sole occu-  
 pation, proposal, 30, 49, 51, 208;  
 British plan, 35-36, 38, 41, 45, 48,  
 49-50; French attitude, 50-52,  
 75-76; Russian attitude, 74; U.S.  
 attitude, 42, 45-46.  
 warship at Nikolaevsk, 318; at  
 Vladivostok, 19-20, 30, 85; U.S.  
 attitude, 31.  
 Joffe, A. A., 629.  
 Jugo-Slavs, 403, 419; recognition, U.S.  
 attitude, 183n.  
 Kaledin, Gen. Alexis M., 40, 587, 588,  
 601-602, 609, 611, 650; death, 619.  
 Kalmykov, 159, 273, 377, 438; Japanese  
 aid, 438, 462.  
 Karelia. *See under* Finland.  
 Kazan, conflicts, 370, 374, 375, 377,  
 379, 381, 383, 556.  
 Kerensky, Alexander F., 370, 430, 580,  
 688, 796, 801.  
 Minister of War, 725.  
 Kharlamov, 588, 592, 602, 606, 607.  
 Kiev: conflicts to gain, 672-676, 704;  
 consulate, 649-650, 656.  
 Knight, Admiral Austin W., 27, 29, 30,  
 36, 46-47, 57, 151, 175, 230-231,  
 271, 350, 389.  
 Knox, Maj. Gen. Sir Alfred W. F., 386,  
 390, 415-416.  
 Kolchak, Admiral Alexander V., 60,  
 65, 189.  
 Allied aid sought, 168.  
 all-Russian government, relations,  
 429, 447, 455-456.  
 army, 192, 441.  
 Chinese Eastern forces, relations,  
 138, 147, 156, 190, 216.  
 Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 441, 444,  
 449.  
 European forces, relations, 443, 449,  
 647.  
 Great Britain, relations, 169, 190-  
 191.  
 Horvat, relations, 93, 437.  
 Japan, relations, 168, 448, 449, 450,  
 456, 460, 462-463.  
 policies, 443-444, 445, 447-448, 453-  
 454.  
 Semenov: protest, 461-462; rela-  
 tions, 147, 169, 189, 442, 443, 444,  
 448, 450, 454, 455, 464.  
 Siberians, relations, 441, 443, 447.  
 Socialist-Revolutionist Party, rela-  
 tions, 443, 455, 456.  
 Supreme Governor, 435, 437, 438-  
 439, 441, 448, 453-454; Russian  
 attitude, 448, 573-574.  
 U.S. support, discussion, 442, 446,  
 448, 455-456.

- Kolontai, Mme A. M., 124.  
 Kornilov, Gen. Lavr G.: Volunteer Army, 602, 611, 612, 650; death, 131, 626.  
 Krasnov, Gen. P. N., 184, 635, 638, 643, 706.  
 Kuchik Khan, 628, 632.  
 Kull, Ferdinand, 831, 837.  
 Labor (*see also* Railway employees): compulsory: Germany, attitude, 830, 847, 848.  
   right to organize, 408, 468, 509, 549.  
   strikes, 533, 654, 725, 731.  
   Ufa conference, program, 408.  
   unemployment, 164, 695.  
 Land:  
   nationalization, 240, 375.  
   peasants, attitude, 659.  
   Ufa conference, program, 385-386, 408.  
   Ukraine, conditions, 656, 659, 660, 680-681.  
 Latvia (*see also* Baltic provinces; Letgalia; Lettish National Council; Livonia):  
   appeals to Germany for protection, 826; protest, 834-835.  
   Bolshevism, post-war efforts to prevent, 839-840, 860-861.  
   exile of nationals, 830, 834.  
   independence, 816, 835, 851; Great Britain, attitude, 816.  
   Lettish legion, British plan, 836; U.S. attitude, 837.  
   Lithuania, relations, 846.  
   mercenaries in Soviet Russia, 473, 704, 851.  
   occupation, German: local government under, 834, 835, 860; protest, 833-835.  
   protectorate, German plan, 816.  
   self-determination, 834, 835.  
   soviets, Soviet Russia, attitude, 851.  
 League for the Defense of our Native Land and Liberty (*see also* Volunteer Army), 609, 622.  
 League for the Regeneration of Russia, 175, 188, 272, 281-282.  
 Lenin, N. (Vladimir Ulyanov), 654.  
   doctrines, 179.  
   influenced by Germany, 74.  
 Letgalia (*see also* Baltic provinces; Latvia), appeal for protection against Bolshevism, 844-845, 846; U.S. attitude, 850.  
 Lettish National Council, protest against German annexation, 833-835.  
 Liberia, loan, 453, 460.  
 Lindley, Francis O., 523, 525, 526, 531, 532, 535, 542, 543, 550, 564, 569.  
 Lithuania (*see also* Baltic provinces):  
   Bolshevism, post-war efforts to prevent, 839-840, 846-847, 861.  
   boundaries claimed, 818, 846, 848-849.  
   independence, 818-819, 839.  
 Lithuania—Continued.  
   Latvia, relations, 846.  
   occupation, German, 830, 846, 847.  
   Poland, relations, 846.  
   recognition, appeal for, 817, 845-849; Germany, attitude, 821, 826; U.S. attitude, 821, 849, 856-857.  
   Russia, relations, 847-848.  
   self-determination of peoples, 818, 819.  
 Lithuanian National Council, 817, 818, 819, 839, 846; appeal to Germany, 820-821.  
 Livonia (*see also* Baltic provinces; Latvia):  
   appeal to Germany, 821-822, 826; protest, 829.  
   recognition: Germany, attitude, 826.  
 Loans:  
   all-Russian provisional government, attitude, 447.  
   Liberia, not Siberia, 453, 460.  
 Local governments, U.S. attitude, 361, 414, 416, 417, 426, 542-543.  
 Lvov, Prince George E., 74, 379, 404, 640.  
 Manchuria (*see also* Chinese Eastern Railway):  
   Japanese forces in, 170, 300, 344, 345-346, 349, 353, 356-357, 388, 420; Chinese attitude, 170, 349, 353, 378; U.S. attitude, 297-298.  
   Russian forces in, attitude of Allied representatives, 264.  
   safe passage for Czecho-Slovaks, Chinese permission, 308; Allied representatives, attitude, 264, 271-272, 278, 286; Horvat, attitude, 277-278, 286, 321; U.S. attitude, 283-284.  
   special interest, Japanese claim, 307, 322, 436.  
 Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil, 859.  
 commanding Finnish White Guard, 749, 750, 751, 753.  
 Germany, views, 782-783, 794, 796, 797.  
 regency, Finland, 812-813.  
 resignation, 789-790.  
 Martial law in Vladivostok, proposals, 349-350, 350-351, 355; U.S. attitude, 361.  
 Martin, Lieut. (later Capt.), Hugh S., 470, 471, 474, 475, 489.  
 Masaryk, Thomas G., 92, 122, 126, 241, 395, 402, 410.  
   Czecho-Slovaks, relations with Soviet Russia, views, 224-226.  
 Maximalists. *See* Bolsheviks.  
 Michael Alexandrovich, Grand Duke, 215, 235, 247, 450, 543.  
 Miller, Gen. Eugene K., 195, 565, 568, 576.  
 Milyukov, Paul N., 602, 603.  
 Mirbach, Wilhelm, Count von, 472, 629, 635, 685, 788.  
   assassination, 496.

- Moldavian republic. *See* Bessarabia.
- Monarchy, restoration discussed, 210.  
235, 247, 279, 423, 430, 431, 435,  
437, 455, 459, 537, 574, 643.
- Moscow, removal of capital to, 75.
- Moscow Central Supply Committee, 207.
- Municipal governments (*see also*  
Zemstvos), 271, 294, 311, 320, 336,  
343, 406, 408, 414, 509, 513, 539.
- Munitions, stores:  
Archangel, shipment to interior, 96,  
451, 468, 470, 472, 475, 477, 488,  
504, 515, 550.
- Caucasus, 618, 633.
- German seizure rumored, 17, 550.
- Vladivostok, 17, 20, 47, 76, 219, 234,  
235, 451; interior points, 23, 76.
- Murman (*see also* Intervention; Soviets,  
local):  
agreement of July 6, 1918, between  
local Soviet and Allied and American  
representatives, 491-492, 493-  
495, 519-520; U. S. approval, 556-  
557, 558.
- Allied aid sought by central Soviet, 473.
- Allied and American forces, 513, 551,  
564; Central Soviet, attitude, 474,  
784; cooperation with local Soviet,  
136, 236, 471, 474, 476, 489, 490,  
492-493; instructions, 488; war-  
ships to leave Russian ports,  
Soviet request, 236, 486-487, 489,  
495, 502-504.
- British and French forces, landing,  
470, 471, 474, 475, 488, 575;  
evacuation desired by Germany,  
471, 472, 473-474, 784; Soviet  
attitude, 784.
- financial aid, 494-495, 520.
- Finnish protest against British troops,  
794-795.
- food supply, 417, 494, 520.
- intervention, Allied and American  
representatives in Russia, views,  
172-174, 179, 799; inter-Allied  
military conference, plans, 212,  
213-214, 485; reasons, 469, 471,  
475, 476; Russian views, 176;  
Supreme War Council, plans, 243,  
246; U. S. attitude, 160, 288-289,  
328, 484-485.
- railway, 473, 520; Germans and  
Finns threaten, 236, 469, 470, 471,  
474, 781, 785, 787, 790, 791, 793,  
794, 805, 807.
- Soviet, local: Central Soviet, rela-  
tions, 474, 476, 489-490, 492-493,  
506, 520, 559, 784; Supreme gov-  
ernment of northern region, rela-  
tions, 520, 559.
- submarines, German, 488, 496.
- U. S. forces, 214, 504, 513-514;  
British request, 469, 471, 476;  
increase of, French suggestion,  
544-546; increase of, U. S. attitude,  
538, 546.
- Nationalization (*see also* Confiscation):  
banks, 312, 469.  
industries, 164, 240.
- Navy:  
Black Sea Fleet, 589, 595, 624, 649,  
679, 696; German seizure, 132;  
Soviet attitude, 685.
- Southeastern federation, relations,  
589.
- Trans-Caucasus, relations, 624.
- Nicholas II:  
abdication, 649.  
imprisonment, 215.
- Niessel, Gen. Henri Albert, on condi-  
tions under Soviet, 166-168.
- Nikolsk, conflicts, 264, 273, 282.
- North Caucasus (*see also* Caucasus;  
Southeastern federation; Trans-  
Caucasus):  
Bolshevism, 633.  
Germany, relations, 629-630, 691-  
692.  
history, 634-635.  
independence, 629; Soviet Russia,  
attitude, 629-630.
- Turkey, relations, 633.
- Northern region. *See* Supreme govern-  
ment of the northern region.
- Norway:  
Bolshevism: in Baltic provinces,  
attitude, 840-841, 843-844, 849;  
propaganda, attitude, 854.
- Finland: recognition, 740-741, 741-  
742; withdrawal of Bolshevik  
troops, attitude, 753.
- Noulens, T., 523, 531, 577.  
recall demanded, 146.
- Nuorteva, Santeri, 763, 764, 767, 768.
- Odessa:  
Allied forces, 703.  
Central powers, relations, 676, 679.  
internal conditions, 593, 648, 653,  
654, 671, 710, 713.
- Rumanians, arrest, 714.
- Ukraine, relations, 648-649, 653.
- Official Bulletin*, 151, 178.
- Oil, Baku district, 65, 597, 626; Grozny,  
628.
- Omsk Soviet, 452, 463; Czecho-Slovaks,  
relations, 248-252.
- Orlov, Colonel, 134, 159n, 169, 189,  
202, 273.
- Otani, Gen. Kikuzo, 356, 396.
- Passports (*see also* Visas), 11, 190, 738.
- Pavlu, Bohdan, 381-382, 451, 459.
- Peace:  
Ukrainian attitude, 649, 651, 652,  
653, 660.
- Peace conference. *See* World War.
- Peasants:  
Bolshevism, attitude, 103, 164, 221,  
659.
- Horvat, attitude, 282.
- organizations, 611, 654.
- provisional Siberian government, at-  
titude, 230, 294, 343.

Perm, capture of, 458, 464, 467.

Persia:

Allied forces, relations, 619, 624-625.  
boundary discussion, 625.

Great Britain, relations, 598, 620,  
628, 630.

Kuchik Khan, 628, 632.

Turkey, relations, 636.

Petyura, Simon, 659, 704, 705, 706.

Piip, Antoine, 826, 829.

Plekhanov, George V., 611.

Pleshkov, 134, 280.

Poland:

appeal to Poles by U. S. Ambassa-  
dor, 419, 432, 450-451.

Germany: attitude toward, 178, 626,  
627; evacuation of forces, 644-  
645, 646; occupation, 830.

Lithuania, relations, 846.

Siberia, forces in, 452.

Ukraine, activities, 657.

Poole, Maj. Gen. Frederick C., 360,  
489, 495, 519, 521-522, 532, 533-  
534, 540, 542, 550, 557, 569, 643.

Postal employees, 164, 165.

Potanin, G. N., 37, 120.

Press, suppression, 601.

Prisoners, exchange of, 677, 738.

Prisoners of war in Siberia, 17, 45,  
47-48, 63, 76, 78, 79, 90, 103, 164,  
167, 174, 181, 271, 295, 370, 430,  
601, 605.

Alexeev, views, 587.

arming: German protests, 124-125,  
129-130; reports, 52, 57, 63-64, 66,  
83-84, 91, 92-93, 94, 95, 96, 108,  
116, 159, 343, 535; reports con-  
tradicted, 117, 122, 125; Soviet  
arms, 211, 230; Soviet reply to  
German protest, 130; Trotsky,  
order to disarm, 131.

Bolsheviks, relations, 91, 93, 94, 95,  
110, 124, 137, 162, 179, 181-182,  
185, 190, 192, 195, 197-198, 205,  
210, 216, 217, 227, 302, 309, 310,  
319-320, 342, 356, 374, 380.

Consular Corps, Irkutsk, protest  
against activities, 370.

Czecho-Slovaks, opposition, 178-179,  
185, 211, 226, 227, 230-231, 242,  
251, 253, 258, 260, 262, 266-267,  
283, 322, 337, 342, 346, 360, 376,  
384.

German and Austrian leadership,  
169, 181, 211, 230, 260, 261, 283,  
292, 322, 330, 337, 344, 345, 358,  
360, 379, 380, 535.

Irkutsk, activities, 95, 110, 137, 181-  
182, 212, 217, 240.

Manchurian border, invasion, report,  
327, 334-335, 345.

Maritime Province, activities, 190,  
235, 264.

numbers, 69-70, 80, 275, 291-292,  
332, 347-348.

Omsk, activities, 125, 137, 181.

Prisoners of war in Siberia—Contd.

Semenov, opposition, 66, 71, 95,  
110, 155, 158-159, 162, 169, 181,  
191, 202.

Siberian Soviet, relations, 95, 217,  
240, 266, 268-269, 291-292, 310-  
311.

U.S. guarding of, British suggestion,  
416, 440; U.S. attitude, 424.

Webster-Hicks investigation, discus-  
sion, 84, 96-97, 122-123, 131.

Propaganda, hostile (*see also* Publicity,  
U.S.):

Bolshevik, 66, 253, 456, 577, 738, 830,  
854.

German, 45, 66, 74, 182, 411, 474,  
578, 579, 593, 624, 805.

Protection of foreigners (*see also* Indus-  
trial interests, foreign), 71.

Finland, 781.

Provisional Government (*see also* Army;  
Constituent Assembly; World  
War):

Caucasus, relations, 579.

Chinese Eastern Railway, transfer of  
section to Japan, report, 161-162.

Finland, relations, 723-726, 726-728,  
759, 760, 765.

Ministry of Kerensky, fall, 580.

officials in European Russia, 468,  
517, 582, 610.

officials in Siberia: asylum, Irkutsk,  
22; Consular Corps, Vladivostok,  
relations, 17, 18-19; powers to  
Zemstvos, 13-14, 16, 18, 25-26;  
Semenov, relations, 65, 156.

Ukraine, relations, 648.

Provisional government (Ufa; Omsk).  
*See* All-Russian provisional govern-  
ment.

Provisional government of autonomous  
Siberia (Tomsk; Omsk). *See also*  
Derber; Vologodski.

Allied and American aid sought, 343,  
350, 379, 391, 405.

all-Russian provisional government,  
fusion with, 418, 423, 429, 430, 553.

appeal to President Wilson, 118.

army, 336, 343, 350.

arrest of Ministers, 392.

Bolsheviks, opposition, 210, 216.

cabinet, 120, 296, 392.

Consular Corps, Irkutsk and Vladi-  
vostok, relations, 332, 370.

Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 210, 241,  
254, 259, 295-296, 336, 367, 369,  
430.

election, validity of, 294-295.

finances, 384, 548.

formation, 28, 37, 88-89, 92, 93, 119-  
120, 216, 342-343, 414.

Harbin, activities, 119, 294.

Horvat, relations, 93, 113, 119-120,  
273, 280, 294; in Vladivostok, 315,  
332, 391, 414.

intervention, attitude, 217, 293, 315.

Provisional government, etc.—Contd.

- Omsk, activities, 216, 343, 354, 414.
- policies, 101-102, 119-120, 278, 293-296, 335, 336, 547-548.
- popular attitude, 230, 294, 332, 336, 343, 380.
- prisoners of war, relations, 295, 297, 391, 415.
- recognition, discussion, 380-381, 390; U.S. attitude, 323-324, 335, 405.
- Soviet Russia, relations, 203-204, 213, 249.
- Supreme government of the northern region, relations, 516, 543, 547.
- Tomsk, activities, 28, 37, 88-89, 118, 119-120, 216.
- U.S. aid sought, 101-102, 157-158, 350, 384; loan, rumor, 453, 460; military plans, 141, 296-297; railway, 315.
- Vladivostok, activities, 261, 280, 282, 293, 294, 315, 332, 336, 354, 391.
- World War, attitude, 102, 295-297, 379, 390-391, 547.

Provisional government of the northern region. *See* Supreme government.

- Publicity, U.S., 66, 448.
- recommendations, 53, 122, 318; Russian, 175.

- Railway employees, 71, 89, 90, 164, 611.
- Bolshevism, attitude, 39, 66, 80, 94, 264.

- Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 264.
- strikes, 168-169.

Railways (*see also* Advisory Commission of Railway Experts; Chinese Eastern Railway; Trans-Siberian Railway):

- control, U.S.: Czecho-Slovaks, attitude, 315; Japanese attitude, 113, 163, 170; Russian factions, attitude, 74, 99, 113, 156, 157, 161, 168, 170, 315, 450, 588; U.S. representatives, views, 54, 91, 104, 165, 415, 448.
- defects, 26, 164, 469, 625, 659, 694.
- rolling stock, U.S., 367.
- Stevens in charge for Russia, plan, 434; British attitude, 457; Japanese attitude, 436, 466.

Ramishville, I. I., 632, 636.

Recognition (*see also* Relations, informal):

- Baltic provinces: Germany, attitude, 821, 826; Great Britain, attitude, 820, 829, 841-842; U.S. attitude, 821, 849, 851-852, 856-857.
- Bessarabia, U.S. attitude, 715.
- Caucasus, *de facto* governments: Allied attitude, 584; U.S. attitude, 583, 584.
- Czecho-Slovak National Council, U.S. attitude, 183*n*, 700.
- Finland: attitude of Denmark, 741; France, 741, 742, 791; Germany, 769; Great Britain, 737, 739, 743,

Recognition—Continued.

Finland—Continued.

- 745, 781-782, 784-785, 786; Norway, 740-741, 741-742, 753; Soviet Russia, 735, 740, 762, 764; Sweden, 735, 738, 739, 740; United States, 736, 740, 742, 743, 749, 756, 782, 788, 791, 796, 806, 814; U.S. Consul at Helsingfors, views, 743-744, 748, 786.

- Jugo-Slavs, U.S. attitude, 183*n*.
- separate Russian governments, 589, 741; U.S. attitude, 743.

- Siberian governments: British and French attitude, 412-413, 426-427; U.S. attitude, 298, 323-324, 335, 414-415, 416, 417, 420, 421, 425, 455-456.

- Soviet régime: all governments withhold, 590, 601; British attitude, 136, 148-149; Masaryk, views, 122; U.S. attitude, 9, 96, 218, 590, 796.

- Ukraine: French attitude, 650, 655, 656, 657, 659, 743; U.S. attitude, 655, 743.

- Zemstvo Committee: British attitude, 18-19; U.S. attitude, 17, 19.

Red Army:

- activities, 201, 475.
- Allied and American aid sought, 111.
- Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 194, 257.
- German attitude, 259-260, 369-370, 380, 398, 422, 605.
- numbers, 192-193, 291, 369, 381, 467, 704.
- organization, 96, 115, 122, 123-124, 131, 179, 194, 204.
- prisoners, armed, relations, 94, 197-198, 205, 342.
- purpose, 123-124, 128-129, 182.
- workmen, relations, 94, 202.

Red Cross. *See* American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Red Guard:

- activities, 16, 39, 80, 235.
- Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 248-252, 309.
- prisoners, armed, relations, 91, 93, 124, 185, 195, 210, 217, 227, 309, 310.
- Regnault, Eugène L. G., 128, 426, 441, 448.

Relations, informal, United States with Soviet régime:

- Consul at Moscow as channel, 183.
- military attaché as channel, 73-74, 114.
- Robins, Raymond, as channel, 106, 125, 130-131, 139, 709.
- Wardwell, Allen, as channel, 789.
- Relations, informal, United States with Zemstvo Committee, 17, 19.
- Reuter, Julio, 739, 742, 747, 755, 756.
- Robins, Raymond, 469.
- contacts with Soviet régime and U.S. Embassy, 106, 125, 130-131, 139, 709.

- Robins, Raymond—Continued.  
 recognition of Soviet régime, views,  
 123, 131.
- Rodzyanko, M. V., 587, 589, 603.
- Rumania:  
 arrest of officials, 711, 714; attitude  
 of Allied representatives, 714.  
 Berthelot, General, views, 173-174.  
 Bessarabia, Rumanian Army in, 707-  
 708, 710, 713, 716; support, 599, 608.  
 Bessarabia, union with, 130, 718, 719,  
 720; Germany, attitude, 720;  
 Soviet Russia, protest, 721, 722;  
 Ukraine, protest, 130, 720-721;  
 U.S. attitude, 720*n*.  
 Central powers: armistice, 710, 713;  
 treaty, 713-714, 721.  
 gold deposit at Moscow, seizure, 599,  
 709, 711; French attitude, 712;  
 U.S. attitude, 713.  
 interests protected by France, 597-  
 598, 600, 615; by Great Britain,  
 598, 600, 628.  
 intervention in Russia, attitude, 709.  
 Minister in Russia, expulsion, 708-  
 709, 711, 748.  
 Russian-Rumanian commissions, 717.  
 Soviet Russia: state of war, 708, 709,  
 711, 712; treaty, 716-717, 718;  
 U.S. attitude toward state of  
 war, 712.  
 Supreme War Council, 596-597.  
 Ukraine, relations, 652, 664, 709.
- Russian Embassy in Washington:  
 intervention, attitude, 62-63, 192-  
 193, 396-397.  
 military supplies, Siberian govern-  
 ment, 384.
- Russian organizations, appeal to Presi-  
 dent Wilson for intervention, 272,  
 281-282.
- Russian Railway Service Corps (*see*  
*also* Advisory Commission of Rail-  
 way Experts; Emerson):  
 activities, 96, 165, 323, 355, 434.  
 forced inactivity, 6-7, 11, 26-27, 56,  
 116, 435, 437.  
 interpreters, 26.  
 political groups, attitude, 156, 315.  
 Soviet régime, conference planned,  
 96, 165; Japanese attitude, 163;  
 Russian criticism, 168, 170.
- Russians:  
 characteristics, 168, 453, 478-479,  
 639.  
 foreigners, attitude toward, 441, 442;  
 Japan, 31, 117, 206, 352; United  
 States, 156, 159, 206, 238, 302,  
 380, 430, 502.
- Samara:  
 conflicts to gain, 365, 398, 409-410,  
 556.  
 government, 516, 534, 537, 539, 542,  
 543, 548.
- Savinkov, Boris V., 517-518, 610-611.
- Sazonov, S. D., 645, 647.
- Self-determination of peoples, attitude  
 of:  
 Allied Governments, 75, 816, 820,  
 841.  
 Baltic provinces, 818, 819, 832, 834,  
 835, 852.  
 Finland, 723.  
 Germany, 685.  
 Soviet Russia, 721, 722.  
 Ukraine, 698, 720-721.  
 United States, 743, 851-852, 856-857.
- Semenov, Gregory, 38-41, 327, 330,  
 463-464.  
 Allied aid, 39, 97; Soviet protest, 97.  
 army, 39, 150, 160, 161, 192, 196,  
 216, 460, 466.  
 Bolsheviks, armed conflict with, 66,  
 71, 95, 110, 155, 158-159, 160-161,  
 162, 169, 181, 189, 191, 202;  
 defeat, 327, 330.  
 British aid, 38, 40-41, 46, 48, 73,  
 151, 163, 169.  
 Chinese Eastern Railway board, re-  
 lations, 147, 156, 169.  
 Chinese recruiting, 169.  
 Chinese territory, invasion, 216, 231-  
 232, 344, 353; Soviet protest, 97,  
 172.  
 Czecho-Slovaks, detention of supplies  
 for, 419-420, 424.  
 French aid, 73, 169, 180.  
 Horvat, relations, 79, 147, 156, 159,  
 169, 177, 181-182, 189, 273.  
 Japanese aid, 65, 117, 138, 151, 180,  
 189, 191, 444, 448, 449, 454, 455,  
 456, 457-458, 460, 462; all-Rus-  
 sian provisional government, pro-  
 test, 448-449; compensation sought,  
 189; U. S. attitude, 462-463.  
 Kolchak: protest of, 461-462; rela-  
 tions, 147, 169, 189, 442, 443, 444,  
 448, 450, 454, 455, 464.  
 opinions concerning, 48, 54, 109, 133-  
 134, 141; Russian attitude, 65, 71,  
 95, 117, 156, 182, 377, 454.  
 railways: control, plan, 38-39, 48;  
 obstruction of, 419-420, 424, 461;  
 U. S. operation, attitude, 156, 161,  
 450.
- Serbia:  
 espionage, Soviet charge, 501.  
 forces in Russia, 374, 398, 488.
- Shcherbachev, Gen. D. G., 599, 651,  
 663, 664, 707, 713.
- Siberia (*see also* Horvat; Intervention;  
 Kolchak; Semenov; Trans-Siberian  
 Railway; Vladivostok):  
 American and Japanese joint inter-  
 vention, 267-268; Allied desire to  
 participate, 269-270; British atti-  
 tude, 456-457; Chinese desire to  
 participate, 298, 299-300, 303-304,  
 305; French attitude, 441; Italian  
 attitude, 449; Japanese declaration,  
 (*Aug. 2*) 302, 324-325, 330, 332,  
 (*Dec. 28*) 464-465; Manchurian

## Siberia—Continued.

## American and Japanese joint intervention—Continued.

press comment, 338-339; numbers, Japanese attitude, 268, 301-302, 306-307, 325-326, 330, 333, 337, 346, 348, 351, 357-358, 420; numbers, Japanese, in excess, 355-356, 420, 436; U. S. declaration (*Aug. 3*), 328-329; U. S. protest against excessive Japanese forces, 433-435; withdrawal, partial, of Japanese forces, 465.

Bolshevism, growth, 2-4, 8, 10-11, 14, 16, 18, 25, 26, 28, 65, 189, 414, 452; popular attitude, 312, 319-320.

China: desire to participate in intervention, 298, 299-300, 303-304, 305; forces in Siberian service, 330, 331, 349, 353; Japanese attitude, 301, 349, 353; U. S. attitude, 46, 58, 303-304, 305, 314, 321-322, 353.

commission, economic, in Siberia, U. S. plan, 290, 292, 329, 362, 373, 389, 417, 425, 437; Russian attitude, 350; U. S. representatives, views, 118, 387, 415.

commission, political, in Siberia, plans, 138, 159-160, 162, 233, 340-341; U. S. attitude, 157, 362. commissioners: British attitude, 339-340, 351-352; U. S. attitude, 360, 364.

conditions, views, 89-91, 102-104, 164-165, 387-390, 397-398, 429-431, 442, 444-445.

France, intervention: discussions at Tokyo, 56, 85, 162, 195; forces in Siberia, 326, 337, 357, 368, 388; inter-Allied civilian board, plan, 340-341, 365; Japanese activities in Siberia, attitude, 441; mission to United States, 180; Siberian action, plans, 20-21, 32, 85, 132-133, 232-233, 269-270.

governments organized: all-Russian provisional government (Ufa; Omsk), 381-382, 385, 397-398, 405-409, 418, 423, 429, 430; Horvat governments, (*Mar. 1918*) 93, 97-98, (*July 1918*) 273, 277-278; Kolchak dictatorship, 435, 437, 438-439; provisional government of autonomous Siberia (Tomsk; Omsk), 28, 37, 88-89, 92, 93, 101-102, 119-120, 278, 335-336, 342-343, 392; Siberian republic, report, 74, 79; U. S. attitude, 298, 307-308, 317, 323-324, 335, 414-415, 416, 417, 420, 421, 425, 455-456.

Great Britain, intervention: discussions at Tokyo, 72, 84-85, 101, 196; forces in Siberia, 326, 327, 337, 357, 368, 388; Japanese activities

## Siberia—Continued.

## Great Britain, intervention—Contd.

in Siberia, attitude, 456-457; military aid to Czecho-Slovaks, plans, 274-275, 341-342, 418; Siberian action, views, 84, 315-317; Soviet régime's approval, views, 136, 140, 160, 179; statement to Russian people, 305-306, 334.

Italy, intervention: forces in Far East, 134, 275-276, 388; Russian-Ambassador's plan, attitude, 170-172.

Japan, attitude toward Allied and American intervention: Allied and American plans, 60-61, 81-82, 84-88, 100, 112, 427; compensation desired, 98, 141, 189, 206; discussions at Tokyo, 84-88; forces, extent of control, 80-81, 423, 427, 432, 434; General Staff, 85, 162-163, 195, 281, 427, 428, 466; preparedness, 8, 17, 23, 24, 53, 56, 71-72; press, views, 86-88, 202; separate action, desire, 30, 32, 49, 51, 59, 208; special interest, 454; statements, 1, 8, 12, 60-61, 72, 81-82, 110, 126, 456.

Japanese and Chinese joint intervention, proposal, 55, 57-58; U. S. attitude, 55, 58.

Japanese separate intervention, desire for, 30, 32, 49, 51, 59, 208; Allied and American representatives, views, 126, 677; France, attitude, 13, 44, 58-60, 72-73, 75-77, 109-112, 128-129, 132-133; Great Britain, attitude, 1, 13, 20, 69, 78, 95, 457; House, Colonel, views reported, 223-224, 233; Italy, attitude, 68-69; Japanese representatives, views, 12, 13, 56, 69; Masaryk, views, 122; Russian Ambassadors, views, 59-60, 62-63; Russian popular views, 9, 23, 31, 36, 55-56, 57, 90-91, 108, 189, 193, 206, 217-218, 223; Soviet views, 73; U. S. representatives in Russia, views, 36, 74, 126, 222, 634; U. S. statements, 42, 45-46, (*Mar. 5*) 67-68, 80, 82, 100, 154.

loan from United States, report, 453, 460.

military training, discussion, 386, 399. supplies, 108, 137, 166, 167, 181, 203, 214, 243; available to Germany, 47, 56, 59, 61, 76, 102, 103, 122, 135, 166, 167-168.

United States, intervention: approval awaited, 51, 59, 108, 137, 196, 219, 276, 319, 322, 330, 382; British plan of military aid to Czecho-Slovaks, attitude, 344-345; forces in Siberia, 261, 263, 352, 388, 390, 392-393, 420, 448; French plans, attitude, 28-29,



## Siberia—Continued.

- United States, intervention—Contd.  
 80, 82, 154, 362; Japanese occupation of Manchuria, attitude, 297-298; Japanese separate action, attitude, 42, 45-46, 67-68, 82, 100, 154; Omsk as winter base, 388-390, 392-394, 410, 435, 437, 448; reports on Siberian situation by Ambassador in Japan, 366, 371, 410-411, 414-415, 525; statements, (*Mar. 5*) 67-68, 160, 262-263, (*July 17*) 287-290, (*Aug. 3*) 328-329, 372, 525, 536, (*Sept. 26*) 392-395, 433-435; western Siberia, 351, 442.
- Siberian and European forces, plans for contact, 39-40, 60, 73, 161, 360-361, 370, 381, 443, 516, 548, 597, 609, 646, 647.
- Siberian Army, 227, 336, 343, 350, 379-380, 432.  
 equipment, 427, 430, 431.  
 Kolchak, relations, 192, 441.  
 morale, 442, 443, 467.  
 Perm, capture, 458, 464, 467.
- Siberian Soviet, 114, 123, 125, 131.  
 army, 201, 357-358.  
 authority, 164, 184-185.  
 Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 182, 196-197, 266, 310, 365.  
 good offices of Allied and American representatives, 184-187, 191-192, 197, 204, 210, 212-213, 250-251.  
 prisoners, armed, relations, 95, 217, 240, 266, 268-269, 291-292, 310-311.
- Simbirsk, conflicts to gain, 374-375, 381, 383, 556.
- Skoropadski, Pavlo, 683, 692, 701, 704, 705, 706.
- Socialist-Revolutionist Party, 435, 440, 443, 455, 456, 459, 610.
- Sookine, John, 232-233, 453.
- South Russia (*see also* Caucasus; Volunteer Army):  
 Central powers, opposition to, 35, 36, 599, 602, 603, 608, 626.  
 financial aid, 598-599; Great Britain, 591-592, 594, 595, 620.  
 German activities, 83, 132, 198, 243, 473, 478, 480, 619, 625, 626, 633-634, 678.  
 military aid: Allied mission, 584; British mission, 592; French mission, 601, 634, 659.
- Southeastern federation (*see also* North Caucasus):  
 Bolshevism, 622.  
 disarming of returned troops, 605, 607.  
 food and fuel supply of Russia, control, 588.  
 formation, 580, 615-618, 619.  
 France, relations, 606.
- Southeastern federation—Contd.  
 Russian groups, relations, 588, 859, 602, 607, 609, 616, 691.  
 World War, attitude, 580, 588.
- Sovereign government. *See* Supreme government.
- Soviet. *See* Harbin Soviet; Omsk Soviet; Siberian Soviet; Soviet régime; Vladivostok Soviet.
- Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, Vladivostok, 16, 17.
- Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, Maritime Province, 18, 25-26.
- Soviet régime (*see also* Bolsheviks; Czecho-Slovaks; Diplomatic and consular service; Finland; Industrial interests; Intervention; Propaganda; Recognition; Red Army; Red Guard; Relations, informal; Terror; Treaty of Brest Litovsk; Ukraine):  
 Åland Islands, 754.  
 Allied and American aid sought, 111, 473.  
 bad faith, 214, 472, 488, 504, 515.  
 Bessarabia, protest against Rumanian annexation, 721-722.  
 Black Sea Fleet, protest against German seizure, 685.  
 Bulgaria, separate peace, report, 23-24.  
 Caucasus, relations, 580-581.  
 code messages, prohibition to Allied and American representatives, 179, 209, 250.  
 Diplomatic Missions in China, interference in Russian affairs, charges, 139, 142-143, 152.  
 duration, estimates of probable, 12, 33, 105, 122, 183, 242, 247, 593, 642.  
 espionage charged against foreigners, 145-146, 500-502.  
 France: aid to Czecho-Slovaks, protest, 203-204, 213; to Ukrainian army, protest, 652-653.  
 German Ambassador, 179, 318.  
 Germany, influenced by, 104, 115, 117, 129, 176, 236-237, 251, 253, 259, 260, 369-370, 380, 398, 422, 513, 539, 540, 626, 642-643.  
 Manchuria, rights in, attitude, 14.  
 mercenaries, use of, 473, 704, 851.  
 munitions, removal to interior, 96, 451, 468, 470, 472, 475, 477, 488, 504, 515, 550.  
 Murman: cooperation of Allied forces with local Soviet, attitude, 784; evacuation by Allied and American forces, German desire, 471, 472, 473-474.  
 naval activities in Pacific, report, 318.  
 North Caucasus, relations, 629-630.

- Soviet régime—Continued.  
 opposition, 176, 517; peasants, soldiers, and workmen, 103, 164, 221, 639; Soviets, local, 468, 472, 474, 475, 476, 489-490, 492-493, 506, 520, 559, 784.  
 prisoners of war in Siberia: arms, 211, 230; European service, 704; statements, 130, 131.  
 provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 203-204, 213, 249.  
 railway matters, U.S. aid accepted, 74; conference planned, 96, 97, 165.  
 recall demanded: Consuls at Vladivostok, 139, 142-143, 152, 153-154; French Ambassador, 146.  
 requisitions, protest against British, 499.  
 Rumania: expulsion of Minister, 703-709, 711, 748; Rumanian-Russian commissions, 717; treaty, 716-717, 718.  
 Semenov: Allied aid, protest, 97; Chinese harboring of, protest, 97, 172.  
 Supreme government of the northern region, attitude, 509, 516, 570-571.  
 territorial sovereignty, protest against violation by Allied forces, 491, 497, 498-499, 505, 510.  
 Trans-Caucasus, relations, 583, 585, 586, 625, 629, 630, 640.  
 Vladivostok, landing of Japanese and British troops, protests, 105-106, 107-108.  
 war, state of: with Associated Governments, discussion, 489, 510, 544, 548; with Rumania, 708, 709, 711, 712.  
 warships, Allied and American, asked to leave Russian ports, 236, 486-487, 489, 495.  
 world-wide revolution, policy, 123-124, 459-460, 506.  
 Soviets, local, 105, 437.  
 demands of Central Soviet, 851.  
 opposition to Central Soviet, 468, 472, 474, 475, 476, 489-490, 492-493, 506, 520, 559, 784.  
 Spain, post-war efforts to prevent Bolshevism in Letgalia, 844-845; U.S. reply, 850.  
 Štefanik, Gen. Milan Ratislav, 451, 455, 458, 459.  
 Stepanov, N. A., 534, 537.  
 Stevens, John F., 6, 7, 11-12, 20, 96, 103, 104, 147, 165, 168, 434, 435, 437, 466.  
 Stewart, Col. George E., 519, 522, 532, 534, 536, 541.  
 Submarine warfare, German, 474, 488, 496.  
 Submarines, German, shipped to Pacific, report, 23, 71.  
 Supreme government of the northern region (*see also* Archangel; Murman):  
 Allied military forces, relations, 516, 518, 526, 527-528, 529, 532, 535, 548, 552; British attitude, 540, 542; U.S. attitude, 533-534, 540.  
 all-Russian provisional government, relations, 563, 565.  
 appeal to President Wilson, 541-542.  
*coup d'état*, 521-522, 525-526, 527-530, 548.  
 Diplomatic Missions, Allied and American: *coup d'état*, attitude, 522, 523, 524, 525, 531; reorganization, attitude, 534-535, 539, 542, 543, 548, 549-550, 550-551, 552-553, 563, 576.  
 forces: disaffection, 564-565, 575-576, 577; mobilization, 560, 561, 564, 576.  
 formation, 468, 507, 508-509.  
 governor general, 539, 541, 542, 543, 547.  
 industrial interests, relations, 526, 549, 552-553, 553-554.  
 intervention, attitude, 514-515.  
 loan, discussion, 519, 520-521.  
 Murman Soviet, relations, 520, 559.  
 policies, 508-509, 512-513, 518.  
 popular attitude, 522, 526.  
 provisional government, reorganization as, 547, 548-549, 550-551, 552-553, 554.  
 provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 516, 543, 547.  
 resignation of Ministers, 534-535, 536-537, 539, 541, 542, 543, 547.  
 Samara government, relations, 516, 534, 537, 539, 542, 543.  
 Soviet régime, relations, 509, 516, 570-571.  
 World War, attitude, 509, 518, 538, 540, 553, 560, 561, 564.  
 Supreme War Council, intervention in Russia and Siberia, attitude, 202, 241-246, 512, 514; in south Russia, 596-597.  
 Svinhufvud, Pehr E., 734, 758, 761, 783, 786, 788.  
 Sweden:  
 Åland Islands, 752-753, 754.  
 Bolshevism: in Baltic provinces, attitude, 838, 840-841, 843-844; propaganda, attitude, 854.  
 Finland: intervention, discussion, 746, 749; recognition, 735, 738, 739, 740; withdrawal of Bolshevik troops, attitude, 753.  
 Syrovoy, Maj. Gen. Jan, 384, 392.  
 Tabouis, General, 655, 656, 657, 659, 672, 743.  
 Tatars, of the Caucasus, 174, 623, 624, 625, 628, 635, 638.

- Taube, General von, 169, 181, 322, 337, 358.
- Taurida republic, 676, 685.
- Telegraph employees, 10, 164, 165.
- Temporary Siberian government. *See* Provisional government of autonomous Siberia.
- Tereschenko, Michael I., 560-561, 562.
- Terror, 89, 104, 422, 450, 517, 593, 601. policy, 555, 571, 639, 643.
- Thompson, Lt. Col. William B., 123.
- Tomsk, uprising, 424, 452.
- Torretta, Tomasi della, 523, 531.
- Trade-unions. *See* Labor.
- Trans-Caucasus (*see also* Caucasus; Gegechkori; North Caucasus): Allied military missions, 584, 607. Bolshevism, 589, 619, 640. disarming of returned troops, 592, 607. dissolution, 631, 639, 641. finances, 624, 625; efforts of Consul at Tiflis, 585, 589-590, 592, 595. Germany, relations, 629, 632, 633. history, 634-637, 640-642. independence, 582-583, 586, 632. recognition: Allied attitude, 584; U.S. attitude, 583. Southeastern federation, efforts at union, 588, 589, 607. Soviet régime, relations, 583, 585, 586, 625, 629, 630, 640. Turkey: demands, 631, 637, 640-641; opposition, 618-619, 620, 623-625, 626, 628, 630, 631-632, 633; peace negotiations, 625, 629, 635-636, 640-641.
- Trans-Siberian Railway (*see also* Chinese Eastern Railway; Railways), 593. Allied control, plans, 48, 63, 84, 587, 603, 605; French views, 172. conditions, 28, 66, 71, 108. Czech-Slovaks: control, 197, 198, 204, 223, 226, 241, 259, 262, 266, 314, 331, 545; Czech-Japanese guard, 388. French investors, 60. Japanese-Chinese joint occupation, plan, 57-58; U.S. attitude, 57-58. Japanese sole occupation proposed, 30, 49, 51; British plan, 35-36, 38, 41, 45, 48, 49-50; French attitude, 50-52, 76; Russian attitude, 74; U.S. attitude, 42, 45-46. Semenov: control, plan, 38-39, 48; obstruction, 419-420, 424, 461; U.S. operation, attitude, 156, 161, 450. U.S., Chinese, and Japanese joint occupation, plan, 54. U.S. control: Japanese criticism, 113, 163; Russian factions, attitude, 74, 165, 168, 170, 450; views, 91, 104, 584.
- Treaties, secret: Japanese statement, 10. publication, 654.
- Treaty of Brest Litovsk, Russia-Central powers: Estonia, attitude, 832. Finland, German attitude, 778. Lettish National Council, attitude, 833-835. Russian protests, 61, 272, 535, 547, 635, 640-641, 646. signature, 65. Ukrainian delegation, status, 657. U.S. Ambassador's statements against separate peace, German protest, 717. violations, German, 221-222, 236; Soviet protests, 146-147, 679; German reply, 685.
- Treaty of Brest Litovsk, Ukraine-Central powers, 665-671. Allied and American Ministers, Jassy, relations with Ukrainian delegation, 663-664. Central powers, gains by, 673, 674, 682, 696. negotiations, 663, 664, 672.
- Trepov, A. F., 858, 859.
- Trotsky, L. D. (Bronstein), 652, 654. Allied and American aid sought, 136. Czech-Slovaks, disbanding, views, 183, 187, 194, 200-201, 259. Germany, influenced by, 74.
- Tseretelli, I. G., 586.
- Turkey: Armenia: conflicts, 620, 624, 625, 632, 633, 635, 637; peace, 638, 641. Brest Litovsk treaty, gains by, 632. Caucasus, advance into, 623, 624, 625; evacuation, 644. Crimea, advance into, 625. Georgia, peace negotiations, 636-637, 641. North Caucasus, relations, 633. Soviet Russia, armistice negotiations, 585-586, 594. Trans-Caucasus: advance into, 618-619, 620, 623-625, 626, 628, 630, 631-632, 633; demands, 631, 637, 640-641; peace negotiations, 625, 629, 635-636, 640-641.
- Ufa conference. *See under* All-Russian provisional government.
- Ukraine (*see also* Treaty of Brest Litovsk): Allied and American Ministers, Jassy, aid sought, 660-661; reply, 661-663. Allied Ministers, Jassy, declaration to maintain order, 699-700, 701-703. army, 651, 652-653, 656, 658, 659, 660, 661; French aid protested by Soviet Russia, 652-653. arrest of Rada members, 681-682, 684.

## Ukraine—Continued.

- Austria-Hungary, relations, 658, 659, 660.
- Bessarabia, relations, 130, 652, 720–721.
- Bolshevism, 557, 593, 601, 660, 699, 705, 706, 710; appeals for protection against, 645, 646, 698–699; declaration of Allied Ministers, 699–700, 701–703; efforts to prevent, 703, 706, 838.
- boundaries: Germany, statement, 677; Soviet Russia, 691.
- Central powers: armistice, 651; relations, 673, 690, 719.
- Cossacks, relations, 654, 692.
- Crimea, relations, 692, 695–696.
- Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 255–256.
- Federal Russia, views, 651, 658, 661, 673, 689, 700, 702.
- finances, 656, 658, 660, 679.
- France: commissioner, 34, 655, 656, 657, 659, 672; relations, 597–598, 615, 656, 702, 706.
- Germany: activities, 473, 627, 643; armistice, Korenevo, 686; Bolshevism, attitude, 838; influence, 679, 687, 690–691, 694, 697; joint military action, 125, 131, 626, 677, 679; land decree, 680–681; military advance, 132, 236, 237, 478, 480, 625, 626, 697; requisitions, 626–627; supplies obtainable, 221, 673, 674, 677, 681, 694, 697.
- governments: Rada, 650–651, 654, 658, 672, 681–682, 684; Skoropadski, 682–683, 687, 688, 694, 701, 705–706; Petlyura, 705–706.
- Great Britain, commissioner, 672, 673.
- intervention, attitude, 658–659, 660, 703–704.
- land reform, 656, 659, 660, 680–681, 683, 692, 695; German decree, 680–681.
- peace: general, views, 651, 652, 659; separate, views, 649, 653, 660.
- recognition: France, attitude, 650, 655, 656, 657, 662, 743; U.S. attitude, 655, 743.
- republic proclaimed, 650–651, 672.
- Rumania: annexation of Bessarabia, protest, 130, 720–721; relations, 652, 664, 709.
- Southeastern federation, relations, 602, 691.
- Soviet Russia: armistices, 686, 693; boundaries, 691; military advance into, 686; peace negotiations, 685, 686, 687, 689, 691–692; war threat, 654.
- treaties of Imperial régime, attitude, 660; reply of Allied and American Ministers, Jassy, 662.
- Volunteer Army, relations, 609.

## Ukraine—Continued.

- World War, attitude, 33, 598, 649, 651, 652, 658.
- Ukrainian National Council, appeal to President Wilson, 697–698.
- Ukrainian National League, 703.
- United States (*see also* Advisory Commission of Railway Experts; Allied and American Governments; Archangel; Chinese Eastern Railway; Diplomatic Missions; Intervention; Murman; Publicity; Railways; Recognition; Relations, informal; Siberia; Trans-Siberian Railway; Wilson, Woodrow; World War):
  - Ambassador in Japan, reports on Siberian situation, 366, 371, 410–411, 414–415, 525.
  - Ambassador in Russia: appeal to Finns, 803–804, 804–805, 809–810; to Poles, 419, 432, 450–451; Brest Litovsk treaty, statement, 717; *coup d'état* at Archangel, attitude, 521–522, 523, 524; parting address to troops, 566.
  - citizens, protection, 604, 619, 622, 628.
  - code messages, Soviet prohibition, 179, 209, 250.
  - commission, economic, in Siberia, 290, 292, 329, 362, 373, 389, 417, 425, 437; provisional government of autonomous Siberia, attitude, 350; representatives, views, 118, 387, 415.
  - commission, political, in Siberia, plans, 138, 159–160, 162, 233, 340–341; attitude, 157, 362.
  - commissioner in Siberia, attitude, 360, 364.
  - Consul at Vladivostok, demand for recall, 139, 142–143, 152, 153–154.
  - estrangement from Japan sought by Soviet, 105, 166.
  - foreign military activities on Chinese soil, attitude, 152–153, 188.
  - good offices of Allied and American representatives between Czech and Soviet forces, 184–187, 191–192, 197, 204, 210, 212–213, 250–251.
  - industrial interests, forced contributions, 70–71.
  - interference in Russian affairs, charge against Consul at Vladivostok and Minister in China, 139, 142–143, 152, 153–154.
  - interference in Russian affairs by Japanese, attitude, 297–298, 462–463.
  - local governments, attitude, 361, 414, 416, 417, 426, 542–543.
  - Manchuria, Japanese forces in, attitude, 58, 297, 304, 305, 314, 353.
  - martial law in Vladivostok, attitude, 361.

## United States—Continued.

- military aid to Soviet régime requested, 111, 473.
- Murman Soviet, approval of agreement, 556-557, 558.
- naval forces in north Russia, instructions, 488, 566.
- noninterference in Russian affairs, 152, 153-154, 157-158, 166, 210, 263, 267, 289-290, 329, 339, 361, 362, 463, 515; in the Caucasus, 582, 583.
- prisoners of war in Siberia, British plan to guard, 416, 440; attitude, 424.
- questionnaires to consuls, 45, 64, 66, 83, 118-119, 367-368.
- Rumanian gold deposit at Moscow, attitude toward seizure, 713.
- Russian people, attitude toward, 339, 417, 817, 852.
- safe passage for Czecho-Slovaks through Manchuria, attitude, 283-284.
- Siberian governments: attitude toward, 298, 307-308, 317, 323-324, 335, 414-415, 416, 417, 420, 421, 425, 455-456; military aid discussed, 62-63, 141, 295-297, 396-397, 422-423.
- territorial sovereignty of China, attitude, 5, 15.
- troops on Chinese soil, permission sought, 391-392, 396.
- war, state of, with Soviet Russia, discussion, 489, 510, 544; attitude, 548.
- warships: at Murman, 475, 477, 485; at Vladivostok, 6, 30, 46-47; Soviet request to leave Russian ports, 236, 486-487, 489, 502-504; response, 495.
- warships, Japanese, at Vladivostok, attitude, 31.
- Zemstvo Committee, relations, 17, 19.
- Ustrugov, L. A., 93, 138, 140, 157, 161, 273, 455.
- Visas (*see also* Passports), 562, 831, 837.
- Vladivostok (*see also* Intervention; Siberia):
  - Allied and American Consuls: code messages prohibited, 179, 209; criticism by Soviet, 71, 74; Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 226, 265; Horvat, views concerning, 277, 307-308, 332; Soviet charges against, 139, 142-143, 152, 153-154.
  - Allied and American forces: commanders, proclamation, 270-271; numbers, 352, 388.
  - Czecho-Slovaks, seizure of city, 234, 235, 261, 262, 271, 327, 354.
  - elections, 320, 321, 327, 467.
  - harbor patrol, Allied, 284.

## Vladivostok—Continued.

- Horvat government, 277-278, 282, 315, 321, 332, 354-355.
- Japanese and British forces, landing, *April 1918*, 99, 100-101, 104-105, 105-106, 109, 114, 115; British attitude, 108, 109; Soviet protests, 105-106, 107-108; U.S. aid sought, 108; U.S. Ambassadors' statements, 106-108, 115, 116-117, 121, 151, 178.
- Japanese forces, landing, *December 1917*, report, 6, 7-8, 9, 10.
- lawless conditions, 6, 37-38, 50, 99, 148.
- martial law, British proposal, 349-350, 350-351; U.S. attitude, 350-351, 361.
- munitions, 84, 219, 234, 275.
- policing, inter-Allied, 270-271, 354, 355; U.S. attitude, 361.
- provisional government of autonomous Siberia, 261, 280, 282, 293, 294, 315, 332, 336, 354, 391.
- U.S. forces, landing, 261, 263, 352.
- Zemstvo, city, 105, 271, 327, 332.
- Zemstvo Committee, district, 14, 16, 17, 18, 25-26, 148, 261; Great Britain, unofficial recognition, 18-19; provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 363; U.S. attitude, 17, 19.
- Vladivostok Soviet, 6, 10, 13-14, 70, 72, 152, 320, 321.
- Consular Corps, relations, 209.
- Czecho-Slovaks, relations, 234, 235, 261.
- Zemstvo, relations, 16, 18, 25-26, 148.
- Volga-Ural region:
  - Allied and American aid desired, 317-318, 379, 398, 411; Allied attitude, 410, 466-467; U.S. attitude, 393-394.
  - Japanese aid, Allied request, 418.
  - military conditions, 317-318, 379-380, 381, 383-384, 388, 398, 415.
  - Perm, capture, 458, 464, 467.
- Vologodski, Peter V., 120, 343, 397, 405, 409, 418, 421, 423, 429, 455, 553.
- Volunteer Army, 593, 602, 603, 604, 638, 643.
- Allied aid sought, 646.
- Consul at Moscow, views, 609, 615.
- financial aid sought, 591, 603; French grant, 609-610; U.S. attitude, 606.
- formation, 587, 588, 591, 612, 650, 653, 704.
- governmental commission, 644, 645-647.
- officers, 611, 612, 644, 645.
- peace conference, desire for representation, 646-647.
- policies and plans, 610, 611, 613-614, 644, 646-647.

## Volunteer Army—Continued.

- Siberian forces, relations, 443, 448, 647.
- Southeastern federation, relations, 609, 616.
- Ukrainian and other forces, relations, 587, 609, 701.
- War, state of, between Associated Governments and Soviet Russia, discussion, 489, 510, 544, 548.
- Wardwell, Maj. Allen, 469, 789.
- Warships:
  - Allied and American, asked to leave Russian ports, 236, 486-487, 489, 495, 502-504.
  - Russian, disposition, 488.
- Webster, Capt. William B., 84, 96-97, 122.
- White Guard, 70, 252, 309-310, 311.
- White Russia, German occupation, 830, 844.
- Wilson, Woodrow:
  - all-Russian provisional government, appeal, 422-423.
  - provisional government of autonomous Siberia, appeal, 118.
  - Russian bodies, appeal for intervention, 272, 281-282.
  - Supreme government of the northern region, appeal, 541-542.
  - Ukrainian National Council, appeal, 697-698.
- World War (*see also* Allied and American Governments; Central powers; Germany; Treaty of Brest Litovsk):
  - all-Russian provisional government, attitude, 407, 412, 422-423.
  - armistice: retention of troops in north Russia after, 567-568, 569-570, 570-573, 574; Russian attitude, 438, 448, 646-647.
  - Bulgaria, separate peace with Russia, report, 23-24.
  - Caucasus, attitude, 579, 580, 582, 585-586.
  - Cossacks, attitude, 605, 609-615, 638.
  - eastern front, German forces reduced, 112, 114, 135, 654.
  - Murman Soviet, attitude, 492.
  - peace conference, desire for representation: Estonian, 815, 817, 828, 829, 853, 860; Russian, 568, 571, 646-647.

## World War—Continued.

- Polish forces, attitude, 178, 626.
- prosecution of war, Russian: Allied and American efforts to induce, 96, 109, 135, 157, 170-171, 227, 239, 529, 537-538, 540, 550, 551, 553; discussion, 65, 73-74, 327, 363, 374, 384, 479, 482, 609-615, 645-646.
- provisional government of autonomous Siberia, attitude, 102, 295-297, 379, 390-391, 547.
- Samara, fall, 409-410.
- Southeastern federation, attitude, 580, 588.
- Supreme government of the northern region, attitude, 509, 518, 538, 540, 553, 560, 561, 564.
- training in Siberia, 386, 390; U.S. attitude, 399.
- Ukraine, attitude, 33, 598, 649, 651, 652, 658.
- withdrawal of German forces from occupied territories, 838, 839, 843, 844-845, 860-861; Bolshevik advance, 699, 844, 854-855, 857-859, 859-861; U.S. attitude, 850, 856.
- Wright, J. Butler, 84, 89-91, 102-104. Y.M.C.A., 459.
- Japanese forces, relations, 438.
- northern region, activities, 504, 517, 541, 550, 566, 572.
- Yudenich, Gen. N. N., 857-858, 859.
- Zemstvo Committee, Far Eastern district:
  - activities, 14, 16, 17, 18, 25-26, 148, 261.
- Great Britain, unofficial recognition, 18-19.
- provisional government of autonomous Siberia, relations, 363.
- United States, relations, 17, 19.
- Zemstvos (*see also* Municipal governments), 513.
- army, relations, 1-2.
- Livonia, 835.
- northern region, 468, 508, 509, 522, 526, 534, 535, 539, 549, 568.
- Siberia: activities, 101, 119, 120, 127, 203, 294, 336, 343; intervention, attitude, 78, 105; military forces, 327, 354, 377; Vladivostok, 105, 271, 327, 332.
- Ukraine, 688.
- Zhordanya, N. N., 639, 641.









